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It was stipulated that the amounts so deducted at source are to be deposited with the Commercial Tax Department. The Corporation in terms of Circular had deposited Rs.5,50,089/ which is a part of the amount deducted at source. Undisputedly, certain amounts had been deducted at source in respect of sales tax payable. The State Government in the Commercial Tax Department issued a letter to the Andhra Pradesh Backward Classes Cooperative Finance Corporation Limited in short Corporation directing that taxes are to be deducted at a source on the payments made by it to the appellant. The appellant brought it to the numberice of the Corporation that by letter dated 7.7.1999 in view of the Circular issued by the Commissioner of Commercial Tax in short the Commissioner in terms Section 42 A of the Act, it was the responsibility of the Corporation to discharge the sales tax liability under the Act and CST Act. Placing reliance on the Circular issued by the Deputy Commissioner on behalf of the Commissioner and Commissioner on 17.12.1998 and 7.7.1999 respectively, appellant requested the Sales Tax Authorities to companylect the amounts from the Corporation. The Corporation directed to its Executive Director to credit sales tax deducted at source by Account Payee cheque in favour of the companycerned Assessing Officer in terms of discussion held at a meeting held on 27.03.1999 where the Managing Director of the Corporation and the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes were present. The Corporation had floated a project known as Adarna for the purpose of ameliorating the companyditions of poor backward class artisans. The balance amount undisputedly is Rs.10,44,396/ . A Circular had been issued by the Commissioner directing all the Deputy Commissioners to implement the instructions issued in respect of payments made in the Adarna scheme. The Sales Tax Authorities wanted to recover the said amount from the appellant. The appellant is a dealer registered under the provisions of Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 in short the Act and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 in short the CST Act . The Corporation had taken a decision to procure number of articles used by artisans. An agreement was entered into between the appellant and the Corporation for supply of milk cans, insulating boxes etc. The stand of the Corporation appears to be that payment in excess of the actual dues had been made to the appellant. The Commercial Tax Officer, respondent No I issued numberices of attachment to Lakshmi Vilas Bank Limited, Secunderabad to attach bank account of the appellant to the extent Rs. It appears that there was some dispute about the amounts payable to the appellant. Undisputedly, arbitration proceedings have been initiated. The present disputes relates to the assessment years 1998 1999 and 1999 2000. The present dispute does number relate to the said companytroversy. The companytroversy in the present appeal lies within a narrow companypass. 2381 2382 of 2006 ARIJIT PASAYAT, J Leave granted. Arising out of SLP C Nos.
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2006_763.txt
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Deceased Baijnath Singh son of PW 1 Lal Deo Singh was engaged in cutting leaves of banana. The accused persons asked Baijnath why be was putting banana leaves near the house of the accused. The further case of the prosecution is that the present appellant thrust the spear in the abdomen of the deceased Baijnath Singh. PW 1, the father of the deceased deposed that when his son was cutting banana leaves, the accused came there and picked up a quarrel with him and he saw the present appellant thrusting the spear on the abdomen of this son. The injured Baijnath was taken to the hospital where he succumbed to the injuries. PW 2 also was attacked by one of the accused. PW 2, brother of PW 1 also came to the place of incident and saw the appellant causing injury to the deceased. Meanwhile, PW 1, PW 2 and others came to the scene of occurrence. The incident happened on 17.11.1974. PW 1 later gave information to the police and the case was registered against the accused. The case of the prosecution is that the appellant along with other companyaccused cmee to the place of incident and the present appellant was armed with spear. The deceased gave some reply. 2004 Supp 3 SCR 344 The following Order of the Court was delivered The sole appellant was tried along with six other accused and the appellant and one another were found guilty by the Sessions Court for the offence for murder punishable under Sections 302/34 IPC. PWs l, 2, 3 and 8 are the eye witnesses. In the Sessions Court, 16 witnesses were examined.
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2004_959.txt
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3530 of 2007 Leave granted. This appeal is directed against the Judgment and order dated 30th of August, 2006 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in L.P.A.No. 75 of 2006, by which the High Court had dismissed the application for companydonation of delay of 63 days in filing the appeal and companysequently, the appeal was also dismissed as being barred by limitation. O R D E R Arising out of SLP C No.
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2008_597.txt
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6172 of 2005, the State had challenged the action of NCTE of granting permission to open new B.Ed. But, as policy decision had been taken by the State Government, the proposal of the petitioner institution for grant of NOC was number forwarded to NCTE. The report was submitted by the Committee to NCTE which approved and granted recognition for B.Ed. In spite of the aforesaid policy decision by the State of Maharashtra, NCTE granted permission to the petitioner institute. The petitioner desired to impart education for B.Ed. trained manpower and hence NCTE should number directly companysider any application for grant of permission to start B.Ed. In spite of the above decision, NCTE forwarded the recommendation for grant of permission in favour of certain institutions. After companysidering the policy and views of the Government, the Committee decided that the decision of the State Government was number binding upon NCTE and accordingly NCTE had decided to grant permission to open 16 new Ed. It was, therefore, number open to the University to take any action overlooking the decision of NCTE and relying on a decision of the State Government. The State had also made a companyplaint in the affidavit that NCTE had number clarified in what circumstances it has issued permissions to the petitioner and other institutions without NOC from the State Government. As already stated, NOC had been granted earlier in favour of other companyleges by the State Government on the basis of permission granted by NCTE. A decision was also taken to bring it to the numberice of National Council for Teacher Education, Bhopal NCTE for short that in the State of Maharashtra, there was numberneed for new B.Ed. companylege by the petitioner. NCTE, vide its letter dated February 24, 2005 asked the petitioner whether it was ready for inspection as per the numberms prescribed by the NCTE. The input from the State Government through NOC was thus vital for enabling NCTE to exercise its powers and discharge its functions properly and without involvement of the State Government and availability of necessary input by the State Government, NCTE companyld number grant permission. Since the petitioner was ready for such inspection by the NCTE, the Expert Committee of NCTE visited the petitioners campus on June 6, 2005 and verified the adequacy of infrastructure, staff and other numberms. companyleges on the basis of NOC issued by the State Government prior to 2005 06. companylege. A question had also arisen as to whether the State Government can refuse permission to an institution which had been granted permission to start B.Ed. 4769 of 2005. Under the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 hereinafter referred to as the University Act , only after permission from the Government, B.Ed. Course companysequent to the petitioner being allowed to start B.Ed. Regarding role of the University, the High Court held that it was incumbent on the University to take an appropriate decision and companysequential action on the basis of decision of NCTE and the provisions of the University Act required the University to implement such decision. companyleges by NCTE in the light of the provisions of the Act in juxtaposition to the extent of trained manpower required by the State and to take policy decision on the basis of output of teachers by such companyleges. companylege to be opened by the petitioner. companylege for the academic year 2005 06. In an additional affidavit, NCTE stated that in the 73rd meeting, the agenda included companysideration of letter of the State of Maharashtra dated May 7, 2005 in which it was stated that Government had decided number to issue any NOC for starting new B.Ed. There was, thus, sufficient B.Ed. An application was also made by the petitioner to NCTE, Western Region Office, Bhopal on December 31, 2003 in the prescribed format for grant of permission to start B.Ed. The State Government had issued NOC to nearly 80 new institutions upto 2004 05. The said decision of the Government was companymunicated to all the Universities on February 4, 2005 and the Universities were directed to companymunicate the decision of the Govenrment to institutions companycerned. The State Government, thereafter, afforded hearing to the institutions, but again it was decided to withdraw cancel NOC in view of the policy decision of the Government. By a companymon judgment, the High Court allowed the petition filed by the institution, set aside the order passed by the State Government on December 28, 2004 and issued direction to the State of Maharashtra as well as Maharashtra University to take appropriate companysequential actions in accordance with law in the light of the decision taken by NCTE in favour of the institution permitting opening of a new B.Ed. The Court was also called upon to companysider whether in the absence of any material being made available by the State Government to NCTE whether the latter can process the application and take a decision companytrary to the decision of the State Government. It was stated that it was also decided to withdraw cancel NOC which had been issued by the State Government in favour of some institutions. According to the petitioner, the University processed the application of the petitioner for affiliation and forwarded it to the State Government. So far as the function of the State Government was companycerned, the High Court observed that it was in the nature of supply of necessary data and materials so as to enable NCTE to undertake the process of companying to an appropriate decision but the State had numberpower to decide that it had taken a policy decision number to grant permission to open new B.Ed. 6172 of 2005, 4769 of 2005 and companynate matters. It was, therefore, number possible to recommend opening of a new B.Ed. An affidavit was also filed by the State authorities, asserting that the petitioner had to obtain NOC from the State Government. companylege can be opened. It was further stated that NCTE companysidered the question but decided number to accept the decision of the State Government for the reason that the State while taking such decision, did number companysider the education policy of the Government of India under Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan which required opening of large number of primary schools and thereafter secondary schools. After receipt of the said letter, the petitioner applied to the Government of Maharashtra on July 4, 2005 for grant of permission to start the companylege and or inclusion of the name of the companylege in the Central Admission Process for the year 2005 06. companylege to be opened by the petitioner from academic year 2005 06 with an intake capacity of 100 students. According to the High Court, under the Act, the only authority which companyld take a decision regarding opening of new B.Ed. The High Court, therefore, was called upon to companysider the role played by the State Government in the process of companysideration of application by the institutions seeking recommendation of opening B.Ed. companyrse for the year 2005 06. Writ Petition No.4769 of 2005 was filed by Sant Dnyaneshwar Shikshan Shastra Mahavidyalaya for an appropriate writ, direction or order, quashing and setting aside the order dated December 28, 2004 passed by the State of Maharashtra by which the petitioner was informed that the State of Maharashtra had taken a policy decision number to grant No Objection Certificate NOC for short to any institution for starting new B.Ed. It was averred in the petition that the application was recommended for the establishment of the proposed B.Ed. A companyscious decision was, therefore, taken by the Cabinet Sub Committee on December 28, 2004 number to grant approval or issue NOC for starting any new institution or to increase intake capacity of existing institutions imparting Ed. 4769 of 2005 may number be stated. The High Court, in the operative part, observed as under For the reasons stated in the judgment, we direct the Director of Higher Education, Government of Maharashtra to forthwith include the name of the petitioner institute in the list of Central Admission process for the year 2005 2006 B.Ed. It was, therefore, prayed by the respondent State that its decision was a policy decision which was in companysonance with law and the petition was liable to be dismissed. It was also decided to companymunicate the said policy decision to the Maharashtra University stating that if necessity will arise in the next year, applications for the institutions would be companysidered at that time. companyleges. Those institutions, therefore, filed writ petitions and the Division Bench set aside the decision of the State Government by granting liberty to the State to take appropriate action in accordance with law after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. In the light of the above findings the High Court allowed the petition filed by the institutions and dismissed the writ petition of the State Government. companylege for women in accordance with the provisions of the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 hereinafter referred to as the Act and the National Council for Teacher Education Norms Conditions for recognition of Bachelor of Elementary Education Regulations, 1995 hereinafter referred to as the Regulations . Since the admission process was to be delayed and the petitioner had undertaken every exercise by getting necessary permission from NCTE and had invested huge amount of more than one crore on development, infrastructure and appointment of staff etc.,
it was companystrained to approach the High Court by filing a petition for appropriate relief. companylege for a particular period. But it was subsequently withdrawn cancelled in the light of the policy decision dated December 28, 2004 number to permit any new Ed. companylege for the academic year 2005 The meeting was held between June 3 5, 2005 which was attended by the State representative but as the agenda companyld number be companypleted, the meeting companytinued on June 16 and 17 when State representative was number present. According to the petitioner, the State Government neither acted on the said letter number even replied. The petitioner then made an application to SNDT Womens University, Mumbai on October 30, 2004 by paying the requisite affiliation fees. The companynsel also referred to the Annual Report 2004 05 prepared by the Department of Elementary Education and Literacy, Department of Secondary and Higher Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India. With the emphasis on universalisation of elementary education and programmes like District Primary Education Programme, the enrolment is bound to increase and once this happens, we may require more than two lakhs institutions at the secondary level to accommodate them. An affidavit was filed on behalf of SNDT Womens University stating therein that it did number recommend the case of the petitioner to the State as in terms of the Prospective Plan for 2002 07, the district wise allocation for Pune was only one companylege. The Trust, hence, approached the High Court by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution companytending inter alia that after passing of the Central Act, neither the State Government number the University had power, authority or jurisdiction to take any action and the only power the State had was to refer the matter to the All India Council of Technical Education since the duty was imposed on the Council for recognizing or derecognizing any technical institution in the companyntry. The State hence challenged the said action by filing Writ Petition No. An additional affidavit was also filed reiterating the decision of the Cabinet Sub Committee dated December 28, 2004. and did number companysider the need of trained teachers who do number seek employment in other institutions but wish to use the training in self employment such as opening of companyching classes, etc. There are number 509 schools in various States UTs and 1,68,545 students were on the rolls of the NVs as on December 31, 2004. A companyy of the said application was forwarded to the Principal Secretary, Higher and Technical Education, Mantralaya, Mumbai. It was the case of the petitioner that it was running a secondary school at village Kondhapuri, Taluk Shirur, District Pune, having a strength of about 150 students. It also did number take into account preferential needs of hilly and remote areas, requirement of teachers for Science, Mathematics and English, need of number formal education of adults, disabled, tribals etc. Such decision was number in accordance with the provisions of the Act number in companysonance with law laid down by this Court. The State has number approached this Court by filing the present appeals. Similar directions were issued in favour of other companyleges also. 1860 OF 2006 ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION C NOs.20969 20977 OF 2005 K. THAKKER, J. ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION CIVIL NO.20918 OF 2005 WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOs. By filing Writ Petition No. The pass percentage in Class X and XII in the year 2004 was 91.3 per cent and 87.68 per cent, respectively, when companypared with the pass percentage of 88.50 per cent and 85.26 per cent in 2003. The petitioner is a public trust registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 as also society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The present appeals are directed against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of judicature at Bombay, on September 28, 2005 in Writ Petition Nos. Those companyleges filed petitions which also came to be allowed by the High Court. It was then stated that there were 216 Ed. To meet with the requirement of infrastructure, library, staff etc.,
it spent more than rupees one crore. It is made clear that those who have been admitted pursuant to the Central Admission Process are number eligible to apply against the seats number available and admissions already done will number be interfered with and the new seats will be filled in from amongst the candidates still on the merit list, by companyducting a special round of admission. The petitioner also deposited the original Fixed Deposit Receipt FDR of Rs.5 lacs towards Endowment Fund. College to be opened. Rule made absolute to that extent in Writ Petition No. To appreciate the companytentions raised by the parties to the proceedings, few relevant facts in Writ Petition No. Both the petitions were heard together by a Division Bench of the High Court. Leave granted. companyrse.
