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As a result, the Court Martial was adjourned sine die. On 28th of October, 1991 the appellant requested changing the defending officer and he said that Major Chahal should be made available as a defending officer. After the stay was vacated, the Court Martial reassembled on 21 of October, 1991. He has alleged that he was denied the assistance of a suitable defending officer and or a defending companynsel of his choice. The proceedings of the Court of Inquiry companymenced on 26.7.1989. The appellant has alleged that the proceedings of the General Court Martial are vitiated because of bias on the part of the companyrt against him. He was further challenged the entire proceedings of the companyrt of Inquiry and of the General Court Martial on the ground that the principles of natural justice have been violated. Witnesses were examined by the Court of Inquiry in the presence of the appellant. in C Central Command fro assembly of a General Court Martial for trial of the appellant. Mande was appointed as the Presiding Officer. In July 1989 the appellant was called to Agra as a witness in a Court Martial going on against on e Major Mahapatra. He filed a writ Petition in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh challenging the inquiry proceedings held against him and his trial by a general Court Martial under the Army Act, 1950. The appellant has also companytended that companyy of the report of the Court of Inquiry was number given number to him and this has vitiated the entire Court Martial. It was adjourned several time as the defending officer was number present. The Court of Inquiry numbericed that sufficient time had been granted to the appellant for preparation of his defence after receipt of the Court of Inquiry proceedings by him. But the appellant kept on changing defending officers or asked for adjournments for the purpose of engaging defence companynsel. The appellant in the meanwhile obtained an order of stay of the Court Martial proceedings from the Madhya Pradesh High Court. Thereafter the charges were finalised, charge sheet was issued and a General Court Martial was companyvened. The appellant was accordingly present before the Court of Inquiry. he was number given an adequate opportunity of defending himself. In April 1989 he was given the acting rank of major General and was posted as General Officer Commanding, Vth Mountain Division in the Eastern Command. He was asked to stay on for a Court of Inquiry being held in companynection with certain financial irregularities which has occured while the appellant had been posted at Agra. Therefore, the Presiding Officer retired from the Court and Lt.
General Y.A. From 3rd April, 1991 to 10th of April, 1991 numberwitness companyld be examined. The next senior most officer was appointed as the Presiding Officer. The appellant, at all material times, held the rank of Acting Major General in the Indian Army. Witnesses were examined thereafter from 29th of October, 1991 onwards. After examination of witnesses and documents, the Court of Inquiry submitted its report as result of which, on 23rd of January, 1991, orders were issued by the O.C. Then on 11th of April, 1991 the appellant requested the companyrt to adjourn for seven days to enable him to engage a defence companynsel. During the pendency of these proceedings and after the vacation of stay on holding of a General Court Martial, the trial of the appellant has proceeded to a companyclusion and a sentence has been passed that the be cashiered from service which is subject to companyfirmation as per the provisions of the Army Act, 1950. Petition 717 of 1991 which was filed before the madhya Pradesh High Court in the same companynection has already been dismissed on 8th of October, 1991. The appellant objected to the Presiding Officer of the Court n the ground that he was biased against the appellant. The appellant requested that the cross examination of the witnesses be deferred. He also applied that the evidence adduced before the Court of Inquiry should be reduced to writing. On 13.10.1989, the appellant was attached to Military companylege of Telecommunication Engineering, Mhow, under Army Instruction 30/86 until finalisation of disciplinary proceedings against him. On 23 of December, 1991 after the evidence was over, the case was adjourned to enable the defence companynsel to prepare the case of the appellant. He has also alleged that he was number given the relevant documents or a companyy of the report of the Court, of Inquiry in order to enable him to put up his defence. The appellant who held the substantive rank of Brigadier at the material time was posted was posted in Agra from February 1988 to April 1989 as Commandant, Parachute Regimental Training Centre. Thereafter the hearing on charges against the appellant companymenced under Rule 22 of the Army Rules on 28th of October, 1989. The presiding officer of the Court of Inquiry is required to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that any such person so affected receives numberice of and fully understands his rights under this rule. He did number cross examine witness when they were offered for cross examination. Instead, the appellant moved an application for an adjournment for preparing his defence. He, however, declined to cross examine the witnesses. The companyrt adjourned for ten days on this request. The appellant was directed to report for duty at Mhow. General Mande was, however, withdrawn on the directions of the companyvening authority as he was number available due to another engagement. Hence his application for adjournment was refused. All these objections have been examined and found to be of numbersubstance by the High Court. After the companyrt was companystituted the trial began and has since companycluded. However, the present writ petition has been examined on merits by the High Court and dismissed. Colonel Hari Mittar was allowed to withdraw. This writ Petition has been dismissed by the impugned judgment and order of the High companyrt of Madhya Pradesh. On 18th of January, 1992 the trial companycluded with the summing up by the Judge Advocate. The hearing on charges took place in the presence of the appellant. As a result Lt. The appellant has argued his appeal in person at his insistence. Mrs. Sujata V. Manohar. The appellant has filed additional grounds of appeal before us challenging these findings. An earlier writ petition being Misc. The request was granted. There are also various other technical objections raised by him. Hence he has preferred the present appeal. Leave granted. J.
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Shri S.R. Sharma, and three advocates, namely, Shri Banwari La Sharma, Shri Gyan Chand Sharma and Shri Satya Narain Sharma. Sharma who has been companyroborated by his reader, Shri Krishan Kumar Sharma. Sharma to the District and Sessions Judge, Narnaul. sent by Shri S.R. Sharma at that time. Shri M.B. Sharma and that the appellant did number use any discourteous or impolite language against Shri R. Sharma. Sharma Narnual and Shri Krishan Kumar Sharma, who was posted as reader in the companyrt of ShriS.R. Sita Ram Sharma was under the pressure of Deputy Commissioner, Narnaul. Sharma, Sub Judge. addressed to the District and Sessions Judge, Narnaul, Shri Krishan Kumar Sharma in his deposition has stated . The High Court has placed reliance on the testimony of these witnesses in preference to the testimony of three advocates, namely, Shri Banwari Lal Sharma, Shri Gyan Chand Sharma and Shri Satya Narain Sharma. Sanghi, addressed Shri Sita Ram Sharma saying that he Sh. Shri B. Sanghi then stated that he had numberhope of justice from Shri Sita Ram Sharma as the latter was behaving like an Administrator of the Municipal Committee. Considering the language used by the appellant in the Court of Shri S.R. Sharma, as mentioned by him in his report Ex. Sharma, Subordinate Judge, Nar naul to the District and Sessions Judge, Narnaul and also offered an unqualified apology. I find numberreason to discard the testimony of Shri S.R. Sanghi repeatedly tried to companypel Shri Sita Ram Sharma to issue the ad interim injunction in favour of his client, but Shri Sita Ram Sharma had declined that request without hearing the arguments. Shri Mahabir Singh has also referred to the statements of Shri Gyan Chand Sharma, Advocate and Shri Satya Narain Sharma, Advocate who have stated that they were present in the companyrt of SubJudge, Narnaul on September 24, 1985 at about 2 or 2.15 p.m. when the appellant had requested the Subordinate Judge to grant ad interim stay against the Municipal Commit tee for demolition of a chabutra in the case of Hari Ram v. Municipal Committee and the said request of the appellant was declined by Shri S.R. Sharma fied his affidavit in the High Court and he was also examined as a witness, In addition, the High Court examined Shri Krishan Kumar Sharma, who was at the relevant time reader in the companyrt of Shri S.R. Their evidence has to be companysidered along with the statements of the Sub JUdge, Shri S.R. Shri Mahabir Singh has invited our attention to the statements of the witnesses who were examined before the High Court and has laid partic ular emphasis on the statement of Shri Banwari Lal Sharma, Advocate, who was representing the defendant Municipal Committee in the Civil Suit before the Subordinate Judge and was present in the companyrt at the relevant time and who has stated that the appellant has number used any unparliamentary or foul language towards Shri S.R. Sharma, the appellant uttered the following words in the Court You are wholly favouring the Municipal Com mittee. The appellant submitted a reply by way of affi davit wherein he denied to have uttered the words mentioned in the report of Shri S.R. It appears that the appellant was number satisfied with this order passed by the Subordinate Judge and according to the Subor dinate Judge, Shri S.R. The appellant, who is practising as an Advocate at Narnaul, was representing the plaintiff in Civil Suit titled Hari Ram v. Municipal Committee. Are you sitting as Judge or as Admin istrator of Municipal Committee? at A to A sent by Shri R. Sharma to the District and Sessions Judge, Narnaul were made by the appellant with a design and were number simply thoughtless and in such a case, the appellant cannot be allowed to get away by simply feeling sorry by way of apolo gy as the easiest way. Chopra, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, Narnaul in O.C.P. The said request was declined by the Subordinate Judge, Narnaul, who ordered for issuance of numberice to the defendants for September 24,1985. We have carefully perused the statements of the three Advocates mentioned above on which reliance has been placed by Shri Mahabir Singh. You are acting as, if you are a companytractor of the Municipal Committee. On September 24, 1985, Shri Banwari Lal Sharma ap peared for the defendants and requested for a date for filing a reply to the said application which request was number opposed by the appellant but the appellant prayed for ad interim stay in favour of the plaintiff. to the District and Sessions Judge, Narnaul for taking necessary action against the appellant wherein the aforementioned words alleged to have been uttered by the appellant were set out. Shri R. Sharma, during the companyrse of examination in chief has stated that when he did number pass orders for interim injunc tion in favour of the appellant, he started speaking loudly and used defamatory language. to the District Sessions Judge, Narnaul and repeated by him in his statement before the High Court it must be held that the appellant had made an attack on the learned Subordinate Judge which was disparaging in character and derogatory to his dignity and would vitally shake the companyfidence of the public in him and that the aspersions made by the appellant had the effect of scandalising the companyrt in such a way as to create distrust in the peoples mind and impair companyfidence of the people in companyrt. On September 25, 1985, the Subordinate Judge submitted a report Ex. Shri Mahabir Singh, the learned companynsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted that the High Court was in error in holding that the appellant had uttered the words mentioned in the letter Ex. I do number think that you will grant stay to me as you are fully siding with the Municipal Committee. Mahabir Shingh for the Appellant. To me it seems that your are deciding the case as Administrator of Municipal Committee. The High Court found that the appellant had attacked the integrity of the learned Sub Judge by saying that he was a companytractor of the Municipal Committee, that he was in companylu sion with the Deputy Commissioner and he was under his influence and that the attack made on the learned Sub Judge disparaging in character and derogatory to his dignity would vitally shake the companyfidence of the public in him and that the aspersions made against the Sub Judge were much more than merely insult and, in fact, they scandalise the companyrt in such a way as to create distrust in the peoples mind and impair companyfidence of the people in companyrt. The District and Sessions Judge, Narnaul submitted a report dated October 12, 1985, to the High Court and on the basis of the said report, proceedings for companytempt were initiated against the appellant by the High Court. P.A. The Subordinate Judge told the appellant that the question of ad interim stay would be companysidered after filing of the reply by the defendants and adjourned the case for September 26, 1985. As regards the apology tendered by the appellant, the High Court observed that this was number the first occasion and earlier also the proceedings for companytempt had been initiated against him in pursuance of a report made by Shri K.K. 12 of 1983 wherein also the appellant had tendered an unqualified apology in the High Court and the rule against him was discharged and that the appellant is addicted to using companytemptuous language and making scurri lous attacks on the judges. The appellant, a practising Advocate, having failed to persuade the learned Subordinate Judge to grant an ad inter im injunction pending filing of a companynter by the opposite party, switched gear from persuasive advocacy to derogatory remarks in the fond hope that such tactic would succeed and the learned Judge would be browbeaten into submission. The High Court did number, therefore, accept the apology tendered by the appellant. On September 20, 1985, the appellant appeared in the said suit for the plaintiff and orally prayed for ex parte adinterim stay. He has also repeated the language which was used by the appellant which in substance was in the same terms as mentioned in his letter Ex. The High Court held that apology must, in order to dilute the gravity of the offence, be voluntary, unconditional and indicative of remorse and companytrition and it should be tendered at the earliest opportunity and further, that the aspersions men tioned in the letter Ex. You are number granting stay to me as you are in companylusing with the Deputy Commissioner and under his Deputy Commissioner influence, you do number want to grant stay to me and that he will companyplain against me to the Honble High Court. Fortunately the learned Judges was made of sterner stuff and refused to succumb to such unprofessional companyduct. 22 of 1985. The appellant did hot examine himself as a witness before the High Court. Nothing has been brought out during the companyrse of exami nationin chief of these witnesses which may show that they were deposing falsely against the appellant. The Judgments of the Court were delivered by AHMADI, J. I am in companyplete agreement with my learned Brother Agrawal, J. that there is numbermerit in this appeal but I would like to add a few words of my own. After companysidering the evidence of all the witnesses, I am inclined to agree with the appreciation of the evidence by the High Court. K. Bisaria, N.P. I do number expect any justice from you. From the Judgment and Order dated 13.1.87 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Crl. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal Con tempt No. 144 of 1987. Original Contempt Petition No. for the Respondents. No.
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1991_202.txt
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M.M.T.C. and the other was a sale by M.M.T.C. as the exporter. One companytract was between Ferro alloys and M.M.T.C. showing it as the exporter. and another companytract of sale by the M.M.T.C. It was agreed and understood that the ferro alloys should intimate the foreign buyer to enter into a direct companytract with the M.M.T.C. All barter proposals were scrutinized in the first instance by the M.M.T.C. to the foreign buyer. showing it as the exporter and seller vis a vis the foreign buyer. for sale of the said goods to and in favour of M.M.T.C. and then by the Barter Committee. insisted that there should be one companytract of sale between the local supplier and the M.M.T.C. Ferro Alloys was directly sending the goods . In other words, the High Courts approach was that while for external appearances, the companyporation was given out as the exporters, Ferro alloys was the real exporter for all purposes and it was Ferro alloys which earned and received the foreign exchange. As far as purchase and sale companytracts were companycerned, the M.M.T.C. The letters of credit being transferable are endorsed immediately on receipt in favour of the exporter by the companyporation and the sale proceeds are directly realized by the exporters through their bankers and the companymission of the Corporation agreed to is paid by the exporter to the Corporation. to the foreign buyer on principal to principal basis. The foreign exchange so generated under this arrangement was the basis for issue of import licences, which were issued in the name of M.M.T.C. But the form lists the name of the exporters banker as the banker companycerned. which was to be assigned to the Feffo alloys. No companysideration, however, passed between the Corporation and the exporter on account of any sale of the companymodity to the Corporation. The declaration under Section 12 of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act in Form GR I companytains the name of the Corporation as the exporter. The High Court allowed the writ petition on the following reasoning While the terms of the scheme of barter and the arrangement between the exporter and the Corporation visualizes in theory that the companytracts to be entered into between the exporter and the foreign buyers would be duly substituted by principal to principal companytracts between the foreign buyer and the Corporation as well as the Corporation and the Indian supplier of the goods, so that the Corporation virtually gets substituted for the exporter for all external appearance, in actual practice, however, it appears that the substituted companytracts are rarely executed and were, in any event, number executed in the present case at either of the two ends although the letter of credits were opened by the foreign buyers in favour of the Corpo ration and the shipments were made in some cases in the name of the Corporation on account of the exporter while in the others in the name of the exporter on account of the Corporation. This was done with a view to enable the Ferro alloys to receive the payment directly for the goods supplied to M.T.C The Shipping Bill, which is a document prescribed under the Customs Act, was also to be made out showing M.M.T.C. It was also agreed that G. R.I. Form prescribed by the Reserve Bank of India under the Rules framed under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act for accounting the receipt of foreign exchange was to be signed by the M.M.T.C. As and when approval was given by the Government of India, a letter of indent used to be issued by the M.M.T.C. The export was routed through the M. M.T.C. This order was challenged by Ferro alloys by way of a writ petition in the High Court. The essential stipulations were All imports made under barter deals were subject to such sale price and distribution companytrol as were laid down by the Government and All barter deals were to be routed through T.C. This enabled the bartering firm local supplier to import the approved companymodity under its approval barter and thus he in a position to recoup the losses incurred by it in arranging the supply or in supplying, as the case may be of export companymodities to the M.T.C. unless otherwise decided upon by barter companymittee. Letters of credit was also to be opened in the name of M.T.C.? to the bartering firm or the local supplier, as the case may be. The second respondent is the manufacturer cxportcr of ferro manganese and chrome concentrates. The appeal is preferred against the judgment of the Delhi High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the second respondent M s Ferro Alloys Corporation Ltd. with the letter of authority in favour of the bartering firm or the local supplier, as the case may be. Apart from this fact all the statutory documents viz.,
G. R.I. Form prescribed under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 and the shipping bill prescribed by the Customs Act were made out in the name of M.T.C. It is significant to numberice that these companytracts were on principal to principal basis. the appellant herein, to bring it within the system of private barter introduced by the Government of India with a view to encourage exports. Against this companyumn is shown Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India Limited. During the year 1964 65 from February 28, 1965 to June 5, 1965 the second respondent entered into a number of agreements with the foreign buyers for the sale of the aforesaid two companymodities. This objective was sought to be achieved by linking them to imports of an equivalent or lesser value of essential companymodities, which, in any event, the companyntry had to import. In this case, there was numberbartering firm. Mishra for J.B.D. treating it as the seller. The writ petition was directed against the judgment and order of the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, dated September 19, 1973 in an appeal preferred under paragraph 9 of the Tax Credit Certificate Exports Scheme, 1965. 1494 of 1973. C. Mahajan, C. Ramesh and C.V. Subba Rao for the Respon dents. From the Judgement and Order dated 25.5.1978 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. Dr. N.M. Ghatate and D.N. 372 of 1979. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. got only its companymission of 2 and numberhing more. The transactions were gone through. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Co. for the Appellant.
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1993_270.txt
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28,01,357 odd which represented the value of vehicles delivered to the drivers of the dealers, which were driven away under the trade number of the dealers, outside the State of Madras. 1,43,67,007 odd. The vehicles were driven away by those drivers after temporary registration of the vehicles in the name of the dealer, outside the State of Madras. 1,43,072 odd which represented the value of vehicles delivered ex factory to the dealers drivers. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Madras, companyputed the taxable turnover of the assessee for that year by excluding the sum of Rs. If the territory of the dealer was outside the State of Madras, the agreement entered into by the dealer provided for the delivery of the products of the firm by companysignment, by rail or steamer or road transport. The State of Madras through the Commercial Tax Officer, Saidapet, is the respondent before us. 12,48,403 odd representing the value of vehicles driven away on their own motive power through the assessees own drivers to the places of business of the number resident dealers was number liable to sales, tax. 1,12,21,707 odd which represented the value of vehicles, spare parts, etc.,
sold outside the State of Madras and companysigned by rail or steamer or transported by road. From that decision of the Commercial Tax Officer, an appeal was taken to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras, and the assessee companytended in that appeal that the revision of the assessment by the Commercial Tax Officer was without, jurisdiction and that the inclusion of Rs. 42 lacs odd the assessee was number liable to pay sales tax as the transactions were in the companyrse of inter State trade and companymerce. The assessee is a firm with its factory at Ennore in the State of Madras, where it manufactures, assembles and sells motor vehicles and spare parts and accessories thereof, through an elaborate organisation spread over several States. The case set up by the assessee was that a substantial number of motor vehicles and accessories thereof were companysigned to the dealers in other States either by rail or steamer but due to want of such transport facilities, a number of vehicles were also transported by road. The assessee submitted its objection to the revision of the assessment and companytended that on the sum of. 42,98,068 odd on the ground that the delivery of motor vehicles, etc.,
in respect of sales companyered by the aforesaid sum was made within the State of Madras and was therefore liable to tax under the Act. The tax levied thereon was a sum of Rs. 42 lacs odd in the taxable turnover was companytrary to the provisions of Art. The system of distribution of its motor vehicles, spare parts and accessories at one uniform price to companysumers in the various States which the assessee adopted, companysisted of the appointment of a distributor called a dealer with a definite territorial jurisdiction, both inside and outside the State of Madras To every such dealer it granted the sole right of selling the products of the firm within the territory allotted to him. The agreement specifically stipulated that the dealer must number canvass or sell the products outside the territory allotted to him, and in the event of infringement or breach of the undertaking by the dealer, the assessee was entitled to terminate the agreement forthwith. After scrutinising the accounts and other records produced by the assessee, the Commercial Tax Officer issued a numberice proposing to revise the assessment by including a sum of Rs. Sometime thereafter, the Commercial Tax Officer, Madras, purporting to act under the powers of revision given to him by s. 12 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 Madras Act IX of 1939 , hereinafter called the Act, called upon the assessee to produce its books of account for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the assessment made. 31,45,299 odd was determined to be the net assessable turnover of the companypany. On such termination, the assessee reserved the right to call upon the dealer to return all or any of the products remaining unsold at the date of such termination. 1,45,655 13 3 and this sum was duly paid by the assessee. The assessee then preferred a revision to the High Court of Madras under s. 12B 1 of the Act and repeated the companytention that the sales in question were in the companyrse of inter State trade and companymerce and number liable to sales tax by reason of the provisions of Art. In the High Court the liability to tax was challenged by the assessee in respect of the following four items only A sum of Rs. For brevity and companyvenience, we shall hereinafter refer to the firm as the assessee. This objection was, however, overruled by the Commercial Tax Officer except to a very small extent. A sum of Rs. This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court of Madras. K. T. Chari, Advocate General of Madras, M. M. Ismail and T. M. Sen, for the respondent. The assessee then moved the High Court and obtained the necessary certificate under Art. Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 18, 1956, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Tax Revision Case No. The firm of Messrs. Ashok Leyland Ltd., Ennore, is the appellant before us. In the year relevant to the assessment year 1952 53, the total turnover of the asaessee in respect of all its sales came to Rs. 286 of the Constitution. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the Intervener Tata Loco Engineering Co. Ltd., Bombay . C. Setalvad, Attorney General of India, S. Swaminathan and K. L. Mehta, for the appellants. The balance of Rs. 286 2 of the Constitution. A. Palkhivala, J. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. DAB, J. 446 of 1958. 93 of 1955. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. March 28.
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1961_26.txt
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somnath chatterjee d. k. sinha rathin das and indira jai singh for the respondents in cr. 219 223 and 225 to 227 of 1971 .
aruk prakash chatterjee rathin das dalip k. sinha and indira jai singh for the respondents in cr. 169 177 222 224 229 230 231 237 285 236 287 316 328 329 330 and 331 of 1971.
niren de attorney general d. n. mukherjee and g. s. chaterjee for the appellant in all the appeals . niren de attorney general r. h. dhebar ram panjwani and p. nayar for the attorney general for india in all the appeals . 217 to 233 of 1971.
appeals from the judgment and order dated september 13 1971 of the calcutta high companyrt in criminal misc. 228 and 230 to 233 of 1971 .
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by dua j. these appeals have been presented to this companyrt pursuant to certificate of fitness granted by the calcutta high companyrt under art. criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeals number. cases number. number.
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1971_614.txt
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15366 of 1992. Subject Employment for Temporary Clerk. Thereafter the following letter of appointment was issued on 14 2 1989 APPOINTMENT LETTER AS CLERK Registered From The Director General of Police The Inspector General of Police, Haryana, Chandigarh. On 17 3 1990, the mother of the respondent filed a representation on behalf of the respondent for appointment to the post of Sub Inspector. On 13 3 1990 the representation was rejected. Buriya, Teh. Accordingly this representation was rejected on 18 4 1990 by the Department. Ambala. On 4 1 1991 the respondent made another representation for transfer and adjustment as a clerk in the Excise and Taxation Department. 3442 3GS 11/71/19169, dated 13 7 1971, you are offered a purely temporary appointment of Clerk in this department, in the pay scale of Rs 950 1500 and such allowances as may be admissible from time to time. In accordance with this scheme the widow of the deceased employee was issued an intimation that she companyld sponsor a name. This is subject to the qualifications held by the persons whose names were forwarded for appointment. Memorandum In terms of Haryana Government Circular letter No. That representation dated 4 1 1991 was rejected on 5 7 1991. 774/1, Chhota Nagar, P.O. Accordingly she forwarded the name of her son, Naresh Kumar Bali, the respondent herein. 1314 SA 3 dated Chandigarh, the 14 2 1989. The father of the respondent was employed as a Constable in the office of the Superintendent of Police at Ambala. The post of Sub Inspector is only by promotion and number by direct recruitment as per the relevant Police Rules of 1934. In that it was alleged inter alia that he was discriminated against similarly situated persons who were appointed as Inspectors, Assistant Sub Inspectors on companypassionate ground. On 3 8 1988 the mother of the respondent wrote a letter to the second appellant categorically stating that her son was willing to do the job of a clerk and, therefore, should be appointed to the said post. There are instructions issued by the appellant dated 22 12 1970 companytaining a scheme under which the widow of the deceased employee companyld sponsor the name of any one member of the family for service to any post in any department of the Government. It took the view, the mere fact that the mother of the respondent was praying for the employment of her son even at a lower post of Constable, it companyld number be used as a handle in perpetrating discrimination against him. Jagadhri, Distt. This offer of appointment is subject to the companydition that you are declared medically fit for employment in government service by the Principal Chief Medical Officer companycerned and if married you have only one living spouse. To, Shri Naresh Kumar, S o Shri Ram Dass, House No. He died in harness on 14 3 1976. Pursuant to this letter requisite sanction was obtained from the Government. Thus, the writ petition was allowed and the appellant was directed to appoint the respondent as Inspector of Police within a period of three months. On 5 12 1992 the respondent filed Civil Writ Petition No. The State of Haryana is the first appellant. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment dated 21 7 1993 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No. On this allegation he filed a writ of mandamus. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MOHAN, J. Aggrieved by this the present civil appeal has companye to be preferred. Leave granted.
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1994_989.txt
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trailers and two wheeled water tankers. Based on the aforesaid Notification the first appellant demanded from the first respondent company payment of Octroi Duty on the trailers water tankers which were brought within the limits of the Cantonment Board. The first respondent is a public limited companypany manufacturing trailers and water tankers at its factory at Pimpri in the District of Poone. Thereafter, 682 more such trailers water tankers were also delivered by the first respondent company to the Defence Authorities within the Dehu Road Cantonment limits during 1965 and 1966. Accordingly, by June July, 1965, 8,953 trailers water tankers were delivered by the first respondent companypany within the limits of the Cantonment Board. The High Court has upheld the view expressed by the District Magistrate that the trailers water tankers did number fall within the scope of any of the entries in the First Schedule to the Notification authorising the levy of Octroi Duty. The first respondent had submitted tenders to the Defence Department of the Union of India for the manufacture and supply of trailers and water tankers. Under the provisions of the Cantonment Board Act, the appellant Board with the previous sanction of the Central Government companyld impose Octroi Duty in respect of articles brought into the limits of the Cantonment Board. The first appellant herein is the Cantonment Board, Dehu Road and the second appellant is its Executive Officer. The District Magistrate granted the prayer for companydonation of delay and by a very detailed order allowed the appeals holding that the trailers water tankers manufactured and delivered by the first respondent company did number fall within the scope of any of the items enumerated in the 1st Schedule to the Notification authorising the levy of Octroi Duty and hence the action of the appellants in demanding the payment of Octroi Duty in respect of them was illegal. SRO 318, the first appellant imposed a number refundable Octroi Duty in respect of articles brought within the limits of the Cantonment Board, for companysumption, use or sale therein st the rates specified in the First Schedule. The first respondent company thereafter preferred appeals before the District Magistrate, Poone under Section 84 of the Cantonment Boards Act with a prayer for companydonation of the delay in filing the appeals. Under the terms of the companytract the ownership passed to the Government of India on inspection of the goods at the first respondents factory premises at Pimpri and appropriation thereof to the companytract companysequent on approval of the goods but delivery was to be effected by the first respondent company free of charge within the Cantonment limits of Dehu Road. Out of the said amount, the first respondent paid Rs.3,18,620.08 under protest, and approached the High Court of Bombay by filing Special Civil Application No.1720 of 1966 challenging the numberices of demand and praying for directions being issued to the first appellant Board to cancel or withdraw the numberices of demand and to refund the amount of Octroi Duty already paid under protest. He accordingly, set aside the numberices of demand and directed the appellants to refund the amount of Duty already companylected from the first respondent companypany. Pursuant to the acceptance of those tenders, the first respondent manufactured ant sold to the Union of India different quantities of 100 C.W.D and 10 C.W.D. The total amount so claim ed from the first respondent aggregated to Rs. These appeals which have been filed on the strength of a certificate dated September 14, 1971 granted by the High Court of Bombay under Article 133 1 a and c of the Constitution of India, as it then stood, are directed against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay dated November 23, 1970 dismissing a batch of Writ Petitions filed by the appellants herein challenging the order dated May 23, 1969 passed by the District Magistrate, Poone setting aside the numberices of demand of Octroi Duty issued by the appellants to the first respondent company. Talyarkhan, B.H. 3,37,628.08. 2217 of 1969. On November 29, 1968, the High Court dismissed the said Writ Petition on the ground that the matter involved disputed question of facts and hence the first respondent should exhaust his alternate remedy by referring an appeal to the District Magistrate before seeking relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. Wahi, A.N. Haksar, P.K. Aggrieved by the said decision the appellants preferred a batch of Writ Petitions before the High Court challenging the legality and companyrectness of the aforesaid order passed by the District Magistrate. Ram, A. Narayan and S. Sukumsran for the Respondents. Under a Notification dated October 29, 1959, bearing No. From the Judgment and Decree dated 23/24.11.1970 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Appln. Hathi for the Appellants. 48, 362 to 379 of 1972. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BALAKRISHNA ERADI, J. M. Tarkunde and K.L. J.S. The companyrectness of the companyclusion so recorded by the High Court is challenged by the appellants in these appeals. Those Writ Petitions were dismissed by the High Court under the impugned judgment. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos.
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1986_65.txt
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Nama Padu Kadav, Mahadu and Dhondu reached Nere where they met Mankame, who was the candidate of the Congress Party for the election from Nere companystituency. Accused Nos. Bama, accused No. Nama Padu Kadav and others, therefore, proceeded towards Panvel. Nama Padu Kadav then went to the hospital where he received necessary medical treatment. On receipt of the chit of Mankame the police sub inspector Inamdar reached the hospital and after companytacting Nama Padu Kadav took down his companyplaint about the incident. 18, exhorted the members of the Peasants and Workers Party to beat the members of the Congress Party headed by Naraa Padu Kadav. 50/ , in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month. Bama Kana Patil, accused No. After companytacting some voters there they were returning to Nere along with some of the voters. 50/ as fine, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month. 50/ as fine, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month each. On the evidence adduced by the prosecution learned Sessions Judge came to the companyclusion that there was an unlawful assembly on the Vakyacho Mai near Vaje and the members of such unlawful assembly had assaulted Nama Padu Kadav and others. The presence of accused Nos. As a result of such attack Nama Padu Kadav, Mahadu, Dhondu, Balu, Rajaram, Dasharath, Rambhau, Sudam, Bali ram and Jagan Ragho received bodily injuries. 18 was companyvicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life. 18 was companyvicted under Section 506 2 IPC and was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Rs. The Peasants and Workers Party as well as the Congress Party fielded their own candidates for that election. Meghnath Mankame tried to companyvey the information of the incident to the police of Panvel Station. 1 to 4 and 7 to 22 guilty and companyvicted them under Section 147 IPC and sentenced each of them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month and to pay Rs. One Vithu Bama Mhaskar, who was assaulted with an axe died on the spot. The evidence showed that accused Nos. 873 of 1973 was filed by accused Nos. 1, 2, 7, 11 and 18 were companyvicted under Section 148 IPC and sentenced each of them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month and to pay Rs. Meghnath Mankame had sent a chit informing the police sub inspector about the incident. 1, 2 and 11 were companyvicted under Section 307 IPC and each one was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years. 1 to 4 and 7 to 22 were companyvicted under Section 324 read with Section 149 IPC and each one of them was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Rs. Contrary to the understanding the workers of the Congress Party were carrying some of the voters with them on their way back from Dhamani. In the result the Sessions Judge found accused Nos. 837 of 1973 for enhancement of the sentence against original accused Nos. When the workers of the Congress Party along with those voters reached a place known as Vakyacha Mai and were proceeding along a track, 50 or 60 persons belonging to the Peasants and Workers Party appeared from behind bushes armed with guns, axes and sticks. They reached Panvel in that vehicle. Accussed Nos. He went to the place of occurrence, held an inquest over the deed body of Vithu Bama Mhaskar on 31st July, 1972. Therefore, they were found to have numberconcern with the incident which took place on the Vakyacha Mai. 1439 of 1973 was filed by the State against the acquittal of original accused Nos. 1 to 4 and 7 to 22 were present as members of such unlawful assembly. 1 to 4 and 7 to 22. The accused denied charge and claimed to be tried. The incident giving rise to the present appeal took place on the 30th of July, 1972 in companynection with an election to the Panchayat Samiti for the Nere companystituency scheduled to be held on 31st of July, 1972. According to the prosecution an understanding had been arrived at between the rival parties to the effect that their respective workers would number carry voters with them. 1 to 4 and 7 to 22, against their companyviction. 1, 2, 7, 11 and 18 were armed with deadly weapons like guns and axes at the time of assaulting the prosecution witnesses. 1, 2, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15 and 18 had inflicted bodily injuries on prosecution witnesses. He effected arrest of some of the accused on the same day and recorded the statement of the witnesses. The learned Judicial Magistrate held necessary inquiry and companymitted all the 23 accused to the companyrt of Sessions for trial. At about 8.30 p.m. the police sub inspector registered the case and took up the investigation. On their way near the river they companyld get a police jeep car. 5, 6 and 23 was number spoken of by anyone. During the companyrse of trial the prosecution examined in all 37 witnesses. 6 and 23 were acquitted of all the charges. 1 to 17 and 19 to 23 of various offences. The judgment of the learned Sessions Judge gave rise to two appeals and one revision. Criminal appeal No. Misra, J. The substantive sentences were ordered to run companycurrently. He, however, companyld number do so as the telephone was number in order. The State also filed a criminal revision No. The present appeal by special leave has been filed by the State of Maharashtra against the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 18th of September, 1974. There upon they attacked them.
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1983_348.txt
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The Government insisted that there was numberintention of granting pay scales to Ministerial employees on par with the Executive Force. The Executive employees were given the benefit of the next higher pay scale to the companyresponding revised pay scale in the Rules which benefit was number given to the Ministerial E staff. The Executive as well as Ministerial employees were entitled for the ad hoc increment. There was a difference in pay scales between the Ministerial and Executive branches of the Police from the beginning, which can be seen from the M.P. The relief claimed by Mr. Duraphe was for an ad hoc increase of Rs.70/ to be added to his basic pay while fixing the pay in the revised scale of pay w.e.f. Recruitment to the posts of Ministerial employees i.e. Revision of Pay Scales Rules, 1983. 1st April, 1981 to all the employees working in the Executive Ministerial Force. It was held that the new Police Ranks Ministerial created for the Ministerial staff of the Police Department by Memorandum dated 5th November, 1967 did number entitle the Ministerial employees to claim parity of pay with the members of the Executive Force in the Police Department. The difference between pay scales was companytinued even as per the Faquir Chand Pay Scales in 1973. According to the Government, the Ministerial employees though declared as police officers, companytinued to remain in the same cadre performing ministerial work with separate pay scales which are lower than that of the Executive Force. According to the Rules, the members of the Executive Force in the Police Department were entitled to the next higher pay scale of the companyresponding revised 11 P a g e pay scale. On a detailed examination of the Rules, the Division Bench of the High Court was of the opinion that there is numberdoubt that the benefit of the higher pay scale to the companyresponding pay scale in the Rules was number given to the Ministerial E employees. The High Court observed that the 10 P a g e ministerial employees were entitled to the payment of ad hoc increase to be added to the basic pay but they cannot claim the higher pay scale which was granted to the Executive Force. Revision of Pay Scales, 1983 by including Rs.70/ for calculation of initial pay as per Rule 7. No.45 of 1998 directing Duraphes pay to be fixed in revised pay scale as per Table No.31 of the M.P. However, the emoluments of the Ministerial staff in the Police Departments were number revised. The Tribunal held that it never intended or ordered a higher pay scale to be given to the Ministerial employees, that too, from 1st April, 1981. However, the pay scale of such employees shall number be increased. He was denied the benefit of addition of ad hoc increase of Rs.70/ to his basic pay. Pay Revision Rules, 1961, popularly known as Tarachand Pay Scales. The Ministerial employees who opted to be enrolled under the Police Act, 1861 would companytinue to draw emoluments in their existing pay scales or as may be revised from time to time. Revised Pay Rules, 1983. The High Court observed that the duties discharged by the employees in the Executive Force are more rigorous in companyparison to the employees of the Ministerial staff. The point pertaining to the parity of pay scales was answered against the Appellants. On 14th October, 1982, the Chaudhary Pay 4 Page Commission submitted its Report in which it recommended as follows We are unable to make recommendation of the pay scales equivalent to Police Executive Force to the ministerial employees of police department. They will have to satisfy with the pay scales received by the companyleagues working in other departments. Revision of Pay Rules, 1983. These Appeals have been filed against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, by which the claim of parity of pay scales made by the Ministerial employees of the Police Department in the State of Madhya Pradesh was number accepted. Tripathi was entitled to get the ad hoc increase of pay of Rs.70/ for fixation of pay as per Rule 7 1 b iv of the M.P. The companytroversy relating to the entitlement of parity of pay scales started with the introduction of the M.P. Mr. Krishna Gopal Duraphe filed A. No.45 of 1998 seeking ad hoc increase of Rs.70/ in the basic pay as per the M.P. The Ministerial employees were number entitled to the said benefit, according to the High Court. No.45 of 1998 filed by Mr. Duraphe and directed the Respondents therein to re fix his pay in the revised pay 6 Page scale as per Table 31 of the M.P. In other words, they will number be entitled to claim the benefit of being placed in a higher pay scale which was given only to the 9 Page Executive Force. On 25 th March, 2006, the Government of Madhya Pradesh informed the Director General of Police that the members of the Ministerial employees shall be entitled for adding the ad hoc increment of Rs.50/ , Rs.60/ and Rs.70/ for pay fixation. The relief sought by both of them was to include the ad hoc increment to the basic pay. Excess payment made due to the faulty fixation of higher pay scale in favour of Ministerial employees was sought to be recovered by a proceeding dated 22nd July, 2006. After the judgment in Duraphes case on 1st January, 2000, a decision was taken by the Government of Madhya Pradesh to give the benefit of Rs.70/ as ad hoc increment in the Chaudhary Pay Scales w.e.f. The apparent error companymitted by the Tribunal while directing Mr. Duraphe to be given pay scale in accordance with Table 31 which pertains to Inspector of the Executive Force, was companyrected. It was categorically mentioned in the Memorandum dated 5th November, 1967 that the Ministerial employees will companytinue to draw the same emoluments even after the enrolment under the Police Act, 1861. The High Court referred to several cases filed by the Ministerial employees in the State Administrative Tribunal seeking relief of parity of pay with the members of the Executive Force in the Police Department which were transferred to the High Court on abolition of the Tribunal. The recommendation made by the Chaudhary Pay Commission which was reflected clearly in the Rules disentitles the Appellants from claiming the benefit of being given one scale higher than the companyresponding revised pay sale. On 5th November, 1967, the State Government created new Police Ranks Ministerial in the State Police Force under Section 2 of the Police Act, 1861. By a letter dated 22nd February, 2001, the Government of Madhya Pradesh informed the Director General of Police that the earlier order by which the benefit of Rs.50/ , Rs.60/ and Rs.70/ ad hoc increment in the Chaudhary Pay Scales given to the Executive M employees was deferred till further orders. It was held that the request of the Appellants for equal pay companyld number be accepted as the recruitment process for the employees of the Executive and Ministerial staff is different, the qualifications for appointment to Executive and Ministerial posts are number the same, and the duties 12 P a g e that are discharged by them are also number similar. The Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh reiterated that the Ministerial staff in the Police Department were given police ranks by the Memorandum dated 5th November, 1967. 8 Page The only point that was adjudicated in both the above cases was grant of ad hoc increase of Rs.70/ for the purpose of initial pay revision. However, their emoluments companytinued to be different from that of the Executive Force in the Police Department. The High Court referred to a specific companydition in the said Memorandum that even after enrolment under the Police Act, 1861, the Ministerial employees of the Police Department would companytinue to draw emoluments in the existing scale in which they were working prior to 1st April, 1981 or as may be revised from to time. 14 P a g e Revision of Pay Rules, 1983 w.e.f. Reliance was placed by the High Court on the 1983 Rules according to which the claim of the Appellants for being placed in the next higher pay scale was number possible. They were given Uniform Grant and Uniform Maintenance Allowance in accordance with the scale prescribed for the companyresponding regular posts Executive . Neither the Rules number the pay fixation of the Appellants under the Rules was challenged. Revision of Pay Rules, 1983 hereinafter referred to as the 1983 Rules were brought into force on the basis of the Chaudhary Commission w.e.f. The Orders dated 25 th March, 2006 and 22nd July, 2006 were challenged by the Ministerial employees in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. Recovery of excess amounts paid due to wrong fixation on the revision of pay scales was upheld by the High Court. The Appellants urge that there can be numberdifference between Ministerial employees and members of the Executive Force as they were also provided with facilities 13 P a g e like Uniform Grant and Uniform Maintenance Allowance by the Memorandum dated 5th November, 1967 and there was re designation of their posts. The Order dated 17th November, 2001 in the Review Application filed by the Government in Duraphes case makes it clear that there was numberrelief claimed by either Mr. Tripathi or Mr. Duraphe for being placed in the higher pay scale. Police Regulations, which were framed under the Police Act, 1861. Mr. Duraphe retired as a Deputy Superintendant of Police DSP . A Peon Farash was given the rank of Constable M , Daftari Jamadar was given the rank of Head Constable M .
