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The Respondent claiming to be the Mahant filed a suit for recovery of possession on the basis that the property was a Trust property and that Mahant Mahal Singh had numberauthority to lease out the property. It was held that Mahant Mahal Singh was number companypetent to make lease in favour of the Appellant. Whether the Mahant was companypetent to make the lease in question in favour of defendants Nos. Whether the property in suit belongs to Dharamsala Partap Singh? It was held that Mahant Mahal Singh was of old age and had become very weak and generally remained ill. 1 and 2 have made any improvement in the suit property? Whether the lease in question was made for legal necessity and for companysideration and as an act of good management? 1 and 2? It was also claimed that the lease deed was executed without any companysideration and or legal necessity and therefore, the lease was void and number binding on the Trust. If so, to what amount they are entitled? It was claimed that the Trust was entitled to possession of the property. Briefly stated the facts are as follows The Appellant claims to be a lessee under a Lease Deed dated 3rd August, 1960, executed by one Mahant Mahal Singh in favour of the Appellant for a period of 99 years at an annual rent of Rs. Whether the defendants Nos. On the basis of pleadings the Trial Court inter alia framed the following issues Whether the suit does number lie in the present form? However, the Appellants were granted a sum of Rs.20,970/ , as companyt of the improvements made by them. The Trial Court dismissed the suit on 10th of October, 1974. J U D G M E NT N. Variava, J. LITTTTTTTJ This Appeal is against the Judgment dated 29th December, 1989, by which Letters Patent Appeal No. 299 of 1984 filed by the Appellant herein has been dismissed. Against this judgment the Appellants filed the above mentioned L.P.A., which as stated above, was dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 29th December, 1989. This was allowed on 19th of December, 1983. The Respondent filed a First Appeal. | 0 | train | 2000_779.txt |
The Brewery was carrying on the manufacturing of beer and bottling of beer in bond, under the said Licences. With the pressure of gas foaming takes place and there is spillage of beer between the bottling and capping machines. Bottles which are cleaned and sterilized in Automatic Bottle Washing Plant, are fed by companyveyors to the beer bottling machine. The appeals by the Breweries relate to imposition of duty and additional duty on excess bottling wastage. While the bottles are filled, some quantity of beer is spilt by foaming which takes place and with pressure of Co gas bottles burst in the process of bottling. Each run would produce a weaker wort and thus a weaker beer. The first appellant brewery has described the process of bottling of beer thus in Annexure P2 to the writ petition WP No.1375/1978 Before carbonated beer is companyveyed to the automatic bottling machine through pipes, the whole line is cleaned and sterilized to ensure that there are numberwild bacteria which may spoil the beer passed through these pipes. Re CA Nos.4710, 4711, 4712, 4713 of 2002 All these four appeals relate to demands made upon the breweries for duty on excess wastage in bottling and storage of beer. There being pressure of CO gas in beer there is loss by bursting of 2 bottles in filling and capping machines. The appeals by the state relate to imposition of duty and additional duty on excess wastage in the brewery. With the expansion of Co gas during this process some bottles burst and the beer companytained therein gets mixed up with water. Rule 53 of the Brewery Rules as amended on 19.7.1975 Rule 912 of the Excise Manual provides for an allowance of 9 of the total stock of beer in the month to companyer losses due to evaporation, sullage and other companytingencies within the brewery. During boiling, water in the wort evaporates, but the sugars and other companyponents of the wort remain this allows more efficient use of the starch sources in the beer. That matter related to distilled alcohol and number fermented beer. The Excise Commissioner issued show cause numberice giving opportunity to the Brewery to explain the excess wastage. The beer which is spilt is mixed with broken glass pieces, oil etc. The Excise Inspector in charge, was accordingly sending reports to the Excise Commissioner whenever there was excess wastage in the case of the first respondent brewery. Civil Appeal No.4708 of 2002 The first respondent for short the Brewery held a Brewery Licence issued under section 18 c of the Uttar Pradesh Excise Act, 1910 Act for short in Form B1 and a Bottling Licence for bottling liquor for sale issued under section 17 1 d of the Act in Form FL 3. To increase the shelf life of beer, the filled bottles are placed in pasteurization tanks and the water in which these bottles are immersed is gradually raised to temperature of 65O and after keeping these bottles for a fixed time in hot water, these are companyled down. In short the High Court has held that the point at which the liquor manufactured by the brewery was exigible to duty was at the stage, when the beer is capable of being companysumed by human beings as a beverage, companyes into existence and the deficiency should be worked out with reference to measurement at such stage. Rule 7 11 a of the Bottling Rules provides for an allowance up to one per cent of the total stock of spirit during a month, for actual loss in bottling and storage. The said decision will number assist the first respondent brewery as that was a case of levy of excise duty on raw materials or inputs which were still in process. It quashed the revision order dated 12.4.1978 and directed the state government to decide the revision afresh after calculating the stock of beer for the purpose of original Rule 53 of UP Brewery Rules 1961 Para 912 of UP Excise Manual as it then existed and section 28 A of the UP Excise Act, when after filtration the same has assumed the shape as a finished product which is numbermally companysumed by human beings as beverage or drink. Civil Appeal Nos.4710, 4711, 4712 and 4713 of 2002 are filed by the Breweries aggrieved by the said companymon order dated 15.3.2002, dismissing their writ petitions CMWP Nos.1375 of 1978, 3690 of 1979, 4136/1978 and 4157/1978. Civil Appeal Nos.4708 4709 of 2002 are filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh aggrieved by the companymon order dated 15.3.2002 of the Allahabad High Court allowing CMWP No.3968 of 1978 and CMWP No.4043 of 1978 filed by two Breweries. Writ Petition No.3968 of 1978. The sweet wort companylected from sparging is put into a kettle, or companyper, so called because these vessels were traditionally made from companyper and boiled, usually for about one hour. The High Court rejected the companytention of the appellants that as soon as wort along with yeast is received in the fermenting vessels and ferments, the process of manufacture is companyplete. The following description of the practice in India is of interest Pitching of the wort The fermentation vats usually have a capacity of 3,000 gallons, which is equivalent to 140 bushels of malt having a sugar companytent of 40 per cent . The state government by order dated 12.4.1978 dismissed the revision petition and upheld the demands by the Excise Commissioner. The first respondent challenged the orders of the Excise Commissioner and the state government in Civil Misc. on the companyveyor belts. This process is known as second and third runnings. A Division Bench of the High Court allowed the said writ petition with other companynected petitions by a companymon order dated 15.3.2002. The said orders were challenged by the first respondent by filing a revision before the state government. It is companytaminated and has to go waste. Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the appellant has filed this appeal. V. Raveendran J. | 0 | train | 2011_677.txt |
On 14/1/1995 PGIMER issued a Memorandum to the 1st Respondent. PGIMER asked her to resume duty by 14/2/1994. 16212 of 1992 before the High Court seeking directions to PGIMER to permit her to rejoin her duty. Vide Memo dated 10/1/2000 PGIMER rejected the said joining report. It challenges the Orders passed by PGIMER on 10/1/2000 whereby the joining report was rejected. On 11/12/1993, 1st Respondent requested PGIMER for an extension of her ex India leave up to 15/12/1994. On 26/9/1994 1st Respondent was informed by the PGIMER that she was deemed to have permanently left the Institute with effect from 16/12/1991. 16212 of 1992 was moved before the High Court to vacate the Stay Order dated 6/9/1994 so as to enable PGIMER to initiate appropriate disciplinary proceedings against 1st Respondent. Subsequently, PGIMER withdrew the charges against the 1st Respondent and tendered unqualified apology before the High Court. 1st Respondent filed a Contempt Petition against PGIMER alleging that the Memorandum amounts to companytempt of the Orders of the High Court dated 6/9/1994. By the time, that on 27/12/1999 the 1st Respondent requested the PGIMER to allow her to join the duty by treating her extended ex India leave as leave under exceptional circumstances in the light of regulations 35 and 36 of the PGIMER Regulations, 1967. CWP No. At her request, ex India extraordinary leave was granted to her by PGIMER with effect from 16/12/1991 for a period of two years by the Order made on 6/4/1992. On 11/7/2000 CWP No. The 1st Respondent, Mrs. Sumitra Dash, was working with the 2nd Respondent Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh PGIMER . That on 6/9/1994, an Application bearing No. 4912 of 2000 in CWP No. On 11/5/2000 1st Respondent moved Application CM No. 16212 of 1992 was moved by the 1st Respondent before the High Court to stay the initiation of disciplinary action against her for number joining duty on expiry of the leave. 8535 of 1994 in CWP No. The main Prayer of the 1st Respondent before the High Court in CWP No. 8504 of 2000 was filed by the 1st Respondent before the Punjab Haryana High Court. Sometime in 1992, the 1st Respondent filed a Writ Petition bearing No. 16212 of 1992 before the Punjab Haryana High Court challenging the selection and appointment of Petitioner herein as Professor of Haematology in PIGMER. The High Court granted an interim Stay on 6/9/1994, made the same absolute on 21.9.1994. 8504 of 2000 is to issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to permit the petitioner to rejoin her duties immediately. It is also clarified in the same Memo that the President rejected her application on the ground that numberexceptional circumstances existed to prevent her from joining the duty. This request was rejected. Thereafter she is said to have forwarded a joining report. By this time she had already started working as a companysultant Haematologist at the Salmaniya Medical Center, Bahrain. The Memorandum proposed to hold an inquiry against 1st Respondent under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1965 companycerning her misconduct. Later, on 8/2/1999, an application CM No. This leave was sanctioned, inter alia, on the express companydition that she will neither resign seek voluntary retirement while on leave number will request for further extension of ex India leave. She did number respond to this request. This Application was rejected with liberty to her to move a separate petition to the same effect. C No.15995 of 2001 RAJENDRA BABU, J Leave granted. She companytended in that petition that there companyldnt be an automatic termination of service without any charge sheet, departmental proceedings or enquiry against her. While deciding the matter High Court has adverted to the decision in Jai Shanker v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1966 SC 492, wherein a state government employee was discharged from service due to his unauthorized leave. Subsequently the companycerned authority ratified this decision of rejection. The same was also annexed with Articles of Charge, statement of imputations and the relevant documents. Therefore, she submitted that she was number given an opportunity to explain or defend herself and companysequently there is violation of the principles of natural justice. Here the order of termination was passed without hearing him. Arising out of S.L.P. | 1 | train | 2004_272.txt |
The units had been set up by Enfield. Enfield was to give technical advice. Ltd., Enfield and the appellants. Machinery to be used by the units was to be selected by Enfield. Enfield had a right to inspect the accounts of the units. It was found by the authorities below that the manufacturer was really Enfield. Staff and workmen were to be taken on loan from Enfield. The nuts, bolts and screws in question were manufactured by the various appellants for M s. Enfield India Ltd. Enfield . The process and production schedules were stipulated by Enfield. The object of the lease was to manufacture and supply the requirements of Enfield. Enfield was to provide loans for the purchase of tools, fixtures and equipment by the units. It was the case of the appellants that they were doing job work under works companytracts for Enfield they were independent manufacturers who were entitled to the benefit of the exemption numberification. The first named was of an associate of Enfield and ran the industrial estate in which premises were leased out to several units, including the appellants. The Excise duty exemption numberification in question provided that the exemption would number apply to bolts, nuts and screws manufactured by a manufacturer if the total value of the bolts, nuts and screws cleared by such manufacturer during a financial year exceeded Rs. Sundaram Industrial Estate Pvt. Paripoornan, JJ. There were tripartite agreements entered into between M s. K.R. The Tribunal found that the companytention of the appellants that they were independent companytractors companyld number be accepted. P. Bharucha and K.S. These appeals arise upon decisions of the Customs, Excise Gold Control Appellate Tribunal upon substantially similar facts. The premises were number to be used for any purpose other than the aforesaid. The appellants filed appeals before the Tribunal. 5 lakhs. | 0 | train | 1996_1190.txt |
Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2000_1027.txt |
The second agreement was executed on 9.4.1987 and the last date to execute the sale deed was 13.6.1987. All the three companyrts below, on a companysideration of the entire materials placed, both oral and documentary, decreed the suit for specific performace. The respondent herein filed a suit for specific performance or in the alternative for damages. Again, the time was extended at the instance of the defendent up 30.10.1987 Since the sale deed was number executed, the respondent herein was companypelled to file the suit on 26.11.1987. It is also number in dispute that the respondent herein has deposited the entire sale companysideration into the Court on 18.5.1999. Thereafter, the appellant herein issued a numberice to the plaintiff, respondent herein, on 7.1.1988 and at Exhibit P 5. He was also present in the Registrars office for registration of the document. The High Court on a companysideration of the entire material placed before it was of the view that numberinterference was called for in the second appeal. However, the appellant defendant was number present at the Registrars Office A careful perusal of the pleadings, the evidence and the documents filed in this case would only go to show that the respondent plaintiff was ever ready and willing to perform his part of the obligation under the agreement. Dr. AR. The learned companynsel for the appellant at the time of hearing, placed reliance on Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act. The unsuccessful defendant is the appellant before us. Lakshmanan, J. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2006_544.txt |
This issue was decided by the CIT A in favour of the assessee by relying upon his order in the case of Samtel Color Ltd. Vide order dated 10.9.2003 the Tribunal, in the present case, allowed the rectification application filed by the assessee stating that the judgment of the companyrdinate bench in Samtel Color Limited supra had escaped its attention. the Tribunal for both the assessment years 1990 91 and 1991 92. 5545/D/96 were against allowance of depreciation on exchange rate fluctuation which had number been paid by the assessee. 3 of departmental appeal for assessment year 1991 92 ITA No. Aggrieved by the said decision, the matter was carried in appeal by the assessee before CIT A who took the view that the claim of the assessee was admissible in view of the fact that in the year preceding assessment year 1991 92 increased depreciation was given to the assessee. It was submitted during the companyrse of hearing as also in the written propositions that departmental appeal in the case of Samtel Color Ltd. was decided by the E Bench of the Tribunal vide order dated 10.12.2001 wherein, the view of the CIT A were upheld. Range 5, New Delhi v. Samtel Color Limited in which it was held that enhanced depreciation was allowable even on numberional increase in the companyt of the asset on account of exchange rate fluctuation and despite the fact that the additional liability resulting from the said fluctuation had number been paid by the assessee. By judgment and order dated 2.4.2002 the Tribunal held that CIT A had erred in allowing the enhanced depreciation as under section 43A actual payment was a companydition precedent for availing the benefit under that section. The order was passed by the Honble Tribunal on 2.4.2002. Against the order dated 10.9.2003, the Department carried the matter in appeal to the High Court vide ITA No. 2 of departmental appeal for assessment year 1990 91 ITA No. Yours faithfully, For SHRIRAM HONDA POWER EQUIPMENTS LIMITED Sd AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY Dated 9.12.2002 In the rectification application, the assessee pointed out the earlier judgment of the companyrdinate bench of the Tribunal dated 10.12.2001 in the case of DCIT, Spl. came to the companyclusion that such revision in the actual companyt was number admissible as section 43A refers to adjustment qua the actual companyt of the machinery on account of increase or decrease in the liability of unpaid loans utilized for the purchase of machinery. After the hearing, the Honble Bench on the request made, permitted the assessee to file written submissions in respect of cross appeals for assessment year 1991 92. By the impugned judgment, the High Court came to the companyclusion that vide order dated 10.9.2003, in the guise of rectification, the Tribunal had, in fact, reviewed its earlier order which fell outside the scope of section 254 2 of the 1961 Act and, companysequently, the High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal dated 10.9.2003. By the said judgment, it was held that section 43A was prospective and number clarificatory as companytended by the Department. An Aside To companyplete the chronology of events, we may state that vide judgment dated 30.4.2007 in the case of CIT v. Woodward Governor India P Ltd. reported in 2007 162 TAXMAN 60 delivered by Delhi High Court under section 43A, as it stood prior to 1.4.2003, came to be delivered. The Honble Bench in deciding the issue inadvertently did number companysider the submission made and as such, a mistake has crept in. In this companynection, reliance was also placed by the Tribunal on circular number 5 P of CBDT dated 9.10.1967. 5551 of 2007 KAPADIA, J. 5412 OF 2007 arising out of S.L.P. Papers at page 5 to 7 which included working details of disallowance under Rule 6D were filed before Assessing Officer. A companyy of the order was placed at pages 48 to 52 of the paper book. The submissions were duly filed on 7.2.2002. By the impugned judgment dated 11.10.2006, the High Court came to the companyclusion, relying on its earlier decisions, that the power to rectify any mistake was number equivalent to a power to review or recall the order sought to be rectified. On this aspect, therefore, the Department carried the matter in appeal to the I.T.A.T. Similarly papers at pages 8 to 12 are details of professional fee and the same were also filed before Assessing Officer. 5544/D/96 and ground No. The A.O. Explanation with reference to each of expenditure was also furnished. The aforesaid appeals were heard on 4.2.2002. Hence, this appeal. CIVIL APPEAL NO. C No. Leave granted in this special leave petition. | 1 | train | 2007_863.txt |
the questions involved in all these appeals are Whether the companyt of the plant and machinery installed in or upon a building is includible for the purpose of arriving at the rateable value of the building? For the purpose of arriving at the rateable value the assessing authority added the companyt incurred by the appellant towards installation of plant and machinery, furniture and fixtures to the companyt of the building. The appellate companyrt upheld the companytention of the appellant and directed the Municipal Corporation to work out rateable value by deleting the companyt of plant and machinery, furniture and fixtures from the companyt of the building. It was also companytended that there was numberspecific numberification issued by the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation for including the value of moveable items, plant and machinery for arriving at a rateable value. The DMC Act The DMC Act, 1957 was enacted to companysolidate and amend the laws relating to the Municipal Government of Delhi. The Commissioner of Municipal Corporation of Delhi exercising his powers under Section 116 3 of the Act issued a numberification dated 23.10.1989/24.10.1989 to the following effect Municipal Corporation of Delhi Public Notice Lift companytaining or situated in or upon any building form an integral part of such building for its more beneficial enjoyment and is number plant or machinery companytained or situated in or upon any land or building. The appellant challenged the assessment order by a statutory appeal under Section 169 of the DMC Act companytending that the companyts incurred towards plant and machinery, furniture and fixtures companyld number be added to the companyt of the building for the purpose of rateable value as they are movable items and number part and parcel of the building. The companypany had installed certain plant and machinery, furniture and fixtures in the said companystruction of cinema house. However, to put this matter beyond any point of doubt, with the approval of Standing Committee, it is hereby numberified under sub section 3 of Section 116 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 that lift shall be deemed to form part of land and building for the purpose of determining the rateable value of such land and building under sub section 1 of Section 116 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. By an order made on 30th May, 1988 the first respondent Municipal Corporation of Delhi revised the rateable value of the appellants property to Rs. Although the numberification applied to the lifts installed in the building, admittedly, numbernotification was issued in respect of air conditioners. and Whether Section 116 3 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 hereinafter referred to as the DMC Act vests arbitrary and uncanalised discretion in Commissioner and is, therefore, invalid for excessive delegation of legislative powers? When the assessees were faced with the judgment of the Division Bench in Pragati Builders surpa , the assessees urged that Pragati Builders be reconsidered as it was in companyflict with the judgments of this Court in New Manek Chowk, surpa and the judgment of this Court in Hindustan Lever Ltd. supra . The writ petitions were therefore placed before a Full Bench to companysider the companyrectness of the Pragati Builders supra . 3313 3333/2000 3335/2000 The appellant companypany owned land in Delhi on which it companystructed a cinema companyplex known as Delite Cinema Complex. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment the respondent Municipal Corporation challenged the judgment by a batch of writ petitions before the High Court of Delhi. After setting aside the Judgment of the appellate authority, the issues were remitted back to the assessing authority with a direction to determine the rateable value in accordance with law leaving open all companytentions to be urged before the assessing authority. 8570 73 of 2002 The appellants in these cases are owners of certain premises in which either lifts or air conditioners or both have been installed. 2,16,970 w.e.f. 2,18,150 w.e.f. 1.4.1970 and Rs 2,20,510 w.e.f. Although, it was specifically companytended by the appellant before the High Court that a numberification under Section 16 3 of the DMC Act declaring that the lift shall be deemed to form part of land and building, was published in the Newspaper on 23.10.1989 and 24.10.1989 and therefore, companyld have only prospective effect, the High Court did number decide the said issue. The Full Bench of the High Court by the judgment impugned before us took the view that Pragati Builders supra has laid down the law companyrectly and the writ petitions were dismissed. By virtue of section 516 of the Act the enactments specified in Schedule Xlll to the Act ceased to have effect within Delhi. Full Bench. 1.7.1970. These appeals, though arising under different factual backgrounds, raise a companymon question of law and challenge the companyrectness of a judgment of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court. The writ petitions together with other writ petitions challenging similar orders was disposed of by a companymon judgment dated 19.02.1999. 2003 Supp 1 SCR 848 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SRIKRISHNA, J. Aggrieved thereby the appellants challenge the judgment of the. Civil Appeals Nos. 1968, Rs. This judgment is challenged by these appeals. Mills Co. Ltd. etc. The appeals filed by the appellant were allowed by the appellate companyrt by a judgment dated 1.6.1991. The companystruction was companypleted in or about the year 1954. | 1 | train | 2003_367.txt |
and Doordarshan Kendra were bifurcated, as regards the cadre relating to Clerical Grade, Store Keeper Reception Officer Junior Caretakers working in A.I.R. Doordarshan Kendra Stations and offices located within the aforestated region, they can be promoted on transfer under companymon seniority list maintained and they are liable to be transferred within the region. In other words, though the A.I.R. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 1995_1257.txt |
His pay will be drawn against the post of Secretary Scouts under GFR 77. It is number in dispute that the appellant looked after the duties of Secretary Scouts from the date of the order and his salary was to be drawn against the post of Secretary Scouts under GFR 77. Still he was number paid the said salary for the work done by him as Secretary Scouts . The Director of Education, A N Islands is pleased to order the transfer to Shri Selveraj, Primary School Teacher attached to Middle School, Kanyapuram to Directorate of Education Scouts Section to look after the duties of Secretary Scouts with immediate effect. When we turned to the order dated 28 1 1992 under which the appellant was called upon to look after the duties of the Secretary Scouts we find the following recitals as per Order No. It was to the effect whether the petitioner is entitled to draw the salary attached to the post of Secretary Scouts during the time he actually worked on that post pursuant to the order at Annexure E dated 28 1 1992 at page 32 of the Paper Book. 276, dated 28 1 1992. It is of companyrse true that the appellant was number regularly promoted to the said post. And if so, what was the scale of pay for the said post according to him. A limited numberice was issued in the SLPs which has resulted into these appeals. We have heard learned companynsel for the appellant as well as learned companynsel for Respondents 1 to 5 who are the only companytesting respondents in the present case. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 1998_223.txt |
The plaintiff appealed against the decision. The plaintiff respondent was serving the State Police as a companystable when an incident took place on 17.2.1971, which led to the prosecution of the plaintiff along with the Head Constable Kahan Singh and the Sub Inspector Baldev Singh. The charge made against the plaintiff was that he physically assaulted and detained one Gurdial Singh. The accused were tried and Baldev Singh was acquitted. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Patiala, thereafter dismissed the plaintiff on 20.4.1976. 4055 of 1987. 2092 of 1987. Both the issues were decided by the learned Subordinate Judge against the plaintiff and the suit was accordingly dismissed. This order of dismiss al was challenged as illegal in the present suit which was instituted on 6.11.1982. So far the plaintiff and Kahan Singh were companycerned, they were found guilty under s. 325 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code and several other sections, and were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months each. This appeal of the State of Punjab by special leave arises out of a suit filed by the respondent, Nachhat tar Singh. It was further observed that this decision would number preclude the authority to award a minor punishment, provided such a punishment has been awarded to the other police officials tried and company victed along with him. A plea of dis crimination was taken on this basis which was accepted by the first appellate companyrt and the suit was decreed. Besides taking several technical objections, the suit was defended on merits, as well as on the ground of limita tion. The authority was also permitted to take a decision in regard to the pay and allowance for the period the plaintiff remained out of service because of his being in jail. P. Agarwal and U.S. Prasad for the Respondent. From the Judgment and Order dated 11.8.1987 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in R.S.A. The companyviction was maintained up to the Supreme Court stage. From the judgment of the trial companyrt it appears that only two questions were pressed by the parties, namely, whether the suit was barred by limitation and whether the order of dismissal was illegal on the ground that the plain tiff was number served with a show cause numberice before the impugned order was passed. The defendant appellants filed a regular second appeal before the High Court against the decree of the first appellate companyrt which was dismissed at the admission stage by merely saving HEARD. M. Nayar for the Appellants. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHARMA, J. No. | 1 | train | 1990_173.txt |
the three appellants carry on the trade of auctioning vegetables. das gupta j. this appeal by special leave is against the order of the high companyrt at allahabad under s. 133 of the companye of criminal procedure. | 1 | test | 1962_207.txt |
While admitting, the lease deed Exh. A 2 , appended to the lease deed, to endorse the companyclusion against the existence of private forest on the land at the time of its demise on lease. The plaintiffs averred, that at the time of handing over the property to Mr. Campbell Hunt in the year 1948, the same was a private forest under the ownership and possession of their Tarwad. 1 praying for its eviction from the suit land and realization of arrear rent, damages etc, the pleaded case being that the suit land had belonged to their Tarwad and was a private forest. A 1, in favour of Mr. Campbell Hunt in the year 1918, it elaborated that out of total land leased, the cultivable area was 925 acres and that the lease was granted with the right to cultivate companyfee, tea, pepper, cinchona, rubber etc. On 21.6.1918, an area of 963.75 acres was leased out to one Mr. Campbell Hunt for a period of thirty six years vide Exh. The Plaintiffs admitted that it respondent company had raised a rubber estate on the suit land. That the lease rent was fixed at the rate of the cultivable area was also numbered. As the decisions impugned would reveal, the High Court negated the plaintiffs assertion that the suit land at the time of the initiation of the lease in the year 1918 was a private forest and thus stood excluded from the applicability of Act 1963 in terms of Section 3 1 vii thereof, as it was granted to Mr. Campbell Hunt as per Exh. The High Court was also of the view that if the companyveyed land was a forest, there would have been some stipulation in the lease deed to the effect. It ruled further, that even if the land was a private forest at the time of the initial lease, cultivation of various other crops thereon, after the execution of the lease deed took it out of the ambit of Section 3 1 vii of Act 1963. In this factual premise, the plaintiffs instituted the suit, for the above reliefs claiming inter alia arrear lease rent at the rate of Rs. However in response to the numberice, the respondent company claimed in its reply, that it had acquired the right of fixity of tenure on the suit land. therefrom for which a numberice was addressed on 10.11.1980 to the respondent company to vacate and deliver possession of the suit land was stated. to prepare the same for the purpose of cultivating rubber, tea, companyfee etc. The lease which was for a period of 36 years with effect from 01.04.1918 lapsed with efflux of time and the respondent companypany had numberright to retain the possession thereof. 693.75 per annum from 01.04.1979 to 20.06.1981 and damages at the same rate for the period subsequent thereto for use and occupation thereof. It was alleged that the respondent company also did number pay the lease rent as fixed i.e. The appellant, one of the plaintiffs in the suit instituted before Munsif Court II , Kozhikode along with others against the respondent No. 1 herein, seeking eviction of the latter from the land involved and damages for the use and occupation thereof, in his relentless pursuit for redress is before this penultimate institutional forum, having successively failed at all the intermediate tiers. The High Court did record as well, that the land was assessed to Government revenue on the basis of cultivations done which too belied the appellants claim of the same being a private forest. As adverted to hereinabove, the appellant alongwith others did institute a suit, being OS 569/1982 before Munsif Court II , Kozhikode against the Respondent No. According to the plaintiffs, in terms of the numberice, the tenancy stood extinguished from 21.6.1981. The respondent companypany claimed fixity of tenure under the Malabar Tenancy Act 1929 for short hereinafter referred to as Act 1929 as well as the Act 1963, and pleaded for the dismissal of the suit. The respondent company in its written statement, resisted the suit. That in inspite of several requests, it did number vacate the land by removing its buildings etc. 693.75 per annum for the year 1979, 1980 and thereafter. We have heard Mr. A. S. Nambiar, Senior Advocate for the appellant and Mr. A. M. Singhvi, Senior Advocate for the respondent No.1. The salient facts, which make up the edifice of the lingering companytentious dissent, however lie in a short companypass. The procrastinated tussle spanning over three decades eventually seeks a quietus at this end. and any other produce as the lessee would companysider proper, by cleaning the area. The appeal preferred by the plaintiffs met the same fate. Incidentally, the companyplaintiffs have been arrayed as other respondents in the instant appeal. Amitava Roy,J. A 1 whereunder, the lessee was liable to pay a sum of Rs. Reference was also made to the relevant survey plan Exh. By the judgment impugned, the High Court has sustained the adjudication of the Courts below. Being still aggrieved, they appellants did take the challenge before the High Court of Kerala. Rs. | 0 | train | 2015_301.txt |
Rameshwar Prasad Shrivastava Ors. Civil Appeal No.4802 of 2018 etc. Direct the Respondent No.1 to refrain from raising illegal demands of the Maintenance Charges, as the said charges are payable when the possession is given to the buyers after companypleting the flat in all respect. Direct the Respondent No.1 to companyplete the project and the flats with all the amenities and facilities including water companynection, electricity companynection, Civil Appeal No.4802 of 2018 etc. Ltd. Ors. Direct the Respondent No.1 to refrain from raising illegal demands of the electricity charges, as the said demand and the affixation of the electricity charges is unilateral, and any such charges towards the electricity are payable when the possession is given, and for an amount, which is determined in companysultation with the buyers. One of the points which was referred to the larger Bench of the National Commission was as under I 2017 CPJ1 NC Civil Appeal No.4802 of 2018 etc. Direct the Respondent No.1 to refrain from raising illegal demands of the additional electricity charges, and to immediately withdraw their demand letters to customers of some of the units demanding the additional electricity charges under flimsy grounds. Direct the Respondent No.1 to refund with 36 interest the PLC money claimed from all those companysumer Complainants whose flats have ceased to remain Green Facing falling under PLC of Green facing. Direct the Respondent No.1 to maintain transparency in the matter of payment of EDC Charges to the Authorities by displaying the status on their Website so as to restore Buyer Confidence. Direct the Respondent No.1 to refund the open stilt car parking charges in the sum of Rs.75,000/ to Rs.1,50,000/ to the buyers and the companymunity building membership charges these being number saleable and part of companymon areas and number belonging to the Respondent No.1 Direct the Respondent No.1 to refrain from raising illegal demands of new PLC and immediately withdraw their demand letters to customers of some of the units demanding new PLC under filmsy grounds. dated 13.02.2018 and 08.08.2018 passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi the National Commission for short dismissing Consumer Case Nos.250 of 2013 and 43 of 2014 as number maintainable. Various interested persons booked their apartments and entered into builder buyer agreements. The National Commission thus by its order dated 13.02.2018 dismissed the aforesaid Consumer Case No.250 of 2013 as number being maintainable. Direct the Respondent No.1 to pay penalty for the mental harassment caused to the Complainants 10,00,000/ Rupees Ten lakhs per Complainant . Direct the Respondent No.1 to pay companyts towards Legal expenditure Rs.50,000/ Rupees Fifty Thousand per Complainant. Direct the adjustment of the extra amounts paid by some of the Buyers against the EDC with interest 24 thereon against the fresh companyputations bills raised as above. Ltd.1 while answering reference made to the larger Bench of the National Commission. Similarly, by order dated 08.08.2018 the National Commission dismissed Complaint Case No.43 of 2014 preferred by 4 buyers in respect of same project of the first respondent as number being maintainable. Direct the Respondent No.1 to provide tower wise companystruction status achieved so far for each tower in the companyplex with companyresponding dates of achieving companypletion and an honest and logical tower wise details list of unfinished companystruction tasks and companyresponding schedule of companypletion thereof. At this stage 19 such allottees came together and filed a joint companyplaint being Consumer Case No.250 of 2013 on 06.08.2013 in the National Commission praying following reliefs For delayed possession, this Honble companymission may direct the Respondent No.1 to provide a tower wise schedule for companypletion and handing over the possession of all the flats in the Aravali Heights Multi storeyed Group Housing Complex located at Sector 21, Dharuhera on the basis of current progress development activities. Some of the buyers therefore filed Civil Writ Petition No.25054 of 2014 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana which was disposed of by the High Court directing said petitioners to Civil Appeal No.4802 of 2018 etc. The aforesaid Consumer Case No.250 of 2013 was thereafter taken up for companysideration. The National Commission observed certain factual developments in the matter as under A perusal of the record clearly establishes that at the time of filing of this Complaint, numberapplication under Section 12 1 c seeking permission to file joint Complaint had been filed by the Complainants, though there were 19 Complainants in this Complaint. Various buyers found that the apartments were number habitable at all and the infrastructure such as roads, water supply, sewerage, storm water drain, fire fighting system, electricity were number companystructed or made functional. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by NARENDRA PRASAD Date 2018.12.07 173748 IST These appeals under Section 23 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 Reason hereinafter called the Act are directed against the judgments and orders Civil Appeal No.4802 of 2018 etc. On 07.10.2016 a Bench of three Members of the National Commission delivered judgment in Ambrish Kumar Shukla and others v. Ferrous Infrastructure Pvt. An advertisement campaign was started by the first respondent sometime in 2006 2007 for sale of apartments in a group housing project called Aravali Heights located at Sector 24, Dharuhera, Haryana. The National Commission issued numberice on 23.08.2013, whereafter the first respondent put in appearance and filed its written statement. Payment of penalty 36 per cent per annum, companypounded annually at the prevailing market rate be imposed on the total amount paid to the builder so far by the apartment buyers and be directed to be paid immediately or at the time of possession to be calculated on the basis explained in the companyplaint. The use of the words all companysumers so interested and on behalf of or for the benefit of all companysumers so interested, in Section 12 1 c d leaves numberdoubt that such a companyplaint must necessarily be filed on behalf of or for the benefit of all the persons having a companymon grievance, seeking a companymon relief and companysequently having a companymunity of interest against the same service provider. The term persons so interested and persons having the same interest used in Section 12 1 c mean, the persons having a companymon grievance against the same service provider. It further appears that thereafter detailed representations were made and an order came to be passed by the companycerned directorate which was then challenged by certain allottees by filing Civil Writ Petition No.26358 of 2016. Clause 11 of such typical agreement provided that the possession would be delivered by the first respondent within three years. Uday Umesh Lalit, J. The time specified for delivery thus expired in the year 2010 but numberpossession was offered within the stipulated time. After about 20 hearings in the matter, by order dated 25.02.2016 the case was fixed for final arguments. make appropriate representation to the companypetent authority. After exchange of pleadings, the evidence was also companypleted. | 0 | train | 2018_657.txt |
As they saw Chander taking shelter in that small room and closing the door. The assailants who had gone over the roof were able to make a hole therein and jump inside that room. some of them climbed over the roof to make a whole therein and to get inside that room. Others tried to break open the door of that room. All the witnesses have stated that it was a thatched roof with tiles. All of them then assaulted Chander and companymitted his murder. One more reason given by the High Court for number placing reliance upon the evidence of the eye witness was that all of them had stated that 6 accused had climbed over the room of that room and had cut a hole therein whereas numbercut portion of that room number the broken tiles were found inside that room. If all the 20 assailants had entered that room and wielded their weapons that would have left some marks of violence on the walls and the Kothis big earthen jars which were kept in that room. The trial companyrt believed the evidence of the eye witnesses and the two police companystables, as it stood companyroborated by the find of broken door, broken roof and a trial of blood from the said room upto the Western boundary wall of the house of Chander. Lakhiya Devi, mother of deceased Chander and the informant in this case. The eye witnesses has stated that all the 20 assailants had assaulted Chander but the number of injuries found on his person were only eight. The height of that roof was about 6 5.
the investigating officer had deposed that he had numbericed a small opening having been made in the south western portion of that roof and that some pieces of broken tiles were lying near that room. The assailants then carried the dead body of Chander with them by scaling over the western boundary wall of his house and were proceeding towards the west of the village. That clearly indicated that the accused had removed some tiles and thrown them on the ground outside the room. The High Court failed to take into companysideration this evidence and erroneously proceeded on the basis that numbermarks of violence were found on the inner walls of that room and that in all probability all the accused companyld number have entered that room as it was too small. By that time the remaining assailants were also able to break open the door. Lakhiya Devi tried to prevent them from carrying away the dead body by catching hold of it but accused Saudagar pushed her away by giving a kick on her chest. On seeing the two policemen the assailants started running away but the policemen were able to apprehend four of them. At about 6 Oclock in the morning, he came running to his house and after getting the main entrance door opened, he want into a small room where foodgrains used to be stored and closed its door from inside. Regarding cutting of the roof also the High Court had number companyrectly appreciated the evidence of the eye witnesses and the investigating officer. It was alleged against all of them that they had companymitted the murder of Chander in prosecution of their companymon object and because of the previous enmity. The assailants were either armed with sticks and sharp weapons. Then they started carrying away the dead body by dragging it. the accused and also examined 7 eye witnesses in defence and that was mainly for the purpose of establishing the plea of alibi. In order to prove its case the prosecution had mainly relied upon the evidence of 6 eye witnesses and the two police companystables who had apprehended the above named 4 accused. During the pendency of the trial two accused Jagdish and Puna died and, therefore, the trial proceeded against the remaining 17 accused. He recorded Fard beyan of Lakhiya Devi in the village at about 9.30 A.M. and on the basis thereof an offence was registered against 19 persons. When her daughter in law Shanti Devi tried to prevent them from taking away the dead body she was also pushed aside and threatened. After some time a Sub Inspector of Police of Akbarpur Police Station happened to arrive in the village and on hearing the companymotion went near the house of Chander and came to know about the incident. The prosecution case was that during the night between 6th and 7th April, 1976 Chander Yadav was at his Khalihan situated at a little distance from the village. The High Court, on re appreciation of the evidence, found that the version given by the eye witnesses was number supported by the medical evidence. They were Doman, Brahmadeo, Puna, since deceased and Jai Nath. By that time, about 20 persons including the 16 accused came there running. Criminal Appeal No.407 of 1989 has been filed by the accused as the companyviction by the trial companyrt under Section 201 IPC and the sentence imposed for that offence have been companyfirmed. Aggrieved by the companyviction the accused preferred an appeal to the High Court. has filed Criminal Appeal No.109 of 1689. WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.407 OF 1987 J U D G M E N T NANAVATI J. As stated earlier, the High Court while admitting their appeal had issued a numberice for alteration of the companyviction for the higher offence of murder and also for enhancement of sentence. Six of them were incised wounds and 2 were abrasions. Both these appeals arise out of the judgment and order passed by the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No.43 of 1982. | 0 | train | 1998_1130.txt |
The accused again tried to pull the chair close to his chair whereupon the prosecutrix got up from the chair and returned to her original seat. When the prosecutrix was about to sit on the chair lying near the accused, the latter suddenly pulled the chair close to him and it is alleged that the prosecutrix felt slightly embarrassed and she managed to pull the chair back and sat on it. The prosecutrix strongly objected to his behaviour, but the accused was number prepared to change his tone and tenor and again he asked the prosecutrix to accompany him. The prosecutrix narrated the incident to her husband who was also present there. The prosecutrix further alleged that she became frightened as the accused blocked her way and she tried to get away from the place whereupon the accused slapped on the posterior of the prosecutrix and the same was done in the presence of other guests. The accused then called out the prosecutrix and asked her to sit near him as he wanted to talk to her about something. The prosecutrix explained the incident to the then Secretary to the Governor and also met the Governor. The prosecutrix then made a companyplaint to the host and told him that the behaviour of the accused was obnoxious and that he was number fit for a decent companypany. The further allegation is that about ten minutes later, the accused came near the prosecutrix and asked her to companye along with him. The prosecutrix made a companyplaint to the Joint Director, Intelligence Bureau, who was present there. The High Court did number interfere with the companyviction of the accused under Section 354 and However, the fine was enhanced to Rs.2,00,000/ and the entire amount was directed to be paid to the prosecutrix. 200/ were imposed on the accused. The prosecutrix met the Advisor to the Governor of Punjab and gave a full and detailed account of the incident that had happened at the dinner party. As per the allegation in the companyplaint preferred by the husband of the prosecutrix, the accused, who was then the Director General of Police of the State of Punjab, came and occupied a chair which was lying vacant at the place where the ladies were sitting. The accused was then gently removed from the place. After about four months, the husband of the prosecutrix filed a companyplaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh, alleging companymission of offence punishable under Sections 341, 342, 352, 354, 355 and 509 IPC. On the next day, that is 19th July, 1988, the prosecutrix sought an appointment with the Chief Secretary and recounted the entire incident to him and requested him to take suitable action against the accused. The prosecutrix and her husband jointly challenged the verdict of the High Court before this companyrt and the judgment of the High Court was set aside and the Chief Judicial Magistrate was directed to take companynizance of the offence under Sections 354 and 509 IPC. The accused appellant in Criminal Appeal No. The Chief Judicial Magistrate later framed the charges and after a full fledged trial the accused was found guilty of the offence punishable under Section 354 and 509 IPC. 430 of 1999 has been preferred by the companyplainant in that case and she prays that the punishment imposed on the accused should be enhanced. The accused challenged the same in the revision before the High Court. 1032 of 1998 was found guilty of the offence punishable under Sections 354 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code. An amount of Rs.25,000/ was directed to be paid as companyts by the accused. Thereupon the accused preferred a criminal revision under section 482 of the Cr. In the appeal preferred by the accused, the Sessions Judge companyfirmed the companyviction, but altered the sentence and the accused was directed to be released on probation in lieu of custodial sentence. The judgment of the High Court is challenged by the accused as well as the companyplainant. He was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of three months and pay a fine of Rs.500 for the offence under Section 354 and for the offence under Section 509 IPC, punishment of simple imprisonment for a period of two months and a fine of Rs. The guests assembled around 8.30 P.M. Ladies were sitting in a semi circle slightly away from the male guests. It is alleged that the accused was able to companytrol the militant operations of the terrorists and got companymendations from the Government and other administrators and this was number liked by many top ranking bureaucrats and as part of the companyspiracy, the entire case was falsely foisted on him. On 18.7.1988, a senior IAS officer, holding the post of Financial Commissioner and Secretary to the Government of Punjab, invited some of the IAS officers and IPS officer working at Chandigarh, for a dinner at 8.30 P.M. at his residence in Sector 16 of Chandigarh. The fine was enhanced to Rs.50,000 with a further direction to pay half of it to the companyplainant. Apart from the IAS and IPS officers, there were a few advocates, including the Advocate General of the State of Punjab and also some journalists and press companyrespondents working with some leading newspapers. It was companytended that numbersuch incident had happened and this was a part of a companyspiracy to malign the appellant who had to take so many serious actions to companytrol the activities of the militants which were at its peak during that time. 430 OF 1999 Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj, I.A.S., Appellant Vs.
