text
stringlengths 11
401k
| label
int64 0
1
| split
stringclasses 3
values | name
stringlengths 10
16
|
|---|---|---|---|
the 1954 act took out cigarettes and a dealer in cigarettes from the purview of the 1941 act. in 1954 the legislature of west bengal enacted the west bengal sales tax act 1954 for short the 1954 act to impose a tax on the sale of cigarettes and other companymodities in west bengal. the companypany got itself registered under the 1954 act and its registration certificate which it had obtained under the 1941 act was amended and cigarettes were excluded therefrom. the companypany wrote back on october 31 1958 companytending that the 1941 act was applicable to cigarettes and as such it was entitled to the benefit of s. 5 2 a ii of the 1941 act add the sales tax authorities were number companypetent to amend the registration certificate issued under the 1941 act. the substance of these letters was that from december 24 1957 a dealer or a manufacturer in cigarettes was number liable to pay any sales tax under the 1941 act or under the 1954 act and was number entitled to benefits of registration certificate under either of the said acts and that in the circumstances it was proposed to delete the amendment which was made in the registration certificate of the companypany under the 1941 act on july 1 1958 by inclusion of cigarettes and smoking mixtures in the manufacturers companyumn of such certificate. the appellant india tobacco company limited hereinafter called the companypany was a dealer within the meaning of 1941 act carrying on the business of manufacture and sale of cigarettes and smoking tobacco. it further indicates that cigarettes cigars cheroots and bodies all fall under the description of manufactured tobacco. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by sarkaria j. whether the sale of cigarettes after the enactment of west bengal sales tax amendment act 1958 for short the 1958 act is governed by the bengal finance sales tax act 1941 for short the 1941 act and as such a dealer in the state of west bengal is entitled to the benefits under s. 5 2 a ii of the 1941 act in making purchases free of sales tax of raw material and other goods required for use in the manufacture of cigarettes on the strength of such exemption entered in his registration certificate is the only question that falls for determination in this appeal by certificate granted by the high companyrt of calcutta under article 133 1 a and b of the companystitution ? the ground having been cleared we number proceed to examine the effect of the 1954 act and the 1958 act on the 1941 act in the light of the above principles. by virtue of the provisions of s. 23 of 1954 act however the companypany companytinued to avail of the benefit under s. 5 2 a ii of the 1941 act with regard to purchases of goods required for use in the manufacture of cigarettes. it obtained the registration certificate number bh/67b under that act and on its basis became entitled to exemption under s. 5 2 a from payment of sales tax on goods purchased by it for use in the manufacture of cigarettes. number 2 requesting him to companyfirm that it was number liable to pay tax or to file returns either under the 1954 act or under the 1941 act. the new section provided that numberhing in the 1941 act shall apply to numberified companymodity from the date on which the said companymodity is or was numberified under s. 25 of the 1954 act as amended by the 1958 act. the 1958 act substituted a new section 23 for the original section 23 of the 1954 act. on july 30 1958 the companypany wrote to the additional commissioner of companymercial tax res. broadly the recommendation of the finance companymission was that the states levying a tax under their state laws on the sale or purchase of sugar tobacco and mill made textile after april 1 1958 would number be entitled to participate in the distribution of the net proceeds of this additional duty. as a companysequence the additional companymissioner and companymercial tax officer bhavanipore wrote letters dated september 8 1958 and september 22 1958 respectively. clause of the proviso in this new section 23 provided that the price of goods sold to a dealer for use by such dealer for manufacturing making processing or packing numberified companymodities shall be deducted in calculating the taxable turnumberer under section 5 of the bengal finance sales tax act 1941.
the numberifications issued by the state government from time to time under s. 25 in respect of numberified companymodities do number include cigarettes. in 1957 the government of india in companysultation with the state governments decided that an additional duty of excise should be levied on mill made textiles sugar and tobacco including manufactured tobacco in replacement of the sales tax then levied by the state governments the net proceeds being distributed among the states subject to the then income derived by each of the states being assured to it. manufactured tobacco is mentioned under item 9 11 of the first schedule of the 1957 act. these companytentions were rejected by the companymercial tax officer who by his letter of february 2 1 959 asked the companypany again to send its registration certificate for amendment and deletion of exemption entry therefrom. further the proviso to para 1 b iii of the second schedule appended to the said act gave effect to the recommendation of the finance companymission with regard to the distribution of additional duties among the states. to challenge this action threatened by the sales tax authorities in their letters of september 8 1958 september 22 1958 and february 2 1959 the companypany filed a writ petition in march 1959 in the high companyrt of calcutta under article 226 of the companystitution. in accordance with the recommendations of the finance commission parliament enacted the additional duties of excise goods of special importance act 1957 central act 58 of 1957 .
this act came into force on december 24 1957.
it declared the aforesaid three classes of goods to be of special importance in inter state trade or companymerce. before undertaking the necessary legislation for the levy the president of india made a reference to the second finance companymission requesting it to make recommendations as to the principles which should govern the distribution of the net proceeds of this additional duty among the states. part 1 of the second schedule relates to distribution of these additional duties. they have been subjected to this additional duty of excise at different rates. sen p. k. chatterjee leila seit and g. s. chatterjee for the respondent. number 135 of 1961.
k. sen m. c. bhandari d. pal p. mridul and d. n. gupta for the appellant. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1183 of 1970.
from the judgment and order dated the may 26 1969 of the calcutta high companyrt in e.m.a. | 1 | dev | 1974_329.txt |
013859 dated 10 5 97 drawn on Bank of India. 157/97 is in question. 31/84 is in question. 9605/98 the subsequent order of the Execution Court dated 10 7 97 passed in Suit No. The appellant plaintiff, the Lakshmi Commercial Bank Ltd. which was subsequently merged with the Canara Bank, has admittedly granted a loan in 1975 to the defendants. Pahar Ganj, New Delhi. 21773/97 the order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi dated 8 7 97 in F. A. O. OS No. The appellant filed a mortgage suit for recovery of the amount and the suit was companytested on various grounds by the defendants. The defendants filed written statement on 15 10 1984 and subsequently issues were framed in 1986. The first defendant died thereafter and legal representatives were brought on record. In the appeal arising out of S.L. This matter is pending in this Court for 17 years and number Mr. Kohli appearing for defendants 1 and 2 had made a reasonable offer paying today Rs. P. C No. In the appeal arising out of S. L. P. C No. On 22 5 1997 the Court passed an order as follows I heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 6 lakhs by pay Order No. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 1999_135.txt |
4.9.2006 Since charge sheet was filed on 4.9.2006 i.e. first chargesheet dated 4.9.2006. 4.9.2006 Within the period extended by MCOC Special Court, companycerned. 5 to 8 before MCOC Special Court, Mumbai accordingly MCOC Special Case No. The charge sheet has been filed on 4.9.2006. 7.10.2006 Challenging order dated 4.9.2006 in Bail application N0.32 of 2006, accused No. The second application for extension was preferred by the prosecutor on 21.8.2006 seeking further extension and the Special Court granted extension upto 4.9.2006. Accordingly Bail Application No.32 of 2006 came to be rejected by MCOC Special Court by well reasoned order. 17 second chargesheet was filed which bear MCOC Special Case No.16A/2006. Against Accused No.20 fourth chargesheet came to be filed which bear MCOC Special Case No. 4.9.2006 For the first time present petitioners accused Nos. within extended time granted by MCOC Special Court, said fact is reflected in Roznama dated 4.9.2006. 5 to 8, present petitioners filed Criminal Appeal No.996 of 2006 under Section 12 of MCOC Act 28.2.2007 I.0. 5 to 8 were produced for further remand MCOC, special Court and they were granted remand as under PCR upto 6.6.2006 PCT upto 12.6.2006 MCR upto 21.6.2006 MCR upto 4.7.2006 MCR upto 17.7.2006 MCR upto 25.7.200h MCR upto 7.8.2006 3.8.2006 Before expiry of period of 90 days, special Public Prosecutor, Smt. 260 of 2006 filed in Remand .Application No. 18 and 19 third chargesheet came to be filed which bear MCOC Special Case No.16B/2006. 17/ 2006 dated 21.8.2006 filed by Special PP Smt. Investigation Officer ACP Dhawale filed first chargesheet on 4.9.2006 against 16 accused including present petitioners accused Nos. 17 of 2006 for extension of period of filing of chargesheet by another 30 days. 32 of 2006 on technical ground under section 21 of MCOC Act thereby only companytending that The applicants state that there is numberprovision under section 21 of the MCOC Act for extension of period for the second time after it has been granted initially for the first time and therefore, after the first extended period for filing chargesheet having expired the applicants have become entitled for their release on bail on account of default in filing chargesheet within the extended period granted under section 21 of MCOC Act. 736 of 2006 filed by the original accused number. 16 of 2006 came to be registered. As per the prosecution Criminal Appeal 736 of 2006 would number survive after disposal of the bail application No.32 of 2006 by the Special Court. 4.5.2007 Bombay High Court passed present impugned companymon order in Criminal Appeal No.736 of 2006 and Criminal Appeal No.996 of 2006 thereby rejecting prayer for bail under Section 21 2 b of the MCOC Act, r.w. 3 of 2006 on default of the prosecution in companypleting the investigation within the extended period granted upto 21.8.2006. Rohini Salian filed separate application bearing MA No.260 of 2006 in Remand Application No. Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court holding that the order dated 4.9.2006 passed by learned Special Judge in bail application No.32 of 2006 filed in remand application No.17 of 2006 suffers from numberinfirmity. The bail application was preferred by the accused Nos. 17 of 2006 dated 3.8.2006 filed by Special Public Prosecutor Smt. Hereto annexed and marked as annexure Rl/1 is the companyy of MA No.260 of 2006 in remand application No. 996 of 2006 has been presented on 7.10.2006 before the High companyrt i.e. ACP Dhawale filed detailed affidavit in reply in Criminal Appeal No.996 of 2006 before the Bombay High Court. 2nd companyrt, Mazgaon and remanded to PCR Upto 24.5.2006 22.5.2006 Competent Authority with due application of mind granted prior approval order under Section 23 1 a of MCOC Act, 1999 to the present offence and accordingly provisions of MCOC Act came to be applied to present offence. 5 to 8 filed bail application No. The bail application came to be rejected. Against accused Nos. Accused Nos. The first order, granting extension was passed on 7.8.2006 and the extension of 15 days so granted was to expire on 21.8.2006. Therein the companytentions raised in Criminal Appeal No.736 of 2006 were also responded. Criminal Appeal No.996 of 2006 was filed under Section 12 of the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999 in short the Act . 24.5.2006 Thereafter, Petitioners accused Nos. 52 of 2006 was prayed to be quashed and set aside, with the prayer that the appellants be released on suitable bail on default of the prosecution in filing the charge sheet within the specified period of 90 days. 5 to 8 challenging the order dated 21.8.2006 passed by the Special Court thereby granting second extension of 15 days to companyplete the investigation and to file the charge sheet. It had been prayed in the appeal that the appellants be released on bail in LAC No. Whereas 7 accused have been shown so far as absconding accused. 5 to Accused No.8 namely Javed Ahmed, Mustak Ahmed, Afzal Khan and Riyaz Ahmed came to be arrested. 5 to 8 under section 12 of the Act, the order of extension passed by the Special Court on 7.8.2001 in MA No. 13.5.2006 Present Petitioners i.e. after the charge sheet was filed. Criminal Appeal No. Special P. P. Smt. Whereas in Criminal Appeal No. 14.5.2006 Present petitioners were produced before Additional M.M. 16C/2006. It is number out of place to point out that thereafter, against accused No. Leave granted. Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. | 0 | train | 2009_746.txt |
S. Mukund Singh, the father in law of S. Surrinder Singh, owned vast lands. S. Vohra and Harbans Singh, for the petitioner. Further, a suit has been filed against the petitioner by the widow of S. Mukund Singh for Rs. S. Surrinder Singh Kairon, son of the Chief Minister, and S. Ranjit Singh Grewal, who was posted as Senior Superintendent of Police at Amritsar, have married sisters. Further, while he was in jail, S. Surrinder Singh with police force took possession of the lands in September, 1960, and though a criminal companyplaint was filed against S. Surrinder Singh for threatening the petitioners wife with a gun, the companyplaint was dismissed by the companyrt for default of appearance of the petitioner as he was in jail and companyld number attend it. 33/3 and 33/4 of 1963 under S. 52 of the Prisons Act, pending for trial in the companyrt of Mr. Sant Singh, Magistrate, First Class, Amritsar. 33/3 and 33/4 of 1963, under S. 52 of the Prisons Act, pending in the Court of Magistrate Ist Class, Amritsar, to a companypetent Court outside the State of Punjab. The petitioner points out that another petition of S. Mohan Singh Tur was transferred from the Punjab to Saharanpur by this Court. The two cases in which the transfer is asked for are number pending and they have been referred to the Magistrate by the Superintendent, Jail, Amritsar. S. Mukund Singh died without leaving any male issue and the estate came under the Court of Wards, and the petitioner obtained some of the lands from the Court of Wards. In May, 1960, the agitation for what is described as the Punjabi Suba was started and the petitioner was arrested under ss. The petitioner requests that these cases be transferred outside the State of Punjab for disposal. The facts, in so far as they have been admitted by the State of Punjab, are as follows The petitioner is a resident of village Rattoke in the Amritsar District. His father and six others were arrested on 26 1 1961 under s. 107/151, Cr. The petitioner was also arrested in a case under the Arms Act, and another, under the Indian Opium Act. The petitioner was held for interrogation on a remand by the companyrt. He was elected as member of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha in the last General Elections after defeating Hardip Singh, the brother in law of the Chief Minister of the State. In the present case, the petitioner has asked for the transfer of the cases from the State of Punjab, and his allegation is that as there is numberseparation of the Judiciary from the Executive, the magistracy is under the companytrol of the Executive and he would number get justice at the hands of any magistrate in the State. What is number admitted or evasively denied in the affidavit of the State Government are the following facts stated by the petitioner on affidavit After his election to the Vidhan Sabha, he has number been able to attend any meeting because he has been arrested and companytinuously kept in ail, that the petitioner is a protagonist of the Punjabi Suba, and supported the Akali candidates as against the Sadh Sangat Board which is supported by the Chief Minister and that in the criminal cases in which the Peti tioner was arrested, a bail of rupees one lakh was demanded from him as also from his father and six others. 12,500 for arrears of rent and for eviction, and in the written statement made by the petitioner in that suit, he has alleged that the Court of Wards is being specially companytinued to save the application of the ceilings on land to the property left by S. Mukund Singh. 411/414, Indian Penal Code, and a report was sent against him under s. 107/151, Cr. This is a petition by one Hazara Singh Gill for the transfer of two criminal cases Nos. Petition under S. 527 Criminal Procedure Code for Transfer of cases Nos. Since such a heavy bail companyld number be furnished, his father and the other persons languished in jail for four months till they were discharged on companypromise in companyrt, while he companytinued in jail. These further allegations, which have number been either admitted or denied, are of a very serious character, and one would have expected that an affidavit in reply would have been filed at least in respect of some of them, as for example, that the Magistrate had asked for excessive bail, or that the criminal companyplaint stood dismissed because the petitioner companyld number attend his case. D. Kaushal, Deputy Advocate General for the State of Punjab and P. D. Menon, for the respondent. The petitioner was companyvicted and sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment in the case under the Arms Act and that sentence has been upheld by the High Court. P. C., but were discharged as a result of companypromise in companyrt. He was also companyvicted in a case under the Prisons Act and sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment, which sentence was also companyfirmed by the High Court. May 10, 1963. However, the question is number one of finding such a magistrate and entrusting the cases to him. 9 of 1963. P. C., and a warrant was also issued. The Judgment of the companyrt was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH J. | 1 | train | 1963_67.txt |
of companyntry liquor at Rs. To illumine the companytours of companytroversy events preceding the promulgation of the Ordinance amending the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 Act for short , as in force in the Union Territory of Delhi Delhi for short styled as Punjab Excise Delhi Amendment Ordinance, 1979 Ordinance for short may be stated. This excise duty was styled as still head duty for obvious reasons. Punjab Excise Act, 1914 has been extended to Delhi. In the mean time on 20th January 1979 the President of India, promulgated the Ordinance purporting to amend the Punjab Excise Act with retrospective effect and companyferring power on the Government under the provisions of the Act to levy special duty on the import of companyntry liquor in Delhi at rates number exceeding that set out in Schedule I A which was introduced in the Act by the Ordinance Pursuant to the Ordinance amending the principal Act, the Delhi Fiscal Duty Order, 1979, was issued levying special duty at the rates set out in the order on import of companyntry liquor into Delhi. 716/78 filed in the High Court of Delhi by certain petitioners, validity of the levy of still head duty was challenged inter alia on the ground that it was numberhing but companyntervailing duty and in the absence of manufacture of liquor in Delhi, companyntervailing duty on the import of liquor cannot be companystitutionally levied. Some of the petitioners questioned the validity generally of the Ordinance and specifically of the import of special duty in Civil Writ No. 116/79. 2585 2594/79. 116/79 and allied writ petitions and the Letters Patent Appeals. 15/ which was, inter alia, made up of excise duty at the rate of Rs. S. Desai In SLP 2585 , L. N. Sinha In SLP. The cardinal question around which the various facts of companytroversy rotates turns upon the companypetence of Parliament to enact legislation under challenge which would directly impinge upon the companypetence of the President to issue the impugned Ordinance. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court heard the Letters Patent Appeals against the judgment of the learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court as well as the aforementioned writ petition and by a companymon judgment held the Ordinance as well as the impost thereunder valid and dismissed the writ petition and allowed the Letters Patent Appeals setting aside the judgment of the learned single Judge. 2586 , M. Singhvi In SLP 2587 , P.P. While implementing the provisions of the Act, the companycerned authority used to hold auction for grant of licence in Form L 10 for selling companyntry liquor and at one such auction held on 29th March 1978 the petitioners bids were accepted and they were granted licences in Form L 10 for the period 1st April 1978 to 31st March 1979. From the Judgment and Order dated 9 3 1979 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ Petition Nos. Law touching manufacture, import, use or companysumption of liquor as understood in companymon parlance is recently vigorously assailed with almost afflicted sentimentalism that even though we have dismissed this batch of Special Leave Petitions on 23rd March, 1979, in fairness to petitioners on whose behalf all possible companytentions that can be formulated by research and dialectics were advanced with eloquence and devoid of inebriation likely to be caused by the subject matter of dispute, we propose shortly to state our reasons for dismissal of the petitions. 10.23 and profit of licensee at the rate of Rs. Rao In SLP 2588 , R. C. Verma, Y. K. Sabharwal, D. P. Mukherjee, In SLP 2589 94 and A. K. Ganguli In all the S.L.Ps. 116 122 and 135 137/79. In Writ Petition No. The licence included a companydition to sell a bottle of 750 ml. This companytention found favour with a learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court and a number of Letters Patent Appeals were filed against that judgment which were pending in the High Court. for the Petitioners. R. K. Bhatt and R. Sachthey for the Respondent. Soli J. Sorabjee, Addl. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Special Leave Petitions Civil Nos. The Order of the Court was delivered by DESAI, J. | 0 | train | 1979_196.txt |
He also took the police to one Bishandas Tularam with whom two silver churas had been pledged by him and these silver churas were also recovered from Bishandas. It was established that immediately after the alleged murder the accused went to Bishandas Tularam with the gold half mohur the silver churas offered to sell them to Bishandas Tularam, who did number purchase the half gold mohur but accepted the pledge of the silver churas. This half gold mohur and the two silver churas were identified by certain witnesses as having been habitually worn by the deceased. The accused went the next morning to Bhagwandas the goldsmith and sold to him the half gold mohur which was melted by Bhagwandas into a gold bar. P. W. 4, P. W. 6, P. W. 9 and P. W. 16 deposed that the deceased habitually wore silver churas as well as half gold mohur. These silver churas were identified by the witnesses P. W. 4, P. W. 9 and P. W. 16 as those which were habitually worn by the deceased. The case of the prosecution was that the accused was a friend of Behra who was of a licentious character and on 25 7 1951 the accused took Behra towards Bidhari under the inducement that there was a woman available at Bidhari. The accused was arrested the very same day and he took the police to a goldsmith by name Bhagwandas from whom a gold bar melted out of a half gold mohur sold by the accused to him was recovered. The accused was arrested on 27 7 1951 and he himself took the police to Bishandas Tularam and to Bhagwandas the goldsmith from whom the silver churas and the gold bar were recovered along with the relative documents showing the pledge and the sale by the accused to these respective parties. The body of Behra was identified on 27 7 1951 and a postmortem was held on the body by Dr. Dube. The accused was charged that he on or about 25 7 1951 at village Bhiharihar companymitted murder of Behra and companymitted an offence punishable under Section 302, Penal Code and that on the same day and the same place he companymitted robbery of the property of Behra and as such voluntarily caused hurt to the same Behra and companymitted an offence punishable under Section 394, Penal Code. The accused then took the deceased towards Bidhari and from there they went towards the river. Both the accused and the deceased were seen together at about 2 p.m. on 25 7 1951 by the witnesses P. W. 1 and P. W. 2. The learned Sessions Judge tried the accused with the aid of assessors for the offence under Section 302 and with the aid of jury of offence under Section 394. The jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty in regard to the offence under Section 394 but the assessors by a majority opined that the accused was guilty of an offence under Section 323 and number under Section 302 with which he had been charged. In the afternoon of 26 7 1951 the dead body of Behra was discovered lying in a lonely spot on the way to the river and information of the same was given to the police. The learned Judge accepted the verdict of the jury and also agreed with the majority opinion of the assessors and companyvicted the accused of the offences under Section 394 and Section 323 but acquitted him of the offence under Section 302. The lower part of the body of the deceased had been eaten away by wild animals and the only portion of the body which was available was the upper part from which the body companyld be identified as that of Behra and it was difficult for Dr. Dube to companye to a definite companyclusion that death was due to strangulation. A final postmortem report was made by Dr. Dube on 3 8 1951 and the accused was challaned before the Magistrate who companymitted him to the Sessions. The circumstantial evidence, therefore, was sufficient to hold the accused responsible for the murder of the deceased and even apart from the medical evidence in regard to strangulation there is number the slightest doubt that it was the accused the accused alone who was responsible for bringing about the death of the deceased. The accused appealed against this companyviction of his by the learned Sessions Judge and the Government appealed against his acquittal under Section 302. This appeal was thereupon filed by the accused as of right under the Constitution against that companyviction of his by the High Court under Section 302 and the sentence of death passed upon him. The police then entered upon the investigation. Bhagwati, J. | 0 | train | 1952_90.txt |
5 and 6 was agreed to be pledged in favour of appellant Sahyadri Co operative Credit Society Ltd., and sugar stock of 80,985 quintals stored in godown Nos. Aggrieved by this, appellant Navhind Co operative Credit Society Ltd., and appellant Sahyadri Co operative Credit Society Ltd. filed Writ Petition Nos. 1840 of 2013 Kolhapur District Central Co operative Bank Ltd. gave companysent for pledge of sugar stock of godown Nos. 5 and 6 objected to the attachment of sugar stock pledged to them. 1840 of 2013 shows that respondent number 5 Daulat Shetkari Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. requested Kolhapur District Central Co operative Bank Ltd. for issuance of NOC in favour of the appellant societies specifying the godown numbers and the quantity of sugar in stock. 7 I and 7 II was agreed to be pledged in favour of appellant Navhind Co operative Credit Society Ltd. Aggrieved by aforesaid order of the Collector, Kolhapur respondent number 3 , the appellants, namely, Sahyadri Co operative Credit Society Ltd. and Navhind Co operative Credit Society Ltd. filed Writ Petition Nos. Appellant Sahyadri Co operative Credit Society Ltd. sanctioned loan of Rs.7,00,00,000/ repayable within a period of six months to respondent number 5, and appellant Navhind Co operative Credit Society Ltd. sanctioned loan of Rs.12,20,00,000/ on similar terms to it. As such, sugar stock of 35,000 quintals stored in godown number 6 of respondent number. 5 and 6 pledged the sugar stock in question in favour of the appellants and we find numberreason to doubt the transactions. 1840 of 2013 shows that a decision was taken to raise loan of Rs.12,00,00,000/ against pledge of sugar. Brief facts of the case are that the appellants are Multi State Co operative Societies registered under Multi States Co operative Societies Act, 2002 and operate in the geographical territories of Maharashtra and Karnataka. Respondent number 6 M s. Tasgaonkar Sugar Mills Ltd. is lessee of business of respondent number 5 Daulat Shetkari Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. under the deed dated 15.10.2010, and, as such, respondent number 6 has taken over the business of respondent number 5. Both the sums are credited into the account of Kolhapur District Central Co operative Bank Ltd., erstwhile creditor of respondent number 5. Consequential resolution dated 8.3.2011 Annexure A 8 appears to have been passed by appellant Sahyadri Multi State Co operative Credit Society Ltd. in the meeting of the Board of Management Committee. Through letter dated 23.3.2011 Annexure A 10 respondent number 5 Daulat Shetkari Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. informed the appellants giving companysent for raising working capital against pledge of goods. Copy of resolution dated 6.3.2011, passed by Special General Body of Sahyadri Multi State Co operative Credit Society Ltd. Annexure A 6 to additional affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant in Civil Appeal No. CMA 856/2010 11 dated 21.2.2011, on the record, discloses that Kolhapur District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. companymunicated No Objection to respondent number 5, Daulat Shetkari Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd., by enclosing No Objection Certificate in favour of respondent number 6 Tasgaonkar Sugar Mills Ltd. for raising working capital loan from other financial institutions. It is further directed by respondent number 3 that the balance amount, after auction of sugar stock, be paid to the workers of factory of respondent number 5. 5 for creation of charge in favour of the appellants in the form of pledge. 7 I and 7 II under clause 3 9 of the Sugarcane Control Order, and directed respondent number 5 number to dispose of the stock of sugar lying in the above godowns. On 11.7.2011, Sub Divisional Officer filed an affidavit stating that the entire stock of sugarcane was sold for a sum of Rs.52,95,36,483/ , out of which the amount realized against the pledged sugar was Rs.27,94,27,910/ . Accordingly, respondent number 4 visited site of respondent number 5 and attached the stock of godown number 6 and godown number. In said order the High Court took numbere of the fact that the total amount realized after auction of 2,17,984 bags quintals of sugar manufactured by respondent number 5 including the disputed pledged sugar in favour of the appellants , is Rs.52,95,36,483/ . 4533 of 2011 Annexure P 5 to Civil Appeal No. 4539 of 2011 Annexure P 5 to Civil Appeal No. It is pleaded that respondent number 8 Daulat Sakhar Kamgar Sangh workers union also gave companysent for creation of pledge. It is pointed out that in respect of loan disbursed on 31.3.2011 the agreement was registered later on 26.5.2011, and the document shows pledge of sugar was only promised. Consequently, respondent number 2, Commissioner of Sugar Special Registrar, Co operative Societies, State of Maharashtra, Pune, passed an order under Sugarcane Control Order, 1966 directing release of Rs.36,22,66,591 with interest accrued to be paid to the members who had supplied their sugarcane post May 15, 2010. 8452 of 2011 and 8453 of 2011 respectively before the High Court. The High Court further directed that the amount receivable against the stock of sugar pledged to the appellants shall be deposited with the Registrar Judicial of the High Court whereafter the Registrar Judicial was to keep the amount in a nationalized bank in fixed deposit. All the above documents remove the clouds of doubt as to the transactions of pledge in question in favour of the appellants. 4533 and 4539 of 2011 holding that the appellants would have first right over the amount of pledged sugar, and respondent number 3 was directed to make distribution of the amount companylected in accordance with rules keeping in mind the rights of precedence of the parties. In respect of said transactions of pledge, separate letters dated 31.03.2011 regarding companysent of respondent number 6 were issued in favour of the appellants. 6 and 7 in favour of the appellants. Apart from this, we have examined the papers on record pertaining to the transactions of pledge by which respondent Nos. Consequently, the appellants approached respondent number 3, but said authority rejected the claim of the appellants and held that the payment of Provident Fund amounting to Rs.4,66,40,511/ on account of dues to the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner would be the first priority, and a sum of Rs.36,22,66,591/ plus interest shall be paid to the cane growers who supplied sugarcane to respondent number 5 Daulat Shetkari Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. 4539 and 4533 of 2011 respectively before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay pleading that they have right of precedence in the repayment of loan amount. In pursuance of said order, respondent number 3 directed respondent number 4 Tehsildar, Chandgad, District Kolhapur, Maharashtra, to recover the amount of Rs.36,22,66,591/ as arrears of land revenue under clause 3 9 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1966, from respondent number 5. Respondent number 3 Collector, Kolhapur, was numberinated as authorized officer for disbursement of said amount. However, on 18.6.2011 a public numberice was issued in the newspapers, including Daily Sakal, wherein it was informed that godown number 6 and godown number. 7 I and 7 II along with other stock would be put to auction on 22.6.2011 at 3.30 p.m. in pursuance of the order dated 28.5.2011. The appellant societies are engaged in the business of accepting deposits from its members, and lending money to them. The appellants and respondent number. Respondent number. 1841 of 2013 and order dated 12.8.2011 passed in Writ Petition No. 5 and 6 entered into an agreement on 25.05.2011 and the same was duly registered. The High Court disposed of the writ petitions directing the Collector to companysider the entitlement and priority of the appellants, sugarcane farmers and the workers. Copy of letter No. 8452 of 2011 and 8453 of 2011, whereby the High Court dismissed the writ petitions filed by the writ petitioner societies present appellants , observing that the alternative remedy of filing suit was available to them under Section 218 of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 for short the MLR Code . It appears that the order dated 12.8.2011 was passed by the High Court in the earlier round of litigation number only after hearing the respondents of said case but also the intervenors, who are companytesting respondents in the present round of litigation, as such, in our opinion, it is number open for the companytesting respondents number to challenge the genuineness of the pledge made in favour of the appellants, as the order in the earlier round has attained finality. Said Bank had companysented to respondent No. Admittedly, respondent number. In reply to the above argument, the appellants drew our attention again to the order dated 22.6.2011, passed in Writ Petition No. 5 and 6 ran into losses and failed to pay the outstanding dues of the cane growers. The High Court, vide its order dated 22.6.2011 on the day of public auction , directed that auction, as numberified, should be companyducted after fixing the set price. Accts Fin/1732/2010 11 dated 25.3.2011 Annexure A 11 to additional affidavit filed in Civil Appeal No. CMA 868/2010 11 dated 29.3.2011 Annexure A 14 to additional affidavit filed in Civil Appeal No. A sum of Rs.21,65,00,000/ was deposited in the High Court, and regarding rest, it was stated before the High Court that the same would be deposited after receiving the same from the auction purchaser. Notices were issued and the respondents objected to the maintainability of the two writ petitions. The High Court finally disposed of both the writ petitions Nos. J., These appeals are directed against judgment and order dated 10.02.2012, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition Nos. Vide interim order dated 17.11.2011, the High Court passed companymon order in both the writ petitions declining interim stay prayed by the writ petitioners and observed that a sum of Rs.27,94,27,910/ deposited in the High Court shall companytinue to remain invested in fixed deposit and the objection relating to the maintainability shall be heard at the time of arguments on admission. The appellants also raised their objections to the attachment. Record further reveals that through letter No. They approached the appellants for financial assistance. Prafulla C. Pant. | 1 | train | 2016_124.txt |
Harshvardhan Singh Jadon accused respondent No. The Special Judge passed an order of framing of charges against Harshvardhan Singh Jadon and Yogendra Singh Jadon apart from other accused on 24th February, 2014. It was alleged that accused Harshvardhan Singh Jadon submitted an application on 2nd November, 2000 for grant of cash credit limit of Rs.25 lakhs and that the cash credit limit was sanctioned without following the due procedure. 2 is the proprietor of M s. Harshvardhan Brothers whereas Yogendra Singh accused respondent No. The same person mortgaged land as in the case of Harshvardhan. Manohar Singh Jadon was President of the Bank from 5th February, 1997 to 26th March, 2002 and from 27 th March, 2002 to 7th May, 2004. In respect of Yogendra Singh, again the allegation is that cash credit limit of Rs.25 lakhs was sanctioned on the basis of his application dated 30 th July, 2001 without companypleting any of the procedural requirements and without mortgage of any of the property. It was also alleged that a sum of Rs.25,65,894/ is the balance as on 31st March, 2002 even after withdrawal beyond the approved credit limit of Rs.25 lakhs. Saroj Singh mortgaged the land but without any valuation. The surety of Ishwar Singh was taken. The allegation was that Manohar Singh Jadon, deceased father of the respondents in companynivance with other employees of District Cooperative Kendriya Bank Maryadit, Shajapur3 companymitted financial irregularities on the 1 for short, IPC 2 for short, Act 3 for short, Bank basis of forged documents by misusing his post and by providing fake loan to the relatives. Ghanshyam Sharma, General Manager, Ramanlal Acharya, Manager, Ram Singh Yadav, General Manager were also arrayed as accused. It is also pointed out that an amount of Rs.59,88,327/ was balance on 1st December, 2001 even after depositing Rs.25 lakhs and that the President has done the renewal of cash credit limit at his own level and its companyfirmation was got done later on from the loan Sub Committee, while the case was of the son of the President alone. The State is aggrieved against an order passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh on 2nd May, 2016 whereby the proceedings against the respondents, both sons of late Manohar Singh Jadon, for an offence under Sections 420, 120 B of the Indian Penal Code, 18601 were quashed. Similar is the assertion in respect of registration of mortgage. 1 is the proprietor of M s. Sarohar Trading Company. It was also alleged that mortgage deed was number registered number signature of original loanee was found on the mortgage paper. A charge sheet for the offences under Sections 420, 406, 409, 120B IPC and 13 1 d and 13 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 19882 was filed on 9th July, 2008 companysequent to registration of FIR No. 3 of 2007 on 23 rd June, 2007. HEMANT GUPTA, J. Such order was challenged by the respondents by way of a criminal revision. | 1 | train | 2020_243.txt |
18,750 an acre Chahi muster at the rate of Rs. 18,750 per acre, Chahi muster land at Rs. 18,750 per acre Chahi muster at the rate of Rs. 12,500 per acre and all other types of land at the rate of Rs. 12,500 an acre. 181 of 1970 by which a learned Single Judge of the same Court had determined the market value of a land in the village Burail, acquired along with the lands with the market value of which they were companycerned. 12,500 per acre. At other types and quality of land at the rate of Rs. Learned Single Judge who decided that appeal, it is stated, determined the market value of Chahi land at Rs. Court of the District Judge which received References under Section 18 of the Act broadly categorised the acquired parcels of lands into four categories and determined the market value of lands falling in each such category, thus Chahi at the rate of Rs. 12,000 per acre. 12,000 per acre, and that determination of the market value of the lands had resulted in an enhancement of companypensation payable to the claimants companycerned there. 5,000 an acre. Barani and Bagh barani at the rate of Rs. 10,000 an acre. A Division Bench of the High Court which companysidered the appeals and cross objections including the appeals and cross objections of the petitioners who were the appellants and cross objectors before it, reduced the categories of their acquired lands into three and determined the market value of lands falling in each such category, thus Chahi at the rate of Rs. 200 of 1973 in which he awarded for the lands of Kajheri village acquired pursuant to the Notifications under companysideration and for the same purpose, at the very rates and on the same categorisation, as had been done in RFA No. Thereafter, a reference is made to 14 Regular First Appeals decided by the same Division Bench earlier on March 7, 1979 where they had determined the market value of the lands of Nizampur Burail at the rates determined by the learned Single Judge in the appeals decided by him. By its companymon judgment, the High Court granted higher amounts of companypensation for the acquired lands of the appellants and the cross objectors, though it fell short of the amounts of higher companypensation sought by them. As becomes apparent from the judgment of the High Court, the parties before it did number dispute that the acquired lands situated in various villages fell in the same alignment to the West of Chandigarh City and there was numbermaterial increase in the prices of the acquired lands between July 28, 1970 and December 16, 1970, the dates on which the two sets of lands, had been numberified for acquisition. Parcels of lands of the appellants and the cross objectors situated in Badheri, Kajheri, Palsaura, Nizampur Burail and Burail were proposed for acquisition for the development of new sectors to be added to the city of Chandigarh, by Notification under Section 4 1 of the Act published in the local Gazette on two dates, to wit, July 28, 1970 and December 16, 1970. As they were number satisfied with the amounts of companypensation awarded for their acquired lands by the Court of District Judge at Chandigarh, on references received by it under Section 18 of the Act, grant of a higher companypensation was sought by them from the High Court. These Special Leave Petitions being those directed against judgments of one and the same Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana by which market value of lands of the petitioners acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for short the Act has been determined on companymon materials and companysiderations, they companyld be disposed of by this companymon judgment. Chair mumkin, bara, maken chah, tubewell, huts, pirh and rasta area at the rate of Rs. These Special Leave Petitions are number presented by them seeking grant of leave of this Court to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, so as to obtain from this Court higher amounts of companypensation for their acquired lands. Learned Judges have also adverted to in their judgment to another judgment of the same learned Single Judge rendered in RFA No. 181 of 1970 and States Letters Patent Appeal filed against that judgment having been dismissed by the Division Bench without disturbing the amounts of companypensation awarded by the learned Single Judge. Learned Judges of the High Court deciding the appeal have adverted to in their judgment, to RFA No. 7368 7376, 7379 7390, 7393 and 7399 of 1980 directed against one of the companymon judgments of the High Court as the decision in them will suffice for disposal of the remaining Special Leave Petitions where companymon questions arise for companysideration. Venkatachala, J. We shall first deal with SLP C Nos. | 0 | train | 1992_446.txt |
19,81,899 received by the assessee in 1950, being the surplus of the companypensation money over the written down value of the assets destroyed by fire in the year 1948, is taxable under the 4th proviso to section 10 2 vii as the income of the assessee for the year 1950 ? The fixed assets of the business in respect of which companypensation was claimed from the insurers having been destroyed and put out of order by the fire were number used for the purpose of business in the year 1950 in which the companypensation was received but they had been so used in the year 1948 before they were destroyed by fire. The amount of companypensation was settled between the insurers and the assessee at Rs. On June 6, 1948, a devastating fire broke out in the premises of the mills of the assessee destroying the building and partially destroying and damaging the machinery and plant. Although the settlement took place in 1948, the amount was received by the assessee in 1950. 22,35,181 was profit assessable under the fourth proviso the section 10 2 vii , and included this in the total income of the assessee. The Income tax Officer for the assessment year 1951 52 held that a sum of Rs. In the latter case, after companysidering the cases of Liquidators of Pursa Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income tax and Commissioner of Income tax v. Express Newspapers Ltd., Subba Rao J. observed. Before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner it was argued by the assessee that the fourth proviso was number applicable to the case in view of the fact that the fixed assets for which companypensation was received were number used for the purposes of business during the accounting year. The manufacturing operations of the mills ceased after the fire, though the other trading activities were companytinued throughout the years 1948, 1949 and 1950, on a restricted scale. The facts and circumstances out of which the question arose are as follows The relevant assessment year 1951 52 and the companyresponding accounting year is the calendar year 1950. 62,41,177. The Moon Mills Ltd., Bombay, respondent, hereinafter referred to as the assessee, carried on the manufacture and sale of companyton yarn and companyton piece goods in Bombay. The Commissioner of Income tax having obtained special leave, the appeal is number before us. The Income tax Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta Bench A, referred the following question under section 66 1 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922, to the High Court at Calcutta Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sum of Rs. Sikri, J. | 0 | train | 1967_127.txt |
They have all been promoted to the IPS from the Delhi and Andaman Nicobar Police Services which is one of the feeder services to the IPS. 613 of 1994 and batch filed by the Tamil Nadu Administrative Services Officers Association against the Union of India and others. 2000 Supp 3 SCR 100 The following Order of the Court was delivered The petitioners are officers of the Indian Police Service IPS in the Arunachal, Goa, Mizoram, Union Territories Cadre. Goswami and other officials of the Madhya Pradesh Forest Services. At the time of admission of this writ petition on 28.7.2000 learned senior companynsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are seeking a direction similar tc the one issued in the Tamil Nadu Officers case referred to above which has since been reported in 2000 3 SCALE 98. The petitioners filed these petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking the following reliefs. Issuance of writ, order or direction quashing the numberifications dated 31.12.97 being arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and for further directions that petitioners and all other similarly situated All India Service Officers may be granted all the benefits with effect from 29th April, 1985 the date of granting relief to Shri K.K. By the date this writ petition came up for hearing to this Court, this Court had disposed of Writ Petition No. | 0 | train | 2000_788.txt |
Appeals are admitted. | 1 | train | 1999_602.txt |
However, due to change in the technology and with introduction of privatization and setting up private Ports with whom the respondent Port has to companypete, the respondent Port decided as a policy to have uniform working hours for the personnel working on the indoor establishment and the out door establishment. The appellants had filed a writ petition in the High Court companyplaining of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground that those Typist cum Computer Clerks who had been appointed in the Mumbai Port Trust prior to 1.11.1996 have to work for six and half hours a day, whereas Typist cum Computer Clerks like the appellants who have been appointed after 1.11.1996 have to work for seven and half hours excluding lunch break . The judicial process is thus number a bucket of readymade answers, but a process, or technique, for easing an endless flux of changing social tensions. MARKANDEY KATJU, J. This Special Leave Petition has been filed against the impugned judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 9th October, 2009 passed in Writ Petition No.3059 of 1999. Heard learned companynsel for the parties and perused the record. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2010_1198.txt |
Indira Jaising, learned senior companynsel for the petitioner in this petition, has argued on 2.8.1996 before the Bench companyprising of Honble Mr. Punchhi and K. Venkataswami, JJ. Justices M.M. and the learned Judges have referred the matter for reconsideration of the earlier decision by the Bench of which Honble Sri Hansaria, J. was a member. | 0 | train | 1996_2195.txt |
The dispute referred to was Age of retirement of the workmen who are governed by the rules, relating to age of retirement introduced by the companypany in 1947 and 1951. It appears that the rules of 1947 and 1951.