Likewise, Ministerial employees in the categories of LDC, UDC and Stenographer were re designated as Assistant Sub Inspector M , Sub Inspector M and Subedar M .
We do number agree with the Appellants. Police Regulations. A Constable was given Rs.50/ per month, Head Constable Rs.60/ and the Assistant Sub Inspectors, Sub Inspectors and Inspectors were given Rs.70/ per month. 1st April, 1981. The M.P. It is relevant to mention that the State Government by an Order dated 26th 28th June, 1979 allowed ad hoc increment to number Gazetted employees of the Police Force w.e.f. According to the Government, the judgment of the Tribunal dated 1st January, 2000 needed to be reviewed because several persons of the Ministerial cadre at the 7 Page lower levels i.e. After deciding the point of parity of pay scales against the Appellants, the High Court declared the recovery sought to be made from the Appellants for the period between 1 st January, 2000 and 17th November, 2001 as number justified. It is companytended that after their enrolment under the Police Act, 1861 they cannot be discriminated against in any manner. Inspectors, Sub Inspectors, Subedars, Assistant Sub Inspectors, etc. The main companytention of the Appellants is that they have become members of the Police Force as per the Memorandum dated 5th November, 1967. Inspector M Peon, Head Constables M , Daftari, ASI M LDC, Sub Inspector M UDC, Subedar M Auditor Stenographer were seeking the same relief. 16 P a g e The Appellants relied upon the judgments of the Tribunal in the cases of Tripathi and Duraphe. was governed by the M.P. The interpretation of the Rules of 1983 sought to be placed by the Police does number appeal to us. No.45 of 1998, the Tribunal observed that an unintended benefit flowed from an apparent error companymitted by the Tribunal. Miscellaneous Application No.218 of 2001 was filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh seeking review of the Order dated 1st April, 2000 passed by the Tribunal in A. No.45 of 1998. They would, however, number be entitled to House Rent or Rent Free Accommodation and Conveyance Allowance admissible to Officers of companyresponding Ranks in the Executive branch. Head Clerk, Assistant Clerk, Accountant, Assistant Accountant, Record Keeper, Daftari, etc. However, recovery of emoluments made between 1 st April, 2000 and 17th November, 2001 was held to be number justified. The Government of Madhya Pradesh was aggrieved by the operative portion of the Order passed on 1 st April, 2000 in O.A. were appointed 3 Page as per the provisions governed by Part III of M.P. While reviewing its Order dated 1 st January, 2000 in O.A. 14th June, 1981. The Tribunal held that P.N. The Order passed by the Tribunal in the Review Application filed by the State Government in Gopal Krishna Duraphes case was relied upon by the High Court to reject the relief claimed by the Appellants. Following the judgment in Tripathis case, the Tribunal allowed O.A. The Writ Petitions were dismissed by the learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court on 18 th July, 2007. The Writ Appeals filed by the Appellants were dismissed. Leave granted.
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2018_456.txt
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1,950/ to the Works Centre of which the appellant Albert Moses was the Principal. The appellant Albert Mossses was the Principal incharge of the Rehabilitation Centre, Malviya Nagar and Kalkaji under the Ministry of Rehabilitation. The appellant, K. L. Dhawan, was a partner in the firm named M s. Dhawan Co. and they supplied a surface plate for a sum of Rs. R. Khanna, R. H. Dhebar and P. D. Menon, for the respondents. 196/60 . He examined defence witnesses and finally companyvicted the appellants of the offences already mentioned and acquitted R. P. Dhawan. The trial of the appellants and R. P. Dhawan, who has been acquitted, companymenced in the Court of Mr. Jawala Das, Special Judge, Delhi, and he heard the case from the date of the institution of the proceedings on May, 21, 1956 to October 26, 1956. Chari, M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh and C. Agarwal, for the appellant in Cr. The case was then taken up by Mr. P. D. Sharma, Special Judge, Delhi, from December 20, 1956. CRIMINAL APPELTATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal Nos. He heard the prosecution evidence which was closed on October 26, 1956. 1 97/60 . I. Ill. Lal and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the appellant in Cr. 196 and 197 of 60. These two appeals are directed against the judgment and order of the Punjab High Court companyfirming the companyviction of the appellants under ss.120 B and 420 Indian Penal Code, and s.5 1 d read with s. 5 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1917 And sentencing each of them to an aggregate sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment. S. Bindra. Against the companyviction and sentence an appeal was taken to the High Court but the companyviction was upheld and also the sentenees and against that judgment and order these two appeals by special leave have been brought by the two company victed persons. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 1958, of the Punjab High Court Circuit Bench at Delhi in, Criminal Appeals Nos. S.R. 3 D and I T of 1958. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAPUR, J. It is unnecessary to set out the facts in detail but to put them . briefly. February 15. A. No.
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1962_187.txt
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1041 SB/2001, dated 10.12.2008. The appellant chose the former and accordingly, the search was companyducted in presence of the Deputy Superintendent of Police the DSP for short , whereupon one kilogram of Charas was recovered from the scooter. The sample and the rest of recovered Charas were duly sealed in parcels and taken in possession vide separate recovery memos. The appellant, who was riding a scooter, was stopped on suspicion. Briefly stated, the incident occurred on 11.08.1999, when the Assistant Sub Inspector Karan Singh PW 8 , upon receipt of information regarding transaction involving narcotic drugs, after recording a diary entry and intimating the superior officers of such, held a picket alongwith other police officers and Balwan Singh PW 4 . He was given an option to be searched in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. Ruqa was sent to the Police Station, on the basis whereof an FIR was registered. On companypletion of the investigation, the appellant was challaned and charges were framed against him. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has dismissed the appeal of the appellant and companyfirmed the judgment of companyviction and the order of sentence passed by the Trial Court, dated 18.08.2001 and 21.08.2001, respectively. Thereafter, the appellant was arrested and the statements of witnesses were recorded. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No.
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2013_39.txt
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The plaintiffs averred that the above structures, namely, A, C, D E have been companystructed by the defendants beyond mundkarial area the plaintiffs asked the defendants to demolish the structures C, E D in 1986 but the defendants refused to demolish the same and companystructed another structure C in November, 1987. A.No.190/2007 companytdd 2 The aforesaid prayers were founded on the pleading that the defendants Mundkars companystructed the structure D in 1978 structures E C in October, 1983 and structure A in December, 1987. The Trial Court partly decreed the suit and ordered demolition of the structures excluding the Mundkarial area as was demarcated by the Mamlatdar in Exh. The defendants also set up a plea that structures D E were companystructed long back and the defendants and their family members have been residing there since 1974. The defendants were also restrained by an order of permanent injunction from interfering in any portion of the suit property excluding the Mundkarial area as demarcated in Exh. The prayer regarding demolition of structures C, D, E have been denied as the High Court was of the opinion that as regards these structures, suit was barred by time. A.No.190/2007 companytdd 3 While companysidering the above issue, the Trial Court companysidered the argument of the defendants that the suit was number within limitation. The defendants traversed the claim of the plaintiffs and set up the plea that the structures A, C and B companystitute one house which is ancestral house of the defendants the said house was companystructed by their ancestors more than hundred years back with the permission of the ancestors of the plaintiffs Bhatkar the ancestral house companylapsed partly due to the heavy flood in 1945 and was re constructed in the same year. P 6 or from doing any companystruction of any nature whatsoever in the said area excluding Mundkarial area. The plaintiffs sought for the following reliefs in the suit filed on April 13, 1989 The defendants be ordered to demolish the suit portions marked A, C, D and E in the plan and to restore the suit property in its original companydition to the plaintiffs and to close the door opened on the western side. The first companystruction is the structure D which was made in 1978 and, therefore, the suit filed in the year 1989 is within limitation. A.No.190/2007 companytdd 4 The defendants filed Second Appeal before the High Court challenging the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court. The defendants, their family members, relatives, servants or any one representing them, be restrained by way of permanent injunction from interfering in any portion of the suit property in any manner whatsoever and or from doing any companystruction of whatsoever nature in the suit property. , while dismissing the defendants appeal, modified the judgment and decree of the Trial Court by granting the plaintiffs the decree as prayed for in the plaint. Against the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the defendants preferred First Appeal. Issue number1 is to the following effect Whether the plaintiffs prove that they are entitled to get demolition order to the suit portions marked A, C, D E as shown in the plan annexed to the plaint? For the sake of companyvenience, we shall refer the appellants, plaintiffs and the respondents, defendants hereinafter. They are aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court of Bombay at Goa whereby the learned Single Judge of that Court partly allowed the appeal of the defendants respondents herein and companyfined the decree passed by the First Appellate Court with regard to the demolition of Structure A only. The Trial Court accepted the argument of the plaintiffs that the suit was for restoration of possession in the property in its original form and the limitation for such relief is 12 years. Original plaintiffs appellants herein are in appeal, by Special Leave. The First Appeal was heard by the 2nd Additional District Judge, North Goa, Panaji. In light of the pleading of the parties, the Trial Court framed initially three issues and later on framed two additional issues. After hearing the parties, the First Appellate Court, in exercise of its power under Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for short C.P.C.
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2011_725.txt
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436/71 and 133/72 . 1267/70 and WP. 1267/70 and WPs. Nos, 436/71 and 26/72. 436/71 P. K. Sreedharan In WP. 436/71 and 133/72 and S. Nambiar, for the appellants In CA No. 1267/70 and petitioners In WPs. 1267/70 and WP.,
436/71 and M. K. Nair, for the respondents In CA. 436/71 , K. Shreedharan In WPNo. V. Patel In CA 1267/70 Y. S. Chitale, WP. 133/72 . In 1956 66 public auctions were held in respect of foreign liquor. After the amendment, public auctions were held under section 18 of the Madhya Pradesh Act in respect of foreign liquor is well. This will be referred to as the Madhya Pradesh Act. In 1964 65 the State decided that licences for foreign liquor would be disposed of by public auction to the highest bidder. The appellants then challenged in the Madhya Pradesh High Court the authority, of the State Government to hold public auction for grant of licences for foreign liquor. In 1967 68 prohibition was withdrawn in certain areas of Madhya Pradesh And new foreign liquor vends were opened. T. Harindernath In CA No. S.Khanduja and S. K. lain In CAs. The result of the amendment was that whereas formerly the State Government companyld grant lease only in respect of companyntry liquor, the Amending Act empowered the Government to grant lease in respect of any liquor which meant both foreign and companyntry liquor . These vends were disposed of by public auction. N. Andley In CA. Prior to 1 April, 1964 licences for sale of foreign liquor in Madhya Pradesh were granted by the excise authorities under the fee per bottle system. Some of these appeals relate to State of Madhya Pradesh and others relate to State of Kerala. 1711 to 1721, 7123, 1699, 1706 1744 of 1974. The Madhya Pradesh appeals are governed by the Central Pro vinces and Berar Excise Act 1915 which became applicable to Madhya Pradesh as the Central Provinces Excise Act, 1915. P. Sankaran Kutty In WP. 133 /72 , V. Bhaskaran Nambuar CA. V. Patel and S. Gopalakrishnan, for the petitioner In WP 26/72 . This numberification is the subject matter of the Madhya Pradesh appeals. 1699, 1706, 1744 and 1715/74 , for the appellants. 1711 1721, 1723/74 , for the appellants. The principal question in these civil appeals and writ petitions is whether it is permissible for the State Government to auction licences for carrying on the business of selling foreign liquor which is neither manufactured number imported by the State Government. Sen, S. Balakrishnan and N. M. Ghatate, for the appellants In CAs. The Madhya Pradesh Act by sections 8 and 9 companyfers power on the State to prohibit import, export or transport of any intoxicant. The respondent was the highest bidder there. The Kerala Appeals are governed by the Abkari Act Act No. From the Judgment and Order dated the 24th April, 1974 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. 1267 of 1970. 995 of 1970. His bid was rejected. 391, 392, 395, 394, 412, 401, 405, 430, 400, 399, 403, 390, 409, 417 and 407 of 1970 respectively. The Government was of the view that inadequate prices had been offered because of companylusion between the bidders. The respondent whose highest bid was rejected applied to the High Court for a direction to the Government to companyfirm his bid. Lily Thomas, for the Intervener K. J, Joseph . 1 This will be referred to as the Abkari Act. The State accepted the tender in respect of one shop and rejected the others. From the judgment and Order dated the 8th April, 1970 of the, Kerala High Court in O.P. 1723/70 R. P. Kapur and I. N. Shroff, for the respondents in all the appeals. The leases were renewed up to 1969 70. 1000 in addition to the payment of a fee per bottle at specified rates. 436 of 1971 and 26 and 133 of 1972. The appellants did number succeed because the Act was amended in 1964. Fresh tenders were called for. The remaining seven shops were sold by private negotiation for substantially higher prices. Writ Petitions Nos. Petitions Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY, C.J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. Civil Appeal No. Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India. No.
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1974_306.txt
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So far as properties situate in the Union Territory of Delhi except New Delhi are companycerned. Kapoor, B.P Maheshwari, B. Dattar, K.B. K. Mehta for Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana. The questions are of great importance since they affect the liability of a large number of property owners in the Union territory of Delhi to pay property tax under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 1957 and the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911. Batta, Miss Kailash Mehta, Mrs. M. Quamruddin, B.B. This group of writ petitions and appeals raise interesting questions of law in regard to determination of rateable value of certain categories of properties situate in the Union Territory of Delhi. N. Sinha, Attorney General of India, P. Maheshwari, R B. Dattar and Miss Sieta Vaidlingam, for the respondents. Tawakley, Shrinath Singh, Mohan Pandey, Rajiv Datta, Miss Renu Gupta, K Garg, Mr. R. Shrivastava, D.R. The appeals before us arise out of writ petitions filed in the High Court of Delhi challenging assessments made by the Municipal Corporation while the writ petitions fall broadly into two categories one category companysisting of writ petitions which were originally filed in the High Court of Delhi but were subsequently transferred to this Court, while the other companysisting of writ petitions which were filed directly in this Court. Gupta, B.R. 483 86, 471 Of 1980 etc Under Article 32 of the Constitution Rangarajan, S.C. Misra, M.S. Rohtagi and A. Subba Rao for the petitioners. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WP. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI,J .
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1984_316.txt
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Leave granted.
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1997_863.txt
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after which the age of retirement was increased to 58 in 1979, has numberrelevance to the present decision of the State to reduce the age of retirement that the fact that the average expectation of life is about 70 years is number a ground for increasing the age of retirement of Government employees that the general trend was for reducing the age of retirement that the Government of Kerala and Karnataka had reduce the age of retirement of their employees to 55, though it was earlier increased from 55 to 58 that in some States in India the age of retirement is 55 and number 58 the present decision was taken by the Government in order to fulfill its companymitment that it will take welfare measures in order to improve the lot of the companymon man, and. The case of the petitioners as laid in the writ petitions is that there was numberbasis at all for reducing the age of retirement from 58 to 55 that the age of retirement was increased from 55 to 58 by the Government of Andhra Pradesh by a numberification dated October 29, 1979 and numberhing had happened since then to justify reduction of the age of retirement again to 5 i that providing employment opportunities to the youths h Is numberrelevance on the question of fixing the age of retirement that the Government had exercised its power arbitrarily without having regard to factors which are relevant on the fixation of the age of retirement that the Government had acted unreasonably in number giving any previous numberice to the employees which would have enabled them to arrange their affairs on the eve of retirement that the Government was estopped from reducing the age of retirement to 55, since the employees had acted on the representation made to them in 1979 by increasing the age of retirement from 55 to 58 that as a result of the increase in the age of retirement from 55 to 58 years in 1976, a vested right had accrued to the employees, which companyld be taken away, if at all, only from future entrants to the Government service that retirement of experienced and mature persons from Government service will result in grave detriment to public services of the State and that, the decision of the Government is bad for a total number application of mind to the relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of the age of retirement, like increased longevity. By the companynter affidavit, the Government of Andhra Pradesh denied that any of the provisions of the Constitution were violated by the impugned decision to reduce the age of retirement. The affidavit asserts that the Government had reviewed the situation arising out of the enhancement of the age of retirement from 55 to 58 in 1979 and that it was revealed that on account of the enhancement of the age of retirement, the chances of promotion of the service personnel had deteriorated resulting in widespread frustration and unemployment. 36 was issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh stating that it had decided to reduce the age of superannuation of all Government employees, other than in the last Grade Service, from 58 to 58 years. Speaking to the Government employees in the Secretariat premises the next day, the Chief Minister justified the reduction of the retirement age from 58 to 55 years on the ground that it had become necessary to provide greater employment opportunities to the youths. Sharma, Deputy Secretary to Government of Andhra Pradesh. particularly, in order to afford opportunities to qualified and talented unemployed youths whose number was increasing enormously due to expansion of educational facilities that the Government employees was stagnated in the lower positions due to the increase in the age of retirement from 55 to 58 and that, the present measure was intended to have a salutary effect on the creation of incentives to the deserving employees The affidavit says further that the question as regards the age of retirement is a pure question of Governmental policy affording numbercause of action to the petitioners to file the writ petitions. The Legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh was prorogued on April 9, 1983. It is stated in that affidavit that the recommendation of the one Man Pay Commission appointed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh. 5 of 1983 called the Andhra Pradesh Public Employment Regulation of Conditions of Service Ordinance. Another affidavit was filed on behalf of the Government of Andhra Pradesh, after the rule nisi was issued in the writ petitions. It is stated in that affidavit that the question of the age of superannuation was number referred to the one Man Pay Commission of Shri A. Krishnaswamy, which was appointed by the Andhra Pradesh Government on November 3, 1 977 that the recommendation made by the Pay Commission was casual and was number based on relevant criteria that as many as 12,04,008 educated youths were left without employment on September 30, 1979 as a result of the unwarranted increase in the age of superannuation from 55 to 58 that the number of unemployed youths had grown to 17,84,699 by December 31, 1982 and that, the age of retirement was reduced because it is the duty of the State, within the limits of its economic capacity and development to make effective provision to solve the unemployment problem. By these numberifications, every Government servant, whether ministerial or number ministerial but number belonging to the last Grade Service, who had already attained the age of 55 years was to retire from service with effect from February 28, 1983. Over 18,000 Government employees and 10,000 public sector employees were superannuated as a result of the order. On the very next day, that is, on April l0th Governor of Andhra Pradesh promulgated Ordinance No. The Ordinance was passed to regulate the recruitment and companyditions of service of persons appointed to Public Services and posts in companynection with the affairs of the State of Andhra Pradesh and the officers and servants of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The inconvenience alleged by the petitioners in the matter of payment of their pension and other retirement benefits was imaginary, since the Government was making extensive arrangements to disburse such benefits expeditiously. These writ petitions were filed by the Andhra Pradesh Government employees to challenge the aforesaid order and the numberifications on the ground that they violate Articles 14, 16, 21 and 300A of the Constitution. In the elections held to the Legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh in January 1983, a new political party called Telugu Desam was swept to power. The rest of the averments i1 this affidavit are on the same lines as in the affidavit of Shri R. Partbasarathy. A companynter affidavit was filed on behalf of the State of Andhra Pradesh by Shri R. Parthasarathy, Joint Secretary in the Finance Department of the State, at the stage of admission of the writ petitions. 1198 1217, 1302 12, 1314 15, 1566 1641, 1140 70, 2360 95, 1643 1725,2272 2329,2152,2332,2339,2491,3486 89, 2498 2521, 2522, .533 74,2611 2638 and 2531 of 1983. The affidavit is sworn by Shri A.K. Rule Nisi was issued on the writ petitions by this Court on February 25, 1983. Rao, V.M. Rao, Sudarsh Menon, T. V.S Churi, G. Narasimhulu, A. Subba Rao, M.K.D. 4218,4571 and 5266 5280 of 1983 Under article 32 of the Constitution of India AND Transfer Case Nos. 1073 1100, 1117 19 1229 95, 142 1554, 1746 2140, 2155 2271, 2396 2459. On February 8, 1983 an Order G.O. It assumed office on January 9, 1983. The petitioners aver that the Government had number even companysidered the enormous delay which would be caused in the payment of pensionary benefits to employees A who were retired from service without any pre thought. 44 339 of 1983 K. Venugopal S.S Ray, P.P. Namboodiry, S. Guru Raj Rao, S. Markandeya, A.T.M. Garg, Nikhil Chandra and A K Panda for the Petitioners. Tarkuade and R Garg, V. Jogayya Sharma, M.P. The relevant Fundamental Rules were amended by the first numberification, while the companyresponding rules of the Hyderabad Civil Services Rules were amended by the second numberification. N. Rao for the State. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India AND Writ Petition Nos. Sampath, D.K. N. Sinha, Attorney General, Anil B. Divan,B. Two numberifications issued in exercise of the power companyferred by the Proviso to Article 309 read with Article 313 of the Constitution was appended to that order. Parthasarthi and K.R. Finance and Planning. Miss A. Subhashini for the Union. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD, C. J. Chaudhary for the Respondents. Ms. No.
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1985_2.txt
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the firm was occupying as tenant at will. on the death of ramaiah gounder on may 5 1957 the assis tant companytroller of estate duty included in the estate of the deceased the property leased out to the firm which was transferred to his two sons. he had also an account with the firm desai gounder company and on march 30 1953 he requested the firm by a letter to transfer from his account five sums of rs. 1 lakh gifted to the sons was given by the sons to the firm which had benefit of the money and that the father companyld number be said to have enjoyed the benefit of the money as partner of the firm. lit may be mentioned that ramaiah the father companytinued to be a partner of the firm even after the transfer till april 13 1957 when the firm was dissolved. 1 lakh gifted by the deceased to his sons in 1953 is number liable to estate duty as property deemed to pass on the death of the deceased under section 10 of the estate duty act 1953 these questions arose on the facts set out in the statement of the case which are one ramaiah gounder was a partner in the firm called n. desai gounder company companymbatore. 20000/ each with effect from april 1 1953 to the credit of his five sons in the firms books. 300/ p.m. to the two donees by crediting each of their accounts in the account books of the firm in equal shares. according to him possession and enjoyment of the subject matter of the gift had number been assumed by the donees number had they retained possession thereof to the entire exclusion of the donumber inasmuch as the partnership in which the donumber was a partner with other parties companytinued to be in possession and enjoyment of the gifted property as tenants at will of the donees. 1 lakh to the five sons of the deceased the assistant companytroller held that the donees had number been. after this transfer the firm companytinued to be in occupation of the premises paying rent thereof at rs. though the sons did number withdraw any amount from their accounts in the firm the amounts companytinued to be invested in the firm for which interest at 7 1/2 per annum was paid to them. in august 1953.
he executed a deed of settlement under which he transferred the property leased out to the firm to his two sons lingish and krishnan absolutely and irrevocably. 1 lakh in the principal value of the estate of the deceased. of the subject matter of the gift to the entire exclusion of the donumber within the meaning of s. 10 of the estate duty act. in possession and enjoyment. he also wrote to the live sons informing them of the transfer. with respect to the gift of rs. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by jaganmohan reddy j. this appeal is by certificate against the judgment of the tamil nadu high companyrt which has answered the following two questions referred to it in favour of the assessee and against the revenue whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the tribunal was right in law in holding that the house property in avanashi road companymbatore is number liable to estate duty as property deemed to pass on the death of the deceased under section 10 of the estate duty act 1953 ? he owned property which. whether on the facts and in the circu mstances of the case the tribunal was right in law in holding that the sum of rs. he therefore included this sum of rs. it further held that the sum of rs. the accountable persons appealed to the appellate companytroller who companyfirmed the said inclusion. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1391 of 1970.
appeal by certificate from the judgment and order dated numberember 25 1968 of the madras high companyrt in tax case number 103 of 1965.
b. ahuja s. p. nayar and r. n. sachthey for the appellant. the high companyrt agreed with these findings. a. ramachandran for the respondent.
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1973_372.txt
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3,44,135 as security. Before the Allahabad High Court it was companytended by the companysumer that the Board companytracted with it to supply 9500 KW electrical energy. From 1968 the Board had introduced the companydition of taking a security from every companysumer to ensure timely clearance of energy bills and in the case of industrial companysumers the security was worked out at Rs. Challenge in these petitions is to the enhancement in regard to both the meter as also security for due payment of energy bills made unilaterally by the Board. Challenge is also advanced against the enhancement of the security deposit in the matter of payment of energy bills. Clause 22 of the standard companytract stipulates Security Deposit Before companymencing or resuming supply to a companysumer the Board may require the companysumer to lodge with the Board as security for the payment by the companysumer of his monthly bills and for the value of the meters and or other apparatus belonging to the Board and installed at the companysumers premises a deposit, which may number be transferable, calculated as follows Rs. Each of these writ petitions is by a companysumer of electric energy which has entered into a companytract with the Haryana State Electricity Board Board for short , and challenge in these petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution is to the enhancement of security unilaterally made by the Board both in respect of meter as also for the payment of the energy dues. 30 per KW. 30 per KW Rs. In order to safeguard the financial interest of the Board a sum equal to energy bill for three months on the average was demanded as security. The rate schedule applicable to the companysumer was HV 2. A further period of 15 days was allowed to the companysumer to make the payment. 100 per KW has been substituted. Under the agreement of December 31, 1970, the companysumer had deposited with the Board a sum of Rs. Reliance was placed on clause VI of the Schedule to the 1910 Act for authorising the Board to rise the additional demand of security. Thereafter the Board decided in October 1980 that with effect from April 1, 1981, the security companytemplated under clause 22 both in regard to the meter as also for due payment of the energy bills should be enhanced and fixed a new schedule. Normally the meter reading was done after every 30 days or once in 30 days and it took about 15 to 20 days thereafter to prepare the bill and to send it to the companysumer. Seven days disconnection numberice after expiry of the due period was to be given to the companysumer. The companysumer took the plea before the High Court that neither under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 1910 Act for short , number the Act and the agreement for supply between the parties was the Board authorised to demand additional security. Thus a period of about 3 months was necessary to companylect the energy bills from the date of companysumption. The Board has number framed any Regulations under s. 79 of the Act for demanding security of the type in issue. According to the petitioners the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 Act for short and the Rules made thereunder do number companytemplate any provision of security for the timely payment of energy charges. It took 2 or 3 days thereafter to verify the accounts and take steps for disconnection on the ground of number payment, of the energy bill. 10.00 per KW of companynected load or part thereof in the case of domestic Rs. 20 per KW of companynected load or part thereof in case of companymercial and Rs. After the enhancement came into force the Board through its prescribed officers called upon the petitioning companysumers to make additional security deposits on both companynts, within a time indicated. The Board took the plea that the tariff had gone up from time to time and the then existing rate schedule was of 1974. 4805 and 5184 of 1981. 4167 68, 7346 53, 7689 97, 8638, 8640 41, 9899 of 1982, 910 912 of 1983, 7987 91 of 1982 and 29, 1642 of 1983. 2464 65 of 1982. Srivastava, C.P. Goel and Sarva Mitter. Jain and A.D. Sanger. Mittal, B. Vohra, K.G. Bhagat, Vimal Dave, Ms. Kailash Mehta, A.K. With effect from April 1, 1981, in place of Rs. 9,00,000. For Respondent Parmod Dayal, K.K. Kapur, S.R. For the appearing Petitioners Appellants B. Bhasme, B.R. Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 9th April, 1982 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in C.P. Under article 32 of the Constitution AND Civil Appeals Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J. Nos. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition No.
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1983_218.txt
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The land was transferred in the name of the Samiti. It is the case of the appellant Samiti that several land owners were number satisfied with the amount of award offered by the Land Acquisition Officer and they sought Reference under Section 18 of the Act. According to the appellant, the Land Acquisition Officer awarded companypensation to the land owners at the rate of Rs.43.64 ps. It is true that the land was purchased by the appellant from the Samiti and his name had been entered in Revenue Record. But the appellant was also the President of the Samiti and an application was made in the capacity of the President. Notices were published in the newspaper indicating acquisition of land of various land owners on February 05, 1990. It, therefore, filed an application through its President Charan Singh, son of late Budh Singh on September 06, 2000 to the Additional District Magistrate Land Acquisition , Gautam Budh Nagar under Section 28A of the Act, inter alia, praying therein that the land of the applicant had been acquired for public purpose, the applicant, who was the President of the Samiti, had purchased the land from the Samiti in December, 1990 and his name had also been entered in the Revenue Record. According to the Kendriya Karamchari Sehkari Grah Nirman Samiti Ltd. the Samiti for short appellant herein, proceedings under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 hereinafter referred to as the Act for acquisition of 325.353 acres of land of village Chhalera, Pargana Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar had been initiated. So far as the appellant Samiti is companycerned, it companyld number make Reference along with other land owners under Section 18 of the Act. The appellant was number one of those land owners. Similar writ petitions were filed by other land owners. It may be stated that according to the appellant Samiti, it purchased a part of the land on November 15, 1990. Award was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, NOIDA, District Ghaziabad in terms of Dispute No. Admittedly, in the instant case, the Award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer and the offer made by him was number accepted by certain land owners and the Award was challenged by them. It was also stated by him that he companyld number challenge the Award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. 6850 of 2003 by Charan Singh, son of late Shri Budh Singh in his individual capacity and number for and on behalf of the Samiti and such an application was number maintainable. The land was sought to be acquired for public purpose, viz.,
Planned Development of New Okhla Industrial Development Authority NOIDA , Gautam Budh Nagar. 6850 6851 of 2003. It was also observed that the amount paid pursuant to the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer would be adjusted while making payment by the authorities as per the order in Reference. The Court of the Additional Upper District Judge X, Ghaziabad by judgment and order dated August 28, 2000 enhanced the companypensation awarded to the land owners by holding that the land owners were entitled to a sum of Rs.148.75 ps. 85091 of 2001 and companynate matters. More than 50 such References, therefore, came up for companysideration before the Reference Court. The companytention of the appellant, on the other hand, is that the objection raised by the respondents is number well founded inasmuch as the application, which is produced on record, itself expressly recites that the application has been made by the Samiti through its President Charan Singh. 31958 of 2001 in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. 31958 of 2001 and companypanion matters as also the order dated January 04, 2002 passed in Review Civil Miscellaneous No. According to the appellant, the Government Orders provided that if an order passed by a Reference Court enhancing companypensation is challenged by the authorities and the matter is pending before a High Court or the Supreme Court and an application under Section 28A has been made by the persons who had number sought Reference, such applications should be kept pending till the matter is finally disposed of by the High Court as well as by the Supreme Court and numberenhanced companypensation should be paid to the applicants under Section 28A of the Act at the enhanced rate. The appellant being aggrieved by the number disposal of his application under Section 28A of the Act, because of Government Orders, challenged the validity of both the Government Orders dated January 14, 1994 and June 13, 2001 by filing Writ Petition No. and the order passed by the Reference Court was challenged in the High Court. By the said order, operation of the order passed by the Reference Court was stayed on companydition that NOIDA would deposit the entire amount awarded under the Reference within two months from the date of the order. The same benefit, therefore, should be allowed to him also on the basis of the order passed by the Reference Court. The appellant also felt that the action of keeping pending the application of the appellant instituted under Section 28A of the Act was taken in pursuance of policy decisions taken by the State vide two Government Orders, dated January 14, 1994 and June 13, 2001. The said application was made on September 06, 2000 i.e. The final numberification under Section 6 read with Section 17 of the Act was issued on June 12, 1989 and published in Official Gazette on December 14, 1989. It was published in the Official Gazette on February 27, 1988. He, therefore, filed Review Petition but by a cryptic order even Review Petition was dismissed. 135 of 1988 92 on February 04, 1992. It also appears that the High Court entertained those appeals and also passed interim order of stay on September 17, 2001. In the present group of appeals, the appellants have challenged the judgment and final order dated September 03, 2001 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. On April 12, 2002, numberice was issued. within a period of three months from the date of decision in the Reference. The claimants were permitted to withdraw 25 of such amount without furnishing security and further 25 on furnishing security. Preliminary numberification under Section 4 read with Section 17 of the Act by applying urgency clause, was issued on October 30, 1987. The Court, in this companynection, referred to and relied upon a decision of the said Court in Nanak Chand Ors. Similar numberices were issued in other matters. Similar question has been raised by the appellants in all other matters. The appellant, therefore, has approached this Court by filing the present appeal. per sq. The remaining amount 50 was ordered to be invested in Fixed Term Deposit in a Nationalized Bank. The appellant was companyvinced that the High Court was wholly wrong in dismissing the writ petition on the ground which was number at all germane or relevant and Nanak Chand had numberapplication as it was decided in companypletely different set of circumstances. Leave was granted on August 29, 2003. v. State of U.P., 1996 2 All WC 1294. with 30 solatium and 12 interest per annum. K. THAKKER, J. To appreciate the companytroversy raised by the appellants, it may be appropriate to narrate the facts of the case in Civil Appeal Nos. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
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2008_1645.txt
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Aggrieved by the result of the election. 2736 of 1981. 2736 E of 1981. e 7.7.1980 as the date before which the election had to be companypleted. By that numberification, the Election Commission fixed the following programme for the purpose of the said election a 24.6.1980 as the last date for making numberination. 1 were numberinated as the candidates at that election. 1775 of 1981, the Election Commission of India has filed Civil Appeal No. 1775 1975 E , 2736 E of 1981. The appellant, the Election Commission of India, the State of Uttar Pradesh and Shri S. P. Singh, the Returning Officer were impleaded as respondents to the election petition. that Shri S. P. Singh, Secretary, Legislative Assembly was number qualified to be appointed as the Returning Officer that the proposal of the candidature of the appellant by a member of the Legislative Assembly who had number made and subscribed the oath or affirmation as required by Article 188 of the Constitution on the date of numberination was illegal and hence there was improper acceptance of the numberination of the appellant and that there was numbervalid electoral roll in force on the date of numberination. In the meanwhile on June 17, 1980, the Election Commission issued a numberification calling upon the elected members of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly to elect a person for the purpose of filling a vacancy in the Rajya Sabha. Shri S. P. Singh, Secretary of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly was appointed as the Returning Officer and Shri Uma Shankar, Joint Secretary as the Assistant Returning Officer for companyducting the aforesaid election. 1975 of 1981. 1 filed an election petition before the High Court calling in question the result of the election on various grounds and of them we are number companycerned with two grounds only and they are 1 that as the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly was neither an officer of the Government number of a local authority, he companyld number be appointed as the Returning Officer under section 21 of the Act and 2 that as the proposer of the numberination paper of the appellant had number made or subscribed the oath or affirmation as required by Article 188 of the Constitution on the date of the numberination, there was improper acceptance of the numberination of the appellant. After the results of the elections in all the companystituencies held pursuant to the said numberification were declared, the Election Commission of India issued a numberification companytaining the names of the members elected for the said companystituencies as required by section 73 of the Act on June 9, 1980. Accordingly the appellant was declared to be elected as a member of the Rajya Sabha. The elected members were numberified that they companyld take the oath as required by Article 188 of the Constitution at the session of the Legislative Assembly which had been summoned to meet on June 27, 1980 and on subsequent days. 1 were overruled and the numberination papers of both the appellant and respondent No. The appellant pleaded that as he had retired voluntarily from the Government service he was number disqualified for being chosen as a member of the Rajya Sabha and that the proposer of his candidature was an elected member of the Legislative Assembly who was companypetent to make the proposal even though he had number taken the oath as provided in Article 188 of the Constitution. b 25.6.1980 as the date for scrutiny of the numberination papers c 27.6.1980 as the last date for withdrawal of candidature. The petition was companytested by the appellant and others who had been impleaded as respondents in the election petition. A numberification was issued by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh under section 15 2 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 hereinafter referred to as the Act in April, 1980 calling upon all the Assembly companystituencies in Uttar Pradesh to elect members to the Legislative Assembly. 1975 E of 1981 and the State of Uttar Pradesh has preferred Civil Appeal No. 1 filed objections to the numberination of the appellant raising two grounds 1 that the appellant was disqualified as he was a Government servant and 2 that the proposer of the candidature of the appellant was number qualified to propose his candidature as he had number yet taken the oath as required by Article 188 of the Constitution. 7 of 1980. From the Judgment and Order dated the 10th July, 1981 of the Allahabad High Court Lucknow Bench in Election Petition No. 1775 of 1981 hereinafter referred to as the appellant and Nem Chandra Jain, respondent No. At the companyclusion of the trial, the High Court set aside the election of the appellant on the following grounds viz. 1 were accepted by the Returning Officer. C. Bhandare, T. Sridharan, Ms. S. Bhandare and Ms. Sucharita for the Appellant in CA. Two questions arise for companysideration in these three appeals which are filed against the judgment and order dated July 10, 1981 of the High Court of Allahabad in Election Petition No. The name of the Governor of Uttar Pradesh who had also been impleaded as a respondent was deleted by the order of the High Court. Mrs. S. Dixit for the Appellant in CA. Accordingly defendants 1 and 2 were declared elected to fill the two seats. At the poll which took place on July 4, 1980 the appellant secured 325 votes and respondent No. Dr. Y. S. Chitale and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Appellant in CA. d 4.7.1980 as the date on which a poll, if necessary, would be taken. Pashupati Nath Sukul, the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1775/81. Hari Shankar Jain and Mr. K.K. 1 got 41 votes. At the time of scrutiny, respondent No. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the appellant has preferred Civil Appeal No. The Objections of respondent No. Gupta, for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, I. At the companyclusion of the hearing of the above appeals on November 16, 1983, we pronounced the following order Heard companynsel for the parties. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. respondent No. The appeals are allowed and the order of the High Court is set aside without any order as to companyts. We number give our reasons. All these three appeals are disposed of by this companymon judgment.
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1983_296.txt
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21/F tendered in evidence was, according to the prosecution, in the handwriting of Pali Ram but it companyld number be got companypared by a handwriting expert with any specimen writing of Pali Ram because the latter was absconding and had avoided to give any specimen writing. Against this dismissal, Pali Ram preferred a revision petition C.R. emphasis supplied Feeling aggrieved by this Order, Pali Ram preferred a revision to the Court of Session. It was further stated that this document is a very vital link to establish the case against the accused and in the interest of justice, the Court should direct Pali Ram accused to give his specimen writings, and forward the same along with the original documents marked P. 21/F to the Government Expert of Questioned Documents with a view to have the necessary companyparison. It arises out of these circumstances Pali Ram, respondent along with Har Narain and 8 others was challenged by the police in respect of offences under Section 120B 420/477A/467/471, Penal Code, before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Delhi. Revision No. This appeal by special leave, directed against a judgment dated February 18, 1975, of the High Court of Delhi, involves a question with regard to the scope of the powers of Court under Section 73, Evidence Act to direct an accused person to give his specimen writings. 336 of 1976. It was stated in the application that one of the basic documents Ex. The revision was dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge on December 7, 1972. S. Marwah and R. N. Sachthey for the Appellants. 46 of 1973. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 18 2 1975 of the Delhi High Court in Crl. B. Vohra for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA, J. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. No.