Kanwar Pal Singh Gill Respondent G. BALAKRISHNAN, J. It was also submitted by the appellants companynsel that the companyplaint itself was filed after a period of three months and the witnesses who were examined were all interested witnesses and most relevant witnesses who were alleged to have witnessed the occurrence were number examined. On 29th July, 1988, the petitioner gave a written companyplaint to the police and a case was registered, but numberfurther steps were taken. 1032/98 raised many companytentions before us. WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. Criminal Appeal No. and the High Court quashed the companyplaint as well as further proceedings pursuant to the case registered by the police. He challenges his companyviction and sentence in this appeal. The companynsel for the appellant disputed the companyrectness of the findings on various grounds, and even the factual findings entered by the companyrt were seriously disputed. The appellant in Criminal Appeal No. A pointed reference was also made to the number examination of some of the witnesses cited by the prosecution. Both the appeals are heard together and disposed of by this companymon judgment. P.C. | 0 | train | 2005_315.txt |
In further appeal, the Income tax Appellate Tribunal the Tribunal in I.T.A. No.210 Hyd /1972 73 by order dated 31.12.1973, held that the firm sub partnership is valid and entitled to registration. Concurring with the said view, the Tribunal further held that the business of sub partnership was number the same as that of the main partnership and all the insignia of a valid partnership are present in this case and so, it is valid and entitled to registration. The Income Tax Officer by his order passed under Section 185 of the Income tax Act, 1961, dated 28.12.1970, held that the respondent assessee sub partnership companytravenes the provisions of Section 14 of the Andhra Pradesh Telangana Area Abkari Act hereinafter referred to as the Abkari Act and so, the sub partnership should be companysidered as void and illegal. No.1028 Hyd of 1969 70 and companynected appeals had by an earlier order dated 30.6.1972, held that a sub partnership on identical lines was number hit by section 14 of the Abkari Act. 1028 Hyd of 1969 70 was heard and decided by the High Court, holding that the sub partnership in the said case, is valid and entitled to registration, vide judgment in Additional Income Tax Commissioner, Hyderabad v. D.G.G. The short question involved in this Appeal is Whether the respondent assessee firm is entitled to registration under Income Tax Act for the year 1966 67? Registration was refused. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the subpartnership is entitled to the benefits of registration under the Income tax Act, 1961 for the assessment year 1966 67? In rendering the said order, the Tribunal numbericed that another Bench of the Tribunal in I.T.A. The High Court granted a certificate under Section 261 of the Income Tax Act to appeal to this Court, in S.C.L. It is thereafter, the Revenue moved the High Court in SCL Petition No.57/1978 under section 261 of the Income tax Act and having obtained a certificate to appeal to this Court vide order dated 10.3.1978 has tiled the above appeal. J. Ramamurthy and Sri V. Bobde. We heard companynsel for the Revenue Sri. By the time the said reference came up for final hearing before the High Court, the reference made by the Tribunal of an identical question in the companynected cases arising from I.T.A No. Ramakishan Co. 1 1977 TLR 244 111 ITR 93. When the instant reference came up before the High Court, the earlier decision on the identical matter was numbericed and the High Court answered the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee vide judgment dated 22.8.1977. The Revenue has filed this appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dated 22.8.1977 rendered in Case Referred No.45 of 1975. Since the respondent assessee was number represented, we requested Sri V.A. The assessee is the respondent in this appeal. It is thereafter, at the instance of the Revenue, the Appellate Tribunal referred the following question of law for the decision Of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Bobde senior companynsel to assist us. Section 14 of the Act is to the following effect No lessee shall, except with the Permission of Government, any person to be his partner and such partner shall number be companypetent to act as such until he has obtained a licence to that effect from the Collector or any other companypetent officer. The said order was companyfirmedin appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by order dated 28.2.1972. PARIPOORNAN. Petition No.57 of 1978. J. | 0 | train | 1996_1474.txt |
The trial companyrt found that the respondents were the occupancy tenants of the land and that the appellants had number become the owners of the land by adverse possession and that the suit was number barred by limitation. Thereafter the appellants applied before the trial companyrt for amendment of the written statement on that basis that they had become the occupancy tenants of the land by adverse possession against the original proprietors and had become owners of it under the Punjab Occupancy Tenants Vesting of Proprietary Rights Act and that the suit was barred by limitation. The allegations in the plaint were that the land orginally belonged to one Atta Mohammad and others, that the respondents were occupancy tenants of the land that by virtue of the provisions of the Punjab Occupancy Tenants Vesting of proprietary Rights Act the respondents became the owners of the land and that since the appellants had taken forcible possession of the land in 1958 they were entitled to evict the appellants. The appellants companytended that they were the tenants of the land and that the civil companyrt had numberjurisdiction to try the suit. The suit was for recovery of possession of a piece of land measuring 29 Kenals from the appellants. By his judgment he directed the trial companyrt to find whether the appellants were trespassers or tenants and in case they were found to be trespassers, the trial companyrt will have jurisdiction to pass a decree against them, but in case they were found to be tenants, the suit will have to be dismissed. Or the other hand, the respondents submitted that they were in possession of the land, that they had acquired the occupancy right and that it was only in Rabi 1958 that they were forcibly dispossessed by the appellants. The companyrt, therefore, decreed the suit. The trial companyrt accepted the companytention of the appellants and directed the return of the plaint to the respondents for presentation to the Revenue Court. The trial companyrt allowed the amendment and framed issues on the basis of the companytentions in the amended written statement. This is an appeal by special leave against the decree of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana companyfirming the decrees passed by the companyrts below decreeing a suit filed by the respondents against the appellants. Against this judgments, the respondents appealed to the learned Subordinate Judge, Ludhiana who remanded the case to the trial companyrt for decision of the case on merits. An appeal was filed by the appellant before the lower appellate companyrt. The appellants filed a second appeal against the decree before the High Court. The appellants filed a second appeal and the same was disposed of by a learned Single Judge of the High Court. K. Mathew, J. That was dismissed. The High Court also dismissed the appeal. | 0 | train | 1975_428.txt |
2 is the Registrar of Co operative Societies, Bhubaneshwar, Orissa. On August 21, 1968, the Registrar passed an order disapproving the appointment of respondent No. 1 was appointed as a secretary of the Bank on May 25, 1955 and the appointment was made in a meeting over which the Registrar of Co operative Societies had himself presided. On August 26, 1968, the President of the Bank issued an order terminating the services of respondent No. 1 was functioning as a Secretary of the Nayagarh Co operative Central Bank from May 25, 1955 till May, 13, 1968. 1 and that order was ratified by the Board of Management of the Bank on September 4, 1968. It was thirteen long years after the date of appointment that on August 21, 1968 the Registrar issued an order disapproving the appointment of respondent No. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment D 9 2 1970 of the High Court of Orissa, setting aside the order dated August 21, 1968 passed by the Registrar of Co operative Societies and the order dated August 26, 1968 passed by the President of the Nayagarh Co operative Central Bank Ltd. 1 as secretary of the Bank on the ground that he was functioning as a secretary without his approval and that he was number qualified to hold the post of a secretary. ls services numberhing at all was done by the Registrar either for regularising the appointment of respondent No. 863 of 1968 challenging the order whereby his services were terminated. 1 as secretary of the Bank, It was in pursuance of that order that the President issued an order five days later terminating the services of respondent No. On August 28, 1968, the respondent filed a writ petition O.J.C. 1 or for removing him from service. The Bank is the first appellant while its President is the second appellant in this appeal. The Presidents order was ratified by the Board of Management on September 4, 1963. Beyond informing the Bank from time to time that appropriate steps may be taken to terminate respondent No. 1, Narayan Rath, has filed the writ petition in the High Court asking that the aforesaid orders removing him from service should be set aside. The writ petition filed by respondent No. Respondent No. As stated above, respondent No. V. Chandrachud, J. The High Court having allowed that writ petition, the appellants have filed this appeal by special leave of this Court. No. | 0 | train | 1976_135.txt |
of barbed wire with the H.P. Agro Industries Corporation. The H.P. Agro Industries Corporation for procuring the barbed wire for supply to the forest department were from the units located at Dharampur. for barbed wire Hot dip and Rs.10,000/ per T. for electroplated barbed wire. Agro Industries Corporation, supply of only 17.64 M.T. Agro Industries Corporation wrote two identical letters to the Chief Conservator of Forests T , Himachal Pradesh offering to supply barbed wire GI wire and U staples to the forest department. In the meanwhile, some of the local units manufacturing barbed wires submitted a companyplaint to the Minister of State for Forests companyplaining against the procurement of barbed wire by the forest department from the H.P. placed with H.P. Instructions were also issued by the State Government through its Secretary in the forest department to all the Conservator of Forests in Himachal Pradesh to cancel all the supply orders in respect of barbed wire GI wire placed with the H.P. The petitioner, who was then the Chief Conservator of Forests, on 30.10.1985 issued a circular letter to all the Conservator of Forests working under him advising them to work out their requirements of GI and barbed wires and in the absence of a rate companytract to place orders for the supply thereof with the H.P. Some reports also appeared in the press alleging serious irregularities in the purchase of barbed wire by the forest department. Agro Industries Corporation, who had offered to make the necessary supply of both these items immediately. Agro Industries Corporation on 25.10.1985 for the purpose of procuring the supply orders from various indenting officers. Agro Industries Corporation without obtaining the requisite number availability certificate from the Controller of Stores. Agro Industries Corporation within a period of less than one month. Agro Industries Corporation, vide its letter dated 6.11.1985 had intimated to all Conservators of Forest in Himachal Pradesh about the firm M s. Gupta Pipes having been appointed as their authorized booking agent. The Additional Controller of Stores on 26.11.1985 also took an objection to the purchases having been effected by the forest department from the H.P. Agro Industries Corporation in violation of the numbermal procedure and without obtaining the requisite number availability certificate from the Controller of Stores. This companyplaint was forwarded by the Minister to the accused in his capacity as Chief Conservator of Forests on 20.11.1985 for his companyments. It was also companyplained that the sources adopted by the H.P. A request was made to the Chief Conservator of Forests to direct all the field officers working under his companytrol to buy their requirements of the above mentioned items by placing their supply orders with the H.P. Sheaving out unnecessary details, the accusations leading to the framing of charges are as under The Controller of Stores, Himachal Pradesh had approved a rate companytract for the purchase of galvanized steel barbed wires for fencing at the ex factory rate of Rs.8400/ per M.T. On 20.10.1985, the Chief Sales Officer and the Executive Officer of H.P. Consequently, against the supply order of 1200 M.T. Consequent upon such instructions having been issued by the petitioner, various forests circles placed the supply orders to the extent of about 1200 M.T. All these orders were booked through M s. Gupta Pipes, Industrial Area, Dharampur, District Solan, who had been appointed as the booking agent by the H.P. The rates quoted were Rs.10,500/ per M.T. They were also intimated that a representative of the said firm would be visiting their offices for companylecting the necessary supply orders for and on behalf of the H.P. The Special Judge Forests , Shimla, directed the accused to be charged accordingly by his order dated 5.8.1995. It was also suggested that the supply orders already placed with the said Corporation may be cancelled forthwith. was actually effected through the Corporation, before the cancellation companyld be intimated to the suppliers. Accused took the stand that the absence of sanctions as companytemplated under Section 197 of the Code and Section 6 of the Old Act companyresponding to Section 19 of the New Act the proceedings were numberest. It is to be numbered that sanction was accorded on 13.6.1990 which though was stated to be unnecessary and inconsequential by the State, in view of its specific stand that Section 197 of the Code has numberapplication. The Himachal Pradesh High Court by the impugned judgment held that in the absence of requisite sanction in terms of Section 197 of the Code proceedings initiated against the respondent hereinafter referred to as the Accused cannot proceed. No rate companytract was approved in respect of this item for the period beginning 1.10.1985. This rate companytract was valid up to the period ending 30.9.1985. However, numberopinion was expressed about validity of sanction dated 13.6.1990. In the other case charges were framed against the accused on 15.11.1995 for the offence punishable under Section 467, 468, 471, 420, 120 B IPC and Section 5 2 1 d of the Old Act companyresponding to Section 13 1 d of the New Act. The then Divisional Commissioner who companyducted the enquiry reported that apparent irregularities were companymitted with the apparent intention to help M s. Gupta Pipes. These two appeals are interlinked as the point involved revolves round the scope and ambit of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for short the Code . At the time of framing charge, legality of the proceedings was questioned by the accused. In support of the appeals, learned companynsel for the appellant State submitted that the scope and ambit of Section 197 has been misconstrued by the High Court. Strong reliance was placed on certain observations of this Court in Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. The State of Bombay 1955 1 SCR 1177 and Amrik Singh v. The State of Pepsu 1955 1 SCR 1302 . The charge in respect of other offences, namely, Sections 420, 120 B IPC and under the Old Act read with the New Act were to be companytinued. 105 and 106 of 1995 learned Single Judge of the High Court held that the charge framed against the accused for the offence under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC were to be set aside and quashed. Per companytra, learned companynsel for the accused submitted that the alleged acts were a part of the official duties and, therefore, a sanction was mandatory for the purpose of proceeding in the matter and in the absence thereof at the threshold the proceedings were number maintainable. In Bakhshish Singh Brar v. Smt. Acting on the recommendations of the Divisional Commissioner, cases for alleged companymission of offences as numbered supra were registered with the Enforcement Branch, South Lane, Simla. Accused moved the High Court for interference. An enquiry companymittee was appointed by the State Government. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. The trial Judge negatived the stand. By the impugned judgments dated 5.6.1996 in Criminal Revision Nos. One of the cases was instituted on the basis of informations which surfaced during investigation. | 1 | train | 2003_831.txt |
In 1945, Anglo American Corporation assigned its rights over the property to Amalgamated Coffee Estate Limited. 4 A suit for partition3 was instituted by the respondents before the District Judge, Palakkad in respect of some portions of the property. The ADJ rejected the submission of the respondents that the claim in execution was barred by the principle of companystructive res judicata. By a subsequent transfer, the leasehold rights were transferred to and vested in Anglo American Direct Tea Trading Corporation Limited Anglo American Corporation . In 1991, M s K J Plantations instituted a suit 4 before the Subordinate Judge, Palakkad seeking inter alia the setting aside of the Power of Attorney executed in favour of M S M Haneefa and the eight sale deeds. 7 On 27 May 1995, the Subordinate Judge, Palakkad ordered the property to be divided into a hundred equal shares of which forty were to be allotted to M s K J Plantations and sixty to the other assignees. The respondents instituted Execution Petition No. An area admeasuring 274.20 acres had been assigned to the petitioners. 1 of 1964 passed by the District Judge, Palakkad on 30 November 1965. The property encompassing an extent of 914 acres originally belonged to Vengunadu Kovilakam of Kollengode. On 17 October 1931, an area admeasuring 5 acres of what is described as the bungalow site was leased out in favour of Anglo American Corporation for a period of 43 years. 414 of 2014 in EP No. On 23 June 1990, acting in pursuance of a Power of Attorney alleged to have been executed by K J Plantations in favour of M S M Haneefa, the latter executed eight sale deeds in favour of the petitioners and M s South Coast Spices Export Limited. True to the bounties of nature, it companyprised of companyfee, cardamom, orange and pepper plantations. 7 of 2008 seeking inter alia a direction for the payment to them of the value of improvements over the property, before an order for delivery of possession was made. Among them were execution applications 33 of 2009 filed by National Spices Company , 38 of 2009 filed by the petitioners and 41 of 2009 filed by K J Plantations under Order XXI Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 5. 8 On 21 February 2003, the District Judge, Palakkad passed a final decree in the suit for partition. In spite of the fact that the tenure of lease had ended, the above three persons assigned their rights in respect of the property on 28 August 1978 in favour of M s K J Plantations. The respondents, in reply opposing the application, companytended that the claim was barred by the principle of companystructive res judicata under Explanation IV of Section 11 of the CPC. 11 Aggrieved by the order of the District Judge, Palakkad, the respondents moved the High Court of Kerala in a proceeding described as Execution First Appeal 5 The CPC No. On 25 November 1897, 909 acres of the property came to be leased out to William Espants Watts Esquire for a period of 75 years. 1 of 1964 on 17 November 2008 for delivery of possession of Schedule B property. 9 On 31 August 2009, several execution applications were filed in Execution Petition No. 5 of 2014 made by the applicants Ravi Varma Thampan and Sarada Thampatty for impleadment in S.L.P. Dismissing a petition instituted by the appellants under Article 227 172721 IST Reason of the Constitution, the High Court held that the claim set up by the appellants before the executing companyrt for the value of the improvements alleged to have been made by them on the land in dispute under the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act 19581 was barred by the principle of companystructive res judicata. During the companyrse of the proceedings before the ADJ, it was only the claim under Section 51 which was pressed. 13 On 24 October 2014, the appellants instituted fresh proceedings, numbered as EA No. In their applications, the applicants inter alia sought a declaration that they were entitled to possession of the property as lessees and were number liable to be dispossessed. 14 By a judgment and order dated 26 June 2015, the First Additional District Judge dismissed the application filed by the appellants on the ground that they were number transferees of the property and were hence disentitled to seek the value of the improvements alleged to have been made by them, under Section 51 of the TP Act. 7 of 2008. In view of the order of the District Court, the respondents, as decree holders, were held number to be entitled to the delivery of actual physical possession of the property and their remedy would be to file a suit impleading the appellants as parties. In so far as question of companypensation of improvements made by the petitioners is companycerned, petitioners are free to pursue appropriate remedy for redressal of their grievance in accordance with law. A preliminary decree for partition was 1 The Act of 1958 2 The TP Act 3 O S No. 553 of 1991 OS No. 27268 of 2012 in view of dismissal of special leave petition and application is disposed of as such. Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J. When the Amin came to effect delivery, the appellants and other similarly situated persons raised an obstruction. The claim under the Act of 1958 was number advanced. By its judgment dated 29 June 2012, the High Court allowed the appeal and, while upholding the submissions of the respondents, dismissed the claim petitions filed by the appellants. 12 On 25 July 2014, a Special Leave Petition filed under Article 136 of the Constitution was dismissed by this Court in the following terms Heard learned senior companynsel and learned companynsel for the parties. Signature Not Verified This appeal arises from a judgment of the Kerala High Court dated 11 Digitally signed by MANISH SETHI Date 2019.02.05 December 2015. The petitioners and their predecessors in interest were number parties. No order needs to be passed in Interlocutory Application No. 7 of 2002 in 4 O S No. Special leave petitions are dismissed. 12 of 2010. 1 Leave granted. Civil No. | 0 | train | 2019_75.txt |
The Industrial Court further granted the request of the appellant Union for cancellation of the recognition of the respondent union. Both the appellant Union and the first respondent Union furnished with their pleadings the details of their membership. 1776 of 1986 by the first respondent Union. While the first respondent Union was acting as such recog nised union, many of the workers claimed that they had resigned from the said Union and formed a new union called the Automobile Products of India Employees Union which is the appellant Union and registered it on January 7, 1981 under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. The appellant Union secured 798 votes whereas the first respondent Union secured 780 votes. The union which thus fails to secure majority in the ballot would raise numberobjection for the period of three years to the union thus declared as the recognised union. While the Investigating Officer was in the process of verifying the memberships of the two Unions, suggestions were made for deciding by secret ballot as to which of the Unions companymanded the majority. The Industrial Court held that since there was an agreement between the two unions, the procedure adopted to grant recognition to the union under the Act was a valid one. The first respondent Union in its reply of October 7, 1982 companytested the appellant Unions claim and pleaded that it had a membership of about 1400 workers. under Section 13 1 vii of the Act as a companysequence of the recognition of the appellant Union. The appellant Union on March 1, 1982 submitted yet another application for cancellation of recognition of the first respondent Union this time under Section 13 1 i of the Act alleging that the recognition was obtained by the first respondent Union by misrepresentation and or fraud, and that it was granted recognition also by mistake. As per the suggestion, the first respondent Union on December 19, 1985 submitted a draft proposal to the Industrial Court as follows The issue pertaining to recognition of any of the unions be decided by secret ballot and the Investigating Officer be directed to companyduct the same ballot. The appellant Union companytested both the petitions company tending that the petitioners there were estopped from challenging the procedure which was adopted by the Industrial Court by companysent of the first respondent Union. On February 10, 1986, the Indus trial Court passed an order granting recognition to the appellant Union in place of the first respondent Union, under Section 14 of the Act after disposing of the objec tions raised by the first respondent Union. The Industrial Court rendered the relief in favour of the appel lant Union. The Union which would have the majority of the votes would be treated as recognised trade union and the one which fails to get the majority would number raise any tech nicality or objection. The present appeals arise out of a battle for recognition between the rival trade unions in proceedings under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union Preven tion of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 hereinafter referred to as the Act . On February 11, 1986, the Industrial Court granted a certif icate of recognition to the appellant Union under Section 14 of the Act. On August 19, 1985, the appellant Union made an application to the Industrial Court to hold an inquiry under Section 12 2 of the Act by directing the investigating officer to verify the membership of both the Unions. On July 29, 1982, the appellant Union filed an application under Section 14 of the Act for being registered itself as a recognised union in place of the first respond ent Union on the ground that it had the largest membership of the workers in the Bhandup undertaking, viz.,
1036 out of a total of 1700 workers, i.e., about 69 of the total stength. 1409 of 1986 by two workers who were members of the first respond ent Union and the other, viz.,
Writ Petition No. On October 9, 1981, the appellant Union made an application to the Industrial Court, Thane under Section 13 1 ii of the Act for cancellation of the recognition of the first respondent Union on the ground that the latters membership in the Bhandup Undertaking had fallen below 30 per cent of the total strength of workmen in that Undertaking for the preceding six months. The appellant Union also submitted its draft proposal, at the same time, in more or less the same terms. The Industrial Court also held that there was numbersubstance in the objections of the first respondent Union that by treating July 1, 1985 as the cut off date, the workers who were otherwise entitled to vote were deprived of their right to vote and also that the numberice of the ballot which was given to the workers was proper one. The result of the ballot showed that in all 1585 workers voted, but only 1578 ballot papers were valid. On September 5, 1985, the Industrial Court gave directions to the Investigating Offi cer appointed under the Act to assist the Court, to investi gate the membership of both the Unions. The appellant Union thereafter started the second battle this time for its own recognition under Section 14 of the Act and the present appeals are an outcome of the said proceedings. The first respondent Union, viz.,
the Association of Engineering Work ers, Bombay obtained a certificate of recognition from Industrial Court, Thane under Section 12 of the Act, on April 7, 1977 for the Companys undertaking at Bhandup. In both the petitions, it was alleged that the Industrial Court had violated the provisions of the Act relating to the grant of recognition of the Union by adopting a procedure which was number sanc tioned by it and which was, therefore, illegal and invalid. In its reply dated November 16, 1981, the first respondent Union refuted the allegation in the application and companytended that its membership was more than 30 per cent for the relevant peri od. 1409 1776 of 1986. The fourth respondent Company has two factories, one at Bhandup, Bombay employing about 1700 workers and the other at Aurangabad employing about 1000 workers. The companytinu ation of their membership of the union companycerned over a period ensured that their association with the bargaining agent was of a steady and durable character and their alle giance and loyalty to it were number of a fleeting moment but were born of a proper evaluation of all facts. According ly, a secret ballot was held on January 4, 1986. Reliance was placed for this purpose on a decision of the Bombay High Court in Maharashtra General Karngar Union, Bombay v. Mazdoor Congress, Bombay Ors.,
1983 M.L.J. The employees who were entitled to vote in the ballot were those who were on the rolls of the Company on July 1, 1985, those who joined employment of the Company, thereafter, being disentitled to do so. The Investigating Officer submitted his report to the Industrial Court on January 21, 1986. On the same day, i.e., December 19, 1985, the Industrial Court passed an order directing the Investigating Officer to hold a secret ballot in the premises of the Company within 30 days from the date of the order. Here ended the first skirmish. On January 30, 1986, the first respondent submitted its objections companytend ing that the cut off date of July 1, 1985 was number companyrect as the employees who were in employment of the Company and whose services were intermittently interrupted were number given an opportunity to exercise their votes, and that there should have been a proper numberification with regard to the date of voting so that the employees who were away companyld have exercised their votes. Deshmukh, Ms. Vrinda Grover and Ms. Bina Gupta for Respondent Nos. Ahok K. Gupta, S.J. Against the said decision, two writ petitions were filed in the Bombay High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, one, viz.,
Writ Petition No. Chitaley and Mrs. Urmila Sirur for the Appellant. From the Judgment and Order dated 3.3.1988 of the Bombay High Court in W.P. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SAWANT, J. However, the said decision was set aside by the High Court and the decision of the High Court was upheld by this Court. Nos. 1597 98 of 1988. 1 to 4. Dr. Y.S. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. | 0 | train | 1990_95.txt |
The third dying declaration is what was stated by deceased Sunita to the Tehsildar Magistrate Rajesh Kumar Shrivastava, PW13. Immediately thereafter, Santosh Kumar brought a companytainer of kerosene oil and poured the same on Sunita and lit fire and burnt her alive. has filed this appeal against accused Shiv Pyari, Prem Narain and Santosh Kumar. On the basis of the three dying declarations, the trial companyrt found the accused Santosh Kumar guilty of killing Sunita by pouring kerosene oil and setting her on fire. Deceased Sunita, daughter of Dhani Ram was married to Ram Chandra on 1.5.1987. The Tehsildar Magistrate PW13 categorically stated that deceased Sunita was in her full senses throughout the recording of her dying declaration. Accused Santosh Kumar immediately thereafter brought kerosene oil in a companytainer and threw it on her body and set her on fire. Deceased Sunita stated to the Tehsildar Magistrate that she demanded Rs.20/ from her mother in law who refused to give her Rs.20/ . But she specifically attributed the act of bringing and pouring kerosene oil on her and setting her on fire only by respondent Santosh Kumar. On exhortation of Prem Narain, Santosh Kumar brought a companytainer of kerosene oil and poured the same on her whole body and set her on fire. The basic companysistency between the three dying declarations given to Dhani Ram PW1, the Investigating Officer PW8 and the Tehsildar Magistrate PW13 is that the accused Santosh Kumar brought kerosene oil, poured the same on the deceased and set her on fire and she died because of the burn injury. The Tehsildar Magistrate was summoned to record her dying declaration. In this appeal, we are companycerned with the only surviving accused respondent Santosh Kumar. The statement of the deceased made to the Tehsildar Magistrate PW13 cannot be brushed aside. She stated that her mother in law Shiv Pyari, uncle in law Prem Narain, brother in law Devar Santosh Kumar and elder brother in law Jeth Arjun Prasad had been harassing her from the very beginning. Thereafter, her brother in law Santosh Kumar came from the outside and asked her, what were you doing in Bombay. Sunita rushed towards her mother in law Shiv Pyari but she did number save her and, therefore, she rushed towards the water pond and jumped into it. According to the prosecution, the death of deceased Sunita was caused by accused Santosh Kumar in furtherance of the companymon intention of all the accused on account of demand of dowry, while the defence version as set up by the respondents was a case of accidental fire. On getting this reply from the deceased, Santosh Kumar started beating her and her father in law also abused her. The High Court ought to have appreciated this fact in proper perspective as to why the dying person in all her three dying declarations named only Santosh Kumar and attributed act of pouring kerosene oil and setting her on fire to him alone when there were so many members in the family. Deceased Sunita immediately after the burning episode cried for help and ultimately jumped into a small water pond to save her life. Om Prakash PW2, Chotey Yadav PW3 and Santosh PW4 did number support the prosecution case, the prosecution case hinges on the statements made by Dhani Ram PW1, Inspector K. Tyagi PW8 and the Tehsildar Magistrate Rajesh Kumar Srivastava PW13. The second dying declaration is Ext. According to the defence version, the deceased Sunita was companyking and accidentally caught fire and died because of burn injuries. in the case diary by the Investigating Officer Shiv Kumar Tyagi PW8. She also stated that her brothers in law Santosh Kumar and Arjun Prasad always used to tell her, Bring Roti Bread from your father. Ka.16 made to the Investigating Officer also seems to be companyrect, companysistent and companyroborated by the other two statements made before the Tehsildar Magistrate PW13 and Dhani Ram PW1. Rizvi of the District Hospital, Unnao gave certificate that he had examined deceased Sunita and she was in her full senses and her statement companyld be recorded and only thereafter her statement was recorded by the Tehsildar. PWs 3 and 4, who alleged to have seen the occurrence, did number support the prosecution case, except the version that the deceased Sunita had jumped into a water pond and she was taken out from that pond and at that time accused persons and the family members of Dhani Ram were present there. On hearing the hue and cry, Om Prakash, Chotey Yadav and Santosh son of Jagdish arrived there and took her out from the pond. The veracity of the dying declarations is proved beyond any shadow of doubt because the deceased specifically did number level any allegation against her husband and her other brother in law Ram Kishore. That, after some time her husbands younger brother, Santosh Kumar, came from outside and asked her as to what she had been doing in Bombay, then she replied that he companyld very well inquire from Bombay itself. Dhani Ram, father of the deceased, on hearing about the incident came to his daughters house. The IInd Additional Sessions Judge companyvicted respondents Shiv Pyari and Prem Narain under sections 498 A IPC and sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act. At that time, Sunita told him that he companyld finish her forever instead of killing her slowly. If she wanted to implicate other members of the family, she companyld have also named her brother in law Ram Kishore and husband Ram Chandra. At the time of marriage, Dhani Ram gave dowry to his daughter beyond his capacity, but unfortunately her in laws were number satisfied and they harassed her by regularly demanding dowry in the form of articles and money. In that statement, she has also stated that she had numberdispute with her husband and Ram Kishore, another brother of her husband. In this dying declaration, it is stated that a day before the occurrence at about 9 a.m. she had a quarrel with her mother in law because she had refused to give Rs.20/ demanded by her. The villagers tried to save her by bringing her out of the pond. The investigating officer also reached the spot and seized the companytainer of kerosene oil, the piece of burnt dhoti and pieces of broken bangles. The other accused Shiv Pyari wife of Deo Krishan and Prem Narain s o Guru Deen have expired during the pendency of the appeal, therefore, the appeal filed by the State of U.P. The said Tehsildar clearly stated that she was in a fit companydition to give her statement. The respondent and other accused were charged under sections 302/34, 304 B and 498 A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for short, IPC and sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 for short, the Dowry Act read with section 34 of the IPC. The respondents preferred appeal against companyviction under sections 302 and 498 A IPC and sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act by the trial companyrt. After companypleting the necessary formalities of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the accused persons under sections 302/34, 304B and 498A of the IPC and sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act. The IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Unnao, in Sessions Trial No. They were however acquitted under sections 302/34 and 304 IPC. Similarly, the statement Ext. Ka.16 which was recorded under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for short, the Cr. Immediately thereafter he started hitting her by kicks, fists and blows. The High Court allowed the appeal filed by the accused and set aside the companyviction and sentence of the accused respondents imposed by the trial companyrt for the offences for which they were held guilty and companyvicted. The trial companyrt carefully marshalled and analyzed the entire evidence on record. She replied, Go to Bombay and get the matter inquired into. The State of U.P. She was alive at that time. The High Court gravely erred in setting aside a well reasoned judgment of the trial companyrt and companying to the different findings which are totally unsustainable on proper analysis of the entire record. He was totally an independent witness and there was numberreason for him to companyk up any false story. Dalveer Bhandari, J. Dr. S.N.H. The prosecution examined 13 witnesses to prove its case. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow dated 2.3.2000 passed in Criminal Appeal No. The appellant State of U.P. Brief facts of the case in nutshell are as under. 281 of 1993. He took the same into custody in the presence of witnesses. against them has abated. aggrieved by the impugned judgment has filed this appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution. P.C. | 0 | train | 2009_1215.txt |
A septuagenarian, Tarsem Singh, his son Resham Singh A1 and his two grandsons Harbans Lal A2 and Sukhwinder Singh A3 were arraigned for the said murder. The State of Punjab filed an appeal against the acquittal of Tarsem Singh. When A1 Resham Singh, A2 Harbans Lal and A3 Sukhwinder Singh, filed appeals in this Court by special leave. Singing of obscene ballad unfortunately became the genesis of a series of events which ultimately ended up in the murder of Malkiat Singh on the morning of 21 3 1991. While upholding the companyviction passed by the trial Court, the Division Bench reversed the order of acquittal of Tarsem Singh and he was also brought within the dragnet of companyviction along with others. A Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana heard all the appeals together. The companyvicted persons filed an appeal before the High Court, The State of Punjab filed an appeal before the High Court. Thomas, J. | 0 | train | 2001_728.txt |
From the taxi P.W. Both he and his brother Santokh Singh owned a taxi and both used to ply their taxis from the taxi stand Kot Atma Singh in Amritsar. The circumstances relied upon are 1 The appellant Balwinder Singh Billa along with his three companypanions Balwinder Singh, Amar Singh and Balkar Singh, hired the taxi of the deceased Santokh Singh PUA 5885 from the taxi stand Kot Atma Singh in Amritsar for going to Batala. 5 recovered the driving licence of the deceased Santokh Singh with his photograph, registration certificate of the taxi and other related documents showing that the taxi belonged to the deceased Santokh Singh. It appears from his evidence that the appellant Balwinder Singh Billa was known to him from before as he used to companye to the taxi stand to hire a taxi. 2 The interception of the taxi No. The deceased Santokh Singh was number seen alive threafter. , on the 26th, some 180 miles from Batala, and the recovery of the driving licence and other related documents of the taxi showing that the taxi belonged to the deceased Santokh Singh together with a loaded companyntry made 12 bore pistol, and the wrist watch worn by the accused Balwinder Singh which has been proved as belonging to the deceased Santokh Singh. At that stage it was number known that the deceased Santokh Singh had been murdered. The accused Balwinder Singh who was driving the taxi and the accused Amar Singh sitting by his side on the front seat were apprehended because they companyld number satisfy P.W. 3 The statement made by the companyaccused Balwinder Singh leading to the recovery of the dead body of the deceased Santokh Singh found embedded in the Aliwal Canal, some eight miles away from Batala. The taxi was hired in the presence of the other taxi drivers, namely, Kashmira Singh, brother of the deceased, P. W. 3, Fauza Singh, P.W. 7 apprehended the appellant Balwinder Singh Billa and the accused Balkar Singh in the vicinity of the District Court at Amritsar. The companyaccused Balwinder Singh was driving the taxi and the accused Amar Singh sitting beside him on the front seat companyld number get away and were apprehended by PW 5 because they companyld number give satisfactory answer about the ownership of the taxi. In the report he stated that the taxi of his brother Santokh Singh had been taken on hire by the appellant Balwinder Singh Billa who was known to him from before, along with his three companypanions whom he did number know, but gave their general description. 4, Suba Singh and Ajit Singh. It also appears that on the 28th the companyaccused Balwinder Singh made a statement leading to the discovery of the dead body of the deceased Santokh Singh from the Aliwal Canal on the 29th, at a place some eight miles from Batala and twenty two miles from Amritsar. There can be numberdoubt, number is it disputed, that the deceased Santokh Singh met with a homicidal death. The taxi was intercepted on the next morning at about 5.15 a.m. by PW 5 near the town of Malerkotla at a distance of approximately 180 miles from Batala. 5, who had set an ambush on a road bypass near the town of Malerkotla, some 180 miles from Batala, intercepted the taxi No. PUA 5885 at the road bypass near Malerkotla town by Gurdarshan Singh, P.W. The manner in which the car was driven long distances after the companymission of the murder of the deceased Santokh Singh does give rise to that inference. It is in the prosecution case that when the deceased Santokh Singh did number return on the night in question, his brother Kashmira Singh made a search for him at Batala and other places on the 26th but he companyld number find any trace. P. Sen, J. Appellant Balwinder Singh DalbirSingh Billa stands companyvicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, Penal Code, 1860, for having companymitted the murder of the taxi driver Santokh Singh and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. The testimony of this witness is companyroborated by the first information report, the testimony of the taxi driver Fauza Singh, PW 4 and other attendant circumstances. After companymitting his murder, the anxiety of the accused was to get rid of the dead body and they therefore took the taxi to a deserted place near the Aliwal Canal at a spot some eight miles away from Batala. The facts give rise to an inference that the accused had companymitted the murder for the sake of the taxi for companymission of other offences. The deceased Santokh Singh had apparently been strangulated to death by a ligature formed by the portion of a white turban twisted in the form of a rope with a knot tied around the neck. On interrogation, he also seized from the accused Balwinder Singh a loaded companyntry made 12 bore pistol and a sandoz wrist watch worn by him. The other two companyaccused Balwinder Singh and Amar Singh have also been companyvicted along with him under Section 302 read with Section 34 and sentenced to imprisonment for life, but have number preferred an appeal. It was buried in the bed of the sand in the Aliwal Canal. Kansal, Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Batala, P.W. On the next morning, i.e., on 26th at about 5.15 a.m. Gurdarshan Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, P.W. There was numberreason for the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court number to have relied upon the testimony of Kashmira Singh, PW3, brother of the deceased. PUA 5885 companying from the side of Ludhiana on suspicion of companytrabands. Some eight days thereafter, i.e., on August 2, 1973, on a tip off Kala Singh, S.I. The green turban of the deceased was found stuck in the reeds at some distance. CIA , P.W. 1 who performed an autopsy of the dead body of the deceased was of the opinion that the death of the deceased was due to asphyxia caused by strangulation. 5 early in the next morning, i.e. 4 The fact that the appellant absconded from his village Supariwind and companyld number be apprehended till he was intercepted at the District companyrt at Amritsar on August 2, 1973 some eight days after the incident. on the 27th he lodged the first information report at Police Station, Amritsar. In cases in which the evidence is purely of a circumstantial nature, the facts and circumstances from which the companyclusion of guilt is sought to be drawn must be fully established beyond any reasonable doubt, and the facts and circumstances should number only be companysistent with the guilt of the accused, but they must be such in their effect as to be entirely incompatible with the innocence of the accused and must exclude every reasonable hypothesis, companysistent with his innocence. On the next day i.e. The body was embedded deep into the sand bed on the expectation that it would number be recovered. On the next day, i.e., on 27th, he lodged the first information report. 5 about the ownership of the car. But their two companypanions sitting on the rear seat managed to escape and companyld number be identified due to darkness. In the light of these well settled principles, the learned Sessions Judge as well as the High Court, during the companyrse of their carefully written judgment, have ably marshalled the evidence and companye to the companyclusion that the circumstances alleged have been fully proved, and they are companysistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the appellant. 5 The false denial of the appellant that he was at his village Supariwind both at the time of the occurrence and on the date of his arrest. The prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution case, in brief, is as follows. There is numberdirect evidence. This witness was closely cross examined but numberhing has been brought out to impeach his credibility as a truthful witness. They both refused to participate in the test identification parade. Dr. D.P. | 0 | train | 1986_273.txt |
part ii of the act companytains the provisions relating to the companyduct of presidential and vice presidential elections and part iii of the act sets out the provisions relating to the settlement of disputes regarding elections to the offices of the president and the vice president of india. the result of the election was declared on 16.7.1987 by the returning officer for presidential election 1987 respondent number 4 declaring shri r. venkataraman respondent number 1 as the president of india. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by venkataramiah j. the above petition is filed by the petitioner shri mithilesh kumar under the provisions of the presidential and vice presidential elections act 1952 act number 31 of 1952 hereinafter referred to as the act calling in question the validity of the election of shri r. venkataraman the 1st respondent herein as the president of india at the election held in july 1987 for electing the president of india and praying for a declaration that he is the successful candidate at that election. the act was passed in the year 1952 for the purpose of regulating certain matters relating to or companynected with the elections to the offices of the president and the vice president of india. there were three candidates at the election namely shri r. venkataraman respondent number 1 shri v.r. original jurisdiction election petition number 1 of 1987.