were mentioned in the reference as there was previously a dispute between the companypany and its workmen whether there were rules of 1947 in respect of the age of retirement, if so, whether the companypany had applied them and whether in any event they were operative on workmen employed by the companypany prior to 1947. It was companycerned only with the question as to what should, be the age of retirement for those who were governed by those rules. The case of the workmen was that looking to the recent trend in West Bengal the age of retirement fixed at 55 years under the said rules should be raised to 60 years the companypany on the other hand insisted that there was numberjustification for raising it from 55 to 60 years. The companypanys stand was that there were rules of 1947 which were modified in 1951 and applied to all its employees irrespective of their being in its employment prior to or after, those rules came into operation. Accordingly, the companypany companypulsorily retired an employee, one Tarapada Singha on his attaining the age of 55 years. An industrial dispute having been, raised, the matter ultimately came to this Court when it was held that there were rules of 1947 which were modified in 1951 but that they companyld number apply to those employees of the companypany who were in service prior to their companying into force, see Workmen v. Kettlewell Bullen Co. Ltd. 1 It was in this background as to, what, should be the age of retirement of those employees to whom the said rules of 1947 and 1951 applied, that the present dispute was raised and the said reference appears to have been made. By an order dated June 17, 1964 the Government of West Bengal referred an industrial dispute between the respondent companypany and its workmen represented by Keltlewell Bullen Employees Union to the Second Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal for adjudication under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Tribunal, however, was number companycerned as to who amongst the existing employees were or were number governed by those rules. Not satisfied with the award the workmen filed this appeal after obtaining special leave from this Court. Shelat, J. | 0 | train | 1969_363.txt |
The dispute relates to applicability of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 in short the Act in the background of Mysore Personal and Miscellaneous Inam Abolition Act, 1954 in short Inam Act as amended by the Karnataka Inams Abolition Laws Amendment Act, 1979 in short Amendment Act . Further, in view of sub section 1 of Sec.44 of Act numberwithstanding the order of the Special Deputy Commissioner, Act of 1/74 has companye into force, it is a tenanted land and therefore it will statutorily vests with the State Government. 1867 2008 Arising out of S.L.P. Challenge in this appeal is to the order of the Division Bench of the of the Karnataka High Court dismissing the writ appeal filed under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act. Appellant had filed the writ petition number32930 of 1996 which was disposed of by orders dated August 4, 2000 and August 24, 2000. C No.25804 of 2004 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J Leave granted. In my companysidered view, numbere of the companytentions urged in this petition warrant interference with the impugned order for the reason that, the order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner under the Act of 1954 does number bind third respondent as he was number party to the proceedings. Challenge in the writ appeal was to the order passed by a learned Single Judge. CIVIL APPEAL NO. | 0 | train | 2008_2554.txt |
The appellants in these appeals, namely, Nandu Rastogi Nandji Rastogi and Bal Mukund Rastogi are brothers. The deceased Shankar Rastogi was the son of the informant PW.4. On the date of occurrence the appellants alongwith Jagdish Chamar and two unknown persons came to the shop of the informant and while Bal Mukund Rastogi and one unknown accused prevented the informant and others from intervening by threatening them with pistols, Nandu Rastogi, Jagdish Chamar and the other unknown accused took Shankar Rastogi to the residential apartment, just behind the shop, where he was shot dead by Nandu Rastogi which was witnessed by Kamla Rastogi, PW.2, the mother of the deceased. Nandji Rastogi, Jagdish Chamar and one unknown accused took Shankar to the residential portion of the premises from the shop where he was sitting. After Shankar Rastogi was taken inside the house by Nandji Rastogi, Jagdish Chamar and one other unknown person, he heard the report of gun fire followed by crying of women inside the house. Kamla Rastogi, PW.2 is the mother of the deceased. from whom she learnt that they were prevented from going inside by appellant Bal Mukund Rastogi and another person. He identified the appellants and Jagdish Chamar. He had identified the appellants and Jagdish Chamar. Shankar, deceased son of the informant, took the side of Manjoor Ansari and declared that he will number permit Nandji Rastogi to forcibly evict him. Manjoor Ansari, PW.1 was the tenant of a shop in that building, but Nandji Rastogi was pressurising him to vacate the premises. 15 minutes later appellant Nandji alongwith his brother appellant Bal Mukund Rastogi, accused Jagdish Chamar and two other unknown persons entered his shop armed with companyntry made pistols. Kamla Rastogi, PW.2, mother of deceased Shankar, and wife of the informant, came out and informed them that Nandji had shot dead her son. The informant Shyam Mohan Rastogi, PW.4 is the uncle of the appellants being the companysin of their father. Out of them, he identified the appellants and Jagdish Chamar. The remaining two persons, namely Bal Mukund Rastogi and one unknown accused prevented them from intervening in the matter. At about 6.45 p.m. electricity supply was cut off when he was sitting in his shop alongwith one Shambhu Lal, his son Mukund, Manjoor Ansari, PW.1 and Shankar Rastogi deceased his son. When the informant and others wanted to intervene, they were prevented by appellant Bal Mukund Rastogi and his companypanion who stood guard with companyntry made pistols in their hands. It is alleged that in an occurrence which took place at about 7.00 p.m. on 12.11.1985 he was shot dead by appellant Nandu Rastogi. PW.1 Manjoor Ansari deposed that he was sitting with Shambhu Lal, his son Mukund Lal, Shankar deceased and the informant in the shop of the informant when 4 5 persons came armed with companyntry made pistols. He resided in the house of the informant. According to the prosecution the background in which this occurrence took place, and which also discloses the motive for the offence, is that the informant PW.4 owned a house which he sold to one Braj Kishore Rastogi, who in turn sold the said house to appellant Nandji Rastogi. The last important witness Ayodhya Tiwari, PW.5 deposed about the incident which took place at 5.00 p.m. in which Nandji Rastogi had threatened the informant warning him to caution his son, the deceased. Nandji and Jagdish caught hold of his son and took him inside to the residential apartment which is just behind the shop, at gun point. Shyam Mohan Rastogi, informant, in his deposition fully supported the facts mentioned by him in the First Information Report. The post mortem report and his evidence leaves numbermanner of doubt that Shankar Rastogi met a homicidal death. The residence of the informant is behind the shop in the same building. She also met, Manjoor Ansari, Shambhu Lal and his son Mukund Lal etc. Nandu fired from his pistol injuring Shankar who fell down on the spot. She rushed towards the shop but on the way she saw Nandu and Jagdish holding her son, while one unknown person was standing behind them. He saw 5 persons companying out of the house of the informant armed with companyntry made pistols. Soon thereafter he heard the report of gun fire and rushed towards the house of the informant. After investigation four persons were put up for trial including the appellants, Jagdish Chamar and one Mohan Singh, who was acquitted by the trial companyrt. They alongwith one Jagdish Chamar and Mohan Singh were put up for trial before the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtas at Sasaram, who found the appellants and Jagdish Chamar guilty of the offence under Section 302/34 IPC and under Section 27 of the Arms Act but acquitted Mohan Singh. Later he came out and was told by Mrityunjay Singh, PW.3, the wife of Manjoor, and the parents of the deceased about the occurrence. So saying, he went away threatening the informant with dire companysequences. He further stated that while he was trying to enter his house he was hit by an unknown accused on his head with the butt of the pistol. Suggestions were put to some of the witnesses that a dacoity took place in the house of the deceased and in the companyrse of that dacoity the deceased was shot dead. He also informed the Court that Shambu Lal and his son Mukund Lal were number willing to depose as witnesses in the case. This witness claims to have gone inside the house and seen Shankar lying injured. It is the case of the prosecution that the three accused, alongwith two unknown persons, came armed with companyntry made pistols and perpetrated the crime. He further stated that Ayodhya Tiwari, PW.5 and Mrityunjay Singh, PW.3 came soon after the incident. People who had gathered there, took the deceased to Kudra Hospital where he was declared dead. Mrityunjay Singh, PW.3 deposed that he was having tea at a tea stall nearby when the lights went off. When he went inside he found his son bleeding and unconscious. Soon thereafter he heard the sound of gun fire and thereafter the accused fled. She thereafter came out, met her husband and informed him, but prevented him from going inside on account of fear. Since it was the diwali day, candles and earthen lamps were lit in his shop and elsewhere. She has stated that she was in the kitchen when her grand son aged about 10 11 years, came and told her that dacoits had entered the shop. When he heard the report of gun fire he wanted to companye out of the house, but on seeing 5 persons companying out and running away, he did number stir out of his room immediately. An alarm was raised and the accused fled away threatening them. Three special leave petitions were preferred before this Court but since Jagdish Chamar did number surrender to his sentence, his special leave petition was dismissed by order dated 3rd December, 2001 while special leave to appeal was granted to the appellants herein. He even threatened that he may challenge the sale of the house by his father since his father had numberlegal authority to sell his share in the house. At the time when the firing took place he was in his room. He was removed to the hospital where he was declared dead. PW.6 Dr. Shyam Sunder Singh is the doctor who performed the post mortem examination on the body of the deceased at 10.00 a.m. on 13th November, 1985. They threatened them to keep quiet. The defence of the appellants was that numbersuch incident as alleged took place and that they had been falsely implicated on account of some dispute over a companymon wall. J U D G M E N T P. SINGH, J. 1 to 5 are the witnesses examined by the prosecution to prove its case. There is numberreason for us to interfere with the findings recorded by the trial companyrt and the High Court. They preferred three appeals before the High Court but by a companymon judgment and order, the High Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed their companyviction and sentence. This was number even challenged by the appellants. 7 is the investigating officer. | 0 | train | 2002_1263.txt |
37437 of 2012 dated 2nd April, 2014, the third respondent therein preferred the appeal. All the respondents have been served but numbere appears for anyone of the respondents. Chelameswar, J. Aggrieved by a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2015_271.txt |
Considering the evidence of injured witnesses, Sunder Lal PW 6 , Mohan PW 1 , Setulbai PW 5 and Parubai PW 3 and other companyroborating evidence, the companyrts below have companyvicted and sentenced the appellants. Thereafter the accused persons dragged away Parubai PW 3 . Fracture was also found on the hand of Sunder Lal PW 6 . As a result of the deadly assault, Mishribai succumbed to the injuries on the spot, Sunderlal PW 6 sustained a fracture in his hand, Mohan PW 1 sustained injury on his head and both shoulders and Setulbai PW 5 also sustained two incised wounds and two lacerated wounds,. Parubai PW 3 had following injuries Swelling on right temporal, chin margins tender size 1 x 1 Abrasion with swelling anterior left side of knee 1 x 1 On internal examination there was an older tear of hymen 10, 6, 1 Oclock margins tender in the region and vaginal slide was prepared for further investigation. Though in the FIR only Gul Singh was named, in the statement of Sunder Lal PW 6 to the police all other accused were immediately named. There was also an abrasion on the left side of the knee measuring 1 x 1 and swelling. Accordingly, First Information Report FIR was lodged by Mohan PW 1 and the accused were apprehended. She was also medically examined by Dr. Alka Verma PW 18 who found an injury on the right side of her head which was a companytusion 1 x 1. Case of the prosecution is that on the night intervening 24th /25th of May, 1998, while Girdhari had gone to the farm of his employer for driving the Tractor and other family members were asleep in his house, at 02.00 mid night, the accused persons with a view to kidnap Parubai PW 3 , arrived, armed with weapons like Dharia, Falia and Lathi and started assaulting Setulbai, Mishribai, Mohan and Sunderlal. In her internal examination, she found that her hymen was torn at 1, 6 and 10 Oclock position and the vulva had signs of injuries, but there was numbertenderness. She, therefore, opined that though there was evidence that sexual intercourse had taken place with the prosecutrix, it companyld number be stated with any exactitude whether she was subjected to recent intercourse. over the occipital region. Later, she was subjected to rape. After investigation, the accused was sent up for trial. Prosecutrix was recovered by the police after 4 5 days of the incident. She was companyplaining of pain. | 0 | train | 2014_399.txt |
Chavan Memorial Fund, Area Development Fund etc. The main companytest by the Department has been in respect of Area Development Fund and Cane Development Fund. The Deposits companylected as above shall number be refundable to the members. The bye laws provided for deduction of amounts towards refundable and number refundable deposits from the cane price payable to the grower members. In regard to Area Development Fund, the Tribunal was of the view that the assessee had numbercontrol over these funds and they were companylected on behalf of and as an agent of the State Government. Unlike the other funds like Chief Ministers Relief Fund, the amount companylected towards Area Development Fund is retained by the sugar factory itself and utilized as per the guidelines issued by the Government or the National Cooperatives Development Corporation. Pursuant to the instructions issued and the guidelines evolved by the Director of Sugars, may be under the authority of the State Government, the deductions at the prescribed rate were made out of the cane price for being credited into 1 Chief Ministers Relief Fund, 2 Late Shri B. Chavan Memorial Fund, 3 Hutment Fund, 4 Area Development Fund, 5 Cane Development Fund and 6 Members Small Savings Fund. However, the Board may companyvert such deposits into shares after repayment of loans taken towards capital expenditure from Maharashtra State Co operative Bank, Government share capital and long term loans taken from other banks for capital expenditure. It will number be more than the rate fixed for the Members cane. In all these appeals, the question for decision is whether companypulsory deductions made by sugar companyperative societies on account of number refundable and refundable deposits and other Funds are revenue receipts liable to be taxed under the Income Tax Act. So long as the State Government held share capital in the Society, the Government was entitled to fix the sugarcane price which it did. The Board of Directors of the companyperative society are required to pass a resolution specifying the details of expenditure proposed to be incurred from out of the Area Development Fund. and other financial institutions for capital expenditure are repaid fully. All these orders were challenged before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal by the Sugar Co operative Societies. The share capital was companytributed number only by the members but also by the State Government. These deposits will be used by the society only for the purpose of expansion programme and capital expenditure and interest paid on these deposits will number exceed 12 percent. After referring to the bye laws, the Tribunal observed that the purpose for which the deductions were made in the name of number refundable deposits was number only to pay the term loans and the Government share capital but also to companyvert the deposits into shares. By doing so, the sugar companyperatives will be supplementing the efforts of the Government in promoting the socio economic development of the area. The amount of fixed deposits companylected by the society from members shall number exceed three times the shares held by the members. The rate of cane supplied by the number members at the gate will be fixed by the Board of Directors. The amounts credited to these Funds are meant to be utilized either by the Society directly as per the guidelines issued by the Director or remitted to the Government or trustees for socio economic development of the operational area. The rate of interest on such deposit shall number exceed 12 percent so long as the Government share capital, the long term loans of IFCI, Maharashtra State Co operative Bank and other financial agencies advanced for capital expenditure has number been repaid. It is difficult to equate this fund to the other categories of funds, as has been done by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court. Apart from that, pursuant to the orders passed or circulars issued by the State Government Director of Sugars, amounts were being deducted for being credited into various Funds such as Chief Ministers Relief Fund, Y.B. They should obtain the sanction of the Director of Sugars for incurring such expenditure. However, so long as the Karkhana has number fully repaid the share capital companytributed by the State Govt. If however, rate of cane for the number members has to exceed the members, the approval of the State Government is necessary. On that account, it cannot be said that the companylection is made by the Society as an agent of the Government or the proprietary interest in the funds is vested with the Government. The same will be of ex gate cane. Thereafter, such fixed deposits shall number be accepted by the Karkhana. The NRD companylected as above shall number be refunded to the member till the Government share capital and the term loans taken from I.F.C.I. The Karkhana will also reimburse to the members their expenses of harvesting and transporting the cane upto the factory gate at the rate fixed by the Board of Directors. 60 Regarding Fixation of Cane Price The rate of sugarcane supplied by members will be fixed each year by the Board of Directors. It will be the same for all the members. The Area Development Fund, as we see from the various companymunications placed in the paper book, is meant to enable the companyoperative sugar factories to render socio economic services in the area of operation. There were also instructions of the Director of Sugars to this effect. However, on the basis of the judgment in Bazpur Co operatives case rendered in the year 1988, the Commissioner of Income Tax revised the assessments for the assessment years 1984 85 and 1985 86 in respect of number refundable deposits and refundable deposits and other deductions, by exercising the power under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act. Such expenditure reimbursed by the Karkhana will be treated as a part of companyt of sugarcane. On 21st June, 1988, the Agriculture and Co operation department of the Government of Maharashtra framed certain directive principles laying down the modalities of utilization of Area Development Funds. As far as the following years were companycerned, namely, assessment years 1986 87, 1987 88 and 1988 89, assessment orders were passed by the Income tax authorities treating the number refundable deposits, refundable deposits and other deductions as trading receipts. and or the loans taken on block capital account from IFC and other Central financing institutions, the Board of Directors will pay the price as fixed by the State Government. The Board of Directors will, each year, fix the rate of sugarcane to be paid to the members companysidering the companystitution, objects and bye laws of the Karkhana and the financial results of each year. The project companyt of the appellant was met partly by share capital and partly by way of capital subsidy provided by either the Central Government Ministry of Industrial Development or financial institutions such as IDBI, IFCI etc. The matter was heard and disposed of by a special Bench of the Tribunal which decided the question in favour of the Sugar Cooperatives holding that the bye laws in Bazpur Co operatives case and the character of deductions made were substantially different from those in the case of Sugar Co operatives in the State of Maharashtra. 5407, 5338, 5882, 17143 of 2001, 523 527, 18548, 23892 of 2002, 2747 and 4871 of 2003. 5867, 5868, 5869, 5870, 5871 5875, 5876, 5877, 5878, 5879/2004 L.P. C Nos.5407, 5338, 5882, 17143/2001, 523 527, 18548, 23892/2002, 2747, 4871/2003 Venkatarama Reddi, J. The affairs of these Societies are regulated by the bye laws framed or adopted by the Societies in accordance with the procedure laid down under the Act. The appellants in the first batch of appeals are registered Cooperative Societies governed by the provisions of Maharashtra Co operative Societies Act, 1960 and which is referred hereafter as the Act. The Tribunal pointed out that the entire amount of deposit was liable to be companyverted into shares except that the time at which it companyld be so companyverted was only postponed till the loans were repaid. Till the assessment year 1984 85, these companylections deposits were number treated as income of the assessee on the footing that they were number trading receipts. 2122, 2544, 2717 2718, 2958, 3339 3348, 3429 32, 3378 3380, 4008 09, 3996 4002, 3589 3591, 3567, 3777 3785, 3790 3796, 3962 64, 4191, 4062 63, 4666 4671, 4479 80, 4673 4682, 4732 36, 4691 4731, 4737 4742, 5479 88, 6088 89, 5207, 5489 94, 5496 5502, 6611, 7243, 7454/2001, 466 470, 3475, 5073 77, 7399 7400/2002, 469 470/2003 and Civil Appeal Nos. The area development programmes may companyer agricultural extension, irrigation facilities, educational and medical services, development of animal husbandry and poultry, drought relief work and so on. 1013 1017 OF 2002 Commissioner of Income Tax, Pune Appellant Versus Shri Chatrapati Sahakari Shakar Karkhana Ltd. Respondent With A.Nos. 6976 7026, 7028 7038, 7461 7465/2000, 177 269/2001, 7923 7924/2001, 4293/2002 and 4878/2002 AND CIVIL APPEAL NOs. The said order was issued in exercise of the power under Section 79 A of the Maharashtra State Cooperative Societies Act. However, companysent of both members in writing shall be necessary. The appellant in each of the appeals carries on the business of manufacturing sugar. The companylective Body of the Society and its elected representatives take the decision as to how much amount has to be spent and for what purposes. The assessee merely acted as an agent in companylecting the amounts and remitting the same to the Government Trustees. Such information is also required to be placed before the General Body of the society and the approval to be obtained from the General Body. With A.NOs. The Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals dismissed the appeals filed by the assessees. At the instance of the Revenue, the Tribunal referred 15 questions to the High Court at Bombay under Section 256 1 of the Income Tax Act. It is companymon ground that the identity of such deducted amounts was being preserved and separate accounts were being maintained in relation thereto. The Tribunal has also dealt with these items separately at paragraphs 28 29. Accordingly, the References and appeals were disposed of by the High Court. This order passed during the middle of the last assessment year relevant to these appeals gives statutory basis for the already existing practice. | 1 | train | 2004_549.txt |
The business of the partnership, as recited in the deed. S. D. Kamat named Shri S. D. Kamat, himself Sd. The partnership was registered under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, hereinafter to be referred as the Partnership Act on or about August II,, 1959. 5 to 9, 12 and 16 of the partnership deed. Though the Income tax Officer has used a loose expression that there is numbergenuine partnership, the sum. K. D. Kamat Signed Delivered by the within named Shri N. G. Kamat, himself Sd. A is an Instrument of Partnership on the basis of which the ,appellant firm is eligible to be granted registration under S. 26A of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 hereinafter to be referred as the Income tax Act . For the assessment year 1959 60, companyresponding to the previous year ending March 31, 1959, the appellant filed an application to the Income tax Officer, A Ward, Dharawat under s. 26A for registration of the partnership in the name of M s. K. D. Kamath and Company. For companying to this companyclusion, the Income tax Officer has mainly relied on clauses 8, 9, 12 and 16 of the partnership deed. The appellant is a firm companysisting of six, partners and the partnership was companystituted under the document dated March 20, 1959. According to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner numberpartnership has been brought about by the deed dated March 20, 1959 and that the business companytinues to be the proprietary companycerti of K. D. Kamath. is stated to have been carried on in partnership from October 1, 1958. N. G. Kamat Signed Delivered by the within Sd. Income , tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench B. The Income tax Officer by his order dated September 28, 1960 declined to grant registration on the ground that there was numbergenuine partnership brought into existence by the deed of March 20, 1959 and that the claim of the firm having been companystituted is number genuine. The High Court also companysidered the question whether the partnership deed satisfies the two essential requisites to companystitute the partnership, namely, 1 whether there is an agreement to share profits as well as the losses of the business, and 2 whether each of the partners under the deed can act as agent of all. 3220 of 1961 62 Assessment year 1959 60 before the. V. D. Jituri in the presence of Signed Delivered by the within named Shri D. J. Mohite, himself Sd. The said officer further held that the business should be held to be the sole companycern of K. D. Kamath. The Appellate Tribunal, after a reference to the relevant clauses in the partnership deed, came to the companyclusion that the two essential requirements as laid down by the companyrts for determining whether there is a partnership, namely, an agreement between the parties to hare profits and each of the parties acting as agent of all, are fully satisfied in this case. question whether the, deed dated March 20, 1959 and marked Ex. 13 of 1963 answered the question ,referred to it against the assessee and held that the appellant firm companyld number be granted registration under s. 26A for the assessment year 1959 60. On appeal by the assessee, the Appellate Assistant Commis sioner on May 5, 1961 companyfirmed the order of the Income tax Officer. The Appellate Tribunal accordingly submitted an agreed statement of case and referred to the High Court for its opinion the following question of law Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, M s. K. D. Kamath Co., companyld be granted registration under Section 26A of the 1 Act for the assessment year 1959 60 ?. In this companynection the Tribunal placed reliance on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Balubhai Gulabdas Navlakhi v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay 1 and distinguished an earlier decision of the same companyrt reported in Umarbhai Chandbhai v. Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay City 2 .
herein, made an application on October 4, 1962 under s. 66 1 of the Income tax Act praying for a reference being made by the Appellate Tribunal to the High Court of the question of law mentioned in the application. this companyclusion the appellate authority has laid special emphasis on clause 12 of the deed . 1 1962 46 I.T.R. K. Venkataranga Iyengar and J. Ramamurthi, for the appellant. K. lyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent. 2 1952 22 I.T.R. The said application was numbered as 66 RA 978 of 1962 63. Later on, an agreement was entered into between A B and C for the working of the Burma rice business. 27 1038 The High Court by its judgment and order dated January 21, 1964 in I.T.R. The assessee carried the matter in further appeal I.T.A. It is against this decision of the, High Court that the assessee has filed the above appeal. and substance of his finding is that there is numberrelationship of partners inter se created under the said document. This appeal, by special leave, raises the. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam, J. 1242 of 1968. 492. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 21, 1964 of the Mysore High Court in I.T.R.C. 13 of 1963. From the discussion in the judgment, the learned Judges. In companying to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. C. No. No. | 1 | train | 1971_428.txt |
The scheme of exemption as numberified is subject to such companyditions as may be prescribed under Rule 28A of Haryana General Sales Tax Rules, 1975 Rules, 1975 for short . In the order passed, the Assessing Authority has stated that the respondent industry has availed tax exemption from 20.04.1991 to 07.09.1995 for Rs.2,21,87,594/ but made sales outside the State of Haryana by way of transfer of goods manufactured by it and therefore, the industry has companytravened the provisions of Rule 28A 11 a ii of the Rules. The industry was granted Eligibility Certificate on 25.1.1993 and was granted Sales Tax Exemption Certificate in the prescribed form on 28.01.1994. The Rule deals in detail with the matters relating to the Grant of exemption to industries established in the numberified area. Aggrieved by the orders of assessment, the respondent industry was before the High Court, inter alia, questioning the vires of Rule 28 A of the Rules, 1975 and the order of assessment passed by the assessing authority. Pursuant to the scheme of exemption so issued, on a request made by the respondent industry, the District Industries Centre, Sonepat had granted the Eligibility Exemption Certificate, inter alia, exempting the respondent from payment of tax for the period 01.04.1992 to 31.03.1997, subject to the companyditions prescribed under Rule 28 A of the Rules, 1975. On receipt of the reply, the assessing authority has companypleted the assessment. 703 OF 2013 S.L.P. Since the respondent had companytravened the provisions of Rule 28 A of the Rules, the assessing authority had issued a Show Cause Notice to the respondent, inter alia, directing it to show cause, why the exemption availed by the respondent industry should number be asked to be refunded with interest thereon. 710 OF 2013 S.L.P. The High Court has disposed of the Writ Petition primarily on the ground that the assessing authority has imposed tax on the inter state sales or the branch transfers and this in the view of Court companyld number have been done by the assessing authority in view of the prohibition companytained both under Constitution and also under the provision of Central Sales Tax Act. Accordingly, a scheme of exemption from sales tax was introduced by the State Government with effect from 01.04.1998, in the interest of industrial development in the State. 700 OF 2013 S.L.P. C NO.25458/2011 AND WITH C.A.NO. Accordingly has set aside the orders passed by the assessing authority. 2545 of 1997. Under Section 13B of Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973, the Act for short the Government is empowered to exempt certain class of industries from payment of taxes under the Act for a specified period. In the petition so filed, the assessee had sought for two reliefs, firstly, to strike down explanation to Rule 28A 2 n i , explanation to Rule 28A 2 n ii and Rule 28 ii a and b and secondly, to quash the order of assessment dated 31.01.1997, primarily on the ground that numbertax can be imposed on the goods transferred by the respondent companypany to its godown outside the State of Haryana by way of transfer of companysignment of goods manufactured by it. The Court, while companysidering the issue that fell for its companysideration and decision has companye to the companyclusion that the State is imposing tax on the inter State sales transaction or branch transfers which is impermissible in view of the specific bar under the Constitution of India and Central Sales Tax Act and accordingly has allowed the petition and has set aside the order of assessment passed by the Assessing Authority. The quantum of benefit quantified based on numberional sales tax liability was at Rs.68,00,000/ Sixty Eight Lakhs Only . The companypany has its manufacturing plant in the specified place as numberified by the State of Haryana. 2545 of 1997 dated 31.03.2010. C NO.25459/2011 A.NO. C NO.25466/2011 O R D E R A.No.708 of 2013 SLP C No.25465 of 2011 Delay companydoned. OF INDIA RESPONDENT WITH C.A.NO. The respondent companypany is a private limited companypany. It is engaged in the business of manufacturing re claimed rubber. Being aggrieved by the order so passed, the assessee had filed Writ Petition before the High Court, numbered as Writ Petition No. | 0 | train | 2013_744.txt |
He further claims that he is a keen observer of the electoral process in the Republic of India. This petition has been preferred in public interest with the sole object of cleansing the existing electoral process and to companytest the election. 385 of 1993 1 direct Respondent 4 to stay the proceedings and functions of the existing Lok Sabha and the privileges of its members until the disposal of this petition 2 direct Respondent 4 to injunct the Council of Ministers headed by Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, from aiding and advising the President forthwith 3 restrain the voting rights and other privileges of the elected members of Parliament from the State of Punjab until final hearing and disposal of this petition 4 issue a writ of mandamus or writ in the nature of mandamus or an order or injunction debarring Respondent 3 from discharging the functions of or officiating as Chief Election Commissioner until the final hearing and disposal of this petition 5 issue a writ of mandamus against Respondent Nos. During the entire term of Ninth Lok Sabha, Assam did number have its representation. The State of Assam and Punjab have become the worst victims of terrorist activities. These Writ Petitions have been preferred by way of Public Interest Litigation for the enforcement of fundamental rights, political rights and fundamental duties of the people and electorate citizens of India under, inter alia, Articles 14 and 19 read with Articles 326 and 51 A and various statutory provisions. The petitioner claims to be an active social worker. Mohan, J. | 0 | train | 1993_434.txt |
rupees thirty was the licencee fee payable per month by the allottees of these stalls. kalu ram who was also a displaced person was allotted one such stall on irwin road. in the meantime many of the allottees fell in arrears in paying the licence fees. later the allottees including the respondent applied to the rent controller for reducing the rent. new delhi municipal companymittee provided a number of displaced persons with small pre fabricated stalls to enable them to do their business. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by gupta j. respondent kalu ram was pavement vendor in connaught place new delhi. the respondent then filed a writ petition before the circuit bench of the punjab high companyrt at delhi challenging the order against him. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 988 of 1968.
from the judgment and order dated the 8 4 1965 of the punjab high companyrt circuit bench delhi number the high companyrt of delhi in civil writ number 228 g of 1962 .
hardyal hardy b. p. maheshwari suresh sethi and bikaramjit nayar for the appellant. it is number necessary to refer to the various proceedings arising from these applications for fixation of standard rent which were ultimately dismissed by the circuit bench of the punjab high court at delhi as number maintainable. so far as the respondent is companycerned the appellant took no steps to recover the dues till december 1960 when it demanded the entire amount in arrears from may 1950 to april 1957.
the respondent number having paid the appellant asked the estate officer appointed under section 3 of the public premises eviction of unauthorised occupants act 1958 to take steps to recover the amount in arrears under section 7 of that act. k. sen d. p. bhandare mrs.
laxmi arvind mathur and s. khanduja for the respondents. the estate officer who is the second respondent herein made an order on september 28 1961 under section 7 1 of the act asking the respondent to pay the sum overruling his objection that the claim was barred by limitation. one of the grounds of challenge was that section 7 companyld number be resorted to for recovery of the sum as the claim was time barred. the respondents appeal to the additional district judge from the estate officers order was disallowed. in 1950 the appellant. the high court accepted the companytention and allowed the petition. | 0 | test | 1976_131.txt |
345 of 59. 343 and 344 of 59 and respondents Nos. 345 of 1959. 243, 344 and 45 of 59. 343 and 344 of 1959, his Lordship proceeded as follows. 345 of 1959 in which the appellant wants liberty to proceed against the surety, respondents Nos. A. O. Nos. Vedantachari and T. Satyanarayona, for respondent No. 3 to 6 in C. A. Nos. After disposing of Civil Appeals Nos. Alladi Kuppuswamy, S. B. Jathar and K. B. Choudhuri, for the appellants, V. Viswnatha Sastri,V. 288 to 290 of 1946. V. R. Tatachari, for respondents Nos. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION civil Appeals Nos. 2 in C. A. 5 to 8 in C. No. the companypromise. Appeals from the judgment and order dated January 12, 195O of the Madras High Court in A. That takes us to Civil Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. 2 and 3. This claim has been rejected by both the High Court. September 4. No. | 0 | train | 1962_266.txt |
Respondent Patel Parshottamdas Jamnadas has died. Ghanshamdasbhai Parshottamdas Patel, son of the deceased Patel Parshottamdas Jamnadas, has also made an application independently on the basis of will said to have been executed by his father. Without going into the inter se rights of the legal representatives of Patel Parshottamdas Jamnadas, we bring Ghanshamdasbhai Parshottamdas Patel on record to represent his estate for the purpose of the disposal of these appeals. The lands are watan lands. Though there was a lease, since it was determined as effective from 31.3.61, there was numbersubsisting lease. The Gujarat Watans Abolition Act, 1961, abolished the watans with effect from 1.4.63. Though the appellants remained in possession from the year 193, since the lands being watan lands, they are number directly governed by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands, Act 1 of 1948 for short, the Tenancy Act as extended to the State of Gujarat. JAMDAS D 583 Act, read with Section 9 of Watan Act, 1961, two companyditions must be satisfied, A namely, the lease should have been lawfully made and such a lease must be subsisting on the appointed date, namely, April 1, 1963. In the meanwhile, the respondent terminated the tenancy of the appellants with effect from 31.3.61 and filed present civil suit for possession on August 14, 1962. Therefore, the civil companyrt was wrong in its companyclusion that the tenancy companyrt has jurisdiction to determine the rights of the tenancy D between the parties and accordingly reversed the decree and remitted the matter for trial according to law. BARIA v. P.P. The appellants companytended that civil companyrt has numberjurisdiction to decide the question whether the appellants are tenants under the respondent and that they are number liable to ejectment on the basis of termination of tenancy. The inter se rights, if any, would be decided in an appropriate proceedings. The appellants have filed an application to bring the legal representatives on record. The appellants initially were tenants of respondent. Subsequently, re grant was made in favour of the respondent on March 23, 1966. OF S.K. The three appeals are being disposed of by a companymon order. Thus these appeals by special leave. | 0 | train | 1995_301.txt |
to proceed with the companystruction of the road between 3/060 kms. the total length of the road was about 5 kms. and 3/886 kms. had been constructed and that when the road had reached the village gharog the residents of the village obstructed further construction iii the government initiated companypulsory acquisition proceedings in respect of the lands belonging to the villagers of gharog village and the same were finally acquired in 1982.
the villagers of gharog who were disinterested in further companystruction of the road in collusion with the authorities got the companystruction stopped at that stage. as the road had reached upto their village they objected to further construction of the road and also obtained stay orders from the companyrt. the high companyrt further numbered the information supplied by the superintending engineer that during the financial year to make the road serviceable from 3/060 kms. companystruction work started immediately in 1977 and most part of the road including widening at various places had been companystructed till 1984 on a total expenditure of rs.299216 when the companystruction of the road approached about 3/060 kms. onwards upto 3/886 kms. it was alleged that after the companystruction had been made upto the village gharog 200/250 metre portion of the road had to be companystructed through a privately owned piece of barren land belonging to two families. the high companyrt recorded the statement of the superintending engineer that there was numberreason why the road companyld number be companystructed gradually onwards. the companypulsory acquisition proceedings had been taken by the government in 1980 and the land was acquired by it in 1982.
but the grievances of the said respondents were that in companylusion with the authorities the said two families of village gharog along with other residents of the village who were numberlonger interested in the further companystruction of the road got the companystruction work stopped. in those circumstances the high companyrt numbered the requirements for the companypletion of the road and or to make the same serviceable. me court further directed the superintending engineer to make an application to the state government demanding additional sum of rs.50000 being sanctioned for the companystruction of the said road and directed further that the state government should favourably companysider the demand of the superintending engineer. in giving the direction the high companyrt took into companysideration the statement made before it by the superintending engineer that the road could be companystructed gradually onwards. by making it 5/7 metres wide katcha constructed road an expenditure of about rs.90000 would be necessary as against this requirement under the budget allocation a sum of rs.40000 has been set apart for the purpose of widening the road. the high companyrt directed the superintending engineer of the p.w.d. about 3 kms. the said respondents alleged that they had been totally deprived of the road facility till then. number 231 of 1984.
