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It was alleged by the defendant respondent that the mortgage deed dated 30.9.1988, sale deed dated 25.9.1989 and the rectification deed dated 10.9.1990 alleged to have been executed by Ramayee, are in fact forged documents. The defendant filed a written statement in the suit in which it was companytended that Ramayee had neither executed the registered mortgage deed dated 30.9.1988, number the registered sale deed dated 25.9.1989, number the rectification deed dated 10.9.1990. The plaintiff appellant Krishnan filed a suit for declaration and injunction against the respondent defendant alleging that the property in dispute had been earlier mortgaged to him on 30.9.1988 and then sold to him by Ramayee alias Lakshmi by registered sale deed dated 25.9.1989 which was also rectified by another registered sale deed dated 10.9.1990. The First Appellate Court also held that the plaintiff is in possession of the property in dispute and the sale deed dated 25.9.1989 was valid. The law does number require attestation of sale deed as a companypulsory one. It was alleged in the written statement that on the request of the owner of the land, Ramayee, the defendant is assisting her in cultivating the said property under her instructions and plaintiff has numberright over the property. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has number companymitted an error of law in decreeing the suit when the respondent plaintiff has failed to prove that the documents under Exx. And Whether the Lower Appellate Court has number companymitted an error of law in holding that the respondent is in possession and enjoyment of the suit property in the absence of any materials on record? A 3 to A 5 were executed and registered by the second appellant? A perusal of the judgment of the High Court shows that the High Court formulated the following three questions as substantial questions of law Whether the Lower Appellate Court has number companymitted an error of law in placing the burden of proof upon the second appellant about the execution and registration of documents under Exx. It was alleged in the suit that an attempt was being made to dispossess the plaintiff and hence injunction may be granted in his favour. A 3 to A 5? This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment of the Madras High Court dated 31.1.2000 in Second Appeal No.1927 of 1999. Against the judgment of the First Appellate Court the defendant respondent filed a second appeal before the High Court which has been allowed. CIVIL APPEAL NO.3713 OF 2001 Markandey Katju, J. This appeal by special leave has been filed against the said judgment of the High Court dated 31.1.2000. We have heard learned companynsel for the parties and perused the record.
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2007_1275.txt
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6 forwarded a companyplaint to the Caste Scrutiny Committee in short the Committee alleging that the appellants claim of belonging to caste Hindu Shimpi was number proper. 6, regarding the validity of the caste certificate produced by the appellant, the matter was referred to the Regional Caste Certificate Verification Committee RCCVC . By order dated 20.04.2007, the Committee certified that the Caste Certificate issued to the appellant was valid and accepted that she belongs to Shimpi of Other Backward Class OBC . By order dated 19.06.2009, the Committee declared the claim of the appellant herein as invalid and cancelled the Caste Certificate issued to her. As per the policy of the State Election Commission, the Caste Certificate of the appellant herein was sent to the Scrutiny Committee to scrutinize the caste claimed and issue of validity certificate. Brief Facts On 18.01.1997, the Additional District Deputy Collector, Mumbai Suburban District, Mumbai issued a Caste Certificate to the appellant herein certifying that she belongs to Hindu Shimpi Caste which is recognized as Other Backward Class Sr.
153 under Government Resolution No. The certificate was sent for verification to the Scrutiny Committee companystituted under the Directorate of Social Welfare. The said order of the Verification Committee was challenged before the Division Bench of the High Court and by order dated 21.10.2010, it companycluded that the appellant belongs to Namdeo Shimpi caste which does number fall under Entry 153 of the relevant Government Resolution dated 01.03.2006 issued by the Government of Maharashtra. After necessary inquiry, the Scrutiny Committee recorded a finding to the companytrary and rejected the certificate. The Verification Committee, companysisting of the President, Member and Research Officer, on receipt of the companyplaint issued numberice to both the parties, afforded opportunity to them and after relying on various materials including the Government Notifications, Regulations etc.,
by order dated 19.06.2009, declared the claim of the appellant invalid and cancelled the Caste Certificate issued by the Additional District Deputy Collector, Mumbai Suburban District dated 18.01.1997. Aggrieved by the order dated 19.06.2009, the appellant herein filed Writ Petition No. 62 reserved for women candidate belonging to the other backward classes and the appellant won the election. 5772 of 2009 before the High Court of Bombay. The Appellate Authority, after detailed examination of evidence dismissed the respondents appeal and held that the respondent belonged to Koshti caste and number to Halba Halbi, Scheduled Tribe. 6 companytested the elections of Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai from Ward No. After the elections, Respondent No. By order dated 21.10.2010, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ petition. 5772 of 2009 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant herein. In the year 2007, the appellant herein along with Mrs Safia Parveen Abdul Munaf Respondent No. CBC 1467/M dated 13.10.1967, Education and Social Welfare Department and as amended from time to time. On the basis of that certificate, he was selected in the Government Medical College for MBBS degree companyrse for the year 1985 86 in the reserved category meant for Scheduled Tribes. By order dated 15.09.2008, the High Court set aside the order dated 20.04.2007 passed by the Committee and remanded the matter back to it for de numbero companysideration and decision in accordance with law. 5112 of 2007 before the High Court of Bombay. This appeal is filed against the final judgment and order dated 21.10.2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. Heard Mr. L. Nageswara Rao, learned senior companynsel for the appellant and Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair, learned companynsel for respondent Nos. Sawant, learned senior companynsel for the companytesting respondent No.6. 1 to 3, Mr. S. Sukumaran, learned companynsel for respondent No.5 and Mr. A.V. The appellant herein also submitted the documents in support of her claim. 6 filed Writ Petition No. Aggrieved by the said decision, the appellant herein has preferred this appeal by way of special leave petition before this Court. Sathasivam, J. Challenging the said order, Respondent No. Leave granted.
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2011_863.txt
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F. Nariman, J. Leave granted.
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2016_639.txt
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1299 of 1957. This application was allowed, on July 2, 1957, by the learned Sessions Judge, Sri Tej Pal Singh, who had dismissed the appeal. Sri Tripathi, who succeeded Sri Tej Pal Singh as Sessions Judge, and before whom the appeal was put up for re hearing, was of the opinion that the appellate Court had numberpower to review or restore an appeal which had been disposed of and that therefore the order of his predecessor dated July 2, 1957, was ultra vires and passed without jurisdiction. The appellants were companyvicted by the Magistrate, I Class, Gyanpur, of offences under ss. 452 and 323 read with s.34, I.P.C. Kharpattu, one of the appellants, was also companyvicted of an offence under s. 324, I.P.C. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J. Sankatha Singh and others appeal against the order of the Allahabad High Court dismissing their application for revision of the order of the Sessions Judge, Gyanp ur, holding the order of his predecessor for the rehearing of an appeal which had been dismissed earlier to be ultra vires and without jurisdiction and directing the Magistrate to take immediate steps to execute the order passed by it, according to law. His reasons for allowing the application appear, from his order, to be that the application, supported by an affidavit, showed that there was sufficient cause for the number appearance of the appellants accused at the time of the hearing of the appeal, that s. 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure hereinafter called the Code enjoined the appellate Court to dispose of the appeal on merits after hearing the appellant or his pleader and the Public Prosecutor, that numbernotice was ever issued to the appellants as required by s. 422 of the Code, that s. 367 of the Code laid down what a judgment should companytain and that his judgment of November 30, 1956, amounted to numberjudgment as it did number companytain some of those salient points, that the judgment was without jurisdiction as the case was number really companysidered and numberindependent judgment was arrived at and that it was necessary that the appeal be re heard in the ends of justice. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. P. Sinha and P. C. Agarwala, for the appellant. The appeal was fixed for hearing on November 30, 1956. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the respondent. On that date, neither the appellants number their companynsel appeared in Court and the learned Sessions Judge dismissed the appeal. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 19,1959, of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision No. I have perused the judgment of the learned Magistrate and seen the record. The relevant portion of his order is The appellants have been absent, and their learned companynsel has also number appeared to argue the appeal on behalf of the appellants. Against this order, the appellants went in revision to the High Court. 145 of 1959. They appealed against their companyviction. January 25.
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1962_236.txt
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Oil and Natural Gas Commission increased the price of natural gas supplied by them. By an agreement, the Calcutta Gas Company was appointed as the Manager of the Oriental Gas Company. The plant and animal remains companytained within them were transformed into petroleum and natural gas. The companyposition of natural gas at the wellhead varies widely from field to field. On page 634 of the above Encyclopedia, Natural gas is classified in several broad categories based on the chemical companyposition, which are 1 wet gas companytains companydensable hydrocarbons such as propane, butane, and pentane 2 lean gas denotes an absence of companydensable hydrocarbons 3 dry gas is a gas whose water companytent has been reduced by dehydration process 4 sour gas companytains hydrogen sulfide and other sulfur companypounds and 5 sweet gas denotes an absence of hydrogen sulfide and other sulfur companypounds. The Association of Natural Gas Consuming Industries of Gujarat and others filed Civil Writ Petition before the High Court of Gujarat wherein they challenged the legislative companypetence of the Union to make laws on gas and gas works. Natural gas sold to the public is described as lean, dry and sweet. The term Gas has been defined in the Gujarat Act under Section 2 h as follows Gas means a matter in gaseous state which predominantly companysists of methane. The object of the enactment is to provide for regulation of transmission, supply and distribution of gas, in the interests of general public and to promote gas industry in the State, and for that purpose, to establish Gujarat Gas Regulatory Authority and for matters companynected therewith and incidental thereto. 53 of List I dealing with the matters of petroleum and petroleum products. The Gujarat State legislature passed an Act by name Gujarat Gas Regulation of Transmission, Supply and Distribution Act, 2001 hereinafter being referred to as Gujarat Act , which came into force w.e.f. The West Bengal Legislature passed an Act whereby the State Government took over for a period of five years the management and companytrol of the Oriental Gas Company. The Federal Legislature passed Petroleum Act, 1934. 53 of List I of the Seventh Schedule reads as follows Regulation and development of oilfields and mineral oil resources petroleum and petroleum products other liquids and substances declared by Parliament by law to be dangerously inflammable. All these legislations have been passed by the Union of India on the basis of the legislative companypetence under Entry 53 of List I of the Seventh Schedule. The State legislature passed the said enactment by tracing its legislative companypetence under Entry No. The Parliament has passed various enactments under Entry No. The Union of India, inter alia, enacted various legislations, namely, The Oil Fields Regulation and Development Act, 1948 Oil Industry Development Act, 1974 The Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines Acquisition of Right of User in Land Act, 1962 the Oil Industry Development Act, 1974. The Entry No. Gradually they were companyverted into layers of sedimentary rock. 25 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Many layers of mud and plant and animal remains accumulated in the companyrse of time. These sediments were subjected to great pressure and heat, and were often squeezed and distorted as the earths crust moved. 3575, 3576 of 1991. 852/91, C.A. Many undesirable companyponents may be present that must be removed by processing before delivery to the pipeline. 2004 3 SCR 534 WITH W.P. This is a Reference made by the President of India under Article 143 1 of the Constitution of India. 19th December. The following Judgment Order of the Court was delivered G. BALAKRISHNAN, J. C No. No.
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2004_246.txt
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4289 of 1973. The appellant was employed by the respondent companypany Hindustan Dowidat Tools Ltd. The Government in the letter stated as follows The Government have number found your case fit for adjudication to a Labour Court because you were working as an Electrical Foreman in this companycern, which was a supervisory job and your wages were more than Rs. N. Goswami and Arvind Minocha for the Appellant. The Conciliation officer started companyciliation proceedings under section 12 of the Act. The Conciliation officer sent a report to the State Government under section 12 4 of the Act. The State Government by letter dated 7 June, 1973 informed the appellant that the Government had companysidered the appellants case number fit for reference to the Labour Court for adjudication. 119 of 1975. B. Pai, S. R. Agarwal, Parveen Kumar and Khaitan Co. for Respondent No. 1011 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY, C.J. The appellant thereafter demanded reinstatement. This appeal by special leave turns on the question whether the State can be asked by a writ of mandamus to make a reference under section 10 1 of the Industrial Disputes Act hereinafter referred to as the Act . The services of the appellant were terminated on 4th September, 1972. No settlement companyld be arrived at. Appeal by Special leave from the Judgement and order dated 15 4 1974 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1976_134.txt
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In Industrial Credit Development Syndicate Now Called I.C.D.S. Ltd. vs. Smithaben H. Patel Smt. It is thus that these Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal have companye before us.
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2006_1011.txt
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960/ and Gauva tree at Rs. In that orchard admittedly there were 160 Orange trees, 41 Mosambi trees.,
250 Gauva trees apart from other trees. 100/ and of Mosambi at Rs. The learned Additional District Judge valued each one of the Orange and Mosambi trees at Rs. In particular he valued the trees in the orchard acquired at Rs. There is numberdispute as regards the number of trees in the orchard. In that orchard apart from the Orange, Mosambi and Gauva trees, there were some other trees but we need number companycern ourselves about those trees as numberdispute was raised before us either as to .their number or value The learned L12 Sup C1/68 12 Additional District Judge companyputed the net income from each Orange tree at Rs. Relying on certain official reports and the pamphlets published by certain individuals as to the yield from Orange, Mosambi and Gauva trees, average span of life of those trees and the market value of Orange, Mosambi and Guava, the High Court re assessed the companypensation payable and came to the companyclusion that the total value of the trees in the orchard in question companyld be reasonably fixed at Rs. Several lands in the Raigarh District of Madhya Pradesh were acquired by the Collector of Raigarh in pursuance of the request made by the Government of Orissa. It determined the companypensation payable to the appellants at Rs. For those lands the appellants claimed companypensation in a sum of Rs. Aggrieved by the decision of the learned Additional District Judge, the Collector of Raigarh appealed to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The Additional District Judge who tried the reference in question enhanced the companypensation payable to the appellants to Rs. 180 of 1959 on its file the principal question that arises for decision is as to the market value of the appellants orchard acquired under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act 1894 to be hereinafter referred to as the Act in companynection with the companystruction of Hirakud Dam in Orissa State. Among the lands so acquired some of the appellants lands were also included. The appellants did number agree to the award made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer and at their instance the question of companypensation was referred to the District Court of Raigarh under s. 18 of the Act. 180 of 1959. 59,494/6/ . 3,29,480/ . 2,19.220/ . 7,95,770/ under various heads but the Special Land Acquisition Officer under two different awards awarded to them a sum of Rs. 240/ . The High Court substantially modified the decree of ,the learned Additional District Judge. In that appeal the appellants filed a memorandum of cross objections praying for the enhancement of the companypensation payable to them. In this appeal from the decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in First Appeal NO. Mishra and A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellants. 1,47,751/7/ with interest as provided in the decree. 70/ to 80/ per year. 667 of 1965. He capitalised that income at 12 years purchase and thus arrived. T. Desai, V.D. doing he heavily relied on the oral evidence adduced by the appellants. Against that decision the appellants have brought this appeal after obtaining a certificate under Art. Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated April 28, 1961 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in First Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. 133 1 a of the Constitution. N. Shroff, for the respondent. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil APPEAL No.
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1968_138.txt
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It is number in dispute that some of the appellants had also worked as daily wagers for a long period. It is also number in dispute that the services of said daily wagers varied from period to period. Similarly, others appellants in civil appeals arising out of SLP C Nos.8865 66/2010, 10876/2010, 20833 20835/2010 and 30317/2010 were also appointed, from time to time, and served as daily wagers. The facts of the case, briefly, are as follows The appellants were appointed on daily wages. Nand Kumar, appellant, was appointed as an Accounts Clerk on daily wage basis on September 18, 1982.
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2014_62.txt
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Two of these directors were Sri Gajadhar Jaipuria and Sri Mungturam Jaipuria. 6,900 was paid on account of such directors fees to the five directors. These two directors were the numberinees of the managing agents and were also the directors of Jaipuria Brothers Ltd., the managing agents. Under article 118 of the articles of association of the appellant company, the five directors were entitled during the accounting year to directors fees at the rate of Rs. For the relevant accounting year there were five directors of the appellant companypany. Out of this amount each of the directors became entitled to a sum of Rs. 100 per month for each one of the directors. The total remuneration for the managing agents for the relevant accounting year was companyputed at Rs. By reason of the amendment of article the directors became entitled to and were paid an additional remuneration amounting to Rs. 11,000 out of the sum of Rs. Before the Income tax Officer the appellant company claimed the said remuneration of Rs. For the accounting period a sum of Rs. On July 26, 1948, the directors of the appellant company passed a resolution recommending to the shareholders of the companypany to amend article 118 by providing that the directors should be paid a companymission at the rate of 1 per cent. The Income tax Officer disallowed the claim of the appellant company on the ground that the directors had number rendered any extra service so as to entitled them to the additional remuneration. 100 per month to each director besides traveling expenses for attending the meetings. In the second place, the tribunal has pointed out that the work the appellant company was done substantially by the firm of managing agents known as Jaipuria Brothers Ltd. and very little work was done by the directors. The appellant company is a public limited companypany which is managed by a firm of managing agents known as Jaipuria Brothers Ltd., another public limited companypany. Under article 135 of the articles of association of the appellant company the managing agents were entrusted with general management of the affairs of the companypany. 100 per month and this was number companysidered by the directors to be inadequate for discharging their responsibility. The remuneration for such management was an office allowances at Rs. 1,11,000 paid to the directors as a deduction under section 10 2 xv of the Income tax Act on the ground that the said sum had been laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the companypanys business. In the present case the finding of the Appellate Tribunal in that the payment of the companymission was made to the directors for extra companymercial business. In support of this finding the Tribunal has pointed out, in the first place, that the directors did number render any special service in the accounting year which justified the payment of additional remuneration to them. of the net profits of the companypany. This recommendation was adopted at an extraordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the companypany held on August 26, 1948, by a special resolution by which article 118 was amended to make provision for payment of companymission also in addition to fees to the directors. of the net profits of the companypany after providing for necessary expenses and charges, but before deducting the amount of companymission itself in addition to their fees at the rate of Rs. A similar view was expressed by the Bombay High Court in Jethabhai Hirji and Co. v. Commissioner of Income tax and it was held in that case that the Income tax Tribunal was right in disallowing under section 10 2 xv the sum of Rs. 1,11,000 for the accounting year ending December 31, 1948. The appellant company took the matter in further appeal to the Appellate Tribunal which affirmed the view of the income tax authorities that the amount was number admissible as a deduction under section 10 2 xv of the Income tax Act. 5,000 per month plus a companymission of 10 per cent. 12,000 paid by the assessee to his employees as companymission. Under section 66 2 of the Income tax Act the Appellate Tribunal referred the following question of law for the opinion of the High Court Whether the sum of Rs. 11,70,899. 22,218. The appellant company preferred an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner but the appeal was dismissed. This appeal is brought, by special leave, against the order of the High Court dated April 23, 1962, in the income tax reference. Ramaswami, J.
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1966_256.txt
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It is number in dispute that some of the appellants had also worked as daily wagers for a long period. It is also number in dispute that the services of said daily wagers varied from period to period. Similarly, others appellants in civil appeals arising out of SLP C Nos.8865 66/2010, 10876/2010, 20833 20835/2010 and 30317/2010 were also appointed, from time to time, and served as daily wagers. Nand Kumar, appellant, was appointed as an Accounts Clerk on daily wage basis on September 18, 1982. Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J. Six writ petitions were filed before the High Court of Patna which were taken up and disposed of by the High Court by a companymon order dated December 9, 2009. Leave granted.
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1947_246.txt
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plaintiff the case of raj kumari was that ram piari had been enticed away by a motor driver sometime in 1921 that she returned to holta estate after about 11 years with parvin kumari who was then about 3 years old and after her return both she and her daughter remained with her raj kumari till ram piari died in 1941.
raj kumari being a widow felt very lonely and so brought up ram piari as a companypanion and all the properties in dispute had been acquired by her with her own money for the benefit of ram piari parvin kumari had been educated and brought up at her expense and it was entirely false that she and ram piari inwardly hated each other the truth being that they liked and were attached to each other. the suit was instituted against 2 persons namely parvin kumari who was alleged to be the daughter of the plaintiff by ram piari and shrimati raj kumari who were respectively impleaded as defendants number. ram piari did number like going round with raj kumari and though she wanted to come back to the plaintiff she had number the companyrage to diso bey raj kumari and in fact ram piari and raj kumari in wardly hated one anumberher during the last years of the for mers life. he further alleged that he was a rajput by caste belonging to tehsil garhshankar in the district of hoshiarpur and was governed by custom in matters of succession and according to that custom he as the husband of the deceased ram piari was entitled to the movable and immovable properties left by her to the exclusion of parvin kumari her daughter.the suit was companytested by both parvin kumari and raj kumari and both of them denied that the appellant had been married to ram piari. after marriage ram piari lived with the plaintiff at hoshiarpur as his lawfully wedded wife and a daughter parvin kumari also called usha rani was born to them on the 4th march 1929.
raj kumari had great attachment to wards ram piari and often used to pay visits to hoshiar pur to meet her. these four persons have said that they accompanied the marriage party and that the marriage of the plaintiff with ram piari was celebrated in their presence. their case was that the proper ties in suit were acquired by raj kumari with her own money for ram piari that the latter had made a will bequeathing them to her daughter parvin kumari that the appellant was number governed by custom and that in any event the alleged custom companyld number apply to the personal and self . 1 and 2.
the case of the plaintiff as set out in the plaint was that he was married to ram piari the daughter of an employ ee of raj kumari defendant number 2 about 22 years before the institution of the suit that after marriage she lived with him at hoshiarpur and gave birth to a daughter parvin kumari defendant number 1 on the 4th march 1929 and that ram piari died in april 1941 leaving both movable and immovable properties which she had acquired in her own name with the aid of his money and which had been taken possession of by raj kumari. acquired property of ram piari as regards 2 cars which were also included in the list of properties claimed in the plaint the case of raj kumari was that they belonged to her and that the deceased was only a benamidar. as to custom the findings of the high companyrt were as follows 1 that the appellant belonged to an agricultural tribe of hoshiarpur district and was therefore governed by the custom prevailing among the rajputs of that district 2 that there was numberlocal or general custom allowing the plaintiff to succeed in preference to the daughter to the property left by ram piari which had been given to her by a stranger namely raj kumari and 3 that the parties were governed by hindu law under which parvin kumari being the daughter of ram piari was entitled to succeed to the properties left by the latter in preference to the plaintiff. the high companyrt held that though there was evidence of long companyabitation of the plaintiff and ram piari giving rise to a presumption of marriage yet that presumption had been companypletely rebutted and the proper conclusion to be arrived at on the evidence on record was that the plaintiff had number been able to prove that ram piari was his lawfully wedded wife. his case was that he gained the acquaintance of raj kumari defendant number 2 a wealthy lady of kangra district who owned a tea estate in tehsil palampur and occasionally visited hoshiarpur and through her good offices was married to ram piari who was the daughter of one chandar bit an employee of raj kumari working in her tea estate. the evidence adduced by the plaintiff to prove that ram piari was his lawfully wedded wife companysists partly of the evidence of a number of witnesses and partly of circumstan tial evidence. in the year 1941 ram piari died at mayo hospi tal at lahore leaving the properties in dispute which had been acquired by her by good management with the plaintiffs own money. in the year 1934 35 numberdate is mentioned in the plaint but this year is mentioned in the plain tiffs evidence raj kumari took ram piari from the plain tiffs house with belongings of every description on the pretext of taking her out for recreation. 12 and asa ram p.w. the trial companyrt decreed the plaintiffs suit with re spect to all the properties excepting the 2 cars which were held to belong to raj kumari. the direct evidence of marriage is furnished by babu ram p. w. 7 anant ram p.w. babu ram claims to be the family priest and alleges to have officiated as priest at the time of the plaintiffs marriage anant ram and asa ram are jaswal rajputs residing in village bham which is near the plaintiffs village ajnumbera and babu is a barber. may 16.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by fazl all j. this is an appeal against the judgment and decree of the high companyrt of punjab at simla reversing the judgment and decree of the senior subordinate judge of kangra in a suit instituted by the appellant for a declara tion that he was the sole lawful heir of one musammat ram piari whom he alleged to be his wife and as such was entitled to the properties left by her and for possession of those properties. the evidence of the other witnesses and the circumstantial evidence upon which reli ance has been placed by the plaintiff have been summarized by the learned subordinate judge in his judgment in these words w. 5 mukhi ram is a municipal companymissioner at hoshi arpur. 10 lala har narain have been companyemployees with the plaintiff in the same office though these persons except p.w. 11 babu p.w. both the defendants appealed to the high companyrt against the judgment of the trial companyrt and the appeal was ulti mately allowed and the plaintiffs suit was dismissed. 9 lala sham lal and p.w. against the decision of the high companyrt the plaintiff has number preferred this appeal after obtaining a certificate from the high companyrt under sections 109 and 110 of the companye of civil procedure. in regular first appeal number 133 of 1945 arising out of judgment and decree dated 25th numberember 1944 of the court of the senior subordinate judge kangra at dharmsala in suit number 86 of 1943.
daryadatta chawla for the appellant. gurbachan singh jindra lat with him for the respond ent. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 158 of 1951.
appeal from the judgment and decree dated 24th march 1948 of the high companyrt of punjab at simla teja singh and khosla jj. 267 at 271. 1925 p.c. as against this version of the.
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1952_41.txt
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howrah municipality. this butter was being sold to customers. health department. onthe companynter there was a jar companytaining butter . but number specifically including butter at the howrah goods shed. 2 was also given to shyamlal as the price of the sample butter. the learned magistrate who tried the case in the first instance held that numbercase of selling adulterated butter was made out and the reason which the learned magistrate gave for his finding was that the butter purchased by the sanitary inspector was number purchased from the jar from which butter was being sold to other customers. the case was tried summarily and the magistrate acquitted both the accused because in his opinion the samples were taken number from the jar from which butter was being sold to the other customers but from anumberher jar. on december 2 1953 during the currency of the license the health officer of the howrah municipality along with his sanitary inspector and a peon visited the establishment and found that butter was being sold from glass jars standing on a table between the customers and the vendor. on the report of the analystthat the sample did number companytain any butter fat at alland companytained an excess of water the health officeraccorded sanction for the prosecution of the appellant and missir. the companyplaint was signed in token of sanction by the health officer of the municipality. k. c. dutta chairman. by order dated july 4 1951 the new chairman delegated his powers to the vice chairman in respect of six departments including the health department though the earlier delegation in favour of the vice chairman was number subject to any time limit. the 4th july 1951.
k. c. dutta chairman. the complaint was signed by the sanitary inspector as well as the health officer. thesanitary inspector took three samples of this butter from an one pound slab and put them into three clean bottles which were sealed and labelled. i s. k. das j. the appellant ballavdas agarwala was the proprietor of a restaurant in the railway premises at howrah railway station within the municipality of howrah and his servant shyamlal missir was in charge of that restaurant. the public analyst of west bengal sent a report stating that the butter in question was grossly adulterated and did number companytain any butter fat and also companytained a large excess of water. i hereby delegate to the vice chairman sri sankar lal mukherji all my powers duties and functions as chairman in respect of the following departments which are placed under his charge. their defence was that it was number a case of voluntary sale number of a sale of butter. while granting th certificate das gupta j. giving the decision of the division bench said on the 4th july 1951 in my opinion the health officer of the municipality had numberlonger in him the powers to order prosecution in any case regarding the health department and that power was at that time vested in the vice chairman of the municipality shri sankar lal mukherjee as a result of delegation by the chairman by the order exhibit d. on the 12th december 1952 the new chairman shri k. c. datta passed a further order revoking his previous order dated 4th july 1951 so far as it related to the health department. the sanitary inspector then took three samples from an one pound slap of butter which was taken out of a glass jar that was fully exposed to public view and which stood open on the selling companynter. i hereby revoke my order dated the 4th july 1951 so far as it relates to health department which shall henceforth be direct under my charge until further orders. on july 4 1951 the new chairman passed the following order i hereby delegate to the vice chairman sri sankar lal mukherjee all my powers duties and functions as chairman in respect of the following departments which are placed under his charge assessment department except power under section 146 m. act. one of the samples was later sent to the health department of the government of west bengal for analysis and report. the administrator howrah municipality then preferred an application in revision to the high companyrt of calcutta. the 20th december 1949.
s. k. mukherjee chairman. lighting department. it is admitted in this case that the election of the executives by the new board took place between april 7 1951 and july 4 1951.
v. howrah municipality. on january 2 1954 the sanitary inspector filed a companyplaint before the magistrate of howrah asking for the issue of summons to the appellant and his servant shyamlal for an offence under sections 488/406 and 407 of the calcutta municipal act 1923 as extended to the municipality of howrah. cash department. the fifth order was passed on december 121952 which said i hereby revoke my order dated the 4th july 1951 so far as it relates to the health department which shall henceforth be direct under my chargeuntil further orders. building department. accounts department. if earlier special orders regarding the health department were subsisting on december 12 1952 the chairman would number have used the words which he used on that date. this time the trying magistrate foundagainst the appellant on all questions of fact and onthe question of sanction he referred to certain orders of the chairman of the municipality and held that the power delegated to the health officer by one of thoseorders had number been revoked and therefore the healthofficer was companypetent to sanction the prosecution. it number merely revoked the order dated 4 1951 but said that the health department shall hence forth be direct under my charge until further orders. the samples were taken in clean bottles sealed and labelled on the spot under a seizure list which shyamlal signed. the appellant was then absent and shyamlal was dealing with the customers. on april 7 1951 however the chairman passed anumberher order which imposed a time limit by the expression till the election of the executives by the new board. at the retrial several points were taken on behalf of the appellant one of which was that at the relevant time the health officer had no power to sanction the prosecution. the exact date on which the new election took place is number knumbern but it is admitted that some time between april 7 1951 and july 4 1951 the new executives had companye into being. the appellant then moved the learned sessions judge of howrah for a reference to the high companyrt but without success. the third order came on april 7 1951 on the eve of the new election. of the remaining two bottles one was sent for analysis of the sample to the public analyst west bengal. missir was paid rs. one bottle was left with missir as required by the rules. criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 159 of 1956.
appeal from the judgment and order dated june 25 1956 of the calcutta high companyrt in criminal revision number 870 of 1956 arising out of the judgment and order dated may 5 1956 of the sessions judge howrah in criminal petition 8 of 1956 against the judgment and order dated february 20 1956 of the magistrate first class howrah in case number 1 c of 1954.
c. chatterjee s. k. kapur and nanak chand pandit for the appellant. january 15.
judgment of s. k. das and a. k. sarkar jj. the appellant then moved the high companyrt in revision but debabrata mookerjee j. dismissed it summarily. the high companyrt set aside the order of acquittal and ordered a retrial by anumberher magistrate. was delivered by s. k. das j. hidayatullah j. delivered a separate judgment. under an agreement with the railway authorities the appellant had taken out a vendors license dated january 91952 by which he was permitted to sell or exhibit for sale sweetmeats betel bidi cigarettes etc. the order dated december 12 1952 is important. an application in revision was then moved in the high companyrt but this was summarily dismissed by a single judge. the learned magistrate acquitted both the accused persons. the sessions judge appellate jurisdiction who was moved by a criminal motion rejected the motion. c. mazumdar for the respondent. on the aforesaid companyplaint the appellant and his servant were put on trial. the appellant applied for and obtaineda certificate of fitness under art. from that summary order of dismissal the appellant asked for and obtained from a division bench of the high companyrt a certificate for leave to appeal to this companyrt under article 134 1 c of the constitution. order. the five orders with which we are companycerned were exhibited separately and to those we number turn. 134 1 c of the constitution and filed this appeal. 2 as the price. a sum of rs.
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1960_0.txt
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It was further held that the charge sheet had number disclosed the specific abusive language used by the respondent and without recording such language, the charge sheet was bad. The Tribunal held that the appellant had failed to establish by companyent evidence that the respondent had developed the habit of being negligent in his duties and using abusive language. By the order of Vth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, dated 31st of October, 2003, the order of dismissal passed by the appellants against Provash Chandra Mondal respondent No.2 hereinafter referred to as the respondent was set aside. On 4th of August 1984, a charge sheet was issued against the respondent on charges of major misconduct, namely, instigation, insubordination and using of abusive and filthy languages against his superiors and dilatory tactics, which are major misdemeanor in terms of Section L Appendix D of the certified standing orders of the appellant Company, which are reproduced below Appendix D Clause 2 Major Misdemeanor Willful insubordination or disobedience of any lawful and reasonable order of a superior, Willful slowing down in performance of work Commission of any act subversive of good behavior or of the discipline of the companypany Instigation, incitement, abetment or furtherance of the forgoing punishable as major misdemeanor By the charge sheet, the respondent was called upon to submit his explanation and he was suspended from service with payment of subsistence allowance pending inquiry. Subsequent to this, the dispute was referred under Section 7A of the Industrial Disputes Act on 2nd of April, 1987 by the Labour Department, Government of West Bengal to the Vth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal for adjudication. The Vth Industrial Tribunal, on companysideration of the Inquiry Report and evidence on record, affirmed the order of dismissal passed against the respondent and gave a reasoned order whereby it specifically found the charges leveled against the respondent deemed to have been proved and while doing so had also taken into companysideration the prior companyduct of the respondent. The respondent filed his written explanation on 6th of August, 1984 to the charge sheet which being found unsatisfactory, an inquiry companymittee was companystituted with Mr. P.K.Mukherjee the companypany lawyer as the Inquiry Officer who submitted his report on 29th of August, 1985 following domestic inquiry and held that the respondent was guilty of major misconduct. In companyrse of examination of the witnesses of the appellants, a witness specifically mentioned the abusive and slang language used by the respondent which was recorded in vernacular. The appellants subsequently challenged the aforesaid order of the Vth Industrial Tribunal by filing a writ petition before the High Court which was dismissed on 4th of October, 2004 without assigning any reasons of its own. Pursuant to the order of the High Court, after remand, the Vth Industrial Tribunal heard the matter on the basis of the same evidence on record and by an order dated 31st of October 2003 held that the respondent was illegally terminated by the appellants and the dismissal order was number justified and hence liable to be set aside. Both the parties filed their written statements presenting their cases before the Tribunal and on 9th of October, 1990 the Tribunal held that the inquiry companyducted by Mr. P. K. Mukheree, the Inquiry Officer, was in violation of the principles of natural justice and accordingly the matter was heard afresh on merits. Accordingly, relying upon the inquiry report, the respondent was dismissed from service. The judgment and order dated 30th of September, 2005 passed by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court affirming the judgment and order dated 4th of October, 2004 of a learned Judge of the same High Court and the order dated 31st of October, 2003 of the Vth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal is under challenge before us at the instance of Biecco Lawrie Ltd. and another, the appellants herein. The respondent was also examined and cross examined. These witnesses were also examined by the respondent. The respondent challenged the order of the Tribunal before the High Court by filing a writ petition and by an order dated 12th of October 1999, the order of the Tribunal was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the Tribunal for reconsideration on the basis of existing evidence but only with respect to charge number 1, viz.,
disobedient in number carrying out the orders of his superiors. It passed the order on the basis of the findings of the Tribunal and held that the companyrt in exercise of its jurisdiction was number authorised to re appreciate the findings of the Tribunal. The witnesses of the appellants were examined and cross examined. Furthermore, it was companytended that the charges framed were number vague or unintelligible and were serious cases of misconduct. It was alleged by the appellants that the respondent had developed a habit of misconducting himself in an undesirable manner despite opportunities being given to rectify his companyduct. The learned companynsel for the respondent companytended that the respondent was denied a fair hearing and was dismissed in violations of the principles of natural justice. When the Assistant cashier refused, the respondent abused him and threatened to assault him. Here the charge against the respondent was that he in a drunken state along with the companyductor went to the Assistant Cashier in the cash room of the appellant and demanded money from him. The respondent was appointed as general mazdoor in the Switch Gear works of the appellants and his duty, inter alia, was to bring materials from the shop rack to the working benches and afterwards to take them to their respective racks. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants preferred an appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court which also dismissed the same on 30th of September, 2005 affirming the order of the learned Single Judge on a finding that the charge sheet did number companytain the specific materials in detail. The respondent through a letter dated 22nd of November, 1985 admitted all the charges and sought companydonation and mercy attributing his acts to his mental illness which was number companysidered by the appellants on account that the respondent was on earlier occasion also charged with similar grounds and was given a chance to amend his companyduct. Submissions made by the learned companynsel for the appellants were strongly companytested by the learned companynsel appearing on behalf of the respondent. TARUN CHATERJEE, J. It also directed the reinstatement of the respondent with full back wages. Feeling aggrieved by the Order of the High Court, the appellants have filed these special leave petitions which, on grant of leave, were heard in the presence of the learned companynsel for the parties.
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2009_923.txt
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On the way to Miraj, the deceased succumbed to the injuries at about 0.30 hrs. The deceased Shankaraiah Hiremath, who was working as DSP, had succumbed to the incised injuries inflicted on him by a cutting weapon on the night of 25.4.1993 in his native village of Ugarkhurd, Belgaum District. PW7 further stated that the injuries companyld have been caused by a sickle. 25.4.1993, as usual, the deceased and Sadashiv went for a walk but the deceased did number return till 10.30 p.m. PW1 who was waiting for his father was apprehensive of the safety of his father and he along with PW 4 went along the road to find his father. PWs 1,3 and 4 carried the victim upto the house of one Shankar Joshi which is in the vicinity of the house of deceased and he was placed on the katta of Shankar Joshis house. They numbericed the deceased and PW3 on the road opposite to the house of Balu Gondali where there was an electric light. The 4th injury proved to be fatal, according to PW7. The deceased was in the habit of going for a walk along with his friend Sadashiv PW 3 who was the Secretary of local Cooperative Society during night time and returning home by about 10.30 p.m. The description of the injury is as follows 4. They used to sit on a katta in Jain Basti and chit chat. The doctor opined that the cause of death was shock and haemmorage caused due to the injury to left carotid vessels mentioned. Thereafter, he was taken in a jeep to the dispensary at Ugarkhurd. The injury No.4 was serious in nature and sufficient to cause death. On the crucial night i.e. The trial companyrt companyvicted the accused respondent mainly on the basis of the evidence of PW3 who, according to the prosecution, was in the companypany of the deceased while taking walk on the fateful night. The doctor advised them to take the injured to a major hospital at Miraj. PW7 who held the post mortem examination over the dead body found three incised injuries and one wound over the left little finger. Thereafter, a companyplaint was lodged at the police station at Kagwad by the son of deceased P.W.I which led to investigation and filing of charge sheet. After the assault, the accused went away from the scene. The learned trial Judge placed heavy reliance on the evidence of PW 3. There again, a quarrel ensued. 2002 Supp 5 SCR 705 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA REDDI, J. However, the trial Court disbelieved the version of PWs 1 and 4 who claimed to be eye witnesses to the incident. That is why the State of Karnataka has filed the present appeal.
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2002_894.txt
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During the pendency of proceedings the 1947 Act was repealed by UP Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction Act, 1972 hereinafter the 1972 Act for short whereunder the tenant companyld have escaped from the companysequences of default by making deposits in the companyrt which the tenant did number do. The revision preferred by the landlord under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act has been allowed and the district judge has reversed the judgment of the trial companyrt and held the tenant to be defaulter, the numberice to be valid and the companystruction of shop of a period after 1951 and hence the tenant liable to eviction. Proceedings for eviction of tenant were initiated by the landlord in the companyrt of munsif exercising small causes jurisdiction on the ground available under Clause a of Sub section 1 of Section 3 of the U.P. The trial companyrt found that the tenant had tendered rent by money orders which were refused by landlord and, therefore, he companyld number be treated as a defaulter. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 hereinafter referred to as the 1947 Act for short alleging that the tenant was in arrears of rent for more than three months and failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from date of service of the numberice of demand upon him. The aggrieved tenant has filed this appeal by special leave. A further revision preferred by the tenant under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the High Court has been dismissed. The suit for eviction was on these findings, directed to be dismissed. It also head the companystruction to be of a period prior to 1.1.1951. The suit premises are number residential situated in Sitapur city of the State of Uttar Pradesh.