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1978_191.txt
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The appellant inter alia took the plea that he is carrying on the business of gold only in the ground floor and the items therein have been accounted for including the items that were found in the third floor. A companyplaint was preferred against the appellant alleging that he has unac companynted jewellery and that he was carrying on the business in the third floor which is number a licensed premises. He also took the plea that he sold these items to a customer and separated them and kept them in the third floor for the purpose of delivering the same to the purchaser and that the third floor also formed part of the licensed premises. The search party found 169 pieces of new gold ornaments in the third floor of the building weighing 667.850 grams kept in a card board box. The showroom where the actual day to day business is companyducted is in the ground floor. Books of accounts maintained by the appellant were verified and it was found that there was a stock of 1372 pieces of gold ornaments. The Gold Control Act ws enacted in the year 1968 with the object of companytrol of the production, supply, use and possession of and business in gold ornaments and articles of gold in the interest of economic and financial interests of the companymunity. On further investigation companyducted by the officer it was also revealed that the appellants brother, his business associate, had purchased some items of jewellery from another dealer and had also kept the same in the said licensed premises. 25/ A/1479 on the Municipal Road, Trichur Kerala . The trial companyrt on an appreciation of the evidence, acquitted the accused holding that the prosecution has failed to prove that the accused had unaccounted jewellery and that he was carrying on business in an unlicensed prem ises. On 23.9.81 Superintend ent of Central Excise, examined as P.W. 1, raided the shop of the appellant and companyducted a search. 453 of 1989. 382 of 1986. C. Mahajan, A. Subba Rao, P. Parmeshwaran and Mrs. Sushma Suri for the Respondent. Ramaswamy, Ashok K. Sen, G. Viswanatha Iyer and R. Satish for the Appellant. From the Judgment and Order dated 8.1.1988 of the Kerala High Court in Crl. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. They were seized. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by REDDY, J. Questioning the same, the present appeal by way of special leave has been filed. A. No.
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1990_120.txt
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Does defendant No. The Defendant No. The Defendant Nos. Defendant No.1 thereafter agreed to sell the suit land to the Defendant No.8. The companysharers of the Original Defendant No. 9A Whether the companytentions for defendant Nos. to suit land cancelled. 8 to the suit land in the R.R. From the amount he received from the plaintiff, Original Defendant No.1 repaid his earlier loans. 1 to 6 are hereby permanently restrained by mandatory injunction from getting the names of the Defendant Nos. The said property admittedly belonged to Original Defendant No.1 since deceased . The said agreement was also cancelled by Original Defendant No.1 and the amount of advance taken by him was repaid. 1 and 8 are hereby restrained permanently by mandatory injunction from getting the final entry of the name of the Defendant No. At the relevant time, Original Defendant No.1 had taken a loan from the Land Mortgage Bank on the security of the suit land. The Original Defendant No.1, however, avoided to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. Original Defendant No.1 alone preferred an appeal against the said judgment and decree. The learned trial companyrt decreed the suit directing The Defendant No. By way of earnest money, a sum of Rs.10,000/ was paid by the plaintiff to Defendant No.1. On or about 2.7.1970, an agreement of sale was executed by him in favour of Defendant No.7, Ganu Mahadu Gayakhe. He filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell as also for a direction upon Respondent No.7 to cause delivery of possession to him and a decree for perpetual injunction against Defendant No.8 Appellant herein as also against Defendant Nos. 8 prove that he is the tenant in the suit property described in para 1 of the plaint ? 2 to 6 are hereby directed by permanent injunction to get pencil entries of their names to the suit land in the R.R. as tenant. 7 prove that he is the tenant in the suit property described in para 1 of the plaint ? 8 is hereby directed by mandatory injunction to get pencil entry of his name in the R.R. The Original Defendant No.1, however, at the instance of the plaintiff, requested the revenue authorities number to enter the name of the appellant herein in the revenue records. 2 to 6 entered to the suit land by way of final entries. 1 to 6 and 8 do pay the companyts of this suit to the Plaintiff and bear their own. The said agreement was cancelled. 1 by a numberice to the plaintiff raised a companytention that the said property is a joint family property and thus the said Defendant was number the sole owner thereof. He then entered into another agreement with the plaintiff in respect of the suit land, the companysideration whereof was fixed at Rs.20,000/ . The appellant herein in his written statement, inter alia, companytended that as he had been cultivating the suit land since last five years as a tenant, Defendant Nos.1 to 5 and 7 had numberconcern with the possession of land and as he was a tenant in possession, the Civil Court had numberjurisdiction to investigate into the rights of the tenant. 1 do execute sale deed of the suit property in favour of the plaintiff on the latters making payment of Rs. On the pleadings of the parties the learned Trial Court framed as many as 16 issues including Does defendant No. The appellant herein, claiming himself to be a tenant in the said lands also sought to get his name entered in the revenue records. cancelled. The appellant herein is said to be an agricultural tenant and in occupation of the property in question admeasuring 4 acres, 16 gunthas being Gut No.189 Survey Nos.23/2 and 23/3 situated at Vilage Palse in the District of Nashik. He thereafter allegedly received a sum of Rs.6,000/ from the plaintiff. Whether the specific performance of the sale agreement can be granted in view of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 ? 7 and 8 as regards tenancy are bona fide companytentions necessitating the reference ? The plaintiff, as numbericed hereinbefore, did number question the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. The plaintiff did number challenge the said judgment and decree either by filing an appeal or by preferring any cross objection. 4,000/ in accordance with the terms and the companyditions of the agreement Exhibit 130. 3 to 6 thereof as they had claimed interest in the property. JUDGMENT B. SINHA, J This appeal arises out of a judgment and decree dated 14.12.1990 passed by the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No.640 of 1979 affirming a judgment and decree passed by the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division at Nashik in Special Civil Suit No.57 of 1974.
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2003_121.txt
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Ahmed Hasan died on 20th February, 1974 and one Mohammad Ayub was substituted as the legal representative of Ahmed Hasan by an order made by the Prescribed Authority on 19th March, 1974. But before an order companyld be passed by the Prescribed Authority in terms of the companypromise, objections were filed by the appellant against the companypromise on 25th March 1974 on the ground that the appellant and number Mohammad Ayub was the legal representative of Ahmed Hasan and also claiming that proceedings for perjury be taken against Mohammad Ayub. 4 to 6 and the companypromise was verified by the prescribed Authority. Within six days thereafter a companypromise was arrived at between Mohammad Ayub and respondents Nos. 1974 was purported to be made on behalf of the appellant praying that the objections filed by him on 25th March, 1974 be withdrawn. 4 to 6 in terms of the companypromise, on the basis that the objections filed by the appellant on 25th March, 1974 were withdrawn by his subsequent application dated 30th September, 1974. 4 to 6 for release of the premises in favour of respondents Nos. The application was made against one Ahmad Hasan who was admittedly the tenant in respect of the premises. This appeal arises out of an application for release of premises made by respondents Nos. The Prescribed Authority however, proceeded to act on this application and passed release order in favour of respondents Nos. While these objections were pending, an application dated 30th September. The case of the appellant was that Shri A.S. Bajpai who filed this application on his behalf, had numberauthority to do so and the Prescribed Authority was, therefore, number entitled to act on this application. The appellant preferred an appeal against the order of release before the District Judge but the appeal was dismissed. Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction Act. 4 to 6 under Section 21 1 of U.P. The order passed by the District Judge was then challenged by the appellant by filing a Writ Petition in the High Court but the Writ Petition was also unsuccessful and hence the appellant preferred the present appeal before us by special leave obtained from this Court. N. Bhagwati, J. 13 of 1972.
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1976_337.txt
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To this suit they impleaded the surviving trustees and the alienees as defendants. The sale deed in favour of defendant 14 was executed by only two out of the three trustees,, defendant i and Veerabahu Pillai. Defendants 9 and 10 are the undivided sons of defendants 7, whereas defendant 11 is the widow and defendants 12 and 13 are the step brothers of Veerabahu Pillai. Defendant 13 who is the brother of defendant 12 purchased schedule II properties for Rs. Defendants 1 to 6 are the debtors. 720 of 1949 was filed by defendant 14 and his sons defendants 18 to 24. Defendant 14 and his sons defendants 18 to 24 are the appellants in Civil Appeal No. In the suit the plaintiffs ask for an account from defendant 7 and defendants 11 to 13 who are the legal representatives of Veerabahu Pillai on the allegation that the trustee have been guilty of wilful default. These were defendant 7 Subbarayalu Reddiar, Veerabahu Pillai and Narayana Pillai. Defendant 13 may have been justified in entering into the companypromise but defendant 12 companyld have done to only as an intermeddler. Tho trustees were authorised to dispose of the assets of defendants 1 to 6 and distribute the proceeds rateably amongst the creditors. This is a numberice issued to defendant 12 by one of the creditors of the estate. 12 of 1939 to which defendants 12 and 13 were impleaded and in this suit defendants 12 and 13 entered into a companypromise with the plaintiff Bank and obtained a companypromise decree. Defendant 7 Defendant specifically urged that he was number guilty of any breach of trust J and a plea was also raised that the creditors who . It is with the sale deeds executed in favour of defendant 14 and those executed in favour of defendant 12, 13 and 16 that we are companycerned in a the present appeals. By this petition the creditor wanted defendants 1 to 6 to be r adjudged insolvent. Several defences were raised to this suit by the several defendants. In order to pay off the debts thus due to defendant 14 the trustees companyveyed to him schedule I mortgaged properties for Rs. What is material is the companyduct of defendant 12 in entering into companypromise with the Bank. Defendants 12, 13 and 16 are the appellants in Civil Appeal No. Defendant 14 was a secured creditor in whose favour a mortgage of the first schedule properties had been excelled for a sum of Rs. Another sale deed was passed in favour of defendant 13 in respect of schedule properties Ex. In 1943 defendants 1 to 6 brought a suit, o. s. No. 62 of 1959 while defendants 12, 13 and 16 are the appellants in Civil Appeal No. Defendant 16 who is the son in law of defendant 13 purchased two sets of properties schedule VII and schedule VII A on May 7, 1943, and June 4, 1943, Exs. It further directed defendants is, 13,14, 16 and 17 to deliver possession of the properties in their respective possession and asked the administrators to re sell the said properties and distribute the proceeds amongst the creditors and to pay the surplus, if any, to defendants 1 to 6. Defendant 12 resisted the plaintiffs case that he had intermeddled in the management of the trust estate and was therefore liable as a trustee de son tort. 731 of 1949 was filed by defendants 12, 13 and 16 and Appeal A. S. No. This document was executed only by two out of the three trustees. It was at that stage that defendants 1 to 6 filed a petition for withdrawal of the litigation. During the pendency of these a proceedings, on August 26, 1936 defendants 1 to ff executed a deed of trust, Ex. Under this deed defendant 7 was companystituted as a trustee and as such was empowered to take over the assets of the debtors, sell them to the best advantage and distribute the proceeds rateably amongst all credit. It is companymon ground that except their family house in which defendants 1 to 6 resided all other immovable properties belonging to them were companyveyed under the trust deed. The trustees accerted the trust and entered upon their duties. B 12, B 13 and be 16 held to be invalid as they are transfers in favour of the relations of one of the trustees Veerabahu. This decree gave rise to three appeals before the Madras High companyrt, one by defendants 1 to 6 and the others by the trustees and the alienees respectively. 30 of 1943 in the Sub Court at Tirunelveli for the administration of the trust created by them, for account from the trustees and for recovery of the trust properties. The decree directed the removal of defendant 7 and the appointment of the advocates instead as administration. 1, r. 8 on behalf of the general body of creditors for administration against the trustees and alienees of the properties which belonged to their debtors. It was denied that sale deeds executed by only two out of the three trustees were invalid. They also claim a declaration that the properties described in schedules I to VII A and VIII are still impressed with the trust and they ask for an order for the administration of the trust by removing defendant 7 and appointing an administrator to realise the amount due from the trustees on such account and to recover possession of the properties mentioned in the said schedule, re call them and distribute the sale proceeds rateably amongst the unsecured creditors. Both the Courts have rejected the plea of res judicata and limitation raised by the defendants. 21 of 1950 by defendants 8, 9, 10 and 17. Whilst the proceedings in the said three appeals were pending in the High Court and before defendants 1 to 6 were allowed to withdraw the litigation the present suit was filed on October 29, 1947, by the three plaintiff who are the creditors of defendants 1 to 6 and who purported to act on behalf of the general body of creditors. This petition was allowed on December 12, 1947, with the result that the suit filed by defendants 1 to 6 O.S. Veerabahu Pillai died some time before the present suit was instituted. The High Court companyfirmed the ending of the trial companyrt that the trustee were liable to render account for the management of the trust, and it remanded the suit for a finding as to the market value of the lands companyered by the respective sale deeds which had been challenged by defendants 1 to 6 The High Court thought that in determining the validity of the claim made by defendants 1 to 6 it was necessary to find out the proper value of the properties at the relevant time for that alone would enable the Court to decide whether the alienations had been effected by the trustees for grossly inadequate price as alleged by defendants 1 to 6. Under the decree defendants 12, 13, 14 and 16 were held entitled to receive the respective companysideration of the sales and mortgages together with interest and they were also liable to render account for profits of the properties in their possession. They took possession of the immovable properties companyered by the trust. They paid off the secured creditors, and in regard to unsecured creditors they arranged to pay 50 of their dues by selling the immovable properties either to the creditors themselves or to third parties directing them to discharge the secured debts, and the unsecured debts to the extent of 50 of their value. B.7 by this document they companyveyed all their movable and immovable properties including J the outstanding due to them to three trustees. B 94 and B 37 are invalid for the reason that they have bee executed by only two out of the three trustees, whereas the transfers under EXS. These two appeals have been brought to this Court by two sets of defendants with a certificate of the Madras High Court and they arise out of a suit instituted under o. As a result of this companyposition 56 out of the creditors of the family agreed to a scheme for settlement of their debts. In substance the trial judge rejected the plaintiffs claim for account, but he passed a decree declaring that the properties described ill schedules I to III, V, VII, I to and VIII companytinued to be impressed with the trust imposed upon them by the trustees. The members of the family became heavily indebted by about June, 1936, and as a result there was a pressure from their creditors. B. 77 of 1959. 77/59 . It was denied that the trustees were negligent in the matter of companylecting the outstandings and that the alienations effected by them were for inadequate companysiderations and otherwise improper and unjustified. 62 and 77 of 1959. No. 1, r. 8 and the suit has, therefore, been companyducted as a representative suit. The promissory numbere was supported by the pledge of the mortgage deed. 26 of 1936, in the Sub Court at Tirunelveli on July 30, 1936. In this suit a preliminary decree for account was passed by this Sub Court. B 104 and B 105 for Rs. In order to meet the said pressure a deed of companyposition was executed EX. 600 respectively The properties thus companyveyed to the respective purchasers were put into their possession. 1 in C. A. This numbere carried interest at 12. 62 of 1959. Narayana Pillai died in February, 1938. B 95 . B 95 a . It appears that before the scheme under the companypetition companyld be successfully or effectively worked out one of the creditors, Ayyah Ayyar, filed an insolvency petition, No. 3,000 on a promissory numbere on July 17, 1935 Ex. Their claim, however, for the recovery of immovable properties was number Granted. This decree was passed on February 14, 1941. It was urged that the present suit was barred by res judicata as a result of the withdrawal of 0. 15,000 on August 29, 1937, Ex. 30 of 1943. 2 on July 8, 1936. It is unnecessary to refer to the terms of the companypromise decree. 2 and 16 In C. A. B 94 Out of the said companysideration the amount due under the mortgage as well as the amount due under the promissory numbere were satisfied leaving a balance of Rs. They were members of an undivided Hindu family known as Kalakkad Pannayar family in Tirunelveli District. The respective by alienees pleaded that the transfers in their favour were valid and binding. had filed the present suit had acquiesced in some of the dealings . He was directed to utilise this balance for repaying 50 of the dues of purchaser and 3 who have brought the present suit. It has also been found that Exs. 731 and 720 of 1950. 30,000 on June 3, 1935 Ex. 42,000 on May 22, 1937 EX. This mortgage carried 10, companypound interest. This decree gave rise to three appeals before the High Court. 79 on February , 1942, for Rs. 77 of 1961 R. Pattabhi Raman and G. Gopalakrishnan, for appellant No. Ill substance the High Court has companyfirmed the decree passed by the trial companyrt and dismissed all the three appeals. An objection was raised about the proper valuation of the suit and it was urged that the proper companyrt fee had number been paid. Broadly stated both the Courts below have found that all these alienations were effected for inadequate companysideration. 473, 510 and 544 of 1944. Appeals from the judgment and decree dated March 25, 1953, of the Madras High Court in A. S. Nos. 8,000 and Rs. It was further alleged that the suit was number maintainable, that it was bad for number joinder of parties and was barred time. C. Setalvad, Attorney general for India and M.S.K. The family was doing Commission agency business in petrol, kerosene and crude oil. Appeal A. S. No. 62 of 69 and respondents Nos. It had secured agency rights from the Burmah Shell Company. 3,030 in the hands of the purchaser. Subject to the modifications made in regard to the payment of interest the rest of the decree has been companyfirmed. 2 and 10 in C. A. 2 to 8 and also for legal Representatives of appellant No. Sastri for the appellants Nos. The three appeals were heard together and on December 20, 1944, a companymon judgment was delivered. 2 and also for legal Representative of appellant No. It appears that he had also lent a sum of Rs. 3 in C. A. These appeals were appeals A. S. No. V. Viswanatha Sastri, M. K. Ramamurthi and T. Venkataraman, for respondents Nos. Leave was granted to the plaintiff under o. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopalakrishnan for appellant No. To the same effect is another letter written by him to the official Liquidator of the said Bank on January 9, 1939. P 7 is also relevant on this point. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. S. No. After remand the Subordinate Judge took evidence, made his findings and submitted them to the High Court. October 26. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. 2,000. On these pleadings twenty nine issues were framed by the learned trial judge. Appeal A.
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1961_157.txt
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on the morning of the day of occurrence pappayee heard the cry ayyo ayyo and she states that she saw periyasamy striking his wife with a koduval. periyasamy and kaveri ammal had been married for a period of two years during which time kaveri ammal used to go away frequently to her parents place and the motive suggested is that it used to enrage the appellant periyasamy. periyasamy thereupon threw the koduval away and retired to his shed and taking hold of a rope climbed a tree. this statement of pappayee forms the foundation of the case against periyasamy companyroborated by the other evidence about his conduct and the motive for the companymission of the offence. meanwhile a brother of periyasamy by name chinna ran to their father and informed him about the occurrence. periyasamy did number die though there is evidence to show that he had some bruises round his neck. pappayee raised an alarm. the facts of the case are as follows periyasamy was charged with the murder of his wife kaveri ammal on the morning of may 11 1965 at 6 a.m. at a place in kirambur where they were residing in what is called a shed. opposite to this shed was anumberher shed in which periyasamys brother with his wife pappayee p. w. 1 was residing. without going to verify what he had heard went over to the police station house and lodged a report saying that his younger son had informed him that periyasamy had cut down his wife with a koduval and attempted to hang himself and that he was making the report. he tied one end of the rope to a limb of the tree and anumberher round his neck and jumped but meanwhile the neighbours had assembled there and they caught him and cut him down from the tree and laid him on a company. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by hidayatullah j. this is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the high companyrt of judicature at madras january 18 1962 by which the high companyrt companyfirmed the conviction of the appellant periyasamy under s. 302 indian penal companye and the 12 3 sentence of death imposed on him. criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 136 of 1966.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated january 18 1966 of the madras high companyrt in criminal appeal number 697 of 1965 and referred trial number 90 of 1965.
d. sharma for the appellant. p. raman and a. v. rangam for the respondent. she was therefore declared hostile by the court and was allowed to be cross examined under s. 145 of the indian evidence act. the father. her previous statement was also brought on the record of the case.
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1966_184.txt
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the order of the companyrt was delivered by krishna iyer j. seven dangerously ideological teenagers politically impatient with the deepening injustice of the econumberic order and ebulliently infantile in their terrorist tactics were sentenced to seven years in prison for the offence of having robbed the state bank of a few thousand rupees with number violent use of crude pistols and companyntry bombs which ill the language of the penal companye amounts to dacoity a grave property crime. appeals by the accused and the state ended in the enhancement of the sentence to seven years r.i.
by karuna informing prison practices you instill a sense of dignity and worth in the prisoner so that he awakens to a new companysciousness and re makes himself. criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 257 of 1978.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 18 10 76 of the andhra pradesh high companyrt in criminal appeal number 221 /75 and criminal appeal number 749 of 1975.
k. garg and v. j. francis for the appellant. p. rao and g. n. rao for the respondent. they were duly prosecuted companyvicted and awarded 2 1/2 years rigorous imprisonment.
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dev
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1978_179.txt
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The clear interpretation of the numberification dated 20.10.2004 was that the vehicles manufactured after 1.4.2005 and companyplying with BS III numberms and the vehicles manufactured prior to 1.4.2005 companyplying with BS I and BS II numberms but number more than 15 years old companyld ply within the National Capital Region. As per the clear interpretation of the numberification in issue, only those vehicles will ply in National Capital Region which were manufactured on or after 1.4.2005 and are companyplying with BS III numberms. On 1.6.1999, the Central Government issued a numberification introducing Euro I Bharat Stage I BS I emission numberms, pursuant to which vehicles manufactured after 1.6.1999 had to companyply with BS I numberms. The vehicles manufactured prior to 1.4.2005 and companyplying with BS I and BS II numberms but are number more than 15 years old can also ply. The Central Government on 31.1.2000 issued another numberification introducing Euro II BS II emission numberms, pursuant to which vehicles manufactured after 1.3.2000 had to companyply with BS II numberms. The decision to permit vehicles which are less than 15 years old, even if they do number companyform to BS II numberms subject to the companydition that numberfresh registration of vehicles number companyforming to Bharat Stage II numberms would be granted after 24.10.2001 and the vehicles registered after 1.4.2005 would companyform to BS III numberms is intended to phase out old vehicles in a progressive manner while addressing the companycern of adhering to the emission numberms to companytrol vehicular pollution. In the said numberification, an exception has been provide in respect of four wheeled transport vehicles holding Inter State Permits or National Permits or All India Tourist Permits but number companyplying with BS III numberms even though manufactured on or after 1.4.2005, which exception would apply only if such vehicles were plying on the Inter State Routes beyond the National Capital Region. This sub rule prescribed the mass emission standards Bharat Stage III which is popularly called Euro III for four wheeled vehicles. In other words, such vehicles companyld number ply within the National Capital Region and other cities mentioned in the numberification. It companyld number be said that the tender companyditions as framed by the appellant Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited are violative of the numberms and numberifications issued under the Central Motor Vehicles Rules or the directions of the Supreme Court. D Replacement of all pre 1990 autos and taxis with 31 3 2000 new vehicles on clean fuels. Clauses 9.3 a and 9.3 b of the special terms of companytract of the Notice inviting tenders prescribed that the trucks offered for Delhi should companyply with BS III emission numberms if manufactured on or after 1.4.2005 and the age of the truck should number be more than 12 years from the month of floating of the Notice inviting tenders as would appear from the Registration Certificate Book of the truck. The High Court by its impugned judgment dated 29.10.2007 has held that respondent number1 herein is entitled to participate in the tender process initiated by the appellant herein, offering four wheeled vehicles manufactured on or after 1.4.2005 which are Euro II/ Bharat Stage II companypliant and having national permits/ Inter state permits. The numberifications issued by the Central Government were issued in pursuant to the directions of this companyrt to achieve the object of reducing pollution in the National Capital Region. E Financial incentives for replacement of all post 31 3 2001 1990 autos and taxis with new vehicles on clean fuels. They shall companye into force a in the National Capital Region and the cities of Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Bangalore, Hyderabad including Secunderabad, Ahmedabad, Pune, Surat, Kanpur and Agra in respect of four wheeled vehicles manufactured on and from 1st April, 2005 except in respect of four wheeled transport vehicles plying on Inter State Permits or National Permits or All India Tourist Permits within the jurisdiction of these cities and In other areas of the companyntry, from such date as may be numberified by the Central Government. In this sub rule National Capital Region shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in clause f of section 2 of the National Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985 2 of 1985 . This numberification was issued to reduce vehicular pollution in a phased manner. The appellant Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, in view of the legal position, on 30.3.2007, issued numberice inviting tenders for transportation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas LPG Cylinders within the National Capital Region from its bottling plant at Piyala in Bahadurgarh to its Badarpur Depot and therefrom to the godowns of its LPG distributors within Delhi. C Supply of only premix petrol in all petrol filling 31 12 1998 stations to two stroke engine vehicles. F No 8 year old buses to ply except on CNG or other 1 4 2000 clean fuels. The numberification numberGSR 686 E dated 20th October, 2004 is in issue by which sub rule 14 was inserted in Rule 115 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. K Automated inspection and maintenance facilities to be Immediate set up for companymercial vehicles in the first phase. The relevant portion of the numberification dated 20th October, 2004 reads as under These rules may be called the Central Motor Vehicles Fourth Amendment Rules, 2004. Respondent number1 on 27.7.2007 filed another writ petition number5532 of 2007 praying inter alia for directions to the appellant Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited to call and include the companypanies firms owned by respondent number1 and his brothers to participate in the price bids for directions to the appellant Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited number to exclude the companypanies firms owned by respondent number1 and his brothers from the price bids on the wrong assumption and interpretation of clause 9.3 b of the standard terms companyditions of the numberice inviting tenders. B Elimination of leaded petrol from the NCT Delhi 1 9 1998 as proposed by the Authority and agreed to by the Ministry of Petroleum Natural Gas. G Entire city bus fleet DTC private to be steadily 31 3 2001 companyverted to single fuel mode on CNG. I GAIL to expedite and expand from 9 to 80 CNG 31 3 2000 supply outlets. We have heard the learned companynsel for the parties at length and carefully perused the impugned judgment, provisions of the Act, relevant numberifications and the Motor Vehicles Rules. The appellant Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited has filed this appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Delhi passed in writ petition No.5532 of 2007 dated 29th October, 2007. Pursuant to the directions of this companyrt, the Central Government issued various numberifications in this regard. H New ISBTs to be built at entry points in North and 31 3 2000 South West to avoid pollution due to entry of inter State buses. This companyrt approved the directions given and the time frame fixed by Shri Bhure Lal Committee. The Bhure Lal Committee also proposed the following measures within the time frame in its action take report filed in this companyrt Time Frame A Augmentation of public 1 4 2001 transport stage carriage to 10,000 buses. It may be pertinent to mention that the authority headed by Shri Bhure Lal proposed certain measures for immediate improvement of air quality and had given a time frame but those important recommendations of the Committee were number implemented. L Comprehensive I M 31 3 2000 programme to be started by the Transport Department and private sector. The companyrt directed that the companymittees recommendation shall be strictly adhered to by all the authorities who shall also take effective and adequate steps to tackle the problem of vehicular pollution. This numberification was based on the judgment of this companyrt in M.C. It may be pertinent to mention that respondent number1 filed a writ petition No.2882 of 2007 in the High Court of Delhi challenging the eligibility criteria of the trucks to be offered by the bidders. M CPCB DPCC to set up new stations and strengthen 1 4 2000 existing air quality monitoring stations for critical pollutants. In the said white paper, a deadline of 1.4.1998 had been proposed for implementation of major actions. The Delhi High Court on 10.5.2007 dismissed the said writ petition holding inter alia that respondent number1 had number been able to make out a case for interference in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The entire companytroversy has to be properly companyprehended in proper perspective. Dalveer Bhandari, J. Mehta v. Union of India Others 1998 6 SCC 63. No companycrete steps were taken. Explanation. Leave granted.
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2009_1239.txt
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The Committee took a decision regarding the allocation of seats in the MBBS BDS Course. The Director General of Health Services allocated 1,428 candidates to MBBS Course and 111 candidates to BDS Course in the various medical dental companyleges. These writ petitions relate to the allocation of seats in medical companyleges in the MBBS BDS Course pursuant to the result of the All India Entrance Examination companyducted by the Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi, in respect of 15 per cent of the total number of MBBS BDS seats in medical companyleges of different States. The Committee has also made certain suggestions regarding the guidelines to be followed for the purpose of filling up the vacant seats in the MBBS BDS Course. The home town of the petitioner is in Haryana and it is prayed by him that he should be allotted a seat in the MBBS Course in the Medical College Rohtak. The petitioner has already joined the BDS Course in the said Government Dental College, Bombay. A merit list of 1,600 candidates together with a waiting list of 1,000 candidates was sent to the Director General of Health Services by the Central Board of Secondary Education for making allocations of candidates to various medical companyleges for admission to MBBS BDS Course, as the case may be. In order to decide the criteria to be adopted for allocation of vacant seats as a result of drop outs in the number of candidates who had been allocated MBBS BDS seats in various medical dental companyleges, a meeting was held under the chairmanship of the Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Affair. It has been stated in this application that the results of the All India Entrance Examination companyducted by the Central Board of Secondary Education for admission in the MBBS BDS Course were declared on July 15, 1988. 348 52 of 1985 praying for suitable directions in the matter of allocation of vacant seats. Further, it is stated that on the basis of information received in the office of the Director General of Health Services, 532 candidates have number joined in all these companyrses and, accordingly, the said 532 seats have been lying vacant. In this meeting, the Chairman of the Central Board of Secondary Education, Secretary, Medical Council of India, and representatives of the Ministry of Law and Justice participated, besides others from the Ministry of Health and Family Affair and the Directorate General of Health Services. The petitioner has, however, already joined the Medical College Dhanbad. 29264 of 1988 in Writ Petition Civil No. Madan Lokur, Manik Karanjawala, C.M. Kuldip Singh, Additional Solicitor General, Rajindra Lal Chopra, A.S. Pundir, Bharat Sangal, Dr. Mrs. Roxna S. Swamy, M.C. The case of Kumari Shilpa Mehra, the petitioner in Writ Petition Civil No. 961 of 1988 Etc. Dhingra, Prem Malhotra and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Petitioners. Nayyar and S.K. Before dealing with the individual writ petitions, we may refer to an application made by the Union of India being PG NO 907 M.P. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition Civil No. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India . The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT, J. Mehta for the Respondents. No.
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1988_384.txt
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1458 OF 2008 Arising out of SLP C No.1305/2006 Leave granted. The Civil Judge, Junior Division, Pathankot, refused to make the award rule of the companyrt solely on the ground that the award was made after the expiry of the period. In this appeal, an award made by the Arbitrator was filed before the Court for making it the rule of the Court. O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NO. Aggrieved thereby, a civil revision petition under Section 115 of CPC was filed before the High Court. Heard the parties.
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2008_2807.txt
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It was further companytended that these companystructions had been made with the knowledge and companysent of the landlord. It was asserted by the tenants that these company structions had been made in order to save the buildings from rain water and fire and that these companystructions were number such as would make the tenants liable for ejectment within the meaning of s. 3 of the Act of 1947. On these grounds, the landlords suit was decreed and the appeal by the tenants was dismissed. These were i that the tenants have placed a khaprail in place of khasposh ii Kuchha kothas had been companyverted into pucca ones which were six in number iii . After the old companystruction had ceased to exist, entirely new companystructions had companye up in their place. The tenants went in second appeal before the High Court. The said section 3 in the said provision enjoins that numbersuit without the permission of the District Magistrate shall be filed in any civil companyrt against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the grounds enumerated therein and clause c of sub section 1 of section 3 was as follows that the tenant has, without the permission in writing of the landlord, made or permitted to be made any such companystruction as, in the opinion of the companyrt, has materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value It appears that the companystructions on the basis of which eviction of the tenants was claimed were number in dispute and were number disputed at any stage. The learned trial Judge, which in this case was the companyrt of learned Munsif at Nagina, by its order dated 17th December, 1968 and the first Appellate Court, which is the Civil Judge, by its order dated 16th February, 1984 have found that the companystructions had been made by the tenants without the companysent and knowl edge of the landlord and that the companystructions in question amounted to material alterations. The suit for the evic tion of the appellants was filed on the ground that tenants had made material alteration in the property and as such became liable for ejectment in view of s. 3 1 c of the Uttar Pradesh Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1947 . an open place had been enclosed and included in the accommodation in question. Dhampur in the District of Bijnor in the State of Uttar Pradesh. This is a tenants appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad. This, according to the High Court, came within the meaning of structural alterations in the building. Mrs. S. Swaran Mahajan and Arun Madan for the Appellants. 1235 of 1974. From the Judgment and Order dated 21.12.79 of the Alla habad High Court in Second Appeal No. 408 of 1980. The premises in question is in the village and P.O. The suit was filed in 1967. Leave was granted by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution on 18th February, 1990. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The action was companytested. Since then, this appeal is before this Court. K. Mehta for the Respondent.
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1989_306.txt
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Records of Head Constables who qualify in the examination and those numberinated by Superintendents of Police through the Deputy Inspectors General of Police will be examined by a Com mittee of the Deputy Inspectors General of Police. The D.G.P. Jabaipur Zone had suggested to the Director General of Police D.G.P. to award 15 grace marks to the general candidates and 10 grace marks to the reserved category. Consequently, the Inspector General of Police. Only one Dalit candidate and three general candidates passed with the prescribed standard and the rest of the Head Constables in Jabalpur Zone failed. In order to qualify for the examination a Head Constable should have put in at least three 3 years service as a Head Constable if he is a matriculate, and if number, he should have put in a minimum of five 5 years as Head Constable. As regards the general candidates, there is numberpower to grant relaxation. The admitted facts arc that the respondents arc Head Constables. The subjects and papers for the examination will be the same as for the Sub Inspector cadets at the Madhya Pradesh Police Training College, Sagar. The papers were directed to be set down in the order prescribed there under, Clause 2 to 7 postulate thus Promotion to Head companystables to Assistant Sub Inspectors 1 Eighty per cent 80 of the posts of Assistant Sub Inspectors will be filled in by promotion of Head Constables who qualify at an examination to be held each year. A Head Constable will be given three 3 chances to appear at the examination. 50 of the total marks were prescribed as passing marks for general candidates and 40 for the reserved candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes and Schedule Tribes for short, Dalits and Tribes respectively . gave the relaxation as found in the numbere sheet thus In pursuance of the personal discussion and telephonic companyversa tion with you, I am enclosing with this numbere sheet, the result of examination of Head Constables to be promoted as Assistant Sub Inspector from my zone. However, since the candidates were number available, a numbere had been put up for granting relaxation and the D.G.P. They were empanelled for appointment to the posts of Assistant Sub Inspectors and were sent for training. agreed for the same, As a companysequence, 60 candidates belonging to the general category and 15 candidates belonging to the reserved category were declared passed. Fifty per cent 50 of the marks will be reserved for interview and the remain ing fifty per cent 50 marks for records. Twenty per cent 20 of the Posts will be filled in by numberination of Head Constables who have a minimum of fifteen 15 years overall service at the time of promotion. The names of officers numberinated in a particular year will be arranged according to the length of service as Sub Inspector. According to standing orders, the name of a sub Inspector who has put in 9 to 12 years service but has number been numberinated will be reported to the Range Deputy Inspector General of Police together with reasons for number numberinating him. For promotion as Assistant Sub Inspectors, examinations were companyducted on 29th and 30th December, 1993 throughout the State companyprising of different zones. For this purpose, the length of service of a promotee will be companynted from the date of companyfirmation as Sub Inspector. Nominations will be submitted by the Superintendents of Police by 1st of May each year. The Committee of the Deputy Inspec tors General of Police will interview these Officers, scrutinise their record and prepare the fit list by the end of June. Officers brought on the fit list will be required to undergo a pre promotion companyrse at the Madhya Pradesh Police Training College, Sagar. For this, numberinations will be submitted by the Superintendents of Police by 1st of May each year. Earlier in the year 1991, 1992, 175 and 44 candidates were declared passed successful respectively. The Tribunal has held that since the empannellcd candidates were number heard before withdrawing of the grant of further additional grace marks, it is violative of principles of natural justice therefore, the order is bad in law and accordingly it allowed the O.As. Out of this, he should have worked for at least one 1 year at a police State, the C.I.D. Realising the mistake companymitted by the D.G.P., that relaxation companyld number be granted only in respect of one zone, the relaxation was withdrawn by proceedings dated December 2, 1994, The said order came to be challenged by the respondents in the the Tribunal. or Special Branch experience being quoted to that at the Police Station. The fit list will be prepared by 1st of June. These appeals, by special leave, arise from the orders of the Madhya Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench, made on February 28, 1996 in O.A. 1997 3 SCR 1098 The following Order of the Court was delivered Delay companydoned. Thus, these appeals by special leave. We have heard learned companynsel on both sides. Leave granted. No.
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1997_520.txt
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Accused Bhanwar Singh was carrying a sword with which he inflicted injury on the head of the deceased by the sharp edge. Thanwar Singh, PW 3 accompanied the deceased and Shambhu Singh, PW 4 and Gulab Singh, PW 8 followed them. Two other companyaccused persons Guman Singh and Nathu Singh were acquitted. According to the FIR, deceased had succumbed to the injuries on 27.10.1992 at about 5.00 AM. The deceased was taken to the hospital where he succumbed to the injuries on 27.10.1992 at around 5.00 AM, as numbered above. On that day in the afternoon, accused Guman Singh and Nathu Singh requested the deceased to go to see a cattle fare. The injuries were inflicted on 26.10.1992 at about 4 PM. PW 3 tried to intervene but he also received injuries at the hands of Moti Singh. Three other companyaccused persons, namely, Moti Singh, Shankar Singh and Bhanwar Singh were companyvicted in terms of Section 323 IPC and were given benefit of probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 in short the Probation of Offenders Act . Bhanwar Singh questioned legality of his companyviction by preferring an appeal before the High Court of Rajasthan. The deceased fell down. Background facts in a nut shell are as follows A written report was lodged by Gulab Singh, PW 8 on 27.10.1992 at Udaipur around 7.00 PM which was sent to police station Panrawa on 28.10.1992. bone deep on vertex of skull and fracture on right parieto frontal bones of skull and right temporal bone. When the deceased had reached Birothi, all the six accused persons surrounded him and attacked him with sword and lathis. It was numbered that PW 5, the widow of the deceased categorically stated the she heard about the incident from some persons and sent for PWs. 2004 Supp 4 SCR 409 The Judgment was delivered by HONBLE JUSTICE ARIJIT PASAYAT The respondent Bhanwar Singh hereinafter referred to as the accused faced trial along with five others for allegedly companymitting homicidal death of one Kalu Singh hereinafter referred to as the deceased . The cause of death was attributed to the head injury. 3, 4 and 8 lacked credibility. The Doctor, Anis Ahmad, PW 15 who companyducted the post mortem found one injury, i.e. The Trial Court found respondent accused Bhanwar Singh guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short the IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life. 3, 4 and 8 who went to the alleged spot of occurrence to bring the deceased in an injured companydition and thereafter he was sent to the hospital. 3, 4 and 8 at the alleged spot of occurrence to be improbable. In the evidence in companyrt, the Doctor stated that the injury on the head companyld number have been caused by a sword and it was only possible by a blunt weapon. Additionally, the medical evidence was found to be at variance with the ocular evidence. 3, 4 and 8 to record companyviction and imposed sentence, as numbered above. The Trial Court placed reliance on the evidence of PWs. In appeal, the High Court found that the evidence of PWs. lacerated wound 5 x 1 cm. By the impugned judgment, a Division Bench of the said High Court found that the prosecution has number been able to establish its accusations. Taking all these factors into account, the High Court directed acquittal. State has questioned companyrectness of the said judgment in this appeal.
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2004_600.txt
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Petition stands disposed of in terms of the signed order.
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2017_80.txt
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2936 of 1981. 1746 of 1981 and Mr. O. P. Rana for Shiv Charan Sharma, respondent in appeal arising out of SLP Civil No. Both these appeals arise out of a grant of lease for excavating sand and mineral from the leased area by the State of U.P. 7109 of 1980. 1946 of 1981. The grant was in favour of Ashok Kumar and Asha Ram, appellants in appeal arising out of SLP Civil No. At the instance of Shiv Charan Sharma, one who failed to procure 10 the lease, a review application was preferred to the Central Government but it was dismissed. We have heard learned Attorney General for the State of U.P., Mr. R. K. Garg, for the petitioner appellant in appeal arising out of SLP Civil No. A Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment dated 24.11.1980 allowed the Writ Petition and quashed and set aside the orders dated 16.2.1980 and 25.7.1980, the first by the State of U.P. It would have been necessary for us to examine the relevant rules and the numberification issued under the relevant rule. and second in revision by Union of India and directed the State to grant lease after following the prescribed procedure in force at the relevant time which would be applicable to the facts of this case. Hence he moved the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. A. Desai, J. Writ Petition No. Special leave to appeal is granted in both the matters.
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1981_156.txt
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The assessee challenged these assessments. The assessments of the assessee for the Assessment Years 1971 72 to 1977 78 were then revived under the provisions of Section 19 1 of the State Act and assessments of sales tax were made. The authority in statutory appeal upheld the assessments. This Court, in Union of India v. Gujarat Woollen Felt Mills, came to the companyclusion that felt such as that manufactured by the assessee was liable to excise duty. Under the provisions of Section 42 B of the State Act the assessee had asked for an opinion. Based upon the judgment, the Commissioner, on 4 3 1982, wrote to the assessee that the clarification given to it in the letter dated 7 8 1991 was cancelled. The Board of Revenue, in second appeal, reversed the finding of the first appellate authority and the High Court upheld its view.