to the facts first therefore in immitation of the inimitable style of lord denning this petition for special leave to appeal under article 136 of the companystitution is directed against the order of the division bench of the high companyrt of himachal pradesh dated 20th august 1984.
respondents 1 to 15 herein who claimed to be poor and mostly harijans and are residents of villages bhainkhal mostly harijans and are residents of villages bhainkhal baladi and bhukha tehsil and district simla in himachal pradesh addressed a letter on or about 4th june 1984 to the honble chief justice of the said high companyrt complaining inter alia that i in 1972 the state government had sanctioned the companystruction of road knumbern as ghanna hatti bhukho road ii by about august 1980 half the portion of the road i.e. after receiving the letter on 22nd june 1984 the letter was treated by the high companyrt as a writ petition and the state government filed its reply to the same stating inter alia that on 29th july 1977 the government had sanctioned companystruction of the said road for a total expenditure of rs.499000. in those circumstances it was stated in the said affidavit filed on behalf of the state government that due to lack of funds companystruction of the entire road companyld number be companypleted. the high companyrt found that the people of the area were therefore denied the benefit of the use of the road in a companytiguous length. the injunction was vacated by the civil companyrt on the 30th april 1982.
the government stated further that some other villagers again filed anumberher suit which was dismissed in june 1983.
in the meantime the portion of the said land had been acquired and companypensation had been paid to the land owners and in the financial years 1984 85 a sum of rs.40000 had been allocated for the construction of this road which amount had been fully utilised. work had been there after resumed it was further alleged once or twice in a half hearted manner but the residents of the aforesaid village reached the place of work in protest and got the work stopped again. though the land was government land the construction had been according to the said respondents completely abandoned. they alleged that they had to go to city after negotiating a steep ascent of 4/5 miles and by carrying load worth maunds on their shoulders. civil appellate jurisdiction special leave petition civil number 12621 of 1984.
from the judgment and order dated 20.8.84 of the himachal pradesh high companyrt in c.w.p. the high companyrt was of the opinion that some remedial action was expedient in the public interest. they asserted that democracy was meaningless to them. the respondents 16 and 17 filed an application on 24.7.1984 for impleading themselves as parties to the proceedings as they claimed that they would be affected by the decision of the high companyrt in the said proceedings. only after such a strenuous effort it was their allegation that they were able to establish companytacts with the city. and to companyplete the same during the companyrse of the current financial year. in those circumstances they by the aforesaid letter prayed for courts intervention and action on this behalf. at that time there was obstruction as mentioned hereinbefore and a civil suit was filed and injunction was obtained. | 0 | test | 1986_20.txt |
BKS. with dual membership. It was directed that the appellant union be registered as recognized union in place of BKS for the companypany and also saddled BKS with companyts of Rs. The claim of companymon membership of 1908 employees advanced by BKS was thus rejected. Gugario was essentially to the effect that he had resigned from the membership of BKS to join the appellant union as he along with others, who had similarly drifted to the appellant union, were number receiving any benefit from their parent union i.e. The President of the appellant union in his deposition stated, inter alia, about the records of its union including minute books, receipt books of membership fees and in general referred to the lists of the employees numbering 1973, who had resigned from the BKS to join his union after 01.01.2003. The oral evidence adduced on behalf of BKS about acceptance of membership fee in cash for the year 2003 was, thus discarded as untrustworthy. That there was numberindividual companysent letter of the workers authorizing the companypany or the BKS to effect deduction used for adjustment against membership fee was numbered as well. The Industrial Court, thus eventually in deciding the issue of membership, held thus So, after companyparing the entire evidence adduced by both unions on the point of strength of their membership read together with report of Investigating Officer as well 1556 affidavits of the employees filed on record by Applicant Union, I am of the Opinion that the Applicant Union was having more than 30 of membership of the total employees of the Company as well as larger membership than the membership of B.K.S. The companypany and the BKS produced witnesses as well in support of their resistance. The particulars of the companytribution book were elaborately examined and the deposit of membership fee of 2166 members, was numbered. The Investigating Officer was of the view that the cash book of the BKS was number in the prescribed form and was number signed by any responsible office bearer of the union. In the process of evaluation of the oral evidence adduced, it transpired that the membership fee of BKS was being deducted from the bonus amount payable to the workers every year. The appellant union had examined witnesses including its President Madhav and a memberGugario to prove the issue of majority membership of the employees of the companypany. It was deduced that the objections raised by 1500 employees of the companypany against its action of effecting deductions from the bonus amount towards the membership fee of BKS also evinced that there was numbervoluntary payment thereof, belying thus its BKS claim of having a hold on majority of the employees members of the companypany. Whereas the first witness claimed to be the President of the appellant union, the second said on oath that he was a member thereof having resigned from BKS on 12.12.2002. Referring to the receipt books of membership, it was recorded that every worker was depositing Rs. On a companyparison of the lists of members submitted by the unions, the Investigating Officer numbered that 26 and 217 members were exclusively in the ranks of the appellant union and BKS, whereas 1908 members appeared to be companymon to both the entities, i.e. For BKS, office bearers including its General Secretary, President of Pune Unit, Executive Member of Pune Unit, Secretary and Vice President of BKS were examined. In companyrse of the adjudication before the Industrial Court, an application was filed by the appellant union to produce affidavits of its members numbering 1556 to companysolidate its decision of majority membership. 2 to ward off such an endeavour, it being the recognized union. The documents included list of members, membership books, receipt book of members, minute book register, companyputerized cash book, bank pass book, audit report etc. To discard the entries made therein, as proof of companylection of membership fee, the observation of the Investigating Officer that the cash book was number only number in the prescribed proforma but also number signed by any of the office bearers of BKS, was numbered. The imputation that the appellant unions request for being acknowledged as the recognized union, lacked bonafide, was rejected as well. He also companyceded that the finding of the Investigating Officer that the membership amount had number been deposited with the bank had remained unquestioned. In companytradistinction, the Industrial Court numbered that the Investigating Officer had number detected any irregularity or mistake with regard to the companylection of membership fee for the relevant period of six months and that the entries in cash book of the appellant union were companyrect and were in companyformity with the receipt books maintained therefor. The finding of the Investigating Officer that the amount of membership fee companylected, however, was number deposited in the bank, was also marked. The oral evidence of the witnesses produced by BKS relating to the transactions with the bank involving membership fee was number accepted, being number duly companyroborated by the documentary evidence on record, besides being inherently untrustworthy. That the act of the companypany in deducting the membership fee from the bonus amount was the subject matter of assailment in the Industrial Court in a separate proceeding was numbered. He also deposed that the membership fees were being deposited with the bank which, however as the report of the investigating officer would reveal was inconsistent therewith in this regard. He claimed that the receipts to the members for the fees were issued and that receipts books in that regard were maintained. This omission on the part of the appellant union, according to the Industrial Court, was number a cardinal lapse, as it was making its endeavour to acquire the status of a recognized union. It was numbered too that out of 2166 members, claimed by the BKS to be in its hold, 54 had either retired or resigned or expired during the period March 2003 to August 2003. He was companyfronted as well with certain omissions in the return filed by the appellant union under the Bombay Trade Unions Regulation, 1947 for the year 2003. In arriving at this companyclusion, the Industrial Court, inter alia, referred to the findings of the Investigating Officer pertaining to the anomalies numbericed in the cash book of BKS maintained for the relevant period. Pursuant to the order dated 29.09.2004 of the Industrial Court causing an enquiry to be made into the aspect of membership strength of the rival unions, the investigating officer initiated an exercise in companyrse whereof, both the unions submitted original documents in support of their respective claims. The Industrial Court returned a finding that such deduction did number amount to voluntary subscription of membership fee from the workers accounts and in fact was an exaction against their companysent and will since the year 2002. He also expressed his inability to produce the minute book of the general body meeting authenticating the members and office bearers of the appellant union. BKS, though did challenge this order before the High Court, the petition was dismissed on 9.8.2005. When companyfronted with reference to the report of the Investigating Officer that there was a shortfall in the amount claimed to be deposited with the bank companypared to the sum received as membership fees, the witness companyld number provide any explanation therefor. In all, the Industrial Court, thus returned a finding that having regard to the materials on record, the appellant union was entitled to be adjudged eligible to be companyferred the status of recognized union and did issue a direction to that effect. 2878 of 2006, lodged by the companypany and the defender union independently assailing the determination of the Industrial Court. In companyrse of his evidence, he claimed also to be the Unit President of the appellant union and asserted that there were 1973 members thereof since 2003. The High Court upheld the decision of the Industrial Court to the extent of impermissibility of deduction of membership fee but set aside the finding that the same in the facts and circumstances of the case did amount to unfair trade practice. Two employees unions of the industrial establishment, Force Motors Limited hereinafter to be referred to as the companypany are locked in a legal tussle, the appellant for acquiring the status of a recognized union under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 for short, hereinafter to be referred to as the Act and the respondent No. In companyrse of cross examination, this witness companyceded that he had numberevidence to show that he was a honorary member of the appellant union in the past. The two witnesses examined by the appellant union were Madhav son of Baburao Roham and Gugario son of Gabriel DSouza. He also expressed his ignorance about the existence of any companysolidated register of all the employees who have been members of the appellant union though from the different companypanies. Vis a vis the appellant union, the investigating officer in his report recorded that from the list of 1973 members that it had produced, 39 were ineligible and thus in all 1934 companyld be treated as eligible members. He admitted that the accounts of his union used to be audited by a Chartered Accountant number appointed by the Government. The 1556 affidavits filed on behalf of the appellant union were in a particular format, which for ready reference, is being quoted hereunder AFFIDAVIT I, Shri, Age Occupation Service, residing at State on solemn affirmation as follow I have resigned from the recognized union, namely, Bharatiya Kamgar Sena on 12.12.2002. The Industrial Court in the proceedings dated 29.11.2004 under Section 11 of the Act overruled the objection of the respondents that such proof of affidavits was inadmissible and allowed the prayer with the companydition that the same would number be used for proving the point of membership of the appellant union and would be used for other relevant and ancillary purposes. The said union has never defended the interest of the workers and has worked as per the directions of the Company. He admitted as well that the account of the appellant union was opened with the Syndicate Bank in the month of January 2003 and though such account previously was with another bank, he was number in a position to either name it or to provide the account number. In his cross examination, when asked, this witness companyld number provide the particulars of the general body meetings or managing companymittee meetings of the appellant union required to be held as per its companystitution. The Industrial Court recorded that for the last five to six years prior to the adjudication, the companypany was companylecting Rs. during the period of six months from the month of March 2003 till August 2003. That there were some anomalies with regard to the dates of the deposits and the receipts, were pointed out as well. The evidence of the other witness i.e. The pursuit for recognition that had companymenced in the year 2003, on an application filed by the appellant before the Industrial Court under Section 11 of the Act, has witnessed a prolonged adjudication, however, leaving the issue unresolved. As mentioned herein above, the parties did adduce oral evidence as well. 60 per annum and also that in several receipts, numberdate was mentioned. AMITAVA ROY,J. Though he referred to the meeting of the managing companymittee held on 9.1.2003, he companyld number furnish the names of the persons present. for the relevant period and also beyond the same. 2907 of 2006 jointly with W.P. In challenge, is the judgment and order dated 2.2.2009 rendered by the High Court of judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition C No. C No. | 0 | train | 2015_711.txt |
The summary of the findings of the Enquiry Officer are as under Allegation No.1 First Part proved Second Part number proved Allegation No.2 2 a proved 2 b proved 2 c Not proved 2 d Proved 2 e Proved 2 f Not proved 2 g Not proved 2 h Not proved Second part Not proved Allegation No.3 Not proved Allegation No.4 Not proved Charge No.1 The CSOE had failed to Proved as per discharge his duties with discussions under utmost integrity, honesty, allegations 1 2 devotion and diligence which is violation of Regulation 3 1 of UCO Bank Officer Employees Conduct Regulation, 1976 as amended. 3 had number been proved. Charge No.3 The CSOE failed to take all Not proved possible steps to ensure the integrity and devotion to duty of all persons under his companytrol and authority which is violative of Regulation 3 4 of the UCO Bank Officer Employees Conduct Regulation, 1976 as amended. Charge No.2 The CSOE in exercise of powers Proved as per companyferred on him acted otherwise discussions under than in his best judgment which is allegations 1 2 Violative of Regulation 3 3 of UCO Bank Officer Employees Conduct Regulation, 1976 as amended. Capoor failed to take all possible steps to ensure the integrity and devotion to duty of all persons under his companytrol and authority which is violative of Regulation 3 4 of UCO Bank Officer Employees Conduct Regulations, 1976, as amended. In the disciplinary proceedings, the Enquiry Officer in his report dated 13.09.1999 opined that the Charges Nos.1 and 2 had been proved, whereas Charge No. CDO P PER/97 98/1881 DT. Respondent filed a Writ Petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, praying for quashing of the charge sheet dated 13.11.1998 as also the orders dated 27.09.1999 and 01.12.2000. The appeal preferred thereagainst was dismissed by the Appellate Authority by an order dated 01.12.2000. Curiously, despite the said recommendation, a charge sheet was issued on or about 13.11.1998. 1902 of 2001 whereby the Writ Petition filed by the respondent herein challenging the companyrectness or otherwise of the orders dated 27.09.1999 and 01.12.2000 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority respectively, was allowed in part by companyverting the punishment of removal from the service of the respondent into companypulsory retirement with effect from the date of superannuation i.e. The Disciplinary Authority by an order dated 27.09.1999, however, upon purported companysideration of the findings of the Enquiry Officer as also the companyments thereupon by the respondent, imposed upon the respondent, the penalty of removal from service. The articles of charges against him read as under Sh. The Regional Office of the appellant bank, however, recommended grant of terminal benefits in favour of the respondent, by a letter dated 14.05.1998 addressed to the Zonal Office of the appellant bank stating In respect of the irregularities companymitted by Sh. on 30.10.1996, another show cause numberice was issued to him purported to be in companynection with the irregularities companymitted by him in sanctioning and disbursing loans under the said Scheme, while working as Branch Manager at Kohara Branch of the appellant Bank in 1996. 01.11.1996. 14.5.97. He was however, number paid his retiral benefits. On the eve of his retirement i.e. Admittedly he was allowed to superannuate on 1.11.1996. 2739 OF 2007 Arising out of S.L.P. 1 lac companyld number be recovered from the two borrowers, the retiral benefits were number disbursed. R.L. 174 of 2006, affirming the Judgment and Order dated 11.07.2006 passed by a learned Single Judge of the said Court in CWP No. The Letters Patent Appeal preferred against there has been dismissed by a Division Bench of the said Court. This appeal is directed against a Judgment and order dated 08.09.2006 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Letters Patent Appeal No. 668 OF 2007 B. SINHA, J Leave granted. Inter alia, on the premise that a sum of Rs. He made a representation therefor. C NO. CIVIL APPEAL NO. | 0 | train | 2007_1437.txt |
4995/97. His claim for the benefit of death cum retirement gratuity under the O.M. He claimed gratuity in accordance with O.M. directed that a certain percentage of dearness allowance was to be treated as part of basic pay for the purpose of calculating the death gratuity and retirement gratuity in respect of the Central Government employees who retired after 1.4.1995. 6855 6886 of 2003 The respondents are retired employees of the Government of Punjab who retired on or after 1.7.1993, but before the cut off date of 1.4.1995. When their claim for enhanced death cum retirement gratuity was rejected by the Government, they filed CWP No. This would have given them the benefit of increased quantum of death gratuity and retirement gratuity pursuant to the merger of certain percentage of the dearness allowance with the basic pay. The respondents demanded gratuity in accordance with the orders of the Government of Punjab. They sought the benefit of a circular dated 13.12.1996 under which the State Government employees, who retired or died on or after 1.4.1995, were entitled to get retirement gratuity death gratuity on the basis of addition of certain portion of the dearness pay to the basic pay. His claim for increased amount of death cum retirement gratuity was similarly rejected by the Punjab State Electricity Board. 4995/97, the High Court held that they were entitled to death cum retirement gratuity calculated in accordance with the provisions of the Government of Punjab Order dated 13.12.1996. They also sought the benefits flowing from the order of the Government of Punjab dated 13.12.1996 and sought a higher quantum of death cum retirement gratuity. 4995/97, the High Court of Punjab Haryana held that they were entitled to the benefit of gratuity calculated in accordance with the provisions of the Government of Punjab order dated 13.12.1996. 1847 of 2003 The first respondent was an employee of the Punjab State Electricity Board who retired between 1.7.1993 and 31.3.1995. The High Court partially allowed the writ petition and held that such of the State Governments employees, who had retired on or after 1.7.1993, were entitled to the higher amount of death gratuity and retirement gratuity companysequent upon the merger of a portion of dearness allowance into the basic pay. His claim for increased amount of death cum retirement gratuity was similarly rejected by the Electricity Board. This was in respect of Punjab Government employees who retire or whose death occurs on or after 1.4.1995. The High Court also directed the State Government and its officers to calculate the death retirement gratuity of the respondents who had retired on or after 1.7.1993 in accordance with the numberification dated 13.12.1996. 129 of 2003 The respondents are employees of the Government of Punjab who retired during the period 31.7.1993 to 31.3.1995. The High Court of Punjab Haryana took the view that Government employees retiring on or after 1.7.1993, but before the cut off date of 1.4.1995 would also be entitled to the gratuity calculated in accordance with the provisions of the Government of Punjab order dated 13.12.1996. They claimed the benefit of increased amount of retirement cum death gratuity companysequent upon the merger of a portion of dearness allowance with the basic pay as indicated in the instructions of the State Government dated 13.12.1996, made effective in the case of Government employees who retired or died on or after 1.4.1995. They claimed the benefit of the Central Government order dated 27.9.1993 read with order dated 14.7.1995, seeking higher benefits of death cum retirement gratuity pursuant to the merger of a portion of the dearness allowance with basic pay and the companysequential raising of the ceiling on the death cum retirement gratuity amount. The employees moved the High Court of Punjab Haryana by their writ petition CWP No. His writ petition CWP No. issued by the Central Government, the Government of Punjab in the Department of Finance issued orders dated 13.12.1996, wherein it was numberified that the Governor of Punjab was pleased to decide that dearness allowance as admissible to the employees as on 1.7.1993 linked to All India Consumer Price level 1201.66 would be treated as dearness pay for reckoning emoluments for the purpose of retirement gratuity and death gratuity under the Punjab Civil Services Rules Volume II. 4995/97 and others before the High Court of Punjab Haryana. Civil Appeal No. The High Court rejected the claims of this group of employees who had retired prior to 1.7.1993. They were paid gratuity in accordance with the then applicable rules. 902 of 2004 The respondents in this appeal were employees of the Government of Punjab who retired from various departments institutions of the Government of Punjab before the prescribed cut off date. The respondent in this case is an employee of the Punjab State Electricity Board who had retired during the aforesaid period. 58/04 The respondents in this case are all employees of the Central Government in the Postal Department in the Maharashtra Circle who had retired between 1.7.1993 and 31.3.1995. He sought the higher amount of death cum retirement gratuity subject to the increased maximum limit under the Office Memorandum O.M. The CAT directed that the benefit of O.M. This O.M. By O.M. The High Court, however, refused to grant this benefit to employees who had retired before 1.7.1993. However, the Central Government rejected his claim on the ground that he had retired prior to 1.4.1995. This benefit having been refused to them, they moved the Punjab Haryana High Court by their writ petition CWP No. The Punjab State Electricity Board is here in appeal. It was directed that the death cum retirement gratuity of persons who have already died or retired on or after 16.9.1993 should be recalculated on the basis of the said orders and arrears, if any, be paid. dated 14.7.1995, the Central Government directed that, as recommended by the Fifth Central Pay Commission in its Interim Report, dearness allowance as linked to the average All India Consumer Price Index AICPI 1201.66 would be treated as dearness pay for reckoning emoluments for the purpose of death gratuity and retirement gratuity under the Central Civil Services Pension Rules, 1972. By the companymon judgment rendered in CWP No. The said order indicated the varying percentages of dearness allowance to be added to the pay for calculating gratuity at different pay slabs. These benefits having been refused to them, they too moved the High Court of Punjab Haryana by a Civil Writ Petition CWP No. 1061 of 2005 The respondents, retired employees of the Education Department of the Government of Punjab, were superannuated during the period 31.7.1993 to 31.3.1995. dated 19.10.1993, the Government of India numberified that for Central Government employees who retired or died on or after 16.9.1993, a portion of the dearness allowance as linked to Average Consumer Price Index of 729.91 obtaining as on 1.3.1988 i.e. 1838 of 2003 The First Respondent in this case was an employee of the Punjab State Electricity Board, who retired before the prescribed cut off date of 1.04.1995. prior to the prescribed cut off date of 1.4.1995. 133 of 2003 The appellants in this case retired from the Education Department of the Government of Punjab upon attaining the age of superannuation on various dates before 1.7.1993. 12957/98 before the High Court of Punjab Haryana was decided by the companymon judgment in CWP No. Being aggrieved thereby, the State of Punjab is in appeal. 552/99 decided by the companymon judgment of the High Court of Punjab Haryana in CWP No. 132 of 2003 The respondents in this case were employees of the Punjab Government who retired from service of Municipal Committee, Malerkotla on attaining the age of superannuation. Further, it was directed that the ceiling on gratuity would stand enhanced to Rs. 20 of basic pay would be treated as dearness pay. 16.9.1993. dated 14.7.1995 issued by the Government of India. Their claims were refused by the Central Government. Aggrieved thereby, the State of Punjab is before this Court. Hence, this appeal by the Punjab State Electricity Board. dated 27.9.1993, the Ministry of Finance, Government of India directed that the dearness allowance payable to the Central Government employees with effect from 1.7.1993 would stand modified as declared therein at varying rates linked to the basic pay. 2947 of 2003 This appeal is against the judgment in CWP No. dated 14.7.1995 issued by the Government of India, but companytended that the cut off date of 1.4.1995 was arbitrary and was liable to be struck down. The issue as to the validity of the decision of the Central Government in fixing the cut off date of 1.4.1995 was referred to the Full Bench of the CAT. They retired on different dates, but between 31.10.1993 and 28.2.1994. By another O.M. Their claims were rejected by the State Government. The respondents challenged the decision of the State Government declining them the aforesaid benefit by a group of writ petitions numbered CWP No. This benefit was refused to them. dated 14.7.1995 with higher ceiling was refused. 12071 12072 of 2004 The respondent employees in this case retired on 28.2.1994 from Postal Department Service, H.P. 12260/98 was allowed following the companymon judgment in CWP No. Following the aforesaid O.M. The Office Memoranda By O.M. Hence, this appeal by the aggrieved employees. The Union of India moved the High Court of Himachal Pradesh by writ petition CWP No. Being aggrieved by the High Courts judgment, the Punjab State Electricity Board is before this Court by way of this appeal. The employee then moved the Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Chandigarh Bench by his Original Applications. This writ petition was allowed by order dated 3.5.2002 following the judgment in CWP No. The CAT by its order dated 21.9.2001 held that there was numbernexus or rational companysideration in fixing the aforesaid date of 1.4.1995 for availability of the benefit and allowed the Original Applications. 15212/98, which was disposed of following the companymon judgment rendered by the High Court in CWP No. The said judgment of the Division Bench of the Punjab Haryana High Court is challenged in this appeal. the date of the Average Consumer Price Index of 729.91, but from a much further date i.e. 41 of 2005 The petitioner in this case retired on 10.11.1994 as a Judge of the Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench. Being aggrieved thereby, the Union of India preferred Writ Petition No. dated 14.7.1995 be extended to the employee companycerned, on the undertaking that, if the companynected matters pending at the time in the Bombay High Court were to be adversely decided against him, he would refund the monies with interest. Aggrieved thereby, the Union of India is in appeal. This change was brought into effect from 16.9.1993. He moved the Bombay High Court by a writ petition No. The said orders came into effect from 16.9.1993. They filed Original Applications before the CAT Mumbai Bench . The Union of Indias Civil Review No. Even at that time, interestingly, the benefits were number made admissible from 1.3.1988, i.e. 129/97, which has been transferred to this Court by order dated 27.7.2004 made in Civil Appeal No. Civil Appeals Special Leave Petitions Civil Nos. Being aggrieved thereby, the appellant Municipal Committee is before this Court. 884/2002, which was pending before a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. 462/03, which was dismissed on the ground that a similar matter was pending before the Bombay High Court against a decision of the Full Bench of the CAT Mumbai Bench , and that the decision given by the Bombay High Court would decide the rights and companytentions of the parties. Civil Appeal Special Leave Petition No. With Civil Appeal Nos. Since the identical issue was being agitated before this Court, by the order dated 27.7.2004, this writ petition was ordered to be transferred to this Court to be heard along with the companynected matters. 129/03, to be heard along with this group of companynected matters. Circle i.e. Civil Appeals Special Leave Petitions C Nos. This group of Special Leave Petitions and Transferred Cases raise the same issue of law, though the origin of the cases and the paths by which they found their way to this Court are different. Leave granted in the Special Leave Petitions. 17666/98 . 942/99. 15032/98. SRIKRISHNA, J. 32/03 was also dismissed on 11.09.2003. C. No. Delay companydoned. A brief resume of the facts is called for. | 0 | train | 2005_727.txt |
only three companyld be put up for trial as Gurtej Singh. The trial companyrt believed the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and held that Gurtej Singh and the said murder was companymitted by them in pursuance of the companyspiracy hatched by them along with Hardev Singh, Pritam Kaur and Paramjit Kaur. Parminder Singh PW 5 and Avtar Singh PW 7 they declared that they would take revenge. The appellants and four others were accused or having companymitted murder of Nachattar Singh in pursuance of their companyspiracy. Hardev Singh and Pritam Kaur have number approached this Court challenging their companyviction. Chamkaur Singh and Jagdev Singh were found absconding and their presence companyld number be obtained at the trial. On one day in presence of Mukhtiar singh PW 4. These witnesses had seen Gurtej Singh in the house of the appellants and heard him assuring appellant No.2 number to worry as they were going to show the result. As pointed out by the High Court, the evidence led by the prosecution agianst the appellants was to the effect that they suspected that Nachatter Singh had killed Joginder Singh, father of appellant No. What is urged by the learned companynsel for the appellants is that the evidence led by the prosecution to companynect the appellants with the murder of Nachattar Singh is really insufficient and, therefore, their companyviction under Section 302 read with Section 120 B IPC is neither proper number legal. 1 and husband of appellant No.2 and they wanted to take revenge. In fact they were declared as proclaimed offenders. Nanavati. Out of six accused. All the three appealed to the High Court and their appeal was dismissed. J. | 1 | train | 1998_1225.txt |
from 20.05.1996. PW 4 Dinesh alias Mathu companyroborated the testimonies of PW 2 and PW 3. However, when it was numbericed from the statements of PW 3 Sawalbai, PW 6 Basanti Bai and PW 10 Sarpach Sukhlal that the respondent was seen hitting his father, he was arrested on 20.05.1996 and FIR in Crime No. From the perusal of the statement of eye witnesses Babulal PW 2 , Sawla Bai PW 3 , Dinesh PW 4 it seems that the incident had taken place at the spur of the moment. PW 2 Babulal stated that upon hearing the cries of PW 3, he saw the accused assaulting someone he reached the spot and found that the injured person was the father of accused and he prevented the accused from further assaulting his father. Having thus companyvicted the accused respondent for the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC, the Trial Court found it just and proper to award him the punishment of 3 years rigorous imprisonment while also observing that the period of detention already undergone from 20.05.1996 to 09.09.1996 would be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him. The appellant himself took his father namely Tulsiram to the hospital. Sawalbai who stated that while working in a field near the place of incident, she had seen the respondent assaulting his father with a lathi wooden log . In appeal by the accused, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, in its impugned judgment and order dated 27.11.2012, found numberreason to companysider interference in the findings recorded by the Trial Court as regards companyviction for the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC but, on the question of punishment, proceeded to reduce the sentence of rigorous imprisonment from the period of 3 years to that of the period already undergone i.e., 3 months and 21 days. In trial, the prosecution, inter alia, relied on the testimony of PW 3 Smt. 260 of 1998 whereby, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, even while upholding the companyviction of accused respondent herein for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code IPC , has modified the sentence of 3 years rigours imprisonment as awarded by Signature Not Verified the Trial Court to that of the period already undergone i.e., 3 months and Digitally signed by ASHOK RAJ SINGH Date 2019.02.21 112144 IST Reason 21 days. In the facts and circumstances of the case and taking into account the period which has elapsed, numberuseful purpose would be served in sending appellant back to jail, I therefore set aside the jail sentence awarded to the appellant under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code and instead award the sentence to the appellant for a period of imprisonment already undergone by him. On the other hand, the accused respondent attempted to suggest that his father sustained injury when he fell from the roof while putting up khapra. The only question calling for determination in this appeal is As to whether, in the given set of facts and circumstances, the High Court was justified in interfering with the punishment awarded by the Trial Court by reducing the same to the period of imprisonment already undergone? However, for the reason that the accused stood companyvicted for the main offence, the Trial Court chose number to companyvict him for the offence under Section 201 IPC with reference to the decision of this Court in Kalawati State of Himachal Pradesh AIR 1953 SC 131. On the basis of the information received from the hospital that the deceased Tulsiram was brought to the hospital by the respondent Suresh in unconscious companydition, Marg Information No. The background aspects of the case, so far relevant for the question at hand companyld be numbericed as follows The prosecution case had been that on 13.05.1996, at about 430 p.m., the respondent assaulted his father Tulsiram with a blunt object causing fracture on the parietal region of skull and the same night, victim succumbed to the injury at Betual Hospital. Per companytra, the learned companynsel appearing for the respondent accused has supported the impugned order with the submissions that the same meets the ends of justice, particularly when the respondent was only 26 years of age at the time of the incident in question that occurred at the spur of moment and without any intention on the part of the respondent to cause the death of his father. The relevant part of the order passed by the High Court, carrying the reasons for reduction of sentence, reads as under The incident had taken place on 13.5.1996. After due investigation, the respondent was charge sheeted for the offences under Sections 201 and 302 IPC. Assailing the order aforesaid, learned companynsel for the appellant State has strenuously argued that the High Court has modified and reduced the sentence awarded by the Trial Court without any companyent reason and without any justification. 0/30/96 was registered under section 174 Cr. The appellant has remained in jail for a period of three months and twenty one days i.e. The appellant at the time of the incident was a young man aged 26 years. 120/1996 Ex. In this appeal, the appellant State of Madhya Pradesh has called in question the judgment and order dated 27.11.2012 in Criminal Appeal No. Dinesh Maheshwari.,
J Leave granted. P 19 came to be registered at police station, Amla. P.C. | 1 | train | 2019_864.txt |
The petitioners were also raising companytractors in respect of another companying companyl mine known as Khas Dharmaband Colliery owned by Messrs Khas Dharmaband Colliery Co. Pvt. Thereafter, Parliament enacted the Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1972 to companyplete the process of nationalisation of the companying companyl mines and companye oven plants. The ordinance was replaced by the Coking Coal Mines emergency Provisions , Act, 1971. Under an agreement of October 1969, the New Dharmaband Colliery was brought over by Messrs Sethia Mining Mfg. 1,21,000, On October 171 1971, the resident promulgated the Coking Coal Mines Emergency provisions ordinance 1971 to provide for . Ltd., subsequently known as New Dharmaband Colliery. As regards New Dharmaband Colliery they allege that between October 1969 and October 17, 1971, Messrs Sethia Mining Mfg. It was entitled as An Act to provide for the acquisition and transfer of the right, title and interest of the owners of the companying companyl mines specified in the First Schedule and the right, title and interest of the owners of such companye oven plants as are in or about the said companying companyl mines with a view to reorganising and reconstructing such mines and plants for the purpose of protecting, companyserving and promoting scientific development of the resources of companying companyl needed to meet the growing requirements of the iron and steel industry and for matters companynected therewith or incidental thereto, Appointed day under s. 2 a of the Coking Coal Mines Emergency Provisions Act, 1971 was October 17, 1971, while that under s. 3 a of the Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1972, is May 1, 1972. time various fixed assets like machinery, plants and equipment and erected structures and raised new roads within the said companyliery and brought in various current assets and movables for the efficient working of the said mine. Clause 25 of the agreement is material for our purposes and it reads That in case the said companyliery is nationalised these presents shall stand determined and all moneys then due and owing by the owners to the Managing Contractor or by the Managing Contractor to the owners under the provisions hereof shall at once become due and payable by the owners to the Managing Contractor or by the Managing Contractor to the owners as the case may be. Since April 1969 when the petitioners became raising companytractors of Kutchi Balihari Colliery and until October 17, 1971 when the management of the said companyliery was taken over by the Central Government, the petitioners allege that they had undertaken, at their companyt, operations for sand stowing and hard mining and had accordingly submitted bills to the Coal Board established under s. 4 of the Coal Mines Conservation and Safety Act, 1952 for subsidy through the owners from time to time. Corporation Ltd. An inventory was prepared of the assets like plants, machinery and stores belonging to the petitioners which were lying in the companyliery, the value of which was approximately Rs. 50,000.00 and the balance of the stores lying in the companyliery as on October 17, 1971 was approximately Rs. 4,50,000 companylected by the Central Government from the erstwhile Coal Board. They had similarly brought over various assets including stores which were being used in the said companyliery. By an agreement dated February 7, 1969 made between Messrs Balihari Colliery Co. Pvt. These appeals by special leave against a judgment of the Delhi High Court turn on the companystruction of certain provisions of the Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1972. 9, to remove such additional fixed assets and current assets. Corporation Ltd., had utilised some of the stores lying in the companyliery to the extent of Rs. 4,50,000 receivable from the Coal Board by way of reimbursement towards companyt of sand stowing and hard mining operations carried on by the petitioners, companyld number be treated to be as an amount due to the companying companyl mine within sub s. 3 of s. 22 and, therefore, companyld number be utilised by the Central Government under sub s. 4 of s. 22 for discharge of the liabilities of the companying companyl mine. 4,50,000. Ltd. hereinafter referred to as the petitioners of the other part, it was recited as follows WHEREAS the owners are the owners of a Working Colliery companyprising an area of 800 Bighas more or less and known as Balihari Colliery particularly described in the first Schedule A hereunder written held under the lease and subleases mentioned in the said Schedule and in companynection therewith have built various structures, dhewrahs companylie lines hereinafter referred to as the said buildings and also installed and put up various machinery, plants, tools, implements and utensils hereinafter referred to as the said machinery therein AND WHEREAS the owners have appointed INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES PRIVATE LIMITED as Managing Contractor of their said companyliery and the said Managing Contractor has agreed to act as such Managing Contractor for the period and upon the terms and companyditions herein companytained Under the said agreement the petitioners were appointed to be the Managing Contractors of Kutchi Balihari Colliery for a period of 20 years. As on October 17, 1971 the amount of subsidy payable to them was about Rs. On May 5, 1976 the petitioners filed a Writ petition in the Delhi High Court seeking a declaration that sub s. 1 of s. 4 does number provide for the acquisition of the right, title and interest of the petitioners inasmuch as being raising companytractors they were number an owner within the meaning of s. 3 n of the Nationalisation Act and, therefore, they were entitled to dismantle and remove the fixed assets like machinery, plants and equipment installed in the two mines and also to remove the movables and current assets thereof like furniture, stores, etc. They, accordingly, sought a writ or direction in the nature of mandamus requiring the Central Government to return the assets like machinery, plants, equipment and other assets and movables and all amounts companylected by way of subsidy or other dues, or in any event pay Rs. Ltd. hereinafter referred to as the owner of the one part and Messrs Industrial Supplies Pvt. Clause 9 gave an option to the owners to purchase the additional machinery, chattels and utensils referred to in cl. and were further entitled to recover the amount of subsidy of about Rs. Soli J. Sorabjee, A. C. Gulati, A. K. Ganguli, G. S. Chatterjee and B. 1284 and Respondent No. 16,35,591 with interest thereon from May 1, 1972 till the date of payment. 616176. 815/78. 815178. 11,85,591.00. 72,000.00. B. Swahney for the Appellant in CA No. 1 in CA No. Miss A. Subhashini and Girish Chandra for the Appellant in CA No. Lal Narain Sinha, Att. 815 and 1284 of 1978 Appeals by special Leave from the Judgment and order dated 20 12 1977 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. | 0 | train | 1980_270.txt |
Sarala married Kunja Behari. Sarala acknowledged receipt of Rs. The agreement of sale and the sale deed were attested by Gobinda son of Sarala. In his cross examination he stated that he had written down the deed according to what was said to him by Sarala, Gobinda and by Sakha Nath Ghosh and thereafter Sarala executed the deed. 101/ were paid on the date of the agreement of sale, that Sarala had received Rs. Sarala owned the land in dispute as a limited ,owner. The land devolved on the death of Sashi Bhusan in 1920 upon his daughter Sarala. It appears that Sarala was for some time thereafter disinclined to carry out the bargain. On October 22, 1941, Sarala executed a deed, Ext. 500/were taken back from Sarala after she left the Sub Registrars office. The recitals in the deed are supported by the testimony of Sailendra Nath Nandi who said that the entire companysideration was received by Sarala. The thumb mark of Sarala was attested by Abinash Chandra Chakravarty and the deed was attested by four persons including her son Gobinda. Under the Dayabhaga system of law Sarala inherited the property of her father as a limited owner. E the agreement of sale was read over and the companytents were explained to Sarala after it was written, and she understood the implications of the deed and also received Rs. It was recited in the agreement of sale that Sarala had agreed to sell 90 acres of land possessed by her on account of financial need and to pay off certain debts. 1,100/ to Chapalabala wife of Sakha Nath Ghosh. The High Court also observed that it was doubtful whether full companysideration for the sale was paid, and that since Sakha Nath Ghosh was a rent companylector under one of Roy Babus of Behala, in order to grab the valuable property belonging to Sarala he had induced Sarala to enter into a transaction of sale. In the sale deed it was expressly recited that Rs. Abinash Chandra Chakravarty who attested the sale deed Ext. In the plaint it was averred in paragraphs that Sarala was illiterate and unpractical in worldly matters, that she was a simple and pardanashin lady, that Sakha Nath Ghosh husband of Chapalabala was an officer of one of the partner of the famous Roy family and was shrewd and cunning, that Sarala called him Dharamapita, and ustd to depend upon him in many affairs and used to be guided by his instructions, and on that account the said Sakha Nath and the husband of Banikana in companylusion with the scribe made fraudulent representation and exercised undue influence over Sarala and got the sale deed executed in their favour. 500/ is supported by the endorsement on the sale deed itself. The High Court held that the defendants case of legal necessity was number proved and on that account the sale deed executed by Sarala was number binding upon the plaintiffs. The latter died in 1937 leaving him surviving Sarala, two sons Tulsi and Gobinda, and four daughters were married during the life time of Kunja Behari. It was also recited in the sale deed, Ext. 1,500/ to Chapalabala and Banikana. It was also recited in the deed that Rs. the view of the High Court there was numbersuch serious and sufficient pressure on the estate of Sarala as to companypel her to sell her property, and the case of the plaintiffs that she was induced to do so by persuasion and undue influence of Sakha Nath Ghosh husband of defendant I must be accepted. 101/ . C and the agreement of sale Ext. That recital was supported by the recital in Ext. 899/ before the date of sale, and Rs. 101/ were paid at the time of the agreement of sale. 899/ were received before the date of the sale, and Rs. E in the agreement of sale. The suit was resisted by Chapalabala and Banikana defendants 1 2 and by alianees of the land from them. But because one Dhiren Chandra an intermediate transferee was number made party to the suit and Dhiren Chandra had obtained a fresh settlement the High Court was of the opinion that the decree of the Trial Court in respect of 10 companyta has out of the land sold by Sarala companyld number be reversed. Kunja Behari left numberestate except a residential house companystructed on the land at Mauza Behala. Jogindra Nath Mondal who wrote the two deeds was examined on behalf of the defendants. 500/ were received before the Sub Registrar. It was recited in the deed Now on account of financial needs and to meet certain debts and out of other legal necessity, I announced to sell 90 acre land at rent of Rs. He deposed that Ext. Kunja Behari was ailing for about one year before his death in 1937. However on March 13, 1942 she executed a deed, Ext. E, agree ing to sell a part of the land .90 acres for Rs. 101/ as earnest money. Payment of Rs. At the time of his death the two sons Tulsi and Gobinda were minors. One Sashi Bhusan was possessed of a piece of land at Mouza Behala District 24 Parganas admeasuring 98 acres. 500/ were paid to her in the presence of the Sub Registrar. It is true that apart from the recital about the payment of Rs. An endorsement of payment of Rs. C, companyveying the land agreed to be sold for a companysideration of Rs. C, that Rs. 500/ before the Sub Registrar was made by that Officer. The plaintiffs set up the case that Rs. It was companyceded that the plea of fraud and undue influence companyld number be supported. 899/ there is numberother documentary evidence to prove that payment. Against the decree dismissing the suit the plaintiffs appealed to the High Court. This plea was denied by the companytesting defendants. 08 acre. The High Court accordingly modified the decree passed by the Trial Court and allowed the appeal in part, and dismissed the plaintiffs suit against defendants 4, 5, 6 and 16 in respect of 10 companytahas of land in the numberthern part of the land. Accordingly the suit was decreed in respect of the remaining defendants in respect of the portion of the land number companyered by 10 companytahs in posses sion of defendants 4, 5, 6 and 16. 23/ per annum free from defects and encumbrances leaving a portion of homestead land measuring. The burden of proving that the companysideration was number received by the vendor, however, lay upon the plaintiffs and numberserious attempt was made to discharge that burden. He was in an humble walk of life, and was apparently number profitably employed during his life time. The plaintiffs were given by the decree opportunity to amend the plaint by making a claim for actual possession which was, number till then claimed in the plaint. These observations of the High Court are number supported by any evidence, and they seriously vitiate the appreciation of the evidence on record. Purushottam Chatterjee, P. K. Chatterjee and Rathin Das, for respondent No. E could number be examined for he had died before the date of the trial. With certificate granted by the High Court, the heirs of original defendants 2 and 3 have appealed to this Court. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated March 7, 1962 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. At the trial numberissue was raised and numberevidence was led in support of that plea. There is numberreason to disbelieve the testimony of this witness. V. Gupte and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellants. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. 173 of 1956. 1943 of 1966. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. | 1 | train | 1970_96.txt |
The Customs Officer in presence of witnesses told the accused that search of his person and the Jeep is to be taken because there is information that charas is companycealed in the cavity of the Jeep. The Officer along with witnesses on inspection of the Jeep was satisfied that the Jeep companytained a Cavity. Subsequently the Jeep along with the accused was brought to the Customs Office and in the presence of witnesses cursory search of the Jeep resulted in the discovery of a cavity and from smell it was clear that in this cavity charas was cleverly companycealed. Act, the Jeep companytaining the charas was also seized. The Officer immediately sent Sepoy Sri Saghir Ahmad to Badhni with a request that Superintendent Customs Badhni may companye immediately for the search of seized jeep which companytained charas in its cavity. The Superintendent came from Badhni early in the morning at about 7.00 a.m. next day and in his presence the search of the Jeep was companyducted and charas companycealed in the cavity weighing 100 Kg. Accused who was the sole occupant of the Jeep stopped the vehicle. At about 7.00 p.m. a Jeep bearing No. Inspector of Customs Sri B.K. In his voluntary statements recorded the accused clearly admitted the time, place and mode of recovery of the seized charas which was cleverly companycealed in the Jeep driven by him. Srivastava, Incharge Customs Station Khunwa, District Siddharthnagar, received an information that a person carrying Charas from Nepal shall be passing through the Customs Barrier Khunwa Check Post . Mantra Prasad PW 4 is the Inspector Customs Khunwa. Since transportation of charas was in violation of Section 8 of the N.D.P.S. UTD 5560 was seen companying from Nepal side and when it reached near the Barrier, the Customs Officer stopped the Jeep for its checking. Samples were taken out, sealed in separate packets which companytained signature of the accused, witnesses and the officer and the remaining charas was duly sealed. One of the packets of the sealed sample of this charas was sent to chemical examiner for analysis and a report from the chemical examiner was received along with the envelope in which the sample was sent to him. The Customs Officer duly arrested the accused on 18.10.94 and produced him before the companypetent companyrt. Accused replied that the Officer may himself take his search and there was numbernecessity to take him before any Gazetted Officer. Sri B.K. A Panchnama of the said recovery, interrogation and seizures was prepared at the spot which were signed by the accused, witnesses and the Customs Officer. Srivastava, Inspector, Customs Station, Mahendra Singh PW 2 , Superintendent Badhni who had companye to the scene of occurrence on the next day to supervise the recovery. Sita Ram PW 3 Laddu is the witness of recovery. According to the companyplaint, statements of the accused recorded by the Inspector and the Superintendent are voluntary statements, and admissible in evidence. The accused was number in companyscious possession of the companytraband companycealed in the vehicle accompanied by the fact that source of information has number been disclosed. He was also informed that if he so desired he shall be taken before a Gazetted Officer for the purpose of search. Accusations which led to the trial of the accused are essentially as follows On 17.10.1994 at about 6.30 p.m. He was authorized by an order dated 10.11.1994 by his superior officer to companyduct the investigation in the case and prosecute the accused. Consequently, Sir B.K. The statements are Exts. The report and the envelope were attached with the companyplaint and were Exts. Singh, companyplainant PW 1 summoned two independent witnesses and took position near the Barrier. On companysideration of the evidence on record the Trial Court found the accused guilty and recorded companyviction as aforesaid. Ka.2 and Ka.5 on the record. That there is number compliance of Sections 42 and 43 of N.D.P.S. They were proved by PW 1. the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Sidharthnagar had companyvicted the accused guilty for the aforesaid offences, and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for 15 years and pay a fine of rupees one lakh with default stipulation. In order to substantiate the allegations four witnesses were examined. The Union of India calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court holding that respondent number1 hereinafter referred to as the accused was number guilty of the offence punishable under Section 20 b 2 and Section 23 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 in short the NDPS Act . 4126 of 2003 ARIJIT PASAYAT,J. of the value of Rs.10,00,000/ , was recovered. Union of India filed the criminal case number68 of 1994. The Trial Court i.e. Crl. Arising Out of S.L.P. The prosecution i.e. The same was challenged by an appeal before the Allahabad High Court. Act. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2004_495.txt |
Under the Bombay Entertainments Duty Act 1 of 1923 entertainment duty is chargeable on the total companylections from the visitors to a theatre. Pursuant to that numberification entertainment duty was levied on the gross sum levied and paid by the visitors for admission to the theatre. Entertainment duty so companyputed was paid till January 1962 by the appellants who own a theatre at Junagadh. In companysequence of the numberification the proprietor companyld companylect from the visitor the amount shown as entertainment duty on the ticket but he was obliged to pay duty equal to the amount companyputed on the total amount paid by the visitor at the appropriate rate. On January 11, 1962 the Government of Gujarat issued a memorandum that the duty entertainment duty is a percen tage of the payment for admission i.e. On March 18, 1960 the Collector, Junagarh issued instructions to his subordinate officers directing them to levy entertainment duty at the prescribed rate only on the net price receivable by the proprietor of the theatre and number on the total amount including entertainment duty companylected from the visitors. Under the memorandum issued on January 11, 1962, the duty payable to the Government was calculated at the appropriate rate applicable to the aggregate of the net value of the ticket and the duty paid by the visitor. By a petition moved in the High Court of Gujarat the appel lants challenged the validity of the memorandum dated January 11, 1962 and the numberice of demand issued pursuant thereto and urged that the primary liability for payment of entertainment duty is by the Act imposed upon the visitor to the theatre, and that the proprietor of the theatre is merely an agent of the Government for companylecting the duty and that the proprietor has under the Act to pay the duty which he companylects from the visitors and that he cannot be required to pay an amount which he does number companylect from the visitors. the amount which a person pays for being admitted to witness the entertainment, inclusive of the various items mentioned in clause b of section 2 of the Bombay Entertainment Duty Act, 1923. The amount which a person pays includes both sums i what the Manager has to pay by way of duty and ii what the Manager can retain as Net receipts and hence the duty has to be charged on the total amount payable by the person buying the ticket, including any SLIM charged separately by way of duty. Under the memorandum issued on March 18, 1960 the aggregate of the duty received by the appellants was paid over to the Government and the net value of the tickets remained with the proprietor. 595, 634, 636, 693, 694, 695, 696, 771 of 1962, 57 and 128 of 1963 and 39 of 1964. 416 to 426 of 1967. N. Shroff and M. N. Shroff for the appellants in all the appeals . K. Daphtary, K. L. Hathi, B. D. Sharma for S. P. Nayar, for the respondents in all the appeals . T. Desai, 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, C. J. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 8, 9, 1968 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Applications Nos. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. | 0 | train | 1971_535.txt |
On March 19, 1965 the parties to the probate proceedings agreed before the companyrt that the evidence led in Civil Original 58 P of 1960 be read as evidence in the probate case. In the appeal numberobjection was taken to the mode in which the evidence was recorded number was there any allegation that there was numberproper trial or companyplete or effectual adjudication of the proceedings. The trial companyrt had number decided the case on any preliminary ground number is this a case which falls under Rule 25, Order 41.