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2006_863.txt
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9202 of 2000, is already filed by respondent No. All these questions will have to be examined on their own merits in the remanded proceedings, after hearing the parties and after giving them opportunity to lead whatever documentary evidence they want to lead. 2667 of 2000 is restored to the file of the High Court with a request to companysider the only question as to whether the appellant can be said to have validly retired on 6th January, 1996 or whether in the light of any other birth date, he is entitled to be retired on any later date. We may mention that against the award of reinstatement and back wages, dated 2nd May, 1999, as passed in favour of the appellant in person which, according to respondent No. 1, is an ex parte award, a writ petition, being Writ Petition No. We have heard the appellant in person and the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 finally in this appeal. Respondent Nos. Leave granted.
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2000_697.txt
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On the basis thereof, the charges had been framed against the respondents accused under Sections 147, 148, 294, 506 Part 2, 326/149 two companynts , 324/149 two companynts . When the companyplainant Sunil tried to stop the tractor, the respondents started abusing him and on being asked number to abuse, the respondents caused injuries to the companyplainant Sunil PW.1 with their respective weapons. When his father Nahar Singh PW.5 came to rescue him, the respondents had beaten him of which he suffers injuries. The learned Magistrate vide impugned judgment and order dated 10.9.2009 companyvicted the respondents for companymission of the offences punishable under Sections 148, 324/149 two companynts and 326/149 two companynts of IPC, and sentenced them to undergo one one year simple imprisonment with fine of Rs.100 100/ and two two years simple imprisonment with fine of Rs.150 150/ respectively, and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment of 10 10 days. In view of the companyplaint filed by Sunil PW.1 , the law came into motion. After companypleting the investigation, the police filed chargesheet against the respondents under Sections 147, 148, 149, 294, 323, 324 and 506 B IPC. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that One Sunil PW.1 lodged a companyplaint with the police station Bhander on 21.3.2004 that his father Nahar Singh PW.5 had gone to his agricultural field for guarding his crops, all the respondents came there on a tractor driven by Kallu, armed with axe, farsa and lathi etc. When other persons namely, Kalyan Singh and Nirbhay Singh reached the spot, the accused persons fled away from there hurling threats to kill the companyplainant side. In the meanwhile, on hearing hue and cry, brother of companyplainant, namely, Brijraj PW.3 and one Kunwar Singh PW.2 reached the spot and tried to intervene, they were also beaten by the respondents. The police arrested the accused persons, weapons etc. 74 of 2010 before the High Court which was disposed of vide impugned judgment and order dated 14.12.2011. 74 of 2009 before the learned Additional Sessions Judge Fast Track , Datia. 74 of 2010, by way of which the companyviction of the respondents has been maintained under Sections 148, 324, 326 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 hereinafter referred to as IPC as awarded by the learned trial companyrt, however, the sentence has been reduced from 2 years to 3 months. The respondents further challenged the said order dated 15.1.2010 by filing Criminal Revision No. The said appeal was dismissed by order dated 15.1.2010. Aggrieved, the respondents accused filed Criminal Appeal No. This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 14.12.2011 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior Bench in Criminal Revision No. CHAUHAN, J. were recovered on the basis of the disclosure statements made by them, and various memos were prepared. Dr. B.S. Hence, this appeal by the State. In order to prove their case, the prosecution examined large number of witnesses.
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2013_456.txt
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Accused Ajmer Singh is the son of Sunder Singh and Banta Singh is his real brother. Ajmer Singh is married to Jagir Kaur and Banta Singh to Kartar Kaur. On the morning of the 28th Banta Singh inquired from Ajmer Singh about this matter and he replied that he had pawned the ear rings to one Banta Singh Mazhbi. On appeal, Sunder Singh was acquitted and the sentences imposed on Banta Singh and Teja Singh were reduced. One Nikka Singh had three sons, Bhagwan Singh, Lal Singh and Sunder Singh. In this report it was stated by Arjan Singh that it was Ajmer Singh who dealt Bagher Singh a barchha blow on his chest and that Bagher Singh fell down at this blow. The police arrested Sunder Singh, Teja Singh and Banta Singh but the appellant companyld number be found. Q Did you on 28th January , 1948, at Nathuwala along with your father Sunder Singh, Banta Singh, and Teja Singh, you Banta Singh and Teja Singh being armed with spears, attack Lal Singh, his son Bagher Singh and Dhan Kaur at their house and in furtherance of the companymon intention of you all, Banta and Teja caused simple injuries to Lal Singh with spears and you caused fatal injuries with a spear to Bagher Singh deceased? Teja Singh and Banta Singh were armed with spears and they made an attack on Lal Singh and Dhan Kaur and inflicted on their persons a number of injuries. It is said that Sunder Singh, his two, sons Banta Singh and Ajmer Singh, and Teja Singh, a companysin of theirs, accepted the challenge and rushed out of the house. Soon after this Ajmer Singh, Banta Singh and one Teja Singh went to Banta Singh Mazhbi and asked him to return the ear rings but the latter replied that numberornaments had been pawned with him and added that he would give a sum of Rs. Sunder Singh, Teja Singh and Banta Singh were prosecuted under section 302/34 but were companyvicted under section 324, Indian Penal Code, Banta Singh and Teja Singh were sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment each and Sunder Singh to six months rigorous imprisonment. He deposed that Banta Singh Mazhbi and Lal Singh were the only persons when the quarrel about ear rings took place near his shop. Sunder Singh was in possession of some of his landed properties and Lal Singh obtained a number of decrees against him but Sunder Singh declined to restore possession of the properties to his brother Lal Singh. Lal Singh is married to Mst. This wordy warfare between the two brothers attracted the attention of Arjan Singh, Bagher Singh and one Ujagar Singh Mazhbi who on bearing the numberse came to the house of Lal Singh. In reexamination he stated that Banta Singh, brother of the accused, and Teja Singh had companye on one side and Lal Singh on the other when the quarrel about the ear rings took place. One of them Bagher Singh was murdered and the other, Arjan Singh, is P. W. 5. Gopal Singh for the respondent. It is said that Lal Singh was also present when this companyversation took place and took up cudgels on behalf of Banta Singh Mazhbi and this led to an exchange of hot words between Lal Singh and the party of Sunder Singhs two sons and their companypanion Teja Singh. Bhagwan Singh died issueless some years ago and disputes arose between Lal Singh and his brother Sundar Singh in regard to the division of the property of Bhagwan Singh. He held that Ajmer Singh was number present at Banta Singh Mazhbis shop and that Lal Singh and Arjan Singh had falsely implicated him in the quarrel over the ear rings, and that if the witnesses companyld falsely involve him in regard to one part of the occurrence, the possibility of his being implicated for the murder of Bagher Singh merely as a matter of vindictiveness companyld number be outruled. At about sunset the same day Lal Singh and his brother Sunder Singh started abusing each other from their respective houses which open out into a companymon.courtyard. Ajmer Singh, it is said, was armed with a spear and he plunged his weapon into the chest of Bagher Singh who companylapsed and died almost instantaneously. Lal Singh finding himself supported by three others threw out a challenge to Sunder Singh and told him to companye out in the open. Q Did Lal Singh interfere when you were demanding the ear rings from said Banta Singh on 28th January, 1948, at Nathuwala and remark that the sweeper, i.e., Banta, was speaking truth when he denied the transaction ? In view of this litigation the relations between Lal Singh and Sunder Singh were companysiderably strained and it is said that for some time they were number even on speaking terms. 30 to them if Ajmer Singh took an oath that the ornaments had in fact been left with him. One Bishandas, whose shop adjoins the shop of Banta Singh Mazhbi, was tendered for cross examination as P.W.7. No direct question was put to the witness about the presence of, Ajmer Singh on that occasion. Bagher Singh died as a result of one blow and injuries on the person of Lal Singh and Dhan Kaur were number very serious Ajmer Singh was apprehended on 4th December, 1948, and as above stated, was tried by the learned Sessions Judge of Ferozepore and acquitted, but was companyvicted by the High Court on appeal by the State Government. The learned Sessions Judge companysidered him a wholly independent witness and accepted his evidence about the incident that took place at Banta Singh Mazhbis shop on the morning of the 28th. Lal Singh, P. W. 3, father of the deceased, Dhan Kuar, his mother, and Arjan Singh,his real brother, have given direct evidence about the occurrence. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MAHAJAN J. Ajmer Singh, a young man of about 22 years of age was tried for the murder of Bagher Singh, his first companysin, and was acquitted by the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore by his judgment dated 13th May, 1950. In the companymittal companyrt the questions put to the accused and his answers were these Q Did you pawn the, ear ring of your wife with Banta Mazhbi and squander the proceeds on or about 28th January, 1948 ? As regards Lal Singh, who had resiled from his earlier statement and bad denied that he was armed with a phaura or that Arjan Singh wag armed with a lathi, it was said that this omission on his part was due to mere lapse of memory and forgetfulness rather than to a deliberate design to improve upon the prosecution story. Dhan Kaur and from her he had two sons. It is significant that the defence also led numberevidence to prove that the fight took place in a manner different from the one described by the prosecution witnesses, or that Ajmer Singh was number present on the occasion. In the companycluding part of the judgment he observed that the parties were at logger heads on several issues and in the absence of independent evidence it is difficult to place reliance on the prosecution story in regard to Ajmer Singh. After examining the evidence of the three eye witnesses in detail, the learned Sessions Judge reached the companyclusion that they had suppressed the facts in order to absolve themselves of all liability for the happenings of the 28th, and had uttered untruths and that numberconfidence companyld be reposed in their statements about the part that they had assigned to Ajmer Singh. Q Why this case against you ? Arjan Singh soon after reported this incident at the police station after travelling a distance of about seven miles at 11 45 p. m. He gave to the police substantially the same version as has number been deposed to by him in the witness box. Q Do you wish to produce any evidence indefence ? It was argued by Mr. Pritam Singh Safeer that in this case there were numbercompelling reasons for setting aside the order of acquittal and that due proper weight had number been given by the High Court to the opinion of the trial judge as regards the credibility of witnesses seen and examined by him. It is alleged by the prosecution that on the evening of the 27th January, 1948, Jagir Kaur companyplained to her fatherin law that her husband had pawned her ear rings in order to pay off his gambling debts. The High Court on appeal minutely reviewed the evidence of these three eye witnesses and companysidered that the variations in the statements of witnesses made at , the two trials and which had weighed on the mind of the Sessions Judge were of a minor and trifling character and were quite natural as the Statements at this trial had been made 27 months after the occurrence and that the narration of events by Arjan Singh was substantially the same as had been given by him at the earlier trial and in the first information report. In an appeal under section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court had full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded and we are satisfied that it did number in any way exercise it wrongly The injuries on the person of Kartar Kaur and under Singh were number proved to have been inflicted at the time of the occurrence and were of numberconsequence. 361 of 1950, arising out of Judgment and Order dated the 13th May, 1960, of the Court of the Sessions Judge, Ferozepore, in Trial No. The parties, however, dispersed after exchanging hot words but without companying to blows. A lenient view of the affair seems to have been taken because the fight between these near companylaterals took place suddenly and ended promptly. in Criminal Appeal No. There is companysiderable force in the point that the examination of the appellant by the Sessions Judge was detective. CRIMINAL APPELLATE.JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No . 5 of 1950. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 14th September, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature for the State of Punjab at Simla Bhandari and Soni JJ. The prosecution was under numberobligation to explain how they came about. S. Safeer for the appellant. 28 of 1950 and Case No. 67 of 1952. A I am innocent. December 10. This is an appeal by special leave against that decision.
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1952_93.txt
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for restitution. 6/62 for declaration that the gift deed executed by Muthukoya Thangal, defendant No. for restitution in the Court of the District Munsif at Androth to which the decree for execution was transmitted and possession was delivered in execution. 147/73, Kerala High Court, dated April 1,1977 reported in 1977 Ker LT 570 AIR 1977 NOC 339. After the proceedings terminated in his favour, the appellant filed an application under Section 144 C.P.C. The Division Bench held that transferee executing companyrt is number the Court of first instance and accordingly set aside the order of the companyrts below and dismissed the Petition filed under Section 144 C.P.C. 1 in favour of his wife and children on July 27, 1960 was null and void. The suit was transferred to the Administrators Court Subordinate Judge , which was ultimately decreed on April 4, 1965. The respondent plaintiff filed a suit O.S. The suit thereafter was dismissed by the appellate companyrt on May 1, 1970 and was companyfirmed by the High Court on November 3, 1971. This appeal by special leave arises out of the Judgment and decree in S.A. No. Thus this appeal. No.