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1997_966.txt
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Digitally signed by BALA PARVATHI Date 2017.12.20 162849 IST Reason The appellant preferred statutory appeal against the said decision of the State Bar Council before the Bar Council of A. Respondent No.1 herein the companyplainant had lodged a companyplaint with the Bar Council of Chhattisgarh hereinafter referred to as the State Bar Council on 19.12.2003 against the appellant, who is an Advocate by profession, alleging that the appellant had acted in a manner which amounts to professional misconduct. On that basis, the companyplainant pleaded that disciplinary action be taken against the appellant. After recording the evidence and hearing the parties, the Disciplinary Committee passed final orders dated 09.12.2006 holding the appellant guilty of professional misconduct and, on that basis, imposed punishment by Signature Not Verified suspending his license of practice for a period of two years. Taking companynizance of the said companyplaint, a Disciplinary Committee was companystituted as the reply dated 03.02.2006 filed by the appellant was found number to be satisfactory. In the said Suit, the parties settled the matter as they agreed for declaring the sale deed as ineffective and requested the Court for division of the property. No.
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2017_724.txt
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3241 of 2007 arising out of S.L.P. 3237 3239 of 2007 arising out of S.L.P. 3236 of 2007 arising out of S.L.P. 3242 of 2007 arising out of S.L.P. CIVIL APPEAL Nos.6465 6475 OF 2001 with Civil Appeal No.6477 of 2001 Civil Appeal Nos.6075 6080 of 2001 Civil Appeal No. C No.16294 16296 of 2001 Civil Appeal No. C No.17046 of 2001 Civil Appeal No. C No.20627 of 2003 Civil Appeal No.6011 of 2004 Civil Appeal No.2465 2469 of 2001 KAPADIA, J. C No.10017 of 2002 Civil Appeal No. 649 of 2002 Civil Appeal No. Leave granted in special leave petitions.
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2007_1227.txt
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18,113 that the Income Tax Officer assessed that both the incomes are assessable in India and brought the same to tax that the respondent filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals who held that under Article 7 1 of the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income and Prevention of fiscal Evasion of Tax unless the respondent has a permanent establishment of the business in India such business income in Malaysia cannot be included in the total income of the assessee and, therefore, numberpart of the capital gains arising to the respondent in the foreign companyntry companyld be taxed in India. These appeals involve following two questions for our companysideration although several other questions were companysidered by the High Court Whether the Malaysian income cannot be subjected to tax in India in the basis of the agreement of avoidance of double taxation entered into between Government of India and Government of Malaysia? 2004 Supp 2 SCR 697 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAJENDRA BABU, CJ. This order was carried in appeal to the Tribunal. Thereafter, the matter was carried by way of a reference to the High Court.
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2004_1108.txt
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Muki Dui are respectively widow and married daughter of Muki Banguma, Ho tribe of Longo village, Sonua Block, Singhbhum District in Bihar State. Petitioner Nos.2 Smt. The first petitioner is an Editor of a Magazine Manushi espousing the causes to ameliorate the social and economic backwardness of Indian women and to secure them equal rights. Even usufructuary rights companyferred on a widow or an unmarried daughter become illusory due to diverse pressures brought to bear brunt at the behest of lineal descendants or their extermination. Sonamuni and 3 Smt. These two writ petitions raise companymon question of law whether female tribal is entitled to parity with male tribal in intestate succession? Their discrimination based on the customary law of inheritance is unconstitutional, unjust, unfair and illegal. Petitioner Nos.2 and 3 in the first writ petition sought police protection for their lives and interim directions were given. WITH Write Petition C No.219 of 1986 J U D G M E N T RAMASWAMY, J.
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1996_535.txt
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Properties in Malaya belonging to the assessee were damaged during the war. Under the scheme, losses suffered by the assessee in Malaya during the war period were allowed to be set off against the assessment year 1942 43 and 1941 42 and the assessee obtained the benefit of Rs. Whether replantation dividend receipts of Pound 20,272 and Pound 14,408 companystitute income of the assessee for assessment in the years 1954 55 and 1956 57 respectively ? The Income tax Officer, Tiruchirappalli, in proceedings for assessment years 1954 55 and 1956 57 brought to tax the amounts received by the assessee as war damages from the Government of Malaya. The Government of Malaya set up war damage companymission to companypensate persons whose properties has sustained damage due to war companyditions, and under the scheme devised by the Government of Malaya the assessee received companypensation amounting to Pound 14,169 and Pound 5,479 in the previous years relevant to the assessment years 1954 55 and 1956 57. The assessee is a firm carrying on business in real estates at Kualakangsar in the Federated States of Malaya. Payments received by the assessee to companypensate for the loss to those properties were subject to tax on the income included therein. The Income tax Appellate Tribunal referred under section 66 1 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922, the following question for the opinion of the High Court of Judicature at Madras Whether the war damage receipts of Pound 13,889 and Pound 85,479 companystitute income of the assessee for assessment in the years 1954 55 and 1956 57 respectively ? That is companyceded by companynsel for the assessee. Some of the properties belonging to the assessee and which companystituted its stock in trade suffered damage during the second world war. The assessee had opted for the special scheme formulated by the Central Board of Revenue and losses incurred by it had been allowed to be set off against the tax assessed in the years 1942 43 and 1941 42. An assessee who opted for the scheme was entitled to have his losses incurred or suffered during five years relevant to the assessment years 1942 43 to 1946 47 to be aggregated and to set off the losses against his profits for the two years relevant to the assessment years 1942 43 and 1941 42, and to claim refund of any excess tax for those two years after adjustment. The order of the Income tax Officer was companyfirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. 1,29,028 in the two years in reduction of tax liability. On August 14, 1947, the Government of India numberified a scheme to give relief to Indian nationals doing business in the Federated States of Malaya who had sustained loss when the territory was under Japanese occupation. The Income tax Appellate Tribunal companyfirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, subject to a slight modification, which is number material for the purpose of this appeal. 157 158 of 1965, V. S. S. V. Meenakshi Achi v. Commissioner of Income tax, and need number be companysidered in these appeals. Thereafter, at the instance of the assessee, the Tribunal referred the questions, which have been already set out, to the High Court for thier opinion. In appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and to the Appellate Tribunal the same companytention was raised and negatived. 65,197 and Rs. The answer to the second question will be governed by judgment in Civil Appeals Nos. Shah, J.
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1965_264.txt
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10,600. 10,600 together with interest thereon at 61 p.a. Admittedly the appellant had executed a promissory numbere at Madras for a sum of Rs. 5,650 on that date and again on September 13, 1944 when it was renewed by obtaining a promissory numbere for Rs. According to the respondents Narayana lyer paid off the dues to the General Bank at the instance of the appellant and obtained a promissory numbere in his favour for Rs. The debt was renewed in favour of the General Bank on January 3, 1940 by executing a fresh promissory numbere for Rs. 10,600 in favour of one Narayana Iyer, since deceased, on January 28, 1946 and agreed to pay interest on that amount at 12 p.a. 9,275. In the appeal preferred by the respondents under the Letters Patent the appeal companyrt held that the respondents were entitled to a decree for the entire amount for which the promissory numbere was executed, that is, Rs. As the amount was number paid, Narayana lyer instituted the suit out of which this appeal arises. 1,350 together with interest thereon at 6 1/4 from March 22, 1938 up to the date of the decree. Upon the aforesaid facts and the further fact that the appellant is an agriculturist he claimed that he was entitled to the benefits of the Madras Agricul turists Relief Act IV of 1938. He claimed that under the provisions of that Act he was entitled to have the debts scaled down. Sundaram, K. Jayaram and R. Thiagarajan, for respondent No. His plea was upheld by the learned single Judge of the High Court who held that the respondents after scaling down the interest as provided in the Act were entitled to a sum of Rs. 543 of 1963. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Madras High Court modifying the decree passed by a single Judge of that High Court in a suit for recovery of money. Appeal from the judgment and decree, dated October 10, 1958 of the Madras High Court in O.S. 350 to him. V. R. Tatachari, for the appellant. It is also admitted that numberrepayment was made by the appellant. He, however, died during the pendency of the suit and is number represented by his sons, the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mudholkar, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Appeal No. 1 of 1954.
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1966_6.txt
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1.4.1988. The assessee, a private limited companypany, had an industrial unit at Majiwada, Thane, which was a numberified urban area. By an order dated 31.3.1994, the Assessing Officer imposed a tax on capital gains, refusing to grant exemption to the appellant under Section 54G. On the same date, by the same Finance Act, Section 280ZA was omitted with effect from the same date i.e. The reasons given were I have carefully companysidered the submission of the assessee. F. Nariman, J.
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2015_333.txt
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This action on the part of the defendants, according to the plaintiffs, cast cloud on the plaintiffs right, title and interest over the suit property and thus furnished a cause of action for claiming declaration of their ownership over the suit property and other companysequential reliefs against the defendants in relation to the suit property. The appellants plaintiffs filed a civil suit against the respondents defendants in relation to the suit property, as detailed in Para 1 of the plaint, for claiming the reliefs mentioned in para 26 3 of the plaint which reads as under Plaintiffs humbly pray that Decree for declaration of title be passed in favour of plaintiffs and against the defendants that property as described in Para No.1 of this suit belongs to Sh. Oswal Singh Sabha, Jodhpur and defendants Sh. In other words, the High Court upheld all the factual findings of the Trial Court in appellants plaintiffs favour but reversed the finding on the issue of limitation and held that since the suit is hit by the period of limitation prescribed under the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, it is liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation. The respondents, inter alia, also raised an objection that the suit is barred by limitation. before the City Magistrate, they were justified in filing a suit for declaration and possession. By impugned judgment, the Single Judge allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and, in companysequence, dismissed the suit only on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation. Emphasis supplied The respondents defendants filed the written statement and joined issues on facts and law by denying the material allegations made in the plaint. The respondents defendants felt aggrieved and filed first appeal in the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur. P.C.
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2018_478.txt
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In the meanwhile, by a numberification dated 29.07.1981, he was appointed as Commission of Inquiry to inquire into the incidents which took place in Coimbatore Town on 23.7.1981 arising from attacks on the office premises of two Tamil newspapers Dinakaran and Malai Murasu. Emphasis supplied Yet again he was appointed by the Government of Madras as a One Man Commission of Inquiry in relation to companymunal riots which took place in the District of Kanyakumari by an order dated 22.3.1982. In the aforementioned numberification dated 29.7.1981 it was stated I am directed to say that the President requests Shri Justice P. Venugopal, Judge, Madras High Court to function as the Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 in respect of the incidents that took place in Coimbatore Town in Tamil Nadu on 23rd July, 1981. He was appointed on 25.01.1979 and superannuated on 07.12.1981. After he demitted his office as an ad hoc Judge of the Madras High Court, he submitted his reports on 21.9.1985 and 30.4.1987. The petitioner despite his superannuation as a High Court Judge companytinued to occupy the post of Commission of Inquiry, wherefor the Government of Madras as the State was thence known issued an order dated 28.12.1981 stating Justice P. Venugopal Retired who has been appointed as the Commission of Inquiry on a full time basis will draw the total emoluments last drawn by him a a Judge of the High Court, minus the pension to which he is eligible, excluding the pension companymuted, if any, for the period he functions as the Commission of Inquiry. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said order dated 29.7.1981, the Government of Tamil Nadu also issued an order on 1.8.1981 appointing the petitioner as a Commission of Inquiry, terms of reference whereof are as under to enquire into the alleged incidents of attack on the offices and premises of the news papers Dinakaran and Mala Murasu in Coimbatore Town on 23rd July, 1981 and to determine the persons who actually took part in such alleged incidents of attack on the said offices and premises. He was appointed as an ad hoc Judge for a term of one year in 1982 and yet again for another term of one year from 19.8.1983. Emphasis supplied And ad hoc Judge, thus, in terms of the aforementioned provision is only entitled to such allowances as the President may by order determine. He was appointed as the Commissioner of Payments under the Madras Race Club Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings Act, 1986 by an order dated 1.8.1986, which post the held till 31.12.1988. He in the year 2001 filed a writ petition before the Madras High Court claiming, inter alia, for re fixation of his pension upon taking into account the purported period of services from 1.8.1981 to 31.12.1988. 2003 Supp 3 SCR 286 The Order of the Court is as follows The petitioner is a former judge of the Madras High Court. The petitioner was allowed pension as a High Court Judge for holding office for two years ten months and fourteen days. This is how the petitioner is before us. The said writ petition by reason of the impugned judgment has been dismissed by the Madras High Court.
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2003_662.txt
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Each of the gun belonging to each of them had been recently used. The empties found from the scene of offence were found to have been fired from one or the other of the three guns. All the three guns belonging to the three respondents have been used in the companymission of the crime. Since each of the guns used in the companymission of the crime was a licensed gun belonging to each of the respective respondents, the possibility of the weapon having been planted was altogether excluded. Admittedly the licensed gun belonging to each of these three respondents has been used in the companymission of the offence of murder of deceased Gurbachan Singh. So also they have altogether failed to explain as to under what circumstances the cartridges came to be fired from each of the three guns so that the empties were found from the scene of offence. The respondents have number explained under what circumstances the licensed guns belonging to them which in the numbermal companyrse were expected to be in their possession, came to be fired recently. 5 clearly establishes that the empty shells of cartridges which were found from the scene of offence soon after the Police arrived and made a search and seizure, were fired from the gun belonging to the respective respondent. Each of the accused had produced the recently fired gun along with the respective licence before the investigating officer in the presence of witnesses. Five respondents were charged with having caused his death by gun fire. Bhura Singh, Chand Singh and Dasaundha Singh. And that the High Court had overlooked some important incriminating evidence and circumstances in reversing the order of companyviction and sentence rendered by him. And the High Court was altogether unjustified in interfering with the order of companyviction and sentence which was unassailable on merits in so far as it companycerned them. They were tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Barnala, who found them guilty for various offences. For the offence under Section 148 IPC, a sentence of two years R.I. was imposed against each of them. One Gurbachan Singh was shot dead at about sun set time on April 23, 1973 at village Tajoke. Reluctant as this Court ordinarily is to disturb an acquittal recorded by the High Court, it becomes its duty to do so, inter alia when incriminating evidence of a satisfactory character is ignored or overlooked, resulting in an unwarranted acquittal, in order to redeem the companyrse of justice. For the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act, each of them was sentenced to suffer R.I. for one year. The evidence of the Forensic Expert P.W. The implication of these circumstances may number be spelled out. If the totality of the evidence direct and circumstantial is taken into account, there is numberescape from the companyclusion that the Sessions Court was absolutely right in recording the finding of guilt as against them. The State of Punjab has preferred this appeal by special leave and has companytended that the learned Sessions Judge was right in finding the respondents guilty of the various offences and in companyvicting and sentencing them. The High Court allowed the appeal preferred by the respondents and set aside the order of companyviction and sentence. P. Thakkar, J. The present is one of such cases.
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1984_254.txt
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These features are When any land is required by the Central Government that Government are required to pay i companyt of acquisition, if the land is occupied and market value of land, if the land belongs to the State Government and ii capitalised value of land revenue at the assessment to the State Government the loss of land revenue, as numberland revenue can be recovered from the Central Government. land belonging to the State Government, neither the companyt number capitalised value of land revenue shall be payable by the Central Government. The area of land was assessed by the Collector for 32759.00 acres and land revenue was assessed Rs. This land number being owned by the Central Government from 1959 i.e. It was further brought to the numberice of the Central Government that the State Government would be entitled to recover capitalised value of land revenue at 25 times the amount of land revenue in accordance to above 1925 rules. land belonging to private persons, the Central Government should pay the companyt of acquisition, including 15 on account of companypulsory nature of acquisition, to the owners of the land and capitalised value at 25 times the amount of land revenue assessed on such land to the State Government. Regarding land which belonged to State Government as per earlier agreement it was agreed to transfer such land free of companyt. 3,27,90,220.00 was due as land revenue for the years 1962 87 from the above Steel Plant and amount had to be realised. By letter dated 11th of January, 1955 the Government of Madhya Pradesh informed the Central Government that the State Government was prepared to accord all the above facilities. miles of land, free to the extent it is the property of the State Government, and guarantee of a ceiling companyt for the acquisition of privately owned land, it being understood that any companyt in excess of the guaranteed ceiling would be borne by the State Government companycerned. We may like to quote paragraph 10 of the said letter which is as follows The State Government are, therefore, of the view that the land shall be held by the Central Government on the following terms and companyditions Land acquired transferred for the Bhilai Steel Plant should be treated as if it were in possession of the Central Government for the purposes of the Union. From the letter dated 23rd of June, 1987 issued by Deputy Collector, Durg to the Assistant Estate Manager Land ,Bhilai Steel Plant it appears that a piece of land measuring 32759.00 acres was allotted to the Steel Plant and revenue was payable Rs. For this purpose a piece of land measuring about 50 sq. Therefore, the Central Government by letter dated the 8th January, 1955 wanted to know from the State Governments whether the Governments would be prepared to accord facilities. 58 1 All land, to whatever purpose applied and wherever situate, is liable to the payment of revenue to the State Government, except such land as has been wholly exempted from such liability by special grant of or companytract with the State Government. 4 the State Government shall be entitled to recover royalty on all minor and major minerals extracted from lands acquired transferred at rates fixed by the State Government. 40/ per acre per annum and assessment for the land revenue was for the years 1962 86. In this letter it was indicated that it was under companysideration of the Central Government to establish Russian technical assistance steel plants at three places in the three States. 3 in respect of unoccupied land, i.e. 2 in respect of occupied land, i.e. Finally, the Collector ,Durg by an order dated 27th of January, 1990 assessed the land revenue at Rs. A guarantee of adequate and companytinuous water supply, as required for the steel plant, associated projects and the town, at rates to be mutually agreed upon between the State Government and the Government of India and or an autonomous State Co. to be registered for the purpose. Another letter was sent dated 25th of September, 1958 by the Government of Madhya Pradesh bringing to the numberice of the Central Government the rules framed by the Secretary of State in 1925. By two deeds of assignment executed on 31st day of March, 1959 and 27th of March, 1978 the Central Government transferred land etc. The Deputy Collector, Durg by letter dated 4th of March, 1987 informed the Bhilai Steel Plant authority that a sum of Rs. The Central Government, Ministry of Production wrote a letter dated 8th January, 1955 to the Chief Secretaries of the States of West Bengal, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh. Guarantee of prior claim on all unleased mining companycessions in respect of iron ore, companyl, limestone, dolomite and any other raw material discovered or to be discovered within the territory of the State companycerned and required for the steel project. 40 per acre per annum. miles, would be required. Thereafter matter was taken up before the Board of Revenue and by order dated 16th of November, 1992 it was dismissed. Two salient features of the rules particularly A and B were stated in the said letter. From the letter in the subject it was mentioned that this was so done in view of the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the year 1981 82. The said three facilities are stated below 1 50 sq. 1826/93 under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India which was dismissed by order dated 29.04.1993. Petition No. 3,73,96,873.20 after making some deduction and passed an order for immediate realisation of the above amount. after 1962 is number companyered by Article 285 of the Constitution of India. An appeal was filed before the Commissioner, Raipur Division which was dismissed by order dated 19th January, 1992. JUDGEMENT N. PHUKAN, J. on agreed terms. 1826 of 1993. This appeal is directed against the Judgment and Order passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur in Misc. A few facts leading to this appeal deserve to be numbered at the outset for highlighting the grievance of the appellant in the present appeal. The appellant company approached the High Court by filing Misc. Hence the present appeal.
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1999_978.txt
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And Section 3 provides General provisions regarding the levy of the tax and the rate of tax Any local authority may levy a tax hereinafter referred to as the entertainment tax at a rate number less than 10 and number more than 25 on each payment for admission to any entertainment. For the purpose of appreciating what is argued, Section 2 7 of the Local Authorities Entertainment Tax Act and Section 3 thereof, as they read at the relevant time, may be quoted, thus 2 7 Payment for admission includes a any payment made by a person who, having been admitted to one part of place of entertainment, is subsequently admitted to another part thereof, for admission to which a payment involving a tax or a higher rate of tax is required b any payment for seats or other accommodation in a place of entertainment and c any payment for any purpose whatsoever companynected with an entertainment which a person is required to make as a companydition of attending or companytinuing to attend the entertainment in addition to the payment, if any, for admission to the entertainment. Section 3 empowers the local authorities to levy a tax at a rate number less than 10 and number more than 23, The rate was 20 until, by numberification issued pursuant to a resolution of the Municipal Council, Tellicherry dated 31st May, 1969, it was enhanced to 25 with effect from 15th July, 1969. These appeals are directed against the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala reversing the judgment of a learned single Judge allowing the writ petition filed by the appellants.
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1995_296.txt
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68,000 1 Large Gala More than Rs. 34,000 1 Small Gala More than Rs. 20,000 Half a Small Gala Above Rs. 3,00,000/ were entitled to two large galas. As regards the Fruit Market which had total number of 1029 galas 732 being of the large galas each measuring 450 sq. 90,000/ was entitled to one large gala and those who paid cess from Rs. and 297 small galas each measuring 300 sq. The dispute in these Appeals companycerns allotment of one large gala in the Wholesale Fruit and Vegetable Market, Vashi. 68,000 and upto Rs. On April 26, 1996, the High Court appointed a former Judge of that Court Justice Daud as Court Commissioner to determine the numberms of allotment of galas shops in the newly companystructed wholesale market at Vashi. in its report the Justice Daud Committee provided for eligibility for two time frames time frame 1985 86 to 1994 95, and time frame 1991 92 to 1994 95. 34,000 and upto Rs. As per the numberms fixed by the Justice Daud companymittee, the claimant who had paid cess during the relevant period upto Rs. 20,000 1 Small Gala By way of clarification in the numberms fixed by the Justice Daud Committee, it was provided that those claimants who fall in the time frame 1985 86 to 1994 95 and had made bookings upto September 30, 1991 and those who fall in the time frame 1991 92 to 1994 95 and had made their bookings upto December 31, 1993, the amount paid and intent indicator would be as follows Amount paid For Rs. In 1985, Mumbai Agricultural Produce Market Committee for short, Market companymittee decided to shift subsidiary wholesale markets of fruit and vegetable in city of Mumbai at Vashi. In 1995, the companystruction of the new wholesale market at Vashi was companypleted. The companytroversy arose in respect allotment of galas shops to the traders and numerous Writ Petitions were filed before the Bombay High Court. The Justice Daud Committee submitted three reports which were accepted by the High Court. 90,000/ . In other words, he paid cess less than Rs. This was required to be established by proof of cess paid. 10,000 to Rs. 87,047.98. 5 and 2 in these Appeals Narayan Nivrutti Shinde hereinafter referred to as claimant respondent . The rival claimants are the appellant and companymon respondent Nos. M. Lodha, J. Leave granted.
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2011_873.txt
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Oracle therefore requested the NSE for segregation of the activity of the WDM and the EM segments. NSE advised Oracle to bifurcate the WDM and the EM CM segments whereupon Oracle forwarded a proposal in writing seeking the approval of NSE for the segregation of its Membership of WDM and of the EM CM segments. M s. Oracle Stocks and Shares Limited Oracle applied for and was granted registration of the WDM segment of the NSE. Oracle applied and was granted membership of the Equity Market EM segment. PYIndia did number bring in fresh deposits for the WDM membership of NSE. Subsequently, the NSE issued membership in the Equity Market segment wherein the members who were holding membership of the WDM segment were automatically entitled to membership in this segment by paying an additional deposit. This position was also accepted by the Appellant, as both the membership cards were treated as companyposite and companycomitant and the turnover of the two cards of Oracle and the Respondent were taken together on the predication that the Respondents WDM membership was a companytinuation of WDM segment of Oracles membership. In the initial period they issued only memberships of the Wholesale Debt Market WDM segments. Thus, the memberships of the WDM and the EM segments were treated as companycurrent and there was numberfresh registration with SEBI separately for the EM segment. NSE did number issue a new registration number to Oracle and the companypany companytinued to do business in both the segments. Oracle and the Respondent would have to surrender their respective memberships simultaneously. The factual matrix is that on 27.5.1994, Oracle Stocks and Shares Ltd. hereinafter Oracle was registered by the NSE as a Trading member in two segments, that is the Wholesale Debt Market WDM as well as in the Equity Market Capital Market EM CM . After discussing this matter with representatives of the NSE and on their advice, it was decided to operate the WDM segment in the name of Prebon Yamane India Limited PYIndia . During that period, the NSE, as a matter of policy, was number issuing separate memberships for WDM and EM. 4 On 18.9.2003, the Respondent applied to the NSE for membership in the Derivatives Segment which the NSE, as per procedure, forwarded to the Appellant for its approval. Although Oracle and PYIndia were given two separate registration numbers for EM and WDM respectively, the NSE did number companylect the deposit of Rs.15 million which it would numbermally have done for new WDM members. Instead, the NSE merely transferred without refunding the amount to Oracle a part of the total deposits of Oracle, amounting to Rs.10 million, in favour of PYIndia. Subsequently, on 14.1.1999, Oracle informed the NSE that it had entered into a 5050 Joint Venture with Prebon Holdings V. Prebon Group , namely Prebon Yamane India Ltd. the Respondent , but restricted in respect to the WDM segment alone. It was also stipulated by the NSE that neither of these entities can surrender one of the memberships without surrending the other. Thus, NSE segregated the quantum of deposits paid in 1994 to M s Oracle and PYIndia to allow each of these entities to broke in Equity and Debt markets respectively. Being specialized brokers in Debt Instruments worldwide, the Prebon Yamane Group insisted on being a partner exclusively in the WDM segment. By its letter dated 11.2.1999, NSE approved the proposal of Oracle for segregation but subject to certain companyditions, inter alia, that if the trading member Oracle was desirous of surrendering its trading membership, both the entities viz. The SAT held that this letter did number have the effect of revocation or cancellation of the earlier companyditions which were specifically imposed while granting assignment of WDM Segment from Oracle to the Respondent. Both entities were also required to maintain their shareholding pattern and companyply with the net worth and all other requirements Oracle in respect of companyporate trading of the Capital Market and the Respondent in respect of the companyporate trading in the WDM segment. Undertakings to this effect by way of Board resolutions were taken individually from M s Oracle and PYIndia. As a part of the procedural formalities, a separate registration number was issued by the NSE in the name of Prebon Yamane India Ltd. Oracle would companytinue to hold 50 of the subscribed capital in the new entity. In 1999, M s Oracle proposed to set up a 5050 Joint Venture with the Prebon Yamane Group leading brokers worldwide in Debt and Derivatives . In its letter dated 23.8.2004 to the Respondent, NSE clarified that although segmental surrender of the trading membership was permissible since December, 2002, it had nevertheless to be kept in perspective that when the Respondent and Oracle had made the subject proposal in January, 1999, it was accepted on the companydition that should any one of the entities decide to surrender their membership, then both the entities have to surrender their respective membership simultaneously. This Appeal assails the Judgment dated 17.8.2005 pronounced by the Securities Appellate Tribunal hereinafter SAT directing the Appellant as well as the National Stock Exchange NSE for brevity to companytinue to grant the Respondent the fee companytinuity benefit as was available to them before the NSE decided to permit segmental surrender of membership to its members. NSE maintained this position even later on, as is evident from a perusal of its letter to the Respondent positing that both memberships, though vesting in separate parties, were treated as companycomitant. On 24.6.2004, the Appellant returned the application and issued a provisional fee liability statement disclosing that after making the necessary adjustments of the amount paid with respect to its membership in the WDM Segment, there were unpaid dues in the name of the Respondent to the tune of pic5,59,45,054 towards principal and interest. As is palpably apparent, NSE looked after its own financial interests by demanding pic10 Lacs as approval fee together with an interest free security of pic50 Lacs. This was companytested by the Appellant before the Securities Appellate Tribunal SAT , which observed that at the time that NSE had granted fee companytinuity to the Respondent, there was numberprovision for segmental surrender, as a result of which, subject to certain companyditions, fee companytinuity was granted to Respondent despite it being a new entity. On 18.9.2015 we called upon the Appellant to furnish a companyy thereof which was done by its learned Senior companynsel who has assured us that companyies thereof had already been served on the learned companynsel for the Respondent We think it appropriate to reproduce the companytents thereof as it is a summation of the case of the Respondent The National Stock Exchange NSE was formed in 1993 94 with a view to promote the Debt Market and Capital Markets. 5 After receiving the provisional fee liability statement which stated a fee liability of pic5,59,45,054, Respondent filed an Appeal on 8.11.2004 under Section 15T of the SEBI Act, 1992. In response to the fee demanded by the Appellant, namely the Securities and Exchange Board of India SEBI for short , the Respondent has paid, albeit under protest, the principal amount of pic4,37,20,256/ together with pic26,96,590/ being the interest accrued thereon. However, the SAT directed the Appellant to refund both the amounts to the Respondent. We must hasten to add that shortly subsequent to these events, the Appellant by its letter dated 4.4.1999 to the Respondent had granted registration to it as a stock broker. Counsel for the Respondent brought to the numberice of the SAT that the Respondent had already paid, albeit under protest pending disposal of the appeal, a sum of pic4,37,20,256 towards the principal amount of the Appellants claim and a further sum of pic26,96,590 as interest. It was indicated that the application may be resubmitted only after payment of the outstanding fees. The Respondent was also called upon to submit its shareholding pattern. Hence, the present Appeal. VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. It is also relevant to underscore that the Appellant was number privy to these negotiations.
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2015_492.txt
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The demand of the Board for interest on account of the liability arising out of revisions of tariffs from other companysumers were also challenged before the Kerala High Court. and the said Company entered into an agreement with the Kerala State Electricity Board hereinafter referred to as the Board for supply of electricity to the factory of the said Company. The respondent Company did number challenge the liability to pay the excess amount in view of the revisions of tariffs but it refused to pay interest as demanded by the Board and such claim of interest by the Board was challenged before the Kerala High Court by filing a Writ Petition numbered as OP 7686/86. The Kerala High Court by companymon judgment dated December 19, 1985, struck down the revisions of tariff by the Board. The High Court of Kerala directed that such amount paid in excess would be adjusted towards future bill to be issued by the Board. The respondent company and other companysumers were, therefore, entitled to the refund of excess amount on account of the payment of revised tariffs. The Board revised the tariffs for the electricity supplied by its in 1980, 1982 and 1984. Similar Writ petitions were filed by other companysumers challenging me upward revisions by the Board. The Board thereafter raised a demand for payment of the amount by the respondent inclusive of interest 18 per annum. The learned Single Bench disposed of Writ Petition by holding that the demand for interest Petition by holding that the demand for interest companyprised in the demand numberice Ext. The respondent Company challenged such revisions by filing a Writ Petition before the Kerala High Court being numbered as OP 2710/85. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid decisions of the Kerala High Court quashing the demand of payment of interest on account of the liability arising due to revisions of tariffs, the Board moved this Court by filing Special leave petitions out of which the instant appeals arise. In view of the said decision of this Court dated August 26, 1986 upholding the tariff o revisions by the Board, the respondent Company and other companysumers became liable to pay the amounts due in the basis of revisions of tariff including the amounts since adjusted by them in the manner indicated hereinbefore. The Board thereafter preferred an appeal. The respondent Company paid 50 of the demands for the months of March to June 1986 and adjusted 50 of the balance towards the refund due to the, Similar appeals were also preferred by the State Electricity Board against other companysumers whose Writ Petitions were disposed of by the said companymon judgment by the Kerala High Court. P.2 was number justified and the demand for interest of a sum of Rs. The Division Bench also held that the liability to honour future bills had ceased on account of the decisions of the Kerala High Court dated December 19, 1985 till the excess payment was adjusted. The Division Bench, therefore, held that there was numberenforceable demand after the decision of the Kerala High Court and the interim order passed by this Court. All the appeals preferred before this Court were allowed by this Court by judgment dated August 26, 1986 upholding the validity of revisions of tariffs by the Board. The Board, thereafter, moved this Court by filing Special leave petitions inter alia challenging the companyrectness of the judgment of the Kerala High Court dated December 19, 1985 striking down the revisions of tariffs. It was also indicated by the Division Bench that even before such adjustments had been fully made, this Court passed interim order and the respondent Company had companyplied with such interim the respondent Company had companyplied with such interim order. Hence, the order quashing the demand for the interest as companytained in Ext. Such demands of interest were also quashed by the Single Bench of the Kerala High Court and the Division Bench also dismissed appeals preferred by the Board following the Judgment dated March 2, 1994 passed in Writ Appeal No. The agreement companytained a provision for payment of power and energy supplied to the Company by the Board within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the invoice by the companysumer, namely the Company. It was inter alia held by the Division Bench in disposing of the said appeal by its judgment dated February 27, 1991, that after the Kerala High Court had struck down the revisions of tariffs and directed adjustment of the excess amount paid towards future demands, the respondent was justified in number making payment of amounts which became due after December 19, 1985. It companyld number also be companytended, therefore, that the responder Company had defaulted in payment of 50 of the future bills as directed to be paid by this Court. An order was passed by the Court at Hongkong for payment of 56,390.92 as principal and 6,336.47 as interest with further sum as companyts. The Division Bench agreed with the view of the learned Single Bench that the respondent Company companyld number be held to have defaulted for number payment of liability which did number factually exist at the relevant time. In the aforesaid circumstances, it companyld number be companytended by the appellant Board that the respondent Company had number companyplied with the directions of this Court. All such Writ Petitions were heard along with the Writ Petition filed by the respondent Company. It was further provided for in the agreement that in default of payment within the stipulated time, the payment was to be made with interest 18 per annum or at such other percentage as would be fixed by the Board from time to time. P.2 of the learned Single Bench was held justified. The finding of the learned Single Judge that there was numberdefault on the part of the respondent Company, as there was numberhing to hold that the respondent Company defaulted on account of its failure to p.w was accepted. M.R.F. It was further directed by this Court that future charges would be companylected to the extent of 50 only and the balance would be adjusted towards the past charges. 6,60.6157 as companytained in Ext. The said M.R.F. Limited hereinafter referred to as the Company is engaged in manufacturing automobile tubes, tread rubber etc. The Division Bench of the High Court also pointed out that the interim order of this Court was passed only on May 15, 1986. The plaintiffs decree holders, however executed decree of payment of principal with interest and received the money decreed in its favour. The said appeal was therefore dismissed by the Division Bench by the impugned order. Such special leave petition was entertained by this Court and an interim order was passed inter alia directing that pending disposal of the appeals before this Court, there would be stay of the refund of charges already companylected. 16265/1991. 49/91. 48/91. Thereupon, on the prayer of the defendants, leave was granted by the Hongkong Court to appeal before the Privy Council. Limited is the respondent in appeal arising out of S.L.P. Such appeal was numbered as W.A. Heard learned Counsel for the parties and the appeals are disposed of by a companymon judgment in view of the fact that in all these matters companymon question of law and fact arise. Such application was refused with companyts. Leave granted in all these five special leave petitions. was quashed. The defendants thereafter applied for a new trial or for a number suit. N. Ray, J. No.
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1995_926.txt
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Section 38 deals with termination of tenancy by landlord for cultivating land personally. 4 The Naib Tehsildar rejected the application on the ground that the Sansthan was number a land holder who companyld cultivate the land personally. 227 of the Constitution which had been filed by appellant Sansthan. 4 under the provisions of s. 38 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Vidarbha Region Act, 1958, hereinafter called the Act. Those proceedings were pending but a numberice under s. 38 of the Act was given to terminate the tenancy without prejudice to the previous proceedings. The appellant is a private religious Trust which is managed by Laxman Anant Mulay who is described as a Wahiwatdar Manager . The main source of income for performing the several acts including the daily worship of the family deity Shri Kalanka Devi is stated to be derived from endowed agricultural land. It was mentioned in the numberice that an earlier numberice under s. 9 1 of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act had been served in the year 1955 that the Sansthan required the aforesaid field for personal cultivation and, therefore, he should give up possession. 94 with ,an area of 30 acres 8 gunthas in Mouza Malrajura, district Akola. S. Barlingay, R. Mahalingier and Ganpat Rai, for the appellant. 862 of 1966. As the numberice was number companyplied with an application was filed on behalf of the appellant under s. 36 of the Act for possession which was opposed by respondent No. 4 is the tenant in field survey No. On January 30, 1961 a numberice was served on behalf of the appellant on respondent No. 40 of 1965. Sastri and S.P. Veerappa, for respondent No. The appellant ultimately filed a petition under Art. Nayar, for respondents Nos. Appeal by special leave from the order dated April 8, 1965 of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the High Court of Bombay dismissing a petition under Art. S.K. His order was companyfirmed by the Sub Divisional Officer and by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal to whom appeals were taken. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Respondent No. 2, 3 and 5.
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1969_82.txt
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This statement of the accused was attested by Head Constable Balwant Singh and Chaukidar Shingara Singh. bore along with 60 cartridges were recovered after digging out some bricks. bore along with 60 live cartridges of the same bore under bricks lying near the main gate of the house. Acting on this statement, the pistol of 9 m.m. The case of the prosecution is on 27 1 89 a police party headed by ASI Dilbagh Singh companysisting of Head Constable Balwant Singly and other police officials was present in the area of Railway crossing Chhebarta. A secret information was received that the appellant was in possession of huge quantity of unlicenced arms and ammunition. He made a statement to the effect that he kept companycealed one pistol of 9 m.m. The prosecution examined PW2 armourer, the investigating officer PW3 and eye witness PW4. The appellant took trial under Section 5 of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act, 1987 for short TADA read with Section 25 of the Arms Act. The case of the appellant as found in the statement under Section 313 of the CrPC was that he had been falsely implicated. However, chaukidar was given up since he was won over by the appellant. Mohan and B.P. The learned judge of the Designated Court on weighing the evidence came to the companyclusion that the discrepancies pointed out by the appellant in the evidence including the delay in sending the fire arm to test whether it was in working companydition would number in any manner affect the credibility of the prosecution case. In as much as he did number have a valid licence, he was proceeded against under Section 5 of TADA. Jeevan Reddy, JJ. A raid was companyducted. In support of his defence he also examined DW 1. The accused appellant was taken into custody.
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1992_500.txt
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7469 of 1997 whereunder he has companycurred with the award passed by the Labour Court which had, on the strength of a companypromise entered into by the Sarpanch of Nava Naroda Gram Panchayat, the 2nd respondent with the workman and on that basis had directed his reinstatement in service on the post of a clerk with full back wages. The learned Single Judge by the impugned order dated 30.7.1998 companysidering the submission opined that there was numbermention in the writ petition that the said companypromise was entered into by the village Sarpanch on account of any fraud or misrepresentation or undue influence that when the Gram Panchayat was made a party and the Sarpanch was representing the said Panchayat, the Sarpanch was entitled under Section 55 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 for brevity, the Act , to sign the companypromise that the Sarpanch being the Chief Officer is the employer of the workman as per sub clause 2 to Section 2 g of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and hence, the companypromise executed between him and the workman was valid and legally enforceable that while interpreting the award on the strength of companypromise, it was open to the Panchayat to reinstate him on the post of Mukadam, the post which he was holding at the time of his retrenchment and that when there was admission in respect of the companypromise before the Labour Court, there was numberillegality in the award passed by the Labour Court. The Gram Panchayat and the Corporation preferred the intra court appeal and as has been stated hereinbefore, the Division Bench relying on a Full Bench decision of the High Court in Revaben wd o Ambalal Motibhai and Ors. vs. Vinubhai Purshottambhai Patel and others1, ruled that the appeal was number maintainable. 1070/1998 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court has opined that against the order of the learned Single Judge under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, an intra court appeal is number maintainable, and also question the defensibility of judgment and order dated 30.7.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. Hence, an appeal has been preferred against the order passed by the Division Bench and another appeal questioning the justifiability of the order passed by the Labour Court that has been affirmed by the learned Single Judge. As has been clarified earlier, we are number delving into the issue whether the intra court appeal was maintainable or number. Being of this view, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. The present appeals, by special leave, assail the judgment and order dated 17.7.2013 in LPA No. Dipak Misra, J.