this Court observed An order remanding a proceeding may ordinarily be made under Order 41, Rule 23 of the CPC when the Trial Court has decided the case on a preliminary point arid the appellate companyrt reverses the decision of the Trial Court. The High Court by its order dated October 20, 1967 set aside the order of the trial companyrt and remanded the case to the trial companyrt for a fresh trial. But power to order retrial after remand where there has already been a trial on evidence exercised merely because the appellate companyrt is of the view that the parties who companyld lead better evidence in the Court of first instance have failed to do so. A trial de numbero after setting aside a final order passed by the Court of first instance may therefore be made in exceptional circumstances, where there has been numberreal trial of the proceeding, or where allowing the order to stand would result in abuse of the process of Court. When that proceeding was pending before the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi yet another proceeding to which the parties herein were also parties was also pending. It was numbered as Civil Original 58 D of 1960. Such an order may also be made to prevent abuse of the process of Court. That was a petition for winding up Lord Krishna Sugar Mills. The question therein was whether the will propounded by the respondent herein, said to have been executed on 26th January 1957 by her late husband Seth Shiv Prasad was genuine. Aggrieved by the decision, the respondent in this case appealed to the Letters Patent Bench of the Punjab High Court which later stood transferred to the Delhi High Court. | 0 | train | 1969_31.txt |
All the three companyrts below held that tenancy was from month to month and accordingly, the second appeal was dismissed and the orders of the companyrts below were affirmed. 539 of 2006 whereby a learned Judge of the High Court had dismissed the second appeal filed by the appellant and affirmed the orders of the companyrts below. A suit for eviction of the appellant from the suit premises was instituted by the plaintiff respondent which was decreed by the trial companyrt and the decision of the trial companyrt was affirmed by the first appellate companyrt and finally, the second appeal of the appellant was dismissed. This special leave petition has number been filed against the aforesaid judgment in second appeal affirming the judgments of the companyrts below in respect of which leave has already been granted. Delay companydoned. This appeal is filed by way of a special leave petition against the final judgment and order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad dated 25th of October, 2007 in Second Appeal No. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2008_367.txt |
28197 of 2005. 150/ p.m. to Rs. 6800/ p.m. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and after going through the impugned order and other materials on record, we are of the view that the High Court was number justified in passing the impugned order. By the impugned order, the High Court had disposed of an interlocutory application filed by the landlord respondent praying for increase of rent of the premises in question from Rs. This is an appeal from an interlocutory order dated 2nd November 2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in a pending Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2008_347.txt |
Jute textile and jute yarn are both subjected to cess among other goods. The cess was held payable even in respect of jute yarn and jute twine companysumed within the same factory unit in manufacturing jute textiles. Jute Twine and Jute Yarn, manufactured by them is used in their own establishment for manufacturing other finished products. In other words, jute twine and jute yarn are intermediate products which are captively companysumed in the same unit for manufacturing the end products which fall within the expression jute textiles. Notices were issued to all the jute manufacturers to pay the said cess at the specified rate on their products including jute twine and jute yarn, produced in their units. 2439 of 1979, New Central Jute Mills Company Ltd., is a companypany engaged in manufacture of jute products like jute twine, yarn, sacking, carpet backing etc. 9701 of 1982 is filed under Article 32 of the Constitution by a Jute Mill questioning the numberifications and numberices issued by the respondents where under it was called upon to pay cess on jute yarn and twine. Indeed the Collector of Central Excise and Custom West Bengal clarified by a trade numberice dated 28th April, 1977, that jute twine and jute yarn when companysumed within the factory of production for companyversion into manufactures falling under Tariff item No. It said that jute twine and yarn captively companysumed within the same factory, though exempt from payment of Central Excise Duty, is yet liable to pay the cess under Section 9 of the Act. Several jute manufacturers filed Writ Petitions in the Calcutta High Court challenging the levy of cess on several grounds all of which were rejected and Writ Petitions dismissed by a learned Single Judge. 5466 of 1980 is preferred by the Inspector of Customs and Central Excise State against the judgment of the Patna High Court allowing the Writ Petition filed by the respondent, Rameshwar Jute Mills Limited. 22 A were subject to levy of cess. 5466 of 1980. Writ Petition No. The cess was levied initially for a period of one year companymencing from 1st March, 1976. 2439 of 1979 and to the facts in Civil Appeal arising from Special Leave Petition No. So are the other Writ Petitions. Common questions arise in this batch of Civil Appeals and the Writ Petition. Civil Appeal 4823/91 Special Leave Petition No. All the appeals except one arise from the judgment of Calcutta High Court dismissing the Writ Petitions filed by the appellants. For the sake of companyvenience, we shall refer to the facts in Civil Appeal No. JUDGMENT P. Jeevan Reddy, J. The Division Bench agreed with the learned Single Judge and dismissed the appeals whereupon they approached this Court and filed these appeals by leave. The petitioners thereupon carried the matters before a Division Bench by way of appeals under Clause 15 of Letters Patent. Later, it was extended for another year. During the arguments before us, facts of these two cases alone were referred. The appellant in Civil Appeal No. | 0 | train | 1991_561.txt |
both the acts were enacted with the same object and purport one relating to the companyking companyl mines and the other to the companyl mines. the provisions of the companyking act and the companyl act are identical. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by kuldip singh j. the companyl resources in the companyntry have been brought under state ownership and companytrol by the companyk ing companyl mines nationalisation act 1972 hereinafter called the companyking act and the companyl mines nationalisa tion act 1973 hereinafter called the companyl act . these acts companypletely divest the ownership rights in the mines from the owners to the central government. meratia s.s.
johar and a. mariarpu tham for the respondents. 489501502 and 1173 of 1982 r .
ramaswamy additional solicitor general girish chandra and c.v.s. 1930 33 of 1989.
from the judgment and order dated 24.9.87 of the patna high companyrt in c.w.c. the short question for companysideration in these appeals is whether the amount of interest which accrues under the act is to be paid in its entirety to the owner or the same is also available along with the principal amount for disburse ment to the claimants of the owner. c. bhandare r.s. rao for the appellants. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number. number. | 1 | dev | 1989_233.txt |
By a deed of partnership dated 13.12.1965, the aforesaid partnership firm was companystituted but the firm was number registered under Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act. M s. Ishar Das Chaman Lal partnership firm companysists of Ishar Das, the father, Chaman Lal and Om Prakash, his sons. The respondents resisted the claim companytending that since the partnership firm was an unregistered one, by operation of Section 69 of the Partnership Act, the application under Section 20 of the Act would number lie. The appellants the widow and alleged son of the deceased Chaman Lal called upon the respondents to render the accounts of the firm. But, on appeal and in revision, ultimately, the High Court held that Sub section 1 of Section 69 and main part of Sub section 3 of Section 69 exclude the application of Section 20 of the Act and companysequently, the suit is number maintainable. Instead of filing a suit, they invoked the arbitration Clause 16 for reference to resolve the dispute by an alternative resolution forum created by the parties. By the death of one of the members, it is numberlonger possible to adhere to the original companytract. 660/85, dated May 7, 1985. Application for substitution is allowed. The trial companyrt negatived the companytention of the respondents. This appeal, by special leave, arises from the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No. Thus, this appeal, by special leave. | 1 | train | 1995_82.txt |
The petitioner is a companypany incorporated under the laws of the Netherlands while the respondent is an Indian companypany. O R D E R This is an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 praying for appointment of a sole arbitrator. Disputes appeared to have arisen between the parties. The parties had entered into an agreement regarding certain works to be executed by the petitioner. The application has been placed before me as a numberinee of the learned Chief Justice of India for necessary orders. | 0 | train | 2005_577.txt |
CI./70 4 given preferential treatment in the matter of seniority in Class I Grade II itself and for further promotion to higher grades by framing rules which were discriminatory and which made hostile discrimination against Class I direct recruits like the petitioners. Class 1, Grade 1, and companyfirmed also as such on the same date. On 9 9 1949 Seniority Rules were framed and a seniority list of Class 1, Grade II, Income tax officers, as on the 1st Jan. 1950, was drawn up and circulated by a letter dated 24 1 1950. To resume the narrative, the petitioners companypleted their probationary periods on different dates in 1949 and were companyfirmed as I.T.Os Class 1, Grade II in 1949 and 1950, except petitioner No. On 29 4 1949 a meeting of the Departmental Promotion Committee took place and the Committee agreed that promotions to Income tax officers Class I Service, of officers recruited in 1944 on the results of the I.A. 12 to 24, 29 and 30. 703.
ment via Combined Competitive Examination and the remaining 33 1/3 by promotion on the basis of selection from Grade III Class II service . 72 to 86 were promoted on the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee held on 29 4 1949, but the records show that the meeting was originally companyvened for 6 9 48 and the agenda etc. Mohan Kumaramangalam and R. Gopalakrisnan, for the petitioners. The petitioners were all companyfirmed as Asstt. L. Sibbal, B. P. Maheshwari, A. N. Pareek and R. K. Maheshwari, for interveners Nos. K. Daphtary, H. K. Puri and B. N. Kirpal, for respondents Nos. Gopalakrishnan, for interveners Nos. 67 to 70 were actually promoted on the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee held on 21 7 48. On 14 6 49 representations were made by direct recruits including petitioners Nos. On 1 1 1952 all the petitioners were promoted as I.T.0s. K. Daphtary and Mohan Behari Lal, for respondent No. 32 , regarding proposed Seniority Rules. and in modification of para 2 d of the Finance Department Central Revenues letter dated 29 9 1944, that for a period of five years in the first instance, 66 2/3 of the vacancies in Class T,Grade II, will, be filled by direct recruit 1 1967 2 S.C.R. R. Rajagopal, S. K. Dholakia and Vineet Kumar, for res pondents Nos. Niren De, Attorney Gereral, N. S. Bindra, R. N. Sachthey and P. Nayar, for respondent No. 72 86 mentioned above, exist the names of the present respondents 12 24 and respondents 29 and 30. 9 Shri D. N. Pande, who was companyfirmed on 22 12 1951. On 1 8 53, a revised seniority list was issued. K. Daphtary and P. C. Bhartari, for respondent No. The result is that both batches of promotees of 1948 will remain senior to the direct recruits from the 1945 Examination who joined in 1946. Apart from respondents 28, 29 and 30, all other respondents were companyfirmed in earlier years. 242/67 under Art. In the serial Nos. J. Raja, B. R. Agarwala and Janandra Lal, for respondent No. 5, 6, 8, 10 and 12 and respondent No. 12 to 14 and 1 5 to 24. Most of the respondents had already been companyfirmed on various dates in 1946, 1947 and 1948. Fifteen others S. Nos. This decision affected respondents Nos. 16 Officers of the Income tax Department have tiled this petition under Art. 6 to 10, 30 to 34 and 39. S. Javali and M. Veerappa, for respondent No. It was stated in this letter that Government was prepared to companysider any representation that they may have to make in regard to the accuracy of the data companytained therein, up to the 28th February 1950, but numberrepresentation against the principles for the determination of seniority will be entertained. Petition under Art. Yogeshwar Prasad and S. Bagga, for intervener No. On 18 10 1951, the Government decided on the recommendations of the U.P.S.C. 146 of 1967. A writ petition was filed by Joshi in the Supreme Court and this Court delivered its judgment in Jaisinghanis Appeal and Joshis Writ Petition on 22 2 67, and the present Writ Petition was filed in July 1967. A.S. and Allied Services examination held in 1943, and on other bases, should be given effect to from the 1st August 1948. This order was held to be statutory by this Court in Jaisinghanis case 1 . Against this decision Jaisinghani filed an appeal to this Court. On 25 4 62 Jaisinghani filed a Writ Petition in the High Court and the High Court delivered its judgment on 11 3 64. 6 to 13. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of the fundamental rights. 3 to 5. Commissioners In 1959. | 0 | train | 1969_238.txt |
Subba Rao, C.J. was delivered by SUBBA RAO, C.J. This petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India raises the question of validity of the detention of the petitioner under s. 3 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 Act No. The Judgment of SUBBA RAO, C.J., HIDAYATULLAH, SIKRI and SHELAT, JJ. Before his term of imprisonment expired, the petitioner filed a writ of habeas companypus in the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi challenging his detention. When he was about to be released from jail, a detention order was served on him by the Central Government under S. 3 2 g of the Act. The petitioner underwent imprisonment and also paid the fine. On May 8, 1964, he was arrested in New Delhi by the Customs Authorities under S. 135 of the Indian Customs Act, 1962. On May 18, 1965, he was ordered to be released. On May 9, 1964, he was ordered to be enlarged on bail. BACHAWAT, J. delivered a seperate Concurring Judgment. V. Pillai, for the petitioner. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The petitioner is a Pakistani national who entered India without any travel documents. Writ Petition under Art. Before the learned Judge the companystitutional validity of s. 3 2 g of the Act was number canvassed. That petition was dismissed by Khanna, J., on merits. The present petition was filed in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution on May 12, 1966 for issue of a writ of habeas companypus against the respondents directing them to set him at liberty on the ground that the provisions of the Act were invalid. On May 29, 1965, he was companyvicted by the Magistrate, First Class, Delhi, of an offence under the Customs Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 9 months and to pay a fine of Rs. 155 of 1966. CI/67 4 learned Judge held that the section authorised the Government to make the said order of detention on its subjective satisfaction and that the Court companyld number question its validity in the absence of any mala fides. it was said that he had to be detained, as police investigation was in progress in respect of a case of companyspiracy to smuggle gold of which he was a member. The petitioner therein did number prefer an appeal against that order to this Court but he filed an independent petition under Art. In short, he dismissed the petition on merits. The Sup. 31 of 1946 hereinafter called the Act . S. Bindra and R. N. Sachthey, for respondents Nos. 2,000/ . He negatived the companytention raised before him that an order under that sub section companyld number be made for the purpose of companypleting an investigation in a companyspiracy case, as numbersuch limitation was found therein. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition No. The appeal filed by him to the Sessions Judge against that order was dismissed. 1 to 3. | 0 | train | 1966_221.txt |
Incised wound 11x1.5x0.5 cm oblique on the right side of back of trunk, the lower inner and being 11.5 cm outer to midline 4 cm below root of neck. Incised wound 5x1 cm bone deep obliquely placed on the left side of head the lower inner and being 9 cm outer to midline 6 cm. Incised wound 2.5x1 cm skin deep oblique on the back of right side of trunk, the lower inner end being 11.5 cm outer to midline 9 cm below root of neck. Incised penetrating wound 2.5x1 cm obliquely placed on the back of left side of trunk, the lower inner sharply cut end was 5.5 cm outer to midline and 7 cm below root of neck. Incised wound 1.8x0.5 skin deep obliquely placed on the right side of front of neck, the lower inner and being 5 cm outer to midline 2.5 cm. A3, Rajeev, called Kochukuttan by saying Kochukuttan Come here. Kochukuttan succumbed to the injuries at 8.10 p.m. on 24.6.1997. P17 , the following injuries were numbericed on the deceased Incised wound 4.5x2 cm skin deep oblique reflecting a flap backwards on the left side of face, the upper outer and being 4 cm in front of ear. The upper outer and was sharply cut. On the front of right shoulder 2 cm inner to its tip. Oblique on the right side of root of neck, the lower inner blunt and being 10 cm below right ear. The upper outer end was sharply cut. As a result of the injuries, Kochukuttan fell down on the road on the side of the verandah of Harishree Bakers. P20, it is stated that as per the information received, the injuries were inflicted on the deceased by A1, A2 and others due to their animosity against deceased Kochukuttan. After causing mortal injuries to Kochukuttan, the assailants left the place in the same jeep in which they had arrived. Accused A3 and A8 to A10 were acquitted. The outer end of the wound showed splitting of the skin. Seeking revenge, the two appellants, Rajeev A3 and Venu A4 assembled at Chaithram Restaurant at Veliyam junction on 20.6.1997 at 7.45 p.m. and hatched a companyspiracy to murder Kochukuttan. In Ext. Abraded companytusion 2 c 1.5x05 cm. It was the case of the prosecution that the deceased Kochukuttan and Murali CW 11 had assaulted the appellants on 19.5.1997 at 9.00 p.m. at a place at Chaithram Restaurant run by the appellant Devakumar Jayakumar. Accused Prathap hereinafter referred to as A1 and Rajeev hereinafter referred to as A3 were in the front whereas Padmachandran A5 to Deepu A10 followed behind them. The upper lobe of the back aspect of the lung was scan punctured 2x05x4 cm. came to Chaithram Restaurant in a jeep KL 2B/9938. The prosecution cited PW 1, PW PW 4 and PW 5 to PW 10 as eye witnesses. There were 20 ante mortem injuries on the deceased. This had led to an assault by the deceased and his companypanion Murali CW11 on the appellants herein, namely, Prathap A1 and Devakumar A2 . All the accused came out of the jeep at a place in front of the restaurant. He was also armed with a sword and made a cut with the same on the side of the chest of the deceased. P17 due to the injury sustained to the chest and left palm. Thereafter, appellant number 1 Prathap A1 assaulted the deceased with his sword and caused an injury on his head. P17, 20 ante mortem injuries are numbered on the body of the deceased and the cause of death stated in Ext. P20, PW.19 had numbered the injuries found on the dead body. The wound was directed downwards, forwards and the left through the muscle plane. They came to a place in front of Harishree Bakers on the Eastern side of Kottarakkara Oyoor Public Road at Veliyam junction at about 7.45 p.m. At that time, the deceased was talking to PW 1 Hareendranathan. The jeep, which belonged to CW 16, was driven by Venu A4 . Both the Courts have companycluded that the medical evidence is companysistent with the eye witnesses account given by PW 1, PW 2, PW 4 and PW 5. By Ext. Thereafter, Padmachandran hereinafter referred to as A5 , Arjunan hereinafter referred to as A6 , Siddikishan hereinafter referred to as A7 , Saji Sajith hereinafter referred to as A8 , Rajesh hereinafter referred to as A9 and Deepu hereinafter referred to as A10 are alleged to have inflicted various injuries with their weapons such as iron rods, chopper, sword, knife and stick. 873 and 432 of 2003. PW 3 was examined mainly to prove the criminal companyspiracy which had been hatched at the hotel of Chaithram owned by A2, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. P20 is the inquest report prepared by PW.19. So there was clear motive for the appellants to assault the deceased. P20, the cause of death is due to the injury sustained by beating, stabbing and cutting. A1, A2, A5, A6 and A7 were also companyvicted under Section 149 and sentenced to I. for 1 year each. However, the lights of the car developed some problem and the deceased was transferred to the jeep driven by CW 15. The deceased was moved to the hospital initially in a car driven by CW 14. P17 is the postmortem certificate prepared by PW16, doctor who has companyducted the postmortem examination on the dead body of the deceased. On 24.6.1997, all the ten accused in furtherance of a companymon object, armed with deadly weapons such as swords, iron rods, chopper, knife and stick etc. The weapons used by the appellants and the injuries caused have been specifically mentioned by PW1 and PW2. Recoveries of other weapons, clothes worn by the accused on the day of the assault were also made at the instance of the other accused. The chest cavity was scan penetrated through the Vth intercostal space, after cutting the upper border of the Vth rib. The appeals filed by the State against the acquittal of A3 and A8 to A10 were also dismissed. A1, A2 and A4 were also companyvicted of the offence under Section 120B IPC and sentenced to R.I. for 5 years each. 319/2003, 400/2004, 422/2003, 479/2003. 901/2003 against the acquittal of 5 accused persons. As stated above, medical evidence also leads to the companyclusion that the death has resulted from the injuries caused by the appellants and the other accused with their respective weapons. The other accused persons filed Criminal Appeal No. At the same time, appellant number 2 A2 shouted cut this man. While answering the numerous questions posed by the defence companynsel, he elaborated that there was previous enmity between the deceased and the accused persons. 432 of 2003 and Criminal Appeal No. 873 of 2003 in the High Court. The left chest cavity companytained 300 ml. On point number 1, the trial companyrt companycluded on the basis of the findings in the inquest report as follows The inquest on the dead body of deceased was companyducted by PW19, sub inspector on the morning on 25.6.1997 at the District Hospital on the direction given by the Circle Inspector, Kottarakara and Ext. It is numbericed by the High Court that PW 6 to PW 10 were declared hostile as they did number fully support the prosecution story. The trial companyrt on the basis of evidence given by the eye witnesses companycluded that the participation in the assault by appellants herein is proved beyond doubt. He also stated that the deceased used to go to the junction quite regularly by about 7.00 p.m. and he would usually go home by 9 p.m. Recoveries of the swords used by them were made at the instance of the appellants. He had definitely told the police about the signs for identification of the accused. Upon companypletion of the investigation, the ten accused were put on trial. He admitted that all the accused were number the residents of the place of occurrence. The evidence given by PW1 has been companyroborated by PW2 in every material particular. In our opinion, the trial companyrt as well as the High Court companyrectly relied upon the unflinching, companyerent and companysistent evidence given by PW1. He also reiterated that he had narrated the acts done by each and every accused. A perusal of the evidence of PW1 leaves numbermanner of doubt about the entire sequence of events. He even went on to narrate that the deceased told him about 2 weeks ago that the appellants had attempted to kill him through hired people. At the same time, the appeals filed by accused number 4, 5, 6 and 7 were allowed and their companyviction as well as the sentence was set aside. The appeals filed by the two appellants herein against the companyviction and sentence under Section 302 IPC read with Section 149 of the IPC were dismissed. The appellants along with eight other persons were tried by the Sessions Court, Kollam, in Sessions case number 564/1999 for the offences punishable under Section 114, 143, 147, 148, 120 B 302 read with Section 149 of Indian Penal Code. The companyspiracy was held to be proved on the basis of the evidence given by PW3. 873 of 2003 whereby the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants herein by companyfirming the judgment of the trial companyrt companyvicting and sentencing them under Section 302 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code. On the basis of the findings, the trial companyrt companyvicted the two appellants along with the other companyaccused as numbericed above. In the cross examination, he seems to have further strengthened the case of the prosecution. However, the appellants herein were certainly local residents. However, the companyviction of these two appellants under Section 120 B was set aside. 13 and 14, i.e., portion of blood stained cement and portion of removed cement without blood respectively. of fluid blood. These two appeals have been filed against the companymon judgment of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam dated 28.6.2004 in Criminal Appeal No. There was also Mercury Street light. He categorically states in the cross examination that the entire incident of assault took 3 minutes. Above companylar bone. State of Kerala preferred Criminal Appeal No. The two appellants herein challenged the aforesaid judgment by filing Criminal Appeal No. This witness was cross examined at length. These two appeals have been filed by the two appellants against the judgment of the High Court rendered in Criminal Appeal No. SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. All the appeals were heard together by the High Court and decided by a companymon judgment dated 28.6.2004. He also stated that the police had number recorded the version as he had narrated. In the post mortem report Ex. We have heard the learned companynsel for the parties. | 0 | train | 2010_552.txt |
The wife of Preetam Pyare, Smt. They, after accepting this earnest money, did number sell the plot to Preetam Pyare and had sold it to someone else and when Preetam Pyare demanded back his earnest money, they refused to return it. Kakoo and Sunder Lal had beaten Kamal Kishore, the younger son of Preetam Pyare as a result of which he received injuries on his head. He also shot at Bhushan Lal S o Preetam Pyare, in his chest saying that, this is the way to return the money. Preetam Pyare raised an alarm, the accused persons ran away from the spot. On 25.12.1992 at about 10.30 p.m. Prem Singh, Sunder Lal and Kakoo, came to the house of Preetam Pyare and took him away saying that they will return his earnest money. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows Preetam Pyare had agreed to purchase a plot from Prem Singh and Sunder Lal and had paid Rs.2000/ as earnest money to them. Sunder Lal and Kakoo were having lathis in their hands and Sunder Lal exhorted them to beat them. Preetam Pyare and his two sons Bhusan Lal and Kamal Kishore came along with them for having talks on the return of money and they reached in front of H.No.407 D, while talking. On this Prem Singh took out a revolver and shot him in his chest. It was found by CFSL that the bullet recovered from the body of the injured matched those test fired through the same pistol. The only evidence against the appellant was the alleged recovery of the pistol which was tested by the CFSL. Shanti Devi also followed them and while they were talking, the talks became uncordial and abuses were hurled. The MLC for the injured was obtained and the accused persons were arrested. Shanti Devi companyplainant, W o Sh. The revolver and the recovered bullet was seized and was sent for analysis to the CFSL and after companypletion of the formalities, the challan was filed in the companyrt. The Mohalla people took the injured to the hospital. As accused abjured guilt, trial was held, accused was companyvicted and sentence was imposed. She then lodged a companyplaint with the police on the basis of which, rukka was sent and on the basis of which case under Section 307/34 IPC r w of Arms Act 1959 was registered against the accused persons. When Smt. The primary stand of the appellant was that there was numberevidence worth a name and even the so called injured witnesses refused to identify the assailant. The appellant, who had faced trial for alleged companymission of offences punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 in short the Arms Act . The caliber also was the same. Questioning companyrectness of the companyviction and sentence as imposed the appellant filed an appeal. Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 233 of 1997 which dismissed the revision petition filed by the appellant. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Appeal No. | 1 | train | 2009_616.txt |
Thereafter on 24.7.1989 the Insurance Company was once again requested to effect the transfer of the Certificate of Insurance as well as the policy but to numberavail. The said Car was insured with the appellant Insurance Company for the period 16.6.76 to 5.6.77. Broadly four companytentions were companysidered, namely, i whether the transfer of the vehicle to the purchaser is number companyplete till the vehicle is registered in the name of the transferee ii whether on transfer in the absence of the transfer of the insurance policy, the policy lapses iii whether it lapses even against the third party iv whether the insurance companypany can validly companytend that the insurance policy had lapsed. It was held that the defence available to the Insurance Company against the claim of the transferee in the absence of proper transfer of policy regarding the damage to own vehicle or injury to self will number be available to a claim by a third party. Since the Vehicle in question was sold on 15.6.1989 and the letter of intimation of transfer and request to transfer the Certificate of Insurance and the policy described therein was sent on 26.6.1989, the old Act applied. The Insurance Company in that case did number respond to the said letters. The victims of the accident filed a claim before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 83,000/ On appeal by the Insurance Company, the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission set aside the order of the Commission at Chandigarh and dismissed the companyplaint. The companymission, overruling the objection of the Insurance Company, awarded a sum of Rs. After companyparing the relevant provisions, as numbericed above, this Court held as follows In Kondaiah case the vehicle in question was transferred but number the insurance policy. The policy or the certificate was number transferred to the vendee. The transferee preferred a companyplaint before the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chandigarh, claiming companypensation for the damage caused to the Car. A Claim Petition was filed before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jaipur, in M.A.C. This transfer was accepted on 24.6.76 by the Regional Transport Authority, Jaipur. the companytention raised on behalf of the appellant before the Tribunal and the High Court as well as in this Court was to the effect that the intimation about the transfer by the transferee was number in accordance with the prescribed form and, therefore, it was number taken numbere of by the appellant Insurance Company. The transferee preferred an appeal to this Court. It appears that the sixth respondent sold the car to the fourth respondent on 18.6.76. The New Act came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. While affirming the decision of the National Commission, this Court elaborately companysidered the nature of a claim by a third party. The said Car met with an accident on 10.5.77 in which one Moti Lal Jain, husband of the first respondent, died. Actually the application dated 26.6.1989 was pending when the new Act had companye into force. By that day the new Act had companye into force. The third respondent, mother of the deceased, was shown as respondent later on transposed as claimant in the Claim Petition. Brief facts respondent herein was the owner of a fiat Car bearing Registration No. Admittedly the request was number refused under section 103 A of the old Act till the new Act came into force. A reminder was also sent on 24.7.89. Venkataswami. 291/77 by the first and second respondents, widow and minor son of the deceased, respectively. This appeal arises out of a judgment dated 8.4.87 of the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No.29 of 1987. J. No. | 0 | train | 1998_706.txt |
Rajendra Chaudhuri and K. R. Chaudhuri, for respondent No. In this appeal, by special leave, against the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay, August 25, 1965, the appellant Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas is an accused before the Presidency Magistrates 4th Court at Girgaon, Bombay. Both the questions have to be answered against the assessee and in favour of the Commissioner of Income tax, so that the answer returned by the High Court to the two questions is set aside, the first question is answered in the affirmative, and the second in the negative. L. Hathi and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No. The case was started on the companyplaint under s. 198, Code of Criminal In the circumstances, the answer returned by the High Court to the two questions referred to it has to be held to be incorrect. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 268, of 1964 11 I I Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 25, 1964 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Revision. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, J. Application No. appellant. | 1 | train | 1966_293.txt |
2.50 per crate towards rental and Rs.3.00 per crate towards service charges and the said amount were number included in the price. and Mfg. By order dated November 30, 1984, the Assistant Collector of Central Excise while according approval to the assessable value as shown in the price list included in the said amount of rental and service charge in the price. The appellant filed for approval a price list number 17/1984 85 dated August 6, 1984 in respect of the said product wherein the price was shown as Rs.32/ per crate of 24 bottles. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Vijayawada, issued numberice dated August 17, 1984 requiring the appellant to show cause why the said amount of rental and service charges should number be included in the price. Co. Ltd. supra, the assessee was manufacturer of liquid Chlorine which was supplied to the customers in Tonners and Cylinders made of steel, which were accepted as a durable and returnable companytainers. The said decision of the Tribunal has been affirmed in appeal in Collector of Central Excise, Bombay 3 vs. M s Century Spg and Mfg Co. Ltd. Civil Appeal No. In the said price list there was a numbere to the effect that the appellant was realising Rs. C AGRAWAL, J. M s. Vijayawada Bottling Co. Ltd, the appellant herein, is a manufacturer of MAAZA MANGO mango drink falling under Tariff Item 1 B of the erstwhile First Schedule to the Central Excise Act, 1994. The Collector of Central Excise Appeals by his order dated April 26, 1986 dismissed the appeal of the appellant and affirmed the order passed by the Assistant Collector. In the present case, as recorded by the Tribunal, the fact that the bottles are returnable and durable are number disputed. The appellant submitted a reply to the said show cause numberice. 4207 of 1988 , decided on July 15, 1997. | 1 | train | 1997_1480.txt |
of the bottles issued to him by the licensed distiller. the licensee referred to in the earlier of the rules quoted is the wholesaler to whom the distiller sold his liquor. of the bottles issued by him and companyfiscate the security to the extent falling short of the 90 per cent. the licensed distiller may at the time of issue demand security at the rates of three rupees two rupees or one rupee and eight annas per dozen quart pint or nip bottles respectively upto 10 per cent. it is number very clear what is meant by the words upto 10 per cent. after the tribunals decision the companymissioner of income tax obtained a reference of the following question to the punjab high court whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the companylections by the assessee companypany described in its accounts as empty bottle return security deposits were income assessable under section 10 of the income tax act. the rule referred to is r. 40 14 f and the relevant part of it on which the high companyrt based its view is as follows it is companypulsory for the licensee to return at least 90 per cent. if the judgment in the earlier case companyered the present ap peals then the question referred would of companyrse have to be answered in the affirmative. it is of interest to numbere that the earlier case also companycerned an identical question and had been answered both by the high companyrt and this companyrt in the affirmative. t. desai r.k.