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1993_455.txt
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On 15.1.1976 the Corporation submitted a revised development plan to the State Government for the area falling within the limits of the Corporation for sanction of the State Government. The State Government sanctioned the draft development plan submitted on 23.7.1981 by the appellant AUDA on 2.11.1987 including for the areas within the Corporation in respect of which the draft development had been sanctioned by the State Government by aforesaid numberification dated 12.8.1983. From the aforesaid numberification itself it is apparent that the State Government purported to sanction the draft revised development plan submitted on 15.1.1976 by the Corporation under the provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act and State Government specified 16.9.1993 as the date on which the said final development plan shall companye into force. A draft development plan was prepared by AUDA for the entire area under its jurisdiction which included the area companyered by the Corporation and was submitted to the State Government for its sanction on 23.7.1981. On 12.8.1983 a numberifications was issued by the State Government saying WHEREAS the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation hereinafter referred to as the said Municipal Corporation has prepared a Draft Revised Development Plan hereinafter referred to as the said Draft Revised Development Plan in respect of the lands within the jurisdiction of the said Municipal Corporation under the provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 and advertisement regarding publication of the said draft revised Development Plan and calling objections and suggestions in the said draft revised and suggestions in the said draft revised development plan was published in the Part Ii of the Gujarat Government Gazette dated 15th January, 1976 AND WHEREAS the government of Gujarat had companysidered it necessary to make modifications hereinafter referred to as the said modifications in the said draft revised Development plan which was submitted by the said municipal companyporation to the State Government for sanction under the provisions of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers companyferred by clause c of sub section 1 of section 17 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, the Government of Gujarat hereby a finalises the said modifications b sanctions the said draft revised development plan and the regulations thereto subject to the modifications so finalised and as set out in the schedule appended hereto and c specifies the 16th September, 1983 as the date on which the final development plan shall companye into force. According to the writ petitioners respondents, as the draft development plan which had been submitted on 15.1.1976 and sanctioned on 12.8.1983 by a numberification saying that the sanction plan shall companye into force with effect from 16.9.1983.
the period of 10 years as specified in sub section 2 of Section 20 of the Gujarat Town Planning Act shall have to be companynted with effect from 16.9.1983 so far the area companyered by numberification dated 12.8.1983 is companycerned. The Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 regulated the town planning activity within the area falling within the jurisdiction of the local authorities in the State of Gujarat including the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation hereinafter referred to as the Corporation . The claimed that within the aforesaid period of 10 years from companying into force of the final development plan neither the lands in question companyered by the numberification were acquired by agreement number any proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were companymenced. The writ petitions had been allowed saying that the sanction accorded by the Notification dated 128.8.1983, by the State of Gujarat in exercise of powers companyferred on it by clause c of sub section 1 of Section 17 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 had lapsed after the expiry of period of 10 years and because of service of numberice by the companycerned land owners in accordance with sub section 2 of Section 20 of the said Act, as during this period neither the lands in question were acquired by agreement number proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were companymenced. These appeals have been filed on behalf of the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority for setting aside the order passed by the High Court of Gujarat dismissing the Letters Patent Appeals filed on behalf of the appellants, against the judgment of the Single Judge of the said High Court in different writ petitions. Thereafter, they issued numberices and on expiry of the period of six months from the date of service of such numberices it was claimed on their behalf that the designation of the land had lapsed. P. SINGH, J. Leave granted.
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1996_1161.txt
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2 Shri Mahmood Baig s o Hidyat Baig teacher Primary School Pribawada attended the quarterly companyference of J.E.I. On 13/11/1964, he was given a show cause numberice which reads as under The nature of alleged association of Shri Mahmood Baig, s o Hidyat Baig, Asstt. 3 that the deceased respondent was deemed to have companytinued in service from 14/6/1965 till 20/8/1982 and retired on attaining the age of superannuation on 20/8/1982. Undisputed facts are that the deceased respondent was found absent from 13/11/1964 till he filed a writ petition in 1987 challenging the order of show cause numberice dated 13/11/1964 that was withdrawn. In the second writ petition, the order dated 30/11/1987 companypulsorily retiring the respondent from service was also challenged. held at the resident of Shri Hussein Khan Hasmat Khan at Naigaven Aurangabad 1964. The High Court quashed the order dated 30/11/1987 companypulsorily retiring the deceased respondent from service. He attended private meeting of J.E.I. It appears, for the first time, he filed writ petition in 1987 challenging the show cause numberice dated 13/11/1964, i.e. Subsequent writ petition filed by the legal representatives of the respondent was also based on the same cause of action, save and except, that in the second writ petition the order dated 30/11/1987 companypulsorily retiring the respondent was also challenged. Sd Chief Executive Officer Zilla Parishad, Aurangabad Pursuant to show cause numberice, he proceeded on leave. 4065 OF 2002 WITH A.NO.4069/2002 This appeal is preferred by Zila Parishad, Aurangabad against the judgment and order dated 29/09/2000 passed by the High Court in WP No.222/1988. His legal representatives filed a second writ petition on 28/1/1988 praying the same relief which was prayed in the first writ petition. Aurangabad District held at Hakgavan on May 9 10. The High Court directed the appellant to pay full pay and allowances for the period from 14/6/1965 to 20/8/1982 including the arrears on account of revision of pay scales during the aforesaid period after adjusting the amount already paid to him. The said writ petition was subsequently withdrawn. In the meantime, the respondent expired on 3/1/1988. The High Court, by its impugned order, allowed the writ petition. after a lapse of about 23 years. Thereafter, his whereabouts was number known for about 16 years. The High Court also held 3. O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NO. We have heard the parties.
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2008_2006.txt
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1 3 herein A 1 to A 3 . 1, Kovvuri Satyanarayana Reddy A 1 and Respondent No. 1 3 herein and quashed the criminal proceedings pending against them. 3, Mallidi Chinna Veera Venkata Satyanarayana A 3 , was initially an associate of the appellant herein but later joined hands with A 1 and A 2. A 1 and A 2 developed grudge against the appellant and they companytracted Valmiki Gujjula Ramayya Kondayya A 4 who belongs to Emmiganur Mandal of Kurnool District for killing the appellant and gave him Rs. 1 3 herein preferred Criminal Petition No. In pursuance of their companyspiracy, on 07.11.2007 between 700 p.m. to 730 p.m. when the appellant was proceeding in his Honda City car along with his wife and children to attend a function near J.K. Gardens, A 4, A 7 to A 12 who were in a Scorpio Car came across his car. 5928 of 2010 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in short the Code to quash the criminal proceedings against them. 5928 of 2010 wherein the High Court allowed the criminal petition filed by Respondent Nos. 2, Karri Venkata Mukunda Reddy A 2 developed ill will against the appellant and were jealous of his gaining popularity within the party as well as in their area and neighbourhood. 175 of 2010. Somehow the appellant managed to escape from the place of incident and went to the house of Jakkampudi Raja Indra Vandir L.W. 6 , who admitted him in the hospital and informed the incident to the SHO, I Town LO , Police Station, Rajahmundry. In the meanwhile, A 5 and A 6 also came there on Bajaj Boxer Motorcycle belonging to A 2 where A 4 and A 12 broke the windowpanes of the car while A 5 sprinkled chilly powder into the eyes of the appellant and attacked him with rods and sticks and caused injuries on his vital parts of the body which resulted in bleeding. Heard Mr. Guntur Prabhakar, learned companynsel for the appellant and Mr. Altaf Ahmed, learned senior companynsel for Respondent Nos. 1 3 and Mr. D. Mahesh Babu, learned companynsel for Respondent No.4 State. The learned single Judge of the High Court, by impugned judgment dated 28.10.2010, allowed the petition and quashed the criminal proceedings against Respondent Nos. 1 3 accused persons are the residents of Komaripalem village of East Godavari District. filed charge sheet against A 1 to A 12 on 30.08.2008 for the offences punishable under Sections 120 B, 147, 148, 427, 307, 201 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code in short the IPC before the Court of IInd Additional Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rajahmundry and the same was taken on file in PRC No. The Magistrate companymitted the case to the Ist Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Rajahmundry for trial and the same was taken on file in Sessions Case No. Brief facts The appellant, who was a defacto companyplainant and Respondent Nos. Further, A 3 was entrusted with the responsibility of giving information about the movements of the appellant. A 4 hired A 5 to A 12 for the said purpose and they companyspired together and hatched a plan to assault the appellant. When the case was pending for trial, Respondent Nos. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 28.10.2010 of the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Petition No. In the year 2006, the appellant companytested Zila Parishad Territorial Constituency Elections as an independent candidate and won it. Thereafter, A 4 to A 12 left the spot. 7,00,000/ to purchase a vehicle and also gave separate amount for hiring goondas. Though all of them belong to Congress Party, Respondent No. After companypletion of investigation, the S.I. Sathasivam, J. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant complainant has filed this appeal by way of special leave petition before this Court. Respondent No. 14 of 2008. Leave granted.
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2011_444.txt
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The claimants were entitled to get an amount of Rs.4,40193.65p, out of which an amount of Rs.l,52,125.70p was deducted by way of estate duty and the remaining amount of Rs.3,15,067.95p was paid to the aforesaid heirs. whether the life insurance money of the deceased is to be deducted from the claimants companypensation receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939? It was averred in the plaint that the deceased was aged about 40 years and was the sole bread winner of the family. The drivers of the two buses were number able to companytrol their buses resulting into companylision between the two, seriously injuring the deceased clemant Rebello and Mr. Vincy John Pereira, in which Rebello received multiple fractures and died on the spot. 24 of 1975 against the aforesaid two State Road Transport Corporations. Being the sole bread winner, he used to provide the family with the support of Rs.25,000/per year. Many Jerome Dsouza and others AIR 1978 Bombay 239 , the Trial companyrt deducted the amount of life insurance received by the appellants to the tune of Rs.3,15,067.95p from the aforesaid companypensation calculated and held that only the balance amount of Rs.74,939.05p with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum is payable by the respondent No.2 to the claimants. 89/4, Karnataka State Transport bus was seen companying from the opposite direction, i.e., from Satara side towards Kolhapur. It is this amount, as aforesaid, which was deducted in view of the decision of the Bombay High Court referred to above. Through the witness Shashikant Dattatraya Kale, Exhibit 67, who was serving in LIC at Bombay, it was elicited that the deceased clement had insured his life under the said policy. The minimum matrix of the facts to appreciate the companytroversy is stated hereunder The husband of appellant No.1, father of appellants Nos.2 to 6, was travelling in the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation bus from Rathare Badruk to Pune on 12th April, 1973 at about 4.00 P.M. when this bus passed the village Umbraj and came near village Kotri near milestone No. The claim of the appellants was allowed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Satara, holding that the death was caused due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of respondent No.2, namely, Karnataka Road Transport Coloration. He was a person of robust health and sober habits. It was found that as the deceased was of 40 years old at the time of his death and his father had lived upto the age of 85 years, the numbermal longevity of his life would have been 25 years from the date of death, but since the claimants had claimed a companypensation only taking a period of 20 years, the Trial companyrt held that the appellants were entitled to a companypensation of Rs3,80,000/by way of pecuniary loss and Rs.l0,000/ on account of pain and suffering, in total Rs.3,90,000/ However, in view of the Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Jaikumar Chhaganlal Patni and Others vs. He was a well known boat builder and businessman of the Bassein. On appeal, preferred both by the appellants and also the respondents, the High Court rejected the cross appeal of respondent No .2, namely, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation. His income from the business and other activities was about Rs 40,000/ per annum. He was assessed for an income of about Rs.43,000/ by the Income Tax Authorities for the Assessment Year 1971 72. The claim made by the appellants for damages companypensation under the various admissible heads of damages was for Rs. However, the appeal No 209/81 of the appellants was dismissed as it companyld number be pressed in view of the decision of the Bombay High Court, as aforesaid. He was a person of great skill and hard worker. The appellant was in pensionable employment. He was doing business in partnership under the name and style of Marine Engineering Works. The appellants filed a Specie Civil Suit No. It is against this judgment, this appeal has been preferred by the appellants. 4 lacs. The question is.
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1998_697.txt
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The appellant was charged under Section 324 326 of the Indian Penal Code. The Trial Court acquitted the appellant for the offences as charged. Leave granted.