parasaran attorney general t.s. krishnamurthy iyer krishnamurthy swami and miss a. subhashini for the respondents. krishna iyer respondent number 2 and shri mithilcsh kumar the petitioner. | 0 | dev | 1987_369.txt |
The State Government recommended that the resignation be accepted. He also addressed a letter dated August 30, 1964, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan submitting his resignation from the Indian Administrative Service for early acceptance, and requested that it may be forwarded to the Government of India with the remarks of the State Government. He also addressed a separate letter to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, intimating that be was withdrawing his resignation from the Indian Administrative Service. After some time the appellant changed his mind and by letter dated November 27, 1964, the appellant requested the Chief Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan to recommend acceptance of the withdrawal of his resignation from the Indian Administrative Service. On October 31, 1964, the Government of India accepted the resignation of the appellant and requested the Chief Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan to intimate the date on which the appellant was relieved of his duties so that a formal numberification companyld be issued in that behalf. On March 29, 1965, an order accepting the resignation of the appellant from the Indian Administrative Service was issued and the appellant was directed to hand over charge to the Additional Collector, Kota. The appellant belonged to the Indian Administrative Service and was in August 1964 posted as Collector District Magistrate, Kota. On August 21, 1964, he addressed a letter to the Chief Minister, Rajasthan, setting out several grievances and finally stated In companyclusion I would only request that the Government may do me the kindness of accepting my resignation from the service which I am submitting separately as I am companyvinced that it would be impossible to companytinue in such an atmosphere without being humiliated from time to time. The appellant then moved a petition in the High Court of Punjab at Delhi for the issue of a writ of certiorari, calling for the record of the case and quashing the order passed by the Government of India accepting the resignation of the appellant, and also quashing the order dated March 29, 1965 issued by the State of Rajasthan. 2429 of 1966. V. Gupte, Sardar Bahadur, Vishnu B. Saharya and Yogindra Kushalan, for the appellant. 170 D of 1965. K. Sen and K. Baldev Mehta, for respondent No. H, Dhebar, for respondent No. Appeal from the judgment and order dated May 28, 1966 of the Punjab High Court Circuit Bench Delhi in Civil Writ No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. | 0 | train | 1968_130.txt |
Out of the UDCs carrying the scale of No. For dealing with such cases certain officers have been promoted to that 10 posts specified among the UDCs in the secretariat as well as number secretariat administrative officers. 35 in the secretariat and other places and they were directed to handle cases of companyplex nature involving deep study and companypetence. 35 per month to the Upper Division Clerks in the number secretariat administrative offices was provided. The respondents were number actually discharging those duties but being UDCs they claimed special pay of No. 35 per month as companypensation for discharge of special duties. 394/90 allowed the petition and directed payment. F7 52 E III/78, dated May 5, 1979 have stated that special grant of pay of No. The Government in O.M. The Tribunal in the impugned order following its earlier decision dated 9.10.1991 made in O.A. We have directed the companynsel to find out whether any appeal has been filed against the said order. We have heard the companynsel for the appellant. They were being paid No. Leave granted. No. | 1 | train | 1996_1741.txt |
The goods purchased by the assessee were used partly for sizing, bleaching and dyeing of textiles belonging to the assessee and partly for sizing, bleaching and dyeing of textiles belonging to third parties on job basis. The first companytention was that the sizing, bleaching and dyeing of textiles did number amount to manufacture of textiles and the goods purchased by the assessee companyld number therefore be said to have been used by it in manufacture of textiles as specified in the Certificate of Registration and hence the assessee had failed to make use of the goods purchased for the purpose specified in sec. The assessee purchased these goods in the companyrse of inter state trade and companymerce on the basis of its Certificate of Registration and furnished to the selling dealers declarations in Form C stating that these goods were purchased for use by the assessee in the manufacturing of goods for sale. The assessee companytended in reply that neither the terms and companyditions of the certificate of registration number the provisions of section 8 3 b of the Central Act required that the goods purchased by the assessee must be used by it in manufacture or processing of its own goods intended for sale by itself and that it would be sufficient companypliance with the requirement of section 8 3 b read with the Certificate of Registration even if the goods purchased were used by assessee in manufacture or processing of goods for a third party under a job companytract, so long as the manufactured or processed goods were intended for sale by such third party. The Division Bench did number accept this companytention of the Revenue and over turning the view taken by the learned single Judge, the Division Bench held that all that section 8 3 b provided was that the goods purchased must be used by the assessee in manufacture of goods for sale and did number require that the sale must be by the assessee himself. The companypany purchased goods from outside the State of Punjab number Haryana on submission of C Forms for the purpose of use in manufacture of goods for sale. The prescription of section 8 3 b was that the goods manufactured must be for sale, without any qualifying expression that the sale must be by the assessee manufacturing the goods and therefore even if the goods were manufactured for a third party, so long as they were intended for sale by such third party, the case would be companyered by the terms of the section. The second companytention urged before the Division Bench was and that was the only companytention pressed upon us on behalf of the Revenue that the interpretation placed on section 8 3 b by the learned single Judge was companyrect and in order to companye within the terms of that section, the assessee was required to use the goods purchased in manufacture of its own goods intended for sale by itself and if the assessee used the goods purchased in manufacture of goods for a third party, the user would be for a purpose different from that specified in section 8 3 b , even though the manufactured goods were intended for sale by such third party. In response to this query made by the assessee, the Excise and Taxation Officer formulated the case against the assessee in the following words. The assessee owns a factory in Faridabad where it carries on business of manufacturing and processing textiles. This companytention was negatived by the Division Bench which held that though sizing bleaching and dyeing of grey cloth did amount to processing, it had the effect of companyverting grey cloth into a companymercially different marketable companymodity and it therefore amounted also to manufacture of a companymercially new product and the user of the goods purchased in sizing, bleaching and dyeing grey cloth was companysequently within the terms of section 8 3 b read with the Certificate of Registration. On 17th September 1966, the Excise and Taxation Officer, Gurgaon issued a numberice calling upon the assessee to show cause why action should number be taken against it under section 10 of the Central Act on the ground that the assessee had been misusing the certificate of registration by doing sizing, bleaching and dyeing for third parties on job basis. But instead of doing so, the companypany used those purchases partly in manufacturing its own goods for sale and partly for doing job work for other parties. The business mentioned in the Certificate of Registration was Textile manufacturing, sale, purchase, wholesale distribution sales and purchase of yarn and waste and textile machinery and the Certificate of Registration also specified inter alia the following classes of goods for the purpose of sub section l of section 8, namely, dyeing companyours, and other chemicals for use in manufacture. This companytention was however number accepted by the Excise and Taxation Officer and he companysequently issued numberices to the assessee for the assessment year 1962 63 to 1966 67 proposing to impose penalty under section 10A of the Central Act on the ground that the assessee had companytravened the provisions of section 10 of the Act ibid by purchasing goods for the purpose specified in clause b of subsection 3 of section 8 but had failed without reasonable excuse to make use of the goods for any such purpose. The assessee thereupon filed a writ petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana for quashing and setting aside the various numberices issued by the Excise and Taxation Officer seeking to proceed against the assessee under sections 10 and 10A of the Central Act. This was followed by another numberice dated 13th July 1967 in the same terms by the Excise and Taxation Officer in regard to the assessment years 1962 63 to 1966 The assessee replied to the numberices by its letter dated 21st July 1967 asking for details and circumstances in which, according to the Excise and Taxation Officer, the assessee had misused the certificate of registration so that the assessee companyld satisfy the Excise and Taxation Officer that numbersuch misuse had, in fact, taken place. On the strength of these declarations the selling dealers were taxed in respect of the sales effected by them to the assessee at the rate of 3 per cent under section 8 1 b of the Central Act. The assessee is registered under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 as in force in the State of Haryana and at material times it also held a Certificate of Registration under section 7 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 hereinafter referred to as the Central Act . The assessee is a limited companypany registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and having its registered office at Calcutta. The Company companyld number use the material companycessionally purchased, for the job work as that does number companystitute sale. The assessee preferred an appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court and before the Division Bench, two companytentions were advanced on behalf of the Revenue in support of the decision of the learned single Judge. This appeal by special leave raises a short but interesting question of companystruction of section 8 3 b of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The Revenue thereupon preferred the present appeal after obtaining certificate of fitness from the High Court. This view taken by the Division Bench was number challenged on behalf of the Revenue in the appeal before us and hence we need number say anything more about it. Gupta, Bishambar Lal and P. Dayal, for the Respondents. 581 of 1970 N. Sachdev and Miss A. Subhashini, for the Appellant. Jain, S.K. 756 NT of 1973. From the judgment and order dated the 28th March, 1972 of the Punjab Haryana High Court in L.P.A. K. Sen, K.K. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI, J. The facts giving rise to the appeal are few and may be briefly stated as follows. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No. | 0 | train | 1981_200.txt |
The chaukidars arrested the appellant and Kirandeo, brought them back to the village and kept them in detention at the house of Sitram. The two chaukidars went in search of the miscreants and found the appellant and accused Kirandeo fleeing at some distance from the village. A scuffle took place between the chaukidars and the appellant and accused Kirandeo and probably, as a result of that scuffle the appellant received two minor injuries. On the question of the identity of the miscreants, the Trial Judge accepted the evidence of Motisingh PW 4 , Sitarams mother PW 8 and also the evidence of the two chaukidars and the Dafadar PW 1 to 3 , but refused to accept the evidence of Sitaram PW 7 , and his companysin PW 5 . Those who had received injuries during the incident were Sitram PW 7 his mother Ram Sundari Devi PW 8 his brother Motisingh PW 4 and Saheo Singh PW 5 a next door neighbour and a companysin of Sitram, who had gone there on hearing the cries of the inmates of the house. 1 from Sitaram, rushed to his house, he found the two of them in the custody of the chaukidars. 1 that he had identified Kirandeo, Laxmi and Ramnandan at the time of the incident. The prosecution relied chiefly on the evidence of the inmates of the House, Sitram, his mother, his daughter, his brother Motisingh and his companysin PW 5 who as aforesaid had rushed to the house on hearing the alarm. as regards the arrest of the appellant and Kirandeo soon after the incident, their attempt to flee from the village at an unusual hour, their resistance against their arrest, the scuffle companysequent upon that, and the injuries sustained therein by the appellant and Kirandeo. Immediately thereafter, Sitram disclosed the names of five of the miscreants, including that of the appellant to two village chaukidars PWs. PW 13 Ramshila, the daughter of Sitram, who also was in the house at the time, identified some of the miscreants, but number the appellant. There companyld also be numberdispute as to the fact of the appellant and the said Kirandeo having been detained by the two chaukidars and the Dafadar soon after the incident, for, when the investigating Officer on receiving Ex. 1 the evidence as to dacoity, which was undeniable, 2 the fact of all these witnesses, except sitarams daughter, having received injuries during the incident, 3 the arrest of the appellant and accused Kirandeo soon after the incident in the companyrse of their flight from the village, and 4 the injuries which both of them had received as a result of the scuffle which took place when they appear to have resisted their arrest by the chaukidars. However, on the strength of the evidence of the other inmates of the house and the evidence as to the manner of arrest of the appellant and accused Kirandeo, he companyvicted the appellant and his four companyaccused and sentenced them as aforesaid. The evidence of the two chaukidars was found to be reliable, firstly, because members of the rural police, they were number under the companytrol or influence of the Investigating Officer and secondly, because they had arrested the appellant and Kirandeo brought them to Sitarams house after Sitaram has left for the police station to give the information about the dacoity. 1 about the incident to the Police Officer, in companysequence of which that Police Officer came to Sitrams house and took into his custody the appellant and said Kirandeo. Sitaram, therefore, companyld number have instigated the chaukidars in falsely placing the appellant and his companypanion under arrest. 1 and 2 and the dafadar PW 3 of the village. The case in that companynection was that after he went to Sitarams house in response to the Police Officers call for assistance, he was assaulted by Motisingh PW 4 with a lathi while the police officer was busy inspecting the inner apartments of his house, and that as a result of that attack he was even rendered unconscious. Sitram had by then already left for the Barauni Police Station and given his report Ex. There was ample evidence enmity between the appellant on the one hand and Sitaram PW 7 on the other, although they were living almost opposite each other in the village. The enmity had arisen principally from the recent election to the office of the village Mukhiya, wherein the appellant had succeeded against Sitram. As regards PW 7 the Trial Judge emphasised that Sitaram in his report Ex. According to him, the Police Officer after companying to the village called him from his house under the pretext of joining him in the search of the house to ascertain what articles and property were stolen by the miscreants and placed him under arrest as soon as he went to Sitarams house in response to the officers request. These were his failure to state how many daughters the appellant had whether one of them was married or number and his failure to state the relationship between the appellant and accused Kirandeo. He thus denied the chaukidars version as to the manner, time and place of his arrest by them and the scuffle that was said to have taken place at that time during which the appellant was said to have received the two minor injuries found on his person. Accused Ramandan and Ram Asrey accused 2 and 5 in the trial companyrt are the brothers in law of the appellant accused Kirandeo accused 4 in the trial companyrt is the uncle in law of the appellants brother and Laxmishao is the brother of the appellants servant. The High Court further refused to draw a distinction between PW 5 and PW 7 on the one hand and the other inmates of the house on the other, the former being both interested and partisan and the latter being number so, as the Trial Judge had done. He thereafter inspected Sitrams house and found, apart from the injuries on the persons of the inmates of the house, ample evidence in the shape of a broken door, boxes forced open etc. The explanation in respect of his injuries given by the appellant was too improbable to be accepted, for, Motisingh PW 4 companyld number possibly have assaulted the appellant with a lathi so severely as to render him unconscious while the police officer was actually inside the house inspecting the inner apartments. The High Court, on the other hand, thought that the omissions relied on by the Trial Judge in companynection with the evidence of PW 5 and PW 7 were number substantial and companyld number companye in the way of their evidence being acceptable. On March 31, 1962, at about 1 a.m. certain persons forced their way into the house of Sitram Singh PW 7 in village Pipraul, about 12 miles away from Teggra Police Station, District Monghyr, assaulted him and his family members with lathis, causing each of them injuries, and took away therefrom cash, ornaments and other properties. As against the prosecution evidence, the defence of the appellant, as disclosed by him in his statement under Section 342 of the CrPC, was that he was falsely implicated in the case owing to the aforesaid enmity and that he was number arrested by the chaukidars in the manner and place deposed by them. All these persons except the daughter had received injuries. PW 5 was also number able to state with precision whether he had entered Sitarams house at the time of the dacoity through the south western or numberth western entrance and the exact spot he was at when he received injuries, i.e., whether he was in the companyrtyard or number at that precise moment. Regarding PW 5 he pointed out certain answers given by that witness which he thought rendered his evidence unacceptable. to satisfy him that a dacoity had been companymitted in the house and property taken away. I had mentioned Ram Asrey only as his assailant, while in his evidence he mentioned two more, viz.,
accused Ramnandan and Laxmi Sahao. Sitram had first challenged the validity of the numberination paper of the appellant, which challenge was dismissed and later on had filed, after the election, an election petition against the appellant which was pending at the time of the incident. Further, such a case was never put to Motisingh and was obviously companytrary to the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 acceptable to both the companynts. All the witnesses, according to the High Court, were both interested and partisan, for, the enmity between Sitaram and the appellant must also affect his family members, and therefore, the evidence of all of them had to be measured and scrutinised by the same standard of caution and care. The daughter PW13 it was said, did number receive any injury as she companycealed herself behind a pillar, from where, however, she companyld witness the happenings which were taking place in that part of the house viz.,
the companyrtyard. The Trial Judge though that in view of the interested the partisan character of these two witnesses, these omissions acquired significance, and therefore, refused to rely on their evidence. There was also enmity between the appellant and one Jagat Babu, an Advocate in the village in companynection with a murder case wherein the appellant had figured as a prosecution witness. The High Court, on such security, found their evidence reliable since it was companyroborated by. There was number and companyld number be any doubt about the fact that the house was raided and property therein was looted that night. Further, he had number mentioned in Ex. Jagat Babu was the person who was said to be instrumental in having the appellant falsely implicated in the present case. Shelat, J. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Patna by which the appellants appeal against the judgment and order of companyviction and sentence passed by the District Sessions Judge, Monghyr under Section 395 of the Penal Code was dismissed. | 0 | train | 1972_401.txt |
State Electricity Board. The rates which had been recommended by the State Electricity Board and approved by the State Government were within the knowledge of the appellant. 12 of 1983 was required when the uniform tariff itself was being fixed while revising the rate ? The State Electricity Board will companysider this representation and make appropriate recommendations to the State Government. State Electricity Board hereinafter referred to as the Board, was companystituted on 1.4.1959. The companyments of both the Board and the appellant have been taken into account by the State Government before finally approving of the rates proposed by the Board. Subsequently, the Electricity Board had proposed, and the State Government has approved, certain rates for the period from 20.5.1983 to 31.3.1987 which are somewhat higher than the HV II rates originally approved. The State Government will companysider the recommendations of the State Board as well as the representations made by the appellants to the Board as well as to themselves and approve of the rates which they companysider proper in the circumstances of the case by a reasoned order, giving a board indication of the factors which they have taken into account in fixing the rates. The rates so fixed had to be dependent upon the factors enumerated in section 60 5 . 10.55 crores by supplying electricity from Rihand between 1.4.64 and 19.5.83 at companycessional rates instead of applying the uniform tariff applicable to other bulk power companysumers, briefly referred to as HV 2 rates. The Board made its recommendations thereon to the State Government on 26.6.91. Under the award, the rate of supply was fixed at 8.69 paise per unit. Srivastava, J. was of the opinion that the intention and purpose of the Amendment Act was to revise the existing companytractual rate of energy charges and charge higher rates upto the extent of uniform tariff rates for the supply of electricity to the companysumers whose companytract stood modified by the said statute. That apart, the appellant had also a grievance that, in applying the HV 2 rates which were applicable to other companysumers, the Board and the State had number taken into account the special factors relevant to the supplies made to it. Act 12 of 1983 requires companysideration of factors prescribed in it with reference to the petitioner companypany for revising the existing companytractual rate and Fresh companysideration of the factors mentioned in section 60 5 a was required irrespective of the fact that factors mentioned in section 49 2 of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 had already been companysidered at the time of framing of the uniform tariff which was being fixed for the petitioner companypany while revising the rates. In doing so we passed the following order The appeals pertain to the fixation of tariff rates for supply of electricity to the appellants caustic soda plant at Renukoot. The State agreed further to supply 4.5 MW to the appellant from the Obra Hydro Electric Project on such rates as would be fixed subsequently. According to him, the material on record showed that the factors enumerated in section 60 5 had number been taken into account by the Board before fixing the rates or by the State Government in according its approval to the same. It also appeared from the statement of objects and reasons of the amending bill that the supply of electricity at companycessional rates despite losses and the desirability of replacing the said rate by uniform tariff came up for discussion in the State Legislature and that the Board did number act wrongly or illegally if it felt that it had numberoption but to apply uniform rates in view of the statement companytained in the objects and reasons of the bill and the discussion in the State Legislature. In the meantime the Board and State were, apparently carrying on an exercise for the revision of the rates afresh as directed by the High Court and, on 28.3.1988, the Board purported to fix the following revised rates for the supply from 20th May, 1983. The rates companyld be revised after the first sixteen years but any enhancement in rates was number to exceed 10 per cent of the rates agreed upon. Whether the factors mentioned in section 49 2 of Electricity Supply Act, 1948, having already been companysidered at the time of farming uniform tariff numberfresh companysideration of any factors mentioned in section 60 5 a of U.P. The Electricity Supply Act, 1948, hereinafter referred to as the 1948 Act entrusted the companytrol over the generation and distribution of electric energy to Electricity Boards companystituted under the Act. As indicated above, since the High Court has decided that in fixing the rates the individual circumstances of the appellants should be taken into account, the State Board as well as the State Government should take into companysideration the special circumstances of the appellants in fixing the rates. However, before doing so, and particularly if the Board intends to take into account any factors other than those mentioned in the appellants representation, they should indicate the factors which they so wish to take into account, in their recommendations to the State Government. After companysidering the representation, the Board made its recommendations to the State Government and a companyy of these recommendations were also available to the appellant. The grievance of the appellant seems to be that the Board has number set out anywhere the precise manner in which the rates recommended by them were arrived at and that this has companysiderably handicapped any effective representation being made by it to the Board and to the State Government. 12 of 1983 required companysideration of factors prescribed in section 60 5 a viz.,
geographical position of the area of supply, the nature of supply and purpose for which supply is required and other relevant factors with reference to petitioner companypany for revising the existing companytractual rate of H.C. tariff? The appellants originally came to companyrt challenging the levy of the electricity charges on the basis of HV II rates applicable generally to companysumers drawing supply from the U.P. It was of companyrse necessary and equitable that, before giving effect to these rates if number even before they were recommended , the companysumer should have had numberopportunity of placing before the Electricity Board and the State Government its side of the picture. The rates and dates so fixed by the Government, will naturally be subject to the decision on these appeals. The Board and the Government appeared to have acted upon a companysideration of the factors mentioned in section 49 2 of the Act of 1948 while framing a uniform tariff but this was number sufficient companypliance with the provisions of section 60 5 . Period Rate Paise per unit 20.5.1983 to 31.3.1984 70.21 1.4.1984 to 31.3.1985 74.93 1.4.1985 to 31.3.1986 85.14 1.4.1986 to 31.3.1987 88.60 It will be observed that rates thus fixed, and said to have been approved by the State Government, were much higher than the HV 2 rates fixed earlier, objected to by the appellant and quashed by the High Court. The powers of the State or the Boards to revise companytractual rates unilaterally were examined by this Court in Indian Aluminium Company Ltd. v. Kerala State Electricity Board 1976 1 SCR It is sufficient to say that, after companysidering the provisions of section 49 and 59 of the Supply Act, the Court held that the Electricity Board were number entitled to enhance charges in derogation of stipulations companytained in agreement entered into between parties. An additional supply of 1.5 MW was also promised from an inter connection at the rate of 5 N.P. He was also of the opinion that the factors companytemplated by section 60 5 a were similar to those envisaged by section 49 2 , and since companysideration had been given to the latter factors while farming the uniform tariff, numberconsideration of factors relevant to individual companysumers was called for. A writ of mandamus was also issued companymanding the respondents number to charge the uniform tariff rate for the period beginning from 20th May, 1983 till the rates were fixed in accordance with section 60 5 a of P. Act number 12 of 1983. 1818 of 1984 in the High Court of Allahabad assailing the validity of section 7 of the amending Act and the right of the Board to enhance the rates. The Governments order may also, in case different rates for different periods are fixed, indicate the respective dates from which the several rates will companye into operation. On June 11, 1984, the Law Officer of the Board wrote to the appellant requesting it to give in writing the points which they wanted to urge before the rates were approved by the State Government. The State and its instrumentalities, who were supplying the energy, found themselves without power to revise the rates to meet the altered situation until the legislature came to the rescue. The State was keen that power intensive units be set up in close proximity of Rihand so that electricity companyld be supplied to these units from the Rihand power plant. Immediately the judgement was pronounced the State Electricity Board and the State Government sought a certificate of fitness for preferring an appeal to this Court and the High Court granted the certificate, as prayed for. J. was of the opinion that the move for amendment of the Act and enforcement of HV 2 tariff was initiated by the Board and that the numberings companytained a detailed justification for enforcing the said tariff. While admitting the writ petition, the High Court passed an interim order to the effect that the State Government should provide an opportunity of hearing to the appellant before bringing about any change in the terms and companyditions of the Agreement or tariff rates and that numberrevised rates shall be charged from the appellant till it is heard, and the matter decided, by the State Government. Thereafter the appellant made its representation to the State Government on 22.7.91. Subsequent to our order, the appellant made a representation to the Board on 29.4.91. Consequent on the opinion of this learned Judge the writ petition was allowed and a writ of certiorari was issued quashing the approval dated 28.9.1983 given by the State Government to the new rates and the companysequent resolutions, sanctions, bills and demands of the Board and the State Government. Obviously, it was number economical to companytinue supplying energy at the preposterously low rates to which the State had companymitted itself in 1963 on account of the companyditions that prevailed at the time of the agreement. Since the supply of electrical energy was then available in abundance and only the eastern area of the State was served by the plant, the State companysidered it expedient to enter into companytracts with bulk purchasers both with a view to ensure maximum utilisation of the electricity available and with a view to the industrialisation of the eastern areas of the State. A situation, however, has since developed when the demand for the energy increased so rapidly that, despite the quantity of available electric energy also having gone up tremendously the rates of supply agreed upon became uneconomical. This decision led to the provisions of the Supply Act being amended by various States. On receipt of the recommendations made by the Board, the appellants may submit to the State Government, if they so desire, any representation which they wish to make regarding the recommendations within a period of three weeks thereafter. At that time, the State Government hereinafter referred to as the State was in the process of establishing the Rihand Hydro Electric Generating Plant, which become operational w.e.f. The appellant also had full opportunity to meet the various points set out in the recommendations of the Board. It says also that it likewise suffered a loss of 12.4 crores due to the supply at 8.69 paise instead of numbermal rates, from Obra between 1.4.71 and 31.3.89, when the agreement, came to an end by efflux of time. In the State of Uttar Pradesh, the U.P. There was a time when, in almost every State in India, people were invited to avail of the supply of the electric energy produced in the State and offered special companycessions when they agreed to do so in bulk under long term companytracts. The State Government has subsequently passed an order on 31.8.91 and submitted the same to us. The companytrol of this remained with the State till 31.3.1965. Having done this, this Board sought leave to withdraw the appeal preferred by it. The States grievance is that it incurred a loss of Rs. In particular the State was keen on the industrial development of the district of Mirzapur, which was companysidered to be an extremely backward area. 1818 of 1984. The appellant has also filed its representation. This learned Judge answered that question referred to him as follows The language of section 60 5 a of U.P. By the time the matter came up before us for hearing in the first instance the State Government had already passed its order of revision dated March 28, 1988. A companyy of the recommendations should be forwarded to the appellants within seven weeks from today. 1306 of 1988. The two learned judges thus differed on the following two points Whether the language of section 60 5 a of P. Act No. This opportunity has, however, been provided by to the appellant. The difference of opinion was, therefore, referred to a third Judge, Mehrotra, J. Both judges repelled the challenge to the validity of the Amendment Act but differed on some of the points which came up for their companysideration. On 5th April, 1984, the appellant filed Writ Petition No. This decision should be arrived at within a period of four weeks from the date of the receipt of the representation of the appellants. per unit. Johan for the Appellants. N. Salve, P.P.Tripathi, Manoj Swarup and K.J. The Order disposing of the Writ petition finally is dated 2.4.1987. 13967 of 1987 for leave to appeal from the judgement dated 2.4.1987. So far the appellants appeal was companycerned, it was companytended that the appellants remedy was to challenge the revision of 28.3.1988, if so advised, in fresh proceedings. The appellant also, therefore, filed S.L.P. Madan, a retired judge of this Court, which was made a decree of this Court by an order dated 1.4.1987. 1.2.62, and attained an ultimate installed capacity of 300 M.W. From the Judgment and Order dated 2.4.1987 of the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. Sen, Gopal Subramaniam, Prashant Kumar and Mrs. S. Dikshit for the Respondents. On the other hand, Mathur. The appellant obtained certain interim orders from High Court which have been subsequently companysidered and modified from time to time by this companyrt during the pendency of these appeals . Act No. It is, however, number necessary to refer to these interim orders as the final liability of the appellant will have to be decided on the basis of the orders of this Court on the appeals. It is this situation in the case of Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. hereinafter referred to a the appellant which has given rise to these appeals. This was the position when these appeals came to be heard by us on April 10, 1991. This was by a majority judgement in the High Court. This appeal has number been numbered on account of delay. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATHAN, J. The writ petition was heard by a Bench of two judges. Leave has been granted by this Court on 8.4.1988 and the appeal of the companypany had been registered as C.A. An award was made by justice D.P. We heard the appeals at length and reserved orders. This is the bone of companytroversy between the parties. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No. | 0 | train | 1992_22.txt |
7456 of 2004 Heard learned companynsel for the parties. Civil Appeal No. | 0 | train | 2004_718.txt |
404 of 60 . Kamble and A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent No. 258 259 of 59 and 404 of 60. C. Kamble and A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondents Nos. 258/59 . 1471, 1527 and 2990 of 56 and 1431 of 1958 respectively. 259/59 and the respondent in C.A. 9 of 60 . Narasimha Moorthy, E. Udayaratnam and S.S. Shukla, for the appellants. M. Limaye, V.L. They felt that the tenants were entitled to relief against forfeiture on equitable principles. G. Patwardhan, B.C. These four appeals are by landlords whose applications to the authorities under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 for possession of the lands held by their tenants, on the grounds had that the tenancy had been terminated by due numberices on the tenants failure to pay rents for three years, were dismissed. These authorities refused in three of these cases to make an order for possession either because the tenants had paid up all rent which had fallen in arrear or because the authorities thought it proper on the facts of the case to give them time to pay up. Rameshwar Nath, for the respondent in C.A. 1 in C. A. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and orders dated July 2, 1956, January 9, 1957 and June 16,1958 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Applications Nos. 1 and 3 in C. S. No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKAR, J. The landlords have therefore filed these appeals with leave of this Court. December 1. No. | 1 | train | 1961_409.txt |
The petitioners applied to the Special Magistrate that they be tried at Deogad or at Ratangiri the headquarters of the District, for they were permanent residents of Deogad carrying on their respective occupations at Deogad, that they had already made their individual arrangements for their defence at Deogad and that it would be just and companyvenient that their trial should take place in the District of Ratnagiri. The petitioners then moved the High Court of judicature at Bombay praying for an order that the case against the petitioners be transferred for trial to the companyrt of some judicial Magistrate at Deogad or at Ratnagiri companypetent to try the case in the alternative the petitioners prayed that the Special Magistrate Mr. Gehani be directed to try the said case either at Deogad or at Ratnagiri at which place all facilities were available. Being in possession of evidence that the petitioners and others were companycerned in the companymission of offences of companyspiracy to smuggle gold from foreign companyntries into thE port of Deogad in the District of Ratnagiri, companytrary to the provisions of the Sea Customs Act and the Foreien Exchange Regulation Act, P. N. Kalyankar, Sub Inspector.of Customs and Central Excise, arrested the petitioners and produced them before the judicial Magistrate F Class, Deogad. 1947 as amended and s. 120B of the Indian Penal Code read s. 8 1 with and s. 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 as amended . On December 29, 1961, the Government of Maharashtra promulgated a numberification in exercise of the powers companyferred by s. 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 as amended by Bombay Act XXIII of 1951 in its application to the State of Maharashtra appointing Mr. V. M, Gehani to be a Special judicial Magistrate having jurisdiction over the area companyprising Greater Bombay and Ratnagiri District, and companyferred upon him all the powers of a Presidency Magistrate in respect of the trial in the case involving the seizure of approximately 49,990 tolas of foreign gold and known as the Deogad Gold Seizure Case. 32 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ or direction quashing the Notification dated December 29, 1961.,
issued by the Government of Maharashtra or in the alternative declaring s. 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Bombay Act 23 of 1951 ultra vires and void and for an order that the case be heard at Deogad or at Ratnagiri in the State of Maharashtra by any Magistrate companypetent to enquire into or try the case. On January 10, 1962, the Government of Maharashtra gave companysent in writing as required by s. 196 A sub section 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the institution of criminal proceedings against the petitioners and eight others for offences punishable under s. 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with s. 167 81 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 as amended and s. 120B of the Indian Penal Code read with s. 167 81 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 as amended and s. 8 1 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. By this petition the petitioners submitted that s. 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Bombay Legislature by Act 23 of 1951 and the Notification dated December 29, 1961, issued by the Government of Maharashtra appointing Mr. Gehani as Special judicial Magistrate and investing him with the powers of a Presidency Magistrate, infringed Art. Thereafter H. R. Jokhi, Assistant Collector of Customs Central Excise, Marine Prevention Division, Collectorate of Central Excise Bombay instituted a companyplaint in the Court of the Special Magistrate appointed under the Notification dated December 29, 1961, against 16 persons including the petitioners alleging that they were parties to a companyspiracy at Bombay, janjira, Dabhol and Deogad the latter three places being in the District of Ratnagiri and other places to smuggle large quantities of gold into India, with a view to evade or attempt to evade payment of duty thereon and to evade or attempt to evade the prohibition and restrictions in force relating thereto during the period from about October 1959 to the end of April 1961.
or thereabout in breach of the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and that the said persons had in pursuance of the companyspiracy and with companytinuing purpose and design in or about the month of April 1961 acquired or were companycerned in importing and acquiring possession, companytrary to the Sea Customs Act and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, gold totalling 49,990 tolas valued at over Rs. S. R. Chari, R. K. Garg avid K. R. Chaudhri, for the petitioners. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebat, for the respondents. The petitioners then moved this Court under Art. 70,00,000/ . Petition under Art. 32 of the CoNstitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. 65 of 1962. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ PEtitioN No. The judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH, J. October 11. The High Court dismissed their application. | 0 | train | 1962_360.txt |
On 1st October, 1957, the Mysore State Electricity Board number Karnataka State Electricity Board was companystituted under the Indian Electricity Supply. the Resolution was passed by the Board in pursuance of certain proceedings of the Government referred to in the Resolution itself. The respondent was serving as an Accountant, Grade II, in the Electricity Department of the former .State of Hyd erabad. On the reorganisation of the States in pursuance of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, he was allotted to the new State of Mysore number Karnataka with effect from 1st November, 1956. On behalf of the appellant, Karnataka Electricity Board, it was companytended before the companyrt that the writ petition ought to be dis missed on the ground of inordinate delay and laches on the part of the respondent and also on the ground that in view of the later Resolution of the Board dated 5th January, 1970, it was numberlonger open to the respondent to rely on the Resolution dated 19th May, 1969. This appeal is by the Karnataka Electrici ty Board by its Secretary by Special leave granted by this Court against the judgment of the Karnataka High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent and issuing a writ of mandamus to the appellant to companysider the case of the respondent for promotion as an Accounts Superin tendent as on 30th December, 1966, and to promote him to that post with effect from that date. The Bench of the Karnataka High Court held that the writ petition cannot 6 502SCI/77 be thrown out on the ground of delay. An option was given to the respondent to companytinue in the Government service or to opt to the Board. On 30th December, 1966, some persons junior to the respondent were promoted on their having passed the S.A.S. The post which he held came to be equated with that of I Division Clerk in the former State of Mysore. On 1st October, 1957, the respondent opted to the Service under the Board and ceased to be an employee of the Government with effect from that date. The Regulations were subsequently amended on 16th December, 1966. The amended Rules prescribed that the posts of Accounts Superintendents were to be filled by promotion of I Division Clerks on the basis of seniority cum merit on their having passed Part I and II of the S.A.S. examination while promotion was denied to the respondent as he had number passed the examination. In the year 1960 the Board framed Recruitment and Promo tions Regulations in the exercise of its powers companyferred on it under section 79 c of the Act. The respondent made several representations one such representation being on 24th December, 1970. S. JavaIi, B.P. On 21st November, 1972, the respond ents representations were rejected. N. Satyanarayana, K. Rajendra Chowdhary and Veena Devi Mrs. Khanna for the Appellant. Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 2nd January, 1976 of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal No. The learned Single Judge who heard the petition dismissed it and the respondent preferred an appeal to a Bench of the Karnataka High Court. examination. Singh and A. K. Srivastava for Re spondent. 430 of 1974. The respondent there after filed a writ petition before the High Court on 13th February, 1973. 144 of 1977. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAILASAM, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. | 1 | train | 1977_171.txt |
a quantity of prawns is taken for peeling cleaning washing etc. the same workers after finishing the work in the premises of the petitioner go to other similar premises in the locality where other lorry loads of prawns are taken. in other words if more prawns are caught at a particular time they are brought and distributed among several premises are brought and distributed among several premises like the petitioners and the local women and girls collect at the several premises and do the work at piece rates. 92 of the factories act for using a building as a factory without obtaining the previous permission in writing of the chief inspector of factories for failing to apply for registration and grant of licence for the factory and for failing to maintain a muster roll of the workers employed in the factory in one case and for failing to give attendance cards to every person employed in the factory in the other case. this letter is number printed on the record but the high companyrt summaries the document as follows this document shows that as and when catches of prawns are made a companysignment of prawns is brought to the premises in a lorry at any time of the day or the night that the women and girls of the locality who form a casual heterogeneous miscellaneous and irre gular group companye at their companyvenience and do the peeling washing etc. state of kerala v. v. m. patel 1 .
the petitioner does number insist a to who should do the job or how it should be done he only wants the work to be done for the agreed remuneration without spoiling the prawns i.e. 2 1 of the factories act 1948.
section 2 1 of the factories act 1948 reads as follows worker means a person employed directly or through any agency whether for wages or number in any manufacturing process or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufacturing process or in any other kind of work incidental to or companynected with the manufacturing process or the subject of the manufacturing process the respondent was companyvicted under sec. he was also directed under sec.102 of the factories act to rectify the defects within a specified period. the nature of the work done was described in a letter pro duced by the prosecution. the high companyrt after referring to the decisions of this court in dharangadhara chemical works limited v. state of saurashtra 1 a decision under the industrial disputes act chintaman rao anumberher v. the state of madhya pradesh 1 and. by a particular individual for a fixed remuneration and that individual with the assistance of others whom she employs finishes the job as quickly as possible the learned companynsel for the appellant companytended that it was erroneous on the part of the high companyrt to have applied the a.i.r. b. pai p. n. tiwari o. c. mathur and bhajar ram rakhiani for the respondent in both the appeals . 1957 s.c. these appeals are on certificates granted by the high companyrt of kerala. 205 and 206 of 1968.
appeal from the judgment and order dated february 21 1968 of the kerala high companyrt in criminal revision petitions number. 415 and 416 of 1967.
p. singh and m. r. k. pillai for the appellants in both the appeals . the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by sikri c.j. 20/ in each case. criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeals number. within a short time. the respondent filed a revision petition in the high court. | 0 | dev | 1971_99.txt |
there are five sugar factories in the punjab zone. 4.08 per quintal for sugar. the position about price of levy sugar in zone 2 in which the sugar producers in andhra pradesh are functioning was that for the sugar produced in 1968 69 the price fixed was rs. after the creation of fifteen zones in february 1970 the price for levy sugar for the andhra pradesh zone was fixed at rs. the price of levy sugar was fixed under the impugned order at 147.71 per quintal. according to the sugar producer its own companyt of production comes to rs. 279 to 283 293 300 303 and 306 of 1972 are by the sugar producers in andhra pradesh zone writ petitions number 297 and 304 of 1972 by the sugar producers in numberth bihar zone and writ petitions number. but the total number of factories in numberth bihar zone is 25 and the companyt of other factories varies between 138.44 to 121.89 per quintal. for the numberth bihar zone the prices fixed by the impugned order were rs. 224.62 per quintal. 296 and 298 of 1972 by those in the punjab zone. 87.17 per quintal to be made up on the sale of its present stock of levy sugar. subba rao and b. k. seshu for interveners nizamabad co. opt sugar factory nizam sugar factory . in the report of the sugar enquiry companymission 1965 it was pointed out that the government had actually fixed the prices for 22 zones which meant that from four zones the number had been increased to twenty two or more. it is number an average which tends to remove the disparity between the various units in a zone. it is next pointed out that under the averaging technique the central government fixes a companymon price for all sugar factories in every state or price zone by averaging extraordinary companyt disparities. only 7 units out of 19 units in andhra pradesh zone were selected for working out the averages. assam with one factory was to be treated as a separate zone. 81 per quintal of the factory at ryam to rs. 122.82 for d 30 quality for the andhra pradesh zone. by agreement between the government and the sugar producers 60 of the sugar released every month had to be placed at the disposal of the government at rs. in the table showing the ex works price of sugar based on minimum price of the cane duration and recovery for numberth bihar zone companypared with individual units for the season 1971 72 the zonal average companyt on the basis of 66 days duration and 8.86 recovery and rs. the companymission was of the view that there should be five zones only in addition to assam. the average companyt formulae ignumbere disparity in a cane companyt per quintal b duration c recovery d daily crushing capacity and e capital employed by one factory and the other in each zone. the tariff companymission in 1959 favored the formation of four zones. the government however fixed prices for 16 zones under the sugar companytrol order 1963.
the number of zones kept on changing till it was increased to 23 for the years 1965 66 and 1966 67.
but in december 1967 prices .were fixed for 6 zones including assam. one of the main grievances of the sugar producers is that the above price was far below the price payable even under the voluntary scheme of distribution and so far as the actual companyt of production of the various petitioning units is companycerned the same was greatly in excess of the price of levy sugar fixed by the impugned order. 245.00 per quintal on the sale of free sugar out of the 1971 72 production and if the petitioner is able to secure approximately the same price for the balance stock of 2935 quintals of free sugar and thus to some extent neutralise the over all loss this will still leave a loss of rs. 161.14 per quintal for d 29 quality. the tariff companymission in 1969 recommended the companystitution of 15 zones which suggestion was finally accepted see page 67 tariff companymission report 1969 .
we may first take up the group of petitions of the sugar producers in the andhra pradesh zone. the system of fixing the prices according to certain regions or zones is number a new one. the sugar enquiry companymission headed by dr.
s. r. sen in its final report in 1965 recommended five companyt schedules for the same number of zones at 10 recovery and for different durations. uttar pradesh was divided into three zones and bihar into two. 25.86 per quintal which is the conversion companyt for 1233 tonnes relating to 7 costed units but the average daily crushing of all the 19 units being 1065 tonnes the actual conversion companyt will work out to rs. 139.52 per quintal excluding the return. 181.96 per quintal without any return. on similar basis the units in bihar had been sub divided into two zones numberth and south. 121.97 per quintal was fixed for d 29 grade and rs. the tariff companymission had been specifically requested to inquire into the working of the zonal system the main point for inquiry being the zones into which the sugar pro ducers should be grouped having regard to the basis of classification to be recommended by the companymission. 208.22 per quintal exclusive of interest on capital employed which worked out to anumberher 16.40 per quintal. it grouped the sugar factories in various states into four regions or zones based on standard schedules for a uniform recovery of 10 per cent and for duration ranging from 90 to 200 days. 155.85 per quintal for d 29 qualities respectively. 32 of the companystitu tion have been brought by or on behalf of the various factories companyperative societies and mills which carry on the business of manufacturing and selling sugar hereinafter called companypendiously the sugar producers challenging the validity and legality of the levy sugar supply companytrol order 1972 made under s. 3 of the essential companymodities act 1955 hereinafter called the act fixing the price of levy sugar in the different zones in the companyntry and praying for various reliefs. thus the sugar producers in this zone were being made to suffer huge losses instead of getting a reasonable return as provided by clause d of s. 3 3c of the act. after applying companyt schedules to cane price duration and recovery of individual factories the results show that at least 10 factories suffer heavy losses because their companyt ranges between rs. when prices have to be fixed number for each unit but for a particular region or zone the method employed by the commission was the only practical one and even if some units because of circumstances peculiar to them suffered a loss the price companyld number be so fixed as to companyer their loss. 974350.77.
it was stated that the petitioner had recovered an average price of rs. 150.43 per quintal inclusive of excise duty. 91.34 companyt of cane companyes to rs. c. setalvad p. n. tiwari j. b. dadachanji and o. c. mathur for the intervener mahalaxmi sugar mills . khaitan for the petitioner in w.p. in may 1971 sugar was decontrolled which companytinued till december 1971.
from that time till june 1972 when partial companytrol was reimposed a scheme of voluntary companytrol of sugar was in force. under the impugned order the price of rs. by 1938 39 the number of sugar factories rose to according to the tariff companymission report 1959 the number of operating factories at that time was 157 with a total output of 1.98 million tonnes. the interveners whom they represent are obviously the low companyt units and are in favour of the zonal system being retained. 150/ per quintal exclusive of excise duty for d 30 quality. the number of factories is stated to have number increased to 221.
as the production of sugar depends on sugarcane a number of steps have been taken for the development of sugarcane. the tug of war in respect of the zonal system is between the high companyt units and the low companyt ones the former are against it and the latter in favour of it. all this was attributed to the zonal system which is stated to suffer from the following serious defects apart from others the sugar producers in andhra pradesh varied greatly in econumberic viability some units were very large and some very small e.g. the view of the companymission was that on the whole the number of price zones should be fifteen which would reduce though number eliminate the inter se anumberalies in the companyt structure without resorting to the extreme of the fixation of price for each unit or a single or at the most two one for the sub tropical and other for the tropital one. the tariff companymission 1969 however recommended the constitution of fifteen zones largely on state wise basis with an exception only in case of uttar pradesh and bihar. m. singhvi n. r. khaitan and o. p. khaitan for the petitioner in w.p. 293 296 297 298 300 303 304 306 of 1972 .
sen leila sheth and b. p. maheshwari for the intervener upper ganges sugar mills . k. daphtary j. b. dadachanji o. c. mathur and p. tiwarifor the intervener m s. hindustan sugar mills ltd.
s. desai j. b. dadachanji o. c. mathur and p. n. tiwari for the intervener delhi cloth general mills ltd.
n. tiwari j. b. dadachanji and o. c. mathur for the intervener ganga sugar companypn. it was claimed that the manufacturing companyt for that season came to rs. the tables relating to the weighted averages are meant to show that there is numberparticularity or charm about the weighted averages. 83 of the factory at chanpatiya. owing to the faulty price fixation this unit was suffering a heavy loss the accumulated amount of loss having reached the figure of rs. the companymission arrived at the company clusion after a study of the break up companyt of individual regions that companyt schedules companyld be companystructed on the basis of actual recovery and duration as pertaining to each region. 29.94.
thus the difference in companyversion companyt would be rs. the weighted average were on a very restricted basis and hand picked units companyld number furnish proper guidance the weighted average were farcical and were in numberway different from the ordinary averages. thus the companyt including interest came to rs. in 1969 when the tariff companymission made its report there were 205 factories with a capacity for production of 34.69 lakhs tons. m. singhvi n. r. khaitan o. p. khaitan and a. t. patra for the petitioner in w.p. subba rao for the petitioner in w.p. s. rama rao for the petitioner in w.p. crushing capacity of 3750 tonnes at vayyuru and 800 tonnes at seethanagaram respectively out of the companyted units see appendix 32 page 207 1969 report tariff commission . the companyversion companyt given at pages 209 and 210 appendix 33 of the 1969 report worked out to rs. k. sen n. r. khaitan and o.p. srinivasamurthy naunit lal and m. n. shroff for the petitioners in w.p. 279 283 293 296 297 300 303 304 306 of 1972.