gauba b.p. the earlier case had arisen out of the assessment of the same assessee but it was concerned with the years 1947 48 and 1948 49 while the present appeals are companycerned with the years 1946 47 1949 50 1950 51 and 1951 52.
the accounting period of the assessee was from december 1 in one year to numberember 30 of the following year. 107 111 of 1963.
appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated march 23 1961 of the punjab high companyrt in income tax reference number 14 of 1960.
ganapathi iyer and r.n. it may be stated that all this had happened before the afore said earlier judgment was delivered. the high companyrt however took the view that as a result of the amendment of the rules made under the punjab excise act 1914 which came into effect from april 1 1948 the charges companylected after that date were number companyered by that judgment. singh and naunit lal for the respondent in all the appeals . sachthey for the appellant in all the appeals . civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number. | 1 | test | 1964_321.txt |
Clause 13 of the developer agreement was also incorporated in the MoU. 20 crores, in accordance with the MOU. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx The respondent, by Advocates letter dated 30 June 2013 sought to invoke the Arbitration Clause under the Development Agreement and the Memorandum of Understanding. As disputes arose between the parties, the said development agreement and the MOU were terminated by the respondent by its Advocates letter dated 6 June 2013 and the respondent invoked arbitration. The parties are entitled to a part of the companystruction each as per the directions of the development agreement or amount in cash as per the MOU. It was further agreed that if the MoU was terminated, the developer would number have any right, title or interest in the township project and would be required to remove his employees and machineries from the land. The said letter was replied to vide letter dated 16.7.2013 refuting the fact that the physical possession of the land had been taken over by the land owner and stating that the possession was still with the developer. Clause 13 of the development agreement companytains an arbitration clause whereby the parties had agreed to refer the matter in respect of any difference or dispute between them with regard to the companystruction or the terms of the development agreement or with regard to the project undertaken for arbitration. The dispute has numberhing to do with the rights of the parties in personam only And again The disputes in the development agreement are closely companynected with the land, the possession of which is disputed by the parties. The petitioners are in possession of the site. And thereafter the Division Bench proceeded to analyse the letter dated 30.6.2013 and on that basis observed that This letter of the respondent further stated that since the Respondent had terminated the development agreement and MoU, the respondent had taken over the entire physical and actual possession of the said land and in view thereof called upon the Appellant to remove its machinery and companystruction material from the said land. While seeking revocation of leave, it was companytended by the respondent that dispute pertains to the land which is situate at Indore that the development agreement and the MoU had been executed at Indore where the immoveable property is situated and that the dispute fundamentally is for right and possession over the land, hence, the companyrt where the land is situated has the territorial jurisdiction in respect of the arbitration or any application to be filed under the 1996 Act. As disputes arose with regard to payment, the respondent terminated the MoU, forfeited the security deposit and invoked the arbitration clause by issuing a numberice through his Advocate on 6.6.2013. The respondent had handed over the vacant possession of the land to enable the appellant to start the development work. The development work is in progress. This included the companystruction put up by the appellant on the said land. After discussing the facts in entirety, the Division Bench has opined thus The development agreement also stipulated that the appellant was entitled to possession of the said land and accordingly the respondent, by a separate possession receipt dated 28 February 2008 handed over to the appellant possession of the said land which is the subject matter of the development agreement. It would have to be filed in Indore where the land is situate. Now, the respondent has suddenly demanded a sum of Rs.71 crores, allegedly due to the respondent, under the MOU dated 8 June 2012. Again, by its letter dated 16 July, 2013, the Appellant once again denied that the physical possession of the said land had been taken over by the Respondent as alleged in its letters dated 6 June 2013 and 30 June 2013 respectively. The petitioners were further called upon to remove the machinery and companystruction material. Thereafter, the parties entered into a MOU dated 8 June 2012 which inter alia recited that the appellant was to companystruct the township project companysisting of residential and companymercial buildings and a club house and further that the respondent would be paid a sum of Rs.137 crores in place of its 40 share under the development agreement. The suit is a suit for land. Before the Division Bench it was companytended that the appellant was in possession of the land and the possession shall remain with it till the companypletion of the entire project and he was entitled to refund of security deposit. The Division Bench referred to certain clauses of the agreement and the clauses from the MoU and the companyrespondences between the parties, the assertions made in the Section 9 petition and the relief sought therein, addressed to the import of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent and what meaning had been given to the suit for land in Moolji Jaitha supra by analyzing various passages, culled out the principles stated in Adcon Electronics supra , took numbere of the fact that the development agreement and the MoU had been executed at Indore, the statement of claim and the companynter claim filed by the parties before the learned arbitrator who has already entered into reference and in the ultimate eventuality opined thus In the present case, we are of the vie that the disputes between the parties hereto in relation to the development agreement dated 28 February 2008 and the MOU dated 8 June 2012 are of such a nature that they are rooted to the land. A Memorandum of Understanding MoU was entered into between the parties, which stipulates that the developer was required companystruct a township project companysisting of one companymercial building, 11 residential wings in four buildings and one club house under licence from the Indore Municipal Corporation. It is pertinent to numbere that in paragraph 9 of the said termination letter, the respondent has specifically stated that as on that date 6 June 2013 , the respondent had taken over the possession and absolute ownership of the said township including the structures thereon, in accordance with the terms of the MOU. By the said letter, the petitioners were informed that the entire physical and actual possession was allegedly already taken over by the respondent. Ltd. Daulat and Anr.3 and eventually came to hold as follows the Petitioner has put up its machinery, staff for the companystruction and the ultimate companystruction upon the land. The petitioners machinery and labour are at site. By the said letter, the petitioners were further informed that the Security Deposit of Rs.20 crores stood forfeited. It was also put forth that it was in physical possession of the property and its companystruction material, machinery, office equipments and other equipments were at the site. An order for protection of the property pending the arbitration would involve the land itself. Hereto annexed and marked Exhibit I is a companyy of the respondents Advocates letter dated 30 June 2013.
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx The petitioners submit that they had companypleted substantial work by companypleting Building B 1, B 2 and B 3 where only top slabs are pending , companystruction of five slabs of Building C 1, companymencing digging and footing work of Building A 1. In the said letter, at paragraphs 11 and 12, the respondent reiterated that it was the owner of the said land. A companyy of the letter dated 6 June 2013 is annexed and marked Exhibit F hereto. The disputes relate to possession of the said land which is outside the jurisdiction of the Court as also regarding the percentage of the parties rights, title and interest in the said land and or their entitlement to a sizable portion of the companystructed space thereon. As the factual matrix would undrape, when arbitration was demanded by the respondent, the appellant on 16.7.2013 replied that the arbitration tribunal had to be in Mumbai. As per the said agreement, the appellant was required to develop a residential project and or companymercial companyplex and or multiplex and or hotels and or malls etc. In the circumstances, the petitioners submit that the petitioners are entitled to, pending an adjudication in the proposed Arbitral proceedings and for a period of sixty 60 days after the award therein, for an order of injunction, restraining the respondent by himself or through his servants or agents from entering upon the property, subject matter of the Development Agreement and from dealing with and moving the machinery of the petitioners used in companystruction activity and from disturbing or interfering with the petitioners possession thereof in any manner. The petitioners were informed that without prejudice to the termination, the respondent made a demand of payment of Rs.71 crores along with interest thereon. The appellant herein replied to the termination numberice by stating that it had carries out substantial companystruction on the property by companystructing three buildings and by taking many other steps. Though number entitled, the respondent has sought to forfeit the security deposit of Rs. It was also stated by the appellant that the environmental clearance certificate for the project was number obtained by the respondent and, therefore, further work was stopped. Several buildings have been companystructed fully or in part. At this stage, the appellant moved the High Court of Bombay for grant of leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent by filing an application under Section 9 of the 1996 Act asserting that the companyrts at Bombay have the territorial jurisdiction, and accordingly leave was granted. The appellant required the respondent to perform his part of the companytract in obtaining the requisite environmental clearance, execute irrevocable power of attorney, refund the part of the amount payable and pay interest on the security deposit. The respondent after entering appearance filed an application praying for revocation of leave. The disputes are number such that they relate only to the execution of any document and or specific performance thereof simplicitor. In essence, it was urged that the application preferred under Section 9 of the 1996 Act was tenable before the High Court of Bombay and there was numberjustification to revoke the leave. The seminal issue is whether on the factual score which has been exposited, the application filed under Section 9 of the 1996 Act before the High Court of Bombay can be regarded as a money claim. Expressing thus, the Division Bench declined to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Division Bench. Dipak Misra, J. The instant appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 10.03.2015 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No. Being of this view, the learned Single Judge revoked the leave that was earlier granted. This is a false statement. as permissible in law. | 0 | train | 2015_768.txt |
Entry Tax Act . General Sales Tax Act, 1958 and were also assessed to the Entry Tax during the period from 1.1. Before the authorities below, it was the appellants companytention that since the goods were brought for purpose of works companytract and they have been subjected to sales tax under the Sales Tax Act, the appellants were number liable to pay the entry tax on goods. 1986 to 11.12.1986 under the Madhya Pradesh Sthaniya Kshetra Me Mal Ke Pravesh Par Kar Adhiniyam, 1976 hereinafter referred to as the M.P. The appellants had unsuccessfully challenged the assessment of tax before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax and the Board of Revenue and thereupon appellants preferred Misc. The appellants are dealers registered under the M.P. RAJENDRA BABU, CJI. The appellants are carrying on the business of execution of works companytract. The High Court vide judgment dated 18/09/1996, did number accept this companytention and dismissed their prayer. Hence these appeals by Special Leave. Petition No. | 0 | train | 2004_391.txt |
The Light Displacement Tonnage LDT of the vessel was shown at 5772.6 LDT. In the said addendum, the price of the vessel was reduced to US 929388.60. Clause 15 companytained the description specifications of the vessel wherein the ballast tanks of the vessel were described as double bottom tanks, fore peak tank, AFT peak tank and wing tank. As per Clause 12 B of the MOA, the buyer was given an option to seek proportionate reduction in purchase price if the vessel suffered any partial damage so as to affect the vessels LDT. They have failed to produce any companyent reason for reduction in price from the MoA. The vessel arrived at the Alang Anchorage on 21st November 1997. The bill of entry was filed on 19th December 1997 at the reduced price of the vessel. As per the said MOA, the total purchase price of the vessel was agreed at US 992887.20 at the rate of US 172 per long ton. Clause 25 gave seller the option to repudiate the agreement if there was any dispute in relation to the description of the vessel. The addendum mentioned that the price reduction was due to the double skin. Further, Clause 16 provided that any dispute relating to the interpretation of the said MOA would be referred to arbitration. It seems that in light of the afore quoted observations by the surveyors, fresh negotiations took place between the seller and the appellant, which resulted in a fresh agreement in the form of an addendum dated 8th December 1997 to the original MOA. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts, material for the adjudication of the present appeal, may be stated as follows M S Chaudhary Ship Breakers, the appellant before us, imported an old vessel for demolition purpose under Memorandum of Agreement for short MOA dated 19th November 1997 with Standard Marine Trading Inc., New York on as is where is basis. The Survey Reports of M s. Erison Richards dated 22.1.97 does number mention anything about the discrepancy claimed by the appellant I rely on the observation of the Tribunal in the case of Atam Manohar supra and hold that the appellant has number produced any evidence to show that the vessel was number the same as was offered to them vide MoA dated 19.11.97. Ltd.1 and Commissioner of Customs, Ahemdabad Vs. In the present case as discussed above, the price was revised after import and in the absence of any provisions regarding price variation in the memorandum of agreement, we find numbermerit in the appeal. The surveyors carried out inspection on 22nd November 1997, and submitted their report on 7th July 2000. Accordingly, the ship breaker is bound to suffer additional illegible loss on this account. This civil appeal under Section 130E of the Customs Act, 1962 for short the Act is directed against order dated 2nd February 2005, passed by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal for short the Tribunal , whereby the appeal preferred by the appellant herein has been dismissed, companyfirming the levy of additional customs duty by virtue of the final assessment order passed by the Deputy Commissioner Customs , Bhavnagar on 28th August 2000. Hence, the present civil appeal by the importer. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant carried the matter in further appeal to the Tribunal. | 1 | train | 2010_780.txt |
The mortgagor was entitled to get possession of the land after redemption of the mortgage. 94 of 1961, was in possession of the suit land as a tenant on the date of the mortgage and so his tenancy would revive after redemption of the mortgage. The respondent filed five suits for redemption and actual possession of the mortgaged land against the aforesaid mortgagees. The a suits were companytested by the mortgagees and their grievance in the main was that they were tenants of the suit land prior to the mortgage and were in possession thereof as such. During the period of the mortgage their tenancy rights remained in abeyance and after redemption their tenancy rights would revive again in view of the provisions of s.25A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 and the respondent companyld number get actual possession over the disputed land despite the redemption. The learned Civil Judge decreed the aforesaid five suits by separate judgments holding that the defendants were number tenants of the suit land prior to the mortgage, and as such there was numberquestion of revival of the tenancy rights after the redemption of the mortgagees, under s.25A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. all the appeals were allowed and the judgments of the trial companyrt were modified in that the defendants were to remain in actual possession of the suit land and the plaintiff respondent would get only symbolic possession in pursuance of the decree for redemption. The plaintiff respondent, therefore, on the basis of the decree for redemption can get only a symbolic possession and number actual physical possession for the land in dispute. In 1948 the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 was repealed and another Act, that is, the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 came into being. In his opinion the defendants in four suits were number the tenants of the said land prior to the date of mortgage, but one of the defendants in one of the suits, viz.,
suit No. He, however, relying on ss.2A and 3A of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 found that the other defendants in the four suits also became deemed tenants under s.2A and companysequently a protected tenant under s.3A of the aforesaid Act of 1939 as it stood amended in 1946 and companyld number be evicted from the suit land. It was further pleaded that the respondent companyld number get actual possession over the disputed land from the civil companyrt as the proper forum was a revenue companyrt. Feeling aggrieved by the said decision the plaintiff filed appeals before the High Court, which in turn allowed the appeals and reversed the judgment of the District Judge holding that the mortgagees in possession did number become deemed tenants under the provisions of s.2A of the Act of 1939, as amended in 1946. 435, 437, 438, 515 of 1964 respectively. Of Mangavati P village measuring 18 acres and 30 gunthas. The defendants have number companye to this Court and reiterate the same points as were raised by them before the High Court. Different portions of the said plot were mortgaged by the respondent to different persons number arrayed as appellants in the aforesaid appeals. The judgments of the Civil Judge gave rise to five appeals which were disposed of by the District Judge. 414A B CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. K Rajendra Choudhary, for the Respondent. 320 323 of 1971. B. Datar, for the Appellants. The dispute in these appeals relates to survey No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MISRA, J. From the Judgment dated the 8th August 1970 of the Mysore High Court in Regular Second Appeals Nos. The present companynected appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment of the Karnataka High Court. Accordingly. | 1 | train | 1985_309.txt |
A 1 was tried for offences punishable under Section 392 read with Section 397 IPC and A 2 to A 4 were tried for offences punishable under Section 392 IPC. Prosecution version primarily rested on the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 and PW 8. The High Court found the evidence to be number companyent and credible and directed acquittal. The trial companyrt placed reliance on the evidence of such witnesses and directed companyviction, as recorded above. Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT,J. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court directing acquittal of the respondent. Heard learned companynsel for the parties. The present respondent, i.e. | 0 | train | 2008_1519.txt |
companysolidation of holdings act 1954 before the companysolidation officer. this application was allowed by the companysolidation offi cer by order dated 23.7.1967.
the order was reversed by the settlement officer companysolidation . number 9943 of 1975 before the high companyrt on 7.8.75 against the order of the deputy director companysolidation. 1002 1003 of 1976.
from the judgment and order dated 3.10.1972 and 18.9. number 2726 of 1970 was allowed by the high companyrt by its judgment dated 3.10.1972 and the orders of the appellate and the revisional authorities were quashed thereby main taining the order of companysolidation officer. the settlement officer companysolidation as such was justified in dismissing the application by his order dated 30.10. 1974 and thereafter the revision by the deputy director companysolidation by order dated 21.7.
the appellants then under the same mistaken advice number in good faith filed c.m.w.p. on the company trary on some mistaken and totally wrong advice of some counsel the appellants again initiated fresh proceedings by moving an application on 6.7.73 before the settlement offi cer companysolidation. 1972 there was no question of giving any advice by any companynsel in good faith to start proceedings afresh by moving a fresh application before the companysolidation authorities. writ number 2726 of 1970 and civil misc writ petition number 9943 of 1975.
satish chander s.n. that application was rejected on 30.10.74.
a revision was filed against that order before the deputy director of companysolidation which was also rejected by order dated 21.7.75.
thereafter the appellants filed m.w.p. civil appeal number 1002 of 1976 is directed against the judgment dated 3.10.1972 of the high companyrt. number 9943 of 1975 which came to be dismissed by the high companyrt on 18.9.
the second judg ment of the high companyrt is number challenged in civil appeal number 1003 of 1976.
both the appeals had been filed after the expiry of the period of limitation. the landlord had obtained a decree against baijnath when the land was mortgaged in favour of ram dayal. this writ petition came to be dismissed by order dated 18.9.
this judgment of the high companyrt is challenged in civil appeal number 1003 of 1976.
when the high court in the earlier writ petition number 2726 of 1970 on the same subject matter had finally decided the matter in favour of the respondents by order dated 3.10. the appellants had filed a special appeal on 30th numberem ber 1972 against the judgment dated 3.10.1972 of single judge of the high companyrt in c.m.w.p. number 2726 of 1970.
howev er the said letters patent appeal was number maintainable and ultimately dismissed in view of the u.p. 1975 of the allahabad high companyrt in civil misc. high companyrts aboli tion of letters patent appeal amendment ordinance 1972 which came into force on 30th june 1972.
this companypletes the narration of the fate of the writ petition number 2726 of 1970 which finally culminated in favour of the respondents by order dated 3.10.72.
the appellants did number challenge the order of the high court dated 3.10.72 by taking any further steps of filing any special leave petition before this companyrt. the respondents prayed for entering their names as sirdars and scoring off the names of the appellants. 6385 and 6386 measuring 5 bighas and 4 biswas had been in the possession of ram dayal as mortgagee under baijnath who was the original tenant. they claimed tenancy fights on the basis of the deed dated 30.7.1945 and they stated that their names had been recorded in the khatauni of 1359 fasli they are in cultivatory possession and have become adhivasis and subse quently sirdars. srivas tava for the appellants. the deputy director of consolidation dismissed the revision filed by the respond ents. the appellants had applied for companydo nation of delay on the ground that the appellants had been prosecuting the prior proceedings in good faith on legal advice and the period of more than three years taken in prosecuting the proceedings is liable to be excluded in computing the period of limitation under the provision of section 14 of the limitation act 1963.
the respondents had filed companynter to the application and opposed the same. the mortgagee later on obtained the decree against the landlord for an amount of rs.214 being the value of the crops in the land. these facts have been found in favour of the respondents by the companysoli dation officer. however the writ petition filed by the respondents as m.w.p. they alleged that the names of the appel lants herein have been wrongly entered in the khatauni of 1353 fasli and that the appellants have numberright or posses sion over the land. an agree ment was subsequently entered into between the landlord and the respondents settling the claim under the decree and granting patta in favour of the respondents. 1976 in both matters subject to the right of the respondents to argue the question of limitation and the applicability of section 14 of the limitation act at the hearing of the appeals. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by fathima beevi j. these appeals by special leave are directed against the judgments of the high companyrt of allaha bad. the high companyrt in quashing the orders of the appellate and the revisional authorities was of opinion that there was apparent error on the face of the record. this companyrt granted special leave vide order dated 2.9. re spondents 1 to 3 are the descendants of ram dayal. bidsar and s.k. before the decree became final pending litigation the u.p. the appellate authority was found to be wrong in its companyclusion that the respondents lost their right by the companytinued possession of the appellants. the land in plots number. they made an application under section 9 of the u.p. zamindari abolition act came into force. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number. the circumstances under which the same was granted also weighed in finding title in favour of the respondents. singh and h.l. singh t.n. p. goyal m.r. jain for the respondents. | 0 | dev | 1990_278.txt |
Stoppage of 3 annual increments with accumulative effect. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the appellant on 19.08.1995 leading to the following punishment Penalty of censure, the entry whereof will be made in his ACR of the year 1994 95. 784 of 2008. Recovery of the balance amount after deducting the amount already recovered from Sh. 5 is directed to pass appropriate order on the quantum of punishment within reasonable period, preferably within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt Communication of order. The penalty proposed in the order dated 30.05.2007 has been found to be harsh by the High Court in the order dated 15.07.2016 in Writ Petition No. Kumar out of Rs.64,000/ , will be made at the rate of Rs. Delay companydoned. 500/ per month. KURIAN, J. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2018_909.txt |
It was further alleged that Harinder Singh had quarrelled with Gurdev Singh and had accused Gurdev Singh of grabbing the land of Suba Singh free of companyt. The dead body was of Gurdev Singh. Harinder Singh and Suba Singh jointly purchased a tractor. It is number disputed that deceased Gurdev Singh was adopted by Suba Singh and Daljit Kaur. The clothes of Gurdev Singh were identified by Chanan Singh PW4 and Karam Singh number examined . Chanan Singh PW4 also states that in his presence the appellantaccused disclosed that he buried the dead body of Gurdev Singh in the field of Suba Singh. She was informed about this fact by Gurdev Singh. The dead body was identified by Karam Singh and Chanan Singh PW4 . It appears that Suba Singh and Daljit Kaur were acquitted. On interrogation the appellant informed that he had buried the dead body of Gurdev Singh in the field of Suba Singh in village Chamiari. Thereafter, he along with Sawinder Kaur, Chanan Singh and other police officials reached the house of Suba Singh at Ajnala and accusedappellant Harinder Singh was taken into custody. Upon the said report being lodged, SI Inderjit Singh PW10 , along with Sawinder Kaur and Chanan Singh, went to the house of Suba Singh at Ajnala and there Harinder Singh was taken into custody. According to him, Chanan Singh PW4 was accompanying Sawinder Kaur. In the presence of Amarjit Singh, other police officials on duty and others, accused Harinder Singh dug out the body of Gurdev Singh from the place disclosed and identified by him. Chanan Singh PW4 also accompanied them. When Harinder Singh was being questioned, he made a disclosure statement to the effect that he had buried the dead body of the Gurdev Singh deceased in the field of Suba Singh in village Chamiari and he said that he companyld get the body recovered. Her elder son Gurdev Singh deceased was adopted by Daljit Kaur, sister of her husband and Suba Singh husband of Daljit Kaur , since they had numberissue. Harinder Singh accused , is the son of Lakhwinder Singh, the elder brother of her husband. After companypleting the investigation chargesheet was filed against the three accused Harinder Singh, Daljit Kaur and Suba Singh who were charged with having companymitted the murder of Gurdev Singh deceased , and having destroyed the evidence related to the crime. Thereafter, the companyplainant enquired about Gurdev Singh from his friends and also from Harinder Singh, but Harinder Singh did number give any proper reply and kept putting her off on one pretext or the other. PW11 has fully supported the prosecution and states that when he went to the spot, appellant Harinder Singh in his presence dug out the dead body from the land of Suba Singh. The statement was signed by SI Gurmukh Singh PW5 and ASI Gurbax Singh. Thereafter, the appellant led the police to the tubewell of Suba Singh. In this companyplaint she alleged that she and her husband had two sons viz.,
Gurdev Singh and Hardev Singh. The prosecution relies on the following circumstances The recovery of the body of Gurdev Singh at the instance of the appellant Extra judicial companyfession made by the appellant to Chanan Singh PW4 The fact that the accused did number want the deceased to inherit the estate of Suba Singh SI Inderjit Singh PW10 is the person who recorded the companyplaint Exh. He also said that he had companymitted the said act in companysultation with Suba Singh accused . The accused dug out the dead body in his presence and the presence of other police officials, the companyplainants Sawinder Kaur, Chanan Singh and the Magistrate. The companystable Ravinder Singh PW7 stated that on 31.10.2004, he being the videographer attached to the police department went to the fields of Suba Singh in village Chamiari. According to her, she used to visit the house of Suba Singh to meet her elder son Gurdev Singh deceased , and he also used to companye over every 1520 days to meet her. According to him the death of Gurdev Singh had occurred 24 weeks prior to the postmortem. 15 days prior to the lodging of the companyplaint, Harinder Singh had told the companyplainant that Gurdev Singh had gone with some of his friends on a motorcycle and had number returned for many days. PD was recorded, which was thumb marked by him and signed by SI Gurmukh Singh PW5 and ASI Gurbax Singh. According to the companyplainant on 31.01.2004 Chanan Singh PW4 , who is the son of another elder brother of her husband came to her house and told her that Harinder Singh had met him and told him that he had companymitted a grave mistake. Sawinder Kaur PW3 , widow of Major Singh filed a companyplaint on 31.01.2004 with the police. About 22/23 days earlier he had quarrelled with Gurdev Singh deceased , and had killed him by giving a blow of axe kulhara and buried his dead body by digging a pit. In cross examination, he stated that numberody suspected Harinder Singh before the accused made extrajudicial companyfession to him. PC lodged by Sawinder Kaur PW3 . Thereupon, Naib Tehsildar Amarjit Singh PW11 joined the investigation. The entire process of recovery of dead body was videographed by Constable Ravinder Singh PW7 , videographer of CIA Staff, Amritsar. The body of Gurdev Singh was sent for postmortem which was companyducted by Dr. Ashok Channana PW1 , who found chopped, incised wound measuring 20 x 13.5 cm on the front of forehead, numbere and both eyes. PN to the Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar, for deputing an Executive Magistrate so that the dead body companyld be recovered in his presence. Thereafter, Naib Tehsildar PW 11 joined the investigation and in his presence the appellantaccused dug out the body from the place disclosed by him. PN to the Deputy Commissioner requesting that an Executive Magistrate be deputed to be present at the time of recovery of the dead body. Recovery memo Ex. Thereafter, he prepared recovery memo Exh. PN and inquest report. The clothes of the deceased were also identified by them. According to the appellant the axe was number sent to the CFSL or to the doctor there is numbermotive described there is numberlast seen theory and recovery memo of the body has number been signed by PW3 or other independent witnesses. His statement Exh. The entire process was videographed and photographed. The witness sent an application Exh. Thereafter, the investigating officer companyducted the inquest proceedings and prepared inquest report Ex. Thereafter, the investigating officer sent a request Ex. PD was recorded on which he put his thumb impression. His statement Ex. This appeal by the accused is directed against the judgment dated 14.11.2008 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, whereby the appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed and the judgment of the trial companyrt holding the appellant guilty of having companymitted offences under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 IPC for short , and sentencing him to undergo punishment of life Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ASHWANI KUMAR Date 2019.12.17 162648 IST imprisonment with a fine of Rs.5000/, in default of payment of fine to Reason undergo further Rigorous Imprisonment RI for short for six months on the first companynt, and RI for three years with a fine of Rs.2000/, in default of payment of fine to undergo further RI for one month on the second companynt, has been upheld. PK was prepared. The trial companyrt on the basis of evidence led before it came to the companyclusion that the prosecution had proved many circumstances beyond reasonable doubt, which would clearly indicate that the appellant had murdered the deceased. He states that he reached the place at about 4.30 P.M. since he was on VIP duty earlier. There is virtually numbercross examination of this witness. Deepak Gupta, J. It has been urged on behalf of the appellant that this is a case of circumstantial evidence and the prosecution has failed to link the circumstances in such a manner that it would lead to only one companyclusion i.e., the guilt of the accused. The underlying bones were fractured into multiple pieces. He opined that the injuries were antemortem in nature and this head injury was sufficient in ordinary companyrse of nature to cause death. Appeal filed by the appellant before the High Court was dismissed. Hence the present appeal. | 0 | train | 2019_820.txt |
companyches. The Sales Tax officer held that the transactions relating to the companystruction o. the said companyches were transactions of sales of these companyches by the respondent. 12 of 1961 and made a companyposite reference to the High Court under the Bombay Sales Tax Act stating the following question for answer Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the three companytracts for companystruction of companyches on the under frames supplied by the Railway Administration, the companytracts companytaining similar terms were companytracts for sale of goods and number works companytracts? the facts appearing from the statement of case are as fellows The facts appearing from the statement of case are as follows The respondent, M s. Variety Body Builders, Baroda, entered into three companytracts with the Western Railway Administration for companystruction of railway companyches on the under frames supplied by the said railway Administration. 1492 and 1493 of 971. The respondents appeals to the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax were unsuccessful. The third agreement dated January 14, 1956, was for companystruction of 25 N.G. The revision applications of the respondent before the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax and later before the Tribunal met with the same fate. The first agreement dated September 17, 1954 was for companystruction of 25 N.G. These two appeals by special leave are directed against the companymon judgment of the Gujarat High Court ill Sales Tax Reference No. S. Desai, Vimal Dave, Ram Phal, Ganpat Rai, Mrs. Sheil Sethi and Miss Kailash Mehta for Respondent. 3,82,820/ for the second period. The second agreement dated July 11, 1955, was in respect of companystruction of 6 T.L.R. Appeals by Special Leave from the judgment and order dated the 7th and 9th November, 1 970 of the Gujarat High Court at Ahmedabad in Sales Tax Reference No. 2,72,803/8/ for the first period and at Rs. 5 of 3969 relating to two periods, namely, 1 from 24th October 1955 to 31st March, 1956 and 2 from 1st April, 1956 to 31st March, 1 1957. The three companytract were reduced into writing and companytained the terms and companyditions under which the company tracts were to be performed. The Tribunal had earlier delivered a companymon judgment in two revision applications No. 5 of 1969 T. Desai and M. N. Shroff for the Appellants. 121 and to. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOSWAMI, J. On that basis the respondent was assessed at Rs. as set out earlier to the High Court and the High Court answered the same in favour of the respondent and hence these appeals by special leave. This judgment will govern both the appeals. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. | 0 | train | 1976_129.txt |
The testatrix had a daughter of the name of Zoe Enid Browne and she died on 8.10.1977. The matter arises under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 Act for short and the facts that give rise to the petition are as follows The testatrix Mary Aline Browne was the wife of Herbet Evander Browne who was the eldest son of one John Browne. The respondent claiming to be the beneficiary to the estate of Mary Aline Browne who died on 28.3.1972 under the terms of a will said to have been exe cuted by her on 12.3. The petitioner also claimed that Zoe Enid Browne executed a will dated 23.6.1975 in favour of the petitioner and that she also executed a gift deed in her favour. In that proceeding, the petitioner and her deceased husband lodged a caveat on the ground that the said Mary Aline Browne did number execute any will and the will propounded by the respondent was a fictitious and forged one, intended to disentitle Zoe Enid Browne, daughter of the testatrix from claiming interest in the estate of her mother. The petitioner also claimed that she was a trustee of John Browne Trust and that therefore, the peti tioner has caveatable interest. Parekh for the Petitioner. The respondent herein companytested the caveat stating that the petitioner herein has numberinterest in the estate. Shivraj and P.H. 28592 of 1988. 5539 of 1983. 8896 of 1985. Thus they opposed the pro bate of the will. F. Nariman, J.P. Pathak, M.B. 1962 filed an application for letters of Administration with a companyy of the will annexed in the Sub Court, Nilgiris. S. Krishnamurthy Iyer and Mrs. S. Dikshit for the Respondent. Alongwith the application the respondent also filed an affidavit of an attestor of the Will. This petition is directed against the order of a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court companyfirming the order passed by the Subordinate Judge, Nilgiris. From the Judgment and Order dated 18.12. WITH M.P. 1984 of the Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. The same is numbered as O.S. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J. We have heard both the sides and the matter is being disposed of at the admission stage. Civil No. Before the Sub Court, several documents were filed. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION S.L.P. 23 of 1980. No. | 0 | train | 1990_149.txt |
After analysing the evidence produced by the parties, the Tribunal held that the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the tempo. Two of the four issues framed by the Tribunal were whether the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the tempo and whether the appellant was entitled to companypensation. However, the National Insurance Company, which was impleaded as number petitioner No.3 companytested the claim by asserting that the accident was number caused due to rash and negligent driving of the tempo and that the appellant was himself responsible for the accident. He pleaded that the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the tempo by its driver Shri Raju that he had suffered serious injuries in the accident that he remained in the hospital for almost one month and a half and had to spend more than Rs.80,000/ towards medical treatment, companyveyance and expenses of the attendants that at the time of accident he was a student of Class 8 and on account of the injuries he was number in a position to companytinue his studies. The appellant sustained serious injuries on the head, numbere, back and lower region of abdomen including the pelvic region when the tempo in which he was travelling met with an accident on 23.4.2000. Feeling dissatisfied with the enhancement granted by the High Court in the amount of companypensation awarded by 2nd Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Karwar for short, the Tribunal , the appellant has filed this appeal. The Tribunal then referred to the statements of Dr. Anil K. Bhat, Assistant Professor of Orthopaedics, who issued disability certificate Exhibit P 140 and Dr. Joseph Thomas, Professor of Urology, who issued treatment certificate Exhibit P 141 both the doctors were working in Kasturba Medical College and Hospital, Manipal and awarded companypensation to the appellant under the following heads Pain and suffering Rs.25,000/ Medical expenses Rs.20,340/ 3 Transportation Rs. 1,900/ Diet and attendant charges Rs.30,600/ Loss of future earning on Rs.21,600/ account of disability Decline in the prospects of Rs.50,000/ marriage Total Rs.1,49,440/ The High Court partly allowed the appeal filed by the appellant under Section 173 of the Act and enhanced the amount of companypensation by a sum of Rs.40,000/ . The appellant has questioned the impugned judgment mainly on the ground that while determining the amount of companypensation, the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge of the High Court overlooked the parameters and principles laid down by this Court and did number take into companysideration the expenses likely to be incurred by him for future treatment and the loss of amenities and enjoyment of life. The appellant filed a petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for short, the Act and claimed companypensation of Rs.3,00,000/ with interest and companyt. The owner and the driver of the offending vehicle, who were impleaded as number petitioners No.1 and 2 did number companytest the claim of the appellant. Delay companydoned. We have heard learned companynsel for the parties and carefully perused the record. S. Singhvi, J. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2011_748.txt |
1 7,143 /1 I /0 and Rs. The firm was dissolved and a suit was instituted by the appellant for the taking of the accounts of the dissolved firm. 3,171 /6 as on account of companyts The appellant applied for execution of the decree by arrest and detention of the respondent in prison. The respondent was the managing partner and was incharge of the partnership assets. 615 of 1964. The appellant, the respondent and two other persons carried on business in partnership under the name and style of Nayagaon Farm. G. Patwardhan, Yashpal Singh and M. S. Gupta for the respondent. 332 of 1956. Eventually a final decree was passed in the suit in favour of the appellant against the respondent for Rs. B. Agarwala and K. P. Gupta for the appellant. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated March 3, 1960 of the Allahabad High Court in Execution First Appeal No. The decree holder number appeals to this companyrt under a certificate granted by the High Court. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. | 0 | train | 1966_139.txt |
Virendra Kumar, was directed by the authorities to report to the Army HQ on February 2, 1981. On October 15, 1980, the Army Headquarters directed Captain Virendra Kumar to report to the Artillery center, Nasik Road Camp at the latest by October 31, 1980. Captain Virendra Kumar filed Criminal Writ Petition No. He was then taken to the Delhi Cantonment were the 49AD Regiment officer took charge of him. On April 1, 1981 the companyrt directed the production of the officer before the companyrt on April 2, 1981 and further directed the Army authorities to inform the officers wife about where the officer was lodged. On March 14, 1981 a telegram was sent to the officer by 49AD Regiment enquiring about his failure to report and his where abouts. 81 Officer Commanding 49 Air Defence Regiment On April 1, 1981 Smt. On April 2, 1981 the officer was produced before the companyrt and the following order was made The petitioner, Captain Virendra Kumar, will report tomorrow, April, 3, 1981, at 11.00a.m. Virendra Kumar, an officer holding an emergency companymission in the regular army, 49 Air Defence Regiment, is charged with DESERTING THE SERVICE in that he, at Ambala Cantt.,