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2013_1013.txt
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Umar Sheikh. During interrogation police learnt about kidnapping and abduction of three British nationals who were kept as hostages in a house at Saharanpur. British and American nationals were taken to the hideouts and were kept as hostages. Some other hideouts were at Ghaziabad and Saharanpur. He was apprised of the militant network already working and was asked to companytact Mohmood A 7 a Mauzzin of Jama Masjid, Delhi who was to introduce another militant named Farooque. The police had become aware of vehicles number during interrogation of Umar Sheikh. Mohmood Ayub A 7 and Nasar Mohmood A 8 surfaced during investigation. The hideouts were at Saharanpur, Ghaziabad where these persons were kept companyfined. He went to Jama Masjid to meet Farooque. He was advised to organize kidnapping of foreign nationals visiting India and to pressurize Indian Government to release some dreaded militants companyfined in jails of India. Thereafter, he was companytacted by other militants and he moved about in Delhi, Ghaziabad, Saharanpur etc. Since accused Umar Sheikh was released from Tihar Jail along with other militants numbercharge was framed against him but charges were framed against rest of the accused persons under various provisions. Umar Sheikh was put up in a hotel named Ishak Guest House in Jama Masjid Area on 27th July, 1994. The three British nationals were abducted from Connaught Place in Delhi and were found to be chained when they were rescued. He obtained visa for India and was given instructions to reach India and companytact other militants. On interrogation, all the accused persons claimed to be the members of Harkut ul Ansar in short HUA a terrorist organisation. By throwing bombs and taking advantage of the darkness some of the terrorists managed to escape, but one of the terrorists was killed in an encounter. He was given a mission to perpetrate terrorist activities in India. After kidnapping the four nationals their photographs were taken by the militants and along with the photographs demand letters were sent to British Embassy and American Embassy, and to various news agencies in India and abroad , newspapers and the demand was that the Government of India should release 10 hard companye terrorists from jails. Sayeed A 4 and Mohmood A 7 have been awarded life sentence. Unfortunately, two police officials sacrificed their lives while trying to companybat with the terrorists. An American national was found chained inside the room with a spike. One of the terrorists fired at the companystable companycerned. Some of these hide outs were in Nizamuddin, Sarai Kale Khan, Jama Masjid area, Suaiwalan area, Turkman Gate area of Delhi. A 2 was arrested by Assam Police while A 7 was arrested by Jammu and Kashmir Police and A 8 was arrested by Srinagar Police. Immediately, action was taken and the house where the three British nationals were companyfined was surrounded. He came in companytact with other militant organizations like Jamet e Islamic and Al e Hadees. To companytinue the narration of facts as presented by the prosecution, Umar Sheikh visited several places in Pakistan and met Abdul Rauf and other militants associated with Harkat ul Mujahiddin in short HUM . After these nationals were kidnapped they were told that they have been taken as hostages and that they would face death if they try to escape. On the basis of his information, police officials were posted near the house from where he had been rescued expecting that some members of the militants organizations may visit the place being unaware of the police action. Arms and ammunitions of huge quantity were seized from the house where they were companyfined. A 2 and A 7 were sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for harbouring and companycealing the terrorists under Section 3 4 of the TADA Act. He met one Yusuf Sultan Mehboob at Jama Masjid and was told that one Shahji was the main architect of the entire operation. One of the companystables was assaulted by two of them, while another companystable was over powered by the third terrorist. During investigation, it came to light that number only the effort was of kidnapping the foreigners who had already kept as hostages, but intention was to kidnap many more so that greater pressure can be used for getting release of 10 hard companye terrorists who were the members of HUA. A 7 was number aware of the companyspiracy and was number involved in any kidnapping. The Police swung into action. Ultimately, the Maruti van DID 9016 was found in the possession of Abdul Rahim A 3 and Mohd. Shahji arranged arms, ammunition and money. Since Umar Sheikh was London born and had studied there, his accent and companymand of English were used to develop companytacts with and seek friendship with different foreigners, who were to be subsequently kidnapped. Since they found a person running suspiciously they entered the house from which the person had jumped out and ran away. During investigation, the statements of the accused persons were recorded in terms of Section 15 of the TADA Act. However, on one occasion one foreign national managed to escape. However, the van was stopped and accused persons were apprehended. On interrogation, the details of hide outs were found out and on raiding them huge quantity of arms and ammunitions including AK 47 rifle were seized. Sayeed A 4 . Two of the terrorists fled away after firing and the third one was arrested after he suffered a bullet injury. The van was surrounded while it was being driven by Mohd. When they came near the house, companystables challenged them and the three persons attacked the companystables by raising slogans and they wanted to kill the companystables. From there he was brought to the police station. On 31.10.1994 a police party headed by Station Officer, Satya Dev Yadav of Police Station, Mussourie near Ghaziabad, had gone to Nai Basti, Mussourie in companynection with the investigation of a theft case. All the six accused persons were found guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 3 1 and 3 5 of the TADA Act. A 1, A 3 and A 8 were sentenced to death under Section 3 2 1 of the TADA Act and a fine of Rs.50,0000/ each. It was a stroke of good luck that while on a routine check around in Ghaziabad, police officials became suspicious and struck gold while trying to find out as to why a person was suspiciously running away when asked to stop. All the accused persons were sentenced under Section 120B read with Sections 364, and 364A IPC to life imprisonment and each one of them was sentenced for the offence under Sections 121A, 122 and 124A IPC and also to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/ each. Nazir Khan A 1 and Naser Mohmood Sodozey A 8 were also companyvicted under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act for having entered India without valid permission and valid documents. His statement was recorded and FIR under different provisions of IPC and TADA Act was recorded. However, three of the proclaimed offenders were later arrested. DID 9016 was purchased from Karol Bagh by Abdul Rahim A 3 . He tried to run away while police officials tried to apprehend him. Though A 3 can be said to be a part of the companyspiracy and kidnapping, there was numbermaterial to fasten A 4 who is only a driver of the vehicle with any offence. All the accused appellants were subjected to a fine of Rs.50,000/ each under Section 364A IPC and in default to undergo RI for three years each. For the said offence, others were companyvicted and sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs.50,000/ each. A Maruti Van bearing registration No. Three days time was given for meeting the demands and the threat was given that in case the demands were number met, the kidnapped foreigners would be killed. Constables Sompal and Jagpal Singh saw three persons approaching the house of Sufi Anwar where the captive was held. However, placing reliance on the prosecution version substantiated to a great extent by the companyfessional statements recorded under Section 15 of the TADA Act, and amongst other companyroboration provided by recoveries of arms and ammunitions, the accused appellants were found guilty and sentenced as afore mentioned. Another case was registered and the police became suspicious that what they have found out is the tip of the iceberg and laid trap. He was unchained and released and on enquiry he disclosed how he had been abducted from Delhi. As indicated above, it was just a fortunate and providential companyincidence that led the revelation of the companyspiracy hatched. 29.9.1994, 16.10.1994 and 20.10.1994. They found the door bolted from inside and when numberody responded, they broke open the door and entered the house. For the said offences, Narul Amin A 2 , Mohd. So he was number involved in the companyspiracy. A number of hide outs were prepared in these areas by either purchasing properties or by taking rooms on rent. He did so on three occasions i.e. They were brought to Delhi. The names of the two persons involved in the operation i.e. He came to Delhi in 1994. Rest were declared proclaimed offenders as they companyld number be arrested in spite of best efforts. He was the main architect of the entire operation i.e. Copies of the demands were faxed to President, Prime Minister and other dignitaries. Though statements of foreign nationals had been recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for short the Code it was number possible to secure their presence as they had left India and gone back to their respective companyntries. They did number choose to companye to India. He met some people in Islamabad to get instructions. They were each to undergo 5 years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.25,000/ each. Since the death sentence awarded to the three accused appellants is subject to companyfirmation by this Court, Death Reference No.1 of 2003 has been made to this Court.
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2003_1093.txt
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Before the said Tribunal, inter alia a companytention was raised that the State of West Bengal had numberjurisdiction to make the reference. and Karimganj Assam by letters of transfer dated 3.10.1994. As despite requests, the purported orders of transfer were number revoked, they sought intervention of the Labour Commissioner, West Bengal by a letter dated 1.3.1995. The State of West Bengal, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 10 1 c read with Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 referred the following dispute for its adjudication to the Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal. Whether the termination of service of 1 Shri Bikash Bhusan Ghosh 2 Shri Pradip Kumar Mukherjee and 3 Shri Shyama Charan Mallick is justified? Contending that the said orders of termination were unauthorized, arbitrary and illegal, as numberdomestic enquiry was held prior thereto, they raised an industrial dispute. As the Division Bench of the High Court did number enter into the merit of the matter, we do number intend to deal with the questions as to whether any companyciliation proceedings was, in relation to the orders of transfer passed as against the appellants, in fact pending before the Deputy Labour Commissioner, West Bengal or number. By reason of an Award dated 10.10.2002, the Tribunal opined that the orders of termination passed against the appellants were illegal and they were directed to be re instated in service with back wages. According to them, the said orders of transfer were violative of the Memorandum of Undertaking dated 18.12.1989 and were issued with an ill motive of victimizing them for their trade union activities. Allegedly, a companyciliation proceeding was initiated, but during the pendency thereof, their services were terminated by Respondent Company by letters dated 15.4.1995. They were transferred to Siwan Bihar , Farrukhabad U.P. 3157 a Division Bench of the High Court, however, without going into the merit of the matter held that the State of West Bengal, being number the appropriate Government in respect of the dispute raised by the appellants, had numberjurisdiction to make the reference and on that premise allowed the said appeal and companysequently set aside the Award made by the Tribunal as also the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. 2495 of 2002. The question in regard to maintainability of the said reference was determined by the Tribunal in terms of an order dated 30.3.1999 holding the same to be maintainable. What relief, if any, are they entitled to? Parties to the reference, however, adduced their respective evidences on merit of the matter. 2201 OF 2007 Arising out of S.L.P. 10438 of 2006 B. SINHA, J. On an intra court appeal filed by the Respondents under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court, marked as G.A. By a Judgment and Order dated 11.7.2003, the said Writ Petition was dismissed. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order, Respondent filed a Writ Petition before the Calcutta High Court which was marked as W.P. C No. Leave granted Appellants were workmen of the Respondent companypany. CIVIL APPEAL NO. No.
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2007_311.txt
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641 of 2007 and the other by Satpal being SLP Crl No. 1.2 The trial companyrt found that the death of Tara Chand and Phoola Devi was admittedly homicidal. Mukesh P.W. An FIR was, accordingly, lodged against unknown persons but on investigation the police found out that four persons had been involved in the murders, they being Juglal, the brother of the deceased Tara Chand, Satpal, Son in Law of Juglal, Crl. and Ram Chand further stated that they had identified Satpal in the torch light and that he was the one primarily responsible for the murders. The trial companyrt also found that the fourth circumstance with regard to the recoveries had been proved as the blood found on the recovered articles and the murdered weapons matched the blood group of the deceased Phoola Devi and Tara Chand. It was further found that the motive for the incident was also proved in the light of the evidence of PW 10 Mukesh who stated that his father and uncle Juglal, though real brothers, had very strained relations over trivial Crl. 641 of 2007 Surendra the appellant before us, and Rajesh, son of Surja Ram. These appeals by way of special leave arises out of the following facts 1.1 Mukesh P.W., son of the deceased Tara Chand and Phoola Devi returned home at 730p.m. It was also found that the alibi tendered by the Crl. The trial companyrt relied on the evidence of PW 10 Mukesh, PW 4 Ram Chand and PW 14, Bharat Singh who stated that they had seen the appellants along with the acquitted accused near the place of incident and that they had been identified by them. Five circumstances in all were, accordingly, determined they being i death of Tara Chand and Phoola Devi was homicidal ii motive for the companymission of the murder iii that the two appellants had been seen near the place of occurrence at about the time when the murders had been companymitted iv recovery of incriminating articles at the instance of the appellants and v false explanation with regard to the alibi claimed by them. 641 of 2007 matters and that their disputes had also gone to companyrt and that just a few days before the incident an unpleasant scene had been created at the time of the fixing of the electricity companynection in the house of Juglal and an exchange of heated words had followed inter se the parties. The trial companyrt then went to the last seen aspect that the appellants had been seen near the place of incident. 641 of 2007 appellants companyld number be accepted and as a false explanation had been tendered this again was a circumstance against them. The trial companyrt, accordingly, relying on the evidence of Mukesh and three other persons Hari Singh, Goverdhan and Dharam Pal who were involved with the parties held that the motive for the murder had also been proved on record. The trial companyrt, by its judgment dated 11th January, 2002, acquitted Juglal and Rajesh but companyvicted Satpal and Surendra under Section 302 on two companynts and sentenced them to imprisonment for life under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code along with fine. The trial companyrt observed that there were numbereye witnesses to the murders and that the prosecution story depended for proof exclusively on circumstantial evidence. 7324 of 2010. The High Court has affirmed the judgment of the trial companyrt. on 24th December, 2000 and found that his parents were lying dead in the verandah of the house. Two appeals have been filed against the judgment of the High Court, one by Surendra being Criminal Appeal No. 1.3 The matter was thereafter taken in appeal. We grant leave in the above Special Leave Petition. A.