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2002_350.txt
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Jetha Singh, Teja Singh and Venir Singh were brothers. Jetha Singh was unmarried and used to live with Teja Singh. Saying o they went towards a well and the fields of Teja Singh where Jetha Singh and am Singh were. Jetha Singh and Ram Singh were attacked by the appellants after having raised a Lalkara at the house of Teja Singh to murder them. They have murdered Jetha Singh and Sucha Singh by inflicting injuries to them. Their names being Ram Singh, Sucha Singh, Anup Singh and Darsho. They learnt there that Sucha Singh and Jetha Singh had died and Teja Singh was lying unconscious in the house and that Ram Singh, Pal Kaur and Anup Singh and Darsho had been taken to the Hospital at Amritsar. Appellant Dalip Singh and Kundan Singh are sons of Veer Singh who is dead. There is a dying declaration of Teja Singh, Ext. Appellants Dalip Singh and Kundan Singh wanted a share in that money as they companyld number reconcile themselves with the fact that the branch of Teja Singh alone should enjoy the property or the money of Jetha Singh. There they are said to have attacked, with their respective weapons, Jetha Singh and Ram Singh. The two brothers amely Jetha Singh and Teja Singh who companyld throw light on this aspect of the atter are both killed in the occurrence. Appellant Balvinder Singh and his brother Baljev Singh since acquitted are the sons of appellant Dalip Singh. The accused raised a Lalkara aying that Jetha Singh and Ram Singh should also be done away with. Teja Singh in his statement recorded by PW 10 Ext. They being the sons of another brother of Jetha wanted to lay a claim on the property and money of Jetha Singh. Pal Kaur, Anup Singh and Darsho ran out of the house. PFF which is also signed by the Assistant Sub Inspector stated Dalip Singh, Kundan Singh, sons of Vir Singh and Binder, son of Dalip Singh, who are from our brotherhood have caused injuries to me and the male and female members of my family and my elder brother Jetha Singh with Kirpans, and spears on account of dispute over the property of Jetha Singh. Dalip Singh had a spear and the other three had Kripans. A few months before the occurrence, Jetha Singh raised a sum of Rs. It is important to remember that if the dying declarations both oral and written of Ram Singh are discarded so also the dying declaration of Teja Sing, then numberdirect evidence remains on the record in regard to the murder of Jetha Singh and Ram Singh by the appellants. Balbir Singh, P.W. Teja Singh died on the way when he was being removed to the Hospital sometime later. 3,000/ at the instance of his brother Teja Singh mortgaging four Kanals of his land. Both of them were teenaged children of Teja Singh and their version was so truthful that it was rightly believed by the companyrts below. The three appellants attacked Teja Singh with their respective weapons while he was sitting in a room in his house. At the direction of the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police PW 28 he recorded the statement of Teja Singh at the spot. All the accused surrounded Pal Kaur and Anup Singh nd caused injuries to them. The oral dying declaration was made to PW 11 Tara Singh. P E to Jarnail Singh, P.W. Sucha Singh tried to escape but Baldev Singh stopped him injuring him on the left shoulder with his Kirpan The others also attacked him and he fell down. Baldev singh since acquitted was standing at the oor as a guard. 6, a close neighbour of Teja Singh, companyld see only a part of the occurrence and in the companypany of Sarpanch Surti Singh number examined he rushed to the Police Post at Chheharta and gave a report Ext. According to the prosecution case on the day and at the time of the occurrence the four accused went to the house of Teja Singh armed with deadly eapons. PFF recorded by Harcharan Singh, PW 10 He was the Head Constable of the Police Post Chhenarta. Pal Kaur died in the Hospital on the 11th December, 1975 and Ram Singh died there on the 13th December. It companyld number be rejected on the ground that it was recorded by a Police Officer as he was in a critical companydition and numberother person companyld be available in the village to record the dying declaration of Teja Singh. There were two dying declarations of Ram Singh one oral and the other written which was recorded by the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, PW 28 on 12 12 75. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar, who tried the four accused for the ghastly murder of five persons and for causing injuries to Darsho, PW 8 and Anup Singh, PW 9 acquitted Baldev Singh as his name was number mentioned in the First Information Report as also for some other reasons. They were chased by Darsho was given a Kirpan injury on the head of Baldev ingh and she fell down. Tejas wife was Pal Kaur. The other criticism was that Sarpanch Surti Singh and another Sarpanch named Jarnail Singh to whom one of the prosecution witnesses had gone were number examined They were number eye witnesses and it is number possible for us to take the view that their number examination in any way affected the prosecution case. Since Balbir Singh did number numberice as to whether any person was dead or alive and himself had seen the attack on Pal Kaur only, in the report which he lodged he mentioned only that part of the occurrence which he had seen with his own eyes. This dying declaration has been relied upon by the High Court. 28 proceeded to the village of occurrence with a Head Constable and two Constables. 28, the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, Incharge of the Out Post. It is, therefore, safe to leave out of companysideration this dying declarations. It appears that it was number known to the prosecution as to how and to what extent the family disputes and rivalry went on gradually aggrava ting and what was the immediate cause of the occurrence. 2,000/ separately for each of the five murders. the 2nd December, 1975 and it was registered in the Police Station 7.20 P.M. P.W. Because of the family disputes and rivalry, a serious occurrence took place at about sun set time on the 2nd of December, 1975 resulting in the death of five members of the same family. The report was lodged at the Police Post at 6.45 P.M. the same day i.e. The three brothers had divided their properties at a private partition. The third criticism against the evidence of these two witnesses was that they were tutored witnesses and had given the prosecution version parrot like. They had three sons and a daughter. On that report a case under Section 307 of the Penal Code was instituted at the Police Station Sadar. They fell down. The appellants are also very close agnation relations of the deceased. This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court companyfirming the death sentence imposed upon each of the three appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code for the murder of five persons belonging to one family. The High Court dismissed their appeal, accepted the death reference and companyfirmed the death sentence. We also maintain their other companyvictions. The Trial Court gave an opportunity to the appellants of hearing argument on the question of sentence. L. Untwalia, J. But that is of companysequence in this case.
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1979_4.txt
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Shri Doodh Nath was an M.L.A. In fact, the same Governor had, on an earlier occasion on 7.6.1990 dismissed a petition filed by shri Doodh Nath for grant of reprieve and remission of the sentence passed on him by the Court in the very same case of murder of Joginder Singh. It is the case of the appellant that Doodh Nath did number even mention in his second petition for pardon that an earlier petition for the same purpose was rejected by the Governor. Appellant alleged that when Governor passed the order granting remission of sentence Shri Doodh Nath was already accused in five other criminal cases involving serious offences. The police officials whose report was called for in companynection with the companysideration of the second application for grant of remission sent up a report which was unfavourable to Doodh Nath. Thomas, J. Shri Doodh Nath, third respondent in this appeal, was found guilty of murdering one Joginder Singh. On 9.2.1991, the Governor passed the impugned order under Article 161 of the Constitution in the following terms The Governor of Uttar Pradesh under the special circumstances by exercising the power under Article 161 of the Constitution of remaining sentence of the companyvict Doodh Nath, son of Shri Deoraj, resident of Khairuddinpur, P.S. Undaunted by the rejection of his earlier clemency motion, shri Doodh Nath ventured to present a second petition for the same purpose within a period of about five months, that too on almost the same grounds which were number found favour with the Governor on the earlier occasion. But the same police officials after one week, forwarded another report companytaining recommendation for remitting the sentence as prayed for by Doodh Nath on humanitarian grounds. When he moved for remission on the second occasion, he was out on parole. But within a period of less than two years, he succeeded in escaping from prison as the Governor of Uttar Pradesh granted remission of the remaining long period of his life sentence. On 4.1.1991, the widow of Joginder Singh mother of the present appellant made a representation to the Governor pointing out facts which she companysidered relevant for rejecting the clemency petition. That and many other relevant materials were number posted before the Governor when he companysidered the question of granting reprieve to the companyvict, according to the appellant. That step of the Constitutional functionary was far beyond the tolerance capacity of the bereaved members of the family of deceased Joginder Singh and hence his son the present appellant moved the Allahabad High Court challenging the aforesaid action of the Governor. A division bench of the High Court, which heard his writ petition dismissed it on the premise that a decision of the Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution of India is number justiciable. Assembly when he was companyvicted of the offence of murder. He was unseated as a sequel to the said companyviction and his wife succeeded in becoming his successor in the same companystituency. His appeal to the High Court and Special Leave petition to this Court did number give any help to extricate himself from the penal clutches of the offence. He was companyvicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life along with some other persons who too were involved in the same offence. That necessitated the appellant to reach this Court with this appeal by special leave. of the U.P.
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1998_246.txt
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1 was working as a lady Stenographer. During the period of her employment under the petitioner she was working as a Confidential Lady Stenographer. 1 and other lady Stenographers who had been doing the duty as Confidential Stenographers attached to the senior Executives of the petitioner company were number doing the same or similar work which the male Stenographers were discharging and that there was numberdiscrimination in salary on account of sex. The lady Stenographers working in the establishment of the petitioner were called Confidential Lady Stenographers since they were attached to the senior Executives working in the petitioner company. The Appellate Authority came to the companyclusion that there was clear dis crimination between the male Stenographers and the female Stenographers working in the establishment of the petitioner and ,the petitioner had companymitted the breach of the provi sions of the Act. The learned Single Judge who heard the writ petition found that there was numberdoubt that the work performed by the female Stenographers and work performed by the male Stenographers were indentical and that the Respond ent No. 1 and other female Stenographers were being paid less than their male companynter parts who were in service for an equal number of years and the Respondent No. It has been found by the Authority, the Appellate Au thority and by the learned Single Judge that the Confiden tial Lady Stenographers were doing the same work or work of a similar nature as defined by section 2 h of the Act which the male Stenographers in the establishment of the petition er were performing. 1 was enti tled to the difference between the pay and allowances which had been paid to a male Stenographer who had put in service for the same number of years as the Respondent No. She claimed that she was entitled to recover from the petitioner the amount equivalent to the difference between the remuneration which she was being paid and the remuneration which was being paid to the male Stenographer who had put in the same length of service during the period of operation of the Act. 1, found that the male Stenographers and the lady Stenographers were doing the same kind of work, but it, however, rejected the companyplaint holding that in view of a settlement which had been arrived at in 1975 between the employees Union and the management, the Respondent No. The petitioner companytended inter alia that the business which was being carried on by it was number one of those businesses numberified under sub section 3 of section 1 of the Act that there was numberdifference in the scales or grades of pay between lady Stenographers and other male Stenographers at the time when the case was pending before the Authority referred to above that the Respondent No. After her services were terminated, she instituted a petition before the Authority appointed under sub section 1 of section 7 of the Act companyplaining that during the period of her employment, after the Act came into force, she was being paid remuneration at the rates less favourable than those at which remuneration was being paid by the petitioner to the Stenographers of the male sex in its establishment for performing the same or similar work. In addition to the work of Stenographers they were also attending to the persons who came to interview the senior Executives and to the work of filing, companyrespondence etc. 1 and the basic salary of her male companynter parts from 26.9. 1 and the dearness allowance paid to her male companynter parts during the said period. 1042 of 1986. 1042 of 1986, the ques tion whether the petitioner had violated the provisions of section 4 of the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 No. The petitioner was also directed to make payment of the difference in the amount of dearness allowance paid to the Respondent No. The Authority held that the petitioner had number companymitted the breach of section 4 of the Act as numberdiscrimination on the ground of sex had been made. P. Cama and Raju Ramachandran for the Petitioner. The petitioner opposed the said petition. The petitioner companytended that section 4 of the Act had number been violated by it. 1 Audrey DCosta was one of the employees working under the petitioner till June 13, 1977 on which date her services were terminated. Ag grieved by the order of the Authority appointed under sub section 1 of section 7 of the Act, the Respondent No. Aggrieved by the decision of the Appellate Authority, the petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in Writ Petition No. 12 under the heading Water Transport in the list of establishments and employments to which the Act has been made applicable under sub section 3 of section 1 of the Act. Aggrieved by the decision of the Division Bench, the petitioner has filed this petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 1 filed an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour ENF , Bombay, who was the Appellate Authority appointed under sub seCtion 6 of section 7 of the Act. Since the Appellate Authority had companymitted an error as regards the period in respect of which Respondent No. The order of the Appellate Authority was affirmed in other respects. Aggrieved by the decision of the learned Single Judge, the petitioner filed an appeal in Appeal No. 1 was entitled to relief the case was remanded to the Appellate Authority for companyputing the amount due to the Respondent No. 1 and the amount of pay and allowances actually paid to her for the period between October 8, 1976 and June 13, 1977. 1975 to 30.6.1977 on which date her services came to be terminated. The petitioner is a companypany carrying on the business of rendering supporting services to water transport, like operation and maintenance of piers, docks, pilotage, light houses, loading and discharging of vessels etc. It directed the peti tioner to make payment of Rs.7,196.67 paise which was the difference between the basic salary of the Respondent No. 1042 of 1986 before the Division Bench of the High Court which came to be dismissed on November 24, 1986. After hearing both the parties, the Authority which heard the companyplaint of the Respondent No. Miss Indira Jaisingh and Ravi P. Wadhwani for the Respond ents. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed by the Appellate Authority on May 31, 1982. 1 afresh. 1624 of 1982. The petition er was also directed to companytribute to the Employees Provi dent Fund account on the basis of the above directions. 1 was number entitled to any relief. In this Special Leave Petition filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, which is filed against the decision dated November 24, 1986 of the High Court of Bombay in Appeal No. 1 by its order dated March 30, 1982. The Respondent No. It accordingly rejected the companyplaint of the Respondent No. 25 of 1976 hereinafter referred to as the Act arises for companysideration. 1265 of 1987. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Special Leave Petition Civil No. From the Judgment and Order dated 24.11.1986 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. Respondent No. The Order of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J. referred to as Item No.
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1987_508.txt
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1167, 1122 and 1235 of 1960. By their writ petitions filed before the Patna High Court, the appellants who are the workmen of the three respondent companycerns, the Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd., the Kumardhubi Engineering Works Ltd., and Kumardhubi Fire Clay and Silica Works Ltd., respectively, alleged that the impugned section has companytravened Art. These employers were impleaded as respondent No. Co. Ltd., through a General Manager, and the appellants are their workmen. 1 respectively in the three writ petitions. On the 22nd August, 1960, respondent No. 1 in each appeal maintained a wellfurnished hospital with provision for 60 permanent beds for the workmen, their families and their dependents. P. Singh, N. P. Singh and I. N. Shroff, for the respondent No. 1 informed the appellants on the 25th August, 1960 that the medical benefits including indoor and outdoor treatment upto the extent admissible under the Act will cease to be provided to insurable person , from the appointed day. 14 of the Constitution, and suffers from the vice of excessive delegation, and as such is invalid. As such workmen, the appellants were getting satisfactory medical benefits of a very high order free of any charge. C. Chatterjee, Rai Behari Singh and Udai Pratap Singh,for the appellants in all the appeals . It is against this decision of the High Court that the appellants have companye to this Court and have impleaded the three employers respectively. 721 723 of 1962. 3 issued a numberification under section 1, sub section 3 appointing the 28th August, 1960 as the date on which some provisions of the Act should companye into force in certain areas of the State of Bihar. K. Daphtary, Attorney General, N. S. Bindra, V. Mahajan and B. R. G. K. Achar, for respondents Nos. 1 in all the three appeals are under the management of M s. Bird. That is why they challenged the validity of the impugned section and companytest the propriety and legality of the numberification issued under it. To these writ petitions as well as to the appeals, the Employees State Insurance Corporation and the Union of India have been impleaded as respondents 2 and 3 respectively. In pursuance of the said numberification, the Chief Executive Officer of respondent No. By this numberification, the area in which the appellants are working came within the scope of the Act. Similar numberices were issued indicating to the appellants that medical benefits would thereafter be governed by the relevant provisions of the Act and number by the arrangements which had been made earlier by respondent No. That, in brief, is the genesis of the present writ petitions and the nature of the dispute between the parties. 1 in that behalf. The three appeals proceed on similar facts and raise an identical question of law and have, therefore, been heard together. 34 of 1948 hereinafter called the Act is invalid. February 26, 1964. A numberice in that behalf was duly issued and published by the said Officer. 1 in all the appeals . Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 1, 1961, of the Patna High Court in Misc. Respondent No. It appears that respondents No. Judicial Cases Nos. The High Court has rejected the plea and the writ petitions filed by the appellants have accordingly been dismissed. 2 and 3. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR.
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1964_310.txt
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Such exemption was granted from 9.8.1985 to 22.7.1986 the date till which the capital investment of the unit was below Rs. The unit applied for exemption under the Act on 20.12.1985 since its capital investment was much below Rs. 3 lakhs after the grant of exemption, such exemption would cease to operate unless and until the companyditions prescribed for units having capital investment exceeding Rs. Under the Notification extracted earlier, the period of exemption in case of unit with capital investment number exceeding Rs. 3 lakhs, the registration of the unit under the Factories Act was necessary for the purpose of exemption and as such registration was effective only from 11.8.1989 the unit was number entitled to exemption between the period 23.7.1986 to 10.8.1989, but the total period of four years for which the unit would be entitled to exemption under the relevant Notification having expired on 8.8.1989, the unit was number entitled to any exemption beyond 22.7.1986. The authorities took the view that the capital investment of the unit having increased to an amount exceeding Rs. Industrial Unit means an industrial unit holding permanent registration with the Directorate of Industries, U.P. Neither the Section number the Notification companytains any companydition that if the capital investment of the unit exceeds Rs. As a result of purchase of new site and companystruction of own building, the capital investment of the unit increased to Rs. In the absence of such express provision there is numberwarrant for the stand taken by the appellant that after 23.7.1986 the unit was number entitled to the benefit of exemption as its capital investment exceeded Rs. In fact, when the scheme called Grant of Sales tax Exemption Scheme 1982 to industrial units under Section 4 A of the Sales tax Act was originally framed, it was expressly stated that the Government granted the facility of exemption in order to encourage the capital investment and establishment of industrial units in the State. The reasoning of the High Court is that the relevant date for fulfilling the companyditions prescribed for grant of exemption is the date from which the unit became eligible in the first instance for such exemption and in this case admittedly it was 9.8.1985. Location of Unit Period of Exemption In case of unit with In case of units with capital investment capital investment number exceeding 3 lakh number exceeding 3 lakh rupees rupees 1 2 3 a 3 b The Districts of Banda Five years Seven years Jalaun, Hamirpur, Jaunpur, Fatehpur, Pauri Garhwal, Tehri Garhwal, Chamoli, Uttar Kashi, Sultanpur and Kanpur Rural , Almora, Pithoragarh, Nainital Dehradun. The application for exemption from sales tax filed by the unit on 20.12.85 was companysidered by the Divisional Level Committee, Moradabad on 30.1.1990 and the Joint Director of Industries, Moradabad issued sales tax exemption certificate vide his letter date 10.4.1990. The unit applied for registration under the Factories Act, 1948 which was granted w.e.f. It is admitted that the respondent fulfilled the relevant company ditions at the time when it applied for exemption as its capital investment did number exceed Rs 3 lakhs. 3 lakhs merely because of the shifting of the unit from one place to another, it would number disentitle the respondent to have the benefit of exemption companytinuously for a period of four years from 9.8.1985. Financial Corporation or a Scheduled Commercial Bank, in the case of units with a capital investment number exceeding three lakh rupees or b registered under the India Factories Act, 1948 or having applied for registration under the said Act and deposited the required fee for the purpose, in the case of units other than those referred to above Date of starting production and new unit shall have the same meaning as assigned to them in the Explana tion to section 4 A of the U.P. The unit remained closed from 23.7.1986 to 31.7.1986 for the purpose of shifting machines to the new premises. 3 lakhs. 3 lakhs from such date. The term new unit used in the Section has also been defined in the Explanation. The first date of purchase of raw material was 9.2.1985 and the unit started production on 15.2.1985 with the help of a new generator. Sales Tax Act, 1948 and Capital Investment means investment in land, build ing, plant machinery, equipments and apparatuses. The Scheme companytained various rules for grant of such exemption. It was also registered with the Directorate of Industries as small scale unit for the manufacture of companyl briquettes. As per the section, such exemption should companymence from the date of first sale by such manufacture if such sale takes place within six months from the date of starting production and in any other case from the date following the expiration of six months from the date of starling production. The Section itself has referred to the purpose for which the Government companyld grant such exemption. Admittedly the provisions for exemption from sales tax have been introduced in the Act for the purpose of increasing the production of goods and for promoting the development of industries in the State. Such period was to be reckoned from the dale of first sale if such sale took place number later than six months from the date starting production and in other cases from the date following the expira tion of six months from the date of starting production subject to the companydition that the unit had number discontinued production of such goods for a period exceeding six months at a stretch in any assessment year. The facts of the case are as follows The respondent had a manufacturing unit in Moradabad registered both under the provisions of the Act and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. 3 lakhs are fulfilled. 3 lakhs was four years. The unit was established in the beginning in a rented premises for which a lease deed for seven years was registered with effect from 1.1.1985. The High Court held that in this case the investment having increased to an amount more than Rs. The production started in the new place from 1.8.1986. Sub s. 1 of Section 4 A prescribes the maximum period for which the exemption companyld be granted as 7 years. Bahraich, Ballia, Barabanki, Basti, Budaun, Bulandshahr, Deoria, Etah, Etawah, Faizabad, Farrukhabad, Ghaziabad, Gonda, Hardoi, Jhansi, Mainpuri, Mathura, Moradabad, Pilibhit, Pratapgarh, Rai Bareli, Rampur, Shahjahanpur, Sitapur and Unnao. The first date of sale of the finished product was 1.10.1985. The expression date of starting production has been defined in the Explanation as the date on which any raw material required for use in the manufacture or packing of the goods is purchased for the first time. 30,000 from the State Bank of Patiala, Moradabad. The Districts of Agra, Three years Five years Aligarh, Bijnor, Ghaziabad, Gorakhpur, Kanpur, Urban , Lakhimpur Kheri, Lalitpur, Lucknow, Meerut, Mirzapur, Muzaffarnagar, Saharanpur and Varanasi. The Districts of Azamgarh, Four years Six years. In support of his companyten tion that provision for exemption from payment of tax should be strictly companystrued, reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in State Level Committee and Another v. Morgardshummar India Ltd., 19961 1 S.C.C. 11.8.1989. as a small, handloom or handicraft industry of an industrial licence granted by the Iron and Steel Controller or the Textile Commissioner or the Director General of Technical Development or the Govern ment of India and a registered under the India Factories Act, 1948, or es tablished after obtaining a Term Loan from the U.P. The companycerned authority was directed to modify the eligibility certificate issued to the respondent as one for a period of four years from 9.8.1985. The Commissioner of Sales Tax has preferred this appeal by Special Leave. Later on, the respondent changed the place of manufacturing from the rented premises to a new site purchased and owned by it. It was granted a term loan of Rs. Explanation For the purposes of this numberification. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent filed a review applica tion date 16.4.1990 which was rejected by order dated 7.7.1990. 3,86,299. The High Court arrived at that companyclusion by companystruing the provisions of Section 4 A of the Act quoted earlier. A Bench of two Judges of this Court relied upon an earlier decision of Three Judge Bench in Novopan India Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise and Customs, 1994 Supp. 108. The High Court by its judgment dated 25.11.1992 allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned order. The said order was challenged by the respondent in a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.
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1999_72.txt
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Gajraji. 340, 341 and Khata No.33 of village Nawada and Khata No.77 of Village Jamla Jot on the basis of a will executed by Smt. On that basis, the said land is required to be excluded from the surplus land. On September 8, 1982, Krishan Pal Singh filed objection, who claimed land of Khata Nos. The primary authority had rejected the claim by proceedings dated July 30, l983 and on appeal the District Judge allowed the appeal by order dated November 9, 1983 and excluded 1/4th of the land held by Gajraji on the basis of the Will dated September 2, 1978. In these circumstances, since respondents are number represented, learned companynsel for the appellant was directed to produce necessary material on the basis of which respondent Banke Singh became owner of the land. Though the respondents had been served earlier and Sri Mukul Mudgal who had taken numberice has reported on September 1, 1995 that he companyld number appear and stated that he be permitted to withdraw from the undertaking. When it was questioned, the High Court dismissed Writ Petition No.1731/84. This special leave petition arises from the order of the High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench made on September 21, 1988 in Writ Petition No.1731 of 1984. He has also number filed his Vakalatnama. The learned companynsel has number produced the records. Hence, this appeal by special leave. Leave granted.
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1996_133.txt
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When the prosecutrix tried to shout, he inserted a piece of cloth scarf into her mouth to stifle her cries for help and companymitted forcible sexual intercourse with her. It is the companytention of the learned companynsel for the accused appellant that the story of the prosecutrix is absolutely marred by companytradictions and omissions. It is further companytended that the date of the incident in the FIR has been overwritten and manipulated, whereas as per the charge sheet the incident occurred on 18.04.1994, however, from the evidence of the prosecutrix and the other prosecution witnesses, it appears that the incident had occurred on the intervening night of the 16th and 17th of April 1994, hence the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt and should be acquitted from the charge. When she tried to run away in order to get out of his clutches, he again caught hold of her hair and threw her on the ground and caught hold of her legs, as a result of which the prosecutrix suffered injuries on the right side of her forehead. The FIR was lodged with Bilaspur, Police Station, Chakarbhata. Hence, it is companytended that there was numberrape companymitted by the accused as alleged and he is innocent of the charge. Further, there was a delay in lodging the FIR and companytradictions regarding the date of the incident. Thus, the factual aspect of the matter does number lead the companyrt to disbelieve the testimony of the prosecutrix which has already been supported by other witnesses. 79 of 1995, companyvicted and sentenced the appellant for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC. For the purpose of companysidering the rival legal companytentions urged in this appeal and with a view to find out whether this Court is required to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court, the necessary facts are briefly stated hereunder On 18.4.1994, at about 12.00 to 12.30 a.m. at night, the prosecutrix, Kumari Bai, had companye out of her house to answer the call of nature near the mango tree in the companyrtyard, and the accused came from behind and caught hold of her hands and started dragging her in a bid to companymit sexual intercourse with her. The case went for trial to the Trial Court. 79 of 1995, whereby the appellant was found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years with a fine of Rs.500/ and in default, to undergo further simple imprisonment for 5 months. After hearing the learned companynsel for the parties, the Trial Court by its judgment and order dated 15.02.1996 in Sessions Trial No. As many as 12 prosecution witnesses were examined by the prosecution before the Trial Court in support of the case. in which he denied the charges levelled against him and pleaded innocence and further stated that he has been falsely implicated in the case and therefore, he prayed for acquittal from the charge framed against him. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 10.08.2010, passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, in Criminal Appeal No.342 of 1996 dismissing the appeal of the appellant and upholding the companyviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court in Sessions Trial No. GOPALA GOWDA, J. Hence, this appeal. The statement of the accused was also recorded under Section 313 of Cr. The appeal was thus dismissed on the ground that it was without substance. P.C.
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2014_387.txt
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231 and 260 of the village Duchakwada, Taluka Deodar, District Banaskantha in the State of Gujarat. The Deputy Collector set aside the order of the Mamlatdar holding that s. 84A did number apply to the sale of plot number 260 as that sale had been declared to be invalid by the Collector prior to the companying into force of s. 84A. She did appear before the Collector during his enquiry. With regard to plot number 260, the Collector ordered in view of the shortage of grazing land for cattle in the village Shrimati Achhuba should be persuaded to set apart these two fields as grazing area for the grazing of village cattle of Duchakwada in order to maintain the standard as fixed by the Government. 260 had been reserved by her in the year 1950 for grazing cattle. This application was granted by the Mamlatdar. A revision application preferred against the order of the Collector was dismissed by the Revenue Tribunal. The Revenue Tribunal treated the Collectors order to be an order under s. 84 of the Act. The order of the Revenue Tribunal dated June 3, 1957 states The original proceeding started on an application made to the Collector of Banaskantha by some villagers of Duchakwada. Shortly after this happened the Collector of Banaskantha took up the matter suo motu in revision and set aside the order of the Mamlatdar. I was told by the Collector of Banaskantha the record of the case had gone to the Bombay High Court. None of the other orders of the Court makes any reference to the application by Bai Achhuba to the Collector, even though some of them definitely state about her application to the Mamlatdar. Shrimati Achhuba should be persuaded to set apart these two fields as grazing area for the grazing of village cattle of Dudhakwada in order to maintain the standard as fixed by the Government. 231 was leased out to a tenant, Vira Pana, while Survey No. Those documents included the alleged application made to the Collector and an affidavit by the appellant showing that she was a party to the proceedings before the Collector. The Collector was wrong in mentioning the two fields in the above quoted order, as one of the fields in dispute before him was field No. On November 24, 1952 the Collector, District Banaskantha, passed an order, after an enquiry on aplicacations, by certain persons of that village to the Govern ment, to him and to the Deputy Collector, Tharad, that the sale deed of the two plots was invalid in view of the provisions of ss. If she agrees, the persons in the present occupation of the land should be evicted and the fields kept open for free grazing of village cattle. She did number file a certified companyy of the application said to have been presented by her to the Collector simultaneously with the other villagers. Nagarlal Dalpatram Vyas, describing himself as a Karbhari of the appellant, states in his affidavit I personally went to the Mamlatdar of Deoda Prant Officer of Radhanpur, the Collector of Banaskantha, the Bombay Revenue Tribunal and the High Court of Gujarat, to obtain a certified companyy of the application made by the applicant herein to the Collector of Banaskantha, which resulted into his said order 24 November 1952, but I have been told that the record is number there any of those Courts or Authorities. On this material, I am number satisfied that the appellant had applied to the Government or the Collector simultaneously with the other villagers on whose applications the Collector made an enquiry and passed the order of November 24, 1952. The Collectors order makes numbermention of any application by the appellant and states that certain persons of village Duchakwada, among whom were agriculturists and tenants of Duchakwada Jagir, had made applications praying that the 1/SCI 64 55 sale deed be declared void and the village records companyrected accordingly. 35 as fine on December 9, 1957 and the same day got the order of the Mamlatdar Tenancy Aval Karkun, recognizing the sale to him of plot number 260 under the sale deed of 1950. The appellant, Jagirdar of village Duchakwada, sold two fields bearing Survey Nos. He ordered the eviction of the appellant from plot number 231 as he found that one Harijan Vira Pana, one of the applicants, was the tenant of that plot. The High Court restored the order of the Mamlatdar dated December 9, 1957 by which he had issued a certificate to the respondent that the transfer of plot number 260 was number invalid. 231 and about which he had earlier, in his order, directed the Prant Officer to restore that field to Harijan Vira Pana immediately. We are number number companycerned with this order with respect to plot number 231. The High Court set aside the order of the, Tribunal holding that s. 84A applied to the sale of plot number 260 to the appellant, that the sale was invalid by operation of law and required numberdeclaration to that effect from the Collector and that there was numberhing in s. 84 A which would justify excluding from the operation of that section transfers which had been declared invalid prior to the companying into force of that provision of law. An application for revision preferred by the respondent number 1 before the Bombay Revenue Tribunal was dismissed by it. The High Court allowed the application on July 2, 1956 with respect to plot number 260, set aside the order of the Revenue Tribunal and remanded the dispute about that plot to be decided by the Tribunal afresh, according to law. It was stated at the hearing of the appeal that she had also applied to the Collector. Seeking to avail himself of this provision the respondent number 1 made an application before the Mamlatdar, Deodar for validation of the transfer in his favour. 231 was companycerned, remanded the matter to the Collector for deciding two points, one being whether the respondent number 1 was an agri culturist and the other whether there was a tenant on the land and if it found that there was numbertenant whether the Collector was justified in declaring the sale void under s. 63 1 . 2220 of 1957. The appellant was a party to all the proceedings subsequent to the order of the Collector dated November 24, 1952. On payment of such penalty, the Mamlatdar shall issue a certificate to the transferee that such transfer is number invalid. The respondent then went in revision against this order to the Bombay Revenue Tribunal and was unsuccessful. Possibly other cattle in the village were also allowed to graze there because of paucity of grazing facilities therein. 231 and 260, to respondent number 1, Kalidas Harnath Ojha, hereinafter called the respondent on October 28, 1950. When the matter went back to the Revenue Tribunal after remand it was companytended ,on behalf of the respondent number 1 that the Collector had numberjurisdiction to declare the sale to be void without passing a companysequential order under s. 84. The respondent has filed a companynter affidavit stating that the appellant had number filed any petition or application before the Collector under s. 84 of the Act seeking his eviction. 2817 of 1955 said, in dealing with the matter about plot No. The respondents appeal against this order was dismissed by the Bombay Revenue Tribunal on October 27, 1955. By this Act, s. 84A was added in the parent Act. In the meantime, on August 1, 1956 the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Amendment Act, 1956. The respondent then approached the High Court of Bombay with Special Civil Application number 2817 of 1955. This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the High Court of Bombay allowing a writ application preferred before it by the first respondent and setting aside the order of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal which had upheld the order of the Prant Officer in a matter arising under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 Bom. All what he decided by his order dated November, 18, 1952 was that in view of the provisions of law the sale deed in favour of respondent number 1 was invalid. While he was occupying that position he obtained from her a sale deed on October 31, 1950, in respect of both these fields. On remand, the Tribunal again dismissed the respondents appeal on June 3, 1957. It is against this order that Bai Achhuba has preferred this appeal after obtaining special leave from this Court. He then filed Special Civil Application No. The High Court, in its order dated July 2, 1956 in Special Civil Application No. The respondent again went to the High Court by Special Civil Application No. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order Sated July 1, 1959, of the Bombay High Court number Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. Where the transferee fails to pay the penalty referred to in sub section 1 within such period as may be prescribed, the transfer shall be declared by the Mamlatdar to be invalid and thereupon the provisions of sub sections 3 to 5 of section 84C shall apply. 302 and prayed for the quashing and the setting aside of the Tribunals Order. The appellant filed companyies of certain orders of the various Courts and a companyy of the Special Civil Application No. The amendment came into force in August, 1956. The High Court dismissed the petition on December 18, 1957. Survey No. The matter was companysidered to be of some importance in view of the respondents companytention that the previous orders on the application of the villagers operated as res judicata, and this Court ordered the appellant, on March 19, 1963 to file certified companyies of the various documents mentioned in that order. Mathur, for respondent No. Act XIII of 1956 came into force. The respondent number 1 was for some time her karbhari manager of her estate . A second writ petition was preferred by the respondent number 1 against this order but it was dismissed by the High Court. was delivered by Mudholkar, J. Raghubar Dayal, J. delivered a dissenting Opinion. L. Hathi for R.H. Dhebar, for respondent No. MUDHOLKAR J. That petition having been allowed, the appellant has companye up before this Court, as already stated, by special leave. In the year 1956 the Act was extensively amended. The Judgment of K. Subba Rao and J.R. Mudholkar, JJ. H. Sheth, Mangaldas Shah and M. V. Goswami, for the appellant. The respondent took advantage of the provisions of this section, deposited Rs. December 6, 1963. Thereafter the respondent number 1 preferred a writ petition before the High Court which was thus his third writ petition. B. Pai, and O.C. Thereupon he preferred a writ petition before the High Court. The appellant was admittedly the owner of Survey Nos. The appellant is a jagirdar and evidently possesses companysiderable property. LXVII of 1948 hereafter referred to as the Act. This was disputed by the respondent. 302 of 1959. According to the appellant she received numberconsideration for the transaction. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 397 of 1962.
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1963_280.txt
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2,68,385/ as bad debt due from the Bombay firm, incurred by that firm in the companyrse of business transactions. 2,68,385/ due to the appellants was number a bad and doubtful debt in its money lending business number a debt representing loss sustained in the other business. The High Court opined that the debt in question was number a bad and doubtful debt in the assessees money lending business number a debt representing loss sustained in the other business. He held that the debt did number arise in the companyrse of the assessees business as Chemists and Druggists number in the companyrse of their money lending business. 2,68,385/ due from the Bombay firm at the foot of their running account as a bad debt written off as irrecoverable. The assessee had dealings for several years with a firm known as Bhojaji Sobhachand to be hereinafter referred to as the Bombay firm . Two minors, Ramniklal Sobhachand and Lakshmichand Sobhachand were admitted to the benefits of the partnership. He held that the debt . Sobhachand Amarchand, a partner of the Bombay firm, is the father of Seshmal, Ramaniklal and Lakshmichand and he was having sixteen percent share in the Bombay firm. Sobhachand, one of the partners of Bhojaji Sobhachand with 16 share in the profit and loss is the father of Seshmal, Ramniklal and Lakshmichand, partners of the appellants. A bad and doubtful debt due to the taxpayer, written off as irrecoverable in the books of account was properly allowable in companyputing the taxable profits from business, profession or vocation, where accounts were number kept on the cash basis, if the debt was in respect of a loan made in the companyrse of the taxpayers business as a banker or money lender, or when the taxpayer was carrying on any other business the debt was in respect of that other business. The appellants had for a long time business relations with a firm styled Bhojaji Sobhachand carrying on business at Bombay as importers of yam and also as agents and adathias. The Bombay firm owed certain amount to the assessee. did number arise, in the companyrse of the appellants business as chemists and druggists number in the companyrse of their money lending business. There were two partners of the firm Mohanlal Sagmal and Seshmal Sobhachand, and Ramniklal and Lakshmichand minors were admitted to the benefits of the partnership, each with 7/32 share in the profits. The Income tax Officer disallowed their claim holding that these transactions were mere accommodations which can have numberbearing to the regular business carried on by the assessee. The assessee firm then applied to the Tribunal to refer the following question to the High Court of Madras Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the disallowance of the bad debt of Rs. On a further appeal taken by, the assessee to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, the tribunal companyfirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The appellant firm which will hereinafter be referred to as the assessee carried on business in drugs, chemicals, mercury, camphor and art silk yam as also in money lending, over a number of years. C. J. M s Amarchand Sobhachanda firm registered under the Indian Income tax Act, 1922, carried on business at Madras in drugs, chemicals, mercury, camphor and silk yam and as money lenders. The assessee thereafter applied to the tribunal under s. 66 1 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 to submit a statement of the case with the question whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the disallowance of the bad debt of Rs. Section 10 2 xi of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922, as in force at the relevant time provided Such profits or gains shall be companyputed after making the following allowances, namely When the assessees accounts in respect of any part of his business, profession or vocation are number kept on the cash basis, such sum, in respect of bad and doubtful debts, due to the assessee in 807SupCI/71 respect of that part of his business, profession or vocation, and in the case of an assessee carrying on a banking or money lending business, such sum in respect of loans made in the ordinary companyrse of such business as the Income tax Officer may estimate to be irrecoverable but number exceeding the amount actually written off as irrecoverable in the books of the assessee, Provided Clause xi was in two parts. In the assessment of income tax of the appellant for the assessment year 1952 53, relevant to the account year Samvat 2008, the assessee claimed a deduction of Rs. The Incometax Officer disallowed that claim holding that these transactions were mere accommodations which can have numberbearing to the regular business carried on by the assessee. In the opinion of the High Court the debt of Rs. The Income tax Appellate Tribunal accordingly companyfirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In the books of account of the appellants which were main tained according to the mercantile, system there was a current sarafi account in respect of their transactions with the Bombay firm in which were credited the funds transmitted from Bombay in respect of their business transactions. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner agreed with the Income tax Officer. 2,03,147 8 O in the, account of the, Bombay was disallowed by the Income tax Officer, but in appeal the amount was allowed. That firm became insolvent in April 1952. The Tribunal will submit the statement within three months from the date on which the papers reach the Tribunal. The firm companysisted of two partners, Mohanlal Baginal and Sashmal Sobha Chand. The case was twice re manded to the Tribunal. Since the Tribunal has number found the facts we are companystrained to send back the case again to the Tribunal for submitting to this Court a supplementary statement on facts found by the Tribunal. We have number received a statement of case from the Tribunal. In, appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner agreed with the Income tax Officer. After receipt of the supplementary statement of case from the Tribunal the appeal was heard by J. C. Shah, K. S. Hegde and A. N. Grover, JJ. It also found that the statement submitted by the tribunal was in adequate. 1008 7 3 2007 Dr.2,02,823 12 3 2008 Dr.2,68,385 1 3 In the assessment for income tax of the appellants for the assessment year 1952 53 relevant to the account year Samvat 2007 all item of Rs. The facts found by the tribunal are found in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the statement. The first Order of the Court remanding the case to the Tribunal was delivered by Shah, Ag. Entries relating to interest were posted till the end of Samvat Year 2006 in the account on the amount due at the foot of the account. The Tribunal has set out in great detail the arguments advanced before it by the assessee and by the Revenue but it has number set out the facts found by it from the evidence on the record in the light of the arguments advanced. After receipt of the second supplementary statement of case from the Tribunal the appeal was finally heard by J. C. Shah, C.J., K. S. Hegde and A. N. Grover, JJ. The supplementary statement to be submitted within three months from the date the papers reach the Tribunal. The following is a table showing the balances at the end of the Samvat years 2003 Amount Interest At the end of the Samvat Year 2003 Cr.16,951 00 2004 Dr.1,02,188 4 5Dr. in the return of income for the assessment year 1953 54 the appellants claimed allowance for Rs. The appeal was originally heard by J. C. Shah, Ag. 2,68,385/ is right in law to the High Court of Madras for its opinion. Hence by its order dated April 7, 1970, this Court directed the tribunal to submit a further statement. The Tribunal will give opportunity to both the parties of being heard, but will restrict themselves to the ,evidence on the record. C.J., Ramaswami and A. N. Grover, JJ. The accounting year with which we are companycerned in this appeal is Samvat year 2008 companymencing from October 31, 1951 and ending on Oct. 18, 1952. The statement of case is intended to be a finding on facts and number a catalogue of the arguments advanced at the Bar. By our order dated July 29, 1969 we called for the light of the two branches of s. 10 2 xi of the Indian In companye tax Act, 1922. The question referred was, therefore, answered in the affirmative and against the appellants. 2633 9 3 2005 Cr.27,815 0 0Dr. The question referred was, therefore, answered in the affirmative and against the asses see. 483 1 9 2006 Cr.11,975 0 0Cr. The order of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 11, 1964 of the Madras High Court in Tax Case No. C. Chagla and B. R. Agarwala, for the appellant. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. T. Desai, R. N. Sachthey and B. D. Sharma, for the respondent. 949 of 1966. 181 of 1962. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Thereafter the present appeal was brought after obtaining special leave from this Court.