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2015_285.txt
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Aggrieved, the election petitioner is before us in this appeal. The appellant hereinafter referred to as the election petitioner having lost the election, as a candidate of the Nationalist Congress Party, challenged the election of the first respondent by filing an election petition under Section 80 read with Section 100 1 b and d of the Act. The election of the returned candidate was challenged mainly on the grounds that the election petitioner having submitted 2 sets of the requisite Form 8 Praroop 8 in respect of his election agent Manbir Singh Dagur before the Returning Officer, who having obtained the signatures of the election petitioner as also of the polling election agent in proforma Anulagnak 22 , deliberately did number send the signed Anulagnak 22 of the election petitioner to different polling stations, with the result that his polling agent was number permitted by the polling officer to act as such on the date of polls that the Returning Officer deliberately delayed the distribution of Anulagnak 22 at various polling stations and on account of inaction on his part, election petitioners supporters got companyfused and either did number vote or voted in favour of the first respondent, an Indian National Congress candidate that the first respondent put pressure on the election petitioner to withdraw from the companytest and on his refusal to do so, a rumour was spread by the first respondent that the election petitioner had withdrawn from the election fray and thus the first respondent used companyrupt practice that the first respondent got a fabricated Fatva from Devband circulated among the Muslim voters asking them to cast votes in his favour and thus the Muslim voters were unduly influenced by the issuance of the aforesaid religious Fatva a companyrupt practice that the Polling Officers at various polling stations did number seal Electronic Voting Machines in presence of the election agent of the election petitioner and other candidates and further before the companymencement of companynting the Returning Officer did number get the seal of strong room certified from any of the polling agents and that the Electronic Voting Machines of various polling stations were either changed or were used after the polling time was over, showing misuse of the official machinery in support of the first respondent and, thus, putting a question mark on the fairness of the election. It was pleaded that on account of failure on the part of the election petitioner to file an affidavit in support of his allegations, the entire election petition was liable to be dismissed and allegations of companyrupt practices made in paragraphs 14, 17, 19, 20 and 21 as well as grounds D and E of the election petition were liable to be struck off. The first respondent, who had companytested the election as an Indian National Congress candidate, was declared elected. 1 An election petition a shall companytain a companycise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies b shall set forth full particulars of any companyrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have companymitted such companyrupt practice and the date and place of the companymission of each such practice and c shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 5 of 1908 for the verification of pleadings Provided that where the petitioner alleges any companyrupt practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such companyrupt practice and the particulars thereof. Every election petition shall be tried as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to companyclude the trial within six months from the date on which the election petition is presented to the High Court for trial. On companysideration of the rival stands, the High Court came to the companyclusion that the allegations of companyrupt practices are entirely superfluous in nature the companycise statement of material facts is companypletely lacking and mandatory requirement of an affidavit in support of the allegations of companyrupt practices was also number companyplied with. Election to the State Legislative Assembly of Uttaranchal number Uttarakhand was held on 21st February, 2007. Relying on the decision of this Court in Ravinder Singh Vs.
Janmeja Singh Ors.1, the High Court 2000 8 SCC 191 came to the companyclusion that number filing of affidavit in support of the allegation of companyrupt practices, is an incurable and fatal defect and, therefore, the election petition was liable to be rejected on that ground as well. Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition. The first respondent on being served with numberice, instead of filing a written statement, filed an application under Order VI Rules 16 and 17 and Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in short the Code read with Section 86 of the Act raising a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition, inter alia, on the ground that the petition was lacking in material facts and particulars and was also defective for want of requisite affidavit in support of allegations of companyrupt practice and that since it did number disclose any cause of action, it deserved to be dismissed at the threshold. This appeal under Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 for short the Act is directed against the judgment and order dated 15th January, 2008, rendered by the High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital in Writ Petition No.03 of 2007 M S .
By the impugned order, the High Court, upholding the preliminary objection raised by the first respondent, has dismissed the election petition mainly on the ground that it did number companyply with the mandatory requirement of furnishing material facts so as to disclose cause of action and was number supported by an affidavit in the prescribed form. Contents of petition. In spite of service, the first respondent the elected candidate has number entered appearance. The results were declared on 27th February, 2007. K. JAIN, J.
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2009_1205.txt
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It was decided by the State of Rajasthan that the petitioner should be superseded and the three officers, Sri Hanuman Sharma, Sri Sultan Singh and Sri Ganesh Singh should be companyfirmed in the rank of Deputy Inspector General of Police. It appears that, on March 22, 1966, Sri Hanuman Sharma was promoted as Inspector General of Police, Rajasthan and on April 28, 1966 Sri Sultan Singh was promoted as Additional Inspector General of Police superseding the petitioner. 4 as Additional Inspector General of Police superseding the petitioner. 3 to the post of Inspector General of Police and of respondent No. In April 1955 the question of companyfirmation of the petitioner and of the three other officers, namely, Sri Hanuman Sharma, Sri Sultan Singh and Sri Ganesh Singh to the rank of Deputy Inspector General of Police was taken up. The petitioner was appointed to the Indian Police Service on June 10, 1952 but even before that date Sri Hanuman Sharma, Sri Sultan Singh and Sri Ganesh Singh were appointed to the Indian Police Service in 1951 and they were already officiating as Deputy Inspector General of Police. The case of the petitioner is that in June, 1959 Sri Hanuman Sharma was promoted as Special Inspector General of Police and on June 2, 1961 the post was encadred and Sri Hanuman Sharma was companyfirmed in that post. Sri Hanuman Sharma and Sri Sultan Singh were officiating since April 22, 1952 and Sri Ganesh Singh since May 17, 1952. 3 was promoted as Inspector General of Police, Rajasthan superseding the petitioner, and the other dated April 28, 1966 promoting Sri Sultan Singh, respondent No. 4, Sri Sultan Singh 1945. 3, Sri Hanuman Sharma 1943, and that of respondent No. It was also companytended for the petitioner that his claim was number companysidered in 1955 at the time of companyfirmation of respondents 3 and 4 as Deputy Inspector General of Police or in 1966 at the time of promotion of respondents 3 and 4 to the posts of Inspector General of Police and Additional Inspector General of Police respectively. When the question of companyfirmation of the officers to the post of Deputy Inspector General of Police arose in 1955, the State of Rajasthan companysidered the companyparative merit of all the officers companycerned including that of the petitioner and it was decided to companyfirm respondents 3 4 and Sri Ganesh Singh as Deputy Inspector General of Police in preference to the petitioner in view of their outstanding record and merit and experience in the Police Department. The petitioner, Sri Sant Ram Sharma was appointed to the Indian Police Service on June 10, 1952. It was said that the posts of Inspector General of Police, Additional Inspector General of Police and Deputy Inspector General of Police are selection posts which carry pay above the time scale of pay and for appointment to these selection posts an officer is chosen number merely on the basis of his rank in the Gradation List but on the record of his merit and past experience in the Police Department. The companytention of the petitioner is that he was entitled, as a matter of right, to be appointed as Deputy Inspector General of Police in 1955 and as Inspector General of Police in 1966 as he was shown as the senior most officer in the Gradation List and the orders of the State of Rajasthan in annexures G and H are in violation of the provisions of Rule 6 of the Indian Police Service Regulation of Seniority Rules, 1954. The petitioner has also prayed for a writ in the nature of mandamus companymanding respondents 1 2 to companysider the petitioners claim as the senior most officer in Rajasthan to be promoted to the post of Inspector General of Police. 4 to the post of Additional Inspector General of Police, it was stated that the petitioner had numberright to the selection posts carrying pay above the time scale of pay and that the appointment to those posts was at the discretion of the State of Rajasthan which decided the question after taking into companysideration the merit of all the officers companycerned. 32 of the Constitution should number be granted for quashing two orders of the State of Rajasthan, one dated March 22, 1966 whereby Sri Hanuman Sharma, respondent No. The petitioner was companyfirmed in the Senior Scale of Indian Police Service on June 10, 1954 but the other three officers were companyfirmed in the Senior Scale of the Indian Police Service on March 24, 1953, i.e., more than a year before the companyfirmation of the petitioner. 14 and 16 have been violated and the orders of the State of Rajasthan dated March 22, 1966 and April 28, 1966 should be quashed by the grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari with a direction to the 1st respondent to companysider the petitioners claim N1sC1 9 afresh for being promoted to the post of Inspector General of Police. The allegations of the petitioner have been companytroverted by the State of Rajasthan in its companynter affidavit. The petitioner, Sri Sant Ram Sharma has obtained a rule from this Court calling upon the respondents to show cause why a writ under Art. The numberifications of the State of Rajasthan dated March 22, 1966 and April 28. B. Agarwala, G. C. Kasliwal, Advocate General, Rajasthan, Indu Soni and K. Baldev Mehta, for respondent No. Rule 3 of the Indian Police Service Regulation of Seniority Rules, 1954 required that every officer shall be assigned a year the allotment in accordance with the provisions companytained in that rule. According to this rule the year of allotment of the petitioner was 1942, that of. On September 8, 1954 by a numberification of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, the Indian Police Service Regulation of Seniority Rules, 1954 came into force. 1966 are annexures G and H to the writ petition. It was therefore said that the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Arts. Cause has been shown by Mr. C. B. Agarwala on behalf of the State of Rajasthan and the other respondents to whom numberice of the rule was ordered to be given. C. Chatterjee, K. B. Roastagi, L. M. Singhvi and S. Balakrishnan, for the petitioner. Baldev Mehta and Indu Soni, for respondents Nos. 3 and 4. S. Bindra, A. S. Nambiar and R. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. Petition under Art. As regards the promotion of respondent No. respondent No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition No.
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1967_148.txt
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Abdul Rahiman fell down. Both the deceased Assainar and Abdul Rahiman were supporting the action in removing the earlier Katheeb and when they were about to leave the mosque, accused number 2 exhorted to stab which was heard by PW2 and PW4. Seeing that accused number 1 was in the grips of PW2, accused number 3 dashed to the spot with a dagger stabbed Abdul Rahiman on his hand. Accused number. PW2 requested them to remain there and decide whether the new Katheeb was fit or number. Go and stab and at this spur of moment, companymon intention was developed and accused number 1 and accused number 3 who were having daggers with them, stabbed deceased Assainar and Abdul Rahiman. An incised wound measuring 3 cm X 2.5 cm X 4 cm over the left scapular region. PW2 Mohammed reached at the mosque around 11.30 a.m. and was entrusted with the duty to bring the new Katheeb Mohammed Musliyar. Behind them PW2 and his father and brother came out of the mosque. The Katheeb had given a letter with amorous overtones to one Mimuna. Seeing this, PW2 hugged accused number 1 from behind. In the fateful incident, the Assainar and Abdul Rahiman, father and brother of PW2 and PW4 who were the ocular witnesses of the incident succumbed to the injuries. PW1 made a declaration that the action of the old Katheeb was number proper. 1 and 3 who were standing in the mosque, after the prayer was over, started questioning PW1 regarding the removal of earlier Katheeb. Immediately accused number 1 dashed at PW2s father Assainar and stabbed him right on his back with the dagger. On the basis of the majority opinion, the masjid companymittee terminated the services of earlier Katheeb of the mosque. Just after the prayer, new Katheeb made a brief religious discourse. There was a dispute between the companymittee members who were in favour of the removal of earlier Katheeb and those who opposed. An abrasion measuring 3 cm X 1 cm X 0.5 cm on the right side of forehead. When Abdul Rahiman reached near, accused number 1 stabbed him also on the left side of his neck. Seeing the incident, PW2s brother Abdul Rahiman came running to the spot and threw a stone at accused number 1. Accused number 2 came running to the spot and he with the dagger in his hand stabbed PW2 on his back. 1 and 3 and the companyplainant party including deceased persons and PW2 and PW4 alongwith others came to the mosque and after the prayer was over, a clash occurred regarding the dispute of removal of Katheeb. PW1 again said that the old Katheeb was number terminated in accordance with his personal wish but as decided by the companymittee. All the persons including accused number. Accused number 2 died at the later stage and accused number. Behind PW2 and others, the accused persons also came out in a group. Go and stab. On 6.12.1997 from 10.45 AM onwards, PW21 Doctor companyducted post mortem examination over the dead body of Abdul Rahiman and numbericed the following antimortem injures An incised wound, oblique, 4 cm X 1 cm X 3.5 cm over the left supra clavicular region. According to PW2, accused number 2 called out and stated, there they go Why simply watch? At that time, accused number 1 and accused number 3 appellants herein along with other persons were standing in a group. The learned trial Court and also the High Court has companyfirmed the guilt of both the accused persons accused number 1 and accused number 3 appellants herein . Accused number 2 who was just approaching the companyrtyard of the madrassa suddenly exhorted raising his voice There they go Why simply watch? Inspite of the request made, some people left the place and around 40 persons including the accused remained in the mosque. There was a through and through injury over the apex of the left lung. The injuries numbericed by her was the result of a single stab. Injury number 2 reached the left lung. On 6.12.1997 at 10 AM, PW21 Doctor attached to the Taluk Headquarters Hospital, Kasargod, companyducted postmortem over the dead body of Assainar with the following injuries An incised wound over inter scapular region, right side, close to mid line, 4 X 1 X 4 cm. After analysing the evidence, learned trial Court companyvicted accused number. PW2s father and younger brother hurried along the front companyrtyard of the madrassa to reach the road abutting on the eastern boundary of the companypound. Beneath the first injury ribs 5 th and 6th ribs were found fractured. It was seen that injury number 1 resulted in the total severance of the left carotid artery. 1 and 2 were caused by two separate stabs. The prosecution in support of its case recorded the statements of PW1 to PW25 and also placed on record Exhibits P1 to P38 with material objects MO1 to MO14 and both accused number 1 and accused number 3 in their statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC took the stand that numbersuch incident had taken place as alleged by the prosecution. Assainaron receipt of the stab swayed on his unsteady steps and finally fell down. PW 21 opinioned that the injuries number. Seeing that situation was getting tense, PW1s brother caught PW1 and escorted him to the door and both went out. To unfold the case of the prosecution, the incident alleged to have occurred around 2.15 p.m. on 5 th December, 1995 in front of the Madrassa building situated in the premises of Bardar Masjid, Belincha, Kumbadage village. There was fracture on 3rd and 4th ribs posteriorly, just lateral to the mind clavicular line. 1 and 3 along with other accused persons for offence under Section 143, 148, 323, 324 read with Section 149 IPC and for 302 read with Section 149 IPC and sentenced them to rigorous imprisonment for life vide judgment dated 31 st July, 2006. Injury number 1 was sufficient in the ordinary companyrse of nature to cause death. At 1.45 p.m., the prayer speech was over. The fateful day being Friday, almost all the male members of Jamayath had assembled for prayer. The 3rd injury aberration companyld be the result of fall on the ground. It was also the companytinuation of the second incised wound referred above. 1, 2 3 preferred joint appeal against the impugned judgment of the learned trial Court and the High Court of Kerala after due appraisal of the evidence on record, found all the three accused guilty and companyvicted them under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life vide impugned judgment dated 16 th November, 2007. Afterwards, people began dispersing. 1 and 3 have preferred their appeals to this Court against the impugned judgment. Exhibit P16 is the relevant post mortem certificate. It struck him on his chest.
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2019_919.txt
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Dhanwanti Devi had purchased House No.80B Block Sri Ganganagar from the State of Rajasthan on 7.7.1947 and that except Smt. Dhanwanti Devi and she had bequeathed the same in favour of the appellant Ashutosh on 7.12.1983 and that Smt. 80B Block Sri Ganganagar. An application under Section 144 C.P.C. The District Judge, Sri Ganganagar allowed the application filed by the State of Rajasthan under Section 144 C.P.C. Dhanwanti Devi died in May, 1985. An appeal was preferred by the State of Rajasthan on 12.2.1980, an application under Section 144 C.P.C. Dhanwanti Devi executed a Will on 7.12.1983 and died in the month of May, 1985. Kamla for Rs.37,592.57. The State of Rajasthan impleaded Sharma Co., Smt. Kamla Devi and that the applicant State was entitled to interest from Sharma Co. and that the aforesaid application was maintainable under Sections 144 145 C.P.C. Dhanwanti Devi had executed the Will in order to escape from her liability to the suit claim. The State of Rajasthan filed reply to the application under Order 21 Rule 58 C.P.C. Dhanwanti Devi was number a party to the suit at any point of time. In May, 1987, the District Judge, Sri Ganganagar allowed the application filed by the State of Rajasthan under Section 144 C.P.C. 61,890/ was arrived at as interest on Rs.37,593/ as on 17.10.1992.
on Rs.37,593/ from 17.10.1992 till date. 80B Block Sri Ganganagar be released in his favour as the same can number be attached in execution. It was asserted that Smt. The attachment order in respect of House No.80B Block Sri Ganganagar was passed by the District Judge in Execution Case No. It is number in dispute that the decree amount of Rs.37,593/ was received by the State on 17.10.1992. Dhanwanti Devi, the wife of Shri Shiv Lal Sharma was the exclusive owner of House bearing No. Dhanwanti Devi was the partner of the aforesaid firm to the extent of 12 paise and she was liable for payment of suit liability. was moved on behalf of the State on 2.4.1981 and Smt. Along with the aforesaid surety bonds, House No.79B Block Sri Ganganagar was also furnished against security. It was also held that Smt. It was also stated that Smt. a A decree cannot be executed against a partner when the decree was against the partnership firm b A decree cannot be executed in violation of Order 21 Rules 49 and 50 C.P.C. It was reiterated that the aforesaid house exclusively belonged to Smt. It is number in dispute that the decree was passed against the firm in which Smt. The Additional District and Sessions Judge dismissed the application under Order 21 Rule 58 C.P.C. and held that the action can be taken against Smt. It was further alleged that the appellant Ashutosh had become the exclusive owner of the house pursuant to the Will executed by Smt. She executed a Will dated 7.12.1983 bequeathing the aforesaid house in favour of her daughters son Ashutosh. 2 of 1998 under Order 21 Rule 58 read with Section 96 C.P.C. Ultimately, the District Judge dismissed the application filed under Order 21 Rules 49 and 50 C.P.C. The said companypany filed execution and recovered Rs.37,592.57. The starting point for the litigation is the decree dated 6.6.1970 passed against the State of Rajasthan in respect of the companystruction work of irrigation department. Briefly stated, the facts are that a decree for Rs.37,255.07 was passed against the State of Rajasthan on 6.6.1970 in respect of the companystruction work of irrigation department under Arbitration Act in case No.4 of 1969 entitled Sharma Co. vs. State of Rajasthan. Kamla Devi and Shri Gurbachan Singh as respondents to the said proceedings. The dispute between the parties is only with reference to the interest on the principal amount of Rs.37,593/ as on 17.10.1992, which according to the State, was payable by the Firm. 2 of 1989 on 21.11.1992 on the application of the State. Civil Execution First Appeal No.2 of 1998 and the said appeal was dismissed on 12.11.2003. The Court while allowing the said application held as follows On the basis of the above discussions, we reach to the companyclusion that this application is maintainable under Sections 144, 145 C.P.C. The appeal preferred by the State of Rajasthan against the aforesaid judgment and decree was allowed ex parte by the High Court. The appeal is preferred against the judgment and final order dated 12.11.2003 passed by the High Court of Rajasthan in S.B. Civil Execution First Appeal No.2 of 1998 before the High Court of Rajasthan is the appellant before us by special leave. Learned companynsel appearing for the appellant submitted that Smt. The High Court of Rajasthan dismissed the first appeal filed by the appellant. The attachment of the property was made of the house in question on 21.11.1992. Civil Execution First Appeal No. Civil Execution First appeal No. As against the said amount, two securities were furnished, one by Shri Gurbachan Singh for Rs.2927.57 and another by Smt. The unsuccessful appellant in S.B. and the Review Application was also dismissed on 5.9.1998. It was prayed that House No. Recovery against number applicant No.2 be made up to the extent of Rs.35,592.57 as per the security while the action for the recovery for the interest amount of Rs.37,592.57 Rs.1.1/2 per hundred per month that would be worked out from the date of filing the application dated 21.4.1981 will be taken against number applicant No.1. Several other proceedings were taken thereafter by both the parties opposing attachment and the execution etc. Thereupon the appellant filed S.B. The Review Application filed by the appellant was also dismissed. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed S.B. was moved on behalf of the State which was registered as Civil Misc. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order dated 12.11.2003, the appellant preferred the above appeal. It is stated that the probate proceedings are pending in respect of the aforesaid Will. against the number applicant Nos. 2 of 1998 whereby the appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed. 1 and 2 and the applicant is fully entitled to get the action taken. Case No.2 of 1981. Civil No.4120 OF 2004 Dr. AR. Though the argument of Mr. Aruneshwar Gupta appears to be attractive on the first blush, yet on a reconsideration and re appreciation of the same, the said submission has numbermerits. We shall number advert to the submissions made by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondent State. The High Court held that the Will was prepared to defraud the creditor and number with an intention to bonafidely bequeath the property to the appellant, daughters son. Both the parties are in the legal battlefield for all these years. Both the companytentions raised by the learned companynsel appearing for the appellant have absolutely numbermerit. filed by the appellant herein. Lakshmanan, J. Now the parties are in this Court. The appellant has also succeeded before the trial Court. Arising out of S.L.P. Leave granted.
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2005_364.txt
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Bhana and Smt. Banti and Smt. Banti but because of strained relations of Bhana and Smt. It was claimed by him that the aforesaid gift by late Bhana in favour of Smt. Banti was to companytinue to have the rights in the property only during the life time of Bhana and was number an absolute owner. Banti would number affect the reversionary rights of Darshan Singh and would operate only during the life time of Bhana. To settle the dispute between them, Bhana parted the suit land to Smt. The plaintiffs along with one Gurdev Kaur were the children of aforesaid Bhana from his first wife Bhago and after the death of his wife Bhago , Bhana was remarried to Smt. Banti, they started living separately. The appellant companytested the suit and it was claimed by her that Banti was the absolute owner of the suit property. Original plaintiffs, Darshan Singh son of Bhana, and Amriti and Udhi alias Iqbal Kaur, daughters of Bhana filed a suit for Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by possession of the subject land in dispute. Banti qua the ancestral property would number affect the reversionary rights of Darshan Singh original plaintiff . It was claimed that Smt. Banti by way of gift for her maintenance way back in the year 1950. Banti had a daughter, namely, Ajit Kaur appellant from the aforesaid wedlock. Both the wills set up by the plaintiffs dated 5th January, 1973 and the defendants dated 21 st February, 1973 were held to be executed by Bhana. Banti companyld number be held to be the absolute owner of the suit property even after the companymencement of the Act, 1956 inasmuch as her title to the suit property was to operate only during the life time of Bhana who died on 27 th March, 1973. Banti bearing number 3813 sanctioned on 25 th February, 1950. On reappraisal of the evidence on record, the appellate Court reversed the findings of the trial Court with regard to Banti having become absolute owner of the suit property on the basis of an oral gift executed by Bhana in the year 1950 and the gift came to be set aside and held that Smt. Since Bhana died on 27th March, 1973 and prior to his death, he had executed a registered will dated 5th January, 1973 whereby he bequeathed his estate in favour of plaintiffs Darshan Singh and others by excluding Smt. It was claimed by the NEETU KHAJURIA Date 2019.04.04 171441 IST Reason plaintiffs that Bhana, son of Moti was the original owner of the subject properties in dispute. The aforesaid gift came to be challenged by the original plaintiff Darshan Singh in a Civil Suit No. Banti came to be dismissed by the High Court on 3rd November, 1959. The aforesaid civil suit filed at the instance of Darshan Singh was decreed by the learned trial Court vide judgment dated 30 th June, 1954 and it was held that the aforesaid gift by late Bhana in favour of Smt. According to the will dated 5th January, 1973, the original plaintiffs became entitled to claim the property of Bhana deceased including the land in dispute to the exclusion of the present appellant. It was stated in the will dated 5th January, 1973 that Smt. 193/1955 filed at her instance Smt. Amriti, Udi alias Iqbal Kaur and son Darshan Singh in three equal shares. 933/1984 decided on 28th July, 2004 held to be validly executed and based on the recital of the will, it was held that the plaintiffs became entitled to succeed to the entire property of Bhana deceased including the land in dispute to the exclusion of defendant appellant herein . The will as claimed by the plaintiffs dated 5 th January, 1973 was also companytested. In reference to the aforesaid will dated 5 th January, 1973, Civil Suit No. Banti was residing separately for almost 20 years and questioned her character having illegitimate relations with Maal Singh, son of Nihal Singh, r o Bada Pind and despite that, the testator has taken care of her maintenance. The will dated 5th January, 1973 came to be executed in supersession of the earlier will dated 11 th April, 1956 and for the aforesaid reason, it was stated by the testator that the entire property after his death be devolved to his daughter Smt. 101/1954 preferred by Banti against the aforesaid judgment and decree was dismissed by learned District Judge vide judgment dated 29th November, 1954 and the Regular Second Appeal No. She even denied the earlier litigation between the parties whereby reversionary rights of Darshan Singh came to be upheld. Ajit Kaur, original defendant number 1 and defendant number 25 appellant herein and other daughter Gurdev Kaur. In furtherance thereof, mutation was also entered in favour of Smt. 15/1975 was filed by the plaintiff for possession. Khanna, learned companynsel for the appellant submits that once this fact is admitted by the parties that Smt. The trial Court in the instant proceedings held that the suit land had been allotted in lieu of the original land during the companysolidation proceedings. On the other hand, the appellant in separate litigation between the parties reached upto the Regular Second Appeal number 933/1984 and the validity of the will dated 5th January, 1973 came to be upheld by the High Court vide judgment dated 28 th July, 2004 and the Special Leave Petition Civil number 24724/2004 preferred at the instance of the appellant came to be dismissed as number pressed. Per companytra, Ms. S. Janani, learned companynsel for the respondents, while supporting the findings recorded by the first appellate Court and companyfirmed by the High Court in appeal submits that the subject land in dispute was mutated in the name of Smt. It may be relevant to numbere that the finding of fact recorded under the impugned judgment in reference to a later will dated 21st February, 1973 on which much emphasis was laid by the present appellant, it was observed that the propounder of the will was legally required number only to prove the due execution of the will but also to dispel all suspicious circumstances which may have existed in its due execution of the aforesaid will and it was observed that the later will dated 21 st February, 1973 claimed by the present appellant cannot be taken to be duly proved and being a finding of fact duly supported by the material on record, we find numberperversity or manifest error in the finding to be reviewed by this Court in the instant appeal. The judgment of the Court of appeal came to be challenged at the instance of the appellant defendant and second appeal before the High Court also came to be dismissed under the impugned judgment dated 28th July, 2004 which is the subject matter of challenge in the instant appeal. There was even a litigation between them. This is the defendants appeal by special leave against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated 28th July, 2004 and arises in the following circumstances. Rastogi, J. Mr. J.M. 103/1953 for declaration under the customary law. The Civil Appeal No.
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2019_1137.txt
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assignment of 23.12.1994 in favour of defendant Nos. Defendant Nos. First defendant claims deed of assignment from second defendant by assignment deed dated 21.03.1997. Defendant No.3 had also lodged companyplaint against 4th defendant and plaintiffs at Mumbai. Under deed of assignment dated 17.10.1994, the 4th defendant had assigned the rights to third defendant and third defendant in turn assigned the rights to second defendant by deed of assignment dated 16.03.1997. The plaintiffs case in the plaint was that plaintiffs have assigned telecasting right of 16 schedule films by 6 assignment deeds dated 23.12.1994 for a period of 9 years in favour of defendant No.5 to 8 as requested by defendant No.4. Defendant No.2 adopted the written statement filed by defendant No.3. Films, the plaintiffs on 23.12.1994 assigned to four persons numberinated by 4th defendant satellite broadcasting rights of 16 Hindi films for a period of 9 years. Although, the above plaintiffs have already been divested of their rights by assignment dated 10.10.1994 with 4th defendant. The assignments were made by six assignment deeds all dated 23.12.1994. Furthermore, it was the case of the defendant No.3 itself that dispute between defendant No.3 and 4 subsided when the suit filed by defendant No.3 was returned in the year 1995 itself. The plaintiffs claim for the right of schedule films arose only after 22.12.2003. It was on 22.12.2003 that plaintiffs again became entitled to assign telecasting rights of the aforesaid 16 films after the expiry of the period of 9 years of assigning the telecasting right of 16 films to defendant Nos.5 to 8 on the request of the defendant No.4 on valuable companysideration. Defendant No.5 to 8 for valuable companysideration received by the plaintiffs from fourth defendant and acknowledging said assignment and receipt of the companysideration vide letter dated 23.12.1994. When the plaintiffs had already parted with their right of telecasting films on 23.12.1994 there companyld number have been any threat to their right in the year 1995. The transactions alleged to have been entered into between 4th defendant and 3rd defendant in respect of 16 films was held number to be proved. A7 to A12, plaintiffs companyld establish their claims in respect of assignment agreement entered into by plaintiffs with fourth defendant and their assignment rights over the suit schedule films and also expiry of the period of said assignment prior to the date of filing of this suit. A7 to A12 are assignment agreements pertaining to Defendant Nos.5 to 8. Whether the plaintiffs acquiesced the infringement of companyy right of the scheduled films? When the plaintiffs assigned their rights to defendant Nos.5 to 8 on the request of defendant No.4 for a period of 9 years, plaintiffs having parted with their satellite rights companyld number have claimed any right for telecasting during the aforesaid period of 9 years. It is the companytention of the plaintiffs that Sr.
D. Rama Naidu, representing plaintiffs firm has entered into assigned agreement with fourth defendant and assigned satellite and broadcasting rights over the suit schedule films for a period of nine years from 23.12.1994 to the numberinees of fourth defendant i.e. No.221 to 225 of 1995 for declaration and injunction against plaintiff No.1 and defendant Nos. Doordarshan and world satellite rights in the said 16 films in favour of 4th defendant on 10.10.1994 for a valuable companysideration of Rs.55,00,000/ . The trial companyrt by its judgment dismissed the plaintiffs suit having accepted the case of the plaintiffs regarding assignment of telecasting rights of said schedule films i.e. They having parted with their right, there was numberreal threat to their right by any inter se dispute between defendant Nos.4 and 3 or other defendants. The 6 assignment deeds dated 23.12.1994 was alleged to be manufactured for the purpose of claiming rights in the suit scheduled films. A legal numberice from first defendant on 14.10.2003 in reply to the numberice of the plaintiffs was received where defendant No.1 claimed that they have acquired satellite broadcasting, Pay TV and Cable TV rights of all above 16 Hindi films from defendant No.2, M s. B.N.U. The agreement dated 23.12.1994 was held to be proved whereas defendants have failed to prove the assignment dated 10.10.1994. Defendant No.3 also filed a written statement which was in the line of the written statement filed by defendant No.1. The suit which was filed in the year 1995 by defendant No.3 against defendant No.4 in the Small Causes Court, Mumbai where assignments dated 10.10.1994 and 17.10.1994 were referred to got dismissed in the year 1995 itself as Small Causes Court had numberjurisdiction to companysider the claim of defendant No.3. First defendant filed written statement. While answering Issue Nos.4 to 9 especially assignment deed dated 23.12.1994 by the plaintiff in favour of defendant No.5 to 8 at the instance of defendant No.4, the trial companyrt recorded the following finding It is an undisputed fact that originally companyyright holders in respect of suit schedule films have been the plaintiffs firms only. No evidence is adduced on record to establish the claims of the companytesting defendants in respect of transfer of satellite broadcasting rights over the suit schedule films from one to another among Defendant Nos.3 and 4. It is further submitted that defendant Nos.4 to 8 had filed O.s. The plaintiffs issued a public numberice in the Film Information Magazine on 27.09.2003 with respect to the above said 16 Hindi films. Several criminal proceedings were filed by the plaintiffs as well as by defendant Nos.3 to 8. On a request of 4th defendant, M s. N.S. 5 to 8 at the request of defendant No.4 for 9 years. It was pleaded that the plaintiffs were very well aware of as back as 1994 rights acquired from the plaintiffs on 10.10.1994. The first defendant called upon the plaintiffs to withdraw the said public numberice. Further, documents relating to transaction alleged to have been entered into between fourth defendant and third defendant in respect of these films, also have number been produced before the Court. The plaintiffs sent reply dated 17.10.2003 refuting the facts in the numberice of the first defendant. Inter se dispute between defendant Nos.4 and 3 which begun with filing suit in Mumbai companyld number have been any cause of action for the plaintiffs to file a suit claiming telecasting rights for themselves. The plaintiff having already assigned their right for a period of 9 years by assignment deed dated 23.12.1994, there was numbercause of action during the aforesaid period of 9 years. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration as prayed for? Reference of Suit No.221 to 225 of 1995 filed by the defendant Nos.4 to 8 was also made which were dismissed on 31.08.2000, the defendant No.3 claimed to be bona fide purchasers of suit scheduled 16 films for a valuable companysideration, with regard to Small Causes Suit Nos. The trial companyrt while discussing Issue No.1 had observed that cause of occasion arose in the year 1995 itself when the plaintiff got knowledge of claim of the first defendant over the given films and plaintiffs have chosen to file the suit in the year 2003 in respect of agreement dated 10.10.1994. First defendant pleaded that from 21.03.1997 it has been exercising the satellite broadcasting rights acquired under the deed of assignment and the suit scheduled films have been telecasted as many as 223 times on various occasions since August 1997 till date. In the year 1995, plaintiffs came to know about the pendency of the Small Causes Suit filed in Bombay, Small Causes Suit No.281 of 1995 by 3rd defendant, M s. Asia Vision against the 4th defendant seeking for relief of declaration and injunction in respect of above 16 films, on the basis of certain documents purporting to be a deed of assignment dated 07.10.1994 and declaration dated 15.10.1994 allegedly assigned by D. Suresh Babu assigning satellite and Doordarshan rights in favour of 4th defendant. The plaintiffs have been carrying on business of producing, distributing and exhibiting cinematographic films. Issue No.3 was also decided in favour of the plaintiffs. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the perpetual injunction as prayed for? 281 of 1995 filed by defendant No.3 against defendant No.4 through Mrs. Nalini Shanker it was stated that it was number necessary to pursue as Small Causes Court, Mumbai was number having jurisdiction. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the damages, as prayed for? The plaintiffs filed Original Suit No.392 of 2003 on 11.11.2003 before the Chief Judge, City Civil Courts, Hyderabad, for declaration that defendant Nos.1 to 4 have numbermanner of right, title and interest in the Copyright in respect of the scheduled films, to pass a decree of perpetual injunction against defendant Nos. Plaintiff Nos.1 to 4 has also filed S.No.16 of 1996 in the Court of Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad against defendant Nos.3,4 and 8 qua 3 films. The trial companyrt in its judgment while companysidering the Issue Nos.4 to 9 has specifically companysidered the assignment deed dated 23.12.1994. They have number even cross examined the witnesses examined for plaintiff and first defendant and they have number adduced any evidence either. Defendant No.1 aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court has companye up in this appeal. The High Court held that in the year 1995 defendant Nos.1 and 2 were number in the scene and so the question of plaintiffs taking action against them does number arise. Co. had in turn acquired the said rights from M s. Asia Vision, defendant No.3, vide agreement dated 16.03.1997. It held that to the plaintiffs cause of action arose for the first time when defendant No.1 issued numberice dated 14.10.2003 and the suit having filed immediately thereafter was well within time. The High Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. Co. vide deed of assignment dated 21.03.1997 for a period of 99 years and that, M s. B.N.U. This appeal has been filed by the defendant against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh dated 11.03.2016 allowing the plaintiffs appeal. It was pleaded that D. Suresh Babu representing the plaintiff Nos.1, 3 and 4 assigned T.V. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the delivery of tapes etc.,
as prayed for? The High Court after companysidering the submissions of the learned companynsel of the parties held that suit filed by the plaintiffs was number barred by limitation. Thus, it is to be taken that, they are number actually disputing with the claims of the plaintiffs. Trial companyrt, however, in view of finding on Issue No.1 that suit is barred by limitation dismissed the suit by its judgment dated 09.03.2011. The trial companyrt framed the following 10 issues Whether the suit is barred by limitation? PW.1, D. Suresh Babu who appeared as witness in the present suit admitted having knowledge of the suit filed in the Bombay Court. Whether the suit is barred by res judicata in view of decree in O.S.Nos.18 to 21 of 1996? Shri Ramesh Babu, Director of first plaintiff lodged a companyplaint with the Police Station, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad companyplaining about the said forgery. To what relief? The suit at Bombay was filed on the basis of numberarised of the said forged documents. The plaintiffs aggrieved by the judgment of the trial companyrt filed appeal before the Hight Court which appeal has been allowed by the High Court by impugned judgment dated 11.03.2016. 3 and 4 before the City Civil Court, Hyderabad which suit was subsequently dismissed. However, suit filed by the other parties came to be dismissed for default and companytroversy was subsided. 4,5,6 and 8 have number chosen to companytest the suit by filing written statement, though they appeared before the Court through their respective advocates. Brief facts of the case for deciding this appeal are Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by MEENAKSHI KOHLI Date 2020.02.26 095436 IST The parties shall be referred to as described in Reason the suit. By examining P.W.1 before the companyrt and by producing Exs. Neither original number any authenticated companyy of the said document is produced before the Court. This Court in Daya Singh and another vs. Gurdev Singh Dead by Lrs. ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. D.W.1 also accepted the same. 1 to 4. The allegations made in the plaint were denied.
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2020_156.txt
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It reads To The Pay Accounts Officer, Rajya Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi. 4, in the hands of the Rajya Sabha Secretariat, was sought and ordered. A warrant or attachment of the funds of respondent No. 2193 50. The appellant, the Union of India, has companye up in appeal, by special leave, challenging a laconic order of dismissal in Civil Revision made by the Delhi High Court, thus upholding the view of the executing companyrt over ruling the companytention of the State, objecting to the attachment of certain provident fund and pension dues held by Union of India on behalf of the Rajya Sabha Secretariat in trust for the judgment debtor who had been employed in the Rajya Sabha Secretariat. Whereas judgment debtor No. 2179 of 1970. 516/66 in favour of M s Jyoti Chit Fund and Finance P. Ltd., for Rs. It is ordered that the defendant judgment debtor is hereby prohibited and restrained until the further order of this Court from receiving from the Pay and Accounts Officer the following property in possession of the said Pay and Accounts Officer that is to say Rs. 2193 50 to which the defendant judgment debtor is entitled, subject to any claim of the said J. D. and the said Pay and Accounts Officer is hereby prohibited and restrained, until the further order of this companyrt from delivering of the said property to any person. On service of the attachment order, objection was raised by the appellant, Union of India, on January 30, 1969 on the score that provident fund amounts and pensionary benefits were number liable to attachment and therefore the order may be rescinded. 3, Shri S. Krishnaswamy, an ex reporter has failed to satisfy a decree passed against him on the 31st day of March, 1967 in suit No. 26 of 1970. On March 31, 1967 a money decree for a little over Rs. Sd Sub Judge 1st Class, Delhi. We may number move on to a companysideration of the basic companytentions and, before that, the basic facts may be briefly set down. L. Sanghi, Girish Chandra and S. P. Nayar for the Appellants. The objections, if made, will be decided afresh on merits. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 1st May, 1970 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Revision No. The decree holder respondent 1 successfully companytested in the trial companyrt and on the objection being over ruled, the appellant moved the High Court. 516 of 1966 in favour of respondent No. 2,000/ was passed in Suit No. Given under my hand and seal of the Court on 12th day of September 1968. 1 and against respondents 2 to 4 who are ex parte . CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1976_68.txt
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It is then said that Bengali was also used side by side with English for elucidation of the companytents of lectures in English.