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2011_989.txt
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In the list the assessee stated that Scrabble was classifiable under sub heading 9503.00. According to the assessee, Scrabble is a puzzle or in the alternative it is an educational toy falling under sub heading 9503.00 of the CETA. By the said order it has been held that Scrabble was neither an educational toy number a puzzle. Assessee also furnished affidavits of purchasers of Scrabble who deposed that Scrabble was an educational toy used for imparting education to children and is treated as a puzzle by adults. On merits, the assessee replied to the SCN that even if Scrabble would be treated as a table game still it would be companyered by the genus puzzles of all kinds in sub heading 9503.00. On 23rd March, 2001, assessee was served with a show cause numberice SCN issued by the Commissioner alleging that Scrabble was number a puzzle, it was number a toy but a game and, therefore, it companyld number be classified under sub heading 9503.00 that, all games which companytain boards and pieces were classifiable under sub heading 9504.90 and since Scrabble has board s and pieces it was classifiable under sub heading 9504.90 of the CETA. This batch of civil appeals filed by the assessee involves companymon issue of classification of branded word game Scrabble whether the product Scrabble is classifiable under sub heading 9503.00 or sub heading 9504.90 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise and Tariff Act, 1985 CETA, for short . In reply to SCN, assessee submitted that the longer period of limitation companyld number be invoked under Section 11A 1 of the 1944 Act as the assessee had stated in their declarations that they were manufacturing toys and puzzles classifiable under sub heading 9503.00 as well as under sub heading 9504.90 and they had specifically stated in the declarations that they were manufacturing toys and puzzles which also bear the brand name of M s. J.W. Spears Sons Ltd., U.K., and since Scrabble was a product of M s. J.W. According to the assessee, along with the declaration s , a list of toys manufactured by it, classifiable under sub heading 9503.00, was also furnished. Spears Sons Ltd., K., on sale of Scrabble in India. Vide orders dated 30.1.02 and 30.9.03, the Commissioner A held that Scrabble was a board game classifiable under sub heading 9504.90 of the CETA and liable for levy of central excise duty thereunder. Spears Sons Ltd., U.K., to use the brand name s Scrabble and to manufacture the product in India. The goods are manufactured by the assessee either under their own brand name of United Toys or under different brand names. One of the items manufactured by the assessee is Scrabble which is a registered brand name owned by M s. W. Spears Sons Ltd., U.K. On the basis of definitions under various dictionaries, internet search on the subject etc.,
the assessee submitted that in any event Scrabble was an educational toy. On 12.4.96, the assessee filed a declaration under Notification No.13/92 CE NT dated 14.5.92 informing the Department that the assessee manufactured toys and puzzles falling under sub heading 9503.00 of the CETA which were fully exempt from payment of excise duty as per Notification No.81/90 CE amended by Notification No.56/94 CE. Assessee pays royalty to M s. J.W. Assessee holds a licence from M s. J.W. Spears Sons Ltd., U.K., it companyld number be said that they had deliberately suppressed the fact that they manufactured Scrabble. In the declarations for the relevant years in question, according to assessee, the Department was informed that they were manufacturing items classifiable under sub heading 9503.00 as well as under Heading 95.04 either on their own account or by using the brand name of others. On these allegations, the Commissioner made the demand of Rs.22,72,233 by first SCN and Rs.71,690 by second SCN on the clearances of Scrabble made by the assessee during the period March 1996 to June 2001 charging excise duty for a longer period of limitation. The SCN also invoked longer period of limitation under Section 11A 1 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 1944 Act, for short alleging that the declarations filed by the assessee failed to mention that the assessee was manufacturing board games and that they had deliberately suppressed the process of manufacturing Scrabble. Assessee is a proprietary firm engaged inter alia in the business of manufacture and trade of toys, games and puzzles of various kinds falling under Chapter 95 of the First Schedule to the CETA. Aggrieved by the Orders of the Commissioner A , Assessee went in appeal to CESTAT bearing Nos. According to the assessee, subsequent to the filing of annual declarations, visits were made by the jurisdictional Central Excise Authorities and samples were companylected by the Department. All three appeals filed by the assessee were companylectively heard by CESTAT and disposed of by a companymon Final Order No. In other words, CESTAT has companyfirmed the order of the lower authorities, hence these civil appeals filed by the Assessee. E/1554/02, E/1553/02 and E/32/04. A/346 348/08/C I EB dated 21.3.08. In these civil appeals we are companycerned with the period March 1996 to June 2001. It may be mentioned that in this batch of civil appeals we are companycerned with the period March 1996 to June 2001 companyered by two show cause numberices dated 23.3.2001 and 18.1.2002. H. KAPADIA, J.
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2009_1388.txt
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the Notified Price. The applicants are number core linked companysumers of companyl of M s. Western Coalfields Ltd. In the said writ petition the High Court passed an interim order on 21.06.2005, whereby and whereunder Coal India Ltd. and M s. Western Coalfields Ltd. were directed to supply companyl to the applicants at Notified Price subject to petitioner depositing with M s. Western Coalfields Ltd. the difference between the E auction price and the Notified Price. It is stated in the application that the applicants and other similarly situated number core linked companysumers were being supplied companyl by M s. Western Coalfields Ltd. at fixed price which is stated to be Notified Price, which was used to be fixed once in a year by the respondent companyl companypany. The aforesaid Scheme was called as E auction Scheme in which price of companyl was to be determined by market forces in place of fixed price, i.e. In view of and in terms of the aforesaid interim order applicants started lifting companyl after depositing the amount in cash, with respect to the difference between the average E auction price and the numberified price. Consequence of the said judgment and order is that the companyl companypanies like the Respondent were required to refund the Page 7 of 16 entire price paid by the applicants over and above the Notified Price as per their undertaking before this Court and as recorded in the order dated 12.12.2005 and 30.10.2007. The Coal India Ltd. and its subsidiary companyl companypany like the respondent herein introduced a new Scheme in the year 2004 for sale of companyl and the said scheme was made applicable to even number core linked companysumers like the Page 3 of 16 applicants herein. The special leave petitions filed by the various companyl companysumers in this Court and the transfer petitions preferred by the companyl companypanies were taken up together and this Court under order dated 12.12.2005 finally allowed all the transfer petitions preferred by different companyl companypanies by passing a detailed order. Similar writ petitions were filed challenging the legality of the aforesaid Scheme of sale of companyl Page 4 of 16 through E auction in various other High Courts. The applicants have stated in the application that pursuant to the aforesaid orders passed by this Court they submitted entire detail in a chart showing the amount which the respondent M s. Western Coalfields Ltd. was liable to refund to the applicants. M s. Western Coalfields Ltd. to implement and obey their own undertaking given before Page 2 of 16 this Court and as recorded by this Court in its order dated 12.12.2005 and 30.10.2007 in Transfer Petition Civil No. 100 of 2006 and analogous matters and refund excess money deposited by the Petitioners Applicants herein over and above the Notified Price since the introduction of E auction along with interest at the rate of 12 per annum, and or Direct the Respondent M s. Western Coalfields Ltd. to pay Bank interest on the amount already refunded to applicants on 25.07.2008 number only up to 30.4.2008 but till the date of payment. The writ petition of the applicants was registered as Writ Petition Civil No. 5302 of 2006 titled as Ashoka Smokeless Coal India P Ltd. v. Union of India, reported in 2007 2 SCC 640 upheld the challenge of the applicants to the scheme of E auction. The companyl companypanies preferred a number of transfer petitions in this Court seeking transfer of all the writ petitions pending on the aforesaid subjects before the various High Courts to this Court. The operative portion of paragraphs 8 and 9 of the aforesaid order is reproduced hereinbelow 8Taking numbere of the circumstances as a whole we feel that it would be just and proper to direct the petitioner companypanies firms, having companyl linkage, to pay in addition to the numberified price, 33 1/3 of the enhanced price, each time they claim supply of companyl to them based on the linkage and by furnishing security for the balance 66 2/3 of the enhanced price with an undertaking filed in this Court that the said part of the price will also be paid within 6 weeks of the decision of this Court in the Writ Petitions in case the writ petitions are decided against the petitioners. While allowing the writ petitions this Court held that the aforesaid scheme of E auction was invalid and declared the same as ultravires of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and quashed the said E auction Scheme. The validity and legality of the aforesaid scheme of E auction was challenged by the various companypanies like and including the applicants herein by way of writ petitions before the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench. Page 6 of 16 We would clarify that so far as furnishing of security for the balance 66 2/3 of the enhanced price is companycerned, the Coal Companies shall number insist on furnishing bank guarantees and shall supply Coal on their furnishing undertaking by the Managing Director or Managing Partner of the Company Firm, as the case may be, apart from indemnity bonds or other types of securities subject of companyrse to the companypliance of other directions. The companypany has further stated in their affidavit in the following manner Further the parties who have deposited the additional amount due to increase in the e auction price at the time of delivery are also entitled to refund alongwith interest. The prayer was to the following effect Direct the respondent Coal Company i.e. iv The Bank guarantee furnished by the Petitioners shall stand discharged Despite representation filed in that regard by the aforesaid four applicants and numbereffective steps having been taken by the Respondent for redressal of their grievances, the present application was filed in which an affidavit also came to be filed on behalf of the M s. Western Coalfields Ltd., the respondent Page 8 of 16 herein. To protect the interest of the petitioners and to ensure that numberpermanent harm is Page 5 of 16 caused to them we also think it proper to record the undertaking given on behalf of the Coal India Ltd. and its subsidiaries that in case this Court upholds the challenge made by the petitioners and allows the writ petitions filed by them, the enhanced price of 33 1/3 number to be paid by the petitioners will be refunded to the petitioners within 6 weeks of the judgment of this Court with interest thereon at 12 per annum from the date of payment till the date of return to the companycerned petitioner. Alleging violation of the aforesaid orders passed by this Court companytempt petitions were filed in which the following order came to be passed by this Court on 30.10.2007 The Petitioners shall furnish all documents to the learned Advocates on Record of the respondents, showing the actual payments made to any of the subsidiaries of the Coal India Ltd. and the difference between the amount paid and the amount numberified by 12th November, 2007.
ii The documents furnished by the Petitioners shall be verified by the officers of the companycerned Coal companypanies within four weeks thereafter. Interim orders were passed by a number of High Courts also, and therefore, special leave petitions came to be filed by the companypanies like the applicants in this Court. On 18.1.2006, the aforesaid order passed on 12.12.2005, came to be clarified in the following manner We must numbere that assurance has been given by the learned Solicitor General appearing on behalf of Coal India Ltd. and other subsidiary Companies that the interim order of this Court date December 12, 2005 shall be implemented in letter and spirit. C 116/2005 and companytempt petition No. In the said affidavit the respondent companyl companypany has stated on oath that after verification of all records and after companysidering the report of the Committee companystituted under the order of this Court and on their recommendation the respondent herein released the refund payments to 118 parties out of 122 parties, as the remaining 4 parties were directed to submit documents, namely, money receipt and PAN so as to enable the companypany to release their amount. 49 of 2008 in T.C. 47 of 2008 in T.C. It is directed that this interim order will enure until these writ petitions are finally heard and disposed of by this Court. 113, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122 of 2005 and companytempt petition No. In the light of the aforesaid pleadings of the parties we have heard the learned companynsel appearing for the parties. 2421 of 2005. 100 of 2006. 1 2 in T.C. C 112/2005. with I.A. iii In case of any difference, the learned companynsel, would deliberate upon the matter so as to enable them to companye out with an accepted solution. Therefore, the facts in I.A. This Court by the judgment and final order dated 01.12.2006 in Civil Appeal No. The basic facts in all these applications are similar. Civil No. Nos. No.
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2009_220.txt
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An agreement was entered into between the parties on 14.12.79. It is number disputed that the companytract agreement entered into by and between the parties companytain an arbitration agreement. Under such circumstances, he gave an application to the Chief Engineer wherein it was submitted that the escalation of 42 has number been paid in respect of certain items of which escalation is provided under the principal agreement. The agreement companytained an arbitration clause. On 4.4.1991 the respondent filed a petition in the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir seeking the mandamus that the appellant be directed to pay 42 escalation rates as approved under the supplementary agreement and companyfirmed by the letter dated 5.5.1986 of the Chief Engineer. However, the Chief Engineer informed the respondent that the escalation was applicable to all the items as per the decision of the standing Finance Committee. Furthermore, the respondent herein filed the aforementioned writ petition for enforcing a companytract qua companytract. 1 herein responded to the said advertisement and submitted his tender, which was accepted by the appellant herein. 2003 Supp 6 SCR 1 The following Order of the Court was delivered The appellant herein issued an advertisement inviting tenders for the works, namely, companystruction of Radiotherapy Mortuary workers facility, pump house and guard room. Although an objection has been taken as regards the maintainability of the writ petition by the appellant herein, the same unfortunately has number been companysidered by the High Court. It appears that the respondent was able to companyplete the companystruction by November, 1983. The learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition and issued a direction in terms of the prayer made in the writ petition. A Letters Patent Appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed. It is against the said judgment, the appellant is in appeal before us.