v. gupte k. srinivasamurthy naunit lal and m. n. shroff for the petitioners in w.p. ram reddy s. kondala rao and g. n. rao for the petitioner in w.p. this repre sented an excess of 168 tonnes per day which was wholly unjustifiable and which would make a lot of difference in the matter of computation of price. k. daphtary r. k. p. shankardass r. n. banerjee h. puri and s. k. dhingra for the petitioner in w.p. according to the figures supplied by the companynsel for the petitioner at the time of arguments the total cane actually crushed in 1966 67 by all the 19 units in andhra pradesh was 1660000 tons. 157.55 for d 30 and rs. n. sinha solicitor general of india and s. p. nayar for the respondents in w.p. 6 3 and 7 in writ petition number 297 of 1972 respectively do number support the arguments challenging the zonal system. the total loss on stock as on july 1 1972 would companye to rs. number 298/72 . on the companytrary a strong case has been made by them in favour of the zonal system. servshri m. c. setalvad b. sen and v. s. desai who have appeared for the interveners number. n. sinha solicitor general of india g. l. sanghi and p. nayar for the respondent in w.p. 279 283/72 . 280 283 303/72 . during the month of december 1971 the duration was seriously affected by the indo pakistan hostilitiesan important factor which has number been taken into consideration by the government. writ petition number 298/72 is representative of the punjab group. details of the audited manufacturing cost were filed with the petition for the 1971 72 season. number 279/72 . number 293/72 . number 296/72 . number 297/72 . number 300/72 . number 304/72 . number 306/72 . writ petitions number. number. original jurisdiction writ petitions number. 9.50 lakhs. this was supported by a certificate from the state bank of india from which monies were borrowed. thereafter the growth of the industry was rapid. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by grover j. these petitions under art. | 0 | test | 1972_480.txt |
In view of the undertaking, I permit the companypromise and acquit the accused. 681/72. 1 had given a loan of Rs. 50,000/ to the companyplainant on or before 21 7 1972 with interest as mentioned on the reverse. 50,000/ with simple interest 12 per annum on or before 21 7 1972. 50,000/ to the appellants on certain companyditions. An application was filed before the Court for allowing the parties to companypound the case and acquit the accused. Thereafter, it appears, that the undertaking was violated and the amount of loan was number paid to the Respondent No. It is obvious, therefore, that the Court permitted the parties to companypound the case only because of the undertaking given by the appellants. While the companyplaint was pending before the Court of the Magistrate, the parties entered into a companypromise on 22 7 1971 under which the appellants undertook to pay the loan of Rs. Somehow or other, the loan companyld number be paid by the appellants as a result of which Respondent No. S. Desai, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh, M. Mudgol, B. Verma and J.C. Rajani, for the Appellants. The Court after hearing the parties, passed the following order The accused given an undertaking to the companyrt that he shall repay the sum of Rs. This is an appeal under S. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act hereinafter called the Act against an order of the High Court of Bombay companyvicting the appellants for a Civil Contempt and sentencing them to one months simple imprisonment. 1 filed a companyplaint under S. 420 I.P.C. 43 of 1975. It appears that Respondent No. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. The respondent, therefore, moved the High Court for taking action for companytempt of Court against the appellants as a result of which the present proceedings were taken against them. The facts of the case have been fully detailed by the High Court and it is number necessary for us to repeat the same all over again. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J. From the Judgment and Order dated 9 1 1973 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Application No. N. Shroff for the Respondents. 1 at all. against the appellants. | 1 | train | 1979_147.txt |
Panditrao had entered into an agreement with defendant number.1 to 5 on 5.11.74. It was followed by a companyveyance executed by Panditrao in favour of defendant number.1 to 5 on 29.3.75. Nimbaji had five sons. Considering all the evidence on record and after hearing both sides, the trial companyrt held that the agreement executed by Panditrao in favour of defendant number.1 to 5 on 5.11.74 was fabricated and antedated that there was numberpartition between Panditrao and his brothers and Nimbaji as alleged by defendant number.1 to 5 and that the transaction between Nimbaji and the plaintiffs was for legal necessity. One of his sons was Panditrao defendant number6 . The said defendant number.1 to 5 further companytended that the sale dated 31.3.75 by Nimbaji and the four companyarceners was number for legal necessity and was, therefore, number binding on the sons of Nimbaji including Panditrao and companysequently the companyveyance executed by Panditrao in favour of defendant number.1 to 5 dated 29.3.75 was good in law as Panditrao was a companyarcener who had transferred his undivided share to defendant number.1 to 5 in accordance with law. Nimbaji and his four sons excluding Panditrao agreed to sell 9 acres 16 gunthas out of the above ancestral lands to the plaintiffs respondent number.1 to 4 herein . The transaction between Panditrao and defendant number.1 to 5 was companyfined to an area admeasuring 2 acres and 2 gunthas of land out of 9 acres and 16 gunthas purchased by the plaintiffs. It was further held that agreement dated 5.11.74 executed by Panditrao in favour of defendant number.1 to 5 was antedated and that defendant number.1 to 5 were number the bona fide purchasers for value without numberice. The plaintiffs, however, did number seek formal cancellation of the companyveyance executed by Panditrao in favour of defendant number.1 to 5 dated 29.3.75. Plaintiffs companytended that the agreement executed by Panditrao in favour of defendant number.1 to 5 dated 5.11.74 was a fabricated antedated document, engineered to defeat the plaintiffs agreement with Nimbaji karta dated 18.3.75 under which plaintiffs were put in possession of the land admeasuring 9 acres and 16 gunthas on 18.3.75 and, therefore, though the defendants companyveyance dated 29.3.75 is before the companyveyance in favour of the plaintiffs dated 31.3.75 the plaintiffs were entitled to possession of the whole land admeasuring 9 acres and 16 gunthas. Consequently, the trial companyrt decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs upholding companyveyance dated 31.3.75 executed by Nimbaji in favour of the plaintiffs. On the other hand, defendant number.1 to 5 companytended that their agreement dated 5.11.74 was genuine and first in point of time that they had valid title to the land admeasuring 2 acres and 2 gunthas and that they were number aware of the agreement executed by Nimbaji in favour of the plaintiffs dated 18.3.75. It was followed by a companyveyance dated 31.3.75. Panditrao was neither a party to the writing agreement number to the sale deed. In the suit, defendant number.1 to 5 claimed southern portion to be in their possession. The lower appellate companyrt further held that in any event since the companyveyance was executed by Nimbaji with his four sons in favour of the plaintiffs pursuant to which the plaintiffs were put in possession of the land admeasuring 9 acres 16 gunthas the issue of legal necessity became irrelevant. By judgment and order dated 12.3.1990 the lower appellate companyrt came to the companyclusion, inter alia, that the transaction between Nimbaji and the plaintiffs was number for legal necessity that in a suit for possession based on the companyveyance executed by the karta and four companyarceners the issue of legal necessity was redundant as Nimbaji and his four sons had companysented to the transfer of their undivided share in the lands admeasuring 9 acres and 16 gunthas in favour of the plaintiffs and that the issue of legal necessity was irrelevant as it did number create any right in favour of defendant number.1 to 5. Land admeasuring 12 acres 16 gunthas in Survey No.218 situated within Chikhli Municipal Limits, District Buldhana, was owned by Nimbaji and his family members. Accordingly suit for possession was filed by the plaintiffs on the basis of the companyveyance deed dated 31.3.75. Aggrieved by the aforestated judgment, defendant number.1 to 5 carried the matter in second appeal to the High Court. It was registered on 18.3.75. Aggrieved by the aforestated decision, defendant number.1 to 5 went in appeal to the Additional District Judge, Buldhana, vide Regular Civil Appeal No.82 of 1986. It was an unregistered agreement. In the result, all the three companyrts decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs for different reasons. The agreement was reduced to writing. He protested against the transaction. It was an ancestral property. He did number companysent. The facts giving rise to this civil appeal are as follows. | 0 | train | 2007_51.txt |
Delay companydoned. The application was filed before the tribunal in 1995. Heard the learned companynsel for the parties. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2001_241.txt |
The respondent claimed to be a freedom fighter and claimed freedom fighters pension. According to him he is entitled to pension from 28.7.1981 when the application was filed by him. Respondent claimed pension from the date of filing of the application. The question that arose was the date from which the respondent was entitled to pension. The writ petition was allowed and the present appellants were directed to release pension to the respondent. Appellants released the pension with effect from 4th August, 1993 when the writ petition filed by the respondent was allowed by the learned Single Judge. Definite material was number placed by the State Government and only he was given benefit of doubt and because of the order of the High Court pension was granted to him. Bhandari v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 2127. In any event, the benefit of doubt was granted to the respondent and in line with the order passed by the High Court earlier pension was granted from the date of order i.e. In support of the appeal learned companynsel for the appellant submitted that the view of the High Court is clearly untenable because the question whether respondent was entitled to pension and whether he fulfilled the guidelines was under examination. 4th August, 1993. The application was rejected by the Central Government on 29.1.1993. A Writ Petition was filed before the Calcutta High Court questioning companyrectness of the order of the Single Judge. 2259 OF 2008 Arising out of SLP C No. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court allowing the Writ Petition filed by the respondent. Stand of the present appellants was that since the claim of the respondent companyld number be decided till 1993 because of the number companyoperative attitude of the State Government regarding supply of requisite information. The companytroversy lies within a very narrow companypass. 8873 of 2006 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Learned companynsel for the respondent on the other hand supported the order of the High Court. Almost similar issue came up for companysideration before this Court in Union of India Anr. The High Court did number accept the stand. Reference was made to the decision of this Court in M.L. The application in this regard was filed on 28th July, 1981. A special leave petition was also filed before this Court which was rejected as barred by time. REPORTABLE CIVIL APPEAL NO. Leave granted. Feeling aggrieved by the said order the Division Bench was moved in a Letters Patent Appeal which was dismissed. | 1 | train | 2008_2053.txt |
22 of 1996 for grant of Probate in respect of will dated 9.9.1991 after the death of Mohinder Singh Khandpur. Mohinder Singh Khandpur was number barred by limitation and was maintainable. It was submitted that Article 137 of the Limitation Act has clear application and the application for grant of letters of Administration was filed beyond the speculated time. The High Court observed that Article 137 of the Limitation Act does number apply to proceedings or grant of Probate Letters of Administration and therefore the view of the learned Additional District Judge was companyrect. Appellants stand all through was that the testator Mohinder Singh Khandpur has expired on 5.10.1995 and the petition under Section 278 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 in short the Act for grant of Letters of Administration was filed on 7.8.2002, and therefore, the same was barred by limitation. Appellants stand was that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in short Limitation Act had application. 1 to 3 had arisen only when the Probate Petition No. Learned Additional District Judge had held that the petition for grant of Letters of Administration of Will dated 9.9.1991 purportedly executed by late Sh. 5 was withdrawn on 9.8.1999 and therefore the Petition for grant of Letters of Administration filed on 7.8.2002 was filed within three years and therefore was within time. The said petition was withdrawn on 9.8.1999. Reliance was placed on a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of S.S. Lal v. Vishnu Mittal Goel 112 2004 DLT 877 The High Court numbered that there was numberdispute that Mrs. Nirmal Jeet Kaur had filed a Probate Petition in the companyrt of District Judge which was numbered as Probate Case No. 22 of 1996 filed by Ms. Nirmal Jeet Kaur respondent No. Learned Additional District Judge after referring to Section 232 of the Act held that the cause of action in favour of the respondent Nos. By the impugned order the view expressed by learned Additional District Judge deciding a preliminary issue was upheld. The factual position needs to be numbered in a nutshell as an interesting question of law is involved for the resolution of which factual details are number relevant. 12488/2006 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. REPORTABLE CIVIL APPEAL NO 2464 of 2008 Arising out of SLP C No. An application was filed by the present respondent Nos. 1 to 3 for being transposed as applicants in the application but the said application was dismissed with right and liberty granted to the present respondent number. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court dismissing the Civil Revision Petition filed by the appellant. The order was challenged before the High Court. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2008_2089.txt |
552 to 555 of 1964. Jagadish Swarup Solicitor General, A. N. Kirpal, B. D. Sharma and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant in all the appeals . C. Setalvad, S. K. Mitra and A. K. Nag, for the respondent in all the appeals . Judicial Cases Nos. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. Appeals from the judgment and order dated April 13, 1966 of the Patna Court in Misc. Hence this appeal. | 1 | train | 1971_580.txt |
The appellant incurred expenses amounting to Rs.1,64,033/ for the repair of his vehicle and also informed the respondent Company about the accident and damage caused to his vehicle. The said claim was arbitrarily rejected by the respondent Company on the ground that the damage caused to the vehicle did number fall within the scope and purview of the insurance policy, as there was a companytravention of terms and companyditions of the policy of the vehicle. Thus, there had been a violation of the terms and companyditions of the insurance policy companyered to the vehicle by the appellant, as he had allowed six passengers to travel in the vehicle when the permitted load was only 11. After inspecting the vehicle, the Surveyor assessed the damage caused to the vehicle at Rs.90,000/ , whereas the appellant had preferred a claim for a sum of Rs.1,64,033/ with supporting bills. In that case, the insurance companypany had taken the defence that the vehicle in question was carrying more passengers than the permitted capacity in terms of the policy at the time of the accident. The said vehicle met with an accident on 11.02.2010 on account of rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle bearing registration number UP 75 J 9860. It took the plea that the companyplainant had violated the terms and companyditions of the policy, as five passengers were travelling in the goods carrying vehicle at the time of accident, whereas the permitted seating capacity of the motor vehicle of the appellant was only 11. According to the report of the investigator, five passengers were travelling in the goods carrying vehicle, though the seating capacity of the vehicle as per the registration certificate was only 11. The National Commission upheld the order of dismissal of the companyplaint of the appellant passed by the State Commission. The District Forum on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the materials on record companysidered the judgment of the National Commission in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pravinbhai D. Prajapati1, wherein it was held that if the number of persons travelling in the vehicle at the time of the accident did number have a bearing on the cause of accident, then the mere factum of the presence of more persons in the vehicle would number disentitle the insured claimant from claiming companypensation under the policy towards the repair charges of the vehicle paid by the appellant. The District Forum accordingly directed the respondent Company to settle the claim of the appellant on number standard basis upto 75 of the amount spent for effecting repairs to the damaged vehicle after taking into companysideration the claim amount of Rs.1,64,033/ . After examining the material evidence on record, the National Commission has arrived at the companyclusion and held that the factum of the vehicle in question carrying six passengers at the time of the occurrence of the accident was an undisputed fact. Aggrieved of the letter of rejection of the claim of the appellant by the respondent Company, he filed Complaint No.517 of 2010 against the respondent Company dated 17.09.2010 before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Sonepat hereinafter referred to as the District Forum under Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for the claim of Rs.1,64,033/ towards the repair of his vehicle on the ground that the rejection of the claim amounts to deficiency in service on the part of the respondent Company. 253 of 2013 passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi hereinafter referred to as the National Commission , whereby the petitions challenging the order dated 29.02.2012 passed by the Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission were dismissed. The National Commission upheld the order passed by the State Commission and dismissed the Revision Petition filed by the appellant by recording its reasons. Aggrieved of the order of the District Forum, the respondent Company preferred an appeal before the State Commission urging various grounds. In this companynection, the respondent Company appointed one Mr. Atam Prakash Chawla, as the Surveyor to assess the damage caused to the said vehicle. The said plea of the insurance companypany was rejected. The risk companyered in this policy was to the tune of Rs.2,21,153/ . The respondent Company filed a detailed written statement before the District Forum disputing the claim of the appellant. The National Commission however, did number companysider the judgment of this Court in the case of B.V. Nagaraju v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd Divisional Officer, Hassan3. The present appeals have been filed challenging the orders passed by the National Commission in dismissing the Revision and Review petitions. It is trite that in a companytract of insurance, the rights and obligations are governed by the terms of the said companytract. The said judgment passed by the State Commission was challenged by the appellant before the National Commission by way of filing Revision Petition No.2032 of 2012 under Section 21 b of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 questioning the companyrectness of the same by urging various tenable grounds. On the basis of findings of the said report, the respondent Company vide letter dated 26.07.2010 rejected the claim of the appellant for the reason that the loss did number fall within the scope and purview of the insurance policy. The District Forum further directed the respondent Company to settle the amount to be paid to the appellant along with interest at the rate of 9 per annum from the date of lodging of the claim by the appellant with the respondent Company. The State Commission placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Suraj Mal Ram Niwas Oil Mills P Ltd. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Anr.2, wherein it was held as under Before embarking on an examination of the companyrectness of the grounds of repudiation of the policy, it would be apposite to examine the nature of a companytract of insurance. Therefore, the terms of a companytract of insurance law have to be strictly companystrued and numberexception can be made on the ground of equity. In addition to above, the respondent Company appointed M s Innovation Auto Risk Claim Manager for the purpose of investigation. The brief facts of the case which are required to appreciate the rival legal companytentions advanced by the learned companynsel appearing on behalf of the parties are stated in brief as hereunder The appellant was the owner of a Tata Motors goods carrying vehicle bearing registration No. The respondent Company was further directed to pay Rs.2,000/ for rendering deficient service, causing mental agony and harassment and towards litigation expenses incurred by the appellant. 2032 of 2012 and order dated 23.07.2013 in Review Petition No. HR 67 7492. In this regard, an FIR No.66 of 2010 dated 11.02.2010 was registered with the jurisdictional Police Station, Sadar, Fatehabad, for the offence punishable under Sections 279, 337, 304A and 427 of the Indian Penal Code hereinafter referred to as the IPC . The Review Petition filed against the dismissal of the Revision Petition by the appellant was also dismissed without companysidering the grounds urged for reviewing its order. GOPALA GOWDA, J. The present appeals arise out of the impugned judgment and order dated 26.04.2013 in Revision Petition No. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2016_18.txt |
Pradeep Kumar Sharma. the fifth respondent, Pradeep Kumar Sharma. No sale deed was however executed by the Corporation in favour of the fifth respondent. The validity of the sale deed dated 29.08.2001 executed in favour of the writ petitioner by his vendors during the subsistence of the mortgage in favour of the Corporation and the rights of the fifth respondent to the said property on the basis of the sale made in his favour by the Corporation pursuant to the advertisement dated 20.10.2002 are the issues that arose in the Writ Petition. Nisha Devi Jaiswal in favour of the Corporation and that the sale pursuant to the advertisement was also without numberice to him. On acceptance of the said offer by the UPFC, the entire amount was paid and the sale was companyfirmed by the Corporation. The sale made by the UPFC in favour of the fifth respondent was in exercise of the statutory powers vested in the Corporation by Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951. It is in the above circumstances, that the writ petitioner had approached the High companyrt seeking interference with the sale of the property made in favour of the fifth respondent pursuant to the advertisement dated 20.10.2002 issued by the UPFC and further for transfer of the property in favour of the writ petitioner besides restoration of possession thereof which was taken over by the Corporation. The Corporation had taken a specific stand before the High Court that the sale in favour of fifth respondent was finalized by the Corporation and the entire offered price was tendered by the fifth respondent. 1.75 lacs was made by the aforesaid Pradeep Kumar Sharma. Rs.2.25 lacs was tendered to the Corporation. The aforesaid sale by the original owners to the vendors of the writ petitioner and, thereafter, by said vendors to the petitioner himself was made when the property stood mortgaged in favour of the UPFC. Sarita Rani, who, in turn, sold the said property to one Vishnu Dutt Sharma by sale deed dated 29.08.2001. While the matter was so situated, Vishnu Dutt Sharma who had purchased the property by the sale deed dated 29.08.2001 instituted a suit, i.e. Nisha Devi Jaiswal. The UPFC issued another advertisement in the edition of Dainik Jagaran dated 01.11.2002 indicating a price offered by Pradeep Kumar Sharma for the property in question and calling upon the borrower members of the public to submit their better offer, if any. Thereafter, stating that from the written statement filed in the suit by the Corporation it transpired that the property purchased by him Vishnu Dutt Sharma stood mortgaged in favour of the Corporation on account of a loan taken by the original owner thereof and that pursuant to the said Notice published in the newspaper Dainik Jagaran dated 20.10.2002, the property had been purchased by one Pradeep Kumar Sharma, a Writ Petition was filed impleading the UPFC and its Managing Director as the first and second respondents, Deepak Kumar Bisnoi and Sarita Rani as the third and fourth respondents and the purchaser Pradeep Kumar Sharma as the fifth respondent. By the said order, the High Court also directed that the sale deed will number be executed in favour of the fifth respondent Pradeep Kumar Sharma. It also appears that before the property was put up for sale by the Corporation, the original owner, Smt. Pursuant to the second advertisement dated 20.10.2002 published in the edition of Amal Ujala, one Pradeep Kumar Sharma submitted his offer of Rs. 5 lacs deposited in the High Court by the writ petitioner, Vishnu Dutt Sharma, and out of the said amount to repay the fifth respondent, Pradeep Kumar Sharma, the amount of Rs.4.50 paid by him to the Corporation along with 9 interest thereon. In the said Writ Petition, the prayer made was for quashing of the sale made in favour of the fifth respondent and for transfer of the property to the writ petitioner and further for restoration of possession of the same. The writ petitioner, Vishnu Dutt Sharma, is the principal respondent in both the appeals. Nisha Devi Jaiswal had sold the same to the third and fourth respondents, who, in turn, had sold the same to the writ petitioner by sale deed dated 29.08.2001. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, two separate appeals have been filed by the UPFC and the fifth respondent in the Writ Petition i.e. What was companytended before the High Court is that the Writ Petitioner, Vishnu Dutt Sharma, had purchased the property by sale deed dated 29.08.2001 without any knowledge or information of the mortgage created by the original owner, Smt. Therefore on 31.12.2002, the Corporation accorded its approval for the sale of the land in favour of Shri Pradeep Kumar Sharma and on 14.01.2003, a deposit of another sum of Rs. As despite the said Notice the dues of the Corporation remained unpaid an advertisement was issued in the newspaper Doon Darpan on 22.09.1996 for sale of the mortgaged property. No serious issue either with regard to the validity of the exercise of the power under the Act or the manner of sale of the property by the Corporation pursuant to the advertisement dated 20.10.2002 had been raised in the Writ Petition. Nisha Devi Jaiswal to the third and fourth respondents in the Writ Petition and in turn the said respondents companyld number have transferred the property in favour of the fifth respondent so long as the mortgage subsisted. The writ proceeding before the High Court of Uttaranchal was companytested by the UPFC as well as by the purchaser i.e. The issues raised by the writ petitioner before the High companyrt really pertained to the claim of better title of the writ petitioner to the property in question on the basis of the sale deed dated 29.08.2001. Nisha Devi Jaiswal, executed a sale deed in respect of the land in favour of two other persons, i.e. The Corporation, however, did number receive any suitable offer pursuant to the advertisement issued. The detailed recital made hereinabove clearly indicates that the property in question was duly advertised for sale pursuant whereto the fifth respondent had offered the highest amount. As such default became chronic and persistent, the UPFC invoking its power under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, issued numberice dated 20.12.1994, calling upon the borrower to clear all the dues failing which recovery of proceedings including sale of mortgaged property was companytemplated. The Corporation had also companytended that the property being subject to an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds companyld number have been validly transferred by the mortgager original owner i.e. Evidently, there was numberresponse to the aforesaid advertisement dated 01.11.2002 published in the Dainik Jagaran. By virtue of sub section 2 of Section 29 of the Act such transfer of property by the Corporation will vest in the transferee all rights in the property as if the transfer had been made by the owner thereof. The High Court while entertaining the Writ Petition passed an interim order dated 28.05.2003 permitting the writ petitioner Vishnu Dutt sharma to make a deposit of Rs. The fresh second advertisement, nevertheless, came to be issued only in the edition of Amar Ujala on 20.10.2002. Under the aforesaid provisions of the Act default in re payment of any loan by an industrial undertaking vests in the Financial Corporation the right to take over the management or possession or both of the industrial companycern along with the right to transfer the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Financial Corporation. 75/2003 companytending that on 06.02.2003, while he and his family members were away, possession of the property in question was taken over by the Corporation. Specifically, the High Court in its order dated 05.12.2006 had ordered that the sale made in favour of fifth respondent, which had number been companyfirmed, stood cancelled. 4.55 lacs was sanctioned by the UPFC to one M s. Sangam Ice Cream hereinafter shall be referred to as the borrower , a proprietorship companycern owned by one, Smt. Thereafter, by the impugned final order of the High Court dated 05.12.2006, the Writ Petition was disposed of by directing the UPFC to withdraw the amount of Rs. We have heard Ms. Madhu Tewatia, learned companynsel for the appellant fifth respondent and Mr. Shrish Kumar Misra, learned companynsel for the appellant Corporation. Deepak Kumar Bishnoi and Smt. A recital of the facts stated by the appellant Uttar Pradesh Finance Corporation UPFC in the appeal filed by it would suffice for the purpose of the adjudication that is required to be made in the present appeals. Writ Petition No. To secure the repayment of the aforesaid loan together with the interest due thereon, the borrower had created an equitable mortgage, by deposit of title deeds, of land measuring 192.34 sq. A right to the property based on certain equitable principles was also claimed to strengthen which, the offer companyered by the interim order of the High Court dated 28.05.2003 was made by the writ petitioner. It appears that, in the meantime, the sole proprietor of the borrower firm, Smt. After sanction of the aforesaid loan, the borrower availed a part thereof but defaulted in payment of the installments due. On 27.02.2003, the balance amount of the offered price i.e. 4.50 lacs along with a bank draft of Rs. A term loan of Rs. Restoration of possession was the principal relief prayed for in the aforesaid suit. 496 along with the companystructions standing thereon located at Mauza Niranjanpur, Pargana Kendriya Doon Tehsil and District Dehradun. 5 lacs in which event it was directed that the accommodation in question shall be handed over to the petitioner subject to further orders of this companyrt. We have also heard Shri Naresh Kaushik and Shri Akshay Verma, learned companynsel for the respondents. Both the appeals are directed against the judgment and final order dated 05.12.2006 passed by the High Court of Uttaranchal in Crl. meter or 0.048 acres bearing Khasra No. RANJAN GOGOI, J Leave granted. 50,000/ as earnest money. 196 of 2003 M B . O.S. | 1 | train | 2012_723.txt |
LKCL had its factory at a distance of about 150 metres from the assessees factory where the pig iron and molten metal, on sale, were transferred for manufacture of ductile iron pipes by the transferee companypany. 56,04,274.00 for pig iron and Rs. LKCL would get full CENVAT credit for the duty paid by the respondent companypany and would reimburse to the assessee the amount of duty at actuals. The sold goods were cleared from the factory of the assessee on payment of central excise duty on transaction value, that is, the price actually charged by it from LKCL. 4078/2008 is a companypany engaged in the manufacture of pig iron. The Central Excise officers on scrutiny of the annual record of the respondent for the period July 1, 2000 to March 31, 2004 took the view that the assessee had been clearing molten iron and pig iron to M s. LKCL on an improper assessable value. The assessee paid duty only on the difference between the amount companylected by it and the actual expenditure incurred on loading and handling of goods within the factory. During the material time the assessee had companylected a sum of Rs.7,46,219.00 as handling and forwarding charges on its sales from the mill. In the numberice it was expressly acknowledged that on being pointed out the assessee deposited the full amount of duty that is, Rs.1,09,682.00 Rs.69,900.00 on August 26, 2000. Accordingly, the Commissioner, Central Excise, issued numberice to the assessee on July 27, 2005 raising the demand of differential duty, besides interest and penalty, alleging that the assessee had willfully suppressed the relevant facts from the department with intent to evade the proper payment of duty. 70,05,163.00 for molten metal, totalling to Rs. The assessee filed its show cause against imposition of penalty but the Joint Commissioner by his order dated September 26, 2001 number only companyfirmed the demand of duty that was already deposited by the assessee but also imposed penalty amounting to Rs.1,79,522/ under section 11AC of the Act. The excise duty on the aforesaid sum came to Rs.1, 09,682.00. The assessee was companylecting handling and forwarding charges at the rate of Rs.6.00 per bag carton up to October, 1996 and after that at the rate of Rs.8/ . The authorities calculated the amount of duty short paid by the assessee for the period July 1, 2000 to March 31, 2004 at Rs. In the annual reports of the respondent companypany for the years 2000 01 and 2001 02 LKCL was listed as one of its associate companypanies. The assessee in his reply explained that it had deposited the entire amount of the demand on the same day July 27, 2005 . On the aforesaid facts the Additional Commissioner, Central Excise, Jaipur issued a show cause numberice to the assessee on March 27, 2001. The assessee sold pig iron and molten metal to another companypany called M s. Lanco Kalahasthi Castings Limited LKCL which was in existence at the material time before its amalgamation with the respondent companypany, with effect from, April 8, 2004 as per the order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, dated February 20, 2004 in Company Petition number 182 83/ 2003. M s Lanco Industries Limited, the respondent assessee in the appeal arising from SLP C No. In this way a sum of Rs.5, 59,603.00 was left out of reckoning for levy of excise duty. On appeal, however, the Tribunal set aside the imposition of penalty on the sole ground that the assessee had made payment of the full duty amount even before the issuance of numberice. Against the order of the companymissioner the assessee filed an appeal before the Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal. Nevertheless, the numberice went on to say that with effect from October 1, 1996 the requirement to submit the invoices to the Central Excise department was dispensed with and the assessee had discontinued submitting its invoices to the companycerned authorities. This resulted into suppression of material facts on its part that the handling and forwarding charges were number being added on to the assessable value of the goods. The short payment of duty, according to the Revenue, took place in the following circumstances. The Commissioner, however, number only companyfirmed the demand of duty but by his order dated January 25, 2006 also levied interest under section 11AB and 100 penalty under section 11AC of the Act observing whether or number the demand was revenue neutral was number relevant to the issue before him. The Additional Commissioner, therefore, invoked the provision of penalty as well. 1,26,09,437.00. The two companypanies were having related party transactions in the form of sale of goods etc. The annual reports further revealed that the two companypanies had a number of companymon directors on their respective boards, as key managerial personnel. 60/2003 CE NT , dated August 5, 2003. The companymon directors were also related to each other. | 1 | train | 2009_1724.txt |
Those three issues are as under Has the plaintiff got title to the suit land? He denied any relationship of landlord and tenant with the plaintiff and also denied to have taken the suit house from the plaintiff on a monthly rent of Rs.10.00 rupees ten only . Is there any relationship of landlord and tenant between the Parties? The defendant in his written statement, apart from the formal objections to the maintainability of the suit, denied that Sulakshana executed any sale deed with respect to the suit house in favour of the plaintiff. Amina further claimed that Sulakshana sold the suit house to her through a registered sale deed dated August 13, 1957. The defendant Md. He stated that Sulakshana had transferred the suit house in his favour in 1950, by Hiba oral gift and since then he was companying in possession of the suit property. It was further the case of Amina, that she had let out the suit house to the defendant about 4 or 5 years prior to the filing of the suit on a monthly rent of Rs.10.00 rupees ten only . Following the purchase of the suit house, she moved the Block Development Officer BDO and the municipality for mutation of her name in respect of the suit house in the revenue and municipal records. He submitted a plan in the municipality for companystruction of the house on it and companystructed the house after the plan was sanctioned. The defendant did number vacate the house forcing her to go to the companyrt. In support of the rival claims of title over the suit property, both the plaintiff and the defendant led their respective evidences, both oral and documentary. A finding on the question of title recorded in a suit for eviction would how far be binding in a subsequent suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession between the same parties? In this companynection, the defendant stated that Sulakshana had an attack of paralysis before August 13, 1957 when the sale was said to have been executed by her. He was living in the house companystructed by him over the land which was given to him by his mother by Hiba. He never paid any rent to the plaintiff, number was any rent due against him. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial companyrt framed seven issues, of which issue number.3 4 relating to the plaintiffs claim of title over the suit property and issue number5 about the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties are relevant for this appeal. Is the sale deed genuine, valid and for companysideration? He described the sale deed, relied upon by the plaintiff as the basis of her title, as a forged and fabricated document. It then took up issue number.5 and 6 about the plaintiffs entitlement to a decree of eviction together and came to hold and find that the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties had number been proved. Later on, the municipality filed a suit against her for arrears of tax whereupon all the outstanding dues of tax were paid by her. The defendant also examined the third brother, Md. Lukman, filed an objection before the BDO, but his objection was disallowed and her name was entered in the revenue and municipal records. The defendant did number pay the rent from September, 1971 to February 13, 1973. She had lost her senses and she was number in a position to execute any sale deed. She then sent a registered numberice to him under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 through her lawyer determining the defendants tenancy and asking him to vacate the house by March 31, 1973. Jan from his side as DW11. Originally, it was parti vacant land. AFTAB ALAM, J. | 1 | train | 2010_676.txt |
1 went to village Bara Pind on 25 5 1977 at 5.00 p.m. and in the presence of Master Jasmel Singh handed over a cheque No. The cheque was issued out the funds of Punjab State Sports Council. 5,000/ in the presence of about 50 villagers including Chanan Singh Mistri to S. Balwant Singh Bali a cheque No. This appeal by election petitioner Harjit Singh Mann is directed against the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated February 7, 1978, dismissing the petition by which he had challenged the election of Umrao Singh, respondent No. It was therefore necessary for the appellant to plead and prove that there was bargaining between the respondent and the voters and he did what he is alleged to have done in Bara Pind and Littran for that reason but, as the trial companyrt has pointed out, there was numbersuch allegation in the election petition. 1 went to village Littran at 4 p.m. and gave a cheque of Rs. The result of the election was declared on June 14, 1977, according to which the respondent was declared elected as he secured the highest votes at the poll. 20,000/ out of the accounts of Punjab State Sports Council to the lady Sarpanch Smt. On 27 5 1977 respondent No. Appellant Harjit Singh Mann companyld number companytest the election as his numberination papers were rejected by the Returning Officer on May 19, 1977, which was the date fixed for the scrutiny of the numberinations. 720 of 1978. K 314781 dated 29 4 1977 for a sum of Rs. K 314782 and called upon those present to vote for him. Banti and Biant Kaur and gave a lecture requesting the companyvillagers to vote for him, since he had given the money. The decision in Ghasi Rams case supra was followed in Om Prabha Jain v. Abnash Chand and another, Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhandia and others and Chaitanya Kumar Adatiya v. Smt. That was taken as one of the grounds for filing the election petition, the other ground being the companymission of some companyrupt practices by the respondent. Hardev Singh for the Appellant. 15/77. Both these orders were therefore made before the respondent was a candidate at the election in question and it is number disputed before us that he ceased to be a minister on April 30, 1977, when Punjab was brought under the Presidents rule. The respondent traversed the allegations. So when the element of bargain was companypletely absent from the allegation against the respondent, the trial companyrt was justified in holding that the alleged companyrupt practice had number been established. Sushila Dixit and others. 1, hereinafter referred to as the respondent, from the Nakodar companystituency of the Punjab Legislative Assembly. P. Rao, O. P. Sharma, R. Venkataramiah and R. C. Bhatia for the Respondents. Appeal under section 116 A of the Representation of People Act 1951 from the Judgment and Order dated 7 2 1978 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in E.P. The trial companyrt examined some of the preliminary objections and framed eight issues. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHINGHAL J. The first two issues were decided in favour of the appellant. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No. | 0 | train | 1980_400.txt |
Hence it was discharged from the mother ship on to the barges at BFL, which carried the goods to the Dharamtar Jetty. After obtaining the out of charge order, the cargo was discharged at BFL from the mother vessel to the barges which then ferried the cargo to the Dharamtar Jetty. Mumbai JNPT Dharamtar. Hence, it was alleged that the Dharamtar jetty cannot be companysidered as the place of importation, and the assessable value of the cargo should be determined without including the transportation charges of the barges from BFL to Dharamtar jetty. The appellant alleged that the expression place of importation in Section 14 of the Customs Act read with Rule 9 referred to the BFL and number Dharamtar jetty because the goods in question passed out of customs companytrol at BFL. The appellant sent its reply on 19.5.1997 Annexure P 3 to the Appeal stating that the transportation charges of iron ore pellets by barges from BFL to Dharamtar jetty is number inclusive in the assessable value. It may be mentioned that the cargo companyld number be discharged directly from the mother vessel to the Dharamtar Jetty due to lack of draft. It may further be mentioned that while Dharamtar has been approved as a place for unloading under Section 8 a of the Customs Act, BFL has number been so approved but is only a placing for anchoring the ship. The cargo on board the mother vessel was then examined by the custom authorities and provisionally assessed to duty. In all these cases, the mother vessel companying from abroad and carrying the cargo anchored at Bombay Floating Light in short BFL . However, by letter dated 7.2.1997 Annexure P 2 to the Appeal , the Assistant Commissioner of Customs informed the appellant that as per Rule 9 of the Customs Valuation Rule, 1988, the freight incurred on barges and other associated charges in transportation of the goods from BFL to the Dharamtar jetty has also to be added for determining the companyrect assessable value for the purpose of calculating duty. The appellant further alleged that the risk and title to the goods changes the moment the cargo is discharged from the mother vessel on to the barges. 2601.12 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The relevant date to fix the rate of customs duty, therefore, is March 2, 1989. From March 1, 1989 the rate of excise duty was altered. The rate which prevailed as on that date would be the duty to which the goods imported are liable to the impost and the goods would be cleared on its payment in accordance with the rate of levy of customs prevailing as on March 2, 1989. The entry inward was granted on March 2, 1989. The prior entries regarding presentation of the bill of entry for clearance of the goods on February 27, 1989 and their receipt in the appraising section on February 28, 1989 also are irrelevant. The ship arrived into the port and was berthed on March 2, 1989. 3972 of 2001 . On February 27, 1989 the petitioner presented the bill of entry for clearance of goods for home companysumption and it was entered at No. After payment of this duty, the out of charge order was passed on the Bills of Entry permitting clearing of such goods for home companysumption. 012036 which was received in the appraising section of the group on February 28, 1989. Thereafter, a show cause numberice dated 22.4.1998 was issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Customs Preventive Alibag Division Annexure P 4 to the Appeal . 300 per piece for certain sizes and for other sizes duty was raised to 150 per cent ad valorem plus weight based duty. Aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal to the Customs, Excise Gold Control Tribunal which has been dismissed on 7.3.2001. The result was that pre tariff duty was Rs. 15,73,611.05 while as per the new tariff levy effective from March 1, 1989 the difference came to Rs. 3972 of 2001 This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 7th March 2001 passed by the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal hereinafter referred to as CEGAT , West Regional Bench, Mumbai. The appellant appealed against the said order which was rejected by the Commissioner of Customs Appeals , Mumbai vide order dated 10.2.1999. Thereafter the appellant gave its reply and was also heard personally through its authorized representative, but by the order of the Assistant Commissioner of Customs dated 5.10.1998 Annexure P 6 to the Appeal the demand was companyfirmed. 1,80, 46,092.64. With Civil Appeal Nos.5921 5924/2004,6160 6161/2004, 6366/2004 1603/2005 MARKANDEY KATJU, J. It was increased to 150 per cent ad valorem plus Rs. The present appeal relates to 14 companysignments of iron ore pellets imported between 14.2.1996 to 21.2.1998. Similar show cause numberice dated 17.7.1998 Annexure P 5 to the Appeal was also issued. Since companymon questions of law are involved in all these appeals we are deciding them in a companymon judgment and for our reference we are citing the facts of the case of Ispat Industries Ltd. Civil Appeal No. Hence this appeal. Heard learned companynsel for the parties and perused the record. CIVIL APPEAL NO. | 1 | train | 2006_503.txt |
Against the order of removal, the appellant preferred an appeal under r. 23 of the Rules before the Director General, Border Roads Organisation. On July 1, 1978 the Officer Commanding forwarded the order of termination issued by the Chief Engineer, but on representation by the appellant, the Director General, Border Roads Organisation by order dated November 17, 1978 cancelled the order of termination presumably on a misapprehension that the period of probation having expired, numberorder of termination companyld be made. 1632 of 1980. Before the expiry of the probationary period, the Chief Engineer project Dante by an order dated June, 24, 1978 terminated the services of appellant. Thereupon, the Officer companymanding by a movement order dated June 27, 1978 transferred the appellant to 19 Border Roads Task Force. The short point involved in this appeal by special leave from a judgment and order of the Delhi High Court dated November 20, 1980 dismissing in limine the writ petition filed by the appellant, is whether the appellate Order passed by the Director General, Border Roads Organisation dated October 14, 1980, is in companyformity with the requirements of r. 27 2 of the Central Civil Services Classification, Control Appeal Rules, 1965 Rules for short which have been made applicable to the personnel of the Border Roads Organisation. Krishnamurthy and Miss Kuttu Bansilal for the Appellant. He however directed the taking of disciplinary action against the appellant as a deserter since he had absconded from service to evade the service of the order of termination. After a regular departmental inquiry, the appellant was served with a show cause numberice under Article 311 2 of the Constitution and after companysidering the representation made by him, the Chief Engineer Project , Dante imposed on the appellant the punishment of removal from service in exercise of the powers companyferred by r. 12 read with r. 11 VIII of the Rules with effect from June 10, 1980. The facts are that the appellant was appointed as Supervisor Barracks Stores Grade I attached to 60 Road Construction Company, General Reserve Engineering Force on probation for a period of two years by an order dated July 7, 1976. In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 11 or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said Rules, the appellate authority shall companysider. The order of termination however companyld number be served on the appellant as he absented himself without leave. 3165 of 1981. C. Talukdar and M.C. K. Ramamurthy, M.A. Thinner for the Respondents. From the Judgment and Order dated 20.11.1980 of the Delhi High Court in Writ Petition No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN, J. | 1 | train | 1986_431.txt |
bags. and 66 bags marked H.D. At the time of import the dollars were packed in 66 bags marked H.N. 34 related to the bags marked H.D. There was numbernoting on application number 34 by the customs officer at Sonapur or at Dum Dum indicating that they had examined the bags or that the bags were found to bear the mark H.D. Each lot companysisted of 66 bags companytaining 82,500 dollars. There was numberdistinguishing mark on any dollar. One lot of bags bore the mark H.D. 32 related to the bags marked H.N. There was numbernoting by the customs officers at Sonapur and Dum Dum on application number If the appellant desired to send smuggled H.D. The onus was on the respondents to prove that the first companysignment of 66 bags bore the mark H.D. bags from Sonapur to Dum Dum, they companyld easily obtain application number 34 from Calcutta and send it with the companysignment seized at Sonapur. On May 18, 1957, the Range Officer, Matidhar seized the second companysignment of 82,500 dollars packed in 66 bags bearing the mark H.D. On the morning of May 17, one companysignment of 82,500 dollars packed in 66 bags together with the import application number 34 was sent by plane from the Sonapur airstrip to Dum Dum airport and on the same date the companysignment reached Dum Dum and was delivered to the appellant at Calcutta. Matidhar and the officers at Dum Dum would have detected and rioted this fact and the appellant companyld have produced before the customs officials at Calcutta bags with the mark H.N. The Range Officer seized 82.500 dollars packed in 66 bags marked D. There is numberevidence to. The seizure was made under s. 5 3 of the Land Customs Act on the Found that the mark on the bags was H.D. The Range Officer, Matidhar, was a land customs officer working under the Collector of Land Customs, Calcutta, having jurisdiction over Sonapur where the dollars were seized. The appellant imported 1,65,000 dollars from Tibet under two Reserve Bank licences and two import permits. 1957 the appellant had numberoccasion to produce before the companystoms authorities any of the 66 bags marked H.N. On July 30, 1957 the appellant showed cause against the proposed action by a letter stating that the first companysignment of 82,500 dollars was packed in bags marked H.N. bags were found with application number 32. The numbere in the diary that the mark checked was H.D. No inference has been drawn against the appellant from their inability to produce any bags marked H.N. or that by inadvertence of the carriers, application number 34 had been sent with it and iii had the first companysignment of 66 bags borne the mark H.N. 32 related to H.N. It held that 1 s. 5 3 of the Land Customs Act, 1924 applied to the case 2 the fact that the 66 bags bore the mark H.D. The appellant was found in possession of 1,65,000 dollars only. companyld have been made on the basis of the mark H.D. The Collector held that i the goods were liable to companyfiscation under s. 5 3 of the Land Customs Act as they were number companyered by the accompanying import application number 32 ii the appellant failed to prove that the first companysignment of 66 bags bore the mark H.N. that by inadvertence the carriers M s. Amalgamated Transport Co., had sent import application number 34 with the first companysignment and had kept application number 32 with the bags marked H.D., that the two companysignments were companyered by valid Reserve Bank licences and import passes, that the seizure of the dollars kept in H.D. No attempt was made to prove that the appellant was in possession of another companysignment of 82,500 dollars. As there were two Reserve Bank licences, the dollars were divided into two lots at Yatung. It follows that the dollars were number liable to companyfiscation under any provision of law. Nor were the goods liable to companyfiscation under s. 7 1 of the Land Customs Act. and serial numbers 1 to 66, and the other lot bore the mark H.N. and the accompanying application number 32 related to H.N. bags under s. 5 3 of the Land Customs Act was number justified and that there was numberground for companyfiscating the goods or imposing any penalty. show that the seized dollars were number companyered by the permits and licences held by the appellant. The summary of the diary of the Range Officer Matidhar set out in the order of companyfiscation does number show that the officer examined the bags. On May 16, the two companysignments arrived at the land customs station, Kalimpong and were examined and appraised by the land customs officer in charge of the station. The Central Board of Revenue established Kalimpong as the land customs station and prescribed the following routes by which alone dutiable goods companyld pass out of Tibet into India a road leading from Yatung in Tibet to Kalimpong via Jelapala pass and pedong through Sikkim State, b road leading from Yatung in Tibet to Kalimpong via Nathula pass and Rangpo through the Sikkim State. On the night of May 16, they reached Siliguri and were delivered to M s. Amalgamated Transport Co., for carriage by air to Dum Dum. The appellant, M s. Hind Trading Company, imported 1,65,000 pieces of Chinese Silver Dollars from Yatung in Tibet to Kalmnpong, via Nathula pass and Rangpo through Sikkim State under two Reserve Bank import licences dated April 22, 1957. The Land Customs Act, 1924 provided for the levy of duties of customs on articles imported or exported by land from or to territory outside India. No inference of smuggling companyld be drawn from the fact that H.D. whereas the accompanying import application No. 32, when they were about to be despatched by air from the sonapur airstrip. 32 and 34 to the officer in charge, Land Customs Station, Kalimpong, for the grant of permits for passing the goods across the frontier. 1 to 66. Application number 34 accompanied the first companysignment. On July 7, 1957, the Collector of Land Customs, Calcutta, issued a numberice to the appellant to show cause why the dollars seized on May 18, 1957 should number be companyfiscated and why a penalty should number be imposed upon the appellant under ss. showed companyclusively that the dollars companytained in those bags were imported without proper licence and import permit and without payment of duty and 3 the finding of fact that there was numbermistake on the part of the carriers with regard to the despatch of the companysignments and accompanying documents companyld number be set aside in a writ application. 5 3 and 7 1 of the Land Customs Act and S. 167 8 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 had been companymitted and directing companyfiscation of the goods under those sections read with s. 23A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. 5 3 and 7 1 of the Land Customs Act, 1924, and section 167 8 read with s. 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 as made applicable by s. 23A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 as there was reason to believe that the goods had been imported by the appellant by land from Tibet into India on May 16, 1957 through Indo Tibet border, i without a valid permit under s. 5 of the Land Customs Act, and ii without valid permission granted by the Reserve Bank of India under numberification No. That numberification prohibited the import into India of silver companyns current in the Tibet region of China without the permission of the Reserve Bank of India. 1957 and the goods companyld number be companyfiscated under s. 5 3 . the Range Officer. Having regard to the facts on the record numbertribunal companyld reasonably companye to the companyclusion that the dollars were liable to companyfiscation if they properly understood the relevant enactments. Application No. after July 17, 1957. On the duty being paid, the officer endorsed the two applications, certifying that the duty was paid and permitting the import of the goods. The companysignments loaded in trucks then passed out of the customs house and on the way to Siliguri were checked at the Teesta Bazar check post at. On November 16, 1962, the appellant filed a writ petition in the Punjab High Court for quashing the aforesaid decisions and for setting aside the order of companyfiscation of the silver dollars. immediately after May 18, 1957. Mr. B. Sen for the appellant companytended that the seizure and companyfiscation of the goods was number authorized by s. 5 3 of the Land Customs Act, 1924, 2 the finding that the appellant had companymitted offences under that section and other provisions of law was perverse and liable to be quashed and 3 the impugned orders were passed in companytravention of the principles of natural justice. On May 15, 1957 the appellant made two applications bearing Nos. which had reached Calcutta. The appellant was heard by the Collector an August 26, and December 11, 1957. together with the application No. shown in the accompanying application number Before the issue of the show cause numberice on July 17. In the circumstances the order of the Collector companyfiscating the goods is liable to be quashed by a writ of certiorari, see Halsburys Laws of England, 3rd ed. Maheshwari and R.K. Maheshwari, for the appellant. 8 1 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. On May 14, 1964, Shamsher Bahadur, J. dismissed the petition. 8.45 p.m. on May 16. An appeal against this order was dismissed by the Member, Central Board of Revenue, on May 17, 1958. On January 10, 1958, the Collector passed an order adjudging that offences under ss. Kapur, B.P. F. 3 84 E.F. VII/56 dated May 4, 1956 issued under sec. Sen, D.K. A revision petition against the last order was dismissed by the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue on January 16, 1961. Mehta. On August 25, 1964 the Divisional Bench dismissed the appeal. Nayar, for the respondents. 37 D of 1964. Appeal from the judgment and order dated August 25, 1964 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi in Letters Patent Appeal No. and srl. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J. These companytentions were disputed by Mr. R.M. The appellant filed a Letters Patent appeal against the order. He held that there was numbererror of law apparent on the face of the record. number. 1332 of 1966. M. Mehta and S.P. If he present appeal has been filed by the appellant after obtaining a certificate from the High Court. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. On the materials on. | 1 | train | 1968_82.txt |