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1972_602.txt
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Whether direct recruits were entitled to the benefit of rotation in determination of seniority. The direct recruits companyld number be given seniority for the period prior to their appointment. The direct recruits as well as the promotees were aggrieved by the determination of their seniority and challenged the same by filing Writ Petitions. After the appointments, the dispute of seniority cropped up. The direct recruits claimed that they were entitled to be given seniority as per rota system laid down under the Rules and that they had been wrongly placed junior to the promotees. The Committee thus held that they were entitled to en bloc seniority without rota system. Thus, Writ Petition SB No.16569 of 2016 was dismissed and objection of the promotees to their seniority was rejected. Objections to the said tentative seniority lists were companysidered in the said report. The Committee took up determination of vacancy and fixation of seniority for the HJS officers appointed upto 1998 2000 which was finalized on 1st August, 2011. The promotees claimed that their seniority should companymence from the date of accrual of vacancy, date of their eligibility and officiation and number from the date of actual appointment. Thereafter, determination of vacancies and fixation of seniority of 2007 and 2009 recruitments was companysidered by the companymittee vide its report dated 23 rd September, 2015 and 6th April, 2016. Accordingly, the writ petitioners sought determination of seniority by applying roster system. The High Court examined two questions Whether promotees were entitled to seniority prior to their appointment on the ground that requirement of suitability test was introduced for the first time in the year 2007 and they had a vested right to be promoted against the earlier vacancies without the suitability test. For the recruitment year 2009, calculation of vacancies was finalized on 24th March, 2009. Challenge was also to the reports of the Committees and decision of the Full Court in so far as objections to seniority list were rejected. They were recruited only after the suitability test was held for the first time in the year 2008. Direct recruited officers to the UPHJS were appointed between 11 th September, 2008 and 24th November, 2008. The view of the Committee was that rota system will create imbalance and injustice. The Committee determined vacancies vide its report dated 7 th February, 2012 on the basis of which tentative seniority lists dated 25 th July, 2013 and 18th December, 2014 were published. Direct recruits for the year 2009 were appointed between 24th December, 2010 to 20th April, 2011. According to the said writ petitioners, they were entitled to seniority from the date of their eligibility, without their passing of the suitability test which was retrospectively prescribed for the first time on 9 th January, 2007. In Writ Petition SB No.1880 of 2017 filed by the direct recruits, respondents 134 to 173, along with others before the High Court, prayer was for quashing the final seniority Report dated 23rd September, 2015 of Committee of High Court Judges , supplementary report dated 6 th April, 2016 also of a Committee of High Court Judges and for a direction to redetermine seniority of the writ petitioners who were the direct recruits on the basis of rotational system proportionate to their quota, apart from other incidental prayers. Only after 25th August, 2004 determination of vacancies took place. The report of the Committee dated 23 rd September, 2015 was in companytinuation of its earlier reports finalizing seniority lists dated 6th May, 1995 and 13th July, 2011, with reference to officers recruited prior to 2007. No direct recruitment was made after 1998 2000 upto 2005. The petitioners in the said writ petition were promoted against vacancies of the years 2002 onwards but the said vacancies were actually determined later. Appointments were numberified on 7 th September, 2010. Promotions and direct recruitments were made in respect of the said selection in the year 2005. In Writ Petition SB No.16569 of 2016 filed by the promotees, challenge was to the validity of the Amendment Rules, 2006 in so far as the Rules were retrospective. Promotions and direct recruitments which are subject matter of the present case were made in 2008/2009. Though, process for appointment was companyducted simultaneously, the select lists were also forwarded to the Court simultaneously, due to observance of certain formalities, letters of appointment for direct recruits were given later to the promotion being affected. The retrospectivity of the Rules prescribed suitability test was valid particularly in view of judgment of this Court in V.K. Same was the position with regard to 2009 recruitments. The High Court and the affected officers defended the report of the Committee as approved by the Full Court. Select list was approved by the Full Court on 9th January, 2010. The question companysidered by the Committee was whether long officiation by officers of UPNS should be given due credit so that they may number suffer on account of delay in holding suitability test. Suitability test was number held due to number amendment of the Rules upto 9th January, 2007 inspite of judgment of this Court dated 21st March, 2002. Vide order dated 11th August, 2008, appointments to the UPHJS by way of promotion were made. It was held that numberdetermination of vacancies had taken place on account of pendency of litigation which was finalized on 25th August, 2004. Thus, from 21 st March, 2002 to 2008 since a different regime of Rules was stipulated under the judgment of this Court in All India Judges case supra and the Rules were amended by the High Court only on 9th January, 2007, in spite of availability of vacancies in promotion quota, the promotee officers who were eligible and were officiating against the said vacancies, companyld number be recruited. The same was approved by the Full Court on 14th June, 2016. The High Court appointed a Committee to go into the matter. Srivastava supra .
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2018_120.txt
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However, the insurer had excluded STFI perils while issuing a policy companyer of Rs 60 lakhs. These together are referred to as STFI Perils. The insurer accepted and paid the claim of Rs 23 lakhs under the policy companyer of Rs 25 lakhs but repudiated the entire claim under the policy companyer of Rs 60 lakhs. Hence for 2005 06, the policy companyer of Rs 60 lakhs extended to fire and allied perils but specifically excluded STFI perils. For 2005 06, the bank had renewed the policies of Rs 60 lakhs and Rs 25 lakhs. The State Commission held that the insurer companyld number be held liable since STFI perils had been excluded from the policy companyer of Rs 60 lakhs and the excess premium of Rs 992 had been refunded to the bank on 26 September 2005. From 2001, the insurance policy was renamed as a Standard Fire and Special Perils Policy. There was an exchange of companyrespondence between the bank and the insurer. On 26 September 2005, the premium of Rs 992 companyering STFI perils was refunded by the insurer to the bank by a cheque which was deposited by the bank in the appellants account. According to the bank, a companyy of the policy was given to the appellants from which the exclusion of STFI perils would have been evident. For 2002 03, the insurer issued a policy companyering a sum insured of Rs 25 lakhs in terms of the same location at Meghdoot Apartment, Surat numbered above. In 2001 02 the value of the insurance companyer was enhanced by an amount of Rs 25 lakhs so as to increase the total sum insured to Rs 85 lakhs. The bank, by its letter dated 11 November 2006, submitted that it was surprised as to how the policy companyer of Rs 60 lakhs had companytained an exclusion of STFI perils despite the fact that both the policies had been renewed under a companymon proposal form and through a single cheque. The first respondent obtained the first insurance policy for the period 1998 99 in the sum of Rs 60 lakhs from the insurer, who is the third respondent to the appeal. 9 A companysumer companyplaint was instituted by the appellants on 26 July 2008 before the State Commission, Gujarat alleging that the insurer had companymitted an unfair trade practice by repudiating the claim under the insurance companyer of Rs 60 lakhs. The appellants made a claim to the insurer for an alleged loss of Rs 78,66,857. The insurer repudiated the claim of the appellants on 24 June 2008. The insurance policy companyered a specific location of the borrower where the goods were stored, namely 12/1123 1124, Basement, Meghdoot Apartment, Surat 4 The policies of insurance for the succeeding years 1999 2000, 2000 2001 and 2001 02 companyered the goods of the borrower stored at the above premises. 3 The first respondent bank has stated that it was acting as a companyporate agent of the insurer and, as a matter of routine practice, obtained policies for all its borrowers. However, a separate insurance companyer in the amount of Rs 60 lakhs was issued in respect of the goods stored at following location B 205, Plot No 17 B, Village Karnaj 5 Similarly, for 2003 04 and 2004 05 there were two insurance companyers one in the amount of Rs 25 lakhs in respect of the location at Meghdoot Apartment, Surat and the second in the amount of Rs 60 lakhs companyering the location at B 205, Plot 17 B, Village Karnaj. The claim of the appellants arose under an insurance companyer pertaining to goods hypothecated by the appellants with the first respondent under a cash credit facility. The perils insured included those occasioned by storm, tornado, flood and inundation. A surveyor was appointed by the insurer to inspect the extent of damage. 10 In its written statement before the State Commission, the bank stated that according to the terms of the agreement governing the grant of credit facilities, the primary duty of obtaining a companyer of insurance for the hypothecated goods was that of the appellants as borrowers. An affidavit dated 6 September 2007 of the Manager of the bank was filed stating that the bank was a companyporate agent and was working on behalf of the insurer. The insurer, New India Assurance Company Limited, repudiated the claim of the appellants. Clause 15 also companytained a stipulation that in the event that the appellants failed to insure the goods, it was open to the bank to secure a companyer of insurance for the goods and to recover the expenses incurred along with the premium from the appellants. In addition, the State Commission awarded Rs 25,000 towards mental agony and Rs 5,000 towards litigation companyts. In terms of clause 15 of the agreement, the appellants were under an obligation to insure the goods which were hypothecated to the bank. The appellants claim that as a result of the floods the goods which were stored in their premises were destroyed. The State Commission found substance in the companysumer companyplaint of the appellants and decreed their claim for companypensation in the amount of Rs 53,66,877 with interest at 9 percent per annum. 12 The State Commission, by its order dated 14 February 2019, allowed the companyplaint only against the bank and its manager, who were directed to pay an amount of Rs 55,66,877 together with interest of 9 percent per annum and damages on account of mental agony of Rs 25,000. As a Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SANJAY KUMAR Date 2020.01.28 121915 IST Reason 1 National Commission 2 State Commission companysequence of the order of the National Commission which is challenged in the present appeal, the claim of the appellants stands rejected. As a practice, the first respondent upon receipt of an intimation, would remit the premium payable on behalf of the borrowers. Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J 1 The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission 1 allowed an appeal instituted by the first respondent and set aside the decision of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission of Gujarat 2. 8 On 7 August 2006, the city of Surat was hit by floods. 2 On 31 May 1998, the appellants and the first respondent entered into an agreement for a cash credit facility. The same companyrse of action was followed by the first respondent under the lending facility granted to the appellants.
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2020_83.txt
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Two applications, one by Baru and 49 others and the other by Rameshwar and 3 others were made to be District Canal Officer under the Provisions of the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 Hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1873 for shifting the heads of the aforesaid waters companyrses but these applications were rejected by the District Canal Officer. The High Court which was then moved in writ jurisdiction quashed the orders of the Superintending Canal Officer at the instance of the Dalip Singh and others on the ground that numberrevision lay to the Superintending Canal Officer under the provisions of the Act of 1873 in the circumstances of the case. Thereupon the aforesaid applicants filed separate revisions before the Superintending Canal Officer who allowed the tame and passed orders for shifting of the heads of the water companyrses alluded to above as prayed for by the revisionists. Hissar by R. Ds. 1000 and 1900. Aggrieved by the judgment and order of the High Court, the appellants have companye up to this Court.
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1978_122.txt
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The Committee went into the affairs of the higher education in the State. Consequently, the Government of Andhra Pradesh enacted Andhra Pradesh State Council of Higher Education Act, 1988. To evolve perspective plans for development of higher education in the State. The Commissionerate Act was enacted purported to be pursuant to or in furtherance of the recommendations of the Vice Chancellors Committee on higher education in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The pressing need for companystituting effective machinery for promotion and companyrdination of higher education at the State level and companyrdination of State level programmes with those of the UGC was felt and pursuant thereto and in furtherance thereof, UGC formulated guidelines for setting up of such Councils as recommended by the Committee. In the year 1986 the State of Andhra Pradesh passed an Act known as the Andhra Pradesh Commissionerate of Higher Education Act, 1986 hereinafter called as the Commissionerate Act . It recommended to the State Government the need to pass a proper legislation to streamline the higher education. 8.0 Powers and Functions of the Council The Council shall function for companyrdination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institution in accordance with the guidelines issued by the UGC from time to time. 8.1 Planning and Coordination To prepare companysolidated programmes in the sphere of higher education in the State in accordance with the guidelines that may be issued by the UGC from time to time, and to assist in their implementation. Such Councils were proposed to be set up as statutory bodies having regard to the fact that there did number exist any effective machinery for planning and companyrdination of higher education at the State level vis vis implementation of the programmes made by the University Grants Commission UGC . Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said recommendations revised guidelines as approved by the Commission were issued in January, 1988 and relying on or acting on the basis thereof the Government of Andhra Pradesh decided to fill up the gaps by companystituting State Council of Higher Education as recommended in the National Education Policy of the Government of India as also in terms of the recommendations made by the Committee companystituted by the UGC. The fact leading to filing of the Writ Petition by the respondent herein questioning the vires of the 1988 Act arose in the following circumstances The Central Government evolved a National Education Policy in the year 1986 pursuant whereto and in furtherance whereof, recommendations were made for creating a State Level Planning for companyrdination of the Higher Education through Councils of Higher Education. To forward the development programmes of universities and companyleges in the State to UGC along with its companyments and recommendations. The relevant extracts of the revised guidelines as approved by the Commission in January, 1988 are as under 2.0 Setting up of the Council In order to achieve the objectives set out above, the Central Government may advise State Governments for enacting legislation for setting up of State Councils of Higher Education in the States. In the light of the judgment, the Department of Education, Government of India requested the Commission to review the guidelines. With a view to give effect to the said policy, UGC companystituted a companymittee to go into the said matter and make recommendations regarding setting up of the said Councils of higher education and programme of action to be taken in that behalf. 3986 of 2001 B. SINHA, J Whether the State of Andhra Pradesh had the legislative companypetence to enact Andhra Pradesh State Council of Higher Education Act, 1988 Act 16 of 1988 hereinafter called as the 1988 Act is the companye question involved in these appeals which arise out of a judgment and order passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. The companyrectness of the judgment of this Court in Osmania University Teachers Association supra was doubted by a two Judge Bench inter alia on the ground that the Commissionerate Act as also the 1988 Act dealt number only with higher education but also with intermediate education and having regard to the fact that Entry 66, List I of the VII Schedule of the Constitution of India does number deal with intermediate education, the entire Act companyld number have been struck down. 17222 of 1988. To assist UGC in respect of determination and maintenance of standards and suggest remedial action wherever necessary, in accordance with the guidelines. A companyy of the Annual Report should be sent to University Grants Commission. The State Government accepted the recommendations and passed the Act in question. To monitor the progress of implementation of such development programmes. Accordingly, the guidelines were reviewed with the help of the law panel of the Commission. However, on an appeal thereagainst this Court in Osmania University Teachers Association Vs.
State of Andhra Pradesh and Another 1987 4 SCC 671 held that the State Legislature had numberlegislative companypetence therefor. The impugned Act was the result of a report from a High Power Committee companystituted by the State Government. As a necessary fallout of the said decision, guidelines were sought to be reviewed wherefor request was made by the Government of India to the Commission. 11.0 Annual Report The Council shall prepare an Annual Report giving an account of its activities during the previous year and companyies thereof shall be forwarded to the State Government and the Government shall cause the same to be laid before the Legislative Assembly. The companystitutionality of the said Act inter alia was questioned on the ground of lack of legislative companypetence having regard to the parliamentary Act known as University Grants Commission Act enacted in terms of Entry 66, List I of the VII Schedule of the Constitution of India. In an Indian state where the number of universities are too few, an advisory body may be set up to fulfil the above objectives. The said writ petitions were filed by the respondent herein and four others as also the Osmania University Teachers Association. The Committee found as a fact that there is numberproper companyordination and academic planning among the various bodies. The said writ petitions were dismissed by a Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court by a judgment dated 24.03.1987. It, by reason by the impugned judgment, was allowed by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The Committee examined among other things, the curricula and companyrses of studies. On the same premise which led to the declaration of 1986 Act as ultra vires the Constitution, a Writ Petition came to be filed. JUDGMENT with Civil Appeal No.
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2003_170.txt
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The remaining letters were written by the wife to the husband or Amit from Delhi between 14th and 24th February 1978, and March 1, 1978. It was further claimed that on February 10, 1978, the husbands mother and the wifes mother in law died at Patiala. The wife and her father participated in the obsequies by going over to Patiala on February 12, 1978. The evidence in regard to reconciliation when the husband had companye to Delhi between January 30, 1978, and February 3, 1978 was disbelieved it was found that the wife had number been permitted to stay in the house of the brother of the husband at Patiala where the mother had died and the Pagri money which had been given by the wifes father had been returned on May 2, 1978, under a companyering letter features which militated against the plea of reconciliation. Between January 30, 1978, and February 3, 1978, the husband had companye to New Delhi and was staying in the Himachal Pradesh Guest House where there were frequent meetings between the spouses and there was reconciliation. A series of letters written by the wife to the husband or to Amit, their son, were marked as Exhibits R 17 to R 46. The first group companyering Exhibits R 17 to R 26 was written from Patiala Circuit House to the husband or the son between February 17, 1978.
and February 20, 1978, when the husband was participating in the obsequies. The husband entered companytest. The husband had represented to the wife that on May 18, 1978, to which the proceeding had been adjourned in Court, she need number appear as the husband would number press the application because of improvement of relationship between them. The husband applied to the District Judge at Simla for a decree of divorce in June, 1977. On the adjourned day, the wife did number appear and the case was set ex parte and was adjourned to May 26, 1978 for trial. On that day the husbands evidence was recorded and an ex parte decree for divorce was passed. The wife examined four witnesses on her side while the husband produced six including himself. The learned District Judge rightly enquired into the companyrectness of the plea advanced by the wife that there was reconciliation after September 3, 1979 which justified the wifes keeping away from the proceeding. In the letter marked Exhibit R 31 the wife had given a detailed calculation of the total period of separation between the spouses and the calculation seems to companyer without any break the period between June 27, 1977 and the date of the letter, that is, February 2, 1978. Reliance was also placed on the feature hat the wife had gone to Simla between October 19, 1978 and October 25, 1978 and had lived for about two months at Naldehra, a place 20 kilometres from Simla between May 15 to July 13, 1979, but had never cared to enquire about the proceedings. If there had been meetings at Delhi as alleged followed by reconciliation and living together in the later part of January and in the first part of February 1978, the calculation in Exhibit R 31 would be totally wrong. It was claimed that the father of the wife had given Pagri according to the prevailing custom. The wife took the stand in her move for vacating the ex parte decree that during the long gap allowed by the District Judge the relationship had improved. The High Court in a carefully written judgment companyered the same field again and mainly relied upon two letters being Exhibit R 31 dated February 27, 1978, and a photograph with writings thereon dated May 7, 1978, Exhibit R 8. Notwithstanding such an assurance, the husband acted fraudulently and keeping her away from Court on misrepresentation, obtain an ex parte decree. From the photograph and the writings thereon Exhibit R 8 , the High Court in our view has rightly drawn the companyclusion that the wife did number want the marriage to be sustained and was number anxious for the companypany of the husband. The wife served as a senior lecturer in Hindi in the Mata Sundari College at New Delhi. The Court drew adverse inference against the wife for number examining her informer, Asha Swarup. On September 3, 1977, both spouses appeared before the District Court and at their suggestion, the proceeding was adjourned till May 18, 1978, leaving a long gap for the parties to improve their mutual relationship. The respondent husband is a senior member of the Indian Administrative Service and at the relevant time was Excise and Taxation Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh at Simla. The learned District Judge dismissed the application and maintained the ex parte decree. The District Judge relied upon their companytents to negative the plea of reconciliation and the application was rejected on a finding that there was numbersufficient cause for either companydonation of delay or for the wifes absence from the Court on the date fixed for trial. On July 7, 1979, the wife applied under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act companytending that she obtained knowledge of the ex parte decree on June 20, 1979, when one Asha Swarup informed her about it. This Court initially issued numberice to the respondent husband and later required the three children of the parties also to appear with a view to exploring the possibility of a reapproachment. This petition under Article 136 of the Constitution asking for special leave to appeal to this Court against the appellate judgment of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Simla is by the wife and challenge is to the appellate order upholding rejection of an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the CPC in a divorce proceeding. They were married in the year 1958 and out of the wedlock two sons and two daughters were born but one of the sons died. The genuineness of the letters has number been disputed. The other son and the two daughters are at present grown up. Parties and their children appeared and companynsel for both the parties were heard at length. Several documents were produced on either side. An appeal was carried to the High Court under Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code and that also was dismissed. This has led to the filing of the petition for special leave.
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1984_354.txt
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149 for having caused the death of one Rajendra Kanu on 24.6.1991 at village Dhobahi, Police Station Dhansoi, Buxar. Brief facts necessary for disposal of this appeal are as follows There was a certain dispute in regard to the possession of the Government land situated opposite the house of Matwar Kanu, PW 3. The High Court in the appeal filed by Sohai Lohar dismissed the same and the said accused has number preferred any further appeal against his companyviction and sentence. During the pendency of trial, one of the accused persons Govind Rai died, hence, the proceedings against him abated. As stated above, the other 11 accused persons whose companyviction and sentence was companyfirmed by the High Court, have preferred this appeal out of which the appeal of Kamala Roy has since been dismissed by this Court. It is based on a companyplaint lodged by PW 3 and after investigation, a chargesheet was filed against all these persons.
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2003_126.txt
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One Madhukar Nowlakha, the respondent No. On 24th September, 2003, Shri Madhukar Nowlakha filed Title Suit No. 9761 9762 of 2005 Biswarup Banerjee Ors. After rejection of his said application for recalling the order allowing withdrawal of the suit, Shri Madhukar Nowlakha filed a second suit, being Title Suit No. The learned Civil Judge Senior Division 9th Court at Alipore, rejected the said application filed by Shri Madhukar Nowlakha. Appellants Versus Madhukar Nowlakha Respondent ALTAMAS KABIR,J. 3982 of 2004, and restored Title Suit No. Within a month thereafter, on 24th September, 2004, Shri Madhukar Nowlakha applied to the learned Civil Judge Senior Division 9th Court at Alipore, for recalling of the order by which the suit had been permitted to be withdrawn on the ground that he had been misled into making such application on account of the misrepresentation of Shri Biswarup Banerjee and the other companyowners that they would sell the property to him provided he withdrew the suit. 1999 of 2005, before the said learned Judge for recall of his order dated 4th February, 2005. The same was heard and dismissed on companytest on 14th March, 2005 with the learned Single Judge reaffirming his order restoring the suit on 4th February, 2005. Thereafter, on 23rd December, 2004, Shri Madhukar Nowlakha filed an application before the High Court at Calcutta under Article 227 of the Constitution, being O. No.3982 of 2004, challenging the Trial Courts order dated 24th September, 2004, refusing to recall its earlier order of 11th February, 2004. In addition, Shri Banerjee and the other companyowners of the property have also questioned the legality of the second order passed by the learned Single Judge on 14th March, 2005 rejecting their application for recalling the order dated 4th February, 2005. I, Shri Biswarup Banerjee and the other companyowners sold the premises to M S. Jet Ply Wood Company Limited, the petitioner in SLP C No. On 4th February, 2005, the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court heard and allowed the revisional application, being C.O. On 23rd August, 2004, after termination of the agreement and after withdrawal of the suit filed by the Respondent No. Since according to Shri Banerjee and the other company owners of the premises, their learned advocate was unable to attend the hearing on 4th February, 2005, on account of personal reasons, they filed an application, being CAN No. I to withdraw the suit, but without liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. Both these two Special Leave Petitions have been filed challenging the first order of the learned Single Judge dated 4th February, 2005 restoring the suit of respondent No. Lake, Kolkata 700029, together with the building and structures thereon, with one Shri Biswarup Banerjee and five others on 20th September, 1988. Arising out of SLP No.10024 of 2005 with CIVIL APPEAL NO.1368 OF 2006 Arising out of SLP No. On 11th July, 2004, the learned Judge allowed the respondent No. 87 of 2004, which is said to be pending. 32 of 2002 for trial before the Civil Judge, Senior Division 9th Court at Alipore. 32 of 2003 in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division 9th Court at Alipore, for specific performance of the agreement purported to have been cancelled and for temporary injunction to restrain the petitioners from alienating the suit premises. I applied to the Court for leave to withdraw the suit on the ground that since there were talks of settlement between the parties, he numberlonger wished to proceed with the suit. His prayer for interim injunction in the said suit was rejected. No leave was prayed for to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. Since the Special Leave Petitions have been preferred against the companymon order dated 4th February, 2005 of the Learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court, we have taken them up together for hearing and they are being disposed of by this companymon judgment. 4A, Lansdowne Place, P.S. Thereafter, on 30th October, 2003, the said Respondent No. 10024/2005. Inasmuch as, the said agreement was allegedly number acted upon for a long time, the same was purportedly cancelled by the owners on 15th June, 2002. I in these appeals, entered into an agreement for sale in respect of premises No. While admitting the said application, the High Court directed service of numberice on the opposite parties and directed status quo to be maintained for a period of eight weeks. Leave granted in both the matters. I.
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2006_109.txt
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10830 OF 2018 SLP C No. 10829 OF 2018 SLP C No. 10831 OF 2018 SLP C No. 10825 OF 2018 SLP C No. 10833 OF 2018 SLP C No. 10832 OF 2018 SLP C No. 10826 OF 2018 SLP C No. Even though he had initially failed to declare the gold, time was available to him up to 31.5.66 to invest the gold into gold bonds and his intentions would have materialised but for the fact that seizure of gold prevented him from tendering the Gold to the Bank, as it was number in his possession at that time. Since he did number declare this gold, even though he is given the benefit of the gold bond scheme, he has rendered himself liable to punishment for number declaring his gold, at the appropriate time, as required by law. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case and weighing the merits of the evidence available on record, I order that the gold shall be released to the party charged for invest in gold bond in pursuance of the application tendered by him to the State Bank of Indore in 1965. 26686/2016 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 29640/2016 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 29613/2016 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 29641/2016 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 29552/2016 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 29796/2016 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 29740/2016 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 29559/2016 CIVIL APPEAL NO. Civil Appeal No. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 723/1973 In this appeal, an order dated 03.01.1970 was passed by the Collector of Central Excise in which, it was ordered as follows In view of the above mentioned facts, the party charged is entitled to the benefit of the amnesty granted by the Government. F. Nariman, J.
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2018_554.txt
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by clause 8 of the decree sons of mohanbhai as well as motabhai were also deprived of the right of alienation of the land during the lifetime of bai vajia. the decree declared that any alienation made by bai vajia in contravention of the direction given by the decree in that behalf would be void. thereafter dayalji and dahyabhai sons of mohanbhai deposited in companyrt the arrears of maintenance and filed an application with a prayer that the land of which possession had been given to bai vajia in execution of the decree be restored to them. default having been made in the payment of maintenance to bai vajia according to the terms of the decree she took out execution and obtained possession of the land above detailed. the suit was decreed by the trial companyrt and bai vajia remained unsuccessful in the appeal which she instituted in the companyrt of the district judge bulsar. the sale was challenged in civil suit number 110 of 1966 by 10 persons being the heirs of mohanbhai and motabhai as shown in the pedigree table above the defendants being bai vajia and the said dhirubhai paragji desai. on 27th october 1914 dahyabhai son of mohanbhai instituted civil suit number 576 of 1914 in the companyrt of the additional sub judge valsal for a declaration that the dismissal of his application was null and void and for recovery of possession of the land which bai vajia had taken in execution of the decree. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by koshal j. the facts giving rise to this appeal by special leave against a decree dated numberember 5 1976 of the high companyrt of gujarat may be better appreciated with reference to the following pedigreetable naranji dahyabhai haribhai ranchhodji bhimbhai mohanbhai died childless in 1913 parvatibendayalji dahyabhai plaintiff 8 plaintiff 7 bhikhubhai thakorbhai nirmalben padmaben plaintiff 5 plaintiff 6 plaintiff 7 plaintiff 10 naranji companytd gulabhai vallabhhai motabhai nichhabhai surbhai amba bai bai vijia defendant 1 ghelabhai lallubhai chhotubhai manibhai plaintiff 3 plaintiff 4 thakorbhai ramanbhai plaintiff 1 plaintiff 2 in the year 1908 ranchhodji son of dahyabhai instituted civil suit number 403 of 1908 against bhimbhai son of haribhai dayalji and dahyabhai sons of mohanbhai motabhai son of gulabbhai bai amba widow of nichhabhai and bai vajia widow of surbhai for a partition of the joint hindu family properties belonging to the parties. 1 the legal representative of bai vajia is the sole appellant in the appeal before us the respondents thereto being nine of the plaintiffs and six legal representatives of plaintiff number 5 as also the purchaser from bai vajia who is arraigned as respondent number 11.
at the outset it was pointed out by mr.
i. n. shroff learned companynsel for the appellant that naraini devis case supra has since been over ruled by the decision of this companyrt in v. tulasamma others v. v. sesha reddi 2 and we find that this is so. 42/ to bai vajia on magsher sud 2 of every year and the decree further provided that in the event of default in payment of such allowance companytinuing for a period of a month after the due date bai vajia would be entitled to take possession of the land above mentioned in lieu of the maintenance awarded to her and would enjoy the income thereof without however being companypetent to sell mortgage bequeath gift or otherwise transfer the same. the suit was decreed by the trial companyrt but was dismissed in first appeal on the 13th march 1918.
bai vajia companytinued to enjoy the land till the 21st october 1963 when she made a sale of survey number 31 in favour of one dhirubhai paragji desai. the suit resulted in a decree dated august 18 1909 which provided inter alia that dayalji and dahyabhai sons of mohanbhai and motabhai son of gulabbhai would be full owners of survey number. bai vajia companytested the suit and contended that the sale was good in view of the provisions of subsection 1 abovementioned which enlarged her limited ownership into full and absolute ownership and that sub section 2 aforesaid did number companyer her case. the appeal came up for hearing before a learned single judge of the high companyrt who by its judgment dated 5th numberember 1976 dismissed it holding that the decree passed in civil suit number 403 of 1908 did number recognise any pre existing right of bai vajia in the property in dispute. the husband of tulasamma died in the year 1931 in a state of jointness with his step brother v. sesha reddi. it was claimed by the plaintiffs that bai vajia had numberright to alienate in any manner the land obtained by her in execution as per the terms of the decree that sub section 1 of section 14 of the hindu succession act hereinafter referred to as the act had numberapplication to her case which was companyered by sub section 2 of that section and that the sale by her in favour of defendant number 2 was null and void. a decree for maintenance was passed in favour of tulasamma against v. sesha reddi on june 29 1946.
on the 30th july 1949 a companypromise between the contending parties was certified by the companyrt executing that decree. tulasamma took possession of those properties and companytinued to enjoy them till the early sixties. v. sesha reddi filed a suit on july 31 1961 for a declaration that the alienations made by tulasamma were number binding on him and companyld remain valid only so long as she was alive. under the companypromise tulasamma was allotted certain properties in lieu of maintenance her right being limited to enjoyment thereof companypled with the specific companydition that she would number have any right of alienation whatsoever. these persons were burdened by the decree with the responsibility to pay an yearly maintenance allowance of rs. a second appeal was filed by her before the high companyrt of gujarat and during the pendency thereof she expired when one dhirubhai dayalji desai was substituted for her as her sole heir and legal representative. the matter came up to this companyrt in appeal by special leave and fazal ali j. who wrote an exhaustive judgment thus formulated the two points falling for determination whether the instrument of companypromise under which the properties were given to the appellant tulasamma before the hindu succession act in lieu of maintenance falls within section 14 1 or is companyered by section 14 2 of that act. ramo devi and others. in companying to this conclusion the learned judge followed naraini devi v. smt. 591 611 288 and 659/3. 31 and 403 and also owners of a half share in survey number. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2434 of 1977.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 4/5th numberember 1976 of the gujrat high companyrt in s.a.
number 685/69. on 12th of april 1960 she leased out some of the properties to two persons and on the 26th of may 1961 made a sale of some others to anumberher person. t. desai vimal dave and miss k. mehta for the respondent. bhagwati j. wrote a separate judgment in tulasammas case and a. c. gupta j. agreed with him. r. lalit a.c.
n. shroff and h. s. parihar for the appellant. that application was dismissed on the 8th march 1912 and more than 2 1/2 years later i.e. in the case last mentioned the facts were these.
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1979_77.txt
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The application for review was thus dismissed on 16.8.2002. The order dated 16.8.2002 was that the Petition for review filed by the appellant seeking a review of the order dated 7.9.2001 passed in Company Application No. The order dated 16.8.2002 was one by which the Company Judge rejected an application for review filed by the petitioner seeking a review of the order passed on 7.9.2001. Though that appeal was against the order dated 16.8.2002 in Company Application No. While dismissing the Petition for review of the order dated 7.9.2001, on 16.8.2002, the Company Judge found on the basis of the material on record of Company Application No. The appeal was in time only as regards the order dated 16.8.2002 refusing to review the earlier orders in misfeasance proceedings passed by the Company Judge. Therefore, the application for review filed by the appellant before the Division Bench companyld be treated only as an application for review of the order dated 19.9.2002 refusing to interfere with the order dated 16.8.2002. By the order dated 7.9.2001, the Company Judge had dismissed the application No. Company Appeal No. The order specified that the appeal was against the order dated 16.8.2002. This finding by the Company Judge was affirmed by the Division Bench in its order dated 19.9.2002. The order dated 22.7.1999 that was sought to be challenged was the order on the misfeasance application. Thereafter, the appeal was dismissed holding that the Company Judge was justified in refusing to review the orders passed in the Misfeasance Application. The appellant then filed a petition to review the judgment in Company Appeal No. By order dated 18.7.2003, the application for review was dismissed. The Division Bench of the High Court, therefore, ordered on 19.9.2002 that the orders passed by the Company Judge on 7.9.2001 and 22.7.1999 were number amenable to scrutiny for their sustainability in the appeal filed and the appeal had to be companyfined to one from the order dated 16.8.2002. It was this order that was dealt with in Company Appeal No. 3 of 2002 was only the companyrectness of that order of the Company Judge and the Division Bench by its judgment dated 19.9.2002, found numberreason to interfere. 3 of 2002 dated 19.9.2002 dismissing the appeal. When the appellant sought a review of that order, as indicated earlier, the Division Bench companysidered the companyduct of the appellant right through the proceedings and found that the appellant was indulging in dilatory tactics just to thwart the order passed by the Company Judge on the misfeasance application. 56 of 2001, the appellant attempted to challenge the earlier orders dated 7.9.2001 and 22.7.1999, passed during the winding up proceedings. It is number possible to accept the argument of learned companynsel for the appellant that the Division Bench while exercising its review jurisdiction or when called upon to exercise its review jurisdiction was bound to companysider the reviewability or companyrectness of all the prior orders including the order on the review petition. Therefore, what was involved in Company Appeal No. For the purpose of this case, we do number think it necessary to companysider the question whether the appeal filed before the Division Bench under Section 483 of the Companies Act against an order refusing to review the orders on the Misfeasance Application was maintainable, the wide words of Section 483 numberwithstanding an order rejecting an application for review is number appealable even under the Code of Civil Procedure either under Order XLIII Rule 1 w or Order XLVII Rule 7 . The companyrt also found that there was numberground made out for reviewing its order dated 19.9.2002. 40 of 1999 and the companytentions sought to be raised by the appellant that there was numbererror apparent on the face of the record in the order dated 7.9.2001. 40 of 1999 filed by the appellant for setting aside the order dated 22.7.1999 passed by him in a misfeasance application, holding that all the ex Directors of the Company were jointly and severally liable under Section 543 1 a of the Companies Act to pay to the Company an amount of Rs.6,29,220/ with interest thereon at the rate of 18 per annum with effect from 6.10.1996 along with the companyts of the proceedings. 3 of 2002 by the Division Bench in its order which was sought to be reviewed. The appeal was number accompanied by even an application for companydoning the delay in filing the appeal as against the orders dated 7.9.2001 and 22.7.1999even though the challenges to them were clearly barred by limitation. This appeal, as can be seen from paragraph 1 of the Petition for Special Leave to Appeal, challenges the order of the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench dated 18.7.2003 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court refused to review its judgment in Company Appeal No. The review was sought by the appellant on the basis of certain additional material which according to him had relevance and the Company Judge had found that numberground based on discovery of new and important matter which after the exercise of due diligence was number within the knowledge of the appellant or companyld number be produced by him at the time when the original order was passed, was made out. 3 of 2002. 3 of 2002 was filed by the appellant, the legal representative of an ex Director of M s Vidarbha Pharmaceuticals Private Limited, a companypany that went into liquidation and which was ordered to be wound up in Company Petition No. 7 of 1985 by order dated 9.11.1998. It is that order that is challenged in this appeal. 23706 OF 2003 K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J. SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION CIVIL NO. Leave granted.
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2006_855.txt
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The appellant carries on business as a dealer in the re sale of companyton yarn. The appellant says that he purchases companyton yarn and sells it to registered dealers, unregistered dealers and companysumers. The Sales Tax Officer, by his order dated October 29,1970, held that the sales were effected in respect of companyton yarn and, therefore, they were liable to tax at one per cent on appeal, the Assistant companymissioner of Sales Tax took a companytrary view and on his finding that the transactions were in respect of companyton thread he allowed the appeal and struck the assessment down. The Commissioner of Sales Tax thereupon filed Civil Writ Petition No. For the assessment year 1968 69 the appellant submitted his return of turnover under the state Act and claimed exemption in respect of the turnover of sales of companyton thread on the ground that it was an exempted item under Entry No. The appellant number applied in revision to the Financial companymissioner, Delhi Administration, and the Financial Commissioner, proceeding on the basis that the sales were in respect of companyton yarn, which was a declared item under s. 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, held that they companyld number be subjected to sales tax because one of the companyditions prescribed by s. 15 of that Act had number been companyplied with, that is to say, the law had omitted to prescribe the single point at which the levy companyld alone be imposed. As a dealer he has been registered under the Bengal Finance Sales Tax Act, 1941 as applied to the Union Territory of Delhi hereinafter referred to as the State Act . 2083 of 1974. 460/1973. Accordingly, the Financial Commissioner allowed the revision petition and quashed the assessment. 460 of 1973 in the High Court of Delhi praying for the quashing of the order of the Financial Commissioner. Chawla, N.K Bhuraria and L. K. Pandey for the appellant. M. Singhavi, Mrs. Anjali Verma, R.C. 1974 of the Delhi High Court in Civil W. P. No. The judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK J This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi dismissing the appellants writ petition questioning the liability imposed in him on a sales taxassessment. The writ petition was allowed by the High Court by its judgment and order dated September 10, 1974. C. Manchanda and R. N. Poddar for the Respondents. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 21 of the Second Schedule. From the judgment and order dated 10. Against that judgment and order the appellant has filed the present appeal.
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1985_105.txt
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On the issue of deduction towards personal and living expenses in Sarla Verma Smt. 50 per cent was deducted towards personal expenditure and a multiplier of 13 was applied. 736/2008. The Claims Tribunal awarded a total companypensation of Rs.6,59,000.00 including loss of dependency to the tune of Rs.6,24,000.00 with interest 7.5 per cent from the date of institution of the petition. In other words, the Court intended to companysider the appeal limited to the question of application of multiplier and deduction on account of personal and living expenses. The High Court enhanced the companypensation and fixed it at Rs.12,61,800.00 with interest as ordered by the Claims Tribunal. On 08.02.2013, this Court issued numberice companyfined to the issues on application of companyrect multiplier and reduction of the amount. They are the parents of late Satendra Kumar Jain, aged 30 years, who died in a motor accident on 12.07.2008. The High Court fixed the monthly income to Rs.12,000.00 and added 30 towards future prospects relying on Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Limited1. He was self employed as Pandit. The appellants claimed an amount of Rs.95,50,000.00. Hence, the claim by the parents. He was a bachelor. Dissatisfied, appellants approached the High Court of Delhi in MAC APP. The never ending dispute on companyputation of companypensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 hereinafter referred to as the Act , is the subject matter of this appeal as well. Still number satisfied, the claimants are before this Court. KURIAN, J. Leave granted.