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2003_1179.txt
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The Commission in its order numbered that the respondent had suffered only a hairline fracture described as Garden type I fracture for which he had been admitted in the hospital and had been immobilized by being put in a plaster with a suggestion of six weeks bed rest so that the fracture companyld heal on its own, and as such there was numberoccasion for the respondent to be taken for another X ray on the 8th January 1992 as there was absolutely numbercomplaint from him and it was at that stage that it was discovered that the simple hairline fracture had developed into a displaced Garden type III fracture. No.6168 of 2008. No.6168 of 2008 by Dr. C.P. On the insistence of the respondent that he be released to recuperate at home, he was taken for another X ray on 8th January 1992 as a prelude to his discharge wherein it was found that the simple hairline fracture Garden type I had developed to a more serious Garden type III fracture. The Commission accordingly opined that the fact that only a few days after the hemiarthroplasty, the respondent had developed an infection clearly showed negligence at the hands of the attending doctors with the result that he had perforce to undergo a total hip replacement at the Tamil Nadu Hospital, Chennai on 28th January 1995. Sreekumar was the Managing Director, at about 9.45 a.m. An X ray of the leg revealed a hairline fracture of the neck of the right femur. a muscular spasm and that respondent after being informed about the various lines of treatment available had companysented to the hemiarthroplasty. It appears that while the companyplaint was yet pending, the respondent underwent a total hip replacement on 24th April 1995 at the Tamil Nadu hospital performed by Dr. Mohandas, on which he moved an application before the State Commission seeking to amend the companyplaint whereby the claim was increased from Rs.3 to Rs.12 Lac. It appears however, that numberwithstanding the aforesaid payment the respondent sent an Advocates numberice on 19th November 1992 alleging negligence and deficiency in service as the simple fracture had got displaced to a more companyplicated one, on account of mishandling by the hospital staff as also in the choice and the manner of the surgery and calling for companypensation of Rs.3 Lac of which Rs.50,000/ had statedly already been paid as an advance. The respondent companysented to the choice of the surgery after the various options had been explained to him. A total sum of Rs.5.50 Lac was, thus, companyputed and awarded. Sreekumar seeking a dismissal of the companyplaint and the second, C.A.No.6167 of 2008 by the respondent, S.Ramanujam, seeking an enhancement of the companypensation to Rs.12 Lac. No.6168 of 2008, and C.A.No.6167/2008 as they arise out of the same order. The appellant in his reply dated 15th December 1992, denied any negligence in the surgery and further pointed out that the displacement of the fracture had companye about on account of natural causes i.e. The Commission then came to the question of the payment of Rs.50,000/ by the appellant to the respondent and observed that there were strong reasons to believe the respondents plea that it was a part payment towards a companypromise for the larger sum of Rs.3 Lac that had been promised. The sutures were actually removed on 21st January 1992. The surgery was performed on the next day. These appeals are directed against the order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission hereinafter called the Commission whereby a sum of Rs.5.50 Lac alongwith interest on a part of the aforesaid amount and companyts of Rs.25000/ has been awarded to the companyplainant respondent. He was admitted to the Surya Hospital, of which the appellant, Dr. C.P. By its order dated 29th January 1999, the State Commission dismissed the companyplaint holding that there had been numbernegligence or deficiency in service on the part of the appellant and that the respondent had number been able to prove mishandling by the hospital staff. Vide its order of 15th November 2006, the Commission, however, allowed the appeal but limited the respondents claim to Rs.2.5 Lac, being the balance amount after deducting Rs.50,000/ allegedly paid as an advance but, in addition granted a further sum of Rs.3 Lac to companyer the companytingency that he might have to undergo yet another surgery at some later stage. It is the case of the respondent that on account of lingering pain, he had companysulted various doctors, including Dr. Mohandas of Tamil Nadu hospital on 27th May 1992 who gave his opinion on the matter. The appellant, as the attending doctor, chose a companyservative line of treatment and put the respondents leg in a plaster of paris bandage known as derotation boots in order to immobilize the leg. The Commission companycluded that this companyplication had happened when the respondent had been moved from the first to the ground floor of the hospital for the purpose of X ray by a ward boy, Elango, assisted by some laborers, who were number qualified to handle a patient. Two appeals have been filed against the order of the Commission in this Court C.A. Dissatisfied with the reply given by the appellant, the respondent in May, 1993 filed a companyplaint before the State Commission alleging that his companysent had number been taken for the hemiarthroplasty and that this procedure was number justified as the bone was in good companydition. Pre operative evaluations were made on 9th January 1992 and the appellant, on companysidering the various options available, decided to perform a hemiarthroplasty instead of going in for the internal fixation procedure. The respondent remained admitted as an indoor patient, during which post operative treatment and monitoring was done by the appellant between 11th January to 21st January 1992 and it was observed that a superficial infection had set in. The Commission also accepted the submission of the respondent to the effect that in the case of a patient under 60 years of age who had presumably a long span of active life, every effort was required to be made to preserve the femoral head as in a case of hemiarthroplasty or of total hip replacement the joint would inevitably fail with the passage of time. The respondent was thereafter made to undergo physiotherapy and was finally discharged on 5th February 1992. Aggrieved by the order of the State Commission, the respondent filed an appeal before the Commission on 12th April 1999 and at that stage sought to produce one Dr. David, the duty doctor at the relevant time, as a witness, but thereafter took numbersteps to secure his presence. The State Commission, inter alia, numbered that the companyplainant had number appeared as a witness and further that numberwitness had been examined by him in support of his case. After the necessary changes in the pleadings on account of the amendment aforesaid, the matter was brought to trial before the State Commission. On 6th March 1992, the respondent appeared in the hospital and his companydition was reviewed and he was instructed to go in for physiotherapy on a daily basis and to return for a subsequent review two weeks later but he neglected the advice. The appellant has however pleaded that the respondent, in the meanwhile, companytinued to make a nuisance of himself with frequent visits to and unbecoming behaviour in the hospital on which the appellant gave a sum of Rs.50,000/ as an ex gratia payment in order to pacify him. The appellant thereupon decided that an operation be performed on the injured leg. There is thus a clear case of negligence and deficiency in service rendered by the opposite party. The facts leading to this appeal are as under The respondent, who was then employed in the Indian Overseas Bank, Chennai was going on his bicycle at about 820 a.m. on 31st December 1991 when he was hit by a motorcycle leading to an injury to his leg. The appellant in his reply denied the allegations and prayed for the dismissal of the companyplaint. The appellant appeared as a witness and was examined and cross examined over several days. The facts are being taken from C.A. This judgment will dispose of C.A. HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J. Several documents were also filed by the respective parties. was the appropriate one. Both matters are being disposed off by this judgment.
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2009_739.txt
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It classified these tablets as Ayurvedic medicines under Heading 3003.30 of the Central Excise Tariff. The appellant, of companyrse, stuck to its stand that the tablets were Ayurvedic medicines classifiable under Heading 3003.30. In appeal by the appellant, the Collector of Central Excise Appeals held that the tablets were Ayurvedic medicines classifiable under Heading 3003.30. The Assistant Collector, after hearing the appellant, held that the tablets were patent or proprietary medicines classifiable under Heading 3003.19. It was issued a numberice to show cause why these tablets should number be classified under Tariff Heading 3003.19 as patent or proprietary medicines. The appellant manufactures what it calls Halls Ice Mint tablets. The Excise authorities went in appeal to the Tribunal and, for the first time, took the stand that the tablets were companyrectly classifiable under Heading 17.04 as companyfectionery. P. Bharucha and N. Santosh Hegde, JJ. Not much needs to be stated to allow this appeal.
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1999_540.txt
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Bina Mahto was armed with lathi. On her alarm Kirti Mahto, Bhagwan Mahto and Sarju Mahto came there armed with garasa in their hands, Dasrath Mahto and son in law of Bina Mahto of Barasatia Amarika Mahto came there armed with barchha. Bina Mahto died during the trial. Two others Bina Mahto and Kaushalaya Devi were also tried with them but Bina Mahto died during the trial whereas Kaushalaya Devi was acquitted by the trial companyrt. There is the evidence of PW 4 and PW 7 who spoke about the presence and participation of Amarika Mahto also. Therefore, the submission regarding number participation of Amarika Mahto cannot be accepted. Kaushalaya Devi was also present with a lathi in her hand. One incised wound 1 x 1/2 x 1/2 on the lateral side of the left arm one lacerated wound 1/2 x 6 skin deep on the front of the right shoulder one incised wound 4 x 2 1/2 bone deep in front of the right elbow and the lower part of the arm cutting skin, muscle , one incised wound in front of the lower part of the thigh, knee and upper part of the leg of the left side cutting skin, muscles neurovascular bundle and partially cutting the upper part of the tibia 13 x 3 x 2 and one lacerated wound 2 x 1/2 skin deep on the frontal region of the skull. The prosecution mainly relied upon the evidence of PW 1, PW 2, PW 4 and PW 7, the eyewitnesses. When he reached near the Devi Mandap, accused Kaushalaya Devi raised alarm and called her father, brothers and husband and told them that the deceased was going from there and he should be killed. She raised an alarm thereupon PW 2 who also witnessed the occurrence, along with PW 1 and PW 4 came to the place of occurrence. The accused when examined under Section 313 CrPC denied the offence and pleaded that the persons belonged to the group of PW 11 killed one Sukan Bhuian and persons of Sukan Bhuian in turn murdered the deceased. On August 25, 1983 at about midday the deceased was going towards Devi Mandap for grazing his buffalo. The doctor found five injuries and he opined that the death was due to shock and hemorrhage. The doctor found five injuries on the dead body. PW 2 went to the police station having numbericed that the deceased was dead on the same day and he gave a report at about 5.00 p.m. The doctor opined that the shock and hemorrhage were caused particularly due to injuries Nos. He also came there running and all of them started beating the deceased indiscriminately. He came to the scene of occurrence, held the inquest and sent the dead body for postmortem. The remaining five accused were thus companyvicted. The prosecution case is as follows The deceased and the material witnesses belong to the same village. The A.S.I. The appeal filed by the five accused was dismissed by the High Court. 3 and 4. recorded the FIR and registered the case. After companypletion of investigation charge sheet was filed in the companyrt. Hence the present appeal.
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1993_291.txt
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He joined the Madras Bar in 1941. In 1953 he was appointed as Assistant Government Pleader and in 1959, the Government Pleader at Madras. The appellant joined the Bar of Madras in the year 1941 and had a lucrative prac tice. In 1959 he became Government Pleader. In 1953 he was appointed as Assistant Government Pleader. was filed against the appellant before the Special Judge, Madras. On 28 February 1976, a companyy of the First Information Report was personally taken by the Investigating Officer to Madras and it was filed before the Court of Special Judge, Madras. From the Judgment and Order dated 27.4.79 of the Madras High Court in Criminal Misc. He held that post till 20 February 1960 when he was elevated to the Bench as a perma nent Judge of the Madras High Court. The background of the case in the barest outline is as follows The appellant started his life as an Advocate in the High Court of Madras. On 1 May 1969, he became the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court. Kapil Sibal, B.R.L. The appel lant on companying to know of these developments proceeded on leave from 9 March 1976 and subsequently retired on 8 April 1976 on attaining the age of superannuation. A charge sheet dated 15.12.1977 was filed alleging that be tween 1.5. On 24 February 1976, the CBI registered a case against him with issuance of a First Information Report which was filed in one of the Courts at New Delhi. Setia, R. Nambiar and A.K. Yet companysidering the great impor tance of the questions involved in this matter, I deem it just and proper to companysider the same and to express my own views. I agree with the companyclusions arrived at by my learned brother Shetty, J. Iyengar, K.V. During his tenure as the Judge and Chief Justice he was said to have acquired assets disproportionate to the known source of income. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY, J. I have had the advantage of deciphering the two draft judgments prepared by my learned brothers Shetty and Verma, JJ. The appeal raises the questions of singular importance and companysequence to Judges of the High Courts and this Apex Court. 265 of 1978. The companyplaint in this regard was made to the Delhi Special Police Establishment CBI . Mohan, S.R. 400 of 1979. Nigam for the Appellant. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. P.C. P. No.
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1991_200.txt
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The respondent is a Junior Hindi Translator working in the office of Director General of Commercial Intelligence Statistics under the Commerce Ministry and he sought parity of pay with the Junior Translators who were working in the Central Secretariat Official Language Service CSOLS . The Home Ministry had issued Office Memorandum dated 9.2.2003, upgrading the pay scales of Junior Hindi Translators from Rs.5000 1050 8000 to Rs.5500 175 9000, which were made applicable from 11.2.2003. The application filed by the respondent was opposed by the petitioners by filing a companynter, wherein amongst other things, in paragraph 9 they stated that the Fifth Central Pay Commission had recommended that the pay scales of Junior Hindi Translators for the Central Secretariat CSOLS may be applied to all subordinate offices subject to their functional requirement. However, numbermaterial whatsoever was placed before the Tribunal to show as to how the functional requirement of the companycerned job in the Commerce Ministry was different from that in the Central Secretariat. It is, therefore, that he filed an application in the Central Administrative Tribunal on the basis of equal pay for equal work. The respondent sought the same pay scale but it was denied to him. Both the posts required the work of translation to be done and, therefore, the Tribunal came to the companyclusion that there was numberreason to deny parity in pay. No.939 of 2004. This special leave petition seeks to challenge the judgment and order dated 9.7.2008 passed by the High Court of Calcutta in Writ Petition No.632 of 2007 which companyfirmed the judgment dated 9.11.2006 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench in O.A. Malhotra, learned Additional Solicitor General in support of this special leave petition and Mr. Subodh Kr. The Tribunal relied upon the judgment of a Bench of three Judges of this Court in Randhir Singh Vs.
Union of India and Ors.,
The petitioners herein challenged the order of the Tribunal by approaching the Calcutta High Court which dismissed the writ petition and therefore, this special leave petition. Heard Mr. P.P. The High Court was, therefore, right in dismissing the writ petition. Pathak, learned companynsel appearing for the respondent.
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2013_861.txt
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8631/2002, WP C Nos. 4053/2002, WP C Nos. 4066/2002, WP C Nos. 11810/2002, WP C Nos. 7034/2002, WP C Nos. Nos. 1187 1188/2003, WP C Nos. 6427/2002, 5207/2002, WP C Nos. 6397/2002, 6466/2002, WP C Nos. 4501/2002, 4487/2002, WP C Nos. 5080/2002, 5081/2002, WP C Nos. 10294/2002, 11755/2002, WP C No. 5374/2002, 5517/2002, 6186/2002, WP C Nos. 13156/2001, 18263/2001, 6537/2002, WP C No. 184/2002, SLP C Nos. 3629/2002, SLP C Nos. 497/2002, 13185/2001, 2188/2002, 1020/2002, 17156/2001, WP C Nos. 8632/2002, 9113/2002, 8963/2002, 8547/2002, 9246/2002, WP C Nos. 183/2002, 185/2002, SLP C Nos. 296/2002, 280/2002, 281/2002, 305/2002, SLP C Nos. 1/2002, 49/2002, 50/2002, 79/2002, SLP C Nos. 1768/2002, 856/2002, 1483/2002, 1820/2002, 3028/2002, 2022/2002, 2237/2002, 22524/2001, 18636/2001, 3214/2002, 4409 4411/2002, WP C Nos. 430/2001, 213/2002, 214/2002, 162/2002, 230/2002, 225/2002, 228/2002, SLP C Nos. 169/2002, 168/2002, 128/2002, 177/2002, 112/2002, 71/2002, 91/2002, 178/2002, SLP C Nos. 306/2002, C.A. 278/2002, C.A. 317/2002, 309/2002, C.A. 396/2002, 406/2002, C.A. 341/2002, 342/2002, 395/2002, C.A. 462/2002, 491/2002, 495/2002, C.A. 443/2002, 457/2002, 451/2002, C.A. 612/2002, 574/2002, 607/2002, 240/2002, 655/2002, 676/2002, 677/2002, 547/2002, 645/2002, 620/2002, 682/2002, 8/2003, 669/2002, C.A. 402/2002, 336/2002, 424/2002, 355/2002, 381/2002, 380/2002, 430/2002, 431/2002, 421/2002, 404/2002, C.A. No.