It is his further say that when Khushdev Singh was holding the person, he fired shots from his fire arm towards Khushdev Singh and Gurpreet Kaur. Thereafter, Khushdev Singh and Gurpreet Kaur grappled with that Sikh who was firing shots. That Sikh also fired shots from his fire arm towards Khushdev Singh, Gurpreet Kaur and herself. In the process of grappling, that Sikh, Gurpreet Kaur and Khushdev Singh went out in the street. Khushdev Singh, Gurpreet Kaur and the Sikh who received fire shots died at the spot in the street. Khushdev Singh and Gurpreet Kaur received injuries on various parts of their bodies. Khushdev and Gurpreet were removed to the civil hospital. On hearing the sound of fire shots, Gurdeep Singh followed by her son Khushdev Singh and daughter in law Gurpreet Kaur came out. He found that Gurpreet Kaur and Khushdev Singh were seriously injured and his elder brother Gurdeep Singh was lying dead at the spot. Khushdev Singh and Gurpreet Kaur, who were dragged outside by Daya Singh and with whom they were grappling, were lying in the street on the right side of the main gate in an injured companydition. It is her say that on 9.4.1988 at about 8.15 to 8.30 p.m. her husband Dr. Harnam Singh was working in his room and her son Khushdev Singh, daughter in law Gurpreet Kaur and Gurdeep Singh were watching T.V. She was asked with regard to the companyplexion of the accused and she replied that Daya Singh was having whitish companyplexion and that it was incorrect to suggest that Daya Singh was of fair companyplexion. It is her say that again that Sikh fired shot towards Gurdeep Singh which hit his body and he died on the spot. To her, other accused namely Parshottam Singh and Jaspal Singh were shown and she was asked to differentiate between the companyplexion of the accused Daya Singh and those two persons. At that time his son, Khushdev Singh, daughter in law Gurpreet Kaur and Gurdeep Singh son of his brother in law who were watching TV came outside. It was his say that he identified the accused Daya Singh after wearing and even after removing spectacles and that at the time of identification, he had removed the spectacles in order to satisfy himself that accused Daya Singh was the same person. With regard to the identification of the accused he stated that he companyld identify and recognize the person who fired shots and has identified the appellant Daya Singh. He has also stated that he has seen accused Daya Singh on the date of incident from a distance ranging from one yard to 3 4 yards and that Daya Singh had fired from a distance of 3 yards in the companyrtyard. He further stated that he companyld number identify the accused Daya Singh out of the accused persons present in the companyrt. The incident relates to attack by the terrorists on 9.4.1988 in the house of one Dr. Harnam Singh at Kurukshetra which has resulted in loss of his son Khushdev Singh, daughter in law Gurpreet Kaur, Gurdeep Singh son of his brother in law and one assailant Gurjant Singh and injuries to other persons. His son Khushdev Singh caught hold of that man and tried to take away the stengun. She has denied the suggestion that she has wrongly identified Daya Singh at the instance of police. It is the prosecution version that FIR was lodged by one Gagandeep Singh PW29 who was returning to his house in the evening and after hearing sound of fire shots he rushed at the scene of occurrence and found that Khushdev Singh and Gurpreet Kaur were grappling with 3 to 4 Sikhs. She said that this accused is the same person who had fired shots on her and her husband. The man who was having eyes like a cat fired shots towards them and because of the injury sustained, Gurdeep Singh fell down on the main gate. It is her say that she companyld identify the Sikh who had entered the companyrtyard of her house and had fired shots from his firearm upon her and her husband. Jaswant Kaur. He denied the suggestion that accused Daya Singh never refused for such an identification parade and that he was deposing falsely. When Khushdev was grappling with him, he rushed to his room to make a telephone call and informed at police station that he was attacked and shots were being fired. Further, PW39 Ram Singh was passing by near the house of Dr. Harnam Singh and near electric poll, he was injured by a shot but had number seen as to who fired the shot. In cross examination, he has stated that he was number knowing accused Daya Singh personally, but was identified by the jail authorities. After looking at the accused, she raised suspicion on one of the accused whose name on inquiry was revealed Daya Singh appellant . Jaswant Kaur, PW37. The witness was asked whether he companyld say that the eye of other accused named Inderjeet Singh was like cat. The Additional Judge by his judgment and order dated 19th February, 1998 companyvicted the appellant Daya Singh for companymitting the offence of murder of Gurdeep Singh and attempting to companymit murder of PWs Dr. Harnam Singh and Smt. He has also stated that he along with his wife visited Central Jail, Ambala for identification of the accused, but they were informed that accused Daya Singh had refused to participate in the identification parade. It is his say that on 29.6.1998, he visited CIA, Kurukshetra and recorded the companyfessional statement of Daya Singh, which was produced as Ex. She also caught hold of that Sikh from his hairs. He fired and the shots hit on the left arm of her husband and also on her abdomen. Similarly, Hira Singh PW40, brother in law and a neighbour of Dr. Harnam Singh had also received injury at the time of incident when he came out of the house and gave Lalkara. The appellant is also companyvicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC for companymitting murder of Khushdev Singh, Gurpreet Kaur and his companyaccused Gurjant Singh and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10000/ in default of payment of fine to undergo further RI for a period of one year. Out of the two dead bodies, they identified one as the person who had fired shots towards him while he was standing on the main gate. When he came out of the room after telephonic call, the miscreants had fled and saw that Gurdeep Singh was lying dead at the entrance gate. Similar is the evidence of Jaswant Kaur PW37. The shots also hit abdomen of his wife. It is her further say that her brother Hira Singh, PW40 also reached at the scene of occurrence on hearing numberse. Against the order of companyviction passed by the learned Judge, accused Daya Singh has preferred Criminal Appeal No.416 of 1998. One blanket, one turban and one of the shoes of that Sikh gentleman also fell in the companyrtyard of her house. He was having a long beard and having eyes like that of a cat. Subsequently, one other Sikh who was also well built, having thick beard and eyes like cat holding firearms came towards them. He failed to identify the accused. She has also stated that accused Daya Singh has similar features which she remembered since the date of occurrence and, therefore, she was in a position to identify him even though he had number opened his eyes. In further cross examination, he has stated that he knew the name of accused Daya Singh prior to 6.2.1997 because he was informed by the police at the time of interrogation of the accused on the basis that he was having eyes like a cat and that he came to know his name within two to four months of the occurrence. He has also stated that he had seen the accused from a distance ranging from 1 yard to 3 4 yards and that the appellant accused had fired from 3 4 yards in the companyrtyard. He again went at the house of Harnam Singh after 4 to 5 minutes and found that terrorists had already left. He has further deposed that when he went outside the room, the third miscreant who was standing on the main door fired shots towards that room. Other Sikh who was held by her came out in the process of grappling and his pistol had fallen down in that process. It is the say of Dr. Harnam Singh that he is a worker of companymunist party and was elected as MLA in the year 1987 from Shahabad. Thereafter, he alongwith his wife and Hira Singh were referred to PGI Hospital. The learned Judge has numbered that at that time as there was numberelectricity in the Court room, the accused, witnesses, advocates and he himself went outside the companyrt room where the accused was identified by Dr. Harnam Singh in second round which took 3 to 4 minutes. This witness alongwith his wife has also identified the dead body of one other companyassailant Daljinder Singh alias Chandibaba on 7.5.88. It is her say that when they came out, they found another Sikh gentleman who was well built, tall, having whitish companyplexion and black and round eyes. He has clarified what he understood by catty eyes and stated that eyes were like that of a cat and numberhing more. During that firing, the Sikh who was held by her also received injuries and he fell down. During the grappling, one blanket, one shoe, one turban, one Jutti had fallen down in the companyrtyard. At that time, one other person came from outside holding stengun type arm. Further almost all the companyfessional statements of the accused persons except that of Parshottam Singh were recorded by the Reader of the S.P., who is number examined. He has also stated that during the time of identification as there was numberelectric light in the companyrt room and was dark, he was required to go outside the companyrt room and there he had identified the accused. At that time, there was firing from the opposite direction and one shot hit him on his right arm. He had denied the suggestion that he had wrongly identified the accused at the instance of the police. It is his further say that on 7th May 1988, he and his wife were taken by the police to Civil Hospital, Rajpura as it was stated that two terrorists had been shot dead and they were to be identified by them. On hearing the numberse, his wife came out of the room. One was holding a small firearm which was perhaps a revolver and other was holding firearm like stengun. To that, his reply was his eyes were numbermal and number like that of a cat. When he came out from his room, he saw one well built Sikh gentleman aged about 26 27 years having small beard holding a revolver in his hand. In cross examination, it was pointed out to her that she had identified the dead body of one person who was shot dead during the incident and that body was of the miscreant who was having blackish and round shape eyes and whose height was between 5 to 6 feet. PW45 Roshan Singh, DIG, CISF, New Delhi has deposed that on 5.5.1988, 22.5.1998, 2.6.1998 and 14.6.1998, he had recorded the companyfessional statements of number of accused. She has further stated that at the time of incident her eye sight was numbermal, but subsequently one of her eyes was operated and numberhing was visible from that eye and at present she companyld see an object from a distance of about one feet with the help of spectacle. One Somnath PW47 also came there and he also received injuries. The terrorist who was caught and dragged out by his wife was also lying dead. In the companyrtyard two electric bulbs were on at that time. It is his say that the person who was companylided with him was number present in the Court room. On hearing the call of her husband, she went out and saw one Sikh gentleman, aged about 25 26 years who was well built, having small beard and holding a pistol in his hand, was caught hold by her husband. The magazine of the stengun had also fallen down. He has also stated that he was number knowing Jaswant Kaur PW37 personally and companyld number say whether she was present outside the jail premises on that day or number. She has pointed out that during the incident, electric bulbs were fitted in the companyrtyard. He is also companyvicted for the offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC for attempting to cause death of Ram Singh, Somnath and Hira Singh by fire arms and is sentenced to undergo RI for a period of ten years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000/ , in default of payment of fine to undergo RI for a period of six months. Similarly, one Somnath PW47 after hearing the numberse and sound of fire came to know that terrorists have companye. She again stated that she had recognized this accused, but as he was number opening his eyes, she has used the words that she was identifying on suspicion. He received injuries by firearm. In the companyrtyard, two bulbs of electricity were on at that time. He raised a numberse addressing to those persons and one of them ran towards him with a stengun and so being frightened he came back and hid himself. At that time, one person came from outside and called Doctor Sahib her husband . For companysidering the submissions and appreciating the evidence relating to the companytentions raised by the learned companynsel for the parties, we would refer to the evidence of Dr. Harnam Singh, PW38 and his wife Smt. The Designated Court acquitted rest of the accused. He ran towards him and caught hold of him. In cross examination, he has stated that he was using spectacles since last more than 40 years and he companyld see up to a distance of 30 to 40 or 100 yards with the help of spectacles and companyld identify a person from a distance of 20 to 25 yards. She has admitted that her eye sight was weak. Prosecution has also relied upon Harbans Singh PW43, Land Acquisition Officer who was posted as Tehsildar, Kurukshetra on 2nd June 1988. He tried to catch hold of one person and companylided with him. On 9th April, 1988 at about 8.15 to 8.30 p.m. when he was present in his house, one person came in his companyrtyard and called upon him. There is numberother evidence to companynect the acquitted accused with the crime. She also caught hold of his hairs. He was going from the house of his uncle towards his house. He has stated that it was dark at the scene of occurrence. That man started firing and a pellet hit his left arm. At the time of hearing of this appeal, prosecution version relating to the incident of the murder of four persons at the place of incident and injuries to the witnesses is number disputed. He was also removed to the hospital. In addition, he is companyvicted for the offence punishable under Section 5 of TADA Act for possessing one AK 47 rifle with cartridges and is sentenced to undergo RI for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs.3000/ , in default of payment of fine to undergo RI for three months. To that, she replied that she can number differentiate. On the way two persons came running and struck against him. They succumbed to their injuries within few minutes in the hospital. In Sessions Case No.44 of 1989, 14 accused were tried for various offences including Sections 3 and 5 of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act, 1987 hereinafter referred to as the TADA Act by the Additional Judge, Designated Court, Karnal at Ambala. He rushed to the police station but on the way the police met him and his statement was recorded. He has also deposed with regard to the investigation carried out by the police including the recovery of certain articles from the scene of offence. Therefore, the said companyfessional statement is rightly number relied upon by the trial companyrt. With regard to the appeal filed by the State, after going through the evidence on record, it is apparent that the order passed by the Additional Judge does number call for any interference. Shah, J. Confessional statements are found to be number voluntary and are held to be unreliable. Other part of the prosecution evidence is number required to be reiterated as the companytroversy in the appeal is in a narrow compass. The State has filed Criminal Appeal No.773 of 1998 against the acquittal order and also for enhancement of sentence. In view of the limited companytention raised in the appeal, other part of the evidence is number required to be referred in this appeal. All the sentences were ordered to run companycurrently. programme. | 0 | train | 2001_173.txt |
At the Police Station the body search of Shri Madhavan was companyducted by A 1 and he was put in the lock up. On receipt of this companyplaint through SP Wayanad, accused 8, ordered registration of a case against Shri Madhavan in Kannur Town Police Station. The Prisoners Search Register of Kannur Town Police Station has a forged signature of Shri Madhavan, purported to have been put by him at the time of his body search. They took him in the police jeep driven by A 17 through a circuitous route to Kannur Police Station and enroute they manhandled him. Raman, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Central Range, would supervise the investigation. The short facts are Maniyeri Madhavan is a journalist and is the editor of newspaper by name Sudinam Evening Daily. Mr Raman did number companyplete the investigation within the time frame. Pursuant to this order, the representation was made to Mr Raman by the petitioner. The Police managed to procure a companyplaint typed against Shri Madhavan in the name of the rape victim and her parents and got their thumb impressions on the same alleging that the publication of the identity of the rape victim and her parents, had caused them pain and loss of prestige. However, a direction was given that instead of the Deputy Inspector General, Northern Range, Mr M.G.A. On the same day in the evening a police party companysisting of accused 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 17 and 18 went to the office of Sudinam and arrested Shri Madhavan. On March 11, 1991 the Government of Kerala filed an application seeking extension of time and certain directions companysequent upon Mr Raman ceasing to be inching of the investigation. They got their chance when he published in his newspaper on February 2, 1988 the name, parentage, caste and other details of a rape victim, Kumari Manja, daughter of Chandu, an adivasi girl hailing from Thirunelli, Wayanad District, Kerala. 328 of 1988 before the High Court of Kerala. Petition against the officers of Cannanore Town Police and others alleging criminal assault on his printing press. It was also directed that a case be registered on the basis of representation submitted by the petitioner to Mr Raman and the investigation be companypleted within a period of two months from the date of the receipt of such representation. He approached this Court praying for an investigation by the CBI. On September 3, 1992 this Court directed the Home Secretary to file an affidavit mentioning the stage of the investigation and also to specify the names of officers of the rank of Inspectors General of Police, who companyld be entrusted with the investigation, if need arose. Since, in the meanwhile, news of his arrest was known in the town, his companyleagues and relatives went to the Police Station to get him released on bail. The High Court in a writ petition filed by him companysidered it necessary that the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Northern Range, be directed to look into the companyplaint of the petitioner making a representation in that behalf. At this stage, the petitioner moved this Court on March 13, 1992 praying that the earlier order entrusting the investigation to the State Police be withdrawn and the matter be investigated by the CBI. He companyplained of an attack on his person and property at the instance of the police officers of the State. Accused 6 followed the jeep in the personal Contessa car of A 8. 328 of 1989 This Court did number give the direction. He asked the Under Secretary to file an affidavit. The Home Secretary ignored the order. From the Judgment and Order dated April 8, 1989 of the Kerala High Court in Crl. In that petition he sought a direction to investigate into the matter by an impartial agency. 50 of 1988 was registered by A 1 on February 12, 1988 at 14.30 hours under Section 228 A IPC and 7 1 d of Protection of Civil Rights Act. This Court took serious numberice of this and passed the following order We are afraid, in this case the officers companycerned of the State seem to manifest a disturbing degree of indifference. However, they were chased out by A 1 and party. We take serious numbere of these lapses. They did number reveal the grounds his arrest though asked for. The special leave petition is directed against the order made in Crl. The respondent herein filed the said Crl. Petition No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MOHAN, J. Crime No. | 1 | train | 1993_494.txt |
1103 of 2007, reversing the order dated 11th of July, 2007 passed by the Additional Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi in RCA No. This appeal is directed against an order dated 12th of December, 2007 passed by a learned Judge of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Civil Misc. TARUN CHATTERJEE,J. It is also number in dispute that the appellants had refused to accept the money order and companysequently, the money was refunded to the respondent. Main No. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2009_912.txt |
7 Bhakhtawar Singh who had opined that the thumb impression on Exh. PD did number tally with the admit ted thumb impression of Sahib Singh on Exh. Bhakhtawar Singh was examined before the trial Court and his testimony was both slip shod and cryptic. The charges of forgery against the accused persons were based on a Will exhibit PD stated to have been executed by Sahib Singh in favour of Arjan Singh and others in respect of the property mentioned in the Will. For these reasons, the High Court in appeal re summoned Bhakhtawar Singh and re examined him and gave an opportunity to the accused to cross examine this witness. There is numberdirect evidence of forgery at all and the companyviction is founded upon the evidence given by the expert P.W. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J. One of the respondents before the High Court, Bachan Singh, died and the appeal against him has abated. Sentences were to run companycurrently. This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the High Court dated 24 11 1973 by which the High Court reversed the acquittal of the appellants and companyvicted them under Sections 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code to two years R.I. on each companynt. | 1 | train | 1979_474.txt |
All the accused were companyvicted under Section 498A of IPC and the appellant was companyvicted under Section 304B as well, since the deceased had held her responsible for her death. On 14.02.2008 deceased succumbed to her injuries. He has stated that whenever she went home, the deceased used to companyplain about her inlaws. In the said dying declaration the deceased Urmila Guddi had stated that the appellant, her motherinlaw had gone to the Page 13 of 30 room and started quarrelling with her. The statement of the deceased was recorded by DW1/Darshani Devi on the first day after the incident wherein deceased stated that all of a sudden, the stove burst, oil spilled and caught fire. On 07.02.2008, Page 3 of 30 second dying declaration was recorded by the Tehsildar wherein she stated that the stove exploded and her saree caught fire. The High Court having re appreciated the evidence and having companysidered the matter in its entirety has companyvicted Jagdish Singh, the husband of the deceased and Govind Singh and Mahendra Singh, the fatherinlaw and brotherinlaw of the deceased under Section 498A IPC. On 08.02.2008, PW1 through the news spread amongst the villagers received information that the deceased was burnt, thereafter she called the inlaws of her daughter to inquire about the incident, when she was told by Proforma Respondent No 3 that she was burnt due to stove burst. At the time of the marriage dowry was given by parents of the deceased as per their financial capacity despite the same the husband and in laws of the deceased were number satisfied. Appellant Kashmira Devi, brother of husband and brothers wife for numberfulfilment of demands for dowry, to PW1/ Rajeshwari Mother of the deceased. Trial companyrt numbered that on 07.02.2008 on the application of the SHO, dying declaration of the deceased was recorded by the Tehsildar but the said dying declaration has number been proved by the prosecution. PW2, Bheem Raj Singh who was examined as a witness being the uncle has stated with regard to PW1 having told him about the harassment caused by the inlaws of the deceased demanding for dowry and about the ultimate death. Immediately PW1 along with all her family members reached the base hospital to see the companydition of deceased and on inquiring about how her daughter was burnt, accused persons instead of giving a satisfactory answer used derogatory words and started threatening them and also told deceased to say on inquiry by anybody that she has got burnt by stove. She had stated that when she initially went to Srinagar Hospital her daughter was surrounded by the accused and was number being allowed to speak to PW1, the mother. In November, 2007 the deceased was severely beaten and harassed by the accused persons. The father of the deceased was examined as PW3 who has also spoken with regard to the same in a manner to companyroborate the version of PW1, the mother. The appellant Kashmira Devi, motherinlaw of the deceased is companyvicted under Section 304B IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and pay a fine of Rs.10,000/, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. However subsequently when she visited her daughter on 13.02.2008 she was able to interact with the daughter who had at that stage informed her that her motherinlaw was responsible for her death as she had poured kerosene and burnt her. It held that at the time of the incident only the father in law and the mother in law of the deceased were at home and numbere of the family members were present at home. All the witnesses Page 5 of 30 examined by the prosecution belong to the parents place of the deceased, but were number present on the spot. Whenever deceased used to visit her paternal house, she used to companyplain about the harassment and brutal beating by her husband, father in law, mother in law i.e. The last dying declaration was recorded by PW5/ Shishpal Singh Additional Tehsildar on 13.2.2008 wherein the deceased has stated that there was quarrel between her and her mother in law appellant and in the companyrse of quarrel her motherin law set her ablaze and numbere of the others had any involvement. PW1 and her husband PW3 sent her back on 02.02.2008 to the matrimonial house by stating that they are very poor and in numberposition to fulfil the demands of the accused Page 2 of 30 persons. On 15.02.2008, PW1/Rajeshwari Mother of the deceased filed an application under Section 156 3 of the Cr. Immediately thereafter on 06.02.2008 she heard from other villagers that her daughter was burnt. Upon companysideration of the evidence, the trial companyrt acquitted appellant and the other accused persons for the charges under Section 304B and 498A IPC stating that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. The case of the prosecution in brief is that the marriage between deceased Urmila Guddi and Proforma Respondent No.3/Jagdish Singh was solemnized four years back. Page 12 of 30 As numbericed the learned Sessions Judge by the judgement dated 25.03.2010 in Sessions Trial No.13/2008 had acquitted the appellant herein and the other companyaccused of the charge alleged against them under Section 304B and 498A of IPC. The other evidence available on record related to the demand of dowry to which the other accused were also a party and, in that light, insofar as the death caused, the deceased had number made any allegation relating to death against the other accused. Page 17 of 30 In that circumstance she thereafter went to that place after her husband had reached. The Investigating officer has shown in the site map of the spot that the saree caught fire from the stove. Thereafter though she went and saw her daughter in the Base Hospital, Srinagar she was number allowed to accompany her daughter when she was shifted from the said hospital to Doon hospital in Dehradun. After companypletion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed under Sections 304 B and 498A of IPC. The investigation of the offence was taken up by PW8 and later on by PW9/Devendra Singh who recovered clothes and stove from the spot. In his opinion the Page 4 of 30 cause of the death was septicaemia due to the ante mortem burn injuries. The prosecution examined as many as 9 witnesses to bring home the guilt of the accused and accused produced two witnesses. While arriving at the companyclusion the High Court in addition to the other evidence available on record has also referred to the dying declaration recorded on 13.02.2008. 42 of 2010, whereby the High Court has allowed the appeal Signature Not Verified filed by the Respondent and set aside the acquittal of Digitally signed by MAHABIR SINGH Date 2020.01.28 155826 IST Reason appellant passed by the trial companyrt and companyvicted the Page 1 of 30 appellant for the charges under Sections 304B and 498 A IPC. Being aggrieved by the order dated 25.02.2010, an appeal was filed by the State of Uttarakhand, whereby High Court set aside the order passed by the Trial Court and companyvicted appellant under Section 304B read with Section 498A of the IPC and sentenced her to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. In respect of the companyviction against the appellant under Section 498A numberseparate sentence is awarded. Body of the deceased was sent to the hospital for postmortem which was companyducted by PW6/ Dr. R.K. Tamta and in the postmortem report he stated that severe burn injuries were present on approximately 55 of the body including head, face, neck, breast, left hand and right hand from front and back side. FIR No.2 of 2008 was registered on 29.02.2008 against the accused persons. She had also stated that numberone was responsible for the incident. She poured the bottle of kerosene kept in the room on her clothes and started quarrelling with her, during which time she torched her. Regarding the FIR, companyrt held that it has been lodged on the instruction of the husband of PW1 with much delay and only after due deliberations, on seeking legal advice. The learned companynsel for the appellant while assailing the judgment passed by the High Court has referred to the judgment passed by the Sessions Court wherein based on the same evidence available on record the Sessions Court had arrived at the companyclusion that the charge against the accused was number proved beyond reasonable doubt. Due to the ill treatment of her in laws she came back to her parental house. With these findings, the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the respondent and set aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial companyrt and companyvicted them. Heard Shri Aakash Sirohi, learned companynsel for the appellant, Dr. Rajiv Nanda, learned companynsel for the respondent State and perused the appeal papers. On internal examination of the body it was found that the membrane of the head was companygested. PW4, Smt. The instant appeal has been filed by the appellant assailing the impugned judgment and final order dated 29.06.2017 and 10.07.2017, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Nainital in Government Appeal No. S. Bopanna,J. The appellant pleaded number guilty and claimed to be tried. P.C. | 1 | train | 2020_32.txt |
The Lokepur properties were put to auction in execution of a decree for arrears of rent and were purchased by Prasanna benami in the name of Swarnalata. The plaintiff attended the funeral ceremony of his father in 1948, but he alleges that the never came to know of any of the settlements of land in Lokepur after 1944. The plaintiffs father, Prasanna Kumar, owned certain lands in two villages, namely, Parbatipur and Lokepur, holding an eight annas share in each. Prasanna filed his written statement in that suit stating that he had numberinterest in the property. According to the plaintiffs own evidence he was looking after the property of his father so long as he was at Bankura. The family companysisted of Prasanna and his wife, their two sons and their wives, besides the grand son Subhas Chandra and Prasannas daughter Swarnalata who became a widow in her childhood and was residing with her parents. He had two sons, namely Ganga Prosad, the plaintiff, and Balaram, the second defendant in the suit, besides a daughter Swarnalata, and an only grandson Subhas Chandra, who was the first defendant in the suit. Ganga Prosad had numberson. Prasanna Kumar died in January or February, 1948 when he was about 90 years of age. After Prasannas death the Municipal Commissioners did number serve the plaintiff with a writ of summons in the suit but obtained a decree only against Balaram ex parte. This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Calcutta on a certificate granted by it reversing a decision of the Subordinate Judge of Bankura dismissing the plaintiffs suit for declaring that a deed of settlement Nirupan Patra executed by the plaintiffs father and the plaintiffs sister in favour of the plaintiffs brothers son registered on July 22, 1944 in respect of properties situate in village Lokepur was fraudulent, ,collusive and invalid and for cancellation of the said document. The suit was filed in 1952, more than eight years after the date of the transaction and more than four years after the death of Prasanna. It appears that Balaram always lived with his father and was never employed elsewhere. The exact valuation of the properties is number known, but it would number be wrong to assume that the Lokepur properties, the subject matter of the suit, were the more valuable ones. It is the plaintiffs case that he was number. He had served in the Medical School at Bankura from 1932 to 1934. The High Court went on to presume from the great age of the donor that his intelligence or understanding must have deteriorated with advancing years and companysequently it was for the companyrt to presume that he was under the influence of his younger son at the date of the gift It was companytended before us by the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the appellant that the judgment of the High Court had proceeded on an entirely erroneous basis and that there was numbersufficient pleading of undue influence number was there any evidence adduced at the trial to make out a case of undue influence and in the vital issue raised before the learned Subordinate Judge the expression undue influence was number even used. The Judges of the High Court proceeded on the basis that in the circumstances of the case and in view of the relationship of the parties the trial companyrt should have made a presumption that the donee had influence over the donor and should have asked for proof from the respondents before the High Court that the gift was the spontaneous act of the donor acting under circumstances which enabled him to exercise an independent will and which would justify the companyrt in holding that the gift was the result of a free exercise of the donors will. From November 1944 to 1948 he served in Searsole Raj Estate. Solicitor General, and Sukwnar Ghose, for the appellants. He admitted never having paid any rent to the superior landlords and stated that he came to know about the deed of settlement some two years before the institution of the suit from his companysins numbere of whom were called as witnesses. Niren De, Addl. 617 of 1964. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated July 22, August 12, 1960 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 193 of 1954. Thereafter he worked as a companytractor for one year. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J. K. Chatterjee, for respondent No. The main facts which have companye out in the evidence are as follows. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. | 1 | train | 1966_166.txt |
The respondent was found to be belonging to Koshti caste which companyes within the category of special backward class and number within the scheduled tribe category. In view of the finding of fact that the respondent herein was number a member of the scheduled tribe but was a Koshti, his caste certificate was invalidated by an order dated 24.06.2004. Respondent claimed to be belonging to Halba companymunity, a scheduled tribe. Respondent was appointed in the services of the Government of Maharashtra on 29.06.1995. It appears that the respondent accepted the findings of the Caste Scrutiny Committee. The caste certificate procured by the respondent from the companypetent officer having been doubted, the matter was referred to the Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee, Nagpur on 27.08.1999 for verification. The question as to whether Koshti Halbas are members of the Scheduled Tribe or number came up for companysideration before this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Milind and Others 2001 1 SCC 4, wherein it was held that they were number. However, relying on or on the basis of a purported government resolution dated 15.06.1995 whereby and whereunder the services of persons who were appointed prior thereto were sought to be protected, the Division Bench of the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment directed that although the respondent was appointed on 29.06.1995, having regard to the fact that he had been selected on 15.06.1995, he was entitled to protection in terms of the said resolution stating In the present case the Petitioner was selected on 15th June, 1995 and got the appointment order on 29th June, 1995. 4158 of 2005 whereby and whereunder the writ petition filed by the respondent herein was allowed. 422 of 1997, is entitled to get the benefit under the Government Resolution dated 15th June, 1995 the same principle should be applied to the Petitioner in the present petition. 2 Committee. 6581 of 2006 B. Sinha, J. A writ petition thereafter was filed by the respondent before the High Court praying inter alia for the following reliefs That by passing a suitable writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus or certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, a quash and set aside the order dated 24.6.2004 passed by the Respondent No. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 19.08.2005 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature of Bombay in Writ Petition No. Arising out of SLP C No. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2007_11.txt |
967 to 969 of 1971. 968 969. 116,, 1621 and 1622 of 1967. H. Parekh and Miss Manju Jetley for Respondent 3 in 967, R. 2 in 968, 969. 116 of 1967, 1621 of 1967 and 1622 of 1967 arise thus Proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, hereinafter referred to as the Act for acquisition of certain lands in villages Sayajipuri, Bapow and Savad, District Baroda, Taluka Baroda were initiated by the Government of Gujarat at the instance of Sardarnagar Co operative Industrial Society Limited registered under the Gujarat Co operative Societies Act 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Company for the purpose of establishing an industrial estate for small scale industries. 1 and 2 in 967 and R 1 in CAs. 967 to 969 of 1971 by special leave which are directed against the companymon judgment of the High Court of Gujarat dated April 17/18, 1970 in Special Civil Application Nos. 2 to companyplete the statutory enquiry under Rule 4 of the Rules in accordance with the principle of natural justice. Suresh Koshy George v. The University of Kerala and Ors. 19701 SCR 457 referred to. The acquisition being for the Company a numberification was issued under section 4 of the Act on July 2, 1964 after following the provisions of Part VII of the Act. The owners of the aforesaid lands who are companytesting respondents herein challenged the aforesaid numberifications issued under section 4 and 6 of the Act by filing petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India inter alia on the ground that the provisions of the Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition Companies Rules, 1963 hereinafter referred to as the Rules made by the Central Government in exercise of the powers companyferred under section 55 of the Act, which by virtue of Rule 1 2 of the Rules apply to acquisition of land for all companypanies under Part VII of the Act, have number been companyplied with particularly as they had number been given a right to be heard in accordance with the principles of natural justice at the enquiry held by Special Land Acquisition Officer, Baroda, appellant No. 1969 1 SCR 317 and A. K. Kraipak Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated April 17/18, 1970 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Applications Nos. N. Shroff for Respondents Rr. V. Patel, M. C. Bhandare, M. N. Shroff for the Appellants in all the appeals. An agreement under section 41 of the Act between the State Government and the Company was entered into on April 2, 1965 and was published on October 15, 1966. 2 herein. The plea raised by the owners of land found favour with the High Court which allowed the petitions set aside the numberification under section 6 of the Act, and issued a mandamus companymanding appellant No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. These three appeals Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JASWANT SINGH, J. | 0 | train | 1976_457.txt |
The two stations in Ajmer were Nasirabad and Deoli. Advorate General for the State of Maharashtra, T. M. Sen and P. D. Menon, for the State of Maharashtra Intervener . Bhimsankaram, T. M. Sen and P. D. Menon, for the State of Andhra Pradesh Intervener . 10,260 under r. 23 of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules. Similarly, the road from Ajmer to Kishangarh was partly in the former State of Ajmer and partly in the State of Rajasthan, approximately two thirds of the road lying in Ajmer and one third in Rajasthan. L. Hathi and P. D. Menon, for the State of Gujarat Intervener . Dinbandhu Sahu, Advocate General for the State of Orissa, B. P. Sinha, T. M. Sen and P. D. Menon, for the State of Orissa Intervener . K. T. Chari, Advocate General for the State of Madras, Ganapathy Iyer, T. M. Sen and P. D. Menon, for the State of Madras Intervener N. Sikri, Advocate General for the State of Punjab, N. Bindra, T. M. Sen and P. D. Menon, for the State of Punjab Intervener . The road from Nasirabad to Deoli was mainly in the former State of Ajmer but for some distance it passed through certain narrow strips of territory of the State of Rajasthan. M. Seervai, Advocate General for the State of Maharashtra and Naunit Lal, for the State of Assam Intervener . The second and the third appellant also had some transport vehicles which plied on the Nasirabad Deoli route or from Kishangarh to Sarwar, a town situated on the Nasirabad Deoli road in the State of Rajasthan. Srinivasmurty and D. Goburdhun, for Nazeeria Motor Service, Motor, and Andhra Pradesh Motor Union Interveners . Sen, S. C. Bose and P. K. Bose, for the State of West Bengal Intervener . 2 the Rajasthan Roadways Ltd., Ajmer in Civil Appeal No. Adhikari, Advocate General for the State of Madhya Pradesh, B. Sen, B. K. B. Naidu, and I. N. Shroff, for the State of Madhya Pradesh Intervener . Ranadeb Chaudhuri, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for M. A.Tulloch and Co. Intervener . The respondents are 1 the State of Rajasthan, 2 the Regional Transport Officer who is ex officio Motor Vehicles Taxation Officer, Jaipur, and 1 1961 1. M. Seervai. Lal Narain Sinha, Lakshman, Saran, Singh, D. P. Singh, R. K. Garg, M. K. Ramamurthi and S. C. Aggarwal, for the State of Bihar Intervener . Then the High Court companysidered the validity of the relevant provisions of the Act from the stand point of trade, companymerce and came to the companyclusion that the regulation of trade, companymerce and intercourse within the territory of India, both inter State and intra State. 4 and 11 of the Act infringed the right of freedom of trade, companymerce or intercourse granted under Art. C. Chatterjee, S. C. Mazumdar and R. H. Dhebar, for the Attorney General for India Intervener . Ltd., Ajmer in Civil Appeal No. On the passing of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951 Rajasthan Act XI of 1951 hereinafter referred to as the Act , and the promulgation of the rules made thereunder, the second respondent demanded of the appellants payment of the tax due on their motor Vehicles for the period beginning on April 1, 195 1, and ending on March 3 1, 1954. The third appellant is a partnership firm named Framji Motor Transport registered under the India Partnership Act. 301 and other companynected articles relating to trade, companymerce and intercourse within the territory of India, companytained in Part XIII of the Constitution. The States of Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar Gujrat, Madras, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal intervened and were represented before us either through their respective Advocates General or other Counsel M s. M. A. Tulloch Co., Andhra Pradesh Motor Congress and Nazeeria Motor Service, Nellore, applied for intervention on the ground that they would be affected in a pending litigation by the decision of this Court on the companystitutional issues involved. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants. Firstly, they companysidered the validity of the Act from the stand point of Act, 19 St 1 of the Constitution which guarantees, to all citizens of India the right to move freely throughout the territory of India this the Full Bench dealt with under the heading of freedom of intercourse from the stand point of the individual citizen and came to the companyclusion that restrictions which the Act imposed on the individual citizen were reasonable restrictions having regard to the necessity of raising funds for the maintenance of roads and the making of new roads in the State of Rajasthan. Thereafter the three appellants filed three separate writ petitions in the Rajasthan High Court in which their main companytention was that the relevant provisions of the Act imposing a tax on their motor vehicles were unconstitutional and void as they companytravened the freedom of trade, companymerce and intercourse through out the territory of India declared by Art.301 of the Constitution and therefore the demand and attempted companylection of such tax were illegal and should be prohibited. was number incompatible with its freedom and in the matter of such regulation of trade, companymerce and intercourse a distinction must be drawn between restrictions which are direct and immediate and restrictions which are indirect and companysequential. 43 of 1959, and 3 Framji C. Framji and others in Civil Appeal No. The prayers which the appellants made in their respective writ petitions were mainly there 1 that it be declared that the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act of 1951 and the Rules made thereunder are invalid and number in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of India and companysequently null and void and inoperative, and 2 that a writ of prohibition or mandamus or any other appropriate writ, direction or order directing the respondents number to realise any tax from the appellants under the provisions of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act of 1951 be issued. The judgment of M. Hidayatullah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and J. R. Mudholkar, JJ.,
was delivered by M. Hidayatullah, J. K. DAS, J. As the companystitutional issues involved affect the state of the Union, numberices were issued to the Advocates General companycerned. 301 of the Constitution. Appeals from the final judament and order dated August 9, 1957, of the Rajasthan High Court Jaipur Bench at Jaipur in Civil Writ Petitions Nos. The judgment of S. K. Das, J. L. Kapur and A. K. Sarkar, JJ.,
was delivered by S. K. Das, J. These are three companysolidated appeals which arise from the judgment and order of a Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court dated August, 9, 1957. It may be here stated that neither the Division Bench number the Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court had the advantage of the decision of this Court in Atiabari Tea Co., case 1 , which decision came much later in point of time. S. C. R. 809. 301 of the Constitution, they felt that in view of the companyplexity of the points involved and the apparent companyflict between certain decisions of other High Courts, the question should be referred to a Full Bench. The Full Bench dealt with the question from two different stand points. S. Pathak, J. These appeals were originally heard by a Bench of five Judges and on April 4, 1961, that Bench recorded an order to the effect that having regard to the importance of the companystitutional issues involved and the views expressed in the decision of this Court in Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. The State of Assam 1 the appeals should be heard by a larger Bench. The three writ petition were heard together by a Division Bench companysisting of Bapna and Bhandari, JJ. The first two Appellants are private, limited liability companypanies registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and having their registered offices at Ajmer. The cases then went back to the Division Bench with the answer given by the Full Bench and the writ petitions were dismissed by the Division Bench by its judgment and order dated August 9, 1957. 22,260, the second appellant Rs. When the appellants failed to pay the tax demanded from them, the second respondent issued certificates under s. 13 of the Act to the, third respondent for the recovery of the tax due as arrears of land revenue. 6,540 and the third appellant Rs. They dealt with and disposed of certain other objection to the validity of the Act, with which we are numberlonger companycerned but as to the companytravention of Art. 42 to 44 of 1959. 44 of 1959. 42 of 1959. A numberice was also issued to the Attorney General on behalf of the Union of India. 132 of the Constitution which certificate the High Court granted by its order dated October 16, 1957. 3 the Collector of Jaipur. The three appellants then moved the High Court for a certificate under Art. These appeals were however, dismissed by an order of the Transport Commissioner dated October 21, 1953. 132 of the Consti tution certifying that the cases involve a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of Art. Accordingly, they referred the question whether ss. The appeals were then placed before the learned Chief Justice for necessary orders, and on his orders have number companye to this Bench of seven Judges for disposal. They have been preferred to this Court on the strength of a certificate granted by the said High Court under Art. April 9. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. The first appellant was called upon to pay Rs. The first appellant did number file any appeal. The following judgments were delivered. Those applications were allowed by us. respondents. | 0 | train | 1962_123.txt |
None of the text books prescribed or recommended by the Board was a text book printed and published, by the petitioner. These 28 text books brought out by the Text Books Corporation were referred to by the State Government as nationalized text books as the Text Books Corporation was merely an agency set up by the State Government for carrying out the work of printing, publishing and distribution of text books. The Board prescribed text books only on languages and so far as the other subjects were companycerned, the Board merely recommended text books on some of those subjects. There were thus four subjects on which text books were recommended by the Board. were used exclusively as text books for the subjects dealt with by them. The same 28 text books, printed and published by the Text Books Corporation, revised in accordance with the new companyrses of instruction and syallabi where necessary companytinued to be prescribed as text books for the academic year 1972 73. It was number seriously disputed on behalf of the petitioner that the procedure set out above for selection of text books was substantially followed by the Board in prescribing text books on languages and recommending text books on these four subjects. The number of text books printed and published by the Text Books Corporation was reduced from 29 to 28 because one text book, namely, Bal Bharati Praveshika, which was printed and published by the State Government as a separate book, was amalgamated by the Text Books Corporation with Bal Bharati Part 1. The result was that in the Primary and Middle school classes for the academic year 1971 72, the above mentioned 28.
text books, printed and published by the Text Books Corporation. The petitioner had submitted text books on Civics, Physics and Chemistry. This procedure gave opportunity to all the registered publishers to submit their text books for selection by the Board and provided a machinery for selection of the best text books to be recommended or prescribed by the Board. This numberification was admittedly issued by the Board and number by the State Government and moreover it did number even purport to prescribe these text books but merely directed that these text books shall be recommended text books for the period companymencing from the academic year 1973 74. new text books had to be brought out which would be in companyformity with such new companyrses of instruction and syallabi. The Text Books Corporation accordingly printed and published 28 text books in accordance with the new companyrses of instruction and syallabi and these 28 text books were prescribed by the State Government by a numberification dated 21st May, 1971 for use in the Primary and Middle school classes for the academic year 1971 72. The appropriate Committee of Courses after scrutinising the text books and companysidering the evaluation made by the reviewers made its recommendation to the Board as regards the merits of the text books submitted for its companysideration. Now, the Board was number given the power to prescribe text books, and therefore, the recommendation of suitable text books invited from the appropriate Committee of Courses companyld only be for the purpose of enabling the Board in its turn to recommend such text books for use by schools in the Higher Secondary classes. It was recited in the numberification that the approval to these text books was given by the State Government in companysultation with the Board. while for the other subjects text books printed and published by private publishers were used according to the companyvenience of the schools. The functions of the Text Books Committee were difined by s. 19 to be as follows 1 to select text books for prescribed companyrses of instructions and syllabi for Secondary Education 2 to prepare a panel of expert reviewers for each of the subjects included in the secondary school education curriculum 3 to appoint expert companymittees companysisting of number more than three members from amongst the panel of experts to examine and submit a detailed report on the suitability of the books referred to them 4 to invite experts to write text books and other books of study, if necessary, Though one of the functions entrusted to the Text Books Committee was to select text books for prescribed companyrses of instruction and syllabi, numberpower was given to the Board to prescribe the text books selected by the Text Books Committee. The Board, however, claimed to have the power to prescribe text books in languages on the ground that the power to prescribe companyrses of instruction and syllabi in languages carried with it by necessary implication the power to prescribe text books and on that view, the Board, on the basis of the selections made by the Text Books Committee, prescribed text books in English, Hindi, Marathi and Sanskrit. So far as the text books for use in Primary and Middle school classes were company cerned, the State Government prescribed 29 text books printed and published by it on different subjects for use in different classes. The Text Books Corporation thereafter brought out eight further text books making in the aggregate 36 text books printed and published by then and as appears from the circular dated 30th August 1973 issued by the Director of Public Instruction, an order dated 23rd Match 1973 was issued by the State Government prescribing these 36 text books for use in the Primary and Middle school classes. The work of printing and publishing of text books was, however number companymenced immediately by the Text Books Corporation and until the end of the academic year 1970 71, the aforesaid 29 text books printed and published by the State Government companytinued to be prescribed and used in the Primary and Middle school classes. The registered publishers than got the text books written by authors of their choice in company formity with the prescribed companyrses of instruction and syllabi and printed in accordance with the instructions and specifications given by the Board and submitted such text books to the Board for selection. These text books were number prescribed by the Board and they were number in force immediately before the appointed day. The Text Books Corporation was by its very companystitution companytrolled by the State Government and it was intended to function as an agency of the State Government. The initial resources of the Text Books Corporation were provided by the State Government by giving a loan of Rs. were laid down by the Board and the registered publishers were invited to submit text books prepared in accordance with such instructions and specifications for selection by the Board. In fact, the Board did number claim to exercise the power to prescribe text books on any subjects other than languages. There was of course, numberstatutory provision under which these 29 text books companyld be prescribed by the State Government and the prescription of these 29 text books had, therefore, numberstatutory authority but private schools, numberless than Government schools, accepted these 29 text books because number acceptance would have involved estoppage of grant in aid from the State Government. it did number have the effect of prescribing any of these text books under s. 4, sub s. 1 , firstly, because it wa s issued by the Board and number by the State Government, and secondly, because it did number more than merely direct that these text books shall be recommended text books for the period companymencing from the Academic year 1973 74. The procedure followed by the Board for prescribing or recommending text books under the Act of 1965 and the Regulations was as follows The Board invited publishers desiring to get their text books selected to register themselves with the Board and several publishers accordingly got themselves registered and the petitioner was one of them. The petitioner carries on business of printing, publishing and selling text books for use in Primary, Middle schools and Higher Secondary classes in schools in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The first was a numberification dated 5th April, 1972 by which the Board recommended six textbooks on Civics, the second was a numberification dated 25th April, 1972 by which the Board recommended five text books on Economics, the third was a numberification dated 26th April, 1972 by which the Board recommended eight text books on Physics and the fourth was a numberification dated 17th May, 1972 by which the Board recommended eight text books on Chemistry. for selection by the Board but they were rejected by the reviewers as they were found to be below standard and were printed on poor quality paper and were also companytlier than the text books submitted by other registered publishers. In the meantime a Society called the Madhya Pradesh Pathya Pustak Rachna Avam Shaikshinik Anusandhan Nigam hereinafter referred to as the Text Books Corporation was formed by the State Government for the purpose of carrying on the work of printing, publishing and distributing text books for use in the Primary and Middle school classes in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The Chair man of the Board then, by virtue of the authority companyferred upon him by the Resolution of the Board dated 12th October, 1971, selected the text books after companysidering the report of the reviewers and the recommendation of the appropriate Committee of Courses and the text books so selected were prescribed or recommended, as the case may be, by the Board. The aforesaid 29 text books printed and published by the State Government, number being in accordance with the new companyrses of instruction and syallabi so prescribed, were rendered useless and in their place,. They companyld number, therefore, be regarded as text books prescribed under s. 4, sub s. 2 . On receipt of the report of the reviewers such of the text books as were rated high by the reviewers were sent to the appropriate Committee of Courses to ether with the report of the reviewers for the purpose of making its recommendations. The detailed instructions and specifications in regard to the text books on matters such as quality of paper, number of pages, price etc. The Text Books Corporation was registered under the Madhya Pradesh Societies Act, 1959 and according to the provisions of that Act, it was to function on a numberprofit no loss basis. The companyrses of instruction and syallabi for the next academic year 1972 73 were prescribed by the State Government by a numberification dated 10th May 1972 and by this numberification the State Government in troduced new companyrses of instruction and syallabi in certain subjects and with regard to the rest, directed that the same companyrses of instruction and syallabi as also the same text books shall companytinue to be in use as in the academic year 1971 72. The State Government made it clear in the numberification dated 21st May, 1971 that so far as the other subjects were companycerned for which such nationalised text books were number available, the schools were free to use according to their companyvenience such books of private publishers as they liked, provided they were written in accordance with the companyrses of instruction and syllabi for the academic year 1970 71. The text books which were received from the registered publishers were then sent to three reviewers appointed by the Board for the relevant subject for evaluation after removing the title page, the names of the author and the publisher and every other matter that might indicate the identity of the author or the publisher. Soon after the companying into force of the Act of 1973, the Board issued a numberification dated 28th March, 1973 which companytained inter alia the following directions The syllabus and scheme of examination for the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination 1976 shall companytinue as per the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination, 1975, Leaving aside General English and Tamil for classes IX and X, so far as the rest of the subjects are companycerned, the text books recommended or prescribed by the Board for the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination 1975 shall be the recommended or prescribed text books for the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination, 1976. The Minister incharge of the portfolio of education was an ex officio, Chairman of the text Books Corporation, while some officers of the Government companynected with the Education Department were ex officio members along with certain other number official members numberinated by the State Government. The Board by issuing the numberifications dated 5th April, 1972, 25th April, 1972, 26th April, 1972 and 17th May, 1972 merely recommended certain text books on Civics, Economics, Physics and Chemistry. Primary and Middle school education may be companysidered together, for barring a short period upto the enactment of the Madhya Pradesh Secondary Education Act, 1959 hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1959 , when Middle school education was clubbed together with Higher Secondary education and was treated differently from Primary education, Middle school education has always been treated on the same basis as Primary education in companytrast to Higher Secondary Education. The State Government thereafter in exercise of the power companyferred under s. 4, sub s. 1 of the Act of 1973 issued a numberification dated 24th May, 1973 according its approval to certain text books on Botany, Zoology, History, Element of Commerce and English for the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination, 1976. The State Government prescribed the companyrses of instruction and syllabi for all classes of Primary and Middle school education and they were followed number only by Government schools but also by private schools, number because of any statutory authority, but because most of the private schools depended on grant in aid from the State Government and unless the companyrses of instruction and syllabi prescribed by the State Government were followed by them, they would number be recognized by the Board of Secondary Education so as to be able to present their students for the examination to be held by the Board a sine qua number for admission to a university unless their Primary and Middle schools sections were recognized by the State Government. The school education in the State of Madhya Pradesh, and prior to the reorganization of the States, in the Mahakoshal and Madhya Bharat regions, has always been divided structurally in three stages, namely Primay, Middle school and Higher Secondary. Primay education companysists of classes I to V, Middle School, of classes VI to VIll and Higher Secondary of classes IX to XI. So far as Higher Secondary education is companycerned, it was regulated by the Madhya Pradesh Education Act, 1951 in the Mahakoshal region and by the Madhya Bharat Secondary Education Act, Samvat 2007 in the Madhya Bharat region. The State ,Government by a numberification dated 18th May, 1971 prescribed improved companyrses of instruction and syallabi in certain subjects to be followed from the academic year 1971 72 and directed that so far as companyrses ,of instruction and syallabi in the other subjects were companycerned, they should companytinue to be the same as in the previous academic year 1970 71. it is number necessary for the purpose of the present petition to trace the history of the regulation of Primary and Middle school education from the inception, It would be sufficient to state that Primary education at all times and Middle school education, so far as Mahakoshal region is companycerned, after the enactment of the Act of 1959, and in other regions even before that time, were regulated by the State Government. There was, however, a change in the companyrse of instruction and syllabi in some of the subjects from the academic year 1971 72. This was the position which obtained when the Madhya Pradesh Prathamik, Middle School Tatha Madhyamik Shiksha Pathya Pustakon Sambandhi Vyavastha Adhiniyam, 1973 hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1973 was enacted by the Madhya Pradesh Legislature. On 1st November, 1956, as a result of the reorganisation of States under the States Reorganization Act, 1956, a new State of Madhya Pradesh was formed companyprising of territories of the existing States of Madhya Pradesh known as Mahakoshal area, the territories of the existing State of Madhya Bharat, excluding Sunel Tappa, Sironj SubDivision of Kotah District in the existing State of Rajasthan and the territories of the existing States of Bhopal and Vindhya Pradesh. It is number necessary to refer to the provisions of these two statutes, for both of them were repealed by the Act of 1959 which was enacted by the Legislature of the new State of Madhya Pradesh after the reorganization of that State. The Madhya Pradesh Madhyamik Shiksha Adhiniyam 1965 here inafter referred to as the Act of 1965 was enacted by the Madhya Pradesh Legislature on 29th September 1965 and by s. 30, it repealed the Act of 1959. Sharff. Though the numberification dated 28th March, 1973 was issued after the appointed day. Sen with K. P. Munshi, U. K. Khaitan and S. R. Agarwala, for the petitioner. 1177 of 1973 Under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of the fundamental rights . for the respondent 1 3 In W. P. 1177 N. Ganpule and Urmila Sirur for the respondent 4 6 in W. P. 1177 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI, J. S. Dharmadhi Kari with Ram Punjwani and. 15 lacs for the purpose Of enabling it to companymence its operations. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition No. I.N. The petitioner thereupon filed the present petition claiming various reliefs under Art. | 1 | train | 1974_73.txt |
PD attested by SI Gurdeep Singh and ASI Satpal Singh. The seal after use was handed over to ASI Satpal Singh PW5 . The prosecution in support of its case, examined Sudh Singh Head Constable PW1 , Chet Ram PW2 , Rachpal Singh Inspector PW3 , Ram Pal Singh PW4 and Satpal Singh PW5 . Bagh Singh. Inspector, Ram Pal PW4 then produced the appellant along with the case property and witnesses before Satpal Singh PW5 on the same day of the alleged crime. The prosecution story is that on 23rd September, 1994 at around 2.30 PM, Inspector Ram Pal Singh PW4 along with SI Gurdeep Singh, ASI Satpal Singh PW5 and other officials were on duty and companying from village Hassanpur to village Mirsapur. The search was companyducted and the police party recovered 1 Kg and 750 gram opium from his custody. The Ex Sarpanch, Narang Singh asked them the reason for the digging. Ten grams of opium was put into a tin companytainer as a sample. Inspector, Ram Pal PW4 recorded the statements of the witnesses and arrested the appellant. The police told him that they were searching for opium and illicit arms, and that he had relations with terrorists. PW4 suspected that that the appellant was carrying some incriminating articles in his bag. Thereafter, PW3 at 7.30 PM deposited the sealed case property with MHC Shudh Singh. PW4 enquired about the alleged incident from other witnesses and checked the case property and also affixed his own seal bearing impression RP on the case property and on samples of seal Ex. SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. The Courts below have also disregarded the deposition of DW 1, Sarpanch Narang Singh for numbervalid grounds. Ruqa Ex. Mr. Ujjal Singh, companynsel for the appellant submits as follows The whole incident happened in a densely populated area and there were so many independent witnesses but only the police have been made the prosecution witnesses. The appellant was apprehended from his village on 10th September, 1994 by the police party. Another police party dug up his house and companyrtyard looking for illicit arms. The entire case property was taken into possession vide memo Ex. After reaching near the bridge of canal minor while going on kacha path, the police party numbericed the appellant companying from the bank of canal. The appellant companyld number produce any valid license or permit for possession of the said opium. one lac and in default of payment of the same, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for another two years, for having been found in possession of 1 kg and 750 grams of opium without any permit or licence. Thereafter, the police took the appellant to CIA staff. On seeing the police party, the appellant tried to run away but on suspicion he was apprehended. The appellant has been falsely implicated. Then he was falsely implicated in this case. On enquiry, he informed the police about his name, parentage, address etc. 25 was also recovered from the accused and the same was taken into possession vide memo Ex. It was duly sealed. PF was sent to the police station and subsequently the FIR was registered. At that time, he was carrying a bag thaili in his right hand. Sessions Judge vide its final order and judgment dated 19th May, 1999 companyvicted and sentenced the appellant under section 18 of the NDPS Act, as numbericed above. P1, signed by the appellant. But numberhing incriminating was found. On personal search, currency numberes amounting to Rs. 590 SB of 1999, whereby the High Court upheld the order of companyviction passed against the appellant herein under Section 18 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 hereinafter referred to as NDPS Act , and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of Rs. The investigation was duly companypleted and challan against the appellant was prepared by S.I. He was tortured by using third degree methods. The High Court, in an appeal, vide judgment dated 12th May, 2008 affirmed the findings of the Sessions Court and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant. We have heard the companynsel for both parties. The companyrts below have number companysidered the appellants version as recorded under Section 313 Cr. This appeal is directed against the final Order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated 12th May, 2008 passed in Criminal Appeal No. The Addl. P.C. Hence the appeal before this Court. | 0 | train | 2011_167.txt |
the firm companymenced selling the shares soon after they were purchased. some of the shares were sold through brokers to outsiders. some of the shares were sold through brokers to strangers. within a few days after purchasing the raymond shares the firm started unloading them. 857480.except 2118 preference shares the entire lot of shares with the debentures was sold for rs. it was claimed that the shares were taken over because the public did number accept those shares. 399587 received by it as profit on sale of shares. in 1944 the firm purchased 50000 ordinary shares of raymond woollen mills limited hereinafter called raymond for rs. it is a significant circumstance that the firm parted with all the raymond shares by april 2 1946 and did number retain a single share after that date. the story that the shares had to be sold on account of financial difficulties is plainly belied by the circumstance that the firm went on purchasing and selling the aluminium shares. it was number the case of the firm that aluminium and j.k.
trust shares were purchased for .acquiring the managing agency. and the shares were never sold without making profit. the story of the firm that some or all the shares were merely distributed to its associates is number proved. 266945.
between january 26 1945 and april 5 1946 the firm also purchased 67 debentures 5582 preference shares and 18576 ordinary shares of the aluminium companyporation ltd.
hereinafter called aluminium for rs. aluminium shares were purchased between january 26 1945 and april 5 1946 except a few which were retained and sold at profit. trust shares were purchased on february 14 1945 and were sold on august 22 1945. large block of shares was purchased at the ruling rates with borrowed money and soon thereafter the shares were disposed of at a profit in small lots. 6975255.
the firm paid rs. the interest which the firm had to pay for the amount borrowed for purchasing the shares was acted in the revenue account and was claimed as a revenue allowance. it was one of the objects of the firm to finance its allied companycerns and in taking over shares which the public did number subscribe the firm was acting in the companyrse of its business. 70 lakhs borrowed from the hindustan companymercial bank limited the firm sold those shares through brokers between numberember 23 1944 and april 2 1946 and realised rs. 705957 between february 1 1945 and august 13 1945.
adjusting the cost of shares left on hand the firm realised a net profit of rs. the companytention that the shares were only distributed to the allied companycerns is companytrary to the findings of the tribunal. the firm used to promote companypanies. the interest paid for the loan borrowed from the hindustan companymercial bank limited for financing the purchase of raymond shares was debited in the accounts as a revenue expenditure and it was claimed as a permissible allowance. whereas the first lot was purchased on january 26 1945 the first sale was made on february 1 1945.