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1969_381.txt
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The kudikidappukaran moved the High Court in revision and in that revision, the High Court set aside the orders of the Land Tribunal and the appellate authority, as per the impugned order before us.
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1999_56.txt
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PW 5 stated to have narrated what he saw on the morning of 23.07.2002 to PW 2 and PW 1 on the day after the cremation of the deceased was over. The prosecution examined PW 1 to PW 10. Thereafter, PW 2 stated to have informed based on the version of PW 5 that she came to know that it was the appellant who was responsible for the companymission of rape on the deceased Radha Bai. The above fact was also supported by the evidence of PW 7, Babulal who in his evidence stated that the deceased Radha Bai was his niece, that on the date of the occurrence he had also gone to the field, where he saw PW 5, Pappu, going towards his house weeping and he also saw the deceased Radha Bai going from the bushes weeping towards her house. One Parmanand climbed the roof and found the deceased hanging from the roof with a Saree. Though, PW 7 was treated as hostile, some part of the evidence did support the version of PW 5. The medical evidence also to a large extent companyfirmed that the deceased Radha Bai was raped prior to the suicide companymitted by her. The doctor in his opinion stated that the cause of the death of the deceased was due to stoppage of breathing, which was due to hanging and the injuries which were present on the body of the deceased were antemortem. PW 5 who is the companysin of the deceased, was an eye witness to the occurrence and, therefore, his evidence became imperative. The brief facts which are required to be stated are that on 23.07.2002, PW 2 the mother of the deceased, when she returned from her days work in the field at 6 p.m., found her daughter, the deceased Radha Bai, who had returned back from the field at around 3 Oclock, inside the house with the door locked from inside. The postmortem was companyducted by PW 4, Dr. Shashank Saxena on 24.07.2002, at 3.45 p.m and in the postmortem report the doctor numbered that the deceased was aged about 15 years, that below the neck there was mark of bluishness and on the ligetcher mark, there were marks of abrasion and on one side of the ligetcher mark, ecmoyosis was present. P 8 and sent the dead body of the deceased for postmortem. PW 7 stated to have seen the appellant also going towards his house and that when he asked the appellant as to what had happened, the appellant stated to have silenced PW 7 or else threatened to beat him. According to PW 5, who was aged about 15 to 16 years on the date of the occurrence, deposed that on the date of the incident he went to the field around 11 a.m for discharging excreta, when he heard the crying sound of his sister, the deceased Radha Bai. PW 1 reported the matter to Aagar Police Station and thereafter, PW 9 went to the place of incident and prepared the sketch map Ext. From the vagina of the body blood was found oozed out, which was frozen and spread over in the midst of the legs on the front side. The doctor stated to have companylected blood stained clothes of the deceased, viscera and pubic hairs, as well as the liquid oozed out from the vagina on the role of companyton, sealed and sent the same to the Station House Officer. The postmortem report was marked as Ext. On inspecting the vagina, it was found that it was reddish, companygested and frozen blood was present. According to the doctor, the age of the deceased was 15 years based on the age written in the application form. On hearing the cries of his sister, when he rushed to the place he found the deceased lying on the ground and the appellant was mounted on her by putting off his pant and the petticoat of the deceased was also lifted, while the appellant was sitting over her. It has also companye in evidence that the seized articles of the deceased, which were sent to the forensic laboratory, were returned back with the report Ext. Based on the investigation, the prosecution came to the companyclusion that the deceased was raped and a case under Section 306 and 376 2 f IPC was registered against the appellant accused on 04.08.2002. He also stated to have recovered the Saree under seizure letter Ext. Laceration on the wall of the vagina of 1 cm size was also numbered. It was also stated by him that the appellant was thrusting his penis and was indulging in some shameful activity. The further opinion of the doctor was that due to hanging, numberinjuries companyld have been caused on the private organs. The said Parmanand stated to have opened the door, cut the rope and brought the body down. The appellant, who was initially charged under Section 306 and 376 2 f IPC, was companyvicted by the trial Court only for the offence under Section 376 1 IPC and was imposed with the punishment of 10 years rigorous imprisonment, along with the fine of Rs.500/ and in default of the payment of fine to undergo one more years rigorous imprisonment. FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J. This appeal by the sole accused is directed against the Single Bench decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench dated 08.09.2006, passed in Criminal Appeal No.1030 of 2003. The appellant was arrested and was put to trial.
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2013_417.txt
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2193/96. On March 21, 1996, the companymissioner suspended the appellant pending investigation. Shri Shiv Sagar Tiwari, learned companynsel for the appellant, companytends that by virtue of definition of appointing authority under Rule 2 a of the Madhya Pradesh Civil services CCA Rules, 1966 for short, the Rules , the appointing authority of the Tehsildars and Naib Tehsildars being the state Government, the companymissioner was devoid of jurisdiction or power to suspend the appellant, pending investigation. The appellant questioned the companypetency of the companymissioner which was negatived by the Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench by order dated October 14, 1996 made in OA No. Leave granted While the appellant was working as a Tehsildar, a trap was laid on March 20, 1996 Pursuant to the information of his demanding and accepting an illegal gratification of Rs. Thus, this appeal by special leave.
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1997_1367.txt
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The Travancore Cochin General Sales Tax Amendment Act, 1957 12 of 1957 came into force on October 1, 1957. During the period April 1, 1957 to September 30, 1957, the assessee was residing in Malabar and in this area the Madras General Sales Tax Act 9 of 1939 applied. Section 3 5 of this Act provides The taxes under sub sections 1 , 1 A and 2 shall be assessed, levied and companylected in such manner and in such instalments, if any, as may be prescribed Provided that In respect of the same transaction of sale, the buyer or the seller, but number both, as determined by such rules as may be prescribed, shall be taxed Where a dealer has been taxed in respect of the purchase of any goods in accordance with the rules referred to in clause 1 of this proviso, he shall number be taxed again in respect of any sale of such goods effected by him. The respondent, N. Sami Iyer, hereinafter referred to as the assessee, is a dealer in tobacco. Sikri, J. In order to appreciate the companytention of the appellant it is necessary to mention a few facts. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Kerala in Tax Revenue Case No.
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1965_286.txt
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While so he companytested the election to the seat of the member of Moroda Panchayat Samiti and the fourth respondent companytested for the seat of member of Gudigan Panchayat samiti. After being elected as members, both of them companytested in the election to the post of Chairman of Moroda Panchayat Samiti. so he was number eligible to be either a member or the Chairman of Moroda Panchayat Samiti. 45 1 i of the Act so he was disqualified to be a member or Chairman of the Panchayat samiti. while functioning provisionally as Assistant Public Prosecutor and was therefore disqualified to become a member Chairman of a Samiti under the Orissa Panchayat Samiti Act 2959. 45 B of the Orissa Panchayat Samiti Act, 1959 for short the Act in the companyrt of the District Judge, Mayurbhanj on the ground that as Assistant Public Prosecutor he was holding office of profit under the Govt. 45 B of the Act was the remedy of the fourth respondent. 45 B of the Act was number maintainable as after the election was over his only remedy was to file an election petition under Section 44 A of the Act. The appellant resisted the same on two grounds first that his appointment under Rule 5 4 of the Rules was a stop gap arrangement so he was number holding office of profit and second that the petition filed by the fourth respondent under Sec. Shri Janaranjan Das, learned companynsel for the appellant urged the very same two companytentions before us as were raised before the High Court namely, i that the appointment of the appellant as Assistant Public Prosecutor was provisional, as a stop gap arrangement as such he was number holding office of profit and ii after the election of the appellant was over only Election Petition under Section 44 A but number petition under Sec. On Sept. 20, 1997 the learned District Judge held that the petition under Section 45 B was maintainable and the appellant was holding officer of profit under the Govt. within the meaning of Sec. Appellant was declared elected as Chairman on February 10, 1997. Having lost in the companytest, the fourth Respondent initiated proceeding against the appellant under Sec. The question that arises in this appeal is whether the appellant was holding office of profit under the State Govt. QUADRI.J. 100/ subject to restrictions under the rules. The factual backdrop in which the question falls for companysideration may briefly be set out here On August 14, 1995 the appellant, an advocate practising in the companyrts of Cuttack, was appointed as Assistant Public Prosecutor provisionally under Rule 5 4 of the Orissa Law Officers Rules, 1971 for short the rules read with Section 25 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 to companyduct the criminal cases. The appellant challenged that order before the High Court of Orissa. On March 10, 1998 the High Court dismissed the writ petition companyfirming the said order of the learned District Judge. He was entitled to daily fee of Rs. Against that order of the High Court the appellant is before us in appeal by special leave. Leave is granted.
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1999_96.txt
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the trustees are all of them members of a sect knumbern as gowda saraswath brahmins. in companyrse of time other families of gowda saraswath brahmins would appear to have settled in the three villages companystituting moolky and the temple came to be managed by members of this companymunity residing in those villages. later on a chieftain who was ruling over the moolky area brought five of these families from bhatkal settled them at mannampady erected a temple for their benefit and installed their idol therein which came to be knumbern as tirumalaivaru or venkataramana and endowed lands therefor. subsequently owing to persecution by the portuguese they migrated further south some of them settling at bhatkal and others in companyhin. but they also held that the evidence established that there were certain religious ceremonies and occasions during which the gowda saraswath brahmins alone were entitled to participate and that that right was protected by art. it is said that the home of this companymunity in the distant past was kashmir that the members thereof migrated thence to mithila and bihar and finally moved southwards and settled in the region around goa in sixty villages. they companytinued to retain their individuality in their new surroundings spoke a language of their own called konkani married only amongst themselves and worshipped idols which they had brought with them. number 403 of 1956 and respondents in special leave petition number 327 of 57.
k. daphtary solicitor general of india b. b. l. iyengar and t. m. sen for the respondents in si number 403 of 56 and petitioner in special leave petition number 327 of 1957.
it is this institution and its trustees who are the appellants before us. against this judgment the plaintiffs have preferred civil appeal number 403 of 1956 on a certificate granted by the high companyrt. 25 2 b applied and that thereunder all classes of hindus were entitled to enter into the temple for worship. they accordingly reserved the rights of the appellants to exclude all members of the public during those ceremonies and on those occasions and these were specified in the decree. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 403 of 1956.
appeal from the judgment and order dated april 11 1956 of the madras high companyrt in appeal number 145 of 1952 arising out of the judgment and decree dated march 31 1951 of the companyrt of the subordinate judge south kanara in original suit number 24 of 1949.
k. nambiyar m. l. naik j. b. dadachanji s.n. 1 1952 2 m.l.j. 26 b . andley rameshwar nath and p. l. vohra for the appellant in c.a. vide devaraja shenumber v. state of madras 1 .
against this judgment the state of madras preferred an appeal to this court civil appeal number 15 of 1953 but ultimately it was withdrawn and dismissed on september 30 1954.
it is the contention of the appellants that by reason of the decision given in the above proceedings which were inter partes the issue as to whether the temple is a denumberinational one must be held to have been companycluded in their favour. 26 b and were void. to resume the history of the present litigation subsequent to the dismissal of civil appeal number 15 of 1953 by this court the appeal of the plaintiffs a.s.
number 145 of 1952 was taken up for hearing and on the application of the appellants the proceedings in the writ petition were admitted as additional evidence. subject to this modification they dismissed the appeal.
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1957_32.txt
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11 and 12 and the Enquiry Commissioner proceeded to hold the enquiry on the remaining ten charges. On November 5, 1950, at the suggestion of the Enquiry Commissioner, the Government of East Punjab with drew charges Nos. This report was submitted to the Government of East Punjab. On charges 3 and 4, the Enquiry Commissioner did number record a finding against the appellant. The Government of East Punjab on May 18, 1950, appointed Mr. Eric Weston, Chief Justice of the East Punjab High Court as Enquiry Commissioner under the Public Servants Inquiries Act, XXXVII of 1850, to hold an enquiry against the appellant on twelve articles of charges. On May 14, 1951, the Enquiry Commissioner prepared his report. The appellant was, at the date when enquiry was directed, employed under the East Punjab Government and there is numberhing in the Constitution which abrogates the authority of the State to direct an enquiry under s. 2 of the Act. On charge No. On January 2, 1951, the Enquiry Commissioner adjourned the proceeding for the winter vacation. The Enquiry Commissioner heard the evidence on behalf of the State at Dharamsala between July 31 and August 21, 1950. Counsel urged, 1 that the enquiry companyld number be directed by the Punjab Government as the appellant was a member of the Indian Civil Service and was number employed under the Government of Punjab 2 that in any event, the enquiry companyld number be made under the Public Servants Inquiries Act, 1850, and companyld only be held under r. 55 of the Civil Services Classification, Control and Appeal Rules and the enquiry number having been held under the rule, the order passed against the appellant was without jurisdiction that the enquiry under the Public Servants Inquiries Act, 1850, violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution and was accordingly void and 4 that the Enquiry Commissioner held the enquiry against the appellant in a manner companytrary to the rules of natural justice in that the Commissioner did number allow the appellant sufficient opportunity to examine witnesses and to produce documentary evidence in support of his case. On April 13, 1949, the appellant was served with an order passed by the Government of East Punjab suspending him from service. 5 and 6 related to the period when he was posted as Deputy Commissioner at Hoshiarpur. 1 to 4 and 7 to 10 related to the official companyduct of the appellant when he was posted as Deputy Commissioner at Dharamsala and charges Nos. Mangal Singh, Sub Inspector about the statements made by certain witnesses for the defence in the companyrse of the investigation which it was submitted were materially different from those made before the Enquiry Commissioner and after hearing arguments, the enquiry was closed. On May 5, 1950, the appellant submitted a representation to the President of India protesting against the action of the Government of East Punjab suspending him from service and praying that he be removed from the companytrol of the Punjab Government and that if any disciplinary action was intended to be taken against him, it be taken outside the Province of Punjab by persons appointed by the Government of India and in atmosphere free from prejudice and hostility. On February 11, 1952, the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs supplied a companyy of the report to the appellant and informed that on a careful companysideration of the report and in particular of the companyclusions reached by the Enquiry Commissioner in respect of the charges framed, the President of India was of the opinion that the appellant was unsuitable to companytinue in Government service and that the President accordingly provisionally decided that the appellant should be dismissed from Government service. The submission of the appellant that the Act did number apply to enquiries against members of the Indian Civil Service is without force. Charges Nos. The Act was, as the preamble recites, passed for regulating enquiries into the behavior of public servants who are number removable from appointment without the sanction of the Government. On and after December 28, 1950, the appellant filed several application and affidavits for obtaining certain directions from the Enquiry Commissioner and for eliciting information from the State. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the order dismissing the appellant was liable to be set aside because the proceedings of the Enquiry Commissioner were without jurisdiction and were in any event vitiated because the Commissioner followed a procedure which was violative of the rules of natural justice. The appellant was admitted to the civil service under a companyenant with the Secretary of State for India, but the special method of recruitment of the appellant to the service does number warrant the view that the appellant was number employed at the material date under the Government of East Punjab. After a period of training in the United Kingdom, the appellant returned to India in November, 1933 and was posted as Assistant Commissioner, Ferozepore in the Province of Punjab. The third charge related to the attempts made by the appellant to secure a firearm belonging to an engineer and the unauthorised retention of that weapon and the procuration of sanction from the Government of East Punjab regarding its purchase. Notice was issued to the appellant of those charges. He held that the appellant had taken the amount referred to in charge No. In July, 1947, he was posted as Deputy Commissioner at Dharamsala and companytinued to hold that office till February 11, 1948, when he was transferred to Hoshiarpur at which place he companytinued to hold the office of Deputy Commissioner till a few days before April 14, 1949. The appellant prayed that a writ quashing the proceeding and the report of the Enquiry Commissioner and also a writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ, Direction or Order companymanding the Union of India to reinstate the appellant into the Indian Civil Service from the date of suspension be issued. He held that the companyduct of the appellant in giving a companytract to Sardar Raghbir Singh which was the subject matter of charge No. The order of dismissal by the President was challenged by the appellant on the plea that the President number having directed viva voce examination before him of witnesses whose evidence was recorded by the Enquiry Commissioner and number having given opportunity to the appellant to make an oral submission about the evidence led in the case and particularly the defence, the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. 2, that the appellant admitted to have received the amounts which were the subject matter of charges Nos. 310 1 of the Constitution, every person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or of an all India service or holds any civil post under the Union, holds office during the pleasure of the President. The fourth charge related to the granting of sanction under the Alienation of Land Act for sale of a plot of land by an agriculturist to a number agriculturist, the appellant being the beneficiary under the transaction of sale, and to the abuse by him of his authority as Deputy Commissioner in getting that land transferred to his name, without awaiting the sanction of the Government. Enquiry proceedings were then resumed on September 5 at Simla and were companytinued till October 23 on which date the evidence on behalf of the State was closed. 1 from the Government on the basis of a claim of Raja Harmohinder Singh which was made at the appellants instance, that the appellant has also received the amount which was the subject matter of charge No. 7, 9 and 10, that the amount which was the subject matter of charge No. The President companysulted the Union Public Service Commission, and by order dated July 27, 1953, dismissed the appellant from service with immediate effect. The order passed by the President was challenged by a petition filed in the East Punjab High Court for the issue of a writ under Art. The appellant was informed that before the President took auction, he desired to give the appellant an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken and that any representation which the appellant may make in that companynection will be companysidered by the President before taking the proposed action. Charges 1, 2, 7, 8, 9 and 10 related to misappropriation of diverse sums of money received by or entrusted to the appellant, for which he failed to account. The Sixth charge related to purchase of a Motor Car by abuse of his authority by the appellant and for flouting the orders of the Government dated March 21, 1949, by entering into a bogus transaction of sale of that car with M s. Massand Motors and for deciding an appeal companycerning that car in which he was personally interested. 5 was an act of dishonest preference and the appellant knowingly permitted the companytractor to cheat the Government when carrying out the companytract and thereby companysiderable loss was occasioned to the Government for which the appellant was responsible. The fifth charge related to the grant to Sardar Raghbir Singh of a Government companytract for the supply of fire wood without inviting tenders or quotations, at rates unreasonably high and to the acceptance of wet and inferior wood which when dried weighed only half the quantity purchased, entailing thereby a loss of Rs. It appears that the appellant did number, at that stage desire to examine any more witnesses, and the appellants case was treated closed on December 28. 6, he recorded an adverse finding against the appellant in so far as it related to the companyduct of the appellant in deciding an appeal in which he was personally companycerned. 8 was obtained by the appellant from the Government under a fraudulent claim sanctioned by the appellant with full knowledge of its true nature and that accordingly the appellant had received an aggregate amount of Rs. 16,734 11 6 and that even though he had made certain disbursements to refugees, the appellant had failed to account for the disbursement of the amount received by him or anything approximate to that amount and therefore the charge against the appellant for misappropriation must be held proved although the amount number accounted for companyld number be precisely ascertained. The defence witnesses were then examined between December 5 and December 28. On October 27, the appellant filed a list of defence witnesses. The proceedings were resumed on March 12, 1951, and after recording formal evidence of two witnesses, S. Gurbachan Singh, Sub Inspector and Ch. Shah, J. Sardar Kapur Singh who will hereinafter be referred to as the appellant was admitted by the Secretary of State for India in Council to the Indian Civil Service upon the result of a companypetitive examination held at Delhi in 1931. Indisputably, since India became a Republic, by Art. The appellant submitted a detailed statement on May 7, 1952, which runs into 321 printed pages of record. A detailed written statement was filed by the appellant and he gave evidence on oath between November 28 and December 5. He served in the Province in various capacities between the years 1933 and 1947. 30,000 to the State. Against the order of dismissal of the petition, this appeal has been filed by the appellant pursuant to a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court. The appellant was called upon to submit his representation in writing within twenty one days from the receipt of the letter. 226 of the Constitution.
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1959_48.txt
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He had recorded the statements of Heera PW 1 Balobai PW 2 and Sumitra PW 4. He had taken into his possession the blood stained axe on production by Heera PW 1 and also blood stained saree of the accused. Heera PW 1 had stated that the appellant accused was standing near the dead body of Kannilal with a bloodstained axe in her hand. The accused was running away with the axe and the axe was snatched from her and she was tied, all this was informed by him while lodging the report, P He had also stated in the report P 3, that the axe was smeared with blood and hair and accuseds garments were also stained with blood. As the appellant was attempting to run away from the scene of crime, he instructed his wife Balobai PW 2 to stop her and snatch the bloodstained axe from her. The blood stained articles were sent for examination to the Forensic Science Laboratory and, according to the report, blood was found on the saree of the accused and the weapon of offence axe. Heera lodged the report P 1 in the Police Station, Sitapur. Balobai PW 2 in her statement before the police had stated, on the date of the incident they were sitting in the house and on hearing the cries of her daughter Sumitra PW 4, she came out of the house and saw appellants son was lying dead and she saw the appellant standing near the dead body with the wooden part of the axe in her hand and the metal part of the axe on the floor. The prosecution in order to establish the charge against the appellant accused, examined eight witnesses including Heera PW 1, his wife Balobai PW 2 and their daughter Sumitra PW 4, but were declared hostile and cross examined by State companynsel. Tiwari PW 7 was officiating in the post of Station House Officer, Sitapur. Thereafter, the dead body of deceased Kannilal was sent to the hospital situated at Sitapur for post mortem examination. Whether the prosecution was successful in establishing that the accused with the intention of causing death, caused the death of Kannilal? On hearing the cries, they came out of the house and went towards the side from where the sound of cries were heard and saw Kannilal deceased lying in a pool of blood. The case of the prosecution is that, on 18.8.1996, Heera PW 1 and his elder brother Naihar Sai had gone to the forest in the morning to companylect wood and at about 1.00 P.M., they returned to the house and when they were sitting inside the house, they heard the cries of his daughter, Sumitra PW 4 and Anita, the daughter of his younger brother. After recording the report P 1, the Station House Officer, Sitapur, left for the scene of occurrence and after giving numberice to the Panchas, he had prepared Panchanama of the dead body of Kannilal. He had also taken into possession the blood stained soil and plain soil from the place of occurrence. They were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory for examination and the report received mentions that both the articles were found blood stained. The post mortem was carried out by Dr. K Datta PW 8, who in his detailed report had stated that the axe wound on the left side of the head of the deceased was sufficient to cause the death. The trial companyrt had also taken other factors into companysideration like the recovery of bloodstained axe and saree of the appellant, for which there was numberproper explanation on the part of the appellant. To answer the second question, the trial companyrt has taken into companysideration the circumstantial evidence available on record, since the sole eye witness Sumitra PW 4 has turned hostile. To answer the first question in the affirmative, the trial companyrt has placed reliance on the post mortem report of the doctor. The appellant, Satni Bai is the mother of the deceased. The trial companyrt raised the following questions for determination Whether the prosecution was successful in establishing that the death was homicidal in nature ? She had also stated, that, when the appellant started running away from the place, on instructions from her husband, she caught hold of appellant and locked her inside the house. He had also stated, that, there were bloodstains on the clothes of the appellant as well. After companypletion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the appellant in the companyrt of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ambikapur, who in turn companymitted the case to the Sessions Judge for trial. The accused when questioned under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, denied all the incriminating circumstances brought against her and reiterated about her being innocent. She belongs to a tribal companymunity. Since the appeal filed against the judgment and order of the trial companyrt is dismissed by the High Court, the accused is in appeal before us. The investigating officer had also prepared the site plan. She has filed this appeal from prison, where she is undergoing her sentence of life imprisonment. She is represented by amicus curiae in this appeal. A.K.
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2010_55.txt
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The Sales Tax Officers rejected that companytention and assessed the sales tax at the enhanced rates. Sales Tax Act, 1948, empowers Provincial Government to fix the rate of sales tax in respect of an assessment year or in respect of certain specified sales only ? The rate of sales tax for certain companymodities was enhanced during the assessment year 1948 49, with effect from June 9, 1948, and for some other companymodities with effect from July 1, 1948. Sales Tax Act, 1948, hereinaf ter referred to as the Act, to submit its returns of sales tax on the basis of its turnover of the previous yearns and filed the returns accordingly. He upheld the order of the Sales Tax Officer. It provided for payment of the sales tax on several companymodities at a uniform rate of 3 pies in the rupee. 1948 are ap plicable to the sales of goods mentioned in paragraph 2 above which took place before 8th June 1948 and 30th June, 1948. The dealer companytended that sales tax on its entire turnover of the two previous years should be assessed at the old rate of 3 pies per rupee and number at the enhanced rate of 6 pies per rupee because the enhancement was made after both the previous years had ex pired. The dealer applied for a reference under section 11 1 and the fol lowing two questions of law were referred to the High Court, Whether the enhanced rate under numberifica tions dated 8th Jane, 1948 and 30th June, 1948 issued under section 3 A of the P. Sales Tax Act. hereinafter referred to as the dealer, was known earlier as the Modi Sugar Mills Ltd. The High Court took the view that the dealer who had chosen to be assessed on the basis of its turnover of the previous year was liable to assess ment, on the entire turnover of the previous year, at the rate prevailing on the first day of the relevant assessment year and that any change in the rate of the sales tax during the companyrse of the assessment year companyld number be applied to that assessment. and it was held in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh v. The Modi Sugar Mills Ltd. 1 that the assessee who had 1 1961 2 S.C.R. Section 3 A was in serted by Act XXV of 1948 companyferring certain powers on the Provincial Government. The Act came into force on April 1, 1948. The assessment years for which the returns were filed were 1948 49 and 1949 50, and the companyresponding previous years were November 1, 1946 to October 31, 1947, and November 1, 1947 to October 31, 1948 respectively. 1 in favour of the dealer, but declined to answer the other question. The dealer accordingly made an application to the Revising Authority on October 11, 1968 to pass an order under sub section 6 of section 11 for a refund of Rs. This appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh and three sales tax officers is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated February 11, 1970. Respondent Modi Industries Limited. The High Court held in its order dated February 22, 1966 that the dealer was entitled to interest at the rate of two per cent on the refundable amount. The dealer filed an application under section 11 8 of the Act for a direction for the payment of interest on the amount which had become refundable as a result of the judgment of the High Court. The dealer felt aggrieved and filed a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution. That case came up to this Court at the instance of the present respondent, which was then known as the Modi Sugar Mills Limited. The appel late authority however upheld the dealers companytention and the matter went up in revision to the Judge Revisions . It is that petition which has been allowed by the impugned judgment of the High Court dated February 11, 1970 by which the order of the Additional Judge Revisions Sales Tax Meerut, dated Decem ber 28, 1968, has been quashed and a direction has been given to him to pass an appropriate order under section 11 6 of the Act in accordance with the law and in the light of the observations made by the High Court. It manufactured various articles like sugar, oil, vanaspati and soap. Whether sub section ii of section 3 A of the U.P. Act XIX of 1956 of the U.P. Sen, J.P. Goyal and Shreepal Singh, for the Re spondent. It exercised the option under section 7 as it stood prior to its amendment by section 7 of U.P. 11 2 70 of the Allaha bad High Court in Civil Misc. 973 of 69 . 1694 of 1971. By its judgment dated July 24, 1961, the High Court answered question No. The High Court has granted a certificate of fitness under clause c of article 133 1 of the Constitution. 189. C. Manchanda and O.P. From the Judgment and Decree dt. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHINGHAL J. Rana for the Appellants. Writ No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1977_25.txt
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In the Writ Petitions filed in the year 1983 the companystitutional validity of the Orissa Additional Sales Tax Amendment and Validation Ordinance, 1983 is questioned. 207 to 211 of 1984 and 1302 of 1986 the companystitutional validity of the Orissa Additional Sales Tax Amendment and Validation Act, 1983 Act 22 of 1983 which replaced the Ordinance is in question. After this judgment the State Legislature enacted the Orissa Additional Sales Tax Amendment and Validation Act, 1983 Act 22 of 1983 . 4596 of 1990 has been filed against the judgment of the Orissa High Court in which the companystitutional validity of Orissa Act 22 of 1983 was upheld. Ramaswami, J. In Writ Petition Nos. Civil Appeal No.
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1992_470.txt
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2.1 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court in quashing and setting aside the order passed by the learned trial Court with regard to framing of the charge under Section 307 of the IPC, the original Complainant has preferred the present Criminal Appeal. 830 of 2007, by which the High Court has partly allowed the said Revision Application preferred by the respondents herein original Accused and has set aside the order passed by the learned trial Court framing the charge under Section 307 of the IPC, the original Complainant Signature Not Verified has preferred the present appeal.
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2019_1113.txt
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Then the Upper Bari doab canal, Sirhind canal, Lower Chinah canal and Lower Jhelum canal etc.,
were companystructed. The canal was companystructed in a reasonably serviceable form by the British during 1817 1823. The western Jamuna canal which serves the State of A Haryana was the first major irrigation work which was initially companystructed by Feroze Shah Tuglaq in 1351. 5415 of 1985 etc. Thereafter, many other projects have companye up and the ones which need mention are Bhakra Nangal project with its network of Bhakra System and the Beas project. It was reconditioned by Akbar in 1568 and was extended in 1626 in the reign of Shahjahan. The appellant in the remaining appeal was an operator in the Mechanical Division, Rohtak under the Irrigation Department of Haryana State. All these projects have been carried out by the state at the state expense. 5415 of 1985 was a Foreman in the Mechanical Construction Division under the Irrigation Department and had applied under Section 33 C 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act before the Labour Court for recovery of arrears of annual increments. 2168 of 1987 was a T. Mate in the P.W.D. From the Order dated 7.1.1985 of the Presiding officer, Labour Court, Amritsar in Application No. Jitendera Sharma, P. Gaur, D.K. When his services were terminated without companyplying with the requirements of the law, he challenged the termination before the Labour Court. His services were terminated and thereupon he approached the Labour Court disputing the validity of the said order. C. Mohanta, Mahabir Singh and C.M. Drainage Division. The companymon justification for ignoring the High Court and approaching this Court directly by way of special leave, according to Mr. Jitendra Sharma for each of the appellants, is that there are a companyple of Full Bench decisions of the Punjab and Haryana High Court holding that the Irrigation Department of the State Government of Punjab is number an industry and numberuseful purpose would have been served by routing the matters through the High Court as the Full Bench decision would have been followed. In each of these cases challenge was advanced by the governmental authority to the maintainability of the application before the Labour Court on the ground that the employer was number an industry and the Act did number apply. Each of these appeals is by special leave and is directed against the Award made in different disputes by the Labour Court. Krishna Iyer, J. spoke for himself, Bhagwati and Desai, JJ. Mohan and C. Kaushik for the Appellants. 547 of 1979. Garg, K.K. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Nayar for the Respondents. The appellant in Civil Appeal No.
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1988_133.txt
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These Way Bills companytained an undertaking that in the event of any of the Banks discounting them and if goods are lost or damaged during transport,, the Transport Company will be responsible to the Bank. The 1st Respondent was the Agent of Shree Narayana Transport Company of one of its Branches namely at Baliapattom and in that capacity it was one of his duties to accept goods from the Public for transporting them by lorry service of the Company and issue Way Bills. While the case was pending before the Assistant Sessions Judge, the Public Prosecutor of Tellicherry filed a Memo on 30 11 67 under Sec. The Appellant who was the Managing Partner of Shree Narayana Transport Company, Calicut filed a Criminal Miscellaneous Petition on 19 2 68 in the High Court of Kerala against the order of the Assistant Sessions Judge according permission to the Public Prosecutor for withdrawing from the prosecution. This fraud was detected on a check made by the General Manager of Shree Narayana Transport Co., Kozhikode and it appears that the 1st accused 1st Respondent executed an agreement in favour of the Transport Company undertaking to make good the loss suffered by it, after which he was suspended on 10 4 63. 494 of the Criminal Procedure Code for permission to withdraw from the prosecution which permission was accorded by the Assistant Sessions Judge on 2 12 67. filed by the Public Prosecutor on 30 11 67, the Government passed an order G.O. It is alleged that the 1st Respondent issued nine Way Bills on different dates in favour of the 2nd Respondent, as if the goods were received but in fact numbersuch goods were accepted for transport number were any such goods dispatched. filed by the Public Prosecutor that the alleged offences charged against the accused arose out of a companytract agreed to between the accused and the defacing companyplainant viz., On the same day a companyplaint was filed before Baliapattom Police and a case was accordingly registered against both Accused 1 and Accused 2. These Way Bills were duly discounted by the second Respondent the companysigner who drew about Rs. 84,000 against, them from his Bank . After investigation the Sub Inspector of Police, Baliapattom filed a charge sheet. 173 companymitted the accused to stand trial before the Assistant Sessions Court on 15 6 65 against which a Revision was filed in the High Court of Kerala on 9 7 65. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Jaganmohan Reddy, J. Respondent 1 and Respondent 2 were companymitted on 15th June 1965 by the Second Class Magistrate, Cannanore to stand trial before the Assistant Sessions Judge, Tellichery, the former for offences under Sections 467, 478 and 420 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code while the latter under Sections 467 read with 109, 471 and 420. 175, 177 and 179 of 1968. 1589/67 Home B dated 22 11 67 directing the withdrawal of the case with the sanction of the Court, in the interest of public policy as also because there was numberlikelihood of the case being pursued to a successful issue. It was stated in the Memo. Sreedharan Nambyar, for the appellant. Lily Thomas, for respondent No. After this petition was dismissed the Respondents seem to have moved the State Government to withdraw the prosecution and accordingly, as would appear from the Memo. G. Pudissery, for respondent No. The Magistrate on the materials disclosed in the report under Sec. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. Rt. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated June 25, 1968 of the Kerala High Court in Criminal M.P. 12 of 1969. Nos.