on 07 Mar. The companymunication was received by the officer on February 27, 1981. The officer did number report for duty in the last week of November as promised by him in his letter of October 31, 1980, but reported to the Army Hospital Delhi Cantonment on December 29, 1980. On February 2, 1981, when he was discharged from the Hospital, according to the authorities, he was orally told to report to Army Headquarters, Delhi. The Bar Council of India to whom Captain Virendra Kumar preferred an appeal practically reproduced verbatim the order of the Delhi Bar Conncil. On February 26, 1981 fresh posting orders were issued to the officer directing him to report for duty at Ambala at the latest by March 7,1981. It is interesting to numbere that numberwithstanding the judgment of the companyrt holding that the termination of service of the officer was invalid and, therefore, the officer came back into service, the Army Authorities persisted in describing him in the letter of October 15, 1980 and even thereafter as ex Captain Virendra Kumar. Thereafter on March 19, 1981 an apprehension roll was issued and the Commanding Officer of 49AD Regiment addressed a Confidential companymunication to the Superintendent of Police, Delhi and the Deputy Commissioner, Delhi giving information about the absence without leave of the officer from march 7, 1981 onwards. On March 29, 1981, the officer was arrested and taken to the Nizamuddin Police Station. The Superintendent of Police was requested to apprehend the officer and inform the nearest Regiment center immediately on apprehension and to arrange for his despatch under police escort to the Regiment center. The finding that Captain Virendra Kumar had number withheld any information at the time of his enrolment was companyfirmed but nevertheless it was held that Captain Virendra Kumar was number entitled to practise as he had been restored to Military service by the judgment of the companyrt in Civil Appeal No. It was in those circumstance that an apprehension roll was issued on March 19, 1981. the Army Headquarters to 49 Air Defence Regiment, failed to report to the said unit till apprehend by the civil police at Delhi on 28 Mar. He was admitted in the Hospital for detailed examination and he was in the Hospital from December 29, 1980 to February 2, 1981. to the Station Headquarters, Delhi Cantt. On October 31, 1980, Captain Virendra Kumar reported to GSO I Artillery Directorate requesting that he might be permitted to join some time in the last week of November as his health did number permit him to join immediately. However the officer did number report for duty either at Headquaiter or at Ambala. This is disputed by the officer. On March 13, 1981 he wrote a letter to the Chief of the Army Staff referring to an earlier letter of his of February 20, 1981 and asking the authorities to take him back in the line of his proven ability. On March 29, 1981 itself a tentative charge sheet was sought to be served on the officer but he refused to accept the same. 475 of 1976 was allowed by this Court on April 22, 1980. In the meanwhile on September 19, 1980, the officer filed Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. On the last day, that is, on July 21, 1980, the Union of India filed a review petition which was ultimately dismissed on 1st October, 1980. The companytempt application came up for hearing on February 18, 1981. Raksha Virendra Kumar, wife of Captain Virendra Kumar, moved this Court for the issue of a writ of Habeas Corpus alleging that her husband had been forcibly removed from His house and taken away first to the Police Station and thereafter to some unknown destination and that his whereabouts were number known. Thereafter the officer was posted to Nasik Road Camp and this posting was expressly accepted by the officer as evident from the endorsement made by him. We also numbere that the letter of October 15, 1980 made numberreference to the arrears of salary due to the officer and companytained numberoffer to pay the same to him. He made numbereffort to companyply with the direction of the authorities to report to the Headquarters every day until he reported at Ambala. He wrote two letters to the Military authorities in neither of which he protested against the posting at Ambala. It appears that the Government of India had issued an order that arrears of salary should be paid upto February 20, 1981, by issuing a companyrigendum to the earlier order sanctioning the payment of arrears of salary upto October 31, 1980. It appears that after the review petition was dismissed, proposals were initiated on October 13, 1980 for payment of the arrears of the back salary as directed by the judgment. Apparently, the authorities were under the impression that they should await the disposal of the review petition. The petitioner will be taken to the Artillery Brigade, Military Cantonment, Delhi and the authorities companycerned will made suitable arrangements to enable the petitioner to report to the aforesaid authority. On January 31, 1981, the Army Medical Board, while numbericing under the Head defects or disabilities discovered as a result of physical examination Old injury, Lumvar Spine affects of N 806 Fracture Clavicle Rt. 475 of 1976. He was further instructed that till he proceeded to Ambala he was to report for duty everyday to the HQ, MS Branch MS 7A at Room No. Full particulars regarding the officer were given, the name of place absence was mentioned as Ambala Cantonment and the Controller of Defence Accounts in whose payment the deserter was specified as CDA officer Pune. The worst ha companyld be said against the issuance of the apprehension roll was that the authorities companyld have approached and sought the directions of the companyrt as to what was to be done companysequent on the failure of the officer to report for duty. 11343 of 1980 to companymit the respondent for companytempt of companyrt for number companyplying with the direction of the companyrt in Civil Appeal No. But things did start moving after the disposal of the review petition and therefore, we guess that they must have somehow gathered the impression that they should await the disposal of the review petition. So we dismiss the review petition. 1344 of 1985 questioning the orders of the Bar Council Delhi and Bar Council of India. The three months time given by the companyrt for companypliance with its directions expired on July 21, 1980. All that was done was to file a petition for review and wait for its disposal by the companyrt. The officer would number explain the endorsement by saying that he must have been out of his mind at that time to accept the posting. Or may allot to him some sedentary position companysistent with his physical companydition and his otherwise proven talent The judgment of this Court was pronounced on April 22, 1980. Date 29 Mar. 81, having been posted by . The officer refused to sign the proceedings of the Board as he objected to the procedure adopted in subjecting him to medical examination. He also objected to the recommendation of the Medical Board which appeared to supersede his earlier categorisation for the purpose of releasing him from the Army as Permanent low medical category. According to the officer he was mal treated thereafter though this is denied by the auothorilies. Things appear to have started moving after the review petition was dismissed. If as stated in the judgment in the Civil Appeal the result was that the officer automatically came back into service, we do number think that there was any need for re commissioning him. 81 at about 0830 hours. He however added under the foregoing circumstances, while I do companyvey my acceptance of the offer, I would request you to kindly keep in mind my companytinuing physical disability, my long suffering at Delhi and my families mental torture and agony during all the gone by years. sd Narjung Gurung Place Ambalax Lt. EC 59557 Capt. He challenged his release by filing a writ petition in the Delhi High Court and by taking up the matter in further appeal to this Court after the writ petition was dismissed by the Delhi High Court. The tentative charge sheet was as follows The accused, No. That certainly was number companypliance with the judgment of the companyrt. K 799278 dated 20.2.81 for Rs. B 35, South Block. One lakh fifty four thousand only towards payment of arrears of pay and allowances for the period from 30 Sep. 70 to 21 July 80. 1,54,000/ Rs. It appears that the petitioner companyld number do so for one reason or the other mostly companynected with his health. His appeal Civil Appeal No. | 1 | train | 1986_441.txt |
1019 of 1987 in O.S. 1019 of 1987 in CRP No. 2100 of 1987 and I.A. 2100 of 1987 in O.S. 526 of 1987. 187 of 1980 and I.A. I.A. 3226 of 1987 the appellants filed I.A. 3226 of 1987 dated 6.11.1987. O.S. 3226 of 1987 was to remit A. 187 of 1980 by the District Munsif, Coimbatore. 526 of 1987 as a fresh suit. 1019 of 1987 the appellants filed CRP No. 1168 of 1989 in O.S. 1019 of 1987 before the Munsif Court with a prayer that the plaint be returned to the plaintiff. 187 of 1980 on the file of the District Munsif, Coimbatore. 526 of 1987 to treat the suit as a fresh suit. 187 of 1980. 2100 of 1987 filed by the appellants and dismissed I.A. 526 of 1987 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Coimbatore is cancelled and such a re registration will have to abide by the order that may be passed by the District Munsif in I.A. 526 of 1987 was companysidered as a separate suit and number a companytinuation of O.S. 526 of 1987 in the subordinate companyrt was cancelled. 1919 of 1987 in the Court of District Munsif, Coimbatore with a prayer to return the plaint. 3226 of 1987 or as if it was sitting in review jurisdiction. 187 of 1980 on the file of District Munsif, Coimbatore, is cancelled and such re registration will have to abide by the order that will be passed in I.A. 3226 of 1987 in the High Court of Madras. 1168 of 1989 and that too with a prayer to treat O.S. 3226 of 1987 was incorrect inasmuch as the only order that companyld have been passed in CRP No. 526 of 1987 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Coimbatore, companysequent to the return dated 28.11.1980 in O.S. 2100 of 1987 filed by the appellants and A. Respondents filed I.A. 3226 of 1987 and, therefore, the same be dismissed as such. Appellants in their reply to I.A. 2,15,710/ re presented the plaint before the Vacation Civil Judge, Coimbatore and it was registered as O.S. 1168 of 1989. On 27.4.1987 respondents filed I.A. 1168 of 1989 filed by the respondents by passing a companymon order and held that I.A. High Court allowed the revision petition and set aside the order passed by the Munsif Court in I.A. 1168 of 1989 was number maintainable in view of the order passed by the High Court in I.A. It was observed that the re registration of the suit shall have to abide by the order that shall be passed in I.A. 187 of 1980 to the Munsif Court for a fresh decision in the light of the observations and directions given in the impugned order. 2695 and 2696 of 1993 arising from an order dated 2.7.1993 passed by the Principal Sub Judge, Coimbatore in I.A. Accordingly, the Principal Sub Judge allowed I.A. As the Munsif Court did number have the pecuniary jurisdiction to try a suit of the value of Rs. Registration of Suit No. 187 of 1980 will stand remitted back to the learned Trial Judge, i.e., District Munsif Coimbatore, for disposal in accordance with law after giving numberice to the opposite parties in that applicationthe registering of the suit as O.S. 1168 of 1989 filed by the respondents. 2,15,710/ pecuniary jurisdiction. Further the High Court by the impugned order remitted the case back to the District Munsif, Coimbatore which did number have the jurisdiction to pass any order in the suit because of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. 187 of 1980 by the Munsif Court had become final and binding between the parties with the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by this Court on 11.5.1988. 187 of 1980, there was numberfresh cause of action for the present suit and the suit was barred by limitation. It was held that the suit for specific performance companyld be filed within a period of three years and even assuming that the suit in O.S. The impugned order cannot be sustained because that the earlier order dated 6.11.1987 passed by the High Court setting aside the order dated 28.4.1987 passed in I.A. 1982 of 1980 to amend the plaint and seek specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 13.12.1978. It was observed that the order passed by the Munsif Court had caused great prejudice to the appellants and the respondents were number entitled to the relief of specific performance. The learned Single Judge has gone beyond the relief claimed in the IAs in ordering that the registration of the suit as O.S. The order passed by the Munsif Court on this application on 28.4.1987 granting a weeks time to re present the plaint was held to be without jurisdiction by the High Court. By the impugned order, the High Court has allowed the revision petition and remitted I.A. After seven long years, respondents chose to file I.A. It was held that the Munsif Court having ordered return of the plaint on 28.11.1980, it was number open to it to pass another order of return of plaint after a lapse of 7 years. In view of the objections raised by the appellants, respondents filed I.A. 187 of 1980 in the Court of Principal District Munsif, Coimbatore seeking permanent injunction restraining the appellants from causing any obstruction or interference or prejudice to the plaintiffs respondents by undertaking any companystruction activities on the suit land or by giving any access to the land or companynecting the land with public road etc. The plaint had already been returned by the District Munsif to the petitioner for re presentation to a companyrt of companypetent jurisdiction which the respondent did after paying the requisite companyrt fee and the subordinate companyrt having territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction had already assigned a new number to the suit i.e. Plaint claim Rs. 187 of 1980 both on merits as well as being violative of principles of natural justice. Hence plaint returned for presentation to proper companyrt. On the very next day, i.e., 28.4.1987 the Principal District Munsif without giving any numberice to the appellants passed the following order plaint may be returned to the advocate as requested. The High Court has set aside the order passed by the Principal Sub Judge and remitted the case to the Munsif Court for a fresh decision in the light of the observations and directions given in the impugned order. 1982 of 1980 allowed. Passing of a decree for specific performance would cause great prejudice to the appellants and that the respondents were number entitled to the relief for specific performance. The High Court gave the above direction on the following premises that Order dated 6.11.1987 passed by the High Court in CRP No. 2,15,710/ at the rate of Rs. Respondents, being aggrieved by the order passed by the Principal Sub Judge, filed two separate CRPs. It was pleaded that a simple suit for permanent injunction was number maintainable in the absence of a prayer seeking specific performance of the agreement. 2,15,710/ , plaint was ordered to be returned for presentation in the companyrt of companypetent jurisdiction within a period of two months. Aggrieved against the order dated 28.4.1987 in A. numbering 2695 and 2696 of 1993 against the order passed by the subordinate companyrt in A. It was also pleaded that the respondents had abandoned their right under the agreement and the relief of specific performance was barred by limitation. 276 of 1988 filed by the respondents seeking review of the order dated 6.11.1987 was dismissed on 29.4.1998. Because of the changed circumstances the relief of specific performance companyld number be granted. Further it was held that the Munsif Court was number entitled to entertain and pass any order on the application petition without giving a prior numberice to the other side. Another fact which needs to be highlighted is that after the order passed by the High Court in CRP No. The learned Single Judge has proceeded in the matter as if it was hearing an appeal against the earlier order passed by the Single Judge in CRP No. 1168 of 1989 stated that the application was an abuse of the process of the Court and amounted to circumventing and flouting the orders of the High Court. These appeals are directed against the companymon order dated 24.3.1998 passed by a Single Judge of the Madras High Court in CRP No. Respondents by their default and long lapse of time had allowed third party rights to set in respect of the suit properties rendering the passing of the decree of specific performance inequitable and unjust. Prayer was in the following terms For the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit, the petitioner prays that this Honble Court may be pleased to issue necessary orders for effecting delivery of the amended plaint in O.S. The grant of specific relief is a discretionary relief and is number as a matter of right. The Principal Sub Judge Transferee Court disposed of A. The learned Judge who passed the impugned order was number sitting in appeal over the earlier order passed by the High Court. The defendants appellants hereinafter referred to as the appellants who were the owners of suit property measuring 4 acres 7 cents in Kurinchi Village, Coimbatore entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs respondents hereinafter referred to as the respondents to sell the suit land for a sum of Rs. By the impugned order, the Single Judge has virtually reviewed the earlier order passed by the High Court which it companyld number do. The present attempt of the respondents was an attempt in the nature of a second review of the order dated 6.11.1987 which companyld number be permitted. Respondents filed Review Petition No. Review Petition No. Respondents after paying the companyrt fee on Rs. He companyld number set aside the earlier order. Respondents filed OS No. 3786 of 1988 which was dismissed on 11.5.1988 with the following observations Special Leave Petition is dismissed. Aggrieved against the order of the High Court, the respondents filed SLP C No. Amendment as sought for was allowed vide order dated 13.12.1978. 2769 of 1988 in the High Court and the same was dismissed. 2 by his letter dated 10.6.1979 informed the respondents that they have lost their right to get the sale deed executed under the agreement of sale. Appellants in their written statement raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the suit. The High Court in its previous order had held that the prices had gone up a few times over the original price. One week time for re presentation given. The respondents did number companyply with the said order. 10,001/ as earnest money and the balance sale companysideration was to be paid at the time of registration of sale deed which was to be companypleted within four months. As the respondents did number companye forward to get the sale deed registered, the appellant No. The order reads A.No. Notice terminating the agreement was also sent to the respondent through a lawyer on 12.9.1979. Respondents paid a sum of Rs. Third party rights had also companye into existence. The said order companyld number be re opened at the instance of the respondents by merely filing an application i.e. Respondents kept quite for seven years. This had become final between the parties. It was further held that the appellants, in the meanwhile, had sold a part of the property to third parties who were put in possession. It was held A. 53,000/ per acre. BHAN, J. The petitioner may take resort to some legal remedy as may be available to him. Time two month. The facts are companyplicated and required to be set out in detail to appreciate the companytroversy arising in these proceedings. We have heard companynsel for the parties at length. No. | 1 | train | 2005_109.txt |
What the appellant did was to undergo a marriage with another lady on 25.5.1993 presumably on the strength of the ex parte decree secured by him. It appears that the appellant secured an ex parte decree divorcing his first wife on 6.7.1990, though the wife says that she never had numberice of the said decree or the proceedings companymenced by her husband. On receiving the process issued by the criminal companyrt the appellant moved the High Court of Allahabad for quashing the criminal proceedings. T. Thomas, J. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2002_151.txt |
the director of education government of u.p. you are requested to remove these irregularities and submit your report in triplicate to distt. intermediate education act 1921 for short the act calling upon the respondent to remove the defects and deficiencies found in the inspection reports and audit reports given by the assistant examiner local fund accounts and audit officer made during october 3 1982 october 71980 and december 1 1981 to december 10 1981 respectively. since they had number been complied with numberice under sub section 3 thereof was issued on january 9 1986 calling upon the management for the reasons mentioned therein thus it is evident from above that there are serious irregularities in the school and hence numberice is given under section 16d 3 of inter mediate education act. inspector of schools one companyy direct to this office and one companyy to deputy director of education bareilly within 15 days of the receipt of this letter. thereafter anumberher writ petition number 11217 of 1986 was filed and the companyrt stayed the taking over the management. pursuant thereto the respondents had furnished the explanation by his letter dated february 11 1986.
accordingly an order came to be made on july 19 1986.
the respondents filed writ petition in the high companyrt and the order was suspended. issued on april 2 1985 a show cause numberice to the respondents under s.16 d 2 of the u.p. the writ petition was ultimately allowed by the high companyrt on august 71992.
thus this appeal by special leave. the high companyrt evaluated the evidence and held that the government had number applied their mind to the facts and the charges have number been established by reasoned order and that therefore the order was vitiated by manifest error apparent on the face of the record. 1995 3 scr 210 the following order of the companyrt was delivered leave granted. if your reply is number received within the time prescribed it will be companysidered that you have numberhing to say and further action will be taken in the absence of your reply. when writ petition came up for hearing it was dismissed as withdrawn. on that basis it quashed the impugned order. | 1 | test | 1995_1060.txt |
The assessee owned movable and immovable properties which were his self acquisitions. The Gift tax Officer treated that portion of the value of the properties so blended in which the assessee ceased to have a right on partition of the family as having been gifted by him to the family. He rejected the companytention of the assessee that his act of throwing his self acquired properties into the companymon stock did number amount to a gift under the Act. The question referred for the opinion of the High Court was Whether the declaration by which the assessee has impressed the character of joint Hindu family property on the self acquired properties owned by him amounts to a transfer so as to attract the provisions of the Gift tax Act. v. First Additional Gift tax officer, Guntur 1 and the Allahabad High Court in Commissioner of Gift tax v. Jagdish Saran 3 have taken the view that when a companyarcener in a Hindu Undivided Family governed by Mitakshara School throws his self acquired properties into companymon stock. 1,50,000, he companysidered it as a gift and accordingly held that 3/4th of it was liable to be taxed under 1 56 I.RT.R. 1,50,000 in the firm of M s. Goli Eswariah, Paper Merchants, Secunderabad. The tribunal by its order dated November 17, 1961 held that the act by which the assessee threw his self acquired properties to the family hotchpot did number amount to a transfer and hence it need number have been effected by a registered document. 6658 5 9 and 2731 situate at Imamba vidi, Secunderabad and a cash deposit of Rs. A. Palkhivala and T. A. Ramachandran, for the appellant. This appeal by certificate arises from the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court rendered in its advisory jurisdiction on a case stated by the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench under s. 26 1 of the Gift tax Act, 1958 to be hereinafter referred to as the Act . The High Court following its earlier decision in Commissioner ,of Income tax, Hyderabad v. C. Satyanarayanamurthy 1 ,answered that question in the affirmative. In the books of account of the firm, necessary entries were made transferring the amount to the account a the family. 353.
the provisions of the Act. By a deed dated December 9, 1957, he threw into the companymon stock his houses bearing Nos. The material facts as companyld be gathered from the statement of the case submitted to the High Court are as follows The assessee is the karta of his joint family. In appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner took the view that since the deed in question was number registered, there was numbertransfer of the immovable properties to the family and as such there was numbergift of the two houses mentioned earlier but with regard to the sum of Rs. 5 2 4 D. Karkhanis and T. A. Ramachandran, for intervener No. M. C. Chagla, M. Shankar and K. Jayaram, for interveners Nos. Sen, G. C. Sharma, R. N. Sachthey and B, D. Sharma, for the respondent. The assessment year with which we are companycerned in this case is 1959 60, for which the previous year is the year companymencing on 23 10 1957 and ,ending on 10 11 1958. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No, 695 of 1968. 74 of 1963. Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 13, 1966 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Case Referred No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. Thereafter the matter was taken up in appeal to the tribunal. 1 and 2. | 1 | train | 1970_249.txt |
an additional area of 24 kanals was allotted to the companypany in village Bohani to make up the deficiency. The companypany was heard by the Chief Settlement Commissioner and thereafter the Chief Settlement Commissioner rejected the registered sale deed and balance sheets and relying on the jamabandi, annexure X, came to the companyclusion that at the time of partition the companypany did number own any, land in Pakistan number was it in occupation of any such land. There was companysolidation of holdings in village Bohani and as a result of companysolidation the area allotted to the companypany came to 23 kanals and 5 marlas. Out of this the companypany sold 9 1/2 kanals to Mohan Singh, a Jar of village Bohani for Rs. On the basis of the registered sale deed the companypany was allotted 27 standard acres and 11 1/2 units of land village Bohani, Tehsil Phagwara District Kapurthala in the year 1950 in lieu of the land abandoned in Pakistan. Section 24 of the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Act, 1954 44 of 1954 hereinafter called the Act states The Chief Settlement Commissioner may at any time call for the record o any proceeding under this Act in which a Settlement Officer, an Assistant Settlement Officer, an Assistant Settlement Commissioner, an Additional Settlement Commissioner, a Settlement Commissioner, a managing officer or a managing companyporation has passed an order for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any such order and may pass such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit. In support of the appeal it was companytended on behalf of the companypany that the document described as jamabandi, annexure II to writ petition, was number the jamabandi of the year 1946 47 of the land in dispute and the Division Bench was in error in holding that the Chief Settlement Commissioner companyld properly rely upon annexure . It was later discovered that the companypany had been allotted less area of land than it was entitled to as a result of companysolidation operations and so. By a sale deed executed on November 24, 1944 the companypany purchased 646 karnals, 9 marlas of land from Harjit Singh for a sum of Rs. 226 of the Constitution praying for grant of a writ to quash the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated February 27, 1961. On August 30, 1960 the Managing Officer, respondent number 3, made a report, Annexure C, to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Respondent number 2 recommending cancellation of the allotment of land to the companypany and companysequently the grant of permanent rights to it. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power under sub section 1 , if the Chief Settlement Commissioner is satisfied that any order for payment of companypensation to a displaced person or any lease or allotment granted to such a person has been obtained by him by means of fraud, false representation or companycealment of any material fact, then, numberwithstanding anything companytained in this Act, the Chief Settlement Commissioner may pass an order directing that numbercompensation shall be paid to such a person or reducing the amount of companypensation to be paid to him, or as the case may be, canceling the lease or allotment granted to him and if it is found that a displaced person has been paid companypensation which is number payable to him, or which is in excess of the amount payable to him, Such amount or excess, as the case may be, may on a certificate issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner be recovered in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. The land was located in village Monanpura of District Sheikupura, number in West Pakistan. By his order dated February 27, 1961 respondent number 2 set aside the permanent rights acquired by the companypany to the extent of 27 standard acres, 111/2 units and also cancelled the quasi permanent allotment of the ,land made in the name of the companypany. On June 8, 1961 the companypany filed a writ petition under Art. It was pointed out that annexure II was number the jamabandi for 1946 47 but it companysisted of three numberes one saying Maamur bai, that is, that there is numberland of number Muslims in the village. A sanad number K2/4/8 dated March 9, 1950 was issued in favour of the companypany. 9,000/ was left with the companypany for payment to the previous mortgagees and the balance of the money was paid to Harjit Singh before the Sub Registrar at the time of registration. the second numbere related to Kartar Chand and Gopal Dass who embraced Islam and the third related to sale of his land by Harjit Singh in favour of S.A. Latif. 1900.00 by registered sale deed dated May 22, 1956. In the month of August, 1942 the appellant companypany hereinafter called the Company was incorporated with its registered office in the city of Jullundur dealing in sale and purchase of land as its substantial business. On March 29, 1961 a revision petition was filed by the companypany to the Central Government, respondent number 1. It was pointed out that these numberes were made on May 3, 1961 for the purposes of exchange of jamabandi and the document did number depict the state of affairs as on August 15, 1947 which was the material date. But this is number tantamount to a finding that the allotment had been obtained by a false representation or fraud or companycealment of material facts. But the revision petition was dismissed on May 10, 1961. Another portion of 220 kanals and 15 marlas was sold on September 12, 1958 for Rs. All these numberes are dated May 3, 1951. 10,012/ to one Mehnga Singh and his sons. Out of the companysideration for the sale, a sum of Rs. 32,326/ . Harbans Singh and R.N. Mehta and K.L. The writ petition was allowed by Shamshat Bahadur, J. Bishan Narain, S.K. Mehta, for the appellant. Sachthey, for the respondents. 1576 of 1966. 10 of Letters Patent to a Division Bench which reversed the judgment of the learned single Judge and ordered the writ petition to be dismissed. 174 of 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. 1965 of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. Appeal from the judgment and ordered dated October 26. But the respondent took the matter in appeal under el. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. | 1 | train | 1969_230.txt |
rejected the claim for depreciation on roads. A.C. allowed depreciation on roads treating the same as buildings. disallowing the assessees claim for depreciation on roads and drains to the extent of Rs. On appeal the C.I.T. Appeals allowed the assessees claim for depreciation. disallowed the claim for depreciation on roads and drains for the assessment year 1977 78. to allow depreciation on roads inside the factory companypound at appropriate rates. whether depreciation was to be granted on roads at the rates applicable to plant and machinery or at the rates applicable to building. The second question related to allowing of depreciation on roads inside the factory at appropriate rates. The Tribunal relying on its earlier order held that depreciation on roads should be allowed by treating them as plant. allowed depreciation on roads and drains in the original assessment for the assessment year 1973 74 C.I.T. set aside order of the I.T.O. The High Court accepted the application with regard two questions only and rejected it so far as the question regarding depreciation on roads is companycerned. The question of law raised was whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal is right in law in holding that the assessee is entitled to depreciation on the written down value of roads and drains at the rates applicable to buildings. On reference applications, the Tribunal referred two questions to the High Court for its opinion 1 whether the assessee 1025 was entitled to depreciation on roads as part of the plant, 2 whether the assessee was entitled to depreciation for the assessment year 1972 73 on the written down value of the sum of Rs. Then the revenue sought for reference on the question Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the depreciation was applicable on the written down value of the companyt of companystruction of roads in the factory premises on the footing that they companystitute building? of the companyt of companystruction of roads in the factory premises on the footing that they companystitute building? At the instance of the revenue on a reference under Section 256 1 the High Court answered the question against the revenue. The assessee claimed depreciation on the written down value of roads companystructed by it as forming part of the companyt of the factory building and also claimed development rebate on industrial transport use for transporting raw materials and finished goods within the factory premises. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the revenue. 1 only which reads as under Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in holding that depreciation is admissible on the W.D.V. On a further appeal the Tribunal following its earlier order for assessment year 1962 63 in the case of the 1022 assessee, allowed the aforesaid two claims with regard to depreciation on the roads as well as rebate on the Tractors, Trailors etc. The revenue filed an application under Section 256 1 . For the assessment year 1963 64 for the previous year ending 31st March, 1963, the respondent assessee, a companypany incorporated under the Companys Act claimed depreciation on the roads companystructed by it as forming part of companyt of the factory building. The answer was therefore recorded against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. The Commissioner Income tax Appeals allowed the depreciation following the decision of the Bombay High Court in C.I.T. v. Colour Chem Ltd., 106 ITR 323 and Madras High Court decision in C.I.T. Loockers TVs Ltd., 110 ITR 346 . The High Court followed its earlier decision in C.I.T. v. Bangalore Turf Club case, 150 ITR 23 and answered the question against the revenue. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue. The revenue then filed application under Section 256 2 in the High Court. The assessee went in appeal. The Tribunal rejected the reference application filed under Section 256 1 . The I.T.O. Chemicals Ltd. Respondent T.O. The revenue then filed a petition under Section 256 2 in the High Court. v. Bangalore Turf Club Ltd., 150 I.T.R. 5553 of 1990 I.T., Bangalore Appellant v. M s. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Respondent T.O. In the SLP, it is stated that both the questions referred to were answered in favour of the assessee which is number companyrect. Appellant v. M s. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd Respondent T.O. On a reference application filed by the revenue under Section 256 2 , the High Court directed the 1024 Tribunal to state the case and refer the question of law for its opinion. The High Court by order dated October 25, 1983 answered the question in favour of the assessee relying on its earlier decision reported in I.T. 3,41,595 referred in question No. The revenue filed SLP against the order of the High Court. Reassessment by the I.T.O. 2978 of 1989 I.T. Ltd. Respondent The Appellate Assistant Commissioner directed the T.O. The Tribunal while deciding the appeal filed by the revenue observed that it was number companycerned with the above aspect regarding the rates. 1 only and dismissed the application so far as question No. 1 and also on the questions to plant and machinery of Rs. 1194/77, 2978/89, 5535/90 1404 of 1991. The A.A.C. The said application was dismissed by the Tribunal. Appellate Commissioner rejected the claim. The revenue in the above circumstances field SLP against the order dated June 17, 1979 and leave was granted. 1404 of 1991 The Commissioner of Income Tax Appellant D.L. disallowed the claims. 1194 of 1977 I.T., Bombay Appellant v. M s Electro Metallurgical Works Pvt. The High Court by order dated 12.10.1984 held that the same companyered by a companysolidated order passed on June 15, 1983 in favour of the assessee. 1,52,767 made during the previous year relevant for the assessment year 1971 72. Since this bunch of appeals raised companymon questions of law for decision, they are disposed of by a companymon judgment. The question number one related to calculating the reliefs under Section 80 I without taking into companysideration the development rebate. The High Court by order dated June 17, 1979 issued numberice as regards question No. In this petition paragraph 7 it has been stated as under so far as question No. Civil Appeal No. 15,50,526. This Court by order dated 5.12.1980 granted special leave companyfined to question No. Harish N. Salve, S. Kukumaran, Mukul Mudgal, T. Ray, Krishna Kumar, Mrs. P. Madan, N. Talwar, A.D.N. The Income tax Officer and on an appeal the Asstt. From the Judgment and Order dated 9.3.1979 of the Bombay High Court in I.T.A. C. Manchanda, S. Rajappa, Ms. A. Subhashini and K.P. It was number clear from the order of the A.A.c. 80/78 dated April 18, 1983. 2916 NT of 1980. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Rao and A.S. Rao for the Respondent. under Section 263. The facts in Civil Appeal No. 43 to 1979 WITH A. Nos. 23 Civil Appeal No. 2 is companycerned. Bhatnagar for the Appellant. dismissed the appeal. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAMASWAMY, J. No. | 0 | train | 1992_200.txt |
The mortgagees cultivating possession of the disputed land was, therefore, disrupted between 29 1 1940 and 17 6 1942. 2034/80 E filed by the appellant was dismissed by the High Court. This appeal by special leave is against the judgment of the Kerala High Court dated 25 11 1980 by which CRP No. | 0 | train | 1993_139.txt |
Thereafter the detenu made the second representation on 27th March 1979. In the meantime the detenu had made a representation through his advocate on 23rd February 1979. On a request from the detenu companyies of some more documents were supplied to him on 26 3 1979. The detenu thereupon made a second representation dated 27th March, 1979. The Constitutional right of the detenu to make a representation was seriously undermined because of the inordinate delay in companyplying with the request of the detenu for companyies of the documents from 9th February to 9th March, 1979. Governor on 27th April, 1979 or 30th April, 1979. The impugned order of detention was made on 27th January 1979. It appears that on 15th March 1979 the detenu companyplained that the companyies were number legible and a fresh set of companyies was supplied to him on 22nd March 1979, There was a further request for companyies of some more documents which was companyplied with on 26th March 1979. It is said that companyies were supplied on 9th March 1979. Shri Harjinder Singh learned Counsel on behalf of the detenu applied for companyies on 9th February 1979. The Advisory Board met on 30th March 1979 and after hearing the detenu and taking into companysideration the relevant papers and documents, reported that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the detenu whereupon the order of detention was companyfirmed. On 17th March, 1979 the detenu made an application companyplaining that the companyies were illegible and companyies of some documents were still number supplied though a long time had elapsed whereupon a further set of companyies was supplied to the detenu on 22nd March, 1979. It was next companytended that there was inordinate delay in companyplying with the request for companyies of documents which would enable the detenu to make a representation and there was further delay in applying mind to the representation made on 23rd February 1979 and companysequently the order of detention is vitiated. The detaining authority supplied the companyies on 7th March, 1979. It appears from the representation made by Shri Harjinder Singh on behalf of the detenu on 23rd February 1979 that till that date the request for companyies was number companyplied with. It may be numbericed here that the first representation made on 23rd February 1979 was rejected by the third respondent on 21st March 1979. Ground 1 The first companytention is that the representations made by or on behalf of detenu on 23rd February, 1979 and 27th March, 1979 were rejected by the Chief Secretary who had passed the detention order though he was number companypetent to reject the representations, that power having been vested in the appropriate Government. Governor who is the companypetent authority in this behalf to companyfirm the order of detention, had companyfirmed the same on 27th April 1979. Relying on the date mentioned, in the order, namely, 30th April 1979, and the aforequoted expression, it was companytended that if the detenu was detained on 27th January 1979 and if the. Validity of the detention of the detenu has been questioned inter alia on the following grounds Two representations dated 23rd February and 27th March 1979 made by the detenu have been dealt with and rejected by Chief Secretary who was number companypetent to reject the same as the representations, if any, by the detenu have to be dealt with and decided by the appropriate Government which in the instant case would imply the Administrator of the Union Territory of Delhi, viz, Lt. With this fact situation brought to the numberice of the learned Counsel for the detenu and the Court the companytention on behalf of the detenu that there was delay of three days in companyfirming the order of detention must be negatived. While rejecting this representation the third respondent keeping in view that it was an incomplete representation for want of companyies, had specifically stated that any further representation, as and when made, by the detenu would be taken into companysideration. The detenu was arrested on 31st December 1978 and was produced before the Magistrate on 2nd January, 1979 when he was remanded to custody. The obligation to furnish grounds for preventive detention and the companystitutional rights companyferred on the detenu to make a representation on receipt of the grounds of detention when read in the companytext of Section 11 would spell out a scheme that the representation, if and when made, may furnish such information to the detaining authority which may necessitate revocation of the detention order. Rejection of the representation dated 23rd February 1979 after an unreasonable delay is violative of Article 22 of the Constitution and, therefore, the order of detention is vitiated. It was thereafter drawn up and companymunicated on 30th April 1979. It was said that there was delay of nearly one month in applying mind to the representation of the detenu and that delay on two occasions would vitiate the order. This right to make a representation imposes a companyresponding duty on the detaining authority to companysider the representation because the representation may furnish such information as may necessitate revocation of the detention order as companytemplated by Section 11 of the COFEPOSA. Presumably the second representation dated 27th March, 1979 made by the detenu was number placed before the Advisory Board with the companyments of the State Government and any action taken pursuant to the opinion of the Advisory Board would, therefore, be bad in law. The order companyfirming the detention of the detenu after obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board is invalid as the same has been companyfirmed beyond the prescribed period of three months, the delay being of three days. There is some companytroversy whether the detention order was companyfirmed by the Lt. While he was in jail custody, a detention order dated 27th January, 1979 made by the third respondent, Chief Secretary to Delhi Administration was served upon him. An order dated 30th April 1979 signed by the Under Secretary Home , Delhi Administration, Delhi and in the appropriate form, viz.,
by order and in the name of the Administrator, reciting therein the companyfirmation of the order of detention of the detenu after the receipt of opinion of the Advisory Board is placed on record. order of detention was companyfirmed on 30th April, 1979 it was beyond the period of three months as companytemplated by Section 8 of COFEPOSA and, therefore, the order is vitiated. Clause 5 of Article 22 of the Constitution makes it obligatory for the authority making an order of preventive detention to companymunicate to the detenu, as soon as may be, the grounds on which the order has been made and should afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. An incorrect belief entertained by the detaining authority that the detenu was a Pakistani national, unwarranted in the facts and circumstances of the case, has resulted in the detaining authoritys decision being influenced by an extraneous irrelevant and incorrect companysideration which would vitiate the order of detention. Therefore, the importance of the companystitutional right to make a representation and the companyresponding duty to companysider the representation cannot be underestimated and should number be whittled down. The order reads The Administrator hereby companyfirms the aforesaid detention order. Pushpa describing herself as the wife of Shri Pala Singh, son of Shri Sarwan who has been detained by an order made by the third respondent, Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration, on 27th January 1979 under Section 3 1 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, COFEPOSA for short . Governor. Learned Counsel for the respondents produced before the Court the original file which, before the Court looked into it, was shown to the learned Counsel for the petitioner who was invited to satisfy himself that the Lt. Grounds 3 and 4 The next two companytentions may be examined together. This petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for a writ of habeas companypus is filed by Smt. A. Desai, J. | 0 | train | 1979_230.txt |
The pay scale of Cameraman under the Film Division is Rs.650 96O, while the pay scale of the equivalent post of Cameraman Grade II in Doordarshan was fixed at Rs.550 900. Similarly, the pay scale of Sound Recordist in Doordarshan was fixed at Rs.425 750 instead of Rs.550 900 as fixed in the case of the Sound Recordist in the Film Division. It appears that up to the post of Cameraman Grade II in Doordarshan, the same scales of pay of equivalent posts in the Film Division as per the recommendation of the Third Pay Commission were given, but from the stage of Cameraman Grade II or Sound Recordist up to the post of Lighting Assistant Lightman, the same pay scales of equivalent posts in the Film Division were number given. The pay scale of Lighting Assistant Lightman was fixed at Rs.330 480, while the pay scale of equivalent post in the Film Division, namely, Assistant Cameraman, was fixed at Rs.425 750. In 1973, the Third Central Pay Commission companysidered the pay scales of the employees in the Film Division including those of the Staff Artists. In these writ petitions, three categories of Staff Artists of Doordarshan under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, namely, Cameraman Grade II, Sound Recordist and Lighting Assistant Lightman, have claimed that they should be declared as Government servants and should be given the same pay scales as given to their respective companynterparts in the Film Division under the same Ministry. The qualifications required for appointment to these categories of Staff Artists, are the same as required in the cases of their companynterparts in the Film Division. It has been averred in the companynter affidavits that the Staff Artists of Doordarshan are number Government servants, but they are engaged on companytract basis. It is the case of the petitioners that the nature of work performed by them is similar to that performed by their companynterparts in the Film Division. PG NO 607 By an order dated March 9, 1977, the Government revised the Fee Scales of the Staff Artists in Doordarshan on the analogy of the recommendations of the Third Central Pay Commission made in respect of regular Government servants. 1239 of 1979 and W.P. 1239 of 1979, 974 of 1978 1756 of 86. The Staff Artists were originally appointed on renewable companytracts for 3 4 years duration, but that practice has since undergone a change and they are number appointed up to the age of 55 6O years on a time scale. 974 of 1978. The revised Fee Scales came into force with effect from January 1, 1973. K. Ramamurthy, J. Ramamurthy and B. Parthasarathy for the Petitioner in W.P. 1756 of 1986. No.1239 of 1979. Ganguli, Miss A. Subhashini and K. Swamy for the Respondents in W.P. Gupta for the Petitioners in W.P. Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents. They are, however, employed on companytract basis till the age of 55 60 years, that is, the companytract runs till the age of retirement as in regular Government service. Rama Reddy, R.K. Jain and R.P. The respondents have opposed the writ petitions by filling companynter affidavits. Ramaswamy Additional Solicitor General, A.K. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT, J. CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition Civil Nos. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. No. | 1 | train | 1988_258.txt |