it companyld number be said that this was an investment in shares independent of the trading activity of the firm. the firm has appealed to this companyrt with special leave. the tribunal amongst others referred the following question to the high companyrt of allahabad for opinion whether the surplus realised by the sale of the shares of aluminium companyporation of india limited j.k.
investment trust and raymond woollen mills amounting in aggregate to rs. the income tax appellate tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the firm. it was found in that case by the tribunal that the intention of purchasing the shares was number to acquire them as part of the stock in trade of tax payers business in shares but to facilitate the acquisition of the managing agency of the companypany which was in fact acquired and on that account loss incurred by the sale of a small lot could be regarded only as a loss of capital nature. industries limited and other j.k.
but the transfer even to the j.k.
concerns was in all cases for a profit. 7242200 the transaction resulting in a net profit of rs. in proceedings for assessment to incometax for the year 1946 47 the appellant firm was assessed to tax in respect of an amount of rs. plea of the firm that the amount was capital gain and was on that account number taxable was rejected.in the view of the income tax officer the profit arose from a well planned business activity in which the assessee had fully utilised its resources. 399587 or any part thereof was the revenue income of the assessee liable to tax under the income tax act 1922 ? 700000 on numberember 41944 and the balance on december 6 1944.
the transaction was financed with the aid of a loan of rs. trading loss. the appellate assistant companymissioner affirmed the decision of the income tax officer. the tribunal agreed with them. lyer r.n. sanghi and b.r. application number 167 of 1955.
k. sen g.l. sachthey and b.d. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by shah ag. the high companyrt answered the question in the affirmative. the departmental authorities rejected the contentions. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1953 of 1968.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated september 17 1962 of the allahabad high companyrt in misc. agarwal for the appellant. sharma for the respondent. | 0 | test | 1969_65.txt |
The appellant who was promoted as Superintendent on 2 5 1983 had been companysidered as senior to Veda Prakash in the cadre of Superintendents prior to this change of date. But in view of this order she has became junior to Veda Prakash. 569 issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh on 22 5 1986 in exercise of its power of relaxation under Rule 47 of the Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate Services Rules, giving a numberional seniority to Veda Prakash, Respondent 3 in the appeal, in the cadre of Superintendents from 18 9 1981 instead of his actual date of promotion which was 17 5 1983. v. D. Janardhana Rao R.R. By a companysequential order dated 2 7 1987 the appellant was reverted as Superintendent. 569 was issued, neither numberice number hearing was given to the appellant who is directly affected by GO No. Verma v. Union of India and Amrik Singh v. Union of India , it is companyceded by the learned Counsel for Respondent 3 that the order of relaxation companyld number have been validly passed without giving numberice to all affected parties since that would be in violation of the principles of natural justice. The appellant challenged the order of 2 7 1987 by filing a petition which was ultimately heard by the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. She was promoted as Deputy Commercial Tax Officer. In view of the decisions of this Court in Govt, of A.P. The dispute in the present appeal has arisen as a result of Government Order No. The Tribunal, by its impugned judgment and order has dismissed the petition of the appellant. The present appeal is from this judgment and order. | 1 | train | 1997_522.txt |
It is held that under the Orissa Motor Vehicles Act unless a vehicle had both a certificate of fitness as well as a valid certificate of registration, the vehicle cannot be presumed to have been kept for use. As numbersubsequent undertaking was filed, it has to be presumed that the vehicle had been used or kept for use within the State. The said vehicle met with an accident on 23rd January 1991. The Respondent gave off road intimation as required for the period January 1991 to December 1991. But for the subsequent periods the undertaking has number been filed and intimation number given. In respect of this Truck, the registration and fitness certificate had been issued and motor vehicle tax was being paid regularly. Thus, it is clear that such an intimation and undertaking has to be given from year to year if the vehicle is intended number to be used on the road for more than one year. As the accident was severe, the fitness certificate was cancelled by the Appellant on 24th January 1991. In this case, admittedly, during the initial period the required intimation and undertaking had been filed. The Taxing Officer also raised further demands for subsequent periods. The undertaking filed for the initial period would number operate beyond the period of one year. He did number, however, submit any off road intimation for the period from January 1992 to December 1995. The High Court was number right in companycluding that merely because the certificate of fitness was cancelled, it companyld number be said that the vehicle had number been kept for use in the State. The undertaking companytemplated by Section 10 can only be for a period of one year at a time. The relevant documents including the registration certificate, fitness certificate, permit and tax token, etc. If numberintimation, as required under Section 10 along with the undertaking, has been given then, by virtue of proviso 3 to Section 10, it will be deemed that the vehicle had been used or kept for use within the State. are to be delivered to the Taxing Officer. The Taxing Officer cum Regional Transport Officer of the Appellant by his letter dated 10th January 1996 called upon the Respondent to pay a sum of Rs.27,750/ being the tax for the period from January 1992 to December 1995. It is held that the demand was thus unsustainable in law and the numberices of demand were quashed. The Respondent preferred an Appeal, against this demand, before the Chairman, Regional Transport Authority. Revision filed by the Respondent, before the Transport Commissioner, also stood dismissed. This Appeal is against the Judgment of the High Court of Orissa dated 8th January, 2002. By an Order dated 23rd August 1996, the appellate authority dismissed the Appeal. N. VARIAVA, J. The Respondent thus filed a Writ Petition in the High Court. Briefly stated the facts are as follows. We have heard the parties. | 1 | train | 2004_1203.txt |
The companytractor has to be paid on the basis of measurement of the work done by him. The objection was to the claim made by the companytractor of Rs.14,32,436/ which was based on the measurements recorded by the Local Commissioner of the work done by the companytractor under the companytract. The companytractor allegedly companymitted breach of the companytract. On May 22, 1976 companytractor companymenced work. On the basis of the report of the Local Commissioner giving details of the measurements of the work done by the companytractor a final bill was prepared by the companytractor which amounted to Rs.14,32,436.62. DAMAGE TO WORKS From the companymencement to the taking over of the works by the Department the companytractor shall be responsible for any damage or loss to the works or part thereof caused due to any reason whatsoever. By this time the companytractor had executed less than 50 of the work and had been paid a sum of Rs.5,71,900/ . The companytractor filed a petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act as the companytract stipulated arbitration agreement between the parties. The companytractor shall provide at his own companyt all labour and materials that may be required for checking the works during execution by the staff of Engineer in charge. The companytractor shall number delay the carrying out of works by reason of any reference to Arbitration and shall proceed with the works with all one due diligence and shall until the decision of the Arbitrator, abide by the decision of the engineer or his representative in charge of the works duly companyveyed by him. Such checks shall number absolve the companytractor of his responsibility from carrying out the works strictly according to the detailed drawings and specifications and as per instructions issued to him by the Engineer during the execution of the works. The quantities shown in the Annexure III may be decreased in detailed drawings to be furnished to the companytractor during execution and the companytractor shall be paid only for the work done or executed and shall have numberclaim for any companypensation on account of any profit or advantage that might have accrued or that may accrue to him otherwise. Some of the terms of the companytract companytaining the arbitration agreement, we may reproduce as under CONTRACT RATES The companytractor shall be paid for the works executed by him under this agreement at the rates specified in Annexure I annexed hereto subject to other terms and companyditions embodied in this agreement. 136 of 1980 with the prayer that measurements of the work done at site may be got recorded by appointing a Commissioner as the work done by him is ? On June 6, 1980 the whole of the companytract was terminated because of default companymitted by the companytractor. Plea of the companytractor against reducing the interest by the learned single Judge was rejected. IN THE WORKS The companytractor shall number in any way alter the works or any part thereof in respect of designs, quality, materials or specifications without the previous permission in writing of the Engineer. Petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act by the companytractor was filed on June 12, 1980. Time being the essence of the companytract, the responsibility for execution of works within eighteen 18 months in an efficient and workmen like manner and in companyformity with the departments drawings and specifications shall be of the companytractor. On the following day when the petition was taken up without any numberice to the State the Court appointed Local Commissioner to take measurements of the work done at the site by the companytractor. The companytractor shall at his own companyt and responsibility locate and establish temporary bench marks and reference lines for all the structures as may be required for the execution of the works according to the detailed drawings and specifications and as required by the Engineer. In his petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act the companytractor claimed a sum of Rs.39,47,000/ under various heads. The Engineer in charge shall be authorised to direct the companytractor to execute extra items number shown in the aforesaid annexure III or increase decrease the quantities beyond these described in the said annexures as may be required to be executed and for such increase decrease quantities the companytractor shall be paid at the rates specified in the annexure I. While deleting the claims under items 13 and 14 the Division Bench observed as under The work done by the companytractor was duly measured and the final bill prepared in accordance with paragraph 40 measurements and terms of payment of the Agreement enclosed by the companytractor with his statement of facts and claim before the arbitrator amounting to Rs.14,32,436.62 paise out of which deducting the amount of Rs.5,71,915.60 paise paid to the companytractor leaves the balance of Rs.8,60,521.02 paise only over and above this amount any measurement subsequently done by the companymissioner cannot form part of the agreement and companyld number be allowed to be multiplied to an unlimited extent beyond the rates and work prescribed in the agreement. The companytractor shall number take advantage of any error or discrepancies occurring in the drawings, designs or specifications but shall report the same to the Engineer who shall make or approve the companyrections if necessary. Reference line and bench marks will be set upon at the site of works by the site of works by the department at companytractors companyt. He awarded a sum of Rs.20,08,000/ to the companytractor with interest at the rate of 10 per annum from the date of application for appointment of the arbitrator upto the date of payment. The other heads of claim overlap the claim No. The companytractor shall be responsible for the true and proper setting out of the works and for the companyrectness of the positions, levels, bench marks alignments and dimensions in works and for the provisions and maintenance of all necessary instruments, appliances, bench marks and reference marks and labour etc. The work was to be companypleted within 18 months, time being the essence of the companytract. The companytract was partially terminated in the structural portion of the work on January 12, 1980. The companytractor shall at his own companyt repair and make good the loss or damage in every respect to the satisfaction of the Engineer whose certificate in this behalf shall be companyclusive proof of the defects etc. Till the measurements are recorded the respondent will number execute any fresh work. The order referring the disputes to arbitration allows those claims to be raised before the arbitrator which fell within the terms of the companytract. It was on the grounds that the Award was against the terms of the companytract and the arbitrator travelled beyond the order of reference. In the application for seeking interim relief the companytractor prayed that a companymissioner may be appointed to go on spot and record the measurements of the work done by the petitioner in presence of the parties and till then the respondents may be restrained from changing the status quo at site or disturbing the position of the work already done. The companytract has been entered into on the basis of measurable item rate companytract and the rates of each items were quoted accordingly. or charges for restoring damages to the works plant or material. This amount is reflected in claims 13 and 14 before the arbitrator. Claims 16 and 18 respectively were claims of interest at the rate of 24 per annum by the companytractor respectively on recoveries made and delay in release of illegally deducted amounts for excess companysumption of cement. Award of penal interest at the rate of 18 was deleted. CLAIMS NOT ENTERTAINABLE From the date of allotment of works and taking over on companypletion by the department numberclaim shall be entertained in respect of the works under this agreement against the department for, Increase in the companyt of POL Railway or road freight Taxes duties and octroi, etc. It was submitted by the State that the order dated April 9, 1982 referring the disputes to arbitration did number allow the companytractor to advance additional claims number mentioned in the summary of claims annexed to the petition. Tender of the companytractor for earth work, excavation, minor drainage crossing, overhead crossing, road bridges and cement companycrete lining of Ravi Canal Project was accepted by the State Government and by order dated May 6, 1976 work was allotted to him. According to the measurements, as quoted, the companytract was for a total value of Rs.12,23,500/ . Awards on claims 16 and 18 were restricted to Rs.20,400/ and Rs.9,524/ . The decision of the Arbitrator shall be final, companyclusive and binding upon the parties. He companyld number companyplete the work within the stipulated time. He is aggrieved by deletion of two claims and also lowering the rate of interest and the State is aggrieved against the award itself. It was partially terminated on January 12, 1980 in respect of structural portion of the work and the companytract was finally terminated on June 6, 1980. VARIATION IN QUANTITIES AND EXTRA ITEMS The quantities shown in the Annexure III to this agreement shall number be taken as final. 16 and 18 shall start and will be companyputed from the date of the publication of the Award. Department Jammu and Kashmir Government may numberinate for arbitration under the Jammu and Kashmir Arbitration Act and rules framed thereunder. Contractor became more aggrieved because of deletion of his two claims and rejection of his plea for enhancement of the interest as awarded by the Arbitrator. FORCE MAJOURE The companypletion schedule is subject to the operation of the force Majour Clause which for the purpose of this companytract is defined as acts of God, Civil, companymotion, sabotage, fires, floods, earthquakes explosions or other catastrophes, epidemics, quarantines, restrictions, strikes, and other labour troubles, embargoes, or other transportation delays beyond the companytrol of the companytractor for which only extension in time companysidered reasonable by the department shall be granted and the companytractor shall have numberclaim for companypensation or increase in rates etc. Annexure companytained summary of claims which included claims on account of earth work cutting as the original alignment was later abandoned, idle labour, illegal recoveries, interest on illegal recoveries, etc. What the companytractor claimed in Section 20 petition was given in the annexure thereto and this is how the claims were advanced Similarly numerous other items in which the petitioner either was number paid at all or was number paid have been companyprehensively indicated in the Annexure to this petition which may kindly be treated as a part and parcel of the present petition. State filed objections to the Award under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act and alleged misconduct by the arbitrator. The arbitrator gave his Award on February 2, 1983. He claimed this bill to be based on the terms of the companytract. It was submitted that new claims were introduced before the arbitrator which were number made in the petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act and, therefore, companyld number be taken companynizance of by the arbitrator. ARBITRATION If at any time any doubt, question dispute or difference whatsoever, shall arise between the companytractor and the Government upon or in relation to or in companynection with this companytract, either of the parties may give to the other numberice in writing of the existence of such doubt, question, dispute or difference and the same shall be referred to a person mutually agreed upon by the parties failing such agreement by any officer of the Government as the minister In charge, P.W. Same objections to the Award were repeated by the State. While the learned single Judge made the award given under the Arbitration Act, 1940 a rule of the companyrt and also granted interest, the Division Bench in appeal deleted two claims from the award and also reduced the rate of interest. Contractor objected to that part of the order of learned single Judge by which interest awarded by the arbitrator was reduced. It was also provided that the interest on the amount awarded against claim Nos. He, however, reduced the rate of interest and number the interest was payable at the rate of 6 per annum from the date of the Award till payment. As numbered above, the companytract was for a total sum of Rs.12,23,500/ . It is a number speaking Award. RESPONSIBILITY OF CONTRACTOR. 20 on which item 13 is awarded. The parties shall be at liberty to raise any further disputes before him provided it is number against the term of the agreement. 20 due to escalation Rs.2,86,487/ claim rejected by arbitrator of the subsequent statement of facts and claim, exceeded his jurisdiction which is against the terms of the agreement and thus invalid in view of the reference. Lastly, it was directed that if the amount awarded was number paid within three months from the date of the Award interest payable shall be 18 per annum on the amount so awarded upto the date of realisation. 13 granting Rs.95,400.00 based on claim No. Engineer, RB C o Chief Engineer, P.W.D. Jammu, is appointed as Commissioner to visit the spot and record the measurements and submit his report within a week. The award was in favour of Dev Dutt Pandit, the Contractor. in companynection therewith including charges therefor shall be borne by him. This time for making the Award rule of the companyrt. We quote the operative portion of the order as under The disputes mentioned in the application u s 20 of the Arbitration Act as well as the objections filed thereto by the other side are, therefore, referred to the aforesaid Arbitrator with a direction that he shall enter upon the reference and make his award within four months thereafter in accordance with law. Even the summary of claims submitted before the companyrt for reference do number include the amount claimed under this head. The Division Bench upheld the order of the learned single Judge except that claims under items 13 and 14 were deleted which amounted to Rs.8,08,250/ . He said High Court was right in deleting these two claims. The petitioner has tentatively assessed the various claims on various accounts which he is entitled to from the said department which may be referred to for the purpose of companyvenience. Local Commissioner submitted his report on December 9, 1980 which formed part of the record. Subsequently Local Commissioner was changed. Learned single Judge of the High Court by order dated May 10, 1986 dismissed the objections raised by the State and made the Award rule of the companyrt. c Increased wages of labour skilled or unskilled and companyt of materials d Rise in companyt of living index e Business or any other losses, and f Idle employees on any account whatsoever. DEVIATIONS ALTERATIONS ETC. The Commissioners fee is fixed at Rs.300/ to be borne by the petitioner. Both the parties are aggrieved by judgment dated February 6, 1989 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir passed in an appeal against judgment dated May 10, 1986 by the learned single Judge of that High Court. Shri Bashir Ahmed Shah, Ex. The appeal of the State was thus allowed in part. This petition was allowed by order dated April 9, 1982. State still felt aggrieved. Court passed the following order An application has also been moved on behalf of the petitioner which is O.M.P. obliterated. P. Wadhwa, J. Matter was then taken to the appellate Bench of the High Court in appeal. The matter number again came to the companyrt. The application is supported by an affidavit. Thus two separate appeals. SETTING OUT. having been removed. No. | 1 | train | 1999_1154.txt |
5479 81/2005 . During the pendency of the petitions, Hinsa Virodhak Sangh, Satellite Murtipujak Jain Sangh, Shree Laxmi Vardak Jain Sangh and Shree Shahibaug Girdhar Nagar Jain Swetambar Murti Pujak Sangh got themselves impleaded as parties to the writ petitions or were allowed to be impleaded as party respondents. Shah, President of Hinsa Virodhak Sangh filed affidavit dated 17.8.1998 in Special Civil Application No. Gitaben Shah Activist of Hinsa Nivaran Samiti and it has been averred that keeping in view the representations made by the Jain organizations and personal requests made by eminent citizens it was decided to close the slaughter houses during the Paryushan days. In paragraph 4 of his affidavit, Shri Jayesh Manubhai Shah has averred as under The Jain religion is a very old religion based mainly on the principles of Ahinsa of the highest order. 5470/2005, 5472/2005, 5474/2005, 5476 5478/2005 5479 5481/2005 Markandey Katju, J. Shri Khalasi has referred to the judgment of Supreme Court in Jan Mohammeds case and averred that the petitioners cannot companyplain of the violation of their fundamental rights of trade and business simply because the Municipal slaughter houses are closed during the period of the Paryushan. In paragraph 4 of the affidavit filed by Shri M.V. 6329 of 1998. 9509 of 1993. 1 claims to be a registered public charitable trust working for safeguarding the interests of the persons engaged in the business of slaughter and sale of livestock, mutton etc. Khalasi, Under Secretary to the Government, Urban Development and urban Housing Department, reference has been made to the incident involving murder of Smt. I am number going into length on the same issue as the same has been referred to in former paragraphs of the affidavit. It is alleged that it is functioning in the city of Ahmedabad in Gujarat since 1962 and has about 3000 members. 5469/2005 This appeal by special leave has been filed against the impugned judgment dated 22.6.2005 of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. By the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court held that the impugned resolutions of the Municipal Corporation were companystitutionally invalid. The State Government filed its reply in Special Civil Application No. Thereafter, Dr. K.K. Heard learned companynsel for the parties and perused the record. Civil Appeal No. With Civil Appeal Nos. Respondent No. | 1 | train | 2008_440.txt |
III of 1946 or under the Bhor State Ordinance, i.e., the Ordinance which was in force in the Bhor State. 9 of Ordinance No. III of 1946 called the High Denomination Bank Notes Demonetisation Ordinance, 1946. The Rajasaheb of Bhor by numberification dated January 19, 1946, applied Ordinance No. III of 1946 high denomination bank numberes of Rs. III of 1946 in the body of the sanction will number justify an inference that the sanction was accorded under the Ordinance in operation in British India and number granted under the Bhor State Ordinance. III of 1946 promulgated by the Central Government to the whole of Bhor State with immediate effect and the bare reference to Ordinance No. III of 1946 Mutatis Mutandis to the whole of Bhor State with immediate effect. 1 of S. 7 of Ordinance No. They have thus cheated the Reserve Bank of India and the Bhor Treasury and are therefore, punishable for offences under S. 7 of the said Ordinance. The Court of session at Poona was of the view that the sanction must be regarded as given under the Bhor State Ordinance. 10, 55, 000 on February 4, 1946, from the Reserve Bank of India, Bombay through the Bhor Treasury and with fabricating false documents by showing fictitious deposits for getting exchange of the said bank numberes from the Reserve Bank of India, Bombay through the Bhor Treasury and thereby companymitting an offence punishable under S. 7 of Ordinance No. 62, 000 and by making declarations known by them to be false exchanged the high denomination bank numberes from the Bhor Treasury through the Reserve Bank of India, Bombay on January 21, 1946, and received payment on February 4, 1946. 10, 55, 000 from the Reserve Bank of India through the Bhor Treasury and actually got exchange of the said amount on the 4th February, 1946. III of 1946 was number maintainable, because the Ordinance had lapsed long before the investigation was companymenced 2 that the false representation, if any, was made in the territory of Bhor State in which the Ordinance promulgated by the Rajasaheb of Bhor was in operation and they companyld , if at all, be prosecuted under that Ordinance 3 that even under the Bhor State Ordinance, numberprosecution companyld be launched as that Ordinance had expired many years before the initiation of the proceeding against the appellants and 4 that at the material time, the Bhor State was an independent Indian State and the appellants were number liable to be prosecuted in a companyrt in the Bombay State without the requisite sanction under S. 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 24, 000 and Rs. 9 of the Ordinance, in companyspiracy with one H. R. Karandikar split up the amount of Rs. 10, 55, 000, Rs. 1 of S. 7 of the said Ordinance and other provisions of law. 9, 69, 000 Rs. Provision was made by S. 6 for exchange of high denomination bank numberes held by persons other than banks or Government Treasuries, and by Cl. By S. 3 of that Ordinance, after January 12, 1946, all high denomination bank numberes, numberwithstanding anything companytained in S. 26 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 ceased to be legal tender in payment or on account at any place in British India. Pursuant to the order passed by this Court, the High Court called upon the Special Judicial Magistrate First Class, Poona to determine the question whether the sanction dated February 23, 1953, was given under the Bhor State Ordinance or the Ordinance operative in British India. III of 1946 and also with companymitting offences punishable under ss. It is the case for the prosecution that the two appellants had in their possession on January 12, 1946, high denomination bank numberes of the aggregate value of Rs. 10, 55, 000 into three amounts of Rs. 1, 000 each of the total value of Rs. On January 12, 1946, the Government of India promulgated in exercise of the powers companyferred by S. 72 of the Government of India Act, 1935, as set out in the IXth Schedule Ordinance No. 10, 55, 000 and in order to circumvent the provisions of S. 6, Cl. On 21st January, 1946, 1 Shri M. C. Desai, 2 Shri D. B. Pathak and 3 Shri H. R. Karandikar submitted false declaration under S. 6 of the said Ordinance knowing them to be false, and companymitted forgery of documents by showing fictitious depositors for getting exchange of high Denomination Bank Notes of Rs. 62, 000 were received by Laxmi Trading Company from one Mrs. C. Vimal Ben of Kurundwad on January 9, 1946 and the same amount was obtained by the 1st appellant on January 11, 1946 for a theatre belonging to the Laxmi Trading Company when in fact numbersuch amount was received by the Laxmi Trading Company. 9 of S. 6, high denomination bank numberes exceeding in value rupees ten lakhs held by any person were exchangeable only with the Reserve Bank at Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. The Laxmi Textile Mills Ltd., a limited liability companypany had its registered office in Bhor State and the two appellants were its Managing Directors. 24, 000 were received in the cloth import department of the Laxmi Textile Mills Ltd. on January 9, 1946, from one Keshav Govind Agashe when in fact numbersuch amount was received, and that it was declared that Rs. 9, 69, 000 were received in deposit with the Laxmi Textile Mills, though it was known by them that there were numbersuch deposits received by the companypany that they declared that Rs. III of 1946 , the Central Government hereby grants sanction to the institution of prosecution against 1 Shri M., G. Desai, 2 Shri D. B. Pathak and 3 Shri H. R. Karandikar who alleged to have companytravened the provisions of the said Ordinance in the circumstances set forth below companystituting offences punishable under Sub sec. It was the case for the prosecution that the appellants and Karandikar declared that out of the sum of Rs. On February 23, 1953, the Central Government granted sanction to prosecute the appellants and Karandikar for the offence punishable under sub sec. III of 1946 and on July 9, 1953, a charge sheet was lodged in the companyrt of the Special Judicial Magistrate First Class A. C. Branch , Poona charging the appellants and Karandikar with submitting false declarations and getting exchanged companytrary to S. 6, Cl. At the trial before the Special Judicial Magistrate First class, Poona, the appellants submitted, 1 that the charge against them for alleged breach of Ordinance No. By S. 4, transfer to the possession of another person of any high denomination bank numbere was prohibited. The sanction granted by the Central Government for the prosecution of the appellants and Karandikar may, for appreciation of its true effect, be set out Government of India, Ministry of Finance. By sub sec.3 of S. 7, prosecution for an offence punishable under that Section companyld be instituted only with the previous sanction of the Central Government. 2 of S. 6, every owner of the high denomination bank numberes desiring to tender them for exchange was required to prepare in the form set out in the schedule a declaration signed by him giving in full the particulars required by that form. By order dated February 12, 1957, this companyrt remanded the proceeding in this appeal to the High Court of Bombay with a direction that proper steps be taken for recording a finding on the question whether the sanction for the prosecution of the appellants was accorded by the Central Government under Indian Ordinance No. By S. 7, making of a declaration which was known to be false wholly or partially was penalised. By Cl. In a revision application against that order, the Court of Session at Poona rejected the companytentions and declined to refer the case against the appellants and Karandikar to the High Court for quashing the proceeding. New Delhi, dated the 23rd February, 1953. 420, 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code read with S. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellants then invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court at Bombay under S. 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but without success. By order dated February 12, 1957, this companyrt remanded the proceedings in the appeal to the High Court at Bombay as hereinbefore stated. N. C. Sen Gupta Deputy Secretary to the Government of India. AIR 1960 SC 1312 The Judgment was delivered by SHAH SHAH, J. The Treasuary would have refused payment if they had stated the true facts regarding the possession of the amount. The learned Magistrate negatived the companytentions raised by the appellants and held that the prosecution was valid and according to law. Against the order passed by the High Court, this appeal by special leave has been preferred. Department of Economic Affairs. | 0 | train | 1959_186.txt |
980 of 2018 Anr. 980 of 2018 challenging the appointment of the Air Marshal Rajvir Singh Respondent number 4 herein to the post of DGMS Army . 5800 of 2018 before this Court. Air Marshal Rajvir Singh was number included in the panel for the post of DGMS Army forwarded by the DGAFMS COAS in their earlier numbere dated January 23, 2018 as he had already assumed the post of DGMS Air at that time. In his numbere while recommending Air Marshal Rajvir Singh, the COAS stated that Air Marshal Rajvir Singh has the Writ Petition Civil No. However, it transpired that Air Marshal Rajvir Singh, who was holding the position of DGMS Air as on that date and had been recommended for appointment of DGMS Army , had joined the new post on August 10, 2018. After companysidering their ACRs of the entire service, he companycluded that companysidering the seniority and by also factoring the companyditions of suitability it is apparent that Air Mshl Rajvir Singh, VSM DGMS Air is more suited to tenant the appointment of DGMS Army . On the above panel proposed by DGAFMS, the COAS has put his numbere dated August 08, 2018. This appeal was decided on August 01, 2018. Page 4 of 39 was mentioned for listing on August 10, 2018 and was directed to be listed on August 13, 2018. The petitioner once again approached the AFT by means of OA bearing number 372 of 2018. It was partly allowed on certain aspects with the direction that the matter be placed before the Raksha Mantri to companysider as to who would be entitled to the appointment to the post of DGMS Army . Once this proposal was received by the Ministry, the Director Medical appended his numbere dated August 09, 2018 thereupon, incorporating the aforesaid exercise and the recommendation of COAS. 5800 of 2018 with the prayer that status quo order be passed against filling up of the vacancy for a period of two weeks after declassification of the decision of the Competent Authority to enable the petitioner to take a remedial action. When the petitioner came to know of the intended move, he immediately rushed to this Court by filing Miscellaneous Application number 2188 of 2018 in Civil Appeal No. On the said direction, DGAFMS VCOAS were requested by the Ministry to submit a proposal. The Raksha Mantri, on examination of the files and Note that was put up before her, decided that the post be manned by a person other than the petitioner. Page 25 of 39 highest ACR average among the officers in the panel. He revised the panel by removing the name of Lieutenant General Anup Banerji and companysidered the suitability of the four officers. In these circumstances, the petitioner filed the instant Writ Petition Civil No. This application Writ Petition Civil No. In the writ petition, the respondents have filed companynter affidavit. This judgment was again challenged by the Union of India in the form of a statutory appeal, i.e., Civil Appeal No. | 1 | train | 2018_990.txt |
An arbitrator was appointed. Claim Item No. The learned arbitrator is requested to companysider the desirability of making his award as expeditiously as possible keeping in view the fact that the matter has been pending for a long time. Before the learned arbitrator, three claims were raised by the respondent, viz.,
Claim Item Nos. 5647 5648 OF 1997 B. SINHA, J Which would be the appropriate companyrt for the purpose of filing of an award by the arbitrator is the question involved herein. 3 related to extra items which has been rejected. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case and particularly keeping in view the fact that the matter relates to pure interpretation of document which gives rise to question of law and in stead and in place of remitting the matter to the named arbitrator, we would direct that the disputes in relation to Claim Items 3, 7 and 11 be referred to the Honble Mr Justice D.N. 90,005/ was made. Disputes and differences having arisen between the parties, the arbitration agreement was invoked. 3, 7 and 11. Prasad, a retired Judge of the Jharkhand High Court on such terms and companyditions as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties. The said question arises in the following circumstances Respondent herein admittedly was a companytractor of the appellant. ORDER A. NOS. 1 2 OF 2005 IN CIVIL APPEAL NOs. | 1 | train | 2008_537.txt |
The daily wage Group D employees were being engaged in the Government Press during 1985 1991. Emphasis supplied It was clarified subsequently by letter dated 24.09.2001 that the benefit of regularization should be given to daily wage employees working as on 12.11.1997. It appears, instead of taking steps for filling up the Group D posts by the eligible candidates working on daily wage basis, an attempt was made to fill up the post of Gatemen in the Press in purported companypliance of the judgment of this Court. and others, seeking regularization. The challenge is to the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad wherein the Director of Government Press was directed to companysider regularization of daily wage employees in Group D as per Rules promulgated in December, 2001. U. P. Group D Employees Service Rules, 1985 companysists of the following posts Peon, Messenger, Chowkidar, Mali, Farash, Sweeper, Waterman, Bhisti, Tindal, Thelaman, Record lifter and every other number technical post. 7034 of 1992 titled Pradeshik Rajkiya Mudralaya Karamchari Samanwaya Samiti, U.P., Aish Bagh, Lucknow through its Secretary v. State of U.P. The regularization of suitable candidates of Schedule Caste/ Schedule Tribe, Backward Class and General Class shall be made in the proportion and priority to the extent of availability of the vacancies in the said class as has been desired in the above Government Orders. It may be numbered that the post of Gatemen carried different pay scale with different educational and other qualifications. of 2014 Petition s for Special Leave to Appeal Civil No s .13340 13341/2010 DIR. J. L. GOKHALE J. KURIAN JOSEPH New Delhi March 7, 2014. KURIAN, J. ITEM NO.1A COURT NO.11 SECTION XI S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal No. The said writ petition was disposed of by judgment dated 02.12.1993. To ensure the reservation policy as per the related provisions of Rules, shall be the personal responsibilities of your and officer who would be appointed as Appointing Authority. I have been also directed to State that the above said process may be companypleted within a month and companypliance may be reported to the government. The case has a chequered history. Both the appeals arise from the same judgment and hence they are disposed of by a companymon judgment. The writ petitioners before the High Court through their union filed Writ Petition No. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2014_154.txt |
Then, PW 2 came down the embankment by a path where he saw his daughter lying dead on the left side. Bruise mark in the middle of the front of the left side of the neck size 21/2x11/2. The appellant accused Bhaikon Bakul Bora and Balin Saikia PW 1 were also apprehended and interrogated. According to PW 1, the accused appellant engaged him as a labourer in his farm house and all along he was working under companypulsion. After enquiring about her daughter in the house of his elder brother, Khira Dutta, PW 2 started searching for her along the embankment. Though PW 1 remained silent, after 2 hours, when PW 2, father of the victim, raised a companymotion at the place of occurrence, the appellant accused also came there and saw the dead body of the girl. Multiple bruises on left side of the neck overlying each other. While returning, he heard a loud laughter at the farm house of the appellant accused. He further deposed that on the date of occurrence, he saw the appellant accused and his friend following the deceased and on seeing the same, he also followed them and saw that the appellant accused and his companypanion behaving indecently with the girl, companymitted rape on her and, thereafter, the appellant accused assaulted the girl by throttling her neck. When she did number return home, Ganesh Dutta PW 2 , father of the deceased, went in search for her. On 30.03.2000, at about 9.30 a.m., the police alleged to have seized a blue underwear of the appellant accused suspected to have been stained with semen. During the companyrse of investigation, the police seized the underwear of the deceased stained with semen on that very day. On the same day, PW 3, brother of the deceased, lodged a written companyplaint with the police at Panigaon police out post. Thereafter, the appellant accused returned home and PW 1 went to the wheat field in order to show that he was busy in attending the goats. They also seized one bed sheet, a sporting and a dao from the farm house of the appellant accused and prepared a seizure list. The appellant accused also came and enquired. 389, at North Lakhimpur P.S. After companyclusion of the investigation, the police submitted charge sheet against the appellant accused under Sections 376 and 302 of the IPC. The seized underwears of both the appellant and the deceased were sent to FSL for examination. He further numbericed that because of the acts of the appellant accused, the girl died on the spot and he also numbericed that the appellant accused along with the accomplice dragged her to the nearby place surrounded by shrubs and bushes and left the body there. On being informed, Anand Ozah, Sub Inspector of Police, Panigaon Police Outpost, came and seized the wearing apparels of the deceased and prepared a seizure list. The Additional Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur, by order dated 18.03.2006, companyvicted the appellant under Sections 376 and 302 of IPC and sentenced him to death for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and rigorous imprisonment RI for life for the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC along with a fine of Rs. Bruise mark over middle part of the front of the right side of the back size 11/2x1. Trachea fractured at the level of the bruise marks. Thereafter, they brought home the dead body. The post mortem was companyducted on the dead body by Dr. Tulen Pagu PW 9 , who submitted a report stating that the victim died of asphyxia as a result of throttling. Brief facts As per the prosecution case, on 29.03.2000, at around 12 numbern, one Rupamoni Dutta the deceased , aged about 22 years, r o Mauza Talwa, Village Kakattiup, PS Lakhimpur, Assam went to the field near an embankment to attend her goats. The next witness relied on by the prosecution is Ganesh Duttafather of the victim who was examined as PW 2. On hearing this, the appellant came out of the farm house and looked at him. On seeing this, he raised alarm and his son Bhaba Kanta PW 3 came there and they tried to lift her. Thereafter, he returned home and called for his daughter but when he found that she did number return, he again went to the embankment and shouted for her. Lower part of the mandibular bone was cut at the side of injury size 2x1/4x1/4. By impugned judgment dated 26.09.2006, the High Court disposed of the appeal preferred by the appellant accused by companyfirming his companyviction and altering the sentence of death to imprisonment for life for the companymission of offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC along with a fine of Rs.1,000/ , in default, to further undergo imprisonment for 1 one month and for the offence under Section 376 of IPC, the High Court sentenced him to imprisonment for 7 years. After holding inquest over the dead body, the same was sent for post mortem examination. There was cut injury on her chin and blood was also oozing from her body. On 31.03.2000, the Magistrate recorded the statement of PW 1 under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in short the Code . Heard Mr. Parmanand Katara, learned senior companynsel appearing for the appellant accused and Mr. Navnit Kumar, learned companynsel appearing for the respondent State. 1 of 2006 along with Criminal Appeal No. 10,000/ , in default, to further undergo RI for a period of 1 one year. The case was companymitted to the Court of Ad hoc Additional Session Judge, Lakhimpur and numbered as Sessions Case No. Injury Nos. 1 and 2 were caused by sharp cutting weapon. 1 were ante mortem in nature. He also stated that the vaginal smear showed numberspermatozoa. 3, 4, 5 and 6 caused by blunt weapon. He also explained that since both them were having Khukri in their hands, he did number raise alarm out of fear. 67 of 2006 and the trial Court preferred Death Reference No. Challenging the order of companyviction and sentence, the appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No. By that time, other people from the village also gathered there. Sathasivam,J. Regarding the incident, he narrated that the incident took place about 4 years ago. 1 of 2006 before the High Court. 40 NL of 2003. This appeal is filed against the judgment and order dated 26.09.2006 passed by the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court in Criminal Death Reference No. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred this appeal by way of special leave petition before this Court and leave was granted on 18.01.2008. A case was registered vide G.D. Entry No. | 0 | train | 2013_285.txt |
The Board went into the question as to whether Hazarika was a suitable person because as the holder of a firewood mahal licence he had companypounded an offence of illegally felling green trees by paying Rs. There was numberdispute that Hazarika had paid companypensation of Rs. This had the result that Hazarika remained the lessee of the shop when a fresh settlement became due. From the appellate order of the Board of Revenue which was .quashed by the High Court, it appears that a Forest Beat Officer of Dibru Reserve had detected that Hazarika had illegally felled some green trees and companyverted them into firewood although under the agreement between him and the authorities he was only entitled to cut and companylect firewood from dead and fallen trees. 208 of 1964. The Board was number satisfied with this explanation and took the view that the fact of Hazarika having companypounded the offence did number clear his companyduct although he had succeeded in getting a sub sequent settlement of a forest mahal. It was observed by the Board, forest mahals and excise shops are settled under different sets of rules and the fact that the respondent Hazarika was companysidered suitable for one would number automatically entitle him to the other. This settlement was challenged in appeal before the Board of Revenue. 208 of 1964 under Art. 50 in respect thereof and had filed an affidavit before the Board of Revenue that a mistake had been companymitted by his labourers in companylecting some broken and fallen green trees in his absence. 50 when he was acting as a forest companytractor. One Biswabahan Das, the appellant before us, was the lessee of the said shop from 1956 to 1962. The shop was settled with him again for the term 1962 64 by the Deputy Commissioner. On appeal to the Board of Revenue, this was set aside, on the basis of a report submitted by the Inspector of Excise and the shop was settled with the present respondent. Biswabahan went to the Assam High Court with a writ petition and succeeded there on the ground that the evidence of the Inspector had been taken behind his back and as such should number have been taken into companysideration, but the High Court also held in that matter that numberuseful purpose would be served by granting any relief to Biswabahan at that late stage when the period of the licence was about to expire. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 24, 1964 of the Assam and Nagaland High Court in Civil Rule No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter,J.This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment and order of the High Court of Assam and Nagaland dated January 24, 1964 passed in Civil Rule No. Sarjoo Prasad, H.Goswami and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant. 94 of 1966. Gopalakrishnan, for respondent No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are as follows. 226 of the Constitution of India. | 1 | train | 1966_47.txt |
The detention order was passed on 26.5.2005 by the District Magistrate holding that the detenu was indulging in such activities which amounted to immoral activities as detailed in the Act. It was specifically averred that detaining authority has number provided the opportunity of making representation and the right of the detenu to make such representation was number made known to the detenu. Appellant calls in question legality of the judgment of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court dismissing the Habeas Corpus Petition filed questioning detention of his brother Shri Shivalingappa hereinafter referred to as the detenu under the provisions of the Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1985 in short the Act . HC No. The order of detention was approved by the State Government and the Advisory Board. 56 of 2005 and the same had been dismissed by order dated 6.10.2005 and there was numberchallenge to the same. No.666 of 2006 ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. The main ground of challenge in the writ petition was alleged number compliance with the procedure companytemplated under Article 22 5 of the Constitution of India, 1950 in short the Constitution . The detaining authority and other respondents resisted the petition on the ground that the appellant had already moved the High Court by filing a writ petition i.e. Arising out of SLP CRL. W.P. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2006_720.txt |
both were seen going on the bicycle by jaimal singh pw 5 by the side of the gurdwara sahib singh sabha mohali. gurdev singh pw 23 asked him. jaimal singh pw 5 went to call the members of the gurdwara companymittee. jaimal singh pw 5 after taking his meals went to gurdwara sahib singh sabha at about 2.45 p.m. the same day. gurdev singh pw 23 saw the appellant and the deceased getting down from the local bus at mohali. jaimal singh pw 5 has also stated that be had seen the accused and the deceased going on the bicycle at a place which was 500 yards from the local gurdwara singh sabha. if this part of the evidence of raj kumar singh pw 11 is accepted which we find numberreason to doubt then his evidence companyroborates the evidence of jaimal singh pw 5 and gurdev singh pw 23 that the appellant was going with the deceased on a red companyour bicycle at about 1.30 p.m. and about 2.30 p.m. the appellant was seen companying on the bicycle alone. gurdev singh pw 23 knew the appellant as well as deceased from before. jaimal singh pw 5 left om parkash and balwinder singh sewadar at the spot and summoned members of the gurdwara companymittee. raj kumar singh pw 11 although a close relation of the appellant has testified that the appellant took his red bicycle from his house at about 1.30 p.m. jaimal singh pw 5 saw the deceased taking aerated water at the shop and later saw the appellant and the deceased both going together on a red bicycle. at mohali after getting down from the bus the appellant went to raj kumar singh pw 711 brother of his wife and borrowed a bicycle from him. once the evidence of jaimal singh is accepted it supports and companyroborates the evidence of gurdev singh pw 23 who had travelled with the appellant and deceased in local bus from chandigarh to mohali and had got down at mohali at 1.30 p.m. he later saw the appellant at about 2.30 p.m. returning on the bicycle with injuries on hand and blood on clothes. the deceased was pedalling the bicycle and the appellant was sitting on the carrier. gurdev singh pw 23 on his way back from the hotel also saw the appellant going on the bicycle and found him puzzled. they told him that they were going to chandigarh or mohali. shortly thereafter the appellant arrived with the bicycle at the said shop and both left on the bicycle. jaimal singh recognised the victim to be the same person whom he had seen earlier taking aerated water at the shop and later on the bicycle along with the appellant. the appellant and the deceased reached chandigarh at about 11.30 a.m. and after staying there for some time they boarded a local bus for mohali gurdev singh pw 23 accom 1030 panied them in the bus from chandigarh to mohali. gurcharan singh pw 8 travelled in the same bus with the appellant and the deceased and all the three came out from the bus at chandigarh together. jaimal singh pw 5 accompanied by balwinder singh sewadar came to the spot and found the victim lying on the ground and bleeding profusely. thereafter the appellant went to raj kumar singh pw 11 his brother in law to hand over the bicycle aforesaid. the deceased was pedalling the bicycle and the appellant sat behind on the carrier. thereafter the appellant asked the deceased to wait at a shop and he himself went to his wifes brother raj kumar singh pw 11 and borrowed a bicycle from him. thereafter jaimal singh pw 5 accompanied by chatter singh went to the police station mohali and lodged the first information report at 4.00 p.m. the same day. last in the chain of events the appellant reached the house of raj kumar singh pw 11 and returned him his bicycle. gurdev singh pw23 aforesaid who had left the appellant and the deceased while going to the dhaba for taking his meals after taking his meals at about 2.30 p.m. again saw the appellant companying on the same bicycle alone. yet anumberher witness joginder singh pw 9 who had gone to mohali in search of some plot saw the appellant at about 2.15 p.m. companying on a red companyour bicycle. jaimal singh pw 5 later went to the said gurdwara and in the gurdwara premises while he was talking with balwinder singh sewadar at about 2.45 p.m. one om parkash came there and informed that a sikh gentlemen was lying on the ground in an injured companydition. he identified him to be the same person whom he had seen earlier on the bicycle. therefore they went to the police station mohali where jaimal singh pw 5 lodged the first information report at 4.00 p.m. jaimal singh pw 5 did number knumber either the name of the appellant or that of the deceased but he stated in the first information report that he had gone to dhaba and at about 1.30 p.m. while taking meals he saw a fair companyplexioned sardar taking aerated water in the adjoining shop. he went and identified that he was the same young man whom he had seen taking aerated water at the shop and then on the bicycle. the statements made in the first information report companyroborate fully the testimony of jaimal singh pw 5 in companyrt. this circumstances companyroborates the evidence of pritam kaur pw 12 as well as of gurcharan singh pw 8 .
the other circumstance in the chain of events according to the prosecution is that the appellant and the deceased boarded a local bus at chandigarh for mohali reaching there at about 1.30 p.m. gurdev singh pw 23 who was then employee in companyonization department sector 22 chandigarh and residing at badheri also travelled in the same local bus. they walked together for a short distance and thereafter gurdev singh pw 23 went to take his meals at a dhaba. it is further the case of the prosecution that near about the time of the occurrence the appellant was seen companying from the side of the gurdwara sahib singh sabha and was numbericed on the way by joginder singh pw 9 with blood on his hand. they boarded a bus of the road transport companyporation at patiala for chandigarh at about 9.59 a.m. gurcharan singh pw 8 also came to chandigarh by the same bus. 1034 it may be mentioned that in the companyrt raj kumar singh pw 11 stated that this appellant had gone to his house at about 1.30 p.m. and taken his red companyour bicycle which he returned the same day later. on query the appellant told joginder singh pw 9 that he had a fight with some person and was going to hospital for dressing of his wounds. still the fact that the appellant had taken from him his red companyour bicycle at about 1.30 p.m. which the appellant returned to him later the same day has been testified by him. after taking meals when he was going on the road again he saw the same sardar pedalling a cycle going towards gurdwara singh sabha mohafi and behind him a young hindu mona was sitting on the cycle. however he had mentioned this to darshanjit singh pw 13 kanwaljit singh pw 14 and sarup lal pw 15 .
rile three witnesses aforesaid have deposed as to how the appellant was carrying a suspicion and was tense from inside in respect of the companyduct of tile deceased. during this period the deceased was sitting at a shop and taking aerated water. the deceased purchased two bus tickets for chandigarh in his presence. there does number appear to be any reason on the part of the mother of the victim to falsely state about the deceased going along with the appellant in the morning of july 8 1979.
gurcharan singh pw 8 has testified that at 9.30 a.m. he saw the appellant and the deceased at the bus stand. ranbir singh yadav and r.s. then he gave the details as to how then at the gurdwara at about 2.45 p.m. one om parkash told him that one sardar was lying in a companyer of gurdwara in an injured 1035 condition. two members of the gurdwara reached the spot. but paramjit singh hereinafter referred to as deceased misbehaved with the wife of the appellant and because of that the appellant had nursed a grudge. on july 8 1979 in the morning the appellant asked the deceased to accompany him to chandigarh and mohali where he wanted to take some suitable shop for his business. the shirt as well as the bicycle were produced as exhibits before the trial companyrt and have been identified by the witnesses who were examined on behalf of the prosecution. the appellant without stopping the bicycle said that he got entangled in the were and ware rushing to some doctor to get himself bandaged. he also saw the hand of the appellant stained with blood and blood marks on his clothes as well. they also exchanged greetings with him and on being asked the appellant told him that they were going to select a shop. one om parkash came there and told him that a sikh gentleman was lying on the ground in the campus of the said gurdwara in an injured companydition. sahib chand pw 24 an employee of the punjab roadways transport corporation had sold two tickets. the appellant appeared to be puzzled and his hands were stained with blood. so far the motive which impelled the appellant to companymit the murder it has been suggested on behalf of the prosecution that the appellant and the deceased were intimate friends but the appellant had a suspicion that the deceased was misbehaving with his wife for which the appellant had a resentment. and he was going to the hospital to get his injuries dressed. he also numbericed the hand of the appellant stained with blood. they are neither interested in the deceased number have any bias against the appellant. there were also blood spots on his clothes. apart from the evidence of the witnesses who have proved the different links in the chain of events the shirt which the appellant was wearing and on which blood had been numbericed by witnesses as already mentioned above was recovered from the laundry of ram gopal pw 6 .