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1971_459.txt
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the vice president acting as president revoked the proclamation of emergency dated 25th june. the proclamation issued under clause 1 of article 352 of the companystitution companyld be revoked by a subsequent proclamation. proclamation of emergency in exercise of powers companyferred by clause 1 of article 352 of the companystitution i v.v. the union of india has companytended that the two proclamations of emergency had been duly issued by the president and approved by the resolutions of two houses of parliament as required by law and that actually the proclamation of emergency of 3rd december 1971 had been revoked by the vice president acting as the president by the proclamation dated 27th march 1977 and the proclamation of emergency dated june 25th 1975 had been revoked by him by the proclamation dated 21st march 1977.
in the month of february 1976 when the house of the people extension of duration act 1976 act 30 of 1976 was passed by parliament both the proclamations of emergency were in force and therefore parliament was entitled to extend the period of the house of the people for a period number exceeding one year at a time. 353 b the following proclamation of emergency by the president of india dated the 25th june 1975 is published for general information proclamation of emergency in exercise of the powers companyferred by clause 1 of article 352 of the companystitution i fakkhruddin ali ahmed president of india by this proclamation declare that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of india is threatened by internal disturbance. 1789 the following proclamation of emergency by the president of india dated 3rd december 1971 is published for general information. the said proclamation was published in the official gazette on the same date. the above proclamation of emergency was revoked by the vice president acting as president on the 27th march 1977 by a proclamation which read thus minstry of home affairs notification new delhi the 27th march 1977 s.r. giri president of india by this proclamation declare that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of india is threatened by external aggression. 132 e the following proclamation made by the vice president acting as president of india is published for general information proclamation in exercise of the powers companyferred by sub clause a of clause 2 of article 352 of the constitution i basappa danappa jatti vice president acting as president of india hereby revoke the proclamation of emergency issued under clause 1 of that article on the 3rd of december. 117/e the following proclamation made by the vice president acting as president of india is published for a general information proclamation in exercise of the powers companyferred by sub clause a of clause 2 of article 352 of the constitution i basappa danappa jatti vice president acting as president of india hereby revoke the proclamation of emergency issued under clause 1 of that article on the 25th june 1975 and published with the numberification of the govt. that proclamation was published under a numberification dated 26th june 1975 in the official gazette. he further submitted that even though the said proclamations had been validly issued the proclamation of emergency dated 3rd december 1971 had ceased to be in operation on 3rd february 1972 and the proclamation of emergency dated 25th june 1975 which was issued on 26th june 1975 had ceased to be in operation by 26th august 1975 because the resolutions passed by the two houses of parliament approving the said proclamations of emergency as required by clause 2 of article 352 of the constitution as it stood during the relevant time had number been published in the official gazette of the government of india. see lok sabha debates dated december 4 1971 companyumn 37 .
similarly a resolution was adopted by the rajya sabha approving the said proclamation of emergency. the proclamation of emergency issued on 3.12.1971 by the president of india was either ultra vires the constitution or had ceased to be in operation on 4.2.1972.
the proclamation of emergency dated 25.6.1975 issued by the president of india on 26.6.1975 was either ultra vires the companystitution or had ceased to be in operation on 26.8.1975 the house of the people extension of duration act 1976 number 30 of 1976 is ultra vires the companystitution and the finance act 1976 66 of 1976 is ultra vires the companystitution. a proclamation issued under clause 1 a may be revoked by a subsequent proclamation b shall be laid before each house of parliament c shall cease to operate at the expiration of two months unless before the expiration of that period it has been approved by resolution of both houses of parliament provided that if any such proclamation is issued at a time when the house of the people has been dissolved or the dissolution of the house of the people takes place during the period of two months referred to in sub clause c and if a resolution approving the proclamation has been passed by the companyncil of states but numberresolution with respect to such proclamation has been passed by the house of the people before the expiration of that period the proclamation shall cease to operate at the expiration of a thirty days from the date on which the house of the people first sits after its reconstitution unless before the expiration of the said period of thirty days a resolution approving the proclamation has been also passed by the house of people. new delhi 3rd december 1971 sd v. giri president the said proclamation was laid before both the houses of parliament on the 4th december 1971.
in the lok sabha a resolution was moved by the prime minister which read as follows i beg to move that the house approves the proclamation of emergency issued under article 352 of the constitution by the president on the 3rd december 1971.
mr speaker resolution moved that the house approves the proclamation of emergency issued under article 352 of the constitution by the president on the 3rd december 1971.
see lok sabha debates dated december 4 1971 companyumn 4 .
after some discussion in the house the resolution was carried unanimously and it was adopted. 1789 dated the 3rd december 1971.
new delhi the 27th march 1977 sd d.jatti vice president acting as president the above proclamation was published in the official gazette extraordinary dated the 27th march 1977.
on the 25th day of june 1975 the president of india issued a proclamation of emergency as he was satisfied that the security of india was threatened by internal disturbance. on december 3 1971 when india was attacked by pakistan the president issued a proclamation under clause 1 of article 352 as he was satisfied that the security of india had been threatened by external aggression. it was required to be laid before each house of parliament and that the proclamation would cease to operate at the expiration of two months unless before the expiration of that period it was approved by resolutions of both houses of parliament. that resolution was adopted by the lok sabha on july 23 1975.
see lok sabha debates dated july 23 1975 companyumn 427 .
a resolution was moved seeking the approval of the said proclamation of emergency on 21st july 1975 in the rajya sabha and it was adopted by the rajya sabha on 22nd july 1975.
see rajya sabha debates dated july 22 1975 column 124 .
the resolution of the lok sabha and the resolution of the rajya sabha approving the proclamation dated 25th june 1975 were number published in the official gazette. it was further pleaded by the union of india that the publication of the resolutions was number necessary and that in any event since they had been published in the lok sabha debates and the rajya sabha debates which were published under the authority of the speaker of the house of the people and the chairman of the rajya sabha respectively the proclamations of emergency remained in force until they were duly revoked. the companytention of the petitioner is that the duration of the house of the people companyld have been validly extended only when a proclamation of emergency was in force under the proviso to clause 2 of article 83 of the constitution and since the two proclamations of emergency dated 3rd december 1971 and 25th june 1975 were either ultra vires the companystitution or had ceased to be in operation by the time the house of the people extension of duration act 1976 act 30 of 1976 was passed by parliament the house of the people extension of duration act 1976 act 30 of 1976 had numbereffect and companysequently all acts passed by the house of the people during the extended period including the finance act 1976 were ultra vires the companystitution. a resolution was moved in the lok sabha on july 21 1975 seeking the approval of the lok sabha to the proclamation of emergency dated the 25th june 1975 and also the order of the president dated 29th june 1975 made in exercise of the powers companyferred by sub clause b of clause 4 of article 352 of the companystitution as it stood then as applying to the state of jammu and kashmir. clause 1 of article 352 of the companystitution provided that if the president was satisfied that a grave emergency existed whereby the security of india or of any part of the territory thereof was threatened whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance he might by proclamation make a declaration to that effect. a proclamation of emergency declaring that the security of india or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened by war or by external aggression or by internal disturbance may be made before the actual occurrence of war or of any such aggression or disturbance if the president is satisfied that there is imminent danger thereof. the period of five years being the period for which the house of the people may under clause 2 of article 83 of the constitution companytinue from the date appointed for its first meeting in relation to the present house of the people shall while the proclamation of emergency issued on the 3rd day of december 1971 and on the 25th day of june 1975 are both in operation be extended for a period of one year provided that if both or either of the said proclamations cease or ceases to operate before the expiration of the said period of one year. article 352 of the companystitution as it stood at the relevant time read as follows 352 1 if the president is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of india or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance he may by proclamation make a declaration to that effect. 1975 by anumberher proclamation dated 21st march 1977 which reads thus ministry of home affairs notification xxxxxxxxxx s.r. 1 the house of the people unless sooner dissolved shall companytinue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and numberlonger and the expiration of the said period of five years shall operate as a dissolution of the house provided that the said period may while a proclamation of emergency is in operation be extended by parliament by law for a period number exceeding one year at a time and number extending in any case beyond a period of six months after the proclamation has ceased to operate. see rajya sabha debates dated december 4 1971 companyumn 46 .
the said resolutions of the houses of parliament were numberdoubt number published in the official gazette. as the period of five years from the date appointed for its first meeting of the then existing house of the people was about to companye to a close parliament enacted the house of the people extension of duration act 1976 act 30 of 1976 which received the assent of the president on the 16th february 1976.
section 2 of that act read thus extension of duration of the present house of the people. the finance act 1976 was passed by the lok sabha after its period was extended as stated above and by the rajya sabha in the early part of the year 1976 and it received the assent of the president on the 27th may 1976.
aggrieved by the levy of the rates of income tax and of wealth tax as provided by the finance act 1976 the petitioner has filed this writ petition. of india in the ministry of home affairs number gsr 353 b dated the 26th june 1975.
d.jatti vice president acting as president new delhi the 21st march 1977.
article 83 2 of the companystitution during the relevant time that is before the 42nd amendment act of 1976 read as follows 83. new delhi the 26th june 1975 f.a. the finance act 1976 passed during the period so extended had been therefore validly passed. it read thus ministry of home affairs notification new delhi the 26th june 1975 s.r. although the petitioner had also challenged section 13 of the companystitution 42nd amendment act 1976 and clause c of section 3 of the companystitution 24th amendment act 1971 in the petition he did number press these two companytentions at the hearing of the petition the petitioner was an assessee under the income tax act and wealth tax act during the assessment year 1976 77 and was liable to pay income tax and wealth tax in accordance with the rates prescribed by the finance act 1976 which was passed by the lok sabha during its extended period which was extended under the provisions of the house of the people extension of duration act 1976 act 30 of 1976 after the expiry of five years from the date appointed for its first meeting. ahmed president number.11/16013/1/75 sp d 11 l. khurana secy. it reads thus ministry of home affairs notification new delhi 3rd december 1971 g s.r. 1971 and published with the numberification of the government of india in the ministry of home affairs number g.s.r. original jurisdiction writ petition number 63 of 1977.
under article 32 of the companystitution of india . the petition is opposed by the union of india. v. union of india ors.19812 s.c.r.1 the validity of the 40th and the 42nd companystitutional amendments had been questioned on similar grounds. samant the petitioner herein who has argued this case in person with great clarity and precision has raised the following contentions in this petition. petitioner in person. a. subhashini ms.
j. wad and c.v.
subba rao for the respondents. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by venkataramiah j. shri baburao alias p.b.
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test
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1987_448.txt
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The Contempt Petitioners filed title suit being T.S. The Contempt Petitioners then filed Title Appeal No. Thereafter, Contempt Petitioners filed WP No. In the year 1983, the said Sumohan Chatterjee the father of Contempt Petitioners died. The Brief facts which are necessary for adjudicating the dispute involved in the present Contempt Petition in a nutshell are as follows The father of Contempt Petitioners Predecessor in interest i.e. The respondents were permanently restrained from making any other companystruction on the suit land and directed to vacate the suit land and to give khash possession to the Contempt Petitioners within two months. 235 of 2011 before Additional district Judge and the same was allowed vide its order dated 29 6 2013, entitling mandatory injunction and holding that the Contempt Petitioners do get a decree of declaration of title and recovery of the possession in respect of the suit land. This Contempt Petition has been initiated against the respondents alleged Contemnors for deliberate and wilful violation of the order dated 27 10 2017 passed by this Hon. In the year 1999, the Contempt Petitioners having companye to know that the aforesaid property was acquired by the State, approached the State Authorities, wherein it was declared that the property was acquired by the State and companypensation was duly paid. 235 of 2011 and to recover Possessions because of massive companystruction has taken place in the property by the government and also having transferred same to the Institute of Nuclear Physics. 7,82,77,387/ Rupees Seven Crore Eighty Two Lakh Seventy Seven Thousand Three Hundred and Eighty Seven only in favour of Registrar, Supreme Court of India payable at New Delhi. Sumohan Chatterjee, since deceased, was the owner of land in question ad measuring 2 Bighas 7 Cottas 1 Chittacks bearing number 5K 333 within the Mouza Kasba, District South 24 Parganas. The suit was dismissed vide order dated 30 06 2011. List the matter after two weeks. 21429 w of 2014 before High Court seeking a writ of Mandamus against the State alleging therein that it was impossible to execute the decree passed in Title Appeal No. List this matter after four weeks. Let this amount be kept in an interest bearing short term fixed deposit of a Nationalised Bank. 117 of 2004 stating that they have neither received any numberice of acquisition number has been paid companypensation by the State. Thereafter, matter again came up on 20 07 2018, when this Court inter alia passed the following order. Learned. No.
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2018_619.txt
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938/2002. 10452/2004 and punishment of companypulsory retirement was imposed by the Sr. Regional Manager. 938/2002 and Civil Writ petition No. The respondent Sone Lal had challenged the order of companypulsory retirement passed by the Sr. 6809/2005 S.L.P. by the Senior Regional Manager whereas the order companyld only be passed by the Zonal Manager as he claimed that he had been promoted as Technical Assistant Grade I by the Zonal Manager. 18432/2002. Civil Appeal No.6808/2005 S.L.P. Appeal by the Corporation before a Division Bench of the High Court was also dismissed by holding that the respondent had been promoted as Technical Assistant Grade I by appellant No.2 Zonal Manager and appellant No.3 Senior Regional Manager was lower in rank than appellant No.2 and was number companypetent to impose major penalty of companypulsory retirement on the respondent. Regional Manager of the Food Corporation of India whereby the penalty of companypulsory retirement from service had been imposed under Regulation 56 of the Food Corporation of India Staff Regulations, 1971 hereinafter referred to as the Regulations , while the respondent was working as Technical Assistant Grade I. Arising out of S.L.P. 2603 of 1998 as companyfirmed by the Division Bench judgment dated 19.12.2003 in L.P.A. 18432/2002 which was also disposed of by the Division Bench following the judgment passed by another Division Bench in L.P.A. 10452/2004 is directed against the judgment in L.P.A. The learned single Judge, by judgment dated 12.04.2002, allowed the writ petition and set aside the order of companypulsory retirement by holding that appellant No.3 was number companypetent to impose the penalty of companypulsory retirement on the respondent. 10452 OF 2004 WITH Civil Appeal No.6809/2005 Arising out of S.L.P. Civil No. 18432 of 2002 whereby the Division Bench disposed of the writ petition in terms of writ petition No. 938/2002 dated 19.12.2003 passed by the Division Bench of the Punjab Haryana Court companyfirming the judgment passed by learned single Judge of the said Court in writ petition No. 18505 /2004 was filed by the Food Corporation of India against writ petition No. 18505/2004 Dr. AR. As already stated Civil Appeal No./2005 S.L.P. The respondent challenged the said order on the ground that the order of companypulsory retirement had been passed by an authority lower in rank than the appointing authority i.e. 2603 of 1988 and Civil Appeal No. Certain disciplinary proceedings were initiated against Sone Lal, the respondent in S.L.P. 18505/2004 is directed against the final judgment dated 06.05.2004 passed by the High Court of Punjab Haryana in Civil writ petition No. Since the respondent filed companytempt petition and numberstay of the operation of the judgment passed by the learned single Judge was granted by the Division bench of the High Court in LPA, the respondent was reinstated in service as Technical Assistant on 23.08.2003. Both the LPA and the civil writ petitions are restored to its file and the Division Bench is requested to dispose of the only issue in regard to the violation of principles of natural justice as alleged by the respondents herein in both the matters. Solicitor General and Ms. Indra Sawhney learned companynsel for the appellants and Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned senior companynsel, Mr.S.P. 938 of 2002. Sharma and Mr. D.K. We heard Mr. A. Sharan, learned Addl. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment passed by the Division Bench, the appellant filed the above appeal by way of Special Leave Petition in this Court. Thakur and other companynsel for the respective respondents. Similar companytentions as in the other case were also taken in this civil appeal. Lakshmanan, J. Leave granted. C No. No.
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2005_570.txt
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The respondents are the promotees to the post of Assistant Engineers from amongst the Junior Engineers and Sub Assistant Engineers. Thereafter the appointees joined as Assistant Engineer. 78 of 1979 had been filed by the direct recruited Assistant Engineers claiming inter alia that the appointments of such direct recruits having been made against vacancies of the year 1978 they should be treated as appointees of the year 1978 and companysequently their seniority should be determined on that basis under the promotee Assistant Engineers of that year numberwithstanding the fact that they were factually appointed as Assistant Engineer in the year 1980. As the order of the Tribunal dated 19.6.1992 adversely affected the seniority of the promotee Assistant Engineers who had been promoted in the year 1979 and 1980 they filed a Misc. Thereafter by interpreting the rule of seniority, particularly Rule 26 of the Rules, came to hold that the direct recruits cannot be held to be recruits of the year 1978 and on the other hand, must be held to be recruits of the year 1980 when the State Government by Notification appointed those direct recruits as Assistant Engineers in march 1980. The Tribunal, therefore directed the State Government to fix the seniority of said shri patnaik below the promoted Assistant Engineers of the year 1978. It may be stated that the promotee Assistant Engineers of the years 1979 and 1980 had number been arrayed as party to the said proceedings. 1 who was a direct recruit to the post of Assistant Engineer filed Original application No.,
78 of 1989 in the State Administrative Tribunal seeking the relief that he should be given the seniority in the rank of Assistant Engineer below the promoted Assistant Engineers in the tear 1978 since he has been recruited to the said post against a vacancy which has arisen for the year 1978 and for the delay caused by the department he should number be made to suffer. the Tribunal was persuaded to accept the said companytention raised on behalf of Shri Patnaik and it came to hold that since he has been selected against a vacancy of the year 1978 his seniority in the cadre of Assistant Engineer should be determined treating him to be a recruit of the year 1978 numberwithstanding the fact that he was appointed as an Assistant Engineer by Notification dated 29th march, 1980. It may be stated at this stage that under Rule 26 of the Rules which deals with the inter se seniority of the Assistant Engineers as between direct recruits and promotees, the promoted officers recruited during the year would be companysidered senior to the officers directly recruited during the year . The respondents who are junior engineers had been promoted as Assistant Engineers in accordance with Rule o different dates in 1979 and 1980, namely, 27.8.1979, 27.11.1979, 4.2.1980, 4.11.1980 and 27.12.1980. The appellants are graduates in Civil Engineering and had been recruited as Assistant Engineers in the Irrigation Wing in the Irrigation and Power Department in the State of Orissa after being duly selected by Orissa Public Service Commission in accordance with Orissa service of Engineers Rule, 1941 hereinafter referred to as The Rules . It further came to hold that such direct recruits, therefore, cannot be held to be senior to the promotees of the year 1979 and will be juniors to promotees of the year 1980. The brief facts culminating in the impugned order of the Tribunal may be stated as hereunder That in the year 1978 forty vacancies were available in the post of Assistant Engineers in the Irrigation Wing of the Irrigation Department of the State of Orissa out of which 10 posts were to be filled up by direct recruitment in accordance with rule 7 of the Rules. Since the implementation of the aforesaid direction of the Tribunal adversely effected the seniority of the promotee Assistant Engineers who had been promoted during the year 1979 80 they approached the Tribunal both by filing as Application for Review and by filing an Original Application, as already stated, and the Tribunal disposed of the same by the impugned order. The promotees whose Original Application No. 3229 of 1992 for reviewing the order dated 29.6.1992. 2325 of 1992. The Tribunal disposed of both the Original Application as well as the Misc. They also filed a direct Petition before the Tribunal which was registered as OA No. Orissa Public Service Commission issued an advertisement inviting applications from the candidates eligible for appointments to the service in the year 1979 and after companypleting the process of selection prepared a list of selected candidates in accordance with Rule 13 of the Rules and submitted the same to the State Government sometimes in November 1979. This appeal is directed against the order dated 25.10.1994 of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal in Misc. Petition No 3229 of 1992, arising out of Original application No. The Tribunal allowed the said application by order dated 19.6.1992. Petition by the impugned judgment and came to hold that the Original Application would number be maintainable since the question of Inter se seniority has been decided in OA No. 78 of 1989. 73 of 1989 by Order dated 29.6.1992. 1955 OF 1998 Special Leave Petition No 7017 of 1998 in CC No. The State Government finally made the final selection in accordance with rule 15 and required the selected candidates to undergo medical examination and issued letters of appointment in March 1980. Tripathy, Advs. 4745 of 1995 B. PATTANAIK Leave granted in SLP No 7017 of 1998. The aforesaid order of the Tribunal reviewing the earlier order dated 29.6.1992 is the subject matter of challenge in this appeal. petition which was Registered as Misc. Jagdish Patnaik, appellant No. Pattanaik Honble Mr. Justice M. Srinivasan K. Banerjee, Raju Ramachandran, Sr. Advs.,
Ashok Kumar Gupta, Adv. L. Sanghi, Sr.
Janaranjan Das, Aswini Kumar, Mishra and K.N. THE 7TH DAY OF APRIL, 1998 Present Honble Mr. Justice G.B. 2325 of 1992 was dismissed as hot maintainable also filed a Special Leave Petition by way of abundant caution and that Special Leave Petition was also taken on Board and was heard alongwith the present appeal. It, however, came to the companyclusion that the review of the said order is maintainable particularly when the affected persons had number been arrayed as parties to the earlier decision. Petition No. for State of orissa J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the companyrt was delivered WITH CIVIL APPEAL No. with him for the Respondents N. Misra, Adv. O.A. with them for the appellants. No.
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1998_340.txt
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they were companyvicted on two charges under section 325/34 of the indian penal companye for causing grievous hurt to bapu and chunia. the appellants nabi bux numberr mohammad and ismail khan were tried by the additional sessions judge rajgarh on charges under section 307 read with section 34 of the indian penal code for attempting to companymit the murder of bapu in furtherance of their companymon intention and also under section 325 read with section 34 of the indian penal companye for causing grievous hurt to chunia in furtherance of their common intention. the appellants were acquitted on the charge under section 307/34 of the indian penal companye. bapu who was one of the victims sustained three fractures on his left temporal parietal and occipital bones and totally lost his power of speech. appeal number 94 of 1970.
nur ud din ahmed and u. p. singh for the appellants. p. kapur for i. n. shroff for the respondent. said that the learned trial judge had taken a lenient view in awarding the sentences to the appellants. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by ray j. this is an appeal by special leave limited only to the question whether the high companyrt was justified in enhancing the sentences. criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 63 of 1971.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated december 10 1970 of the madhya pradesh high companyrt indore bench in cr.
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dev
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1971_498.txt
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The agreement did number become void on the requisitioning of the premises and Brij Mohan Mehra had manipulated for the requisitioning of the premises. Brij Mohan Mehra companytested their claim. 3 to 8 and Brij Mohan Mehra. Their case was that the premises were requisitioned on the manipulation of Brij Mohan Mehra, that clause 6 of the agreement was intended to be for the benefit of the prospective vendees, that the prospective vendees waived the companydition in cl. Thereafter Brij Mohan Mehra refused to execute the sale deed in spite of the requests of the prospective vendees. Brij Mohan Mehra filed an appeal against the order of requisition. 6, that Brij Mohan Mehra companyld number put an end to the companytract by relying on cl. By that agreement Brij Mohan agreed to sell the premises in suit to Dr. Jiwan Lal, Shri Kishan Das and Bal Kishan Das. Brij Mohan Mehra, one of the respondents, was the defendant, and the appellants were the plaintiffs in the suit. The plaintiffs waived the companydition in cl. His case was that the agreement was a companytingent agreement, that it became void on the requisitioning of the premises, that numbercontract ever came to existence prior to the requisitioning of the premises, that he did number manipulate for the requisition of the premises, that the plaintiffs companyld number waive the companydition in cl. From the date from which the above said premises are vacated by the Income tax Authorities to the date of execution and registration of the sale deed the Vendor shall affect such repairs as may be necessary with the companysent of the Purchasers at the expense of the Purchasers. 6, and that the plaintiffs have always been ready and willing to perform their part of the obligation under the agreement. The Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiffs were always ready and willing to perform their obligation under the agreement. The Subordinate Judge had decreed the plaintiffs suit for possession of the premises by specific performance of the agreement to sell. If even after the vendor having satisfied the purchasers regarding, the title of the premises which are the subject matter of sale, the Purchasers do number companyplete the sale deed and have it registered within the stipulated period as mentioned in clause No. 5, 6, 7 and 9 of the agreement are set out here The sale deed shall be executed and registered by the vendor in favour of the purchasers within three months from the date when the premises are vacated by the Income tax Authorities and intimation is given to the purchasers by the vendor per registered post. In the event of the above said premises, which is the subject matter of sale number being vacated by the Income tax Authorities or is subsequently requisitioned by the Government prior to the registration of the sale deed the vendor shall refund to the purchaser the sum of Rs. 6, that they were number ready and willing to perform their obligation under the agreement and that they were guilty of laches and should be deemed to have abondoned their rights under the agreement. The balance of the sale companysideration was to be paid by them at the time of the registration of the sale deed. The premises were requisitioned by an order dated January 23, 1960. all expenses and incidentals incurred in companynection therewith by the vendor before the sale deed is executed and tendered for registration. 5 above, the earnest money so paid by the Purchasers to the Vendor shall stand forfeited for number performance of the companytract here inbefore entered into, and the Vendor shall be at liberty to retain or resell the property. They also said that they were ready and willing to pay the sale companysideration stipulated in the agreement. Clause 5 makes the vendor liable to execute a sale deed within a certain time. So the plaintiffs instituted their suit. The premises were requisitioned by the Additional District Magistrate, Amritsar on January 23, 1960. The purchasers shalt also pay for and on account of the Chowkidar to look after and maintain the companydition of ,the premises in good order till the execution and registration of the sale deed. The purchasers shall be liable to pay after such repairs etc. The prospective vendees paid Rs. As soon as the premises were requisitioned the entire companytract fell through and thereafter there subsisted numberenforceable obligation on either side. He companyld number rescind the companytract by relying on cl. The sale companysideration was Rs. They were number guilty of laches and they did number abondon their claim under the agreement. On those findings, the Subordinate Judge decreed the plaintiffs suit. 10,000/ as earnest money. 5 The agreement was made on December 9, 1959. The seller became liable to sell and the buyer became liable to buy from the very inception of the companytract. 10,000/ Rupees ten thousand only received by the vendor as earnest money plus interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. There was an agreement between Dr. Jiwan Lal, the first appellant, Shri Krishan Das the second appellant, and one Bal Kishan Das, the predecessor in interest of the appellants Nos. The material terms incorporated in cls. It was dismissed on August 1, 1960. So there was a companycluded companytract between the parties. K. Daphtary, M. C. Chagla, S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja, ill.
Oamaruddin, K. S. Suri and R. K. Melita, for the appellants. The suit was instituted on November 5, 1962. As the appeal was pending, the plaintiffs companyld reasonably wait until August 1, 1960 in the hope that the order of requisition might be set aside in appeal. So numberlegitimate objection can be taken on the score of delay until August 1, 1960. The suit was instituted within two years, three months and four days of the dismissal of appeal on August 1, 1960. The High Court reversed the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge, 1st Class, Amritsar, dated August 17, 1964. 122500/ . 6 and insisted on buying the property. It was companycluded on December 9, 1959. C. Setalvad, S. T. Desai and I. N. Shroff, for respon dent No. 362 of 1964. The High Court dismissed the suit. This is an appeal against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, dated January 25, 1966. Appeal by certificate from the judgment and decree dated January 25, 1966 of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in Civil Regular First Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DWIVEDI, J. 1100 of 1967. are effected. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION C.A. No.
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1972_376.txt
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Puri who was the Financial Commissioner Develop ment and Secretary Incharge of Development Department. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Punjab it has been asserted that the Development Department was under the charge of the Financial Commissioner who was designated as Financial Commissioner Development and Shri Pun who was holding the rank of the Commissioner was the Secretary Incharge of the Development Department. Instead, the Financial Commissioner was made Incharge of the Development Department and he was designated as Financial Commissioner Develop ment . He was neither holding the rank of Commissioner number he was the Secretary Incharge of the Development Department. Instead Hardayal Singh was Incharge of the Development Department as Special Secretary in the Department of Rural Development, Panchay ats, Agriculture and Forests. He was number Incharge of the Department as Secretary, instead he was working under over all companytrol of Financial Commissioner Development namely, Shri I.C. On behalf of the Appellants Petitioners it was strenu ously urged that Shri Puri was number the Secretary Incharge of the Development Department on 30.11.79. Puri who was posted as the Financial Com missioner Development was the Incharge of Development Department at the relevant time and as such he was appointed a member of the Selection Committee and admittedly he par ticipated in the deliberations of the Selection Committee which held its deliberation on November 30, 1979 for prepar ing the select list of 1979. This finds support from the numbere recorded by Hardayal Singh on 5.12.79 requesting the Chief Secretary for allocation of work between the Financial Commissioner Development and Special Secretary. Shri I.C. it is asserted that Hardayal Singh was merely posted Special Secretary to the Govt. Ajit Singh Nagpal and other officers filed a similar petitions challenging the validity of Select List prepared for the year 1983. It is thus evident that Hardayal Singh was working under the over all companytrol of Shri I.C. The challenge to the validity of the Select List for the year 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1983 are almost on similar grounds. Das, Mrs. Goyal challenging the validity of the Select List pre pared for the year 1978, 1979 for promotion of members of Punjab State Civil Service Executive to the Indian Admin istrative Service, During the pendency of these appeals 17 writ petitions were filed before this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution by Pritam Singh, Ajit Singh Nagpal and other members of the Punjab State Civil Service Executive challenging the validity of Select List prepared ,for the year 1979, 1980 and 1983. During the pendency of these Appeals Pritam Singh and 15 other officers of the State Civil Service challenged the validity of Select List prepared for the year 1979 and 1980 before this Court by means of petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution. On December 31, 1980 Selection Committee companystituted under Regulation 3 met to prepare fresh select list for the year 1980. However, Hardayal Singh was given the rank of Secretary simply to protect his special pay in the time scale of selection grade in the Indian Administrative Service. He filed another writ petition challenging the validity of that Select List also almost, on the same grounds, that writ petition was also dismissed by the Divi sion Bench on November 26, 1979. R.S. 4370 of 1983 etc. The list so prepared did number include the names of aforesaid officers. Before the High Court S Shri R.S. Puff. In the companynter affidavit filed on behalf of the State Govt. Das, Baldev Kapoor and Smt. In the companynter affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government allega tions regarding mala fide have been denied. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIIN Civil Appeal No. SINGH, J These three Civil Appeals are directed against the judgment of Division Bench of Punjab Haryana High Court dismissing the writ petitions filed by R.S. The rele vant numbere is available on record. Das and Mrs. K. Goyal have preferred appeal before this Court by special leave. I also respectfully agree with him on the companyclusions he has reached on the different companytentions urged before us in these cases. From the Judgment and Order dated 26.11.
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1986_319.txt
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155/78 dated 12 12 78. The brief facts of the case which led to this appeal are as follows The Sessions Judge of Nawagaon, during the trial of a murder case in Sessions Case No. It is a criminal appeal arising out of an order passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Gauhati dismissing the reference made by the Sessions Judge under Section 395 of the CrPC. After the matter went back, the Sessions Judge made a reference before the High Court under Section 395, Cr. 18 N /74 exercising the powers companyferred under Section 319 of the CrPC directed the five respondents herein to be tried together with four other original accused already companymitted by the Magistrate to take their trial Under Section 302 read with Section 34, I.P.C. The occurrence should have taken place before 1974 since the order of the Sessions Judge is dated 23 9 74. P.C bringing to the numberice of the High Court that the order of the learned single Judge was companytrary to the decision of the Supreme Court in Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab, . and also issued number bailable warrants against these respondents.
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1992_228.txt
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4 Regulation 33.1.3 prescribed the Station Heat Rate SHR . Gross station heat rate Gross station heat rate for companyl based generating stations 200/210/250 MW sets 500 MW and above sets During stabilization 2600 kCal kWh 2550 kCal kWh Period Subsequent period 2500 kCal kWh 2450 kCal kWh Note 1 1 Section 181 2 zd 2 Tariff Regulations 2005 In respect of 500 MW and above units where the boiler feed pumps are electrically operated, the gross station heat rate shall be 40 kCal kWh lower than the station heat rate indicated above. Note 2 For Generating Stations having companybination of 200/210/250 MW sets and 500 MW and above sets, the numbermative gross Station Heat Rate shall be the weighted average station heat rate. Note 2 For generating stations having companybination of 200/210/250 MW seats and 500 MW and above sets, the numbermative gross station heat rate shall be the weighted average station heat rate. Regulation 44.2 stipulates gross station heat rates for existing generating stations in the following terms 44.2 Gross Station Heat Rate For existing Generating Stations Existing Coal based Thermal Generating Stations, other than those companyered under clauses b , c and d , below 200/210/250 MW sets 500 MW and above sets 2450 kcal kWh 2425 kcal kWh Note 1 In respect of 500 MW and above Units, where the boiler feed pumps are electrically operated, the gross Station Heat Rate shall be 40 kcal kWh lower than the gross Station Heat Rate indicated above. MERC in the companyrse of its adjudication on the business plan had adopted the same SHR as under the tariff regulations. In the Tariff Regulations 2005, the gross SHR was defined in the following terms 33.1.3. The SHR is significant because it represents the ratio between heat input and the energy output. The present Petition challenges the vires, legality and validity of Regulation 44.2 d of the MYT Regulations that fixes SHR numberms for the 1st Petitioners. The SHR is the heat energy required to generate one unit of electrical energy. 156 of 2011 which disallowed the Petitioners prayer for relaxation of the numberms under Regulations 99 and 100 of the MYT Regulations. On 25 October 2012, MERC passed an order on the MYT Business Plan for RInfra G stating that it had companysidered the numberms for SHR based on the MYT regulations. The appellant submitted that the MERC ought to have exercised its power under Regulations 99 and 100 of the Tariff Regulations 2011 to amend and remove difficulties since the SHR which was prescribed for Dahanu TPS was number the same as for similarly situated generating units. The appellant moved the Tribunal against the order of MERC dated 25 October 2012 which disallowed the prayer for relaxation of the numberms under Regulations 99 and 100 of the Tariff Regulations 2011. The MERC framed the MERC Terms and Conditions of Tariff Regulations 20052 for a period of five years, upto financial year 2010 11. 2 The validity of a tariff regulation framed by the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission MERC was questioned before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The MERC Multi Year Tariff Regulations 20154 which govern the period 1 April 2016 to 31 March 2020 place the Dahanu TPS of RInfra G at par with other companyl based thermal generating stations. 14 MERC opposed the writ petition. 13 On 3 October 2013, the appellant instituted a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Bombay High Court for the purpose of challenging Regulation 44.2 d which specifies a separate SHR for the Dahanu TPS as companypared to other generating stations in the State of Maharashtra. The petition challenged the vires of the regulations before the High Court and the remedy before the High Court was the only remedy available to challenge the validity of the regulations. Electricity Regulatory Commissions companystituted under Section 82 are empowered to frame regulations under Section 181, including the terms and companyditions for determination of tariff under Section 611. Regulation 44.2 d has been challenged in the present Writ Petition and is number the subject matter of any other Petition or Appeal in any other Court as stated, inter alia, in paragraph 27 of the Petition. It is settled law of the Honble Supreme Court of India that the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity has numberpower, authority or jurisdiction to go into validity or legality of Regulations framed by a Regulatory Commission. The High Court held against the appellant both on the maintainability of its writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and on the merits of the challenge to the validity of the statutory regulation. The regulations, in so far as the appellant is companycerned were extended for a further period of one year upto financial year 2011 12. In response to the objection raised by MERC, the following assertion was companytained in the rejoinder filed by the appellant before the High Court 2.3. The appellant disclosed the pendency of the appeal before the Tribunal against MERCs order dated 25 October 2012 disallowing the prayer for relaxing the numberms. The national tariff policy, suggestions of stakeholders as well as the assessment carried out by the CPRI were duly companysidered. 4 of 2013 before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity challenging the order dated 25th October 2012 passed in Case No. The Petitioners in the Petition have, inter alia, in paragraph 27 thereof disclosed to this Honble Court that they have preferred Appeal No. The submission of the appellant on the maintainability of the proceedings under Article 226 is that the scope of the appeal before the Tribunal was entirely different from the ambit of the writ petition. Save as aforesaid, the Petitioners have number filed any other Petition in respect of the subject matter of the present Petition either before this Honble Court or any other High Court or the Supreme Court of India. In fact, the Petitioners have enclosed at Exhibit K to the Petition a companyy of the Memorandum of Appeal without annexures. 15 The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity disposed of the appeal on 8 April 2015, recording that it did number survive in view of the institution of the writ proceedings before the Bombay High Court. The said Appeal has since been heard by the Appellate Tribunal, in any event, was number pressed by the Petitioners at the final hearing of the Appeal. It is denied that there is any forum shopping. Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J 1 Leave granted. The grievance of Respondent No.
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2019_7.txt
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On the basis of the offer made, Pradip Sarkar invested an amount of Rs.1,50,000/ and Heritage Herbs issued three receipt cum allotment letters for three plots of land to Pradip Sarkar. All the three cheques were deposited by Pradip Sarkar but were dishonoured by the companycerned bank. These cheques were issued by Heritage Herbs and were signed by Raj Kumar Chamaria as Chairman of the said companycern. This led Pradip Sarkar to take steps to issue a numberice to and initiate proceedings against Heritage Herbs and Raj Kumar Chamaria under the provisions of Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In a companyplaint filed on 31st March, 2001, Pradip Sarkar alleged that Heritage Herbs had made an offer for companylecting money from the market with a view to allot land to the intending investors. Thereafter, Pradip Sarkar moved an application for impleading the appellants as accused persons. At the time of handing over the receipt cum allotment letters, Pradip Sarkar was also handed over three cheques of Rs. The question arising for companysideration in these appeals relates to the alleged failure and companysequential effect of Pradip Sarkar to specifically state in his companyplaint filed under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 that the appellants accused persons were in charge of and responsible for the companyduct of the business of M s. Heritage Herbs Ltd. of which they were said to be Directors. During the pendency of the proceedings Raj Kumar Chamaria died on 10th December, 2003. The appellants have challenged the order of the Calcutta High Court and the only companytention urged is that numberspecific allegations were made against them either in the companyplaint as originally filed on 31st March, 2001 or in the amended companyplaint filed on 28th April 2004. The application was allowed and the appellants were impleaded as accused persons by the companycerned Magistrate by an order dated 28th April, 2004 and summons issued to them. 61,000/ each post dated to 29th October, 2000. Madan B. Lokur, J. Feeling aggrieved by their impleadment and summons issued to them, the appellants preferred Criminal Revision Petitions in the Calcutta High Court, which dismissed the petitions.
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2014_596.txt
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After his death, the said Trust became a Public Charitable and Religious Trust and the trustees held the companypus and accumulations of income of the Trust thereunder. the Nizam of Hyderabad created a trust with a companypus fund of Rs.22,20,000/ , named E.H. the Nizams Pilgrimage Money Trust on November 2, 1950. The objects of the Trust, inter alia, are that during lifetime of H.E.H. The Trustees shall hold and stand possessed of the Trust Fund UPON TRUST a to d On and after the death of the Settlor to hold the Trust Fund or the balance thereof then remaining and the unspent accumulations If any of the income of the Trust Fund and the investment thereof upon trust to expend or utilise the net income of the Trust Fund as well as the accumulations if any of the income thereof made during the Settlors lifetime and the investments thereof for all or any one or more of the following religious or charitable objects and purposes at Hedjaz and or Iraq in such manner as the Trustees may in their absolute discretion think proper to iv for companystructing, establishing and maintaining dispensaries or hospitals or wards in hospitals and otherwise for medical aid and relief for companystructing, establishing, maintaining and running schools, madressas and other educational institutions and otherwise for advancement of education vii for such other religious or charitable purposes as the Trustees may in their absolute discretion think fit in such manner and to such extent as they may think fit. the Nizam to meet expenses of Haj Pilgrimage of himself and members of his family accompanying him on such pilgrimage and expenses on visits to holy places of Hedjaz and Iraq and also for making religious offerings at such places as the settlor in his absolute discretion might think fit that after the death of the Nizam the net income and the unspent accumulations of income, if any, shall be spent or utilised by the trustees for all or any of the religious or charitable purposes specified in clause 3 e of the said trust deed. H.E.H. But the trustees companyld number have spent the income of the Trust property in Hedjaz or Iraq under clause 3 e in view of the restriction imposed by the Government of India on sending monies outside India. On September 29, 1973, the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad allowed the application and directed the trustees to utilise the income of the Trust fund including the accumulated income for the objects and purposes specified in aforementioned sub clauses of clause 3 e within the territory of India. Thereafter, they filed an application before the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad seeking relief under Section 34 of the Indian Trusts Act for short, the Trusts Act . After obtaining legal opinion, the trustees passed a resolution dated May 22, 1968 to spend the income of the Trust property including accumulations thereof only on objects and purposes specified in sub clauses v , vi and of clause 3 e within the territory of India. In assessment proceedings, under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 for short the Act for the Assessment Years 1974 75 and 1975 76, the trustees claimed exemption under Section 5 1 i thereof on the ground that the properties assets were held in Trust for public purposes of charitable and religious nature in India in view of the said order of learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. During his lifetime, he did number go either for Haj or on any other pilgrimage. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, however, took the view that by virtue of the order of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, the properties of the Trust were entitled to exemption under Section 5 1 i of the Act from the date of the order. the Nizam died on February 24, 1967. The Revenue carried the matter in appeal before the Income tax Appellate Tribunal. The Wealth Tax Officer rejected the claim. No.292 of 1982 for the Assessment Years 1976 77 and 1977 78 which gave rise to Civil Appeal Nos.9269 9270 of 1995. Civil Appeal No.2328 of 1995 is against the order of the Division Bench of the High Court in R.C.No.192 of 1980 dated March 24, 1987 reported in 171 ITR 323 pertaining to the Assessment Years 1974 75 and 1975 76. SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI,J. Holding that the assessee was number entitled to exemptions under Section 5 1 i of the Act, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and allowed the appeal of the Revenue. These appeals arise out of two reference cases under Section 27 1 of the Wealth tax Act, 1957 decided by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, give rise to a companymon question of law. Following the said order, the High Court disposed of R.C. They read as under 3. The appellants are the assessees.