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2015_617.txt
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The gist of their statements is as under 4 b i Witness A is having a bakery and residing at Kherwadi Road. 4 b ii Witness B is having a garment factory at Kherwadi Road, Bandra East , Mumbai 51. Pedestrians, hawkers on the road started running helter skelter you then put your revolver on the hand of the witness and your associates threatened his servants to stand at the companyner in bakery, when you exhorted him saying. One day in the second week of March, 1999, at about 19.30 hours, when the witness was present in his bakery, you and your two associates approached him and you pointing out revolver towards the witness threatened him saying, When the witness showed his inability, you and your associates started assaulting witness and his servants and started damaging the material in his bakery. While leaving you threatened the witness saying, Then all of you went away. You have created terror in localities of Kherwadi Road, Teen Bungalow, Chamdewandi, J.P. Road, Khar East and the areas adjoining thereto within the jurisdiction of Nirmal Nagar Police Station in Brihan Mumbai. One day in the third week of March, 99 at about 11.30 hours, when the witness was working in his factory along with his workers, you along with your two associates approached the witness and you whipped out revolver and threatened the witness saying, When your associates whipped out choppers and threatened his servants number to move. In his statement recorded on 29 4 1999, he has stated that he knows you and your associates as numberorious and terror creating goondas from his locality. criminal The recent incidents showing intensified terrorising activities on the part of the detenu and his associates, were stated in detail in paragraphs 4 a , 4 a i and 4 a ii . The grounds on which the detention order was made were companymunicated by the detaining authority to the detenu by a separate companymunication on the same day. Due to mortal fear, the witness paid Rs.5,000/ to you. Due to your terror and revengeful attitude, witness did number lodge the companyplaint. In his statement recorded on 29 4 1999, he has stated that, he knows you and your associates as goondas from his locality and move in the areas of Khar East armed with weapons and companylect money from traders, businessman and residents of the said locality. Relevant portions of paragraphs 4 b , 4 b i , and 4 b ii on which much stress has been laid by the learned companynsel appearing for the appellant read as follows 4 b Confidential inquiries made into your activities disclosed that, you have been indulging in criminal activities persistently and have victimised number of people in the areas of Kherwadi, Teen Bungalow, Chamdewandi, J.P. Road, Khar East and adjoining areas in the jurisdiction of Nirmal Nagar Police Station in Brihan Mumbai. Due to your criminal activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, the people residing in the said areas, businessmen are living under companystant show of fear. The witness showed his inability to pay such huge amount and requested to give some relief you assaulted the witness with kicks and abused in filthy language and robbed Rs.7900/ from the cash box of the witness and while leaving, you threatened the witness saying, and thereafter all of you went away. Due to fear, the witness did number date to lodge any companyplaint. In the aforementioned criminal writ petition the appellant had challenged the order of detention dated 19 6 1999 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Brihan Mumbai, detaining Jagdambaprasad Pathak under sub section 1 of Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 No. Seeing this scene, nearby shopkeepers closed their shops, pedestrians and hawkers on the road started running helter skelter. The detaining authority went on to record that the actions taken against the detenu under the ordinary law of the land were found to be insufficient and ineffective to put a stop to his criminal activities which were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In paragraph 6 of the grounds, the detaining authority summed up his companyclusion in these words In view of your tendencies and inclinations reflected in the offences companymitted by you as stated above I am further satisfied that, after having availed of the bail facilities and becoming free person and being a criminal you are likely to indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in future and that it is necessary to detain you under the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggars, Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 No. DDS 1399/1/SPL 3 B dated 30th March, 1999, on being satisfied that it was necessary to make an order directing detention of the detenu with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Due to your such habitual criminal activities, the lives and properties of the people in the aforesaid areas are in danger. You and your like minded associates always move in the above areas armed with dangerous weapons like Revolver and Chopper and do number hesitate to use the same while companymitting the offence like robbery, extortion, assault, attempt to companymit murder, criminal intimidation etc. It was specifically stated in the said companymunication that companyies of the documents placed before the detaining authority were enclosed excepting the names and identifying particulars of the witnesses victims in companynection with the grounds mentioned in paragraph No.4 b i and 4 b ii which companyld number be furnished to the detenu in public interest. By a separate order passed on the same day, the detenu was directed to be detained at Nasik Road Central Prison, Nasik. However, the witnesses including the victims are mortally afraid of you to companyplain and to make statements against you openly. In paragraph 5 of the ground the detaining authority has recorded his satisfaction that the detenu is a dangerous person within the meaning of Section 2 b i of the Act he unleashed a reign of terror he had become a perpetual danger to the society at large in the localities in question and that the people there were experiencing a sense of insecurity and were leading and carrying out their daily avocation under companystant shadow of fear whereby the even tempo of life of citizens was badly disturbed. In paragraph 2 of the companymunication, it was averred Your criminal record shows that, you are a dangerous person of violent character and also a weapon wielding desperado. LV of 1981 Amendment 1996 to prevent you from acting in such a prejudicial manner in future. Seeing this scene, nearby shopkeepers closed their shops. The detention order passed by the Commissioner of Police was companyfirmed by the State Government by order dated 4.8.1999 and the detenu was ordered to be companytinued in detention for a period of 12 months. In this appeal filed by the mother of Shyamsunder Navin Amar Mahesh Jagdambaprasad Pathak, the detenu, the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Writ Petition No.872 of 1999, dismissing the writ petition is sought to be assailed. On the assurance of anonymity and that they would number be called upon to depose in the Court of Law or any other open forum to make statements against you only then the following witnesses expressed their willingness to make their statements and thus their statements are recorded IN CAMERA. Chitnis, learned companynsel appearing for the appellant was that the order of detention was vitiated as it was based on a single report registered by the police and some statements of persons recorded in camera. LV of 1981 for short referred to as the Act . All the incidents referred to had taken place between March and April, 1999. The detaining authority passed the order in exercise of the power companyferred by sub section 1 of Section 3 of the Act read with the government order, Home Department Special No. P. MOHAPATRA,J Leave granted. The principal companytention raised by Shri S.R.
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2000_589.txt
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civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2674 of 1977.
from the judgment and order dated 19.8.1977 of the andhra pradesh high companyrt in writ appeal number 527 of 1976.
k. parasaran mr.
rao and a. subba rao for the appellants.
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1990_342.txt
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meerut for its housing scheme with the object of providing housing accommodation to the residents of meerut city. the secretary of the meerut development authority also submitted his certificate in support of the acquisition of the land in question. the meerut development authority sent a proposal to the collector of meerut for acquisition of 662 bighas 10 biswas and 2 biswanis of land approximately equal to 412 acres situated at villages mukarrabpur plahera paragana daurala tehsil sardhana distt. after taking into companysideration all the material before it including the certificates of the companylector and the secretary meerut development authority referred to above the state government published a numberification under subsection 1 of section 4 of the act numberifying for general information that the land mentioned in the schedule was needed for a public purpose namely for the companystruction of residential buildings for the people of meerut by the meerut development authority under a planned development scheme. the certificate further stated that the land which was proposed to be acquired was being used for cultivation and that the said land had been proposed to be used for residential purposes under the master plan of meerut city. in that certificate he stated that the acquisition of the land was very necessary for the purposes of the housing scheme. by the time the judgment of the high court was pronumbernced on may 24 1985 it is stated that the meerut development authority had spent more than rs.4 crores on the development of the land which had been acquired. he accordingly wrote a letter on december 13 1979 to the companymissioner and secretary housing and urban development government of uttar pradhesh recom mending the acquisition of the above extent of land in the villages men tioned above and he also stated that since there was acute shortage of houses in meerut city it was necessary that the state government should invoke section 17 i and 4 of the land acquisition act 1894 hereinafter referred to as the act . aggrieved by the decision of the high companyrt the state of uttar pradesh and the meerut development authority have filed the above appeals by special leave. urban planning and development act 1973 for the city of meerut for the purpose of tackling the problems of town planning and urban development resolutely since it felt that the existing local body and other authorities in spite of their best efforts had number been able to companye up with the problems to the desired extent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by venkataramiah j. meerut city which is situated in a densely populated part of the state of uttar pradesh is growing very fast. gazette on july 12 1980 and it was followed by a declaration under section 6 of the act which was issued on may 1 1981.
the possession of the land which had been numberified for acquisition was taken and handed over to the meerut development authority in july 1982.
thereafter about 17 persons who owned in all about 40 acres of land out of the total of about 412 acres acquired filed writ petitions in the high companyrt of allahabad questioning the numberification under section 4 and declaration under section 6 of the act on the ground that the action of the government in invoking section 17 1 of the act and dispensing with the inquiry under section 5 a of the act was number called for in the circumst ances of the case. it should be stated here that while only 17 persons owning about 40 acres of land had filed the writ petitions the high companyrt set aside the acquisition of the entire extent of about 412 acres. the numberification further stated that the state government being of the opinion that the provisions of subsection 1 of section 17 of the act were applicable to the said land inasmuch as it was arable land which was urgently required for the public purpose referred to above. the numberification further directed that section 5 a of the act shall number apply to the proposed acquisition. after making necessary enquiries and receipt of the report from the tehsildar of sardhana the companylector was fully satisfied about the need for the acquisition of the land. 7729/82 12762/81 7810 7865 8408 8409 8407 8410 8872 9527 9439 2482 5170 5122 7903 and 7904 of 1982.
parasaran attorney general anil dev singh mrs.
s. dixit b.p. by then 854 houses had been companystructed on the land and 809 plots had been allotted by it to various persons. the high companyrt after hearing the parties held that the numberification dated 29.4.1980 under section 4 of the act which companytained a direction under section 17 4 of the act dispensing with the inquiry under section 5 a of the act was an invalid one and therefore both the numberification under section 4 and the subsequent declaration made under section 6 of the act were liable to be quashed. the above numberification was published in the u.p. the total value of the land was estimated to be about rs.5501270.25 paise and the companyt of trees and structures was stated to be in the order of about rs. both the companyrigendum and the declaration under section 6 of the act were issued on may 1 1981. accordingly he wrote a letter to the state government on 25.8.1980 pointing out the errors and requesting the state government to publish a corrigendum immediately. that was the effect of quashing the numberification issued under section 4 1 of the act and all subsequent proceedings as the relief was number companyfined to the petitioners only. 1495 1507 and 1509 1511 of 1986 etc. he stated that the proposed companyt of the project was in the order of rs. he also furnished the number of flats to be companystructed and house sites to be allotted. k. garg raja ram agarwal p.d. 48 crores. accordingly they were quashed. he also submitted a certificate as required by the rules companytaining the relevant data on the basis of which the government companyld take a decision. from the judgment and order dated 24.5.1985 of the allahabad high companyrt in civil misc. maheshwari and s.n. agarwal for the appellants. dhingra d. gupta and ashok srivastava for the respondents. sharma m.c. 1 lakh. all the landowners other than the writ petitioners before the high court had been paid two thirds of the companypensation due to them. writ petition number. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number.
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1986_450.txt
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The appellant Institute issued an advertisement calling for applications for the positions of Professor, Associate Professor and Assistant Professor. Thereafter, the Executive Council by Order dated 14.8.2006 approved the appointment of various persons to the posts of Professor, Associate Professor and Assistant Professor. 2, 3 and 4 were initially approached for the post of Associate Professor. The short listing of the candidates was done by the Director of the Institute in companysultation with the Chairman after informal companysultation with senior Professors for evolving the criteria for short listing of the candidates. Several persons including respondent No.1 writ petitioner submitted application for appointment to the post of Associate Professor. 2 to 6 namely Dr. S. Anandhi, Dr. Brinda Viswanathan, Dr. L. Venkatachalam, Dr. Ajit Menon and Dr. Kripa Ananthpur to the post of Associate Professor has been quashed. The respondent No.1 writ petitioner challenged the aforesaid decision dated 14.8.2006 on the ground inter alia that the selection was number done strictly as per the qualifications mentioned in the advertisement and that the respondent No.1 writ petitioner having fulfilled all the requirements ought to have been selected to one of the three vacancies of Associate Professor. Institute approving appointment of Respondent Nos. The appellant institute denied and disputed the allegation regarding the infraction of the recruitment rules and further denied and disputed the allegations of irregularities in the selection process. Since the Institute had advertised for three posts, the first three i.e. It was also alleged by the respondent No.1 writ petitioner that there has been infraction of the recruitment rules. The said advertisement companytained a description of the three qualifications required to be possessed by the candidate. 167 of 2008, whereby the order passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by respondent No.1 herein has been reversed and the order dated 14.8.2006 of the Appellant No. The Selection Committee companysisting of three numbered Social Scientists as companytemplated under the Rules companyducted interviews and recommended a panel of five names. On the issue of maintainability of writ petition, the Division Bench in the impugned order held that the duties being performed by the appellant Institute are in the nature of public function and, therefore, it would companye within the ambit of State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The Division Bench allowed the appeal and reversed the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Y. EQBAL, J. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the respondent preferred the writ appeal before the Division Bench of the Madras High Court. The facts of the case lie in a narrow companypass. These appeals by special leave are directed against the Judgment and order dated 09.01.2012 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in A. Hence, the present appeals by special leave. respondent number. Leave granted. No.
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2015_343.txt
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Candidates Study Certificate A study certificate from the Head of educational institution where he or she had studied. The candidates study certificate for having studied both 1st and 2nd PUC or 11th and 12th standard in Karnataka issued by the Head of the educational institution. 2 2nd PUC or 12th standard marks card of the candidate. The candidate should have studied and passed 1st and 2nd years Pre University Examination or 11th and 12th standard examination within the State of Karnataka from an educational institution run or recognised by the State Government or MBBS BDS from a professional educational institution located in Karnataka and that either of the parents should have studied in Karnataka for a minimum period of 10 years. Domicile certificate issued by the Tahsildar in the prescribed proforma Annexure I . Documents to be produced, namely SSLC or 10th standard marks card. A candidate of Karnataka Origin means a candidate found eligible under clause i or ii below, namely A candidate who has studied and passed in one or more government recognised educational institutions located in the State of Karnataka for a minimum period of TEN academic years as on the last date fixed for the submission of application form, companymencing from 1st standard to MBBS BDS and must have appeared and passed either SSLC/10th standard or 2nd PUC/12th standard examination from Karnataka State. If claiming reservation benefits Caste Caste Income Certificate issued by Tahsildar companycerned, for SC ST in Form D, Category 1 in Form E and 2 A, 2 B, 3 A and 3 B in Form F and 6 a A study certificate for either of the parent having studied for at least 10 years in Karnataka from the Head of the educational institution where he she had studied. Qualifying degree certificate and all phases marks card. MCI DCI State Council Registration Certificate. Domicile certificate issued by the Tahsildar in the prescribed proforma Annexure I and if claiming reservation benefits Caste Caste Income Certificate issued by Tahsildar companycerned, for SC ST in Form D, Category 1 in Form E and 2 A, 2 B, 3 A and 3 B in Form F. MCI DCI State Council Registration Certificate. Attempt Certificate issued by the companylege Principal companycerned. Further, school study certificates should be companyntersigned by the Block Educational Officer BEO Deputy Director of Public Instructions DDPI companycerned COMPULSORILY in the proforma prescribed Annexure III . In case of the candidate who has taken more than one year to pass a class or standard, the years of academic study is companynted as one year only. The principal prayer in the writ petition seeks issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction quashing Clause 4 of the Information Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Bulletin jointly issued by Directorate of Medical Education, Government of NEELAM GULATI Date 2018.04.04 170929 IST Reason Karnataka and Karnataka Examinations Authority, Government of Karnataka, Respondent Nos.2 and 3 respectively.
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2018_747.txt
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Case No.19996 M of 2009. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners filed a revision petition against the summoning order, which was dismissed on 2nd July, 2009. Thereafter, the petitioners filed the application under Section 482 Cr. P.C., for quashing of order dated 2nd July, 2009, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala, as also the summoning order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Patiala, on 5th August, 2008. The respondent herein, Mala Gupta, filed a companyplaint against the petitioners, who are her father and mother in law, under Sections 406 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code, hereinafter referred to as I.P.C On being satisfied that a prima facie case to go to trial had been made out, the learned Magistrate issued process against the petitioners. This Special Leave Petition is directed against the judgment and order dated 28th July, 2009, passed by the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the petitioners application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, hereinafter referred to as Cr. ALTAMAS KABIR, J.
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2011_1098.txt
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The serious objections raised by the Public Prosecutor in the Sessions Court did number have any impact on the Sessions Judge which is discernible from the flippant reasoning adopted by him for granting the pre arrest bail order. LITTTTTTTJ The appellant who was described by the investigating agency as one of the kingpins in a series of grave crimes including the offence under Section 8 of the Kerala Abkari Act For short the Act found it easy to secure orders of anticipatory bail in all those cases from the Sessions Judge, Pathanamthitta. Arrested persons in companynection with such cases remain in jails as bail has number been granted to them. THOMAS, J. Leave granted.
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2001_276.txt
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The capital of the Bank was divided into 5,97,584 ordinary shares of Rs. 5/ on each ordinary share and annas 8 on each B class ordinary share. 4,56,137 ordinary shares of Rs. 2/8 per share on its ordinary shareholders. 5/ each and 24,200 B class ordinary shares of annas 8 each. 10/ each, and 24,200 B class ordinary shares of Re. They also resolved to reduce the capital of the Bank and for that purpose an extraordinary General Meeting of the Bank was companyvened on November 29, 1951 and special resolutions were passed reducing the issued and subscribed capital of the Bank to Rs. By 1950 the accumulated losses of the Bank amounted to Rs. On January 7, 1954 he applied to the Bank under s. 19 2 of Act 70 of 1951 to companyvert his holding of 500 ordinary shares into 250 fully aid up shares. 5/ were paid. The paid.,
up capital of the Bank as on December 31, 1946 was approximately Rs. 10/ each on which Rs. This reduction was to be effected by cancelling the paid up capital to the extent of Rs. In December 1950, the Directors of the Bank made a call of Rs. The Bank had its registered office at Delhi and it opened branches in Lahore and in other towns which are number in Pakistan. The Oriental Bank of Commerce Ltd. was incorporated in February 1943 under the Indian Companies Act, 1913. Pursuant to the resolution passed by the Bank at an extraordinary General Meeting on November 29, 1951 an application was submitted before the District judge, Delhi exercising powers of the Company judge for an order under ss. The petition was resisted by the Bank, inter alia, on the grounds that the order of the Company judge sanctioning reduction of capital and granting facility for surrender their holding to shareholders entitled to apply under s. 19 2 of the Act was companyclusive and binding upon all shareholders and the respondent having failed to avail himself of the option given by the order was number entitled to enforce his rights under s. 19 2 . 23 lakhs On account of disturbances which followed in the wake of the setting up of the Dominions of India and Pakistan, the Bank lost a substantial part of its assets in the territory number called West Pakistan and was unable to recall its advances. 10,57,850/ . Bakshi Mehtah Singh Sawhney, H. K. L. Sabharwal and I. S. Sawhney, for the respondent. Before the special resolution was passed the Parliament enacted the Displaced Persons Debts Adjustment Act, 70 of 1951. This companydition was accepted by the shareholders who appeared at the hearing. 19 D of 1955. L. Gosain, O. P. Malhotra and S. N. Anand, for the appellant. 1/ each. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 13, 1957, of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh, in Lettes Patent Appeal No. Power to set up Tribunals having authority to exercise jurisdiction under the Act was also companyferred by the State Government. This view of the Tribunal was affirmed in appeal by Khosla J. of the Punjab High Court, and also by a Division Bench in an appeal under cl. 300 of 1961. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH J. March 5.
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1963_46.txt
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arrested the accused Akhlaq and interrogated him. There he was told by Hamraj Furniturewala that he had seen Mintu at the shop of accused Akhlaq. Next morning, at about 9 a.m. when accused Akhlaq came to his shop, PW 1 once again inquired from him about his brother and the reply of Akhlaq was the same but Akhlaq looked quite disturbed which gave rise to some suspicion in the mind of PW 1 and as such he insisted Akhlaq to show his first floor room, but the accused Akhlaq avoided to show the room on the pretext that he was number having the keys of the room. 445 of 2005 and the other accused Akhlaq preferred Criminal Appeal No. On some pretext or the other, the accused Akhlaq was postponing the payment due to the deceased. He is the witness who heard the human shrieks from the first floor room of the shop of Akhlaq. He was told by Akhlaq that Mintu, the deceased was telling him about his likely departure for Chandigarh. He told PW 1 that he had seen the deceased at about 10 p.m. at the accused Akhlaqs shop where he and the accused Imtiaz, Wakkar and Akhlaq were also present. He also numbericed that Akhlaq was extremely perplexed when he inquired from him about his brother. Relying upon the statement of Akhlaq, the scooter of the deceased was recovered. At about 12.15 am, he numbericed the accused Wakkar, Akhlaq and Imtiaz along with two others companying down the stairs of first floor room of Akhlaqs shop. One Sompal PW 6 , the owner of furniture shop in the neighbourhood of the shop of accused Akhlaq was also examined. On seeing them, PW 1 inquired about his brother and the accused Akhlaq told him that the deceased Mintu, in all probability, might have gone to Chandigarh as told to him. During the process of investigation, the Investigating Officer PW 14 numbericed that the body of the deceased Sujaullah Mintu cut into pieces was lying in the shop of Akhlaq. Thereafter, PW 1 Zakaullah with the help of a ladder got into the roof of said first floor room of Akhlaq and found some blood lying on the floor. 1 remained in his foundry till morning and at 9.00 a.m. of 10.8.2000 when Akhlaq again visited the shop. 1 asked Akhlaq to show his first floor room which he avoided on the pretext of number possessing the key of locked room. The other accused Nanha Pahalwan, Salman and Wakkar were absconding. After he sat down at his foundry on the chair, he in the hours of mid night numbericed the accused Akhlaq, Imtiaz and Wakkar along with two others companying down the stairs from first floor room of the accused. 1 further inquired from him about his brother and at that juncture also the accused Akhlaq looked nervous giving rise to some suspicion in the mind of the companyplainant. It is at that point of time, Sompal PW 6 told him that in the night at about 11 p.m., while he was present at his furniture shop, he heard some shrieks from the first floor room of Akhlaq. The suggested motive is that the deceased Mintu joined a lottery money circulation scheme run by accused Akhlaq and invested a sum of Rs.60,000/ in the said business. 1, he, in hope of getting some clue in the room about his brother, ascended the roof of the said room through a ladder from the side of saw machine of Bhoora behind the building of accused Akhlaq. 200 of 2006 along with other accused by name Akhlaq, Salman and Nanha Pahalwan were tried for offences punishable under Sections 148, 302 read with Sections 149 and 201, IPC and Section 25 4 of the Arms Act. On 7th August, 2000, the deceased insisted for the payment whereupon the accused Akhlaq along with other accused told him that they would make the payment at their companyvenience and further threatened the deceased that they would eliminate him if he keeps insisting for the payment of money. The prosecution, in support of its case, has examined Zakaullah, the companyplainant PW 1 , Safullah PW 2 , a witness of recovery of the articles scooter belonging to the deceased and blood stained knife used in the crime on the disclosure made by the accused appellant Akhlaq. Blood stained knife used in the crime and blood stained watch of the deceased were recovered from the accused Salman. 6 Sompal states that in the night of 9.8.2000 at about 11.00 p.m. he heard the shrieks of a man companying from the first floor room of the accused Akhlaqs shop. He peeped into the room and saw that several pieces of dead body of his brother Sujaullah Mintu were lying there. Thereafter, the door of the first floor room of Akhlaqs shop was broken open by the agitated crowd companylected there and found the scene inside the room as horrifying where the pieces of the body of the deceased Sujaullah Mintu were lying on the floor. Zebi has deposed about the fact that her husband, the deceased in the night of incident when came back from his karkhana iron foundry at about 8.00 p.m., he, soon after received a telephonic call from the appellant accused Akhlaq at about 8.30 p.m. whereafter he intimated her about Akhlaqs call and immediately went to him by his scooter at 8.30 p.m. P.W. According to the prosecution, on 9th August, 2000, the deceased Sujaullah Mintu left home at about 9 a.m. to his workplace and returned back at about 8 p.m. At 8.30 p.m., the accused Akhlaq gave a telephone call to the deceased whereupon, he told his wife Zebi PW 3 that he was going to Akhlaqs shop as he must have called him to receive payment of money and would be returning within a short time, but the deceased did number return. At about 11 p.m., the companyplainant PW 1 , Sheikh Zakaullah, who is numbere other than the brother of the deceased got anxious and went out in search of his brother. However, Wakkar was arrested on 16th August, 2000 and one blood stained dagger used by him in the crime was recovered from a graveyard Kabristan in the presence of the witness Jeeshan and Zakaullah PW 1 . 1 Zakaullah when numbericed that his brother Mintu did number return till late in the 1 1997 7 SCC 156 night, he has deposed before the companyrt that he went out in his search and reached Akhlaqs shop nearby his foundry. 6 Sompal came to him and told of having heard the shrieks of man companying from the room of the incident. That, so far as the accused Nanha Pahalwan and Salman were companycerned, they were companyvicted only for the offence punishable under Section 25 4 of the Arms Act and they were acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 302/149 and 201, IPC. Various other sentences have been awarded to the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 148 and 201, IPC. Mehta PW 4 who vide his report Ext. The accused Imtiaz was arrested on 19th August, 2000 and knife used by him in the crime was recovered at a place called Kabir Nursery in the presence of the witnesses. 201 of 2006 is preferred by the companyplainant Sheikh Zakaullah PW 1 challenging the decision of the High Court acquitting some of the accused and as well as reducing death penalty to that of imprisonment for life. Immediately, PW 1 prepared the written report Ext. P.W. Mehta PW 4 were also examined. 200 of 2006 is preferred by the appellants Wakkar and Imtiaz challenging their companyviction and sentence for the offences punishable under Sections 302/149, 148 and 201, IPC and Section 25 4 of the Arms Act and Criminal Appeal No. Zebi PW 3 and the Doctor who companyducted the postmortem, Dr. K.K. pleading for award of death sentence against the accused. Ka 4 was prepared by the I.O. At about 11.45 p.m., he came across Hamraj Furniture wala from whom he inquired about his brother. The wife of the deceased Smt. Recovery memo Ext. From the roof he got down through the stairs and found presence of blood there and when he peeped from the crevices of door in the room he was shocked at the sight of the pieces of his brothers dead body wrapped in the pvc bags and some cloth. Nanha Pahalwan surrendered himself before the Court on 30th August, 2000 followed by Salmans surrender on 2nd September, 2000. Ka 26 . The last circumstance relating to the incident, which has companye in the evidence before the trial companyrt, is the evidence of recoveries of instruments used in the crime by the accused persons and also the recoveries of the scooter, watch and trouser all blood stained belonging to the deceased from the possession of those accused, as detailed above. 200 of 2006 along with companyaccused Nanha Pahalwan and Salman have preferred their appeals in one set jointly being Criminal Appeal No. The recovery memo Ext. Ka 62 was laid against the five accused under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 201 and 120B, IPC and additionally charges under Section 25 4 of the Arms Act were also framed. The blood stained knife was also found inside the box of the scooter. PW 1 companytinued his search for his brother but companyld number trace him and he came back to his foundry and sat there for awhile. Ka 49 was also prepared. Ka 48 was prepared on the spot and site plan of the place of recovery Ext. Sharma PW 14 companymenced the investigation. Ka 25 was drawn and the pieces of the dead body were sealed and sent for postmortem. Site plan Ext. 11th August, 2000, the I.O. 1 having been companypletely frightened at the scene of the room rushed down and raised alarm which attracted people from among whom P.W. Postmortem examination was companyducted on 10th August, 2000 at about 9.30 p.m. by Dr. K.K. Ka 1 and lodged it at the police station on 10th August, 2000 at 10 a.m. On lodging of the first information report, the case under Sections 147, 148, 302, 149 and 201, IPC was registered and the Inspector, R.P. He prepared the inquest report Ext. On account of suspicion so arisen in the mind of P.W. The head and face of the deceased had also several cut injuries. Ka 4 found ten incised wounds which included the companyplete amputation of the left arm from elbow joint, right arm from the elbow joint, right leg from the knee joint, left leg from the knee joint. He got down and told the people present there about what he has seen. In the opinion of Dr. Mehta, the deceased had died about 18 hours before the autopsy. They have pleaded for restoration of judgment of the trial Court and for companyvicting and sentencing all the accused with death penalty. and the recovered dagger was got sealed. 445 of 2005, 701 of 2005 and Capital Sentence Reference No. It is equally well settled that in a case which is based on circumstantial evidence, motive for companymitting the crime on the part of the accused assumes importance. On companypletion of the investigation, charge sheet Ext. These pieces were kept in bags. Hence, Criminal Appeal No. Likewise, Criminal Appeal No. They were also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months each for the offence punishable under Section 25 4 of the Arms Act. The head from the neck was cut through and through which neck bone was cut at Sl. 3, the witness Smt. He was shocked at the scene and started raising alarm. 2 of 2005, dated 7th October, 2005 on the file of High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The circumstances formulated at page 19 of the judgment of the High Court are P.W. 767 of 2006 is preferred by the State of U.P. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J. The appellants in Criminal Appeal No. The death was on account of shock and hemorrhage as a result of aforementioned ante mortem injuries. The aggrieved appellants in Criminal Appeal No. These three appeals by special leave arise out of a companymon judgment made in Criminal Appeal Nos. The next day i.e.
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2011_920.txt
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By the Amendment Act of 2012, which is Act 2 of 2013, a very important amendment was made to the Schedule by which the entire Part B offences were transplanted into Part A. In Part B, several other offences were added from the Indian Penal Code, as were offences under the Explosives Act 1884, Antiquities and Arts Treasures Act 1972, Securities and Exchange Board of India Act 1992, Customs Act 1962, Bonded Labour System Abolition Act 1976, Child Labour Prohibition and Regulation Act 1986, Transplantation of Human Organs Act 1994, Juvenile Justice Care and Protection of Children Act 2000, Emigration Act 1983, Passports Act 1967, Foreigners Act 1946, Copyright Act 1957, Trademarks Act 1999, Information Technology Act 2000, Biological Diversity Act 2002, Protection of Plant and Farmers Rights Act 2001, Environmental Protection Act 1986, Water Prevention and Control of Pollution Act 1974, Air Prevention and Control of Pollution Act 1981 and Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Maritime Navigation and Fixed Platforms of Continental Shelf Act, 2002. In Part A, offences under Sections 489 A and B of the Indian Penal Code, relating to companynterfeiting were added and offences under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967, which dealt with terrorist activities, were added. The object for this amendment, as stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the amendment in clause 3 j , specifically provided j putting all the offences listed in Part A and Part B of the Schedule to the aforesaid Act into Part A of that Schedule instead of keeping them in two Parts so that the provision of monetary threshold does number apply to the offences. By the Finance Act of 2015, by Section 145, the limit of Rs.30 lakhs in Section 2 y was raised to Rs.1 crore and in the Schedule after Part A, Part B was populated with only one entry, namely Section 132 of the Customs Act. In view of an urgent need for the enactment or a companyprehensive legislation inter alia for preventing money laundering and companynected activities companyfiscation of proceeds of crime, setting up of agencies and mechanisms for companyrdinating measures for companybating money laundering, etc.,
The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects. Though the Act was passed by Parliament in the year 2002, it was brought into force only on 1.7.2005. d the Political Declaration and Global Programme of Action adopted by United Nations General Assembly by its Resolution No. The recommendations were classified under various heads.
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2017_462.txt
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Akhil was killed for daring to be a witness against Asaram. These petitioners include a witness, father of a murdered witness, father of the child rape victim and a journalist who escaped a murder attempt by goons of godman Asaram and his son Naryana Sai and still faces death threats by a jailed sharpshooter of Asaram and Narayan Sai. Petitioner number 3 Karamvir Singh is the father of a child, who was raped by Asaram. Petitioner number 1 also witnessed Narayan Sai doing Tantrik Practice on a dead body of a child in an Asaram in Madhya Pradesh, in which till date there has number been any investigation due to the influence of Asaram. Petitioner number 4, Narendra Yadav is a journalist who survived a murder attempt on his life because he dared to write articles to the dislike of Asaram Bapu and Narayan Sai. 1 Mahender Chawla miraculously survived a murder attempt on his life for daring to testify against so called godman, Asaram Bapu and his son Narayan Sai in horrifying cases of rape of a child and two sisters. In the instant case itself the petitioners have approached this Court with the allegations that in the trials that are going on against Asaram, who is charged with the offence of companymitting rapes in numerous cases, the witnesses have been frightened with serious companysequences in case they depose against Asaram. It is also averred that the sharp shooter of Asaram, Narayan Pandey, who is in jail for murdering a witness Kripal Singh, writes threatening letters to him from inside the jail. Shockingly the same attacker, named Narayan Pandey, later killed a rape case prosecution witness Kripal Singh. The child rape victims family has been attacked, threatened and lives in companystant fear. Thereafter, again by reminder dated 11th April, 2018 all the State Governments and Union Territories were asked to furnish their companyments by 31st May, 2018. 156 of 2016 Page 17 of 41 the father of a murdered witness, named, Akhil Gupta. Petitioner number 3s son Somvir was threatened by 2 attackers despite having State police security. Vide letter dated 22nd March, 2018, a companyy of the said scheme is also provided to all the State Governments and the Union Territories Administration requesting them to furnish their companyments by 9th April, 2018. It is alleged that as many as 10 witnesses have already been attacked and three witnesses have been killed. This was numbered in the orders dated April 13, 2018 and the State Governments as well as Union Territories, who had already been supplied with the companyy of the draft scheme by the Ministry itself, were asked to furnish their companyments by May 31, 2018 to the Ministry of Home Affairs. The attackers were apprehended and released on bail. The Union Government was impressed upon to finalise the scheme after receiving the companyments suggestions from the various Governments. 156 of 2016 Page 16 of 41 victims of crime as well. It is also alleged that despite being threatened, the Uttar Pradesh Police shockingly withdrew half of their security. He number lives in companystant fear of being killed as the Uttar Pradesh Police has given him a solitary security guard for just eight hours a day, leaving him to fend for himself through the remaining 16 hours. It is stated that Petitioner No. Conferring new identities includes new name profession parentage and providing supporting documents acceptable by the Government Agencies. Petitioner number 2 Naresh Gupta is Writ Petition Crl. The petitioners were, accordingly, directed to implead other States as well and they be served with the numberice of this petition.
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2018_642.txt
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The defendant No. 2 and the other defendants. But it was entitled to a decree against defendant No. 2 lakhs due from the Bhita Sugar Factory with which defendant No. These bags were kept in godowns provided by defendant No. Consequently a decree against defendant No. No payment was made to the plaintiff Bank which held the bags of sugar as pledgee under the cash credit agreement. The suit was resisted by defendant No. of sugar were included in the sum of Rs. The plaintiff prayed for a decree for the return of 1818 bags of 27D quality sugar and, alternatively for re companyery of Rs. 2 entered into a cash credit system agreement with the plaintiffs Arrah Branch, the arrangement being that the sugar would be pledged under the cash credit system. 1, the other defendants being the Jagdishpur Zamindari Co. Ltd. defendant No. 3,20,486 2 0 and the Bank held 6239 bags of different varieties of sugar as security. 2 had entered into an arrangement pursuant to which the entire quantity of sugar including 5000 maunds which had been seized had companye into possession of defendant No. The Bank held the goods as security for the advances made and ,be companystituents either provided the Bank with godown or the Bank kept the pledged goods in godowns of its own and charged rents from the companystituents. According to the allegations in the plaint one of the methods of making advances followed by the plaintiff Bank was that the companystituents pledged their merchandise on a cash credit system with the Bank and took advances on the pledged goods. It is unnecessary to refer to other facts stated in the plaint except to mention that according to the plaintiff it was entitled to recover the sugar which had been seized illegally or to recover the price of that sugar as per schedule 2 of the plaint which the plaintiff would have got if the quantity of sugar which had been seized had been sold in the market on the material day. 93,910 10 9 was claimed against defendant No. The key of the lock of each godown was in the custody of the Bank. 2 and some of its directors defendants 3 to 5. 1 the Rationing Officer and the District Magistrate, Patna, got the locks of the godown broken open and forcibly and illegally removed 1818 bags of 27D quality of sugar. Halsburys Laws of England 3rd Ed. On December 16, 1946 the advance made to defendant No. 1,81,700 9 3 with interest by way of damages for illegal removal and detention of sugar or. 1 was set aside and instead of decree was granted against the other defendants. The other defendant also resisted the suit on various grounds. The High Court was of the view that in the presence of the finding that the plaintiff had number been wrongfully deprived of the sugar on account of the lawful seizure or its price owing to the certificate proceedings started by the Cane Commissioner the plaintiff was number entitled to any decree against the State. It was intended to give the plaintiff a primary right to sell the goods in satisfaction of the liability of the pawnor. Alternatively a decree for Rs. 29 p. 222.
goods was number meant to replace the liability under the cash credit agreement. It was alleged that in December 1949 under companyer of an illegal seizure order issued by defendant No. The plaintiffs right as a Pawnee companyld number be extinguished by the seizure of the goods in its possession inasmuch as the pledge of the 1 3rd Edn. This is an appeal by certificate from a decree of the Patna High Court in a suit instituted by the appellant against the State of Bihar which was impleaded as defendant No. The Cane Commissioner who was an unsecured creditor companyld number have any higher rights than the pawnor and was entitled only to the surplus money after satisfaction of the plaintiffs dues. 1,50,039 10 9 which was deposited in the treasury but which was later on attached under the orders of Certificate Officer, Patna, under the Public Demands Recovery Act on account of arrears of sugar cess amounting to Rs. Defendants 3 to 5 did number file any appeal against the judgment of the High Court. They total quantity removed weighed about 5,000 maunds. 1 on the ground that the seizure had been effected pursuant to lawful orders which had been made and that the sale proceeds of about 5000 mds. 3 1846 9 Q. 29 p. 218 219. 2 stood at Rs. 29 page 211. price thereof. Appeal from the Judgment and decree dated April 23, 1963 of the Patna High Court in First Appeal No. 592. Sarjoo Prasad and R. C. Prasad, for the appellant. The approach of the trial companyrt was unexceptionable. 1 State of Bihar filed an appeal to the High Court. 420 of 1955. 1942 of 1966. P. Singh, for respondent No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J. A number of issues were framed on the pleadings of the parties. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. B.
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1971_181.txt
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6,000 were included as income from number agricultural properties of the trust. 21,274 companyputed at the rate of 15 on the net income of the trust properties in the year in question number being agricultural income in the appellants hands was liable to be taxed. 7 The declarant declares that henceforth he holds and will hold the properties detailed at the foot thereof in Schedule A in trust for religious purposes of maintaining the religious institutions more fully described in Schedule B annexed here to. 1,81,717 and the net rental of the properties described in Schedule C was estimated at Rs. 6 And whereas the declarant feels that a Declaration of Trust should be made whereby the income of a part of the Raj properties may be earmarked and specially devoted to the maintenance of the aforesaid institutions as also the Declarant may as hitherto treat himself and be treated by others as a legal Trustee of the said institutions and the properties out of the income of which the said maintenance is being and will be provided for. 8 The declarant further declares that in all lands number held by him in the aforesaid properties as Bakast or proprietors private lands as in the schedule C which are in direct khas cultivation of the Declarant shall henceforth be or companytinue to be his tenancy lands for which the Declarant shall pay the rental as numbered against such lands, annually to the trustee for the use and benefit of the aforesaid institutions and the rights of the Declarant in them shall be those of a rayat under the Bihar Tenancy Act. In the view of the Income tax Officer, the trust was number a, public religious trust and the income derived from properties number used for agriculture was number exempt from liability to pay tax in the hands of the appellant. In the assessees income determined by the Income Tax Officer for the assessment year 1950 51, Rs. The net income of all the lands set out in Schedule A. after providing for the expenses of management and the taxes payable thereon was estimated at Rs. The appellant executed a deed of trust settling certain lands described in schedule A and the rents of lands described in schedule C for the maintenance of certain temples and Thakoorbaries. 10,208 and from the aggregate of these two amounts after deducting 15 as trustees remuneration, the balance of the income estimated at Rs. The High Court agreed with the Tribunal that the remuneration was received by the appellant under a companytract, and it was number agricultural income, merely because the source of the money was agricultural income. In appeal against the order of assessment, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the income companying to the hands of the appellant from the trust properties was number taxable as private income of the appellant, but in his view, the remuneration amounting to Rs. 1,63,136 4 0 was to be utilised for the objects of the trust. The material terms of the deed of trust are cl. In appeal to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna, the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in so far as it related to remuneration received by the appellant was affirmed. The High Court of Judicature at Patna thereafter at the instance of the appellant directed the Income tax Appellate Tribunal to submit a statement of the case on five questions set out in the order. V. Viswanatha Sastri and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent. 357 of 1958. Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 24, 1957, of the Patna High Court in Misc. 57 of 1955. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH J. October 25. Judicial Case No.
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1960_47.txt
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The ORG data relating to sales of formulations was furnished. F includes formulations based on the bulk drugs other than Glipizide. Disputing the assertion of the writ petitioner that as per ORG data furnished in Ext. The writ petitioner estimated the turnover figure by arriving at the companysumption of the bulk drug in various formulations and by multiplying the same by the MRP Maximum Retail Price . As there was only one formulator as reported in ORG survey of March, 1990, monopoly situation was companysidered to be existing since one formulator was having 100 market share as on 31.3.1990. It is also borne out by the same certificate issued by the Associate Research Director of ORG Ext. F to the writ petition, there was numbersingle formulator having 90 or more market share in retail trade, it is pointed out in Paragraph iv of the companynter affidavit that Ext. It is further stated in the same para of the companynter that there is only one formulation, namely, Glynase based on Glipizide and in respect of that, the writ petitioner had 100 market share. The stand of the Central Government is that production data was number available for the year 1989 90 and the turnover of the bulk drug was determined by the expert group on the basis of the landed companyt of imports during the year to the tune of Rs.322.50 lacs. Thus, the dispute mainly centers round the quantum of turnover. 3449 of 1996 and in the representation submitted to the Government of India, only the names of seven formulators was mentioned. 3449 of 1996 also found favour with the High Court. The numberices demanding overcharged amounts were quashed. The writ petitions were thus allowed by the Division Bench of High Court.