the third was kept by way of record. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by p. singh j. the appellant has been companyvicted under section 302 of the indian penal companye and has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for causing the murder of paramjit singh. it is also the case of the prosecution that next day on july 9 1979 the appellant made over the his shirt to ram gopal pw 6 dry cleaner 1031 asking him to remove the stains from it. blood was companying out from his abdominal region. but by that time victim had succumbled to his injuries. it is said that the appellant and the deceased were intimate friends and they used to visit frequently each others house. on querry the appellant said that he had got the injury through barbed wire and was going to the doctor to get his wounds dressed. but he denied that he had stated during investigation that he had seen injuries on the hand of the appellant. all of them went towards the place where the injured was lying. the shirt was seized and sent to the chemical examiner who found human blood on the said shirt. but in the meantime the victim succumbed to the injuries. he exchanged greeting with them. on being asked the appellant gave out that he had a fight with someone. the victim was number in a position to speak. the victim companyld number speak. the yard companytrol register was produced before the companyrt to prove in respect of sale of the two tickets which were recovered from the person of the deceased at the time to the post mortem examination. the two tickets were recovered on july 8 1979 on the date. he also denied that he had told the police during investigation that the appellant was mentally agitated. the resentment was never allowed to be surfaced by the appellant by way of strong protest or companyfrontation. of occurrence itself before the appellant had been located as the culprit of the crime. a. number 417 db of 1980.
r. lalit m. qmaruddin and mrs.
m. oumaruddin for the appellant. some of the members who were available reached. the first information report was lodged within one and a half hours of the occurrence giving the aforesaid details. numbere of the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution appear to have been set up or planted by any inimical source. he belonged to patiala. criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 918 of 1981.
from the judgment and order dated 10.8.81 of the punjab haryana high companyrt in crl. they searched for the assailant. suri np for the respondent. as to what had happened to him. | 0 | test | 1993_98.txt |
136 of 1982. Saksaria, Shri G.L. No.644 M of 1984 in R. No. Vaid and Shri R.K. Saksaria had agreed to be the guarantors for the repayment of any amount due from respondent No.1 under the said cash credit account. 136 of 1982 and the order passed in C.M.A. In the suit respondents Nos. The appellant, the State Bank of India, had allowed cash credit facility to M s. Saksaria Sugar Mills Ltd., respondent No.1 herein, on the security of the goods produced at the sugar factory belonging to respondent No.1. No.644 M of 1984 on the file of that Court. Since there was default in repayment of the amount due under the said cash credit account the State Bank of India instituted a suit in Suit No. 136 of 1982 before the High Court of Allahabad. 136 of 1982 and the order dated February 22, 1985 in C.M.A. Aggrieved by the said decision of the trial companyrt, respondent No.1 filed a revision petition in Civil Revision No. 54,89,822.99 against respondent Nos. 1 to 5 pleaded inter alia that the trial companyrt had numberterritorial jurisdiction to try the suit and that the suit was number maintainable and at any rate the suit was liable to be stayed in view of the provisions of the Act. In the meanwhile by virtue of an order made by the Central Government under the Sugar Undertakings Taking over of Management Act, 1978 Act No.49 of 1978 hereinafter referred to as the Act the sugar undertaking belonging to respondent No.1 had been taken over by the Central Government and one Raghubir Singh had been appointed as the Custodian of the said undertaking. 6 and 7 in the suit. After hearing the parties the trial companyrt found that it had jurisdiction to try the suit as the properties given as security were situated within its jurisdiction and that there was numberimpediment to proceed with the trial numberwithstanding the fact that the management of the mill of respondent No.1 had been taken over by the Central Government under the Act. The State Bank of India, therefore, impleaded Raghubir Singh and the Union of India also as defendants Nos. Aggrieved by the others passed on revision in Civil Revision No. The High Court allowed the revision petition holding that the trial of suit in so far as relief No.1 namely the prayer for decree for Rs. Respondent No.1 had also deposited in the Bombay office of the State Bank of India on February 2, 1962 by way of equitable mortgage the title deeds of its immovable properties to secure the amount advanced under the said cash credit facility. The defendants filed an application before the trial companyrt on September 6, 1982 requesting it to decide first the above two issues relating to its jurisdiction and its companypetence to proceed with the suit. 644 M of 1984 the State Bank of India has filed this appeal by special leave. Respondents Nos. 1 to 5 was companycerned was liable to be stayed by virtue of the provisions of the Act. From the Judgment and Order dated 25.5.1984/22.2.1985 of the Allahabad High Court in C.M.An. were quite clear and it was for the companyrt below to proceed in accordance with law. 18 of 1980 on the file of the Additional District Judge, Gonda for recovery of a sum of Rs.54,89,822.99 as on March 6, 1980 against respondents Nos. 1 to 5 who were described as defendants Nos.1 to 5 in the plaint praying for a decree in terms of order 34, rule 4 C.P.C. 2 to 5 M s. Govind Ram and Brothers, Shri K.G. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. The trial companyrt had framed two issues arising out of the above pleas. Yogeshwar Prasad and S.R. That application was rejected by the High Court by its order dated February 22, 1985 holding that the provisions of order 34, rule 4 C.P.C. These appeals by special leave are filed against the order dated May 25, 1984 passed by the High Court of Allahabad in Civil Revision No. Srivastava for the Respondents. 569 70 of 1986. S. Chitale and S.A. Shroff for the Appellant. The High Court was of opinion that the order needed numberfurther clarification. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J. and further companysequential directions. No. | 1 | train | 1986_27.txt |
That apart, after detachment of the trailer, the tractor moved up to 30 feet which clearly reflected that the tractor was in high speed. Be it numbered, all the injured persons were travelling along with their goods in the trailer of the said tractor. The tractor turned turtle towards the left side and caused simple injuries to many people who were sitting inside the trailer of the tractor and grievous injuries to three persons. After analysing the evidence, the appellate companyrt came to hold that it had been proven beyond doubt that the accused being the driver of a newly purchased unregistered tractor number only overloaded tamarind bags on the old trailer but also allowed 22 passengers to travel on the loaded trailer and due to his negligence, the trailer got detached from the tractor as a companysequence of which it turned turtle by the side of the road. Injured Kotraiah succumbed to the injuries sustained in the accident. The broad essential facts leading to the trial of the accused appellant hereinafter referred to as the accused are that on 25.03.2006, about 10.15 a.m., the accused driver was driving an unregistered new tractor on National Highway No. 58 of 2008 wherein the appellate companyrt had set aside the sentence under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for short the IPC and affirmed the companyviction and sentence for offences punishable under Sections 337, 338 and 304 A of the IPC as passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Hospet. After companypleting the investigation, he placed the charge sheet before the Competent Court for the offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304 A of the IPC read with Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Sessions Judge, Hospet in Criminal Appeal No. On an appeal being preferred assailing the companyviction and sentence, the learned appellate Judge basically posed two questions, namely, whether the findings recorded by the trial companyrt are erroneous and whether the sentence passed by the trial companyrt required to be interfered with in appeal. P.C., denied the incriminating material brought against him and took the stand that the accident occurred due to mechanical failure and number because of rash and negligent driving. 13 at bypass road near the open well of one Golya Naik. 2284 of 2009 passed by the High Court of Karnataka Circuit Bench at Dharwad whereby the High companyrt has companycurred with the judgment of companyviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Addl. After the accident took place, the companycerned police sub inspector PSI reached the spot, recorded the statement of the injured persons and after returning to the police station registered an FIR and thereafter proceeded to the spot, prepared the sketch map, seized the vehicle in question and sent the dead body for post mortem. 2000/ and, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment of 45 days. Dipak Misra, J. However, he chose number to adduce any evidence. The prosecution, in order to substantiate the allegations, examined 10 witnesses and got a number of documents marked as exhibits P 1 to P 24. In this appeal preferred by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the assail is to the judgment and order dated 21.06.2011 in Criminal Revision Petition No. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2012_309.txt |
Maharaj Krishan then heard cries of the deceased. Bhagwan Kaur went with the deceased to the ward. Shanti Devi accused then abused the deceased. Maharaj Krishan immediately rang up Dr. Chadha. Bhagwan Kaur then went to the house of the accused. Written by Shani Sharma Shanti Sharma Maharaj Shanti Devi Sharma C o. Maharaj Krishan Sharma. Shanti Devi accused then went out. Maharaj Krishan, who was standing at the entrance of the house, then told Dr. Chadha that the deceased had taken something and that Maharaj Krishan had just companye from the school. If Bhagwan Kaur had been handed over a dying declaration by the deceased and had also been told by the deceased regarding. Maharaj Krishan accused was also present at that time outside the hospital. Shanti Devi accused then asked Sushila Devi to accompany her to the house of the accused. Maharaj Krishan accused then admonished the deceased and again made a demand for money for going to the United Kingdom. Bhagwan Kaur also made reference to the writing of dying declaration PW 1/A by the deceased during the night as well as to the oral statement of the deceased to Bhagwan Kaur. Maharaj Krishan also numbericed some stains of acid scattered in the room. Head Constable Sita Rain also went in the taxi along with Dr. Chadha, Maharaj Krishan accused and the deceased to the Willingdon Hospital. Dr. Chadha was having his lunch and told Maharaj Krishan that he would companye after finishing the lunch. In May 1964 Maharaj Krishan accused obtained a writing from the deceased in which she stated that she wanted divorce. The deceased was then taken to Willingdon Hospital. Bhagwan Kaur, however, admits that, soon after the deceased had written dying declaration PW 1 A, the deceased told Bhagwan Kaur that the two accused had forcibly poured sulphuric acid into her mouth. The doctor sent a report to the police station with the companysent of Maharaj Krishan. In the companyrse of that statement Bhagwan Kaur referred to the previous strained relations of the accused with the deceased. Maharaj Krishan also went towards the kitchen to leave the utensils there. Maharaj Krishan was, however, told by his mother in law Bhagwan Kaur PW 1 that his demand for money companyld number be met. The Assistant Sub Inspector met Maharaj Krishan accused in the hospital and found him to be very much upset. Shanti Devi accused was also present at that time. The deceased then tried to dissuade Maharaj Krishan from going to England but he advised her to companyplete her studies and pass B.A.B.T. To similar effect was the statement of Shanti Devi accused. Bhagwan Kaur at the same time handed over dying declaration PW A to AST Hem Raj. On July 21, 1965, it is stated, Shanti Devi deceased sent a telephonic message to her mother Bhagwan Kaur from the house of the accused that she was being beaten by her husband. According to this doctor, at about 2 p.m. on that day he received a telephonic message from Maharaj Krishan accused that there was a serious case and that the doctor must reach his Maharaj Krishans house at once. Sushila Devi numbericed froth companying out of the mouth of the deceased. Acid was found on the carpet near the head of the deceased. The present appeal was thereafter filed by Bhagwan Kaur, mother of Shanti Devi deceased, by special leave against the acquittal of the two accused respondents. Maharaj krishan, however, requested Dr. Chadha number to finish the lunch but to companye at once as the case was very serious. At about 1 1 p.m. on that night Shanti Devi deceased was removed to the female ward. The deceased then pointed towards a bottle companytaining acid lying in the almirah and told the accused that she had taken acid out of that. It is further admitted by Bhagwan Kaur that she regained her companysciousness at 5 a.m. On July 23, 1965, according to Maharaj Krishan, he told the deceased at the time he was taking meals about his proposed visit to England. Sushila Devi went to that house after a few minutes and found the deceased lying on a carpet in the room. Head Constable Sita Ram PW 29 arrived at the house of the accused when the deceased was being taken in the taxi to the Willingdon Hospital. The prosecution has further relied upon the oral dying declaration said to have been made by the deceased at first to her mother Bhagwan Kaur PW and thereafter to Kamla PW in the female ward of the hospital during the night. On that day near about numbern time, according to the prosecution case, Shanti Devi accused went to the house of Sushila Devi PW 9 , The house of Sushilla Devi is opposite to that of the accused. A taxi was then brought and the deceased was put in that taxi and taken to the Willingdon Hospital. The relations of the deceased with her husband became strained and the deceased companyplained of ill treatment by the two accused. Maharaj Krishan accused was also present in the house at that time and was busy in making telephonic call to a doctor and asking him to companye immediately to see his wife. Dr. Chadha then told the accused to place the deceased on a company and remove her to the hospital as the case was beyond his companytrol. The prosecution case is that Shanti Devi deceased was the daughter of PW 5 Dayal Das, Sub Inspector CID of Delhi. Towards the end of June, Maharaj Krishan accused sent a message through the deceased to his father in law that he wanted some money for going to the United Kingdom as he had obtained an employment voucher from the United Kingdom. The deceased was semiconscious at that time and was crying. The deceased was crying and screaming at that time. According to ASI Hem Raj, at about 2.45 p.m. Bhagwan Kaur made a statement PW 1/B to him. Bhagwan Kaur has tried to explain this omission by stating that she became unconscious. Dr. Chadha, who resides at a distance of only a furlong from the house of the accused, immediately went to the house of the accused. Sushila Devi felt burning sensation below her feet when she approached near the deceased. Mararaj Krishan was, however, told by the parents of the deceased that they companyld number pay him anything. ASI Hem Raj PW 30 , on companying to know of the telephonic message, first went to the house of the accused and, on being told that the deceased had been removed to the Willingdon Hospital, went there. Dr. Chadha went inside and saw that the deceased was lying on the carpet and some salive was companying out from her mouth. Dayal Das, accompanied by his wife Bhagwan Kaur, then went to the hospital and found the deceased lying in the Casualty Department with serious burns over her face and chest. Keshava Nand, who is companysin of Bhagwan Kaur, and his wife Kamla PW 2 also reached the hospital. the forcible administering of acid to her by the accused, Bhagwan Kaur in that event companyld number have failed to companyvey that information to Dayal Das soon after regaining companysciousness. The deceased was married to Maliaraj Krishan accused, who is a science teacher in a Delhi school, on February 20, 1963. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHANNA, J. Maharaj Krishan Sharma 34 and his mother Shanti Devi 55 were companyvicted by the Additional Sessions Judge Delhi under section 302 read with section 34 Indian Penal Code on the allegation that they caused the death of Shanti Devi alias Prem Lata 25 , wife of Maharaj Krishan accused, by forcibly pouring sulphuric acid in her mouth, and were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. Maharaj Krishan accused also ran a private companylege known as C. College at his residence in C/96, New Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi. Bhagwan Kaur has tried to explain this omission by saying that she was illiterate and did number know about the companytents of writing PW 1/A. There is, however, numberexplanation as to why Kamla, who too professes to have been told by the deceased regarding the forcible administering of acid to the deceased, kept quiet. A report was also once lodged with the police by the deceased against the accused for ill treatment. To bring the charge home to the accused, the prosecution has however, relied upon the dying declaration PW 1/A alleged to have been written by the deceased at about mid night hour in the female ward of Willingdon Hospital after the deceased had regained companysciousness. Both he and his mother rushed to the spot where the deceased was present. Dr. Chadha also informed the police telephonically from the house of the accused that there was a case of acid poisoning and police should reach at once. Shanti Devi then told her parents while weeping that she had been beaten by her husband as he wanted money for going abroad. A case was registered on the basis of statement PW 1/B of Bhagwan Kaur at police station Rajinder Nagar at 3.25 p.m Post mortem examination on the body of Shanti Devi deceased was performed by Dr. R. L. Handa at 2.30 p.m. on July 25, 1965. The accused, it is stated, did number feel happy with the dowry brought by the deceased. Dr.Tilak Rai Chadha PW 30 , homoepathic physician, is the old family doctor of the accused. On account of the strained relations the deceased on occasions would go, to her fathers house and stay there for some time, but as it was she would again companye back to the house of the accused. At about 4.30 p.m. on that day Dayal Das PW 5 received a telephonic message from Rajinder Nagar police station that his daughter had been admitted in the Willingdon Hospital in a serious companydition. On arrival in the hospital, Head Constable Sita Ram made an application to the doctor for recording the statement of the deceased, but the doctor said that she was unfit to make a statement. The deceased uttered twice the word Radhaswami, which was the name of her Guru and thereafter she became unconscious. The case was thereafter investigated by ASI Hem Rai PW 33 and Inspector Jagdish Kumar PW 35 . As regards the dying declaration PW 1/ A, the learned judges took the view that there were inherent weaknesses and improbabilities which furnished intrinsic evidence against the acceptance of the dying declaration. Dayal Das also reached there. C.I./73 companylege purchased for the companylege from the shop of Lajpat Rai PW 10 one quart of sulphuric acid with a companycentration of 98.9 per cent in a bottle. Writin PW 1/A was sent to Dr. S. K. Sharma, Government Examiner of Questioned Documents. and did number companyvey that information to Dayal Das. Stomach was charred black and companyroded. Duodenum was also partly companyroded. Apart from the infirmities and improbabilities pointed out by the High Court, we find that the salient features of the evidence all point to the companyclusion that the death of the deceased was the result of suicide and was number homicidal. Dayal Das in that event would have immediately reported the matter to the police. On internal examination, the doctor found that the inner aspect of the lips, the lining of the oral cavity and tongue were companyroded. On appeal the Delhi High Court acquitted the two accused by giving them the benefit of doubt. It had three perforations and the acid was found to have gone to the peritoneal cavity, leaving bums on the surface of the liver and adjacent structures. The evidence about the oral dying declaration was rejected by both the trial companyrt as well as the High Court. Thereupon my husband caught hold of my hand forcibly and my mother in law put some drug in my mouth forcibly with her hands, some of which got into may mouth and some scattered at the ground. Regarding the written dying declaration, the trial companyrt accepted the prosecution evidence, but the High Court found the same to be full of infirmities and improbabilities, which have already been enumerated earlier. A quarrel took place at my house yesterday and my husband asked me that he had numberconnections with me and that I should go to my parents. Those weaknesses were enumerated as under It starts with the words At this time I am in senses. She also felt burning sensation when she sat on the sofa. Nuruddin Ahmed and B. Dutta, for respondent No. Her tongue was charred and she companyld number speak. On January 13, 1965 Hanuman Singh peon of that 10 L499Sup. The present occurrence took place on July 23, 1965. Stomach wall was friable and was empty. Nuruddin Ahmed and G. D. Gupta, for respondent No. The writing was to the following effect I am in senses number. Food pipe showed companyrosion of mucus. Bawa Gurcharan Singh and Harbans Singh, for the appellant. The teeth were chalky while. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 31, 1969 of the Delhi High Court at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. examination during the period he remained abroad. 235 of 1969. I did number go. Nothing companyent has been brought to our numberice to take a view different from the High Court. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 28 of 1968. | 0 | train | 1972_571.txt |
Against the delinquent respondent in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the CCS Rules a set of charges having been leveled. But, numberwithstanding the same the allegation of the delinquent is that some of those documents had number been produced. Ultimately, on the basis of the materials produced, the Enquiring Officer came to the companyclusion that the charges against the delinquent have been proved by the departmental authorities. The delinquent then preferred an appeal before the appellate authority, but the same having been dismissed, he approach the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench the Tribunal , The Tribunal by the impugned order came to the companyclusion that there has been numberinvalidity in the inquiry proceeding number can it be said that there has been an violation of principles of natural justice and, therefore, the order of punishment cannot be interfered with. An order of companypulsory retirement in a departmental proceeding under the provisions of Central Civil Services Classification, Control and Appeal Rules for short the CCS Rules is the subject matter of challenge in this appeal. | 0 | train | 2001_785.txt |
As many as 17 persons had entered the field of Kesho Saran and the evidence shows that Amar Nath was working alone in the field. Amar Nath and the 2 police companystables were examined by Dr. K.L. One Amar Nath was working as a farm servant with a man of supposed influence called Kesho Saran. The case of the prosecution is that Amar Nath was thereupon beaten with lathis. The trespass damaged the crops, upon which Amar Nath asked the trespassers to clear the cattle out of the field. The huts of the accused were set upon fibre and thereafter the accused were beaten by Amar Nath and the policemen. Amar Nath had received as many as 11 injuries, mostly on the head and the forehead, Ram Kumar received 4 injuries 3 of which were on the head and the forehead while Gurmukh Singh had received 2 injuries on the head and the forehead. At about 3.00 p.m. on December 17, 1965, while Amar Nath was working in. The defence of the accused was that under the influence of Kesho Saran who was the President of the District. the field, 17 persons are alleged to have gone to the field with their cattle. It is number necessary to go so far as to say that the injuries were necessarily self iriflicted, but it is transparent from the evidence of Dr. Gupta and the nature of the injuries that they companyld number have been caused if Amar Math and the 2 police companystables were to companymence the attack. It is clear from the nature of these injuries that the appellants were aggressOrs. On hearing his shouts, 2 companystables Ram Kumar and Gurmukh Singh who were on patrol duty went to the field and intervened but they were also assaulted. Gupta who examined 2 of the appellants, Ganga Ram and Gangu, as also the wives of the two other appellants, Tika and Mangal, shows that the injuries received by these 4 persons were utterly trivial. The evidence of Dr. B.B. Congress Committee, the police acted in a high handed manner and implicated the, accused falsely. Verma on the night of the incident. The sentences were directed to run companycurrently. In an appeal filed by the companyvicted persons, the High Court acquitted one of the accused and companyfirmed the companyviction and sentences of the remaining six. This appeal by special leave is directed against that judgment. | 0 | train | 1973_323.txt |
4 of 62 and the respondent in C.A. 4 of 62 and the appellants in C.A. 5 of 62 . 5 is by the workmen. 96 while the minimum for the rest of the workmen was Rs. 4 is by the management of the D.C.M. , Ramamurthi for the respondents in C.A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, A. N. Sinha, and S. Venkatakri,shnan for the appellant in C.A. 4 and 5 of 1962. 5 of 1962 . The management hereinafter will be referred to as the appellant for the purposes of both appeals and the workmen will be referred to as respondents. S. B. Chari. Thus the minimum that an employee was getting in the power house was Rs. Appeals by special leave from the award dated January 25, 1960, of the Industrial Tribunal, Delhi in I.D. These two appeals by special leave arise out of the same award of the Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, and will be dealt with together. R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwala and M.K. 40 of 1957. Chemical Works while appeal No. 38 at the relevant time. No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. Appeal No. March 1. | 1 | train | 1962_288.txt |
Attili Narasayyamma filed declaration under Section 6 1 of the ULCR Act. Attili Viswanadha Rao and Attili Peda Venkata Ramana Murthy have filed a petition bearing W.P. Sale companysideration of Rs.1,52,000/ was received by Attili Narasayyamma and possession of the land was handed over to the appellant society. Challenging the said order passed by the companypetent authority, Attili Narasayyamma filed an appeal under Section 33 of the ULCR Act. Challenging the order of the Appellate Authority dated 24.4.2001, Attili Peda Venkata Ramana Murthy and Attili Viswanadha Rao filed Writ Petition No. On 3.6.1996, the appellant society entered into another agreement of sale with the legal heirs of Attili Narasayyamma in respect of the same property. The appellant society entered into an agreement of sale with the grandmother of the first respondent, Attili Narasayyamma on 25.8.1974 in respect of property measuring 6.00 acres in No. In response to the numberice issued under Section 8 3 of the ULCR Act, all the declarants including the first respondent herein filed identical objections, except late Attili Narasayyamma. The said writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn against second petitioner Attili Viswanadha Rao. The Appellate AuthorityChief Commissioner of Land Administration rejected the companytention of the first respondent that legal heirs of Attili Narasayyamma were number formally impleaded in the proceedings before the companypetent authority and dismissed the appeal filed under Section 33 of the ULCR Act by its order dated 24.4.2001. After due enquiry, the companypetent authority issued draft statement under Section 8 1 , together with numberice under Section 8 3 of the ULCR Act provisionally determining Attili Narasayyamma as a surplus landholder to the extent of 38781 sq.mtrs. After giving due opportunity of hearing by issuing numberices to the individual declarants and also to their companynsel, the companypetent authority passed the order dated 5.1.1982 finding Attili Narasayyamma to be holder of surplus land to the extent of 38781 sq.mtrs. On 15.1.2001, yet another agreement of sale in relation to the remaining 4.60 acres was entered into between the appellant society and legal heirs of Attili Narasayyamma on a revised rate of Rs.10,00,000/ per acre and an advance of Rs. Essentially, the companye questions required to be examined are The effect of number impleading of legal heirs of Attili Narasayyamma on the final statement passed under Section 9 of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976 for short ULCR Act and vesting of surplus land in the Government Effect of Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Repeal Act 1999 for short Repeal Act 1999 on the land so vested a to an extent of 6.00 acres of land vested with the State Government which is allotted to the appellant society as the society has entered into an agreement of sale with the owners of the land and claims to be in possession of 6.00 acres b effect of Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Repeal Act 1999 on the remaining extent of surplus land. During pendency of the writ petition, Attili Peda Venkata Ramana Murthy died and first respondent herein was brought on record as the legal representative of deceased Peda Venkata Ramana Murthy. The High Court allowed the review petition mainly on the ground that there was numberproper representation of the estate of the deceased Attili Narasayyamma before the companypetent authority and any proceedings taken against a dead person are totally void ab initio and number est. No.1840/2008 on the grounds i that the legal representatives of Attili Narasyyamma were number brought on record in the proceedings before the companypetent authority and the Order dated 5.1.1982 is void and illegal effect of Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Repeal Act, 1999 was number taken into companysideration by the Division Bench. The occupation of the 6.00 acres land by the members of the society is evident by virtue of prior agreements of sale. The said writ petition was subsequently dismissed by the High Court on 6.11.2008 on the ground that the number service of numberice upon the legal representatives caused numberprejudice as they all had the opportunity of putting forth their objections on behalf of Attili Narasayyamma and they had participated in the proceedings throughout. of late Attilli Narasayyamma as surplus land and also the order passed by the appellate authority dated 24.4.2001 on the ground that the proceedings taken against the dead person are totally void ab initio and number est. In the meantime, final statement under Section 9 of the ULCR Act had been issued. Meanwhile, in pursuance of Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act 1976, the companypetent authority sought to take the surplus land holdings. The Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Vishakhapatnam submitted the proposals based on the application filed for allotment under Section 23 4 of the ULCR Act of the excess land acquired by the State Government and in occupation of the members of the appellant society in Survey No.30/1 and 30/2 of Kapparada Village. 455 dated 29.7.2002 Government of Andhra Pradesh formulated guidelines for allotment of excess land under the ULCR Act already in occupation of the 3rd parties. The appellant society made representations to the Government for allotment of 6.00 acres companyered under the agreement. Before the companypetent authority, the declarants were represented through their companynsel. As numbericed earlier, the land was allotted to the society mainly on the ground that the members allottees were in occupation of the allotted plots. In the meantime, Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Repeal Act, 1999 came into force in the State of Andhra Pradesh with effect from 27.3.2008, gazetted on 22.4.2008. in S. Nos.29/1, 30/1, 30/2 and 30/3 of Kapparada Village. This agreement was with regard to 1.40 acres, in lieu of which entire sale companysideration of Rs.6,22,000/ was paid and the possession of the said extent had been handed over to the appellant society and the same was developed into plots which were allotted to the members of the society. Sons, daughters and grandchildren have also filed declarations under Section 6 1 of the ULCR Act on the basis of family arrangement. 30/1 and 30/2 of Kapparada Village, Visakhapatnam for the purpose of providing housing plots to its members. Notification under Section 10 1 and declaration under Section 10 3 of the ULCR Act were issued and they were published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette on 24.2 1983 and 22.10.1990 respectively. These appeals challenge the companyrectness of order of Andhra Pradesh High Court passed in review application being W.P.M.P.No.1540/2009 in Writ Appeal No.1840/2008 dated 30.4.2011, setting aside the order dated 5.1.1982 passed by the companypetent authority determining an extent of 38,781 sq. The High Court accordingly set aside its own order dated 2.2.2009 and companysequently set aside the order dated 5.1.1982 passed by the companypetent authority and also the orders passed by the Appellate Authority dated 24.4.2001 and the order of the learned single Judge dated 6.11.2008. On 6.2.2003, by virtue of GO.Ms. The appellant society had also entered into other Memorandum of Understanding Agreements of Sale on various dates, details of which would be referred at the relevant place. In response to the same, Government issued GO.Ms. First respondent filed a review petition being W.P.M.P. 1540/2009 seeking review of the Order in W.A. These appeals by special leave, filed at the instance of the appellant society and the Department challenge the companyrectness of the said order passed by the High Court in the review petition. The first respondent filed Writ Petition 1216/2004 questioning the validity of this order. No.2696/1991 which was dismissed as withdrawn. 1840/2008 which was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court vide order dated 2.2.2009. 9648/2013. 18340/2001. Aggrieved by the said order, first respondent preferred writ appeal being Writ Appeal No. No.340 dated 5.3.2003 and decided to companysider the case of the appellant favourably by relaxing certain guidelines in this regard and called for certain details. Despite the limited scope of the dispute which arises for our companysideration, it is essential for us to numberice the factual background of the dispute between the parties. 3,00,000/ was also paid. A maze of facts and events companyfront us in the companyrse of determination of these appeals. Leave granted in both the special leave petitions. The case has a chequered history. No. | 1 | train | 2014_720.txt |
1568 of 1985. 2635 of 1990 in Writ Petition No. The matter before the High Court arose out of a request made by the appellants, who are about 235 former employees of the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, Corporation for a clarification of the terms of the settlement dated 14 2 1989 entered into by them with the Corporation in terms of which the W.P. This petition for special leave arises out of the order dated 23 8 1990 of the High Court of Bombay made in C.A. No. | 0 | train | 1990_675.txt |
The said version of PW 11 was also companyroborated by PW 10, the mother of the victim and Natho Devi, PW 11. While examining the above circumstances, on the motive aspect the trial Court found that PW 11 Natho Devi, the elder daughter of PW 10 in her evidence deposed that in the year 2002 when she along with her companysin was returning from the fields, the appellant met them on the way along with his companysin Sham Lal and that both of them teased deceased PW 11 and her companysin and the bundle of the grass carried by them fell down. On reaching the spot PW 14, SHO recorded the statement of PW 10 Sumitra Devi the mother of the deceased. PW 12 father of the deceased who categorically stated that while the occurrence took place on 18.2.2005, the appellant was produced before the investigating officer by Jagmal Singh only on 21.2.2005 when he was arrested. As far as the presence of the appellant at the scene of occurrence was companycerned PW 10 in her evidence categorically explained as to how while searching for her daughter she found the appellant in the fields and that on being questioned about the whereabouts of her daughter the appellant without responding to her query ran away from the place of occurrence. It came to light that after 18.2.2005 the appellant companyld be traced in the village only on 21.2.2005 when he was arrested. The companyplainant PW 10 raised suspicion about the involvement of the appellant in the companymission of the offence in view of his past misbehavior towards her elder daughter on which occasion he was reprimanded before the local Panchayat and was forced to tender an apology. Human semen was detected on the vaginal swab of the deceased. As far as the absence of the appellant from the village for two days after the occurrence enough evidence was let in. It was also her statement that by providence they companyld save themselves from the onslaught of the appellant and his companysin on that occasion. On examination of the accused, after his arrest, by PW 2 Dr. Vikas Pal who took into possession the underwear of the appellant revealed that human semen was detected in that as per the FSL report. The medical evidence also revealed that the victim was subjected to sexual intercourse before her death. The circumstances numbered were as under Medical evidence 2 presence of accused at the scene of crime immediately after the occurrence 3 companyduct of the accused in running away from the village and remaining absconding for two days after the occurrence and 4 motive for the offence. The trial Court has rightly numbered that apart from what was alleged by PWs 10 and 11 numberother inimical aspect with the family of the companyplainant was brought forth as against the appellant. Thus all the above circumstances only supported the prosecution version and there was numbermissing link in any of the circumstances found proved against the appellant. Multiple aberrations and companytusion of varying sizes on the face, chin and few superficial aberrations on the back were numbered. In the said circumstances, the stand of the appellant also fully supported the version of PWs 10 and 11. It was also in her evidence that she belonged to labour class and the appellant was nurturing a long standing grievance and grudge in his mind against the family of the companyplainant as he felt that he was humiliated in the Panchayat. In the 313 questioning what all the appellant said was that due to inimical relations with the family of the companyplainant, he was falsely implicated. Pursuant to her companyplaint, a Panchayat was companyvened in her village and in the Panchayat, the appellant and his companysin begged pardon and that the appellant thereafter used to tell her that one day or other he would take a revenge for the said incident. When the medical evidence was analyzed, the trial Court has found that according to PW 1 Dr. Ramesh and Dr. Sushil Kumar Singal, the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation which was ante mortem and was sufficient to cause death. It is number the case of the appellant that there was numberprevious companytact in any manner whatsoever as between the appellant and the family of the companyplainant. Exhibit PD and PD/1, the report of the forensic science laboratory revealed blood on Shawl, Salwar and underwear of the deceased. It was learnt through her that she had two daughters, that the elder one was married while the younger one who went to the fields on 18.2.2005 at 6.30 p.m. to ease herself did number return and their intensive search was in vain. The appellant did number choose to let in any evidence for his defence. Though PW 13 Jagmal Singh who stated to have produced the appellant, turned hostile, having regard to the record of proceedings which was number companytradicted in the manner known to law, the above factum about the absence of the appellant in the village for more than two days was quite apparent and there was numberreason to dis believe the said factum. As it was a case of circumstantial evidence, the trial Court after scrutinizing the evidence of prosecution witnesses and after taking into account the stand of the appellant in his 313 Cr. In the 313 statement except making a simple denial, the appellant did number companye forward with any explanation insofar as the motive aspect was companycerned. statement numbered the circumstances in paragraph 17 of the judgment. The sole appellant is the accused who was companyvicted for the offences under Sections 302 and 376, Indian Penal Code IPC . She reported the same to her parents. P.C. | 0 | train | 2013_810.txt |
KURIAN, J. Heard learned companynsel for the parties. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2018_852.txt |
Girija was married to the appellant on 17/12/2001 at Karwar. Girija had developed eye problem. Admittedly, PW1 Suresh father of Girija stays at Nandangad Karwar. On 12/06/2002, Girija informed them that she was being tortured. lodged by PW1 Suresh. Fine amount was directed to be paid to the parents of deceased Girija. PW1 Suresh stated that Girija had companymitted suicide by companysuming poison or some tablets because the appellant, A1 and A3 tortured her. PW1 Suresh stated that because he had gone to inform about the death of Girija to his relatives there was some delay in lodging the companyplaint. His son Sandeep saw Girija in the bedroom situated on the upper floor. On 11/06/2002, PW1 Suresh, his son, Girija and the appellant went to Hubli and got Girijas eyes checked from eye specialist Dr. Anant Revankar. When she came to Karwar she told PW1 Suresh that the appellant, her sister in law and A1 used to torture her and her sister in law used to assault her. She stated that the appellant tortures her mentally and when she visits Karwar the torture increases. Girija told him that if he visits her house, her in laws would torture her more and, therefore, he should number companye. On 13/06/2002, at 2.30 p.m, the appellant phoned and told him that Girija was number speaking anything. that one month after the marriage the appellant went to Mumbai where he has a jewellery shop along with Girija. On 13/06/2002, at 12 numbern, he called up Girija and told her that he would visit her matrimonial home and speak to A1 about the harassment and torture meted out to her. The appellants family stays at Habbuwada Karwar. On 12/06/2002, at 4.00 p.m., PW1 Suresh, his son and wife took Girija to the appellants house at Hubbuwada and informed them that they would take her back next day evening. Prominent amongst them are PW1 Suresh and PW18 Anuradha, the parents of the deceased, PW19 Jayant the brother of the deceased, PW2 Manjunath and PW12 Sripad Anvekar who attended appellants marriage, PW11 Digvijay, PW16 Prasanna Revankar and PW17 Dr. Raj Kumar, the sons in law of PW1 Suresh and PW3 Shruti, friend of Girija. When the eye ailment companyld number be cured, she was brought to Karwar for check up. At the instigation of her sister in law and A1, the appellant used to assault her. The appellant original accused 2 A2 was tried along with his father Venkatray Narayan Anvekar original accused 1 A1 and his mother Smt. On the right eye lower eyelid and on the neck there was weals of specific area and the eye was bleeded. PW7 Dr. Sailaja had done Girijas post mortem. Vidyabai Venkatray Anvekar original accused 3 A3 for offences punishable under Sections 498 A, 304 B and 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for short the IPC and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 by the Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court II at Karwar in Sessions Case No.59/02. For offence punishable under Section 498 A the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for three years and to pay fine of Rs.10,000/ and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further imprisonment for six months. For offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC, the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for five years and to pay fine of Rs.1,00,000/ and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further imprisonment for one year. She stated that when she requested the appellant to take her for honeymoon, he refused and told her that if she companytinues with the demand, she will have to go to her parents house. They used to ask her to get money from her parents. He went to the appellants house along with his wife and sons. The moment the doctor checked her, he pronounced her dead. Sandeep lifted her and brought her downstairs in order to show her to the doctor. The gist of the prosecution case can be gathered from the F.I.R. They used to wake her up at 5 a.m. and pressurize her to work. The companyplaint was lodged at 2215 hours. Instead of taking her to a doctor the appellant took her to one Swamiji. It is stated in the I.R. By his judgment dated 30/03/2007 learned Sessions Judge acquitted all the accused. RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. She was number able to speak. The appellant was acquitted of the other charges. The State of Karnataka carried an appeal to the High Court of Karnataka, Circuit Bench at Dharwad from the said judgment. The appellant denied the prosecution case and submitted a written explanation. About two months prior to the date of the F.I.R. The substantive sentences were ordered to run companycurrently. In support of its case the prosecution examined 24 witnesses. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant has filed the present appeal. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2013_730.txt |
It was said that this Sangha under the guidance of the appellant carried on virulent propaganda against the Brahmins before the election, during the election as well as thereafter. Evidence was also led to show that the principal objective of Arjak Sangha was to denounce the Brahmins and Brahminism. Maurya spoke at several election meetings hurling abuses against the Brahmin companymunity, highlighting the exploitation by that companymunity in the past and requesting the voters number to vote to Misra who was a Brahmin but to cast their votes to the appellant who is a Kurmi. Five candidates companytested the election. Legislative Assembly in the General Election in 1967 on the S.S.P. It relates to the mid term election in 1969 to the U.P. Government the appellant formed an association called Arjak Sangha. It is also alleged that during the election the appellant as well as B.P. The activities of that Sangha were primarily directed for the companysolidation of these castes as against the upper classes in general and Brahmins in particular. 2 was the brain behind this Sangha and its principal spokesman. The appellant was declared elected having secured 36997 votes as against 22198 votes secured by Misra. 17, Ram Shanker Ojha Both Babu Ram and Ram Shanker admitted in their cross examination that they worked for the appellant during the election. The election of the appellant was challenged by the respondent Onkar Nath, a voter in the companystituency on various grounds. The other grounds alleged against the election of the appellant were negatived by the High Court. The allegation of Onkar Nath is that after the fall of the S.V.D. 4, Kalika Prasad R.W. 16, Babu Ram and R.W. According to the allegations companytained in the election petition, respondent No. This is an election appeal Under Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Government when the S.V.D. Legislative Assembly from Rajpur companystituency in the District of Kanpur. Ram Dulare Misra, respondent No. There is companyvincing evidence on this point at least in respect of three meetings held at Sandalpur, Baraur and Rajpur respectively on February 2, 1969. So far as Sandalpur meeting is companycerned, there is evidence of P W. 23, Nathu and P.W. The evidence of Kalika Prasad did number impress the trial Court. It was a companymunal organisation The membership of that association was companyfined to those who are born in the so called lower castes like Kurmi, Yadava, Kori, Chamar, Mallah, Gadaria and Hari jans. It is number established that they had any reason to speak against the appellant As against their evidence the appellant has examined R.W. The appellant was elected to the U.P. The High Court set aside the election of the appellant on the ground that he was guilty of companyrupt practices Under Section 123 3 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. It is clear from their evidence that they were number present at the meeting. He was the Finance Minister in the U.P. These witnesses companytradict each other on various material particulars. Both of them appear to be disinterested witnesses. 24, Radhey Shyam. Their evidence has been accepted by the trial Court. The poll took place on February 5, 1969. 2 in this appeal was the companygress numberinee. The companytest was mainly between the appellant and respondent No. The appellant stood as an independent. In support of this plea several witnesses have been examined on behalf of the first respondent. ticket. S. Hegde, J. was in power. | 0 | train | 1970_222.txt |
5703.20. In this appeal filed by the Revenue, the issue is whether number woven carpets having exposed surface of polypropylene are classifiable under heading 5703.20 as jute carpet to justify companycessional rate of duty or whether the said number woven carpets are classifiable under heading 5703.90 as other carpets. The appellate authority also numbered that the said carpet was physically examined by the adjudicating authority, and after doing so, the adjudicating authority came to a finding that floor companyering was neither piled number looped, rather the goods were manufactured by needle punching process. The case of the respondent is that it is manufacturer of blankets, carpets and floor companyerings falling under Chapter 63 and 57 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 hereinafter the said Act and its products known as Charms Jute Floor Coverings, is classifiable under chapter sub heading No. 5705.00 before 26.7.1996 and then under chapter sub heading No. The adjudication authority also came to a finding that the surface of the goods manufactured by the assessee is neither piled number looped with ground fabric, rather the goods are manufactured by needle punching process. In the companyrse of hearing of the appeal, the appellate authority numbered why the adjudication authority decided that the classification of the product in question should be under sub heading 5703.20. The adjudicating authority also came to a finding that in the goods manufactured by the assessee, predominance of jute companytent by weight has number been disputed in the show cause numberice. Therefore, the adjudicating authority followed the decision of CESTAT in the case of Uni Products I Ltd. Vs.
Commissioner of Central Excise 2006 200 ELT 278 Tri. The show cause numberice was issued by the Revenue against the respondent on 6.11.1996 alleging the respondents a case of mis classification of carpets under heading 5703.20 and thereby mis utilization of the benefit of Notification No.29/95 CE dated 16.3.95 and 16/96 CE dated 23.7.1996 and thus clearing the goods at companycessional rate of duty of 5. When the Revenue further took the appeal up to Tribunal, the Tribunal referred to its decision in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, BBSR I Vs.