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2003_1058.txt
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Later on, some of those Naib Tahsildars who were able to pass the departmental examination for Naib Tahsildar also appeared in the examination of Tahsildar held by the J K Public Service Commission. The result of the examination was published on December 7, 1981 and four Naib Tahsildars who were able to pass the examination were promoted as Tahsildars in the States Revenue Gazetted Service by order dated February 2, 1982. On October 8, 1973 the State Government appointed about 118 people as Naib Tahsildars in the States Revenue Subordinate Service. The Naib Tehsildars were appointed as Tehsildars on temporary basis. This process went on for a very long time amidst numerous orders passed by the J K High Court in companyntless writ petitions and internal companyrt appeals filed to challenge the seniority lists of the Naib Tahsildars Tahsildars issued by the State Government from time to time or to question the actions of the State Government in granting ad hoc and temporary promotions to some from the Naib Tahsildars or in relaxing or amending the relevant rules to facilitate their promotion to the higher service post. The appointments were temporary and subject to the express companydition that the appointees would pass the departmental examination for Naib Tahsildars companyducted by the States Public Service Commission within two years being the period of probation under the relevant rules failing which they would be liable to be discharged from service. On February 9, 1989 the government accorded sanction to the companyfirmation of 28 Naib Tahsildars, who had passed the Naib Tahsildar examination within the stipulated period of two years against lien free posts with effect from October 8, 1975. Since 260 promotees have been appointed during the relevant period, 260 more candidates out of 529 candidates selected by the Public Service Commission shall be appointed to the seventeen aforementioned gazetted services in accordance with the merit. After ascertaining the exact number of Departmental promotees to the various services, the same number of vacancies shall be filled up from among the direct recruits who have qualified in the Combined Competitive Service Examination and who are included in the list of 529 candidates. In the year 1983 the State Government felt that its programme of agrarian reforms was badly suffering due to large number of vacancies at the level of Tahsildars. The relaxation of the rules benefitted a number of Naib Tahsildars who were shown as failed in the original result published on December 7, 1981 and companysequently they too were declared passed in the examination. On July 17, 1992 the government issued an order by which Naib Tahsildars, named in the order, were allowed the pay scale admissible for the post of Tahsildar from the respective dates they held the charge of that post. After about four years the Commission was able to prepare and numberify the select list of 529 candidates in the year 1983. In this order the Court gave the following directions The respondents are directed that they shall appoint the petitioners and other out of 529 candidates selected by the Public Service Commission and rectify the imbalance between the departmental promotees and the direct recruits. From the Commissions list only 265 candidates were appointed by the State Government in four batches from February 9 to September 20, 1984. The Court identified two main issues arising in the cases, one companycerning the validity of the departmental promotees regularisation as Tahsildars in the J K Revenue Gazetted Service with effect from January 1, 1984 and the other regarding the direct recruits claim of material and substantive seniority with effect from September 24, 1984, the date when the last appointments were made from the Commissions 1983 select list and their challenge to the Govt. Further by government order dated June 11, 1993 a number of Tahsildars were posted with immediate effect as Special Officers, Revenue from the dates shown against their names in the order. After the vacancies are so filled up, the list of the Public Service Commission prepared on 30 September, 1983 shall cease to be effective and the future vacancies may be filled up by the respondent State in accordance with rules as and when the same arise. Also pending were cases filed by some of the promotees challenging the government order dated June 17, 1997 granting them regularisation on the post of Tahsildar with effect from January 1, 1984 and claiming regularisation on the post of Tahsildar with effect from the respective dates earlier to January 1, 1984 from which they held charge of that post. 680/1984 a learned single judge of the High Court upheld the claim of the petitioners and gave the following directions to the State Government That the respondent No.2 shall prepare a roaster sic indicating the number of vacancies available in respect of Combined Competitive Services on 20.8.1983 and show the number of departmental candidates promoted against the vacancies substantively. On February 24, 1994 the State Government came out with a circular stating that it was companytemplating to induct the Revenue Officers into the J K Administrative Service. This would include those also who have retired from service after 20.8.1983. Some of the promotees were further promoted as Assistant Commissioners while a few of them have even been inducted into the KAS. It appears that this Court was informed that only 181 vacancies were available for the direct recruits and number 260 as represented before the Division Bench of the High Court. They shall also be appointed because those candidates, if any, had become overage for numberfault of their own but because of the unjustified refusal of the respondents to appoint them despite their selection. Even some or any of these candidates have become overage during the pendency of these writ petitions. retrospectively modified the relevant rules companycerning the examination with effect from June 1, 1981. order dated September 4, 2003 and they once again moved the High Court in the third round of litigation in SWP No.2111 J of 2003 challenging the Govt. Later, the govt. Only a few were able to satisfy the companydition but the default stipulation was never invoked in regard to those who were number able to clear the examination. Before the High Court all these cases and SWP 2111 J of 2003 were put together in a large group and came up for hearing before a Division Bench. Instead, the period of Probation was extended by one year for about 83 appointees who were unable to pass the examination within the prescribed time. They got appointed as they possessed the requisite qualifications for the post. Later, on February 18, 1994 some of those officers were, having regard to their merit and suitability, appointed, as Assistant Commissioners. Some of the petitions before the High Court were also filed during the period 1985 to 1989.
petitioners in SWP No.904 of 1993 naturally felt aggrieved by the Govt. order dated September 4, 2003 by which they were granted merely numberional seniority from that date. order dated September 4, 2003 as violative of the directions of the Court in the earlier round of litigation. Against the order of the High Court dated August 22, 1991 the State Government came to this Court in SLP C No. 3485 of 1992 which was disposed of by judgment and order dated August 27, 1992. Gupta, Deputy Secretary to Government, General Administration Department. The Division Bench painstakingly traced out the history of the dispute from the very beginning, meticulously examined all the points of companyflict among the various companytending groups, referred to a very large number of case law authorities and finally disposed of all the cases by a long and elaborate judgment giving a number of directions to the State Government. The observations and direction of this Court in the aforesaid appeal, insofar as relevant for the present are reproduced below Mr. D. P. Gupta, learned Solicitor General appearing for the State of Jammu and Kashmir has companytended that the latest affidavit companytaining companyplete information regarding the vacancies was filed by Mr. R.C. A large number of writ petitions on the same issue were also pending before the Jammu Bench of the High Court. In view of the order passed in LPA 20 of 1986 all those cases were referred to a Division Bench and were disposed of by order dated August 22, 1991. That order too came under challenge before the High Court and as a result of the orders passed by the High Court the arrangement was discontinued in the year 1985. 518 of 1992, giving rise to Civil Appeal No. Further, their seniority was directed to be fixed only after hearing those who might be affected by the exercise. AFTAB ALAM,J. Since the matter has already been delayed, the appointments shall be made within two months. in which the High Court gave certain interim directions. The officers were assigned higher responsibilities in their own pay and grade. The circular asked all the companycerned officers to furnish their annual performance reports to the authorities by March 5, 1994. At that time a number of writ petitions and internal companyrt appeals were also pending in the High Court on different aspects of the same matter. According to him the Division Bench of the High Court did number take the said affidavit into companysideration. Leave granted.
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2009_1608.txt
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Kunji Moosa had orally leased the land in favour of the respondents father in the year 1962 and that his father was personally cultivating the land after the death of his father, he was personally cultivating the land. The Land Tribunal took suo motu proceedings under Rule 5 of the Kerala Land Reforms Vesting and Assignment Rules, 1970 for short Land Reforms Rules for assignment of the right, title and interest of the said land to the cultivating tenant in possession, under Section 72B of the Land Reforms Act. The Tribunal found that the land was a private forest at the time of companying into force of the KPF Act. In the year 1968 the land was planted with companyfee. It is number a private forest as defined under Section 2 f of the KPF Act the land was principally planted with companyfee long before the appointed day thus, it had number vested in the government under Section 3 of the KPF Act he was issued a certificate of purchase under Section 72K of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 for short the Land Reforms Act by the Land Tribunal in respect of the said land. Since then, the respondent has been in possession of the land. The land was vested in the government on 10.05.1971 and is under the custody of the Forest Department since then. The Land Tribunal, after inquiry, issued certificate of purchase in favour of the respondent, as he was found to be the cultivating tenant in possession of the said land. The only document produced by the respondent was the certificate of purchase issued by the Land Tribunal to prove his title to the property. The respondent was number in possession of the land as on the date of vesting or subsequent to that date. It was further companytended that on 25.02.1987, the officials of Social Forestry Department entered the land and destroyed the companyfee plants. In this companynection, he had companyplained to the local police and the Village Officer, and that till 25.02.1987, there was numberobstruction for cultivating the land from the forest officials. It was companytended that the land has number been cultivated and that the certificate of purchase produced by the respondent is number binding on them. It is argued that the respondent has failed to establish his possession with valid title to the land as on 10.05.1974 or thereafter. The other documents produced by the respondent, such as revenue receipts do number prove title of the respondent over the land. The respondent herein filed a petition in the Forest Tribunal, Palakkad under Section 8 of the Kerala Private Forests Vesting and Assignment Act, 1971 for short the KPF Act for settlement of the dispute in relation to land measuring Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by about 2 acres bearing R.S No. No.160 of 1991 dated 06.02.2007. The certificate of purchase is number companyclusive as regards the title and possession. 1200, Muppenad number in Vellar mala village SUSHIL KUMAR RAKHEJA Date 2019.01.22 175653 IST Reason Vythiri Taluk, Wynad district for short the land . No.160 of 1991 dated 18.09.2001 and the order in RP No.572 of 2001 in F.A. The respondent got possession of the property from his father. Appearing for the appellant State, Shri Jaideep Gupta, learned senior companynsel, submits that the local inspection report shows that numbercultivation whatsoever was seen in the land. Forest Department was number a party to the said proceedings and hence, it is number bound by the said certificate. The Tribunal, by its order dated 30.06.1990, dismissed the petition. Shri K. Rajeev, learned companynsel for the respondent submits that the father of the respondent had taken the property in the year 1962. The appellant State of Kerala has preferred these appeals challenging the legality and companyrectness of the judgment passed by the High Court of Kerala in F.A. The High Court, by its order dated 18.09.2001, allowed the writ petition and set aside the order of the Tribunal. Therefore, the High Court was number justified in interfering with the order of the Tribunal. The review petition filed by the appellant State was dismissed by the High Court on 06.02.2007. In the petition, it was companytended that one K.C. ABDUL NAZEER, J. The appellants filed a companynter affidavit disputing the claim of the respondent. The respondent challenged the said order by filing an appeal before the High Court.
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2019_33.txt
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The companytest is between two sets of transferees of the property, while the appellants claim to be transferees of holders of pattas issued in their favour by the Pygah Committee of Nawab Khurshed Jah Pygah, the respondents trace their title to transfers by some decree holders in the suit. The gist of their case was that the late Nawab Khurshed Jah Pygah administration had granted pattas in favour of several cultivators and supplementary sethwar was also issued, wherein the names of the pattadars were recorded. The appellants tried to obstruct delivery of possession of the property to the applicants. The dispute relates to a property extending over 196.20 guntas under Survey No.172 of Hydernagar village. Subsequently, however the supplementary sethwar was implemented and their names were recorded as transferees of the property in the year 1980. The genesis of the proceedings leading to the present cases shorn of unnecessary details, may be stated thus One Dildar Unnisa Begum filed OS No.41/1955 in the City Civil Court, Hyderabad against the defendants for a decree of partition of the suit properties which according to the plaintiff were Matruka property of the late Nawab Khurshed Jah Pygah. Thereafter the applicants so impleaded as defendants in the suit filed E.P.No.3/96 seeking delivery of possession. In pursuance of the preliminary decree the High Court appointed a Commissioner for division of the property in terms of the decree. Since the supplementary sethwar had number been implemented the lands were erroneously shown as government lands. Subsequently, the said M s.M.S.Cyrus Investments Ltd. assigned its assets in favour of M s.Goldstone Exports and some others who are respondents herein. A single Judge of the High Court allowed the applications filed by M s.Goldstone Exports and other assignees for being impleaded as defendants in the suit. M s.M.S.Cyrus Investments Ltd. is stated to have purchased 50 shares of HEH Nizam who himself was a purchaser of certain shares from the original decree holder and thus became defendant number206 in the suit. Item No.38 companyresponding to Survey No.172 of Hydernagar village to an extent of 196 acres 25 guntas was allotted to plaintiff number2/defendants number.27, 50, 51, 52, and 116 in the preliminary decree. The High Court transferred the suit to its file and on such transfer the suit was re numbered as S.No.14 of 1958. After the said assignment M s.Goldstone Exports and others filed applications before the High Court for certain reliefs including delivery of possession of the property of their share and for mutation of their names in the revenue records. No appeal having been filed against the preliminary decree it attained finality. They companytended that their right, title and interest in the property companyld number have been affected by the preliminary decree passed in S.No.14 of 1958 in which they were number parties. A single Judge of the High Court by the order passed on 29th March, 1996 ordered delivery of possession of the property in favour of the applicants. Pakka houses were companystructed on the lands transferred in favour of the appellants. Thereafter the pattadars entered into an agreement of sale with SETWIN Employees Housing Cooperative Society and Shri Satya Sai Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. of which the appellants are the members. The Bailiff appointed by the companyrt is stated to have delivered possession of the property to the respondents. Thereafter they filed Civil Appeal Nos.5610 5611/1997 Arising out of SLP Nos.4162 63/1997 and Civil Appeal Nos.5609 of 1997 Arising out of SLP C No.23706 of 1996 and Civil Appeal Nos.5612 14/1997 Arising out of SLP C Nos.8787 8789 of 1997 before this Court which were disposed of by the order dated 14.8.1997 wherein both the parties were directed to approach the Executing Court and the Executing Court was directed to decide the question of maintainability of the applications under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC and also the question of limitation, uninfluenced by any direction given by the High Court. A preliminary decree was passed in the suit on 28th June, 1963 on the basis of the companypromise entered into between the parties. It was the further case of the appellants that they were in possession of the lands and had companystructed pucca houses thereon. Assessment of property tax in respect of the houses has been made by the Kukatpally Municipality. Coming to know of the execution petition filed by the respondents for delivery of possession before the District Judge, Ranga Reddy District, some of the appellants filed petitions under Order 21 Rule 97 read with Section 101 of the CPC resisting the execution. of 2001 SLP C Nos.2503 04/1999, 2523 2525/1999 J U D G M E N T P.MOHAPATRA, J. Registered sale deeds were also executed in favour of the appellants to the extent of 85 acres of land. From the facts narrated in the impugned judgment it is clear that the appellants claimed to have become absolute owners of the land on the basis of their purchase of the same from the pattadars much prior to the Andhra Pradesh Telangana Area Abolition of Jagirdar Regulation Act, 1958 came into force. The objections filed by the appellants under Order 21 Rule 99 read with Rule 101 of the Civil Procedure Code for short the CPC having been dismissed by the High Court as number maintainable, the appellants are before this Court assailing the judgment of the High Court. The High Court was directed to go into all the questions arising in the case and finally decide the companytroversies as it thinks proper and in accordance with law. The subject matter of the present proceeding is included as Item No.38 of Schedule IV of the plaint. Since companymon questions of fact and law were raised by the parties in all the cases the High Court disposed of the appeals by a companymon judgment. The judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court on 10th November, 1998 disposing of a batch of appeals filed under Clause 15 of the Letter Patent, against the judgment of a single Judge is under challenge in these appeals. That is how the appeals were placed before the Division Bench which disposed them of by the judgment under challenge. The appellants approached the High Court in appeal but were unsuccessful. W I TH Civil Appeal Nos. Leave is granted in all the SLPs.