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2000_392.txt
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The wife led to the discovery of the skipping rope that was used for strangulation. In companyrse of investigation Probal Dutta companyfessed before the police that he along with his aunt had strangulated the deceased and he had stabbed him on his chest. When she shouted, her nephew Probal Dutta, who was inside the house, came out and both of them looked for the child first and found him from the road. in length and 1.5 c.m.,
in length and 1.5 c.m. The base of the mark is redid and there is achymosis at the edges of the ligature mark. The scalp, membrance and brain are all companygested Pleaurae, lungs, pericardium and heart are all companygested affected Paritonium, stomach, intestine are also companygested. The head and the facre are companygested. The other appellant, Probal, nephew of the deceased, was shown affection, a beautiful and sacred sentiment in a human being and also charity, the wonder of life without a ceremony, and kept at his home to prosecute his studies but, an obnoxious one, the infidelity of the wife with incurable sensuality and the monstrous ingratitude of the nephew, brought his tragic end. Thereafter, they proceeded to the bed room where the deceased was lying on the bed and a rope had been fastened around his neck. Thereafter a case under Section 302/34 IPC was registered and during investigation Probal Dutta, in pursuance of his disclosure statement, Ext. 6, led to discovery of the two pieces of handle of the skipping rope and the knife hidden inside the house. When the Investigating Officer reached the house, wife of the deceased lodged a written FIR, Ext. One transverse, companytinuous ligature mark seen around the neck at the level of thyroid cartel edge. The deceased husband, as expected, trusted the wife, Ruma Bora, and such an emotional trust has always been regarded as a great companyplement to any person. The falsehood of both the wife and the nephew culminated in the murder of the deceased, an Upper Division Clerk in the office of the Deputy Superintendent of Schools, Jorhat. Shorn of details, the prosecution case is that on 4.6.1997 about 4.30 a.m. the police came to know that at 1.30 a.m. one Naren Dutta had been hospitalized on being hit by a bullet by the unknown miscreants. It is further opined that the injury on the chest of the deceased was caused with some pointed weapon like dagger. Similar companyfession was made by the wife. lateral to the sternum, measuring 1 c.m. One stab wound on the right side of the chest wall, size 5 c.m. A general diary entry was made on 4.6.1997 and thereafter the police moved to the house of the deceased at Gajpuria Village. On dissection the subcutenous tissue is found acchymosed. As alleged, they lifted their child, Pranjal, and took him out. The Investigating Officer on enquiry found the story narrated, vide Ext. In his report he has opined that the cause of death is due to asphyxia following strangulation and the same was caused with a rope. P 2, to be absolutely false, companycocted and incredible and, accordingly, arrested the accused persons. The factual score from which the present appeals arise has a sad and sordid story to tell reflecting the morbid obsession of the appellants with lust, abandonment of kernel of all human virtues and deep addiction with carnal desires. The wound is gapping. The trial companyrt, appreciating the material brought on record, came to hold that death was homicidal in nature that there was numberbullet injury on the chest but a stab injury with the knife that had been seized that though the companyfession made before the police officer was number admissible in evidence, yet the statement that provided information pertaining to recovery was admissible that the recovery made by the prosecution was absolutely believable that the story put forth by the wife being disowned by her was a circumstance against the accused to be taken numbere of and that there was motive as the evidence on record would show existence of illicit relationship between the accused persons and, accordingly, found them guilty and imposed the sentence as has been stated hereinbefore. The breadth of the mark is about 4 m.m. Underlying bony cage is intact. The police rushed to the hospital and found him dead. 2, stating that about 1.30 a.m. three unknown persons with their faces companyered with black clothes had entered into the house, tied her up with the point of pistol and while one guarded her, two others entered their bed room and after 15 minutes they came out. The prosecution, in order to bring home the charge, examined nine witnesses and two witnesses were examined as companyrt witnesses. The injuries were ante mortem. The wife, a teacher in the school and the nephew, a student of Class X, ultimately faced trial and being companyvicted by the learned trial Judge under Section 302 read with 34 of Indian Penal Code for short IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of life and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/ , in default of payment of fine, to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for three months, preferred Criminal Appeal No. The tongue is swelled. Clotted blood seen at the external margin and at the level of the rib. Thereafter, the investigating agency got the post mortem done, recorded the statements of the witnesses and after companypleting all the formalities placed the charge sheet before the companypetent companyrt which, in turn, companymitted the matter to the companyrt of Session. On an appeal being preferred the High Court re appreciated the evidence, took numbere of all the circumstances and opined that the prosecution had proven the charge to the hilt and companysequently declined to interfere with the impugned judgment of companyviction. We have heard Ms. Kiran Bhardwaj, learned companynsel for the appellant, and Mr. Navnit Kumar, learned companynsel for the respondent State. The accused persons abjured their guilt and claimed to be tried. Dipak Misra, J. They moved him to the civil hospital where he was declared brought dead by the doctor. The relevant part of the report is as follows The dead body was in stout companydition. The defence chose number to adduce any evidence. in depth. Hence, they have preferred the present appeals by special leave. 16 of 2002 before the Gauhati High Court which affirmed the companyviction and the sentence.
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2013_276.txt
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Zafir respondent 19 , Mohd. This brings us to the case of eleven workmen who are Mohd. Islam respondent 20 , Mohd. On February 23, 1954, the strike was launched in accordance with the numberice served by Shri Bari and the strike companytinued for about a month. Zafir respondent 22 , Rajeshwar Prasad respondent 26 , Chirkut respondent 27 , Lal Das respondent 43 , Inderdip respondent 47 and Mohd. Mansoor respondent 6 , Ram Kuber Das respondent 9 , Ramasis respondent 15 , Mohd. This was followed by the dismissal of these sixty workmen after a managerial inquiry. The strike was called off on March 19 and 20, 1954. On February 6, 1954, the newly elected president served a strike numberice on the management. Conse quently, the appellant took steps to serve charge sheets on the workmen, who had joined the illegal strike, on March 4, 1954. This decision was given on February 22, 1954, and the strike was launched on February 23 immediately thereafter. The main findings of the tribunal are that the settlement of February 18, 1954, was a bona fide settlement arrived at during the companyrse of companyciliation proceedings and was therefore binding on the workmen and companysequently the strike which began on February 23, 1954, was in breach of the terms of the settlement and was therefore illegal. Having thus held that the strike was illegal and there was numberreason why it should have been launched in such hot haste, the tribunal went on to companysider the case of these sixty workmen who were dismissed. The case of the appellant was that the strike which began on February 23,1954, was an illegal strike as it took place during the currency of a settlement arrived at in the companyrse of companyciliation proceedings with the assistance of the Labour Commissioner who acted as companyciliation officer. The dispute was referred by two references one relates to 31 workmen and the other to 29 workmen. It held that numbercharge of violence was brought home to these workmen and even the charge sheets which were originally issued to the workmen did number companytain any charge of violence. The brief facts necessary for present purposes are these On November 10, 1953, a general meeting was held by the workmen of the appellant and a numberconfidence motion was passed against the executives of the workmens union and Shri Shahabuddin Bari was elected as the new president of the union. Nazir respondent 58 . On February 18, 1954, a settlement was arrived at between the management and Shri Fateh Narain Singh, the general secretary of the old executive companymittees. The charge sheets in this case were sent to the eleven workmen by registered post and returned unserved, because they were number found in their villages. This matter was referred to the Registrar of Trade Unions and he held that the meeting at which Shri Bari and the new office bearers were elected was irregular and in companysequence the old office bearers of the union companytinued to remain validly elected executives of the union. We dismiss the appeals so far as the remaining thirteen are companycerned, namely, Jagdish Lal respondent 31 , L. Choudhary respondent 60 , Mohd. These are two companynected appeals by special leave in an industrial matter and relate to the dismissal of sixty workmen of the appellant company. Nazir respondent 58 and companyfirm the order of the tribunal with respect to them. In their case the tribunal held that though charge sheets were issued to them, they companyld number be served and the inquiry took place without their knowing anything about the charges or the date of the inquiry. Appeals by special leave from the Award dated February 24, 1959, of the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, Patna, in Reference number. There is numberprovision in the Standing Orders for affixing such charge sheets on the numberice board of the companypany. On the same day on which the charge sheets were sent by registered post it appears that numberices were 1 1959 SUPPl. It is said that thereafter there were companyciliation proceedings which failed and companysequently the two references were made. C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India, Nooni Coomar Chakravarti and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant. Ghose and P. K. Chatterjee, for the respondents. They have been disposed of by a companymon award, though, as the references were two, there are two appeals before us. 10 of 1959 and 1 of 1955. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO, J. December 15. 32 and 33 of 1960. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos.
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1960_174.txt
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Ahu rice 8 bags. Joha rice 15 bags. Joha Rice 15 bags. You are also responsible for unauthorised hoarding of rice and sugar in the premises of Messrs. Deora Flour and Rice Mills at Zoo Road and Messrs. Srinivas Basudeo at ties at higher prices in and outside Gauhati for profiteering. On 25 7 1973 the following quantities of paddy and rice were unearthed and seized from your unauthorised possession at Zoo Road Deora Flour and Rice Mills premises. Fancy Bazar, Gauhati. That on 25 7 73 the following quantities of paddy and rice were unearthed and seized from your unauthorised possession at Zoo Road Deora Flour and Rice Mills premises. That on 25 7 73 the following quantities of paddy and rice were unearthed and seized from your unauthorised possession at Zoo Road Deora Flour and Rice Mills premises . in Messrs. Deora Flour and Rice Mills at Zoo Road, Gauhati, and smuggling of the resultant rice to Meghalaya for earning un due profit. That on 25 7 1973 the following quantities of paddy and rice were unearthed and seized from your unauthorised possession at Zoo Road Deora Flour and Rice Mills premises Sali paddy 147 bags Ahu paddy 207 bags Sali Mota Rice Arua 239 bags Ahu rice 8 bags Joha rice 15 bags L447SupCI/74 That on 4 1 1972, 191 bags of sugar were seized by the supply officials of Gauhati from your unauthorised possession at Messrs. Srinivas Basudeo, Fancy Bazar, Gauhati. You are also responsible for unauthorised hoarding of rice and sugar in the premises of Messrs. Deora Flour and Rice Mills at Zoo Road and Messrs. Srinivas Basudeo at Fancy Bazar for the sole purpose of selling these companymodities at higher prices in and outside Gauhati for profiteering. Joha rice 8 bags Joha rice 14 bags That on 4 1 1972, 191 bags of sugar were seized by the Supply Officials of Gauhati from your unauthorised possession at Messrs. Basudeo, Fancy Bazar, Gauhati. Sali paddy 147 bags Ahiu paddy 207 bags Sali Mota rice Arua 239 bags Ahu rice 5. Sali Mota rice Arua 239 bags. Gauhati and in the active management Basudeo, Fancy Bazar, Gauhati, are responsible for unauthorised milling of paddy. You are also responsible for unauthorised hoarding of rice and sugar in the, premises of M s. Deora Flour and Rice Mills at Zoo Road and M s. Srinivas Basudeo at Fancy Bazar for the sole purpose of selling these companymodities at higher prices in and outside Gauhati for profiteering. That on 16 5 72 the Supply officials seized 105.03 quintals of rice from your unauthorised possession at Messrs. Srinivas Basudeo, Fancy Bazar, Gauhati. That on 16 5 72 the supply officials seized 105.03 quintals of rice from your unauthorised possession at Messrs. Srinivas Basudeo, Fancy Bazar, Gauhati. The grounds of detention served upon the petitioner Prabhu Dayal Deorah read as follows That you, being one of the partners and in the active management of M s. Deora Flour and Rice Mills, Zoo Road, Gauhati and M s. Srinivas Basudeo, Fancy Bazar, Gauhati are responsible for unauthorised milling of paddy in M s. Deora Flour and Rice Mills at Zoo Road, Gauhati and smuggling of the resultant rice to Meghalaya for earning undue profit. That on 16 5 1972 the supply officials seized 105.03 quintals of rice from your unauthorised possession at Messrs. Srinivas Basudeo, Fancy Bazar, Gauhati. You are also responsible for unauthorised hoarding of rice and sugar in the premises of M s. Deorah Flour and Rice Mills at Zoo Road and M s. Srinivas Basudeo at Fancy B for the sole purpose of selling these companymodities at higher prices in and outside Gauhati for profiteering. The grounds of detention served on the petitioner Raj Kumar Deorah read as follows That you being a close associate of Shri Prabhu Dayal Deora s o Late Basudeo Deora of Zoo Road, Gauhati and in the active management of Basudeo, Fancy Bazar, Gauhati, are responsible for unauthorised milling of paddy in Messrs. Deora Flour and Rice Mills at Zoo Road, Gauhati and smuggling of the resultant rice to Meghalaya for earning undue profit. That on 4 1 1972191 bags of sugar were seized by the Supply officials of Gauhati from your unauthorised possession at Messrs. Srinivas Basudeo, Fancy Bazar, Gauhati. Th grounds of detention served upon Prabhu Dayal Deorah on the afternoon of 30 7 1973 read as follows That you, being one of the partners and in the active management of M s. Deora Flour and Rice Mills, Zoo Road, Gauhati and M s. Srinivas Basudeo, Fancy Bazar, Gauhati are responsible for unauthorised milling of paddy in M s. Deora Flour and Rice Mills at Zoo Road, Gauhati and smuggling of the resultant rice to Meghalaya for earning undue profit. That on 4 1 72, 191 bags of sugar were seized by the supply officials of Gauhati from your unauthorised possession at Messrs. Srinivas Basudeo, Fancy Bazar, Gauhati. That on 16 5 1972 the supply officials seized 105.03 quintals of rice from your unauthorised possession at Messrs. Srinivas Basudeo,. As regards 105.03 quintals of rice seized on 16 5 72, the petitioner denied any seizure of rice from the unauthorised possession of M s. Srinivas Basudeo on 16 5 72F. to keep the rice in question at Zoo Road, Gauhati, on the ground That the aforesaid Deorah Rice and Flour Mill used to get paddy from Food Corporation of India for the purpose of milling and the said mill did rice milling job only as a licencee under the Rice Milling Regulation Act of paddy allotted by the Food Corporation of India and given for the purpose of milling by other authorised persons. That you indulged in such trade activities which created acute scarcity and high prices of rice and sugar in Gauhati market. Ahu paddy 207 bags. Sali Paddy 147 bags. Sali paddy 147 bags. The petitioners Prabhu Dayal Deorah and Raj Kumar Deorah, have filed separate petitions for writs of habeas companypus and orders of release after investigating questions raised by them against their detention orders dated 25 7 1913 made following a Police raid on 25 7 1973 at the stores of the Deorah Flour and Rice Mills at Zoo Road, Gauhati. He went on to explain that, as the firm had a licence for dealing in rice, the possession of it companyld number be unauthorised. In this way, at least the seizure of rice was admitted, but, what was disputed was that its possession was unauthorised on 16 5 72. The grounds of detention served on the, afternoon of 30 7 1,973 upon Raj Kumar Deorah read as follows That you being a close associate of Shri Prabhu Dayar Deora S o Late Basudev Deora of Zoo Road. Sd District Magistrate Kamrup On 5 8 1973, Prabhu Dayal Deorah sent his representation to the State Government through the Jail authorities of Gauhati. As regards 191 bags of sugar seized on 4 1 1972 from M s. Srinivas Basudeo, Fancy Bazar, Gauhati, of which also Prabhu Dayal Deorah was a partner, the petitioner claimed that it was companyered by a licence Annexure g to the petition , the annexed companyy of which showed that it was a provisional licence renewed on 27 3 1973 retrospectively for the years 1971 and 1972. Accordingly to the detaining authorities this did number prevent the possession of sugar seized from being unauthorised at the time of its seizure. The orders of detention state that the detaining authority is satisfied that with a view to prevent the petitioners from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the companymunity in Kamrup District, it is necessary that they should be detained in Gauhati Jail with immediate effect until further orders. On 5 8 1973, each of the petitioners sent his representation to the State Government through the jail authorities of Gauhati raising various grounds against the validity of the order of detention. You are, thus acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the companymunity as a whole in this district and your being at large has jeopardized the maintenance of such supplies and services to the companymunity. You are, thus acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the companymunity as a whole in this district and your being at large has jeopar dised the maintenance of such supplies and services to the companymunity. The reply of the detaining authorities, set out in the affidavit of the Joint Secretary to the Government of Assam, was that there was numberlicence for this rice and that this was released only after a warning and directions were given to the petitioner as to how it should be dealt with. The identically worded orders of the District Magistrate, Kamrup, against them state that the detaining authority is satisfied that, with a view to preventing them from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the companymunity in the Kamrup District, it is necessary that they be detained at Gauhati Jail with immediate effect until further orders. You arc, thus acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the companymunity as a whole in this District and your being at large has jeopardi zed the maintenance of such supplies and services to the companymunity. You are, thus acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the companymunity as a whole in. this district and your being at large has jeo pardized the maintenance of such supplies and services to the companymunity. Raj Kumar Deorah had denied companynection with both the partnerships mentioned above. Apart from companyplaining that the grounds served upon him were so vague and devoid of particulars as to nullify his companystitutional right of making a representation against the order of detention, he also alleged that, as a criminal prosecution had companymenced against him on 28 7 1973, for the alleged unauthorised possession of hoarded rice on 25 7 1973, a detention order against him, on the basis of this allegation, was illegal as the charge against him companyld be dealt with in the companyrse of the criminal prosecution. sd Illegible 30 7 72 District Magistrate, Kamrup. On the same day, each of the petitioners was served with the order of detention and also the grounds of detention together with a letter informing him of his right to make a representation against the order of detention to the State Government. It was also revealed by the returns made in this Court that the petitioners, who were present when the stores were raided, had run away from the premises on one pretext or another and that numberody there companyld explain how the storage of all the rice found boarded was authorised. On 30 7 1973, the petitioners surrendered themselves before the Additional District Magistrate. 1496 and 1497 of 1973. On 30 7 1973, soon after each petitioner had surrendered in the Court of a Magistrate on that very date, the District Magistrate, Kamrup, sent the grounds of detention to each petitioner with a letter informing the detenu of his right to make a representation against the order by which he had been detained and also that he has a right, if he so desires, to appear before the Advisory Board, to which his case would be submitted within before thirty days of the detention. on 6 8 1973 had been rejected on 28 9 1973, by the Govt. The petitioners question the legality of the orders of detention dated 25 7 1973 passed by the District Magistrate, Kamrup, under s.3 2 a of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and pray for issue of writs in the nature of habeas companypus. The Board had to report to the Government within ten weeks from the date of detention as to whether there is or number sufficient cause for the detention of the person companycerned. Both representations were rejected by the State Government on 28 8 1973 and their cases, together with their representations were sent by the State Government to the Advisory Board companystituted under s.9 of the Act. The orders also intimate that grounds of detention will be served on the detenus within five days. The detaining, authorities had found the allegations to be false after companytacting the Food Corporation and M s. Gogoi Co. V. Gupte, J. P. Bhattacharjee, D. N. Mukherjee, Dilip Hazarika and N. R. Choudhury, for the petitioner in W.P. P. Bhattacharjee, D. N. Mukherjee, Dilip K. Hazarika and N. R. Choudhury, for the petitioner in W.P. of Assam after due inquiries into allegations made by the petitioners. He alleged in his Habeas Corpus petition dated 13 8 1973 to this Court that his representation had number been disposed of by the State Government till then. The replies filed also showed that the sources of the total quantities seized had remained unexplained and that the quantities recovered were number shown to be companyered by required authority or licences under the law. A dissenting opinion was delivered by Beg, J. MATHIEW, J. The recommendation of the Advisory Board to release a detenu was binding on the Government. Their lengthy representations submitted to the Govt. was delivered by MATHEW, J. The petitioners had tried to companytrovert the allegations made against them by the detaining authority but had number succeeded in satisfying the Government of Assam about the companyrectness of their stands either on questions of fact or of law raised by them. 1946/ 73 . BEG, J. He claimed to have the authority. The Judgment of MATHEW and MUKHERJEA JJ. Niren De, Attorney General of India and Naunit Lal for the respondents in both the petitions . 1497/73 . ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petitions Nos. No.
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1973_254.txt
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He appears to have been carrying on a flourishing business as a hotelier. He was a partner of Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging situate close to the premises in which the appellant was a tenant. Formerly there were two businesses which were separated in 1962 According to the petitioner the hotel building though companystructed recently had numberspace which companyld be used as a godown and the materials required to be stored for the purpose of running the hotel were being kept in the godown of Bombay Chandra Bhavan, Avenue Road. The appellant has been carrying on business in this premises for over twenty years. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment and order of the Mysore High Court on a Revision Petition filed under Section 50 of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961. Mitter, J.
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1969_376.txt
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An Official Liquidator Respondent 2 was appointed as Liquidator of the Company. 7 of 1986 and 507 of 1989 pending on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Rangareddy District at Saroor Nagar. According to the appellant since the properties were situate in Rangareddy District it would be just and companyvenient to companytinue to prosecute the suits in Hyderabad. Third and fourth respondents are the Advisors and Directors respectively of the first respondent Company. The first respondent requested that its account be transferred from Sundernagar Branch, Bombay to Hyderabad Main Branch of the appellant. The first respondent deposited with the appellant the documents of title relating to its landed property at Industrial Development Area, Nacharam Tehsil, District Hyderabad presently Rangareddy District with an intention to create an equitable mortgage of immoveable property companyered by those documents together with all structures and buildings thereon. The first respondent is a limited companypany. The appellant brought to the numberice of the Official Liquidator the pendency of these two suits. On 23 7 1990 a meeting was held in the presence of the Official Liquidator. 7 of 1986 against Respondents 1, 3 and 4 in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Rangareddy District at Saroor Nagar, Andhra Pradesh for recovery of Rs 97,21,274.11 with interest thereon. Premium Automobiles Limited filed a winding up petition against the first respondent in Company Petition No. In order to secure the amount under the various heads credit facilities the first respondent deposited on 17 8 1979 with the appellants Sundemagar Branch, Bombay, an agreement for sale in respect of the first floor of the building belonging to the first respondent. On 6 10 1976, the third and fourth respondents executed separate guarantees in respect of the facilities granted to the first respondent guaranteeing repayment of amounts. The appellant filed a suit bearing O.S. Both the suits are pending adjudication. 507 of 1989 came to be filed by the appellant for recovery of a sum of Rs 58,783.25 being expenses incurred from time to time in respect of these properties. The necessary forms in this regard were filed before the Registrar of Companies, Maharashtra at Bombay for registering the charges. By an order dated 23 6 1990 the first respondent was ordered to be wound up. The prayer in the application was for leave to prosecute the two original suits bearing Nos. The appellant filed Company Application No. O.S. On 20 1 1984, one of the Directors declared that equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds dated 6 10 1975 would also form security for the letters of credit, fresh funded term loan, guarantee limited and other facilities allowed to the first respondent, by the appellant. 428 of 1992 was preferred by the appellant. 645 of 1988 before the High Court of Bombay. On 26 3 1992, the learned Single Judge passed an order directing that the two suits be transferred to the Bombay High Court. The further prayer was, in default of payment a final decree might be passed directing the sale of mortgaged properties and for ancillary reliefs. 229 of 1991 in the aforesaid companypany petition under Section 446 of the Companies Act hereinafter referred to as the Act . That was dismissed summarily by the impugned order dated 15 12 1992. The averments in the plaint are briefly as follows. Hence, the special leave petition. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MOHAN, J. Leave granted. Aggrieved by that order Appeal No. No.
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1994_258.txt
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as that was the offer of the Noida authorites in the year 1993. the rate offered by the Noida authorities stood accepted. at the same rate of Rs.2750/ sq.mtr. which rate was also offered by the Noida authorities to the respondent in the year 1993. Pursuant to such advertisement for allotment of plots by the Noida authorities, the respondent submitted an application for allotment along with the registration money. This deposit companyfirmed that the rate of allotment was Rs.3600/ per sq. Rs.2750/ per sq.mtr. In the affidavit of evidence, it was alleged by the Noida authorities that the letter dated 21st of December, 1993 was only a proposal for allotment and that the said letter companyld number be treated as an allotment letter. 2750/ per sq.mtr. In 1993, applications for registration for allotment of plots to institutions including Nursing Homes and Hospitals were invited by a general scheme by the Noida Authorities. Accordingly, the Noida authorities were directed by the MRTP Commission to refund the excess amount paid by the respondent, that is to say the difference of money between Rs. Rs.3600/ per sq. 2750/ per sq. in respect of the plot in question and therefore, the Noida authorities were liable to refund the excess amount paid by him. On the other hand, the Noida authorities also companyld number allot the plot offered in the said letter of 1993 and the amount of Rs. It is an admitted position that this offer of the Noida authorities was number accepted by the respondent as we find from the record that the amount under the offer letter was number deposited by the respondent. An affidavit of evidence was filed by the Noida authorities in which it was brought on record that as per the terms of the scheme, the rate applicable was the one prevailing at the time of issuance of the allotment. 3600/ per sq.mtr. in 1997 Rs.2750/ per sq. On 20th of April, 1996, on the basis of a request made by the respondent in his letter dated 29th of January, 1996, a fresh allotment letter was issued and in this allotment letter, it was specifically made clear that the allotment rate would be Rs.3600/ per sq. That the respondent had read and understood all the terms and companyditions of allotment and the respondent shall companyply with the terms and companyditions of allotment. and depositing the companysideration money at the aforesaid rate with the Noida authorities, a petition was filed before the MRTP Commission by the respondent against the Noida authorities under Sections 10 a i 1 , 36A and 13 of the MRTP Act praying for instituting an enquiry and thereafter passing the cease and desist order and demanding the excess amount paid by him. A plain reading of this undertaking filed by way of an affidavit before the Noida authorities would indicate that the respondent had accepted the terms and companyditions of the offer letter, including the companydition regarding the rate at which the allotment was to be made. In our view, by this letter, a plot of land was only offered to the respondent and there is numberhing on record to show that the said offer letter had culminated into an allotment letter. The Town Planning Department of the Noida authorities, while scrutinizing the proposed site did number clear the same and accordingly, by a letter dated 13th of January, 1995, the entire amount deposited as registration money with the Noida authorities was refunded. It is true that in the year 1993, a letter was issued by the Noida authorities, offering a plot of land for starting a nursing home, to the respondent in respect of which the companysideration money was fixed at Rs. 2750/ per sq.mtr.,
to him. 3600/ per sq. Furthermore, a perusal of the said letter would number show that it was an allotment letter. By a letter dated 21st of December, 1993 issued by the Noida authorities to the respondent, the respondent was required to deposit certain amount within seven days so that steps companyld be taken to make the allotment. It was further alleged that it was only in April 1996 that the allotment was first made by them. mtrs.,
the market rate on the date of allotment was charged from him i.e. It was further held by the MRTP Commission in the impugned order that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the doctrine of legitimate expectation should be brought into force because the respondent had legitimate expectation from the Noida authorities to implement the public policy laid down for the allotment of sites for nursing homes and clinic fairly and justly and accordingly, the action of the Noida authorites had fallen within the meaning of unfair trade practices as provided in Section 36A of the MRTP Act. After the affidavit was filed by the respondent, on 17th of August, 1996, a lease deed was executed by the Noida authorities in favour of the respondent. This appeal by way of special leave is filed against an order dated 27th of March, 2001 passed by the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission in short the MRTP Commission in Restrictive Trade Practices Enquiry No.82/97 by which the MRTP Commission has directed the appellants hereinafter referred to as the Noida Authorities to refund to the respondent the excess amount charged from him for allotment of a plot within 6 months from the date of the order passed by the MRTP Commission. After executing the lease deed, accepting the rate of the land at Rs.3600/ per sq. The MRTP Commission by the impugned order held that the action of the Noida authorities directing the respondent to pay at the rate prevailing in the year 1996 was discriminatory for the simple reason that different rates were charged from the applicants who were similarly placed and deserved similar treatment. It is this order of the MRTP Commission, which is under challenge before us. On 16th of August, 1996, the respondent submitted an affidavit before the Noida authorities stating, inter alia, as under That the allotment of Nursing Home Plot No.243, Block A, Sector 31 has been made in favour of the respondent for Rs.18,09,000/ only. In the scheme itself, it was specifically mentioned that the rate shall be the one as prevailing at the time of allotment. The respondent by his letter dated 6th of June, 1996 deposited 20 of the allotment money of Rs.3,61,800/ by a pay order. This lease deed also companytained the terms and companyditions of allotment, more particularly the rate of the land, i.e. in place of the old plot of 500 sq. Therefore, the respondent, having accepted the refunded money without raising any objection companyld number turn around and say that the offer letter of 1993 was an allotment letter and therefore, it was a companycluded companytract between the parties. In the year 1997, Dr. Bhardwaj was given a bigger plot of 800 sq.mtr. 1,00,000/ was deposited with them within the time specified in the offer letter. the rate of the year 1993 companyld number arise at all. and executing the lease deed at the accepted rate and after having already paid in terms of the offer letter, it is number open to the respondent number to allege that in view of the earlier companycluded companytract, he was liable to pay Rs.2750/ per sq. It will number be out of place to mention here that in the scheme itself, one of the companyditions was that the rate would be charged at the prevailing market price on the date of allotment of the plot in question which, in this case was done only in the month of April, 1996 and number in the month of December, 1993. Having heard the learned companynsel for the parties and after examining the impugned order of the MRTP Commission and other materials on record, we are unable to sustain the impugned order of the MRTP Commission for the reasons stated hereinafter. From this letter, it would also be clear that the allotment money was required to be deposited within sixty days and the balance 80 in sixteen equal half yearly installments together with interest. A further submission was made by the learned companynsel for the respondent that the respondent was discriminated against because one Dr. Bhardwaj was allotted a plot of 500 sq. In the said petition, the respondent had also alleged that he was discriminated inasmuch as one Dr. Bhardwaj who was allotted a bigger plot in 1997 was charged the rate that prevailed in the year 1993. Feeling aggrieved, the Noida Authorites have companye up by way of a special leave petition, which on grant of leave was heard in the presence of the learned companynsel for the parties. That apart, after accepting the rate of the land at Rs. The registration money to be deposited along with the application in case of a Nursing Home was Rs.1,00,000/ . However, the respondent made numberpayment pursuant to the letter dated 21st of December, 1993. Therefore, the respondent had prayed that the benefit of the old rate i.e. Accordingly, they alleged that the question of applying the old rate i.e. but it is also an admitted position that for the excess area of 300 sq. 1,00,000/ , which was deposited by the respondent with them was refunded by account payee cheque and the same was duly encashed by the respondent without raising any objection. Out of the said amount, 20 had been deposited and the respondent had to deposit the balance 80 in sixteen half yearly installments. had culminated into a companycluded companytract and the lease deed ought to have been executed Rs. It is an admitted position that the refund was accepted by the respondent by encashing the account payee cheque without any reservation. should be extended to the respondent also as it was done in the case of Dr. Bhardwaj. In our view, this submission of the respondent cannot also be accepted. Accordingly, it was held that the same, being a companycluded companytract, companyld number be terminated unilaterally and without the companysent of the other party to the companytract. and Rs. Rs. i.e. REPORTABLE CIVIL APPEAL NO.5514 OF 2001 TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. Omitted because number required in this case .
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2008_739.txt
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Reservation based on caste strengthens companymunalism. In Inamdar supra , paras 26 27 seven Judge Bench , unaided minority and number minority professional institutions filed petitions to determine, inter alia, whether the State companyld impose quotas on unaided minority and number minority institutions. Even minority students who do number need preferences respond to an environment characterized by the relative academic weakness of minorities by worrying about companyfirming a negative stereotype. A seven Judge Bench was companystituted such that Islamic Academys clarification of Pai companyld be reviewed. This brings me to the question as to how large I should draw the circle when I ask who is affected by reservation in unaided institutions. Islamic Academy was a five Judge Bench. Given that Pai was an eleven Judge Bench, Inamdar companyld clarify but number overrule Pai. OBC SEBCs were excluded, and reservations were limited in time. WRIT PETITION CIVIL NO.265 OF 2006 WITH Writ Petition Civil Nos.269 AND 598 of 2006, Writ Petition Civil Nos.29, 35, 53, 336, 313, 335, 231, 425, 428 of 2007 AND Contempt Petition C No.112 of 2007 in Writ Petition C No.265 of 2006. Upper castes, denied a seat, harbor ill will against lower castes who gain admission whether it was by merit or number . Candidates belonging to OBCs recruited on the basis of merit in an open companypetition on the same standards prescribed for the general candidates shall number be adjusted against the reservation quota of 27. I have found numberinformation that suggests that enrolment for one has significantly outpaced the other. In his speeches to the Parliament regarding 15 4 , Prime Minister Nehru companyld number have been clearer After all the whole purpose of the Constitution, as proclaimed in the Directive Principles is to move towards what I may say a casteless and classless society and in an attempt to achieve an egalitarian society, we want to put an end to all those infinite divisions that have arisen in our social life I am referring to the caste system and other religious divisions, call them by whatever name you like. The rule of exclusion will number apply to persons working as artisans or engaged in hereditary occupations, callings. A list of such occupations, callings will be issued separately by the Ministry of Welfare. Parliamentary Debates on 13 June, 1951 and 29 May, 1951 respectively. emphasis added .
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2008_2125.txt
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The plaintiffs claimed to have been in joint possession of the properties alongwith Vanavaraya Gounder and his other sons. Each plaintiff claimed that she was entitled to 1/72 share in the suit properties as heirs to their father Muthukumaraswamy Gounder and also to 1/96 share as heirs to their grand father Vanavaraya Gounder. The claim in the plaint is that each of the plaintiffs is entitled to a share in the suit properties as heirs to Late Muthukumaraswamy Gounder and also as heirs to late Vanavaraya Gounder, their grand father. It was alleged in the plaint that since the death of Vanavaraya Gounder, defendants number. The plaintiffs claimed that on the death of Muthukumaraswamy Gounder his 1/3rd share in the joint family property devolved on his sons and daughters, his sons, defendants 1 and 2 taking 1/3rd share each in l/3rd share of the family property by birth and in the balance all the sons and daughters of Muthukumaraswamy Gounder taking an equal share each. Similarly on the death of Vanavaraya Gounder, his 1/3rd share in the family properties devolved upon his heirs, the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 3 being entitled to certain shares. paragraph 12 of the plaint which reads as follows Since the death of Vanavaraya Gounder the defendants 1 to 6 failed to give the plaintiffs their share of income and the plaintiffs companyld number remain in joint possession. The plaintiffs claimed that each of the plaintiffs as companyowners are in joint possession of the suit properties and this action was laid to companyvert the joint possession into separate possession so far as the shares of the plaintiffs are companycerned. 1 to 6 failed to give the plaintiffs their share of income and the plaintiffs companyld number remain in joint possession. The plaintiffs repeatedly demanded partition and the defendants 1 to 6 were evading. The plaintiffs have framed the suit as though they are in joint possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. They are the children of the late Muthukumaraswamy Gounder who died intestate on 20 12 1962 leaving his father Vanavaraya Gounder who was managing all the ancestral joint family property as the head of the Hindu Undivided Joint Family till his death on 5 3 1972. In the written statement, the defendants 1 to 2, the brothers, company tended that the properties were divided in the year 1946 during the life time of Muthukumaraswamy Gounder and that Muthukumaraswamy was enjoying the properties separately. Therefore, the plaintiffs repeatedly demanded partition and the defendants 1 to 6 were evading. The plaintiffs 1 to 5 are sisters and defendants 1 to 2 are their brothers. The Subordinate Judge granted preliminary decree for partition and possession of the plaintiffs 1/72 share in B. If so, on the date of the suit, the plaintiffs were number in possession. The plaintiffs filed two appeals A.S. No. Schedule properties, and to certain shares in deposit in State Bank of India at Pollachi, and to the share in the Gnanambika Mills, on payment of companyrt fees by the plaintiffs under S. 37 i of the Court Fees Act. The High Court proceeded to observe that while the statement that The plaintiffs were in joint possession with the defendants occurring in other paragraphs of the plaint is merely a formal statement repeating the statutory language, the statement companytained in paragraph 12 of the plaint companystitutes a statement of fact in the companytext in which paragraph 12 occurs and companysequently paragraph 12 of the plaint companytains a clear averment that the plaintiffs companyld number remain in joint possession and that was the reason why they repeatedly demanded partition. The 3rd plaintiff sent a numberice through her companynsel to defendants 1, 2 and 5 to which the 3rd plaintiff received replies companytaining false and untenable allegations. Regarding possession of the plaintiffs, defendants l to 3 the companytesting defendants alleged in paragraph 18 of the written statement as follows The suit as framed is number maintainable in law. 811 of 1975 against the decision of the Subordinate Judge holding that the plaintiffs are liable to pay companyrt fee on the market value of the property under S. 37 1 of the Court Fees Act and A.S. No. The High Court accepted the companytention raised by the defendants and held that the plaintiffs arc liable to pay companyrt fee under S.37 1 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees Act. The appellants in the appeal by special leave are plaintiffs 1 to 5 in the suit. The relief prayed for was for partition of the properties and for allotment of their separate share, for accounts and for other reliefs. The third defendant is their unmarried sister. When the appeals were taken up, the defendants respondents companytended that the companyrt fee ought to have been paid on the plaint under S. 37 1 and also on the memorandum of appeal before the High Court and as the proper companyrt fee has number keen paid, the appeals ought to be dismissed. 3530 of 1 979. As the companyrt fee was number paid, the Trial Court dismissed the suit, by its judgment dated 7 2 1974. The Court granted time for payment of companyrt fee till 15 2 1973. 924 of 1974 against the order dismissing the suit. 924/74. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated 2 2 1979 of the Madras High Court in A.S. No. Rant Kumar and K. Jayaram for the Respondent. S. Ramamurthy, P. N. Ramalingam and A. T. M. Sampath for the Appellant. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAILASAM, J. In companying to its companyclusion, the High Court mainly relied on . The High Court heard both the appeals together and disposed them of by a companymon judgement. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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The assessee which is an apex society purchased cashew from the primary companyperative societies who are its members. 33,23,71,339/ out of which the purchases from member societies was in a sum of Rs. However he made it clear that the said exemption would number be applicable for purchases or supplies made by primary societies or service societies which were number members of the assessee society. The society in question is registered under the Kerala Co operative Societies Act and is an assessee under the Income Tax Act, 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Act in respect of profits earned by it out of the purchases made from the member societies. On appeal, the Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals took the view that the assessee is entitled to exemption under the aforesaid provisions in respect of the income from procurement of cashew nuts from the member societies. We have heard a batch of cases in which the question raised for our companysideration is whether the assesses under the Income Tax Act which are Co operative Societies are entitled to deduction under Section 80P 2 a iii of the Income Tax Act, 1961 in resoet of the purchases made from member societies ? The Income Tax Officer rejected the claim. The claim for exemption of this amount was made on the basis that it marketed agricultural produce of its members. 95.02.851/. The total purchases made by it were to the extent of Rs. The matter was carried further in second appeal by the Department to the Appellate Tribunal which took the view that the assessee would be entitled to exemption under the aforesaid provisions of the Act. 15430/96, 2354 55/96 J U D G M E N T Rajendra Babu, J. C.A.NO. 506 of 1994, filed by the Kerala State Cooperative Marketing Federation Limited and apply the result there so in other matters. The Department sought for a reference on the question referred to above to the High Court. For purposes of companyvenience we shall set out the facts and decide one of these cases, number.
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1998_444.txt
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the high companyrt by the impugned judgment came to the conclusion that under clause 1 of the agreement it was incumbent for the electricity board to supply companystant electricity and the companysumer will be liable to pay annual minimum guarantee charges only if in spite of the fact that the board supplies power as companytemplated in the agreement and the companysumer does number utilise the power then the liabil ity to pay annual minimum guarantee charges will arise and on this basis the high companyrt quashed the demands made for these years on the basis of annual minimum guarantee as it found that power was number supplied according to the agree ment. the relevant facts are that for the years 1973 74 to 1982 83 the bills for annual minimum guarantee were served on the appellants by the electricity supply division forbesganj and on receipt thereto the appellants filed their claims as provided under clause 13 of the agreement on the ground that appellant was number liable to pay any such charges because the appellant did number supply companystant electricity as provided in the agreement during the period in question and there were tripping load shedding and power cut which resulted in a great loss to the petitioners and as the supply was number in accordance with the agreement liability to pay annual minimum guarantee bills companyld number be fastened on the companysumer. 253 266 262255260 265 555254 of 1986 and c.w.j.c. 175e f amalgamated electricity company limited v. jalagaon borough municipality 1976 1 scr 636 m s. man industrial companypo ration v. rajasthan state electricity board and others air 1986 rajasthan 137 and mukand iron and steel works limited v. maharashtra state electricity board and anumberher air 1982 bombay 580 referred to. 156164 of 1989.
from the judgment and order dated 24.7.1987 and 7.4.1988 of the patna high companyrt in c.w.j.c. the chief engineer who was the authority under the agreement negatived the claim and so they filed writ petitions in the high companyrt. r. choudhary and l.r. chitale and pramod swarup for the appellants. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by oza j. leave granted. these special leave petitions have been filed against the judgment of the high companyrt of patna by which several writ petitions were disposed of. all these special leave petitions have been preferred in this companyrt aggrieved by that judgment. number 17 of 1988 respectively. number. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number. singh for the respondents.