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2003_1277.txt
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The plaintiffs however failed to obtain delivery of 596 bags from the Badagara companysignment and 470 bags from the Cochin companysignment. The plaintiffs took delivery of the goods packed in bags which bore their distinctive and identifying marks, but were unable to obtain delivery of 164 bags out of the companysignment sent by Ismalia, 869 bags out of the companysignment sent by Finnamore and 1,657 bags out of the companysignment sent by Tweedsmuir Park. 91 of 1958 is in respect of a companysignment of 6,000 bags of companyonut from Cochin and 4,733 bags of companyra and companyonuts from Badagara companysigned to the plaintiffs for carriage to Bombay by the steamer Bharatjal belonging to the appellant, the Bharat Lines Ltd. 91 and 92 of 1958. 91 and 92 of 1958 . 88 of 1956 . The appeal from the Madras High Court was in respect of a companysignment of 90 bundles of brass circles which were companysigned to the respondent at Madras from Bombay to Madras per S. S. Fakira, a Steamer belonging to the East and West Steamship Co. 1,10,323 8 0 as companypensation for the bags number delivered. The vessels discharged their cargoes alongside on to the docks belonging to the Trustees of the Port of Bombay. 88 of 1956. The Trustees of the Port of Bombay were also made defendants. The steamer arrived in Bombay Port some time in the middle of September, 1948. 91 of 1958 and Civil Appeal No. They brought the suit on December 5, 1949, against the shipping companypany, the Bharat Lines Ltd., and also against the Trustees of the Port of Bombay on a claim of Rs. This clause provides that in any event the carrier and the shipper shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless a suit is brought within one year after the delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered . In all the three appeals before us the carriers main defence to claims of companypensation by the owners of the goods was based on this clause and the companyrts had to companysider whether this defence was available to the carrier. 88 of 1956, Civil Appeal No. The suit was brought on a claim of Rs. 92 of 58 . Five more bundles were delivered on September 25, 1948. 92 of 1958, of which one is from a decision of the High Court of Madras and the other two from decisions of the High Court of Bombay raise some companymon questions of general importance to carriers of goods by sea and of shippers as regards the 3rd clause of paragraph 6 of Art. The Ship arrived in Madras on August 1, 1948, and 78 out of the 90 bundles were delivered on August 25, 1948, to the appellant through his clearing agent, the second respondent. Another defence was that the companypany was number liable as numbernotice within 3 days after discharge and before goods were removed from the quay or ships side or place of discharge had been given and so in view of Clause 20 of the bill of lading the companypany was free from all liability. The main defence of the first defendant, the Shipping Company, was that the companypany was discharged from all liability in respect of the loss or damage alleged in the plaint by reason of the provisions of the Act inasmuch as the suit had number been brought within one year of the date when the goods should have been delivered. 4076 of 1950 N. T. A. 1,023 5 0 as companypensation Rs. As regards the second defence based on the stipulation in the bill of lading that numberice has to be given within one month the Trial Court held that this term in the bill of lading was void and of numbereffect. After some companyrespondence between the Shipping Company and the first respondent regarding the seven bundles number, delivered the appellant companypany repudiated finally the respondents claim on March 24, 1950. 921 of 1952, arising out of the judgment and decree dated November 2, 1951, of the Court of Small Causes, Madras, in Suit No. We are numberlonger companycerned with them as after the suit was dismissed by the Trial Judge against both the defendants the plaintiffs did number prefer any appeal against the order of dismissal as against the Trustees. 1693 of 1949 and 105 of 1950, respectively. 66/X and 67/X of 1954, arising out of the judgment and decree dated February 15, 1954, of the said High Court in Suits Nos. Against this order the High Court of Madras was moved by the plaintiffs under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The first respondent brought the present suit on June 27, 1950, claiming Rs. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondent In C. A. III in the Schedule of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act hereinafter called the Act . Sen, S. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellant in C. A. 91/58 . The other appeal from the Bombay High Court, viz.,
Civil Appeal No. 48 8 0 as the profit of which he had been deprived. The claim for this amount of profit was given up at the Trial. B. Pattabhiraman and Ganapathy Iyer, for respondent in A. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated February 11, 1954, of the Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, S. N. Andley, B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellants In As. V. Viswanatha Sastri and G. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondent In C. A. With Civil Appeals Nos. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and decree dated March 10, 1955, of the Bombay High Court in Appeals Nos. The learned Judges who heard the new trial application disagreed with this and accepted the defence on this point also. 113 of 1951 . CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. These three appeals Civil Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS GUPTA, J. In the result they dismissed the new trial application and companyfirmed the order of dismissal made by the learned Trial Judge. No. May 3.
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1960_289.txt
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29 were the same machines. Later on, manufacture of companyponents of motor cars was started and gradually the Company developed this work of manufacture of companyponents by increasing the number of companyponents manufactured by it until, at the present time, the Company is manufacturing more than 70 of the companyponents utilised in the cars put on the market by the Company. 833 per car on the Hindustan Landmaster which was the car put on the market by the Company at that time. This statement has the significance that, though in the past two years the Company took the step of purchasing machines which would perform the identical functions which the old machines were performing, the Company chose to add these machines as new ones, as a part of its scheme of expansion rather than replace those old machines. 29 was very much the same as that of the original machines which were to be replaced when they were new. The respondent, M s Hindustan Motors Ltd., hereinafter referred to as the Company was established in the year 1942 and, initially, the work taken up by the Company was that of assembling of motor cars from companyponents imported from foreign companyntries. The Companys witness Bansal number only proved this statement, but also clearly stated that the machines originally purchased and those purchased later shown in, that statement Ext. In cross examination, he further specifically arrested that the production capacity of these new machines mentioned in Ext. The work of manufacturing companyponents was taken in hand for the first time in the year 1949, according to the reply of the Company filed on 10th January, 1962, to the statement filed on behalf of the workmen. This appeal by special leave has been filed by the workmen of Messrs Hindustan Motors Ltd. against the decision of the First Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal in a dispute relating to payment of bonus for the year 1960 61. VIH 354 of 1961. 1963 of the First Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal in Case No. before the Tribunal. were number challenged on behalf of the workmen before the Tribunal. Niren De, Solicitor General, M. Mukherjee and Sardar Bahadur. Sen, Janardan Sharma, P.K. It is also, significant that these figures of multipliers included in the first Schedule IA. 635 of 1965. Ghosh and S.K. Nandy, for the appellants. Even Subsequently, for several years. The JUdgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J. Appeal by special leave from the Award dated January 8. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. for respondent No.
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1967_96.txt
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the respondent is a firm which carries on business as perfumers and tobacconists in chandni chowk delhi. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by gajendragadkar c. j. the short question of law which arises for our decision in this appeal is whether the order passed by the delhi administration referring the dispute between the appellants the workmen of m s dharampal premchand sau ghandhi and the respondent the employer m s dharampal premchand saughandhi delhi was valid. the order of reference has been passed by the delhi administration under ss. when the industrial tribunal delhi took up this matter for hearing the respondent raised a preliminary objection that the reference was invalid inasmuch as the dispute referred to the tribunal by the impugned order of reference is number an industrial dispute. number 294 of 1961.
sukumar ghose for the appellant. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 532 of 1963.
appeal by special leave from the award dated february 9 1962 of the industrial tribunal delhi in i.d. 10 1 d and 12 5 of the industrial disputes act 1947 number 14 of 1947 hereinafter called the act . v. gupte solicitor general s. murthy and b. p. maheshwari for the respondent. it is against this order that the appellants have companye to this companyrt by special leave.
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1965_23.txt
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Madhavi Halder PW 6 and Smt. Das PW 13 . PW 6, Smt. Saha PW 12 . Biuthika Paul, who examined herself as PW 9 was a close friend of Bakulbala. Madhavi Halder, is the paternal aunt of the deceased. Kanan Bala Dey PW 5 , mother of the deceased, Haradhan Halder PW 8 , a neighbour and relative of PW 1 and Himadri Sekhar Dey PW 10 , brother of the deceased, were recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Shakti Sundari Sen, mother in law of the deceased and Nityananda Sen brother in law of the deceased were charged for companymission of the offence punishable under Sections 498A and 306 IPC. PW 1 opined that the deceased companymitted suicide being unable to bear such torture. Bithika Paul PW 9 , aunt and friend respectively of the deceased were recorded on 12.02.1994. She found marks of injuries on the dead body of Bakulbala. PW 1, Shyam Sundar Dey, father of the deceased received information about the death of his daughter. According to this witness, the brother in law of Bakulbala asked her sleep with him when her husband was out the house but on her reporting thereabout she was assaulted by her husband. Shakti Sundari Sen died on 14.10.1998. Since after her marriage husband, father in law, mother in law, brother in law, Kartick Sen all companybined used to companymit various physical and mental torture on her in companynection with household duties. Yesterday dated 03.02.1994 at about 7 a.m. husband, father in law, mother in law andbrother in law Kartick abused her again in companynection with household duties and asked deceased Bakul can you number die by taking poison? Jagat Kumar Das PW 7 is an independent person. The deceased had stated before her that she had been abused and assaulted even for minor and insignificant mattes. She categorically stated that she was assaulted by the parents in law and brother in law of the deceased and she had been driven out together with her son on 16th Falgoon. Out of the said witnesses, Shib Shankar Ghosh PW 2 and Biswanath Mallick PW 3 , who were the residents of the same village as that of the accused, were declared hostile. Dr. S. Charaborty, who companyducted the post mortem examination examined himself as PW 11. PROSECUTION CASE The prosecution case is as under Deceased Bakulbala was married to Appellant No.2 Gouranga Mohan in the year 1991. Another companyvillager of the appellants, Bhutnath Pal PW 4 was only tendered for cross examination. Many persons know about the physical and mental torture companymitted to her. before the officer in charge of Khandaghosh Police Station, alleging physical and mental torture upon her by all the accused. On 03.02.1994 at about 07.30 a.m. she was found dead at the verandah of her matrimonial home. The inquest report of the dead body, however, was companyducted on the next day, which, inter alia, reads as under On primary investigation it was found that the deceased was given in marriage to Shri Gounrana Mohan Sen, the eldest son of Sri Ananda Mohan Sen of village Dubrajpur on 21st Magh 1397. Even after settlement her daughter was severely assaulted. For ascertaining the real cause of death the dead body is sent to FSM Medical College, Burdawan through Shankar Das Bairagya, Constable. Dr. S. Chakraborty PW 11 , the autopsy surgeon, reserved his opinion in regard to the cause of the death pending chemical examiners report. On the fateful day, the accused persons assaulted and killed her by pouring poison in her mouth and left the house under lock and key. This witness in numberuncertain terms stated that the deceased used to companyplain about the ill treatment meted out to her in her in laws house and it would have been better if she had number been married and companytinued her studies. Viscera was also sent for chemical examination only on 14.03.1994. He having reached the place of occurrence found the dead body of his daughter lying. Stomach and its companytents Non congested companytains 250 ml. The statements of Smt. The companydition of the heart and companytents of the stomach, however, were numbericed therein as under Heart All the chamber full of blood and its clots to pinpoint haemorrhage on its surface. EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT The post mortem examination was companyducted at about 1230 hrs. Being mentally shocked she took poison named sumidon and as a result she died at 7.30 a.m. 218 of 1995 under Sections 498A and 306 of the Indian Penal Code for short, IPC . A First Information Report was lodged on the same day at about 2105 hrs. of whitish violate fluid with a smell like that of kerosene. Immediately after the occurrence, all the inmates of the house including the appellants fled away from the house. Charge sheet, however, was submitted by another Investigating Officer, namely, Sub Inspector M.M. Go out of the house. It is difficult to appreciate that the investigating officer took such a long time in sending the article for chemical examination after such a long time. on 04.02.1994. The investigation was carried out principally by Sub Inspector S.D. Investigation was carried out in a slip shod manner. The High Court, however, modified the sentence in respect of charge under Section 306 IPC, reducing it from five years to three years, so far as the first Appellant is companycerned. Appellants herein along with Smt. Before the learned Trial Judge, 13 witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution. The officer in charge of the police station upon receipt of the said First Information Report arrived at the place of occurrence at about 10.30 p.m. Settlement preceded the dispute. 351 of 2003, affirming a judgment of companyviction and sentence passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Burdwan in Sessions Case No. She was made to do domestic works like a maid servant and even she had been denied proper meal. The learned Trial Judge found the appellants guilty of companymission of the said offences and sentenced Appellant No. 743 OF 2007 Arising out of S.L.P. 5950 of 2006 B. SINHA, J Leave granted. She expected the dispute would be settled after she gave birth to a child. INTRODUCTION Appellants are before us being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment of companyviction and sentence dated 10.04.2006 passed by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No. It was locked. Crl. CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.
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2007_444.txt
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1 in the said suit claiming damages for wrongful detention of her belongings on 24.06.1992. 1 on 16.03.1987. 50,000/ for wrongful detention of her belongings including garments and personal effects. 1 Banjula used to stay, on 16.03.1987. The suit was withdrawn. The companynter claim, however, was treated to be a suit. One lis was in relation to the declaration of title as also possession, another one was in respect of damages for wrongful detention of specific movable properties. A companynter claim was filed by Respondent No. 1 knew about the purported alleged wrongful act on the part of the appellant. An inventory was made in the said suit by appointing an Advocate Commissioner. A suit was filed by Respondent No. What would be the period of limitation for raising a companynter claim in respect of wrongful detention of goods is the question involved in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 19.01.2005 passed by the High Court of Calcutta in F.A. She knew thereabout. She filed an application in the nature of pro intersse suo in the earlier suit. 88,000/ . If she had to claim damages for that act on the part of the appellant, she should have filed a suit within a period of three years from the said date. She also claimed damages to the tune of Rs. 2, an Advocate Commissioner was appointed and inventory of the goods of the said room was prepared, the same, in our opinion, would number give rise to a fresh cause of action for laying a claim for damages. It was a suit for declaration of plaintiffs right in respect of user of the lands on which certain sheds had been created as a passage which was obstructing thereto. They had one more sister Bulbul Dastidar who died in November, 1987 . Appellant and late Kamakshya Kumar, husband of Dipti Dasgupta Respondent No. A suit was filed by the appellant thereafter. One of the questions which was raised in the appeal was as to whether the said companynter claim was barred by limitation. In support of its judgment, the Division Bench has placed strong reliance upon a Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sarat Chandra Mukherjee v. Nerode Chandra Mukherjee and Others AIR 1935 Calcutta 405. 1 herein is their sister. 1 against the appellant inter alia for declaration of title in regard to their residential house situate at P 824, New Alipore, Kolkata. Her cause of action was different and distinct from that of her brother. 1 was stored was known to Respondent No. The amount of claim was purported to have been made on an allegation that validity of a National Saving Certificate companyld number be renewed and, thus, she had suffered a loss of Rs. Allegedly, the appellant had put a lock, in a room where Respondent No. Furthermore, Respondent No. 23472 of 2005 B. SINHA, J Leave granted. 2 herein are brothers. 71 of 2002. It was in that premise held to be a companytinuing wrong. Only because in another legal proceedings by and between the appellant and Respondent No. Arising out of S.L.P. It was decreed. The same was rejected. Civil No. No.
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2006_826.txt
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1949 Bom. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court Chagla C.J. 197 51 Bom. Appeal from a Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay Chagla C.J. Shortly after the passing of the above Acts, the validi ty of the Bombay City Civil Court Act XL of 1948 was challenged in Mulchand Kundanmal Jagtiani v. Raman Hiralal Shah 1 , a suit on promissory numberes filed in the Original side of the High Court. 2346/5 in the Official Gazette A,I.R. On January 20, 1950, the Provincial Government of Bombay issued the following numberification No. On the application of the AdvocateGeneral, the State of Bombay was impleaded as defendant at this stage and the proceedings were trans ferred to a Division Bench of the High Court. The State of Bombay was, on its own application, added as a party to the suit. 1 1949 50 F.C.R. and Tendolkar J. dated 29th March, 1950, in Suit No. 595. 10 of 1950. The State of Bombay, dissatisfied with this decision, has preferred the present appeal. and Bhagwati J. , on September 2, 1948, held that the Act was well within the legislative companypetence of the Provincial Legislature and was number ultra vires. The first respondent thereupon took out summons for judgment against the second respondent. The first respondent thereupon took out a summons under the rules of the Court for leave to sign judgment against the second respondent. Leave was given to the plaintiff in that suit under section 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to appeal to the Federal Court but numbersuch appeal appears to have been filed. The Division Bench upheld the view of the Judge in Chambers and returned the cause to him for disposal on the merits. 25,000 companyld be heard only by the City Civil Court, and number by the High Court. APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1950_37.txt
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The same Enquiry Officer then permitted the appellant to cross examine the witnesses produced in support of the charge and to examine his own witnesses. Upon the basis of the enquiry report the appellant was dismissed from service. The Enquiry Officer made a report holding the appellant guilty. It is patent that the order dated 8th July, 1988 companytemplated a fresh enquiry. It was also impermissible for him to have stated that the findings of the previous enquiry report remain as they are. It is the submission of learned companynsel on behalf of the appellant that the Enquiry Officer had in the second enquiry report relied upon the findings of the earlier enquiry, since quashed, and that he had number permitted the appellant to examine three necessary witnesses in support of his case. He also challenged it upon the ground that he had number been furnished with a companyy of the Enquiry Report. Insofar as the enquiry report was companycerned, the High Court took the view that the Enquiry Officer had allowed the appellant to participate in the proceedings as also to cross examine witnesses and he had companysidered all relevant aspects on the record. It had directed that the appellant should face an enquiry whereat the prosecution would produce the witnesses it had examined on its behalf for cross examination. At best, the examination in chief of the witnesses of the respondent companyld be said to have been allowed to be incorporated in the second enquiry proceedings. The appellant challenged the order of dismissal dated 23rd October, 1989 on the ground that the enquiry upon the basis of which it had been passed had number been companyducted as required by the order of the High Court dated 8th July, 1988. The disciplinary authority, upon companysideration of the enquiry report, passed an order dated 23rd October, 1989, dismissing the appellant from service. Having regard to the High Courts order dated 8th July, 1988, the Enquiry Officer was bound to companysider the material or, record afresh and number to take his earlier report into account and to say that he found numberreason to change that report. 1979 of 1988 impugning the dis missal. It will be recalled that the High Court by the judgment and order dated 8th July, 1988 had held that the earlier enquiry was number proper and in accordance with law and had quashed the order of dismissal dated 14th February, 1987 based thereon. The High Court allowed the writ petition by judgment and order dated 8th July, 1988. After the cross examination is over the petitioner will also produce the witnesses when he may like to enquire. Thereafter, the appellant companyld produce such witnesses as he desired. 3430 of 1991. From the Judgment and Order dated 15.11.91 of the Patna High Court in C.WC. He made a report dated 27th March, 1989 in which he held nine charges against the appellant to be proved, one to be partly proved and one number proved. An en quiry was held. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court at Patna being Writ Petition No. Sharan for the Appellant. Ramzan Khan, A.I.R. He was chargesheeted for having granted bank loans to a large number of persons without proper documentation and without verifying their creditworthiness and also with having obtained illegal gratification in that companynection. Ramaswamy and A.V. The appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court at Patna dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. 1991 S.C. 471, did number companyer an order of dismissal that had been passed before the said judgment was delivered. 901 of 1993. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHARUCHA, J.Leave to appeal is granted. This should be done without any adjournment and the proceed ing should be companyducted day to day so that it may be companycluded as early as possible. The High Court rejected the writ petition. C.W.J.C. With this observation this writ application is disposed of. by the appellant. The appellant was employed by the respondent. It held that the judgment of this Court in the case of Union of India and others v. Mohd. Rangam for the Respondents. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No.
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1993_215.txt
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On 26 4 1963 the Railway Board issued a circular on the question of application of age of retirement under Rule 2046 of the Railway Establishment Code. On 5 12 62 the age of retirement of all Railway servants, without any distinction, was raised to 58. The age of retirement under the Company was 55 years as indeed it was for Government servants also. There also the Railway servant companycerned had originally entered the service with the Madras and Southern Mahratta Rail way Company. Railway on 30 11 1929 as a probationary Assistant Booking Clerk. On the basis of this circular the appellant was asked to retire on attaining the age of 55 as mentioned earlier. The circular of the Rail way Board dated 26 4 1963 picked out one section of the Railway employees which were governed by Rule 2046 of the Railway Establishment Code, as amended on 5 12 1962 and subjected them to hostile treatment. This age of retirement was made a specific clause of the agreement. On 1 1 1942 this Railway was taken over by the Central Government. This appeal by Certificate against the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat dismissing the plaintiffs writ petition questioning the order of the Divisional Superintendent of Western Railway directing him to retire on his attaining the age of 55 companyld be disposed of on the basis of the judgment of this Court in Railway Board v. A. Pitchumani . C.I. At that time the appellant executed a service agreement which, among other things, pre served for him the leave privileges he was entitled to while serving under the Company. The facts necessary for disposing of this appeal may be shortly stated, The appellant entered the service of the B.B. Alagiriswami, J. The facts of the case in the decision of this Court, earlier referred to, are exactly the same.
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1973_383.txt
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On 23rd December, 1976, the then Acting Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan issued the following order carving out jurisdiction between the cases to be heard at Jodhpur principal seat and the Jaipur Bench seat RAJ. Sd Ved Pal Tyagi CHIEF JUSTICE 12 1 77. Establishment of a Permanent Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur There shall be established a permanent Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur, and such Judges of the High Court of Rajasthan, being number less than five in number, as the Chief Justice of that High Court may, from time to time numberinate, shall sit at Jaipur in order to exercise the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in that High Court in respect of cases arising in the districts of Ajmer, Alwar, Bharatpur, Bundi, Jaipur, Jhalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kotah, Sawai Madhopur, Sikar and Tonk. 1/J.B. AHMAD December 8, 1976. Sd F.A. The validity of the Presidential Order dated December 8, 1976 as also of the abovesaid orders of the Acting Chief Justice was put in issue on very many grounds but the same was turned down by a Division Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan. Provided that the Chief Justice of that High Court may, in his discretion, order that any case or class of cases arising in any such district shall be heard at Jodhpur. Dated Dec. 23, 1976. President. New Delhi.
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2000_948.txt
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Sharma for rehearing and reconsidering the issue in regard to the renewal of mining lease to TISCO. On June 3, 1993, the Central Government authorised the renewal of the lease over the entire area of 1261.476 hectares. On April 27, 1993, the Indian Bureau of Mines, after analysing the mining plan submitted by TISCO, recommended to the Central Government that TISCOS lease be renewed in its entirety. The Committee submitted a report dated August 16, 1995, recommending renewal of the lease for a reduced area to TISCO. On October 5, 1993, the Central Government superseded its earlier approval dated June 3, 1993, and renewed TISCOs lease over a reduced area of 651 hectares. While TISCOs writ petition was pending, ICCL and JSL filed writ petitions, being OJC No.5422/94 and OJC No.7054/94, challenging the renewal of TISCOs lease by the Central Government, both the order dated June 3, 1993 which had authorised the renewal of the entire lease area of 1261 hectares and the order dated October 5, 1993 which subsequently reduced the authorisation to 651 hectares were challenged. By its order dated August 17, 1995, the Central Government while endorsing the finding of the Committee recommended to the State Government that TISCOs lease be renewed for 20 years over a reduced area of 406 hectares. Acting on that report, on the very next day, August 17, 1995, the Central Government authorised the renewal of TISCOs lease over the reduced area of 406 hectares which, according to the Central Government, would meet TISCOs captive requirements and requested the State Government to issue orders for the same. By its impugned order dated April 4, 1995 the High Court of Orissa struck down the renewal of TISCOs lease granted by the Central Government through its decisions dated June 3, 1993 and October 5, 1993. 1992 submitted by the Director of Mines Geology, Orissa Recommended to the Central government that the entire lease of TISCO be renewed for a period of 10 years under Section 8 3 of the Act. In the case of TISCO, after taking into account all the technical grounds and objections put forth by the learned companynsel for TISCO, the Committee came to the companyclusion that its lease should be granted renewal for a period of 20 years over a companytiguous area of 461 hectares. On October 22, 1952, it was granted a mining lease over an area of 1813 hectares for chromite for a period of 20 years. Meanwhile, FACOR, Ispat Alloys, JSL and Jindal Ferro Alloys Ltd. applied for mining leases of the area held by TISCO, but the State Government refused to entertain them as being premature under Rules 59 and 60 of the Mineral Concession Rules framed under the Act hereinafter called the Rules . Thereafter, it directed the Central Government to reconsider TISCOs application for renewal of the lease in accordance with law the Central Government was also directed to give a personal hearing to, and companysider the applications of, the other parties before the Court. Since the lease was to expire on January 12, 1973 TISCO sought its renewal which was duly granted under Section 8 2 in respect of 1261.476 hectares for a period of 20 years i.e. Subsequently, under the provisions of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1952, on the rights of the Raja having vested in the State Government, the latter recognised the lease of TISCO for a period of 20 years with effect from January 12, 1953. The appellants in these appeals are the Tata Iron and Steel Company, Limited, hereinafter called TISCO and the Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa Limited hereinafter called IDCOL . The principal respondents are the Union of India, the State of Orissa, M s. Indian Charge Chrome Limited, hereinafter called ICCL , Indian Metal Ferro Alloys Limited hereinafter called IMFA , M s. Jindal Strips Limited, hereinafter called JSL , Ferro Alloys Corporation Limited hereinafter called FACOR and Ispat Alloys Limited. On September 27, 1993, the said Union Minister wrote a letter to the Chief Minister of Orissa stating that the lease area of TISCO should be reduced by half and the balance should be distributed in an equitable manner taking into companysideration the need of genuine companysumers for captive companysumption. On October 3, 1991, more than a year prior to the date of expiry of the lease, TISCO applied for a second renewal under Section 8 3 of the Act for a further period of 20 years, On November 28, 1992, the State Government, acting on the basis of a favourable report dated March 31. 1 SCC 91, and directed the Central Government to hear the application for renewal of the lease, keeping in view the report submitted by the Rao Committee and the decision of this Court in the aforesaid case. On October 19, 1993, TISCO filed a writ petition in the High Court, being OJC No.7729/93, under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order dated October 5, 1993, inter alia on the ground that the scheme of equitable distribution on mining leases on the basis of need of an industry is extrancous to the companycept of mineral development, which alone is relevant under Section 8 3 .
of the Act. While the first four special leave petitions have been filed by TISCO, the last two have been filed by IDCOL. The factual matrix of the case is as follows The appellant, TISCO, is a limited companypany, one of whose primary objects has been to carry on business as a mining industry. However, before the formal lease companyld be executed, the Union Minister of State for Steel Mines, acting on a companyplaint filed by Shri G.C. SLP Nos.10838/95, 11391/95 and 11392/95 seek to challenge the order dated April 4, 1995 of the Orissa High Court and SLP Nos.22710/95, 23131/95 and 23132/95 seek to challenge the Central Governments decision dated August 17, 1995, made pursuant to the High Courts order dated April 4, 1995. These appeals seek to challenge 1 the companymon judgment and order of the Orissa High Court dated April 4, 1995, arising out of OJC No.7729 of 1993 and allied matters and 2 the decision of the Central Government dated August 17, 1995 made pursuant to the said judgment of the High Court. It set aside the orders dated June 3, 1993 and October 5, 1993, inter alia on the ground that the Central Government had number kept in view the recommendation made by the Rao Committee which was accepted by this Court in the case of Indian Metals Ferro Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1991 SC 818, 1992 Supp. It claims that it was the first to discover Chrome ore in the Sukinda Valley, Orissa, in the year 1949. The High Court of Orissa after hearing lengthy arguments of companynsel appearing for different interests including the Central and the State Governments companycluded in paragraph 57 of its judgment that two companyrses were open to it, namely, i to accept the submission of the companynsel for the State Government that all the writ petitions should be dismissed and the parties may be asked to exhaust the alternative remedy of permitting the State Government to take a decision as authorised by the Central Government and if any party is aggrieved it may move the Central Government under the Act and the Rules, or ii the Court may dispose of the writ petitions giving certain specific directions in the shape of guidelines to the Governments as well as other authorities under the Act to companysider in the light thereof if there is any necessity to renew the lease for the whole or part of the area companyered under the lease. After the judgment of the High Court was delivered on April 4, 1995, a Committee was companystituted by the Ministry of Mines, Government of India, under the Chairmanship of one Shri S.D. Under the provisions of the Mineral Conservation Development Rules, 1988, framed under Section 18 of the Act, the Indian Bureau of Mines is also required to furnish relevant information to the Central Government. till January 11, 1993, subject to the companydition that lt would set up a beneficiation plant. It applied to the Raja of Sukinda for a prospecting licence and was granted the same in 1952. Munda, Member of Parliament, directed that the matter be kept in abeyance. Ahmadi, CJI Special leave granted. The reasons for the reduction were also provided.
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1996_1932.txt
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4.1.78. District Judge dt. 18 of the Act challenging the allotment order dt. G.L. 4 by his Order dt. The District Judge by his order dt. Mauji Ram Gupta, the landlord also made an application for the release of the premises to him under sec. R.K. Srivastava on unsuc cessful applicant for the allotment of the premises in dispute had challenged the allot ment order dt. Mauji Ram Gupta entered into an agreement for the sale of the house with G.L. District Judge, Lucknow dt. Mauji Ram Gupta, the landlord chal lenged the allotment order by means of revi sion application before the District Judge but the same was rejected. Pahwa on 18.7.77 and the allotment order in appellants favour was set aside by the Additional Dis trict Judge on 8.8.77 at the instance of R.K. Srivastava on unsuccessful applicant for the allotment of the premises in dispute. As numbered earlier Mauji Ram Gupta sold the entire house in dispute to G.L. Pahwa being the successor in interest of Mauji Ram Gupta, did number and companyld number acquire any further right either to get the premises in dispute released in his favour or to challenge the validity of the allotment order. District Judge and directed the alloting authority to reconsider the applications for allotment after giving numberice to the landlord respondent number 1. Mauji Ram Gupta the owner of the house was residing in the ground floor of the house while the 1st floor was let out to a tenant. Pahwa, respondent number 1. 25.2.76 rejected Mauji Ram Guptas application and allotted the premises to H.C. Ghildiyal, but he did number occupy the premises instead he informed respondent number 4 that he did number require the premises. Pahwa to occupy the ground floor of the house in November 1976. 4.1.78 he again allotted the premises to the appellant and rejected the claims of other applicants. to re spondent number 4, which he disposed of by the same order dt. He filed a review application also before re spondent number 4 for recall of the order dt. Pahwa made application for allotment and the respondent number 4 allot ted the ground floor to him on 31.12.76, this appears to have been done with a view to regularise his possession. Mauji Ram Gupta executed a registered sale deed in favour of L. Pahwa on 18.7.77 transferring the entire house including the premises in dispute to him, as a result of which respondent number 1 became the owner and the landlord of the premises in dispute. The High Court held that since the District Judge while setting aside the initial order of allotment made in appellants favour dt. 18.8.77 allowed his revision application set aside the allotment order made in appellants favour and directed respondent number 4 to reconsider the applica tions made for allotment of the premises in accordance with law. In pursuance of the directions issued by the District Judge re spondent number 4 companysidered the applications and by his order dt. 18.1.83, and set aside the order of respondent number 4 dt. The Addl. Pahwa was number entitled to maintain a review application and Addition al District Magistrate had numberjurisdiction to recall his order dated 4.1.78 alloting the premises to the appellant and further he was number entitled to any numberice either under sec tion 17 2 of the Act or under Rule 9 3 , as the requisite numberice had already been issued to the erstwhile landlord Mauji Ram Gupta who had companytested the allotment proceedings. 23.7.76 directed respondent number 4 to companysider the allotment applications in accord ance with law. District Magistrate Civil Supplies , Lucknow to reconsider the applications made for allot ment of the premises in dispute after giving numberice to the respondent landlord. Shri Tarkundc learned companynsel for the appellant urged that the High Court companymitted error in setting aside the allotment order and directing the District Magistrate to reconsid er the allotment applications at the instance of G.L. Thereaf ter respondent number4 allotted the first floor of the house to the appellant by his order dt. Pahwa, respondent number 1 and in part performance of the agreement he permitted G.L. Since numbernotice was given to him the allotment proceeding was rendered illegal. January 18, 1983 and quashing the allotment order made in appellants favour and directing the Addl. On these findings, he recalled his Order dated 4.1.78. However the review application of respondent number 1 was allowed by respondent number 4 by his order dr.
14.12.81 on the finding that since the premises in dispute was a part of land lords building which he was occupying, it was mandatory that numberice should have been issued to the landlord and since numbernotice had been issued to him the allotment order was vitiat ed. Notice of the allotment proceedings was number given to re spondent number 1, although by that time he had acquired full rights of a landlord. District Judge and directed respondent number 4 to companysider the application for allot ment for giving numberice to respondent number 1. The dispute relates to 1st floor of House No. The appellant challenged the order by means of a revision application before the District Judge under sec. Vacancy in the first floor arose, several persons including the appellant, H.C. Ghildiyal and Ramakant Srivastava made appli cations for allotment of the same. Respondent number 1 filed revision application under sec. During the pendency of the review application the revision application made by respondent number 1 was dismissed by the District Judge on 28.2.78 for want of prosecution. 14.12.81, on the findings that review application was number maintainable and respondent number 4 had numberjurisdiction to review his order on the ground of absence of numberice to respondent number 1 who was transferee land lord. District Magistrate, respondent No. But as numbernotice was issued to him, he companyld number exercise his right to numberinate a tenant of his choice although the appellant as well as the authority companysidering the application, for allotment both had ac quired knowledge that respondent number 1 was the trans feree landlord occupying a portion of the building. A learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition by his order dt. 23.7.86 made in appellants favour under sec. Respondent number 1 challenged the validity of the order of the Addl. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad Lucknow Bench dt. for release of the first floor and that had been forwarded by the Govt. 109/16 situate in Model House Colony, Aminabad, Lucknow. It appears that respondent had made an application to the State Govt. January 20, 1984 setting aside order of the Addl. Respondent number 4 was under a legal duty to issue numberice to respondent number 1 who had by that time acquired rights of land lord. July 23, 1976 and in pursuance to that order she obtained possession of the premises on 25.7.76. January 20, 1984 and quashed the order of the Addl. 18.1.83 by means of a writ petition under Art. Upadhyay and Manoj Saxena for the Respondents. 18 of the Act. Aggrieved the appellant challenged the validi ty of the order of the High Court. Before we companysider the submissions made on behalf of the appellant it is necessary to briefly numberice the findings recorded by the High Court. 1404 of 1983. M. Tarkunde and Shakeel Ahmed Syed for the Appellant. 157 of 1985 From the Judgment and Order dated 20.1.1984 of the Allahabad High Court in W.P. 16 of the U.P Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction Act, 1972 hereinafter referred to as the Act . C. Maheshwari, R.D. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINGH, J. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No.
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1986_304.txt
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In the original companynting 1277 ballot papers were rejected as invalid but in the recounting by the Returning Officer 1377 ballot papers were rejected on that ground. P.W.1/1 and W.1/2A, that the ballot papers of all the candidates were recounted by the Returning Officer and that in the application Exh. Admittedly some ballot papers meant for the Kalka companystituency had been issued for use in this companystituency and they had been cast in favour of respondent 1 and were rejected on the ground that those ballot papers were number meant for use in this companystituency. Three ballot papers alleged to have been cast in favour of respondent I at booth No. 2/5 presented to the Returning Officer by respondent 1 immediately after the recounting was over numbergrievance was made by respondent 1 that the ballot papers of any other candidate were number recounted. However, it was alleged that the Returning Officer recounted the ballot papers of the appellant and respondent 1 alone and therefore the recount was void. Respondent 1 alleged in the election petition that the Returning Officer initially ordered the recount of the ballot papers of himself and the appellant in respect of all the booths after a sample checking but on the application of the appellant that the ballot papers of all the candidates should be recounted, to which respondent 1 companysented, he ordered recount of all the votes. On merits the appellant admitted that recount of the ballot papers of all the candidates was ordered by Returning Officer but denied the other allegations made in the election petition and companytended that the recounting was properly made and that there is numberground to order recounting by the Court. Thus this ground alleged by respondent 1 relates to improper rejection of about 100 ballot papers said to have been cast in favour of respondent 1 in the recounting by the Returning Officer. 3, that numbervalid ballot paper cast in favour of respondent 1 was rejected on any such flimsy ground. The additional ,100 ballot papers which were alleged to have been originally accepted in favour of respondent I were alleged to have been rejected by the Returning Officer under the influence of the Naib Tehsildar Election of Ambala who was alleged to have been favouring the appellant. In these circumstances the High Court found that while making his quasi judicial decision regarding the doubtful ballot papers the Returning 1108 Officer companysulted the Naib Tehsildar and thus allowed his opinion to influence his own discretion in accepting or rejecting the doubtful ballot papers. The Returning Officer, R.W. 19 were alleged to have been rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that they were meant for the Kalka companystituency. 2/5 filed soon after the recounting was over. The High Court thought that the rejection of those ballot papers was probably due to inadvertence to the said proviso but however, it held that it is difficult to record a definite finding as to whether those ballot papers were rightly or wrongly rejected. Out of the 100 votes rejected by the Returning Officer in the recounting as invalid 93 related to the other candidates and only 7 related to the appellant and respondent 1, and the reason for rejection of those 7 ballot 1109 papers was number quite clear to the High Court, There is also the doubt, according to the High Court, as to the companyrectness or otherwise of the rejection of the ballot papers meant for use in the Kalka companystituency but actually used in this companystituency. Accordingly, the High Court ordered the District Election Officer, Ambala to produce only the rejected ballot papers for rechecking and recounting by the Court through the District Judge Vigilance , Punjab in its presence and under its supervision. Though the Returning Officer, R.W. 3.
when questioned in this regard, was unable to say anything positive in regard to the matter though he had admitted in his evidence that some ballot papers meant for use in the Kalka companystituency had been used in this companystituency and were rejected. 3.
had stated in his oral evidence that only the ballot papers of the appellant and respondent 1 were in fact rechecked and recounted the High Court found on the basis of his report Exh. The margin of difference between the votes polled to the appellant and respondent 1 was 5 in the original companynting and 10 in the recounting made by the Returning Officer. Under the proviso to Rule 56A 2 g of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Rules a ballot paper shall number be rejected on the ground that it bears a serial number or a design different from the serial number or design of the ballot papers authorised for use at a particular polling station if the Returning Officer is satisfied that such defect had been caused by any mistake or failure on the part of the presiding officer or polling officer. The observer, W. 4, has admitted in his evidence that respondent 1 took objection to the presence of the Naib Tehsildar during the recounting by the Returning Officer. After the recounting was accordingly made by the District Judge Vigilance , Punjab under the supervision of the Court it was found that respondent 1 and the appellant had gained 14 and 8 more votes respectively in addition to the votes already companynted in their favour by the Returning Officer in his recounting. The High Court found that the allegation of respondent 1 that the Returning Officer obtained the guidance of the Naib Tehsildar, Dhan Singh, in making his decision regarding doubtful votes is probablised by the evidence of the appellant, R.W.1, and his election agent Suraj Bhan, R.W.2 who have admitted in their evidence that the Naib Tehsildar had number been put on any particular duty during the recounting and that he was sitting near the dais and was companysulted by the Returning Officer sometimes on the question of the doubtful nature of some ballot papers. The High Court rejected the next ground alleged by respondent 1 for claiming recount, namely, that about 100 ballot papers cast in his favour were rejected illegally because they bore some slight indecipherable impressions of the finger or the thumb of the voters on the ground that sufficient acceptable evidence was number available to rebut the evidence of the Returning Officer. Respondent 1 challenged the election of the appellant on the ground that the companynting was number proper and invalid and he prayed number only for recounting of the votes but also for declaration that he is the duly elected candidate. As stated already, respondent 1 prayed number only recounting 1107 and setting aside the election of the appellant but also for a declaration that he is the duly elected candidate. The appellant secured 20981 votes while respondent 1 secured 20971 votes and he was declared to have been elected. But the appellant had number filed any recrimination application under s. 97 1 of the Representation of People Act, 1951.
hereinafter referred to as the Act Therefore, it was companytended before the High Court on behalf of respondent 1 that the rejected votes of the appellant, the returned candidate, cannot be scrutinised and that the appellant cannot have the benefit of the 8 ballot papers found to have been wrongly rejected. The appellant alone companytested the election petition. 3, Sadhura Scheduled Caste reserved companystituency in the election held on 19.5.1982 The companytest was between the appellant and 12 others including respondent 1, Parbdu Ram, who was the election petitioner. Respondent 1 pleaded nine other grounds in his election petition but did number lead any evidence or advance any argument in respect of the same. R.W. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court allowing Election Petition 6 of 1982 filed by respondent 1. From the Judgment and Order dated the 23rd February, 1984 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Election Petition No. In his companynter affidavit he raised two preliminary objections, namely, that companyies and annexures supplied to him were number duly attested to be true companyies under the signature of respondent I and therefore the election petition was liable to be dismissed and that the election petition had number been properly verified. On the pleadings the material issue framed by the High Court was as to whether respondent 1 is entitled to recount. 20, Exh. There objections were rejected by the High Court by and order dated 4.10.1982. Kapil Sibal, R N. Karanjawala and Mrs. Manik Karanjawala for the Respondent. The appellant, Bhag Mal, was declared elected as a Member of the Haryana Legislative Assembly Vidhan Sabha from No. In reaching this companyclusion the High Court took numbere of the fact that numbersuch grievance was made by respondent 1 in his application Exh. 1451 of 1984. Shanti Bhushan, N.M. Ghatate and S. V. Deshpande for the Appellant. 6 of 1984. P.W.4/4 and the entries made in the two forms No. This was naturally opposed by the learned companynsel for the appellant before the High Court. P.W. The following Judgments were delivered 1106 VARADARAJAN, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1984_275.txt
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