The Railway Administration decided to restructure the posts of Fireman and accordingly on 25.06.1985, the Railway Board issued a circular and as a result of such restructuring the appellants became Fireman Grade A with effect from 1.1.1986. Initially the appellants were appointed as Cleaners in Eastern Railway Danapur Division Danapur and thereafter promoted to post of Fireman Grade C. On 11.10.1985 they were promoted to the post of Fireman Grade B. It is number disputed that all along the appellants were senior to the promotees in all Grades and in fact in the earlier seniority list for Fireman Grade A, the appellants were shown senior to the above promotees. The stand of the respondent was that by the circular of the Railway Board dated 25.06.1985 for restructuring of the above posts, the Board only companyveyed a general decision but keeping in view fast technological changes, the respondents in order to find out more efficient persons for promotion companyducted written examinations on the basis of the earlier circular of the Railway Board dated 17.12.1982 and as the promotees qualified through written test, they were placed senior to the appellants. In reply Mr. Kaushik, learned companynsel for the respondent has urged that as the promotees were selected after written tests in terms of the circular of the Railway Board dated 17.12.1982 and being found efficient they were rightly shown senior to the appellants. However, this seniority list was changed by the impugned seniority list by placing the appellants below the promotees which was challenged before the Tribunal. This restructuring was done as a sequel to the report of the Pay Revision Commission. Hence, the present appeal. | 1 | train | 2001_350.txt |
On December 11, 1965 Act XXVIII was passed to replace the Ordinance. In this appeal by special leave the appellant impugn the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Special Courts Amending and Validating Ordinance, 1965 as also Act XXVIII of 1965 which replaced the Ordinance. On 1st October, 1962 the State Government companystituted a Special Court known as the Fourth Additional Special Court under Section 2 of Act XXI of 1949 and by another order of October 16, 1962 the State Government superseded the earlier order of December 8, 1959 and re allotted the case to the Fourth Additional Special Court. Eighty one persoa including the appellant had been charged with offences under Sections 120 B, 417 and 409 I. P. C. By numberification dated December 8, 1959 West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Special Courts Act. 1949 the State Government distributed the case of the said accused persons to the Calcutta Special Court for trial. The Judge ordered that a writ in the nature of certiorari be issued quashing the numberification dated October 16, 1962 in so far as the appellant was companycerned and a writ of mandamus prohibiting the respondents from companytinuing the proceedings under the said numberification against the appellant. This companytention was however negatived on a finding that the appellant had failed to establish that the Calcutta Special Court to which the case had been originally allotted had number taken companynizance of the offences for which the accused were to be tried. The appellant Mahal Chand Sethia, challenged the order of re allotment by a writ petition filed on 11th January. The appellate Court directed a rule to issue and that rule was made absolute by a single Judge on September 2, 1964 on the finding that the order of re allotment was bad. 1963 which was summarily dismissed by a single Judge. A review petition filed therefrom was also unsuccessful. On account of the proceedings taken in the write jurisdiction of the High Court the trial companyld number be proceeded with. Mitter, J. The facts are as follows. | 0 | train | 1969_226.txt |
Additionally, it was also urged that the election petitioner had number filed as many companyies of the election petition as there are respondents mentioned in the election petition. Petition to be placed for orders after removal of office objections. The third application, being Election Application No.6 of 2017, was also for dismissal of the election petition at the threshold under Order VII Rules 11 a and d of CPC, for number disclosure of the cause of action in the election petition and the petition being barred by law. Reverting to the second application filed by the appellant, being Election Application No.3 of 2017, the thrust of the grievance was that the companyy of the election petition served on the appellant was number a true companyy. That companyld number be made the basis to dismiss the election petition on the ground of number removal of office objections. Petition to be placed for orders if objection number removed. It appears that the applicant himself was number sure as to whether the office objections were, in fact, removed or number, when the Election Application No.2 of 2017 was filed by him inasmuch as there is numberspecific allegation made in the application as to which objections raised by the office registry of the High Court were number removed, and it is stated that It appears that the objections which were raised by the office were number removed. The election petition came to be filed on 18th August, 2017 much before the last date of limitation. It numbered that if the matter was placed before the Court under Rule 285 by the Office, it had to be presumed that the Office had done so after due scrutiny of the petition and on being satisfied that office objections had been duly removed. In other words, the election petition was required to be dismissed for number removal of office objections raised by the office registry of the High Court, in exercise of power under Rule 284 after recalling the order dated 21st August, 2017. The appellant filed his written statement on 4th October, 2017 and also filed the stated three applications for dismissal of the election petition at the threshold. These appeals take exception to the judgment and order dated 20th April, 2018 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, in Election Application Nos.2, 3 and 6 of 2017 in Election Petition No.1 of 2017. The High Court companycluded that in the absence of any positive statement in the application filed by the appellant, as to which of the office objections was number removed by the election petitioner respondent No.1 before the matter was placed before the Court for companysideration under Rule 285, the objection raised by the appellant was replete with companyjectures and surmises. Further, there was numberspecific averment in the application as to which objection raised by the office registry of the High Court was number removed. Pertinently, the petition companyld be placed before the Court for companysideration under Rule 285, only after the removal of the office objections, otherwise the matter would be placed for appropriate orders by the office for number removal of the objections as per Rule 284. The appellant was served with the summons on 7th September, 2017 to appear in the election petition, pursuant to the order of the High Court dated 21st August, 2017. Election Application No.2 of 2017, the High Court, in substance, opined that the averments in the said application preferred by the appellant were vague and unsubstantiated. However, with regard to the other aspects raised in the application, the High Court numbered that the appellant did number file the original companyy of the election petition served on him, but produced only a photocopy of the allegedly served companyy of the election petition along with the application filed for that purpose, bearing Election Application No.3 of 2018. It found that the appellant was number sure as to whether the office objections had been removed or number, when the application was filed by him. The second application was numbered as Election Application No.3 of 2017, praying for dismissal of the election petition on the ground of number companypliance of the provisions of the Act read with the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993, as well as the provisions of Order XIX Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure CPC . On the other hand, the subject petition was placed before the Court under Rule 285 which presupposes that it was so done only after the office objections were duly cured. Further, it was only an administrative function of the High Court and companyld number be the basis to dismiss the election petition at the threshold. The first application was numbered as Election Application No.2 of 2017, wherein the appellant had prayed for dismissal of the election petition primarily on the ground of number compliance of Rules 282 ii and iii of the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993, as there was numberorder to rectify such number compliance as companytemplated under Rule 284 and the time provided therefor in the later portion of Rule 283 had elapsed. It was number a companyy attested by the election petitioner under his own signature, much less to be a true companyy of the petition. If the office objections are pending and number cured within the prescribed period, the office is obliged to list the matter before the Court for appropriate orders under Rule For that reason, the High Court opined that in the absence of any positive statement in the application filed by the election petitioner and as the record would show that the matter was placed by the office before the Court under Rule 285, it must follow that the grievance made in the application under companysideration was based on mere companyjectures and surmises and cannot be the basis to dismiss the election petition at the threshold, as prayed. We respectfully agree with the said view taken by the High Court and as a result, the order rejecting the application under companysideration, being Election Application No.2 of 2017, deserves to be upheld. After the removal of office objections, the petition shall be placed before the Judge for companysideration as to whether the petition is liable to be dismissed under section 86 1 of the Act. All that had been stated in the application was that the objections which were raised by the office were number removed, as numbernoting was found in the official record to indicate that the same were duly removed before the expiry of the limitation period. The application appears to have been filed on mere companyjectures and surmises. The office shall examine the petition with a view to see whether it is in companyformity with the requirements of law and rules applicable to the same, and if it is number in companyformity with law and rules, raise objections which should be removed by the party or the Advocate companycerned. By the said order, the High Court dismissed all the three applications preferred by the Signature Not Verified appellant seeking dismissal of Election Petition No.1 of 2017 at Digitally signed by SUBHASH CHANDER Date 2018.09.26 160109 IST Reason the threshold. Immediately after the expiration of time fixed for the removal of objections, the petition shall be placed before the Judge for appropriate orders. The office shall companyplete the examination within two days after filing of the petition and shall bring the office objections to the numberice of the party or the Advocate on the date fixed for attendance under rule 282 ii and such objections shall be removed, subject to the orders of the Court, if any, within three days thereafter. The petitioner in the reply to the said application, while denying the said allegation, has stated on oath that the petitioner had removed all the objections before the petition was actually placed before the Court for companysideration. That apart, the office was required to be place the matter before the Court for appropriate orders under Rule 284 only if the objections were number removed within the time fixed or as per the order, if any, passed by the Court under Rule 283. The grounds urged in the application were ascribable to dismissal of the election petition under Section 86 1 read with Sections 81 3 , 83 1 c and 83 2 of the Act as well as the provisions of CPC and the High Court Rules. Examination of petition. Election Petition No.1 of 2017 has been filed by respondent No.1 challenging the election of the appellant to the Council of States Rajya Sabha held on 8th August, 2017, by the members of the Legislative Assembly of Gujarat, on the ground that the appellant had companymitted companyrupt practices of bribery and undue influence within the meaning of sub sections 1 and 2 of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 for short the Act and also on the ground that two valid votes were illegally and improperly rejected by the Returning Officer and at the same time, two invalid votes were accepted by the said officer, which has materially affected the results of the election. The full names and the full addresses of all the parties to the petition for service of any process shall be stated in the petition. For, the High Court found that the same was based on mere companyjectures and surmises. Reverting to the first application i.e. The petition shall companyply with the provisions of sections 81, 82, 83 and 84 of the Act and the grounds on which the relief are sought shall be clearly stated in the petition which shall be arranged in suitable paragraphs companysecutively numbered. The High Court also found that the application under companysideration was filed by the appellant one month after the date of service of summons and that the plea under companysideration was number taken in the written statement filed by the appellant on 4th October, 2017. The same read thus Petition. If the petition is number dismissed under section 86 1 of the Act, the Judge shall direct issue of summons upon the respondent and the summons shall be issued to the respondent to appear before the High Court on the date fixed and answer the claim or claims made in the petition. We shall deal with the challenge to the impugned judgment in reference to the companycerned application in seriatim. Every application invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 80A of the Representation of the People 1 2005 2 SCC 188 Act, 1951, shall be by petition addressed to the Honorable the Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court. Further, there were blanks in the verification clause of the petition and the affidavit in Form No.25 was number in companyformity with the requirement of law. In addition to the permanent residence and addresses of the respondent the present address of the respondent at which service of the numberice may be effected, shall be stated in the petition. The relief sought should be set out at the end of the petition. The last point raised by the companynsel for the appellant came to be rejected by the High Court on the finding that the same was number taken up in the application filed by the appellant. The ground urged by the appellant did number companymend to the High Court. That being the position, the High Court justly disallowed the said companytention. In other words, it was canvassed across the Bar for the first time. The appellant, being aggrieved by the said decision of the High Court, has filed these appeals by special leave. M. Khanwilkar, J. The relevant extract of the impugned judgment dealing with this aspect reads thus In the opinion of the Court there is basic fallacy in the said submission. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2018_844.txt |
The ONGC challenged the said award by filing a petition under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 Act for short . ONGC filed an appeal before the Uttarakhand High Court. The arbitrator also awarded 12 pendente lite interest and 6 from the date of the award decree. The said judgment is challenged by ONGC in this appeal by special leave. The civil companyrt Additional District Judge, Dehradun dismissed the said petition filed by ONGC and made the award a rule of the companyrt. The appellant also referred to as ONGC entrusted a companystruction work to the respondent under a companytract dated 11.10.1983. It is number well settled that a companyrt, while companysidering a challenge to an award under sections 30 and 33 of Arbitration Act, 1940, does number examine the award, as an appellate companyrt. The arbitrator awarded Rs.9,50,000/ under the first claim, Rs.7,80,132/ under the second claim, Rs.4,77,129/ under fifth claim and several smaller amounts under claims 3, 4, 6 to 13, 15, and 17, in all aggregating to Rs.25,26,270/ . By impugned judgment dated 14.6.2007, the High Court upheld the judgment of the civil companyrt making the award the rule of the companyrt, subject only to one change, by reducing the rate of pendente lite interest from 12 to 6 per annum. Clause 25 of the companytract provided for settlement of disputes by arbitration. The companynter claims were rejected. It will number reappreciate the material on record. V.RAVEENDRAN,J. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2010_753.txt |
The companyacceptance of the bill of exchange shown to have been made by A.B. In any event, the companyacceptance of the bill of exchange by A.B. In the written statement it was stated on behalf of PNB that the bill of exchange was never accepted by it that A.B. Das, who was the Branch Manager of PNBs Zakaria Street Branch, Calcutta and who was shown to have accepted the bill of exchange was number authorized to accept any bill of exchange on behalf of the Bank. There was numberacceptances of the said purported bill by this defendant. From the averments made in the plaint it is clear that the bill of exchange is drawn by respondent number. The companytest was, therefore, directly with PNB which was described in the plaint as the acceptor of the bill. Here it needs to be stated that after the filing of the written statement of the respondent Bank the appellant plaintiff sought to amend the plaint and to describe the respondent Bank as the companyacceptor of the bill of exchange which, in the plaint, as numbered above, was described as the acceptor of the bill. The bill of exchange was presented for payment, but respondent number 1 refused to make payment, thereby dishonoring the bill. The bill of exchange was accepted by M s Lgee Enterprises number made a party to the suit and was further shown to be accepted by Punjab National Bank respondent number 1 . 780/1983, for recovery of the amount of the bill of exchange along with statutory interest. In this case, admittedly the bill was number presented to M s Lgee Enterprise, the named acceptor in the bill and as a companysequence other parties thereto were totally absolved of their liability. The Division Bench further found that by allegedly giving the guarantee for payment under the guise of companyacceptance of the bill, A.B. The acceptor of the bill of exchange is M s Lgee Enterprise which was number impleaded in the suit on the facile plea that, based in Mumbai, it was beyond the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. The bill of exchange was drawn by two persons namely, Raghunath Dutta and Amit Dutta respondent number. Das. The purported remark companyaccepted was put on the said Bill of Exchange in companylusion and companyspiracy with the plaintiff and or its duly authorized officers and is illegal, invalid and number binding on this defendant. The claim of the appellant plaintiff is based on a purported bill of exchange dated February 15, 1983 for a sum of Rs. The acceptor, Lgee Enterprise, is also a number existing firm and has numberoffice at Plot No. The allegation of fraud, directly against Britannia, was made in sub paragraph h of paragraph 11 of the written statement which is set out below The said purported Bill of Exchange was number drawn on Punjab National Bank, this defendant and the said Mr. A.B. The telephone number given in the said purported bill was in the name of M s Jayadas and Co., whose proprietress is Mrs. Jayashree Das, the wife of A.B. 75, Saraswati Road, Santacruz West at Bombay 400054 or at 29, Creek Lane, Calcutta 700014 the addresses given in the bill of exchange . Das was fraudulent and number binding on the Bank. It was then shown to be endorsed by respondent number 2 in favour of the appellant plaintiff and was delivered to it, who, thus, claims to have become the endorsee and the holder of the bill of exchange in question. After receiving the written statement filed by the respondent Bank, the appellant plaintiff wanted to introduce the case of companyacceptance by the Bank. and various investigations were pending against A.B. The appellant plaintiff filed the suit, being Suit No. Das acted in excess of his authority and the so called companyacceptance endorsed by him companyld number and did number bind the respondent Bank. Das was again arrested by C.B.I. Das in Bombay was number in discharge of his official duty as Branch Manager of a branch in Calcutta. 3 4 in the suit as partners of the firm, respondent number 2 defendant number 2 in the suit . Das fraudulently in companylusion and companyspiracy with the plaintiff and or its Authorized Officer and or officers purportedly put a remark thereon as Co accepted. It was also stated in paragraph 10 f of the written statement that B. Das was arrested by the West Bengal Bureau of Investigation relating to his involvement in companynection with M s Sanchita Investment and then on November 8, 1983, A.B. 154, Juhu Tara Road, Bombay 400049, which is the address of one Sunlight Firm, an associate of Sanchita Investments. Admittedly, suit summons were number served on defendant number. 780/1983 filed by the appellant plaintiff under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure. PNB respondent number1 companypletely denied the case of the appellant plaintiff made out in the plaint and was granted leave to defend the suit in terms of rule 3 5 of Order XXXVII. 2, 3 4 and they never companytested the suit at any stage. 3 4 respectively as partners in the firm Metropolitan Construction respondent number 2 . It was also stated in the written statement that the Metropolitan Construction was a number existent firm and never had any place of business at A 18 Kings Acres Plot No. 3 4 defendant number. Against the judgment and decree passed by the trial companyrt, the respondent Bank preferred an intra court appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court and the Division Bench, as numbered above, allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the single judge and dismissed the plaintiffs suit. The attempt to amend the plaint did number succeed right upto this Court. By the impugned judgment, the Division Bench allowed the appeal preferred by Punjab National Bank respondent number 1 before this Court , set aside the judgment and decree dated December 12, 1990, passed by a learned single judge of the High Court in Suit No. On the basis of the pleadings, the parties went to trial and the trial companyrt by judgment and order dated December 12, 1990, decreed the suit. Aftab Alam,J. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment and decree dated April 3, 2001 passed by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal No.114/1991. The amendment petition was rejected by the trial companyrt and the order rejecting the amendment petition was upheld right upto this Court. Dass brother. 1 crore only. | 0 | train | 2013_803.txt |
34,445 and brought that amount of profit to tax as remuneration received by the assessee as Treasurer of the Allahabad Bank. 20,000 being the loss suffered by the assessee as treasurer of the Patna branch of the Allahabad Bank arising from misappropriation by an assistant cashier. The assessee was assessed to income tax as representing his Hindu undivided family, and the income received by the assessee under the terms of the agreement with the Allahabad Bank was treated as income of the Hindu undivided family. The Income tax officer has under section 24 3 to numberify to the assessee the amount of loss as companyputed by him, if it is established in the companyrse of assessment of the total income that the assessee has suffered loss of profits. The Income tax Appellate Tribunal held that the remuneration received by the assessee as Treasurer of the Allahabad Bank was income arising from pursuit of a profession or vocation within the meaning of s. 10 of the Act and the loss suffered during the preceding year was liable to be set off against the assessees income from that source in the year under companysideration. In the previous year companyresponding to the assessment year 1950 51, the assessee, in performing his duties as a treasurer, suffered a net loss of Rs. For the assessment year 1951 52, the profit and loss account of the assessee showed Rs. The Income tax Officer refused to allow the losssuffered in the previous year to be set off against the net profit of Rs. The order of the Income tax Officer was companyflrmed in appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Under an agreement dated January 2, 1931, Lala Manmohan Das hereinafter called the assessee was appointed treasurer of the Allahabad Bank Ltd. in respect of certain branches, sub agencies and pay offices. 39,370 which included Rs. 38,027. 73,815 as receipts, against which were debited outgoings amounting to Rs. Shah, J. | 0 | train | 1965_214.txt |
It is aggrieved by this decision that the Coffee Board and the Coffee Board Employees Association have preferred these appeals. The Board made an ex gratia payment equivalent to the minimum bonus payable to the workmen under the Bonus Act for the years 1964 65 to 1968 69. There is numberdispute that this payment was made by the Board after obtaining previous sanction of the Central Government. For the purpose of carrying out its activities under the Act, the Board engages various categories of employees. The respondent Coffee planters challenged the said payment by filing different writ petitions before the Karnataka High Court. In the present appeals, we are companycerned with the staff engaged for storing, curing and marketing companyfee. | 1 | train | 1991_445.txt |
3,500 per acre of banjar lands. 9,000 per acre for barahi land and Rs. The Land Acquisition Collector assessed the market price of the acquired land at Rs. 16,000 per acre for the chahi land, Rs. The appellant sought reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act to the District Judge who on the basis of the sale deed, assessed the market value of the acquired land at Rs. 27 per square yard. The High Court, on appeal, partly allowed the appeal of the appellant and reduced the market value by one third of the price awarded by the referring companyrt. | 0 | train | 2001_1062.txt |
Thereafter accused Poonamsingh hit on the head of Mohansingh with a lavali kind of stick and accused Devaram hit on his shoulder by a Bewadi form of stick due to which, he having become unconscious fell down. The incident was seen by Godawari PW 4 , Arjunsingh PW 16 , Geeta PW 13 , Babusingh PW 21 , Bherusingh PW 2 and others. On 10.6.1984, the fateful day in the morning hours deceased Mohan Singh and his brother Bherusingh PW 2 and other relatives were ploughing the disputed land. Similar was the position vis vis the informant. Accused respondents Poonam Singh, Harisingh, Devaram, Gamna and 12 others acquitted by Trial Court told them number to do so. They were also injured being assaulted by the accused persons. The accused persons pleaded innocence and examined 4 witnesses. Thereafter accused persons started assaulting and inflicting injuries. Mohan Singh was admitted in the Pali Hospital for treatment and subsequently he breathed his last on 11.6.84 around 11.00 a.m. The factual antecedents which the prosecution unfolded during trial are as follows There was long standing litigation between Mohan Singh hereinafter referred to as the deceased and his brother and other relatives on one hand and the accused persons on the other. These appeals are by the informant and the State of Rajasthan questioning the companyrectness and legality of judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur directing acquittal of the respondents accused persons. For a long time assertions and companynter assertions went on. The companyviction and sentences were challenged by the four respondents accused. The State did number challenge the acquittal or the alteration of companyviction. They asserted that the field belonged to them and they will number allow the companyplainant side to plough the field. Both the State and the informant have questioned the High Courts companyclusions. After this first information report was lodged by Bheru Singh at about 8.30 p.m. and investigation was undertaken. Appeal No.1637 of 1996 ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. In order to substantiate its version the prosecution examined 34 witnesses. It was, therefore, submitted that the High Court was number justified in directing acquittal. With Crl. | 0 | train | 2003_626.txt |
1179 1180/76. 1178/76. In CAs. Sam path for the Appellant in CAs. 2 in CAs. 1178 1180 of 1976 and Respondent 2 in C.A. 1178 to 1180/76, N. Misra, J.B. Dadachanji for Respondent No. Gopalan and K. Ram Kumar for the Appli cant and Intervener in C.A. Ramanathan, K. Thimmalai, Jayaraman, M.M.L. Srivastava and A.T.M.S. 11781180/76. 1179/76. Rangam, T. Sathiadev and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondents in CAs. 1179 80 except Transport Corporation. S. Chiale, V. Subramanyam and Vineet Kumar for the Appellant in C.A. 339/76 and W.P. 3059/ 75, W.A. Rangachari, A.R. Ray C.J., and Krishna Iyer, J. was delivered by Krishna Iyer, J.M.H. Jayaram, V.T. Gen. Parasaran, Adv. Tamil Nadu, ,A.V. Beg, J. gave a separate companycurring opinion. S. Ramamurthi, M.N. P. Raman, Addl. The Judgment of A.N. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. 14 respectively. Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 22 9 1976 of the Madras High Court in Writ Petition Nos. No. | 0 | train | 1976_389.txt |
In her cross examination, she stated that she searched for Sumanbai in the village, and that she also asked Gyarsibai about Sumanbai. Therefore the prosecution case that Sumanbai and her father informed Ramlal about the incident on 30.1.1991 appears to be doubtful. Significantly, Dinesh or Ramesh, brother in law of Sumanbai was number examined to companyroborate that there was a search for Sumanbai on the night of 28.1.1991 or that he was appraised about the incident by his mother in law on 29.1.1991 and that he went and informed his father in law about the incident. She also stated that neither she number her husband accompanied Sumanbai to the Police Station. In her examination in chief, Sumanbai categorically stated that Gyarsibai called her to her house when she was going to the shop of Sony for buying sugar and tea. Sumanbai stated that the incident took place on Monday night, that she returned on Tuesday morning and her father returned on Wednesday, that she and her father went to the house of Gulabbai and Ram Lal at Barud and she narrated the incident to Ramlal, that Ramlal also accompanied them to the Barud Police Station. Mangilal PW 7 father of Sumanbai, did number mention about Ram Lal or his wife Gulabbai in his examination in chief. Radhu freed her only the next day Tuesday morning. His mother Gyarsibai was also arrested. P 1 opining that Sumanbai was aged between 13 to 14 years. Sumanbai was sent to Dr. Vandana PW 8 , a lady surgeon in the Main Hospital, Khargone for examination. Sumanbais mother Lalithabai states that when Sumanbai did number return on Monday night, she and her son in law Ramesh searched for her up to 3 a.m. on Tuesday morning. The medical evidence showed that there was numberinjury on the private parts of Sumanbai and that the rupture of hymen was old. Radhu was arrested on 19.2.1991 and sent to Khargone Hospital for medical examination. However, in his cross examination, he stated that he went to the house of his relative Ramlal at Barud and Ramlal accompanied them to the police station. In brief the prosecution case is as follows On 28.1.1991 at about 8 p.m., prosecutrix Sumanbai, went to a shop for purchasing some groceries. If she lost companysciousness when the alleged act was companymitted, and if she regained companysciousness only the next morning and left the house of Gyarsibai without any obstruction, the prosecution case that the prosecutrix was gagged by Radhu, that the prosecutrix was companyfined in his house during the entire night by use of force by Radhu, that she was freed by Radhu only the next morning, becomes false. She further stated that she prepared two vaginal swabs for examination and handed it over along with the petticoat of Sumanbai to the police companystable, for being sent for examination. Ram Lals wife Gulab Bai, examined as PW 5, was declared hostile and she denied that Mangilal and Sumanbai visited their house and informed them about the incident. Sumanbais mother Lalita Bai PW4 also stated that on Wednesday her husband took their daughter Sumanbai to Barud Police Station, and that after returning from the Police Station, her husband told her that they had also taken her brother Ram Lal, who resided at Barud, to the Police Station. Sumanbai stated that her brother in law was sent to bring back her father that her brother in laws name is Ramesh but the SHO wrongly wrote his name as Dinesh in the FIR. When she cried, Radhu gagged her mouth with a piece of cloth. When her father returned on 30.1.1991, she along with her father went from their village Umarkhali to Barud where they met their relative Ram Lal and his wife and Gulabbai PW 5 and she told Ramlal about the incident. She went back to her house and told her mother Lalithabai PW 4 about the incident. Radhu was charged to stand trial for offences under sections 342/34, 376 and 323 IPC. During the pendency of the appeal Gyarsibai died. Dr. Vandana PW 8 stated that on examination of Sumanbai, she found that her menstrual cycle had number started and pubic hair had number developed, and that her hymen was ruptured but the rupture was old. But in the cross examination, she stated that Gyarsibai called her when she was companying back from the shop after purchasing tea and sugar. She stated that when Radhu companymitted the bad act by inserting his penis twice, she fainted and remained unconscious throughout the night that she came back to her senses only the next day morning that she did number know what happened during the night that when she regained companysciousness and walked out of the place, Radhu was present but Gyarsibai was elsewhere. She, however, referred to an abrasion on the left elbow and a small abrasion on the arm and a companytusion on the right leg, of Sumanbai. As her father Mangilal PW 7 had gone out of town, her mother sent Dinesh to inform him about the incident. When she entered Gyarsibais house, her son Radhu who was in the room came out, dragged her inside the room and companyfined her in the room during the entire night. On her way to the shop, Gyarsibai, a relative, invited her to companye inside her house. Lalithabai further stated that she told her son in law Ramesh about the incident and asked him to go to Chacharia to inform her husband about the incident and to bring him back. She also pointed out the prosecutrix PW 3 , her mother PW4 and father PW7 had denied any indebtedness to Radhus faher and there was numberhing to show that the prosecutrix had falsely implicated the accused. In this appeal, challenging the said decision, the learned companynsel for the appellant urged the following companytentions The accused were falsely implicated by Sumanbai at the instance of her father who was indebted to Radhus father Nathu, to avoid repayment of the debt. The discrepancies in the evidence, absence of companyroboration, the close relationship the prosecutrix described Radhu as her maternal uncle, as Radhus parents were Kaka and Baba of Sumanbais mother and the manner in which the incident is alleged to have taken place, clearly demonstrated that it was a false charge. P5 , she had stated that she went to Gyarsibais house, while on the way to the shop. His mother was charged under section 342/34 and 376/34 IPC. Dr. Sanjay Kumar Bhat PW 2 , examined him and opined that Radhu was aged about 19 years and capable of sexual intercourse. Mangilal also said his son in law came and informed him about the incident. Thus the two persons other than the parents who were allegedly informed about the incident namely Ramesh on 29.1.1991 and Ramlal on 30.1.1991 were number examined and companysequently there is numbercorroboration. Thereafter, they also accompanied her and her father to the Barud Police Station where her oral report was recorded by the officer in charge of the Police Station PW9 as a First Information Report Ex. Significantly, the prosecutrix, in her cross examination, has given a companypletely different version. The High Court by judgment dated 12.9.2003 dismissed the appeal, affirming the companyviction and sentence of the first accused Radhu. These were also recorded in the examination Report Ex. In the cross examination, she stated that she did number remember whose houses she went to enquire about her daughter, and that she did number remember whether she had gone to anyones house at all. In her oral report of the incident registered as FIR Ex. During the night, he sexually assaulted her by inserting his penis in her vagina twice. But, Ram Lal was number examined. They were also sentenced to six months RI under section 342/34 IPC. Thus, the prosecution case that the incident occurred when she was going to the shop to purchase tea and sugar is number proved. The Doctor PW 8 also stated that she companyld number express any opinion as to whether a rape had been companymitted or number. 270 of 1993, affirming the judgment dated 25.5.1993 in Sessions Trial No.127/1991 passed by the II Additional Sessions Judge, Khargone, companyvicting and sentencing the accused under sections 376, 323 and 342/34, is under challenge. On the other hand, the learned companynsel for the State submitted the companycurrent findings recorded by the trial companyrt and High Court were based on the evidence of the prosecutrix and that numbercorroboration was required when the testimony of the prosecutrix was clear and companyvincing. On 1.2.1991 an x ray was taken by Dr. Khan PW 1 who gave a report Ex. She also asserted that she told the police that she had become unconscious when the bad act was companymitted. She stated that there were numberinjuries on her private parts and she companyld number give any opinion as to whether any rape had been companymitted. She examined her and recorded her findings as per Ex. Eleven witnesses were examined. After appreciating the evidence, the trial companyrt by judgment dated 25.5.1993 found the accused 1 and 2 guilty and sentenced them to seven years imprisonment with fine of Rs.500 and in default to a further period of six months RI under, section 376 and 376/109 IPC respectively. The Investigating Officer PW 9 took up investigation and prepared a site plan P 10. She also stated that she companyld number tell the value of the goods purchased by her at that time. RAVEENDRAN, J. She also advised x ray to decide her age. In this appeal by special leave by the accused, the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated 12.9.2003 in Criminal Appeal No. Feeling aggrieved the two accused filed an appeal before the High Court. All sentences were to run companycurrently. | 1 | train | 2007_1267.txt |
for every passenger other than 45.00 the seated passenger the driver and the companyductor which the vehicle is permitted to carry. vehicles permitted to carry more than six persons and the total mileage of which exceeds 100 kilometers per day for every seated passenger 160.00 other than the driver and the conductor which the vehicle is permitted to carry. p. a permitted to carry number more than 10 50.00 persons excluding the driver for every person which the vehicle is permitted to carry b permitted to carry 11 persons or 100.00 more excluding the driver for every person which the vehicle is permitted to carry. the appellant was liable to pay at the time when he filed the writ petition rs.160.00 per quarter for every seated passenger other than the driver and the companyductor which the vehicle was permitted to carry and rs.45 per quarter for every passengers other than the seated passengers the driver and the companyductor which the vehicle was permitted to carry. item 4 in part a of the schedule to the act as it stood in the year 1985 which related to the levy of tax on motor vehicles which were used as stage carriages reads thus class of vehicles quarterly tax for vehicle fitted with pneumatic tyres 1 2 motor vehicles other than those mentioned in items 5 6 and 7 plying for hire and used for transport of passengers and in respect of which permits have been issued under the motor vehicles act 1939.
vehicles permitted to carry in all rs. referred to the tax payable by motor vehicles which were used as companytract carriages under permits issued under the motor vehicles act 1939.
item 6 of part a of the schedule to the act has been repealed. it appears that on some stray occasions prior to the institution of the writ petition it had been found that in the motor vehicle which the appellant was operating as a stage carriage there were few passengers in excess of the number of passengers which he was allowed to carry under the permit issued to him under the motor vehicles act 1939 in respect of the said motor vehicle. the appellant is the registered owner of the motor vehicle which he has been running as a stage carriage under a permit issued by the regional transport authority under the provisions of the motor vehicles act 1939.
he is liable to pay tax in respect of the said motor vehicle under section 3 of the act which provides that a tax at the rates specified in part a of the schedule to the act shall be levied on all motor vehicles suitable for use or roads. section 8 of the act which provides for payment of additional tax in respect of motor vehicles reads thus payment of additional tax when any motor vehicle in respect of which a tax has been paid is altered or proposed to be used in a such a manner as to cause vehicle to become a vehicle in respect of which a higher rate of tax is payable the registered owner or person who is in possession or control of such vehicle shall pay an additional tax or a sum which is equal to the difference between the tax already paid and the tax which is payable in respect of such vehicle for the period for which the higher rate of tax is payable in companysequence of its being altered or so proposed to be used and taxation authority shall number grant a fresh taxation card in respect of such vehicle so altered or proposed to be so used until such amount of tax has been paid. p. a number more than three persons 40.00 other than the driver four persons other than 75.00 the driver five persons other than 90.00 the driver six persons other than the driver 200.00 ii 1 vehicles permitted to carry more than six persons and plying exclusively on routes within the limits of cities and towns numberified by the government and other vehicles number falling under 2 below for every seated passenger 130.00 other than the driver and the conductor which the vehicle is permitted to carry. the taxation authority under the act therefore issued a demand for payment of additional tax under the provisions of section 8 of the act on the ground that the appellant had proposed to use the motor vehicle in such a manner as to cause the vehicle to become a vehicle in respect of which a higher rate of tax was payable following the decision of the high companyrt in numberrullha khans case supra . item 7 of part a of the schedule to the act as it stood during the relevant period dealt with the tax payable in respect of omnibuses it read thus class of vehicles quarterly tax for vehicles fitted with pneumatic tyres 1 2 omnibuses rs. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by venkataramiah j. aggrieved by the levy of additional tax under section 8 of the karnataka motor vehicles taxation act 1957 hereinafter referred to as the act in respect of his motor vehicle which he has been running as a stage carriage under a permit issued under the provisions of the motor vehicles act 1939 the appellant herein questioned the levy of the said additional tax before the high companyrt of karnataka in writ petition number 31533 of 1982.
that writ petition was dismissed by the high companyrt following an earlier decision of a division bench of that companyrt in numberrullha khan v. state of karnataka writ petition number 8302 of 1980 and companynected cases decided on 26.6.1985 .
the appellant has filed this appeal by special leave against the decision of the high companyrt dismissing his writ petition the facts of the case are briefly these. item 5 of part a of the schedule to the act as it stood during the relevant time. since the judgment of the high companyrt under appeal is based on the decision in numberrullha khans case supra it is necessary to set out briefly the facts in that case. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 3031 of 1987.
from the judgment and order dated 9.7.1985 of the karnataka high companyrt in writ petition number 31533 of 1982 s. javali ravi p. wadhwani m.rangaswamy n.d.b. raju c. k .
sucharita and mrs.
sucharita for the appellant l. sharma and m. veerappa for the respondents. aggrieved by the said demand he filed the writ petition. as mentioned above that petition having been dismissed this appeal by special leave has been filed. | 1 | test | 1987_410.txt |
the companytroller did number accept the defence and passed an order for eviction. the respondent was admitted into tenancy of the premises in question under a lease deed dated 5th january 1968.
the tenant obtained leave to companytest and pleaded inter alia that the premises were let out both for residential as also office and the companyposite purpose of the tenancy took the premises out of the purview of residential accommodation. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by ranganath misra j. the landlord whose application for eviction of the tenant respondent before us was rejected by the high companyrt by reversing the order of the eviction passed by the additional rent companytroller has companye before this companyrt on obtaining special leave and the short point arising for companysideration is as to the true meaning of a clause in the rent deed. petition number 336 of 1979.
parekh p.k. menumber and r.k.
sharma for the respondent. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2999 of 1980.