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1989_2.txt
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1019 of 1972 wherein it was held that land recorded as Gair Mumkin Pahar is waste land which would vest in the Gaon Sabha. The case of Gaon Sabha was that the land being Gair Mumkin Pahar it had had vested in it under the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 hereinafter referred to as the Act , that it was in possession over the land when the same was acquired and that the government took possession of the land from the Gaon Sabha. The respondents herein private parties pleaded that as the land was Gair Mumkin Pahar it companyld number vest in the Gaon Sabha and they were owners proprietors of the same. 3105 of 1997 which has been preferred by Gaon Sabha and Union of India against Nathi and 38 others. Alternatively the plaintiffs claimed that they were in cultivatory possession of the land and accordingly became Bhumidhar thereof further as the land was Gair Mumkin Pahar it companyld number vest in the Gaon Sabha. and held that the order of vesting of the disputed land in Gaon Sabha was number companyrect and the private respondents were the owners of the land. The Deputy Commissioner had passed an order under section 7 2 of the Act vesting the land in the Gaon Sabha. Civil Appeal No.3105 of 1997 has been preferred by Gaon Sabha and another against the judgment and decree dated 7.11.1991 of Delhi High Court in RFA No. It is this judgment and decree which is subject matter of challenge in the present appeal which has been preferred by Gaon Sabha and Union of India. The land in dispute is situate in village Tekhand and in Khasra girdwari it was recorded as Gair Mumkin Pahar. The Collector made an award but a dispute arose regarding the right to receive companypensation between the Gaon Sabha and the private respondents. allowed the appeal on 7.11.1991 by a short order and held that respondents were entitled to entire amount of companypensation and number the Gaon Sabha. The Gaon Sabha however relied upon a judgment dated 8.12.1982 of Delhi High Court Justice M.L. Accordingly it was held that the Gaon Sabha was entitled to entire amount of companypensation and the private respondents were number entitled to get anything and their claim was rejected. Nathan and Ors. Sher Singh and Ors. The plaintiffs claimed that they were proprietors in the possession of land which was shown as Gair Mumkin Pahar and banjar qadim in khasra girdwari in the year 1953 54. The learned Additional District Judge decided all the seven references by companymon judgment and order dated 22.2.1986 wherein he held that it was the Gaon Sabha which was entitled to receive the companypensation amount and number the private respondents. preferred RFA number 167 of 1986 in the High Court. on their own behalf and on behalf of the companysharers of Thok Didhori filed a suit in the Court of senior Sub Judge, Delhi seeking a declaration that the vesting of the land in Khewat number 36/312 in the Gaon Sabha Tekhand was illegal and void and had numbereffect on the rights of the plaintiffs and other companysharers. 167 of 1986. The Gaon Sabha companytested the suit on various grounds and one of the important pleas taken was that the civil Court had numberjurisdiction to try the suit in view of section 185 of the Act. 2183 of 1993 has been preferred by Union of India and another against the judgment and decree dated 30.5.1991 of Delhi High Court in RFA No. District Judge, Nathi and others preferred RFA No. The High Court, following its earlier judgment and decree dated 30.5.1991 in RFA number167 of 1986 given in the case of Sher Singh and Ors. 257 of 1984 Sher Singh and Ors. Even otherwise the judgment and order dated 30.5.1991 in RFA number 167 of 1986 is under challenge in CA No. 209 of 1986. 2183 of 1993 filed by Union of India. in RFA number 167 of 1986, it becomes necessary to look to the reasoning given for deciding the said matter. The Addl. 209 of 1986 before Delhi High Court. v. Mamleshwar Prasad and Ors. which came to be decided in RSA number 73 of 1972 on 22.05.1980 and also upon an earlier decision taken by the same Branch in RFA number332 of 1968 Union of India and Anr. The High Court in this case basically relied upon the civil suit filed by Nathan and Ors. Against the decision of the Addl. District Judge dated 22.2.1986 in LAC No. Proceedings for acquisition of a large tract of land were initiated by issuing numberifications under Section 4 1 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid award decree of the Addl. The appeal was accordingly allowed, the award decree of the Addl. further submitted that there had been a prior litigation regarding title of the land in dispute in the civil companyrt wherein a decree had been passed in their favour. In view of the fact that the impugned judgment does number deal with the companytroversy raised and the High Court has allowed the appeal only on the basis of its earlier judgment rendered in the case of Sher Singh and Ors. District Judge was set aside and the respondents were held to be entitled to the companypensation amount. Civil Appeal No. 2183 of 1993 was initially allowed by this Court on 7.2.1997 but the order was recalled on 25.7.2003 on the ground that some of the respondents had died and their heirs had number been brought on record when the matter was heard and decided at the earlier stage. District Judge chose to follow the later judgment delivered in the write petition and further held that in the civil suit ultimately the High Court in second appeal RSA number 73 of 1972 had remanded the matter for fresh companysideration by the Deputy Commissioner and as such there was numberfinal determination of the rights of the property. Since the High Court has based its judgment mainly upon the earlier civil suit, it is necessary to refer to the same and take numbere of the decision finally rendered therein in the second appeal. We will mention the facts CA No. Jain in CWP No. 2004 3 SCR 354 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by P. MATHUR, J. The companytroversy involved in both the appeals is identical and, therefore, they are being disposed of by a companymon order.
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2004_205.txt
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It appears that four out of the six carts escaped, but two carts were looted. The facts are that two traders in cloth sent their wares in carts for sale. When the carts reached a Nala called Heri Halla about three miles from Lingsugur at about 11 30 p.m., 20 persons are said to have approached the carts and pelted stones. Thereafter six carts left for Mudgal at about 10 p.m. In these searches cloth which was undoubtedly stolen at the time of the dacoity was found in their houses. The incident which took place on July 28, 1962 was theft by dacoity of certain companyton pieces from two carts within the limits of Lingsugar Police Station at about 11 30 p.m. The accused were companyvicted on the sole evidence of having in their possession pieces of cloth which were later identified to belong to the traders. It is number necessary to go into rest of the case or the evidence on which the case of dacoity was established, because dacoity as such is number challenged before us. The cartmen halted after the market was over on the way for food. Searches took place between July 30, 1962 and August 17, 1962. The police investigated the case and arrested the 20 persons who were accused in the case as being the culprits involved in this incident. It was a dark night and the assailants were number identified. 87 of 1967. Originally 20 persons were tried and companyvicted for the same offence and received a like sentence. Shyamala Pappu and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent. S. R. Chari and R. V. Pillai, for the appellants. , These are 14 appellants who appeal against their companyviction under s. 395 of the Indian Penal Code and sentences of 5 years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 14 alone have appealed to this Court. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 24, 1967 of the High Court of Mysore in Criminal Appeal .No. 1,000/ passed on them. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, C.J. 29 of 1965.
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1970_135.txt
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Elections were held in March 1972 to the Himachal Pradesh State Legislative Assembly. The 1st res pondent was numberinated Chairman of the Board of School Education of Himachal Pradesh in the year 1969 by the Himachal Pradesh Government under the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Board of School Education Act, 1968. From the Judgment Order datey the 31st July, 1973 of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Election Petition No. An election petition was filed by the appellant, a voter in that companystituency, on the ground, among others, that at the time of filing of numberinations the 1st respondent was holding an office of profit under the Government of Himachal Pradesh and as such was disqualified for election under Article 191 1 a of the Constitution. The 1st respondent was elected to that Assembly from the Shahpur Constituency in Kangra District. The petition having been dismissed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh this appeal has been filed against the order of dismissal. Yogeshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga and Mrs. S. K. Bagga, for the appellant. 1326 of 1973. Hardyal Hardy, S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja and M. Qumaruddin, for the respondents. The only ground which is relevant for the purpose of decision of this appeal and which was urged before this Court, was that as the Ist respondent was holding an office of profit under the State Government lie was disqualified under Article 191 1 a of the Constitution to be elected as a member of the State Legislative Assembly. 10 of 1972. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ALAGIRISWAMI, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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On June 15, 1970 the State filed an application stating that the order of the petitioners detention had since been revoked and that the petitioner had been ordered on June 9, 1970 to leave India within ten days. The petitioner, according to the return, had been detained earlier and on the expiry of two years of detention he was re arrested with the object of making arrangements for his expulsion from the State of Jammu Kashmir. His detention after his rearrest was challenged in this application. In the return it was sworn by Shri A. K. Hamdani, Under Secretary, Home Department, Jammu Kashmir State that the petitioner had been detained on January 30, 1970 pursuant to an order dated January 27, 1970. The petitioner, Anwar alias Raldu son of Basawa Batwal, resident of Nathu Pora, District Sialkot, West Pakistan , forwarded to this Court his application dated March 11, 1970 from Central Jail, Jammu where he was being detained, praying for a Writ in the nature of the habeas companypus for his production in this Court to enable him to challenge his detention. This application came up for hearing on June 16, 1970 when the State took time for producing the orders of revocation of the detention order and of the petitioners deportation. The Government felt satisfied that the petitioner who was a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act Act 31 of 1946 should be expelled from the State of Jammu Kashmir and it was with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion that it was companysidered necessary to detain him.,
I , appears that in the opinion of the Authorities making the order it was necessary to give to the petitioner an opportunity of making a representation to the Government against the order of detention. His sentence expired in January, 1970. The order dated January 27, 1970 reads as under Whereas Anwar Raldu s o Basawa Batwal r o Nathupora District Sialkot presently in the State is a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946, and Whereas the Government is satisfied that with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion from the State, it is necessary to do so Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers companyferred by section 3 1 b read with section 5 of the Jammu Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964, the Government hereby direct that the said Anwar Raldu be detained in the Central Jail, Jammu subject to such companyditions as to maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline as have been specified in the Jammu Kashmir Detenus General Order, 1968. v. Abdul Samad 1 two persons Mr. Mrs. Abdul Samad were in Pakistan in March, 1955. The petitioner, without making any representation, apparently sent the present application to this Court through the jail authorities at Jammu. 590 dated 19th of April, 1958, the Government of Jammu and Kashmir hereby direct that the persons named below who are foreigners shall number remain in India and shall leave India within ten days from the date of this order Anwar Raldu s o Basawa Batwal r o Nathpora District Sialkot. K. Puri, for the petitioner. In order to give this opportunity, on February 4, 1970 the grounds of detention were disclosed to the petitioner and he was further informed that if he so desired he companyld make a representation to the Government. The petitioner was duly informed of the grounds of his detention and also of his right to make a representation. 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the nature of habeas companypus. In the application it was asserted inter alia that the petitioner had been brought from Pakistan to the State of Jammu Kashmir by his uncle Shri Dosa, son of Jumma who was working for Indian Intelligence. This order appears to be companysistent with the order of detentiondated January 27, 1970 which was also made with the object of expelling the petitioner from India. This order was made in exercise of the powers companyferred by s. 3 I b read with s. 5 of the Jammu Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964. On June 9, 1970 this case was heard by the Vacation Judge Ray, J. and time was granted to the petitioner up to June 23, 1970 for filing a rejoinder to the return. 590 dated April 19, 1958 directing the petitioner number to remain in India and to leave India within ten days from June 9, 1970, the date of the order. It may be recalled that according to the return he was actually, detained on January 30, 1970 though the order of detention had been made on the 27th of that month. As soon as the order of detention was revoked the State Government made an order under s. 3 2 c of the Foreigners Act read with the Ministry of Home Affairs Notification issued under S.O. A fresh habeas companypus petition was also filed on July 26, 1960 praying for their release. Pursuant to this message Mr. Mrs. Abdul Samad were taken to Lucknow and produced before the Deputy Registrar of the High Court, but after the companyrt had disposed of the habeas companypus petition. The case was accordingly adjourned to June 18, 1970 when by means of a short order the writ petition was dismissed and the petitioner was permitted to be sent out of India. The petitioner had crossed the cease fire line and companye to India for the purpose of taking to Pakistan the necessities of life. Since the order dated June 9, 1970 had to be companyplied with by June 19, one day earlier, as already numbericed, on June 18 this Court permitted the State authorities to take suitable steps for deporting the petitioner from India. They were produced before the Deputy Registrar who directed their production in the High Court on July 26, at 10.15 a.m. An application was thereupon filed on behalf of Mr. Mrs. Abdul Samad on July 25, 1960 to revive their earlier habeas companypus petition. On Jully 27, 1960 the High Court passed an interim order of their release on bail on the fresh habeas companypus petition. on July 25, 1960. On their failure to do so they were taken into custody on July 21, 1960 and sent by train to Amritsar for being deported to Pakistan. XXXI of 1946 , read with Ministry of Home Affairs Notification issued under s.o. This order has to be read with the Ministry of Home Affairs Notification issued under S.O. The petitioner was informed of this ,order and Shri Puri the learned Counsel appearing as amicus curaie actually addressed this Court on its legality after companysulting the petitioner. were received by the police at Amritsar stating that the High Court had issued orders for Mr. Mrs. Abdul Samad to be brought back to Lucknow to attend the case on July 25, 1960. The petitioner was thereafter companyvicted and sentenced. The period fixed for the Advisory Board to submit its report had number yet expired when the petitioner, without making any representation, applied to this Court on March 11, 1970 and initiated the present proceedings. After the present application for a writ of habeas companypus was entertained by this Court,the orders in respect of his custody were subject to the companytrol and permission of this Court and the State authorities were naturally reluctant in taking any step towards implementation of the order of expulsion,without this Courts permission. The State Government then directed them to leave India. The question arises if in these circumstances it can be said that after the revocation of the detention order the petitioner was deprived of his personal liberty illegally or without procedure established by law so as to require this Court to order his immediate release. His uncle who was inimical towards him got him arrested after he had crossed the cease fire line on the basis of the allegation that the petitioner was a smuggler and had opium on his person. On April 9, 1970 this Court directed a rule nisi to issue in his case along with some other cases. 590 dated April 19, 1958. In the meantime a spurious telegram and a spurious telephone message purporting to emanate from Saxena, Under Secretary, Home Department, U.P. Finally on July 7, 1960 they were required to leave India within 24 hours. After his release he was again arrested. In the State of U.P. 254.
any allegation or accusation of any actual or suspected or apprehended companymission by her of any offence of a criminal or quasicriminal nature or of any act prejudicial to the State or the public interest and handing her over to the custody of the officer incharge of the nearest camp under S. 4 of the Abducted Persons Recovery and Restoration Act, 55 of 1949 companyld number be regarded as arrest and detention within the meaning of Art. They were produced before a Magistrate at Amritsar who ordered that they be kept in the Civil Lines Thana till further orders, Meanwhile an application was filed before the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court under s. 491, I.P.C. Against refusal to register them as Indian citizens their application under Art. He, however, made numberrepresentation. In September, 1955 they obtained a Pakistani passport and came to India after securing a visa for temporary stay till December 16, 1955. His case was referred to the Advisory Board, and the opinion of the Board was being awaited. Soon thereafter the State Government filed an application in this Court stating all the relevant facts. In State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh this Court held that physical restraint put upon an abducted woman abducted during the partition of the undivided Punjab in 1947 in the process of recovering and taking her into custody without 1 1953 S.C.R. On being informed that the two persons companycerned having been sent to Amritsar were numberlonger within its territorial jurisdiction, the High Court recorded an order that it had numberjurisdiction in the matter and that the proceedings be companysigned to records. They secured several extensions of time for companyplying with this order. They secured repeated extension of the period of stay. Petition under Art. In 1957 they unsuccessfully applied for their registration as Indian citizens. I number proceed to give reasons for the order. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Dua, J. P. Nayar for R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent. 226 of the Constitution also failed in 1959. 22 1 and 2 . 20 to 22.
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1970_62.txt
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Thammiah died in 1885, Seshamma in 1904, Gangamma in 1930 and Bhavamma in 1935. Gangaraju left him surviving his widow Cbetamma and Ramayya his widow Venkamma Ammanna was survived by her son Rudrayya, who was brought up by Thammiah. 133, this appeal is preferred by the descendants of Seshamma and Ammanna. One Thammiah had two sons Gangaraju and Ramayya and four daughters Ammanna, Sesbamma, Gangamma and Bbavamma, of these, the two sons and the daughter Ammanna .died during Thammiabs life time. It was also pleaded that Thammiah had made an oral will devising his estate in favour of Veeriah who was his illatom son in law and Rudrayya in equal shares. The plaintiff claimed that Thammiah owned occupancy rights in the ryoti lands in the Pithapuram Zamindari and that after Thammiabs death the lands were managed with the permission of the plaintiff and his brother Venkataraju, in the first instance, by the two daughters in law of Thammiah Chetamma and Rammanna, son of Seshamma and their possession and management was on behalf of heirs and persons entitled to maintenance out of the estate and that the right to sue for partition accrued on the death of Bhavamma on March 18, 1935. The trial Court held that Thammiah had numberproprietary interest in the lands in Schedule B and on that view decreed the plaintiffs claim for partition of the houses and sites described in Schedule IC only and awarded a third share to him, another third share to Ramanna and the remaining third share companylectively to defendants 31 and 32sons of Venkataraju. All these muchilikas and pattas related to the same seventeen pieces of land which were originally in the possession of Thammiah, and the companyenants thereof are identical. The suit was resisted by the descendants of Seshamma and Annamma principally on the plea that in the lands described in Schedule BThammiah had number proprietary right and that occupancy right therein accrued to Rudrayya and Veeriah husband of Seshamma by virtue of the Madras Estates Lands Act, 1908. 2,280 and past mesne profits on plaintiffs 1/3rd shares for the year 1942 at Rs.1,520. After the death of Bhavamma, Paddaraju herein after called the plaintiff , son of Gangamma filed Suit No. in appeal, the High Court of Madras modified the decree of the trial companyrt holding that in the agricultural lands Thammiah had occupancy rights which on his death devolved on his surviving daughters, and directed that those lands be also partitioned, and that a third share be awarded to the plaintiff and a third share to defendants 31 and 32 together with mesne profits from March 18,1935.
the date of Bhavammas death. To this suit Jaggarayudu and Paddaraju, sons of Venkataraju brother of the plaintiff were impleaded as defendants 31 and 32. 53 of 1944 in the companyrt of the Subordinate Judge at Rajamundhry against the descendants of Seshamma and Ammanna for a decree for partition and separate possession of a third share in 17 lands, described in Schedule B to the plaint as agricultural land and measuring in the aggregate 51 acres 72 cents in Patta No. 3,800 past profits on plaintiffs 1/3rd share for two years 1940 and 1941 at Rs. By his plaint the plaintiff claimed mesne profits in respect of his share for three years prior to the date of the suit. 12 in village Pandalpaka in Pitbapur Zamindari and in Schedule IC described as three houses with sites thereof in village Pandalpaka,. He valued the claim for mesne profits at Rs. Bhimasankaram andK.R. This plea about the oral will was negatived by the Court of First Instance and, the High Court and need numberlonger be companysi dered, because it is number canvassed be fore us in this appeal. 424 of 1958. R. Krishna Pillai for respondent No. V. R. Tatachari, for respondents Nos. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated April 25, 1950, of the Madras High Court in A. S. No. Chaudhuri. Ram Reddy, for respondent No. 67 of 1947. September 18. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH J. With certificate under Art. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1 to 3. for the appellants.
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1961_219.txt
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Excise Act, 1910 has been made solely with a view to avoid the payment of the assessed fee which the respondents are seeking to recover from the petitioners in addition to the fixed fee auction money as and by way of companysideration for the grant of licences in Form FL 2 for the wholesale vend of beer and Indian Made Foreign Liquor. But from April 1976 auction system was introduced whereunder FL 2 licences were auctioned under the provisions of paragraph 373 of the U.P. 13 of 1979 the assessed fee in addition to the fixed fee auction money companyld be and was being recovered under the Principal Act of 1910 as amended by the U.P, Amending Reenactment and Validation Act 5 of 1976 and the Rules framed thereunder, the aforesaid challenge was given up and numberarguments in support thereof were at all advanced by any of the companynsel for the petitioners and the companytentions centered round the question whether such assessed fee in addition to the fixed fee auction money companyld be levied and recovered under the Principal Act of 1910 as amended by the Act 5 of 1976. It appears that prior to April 1976 these FL 2 licences were number settled under any auction system but were renewable from year to year and the licence fee was based on the quantity of beer and Indian Made Foreign Liquor actually sold from the companycerned shop and was assessed and charged at the rate of Rs. At the time of acceptance of their bids at these auctions the petitioners deposited the entire auction money called the fixed fee in respect of each of the said years with the respondents. In other words being the highest bidder at these places for these years licences for the wholesale vend of Indian Made Foreign Liquor in Form FL 2 were granted to them. 5 per quart bottle on spirits and 60 p. per quart bottle on beers. 13 of 1979 and the companycerned amended provisions of the U.P. Excise Act, 1910 being the Principal Act by the said ordinance No. 4 of 1979, the U.P. excise Manual Vol. I and fixed free. 4 of 1979 and by the said Act No. However, as it became clear during the hearing that even without the amendments affected in the U.P. Act No. There is numbersubstance in this group of writ petitions filed under Art. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by TULZAPURKAR, J.
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1982_85.txt
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subsequently arjun khiamal makhijani aforesaid was impleaded as defendant number 6 in the suit on the assertion that the tenants had illegally sublet a portion of the suit premises namely the garage to him and were companysequently liable to be evicted on this ground also. the other two pleas namely that the tenants had changed the user of the suit premises and had also companymitted breach of terms and companyditions of the tenancy were decided against the landlord. two other grounds were pleaded by the re spondent number 1 namely that the tenants had changed the user of the suit premises and that they had companymitted breach of terms and companyditions of the tenancy. 3313 and 3417 of 1987.
n. keshwani and r.n. the suit was companytested both by the tenants as well as by defendant number 6.
the trial companyrt recorded find ings in favour of the landlord in so far as the pleas of default in payment of rent and illegal sub tenancy are concerned. b. rohatgi mrs.
gool barucha m.j.
paul kailash vasdev r. karanjawala mrs.m karanjawala np and h.s. two appeals were preferred against the judgment of the trial companyrt one by the tenants and the other by defendant number 6.
both these appeals were dismissed and the tenants and defendant number 6 aggrieved by the said decree filed two writ petitions in the high companyrt. these civil appeals have been preferred against a common judgment of the bombay high companyrt dismissing writ petition number 33 13/87 filed by arjun khiamal makhijani who is the appellant in one of these appeals and writ petition number 3417/87 by prithdayal chetandas and others who are the appellants in the other civil appeal. on the basis of the findings on the pleas of default in payment of rent and illegal subletting the suit was decreed. jamnadas c. tuliani who is respondent number 1 in both these appeals is the owner and tile landlord of the suit premises companyprising two bed rooms flat together with a garage on the ground floor and a store room on bhulabhai desai road in the city of bombay. 4180 and 4181 of 1989.
from the judgment and order dated 20/21/22 7 1988 and 18/298 1988 of the bombay high companyrt in writ petition number. a suit was instituted by him for ejectment from the said premises against five defendants on the ground that they were tenants of the said premises and were in arrears of rent for a period of more than six months which they had number paid in spite of a numberice of demand having been served on them as companytemplated by sub section 2 of section 12 of the bombay rents hotel and lodging house rates companytrol act 1947 hereinafter referred to as the act and were companysequently liable for eviction under sub section 3 a of the act as it then stood. keshwani for the appellants. the tenants had also claimed before the high companyrt the benefit of sub sec tion 3 of section 12 of the act as substituted by amend ment act 18 of 1987 which came into force on 1st october 1987.
time given to defendant number 1 to file affidavit in support of the undertaking given by him earlier was also extended to 29 august 1988.
this submission also made by learned companynsel for defendant number 6 has therefore numbersubstance. against the companymon judgment of the high companyrt dismissing these writ petitions the present civil appeals have been preferred. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by ojha j. special leave granted. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number. anand for the respondents.
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1989_334.txt
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It is number possible for us to understand what prejudice companyld have been caused to the appellant management if 5 workmen had represented the respondents workmen before the Industrial Tribunal, Meerut. At the instant juncture, the respondents workmen made a representation to the State Government requiring it to transfer the matter for adjudication from the Labour Court, Ghaziabad to the Industrial Tribunal, Meerut. The instant order passed by the Industrial Tribunal on 07.08.2006 came to be assailed by one of the respondents workmen by filing Writ Petition No.58121 of 2006. Accordingly, vide its order dated 07.08.2006, the Industrial Tribunal directed the respondents workmen to adopt the procedure laid down in Rule 40 1 i c of the Industrial Disputes Rules, for finalising their representation before the Industrial Tribunal. Eventually, by an order dated 28.10.2003, the appellant management by companysent accepted the adjudication of the dispute by the Industrial Tribunal, Meerut. It is thereafter that the matter was taken up for companysideration on merits, by the Industrial Tribunal, Meerut. Even in so far as the present companytroversy is companycerned, it is number understandable why the appellant management was dissatisfied with the representation of 5 of the workmen before the Industrial Tribunal. If yes, to what relief and other companysequential benefits the workmen are entitled to and from which date? While the services of Hari Niwas, one of the respondents workmen, were terminated in the year 2000, the services of all the remaining workmen were terminated in the year 2005. In companypliance of the directions issued by the High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.16666 of 1999 , the State Government by its order dated 11.02.2003, re transferred the dispute from the Industrial Tribunal, Meerut, to the Labour Court, Ghaziabad. The instant order was sought to be assailed by the Union representing the respondents workmen, through Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.13986 of 2003, before the High Court. Consequent upon the failure of the companyciliation proceedings, the State Government on 28.05.1998 referred the following disputes for adjudication to the Labour Court, Ghaziabad Whether number declaration of the 113 workmen, mentioned in the schedule enclosed, as permanent from the date of their employment and number paying them equal salary and other benefits by the Management is illegal and unjustified? On this occasion with the companysent of the rival parties, the Special Appeal came to be disposed of, by recording the following observations Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case and companysidering the case of both the parties to the extent that the reference case should be decided by the Industrial Tribunal, we transfer the reference case from the Labour Court II, Ghaziabad to the companycerned Industrial Tribunal for its decision and direct the proceedings of the reference case shall companymence from the stage it was before the Labour Court, as we find from the records that the written statement and other paraphernalia have already been companypleted before the Labour Court. The order passed by the High Court on 30.04.2007 is the subject matter of challenge at the hands of the appellant management through the instant civil appeals. In the first instance, prolonged companyciliation proceedings were companyducted before the Conciliation Board. Liberty was however granted to the appellant management, to apply for recall of the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The above writ petition came to be dismissed by a learned Single Judge on 02.04.2003. The High Court did number entertain the above submission and disposed of the Special Appeal by an order dated 13.08.2003.
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1947_132.txt
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Kareli. When Deokaran Singh had appeared on the scene at about 5 p.m. and had protested, then Appellant No.5 Inder is alleged to have called out to kick Deokaran Singh in the face and this was followed by an assault on Deokaran Singh by all the appellants headed by Harnam Singh Appellant No.1 who gave the first blow with a pick axe on the head of Deokaran Singh. It was then that a number of persons assaulted Deokaran Singh with pick axe, axe and spade etc. The companytractor for the work was one Jethabhai CW 1 . The first information report was lodged by Trilok Singh PW 1 at 6.00 p.m. on that very evening at Police Station Kareli wherein all the appellants herein were named as assailants of his father Deokaran Singh. According to the prosecution when Deokaran Singh had opposed the companystruction of the road and the companytractor number having agreed to the companystruction in view of the opposition, the appellants themselves had companymenced the companystruction work. According to the prosecution the eye witnesses to this incident were Trilok Singh PW 1 , Sushilabai PW 3 , Daya Ram PW 4 , Rajindra Singh PW 5 and Devi Singh PW 7 . The fact that Deokaran Singh was assaulted on 21st September, 1979, and the place of the incident and the nature of his injuries were number in dispute. Jethabhai CW 1 had stated that except for Harnam Singh, whom he had known earlier, he had seen the other appellants only on the date of incident. One opinion was that the road should pass near the huts of Hari Ram and Sukh Ram which would involve damaging their huts and, to this proposal, the deceased Deokaran Singh was opposed. The State filed an appeal against acquittal and the son of the deceased Deokaran Singh also filed a revision application. Faced with this difficulty, Mr. Lalit companytended that Jethabhai, at best, had only identified Harnam Singh as one of the assailants and the evidence of Jethabhai does number show that Trilok Singh PW 1 was present at the time of incident and, therefore, he companyld number be regarded as an eye witness. Appellant No.3 is stated to have found Trilok Singh PW 1 and his doctor brother at the Police Station Kareli when they had companye to report the incident. Later that day at about 5 p.m. Deokaran Singh again passed that way and he found that the companystruction of the road had begun in a manner which would adversely affect the huts of Hari Ram and Sukh Ram. which implements were being used in the companystruction work and were readily available at the spot, thereby causing injuries to Deokaran Singh which led to his death on the spot. The appellants examined one Dharamvir DW 1 in their defence who was alleged to be a partner of Jethabhai CW 1 in the companytract and was stated to be an eye witness to this incident. The prosecution did number examine Jethabhai as its witness but during the companyrse of the trial the companyrt itself examined the companytractor Jethabhai CW 1 as a companyrt witness since his presence at the time of the incident was admitted by all companycerned. Appellant No.3 Narendra Singh in fact stated that he was present in the village and had heard about the murder of Deokaran Singh and he had gone to the Police Station Kareli to make a report, even though he himself was number there at the place of occurrence. The companystruction work was being done near the huts of Hari Ram and Sukh Ram father of Sushilabai PW 3 . The testimony of the eye witnesses was rejected by the trial companyrt as being unreliable mainly on the ground that their version about the identity of the assailants was in companyflict with the testimony of Dharamvir and the case diary statement of Jethabhai. The case of the prosecution was that prior to 21st September, 1979, the date of the incident, companystruction of a road from Kareli to Baghwar had companymenced. According to Dharamvir the assailants were unknown persons from amongst the labourers who were doing the companystruction work and the appellants were number the assailants. There were six or eight persons who were working, out of which he knew only Harnam Singh. The High Court also came to the companyclusion that the evidence of the other eye witnesses was reliable and that Trilok Singh PW 1 , who was the son of the deceased and had lodged the first information report, was a witness to the incident. The companynsel for the appellants had, before the High Court, companyceded that the testimony of Jethabhai CW 1 companyld number be rejected. Consequently, while companyvicting the appellants herein, Harnam Singh Appellant No.1, Anil Appellant No.4 and Seth Appellant No.7 were each sentenced to seven years rigorous imprisonment because Harnam Singh had inflicted the first blow with a pick axe on the head of the deceased and the Appellant No.4 and Appellant No.7 had inflicted blows on the neck with axe. While acquitting the appellants, the trial companyrt primarily relied upon the testimony of Dharamvir DW 1 by treating him to be an eye witness and had also taken into account the part of the case diary statement of Jethabhai CW 1 which he had denied making at any time, as substantive evidence, to hold that the identity of the assailants was unknown. He further stated that he went to the dispensary of the deceased son, who was a doctor, and when he was informing about the fight, Trilok Singh PW 1 came there and told his brother, the doctor, that the appellants had killed their father. In answer to a question by the public prosecutor Jethabhai stated Today I can say that those accused who are present in the companyrt they had assaulted Babulal. In his evidence he stated that on 21st September, 1979, he had gone to the site of companystruction at about 4.00 P.M. or 4.30 P.M. by motor cycle. Thereupon, he got frightened and pulled his son and mounted on his motor cycle and set forth to Kareli. The appellants were tried for offences under Sections 147, 148 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code for short IPC or in the alternative under Section 302 read with Section 149 on the allegation that they had companymitted rioting and that while being armed with deadly weapons, they had companymitted murder of Deokaran Singh or, in the alternative, they all companymitted his murder in prosecution of companymon object of unlawful assembly of which these seven appellants were members on 21st September, 1979, at 5 p.m. at village Baghwar, P.S. The said DW 1 claimed that he had companye to the companyrt on his own on hearing of the case and he stated that he did number disclose to anyone, before appearing in the companyrt, that he was an eye witness. He further stated that six to seven persons who were digging the soil pounced upon deceased and assaulted him. All the appellants denied any participation in the incident and they alleged that they had falsely been implicated. The appellants herein mainly disputed the identity of the culprits. While taking into account the evidence of Dr. Chouhan PW 6 , with regard to the nature of injuries, the High Court companysidered it safer to hold that the offence which had been made out fell under section 304, Part II, I.P.C. As there were disputes with regard to the location of the road in the village, opinion of the members of the Gram Panchayat had been sought by the companytractor a companyple of days earlier. The High Court, as already observed, examined the entire evidence and came to the companyclusion that the acquittal of the appellants was perverse and the same was set aside because, according to the High Court, the companyclusion which had been reached by the trial companyrt was number at all plausible in the light of the over whelming evidence against the appellants. He saw the work was in progress but numbere of his labourers were working there. He again protested. The Sessions Judge, Narsinghpur by his judgment dated 8th February, 1980, acquitted the appellants. and number under section 302 I.P.C. KIRPAL, J. Different sentences were imposed. It is against this judgment that appeal by special leave has been filed.
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1995_1201.txt
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One of the direct recruits J.H. 4, who was an officiating Deputy Engineer, also appeared and was appointed a Deputy Engineer as a direct recruit and his name appeared in the list below the petitioners. 672 of 1981 was filed by the direct recruits challenging the validity of the 1978 Rules mainly on the ground that the Rules omitted to fix propor tionate quota for the direct recruits and the promotees. Since the preparation of the seniority lists and reversion of the direct recruits whose promotion was ille gal, in view of the decision in Patwardhans case, were being delayed, one Bagayat Patil, a promotee Deputy Engineer officiating as Executive Engineer, filed a writ application being W.P. For the purpose of fixing the seniority of Executive Engineers and Assistant Engineers for the period companymencing on 21.12.1970, separate rules were framed under Article 309 of the Constitution and are called the Executive Engineers and Assistant Engineers belonging to the Maharashtra Service of Engineers Class I and the Maharashtra Service of Engi neers Class II Regulation of Seniority and Preparation and Revision of Seniority Lists Rules, 1983 and will be re ferred to hereafter as the 1983 Rules. 660 of 1984 was filed by the direct recruits before the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court and stay was obtained. Joshis case and Patwardhans case companyprising the single cadre theory and companytended that these and other materials were available to the Court in Patwardhans case. 4 were promoted as Executive Engineers and the name of the respondent No. The two cases were disposed of by a companymon judgment upholding the validity of the 1978 Rules, striking down r. 6 iii of the 1960 Rules, and issuing appropriate directions for reversion of the illegally promoted direct recruits as also for preparation of seniority lists in accordance with the judgment in Patwardhans case. When the promotees pointed out before this Court the game of the direct recruits, a direction was issued for hearing of all the cases at Bombay. V of the paper book after referring to the sanction accorded by the Government for creation of the temporary posts stated, The posts of Executive Engineer and Deputy Engineer should be treated as temporary additions to their respective cadres. The validity of these Rules has been challenged in W.P. The further seniority lists were directed to be pre pared for the years 1957, 1958, 1959 and 1960 in accordance with the judgment in Patwardhans case wherein the seniority of the promotee Deputy Engineers was made dependant on the companytinuous officiation subject to certain other companyditions. Kulkarni, one of the direct recruits, in representative capacity, challenged the judg ment before this Court in S.L.P. 620 of 1984, 2653 of 1984, 394 of 1985, 456 of 1985, 457 of 1985, 183 of 1985, 660 of 1984, 126 of 1985 and 154 of 1985 M. Tarkunde, M.C. Aggarwala for the Appellants and J.H Bhatia, Brambhate Petitioners in person. 5 187 of 1983 was filed by Srikant Bharat Sohoni, a direct recruit to Class II, who, besides challeng ing the 1978 Rules, has also attacked the validity of the 1982 Rules, although he did number file an appeal against the judgment of the High Court on this point. The petitioner number 1, after making a very brief argu ment, filed written submissions, but since in our view the Patwardhans case was companyrectly decided, the State was under a duty to prepare fresh seniority lists for the period 1.11, 1956 to 30.4.1960, and this was done after framing the 1978 Rules. The writ petition states that the petitioners were in Subordinate Engineering service of the former State of Bombay when they appeared at the companypetitive examination held for direct recruitment and were appointed Deputy Engi neers. Bhatia, who was admittedly represented by the petitioner in S.L.P. As stated earlier, J.H. Bhatia filed Writ Petition No. V of the paper book , The temporary posts in each Department be treated as temporary additions to the respective cadres. detailed rules for recruitment to Class I and Class II Services were framed by a Government resolution dated 29.4. Bobde, D. Dave, R. Karanjawala, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Mrs. Manik Karanjawala, Jitender Sethy, S.V. Bhasme, V.A. Another writ application being W.P. According to the learned companynsel for the promotee respondents he was number companycerned with the 1978 Rules at all but he mentioned the same in his application for the sole purpose of obtaining a rule on the ground of admission of Bhatias writ petition. Gok hale, B.R. Chari, Miss Manjula Gupta, Ms. Kitty Kumarmangalam, Ms. A. Subhashini and V.J. Shroff, A.S. Bhasme, A.M. Khanwilkar, P.G. 8064 of 1981, filed an application under Article 32 of the Con stitution before this Court on 1.2. In the meantime a fresh writ petition being W.P. By an amendment in 1984 the rr. It is stated in paragraph 13 of the writ petition that the petitioner No. 1327 of 1982 in person and obtained an ex parte rule. Tambwe kar, M.N. K. Singhvi, T.V.S.N. The petitioner, however, was permitted during the hearing, to place his case on merits and he did so at some length, and Mr. Singhvi replied thereto. After the bifurcation of the two States of Maharashtra and Gujarat in 1960, the petitioners as well as the respondent No. 8064 of 198 1 which was dismissed on 29.10.1981. 9161 of 1981, filed by one Samtani was also rejected. In 1969 the petitioner No. emphasis added Similarly the Resolution No. Singhvi, the learned companynsel for the promotees relied upon these resolutions and several other documents in support of the finding of this Court in P.Y. CDS 1170 F, dated the 3rd of November 1970, dealing with the temporary posts created in the departments of Irrigation and Power stated as follows pages 283 286, at page 284 paragraph 3 of Vol. At the same examination, H.N. Bhandare, R.N. Sachthey, S.B. Accordingly aH the 15 writ applications were transferred and heard together at Bombay. emphasis added Mr. K.K. No. Encouraged by these two cases, several other writ petitions were also filed and have been heard along with the Civil Appeals. The result is that the senior ity has to be reckoned on the basis of companytinuous officia tion. Shah, respondent No. 1169 of 1986 filed under Article 32 in this Court. Thereafter a number of similar applica tions were filed one after another, either before the Nagpur Bench or the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court. 4 were allocated to the State of Gujarat. However, the prayer for stay was rejected. All the posts were permanent. Still numberhing was done till 1984 and an application for starting proceedings in companytempt was made before the High Court. 194 202 of 1986. Appeals by Certificates from the Judgment Order dated 9.12.85/17.12.85 of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition Nos. On the same date S.L.P. 4 and 9 were formally deleted. CIVIL APPELLATE AND WRIT JURISDICTION Civil Appeals No. Francis for the Respondents. A special leave petition by the State Government was also dismissed later. 1 and the respondent No.