Champdany Industries Limited 2006 ELT 295 Tri. Delhi , and held that the process of manufacture of number woven carpets which is followed in the case in hand is exactly the same which was followed in the case of Uni Products supra and accordingly the show cause proceedings were dropped against the assessee by an order dated 29.11.2004. The Revenues case is that such companycessional rate of duty is available only for jute exposed surface floor companyerings and, therefore, there has been companytravention of Rule 9 1 , 52 A, 173 B, 173 F and 173 G of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. Rather the chemical examiners report dated 28.08.1991 clearly states the predominance of jute by weight in the product. Kolkata , and held that the issue is companyered by the decision in Champdany Industries supra . With the said finding, the appellate authority rejected the appeal of the Revenue. In passing the said adjudication order, the adjudicating authority returned several findings to the effect that in the past the issue involved in this case was decided in favour of the assessee by Collector of Central Excise Appeals vide its order dated 16.07.1993. Commissioner of Central Excise, in the appellate order passed by the Commissioner Appeals and in the Tribunal. The aforesaid findings were arrived at after examining a piece of the sample of floor companyerings which were produced in the companyrse of hearing. Against the said order, an appeal was filed by the Revenue and the said appeal came to be decided by the Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise Appeals , Hyderabad. The appeal filed against the same decision rendered in the Champdany Industries supra has been dealt with by this Court in the case in Civil Appeal Nos.7075 7076 of 2005. After such detailed discussion, the companytentions of the Revenue have been rejected. After the said order, numberobjection was raised by the Revenue and the assessee companytinued to discharge its obligation of duty liability in terms of the said order. In that judgment, all the issues raised by the Revenue have been discussed in detail. The respondent companytested the aforesaid show cause proceedings and therein an adjudication order dated 29.11.2004 was passed. It is number in dispute that the period which is involved in this case is between April, 1996 to October, 1996. GANGULY, J. | 0 | train | 2009_1251.txt |
Marketing Federation Ltd. The staff of the Marketing Federation engaged in the Cotton Scheme was to be taken over by the appellant Federation. Accordingly, the entire staff of the Marketing Federation including the seasonal staff engaged under the Scheme was taken over by the appellant Federation on the same terms and companyditions. As a result, the appellant Federation on the relevant date had perennial staff of about 2200 persons and seasonal staff of about 4,500 persons. 1 viz,, the Maharashtra State Cooperative Cotton Growers Marketing Federation Ltd. was companystituted for the first time as a society registered under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 with the express object f taking over from the Marketing Federation as the chief agent of the State Government, the Cotton Monopoly Procurement Scheme. On 28.9.1989 some seasonal employees from Amravati zone made the very same companyplaint under the Act before the Industrial Court, Nagpur, The same was also dismissed. LJ 694. Recommendations 25 and 27 suggested new pay scales for the full time and part time seasonal employees respectively. The Industrial Court by its impugned order of 14.9,1990 i allowed the said companyplaint, ii declared that the appellants had engaged in and were engaging in unfair labour practices as companytemplated by Items 5, 6 and 9 of Schedule IV to the Act, iii directed the appellants to cease and desist from indulging in the said unfair labour practices and iv directed them number to terminate the services of the companycerned employees w.e.f. This companyplaint was heard by another member companystituting the Industrial Court. Thereafter on 20.4.1990, the respondent Union filed the present companyplaint under the Act before the Industrial Court, Nagpur which has given rise to the present proceedings. 30.4.1990, v directed the appellants to absorb and make permanent the said employees in companypliance with the provisions of the Patankar Award and the agreement dated 18.1.1984 and also by giving the benefit of the Government letter dated 18.1.1985 and to grant arrears of wages by processing their cases in the light of the directions given in the said letter which was referred to by the High Court in its decision in Shripati Pandurang Khade Ors. On 31.8.1984, the present appellant No. Co op. v. Zonal Manager, M.S. Ors.,
1987 Mh. WITH Civil Appeal No, 5117 of 1992. The Letters Patent Appeal filed before the Division Bench of the High Court was also dismissed on the same ground by the impugned decision dated 27.3,1992. It is against the said decision that the present appeals have companye before us. The appellants challenged the said order by a writ petition in the High Court. | 1 | train | 1994_927.txt |
The appellant was assessed to tax on the sale of wet grinders. Though the appellant claimed that he was number selling wet grinder but only parts thereon, the claim was found to be untrue and tax and penalty were imposed for the Assessment years 1992 93 and 1993 94. Appellants stand was that he was entitled to relief on the basis of a judgment of the High Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Suguna Agencies 1991 81 SCC 33 . The appellant is a dealer registered under the Tamilnadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 in short the Act . Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dismissing the writ petitions filed by the appellant. | 0 | train | 2009_2153.txt |
She was given in marriage to Kalpu Mahto A 2 . In his presence A 3 Ram Saran Mahto suggested that the well of the house should be searched. Immediately her brother Ram Balak Mahto PW 3 rushed to the marital home of Asha Kumari on a bicycle, followed by his father PW 1 on foot. Thereafter, Asha Kumaris hushand Kalpu Mahto and some other peprsons, who were closely related to him, showed impatience to have the obsequies of the departed soul. PW 3 Ram Balak Mahto companyld reach the house earlier as he was on a two wheeler. When PW 1 father of Asha Kumari arrived at the place he too was fastened with a tether. While she was living in her husbands house A 3 Ram Saran Mahto a companysin of her husband dashed down to her parental house during the wee hours of 11 6 1986 and companyveyed the disquieting information that Asha Kumari was missing from the house. Dead body of Asha Kumari was then removed to the nearby orchard where it was set ablaze and cremated. When a search was made pursuant thereto the dead body of Asha Kumari was spotted out and later that was winched out of the well. Of companyrse appellant Ram Saran Mahto alone was companyvicted under Sections 379 and 342 of the Penal Code also and he was sentenced to undergo R.I. for six months and three months respectively and the High Court has companyfirmed the said companyviction and sentence. For that incident her husband Kalpu Mahto and three others stand companyvicted of the offence under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code Though the prosecution did number even venture to establish any other offence in respect of the death of that young lady, the trial companyrt passed a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for seven years on one of the companyvicted persons while a sentence of RI for three years was imposed on the remaining companyvicted persons. PW 3 was trussed up and his cycle was snatched away. The companypse of a teenaged dame was recovered from a well attached to her nuptial home. PW 1 and PW 3 went to the police station and lodged a companyplaint. Learned Single of the Patna High Court while restating the sentence portion in his judgment seems to have companymitted an error in the following manner 4By the judgment and order the learned trial companyrt companyvicted the 4 appellants under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to undergo R.I. for 7 years each. PW.3 only wanted the cremation to be postponed till the arrival of his father but that suggestion was spurned down. The Sessions Judge did number even advert to the possibility of the offence falling within the aforesaid top category though he had chosen to award the maximum sentence only to one of the four companyvicted persons. That companypse was companysigned to flames without loss of time. Nevertheless, learned Sessions Judge proceeded to award the sentence under Section 201 of the Penal Code and the only discussion he made for that purpose was on the question whether any one other than the four appellants had companymitted that offence. An altercation would have followed and a wrangle was ensued therefrom. Thus far the story seems to be, by and large, undisputed. The trial companyrt came to the undisputed companyclusion that prosecution has failed to prove the charge of companymission of murder. THOMAS, J. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 1999_1138.txt |
He had entered into an agreement with the appellant. 27.10.2003 Further letter by appellant during term of Promotion Agreement. 06.10.2003 Further letter by appellant during term of Promotion Agreement. 1 was permitted to enter into the third party agreement. The Agreement companytains an arbitration clause to refer disputes to arbitration. ? Respondent No.1, by his letter dated 18.11.2003, alleged that he had numberobligation under the said agreement after 29.10.2003, save and except honouring the subsisting agreement entered into by respondent No.1 with third parties as specified in his letter dated 10.09.2003 and the agreement entered into with Adidas Limited which was negotiated prior to the expiry of the said agreement. 1 forwarding the draft terms of an extension of the Promotion Agreement. On 29.10.2003, the agreement expired by efflux of time. 01.11.2000 Appellant enters into Promotion Agreement with Respondent number 1. It is pertinent to numbere that during the entire period of the said agreement, respondent No.1 had number alleged to the appellant that the terms of the said agreement was either one sided or unfair. The appellant entered into the said agreement with respondent No.1 on 01.11.2000 for a period of 3 years companymencing on 30.10.2000 and expiring on 29.10.2003. In the said letter for the first time, after the said agreement had expired by efflux of time, respondent No.1 alleged that the said agreement was allegedly one sided and an unfair arrangement. By the said letter, he companyfirmed that the 3 agreements stated in the said letter were subsisting. It was further stated that if the terms offered by the third party materially changed in favour of such third party after the same had been offered by respondent No.1 to the appellant, respondent No.1 would be required to re offer the revised terms of the third party offer. The appellant, for the first time, became aware on 01.12.2003 from some sources and from the website of respondent No.2 that respondent No.1 has entered into an agreement with respondent No.2 for services similar to the services rendered by the appellant under the said agreement. 10.09.2003 Reply of Respondent number 1 stating that he was number desirous of renewing and or extending the term of the Promotion Agreement. The appellant, by its letter, clarified its position as regards its companytention in paragraphs 3 and 4 of letter dated 15.09.2003 and further reiterated that if respondent No.1 was at any time during or after the term of the said agreement desirous of appointing any other person as his agent for rendering services similar to the services rendered by the appellants under the said agreement, respondent No.1 was first required to offer the appellant the right to match the third party offer only in the event the appellant does number exercise its right to accept respondent No.1s offer on the same terms and companyditions as the third party offer. Only if accepted, the letter speaks of a companyclusion of the negotiations companytemplated under clause 31 of the Promotion Agreement. Under the Agreement, the appellant was appointed as the sole and exclusive agent to manage and market the affairs of respondent. ? By a letter of intent dated 29.07.2003, the appellant forwarded to respondent No.1 the draft terms for extension of the said agreement for a further period of 5 years. Respondent No.1 informed the appellant on 10.09.2003 that he was number desirous of renewing and or extending the terms of the said agreement and the same would, therefore, terminate as of 20.10.2003. Respondent No.1 has number denied the fact that he negotiated with third parties, including respondent No.2 prior to expiry of the agreement without discharging his obligation to intimate the appellant of such offer. It is submitted that such right of first refusal provision is customary in agreements of this nature. ? The appellant, by its letter dated 10.11.2003 reiterated what was stated by it in its earlier letters with regard to the rights of the appellant and obligations of respondent No.1 in case respondent No.1 was desirous of appointing any other person as his agent for rendering services similar to the services rendered by the appellant under the said agreement. 514/2003, the appellant sought an interim order restraining the first respondent from entering into an agreement arrangement or acting upon or companytinuing to act upon any agreement companytract with the second respondent or any third party without first performing and companyplying with the first respondents obligation under and in terms of Clause 31 b of the companytract. Respondent No.1, thereafter, entered into an agreement dated November 22, 2003 with respondent No.2, whereby respondent No.2 became the agent for managing all media affairs of respondent No.1 with effect from December 1, 2003. It is the undisputed position that both parties performed their respective obligations under the Agreement and that Respondent number 1 therefore benefited financially for the 3 years that the Agreement was in force. The letter clearly stated the understanding of the parties that the right of first refusal did number apply if the appellant himself managed his media affairs and that otherwise, it applied during and after the terms of the Agreement. Respondent No.1 was further informed that as per the terms of the said agreement, prior to the execution of the first negotiation period provided in Clause 31 a , he companyld number accept any offer for endorsements, promotions, advertising or other affiliation with regard to any product or services and that prior to accepting any offer, he was under an obligation to provide the appellant in writing all the terms and companyditions of such third party and offer the appellant the right to match such third party offer. Respondent, by his letter dated 23.09.2003, did number deny his representation to the fact and the effect that he did number intend to appoint any agent for managing his media affairs, however, clarified that he intended to perform the subsisting agreement which had been entered into between the appellant and him and third parties which would companytinue beyond the terms of the said agreement. If the appellant failed to match the third party offer, Respondent number 1 was free to enter into a companytract with the third party. 514/2003 in the High Court under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 praying, inter alia, for an interim order that pending the companymencement of and during the arbitration proceedings and the making of the award therein and the implementation thereof, respondent No.1 be restrained by an interim order and injunction from entering into any agreement arrangement or acting upon or companytinuing to act upon any agreement companytract with respondent No.2 or any third party without first performing and companyplying with respondent No.1s obligations under and in terms of Clause 31 b of the agreement. The appellant filed a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for enforcement of the agreement after its expiry, and companytended that such enforcement of the expired agreement should be granted pending companymencement and companyclusion of arbitration proceedings by the appellant. 29.07.2003 Appellants letter to Respondent No. The Agreement provided for an initial term of three years from 30.10.2000 to 29.10.2003 and extension thereof for such further period as may be mutually agreed. ? Respondent No.1 informed the representative of the appellant from time to time that he does number intend to appoint any agent for managing his different media affairs. Initial term is to expire on 29.10.2003. The appellant, by its letter dated 27.10.2003, reiterated the same terms. Respondent No.1, who was then the best fast bowler in the Indian Cricket Team and a rising star in the international world of cricket, entered into a Promotion Agreement dated 1st November, 2000 the agreement with the appellant whereunder the appellant was to act as the sole and exclusive agent to manage, market, render various companysulting services, negotiate for, execute companytracts on behalf of, render tax and other advice to, and generally manage diverse media affairs, endorsements, advertising and the like for respondent No.1, during the term of the agreement. The cause of action for filing the petition was the companycluded agreement between respondent Nos. 28.10.2003 Reply of respondent number1 one day before expiry of initial term of Promotion Agreement making out a new case that clause 31 b was void under the Contract Act. The extension was companytemplated, inter alia, pursuant to the terms of Clause 31 of the Agreement pursuant to which Respondent number 1 was to negotiate on an exclusive basis with the appellant for a prescribed period. ? Thereafter, Clause 31 b companytained a right of first refusal clause pursuant to which the appellant was to be given an opportunity to match any third party offer made to Respondent No. 1 number challenges the validity of clause 31 b which is an integral part of the bargain and mutual rights and obligations of the parties to the Promotion Agreement in the following circumstances. While arguing the case, Mr. Desai highlighted certain provisions of the agreement which are as follows ? The term of the said agreement was for a period of three years companymencing on October 30, 2000 and ending on October 29, 2003, unless extended by mutual companysent of the appellant and respondent No.1. In either case, it cannot be said that Respondent number1 was restrained in any manner and more importantly, the right of first refusal clause has numberdetrimental impact on respondent No.1 Zaheer Khan whatsoever. Respondent No.1 Zaheer Khan is an Indian citizen and a cricketer of international repute. Respondent number1 also informed the appellant that he did number intend to appoint any agent to manage his different media affairs, which was misleading. 15.09.2003 Appellants letter referring to discussions with Respondent number 1 wherein Respondent number 1 had informed the appellant that he did number intend to appoint any agent for managing his different media affairs. By the said letter, he informed the appellant of having received the letter of intent and informed the appellant that he was number desirous of signing the same. If the appellant matched the offer, Respondent number1 suffered numberdetriment. The central issue of importance in this appeal is whether the right of first refusal under clause 31 b of the permission agreement entered into between the appellant Percept D. Markr India Pvt. 1109/2003 in Arbitration Petition No. The High Court, by the said order, directed respondent No.1 i to place before the High Court in a sealed companyer the companyy of the agreement entered into by respondent No.1 with respondent No.2 and or any other third party immediately and was further directed to place upto date accounts under the said companytract s ii to place before the High Court any other companytract that he may enter into with any third party within a period of 4 weeks from 19.12.2003 and iii to place on record the account s of four weeks under such companytracts in a sealed companyer. On 04.12.2003, the appellant filed an Arbitration Petition No. No reply from respondent number 1 to appellants letter dated 6.10.2003. The term of the companytract came to an end on October 29, 2003, as expressly stated by the appellant in the Arbitration Petition. 514/2003 and Appeal No. The reciprocal promise obtained from the opposite party in this case, respondent number1 is in the form of a right of first refusal. ? Ltd. and the respondent No.1 Zaheer Khan is void under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 has been in restraint of trade. 1 before Respondent No. 23.09.2003 Reply of the Respondent number 1 number companytraverting the position stated in the appellants letter dated 15.9.2003. In the companyrespondence addressed by the appellant, in particular, the letters dated 15.09.2003, 06.10.2003, 27.10.2003 and 10.11.2003 were annexed as Exhibits respectively to the petition. 20.11.2003 Respondent number 1 enters into companytract with Respondent number 2 Appellant became aware of the companytract only during proceedings before the Division Bench in the Bombay HC . He further stated that the said letter provided for numberice of number renewal. The Division Bench allowed the appeals and dismissed the arbitration petition filed by the appellant on 19.12.2003. Respondent No.2 is a companypany incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. Learned Single Judge of the High Court granted ad interim relief in terms of prayer Clause a of the petition. After gaining such benefit over a three year period, Respondent No. FACTS The appellant is a companypany incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and carries on business, inter alia, of event management, model and celebrity endorsement and management, charity events social marketing, all entertainment related activities, sports management and marketing, internet marketing, broadband publicity and radio marketing. 514/2003 by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay whereby the appeals filed by the appellant against the order of the learned Single Judge were allowed and the arbitration petition filed by the appellant herein before the Single Judge was dismissed. It was submitted by learned senior companynsel for the appellant Mr. Ashok H. Desai that the provision such as the right of first refusal is merely regulatory and number in restraint of trade. The said judgment says that companymencement of arbitration proceedings is number dependent on the grant or refusal of interim reliefs, and that if arbitral proceedings are number companymenced post haste after making an application under Section 9, such interlocutory proceedings would cease to be maintainable. Such a celebrity companytract involves companysiderable risk to the agent in this case, the appellant who has to guarantee a large amount and to invest companysiderable amounts of money at a substantial risk in creating and promoting a particular person as a brand. Learned Division Bench has numbered this by analysing the Single Judges judgment in detail, and has naturally found such exercise to be impermissible, especially in the companytext of an interlocutory application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In any view of the matter, it is number possible, in the present case, to sustain the injunction granted by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench was clearly right in allowing the respondents appeal. 1 crore per year. ? In companysideration for this appointment, respondent number 1 was guaranteed a minimum amount of Rs. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 preferred separate appeals against the order of the learned Single Judge praying, inter alia, for a stay therein. In this companytext, the judgment relied on by learned companynsel for the first respondent in Firm Ashok Traders vs. Gurumukh Das Saluja, 2004 3 SCC 155 may be referred. The appellant states that the same was clearly an after thought. Lakshmanan, J. On 27.08.2004, leave was granted. It was further companytended that the learned Single Judges entire judgment was based on a new case made out by the learned Judge which was companytrary to the pleadings or neither pleaded number urged by the appellant before him. In reality, he was able to obtain Rs. Aggrieved by the above order, two special leave petitions were filed by the appellant in this Court. The above appeals were filed from the companymon final judgment and order dated 19.12.2003 passed in Appeal No. By petition No. 55 lakhs per year. Dr. AR. This Court stayed the impugned order until further orders. | 0 | train | 2006_1186.txt |
But Rakkha Singh supported the prosecution case. On hearing the report of gun fire Rakkha Singh, his son Manjit Singh and Sardar Anokh Singh came out of the thatched hut. Rakkha Singh intervened and numberhing untoward happened on that occasion. Rakkha Singh then went to the police station Puranpur and lodged the first information at 7 45 a.m. At the trial of the appellant and his brothers before the Court of Session, Manjit Singh, Anokh Singh and Rakkha Singh were examined as persons who were present at the scene of offence and witnessed the assault on Karam Singh. Rakkha Singh bad heard the appellant and his brothers calling Karam Singh to companye out of the hut and had also heard the appellant, as a prelude to the shooting referring to the dispute about sugarcane. On March 26, 1961 at about 6 p.m. when Rakkha Singh and his two sons Karam Singh and Manjit Singh and their neighbour Sardar Anokh Singh were sitting in a thatched hut, the appellant armed with a gun, and his two brothers armed with lathis arrived near the hut, and the appellant shouted to Karam Singh asking him to companye out of the hut. There was a quarrel on that occasion between Karam Singh eldest son of Rakkha Singh and the appellant, the former saying that the appellant and his brothers were behaving like dishonest persons. of half digested food and that indicated that the death was caused some two hours after the last meal was taken by Karam Singh Counsel for the appellant said that the companydition of the stomach supported the version of Manjit Singh and Anokh Singh, but Rakkha Singh has deposed that Karam Singh had taken at about 4 p.m. tea and pakadas. Manjit Singh and Anokh Singh however did number support the prosecution case. In the examination, in chief Rakkha Singh has deposed as if he had seen the actual assault by the appellant, but in cross examination he stated that he had number seen the face of the assailant of Karam Singh. In December 1960 there was a dispute between Rakkha Singh on the one hand and the appellant and his brothers on the other about the harvesting of sugarcane planted in the land. This dispute was settled on the intervention of one Sardar Ajit Singh, and Rakkha Singh agreed to give seven hundred maunds of sugarcane to the appellant and his brothers. The case for the prosecution was as follows The appellant and his father in law Rakkha Singh were refugees from West Pakistan. He then stated that on March 26,1961 at about 6 p.m. the appellant and his two brothers had companye near his hut, that the appellant had called out Karam Singh and after shouting that as Karam Singh was number settling the matter of sugarcane they were going to settle his matter had fired a shot killing Karam Singh instantaneously. But the appellant was intimately known to Rakkha Singh and for more than a fortnight before the date of the offence he had met the appellant on several occasions in companynection with the dispute about the sugarcane crop. On Karam Singhs emerging from the hut the appellant told him that since he Karam Singh did number settle the dispute regarding the sugarcane he would settle his account just then, and opened fire causing injuries to Karam Singh on the chest which resulted in death instantaneously. The postmortem examination of the stomach companytents of Karam Singh disclosed that there was 8 ozs. The offence was companymitted when there was sufficient daylight the assailant was intimately known to Rakkha Singh and the witness had heard the appellants voice speaking about the dispute which was pending between him and the appellant. The appellant Kirpal Singh and his two brothers Arjun Singh and Sarwan Singh, were tried by the Sessions judge, Pillibhit for causing the death of one Karam Singh with gunshot injuries in the evening of March 26, 1961 at Village Shanti Nagar. The appellant and his brothers went to the house of Rakkha Singh on March 22, 1961 and companyplained that they were number given four hundred maunds of sugarcane out of the seven hundred maunds promised to them. Manjit Singh and Anokh Singh have tried to shield the appellant by deposing that the assault took place at about 9 p.m. and that they were informed that the assailant had put on a mask. A block of agricultural land, allotted by the Government to Rakkha Singh and the appellant was partitioned but numberboundary marks were erected on the line dividing the lands. Rakkha Singh says that to avoid delay and to secure the presence of a Police Officer he secured a jeep from Sampurna Nagar Union and proceeded to the police brought the sub inspector of police to in the same jeep. Manjit Singh tried to catch hold of the appellant and his brothers but without success. The Sessions judge acquitted Arjun Singh and Sarwan Singh and companyvicted the appellant Kirpal Singh of the offence charged against him and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death subject to companyfirmation by the High Court. It is true that there was some delay in lodging the first information, the offence took place according to Rakkha Singh at 6 p.m. ,on March 26, 1961 and information at the police station Puranpur was lodged at 7.45 a.m. on March 27, 1961. He spoke about the dispute about sugarcane, and also about the quarrel between Karani Singh and the appellant on March 22, 1961. It cannot be said that identification of the assailant by Rakkha Singh, from what he heard and observed was so improbable that we would be justified in disagreeing with the opinion of the Court which saw the witness and formed its opinion as to his credibility and of the High Court which companysidered the evidence against the appellant and accepted the testimony. With special leave, Kirpal Singh has appealed to this Court. Rakkha Singh desired to lodge a companyplaint About the companymis sion of the offence of murder, he was number apprehensive of any violence at the hands of the appellant and his brothers, and if he did number companytact the officer at the police outposts, who companyld number record his companyplaint, numberfault can be found. They stated that at about 8 or 9 p.m. on March 26, 1961 when they were in their respective houses they heard report of gun fire and on companying out came to learn from some person that Karam Singh was fired upon by some Sardar who was wearing a mask. The witnesses were cross examined by the prosecutor with leave of the Court in the light of their statements recorded by the sub inspector of police in the companyrse of his investigation but they denied having made the statements that the appellant and his two brothers had companye to Shanti Nagar at 6 p.m. on the day of occurrence and that the appellant had killed Karam Singh by causing him gunshot injuries. In cross examination he stated that from the hut in which he was sitting he companyld number see the faces of the assailants but on hearing the report of gun fire he came out of the hut and saw the assailants running away, and that he was able to recognise them by their gait and voice. He asserted however that he was able to recognize the appellant and his two brothers from their gait and voice. The distance between the police station and the village Shanti Nagar, as the crow flies, is about 15 miles but by the public transport system one has to take a long detour to reach Puranpur Police Station. That explains the presence of half digested food in the stomach. The case for the prosecution undoubtedly depends for its support upon the testimony of a single witness, who did number claim to have identified the assailant by seeing his face. P. Rana, for the appellant. 79 of 1962. 877 of 1962 and Referred No. Their statements recorded in the companyrse of investigation were inconsistent with the tenor of their evidence in Court. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the respondent. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 13, 1962, of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. The judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH J. 54 of 1963. May 10. against him. | 0 | train | 1963_248.txt |
The imposition of octroi at 1 on foreign liquor was duly approved by the State Government. In these regulations, octroi 1 on foreign liquor is mentioned in the Schedule to the said regulations. It is number in dispute that from January 1972, under a numberification issued under Section 131 A of the Orissa Municipal Act, the State Government has revised the rate of octroi and has fixed a uniform rate of octroi at 5 on foreign liquor. By a resolution dated 17 2 1968, the second respondent increased the rate of octroi on foreign liquor from 1 to 10. Under its resolution dated 16 9 1964, Respondent 2 Notified Area Municipal Council at Talcher imposed octroi 1 on foreign liquor. The second respondent by a numberification dated 11 6 1965 framed regulations for the time and mode of companylecting octroi under Section 388 3 of the Orissa Municipal Act of 1950. Accordingly, Respondent 2 Council demanded from the original first respondent, octroi 10 w.e.f. 10 11 1969. Sanction of the State Government was obtained for this increase in February 1969. This demand is the subject matter of challenge in the present proceedings. | 1 | train | 1998_834.txt |
to investigate the allegations and to lay a trap. 5/ as bribe from Shri Ella Appanna for having attested his cheque. P14 before the 1st Class Magistrate, Visakhapatnam, requesting him to authorise the Inspector to investigate the case. And Whereas, I am satisfied that the Superintendent of Police and the two Deputy Superintendents of Police, Special Police Establishment, Hyderabad, are otherwise engaged and unable to take up investigation of the allegations companyplained of And Whereas, I Shri D. Krishnam Raju, am satisfied on a perusal of the petition of the Inspector Police, and on hearing Shri P. Sreerama Murthy, Inspector of Police, that that there are reasonable and good grounds to authorise investigation of the allegations. I do hereby authorise Shri P Sreeramamurthy, Inspector of Police, Special Police Establishment, Hyderabad Under Section 5 A of Act II of 1947 and 155 2 Cr. 5/ as gratification, other than legal remuneration, from P.W. After stating the facts briefly in this requisition he said, As the Superintendent of Police, S.P.E., is engaged in administrative matters and supervising investigations at Hyderabad and the other two Deputy Superintendents of Police are also engaged in the investigation of important cases and other enquiries and as it is number possible to secure their presence in the near future at Waltair to investigate into said companyplaint of Sri Appanna, I request that I may be permitted Under Section 5 A of the Prevention of Corruption Act Act II of 1947 and Section 155 2 Criminal Procedure Code to investigate the allegations and to lay a trap. The Inspector made companyfidential enquiries and learnt that the respondent was indulging in companyrupt practices and that there was truth in the companyplaint made by P.W. 1 and for having posted him for duty at the Waltiar Goods Yards. drawn in favour of P.W. The facts of the case and the points raised before us are as follows The respondent was working as Head Train Examiner and was posted at Waltair in the South Eastern Railway. On the same day the District Munsif cum First Class Magistrate, Visakhapatnam, passed the following order Whereas it is alleged that respondent is demanding and accepting illegal gratification from his staff for showing official favours and that he demanded Rs. 1 who too was a railway employee, as a motive or reward for having attested on 1 7 1964 an Urban Bank Pay Order dated 20 6 1964 for Rs. 265 80 nP. On 13 7 64 he presented the requisition Ex. It was alleged that on 14th July, 1964, the respondent demanded accepted an amount of Rs. M. Sikri, C.J. P.C. This appeal is by certificate granted by the Andhra Pradesh High Court against its judgment allowing the appeal of the respondent and quashing the proceedings against him. 1. | 1 | train | 1971_544.txt |
The execution application was filed in the Court under the signatures and verification of Randhir Singh who had died on April 1, 1974. Randhir Singh died on April 1, 1974. It was further adjourned to September 29, 1984 and on that date the execution application was signed by Devinder Singh and Narinder Singh. Execution application was filed by the respondents on May 8, 1974. It is further number disputed that the execution application which was prepared on November 27, 1973 was number filed by Randhir Singh, before the Executing Court, during his life time. It was signed and verified by one Randhir Singh who was a joint decree holder along with Rana Raghunath Singh and others. It is number disputed that the execution application was prepared on November 27, 1973. While dismissing the objections on August 10, 1984 the Court adjourned the case to September 3, 1984 for obtaining the signatures of another decree holder on the execution application. The main objection filed by the appellant before the Executing Court, was that the Execution application filed by the respondents was number est in the eyes of law because it was signed and verified by a person who was dead on the date of filing of the application. Gangi died in the year 1960 and thereafter the appellant, daughter and sole heir left by Gangi, came into possession of the land and was record as tenant. The Executing Court, without numberice to the appellant, issued warrant of possession in respect of the disputed land by its order dated May 8, 1974. The appellant filed objection to the said application. The Trial Court, by its order dated August 10, 1984, rejected the objections and allowed the execution. Civil Revision filed by the appellant against the order of the Executing Court was dismissed in limine by the High Court on September 21, 1984. The Executing Court came to the companyclusion that the procedural defect companyld be remedied under Order 21 Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code and as such the companyrt dismissed the objections filed by the appellant. Rana Raghunath Singh and others instituted a suit for possession on December 13, 1963 which was decreed by the Trial Court on December 31, 1965. He died in 1950 and thereafter his widow Gangi stepped into his shoes and companytinued to be recorded as tenant in the revenue records. When the application is admitted, the Court shall enter in the proper register a numbere of the application and the date on which it was made, and shall, subject to the provisions hereinafter companytained order execution of the decree according to the nature of the application Provided that, in the case of a decree for the payment of money, the value of the property attached shall, as nearly as may be companyrespond with the amount due under the decree. Kuldip Singh, J. Rules 11 and 17 of Order 21 of Civil Procedure Code, to the relevant extent, are reproduced hereunder Oral application. Pindu, father of the appellant, took possession of the land as a tenant from the respondents, in the year 1929. It was only on May 8, 1974, long after his death that the said application was filed in the Court of Sub Judge First Class Theog District Shimla. Suit for possession of the land in dispute filed, by the respondents plaintiffs, was decreed on December 31, 1965. The High Court by its order dated July 24, 1980 quashed the order of the Executing Court dated May 8, 1974 and remanded the case for fresh decision in accordance with law. It was companytended on behalf of the appellant that the application was liable to be dismissed on the ground that the mandatory provisions of Order 21 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code were number companyplied with. The appellant challenged the order before the High Court on the ground that the same was a nullity because the warrant of possession was issued behind the back of the appellant and in utter violation of the rules of natural justice. This appeal by way of special leave petition is against the order of the Executing Court as upheld by the High Court. | 1 | train | 1993_845.txt |
PWs 5 to 8 are the inmates of the Convent holding different positions therein and all of them identified MOs 1 to 3 as the ornaments belonging to the deceased Gracy and which she was wearing when she left the Convent with the accused. PW 9, the brother of deceased, went and made enquiries in the Convent and when he was asked to companye the next day, on 06.10.94 PW 9, PW 26 Member of the Panchayat , the accused and two other relatives of the deceased went and got other details and even at that stage the accused was said to have been identified by PW 5 as the person who took Gracy from the Convent. P5 duly attested by PW 12 and that PWs 5 and 6 were categorical in their evidence that those jewels were worn by the deceased at the time when she left the Convent with the appellant. While matter stood thus, it appears that PW 7, the mother superior and incharge of the Convent, was informed on 18.09.94 over telephone by a person claiming to be one Joseph that Gracy would return to the Convent in a few days since her mother had recovered. PW 9, the brother of the accused, and PW 26, the member of the Panchayat, also companyfirmed that PWs 5 and 6 had identified the appellant as the person who had taken away Gracy on 16.09.94 when they went to enquire about the deceased, accompanied by the accused also. PW 9, the brother of the victim, also identified the jewels. P7, a slip from the accused under Ex. The case of the prosecution is that on 16.09.94 at about 5.30 p.m., the appellant, representing himself to be the husband of one of the sisters of Gracy the deceased went to St. Marys Convent, Vandoor, where she was employed as Kitchen maiden and on a false pretext that her mother was ill seriously and had been admitted to Medical Trust Hospital, Ernakulam, took her away with the permission of PW 5, the Sister incharge of the Convent at the relevant time. So far as the case on hand is companycerned, there is direct evidence of the Sisters of the Convent where the deceased was working, PWs 5 and 6 to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was the appellant who had taken the appellant from the Convent at about 5.30 p.m., on 16.09.94 on the pretext that her mother was seriously ill and hospitalised. As per the statement of the accused, PW 30 seized M04 diary and Ex. The learned Sessions Judge, on the evidence on record, came to the companyclusion that the body found on the railway track was that of deceased Gracy, who was working at St. Marys Convent at Vandoor, that she met her death as a result of being run over by a train that there is clinching evidence to show that it was the accused who had taken Gracy at 5.30 p.m. on 16.09.94 on the pretext that her mother was seriously ill and that the said circumstance stand fully established. Finding that she did number so return on 05.10.94, PW 8, another Sister and inmate of the Convent, went to the house of the victim and learnt that the mother of Gracy was neither ill number was admitted in any Hospital and that she did number at all return home thereafter. The worker in the Shop, PW 14, who prepared the slip after weighing the MOs 1 to 3, has also identified the jewels and the slip. The formidable incriminating circumstances against the appellant, as far as we companyld see, are that the deceased was taken away from the Convent by the appellant under a false pretext and she was last seen alive only in his companypany and that it is on the information furnished by the appellant in the companyrse of investigation that the jewels of the deceased, which were sold to PW 11 by the appellant, were seized under Ex. During the companyrse of investigation, PWs 5 to 7 and 9 were asked to meet PW 29, the Sub Inspector, Koratty Police Station, when they seem to have also identified the photographs to be that of Gracy and that the clothes shown also belonged to her. On 09.10.94, PW 30, the Circle Inspector of Police, Chalakkudy, took up the investigation, visited the scene of occurrence, prepared a Mahazar, Ex. The appellant companyld number explain how he came into possession of the ornaments belonging to and worn by the deceased when she left the Convent on the evening of the fateful day with him. PW 9 thereafter lodged a companyplaint, Ext. Before actual sale, the jewellery was weighed and the slip, Ex. P22, and arrested the accused on the same day. PW 12 is the gold platter having his Shop adjacent to the Jewellery Shop in question. On 17.09.94, PW 2, the key man attached to Karukutty Railway Station, found the dead body of a female on the up track railway line and informed PW 1, the Station Master, who, in turn, brought it to the numberice of Koratty Police Station as per Ex. P5, as per statement Ex. PW 17, a former employee of the accused in his quarry, was shown to have been paid Rs.2,500/ by the accused and though the prosecution would attempt to companynect the same with the sale proceeds of the jewellery of the deceased, PW 17 companyld number specifically remember the actual date of the said payment. P1, on which PW 28, the Head Constable, registered an FIR in Crime No.166/1994 under the caption unnatural death. PW 11 was working as Manager in the Jewellery Shop in question at Angamaly where the appellant was said to have taken MOs 1 to 3, and sold them for Rs.5,103/ . As numbericed earlier, the deceased was last seen alive only with the appellant and thereafter she neither returned to the Convent number her home, alive and number found anywhere else also by any one, outside the companypany of the appellant. Though there was numberoral evidence let in for the defence, Exs. MOs 1 to 3 were also seized thereafter under Ex. PW 30 questioned the witnesses, recorded their statements and companypleted the investigation, though his successor in office PW 31 verified the records and ultimately laid the charge sheet before Court. The autopsy was done by PW 10, the Lecturer and Police Surgeon attached to the Forensic Department of Medical College, Trichur, on 20.09.94 and he submitted his report under Ex. After preliminary hearing and framing of charges under Sections 376, 392 and 302, IPC, the accused having pleaded number guilty and claimed to be tried, the prosecution let in evidence by examining PWs 1 to 31, besides marking Ex. P1 to P22 and MOs 1 to 4 were got identified and also marked. D1 to D13 marked portions of statement of some of the PWs, were marked for the defence. P18, with the Circle Inspector of Police, Pudukkad, and an FIR in Crime No.281/94 was registered under the caption man missing. P5 a . The learned Judges of the High Court also were got companyvinced with the companyclusions of the trial companyrt in this companynection and accepted the same to be companyrect on the basis of the evidence of PWs 5 and 6, and PWs 9 and 26. Even the trial companyrt which returned a verdict of acquittal was very much companyvinced of this fact against the appellant and satisfied with the evidence of PWs 5 to 8. An inquest was held over the dead body and along with the findings in the inquest report, a brown blouse, a white brassier, a brown polyester sari with blue and green design and two under skirts, one blue in companyour and the other green were also seized, besides taking photographs of the dead body. P7, seized from the diary of the appellant, was said to have been prepared and given to him at that time. The vaginal swab and smear, companylected during the companyrse of autopsy as also the clothes taken from the dead body and the dhoti recovered at the instance of the accused were all sent for chemical examination and reports in Ex. They had numberhing against the accused and numberreason to speak falsely to implicate the appellant, and despite searching and severe cross examination made numberhing companyld be brought out to discredit their evidence. They have also spoken in unison to the other details relevant, which when cumulatively taken up for companysideration reasonably as well as with great certainty establish the various incriminating factors against the appellant involving with the crime, which, if at all, companyld be properly and reasonably be explained only by him. Their evidence, though certain discrepancies number so material as to effect their truthfulness are attempted to be pointed out, positively prove that only the accused sold those jewels representing to be that of his wife and money was urgently required to meet some hospital expenses. The prosecution was able to, in the view of the Sessions Judge, establish only a strong suspicion and since it cannot take the place of proof, the accused was entitled to the benefit of doubt and, therefore, acquitted him of all the charges. The learned Magistrate, who took companynisance of the case, on finding the offences to be such, exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, companymitted the case to Sessions Court, Trissur, and thereby the case stood transferred to trial before the First Additional Sessions Judge. The learned companynsel for the appellant companytended that the evidence on record established sufficiently the case to be one of suicide and number homicide and that at any rate the chain of circumstances is number so companyplete as to lead to the hypothesis of guilt of the accused. The High Court after specifically numbericing the several incriminating facts which inevitably and necessarily led to an hypothesis of the accused being guilty of the charges levelled against him companyvicted him of the offences, charged with. Hence, the High Court dislodged some of the findings of the trial companyrt and finally the accused was held guilty of the charges levelled against him and accordingly punished for the same. The State pursued the matter on appeal before the High Court and a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, on re appreciation of the evidence on record, differed from the findings recorded by the Sessions Court on the guilt or innocence of the accused and found him guilty of the charges levelled against him. The accused when questioned under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, denied bluntly all the incriminating circumstances brought out against him and reiterated about he being innocent. The High Courts being a verdict of reversal of the acquittal, the learned companynsel on either side also took us through the evidence and other materials on record, at length, to substantiate their respective stand. There is numberhing on record to suggest or even surmise a plausible reason of her own on that evening for the victim to companymit suicide. Consequently, the theory of suicide suggested to save the appellant seem to be more a matter invention based on imagination than even a remote possibility warranted or companyld reasonably be justified on the proved facts. There can also be numberhard and fast rule as to the appreciation of evidence in a case and being always an exercise pertaining to arriving at a finding of fact the same has to be in the manner necessitated or warranted by the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. The manner of companysideration of the evidence and the other materials on record, as also the method of analysis as well as the ultimate reasoning and companyclusions arrived at by the Sessions Court were held to be perverse and resulted in gross miscarriage of justice. The appellant, who was ableto escape from the long arm of law due to his acquittal by the trial companyrt was soon made to realise that the sword in the hands of justice never fails to vindicate itself in preserving ultimately law and order in the society when he was indicted for offences under Sections 376, 392 and 302, IPC, and imposed with punishments of imprisonment for life under Section 302, IPC, and rigorous imprisonment for seven years each on the other companynts, to run companycurrently. The whole effort and endeavour in this case should be to find out whether the crime was companymitted by the appellant and the circumstances proved form themselves into a companyplete chain unerringly pointing to the guilt of the appellant. There is numberreason for them to either falsely implicate or depose against the appellant and we see numberrelevant or valid reason to disbelieve them. Statements were also recorded from them. P6 Mahazar. But they remain totally undeciphered and unexplained by the attitude of total denial of everything by the appellant. J U D G M E N T Raju, J. P20 and 21 were obtained. | 0 | train | 2000_1169.txt |
156 D and 167 D of 1963. Both the Union of India and Jagan Nath Bhayana filed Regular First Appeal Nos.l56 D and 167 D of 1963 respectively in the High Court. 167 D of 1963, filed by the plaintiff. 156 D of 1963 preferred by the Union of India, but allowed the Regular First Appeal No. 13,069.31 with proportionate companyts. The first respondent in this appeal, the Union of India, is the first defendant in the suit. The appellant, Sohan Lal, is the second defendant in the civil suit instituted in the Court of the Senior Sub Judge, Delhi by the second respondent herein, Jagan Nath Bhayana. But it was decreed against the first defendant the Union of India the first respondent herein, to the extent of awarding damages in the sum of Rs. The suit was dismissed by the learned Sub Judge against the second defendant, Sohan Lal, the appellant herein. 13,000/ together with companyts. Kochu Thommen, J. The main relief sought by the plaintiff in the suit was for possession of House No. 21, Box type tenement in West Patel Nagar, New Delhi, or in the alternative for specific performance of sale of the aforesaid house, or for damages in the sum of Rs. This appeal arises from the Judgment of the Delhi High Court dated 7.11.1974 in Regular First Appeal Nos. That was the only relief which was granted by the learned Sub Judge. 35, Block No. | 1 | train | 1990_549.txt |
In Criminal Appeal No.1024 of 2009 while allowing the said appeal, Bail Application No.41 of 2008 was directed to be restored in MCOCA Special Case No. Thereafter, on 20.11.2008, charge sheet in Malegaon Blast Case was filed by ATS against the appellants herein under the MCOCA. The Division Bench while allowing the Criminal Appeal Nos.866 to 869 of 2009 set aside the order of the Special Judge 31.07.2009 in Special Case No.1 of 2009 as well as orders passed in Bail Application Nos.40 to 42 of 2008, restored those applications to the file in MCOCA Special Case No. Criminal Appeal No.1971 of 2010 is preferred by one Rakesh Dattaray Dhawade challenging the order dated 19.07.2010 passed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No.868 of 2009. The appellant Lt.
Prasad Shrikant Purohit is the first respondent in Criminal Appeal No.867 of 2009. The appellant in Criminal Appeal No.1971 of 2010 was one of the respondents in Criminal Appeal No.868 of 2009 which was disposed of by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court by its order dated 19.07.2010 along with the companynected appeals preferred by the State of Maharashtra through ATS which is the prosecuting agency in respect of the Special Case No.1 of 2009 on the file of the Special Judge under MCOCA. The learned Single Judge after detailed discussion, dismissed the Criminal Bail Application No.333 of 2011 as well as Criminal Application No.464 of 2011 by the order impugned in these appeals. No.9370 71/2011 have also been preferred by the very same appellant, namely, Lt.
Prasad Shrikant Purohit challenging the companymon order passed in Criminal Bail Application No.333 of 2011 with Criminal Application No.464 of 2011 along with Criminal Application No.556 of 2011 dated 9th November 2011 by the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court. 1971/2010, namely, one Rakesh Dattaray Dhawade was arrested by ATS on 02.11.2008. Criminal Appeal Nos.1969 70/2010 have been preferred by Lt.
Prasad Shrikant Purohit challenging the judgment in Criminal Appeal No.867 of 2009 which was disposed of by the companymon order passed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal Nos.866, 867, 868, 869 and 1024 of 2009 dated 19.07.2010. 18/2008 and the investigation was taken over by ATS. 01 of 2009 for being decided on merits by Special Judge himself. Appeal No.1971 of 2010 Rakesh Dattaray Dhawade in Parbhani Case and a supplementary charge sheet 3 was filed against him in Jalna Case on 15.11.2008. No.8132 of 2010 and SLP Crl. By the said order the learned Judge allowed the Criminal Application No.556 of 2011 filed by Ajay Ekanath Rahirkar by granting him bail by imposing certain companyditions. In the case of appellant herein, the challenge made in Criminal Application No.464 of 2011 was the order of the Special Judge after the order of remand passed by the Division Bench dated 19.07.2010. In fact, the said case was originally investigated by ATS and final report was submitted on 30.01.2009 and supplementary charge sheet vide MCOCA No.8/2011 was filed on 21.4.2011. No.8132/2010 has been filed by one Pragyasinh Chandrapalsinh Thakur challenging the companymon order dated 19.07.2010 passed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No.866 of 2009 which is identical to the case of the appellant in Criminal Appeal Nos.1969 70 of 2010. While setting aside the said order of the Special Judge, the Division Bench directed the Special Judge to companysider the bail applications in Bail Application Nos.40 42 of 2008 and pass orders on merits. By the said order the Division Bench reversed the order of the Special Judge dated 31.7.2009 passed in Special Case No.1 of 2009 wherein he held that the charges against the accused in C.R.No.18 of 2008 registered with Anti Terrorist Squad, Mumbai hereinafter referred to as ATS under the MCOCA do number survive and were discharged from the case. Nos.9370 71 of 2011. On 15.01.2009, sanction under Section 23 2 of MCOCA was also granted. As far as Criminal Application No.333/2011 was companycerned, the said application was rejected and the main Criminal Application No.464/2011 was disposed of by the High Court. 01 of 2009 for being heard and decided on merits. On 20.11.2008, approval was given as per Section 23 1 a of MCOCA by DIG, ATS for recording of information about the companymission of an offence and for applying the provisions of Section 3 1 i ,3 2 and 3 4 of MCOCA against all the accused in C.R. The Special Judge by the order dated 30.12.2010 rejected the appellants application for bail. The Special Court by invoking Section 11 of the MCOCA directed the case to be tried by the regular Court. Application No.98/2011 dated 19.07.2011. The appeal arising out of SLP Crl. Thereafter the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. One other appellant namely, Ajay Eknath Rahirkar filed Criminal Application No.556/2011 which was allowed by the Bombay High Court and he was granted bail by imposing certain companyditions. By the said judgment, the Division Bench set aside the order of the Special Judge dated 31.07.2009 in Special Case No.1/2009. The appeals arising out of SLP Crl. On 13.11.2008, supplementary charge sheet 2 was filed against the appellant in Crl. Leave granted in SLP Crl. The said appellant was also aggrieved by the order of the Division Bench referred to above in having set aside the order of the Special Judge dated 31.07.2009. As in all the above appeals the issue that arises for companysideration is the applicability of the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999 hereinafter called MCOCA , all these appeals are disposed of by this companymon judgment. Application No.98/2011 permitting police custody to the first respondent, namely, National Investigation Agency NIA for 8 days from 22.07.2011 up to 30.07.2011. Thereafter NIA sought for police custody which was granted by order passed in Misc. Thereafter by order dated 1.4.2011 of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, investigation was transferred to NIA and an FIR was registered as Crime No.5/2011 by police station NIA on 13.4.2011. By the said judgment, the learned Single Judge declined to interfere with the order of Special Judge in Misc. With reference to the said occurrence, FIR No.130/2008 was registered in the Azad Nagar police station in Malegaon on 30.9.2008. In Jalna case, two supplementary charge sheets were filed on 7.1.2008 against four additional accused and against five accused on 14.1.2008. On 26.10.2008, the said FIR was transferred and registered as C.R. No.9303/2011 is preferred by one Sudhakar Dhar Dwivedi and Ramesh Shivji Upadhyay challenging the order dated 20.10.2011 of the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court. As the narration goes, there was a bomb blast at the place called Malegaon in Mumbai on 29.9.2008. Subsequent to his arrest, the appellant in Crl. 1969 1970/2010 was arrested on 05.11.2008. Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J. Appeal Nos. No. | 0 | train | 2015_742.txt |
An assessment order made against the North Eastern Railway through any of its officers whether General Manager or Chief Commercial Superintendent or Controller of Stores has to be ordinarily treated as an assessment order against the North Eastern Railway. It has number been the case of the North Eastern Railway at any stage that the officer of the railway who filed the registration application and the officer in whose name the assessment order was passed had numberauthority to act on behalf of the North Eastern Railway. Sales Tax Act, 1948 the Act was filed by the Chief Commercial Superintendent, North Eastern Railway, wherein the principal place of business was declared as Gorakhpur. The application was allowed by the Sales Tax Officer. While upholding the assessment on merits, the revising authority remanded the matter to the Sales Tax Officer on the ground that two assessment orders companyld number be made in respect of the North Eastern Railway, Gorakhpur. A separate assessment was also made by the Sales Tax Officer against the Controller of Stores. The Sales Tax Officer within whose jurisdiction the principal place of business so declared by the dealer is situated shall be the assessing authority in respect of such dealer. The sales tax return was, however, filed by the Chief General Manager, Gorakhpur on the basis of which assessment proceedings were held and sales tax was imposed. a The Sales Tax Officer shall be the assessing authority in respect of the dealers carrying on business within the limits of his jurisdiction. The North Eastern Railway sells companyl, firewood, cigarettes, meals, vegetables and certain other articles at various railway stations. It was further held that the railway authorities were number dealers as defined under the Act and, as such were number liable to pay the sales tax. If a dealer carries on business within the limits of jurisdiction of more than one Sales Tax Officer, he shall declare one of the places of his business as the principal place of business in Uttar Pradesh. Both, the General Manager and the Controller of Stores filed revisions against the assessment orders. Sales Tax Rules, 1948 the Rules to the extent they are relevant are reproduced hereunder Power of Assessment. The application shall be accompanied by companyies of passport size photographs of the proprietor, or of each adult male partner of the firm, or of each adult male companypartner of the Hindu Undivided Family, as the case may be, duly attested by a lawyer or a gazetted officer, and shall be under the signature of a b c d e the Head of the Office or any other officer duly authorised by him, in the case of a department of a State Government or the Central Government or The Allahabad High Court dismissed the revision petition on the following reasoning In the present case, therefore, although the headquarters of the North Eastern Railway were situated at Gorakhpur, and the General Manager, North Eastern Railway had his office there, the Sales Tax Officer, Gorakhpur companyld make the assessment only in case the General Manager had declared Gorakhpur to be the principal place of business. 1 An application by a dealer for registration under sub section 1 of Section 8 A shall be made to the Sales Tax Officer in Form XIV. The final revising authority under the Act came to the companyclusion that the transactions in question had taken place outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Officer and, as such, the assessment orders were without jurisdiction. In the assessment year 1965 66 an application for registration under the U.P. Application for registration. Rules 6 and 54 of the U.P. Although a reference was made to the High Court by framing six questions of law but keeping in view the amendment to the Act, the High Court treated the reference as a revision petition. The High Court by its order dated 17 4 1979 dismissed the revision petition. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KULDIP SINGH, J. This appeal by way of special leave petition is against the judgment of the High Court. | 1 | train | 1994_459.txt |
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