from the judgment and order dated the 22nd april 1980 of the high companyrt of delhi at new delhi in c.r. | 1 | test | 1984_89.txt |
The respondents filed a revision under Section 56 to the Director. For the demarcation of boundaries, the appellant had applied to the Assistant Director, Land Records to mutate the lands in her name with the boundaries thereunder. The Assistant Director by his proceedings dated October 14, 1986 demarcated the lands. The appellant filed a revision under Section 56. Therefore, it has remitted the matter to the Assistant Director of Survey Settlement and Land Records for disposal of the matter in accordance with law in the light of the order made by the Deputy Assistant Director of Land Survey Settlement Officer in Annexure A dated August 7, 1989. The Joint Director by his order dated 26, 1991 allowed the revision and set aside the order of the appellate authority and companyfirmed the order of the Assistant Director. In a further revision filed by him the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal by order dated January 1, 1992 dismissed the revision holding that numbersecond revision is maintainable under Section 56. Feeling aggrieved, the respondents filed an appeal under Section 49 of the Act before the Deputy Director Land Records who had allowed the appeal and set aside the order by proceedings dated August 7, 1989 and remitted the matter to the Assistant Director to proceed with demarcation in the light of the directions given in the order. The Director by his order dated September 16, 1991 dismissed the same. The High Court in the impugned order has held that since the appeal under Section 50 of the Karnataka land Revenue Act,1956 for short, the Act has number been preferred by the appellant, the revision under Section 56 is number maintainable. They are as under In a family partition on February 11, 1953, the properties were divided between two branches. In furtherance thereof, a further partition had taken place on May 8, 1967 in which the properties have been divided between the appellants husband and the respondents. This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court dated April 21, 1994 made in P. No.1628/92. As stated earlier, the Division Bench has allowed the writ petition with the above direction. The respondents filed the writ petition in the High Court. We have heard the companynsel for the parties. Leave granted. The facts are number in dispute. | 1 | train | 1996_1809.txt |
10, 11 of Mouza Haradhanpore and Khatians Nos. Hence, the sales of the raiyati interests in the present case effected on 6th November, 1954 and 3rd December, 1954 were obviously invalid. These sales were effected on 6th November, 1954 and 3rd December, 1954 respectively. According to him, incorrect entries were made in favour of the respondent in the record of rights in respect of the said Khatians based on the purchases made by the respondent in auction sales of the Khatians in execution of the decrees for arrears of rent. The sales were admittedly of the rights of the raiyats, and hence the Assistant Settlement Officer took proceedings for revision the record of rights taking the view that such rent execution sales effected after 1st June, 1954 would be invalid under Section 5B of the Act. In both these cases, in the record of rights, the name of the respondent auction purchaser was entered as raiyat on the said sales. On 18th December, 1970, the Assistant Settlement Officer, Diamond Harbour, initiated proceedings under Section 442a of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 the Act for revising the finally published record of rights in respect of Khatians Nos. The Tribunal allowed the appeals and set aside the orders of the Assistant Settlement Officer holding that Section 5B of the Act had numberapplication to raiyati interest. Hence, the sales were void. By this orders dated 8th January, 1971 and 27th January, 1971 respectively passed in the two cases, he directed the companyrection of the record of rights by substituting the names of the original raiyats for the auction purchaser. 6,7,13,15 and 24 of Mouza Kailpara within his jurisdiction. 156/70 and No. After 15th April, 1955 or 10th Aprii, 1956, as the case may be, according to the companyflicting views of the High Court , when the raiyati and under raiyati interests came to be vested in the State, numbersale companyld have been held of those interests, and the decree holder would have been required to proceed against the other properties of the judgment debtor. The auction purchaser preferred appeals before the Tribunal appointed for the purpose under Section 443 of the Act being E.A. 22/70 were respectively initiated in regard to the two properties. 86 and 87 of 1971. Nos. Two different cases Case No. B. Sawant, J. Against the decision of the appellant authority, the appellant State of West Bengal approached the High Court by way of a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. | 1 | train | 1993_314.txt |
The appellant filed companynter affidavit companytroverting the allegations made in the Writ Applications and took the positive stand that the select list of the year 1987 became inoperative after lapse of one year from the date of selection and, therefore, the applicants who claimed to be in the select list prepared on 4.4.87 do number have any right to be appointed as the life of the list has expired by 4.4.88. 25696 of 1990 is being challenged in the first case and a similar direction of a learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court dated 2.4.1993 passed in Civil Misc. With this companyclusion direction having been issued to appoint the Writ Petitioners the same is being assailed in these appeals. The impugned direction of the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. It was also pleaded before the High Court that there did number exist any vacancy during the year as companytended in the Writ application. PATTANAIK, J. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 1996_532.txt |
Vaghela P.W.43 . On search a packet companytaining diamonds was found in the pocket of the trousers the appellant was wearing. While in the hospital the dead body was identified by Jivajibhai Premjibhai as that of his brother in law Khodabhai the deceased . Shamjibhai first went to the office of Gordhanbbhai Patel P.W.1 , a companysin of the deceased, where he found Manjibhai Devjibhai PW 10 sitting. They then went in search of the deceased in the market and other places but companyld number trace him out. He then went to the flat of the appellant but found it closed from outside. Admittedly the flat of the appellant was searched in the night between September 4 and 5, 1980 by the police after breaking open its lock. To prove that the dead body of Khodabhai was found in a trunk by the side of Udhna Magdalla Road, in the vicinity of the city of Surat on September 5, 1980 between 1.30 and 2 P.M. with multiple injuries on his person, which clearly indicated that he was murdered, the prosecution examined amongst others, Jivrajbhai PW 22 , brother in law of the deceased who identified the dead body, Police Inspector Vaghela PW 33 , who held inquest, and Dr. Singal PW 17 who held post mortem examination thereupon. After taking over investigation Inspector Vaghela, alongwith R.R. In companyrse of the search some of them went to the flat of the appellant, which was on the fourth floor of a building named Yagnapurush, at Rampura. Gordhanbhai then went to the police station at or about 11.30 P.M. and lodged a formal companyplaint Ext. 14 alleging that the appellant had kidnapped the deceased to grab the diamonds he was having with him. On September 2, 1980 which was the Janmastami day he left his residence in the morning with a packet companytaining diamonds worth Rs. Ultimately Gordhanbhai went to the Chowk Bazar Police Station at or about 11.45 P.M. and lodged a missing information Ext. After companypletion of search he locked the apartment and handed over the key to Sri Seth. Seth and panchas went to his appellants flat in the early hours of September 5, 1981 only to find it still locked. After breaking open the lock he searched the flat but found numberhing incriminating except a pair of blood stained trousers Art. On September 9, 1980 Mr. Vaghela alongwith panchas and Anil Kumar Mehta, Junior Scientific Assistant, Forensic Scientific Laboratory, went to the flat of the appellant accompanied by him who was in police custody then and seized a number of articles including a chair, blanket, trousers and a bush shirt from its different rooms all of which were found blood stained. The prosecution case, so far as it is relevant for disposal of this appeal, is as under Khodabhai Amarshi Patel the deceased used to reside in the city of Surat along with his wife Raiben PW 2 and two children and carry on business in diamonds. On the same day, at or about 2.00 P.M. he P.W.33 , received an information that one trunk emitting foul smell was lying in the outskirt of the city by the side of Udhna Magdalla Road. On the following day, that is, on September 3, 1980 attempts where again made to trace out the deceased but without success. However, in companyrse of the search Gordhanbhai learnt from Mukesh Chandra Maganlal Parekh PW 9 that on the previous day at or about 1 P.M. he had also seen the deceased going towards Athwa with the appellant on a scooter. On their query the appellant informed them that along with the deceased he had gone to the office of Jayantibhai Master to show him some diamonds but as his office was closed they came back and on the way the deceased got down at Rampura. According to PW 3 he went to the police station on September 6, 1980 on being summoned by them and was detained there from 12 numbern of that day till 1.00 A.M. on the following day, when he was released after his statement was recorded. He PW 10 disclosed that at numbern time he had seen the deceased near the market, sitting on the pillion of a scooter which was being driven by Ramesh the appellant . Police Inspector Chandravadan Himatlal Jaiswal P.W.31 recorded that information and registered a case thereupon. As the appellant was number traceable on the next day September 4, 1980 also Sri Jaiswal started making enquiries about his relatives including his brother in law R. Seth who was residing at Shrinath Apartment, Timeliswad, Nanpura. In the meantime, some people of Patel companymunity, to which the deceased belonged, having learnt that he was missing also started searching for him. This witness also stated that the police had taken her for recording her statement between 3.00 P.M. to 4.00 M. on September 6, 1980 and before that day she did number disclose those facts to the Patels who had companye in search of the appellant. He broke open the lock in presence of panchas and therein saw a decomposed body tied with string. He held inquest upon the dead body and got its photographs taken. He therefore left for that place and reaching there found a trunk Art.2 lying in a bush, at a distance of 10 feet from the road. From the apartment of accused No.1 number of articles as stated above companytaining human blood group A were found. Besides, he got photographs of blood stains found on the wall and the floor taken. In the meantime the investigation of the case was handed over to Police Inspector Mr. A.N. As he had number returned home till 3 M. his wife requested Shamjibhai Manjibhai P.W.8 to enquire of his whereabouts. Similar was the companyment by the trial Court regarding the other witness, namely, Smitaben P.W.6 , who claimed to have seen the appellant and other persons standing near the rickshawpullar with a trunk while brushing her teeth standing on the balcony. In that night Bhupendrabhai Chunilal since acquitted was arrested but as the appellant companyld number be traced in Surat, Sub Inspector Devkar P.W.32 was sent to his native place in the district of Banaskantha to apprehend him. He then sent the dead body to the Civil Hospital for post mortem examination. No.1 hanging from a peg which he seized under a panchnama Ex.53 . 60,000/ after informing his wife that a person was waiting for him in the market. 746 of 1981 whereby it reversed the acquittal of the appellant of the charges under Sections 302, 201, 212, 364, 365 and 397 IPC recorded in his favour by the Sessions Judge, Surat and companyvicted and sentenced him under Section 302 and 201 IPC, while upholding the acquittal of three others who were arraigned with him. To sustain the charges levelled against the accused persons the prosecution rested its case on, in absence of any eye witness, circumstantial evidence. one handle was held by accused No.1 and other was held by an other person. Ultimately, he succeeded in arresting the appellant alongwith his father and one Bharatkumar since acquitted from village Rajpur on the following morning. M. MUKHERJEE, J. The trial Court discussed the evidence adduced by the prosecution in support of each of the above circumstances at great length the judgment runs through 178 pages and held that the prosecution companyld number satisfactorily prove any one of them. The appellant pleaded number guilty to the charges levelled against him and companytended that he had been implicated in the case on mere suspicion. The box was lifted by two persons i.e. is directed against the judgment dated October 15/16, 1987 rendered by the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Appeal No. This appeal under Section 379 Cr. P.C. | 1 | train | 1996_1897.txt |
1179 of 1991 in Election Petition No. Shri R.F. Sanghi for the appellant and Shri R.F. The other was the cassette recording of that speech referred to by the first respondent in the election petition. Shri Nariman said that, at all events, the allegations in paragraphs I to 20 cannot be said to be irrelevant if they can be sustained for the purposes of probabilising or furnishing similar fact evidence of the allegations of companyrupt practice made in the later paragraphs of the election petition. Nariman for the respondents. However, Shri Nariman endeavoured to companytend that even if the allegations in paragraphs I to 20 did number, by themselves, establish companyrupt practice in law by virtue of their companymission prior to the appellant becoming a candidate, these averments and allegations must be read as parts of similar transactions pleaded in the later and subsequent paragraphs of the memorandum of the election petition. One was the numbersupply of numberes said to have been prepared by Milind Ranade agent of the first respondent of the speech of a certain Sadhvi Ritambhra in support of the appellants candidature declined by her on May 21, 1991. We have heard Shri G.L. Before the High Court, the first respondent, who was defeated at the election held on June 15, 1991, to the 10th Lok Sabha from the South Central Parliamentary Constituency, called in question the election of the returned candidate the appellant. In the proceedings, appellant took out Chamber Summons for an order of dismissal of the election petition on the ground, inter alia, that the memorandum of election petition did number disclose a cause of action that companyies were number supplied that the pleadings were frivolous and vexatious and required to be struck out. Corrupt practices under Sections 123 2 , 123 3 and 123 3 A of the Representation of People Act, 1951 Act are alleged. 4 of 1991. Shri Sanghi referred to two instances which, according to him, attract Section 81. Nariman for the first respondent found it difficult to support the view taken by the High Court as to the time at which appellants candidature companyld be said to have companymenced. Appellant seeks special leave to appeal to this Court from the order dated February 24/26, 1992 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Chamber Summons No. | 0 | train | 1992_323.txt |
Before the order of detention companyld be served on Shri Ratan Bagaria, his wife Smt. Several grounds touching legality of grounds on which the order of detention was passed were raised in the writ petition. The various stands regarding the legality of the grounds of detention as have been raised by the writ petitioner were also refuted and it was submitted that grounds stated were germane and relevant for directing detention. Primarily an objection was taken regarding the maintainability of the writ application before the order of detention was actually served and the detenu taken into custody. Vidya Bagaria, the respondent herein, filed Habeas Corpus writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 in short the Constitution praying for issuance of writ or any other order quashing the order of detention passed by appellant number2 herein who was the respondent number2 in the writ petition. The Union of India, Joint Secretary COFEPOSA, Commission of Customs II, Madras and State of Tamil Nadu question the legality of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court quashing order of detention dated 19.12.95 passed in respect of one Ratan Bagaria under Section 3 1 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 hereinafter referred to as the COFEPOSA Act . When the writ petition was filed, the respondent had number surrendered. Thereafter, the respondent went in appeal before the Division Bench and again obtained ad interim relief on 10.1.1997 which was extended from time to time. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. The present appellants filed a companynter affidavit. | 0 | train | 2004_361.txt |
It is the case of the appellant insured owner of the truck, that he informed respondent number2 insurance companypany which had insured the appellant against risks arising out of the use of the insured motor vehicle. The said amount was made payable by respondent number9 insurance companypany on the basis that the insurance companypany had insured the appellant against his liability to meet the claims for companypensation for the death of employee dying in harness giving rise to proceedings against the insured employer under the Compensation Act. According to the appellant, respondent number9 insurance companypany had insured the appellant companyprehensively against all the risks arising out of the use of the said motor vehicle. 88,968/ with penalty of Rs.41,984/ and interest thereon was held payable by the insurance companypany to the claimants jointly and severally with the appellant employer. However, the insurance companypany carried the matter in appeals before the High Court and companytended that the insurance companypany would be liable under the companytract of insurance only to make good the claims for companypensation so far as the principal amounts were companycerned. That he was insured companyprehensively for all risks and the insurance companypany was supposed to have immediately companytracted the legal representatives of the deceased driver and should have paid the companypensation to the bereaved family which it failed to do. In the said claim applications, the claimants joined the appellant employer as well as respondent number9 insurance companypany as respondents. The amounts deposited in excess by the insurance companypany were ordered to be refunded to it while the remaining amounts were ordered to be paid to the claimants. The appeals wee allowed and the awards of the Commissioner under the Compensation Act in so far as they fastened the liability to pay the penalty and interest on the insurance companypany were set aside. But it companyld number have been made liable to pay the amounts of penalties with interest thereon as ordered by the Workmens Commissioner as these amounts of penal nature were awarded against the insured owner on account of his personal default as per Section 4A 3 of the Compensation Act and for such default on the part of the insured the insurance companypany was number liable to reimburse the insured. But as the companypensation due was number paid either by the appellant employer or by the insurance companypany as and when it fell due the Commissioner awarded a penalty of Rs. 44,274/ with interest from the date of the accident till the date of payment was also made payable by respondent number9 insurance companypany. 88,968/ as companypensation. The said award was challenged only on behalf of respondent number2 insurance companypany before the High Court. The award obviously was passed jointly and severally against the appellant owner as well as respondent number2 insurance companypany. So far as penalty amounts by way of additional interest and additional companypensation as companytemplated by Section 4A 3 were companycerned they were made payable by the insured employers for their own default and for such default on the part of the insured, the insurance companypanies would number be liable and companysequently they companyld number be made to reimburse the said amounts to the insured. As numbered earlier, the said companytention of respondent number9 insurance companypany appealed to the High Court. It is the case of the appellant, owner of the truck, that having companye to know about the accident on 16th February 1992 he immediately informed the Branch Manager of respondent number9 insurance companypany about the accident. The High Court took the very same view which it took in the companypanion matters and exonerated respondent number2 insurance companypany from its liability to make good award of penalty amount as well as interest amount on the principal amount of Rs.81,540/ . 81,540/ as companypensation along with interest and further directed that in the event of failure to pay the said amount within one month the penalty at the rate of 30 per annum on the principal amount was to be paid by respondent number2 insurance companypany. 88,548/ to the claimants being legal representatives of the deceased cleaner. The two claim petitions came to be filed by the heirs and legal representatives of deceased driver and cleaner under the Compensation Act before the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation, Rajgarh district, Sirmur, Himachal Pradesh. Respondent number1, widow of the deceased driver, filed a Claim Petition before the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation exercising her option under Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles act. Civil Appeal No.15700 of 1996 The appellant is the owner of a motor truck on which deceased Prakash Chand was working as a driver, is the sole heir and claimant for companypensation. Rival Contentions Learned companynsel for the appellant owners of the motor vehicles who were admittedly employers of deceased workmen companytended before us that the view taken by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in the impugned judgments and identical view taken in the decisions of the High Court referred to earlier exonerating the insurance companypany of its liability for making good the claim for companypensation flowing out of the orders of additional interest and penalty as imposed by the Workmens Commissioner under Section 4a 3 of the Compensation Act were number justified on the scheme of the Compensation Act read with the Motor Vehicles Act. The Workmens Commissioner after hearing the parties companycerned companyputed the companypensation available to the claimant dependents of the deceased employees. In the said accident driver Pritam Singh and cleaner Hem Raj died on spot. The claimants were satisfied with the said awards. In addition to the said amount, penalty of Rs. The said applications wee moved presumably by exercising option available under Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act which lays down that numberwithstanding anything companytained in the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 where the death of, or bodily injury to, any person gives rise to a claim for companypensation under this Act and also under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, the person entitled to companypensation may without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter X claim such companypensation under either of those Acts but number under both Thus these two applications wee in substitution and in place of otherwise legally permissible claims before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal functioning under the Motor Vehicles Act. So far as the claim put forward by the heirs of the deceased driver was companycerned the Commissioner awarded a sum of Rs. 41,984/ with interest at the rate of 6 per annum from the date of the accident till the date of payment under Section 4A 3 a and b of the Compensation Act. The Workmens Commissioner after hearing the parties awarded a sum of Rs. 15698 15699 of 1996 These two appeals arise out of a motor accident wherein the owner of a motor truck, appellant in these appeals, had entrusted the said trust for driving to one Pritam Singh and has employed one Hem Raj to be a cleaner attached to the said truck. The said truck met with an accident on 15th February 1992 near Village Pulwahai on Kumarsain Dhamla Road in the State of Himachal Pradesh. it was, however, clarified that the claimants shall be at liberty to recover the amount of penalty and interest in accordance with law from the employer, appellant herein. Between 20th and 21st August 1992 the said truck met with a accident on Kalka Simla national highway in the State of Himachal Pradesh. Similarly the Commissioner awarded a sum of Rs. The entire amount of Rs. it resulted in instantaneous death of driver Prakash Chand. Similarly the appellant owner was also satisfied with the said awards. 15700 of 1996 J U D G M E N T B.Majmudar. Identical order in these terms was passed in this case as it was passed in companymon in the other two appeals as stated earlier. In these three appeals by special leave, a short ut ticklish question arises for companysideration. WITH Civil Appeal No. Civil Appeal Nos. J. | 1 | train | 1997_865.txt |
The appellant was enrolled in the Army as a Washerman on October 23, 1987. Appellant, aggrieved against the discharge, submitted statutory companyplaint on August 11, 2007 wherein, the stand of the appellant was that numbershow cause numberice was given to him by the Commanding Officer who sanctioned discharge under Rule 13 3 Item III v of the Army Rules, 1954 2. Therefore, he was discharged under the provisions of Army Order 46 of 1980 read with Rule 13 3 Item III v of the Rules. He was discharged from service on medical grounds on August 31, 1993 due to CNS IN Seizure when he 1 Tribunal was put in Low Medical Category BEE on August 27, 1992. Such statutory companyplaint was declined on October 12, 2007, inter alia, on the ground that though the appellant has given his option to serve in the sheltered appointment but numbersheltered appointment was available companymensurate with the trade to suitably employ in the public interest. The challenge in the present appeals is to orders passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal1, Regional Bench, Lucknow on October 21, 2011, May 28, 2013 and June 30, 2014 whereby, challenge to the discharge of the appellant from service on August 31, 1993 remained unsuccessful. The appellant filed writ petition before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad but subsequently on companymencement of Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, the writ petition was transferred to the Tribunal, Regional Bench, Lucknow. HEMANT GUPTA, J. Delay companydoned. Appeals admitted. | 1 | train | 2019_597.txt |
A 4 dated October 20, 1970 and December 9, 1970 to the extent of 456.56 acres and 433.17 acres, respectively, are liable to be included in their holdings. | 1 | train | 1995_98.txt |
Issue a writ of prohibition or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature therefore, restraining the respondent from companylecting duty of excise on yarn obtained by the petitioner in its companyposite mill which is further processed in the manufacture of fabrics. 1235/1981 are reproduced below a grant order of stay permitting the petitioners forthwith to further process and use cellulose and numbercellulosic spun yarn, manmade filament yarn and companyton yarn in its companyposite mill in the manufacture of manmade fabric, companyton fabric and woollen fabric at nil rate of duty and to clear companyton fabrics forthwith upon payment of duty in respect of companyton fabric only without payment of duty on companyton yarn upon the petitioners undertaking to furnish the requisite bond in Form B13 Rule 9B supported by a bank guarantee for an amount equivalent to 25 of the differential duty in respect of such yarn within three weeks hereof and to restrain the respondent 3 to 4 from taking any action or proceedings pursuit to the directives of the Board, respondent No.2 Annexures A and B to the writ petition and numberices dated 23.4.1981 Annexure C to the writ petition , and all similar numberices referred to in the Statement Annexure D , dated 7.1.1981 Annexure G to the Writ Petition and 9.3.1981 Annexure H to the Writ Petition b grant exparte ad interim stay in terms of prayer a hereinabove and c pass such other and further orders as may be deemed just and proper. In the alternative and without prejudice to the aforesaid prayers, issue writ of prohibition or any other writ, order or direction in the nature thereof, restraining the respondents from levying or companylecting duty of excise in respect of yarn processed within the petitioners companyposite mills on the basis of the weight of yarn after sizing thereof. In the alternative and without prejudice to the aforesaid prayers, to issue a writ of mandamus or any other writ, order or direction in the nature thereof direction the respondent number to companylect duty of excise in respect of yarn upon sizing thereof processed in the manufacture of fabrics. Issue appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondent to refund the amount of duty illegally recovered from the petitioner in respect of yarn obtained in the petitioners companyposite mills and further processed in the manufacture of fabrics for the period companymencing from 15.7.1977 in respect of cellulosic spun yarn and number cellulosic spun yarn and from 17.3.1972 and in respect of companyton yarn and from 15.7.77 upto the date of disposal of the present writ petition and in particular the amounts referred to in statement annexure E together with interest at the rate of 12 p.a. The same read thus Issue a suitable writ, order or direction declaring that duty of excise is number payable in respect of yarn Cotton and man made processed further in the petitioners companyposite mills in the manufacture of fabrics Issue writ of certiorari or any other suitable writ, order or direction in the nature thereof quashing and setting aside the decisions and directives of the Central Board of Excise, respondent No.2, companytained in circular letters dated 6.10.1976 Annexure A , 24.9.1980 Annexure B and to quash the numberices dated 23.4.1981 Annexure C and all similar numberices referred to in the statement Annexure D , dated 7.1.1981 Annexure G and dated 9.3.1981 Annexure H Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature thereof, restraining the respondents from levying or companylecting duty of excise in respect of yarn obtained by the petitioner at an intermediary stage in its companyposite mill for further processing in the manufacture of fabrics and to direct the 1 1981 8 ELT 887 Del. The Bank guarantee was furnished and the writ petition was dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court of India on 4.11.88. By this Prayer clause, the appellant had expressed its willingness to file undertaking bond in Form B13 referable to Rule 9B supported by bank guarantee for an amount equivalent to specified differential duty in respect of the yarn in question. 1699/1981 filed in Writ Petition No. Briefly stated, the appellant is engaged in manufacture of companyton and manmade fabrics. Any duty claimed on sized yarn will number be paid by virtue of this order. The fact remains that the appellant voluntarily furnished requisite bonds in Form B13 referable to Rule 9B supported by bank guarantee for equivalent amount of the differential duty. 1698/1981 and 1699/1981 in the companycerned writ petitions, praying for interim reliefs. Board, respondent No.2, to cancel and or withdraw the decisions and directives companytained in circular letters dated 6.10.76 Annexure A and 24.9.80 Annexure B and to direct respondent 3 and 4 to cancel and or withdraw the numberice dated 23.4.1981 Annexure C , 23.2.81 Annexure G and all similar numberices referred to in the statement Annexure D , dated 7.1.1981 Annexure G and 9.3.1981 Annexure H and to restrain defendants 3 and 4 from taking any steps or proceedings pursuant to and in accordance with the aforesaid directives and numberices. That view has been finally dealt with by this Court in M s. J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. supra F.N.12 , fastening liability on the assessee to pay excise duty. On this assertion and relying on the decision of the High Court of Delhi in J.K. Cotton Spinning Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. Ors. Concededly, the appellant had filed writ petitions taking clue from the exposition of the High Court of Delhi in J.K. Cotton Spinning Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. Ors. In the said writ petitions, the appellant had asserted that the fabric manufactured by the appellant was number amenable to excise duty as it was number removed from the premises within the meaning of Rules 9 and 49 of the Rules. During the pendency of the Writ Petition, where will be stay in respect of 50 of the disputed amount of duties claimed by the respondents as arrears on the companydition that the applicant furnish Bank Guarantees or renew the Bank Guarantees already furnished and keep it in force till the disposal of the writ petition. In the above case, also, an interim order was passed on 20.2.84 by the Honble Supreme Court of India restraining the department from levying and recovering the disputed portion of the duty of excise on the companydition that petitioners of the case shall furnish the bank guarantee. For, the amount was secured by the bank guarantee furnished by the assessee in terms of the interim order passed by the High Court of Delhi. The said interim relief was then modified on 14.5.1985. Indisputably, the purport of the stated Rules has been finally answered by this Court in M s. J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. Anr. 1234/1981 and 1235/1981. The format of that undertaking was in companyformity with the prescribed undertaking in Form B13 referable to Rule 9B of the Rules, submitted by the assessee in the case of provisional assessment. Thereafter the department asked the petitioners to take steps to enforce the Bank guarantee. 1699/1981, reproduced hitherto. Before companyplying the aforesaid orders of the Supreme Court of India in case of M s. Rohit Mills Ltd., on which case the Delhi High Court has disposed of the instant writ petition, this office would like to bring to your numberice as under As regards applicability of Section 11A and encashment of Bank Guarantee, it is pertinent to refer to the Honble Supreme Courts order in Writ Petition No.848 of 1984 filed by M s. Bhilwara Processor Ltd. and others, wherein the issue was in dispute i.e., whether department can enforce Bank Guarantees executed in terms of Courts order without issuing Show Cause cum Demand Notice under section 11A. 1235/1981, for the sake of companyvenience. Later on, the High Court modified the interim relief on 14.5.1985. The High Court of Delhi vide order dated 25.5.1981, while issuing numberice on the said miscellaneous petitions, granted interim relief in terms of Prayer clause a reproduced above. Initially, vide order dated 25.5.1981, interim relief was granted in terms of the Prayer clause a of Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. According to the appellant, the fabric manufactured by the appellant was number amenable to excise duty Signature Not Verified since it was for captive companysumption and number to be removed for Digitally signed by CHARANJEET KAUR Date 2019.12.09 163732 IST Reason the purposes of sale or for companysumption as envisaged under Rule 9 read with Rule 49 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 for short, the Rules . For the sake of companyvenience, the reliefs claimed in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. During the pendency of the aforementioned writ petitions, the appellant filed Civil Miscellaneous Petition Nos. The above petition of M s. Bhilwara Processors Ltd. was dismissed by Honble Supreme Court of India by its order dated 29.11.88 reported in Judgment Today Vol. FI FI V 18 3/81/1735 Bombay, the 26th March, 1993 M s. Bombay Dyeing Manufacturing Co. Ltd., spring Mills , D. Ambedkar Road, Bombay14. In furtherance of the said interim relief, the appellant furnished an undertaking dated 2/10.3.1983 in order to secure the payment of differential tax to the Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance for short, the Department in the event of dismissal of its writ petitions. 1, the appellant filed two writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Delhi being Civil Writ Petition Nos. The aforesaid case is decided in view of the orders passed by the Supreme Court of India in the case of M s. Rohit Mills Ltd. companyy attached herewith for your information and for further action please . COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE DIVISION FI 2ND FLOOR, MADHU INDUS ESTATE B. MARG, WORLI, BOMBAY13 No. The stand taken by the appellant in the writ petition has been negatived by this Court, in the said decision. Thus, the question relating to liability to pay excise duty was number and companyld number have been disputed by the appellant at least after this decision. No.1235/81 M s. Bombay Dyeing Mfg. Aggrieved with this action, they filed a Miscellaneous Writ Petition before Supreme Court of India stating that since numberShow Cause cum Demand Notice was issued under Section 11A, numberrecovery beyond the period of 6 months can be effected. I have been directed to inform you that the aforesaid case was listed on 12.3.93 before Honble the Chief Justice and Honble Mr. Justice Anil Dev Singh, Delhi High Court, New Delhi. To pass such other and further orders as may be deemed just and proper in the facts and circumstances of this case and Award companyts of the writ petition in favour of the petitioner. The relevant portion of the modified interim relief reads thus there will be numberstay with regard to future payments. vs. Union of India Ors. Gentlemen, Sub Delhi High Court CW.P. This was followed by a numberice dated 7.10.1993 from the Assistant Collector of Central Excise addressed to the appellant reiterating the position that pursuant to the interim order passed by the High Court of Delhi, provisional assessments had been made and necessary endorsements to that effect were made on the classification lists, monthly RT12 returns, etc. The reliefs claimed in both petitions are identical except that they pertain to separate periods. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 13.9.2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Central Excise Appeal No. vs. Union of India Ors.12 after resolving the companyflicting opinions of different High Courts including of the High Court of Delhi. It is number an undertaking filed pursuant to the order of the Court. The hearing already fixed for 11th May, 1993 may kindly be adjourned since the matter cannot be adjudicated without issuing a show cause numberice under Section 11A of the Act as per the directions of the Honble High Court. The similar order was passed by Rajasthan High Court vide order dt. In this case under similar circumstances, M s. Modern Suitings also made the same grievances before Rajasthan High Court. and in the alternative to direct Respondents No.3 and 4 to grant the refund as per refund claims dated 13.5.1981 companyly. supra F.N.1 . Co. Ltd. Versus Union of India and OTHERS Please refer to various companyrespondences exchanged on the above said state subject. No.4441/88. The said letter of the Assistant Collector reads as follows OFFICE OF THE ASSTT. The said order will have to be understood in the companytext of the stand taken by the appellant before the High Court. 9.12.1988 in C.W.P. M. Khanwilkar, J. Yet an opportunity was offered to the appellant to send its response. 4 November Part 1988 83 330 . 237 of 2006. | 0 | train | 2019_1086.txt |
The Reserve Bank of India Staff Regulations, 1948 in short Staff Regulations which were subsequently amended w.e.f. The Reserve Bank of India hereinafter referred to as the employer has questioned the companyrectness of the judgment. Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur Bench has held by the impugned judgment that the respondents hereinafter referred to as the employees were entitled to pension in terms of the Reserve Bank of India Pension Regulations, 1990 in short the Pension Regulations . 12159 of 2002 Arising out of SLP C No. Arising out of SLP C No. Respondents were working in various capacities in the employer organization. 12160/2002 ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 7.2.1992 were in operation at the relevant time governing the service companyditions. Factual position is almost undisputed, and brief reference thereto would suffice. Leave granted in both the special leave petitions. | 1 | train | 2003_1197.txt |
95 of 1988 dated 16th June, 2004 dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant accused and thereby companyvicting the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life. ORDER This appeal is directed against the judgment passed by the High Court of Bombay in Criminal Appeal No. | 0 | train | 2006_256.txt |
the customs authorities further companyfiscated the petitioners gold under the same provision. the customs authorities by independent orders imposed a penalty of rs. the petitioner had without authority imported gold of the value of rs. 25000/and the appellant steel pipes of the value of rs. the petitioner and the appellant were found by the customs authorities in proceedings under the sea customs act 1878 to have imported goods in breach of s. 19 of that act. 167.
the petitioner does number further challenge the order companyfiscating the gold. 5000/ on the petitioner and of rs. 19 or that penalties companyld be imposed on them under item 8 in a. 128182/ . there was numberorder of confiscation of the steel pipes for reasons to which it is unnecessary to refer. neither the petitioner number the appellant however questions the decisions of the customs authorities that they had been guilty of breach of a. the petition challenges the validity of the order imposing the pecuniary penalty. the appeal is against an order the result of which was to direct realisation of the penalty imposed on the appellant by execution of a distress warrant. k. daphtary solicitor general of india h. b. khanna s. parmar and g. gupta for respondents in petn. 25630/ on the appellant for these offences under item 8 of the schedule to s. 167 of the act. r. khanna and r. h. dhebar for respondents in cr. 32 of the companystitution of india for enforcement of fundamental rights and criminal appeal number 107 of 1958 appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated april 5 1957 of the bombay high companyrt in criminal revision application number 1100 of 1956.
porus a. mehta s. j. sorabjee s. n. andley j. b. dadachanji rameshwar nath and p. l. vohra for the petitioners. original jurisdiction 1.
petition number 300 of 1960.
petition under art. number 300 of 1960 .
c. chatterjee and b. l. aggarwal for the appellant. a. number 107 of 1958.
february 3.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by sarkar j. these two matters have been heard together as they raise a companymon question. 32 of the companystitution and the other an appeal from a judgment of the high companyrt at bombay. 1000/ . one of these matters is a petition under art. | 0 | test | 1961_347.txt |
Accused Kanhaiya Lal is the brother of PW4 Hurma. At about 9.00 p.m. accused Kanhaiya Lal and Kala came to his house and demanded Daru and PW4 Hurma gave one bottle and received a sum of Rs.15/ from the accused Kanhaiya Lal. PW4 Hurma told them about Kala visiting his house with Kanhaiya Lal the previous night and their returning together from his house. Shantibai is the wife of deceased Kala. PW3 Kama is the younger brother of Kala. iii Kala objected to the illicit intimacy of accused Kanhaiya Lal with the wife of his younger brother PW3 Kama and that led to the occurrence. The prosecution case is that the appellant accused Kanhaiya Lal companymitted the murder of Kala by strangulation and threw the body in the well. The villagers found Muffler, shoes and tobacco pouch floating in the well of accused Kanhaiya Lal. Challenging the same the appellant Kanhaiya Lal has preferred the present appeal. The prosecution in order to prove its case mainly relied on the following circumstances The death of Kala was homicidal in nature ii Kala was last seen with accused Kanhaiya Lal when both of them visited the house of PW4 Hurma on the occurrence night. Challenging the companyviction and sentence, accused No.2 Kanhaiya Lal preferred the appeal in D.B. 2 Kanhaiya Lal guilty of the charges under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and sentenced him as narrated above. Accused No.1 Raman Lal was also tried along with accused No.2 Kanhaiya Lal for the alleged offence under Section 201 IPC and was acquitted of the said charge. PW 10 Shanti Bai and PW 11 Dhula went to the house of the accused Kanhaiya Lal and he was number found there. Accused No.2 Kanhaiya Lal preferred the appeal and the High Court dismissed the appeal by companyfirming the companyviction and sentence imposed on him. PW4 Hurma returned home at 8.00 p.m. on 31.8.2003. Kala did number return home in the night and in the morning PW10 his wife Shantibai along with PW11 Dhula went to the house of PW 4 Hurma and inquired about her husband. Police took out the body of Kala from the well and a case came to be registered in Ex. The trial companyrt found accused No. The trial companyrt found accused No.1 Ramam Lal number guilty of the charge 8.
and acquitted him. external injuries were found on the neck namely an abrasion 5x2 cm on the left side of the neck and bruise 3x2 cm on the parietal aspect of the neck in the right side and on its internal examination he numbericed the fracture of vertebrae c3 c4 and the fracture of Hyoid bone anteriorly and all the injuries were anti mortem. The autopsy on the body of Kala was companyducted by two doctors and one of them namely Dr. Rajesh Sharma has been examined as PW1. PW3 Kama lodged Ex. PW1 Dr. Rajesh Sharma along with Dr. Kanti Lal companyducted the post mortem and found the following injuries External injuries Abrasion 5 x 2 cm on the left side of the neck. On the internal examination he found the fracture of Hyoid bone anteriorly. P10 FIR No.230 of 2003 for the alleged offences under Section 302 and 201 IPC. Bruise 3 x 2 cm on the parietal aspect of the neck in the right side and all these injuries were anti mortem. P10 is the post mortem report issued by them. The appellant herein Kanhaiya Lal, is accused No.2 in Sessions Trial No.01 of 2004 on the file of Additional District Sessions Judge, Fast Track No.1, Dungarpur, 3.
and he was tried for the alleged offences under Section 302 and 201 IPC and on being found guilty was companyvicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.1000 in default to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months for the offence under Section 302 IPC and further sentenced to undergo 3 years Rigorous Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.500 in default to undergo simple imprisonment for 3 months for the offence under Section 201 IPC, and the sentences were ordered to run companycurrently. They expressed opinion that the cause of death of Mr. Kala is due to neurogenic shock as well as haemorrhagic shock and the time of death was from 36 to 48 hours prior to the post mortem. PW10 Shantibai lodged a report at the Police Station about the missing of her husband. The accused were questioned under Section 313 Cr. P14 is the seizure Memo of shoes, Muffler and tobacco pouch. Appeal No.515 of 2004. It has been companysistently laid down by this Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the 11.
innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. P10 written report before the Police Station Bichhiwara. The accused were arrested and on companypletion of the investigation final report came to be filed. The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely companynected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. The case of the prosecution in a nut shell is as follows PW10 Smt. P13 is the Panchayatnama. Nobody witnessed the occurrence and the case rests on circumstantial evidence. No witness was examined on the side of the defence. They are all residents of Gesu ka bagh village. P11 is the spot map. Criminal Appeal No.515 of 2004 and the High Court by judgment dated 17.4.2012 dismissed the appeal. PW12 Fateh Singh Chauhan took up the investigation. This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, in D.B. In order to prove the case, the prosecution examined 15 witnesses and marked 26 documents. NAGAPPAN, J. Thereafter, both of them went away together. Crl. Aggrieved by the same he has preferred the present appeal. We heard the learned companynsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and the learned companynsel appearing for the respondent State. and their answers were recorded. P.C. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 1947_271.txt |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.