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1990_187.txt
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62293/11/9 were due on the mortgages. the mortgage deed ext. the first mortgage ext. ladhia executed a third mortgage deed in favour of ramji dass on may 21 1897 for rs. on may 17 1897 ladhia executed in favour of ramji dass anumberher mortgage deed on the same properties for rs. the trial companyrt held that the mortgage dues were rs. 14100 being double the amount due as mortgage debt and rs. the mortgage deed contained the following amongst other companyenants first interest on the mortgage money has been fixed at re. lekh ram son of ladhia filed a suit for redemption of the three mortgages. it is urged that s. 30 of the punjab relief of indebtedness act 1934 had numberapplication for the three mortgages being usufructuary mortgages there is numberdebt due by the mortgagor number can the mortgagee enforce recovery of any debt under the companyenants of the mortgagees. interest under that mortgage was payable at the rate of 2 per mensem. 17855/4/3 as interest on the three mortgages and after giving credit for rs. 62293/11/9 to rs. 7050 that the mortgagee had received rs. thereafter the mortgages remained outstanding only on number agricultural properties. the properties mortgaged in favour of ramji dass were subject to a previous mortgage in favour of one shugan chand. the second clause referred to the interest payable on the mortgage money at the rate of rs. a decree for redemption on payment of rs. on july 20 1896 ladhia grandfather of the respondents borrowed rs. the mortgage amount was to carry interest at the rate of 12 annas per cent. the companyrt held that the mortgagee was entitled besides rs. p 1 dated july 20 1896 recited that the mortgagor ladhia had mortgaged with possession the properties set out therein for rs. on august 21 1915 a preliminary mortgage decree was passed in the suit by the subordinate judge hissar. time he and his representatives remained in possession of the mortgaged properties that the preliminary decree in the earlier suit declaring that rs. ramji dass redeemed that mort gage on payment of rs. whether the provisions companytained in s. 3 of the usurious loans act 1918 as amended in the punjab would govern a suit for redemption of mortgage executed before the commencement of the act ? it included the properties in the two earlier mortgages and 1/12th share in other lands and two houses. 31578.
the trial companyrt accordingly passed a decree for redemption of the properties in suit on payment of rs. the representatives of ladhia then instituted an action in the companyrt of the senior subordinate judge hissar for redemption of the number agricultural properties and claimed an account under s. 30 of the punjab relief of indebtedness act 1934 and also of usurious loans act 1918 as amended by the east punjab amendment act 4 of 1948.
the representatives of the mortgagee companytended inter alia that the suit was barred because numberpayment was made pursuant to the preliminary decree in the earlier suit that in any event it was declared that the amount due in 1919 under the three mortgages was rs. 6308 rs. a division bench of the high companyrt then held that under the principle of s. 30 of the punjab relief of indebtedness act the mortgagees representatives were entitled to receive rs. therefrom rs. declaring that rs. 1420 being double the amount of improvement made by the mort gagee and the total amount received by the mortgagee as income from the properties was rs. 5000/ on the basis of the mortgage deed dated the 20th of july 1896 agreed to be paid back within a period of six years the surplus rights in the mortgaged property shall be companysidered as foreclosed and shall be the absolute property of the mortgagee exhibit p 3 dated may 21 1897 also referred to the two earlier mortgages. 48571 received as income the balance due was rs. per mensem. amount declared as due under the preliminary decree in the earlier suit was for the purposes of s. 30 of the punjab relief of indebtedness act the amount actually advanced. fourth i will pay back the principal mortgage money within a period of six years. it also recited that an amount of rs. seventh till the principal mortgage money and the interest are number paid off in full temporary or permanent transfer of the mortgaged property by me to any body else shall be considered illegal and invalid. 15520 less rs. third i will be entitled to get from the mortgagee the income accruing from the mortgaged property after deduction of the government revenues therefrom. per mensem and in default of payment of interest due at the end of the year interest was chargeable at i per mensem. some time in 1951 the representatives of ladhia applied under the punjab restitution of mortgaged lands act 1938 to the special companylector and obtained an order for restoration of the agricultural lands. 35810 being the amount received in excess the balance of rs. 5000 from ramji dass and as security for repayment thereof mortgaged with possession certain agricultural lands and a house. 62293/11/9 were due operated as res judicata and that the present action number being one for recovery of a loanthe rule of damdupat incorporated in s. 30 of the punjab relief of indebtedness act 1934 had numberapplication but s. 2 of the usurious loans act 1918 as amended by the east punjab act 4 of 1948 applied. against the decree passed by the high companyrt these appeals have been preferred by the representatives of the mortgagee with certificate granted by the high companyrt. 31578.
in the appeal filed by the parties to the high companyrt of punjab two questions were referred to a full bench whether it is open to the legal representatives of a debtor to invoke the help of s. 30.
of the punjab relief of indebtedness act in a suit for possession by redemption ? the mortgagee shall also be companypetent to file a separate suit regarding the amount of interest in civil companyrt and recover the same from me through it. p 2 dated may 17 1897 for rs. 48571 as income during the. the high companyrt of punjab companyfirmed the decree on numberember 24 1919.
but numberpayment was made under that decree number was the decree made final. 9212 remained. /12/ per cent. 5000 was borrowed under a deed dated july 20 1896 and the mortgagor agreed to repay the sum within six years with interest at the rate of re. 800 contained similar companyenants. 9212 was accordingly passed. 10 and 1 1 of 1966.
appeals from the judgement and decree dated may 23 1961 of the punjab high companyrt in regular first appeals number. number io of 1966 and respondent number 24 in c.a. number i 1 of 1966 .
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by shahj. 45022 and deducting. 1 to 4 in c.a. number 10 of 1966 and respondents number. 1 to 6 in s.a.
number ii of 1966 .
datta for respondent number 18 in c.a. l. gosain s. n. goswami and p. c. khanna. i shall number have any objection thereto. for respon dents number. the full bench answered the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative. 184 of 1954 and 6 of 1955.
b. agarwala and a. d. mathur for the appellant in both the appeals . civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number.
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dev
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1969_250.txt
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1256 and 1257 of 2004 the numberices sent to the appellant were returned with the endorsement addressee always absent during delivery time. 1255 of 2004. But the legal numberice has been returned unserved on 25.3.2004 with the following endorsement Party number in station arrival number known. The cheque was presented to the bank for encashment but the same was returned on March 6, 2004 with the endorsement funds insufficient. Hence returned to sender, in the remaining five cases the numberices were returned with the endorsement party number in station. The said numberice was sent on March 17, 2004 by registered post but the same was returned unserved on March 25, 2004 with an endorsement party number in station arrival number known. Thereafter the postal article remained unclaimed till 15th February, 1993 and it was returned to the sender with a further endorsement unclaimed. The appellant sent a second numberice of dishonour of the cheque but the respondent having received the numberice on July 27, 1998 did number make the payment. On June 13, 1998 the appellant issued to the respondent and one of its partners the statutory numberice under Section 138 of Act and received the postal acknowledgement of the numberice on June 15, 1998 which was the last date of limitation on the basis of the said numberice. However, the appellant again presented the cheque on July 1, 1998 which was again dishonoured on July 2, 1998. The legal numberice has been issued to the same address of the accused as the numberices which were issued to the accused in CC No.2173/2003, 2174/2003, 2175/2003 and 2208/2003 filed before this Court. A numberice was sent by registered post but the same was returned with the endorsement that the addressee was found absent on 3rd , 4th and 5th February, 1993 and intimation was served on addressees house on 6th February, 2003. The respondent moved a petition before the High Court for quashing of the companyplaint under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that it was time barred since acknowledgement of the first numberice was received by the companyplainant on June 15, 1998 and the companyplaint was filed after July 15, 1998. The legal numberice was issued to address of the accused at No.4, Lavalle Road, Bangalore 560001. On September 9, 1998 the appellant filed a companyplaint. On those occasions the accused has received the numberices. The respondent thereafter filed a companyplaint under Section 138 of the Act on May 4, 2004. Arrival number known. The respondent issued a legal numberice to the appellant calling upon him to make the payment. By order dated June 2, 2004 the learned Magistrate passed orders under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure registering a criminal case and issuing process against the appellant. The companyplaint filed by the drawee was dismissed on the ground of territorial jurisdiction as also on the ground that since the numberice had number been received by the drawer, there was numbercause of action for filing the companyplaint. These seven appeals arise out of seven separate orders passed by a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court on July 19, 2004 dismissing seven criminal petitions filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for setting aside the orders of the JMFC Medikeri issuing process against the appellant on the companyplaints filed by the respondent under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for short Act . The appellant on the other hand companytended that the respondents having denied receipt of the first numberice, the only companyrse open to the appellant was to present the cheque again. The case of the companyplainant respondent is that the appellant had issued a cheque in his favour for a sum of Rs.1,25,000/ on November 7, 2003. The appellant filed an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the High Court which has been dismissed by the impugned order. The only distinction is that whereas in Criminal Appeal Nos. The representative facts are taken from Criminal Appeal No. On appeal, the High Court reversed the order of acquittal. The facts of the cases are similar and the same question arises for companysideration in each of the appeals. P. SINGH, J. The appellant approached this Court by special leave.
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2006_267.txt
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It has a factory at Rajahmundry Bommur for manufacturing Horlicks. Out of this one thousand tons, it clears 250 tons of Horlicks from the Rajahmundry factory on paying duty. By using the said 100 tons of barley malt, the respondent manufactures one thousand tons of Horlicks. There, the Horlicks is put in unit companytainers packages and cleared after paying the duty. The entire stock of Horlicks manufactured at Rajahmundry is, however, number cleared removed after paying the duty at Rajahmundry. Controversy has arisen with respect to the application of the said numberification and it is this the appellant says that it is entitled to take credit of the entire duty paid on barley malt against the duty payable on the Horlicks cleared at Rajahmundry, numberwithstanding the fact that the entire quantity of Horlicks manufactured out of the said barley malt is number cleared removed at Rajahmundry by paying the duty. According to the appellant, he is entitled to take credit for the entire duty of Rs.10,000/ paid on 100 tons of barley malt from out of the duty payable on 250 tons of Horlicks cleared from Rajahmundry factory, whereas according to the Revenue, since the quantity cleared at Rajahmundry on payment of duty is only 1/4th of the total quantity manufactured using 100 tons of barley malt, the appellant is entitled to take credit of only Rs.2,500/ against the duty payable at Rajahmundry. The 750 tons is put in unit companytainers and packages at the Bangalore factory and cleared from there on payment of excise duty. Revenue also says that the respondent is number entitled to take credit of b balance of Rs.7,500/ duty paid on 75 tons of barley malt from out of the duty paid on 750 tons at Bangalore. For the purpose of manufacturing Horlicks, the appellant purchases barley malt which was dutiable under Tariff Items 68. The remaining 750 tons is sent to the factory situated at Bangalore without paying duty under a bond. Only a portion of the production is put in unit companytainers packages and cleared at Rajahmundry after paying the duty while the bulk of the production is sent to the appellants factories situated at different places in India in bulk companytainers. He is, thereafter, entitled to utilise the credit for payment o duty of excise on the goods manufactured by him. The manufacturer is entitled to take credit of the duty already paid on the inputs as soon as he receives the inputs and submits the necessary declaration to the Excise Officer. On June 4, 1979, the Central Government issued the aforesaid numberification No.201 of 1979 exempting all excisable goods on which the duty of excise is leviable and in the manufacture of which any goods falling under Item No.68 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 have been used, as raw materials or companyponent parts hereinafter referred as the inputs from so mush of the duty of excise leviable thereon as is equivalent to the duty of excise already paid on the inputs. The appellant assessee is engaged in the manufacture, inter alia, of Horlicks falling under Tariff item 1 B of the Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act. This appeal preferred against the judgment of the CEGAT involves the interpretation of Notification No.210 of 1979 CE dated 4.6.1979, issued by the Central Government under Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules. P. JEEVAN REDDY.J.
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1996_1314.txt
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6231 of 1983 that the Orissa Forest Produce Control of Trade Act, 1981 had numberapplica tion to forest produce grown in Government forests. which were grown both in private holdings and Government forests. Since the Government was already the owner of forest produce in Government forests all that was necessary to create a monopoly in all forest produce in the Government was to vest in the Government the exclusive right to pur chase forest produce grown in private holdings. It is seen that the Statement of Objects and Reasons expressly mentions sal seeds as a forest produce which is grown in Government Forests and number in private holdings. The Act was aimed at creating a monopoly in forest produce in the Government. sal seeds. This was followed up by an agreement between the Utkal Contractors and Joinery Private Limited and the Orissa Oil Industries Limited for the supply of the entire companylection of sal seeds from the eleven Forest Divi sions by the Utkal Contractors to the Orissa Oil Industries. While so the Orissa Forest Produce Control of Trade Bill 1981 was introduced in the Legislative Assembly of Orissa State. He urged that the language of s. 5 1 a was so wide as to be incapa ble of any companystruction other than to say that all companytracts relating to trade in forest produce shall stand rescinded irrespective of whether the companytract related to forest produce grown in Government forests or forest produce grown on private lands. The Utkal Contractors and Joinery Private Limited and Orissa Oil Industries Limited have filed Civil Appeal No. The object of the legislation was to prevent smuggling in such forest produce and to provide for State monopoly therein. It was further argued that even otherwise Explanation II to s. 5 1 saved such companytracts for the purchase of specified forest produce from Government forests also. The present provisions of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 for checking, hoarding and transport of forest produce are number adequate to bring the culprits to book. The agreement provided for the sale and purchase of Sal Seeds failing on the ground naturally in the forests. most of the important items of minor forest produce such as Mahua flower, Tamarind, Charmaji, Karanja and the like are grown in private holdings as well as in the forest areas owned by Government. Shri G. Ramaswamy, learned Additional Solic itor General argued that Orissa Forest Produce Control of Trade Act, 1981 was a companyprehensive Act intended to companytrol and regulate trade in forest produce whether grown in Gov ernment forest or land held by private owners. On December 12, 1967, the State of Orissa granted a license for companylection of Sal Seeds from eleven Forest Divisions to M s. Utkal Contractors and Join ery Private Limited. That was precisely what was done by the Orissa Forest Produce Con trol of Trade Act, 1981 according to the learned companynsel. The Orissa Forest Produce Control of Trade Act, 1981 received the assent of the President of India on August 21, 1981. Such agreements were in fact entered into in relation to Parlakhemundi Forest Division between the State of Orissa and Indo East Extrac tion Limited. The said Act is number adequate for imposition of any restrictions of companytrol on trade in forest produce by framing rules thereunder. Instances of smuggling in such cases are too many and the smugglers are escaping with impunity because of absence of any legislation providing for State monopoly in forest produce. Barring few items like sal seeds. The Orissa Oil Industries Limited, a public limited companypany, was floated by the Utkal Contractors and Joinery Private Limited and it was agreed that the State Government should also companytribute to the share capital of the companypany. They were public agents, named as such, to carry on the activity of purchas ing and trading in specified forest produce. It was agreed that the Utkal Contractors and Joinery Private Limit ed should supply Sal Seeds to the two solvent extraction plants of the Orissa Oil Industries Limited, one set up at Bairangpur in Mayurbhanj District with a capacity to crush 21,000 M.T. Unscrupulous trad ers take advantage of this situation and evade the law under the companyer that the produce relates to private land and number to forests under the companytrol of Government. Thereafter on May 25, 1979, agreements renewing the leases for the purchase and removal of sal seeds from the eleven Forest Divisions for a further period of ten years from October 1, 1979 to September 30, 1989 were entered into by the Utkal Contractors and Joincry Private Limited and the Government of Orissa. Sal Seeds and the other at Sasan in Sambalpur District with a capacity to crush 21,000 M.T. Thereupon Utkal Contractors and Joinery Private Limited and Orissa Oil Industries Limited filed a writ petition in the Orissa High Court for a decla ration that the Notification dated December 9, 1982 did number have the effect of rescinding the companytracts which they had with the State Government. On December 24, 1982, the Government refused to accept royalty from Utkal Contractors and Joinery Private Limited in respect of Dhenkanal and Sambalpur Forest Divi sion on the ground that the Notification dated December 9, 1982 had the effect of rescinding the companytract between the companypany and the Government. It appears from a perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons that the object of the proposed Act was to prevent smuggling of forest produce like Mahua flowers, Tamarind, Charmaji, Karanja, etc. The Statement of Objects and Reasons was as follows Smuggling of various forest pro duces is increasing day by day. 6230 and 6231 of 1983. Purporting to act under this provision, a numberi fication was issued by the Government of Orissa on December 9, 1982 directing that the Act shall companye into force at once in the whole of the State of Orissa in relation to sal seeds. In another case, on similar facts the Orissa Minor Oil Private Limited have filed Civil Appeal No. Under s. 1 3 of the Act, the State Government is empowered from time to time to issue a numberification specify ing the area or areas, the forest produce in relation to which and the date with effect from which the Act shall companye into force. He urged that Explanation II, properly viewed, was an explanation to s. 5 1 b only and number to s. 5 1 a He argued that in any event the companytract was for the companylection and number for the purchase of forest produce and therefore, number saved by the explanation. 6230 of 1983. 6231 of 1983. 6230 of 1983 and Shri S.N. From the Judgment and Order dated 20.6.1983 of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. It was also brought to our numberice that such companytracts were entered into in pursuance of the avowed Industrial Policy of the Govern ment of Orissa. They companyld purchase from and sell to the Government. There was a stipulation that the companypany should establish solvent extraction units in the backward areas of Mayurbhanj and Sambalpur. He further urged that the agents companytemplated by s. 4 of the Act were number agents to act on behalf of the Government. Kacker, R.F. 237 and 46 of 1983. Nariman, Patnaik and M.M. Ganguli, S.N. S. Nariman, A.K. It was later agreed that the period from October 1, 1967 to September 30, 1969 should be treated as experimental period and the lease should be deemed to have companymenced from Octo ber 1, 1969 and to last for a period of ten years. Kacker in Civil Appeal No. On behalf of the appellants, it was submitted by Shri S. Nafiman in Civil Appeal No. Enactment of a separate legislation for the purpose is, therefore, absolutely necessary. There was also an option for renewal of the lease for a further period of ten years. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General and R.K. Mehta for the Respondents. The Bill seeks to achieve the above purpose. Kshatriya for the Appellants. Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos.
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1987_530.txt
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He was accordingly advised to recognise the officer incharge of the companycerned depot as the occupier of that factory. While granting the licence earlier, for the existing unit, the Inspector of Factories had recognized the Depot Manager as the occupier and the occupancy certificate etc. Rejecting this request the Inspector of Factories reiterated the stand taken by him and refused to recognise the officer incharge as the occupier. But this time, the new Inspector of Factories, by his letter dated 28,4.92 refused to grant the licence showing Depot Manager as the occupier, on the ground that Indian Oil Corporation is a companypany and in case of a companypany any one of the directors only can be deemed to be the occupier. In that order also he reiterated that he would recognise only the Board of Directors of the Corporation in general and Director Marketing in particular as the occupier of the factory and number the local Depot Manager. As storage facilities are also companyered by the definition of factory as defined by the Factories Act, the Depot Manager posted at the Namkum Depot made an application on 10.4.92 for obtaining a licence for the new unit. Before the High Court two questions were raised on behalf of the appellant One was whether in the case of a companypany one of the directors of the companypany only can be recognised as an occupier of the factory owned by it and the second was whether clause iii would apply to the factories of the Corporation and it is open to the Central Government to numberinate any person other than the director as the occupier. Following the decision of this Court in J. K. Industries Limited and others v. The Chief Inspector of Factories and Boilers and Others, 1996 6 SCC 665, wherein it is held that in the case of companypany, which owns a factory, it is only one of the directors of the companypany who can be numberified as the occupier of the factory for the purposes of the Factories Act and the companypany cannot numberinate any other employee as the occupier of the factory, the High Court answered the first question accordingly. 2456 of 1992 challenging the action of the Inspector of Factories. On 2.7.92 the Government of India, in the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas wrote to the Chief Inspector of Factories that the Ministry had already issued numberifications declaring the unit incharge as the occupier for the purpose of the Act. On 11.5.92 the Corporation wrote to the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas apprising it of the stand taken by the Inspector of Factories at Ranchi and seeking its guidance in the matter. It gave the following three reasons for taking that view 1 The storage depots are owned by the companypany and number by Central Government, though the companypany itself is owned, to a very large extent by the Central Government, 2 proviso ii to Section 2 n is applicable to all the companypanies as it does number make any distinction between a private companypany and a Government owned companypany, and 3.
the Depot Manager has number been appointed by the Central Government but by the companypany. On 26.5.92 the Inspector of Factories passed an order granting permission to the Corporation to start pumping of oil and to do other allied processes in its new unit at Namkum on certain companyditions and on temporary basis till the disposal of the said writ petition. The appellant, Indian Oil Corporation Limited, is a government companypany as defined by Section 617 of the Companies Act. He directed the appellant to submit proper applications duly signed by one of the directors of the companypany. It is almost wholly owned and companytrolled by the Government. In view of this decision the learned Attorney General appearing for the Corporation has number raised that point before us On the second point, the High Court held that proviso ii to Section 2 n would apply to the storage depots at Namkun. He also made ah application on 30.12.91 for renewal of the licence of the existing unit. It is, inter alia, engaged in the supply and distribution of petroleum and petroleum products including L.P.G. Thereupon the Corporation filed a more companyprehensive petition, C.W.J.C. In order to ensure an effective and efficient supply system it is required to establish and maintain storage facilities at many places in the companyntry. In view of this refusal the appellant filed W.J.C. 443 of 1991 in the Patna High Court. 1998 3 SCR 598 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by NANAVATI, J. Heard learned companynsel for the parties. were issued in his name. No. Leave granted.
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1998_515.txt
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GSR 200 dated 29.1.1970 did away with the difference in the rate of royalty on the basis of the grade of limestone and fixed the royalty payable in respect of all grades of limestone at Rs.1.25 per tonne. According to this numberification with effect from 1.7.1968, royalty of Rs.1.25 paise per tonne was payable in respect of superior grade limestone and at the rate of 0.75 p. per tonne for inferior grade limestone. Since the limestone quarried by the appellant was of inferior grade, it companytinued to pay royalty at the rate of 0.75 p. per tonne. The Notification sought to fix royalty on limestone at the rate of 0.75 p. per tonne subject to a rebate of 0.38 p. per tonne to be given on limestone beneficiated by froth floatation method. This was taken as the equivalent of the sale price of limestone at the pits head and the royalty was calculated at 20 of the sale price so fixed. It is number in dispute that the appellant had paid for the limestone quarried by it subsequent to 29.1.1970 at 0.75 p. per tonne. In their written statement, they said that the periodical returns filed by the appellant indicating pits mouth values of the limestone were number accepted by the State since royalties at flat rates were fixed for limestone. The rate of royalty has to be fixed so as number to exceed 20 per cent of the sale price of the mineral at the pits head. Incidentally both the Courts below had incorrectly recorded that the third numberification fixed the rate of royalty at 0.75 p. per tonne. According to the claim in the appellants plaint, the appellant had paid royalty at the agreed rate of 0.37 paise per tonne on the limestone quarried by it from the leased areas till November 1962. The main raw material used for the manufacture of cement is limestone. The appellant has claimed it had submitted monthly and annual returns to the companycerned authorities which disclosed the quantity of limestone quarried during each month, year, the total value and stock in hand, the royalty payable and paid together with land cess and the pits mouth value of limestone. The learned Judge also directed that the Government will ascertain the sale price of the limestone at the pits head in each case and charge 20 per cent thereof as royalty and refund the excess, if any, paid by the persons companycerned. It was further stated that on a verification of the accounts produced by the appellant, the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology , Kurnool, had found discrepancies in the quantity of limestone stated to have been quarried by the appellant and that the appellant was in fact liable to pay royalty on a further quantity of 1,56,268.00 tonnes. In Annexure F to the written statement, the State respondents gave the total amount payable by the appellant for the period 10.11.1962 to 31.3.1972 on account of royalty and cess including the additional royalty on the inferior quantity of limestone detected after giving credit to the appellant for the payments made by the respondents. The rate of royalty was again revised by an amendment of the second Schedule by a second Notification dated 8.7.1968. The learned Judge companye to the companyclusion that the royalty cannot in any case exceed 20 per cent of the sale price of the mineral at the pits head and, therefore, the numberification issued by the Government would have to be limited to 20 per cent of the sale price at the pits head. In that case also the appellant was a manufacturer of cement and held a mining lease for excavating limestone like the appellant before us. In 1957 and 1959 the appellant was granted two mining leases by the State Government for extracting limestone companyering a total area of 3597 acres and 85 cents. The sale price had been worked out by the Director Mines and Geology on the basis of various items of expenditure involved in extraction of limestone from the leased areas which included expenditure on account of Staff Welfare Fund , Insurance and Depreciation. The cause of action as pleaded in the plaint was that an amount of Rs.14,82,311.50 of excess royalty had been paid by the appellant by mistake which became known to the appellant only after the decision in W.P. The said respondents relied upon guidelines issued by the Central Government fixing the sale price at the pits head year wise for the period from 10.11.1962 to 31.3.1972. 3276 of 1970 in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on two grounds first that the rate of Rs.1.25 per tonne did number reflect 20 of the sale price under proviso a to Section 9 3 and second that there companyld be numberrevision in 1970 after the 1968 numberification in companytravention of clause b of Section 9 3 . 3276 of 1970. The present dispute has arisen out of a claim made by the appellant in a suit against the respondents claiming refund of excess royalty alleged to have been paid by the appellant to the respondents between the period 11.10.1962 to 10.12.1971 together with the cess thereon as well as for interest on such excess payment. The third Notification No. On 16.11.1962 the Central Government issued Notification No. The submission of the respondents that the rate of Rs.1.25 was fixed on the basis of an All India average was rejected following an earlier decision of the same High Court. A decree for the entire amount was sought together with interest from 27.4.1972 at 12 per annum. M11 152 26 62 amending the Second Schedule to the Act with effect from 10.11.1962. Interest 12 per annum was also granted on the decreed amount from 27.4.1972 till realisation. The appellant challenged the second and third Notifications by way of a writ petition W.P. An amount of Rs.2,50,571.61p. In 1970 the Central Government issued a third Notification in exercise of powers companyferred by Section 9 3 of the Act. The suit out of which these proceedings arise, was filed by the appellant before the Subordinate Judge, Kurnool on 17.1.1973. J U D G M E N T RUMA PAL, J The appellant manufactures cement at its factory in Kurnool District, Andhra Pradesh. In that case, it was argued that it was the All India average that had been taken into companysideration. 5758/70 and batch, where the very same numberification had been challenged on the grounds raised before me. The allegation of companytravention of clause b of the proviso to Section 9 3 was however rejected. was held to be due to the appellant by way of refund. Evidently, the question of taking averages into companysideration does number arise. The claim of the appellant was resisted by the State respondents. The land on which the factory is situated is owned by the appellant. This is what the learned Judge who disposed of the appellants writ petition said What is stated in clause a is very clear. In other words, the case made out by the respondents by the amendment to the written statement was rejected. The same view was taken by my learned brother Kuppuswami, J., in Writ Petition No. No.
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2003_1064.txt
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The said amendment application was companytested by the plaintiff. By the proposed amendment the defendant wanted to say that Ala Mohan Das was a permissive occupier instead of owner. It was number shown as to how any prejudice would be caused to the plaintiff by allowing the amendment a mere delay in filing application for amendment is itself number a ground to reject the same the proposed amendment was necessary to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to avoid further litigation. OF 2001 Arising out of SLP C No.3581 of 2001 Leave granted. Thereafter the defendant filed an application for amendment under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure. OF 2001 Arising out of SLP C No. The defendant filed a revision petition against the said order under Section 115A of the CPC before the District Judge who allowed the revision petition, reversed the order of the trial companyrt and allowed the amendment application filed by the defendant. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant in respect of suit property for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement for building or rebuilding and on the ground of default in payment of rent. 8737 of 2001 J U D G M E N T Shivaraj V. Patil, J. This appeal by the defendant in the suit, aggrieved by and directed against the order dated 15th September, 2000 made in CO 665 of 2000. The defendant filed an application under Section 17 2 and 17 2A of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 for short the Act raising certain companytentions including that the relationship of landlord and tenant did number exist between the parties. It is, thereafter, the plaintiff filed petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the High Court. Per companytra, the learned companynsel for the respondent made submissions supporting the impugned order passed by the High Court. WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. CIVIL APPEAL NO. Hence this appeal.
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2001_531.txt
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The assessment by the S.R. Colonel was refused on the basis of the ACRs of the year for 1985 86. J.C. No. For 1990, ACRs in previous 5 years were relevant. In other words, the assessment, so far as the year 1985 86 was companycerned, was 7,5,5, as assessed by the I.O. A further direction was sought to issue a writ of mandamus for companysidering the case of the appellant for promotion along with his batch mates who were promoted in 1990. But ultimately, what is relevant for the purpose of this case are the ACR for 5 years prior to 1990 which includes the years 1985 86 and that companytains one adverse remark. The S.R. and S.R. So far as the judgment of the learned Chief Justice is companycerned, it states that the number promotion of the appellant along with his batch mates who were promoted in 1990, companyld number be interfered with in writ jurisdiction and that the fresh assessment that was made pursuant to an earlier direction of the High Court in C.W. 175/1992 challenging the orders dated 15.5.90 and 30.4.1991 by reason of which promotion of the appellant to the rank of Lt. But in the companytext of the dispute raised in the case, material was produced for 5 years prior to 1990, among which the ACR for 1985 86 was definitely adverse and relevant. 7, the R.Os assessment was 5. 175/1992 dated 25.3.1994 companyld number be interfered with under writ jurisdiction. In the earlier judgment of the High Court, it directed a fresh review or reconsideration of the appellants case de numbero for promotion in 1990 along with his batch mates, in accordance with the guidelines which were filed as Annexures A and B which has number been set out in the judgment under appeal before us. It was thus on the ground that the Selection Board did number follow the guidelines of their own, the number promotion of the appellant was held to be companytrary to the guidelines and therefore arbitrary and illegal. It appears that for the year 1985 86, the Investigating Officer had given a fairly good report about the appellant on 7.2.86. Colonel is companycerned, it is done by way of selection process. In subsequent ACRs of the later years, invariably the appellant got various ranking on assessment at 7,8 and 9 also. On an earlier occasion, the appellant filed C.W. granted an assessment marking as No. Colonel in the Indian Army, against the judgment of the High Court of Patna in C.W. O., who thereafter gave his remarks, gave him an assessment of No. Thus, in spite of certain observations made in favour of the appellant, learned Justice Radha Mohan Prasad ultimately companycurred with the judgment of learned Chief Justice, in dismissing the writ petition. The writ petition filed against that judgment was dismissed by the learned Chief Justice of the Patna High Court, Justice D.P. Wadhwa as he then was and learned Justice Radha Mohan Prasad, the other Judge of the Bench, writing separate judgment. Assessment at 9 appears to be a case where the performance is outstanding. While the I.O. It was prayed in that writ petition that the order dated 15.3.87 and the other order of January 1989 companymunicated on 3.2.1989, rejecting the promotion should be quashed. 8083/94 dated 18.2.1997. The writ petition was allowed by judgment dated 25.3.94 and a de numbero companysideration was directed. The Reviewing Officer while giving him good report in various respects, made a particular remark which was adverse to the appellant in the sense that the appellant was advised to display resoluteness during execution of operations. The other learned Judge in his separate judgment, made certain observations stating that the appellants previous records were good and that the appellant otherwise deserved promotion but the learned Judge said, in writ jurisdiction he companyld number interfere, because it would amount to a review of the decision of the Selection Committee, as an appellate authority. The High Court on that occasion, numbericed that certain companytentions raised by the appellant in the writ petitions were number specifically denied in the companynter filed by the Department, namely that he was awarded medals in earlier years and also in regard to an allegation that the guidelines in Annexures A B were number followed. It was also observed that the Selection Board did number observe the direction which were annexed as Annexure 13. This is an appeal preferred by the appellant, who is a Lt. , R.O. Subsequently, the appellants case was reconsidered by another Board. That is how the present writ petition was filed in 1994. The records relating to this case were produced before the High Court and also before us. Order was on 14th November, 1986. But the matter went against the appellant once again. It is against this judgment that his appeal has been preferred. Order respectively.
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2000_874.txt
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The appellants approached the High Court by filing a writ petition, challenging the legality of the Government Order dated 25th of January, 1996, by which order it had been directed that the pension amount of each of these appellants should be deducted from their salary, payable as President of the District Consumer Forum.
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2001_872.txt
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The claim was number accepted by the Sales Tax Officer who hold that ammonia paper and ferro paper fell under the entry paper other than had made paper included in numberification No. The respondent assessee is a dealer in stationery and drawing material, and sells ammonia paper and ferro paper. The short question in this appeal by special leave is whether ammonia paper and ferro paper can be described as paper other than hand made paper for the purposes of the numberification No. Sales Tax Act, 1948 for the assessment year 1966 67 the assessee claimed that ammonia paper and ferro paper were liable to tax as unclassified goods at the rate of two per cent prescribed by s.3 of the Act. ST 3124/X 1012 4 1965 dated July 1, 1966 issued under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 194. ST 3124/X 1012 4 1965 dated July 1, 1966 and its turnover was, therefore, liable to tax at six per cent. 133R of 1973. Against the assessment 80 made the assessee appealed, but his appeal was dismissed by the Assistant Commissioner Judicial , Sales lax. Tandon and Randhir Chawla for the Respondent. In assessment proceedings under the U.P. From the Judgment and Order dated 19.2.1973 of the Allahabad high Court in sales Tax Reference No. C. Manchanda, R.A. Gupta and Ujjal Singh for the Appellant. Puri, M.N. A revision petition by the assessee thereafter was dismissed by the Revising Authority. 357 of 1971. T. Desai, H,K. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1985_277.txt
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1607 of 1973. It is important to numbere that in the atlidavit in opposition, filed on behalf of the respondent we find a statement as under I further state that it appears from the records that the detenue petitioner is a man of desperate habits and dangerous character and also prone to companymitting theft of underground telecommunication cable. This has been relied upon by the State as additional ground in Support of the detention, apart from the theft of cables, recited in the detention order and repeated in the companynter affidavit. Counsel candidly ,admitted that this additional circumstance had been placed before the State Government and the Advisory board, and certainly was before .the District Magistrate when he passed the detention order. Under Art. Sadhu Singh, for the petitioner Dalip Singh and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent. The petitioner has moved this Court under art. 32 of the Constitution for issue of a writ in the nature of habeas companypus. 1456 of 1973 judgment delivered on February 8, 1974. Writ Petition No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J. CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition No.
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1974_49.txt
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The first defendant in the suit is the mother in law of the plaintiff No.1 and the defendants 2, 3 4 are the daughters of the defendant No.1 and the defendant No.5 is the son of the defendant No.1. However, latter on relationship between the plaintiff No.1 and her husband and defendant No.1 became strained and the plaintiff No.1 and her husband had to leave the ancestral house. Plaintiff was the only child of the plaintiff No.1, who was her mother and natural guardian and she represented the plaintiff No.2. The first defendant being a housewife had numberincome to purchase properties. The genological table of the family is as under Ganganna Died in 1973 Gangamma Pet. Defendants 6 to 14 are tenants in the suit properties. The further plaint case is though some of the properties stand in the name of first defendant, they were bought benami in her name by the late Ganganna out of the income from agricultural lands and the income of the first plaintiffs husband who was working as an accountant in a private firm and drawing salary. Ganganna, the father in law of the plaintiff No.1, expired in 1973 leaving behind his wife, three daughters and two sons. The plaintiffs are respondent Nos. The plaint case is that out of the properties those at item Nos. In the written statement filed by the first defendant, the plaint case was denied excepting the relationship between the parties. Nagarathnamma wife of late G. Srinivas and ii by G. Hemlata who was a minor at the time of filing of the suit in 1992. Thus he was companytributing seven to eight thousand every month to the family and out of such income the suit properties were purchased. This suit was filed for partition claiming 1/3rd share in suit properties and also claiming separate possession by metes and bounds and for mesne profits and other incidental reliefs. The plaint case is Sri. The dispute arose out of a partition suit filed by i Smt. 1 to 4 are the joint family properties. He also had a leather business and had earning from running a taxi. The subject matter of challenge before this Court is the judgment and order dated 1st December, 2006 passed by a Learned Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Regular First Appeal 617/2004 and in the cross objection 47/2006 filed under order 41, rule 22 against the judgment and decree dated 28.01.04 passed in Original Suit No.6169/92 by the XX Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore City. GANGULY, J. 1 2 before this Court. Leave granted.
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2009_975.txt
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This was objected to by the companyplainant Gaya Prasad PW 1 . Uma Shanker succumbed to his injuries. While he was aiming a shot at the companyplainant Gaya Prasad PW 1 , Uma Shanker, the son of the companyplainant, caught hold of the appellant from behind. Gaya Prasad PW 1 , who is the companyplainant, was returning home after answering a call of nature. 4 The eye witness account of the occurrence was based on the depositions of the companyplainant Gaya Prasad PW 1 and Ram Nath PW 2 . The appellant managed to free himself and shot Uma Shanker who fell down as a companysequence of a fire arm injury. When the companyplainant objected, Durga Prasad is alleged to have stated that he was number companymitting any wrong. Moreover, PW 1 did number implicate Durga Prasad in the crime despite his presence which was an indicator of the fact that he had given a truthful account of the actual incident. The ocular evidence was supported by the medical evidence and by the evidence of the doctor PW 4 who opined that the ante mortem injury companyld have been caused by a gun. Both these witnesses deposed about the incident. The presence of the appellant and the role of the appellant in the incident has emerged from the evidence on record. The High Court held that the presence of PW 1 was natural, having regard to the time and place of the incident. The post mortem report indicated one fire arm injury, in the following terms One fire arm wound of entry 1 x 1 x chest cavity deep on the sternum 3 from the right nipple at 3 oclock position. When he reached the Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SANJAY KUMAR Date 2020.02.12 173310 IST disputed plot while passing through the Chak road, he numbericed that Durga Reason Prasad, the brother of the appellant, was getting a mound dug with the 1 IPC help of two labourers, one of whom was Ram Nath PW 2 . He found one pellet from inside the dead body of Uma Shankar. On this state of evidence, the nature of the incident has been duly established. There was blackening and tattooing around the wound. The margins were inverted and lacerated. The direction of the injury was from front to back. 3 The incident in question is alleged to have taken place at 8.45 am on 25 August 1985. Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J 1 Leave granted. At that point, the appellant intervened in the altercation and there was an exchange of words. Both the Sessions Court and, in appeal, the High Court have relied upon the evidence of PWs 1 and 2. The appellant rushed to his house and returned with a companyntry made pistol. The appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for life. 2 This appeal arises from a judgment and order of a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 5 September 2017.
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2020_105.txt
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With regard to Dr. D. M. Kar, the interrogatories were filed in companyrt on November 10, 1951. 6 on November 10, 1951. On November 14, 1951, the prosecution submited the interrogatories for the examination of Sri G. R. K. Tandan, Sri Lakshmi Shankar, Sri Biswanath and M. N. Dube. The proceedings were then transferred to the Judicial Officer, Almora, who began the examination of witnesses on June 16, 1951. for summoning some witnesses for examination on June 15, 1951, and the same was ordered. 1 Shib Lal Tewari on June 16, 1951, P.W. A case was registered in the companyrt of the S. D. M. Almora, on August 7, 1950, against the accused under s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code. 5 D. N. Pandey on October 25, 1951, and Hira Lal P.W. 2 Bishun Singh on August 21, 1951, P.W. In the meantime on September 1, 1951, the District Government companynsel applied to the companyrt of examining three witnesses on behalf of the prosecution, namely Dr. D. M. Kar, Sri R. P. Kapoor and D. N. Pandey and the Magistrate directed summonses to issue to them on the same date. The petition further referred to the fact that the presence of Dr. D. M. Kar and R. P. Kapoor in companyrt was necessary. On October 29, 1951, the prosecution submitted interrogatories for the examination of Dr. B. R. Jain and Srimati Malti Devi Joshi. 5, 6 and 9 to be put to Dr. D. M. Kar on the ground that they are leading questions which cannot be put in examination in chief and stating further that the appearance of Dr. D. M. Kar and Sri Kapoor for recording their evidence in person before the companyrt is necessary and their cross examination in companyrt be arranged for the purpose. On November 12, 1951, the accused put in an application objecting to questions Nos. The letter further stated that if a companymission companyld be arranged, the same may be arranged to record the evidence of D. M. Kar at Allahabad. We find another letter from the Accountant General of Uttar Pradesh dated September 14, 1951, which was in reply to a letter dated September 3, 1951, to the effect that R. P. Kapoor, the senior auditor of the Accountant Generals office, had been directed to attend companyrt on September 19, 1951, but he was number authorised to give evidence from the unpublished records of the Accountant Generals office for which privilege was claimed under s. 123 of the Evidence Act. Thereafter on June 4, 1951, the District Government Counsel applied to the S.D.M. Thereupon the then Civil Surgeon, Dr. Kar, enquired into the matter and found that the appellant, who was Head Clerk when he took charge, was on leave. Nothing seems to have been done on November 14, 1950, and the matter was postponed to November 30, 1950, and on that date the District Government companynsel, engaged in the case, stated that the documents in the Accountant Generals office would have to be summoned and examined. After investigation, a charge sheet was filed on November 13, 1949, and the case was finally submitted by the S. P. O. Almora, on July 10, 1950, and was received in companyrt some time later, the exact date of which does number appear from the records. The order sheet dated November 7, 1950, shows that when the file was submitted, the S. P.O, the accused and Advocates appeared in companyrt, but as the necessary papers had to be requisitioned from the Accountant Generals office, the case was adjourned to November 14, 1950, and the S. P. O. was directed to file by that date a list of documents to be requisitioned. The alleged misappropriation was detected some time in March, 1948, when Messrs May Baker Ltd., sent a reminder to the Civil Surgeon, Almora, to the effect that certain bills of their were unpaid and outstanding. If that was number possible, the cross interrogatories attached to the petition may be sent along with the interrogatories. The police charge sheet dated November 13, 1949, which originated the proceedings out of which this appeal has arisen, was to the effect that the appellant, the Head Clerk of the Civil Surgeons office at Almora, misappropriated a sum of money entrusted to him during a portion of the period he was functioning as Head Clerk. It is seen from he records that on September 7, 1951, the Magistrate received a letter from the Civil Surgeon at Allahabad, that the Magistrates certificate is necessary under s. 507 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code and s. 33 of the Evidence Act to the effect that it is necessary that the personal attendance of the medical officer is desirable and that a companymission should number issue for examination for those witnesses. In this state of circumstances, the District Government companynsel put in an application on October 26, 1951, stating that permission may be given to examine three witnesses on companymission. On October 16, 1951, the appellant put in an application to the Magistrate stating that the case had been going on since March, 1948, and on account of the long drown out proceedings he was greatly harassed and requested that the matter may be decided quickly. Though the charge sheet did number specifically state the exact amount misappropriated, the matter was cleared up when the charge against him under s. 409, Indian Penal Code, was framed, namely, that between September 26, 1947, and February 11, 1948, he in his capacity as a public servant, having been entrusted with Rs. The matter was put into the hands of the police for investigation only in June, 1949, when the Deputy Commissioner of Almora ordered the Deputy Superintendent of Police to look into the matter. Only Sri R. P. Kapoor can be called on the next day of hearing. He examined P.W. Therefore, witnesses were summoned but numberwitness seems to have been examined for some time. 3 Mohan Singh on the same date, P.W. It has number been explained before us how s. 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code companyld be applied to a case like this, number is it applicable to cases falling under the Chapter dealing in the warrant cases but one thing is clear that after November 30, 1950, the case seems to have been dropped for a fairly long time. As the Magistrate was of opinion that it was an indefinite thing, he companysigned the file under s. 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to the record room with the direction that it would be taken out when the documents were available. Thereafter, according to the prosecution, the money alleged to have been misappropriated was recovered from the appellant and paid in March, 1948, to the firms whose bills were outstanding but which had been shown as having been paid in the accounts. This case is hanging on, since a very long time. On sending an intimation to the appellant to submit an explanation, the latter sent a letter Exhibit P. 8 on March 5, 1948, companytaining certain statements which the prosecution alleges showed that the appellant was guilty of criminal misappropriation. 4 Shiv Lal Sah and P.W. The Magistrate on the same date passed an order that companymission be issued to examine these witnesses. Govinda Menon, J. Neither the companynsel for the appellant here, number Mr. Mathur for the State of Uttar Pradesh, has been able to explain to us as to how the sections referred to in the letter of the Civil Surgeon are in any way applicable. Nevertheless, it also stated that the case had been pending for a long time. The State preferred an appeal to the High Court of Allahabad which by its judgment dated June 7, 1954, set aside the acquittal, found the accused guilty of an offence under s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months. 1,118 10 9, companymitted criminal breach of trust in respect of that amount. 136 1 c of the Constitution, the same was granted by the order dated July 30, 1954, and it is in pursuance to the special leave so granted that the appeal is before us. This is also evident from the amounts detailed in companyumn 3 of question 2 that had been put to him by the learned trial Magistrate. Evidently the prosecution was number ready and might number probably have been serious. On an application to this companyrt for special leave under Act.
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1957_1.txt
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Under the Contempt of Courts Act a fine of Rs.2,000/ was imposed and under Article 215 of the Constitution of India the appellant was suspended from practice for a period of two months. The main companytention of the learned senior companynsel Signature Not Verified appearing for the appellant is that the whole companyviction Digitally signed by NARENDRA PRASAD Date 2017.08.01 132834 IST Reason is based on the unilateral version of the companyplainant before the Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi. The appellant is before this Court aggrieved by the companyviction and sentence under section 2 c read with Section 10 15 of Contempt of Courts Act and under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. KURIAN, J.
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2017_239.txt
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Leave granted.
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2008_2619.txt
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Dr. A.S. Anand, C.J.I. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. Leave granted.
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1999_325.txt
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The Appellate Tehsildar has endorsed his findings on the document itself. Challenge in the petition was to the order passed by the Land Reforms Appellate Authority, Dharwad in short Appellate Authority Respondent number 3 had filed the petition.
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2008_773.txt
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The Income tax Officer held that the income from the aforesaid two properties was assessable in the hands of the assessee inasmuch as he had retained a portion of the income from the trust properties for himself. He derived income from house properties and from the business of a registered partnership firm H. Ganguly Co. The assessee was assessed in the status of an individual. On March 19, 1953 the assessee created a trust in respect of these two houses. 200/ per month to the settlor for life for his own absolute use and benefit out of the income of the trust estate remaining after payment of taxes, rents etc. He had six houses one of which was 24, Mohanlal Street, Calcutta and the other at Jangambari in the city of Banaras. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the Calcutta High Court answering the following question of law referred to it against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the entire or any part of the income from the house properties companycerned companyld be included in the total income of the assessee by virtue of the provisions of Section 16 1 c of the Income tax Act, 1922 read with the first proviso thereto? It was provided in the trust deed that the trustees shall pay a sum of Rs. In other words he himself was one of the beneficiaries. N. Grover, J.
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1971_308.txt
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533, 1004, and 1410 and 16711685/75. 1 in CA 533 and RR in C.As. J. John for Respondents in CA 1685/75. 533 and 1004 ,of 1975. S. Nariman, M. N. Shroff and Miss Radha Rangaswami for the Intervener State of Maharashtra in CA No. T. Desai and R. M. Mehta, M. N. Shroff and Miss Radha Rangaswami for the Appellants in CAs. Sen CA 533/75 I. N. Shroff for Respondent No. 1677 78, 1680 and 1682 1683/75. Kanishkar H. Kaji, Mrs. S. Bhandare, M. S. Narasimhan, A. K. Mathur, A. K. Sharma, and Miss Nalini Paduval for Respondent in CA 1671/75. 1410 and 1671 1685/75 From the Judgment and Order dated 16 8 73 of the Gujarat High Court in SCA No. 400, 377 and 1220/70 and 30, 129, 155, 184, 362, 363, 391, 406, 822, 823 and 1764/71 and 234 and 449/72. 1410/75. Contradictory verdicts on the companystitutionality of a certain pattern of sales tax legislation, calculated to companynter companysumer victimisation by dealers, have been rendered by different High Courts and what companyplicates the issue is that seasonings in the prior rulings of this Court on the topic have been pressed into service by both sides. 421 and 508 of 1971 and CIVIL APPEALS NOS. The honest dealer made a return of the total slims companylected by him on the turnover and it was discovered by the sales tax officer that certain items were number taxable and, therefore, refund was due. From the Judgment and Order dated 16 8 73 of the Gujarat High ,Court in S.C.A. Nos. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos.
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1977_204.txt
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22 and Phulia Devi P.W. Yamuna Singh A 1 Chitra Deo Prasad A 3 and Ashok Kumar Singh P.W. The absconding accused knocked the door of Prof. Maheshwar Prasad and thereupon it was opened by Ramayan Singh A 2 , who uttered the words Bap Re Bap. The absconding accused A 3 came to the house of Yamuna Singh A 1 and went in his room. Upon hearing this, Prof. Maheshwar Prasad came out of his room. Meena Kumari P.W. Abyay Kumar Singh P.W. Yamuna Singh A 1 , the absconding accused, Chitra Deo Prasad A 3 made to stand in the lane in front of the door of the deceased. It is alleged by the prosecution that on 26.1.1979 the appellants worked out a companyspiracy to eliminate Prof. Maheshwar Prasad Sharma. At that time Meena Kumari P.W. This companyspiracy was heard by Meena Kumari P.W. The other appellants accused persons were close associates and friends of Yamuna Singh A 1 . 23 the brother of Ashok Kumar Singh P.W. During night when the door would be knocked, Ramayan Singh A 2 would open the door, and utter the word Bap Re Bap and on such utterances Prof. Maheshwar Prasad would companye out of his room and then he would be killed. I and told him that he was wanted by the absconding accused. On 26.1.1979 as companyspired in the afternoon Chitradeo Prasad Singh A 3 at about 10.30 p.m. went to the house of Ashok Kumar Singh P.W. Yamuna Singh A 1 and his associates were waiting for a chance to teach a lesson to the deceased. The absconding accused as per the companyspiracy at about mid night knocked the door of the deceased and thereupon Ramayan Singh A 2 , who was sleeping inside the room opened the door and shouted Bap Re Bap. They numbericed the dead body of Prof. Maheshwar Prasad Sharma, lying on the road in front of his room. All the appellants and the absconding accused used to gather at the place of Yamuna Singh A 1 and shared cheap jokes with these two ladies. The ground floor companysisted of three tenements out of which a tenement of two rooms, inter connected by a door, was in possession of Prof. Maheshwar Prasad Sharma since deceased , another tenement was occupied by Hari Mangal Prasad Singh the absconding accused and the third tenement was in possession of Chamari Prasad P.W. It was decided that Ramayan Singh A 2 , a Sanskrit teacher who was known to Prof. Maheshwar Prasad and was a man of his companyfidence would sleep during the. It is alleged by the prosecution that Yamuna Singh A 1 , since last two months had kept Meena Kumari P.W. On the second floor there was one room and an open terrace which was in occupation of Yamuna Singh A 1 . Prasad Sharma. 23 , the brother of Ashok Kumar Singh P.W. In the meantime the absconding accused took out his Gupti and gave a forcible blow on the left shoulder of Prof. Maheshwar Prasad, who screamed loudly and fell on the ota. Both of them tried to desist Yamuna Singh A 1 from companymitting any such illegal act. On 26.1.1979 sometime in the afternoon A 2 to A 4 and Hari Mangal hereinafter called the absconding accused because his trial is pending and prosecution has to prove his companyplicity came to the room of Yamuna Singh A 1 . I caught hold of Prof. Maheshwar Prasad who although struggled but companyld number get himself rescued. On hearing this companyment from the deceased, Yamuna Singh A 1 retorted by saying, why anyone it companyld be yours. Yamuna Singh A 1 , Chitradeo Prasad Singh A 3 and Ashok Kumar Singh P.W.I caught hold of the deceased who tried to struggle and get out of their clutches, however, he companyld number succeed. All these accused then came to the house of A 1, absconding accused was then carrying a Gupti, Chitradeo Singh A 3 was made to stand in the lane in front of the door of the deceased and Ram Babu A 4 was standing at the junction of the lane. The prosecution case mainly rests on the evidence of Ashok Kumar Singh P.W. This talk was overheard by Abhay Kumar P.W. 28 in his room. Yamuna Singh A 1 told these ladies to keep quiet otherwise they will have to face dire companysequences. The prosecution has unfolded it story as under Yamuna Singh A 1 owned a double storeyed building situated in a lane called Langertoli in Patna town. After a short time, the absconding accused, came there and a little later he himself went to the police station and lodged the report stating that some unknown persons have companymitted the murder of Prof. Maheshwar Prasad Sharma. In the meantime the absconding accused took out his Gupti and forcibly hit on the left shoulder of the deceased who thereafter fell down on the ota and rolled down in the lane. After some time Yamuna Singh A 1 came back to his house and while standing near the telephone pole he fired a shot, and then entered in his house from the southern side. As anticipated by the companyspirators, the deceased came out of his room. After a short time Yamuna Singh A 1 came back in the lane near the telephone pole, fired a short from his gun in the air and ran away towards the southern side of the lane from where he entered in his house. The appellants and in particular Yamuna Singh A 1 got upset by this remark made by the deceased and told him that if he is unhappy in the premises he may find out some other accommodation. It is alleged by the prosecution that the deceased came out of his room on the road and shouted at the appellants. Thereafter he rolled down in the lane. In order to lend companyroboration to the approvers evidence, the prosecution drew support from the evidence of Meena Kumari P.W. companyspiracy was companyked up by the appellants on 26.1.1979. night in his room as in the past he had slept once. They pleaded that in the early morning of 27.1.1979 they heard a sound of fire arm and at that time probably some unknown persons might have companymitted the murder of Prof. Maheshwar. All the accused then fled away. We may number proceed to companysider the evidence of approver P.W. After companypleting the investigation the charge sheet under Sections 120B/302, 302/34 IPC against all the appellants including the absconding accused was submitted. Accused person then fled away. The appellants again retorted to the deceased saying that he may vacate the room as early as possible. At the trial the absconding accused companyld number be apprehended and, therefore, his trial was separated. Because of such threats given by A 1 the deceased had stopped companying out of his room during night time even for urination. The deceased was a Professor of Sanskrit in Government Sanskrit companylege Rajinder Nagar, Patna. Ram Babu A 4 was standing at another junction of the lane. All the appellants again started enjoying cheap jokes with loud screams which annoyed the deceased. The accused denied the charges and claimed to be tried. I overheard this talk. Once the deceased told them, you are running a brothel and this will have a very bad effect on the youngsters and other residents in the locality. I , the approver. 28 . 28 narrated as to how ??? In addition to this evidence the prosecution also relied upon several other circumstances to prove the guilt of the accused. After hearing the fire arm shot, residents in the locality woke up and came on the road. I and he has companyroborated this part of the companyspiracy. 28 were preparing the meals in the varandah. The trial companyrt on appreciation of ocular evidence and other materials on record found all the appellants guilty under Sections 120B/302 and 302/34 IPC and companyvicted each one of them to suffer imprisonment for life. Both these ladies were of easy virtues. He was a very orthodox and religious minded person. These four Criminal Appeals are filed by the appellants accused challenging the legality and companyrectness of the judgment and order dated April 25, 1986 passed by the Patna High Court dismissing these appeals and companyfirming the judgment and order dated 25.3.1981 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Patna companyvicting each of the appellants for offences punishable under Sections 120B/302 and 302/34 IPC. It was also decided that during night the lower gate of the stair case would be kept open to facilitate free entry. At times they were found screaming. After registering the offence investigation companymenced. Since local police did number show any progress in the investigation, it was handed over to CBI. The appellants preferred four separate appeals to the High Court of Patna and on reappraisal of entire evidence on record the High Court dismissed all these appeals. At the material time his son, Sri Prakash PW 10 was staying with him. They pleaded that they are innocent and they be acquitted. P. Kurdukar, J. This fact was known to the appellants. During investigation the statements of various witnesses were recorded. Since these appeals arise out of a companymon judgment and order, they are being disposed of by this Judgment. According to them they have been falsely implicated in the present crime. It is against this Judgment and order of the High Court the appellants have filed the present appeals. 20 . I .
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1996_1052.txt
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on measurement and demarcation. It was the case of the judgment debtor that the decree became enforceable on and from 23.9.1966 by which date the decree holder had deposited the balance companysideration. The decree holder deposited the balance of the sale price by 23.9.1966 but the measurement and demarcation was number done by the judgment debtor on or before 23.9.1966, the time fixed for the purpose. Thereafter the decree holder filed the execution petition on 19.4.1980 being E.P. If the judgment debtor had failed to measure and demarcate the land the decree holder should have moved the executing companyrt for the purpose. The appellate companyrt was of the view that if the companytention of the decree holder is accepted it would mean that in case the judgment debtor intentionally did number fulfil the companydition imposed on him in the decree he companyld defeat the fruits of the decree for the decree holder and avoid the execution of the sale deed in his favour. in the property described hereunder on or before 23.9.1966. The appellate companyrt took the view that since the decree holder after obtaining the decree on 23.9.1966 has number executed the decree within 12 years from that date the petition is barred by limitation. No.346/1981 for executing the decree for specific performance of the companytract praying therein to direct the judgment debtor to execute the sale deed as per the draft sale deed produced in the Court by the decree holder and in default to cause the execution of the sale deed by the companyrt. The Executing Court accepted the case of the decree holder and held that the decree under execution was a companyditional decree which became enforceable when the judgment debtor measured and demarcated the land in 1973 and therefore the execution petition was number barred by limitation vide the order dated 16.2.1982. After a lapse of more than six years the measurement and demarcation of the land was done by the judgment debtor in the year 1973. That the plaintiff do deposit into companyrt on or before 23.9.1966 the balance of the sale price for 13 grounds and 491 sq. It was the companytention of the decree holder that since the companydition regarding measurement and demarcation of the land was companyplied by the judgment debtor only in 1973 the period of 12 years is to be companyputed from that date and on such companyputation the execution petition filed on 19.4.1980 was within time. The judgment debtor in the objection filed against the execution petition raised the question of limitation. That on such measurement and demarcation and fixation of the price and on deposit the defendant do execute the sale deed in respect of the suit house sites in favour of the plaintiff at her companyts as agreed and in default the companyrt do execute the sale deed on application of the plaintiff and the companyt of the execution of such sale deed be recovered from the defendant. of land measured and demarcated. The said decree reads as follows The defendant do measure and demarcate the boundaries for 13 grounds and 491 sq. On appeal by the judgment debtor the Additional District Judge, Tiruchirapalli, by the order passed on 6.8.1985 allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the Executing Court holding, inter alia, that it was number possible to companyclude that just because the judgment debtor had number measured and demarcated the property the decree holder had number acquired any right to execute the decree. The factual backdrop of the case relevant for appreciating the points raised may be shortly stated thus The predecessor in interest of the decree holder filed the suit against the judgment debtor, O.S.No.35/1965, for specific performance of the companytract of sale dated 7.2.1964. The High Court having answered the question in the affirmative the decree holder has filed this appeal assailing the order of the High Court. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the appellate companyrt the decree holder filed the revision petition before the High Court at Madras assailing the said order. The suit property was described as 13 grounds and 491 sq. That the defendant do pay to the plaintiff the sum of Rs.1,423/ being companyts of this suit and do bear his own companyts of Rs.507.50. Is the execution petition filed by the appellant barred by limitation is the question that arises for determination in this appeal. The suit was decreed on 23rd July, 1966. P.Mohapatra, J.
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2001_655.txt
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recommended 2 more candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes Tribes for the posts. to prescribe one qualifying standard for members of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes and another for the rest of the candidates. The Union Public Service Commission recommended 16 candidates for being appointed in unreserved vacancies and 28 candidates in reserved vacancies. The numberification further stated that a reservation of 12 1/2 of the vacancies would be made for members of the Scheduled Castes and 5 for members of Scheduled Tribes. The Go vernment, however, made only 45 appointments out of which 29 were from among the candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. recommended the names of only 30 candidates for the latter class of vacancies. The petitioner points out that the percentage of marks secured by him at the examination was 61 whereas the percentage of marks secured by some of the 29 candidates from the Scheduled Castes and Tribes was as low as 35 and one of his grievances is that it was number companypetent to the P.S.C. Supplementary instructions with regard to this subject were issued by the Government of India on January 28, 1952, of which the relevant portions may be quoted 2 a RECRUITMENT BY OPEN COMPETITION If the candidates of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and the Anglo Indian companymunity obtain by companypetition less vacancies than are reserved for them, the difference will be made up by the numberination of duly qualified candidates of these castes, tribes and companymunities, i.e., candidates of these company munities etc., Subsequently the U.P.S.C. He became permanent on January 1, 1958.
examination 30 by promotion from Grade IV to Grade III on the basis of a departmental examination held at intervals by the U.P.S.C. 30 by promotion from Grade IV on the basis of seniority cum fitness. It may be mentioned that the number of vacancies which were expected to be filled was stated to be 48 out of which 16 were unreserved and the remaining 32 reserved, though in fact the U.P.S.C. MUDHOLKAR J. The petitioner, who is a graduate, is an Assistant in Grade IV of the Central Secretariat Service, having been recruited therein in the year 1956. On February 6, 1960 the Union Public Service Commision issued a numberification to the effect that a limited companypetitive examination for promotion to the regular tem porary establishment of Assistant Superintendents of the Central Secretariat Service would be held in June, 1.960. The result of this examination was announced by the Union Public Service Commission in April, 1961. C.J., Raghubar Dayal, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and J. R. Mudholkar, JJ. was delivered by Mudholkar, J., K. Subba Rao J., delivered a dissenting opinion. On September 13, 1950, the Government of India published a resolution indicating their policy in regard to companymunal representation in the services. August 29, 1963. Gopalakrishnan, for the petitioner. Ganapathy Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the Respondents. 87 of 1963. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights. In order to understand what the aforesaid rule is it is necessary to refer to certain resolutions of the Government of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Judgment of S. K. Das, Acting. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Petition No.
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1963_205.txt
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the respondent manufactures various other items hot rolled finished steel products in rectangular cross section of thickness varying between 1.7 mm and 6.55 mm and width varying between 16.2 mm and 311.2 mm and rolled in companyls which it supplies to the indian tube companypany limited at jamshedpur for making tubes and also to others. from various dictionaries and treatises such as hornumber j. g. dictionary of terms page 323 year 1952 brandt d.j.c. manufacture of iron steel pages 318 and 319 year 1953 henderson j.c. a. palkhiala ravinder narain j. b. dadachanji o. c. mathur k. j. john and k. r. jhaveri for the respondent. of india d. n. mukherjee and r. n. sahthey for the appellants. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1527 of 1974.
appeal by special leave from the judgment order dated the 14th december 1973 of the delhi high companyrt in civil writ number 1678 of 1967.
s. nariman addl. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by goswami j. this appeal is by special leave from the judgment of the delhi high companyrt in a writ application there under article 226 of the companystitution.
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1975_5.txt
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17 and 20 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, for a decree in terms of the award. They entered into three companytracts for the companystruction of aerodrome, hangarettes, buildings, stores and other works at Ranchi, the first of them being companytract No. While this suit was pending, the arbitrator who had meantime left for Hong Kong sent to the companyrt of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Ranchi before whom the suit was pending a companyy of the award duly signed by him, for being filed as provided in the Act. After an elaborate trial the Additional Subordinate Judge, Ranchi, passed a decree in terms of the award except as to a part which he held to be in excess of the claim. The arbitrator made his award on June 4, 1948, and sent a companyy thereof to the parties. 21 of 1942 dated November 5, 1942, and the other two being companytracts Nos. This is an appeal against the Judgment of the High Court of Patna in an appeal under the Arbitration Act, 1940. After the above works were companypleted, disputes arose between the parties over the bills and eventually by an agreement dated February 6, 1948, they were referred to the arbitration of one Col.
A. W. S. Smith. The appellant took the matter in appeal to the High Court of Patna which companyfirmed the decree of the Subordinate Judge but granted a certifi cate under Arts. 367 of 1953. C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India, N. De and P. Mukherjee, for the respondents. The appellant filed objections thereto, and the petition was then registered as Title Suit No. Notices were issued by the companyrt under s. 14 2 of the Act, and, in answer thereto, the appellant filed an application to set aside the award on various grounds. The appellant is the State of Bihar, and the respondents are a companypany registered under the Indian Companies Act, doing business as building companytractors. 209 of 1959. K. Jha and R. C. Prasad, for the Appellant. 6 and 8 dated April 5, 1943. Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 5, 1956, of the Patna High Court in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 132 and 133 1 of the Constitution, and hence this appeal. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA AIYAR, J. 53 of 1951. To this, the respondents filed their reply statement. The respondents thereupon filed a petition under ss. April 7. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1961_39.txt
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The petitioner companytractor did incur an extra companyt of Rs.14,72,456 within the companytract period for executing the assigned work. Whether the companytractor had incurred extra companyt of Rs.8,84,336 for the work beyond the companytract period due to unforeseen circumstances? The petitioner companytractor did incur an extra companyt of Rs.6,81,796 for the work done beyond the companytract period due to unforseen circumstances. Whether the petitioner companytractor had to incur extra companyt of material and labour to the tune of Rs. Was the claim number entertainable in accordance with the terms of the companytract under clause 3.3.32, 3.3.33 and 3.3.34 during the extended period of companytract? The companytractor is entitled to claim extra companyt due to the delay caused on account of the shale zone in foundations. Whether the companytractor was entitled to extra companyts of damages for the delay caused on account of shale zone? 14,72,456 within the companytract period for executing work assigned to it? Was the petitioner entitled to payment of this extra companyts of Rs. Was the work delayed because of the presence of shale zone in the foundation which factor was number made known to the companytract? The petitioner is number entitled to the payment of the extra companyts of Rs.1,20,355. The Division Bench companysidered the following issues raised before the District Judge Whether the companytractor had incurred extra companyts towards wetting and washing of stones used in masonry of Group II Tawa Masonry Dam? 1.20,355? It was companytended further that there was only one companytract and there being numberseparate agreement for extension of period of the companytract the rate as provided in the original companytract alone was permissible. 15, the companytract was rendered ineffective in terms of section 56 of the Contract Act due to abnormal rise in the market rate of material and labour and the claim number entertainable under clause 3.3.32, 3.3.33 and 3.3.34. The High Court companysidered whether the appellant was entitled to extra companyt towards rise in prices of materials and labour within and beyond the companytract period. Yes, the work was delaved due to the presence of shale zone in the foundations, a factor which was unforeseen and was number made known to the companytractor. The Division Bench came to the findings as follows The companytractor did incur expenditure on wetting and washing of stones in Masonry Group II, Tawa Masonry Dam but this was according to agreement. Whether the companytract was rendered ineffective in terms of section 56 of the Contract Act due to unexpected change in the market rate of material and labour charges? In view of the specific clauses, the appellant was number legally entitled to claim for extra companyt. The companytractor attributed delay on the part of the State Government whereas the State Government blamed the companytractor. The companytract was number rendered ineffective in terms of section 56 of the Contract Act due to abnormal rise in the market rates of materials and labour. It was companytended that the claim was barred by clause 3.3. The claim under reference cannot be ruled out merely be cause of the provisions of clause 3.3.32, 3.3.33 and 3.3.34. While the work was in progress, the companytractor was required to meet extra expenditure on labour charges and materials due to revision in wage scales and escalation of prices. The petitioner is entitled to the claim to the extent of Rs.2,65,000 against Issue No. Alterations and substitutions of works also led to extra expenses. Whether the petitioners claim on both the companynts was in whole or in part of it was barred by time in terms of clause 3.3. The companytract companyld number be companypleted within the stipulated time because of alleged gross delay on the part of the State, according to the petitioner, in allotment of work and discharge of its obligations under the companytract. The work, however, companyld number be companypleted within the stipulated time, the period of companytract was extended. The petitioner incurred unforeseen expenditure, it is claimed, to the tune of Rs.5,29,812 and approached the Superintending Engineer for payment. Regarding the remaining issues, the State had taken objection while opposing the application under section 20 that the appellant was number entitled to extra companyt for material and labour in terms of the companytract but the Court directed that this matter had to be agitated before the arbitrator and the application under section 20 companyld number be dismissed on the ground that the claim would number ultimately succeed. In order to appreciate the points involved, it is neces sary to state that the petitioner entered into a companytract dated 31st March, 1970 with respondent, State of Madhya Pradesh for the companystruction of Rip Rap on right bund of Masonary Dam of Tawa Project. So far as three legal issues which were referred to him, namely, whether the claim was barred under clause 3.3. 3 and Rs.6,81,796 against Issue No. 4 above and the same is number barred by time in terms of clause 3.3.15. Upon refusal of the Superintending Engineer to pay the claim and his refusal to refer the matter to arbitration, the petitioner moved the learned District Judge under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 hereinafter called the Act for filing of the arbitration agreement and for reference of the disputes to the arbitration. The arbitrator misconducted himself in allowing the claim without deciding the objection of the State. There was an award dated 29th October, 1978 on all the issues referred, partly allowing the petitioners claim. N. Kacker and R. Ramachandran for the Petitioner. There were certain items for which rates were number provided but all the same work had to be done. On 24th April, 1976 the learned District Judge allowed the petitioners application and directed the respondent, State of Madhya Pradesh to file the agreement in Court and made a reference for specific question to the arbitration. The award was filed in the Court of the District Judge and the respondent filed objections to the award under sections 30 and 33 of the Act and the petitioner filed replies. The District Judge made the award a rule of the Court. The District Judge accepted the objections and set aside the award. The Division Bench felt that the four factual issues decided by the District Judge were more or less by the agreement and therefore, the Division Bench did number deal with these. Being aggrieved the petitioner went up in appeal before the Division Bench and the Division Bench on companysideration of the matter dismissed the appeal. 13180 of 1985. Bhopal was appointed arbitrator. The High Court on 22nd September, 1976 dismissed the States appeal against the order of the District Judge. The High Court remanded the matter to the District Judge for fresh decision. From the Judgment and order dated 17.4.1985 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. 15 and it had number been made within the time. Thereafter in March, 1977 Retired Engineer in Chief, P.W.D. This is an application under Article 136 of the Constitution for leave to appeal to this Court from the judgment and order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated 17th April, 1985. 252 of 1981. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. F.A. The respondent appealed to the High Court. This was a disputed question. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Special Leave Petition Civil No. No.
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1988_93.txt
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His widow Dhapan had remained in possession as Widows Estate. Therefore, being a companyowner of Shri Ram, the respondent is entitled to preemption of the lands sold by Dhapan to the appellants. The facts are that on July 16, 1979, certain lands situated in Kutiyana Tehsil District Sirsa were sold by Mathri, Dilawar and Santosh Kumar to the appellants by registered sale deed dated June 16, 1979. A. SLP C Nos.14362 14372 of 1986 decided on 24th January, 1996 by a Bench of which two of us K.Ramaswamy B. Pattanaik, JJ. The respondent filed Suit No.581/80 in the Court of Sub Judge, Ist Class, Sirsa under Section 15 l b of the Punjab Pre emption Act, 1913 on July 18, 1980 for preemption of the land from the appellants on the premise that the lands originally belonged to one Shri Ram who died in the year 1944. She had numberright to sell the lands to the appellants as she remained limited owner. v. Bhagwan Singh Dead by L.Rs. No.4017 are sufficient for disposal of these appeals. This companytroversy was companysidered by this Court Karan Singh Ors. Substitution allowed. Leave granted in the SLP. She cannot be said to have inherited the property through her husband. Accepting the companytention of the respondent, the trial Court decreed the suit. The facts in C.A. These appeals were referred to a larger Bench by order of this Court made on 10th May, 1994. Thus these appeals by special leave.
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1996_1756.txt
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68, 69 and 70 of 1975 made by the appellant under Section 256 2 of the Income tax Act, 1961, for an order directing the Income tax Appellate Tribunal to state a case and refer the question of law arising out of the Tribunals order for the decision of the High Court. These appeals by special leave are against the companymon order dated March 8, 1976, rejecting three applications Nos.
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1992_336.txt
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35/B, 36/B, 37/B 38/B of 1981. 38 of 1981 relates to an award, awarding to the respondent Rs.46,321.32. 35 of 1981 relates to the award, awarding to the respondent against the appellant Rs.2,75,091.13. 36 of 1981 relates to an award, awarding to the respondent a sum of Rs.1,88,968.36. 37 of 1981 relates to an award, awarding to the respondent Rs.3,36,230.36 and Appeal No. 35/B to 38/B of 1981 dis posing of all the four appeals field by the appellant against the judgment and order of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panaji, Goa dated 26.8.1981 companyfirming four different awards by an arbitrator appointed in pursuance to the agreement between the parties. The said award was filed in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panaji, by the Arbi trator on 31st March, 1981 for making the award Rule of the Court. 35/B, 36/B, 37/B and 38/B of 1981 against the said Order of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panaji, Goa on the ground that the Civil Judge did number companysider that the Arbitrator misconducted himself in making the awards without recording any reasons for the same, even though the claim was Rs.50,000 and above as provided in clause 25 of the agreement between the parties and as such the awards should have been set aside by the Court. The Arbitrator on March 23, 1981 submitted four awards granting the claims of the respondent as stated hereinbefore on the basis that the appellant was responsible for the slow progress and number companypletion of work and the work companyld number be companypleted as the companytract was terminated by the appel lant, the Housing Board. The learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panaji by his Order dated 26th August, 1981 rejected all the objections raised on behalf of the appellant against the said awards and companyfirmed the same. All the four impugned awards have been made Rule of the Court. Several extensions were granted to the respondent for companypleting the work out the respondent failed to company plete the companystruction work undertaken by him under the said four companytracts. The facts leading to these appeals are as follows The appellant Goa, Daman Diu Housing Board entered into two companytracts on 15.3.72, and one companytract each on 11.7.73 and on 4.7.73 with the respondent for the companystruc tion of tenements at Vasgoda Gama, Goa. The order of the lower companyrt was set aside and the awards were remanded back to the arbitrator for giving reasons for the same as required under clause 25 of the arbitration agreement and thereafter to file the same in the companyrt of Civil Judge, Panaji, within eight weeks after the order is served on him. Thereafter in April, 1978, the appellant filed a suit claiming damages for a sum of Rs.4,38,786.96 with interest against the respondent in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panaji, Goa. The appellant submitted his objections for setting aside the awards on April 27, 1981 on the grounds inter alia that the Arbitrator had misconducted himself by number framing the main issue i.e. There was a time limit in all the aforesaid four companytracts for the companypletion of the work referred to therein. On July 31, 1975, the Chairman of the appellant board companyfirmed that all the four companytracts stood rescinded. Pinto, retired Superintending Engineer w.as ap pointed as Arbitrator. Respondent also made another application to the Court under section 20 of the Arbitration Act for directing the Housing Board to file the arbitration agreement in Court and in pursuance of clause 25 of the agreement to appoint an arbitrator. On May 17, 1976, the respondent served a numberice to the appellant on the ground that the appellant had rescinded the work companytracts. Accord ingly, the Court by its order dated 28.2.1979 had the agree ment between the parties filed in companyrt and directed the Housing Board to appoint an arbitrator. On July 14, 1975, the Engineer in Charge of the appellant Board exercised its unilateral right of terminating the companytract under clause 3 of the agreement in view of the fact that the respondent did number companyplete the work of companystruction undertaken by him in spite of various extentions granted to him. Mehta, Dhruv Mehta and Aman Vachher for the Respondent. Ashok H. Desai, Solicitor General, Ravinder Narain, Aditya Narain, Rajan Narain, S. Sukumaran, D.N. whether or number the claimant abandoned the work and thereby companymitted breach of the agreement. The respondent stated therein various reasons why the work companyld number be companypleted. On July 1, 1975 the appellant issued a numberice to the respondent under clause 3 of the said companytract for exercising the right of termination in view of the fact that the respondent was unable to fulfil the companytractual obligation of companypleting the companystruction work in spite of the various extensions granted to the respondent. Mishra and Pallav Sishodia for the Appellant. The above four appeals on special leave by the appellant were filed against the judgment and order dated February 7, 1983 made by the Panaji Bench of the Bombay High Court in First Civil Appeal Nos. The appellant ac cepted two tenders of the respondent on 9.3.72 and remaining two on 24.2.73. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. Subsequently, an application was filed by the respondent under section 34 of the Arbitration Act for stay of the suit. The appellant thereafter filed the aforesaid First Civil Appeal Nos. L. Sanghi, S.K. 1983 of the Bombay High Court in F.C.A. Nos. On March 29, 1979 Shri J.S. Appeal No. From the Judgment and Order dated 7.2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY, J. Against this judgment and order the impugned appeals by special leave were filed. The Court allowed all the appeals.
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1991_293.txt
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The Petitioner further claims that under threat of death her signatures were taken before the Registrar of Marriages purportedly to show that she was married to the Respondent.
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2005_721.txt
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PW 3 went to the New Market alongwith PW 2 and saw the dead body of Manjit Singh lying there. at about 3 or 4 a.m. on 9.5.76 PW 2 was awakened by the appellant and enquired as to where Manjit Singh was. PW 2 took the appellant to the new market which was only about 9 or 10 yards from where PW 2 was sleeping and pointed out Manjit Singh sleeping on the bench. Manjit Singh died almost instantaneously on receipt of the injuries inflicted on him by the appellant. PW 2 Ramesh Chand and PW 3 Subhash Chander intervened and pacified them and sent them away. PW 2 went back to his house and dozed off for some time and thereafter went and informed PW 3 at his house as to what had happened. He advised PW 2 to inform the matter to one Jagan Nath and on PW 2 informing Jagan Nath he was asked by the latter to inform one Kartar Chand, Municipal Commissioner about the occurrence and accordingly PW 2 went and informed Kartar Chand. Not stopping with that, the appellant took out a knife brought by him and inflicted two or three stabs on the chest of Manjit Singh. Thereafter it is said that Kartar Chand took PW 2 to the Police Station and PW 2 lodged the first information report. The appellant denied his companyplicity in the offence and stated that PW 3 and the Municipal Commissioner Kartar Chand were engaged in doing Satta gambling and deceased Manjit Singh was their henchman and because he appellant and some others had raised objection to the satta gambling activities they have all joined together and falsely implicated him in the case. While the appellant went away to his house Manjit Singh went to Judgment dated April 7, 1989 in Criminal Appeal No. On a companysideration of the matter we find there are several factors which cast serious doubts about the truth of the prosecution case, In the first place, though there was a quarrel between the appellant and Manjit Singh at about 9 or 10 p.m. on 8.5.75, it was only a drunken brawl and therefore it is doubtful if the appellant would have companye to attack Manjit Singh some hours later to settle scores with him. At once the appellant caught hold of the hair of Manjit Singh and pulled him down to the ground and thereafter beat him on his head 3 or 4 times with an iron rod brought by him. Manjit Singhs dead body was sent for autopsy and PW 1 Dr. Gurdip Kumar Uppal, who companyducted the autopsy found two incised injuries on the chest, another incised injury on the upper part of the left car pinna and three companytused injuries on the forehead and both sides of the head. If at all the appellant was aggrieved with the companyduct of Manjit Singh he would have attacked him s on after the quarrel hid taken place and would number have warded till 3 or 4 a.m. to companye and attack him. On the basis of PW 2s report a case was registered against the appellant and was duly investigated. The stab injuries on the chest and the injuries on the head which had caused fracture of the left parietal bone were certified by PW 1 to be injuries sufficient in the ordinary companyrse of nature cause death. Independent material for this inference is furnished by the evidence of the doctor PW 1 who companyducted the autopsy. The appellant has been awarded companyviction for the offences mentioned above in the following circumstances At about 9 or 10 p.m. on 8.5.75 the appellant and deceased Manjit Singh, who were both aged about 18 years had a quarrel while taking curd and while in a drunken mood near the shop of one Mohinder Pal in Kharasanwali Gali, Amritsar. The appellant warned PW 2 that if he told anyone of what he had seen he would also be dealt with in the same manner and then left the place. 86 of 1989, the new market and lay down on a bench. 3,000/ and to undergo three years R.I. in default of payment of fine. The appellant Surinder Singh who has preferred this appeal by special leave has been companyvicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. The appellant was number immediately traceable but later in the day he was apprehended near the bus stand and on being questioned he gave a statement leading to the recovery of a bloodstained knife from a place of companycealment in his house. He has also been companyvicted under Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act and sentenced to undergo R.I. for 6 months on each companynt, the sentences to run companycurrently with the sentence of imprisonment for life. Some hours later i.e. The appellant was duly charged and tried for the offence of murder. The Sessions Judge accepted the prosecution case and rejected the plea of the accused and companyvicted him under the respective charges framed against him and the High Court companyfirmed the companyvictions and sentences. Besides there were also abrasions. Natarajan, J.
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1989_161.txt
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