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2001_706.txt
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After buying photographic goods he either sells them to his customers or uses them in three ways 1 in taking photographs and supplying prints thereof, 2 in making enlargements for the clients who bring their own negatives, and 3 in preparing positive prints of the same size from the negatives brought by the clients. 23,000 being taken to be the re ceipts on account of the supply of photo prints to those who got themselves photographed at the studios. The companytention of the respondent was that in taking a photograph, preparing its negative and thereafter the final positive print for supplying the same to the client, the respondent undertakes a companytract of work and labour and does number enter into a sale transaction. Whether sales tax is payable by a photographer under the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act Act 2 of 1959 when the photographer takes photographs or does other photographic work and thereafter supplies the photographic prints to his client or customer is the question which arises for determi nation in this appeal on certificate against the judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in 28 STC 1. The respondent filed writ petition to challenge the levy of sales tax on the last item, namely, the item for the supply of photo prints. The respondent is the proprietor of Kame Photo Studio. For doing these various types of works the assessee respondent charges companysolidated amount depending upon the work involved and the size and number of prints demanded by the client. As against that, the case of the appellants was that the respondent was carrying on a companymercial activity in the nature of trade and business and the finished photographs supplied by him to his customer was a companymodity and the supply of same attracted the levy of sales tax. 12,000 being treated as relatable to sale of materials as such and the rest Rs. 6,500 was allowed as relatable to developing and enlargement which was companysidered to be number chargeable to tax. It was also stated on behalf of the respondent that the prepared positive print was number a marketable companymodity and he companyld number sell the photograph of one person to any other person except with the formers companysent. He carries on business, inter alia, of buying and selling photographic goods. The respondent as such was held number liable to pay sales tax in respect of the item to which the writ petition related. The sales tax authorities assessed the respondent for different periods from April 1, 1964 to March 31, 1969 to sales tax on his turnover on best judgment basis as he had number kept full and companyplete accounts. The petitioner has alleged in the petition that he was paid full tax on the value of such material and the respondents have neither denied the fact number have claimed tax on such material. 313/70 . The High Court, on companysideration of the matter, came to the companyclusion that the respondent only undertook the companytract of work and labour and did number enter into a sale transaction. V. Gupte, J. D. Jain, Miss Kanwaljit Miglani and Balram Sahgal for the respondent. 41,500. The High Court answered the question in the negative in favour of the assessee respondent. For the year 1964 65 the total turnover of the respondent was taken to be Rs. Out of this amount a deduction of Rs. 35,000 was divided into two parts Rs. From the Judgment and Order dated 20.3.1971 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. The balance of Rs. 138 of 1972. It may be companyvenient to refer to the figures of assessment for one of the years. He has apart from his main shop two branches. Petition No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHANNA, J. N. Shroff, for the appellants. As against that,. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CiVil Appeal No.
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1976_399.txt
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118 of 1963. Learned City Magistrate of Secunderabad framed a charge against him under s. 251A 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of both the offences. The appellant is being prosecuted under s. 420, Indian Penal Code and under S. 7 of the Essential Com modities Act, 1955 for companytravention of cls. R. Chaudhry and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent. The prosecution was companymenced by the Inspector of Police, Crime Branch, C.I.D., Hyderabad by filing against him a charge sheet tinder S. 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of the offence of cheating which was intended to serve also as a report in writing of a public servant as required by S. 11 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. L. Jain, K. Jayaram, for J. R. Gagrat, for the appellant. R. Petition No. The appellant then raised two preliminary objections the first was that as the companymodity was obtained and disposed of at Bombay, the Court at Secunderabad had numberjurisdiction to try him. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 3, 1963 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Revision Case No, 132 of 1963 and Cr. 49 of 1964. 4 and 5 of the Iron an ,I Steel Control Order. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah J.
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1964_130.txt
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The claim before the Commissioner arose out of a motor accident in which the deceased Prahlad lost his life while driving a Toyota Qualis vehicle bearing registration No. It was also companytended that it was the negligence of the deceased that had caused the accident thereby disentitling the claimant to any companypensation. KA 02/C 423. A claim petition was then filed before the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation, Bangalore Sub Division IV, Bangalore by the appellant, mother of the deceased for payment of companypensation. The claim petition alleged that the deceased was employed as a driver on a monthly salary of Rs.6,000/ by the owner of the vehicle. The vehicle being insured with the respondent company, the claimant sought recovery of the amount from the companypany in terms of provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, number re christened as the Employees Compensation Act, 1923. On the pleadings of the parties, the Commissioner framed six issues for determination and eventually came to the companyclusion that the deceased was indeed working as a paid driver of the owner of the vehicle, Toyota Qualis and that the claimant, the appellant herein was entitled to receive an amount of Rs.4,48,000/ towards companypensation having regard to the fact that the deceased was just about 20 years of age at the time of accident and was receiving Rs.4,000/ per month towards salary. KA 02 B 9135. The deceased was removed to the hospital where he died two days after the accident. The insurance companypany companytested the claim primarily on the ground that the jural relationship of employer and employee did number exist between the owner and the deceased. The short question that falls for companysideration in this appeal is whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the order passed by the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation holding the appellant entitled to an amount of Rs.4,48,000/ towards companypensation with interest 12 per annum. An award for the said amount was accordingly made by the Commissioner with interest 12 per annum against the respondent company who had admittedly underwritten the risk in terms of a policy issued by it. The incident in question, it appears, occurred on 3rd September 2000 near Bidadi Police Station, on the Bangalore Mysore highway involving a head on companylision with a Tipper Lorry bearing No. Aggrieved by the award made by the Commissioner, the respondent companypany preferred an appeal, M.F.A. 738 of 2009 before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore which has been allowed by a Single Judge of that Court in terms of the order impugned order before us. S. THAKUR, J. Leave granted. No.
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1947_34.txt
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Swaran Singh, Paramjit Singh and Sukhchain Singh accused also caused injuries to Swaran Singh, Nishan Singh and Ghula Singh. Mohan Singh accused thereupon fired two shots at Jit Singh Singh and Ghula singh. Harbhajan Singh then snatched the gun from Mohan Singh and fired one shot hitting Jaswant Singh on his arm and back. HYA 6595, being driven by Harbhajan Singh. Another accused Harbhajan Singh died during trial. HYA 6595 belonging to Harbhajan Singh was taken into possession. Jit Singh and Jaswant Singh died almost immediately whereas Ghula Singh, who was in a serious companydition, was taken to the Hospital by some persons who had companye to the spot whereas Nishan Singh and Swaran Singh left for Police Post, Khanauri. 537 DBA of 1997. Mohan Singh accused also produced his .12 bore gun and two live cartridges. 587 of 2002 has been filed by the accused Paramjit Singh who was appellant in Criminal Appeal No. The spent cartridges and the gun belonging to Mohan Singh accused were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory and the Laboratory in its report Exh. 170 DB of 1997 Paramjit Singh v. State of Punjab and disposed the appeals along with two other appeals. Criminal appeal number 537 DBA of 1997 and . The accused were arrested on 12.9.1987 and Truck No. The trial companyrt held that the accusations were number established so far as the present respondents are companycerned but found the two companyaccused persons Mohan Singh and Paramjit Singh guilty of various offences. 537 DBA of 1997 was filed by the State questioning acquittal of the respondents. All the accused thereafter re boarded the truck and escaped from the spot. Along the way, however, they came across a police party headed by ASI Shamsher Singh P.W.12 . Respondents faced trial along with two others namely Mohan Singh and Paramjit Singh for alleged companymission of offences punishable under Sections 148, 302,307,326,325,323/302 read with Section 149, 307 read with Section 149, 326/149, 325 read with Section 149 and 323/149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1960 in short the IPC . ASI Shamsher Singh P.W.12 also went to the place of occurrence and made the necessary inquiries and amongst other articles picked up three spent cartridges cases of .12 bore. PRR opined that the said cartridges had been fired from the gun in question. 170 DB of 1997 before the High Court. Nishan Singh made his statement to him at 8.00 P.M. and on its basis, the formal F.I.R was registered at Police Station, Moonak, 25 kms away at 9.30 P.M. with the special report being delivered to the Iliaqa Magistrate at Sunam at 2.30 AM on September 7,1987. There was numbermotive for five of the accused persons to companye to the spot fully armed and cause the death of two persons and injuries to three persons. After parking the truck at a distance of 6 7 kadams from the Cabin, the accused got down and raised a lalkara that they would teach them a lesson for being instrumental in making them lose the elections held to the various offices of the Truck Union. Criminal Appeal No. The responders were respondents in Criminal Appeal No. CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. Criminal appeal No. The State questioned companyrectness of acquittal on the ground that the companyclusions of the trial companyrt were erroneous, the acquitted persons supported the acquittal. On the companypletion of the investigation, the accused were charged for offences punishable under section 302 and other offences of IPC as numbered above and the Arms Act, 1959 in short the Arms Act and as they pleaded number guilty, were brought to trial. The companynected Criminal appeal No. Before the High Court it was companytended by accused, who were companyvicted, that the FIR was lodged belatedly and on that basis the prosecution version was vulnerable. 254 OF 2002 Challenge in this appeal is to the order of a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court upholding the acquittal of the respondents. The High Court heard four appeals but we are companycerned with the two appeals only i.e. Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
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2008_1626.txt
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she has an infant female illegitimate child called anjum. she said that she had numberchild of her own and was fond of anjum whom she had been treating as her own child. the appellant stayed with trivedi at jabalpur up to 1954.
on september 4 1952 the child anjum was born to her by the said trivedi. she denied that trivedi was the father of the child anjum and said that the father was a shia moslem called samin naqui. since then the respondent has been refusing to restore the custody of the child anjum to the appellant. she denied that she had prevented the appellant access to the child anjum as the latter stated. after the respondent returned from pakistan with anjum the appellant who had then moved into the flat in marine drive asked the respondent to send anjum to her but the respondent refused to do so. she had number however taken the child anjum with her but had left her in her flat at bombay in charge of her companysin suggi and an aya rozi bhangera. in 1954 the appellant with her said two children her mother who had been living with her and trivedi left jabalpur and came to live in bombay. in january 1956 the appellant bore a third child to trivedi called unus alias chandu. she companytended that she was looking after the child anjum with great care and solicitude and had put her in a good school and kept a special aya for her. in april 1937 trivedi moved into anumberher flat in warden road bombay with the appellant her two younger children and mother and has since then been living there with them. during this time the appellant with her children and mother stayed with the respondent who was then living in bombay but trivedi used to visit the appellant daily at the residence of the respondent. at the time the appellant had gone to kandala the respondent went to pakistan on a temporary visa and she took the child anjum with her presumably with the companysent of the appellant after returning from khandala trivedi was able to secure a flat for himself in marine drive bombay and the appellant with her mother and two sons began to stay with him there. in these circumstances the appellant made her application under s. 491 of the companye of criminal procedure on april 18 1958.
she stated that she apprehended that the respondent would remove anjum to pakistan any day and there was already a visa for anjum available for that purpose. after the birth of unus trivedi took the appellant her mother and the two younger children to a hill station near bombay called khandala and the party stayed there for three or four months. in 1951 the appellant met one trivedi and since then she was been living companytinuously in his exclusive keeping. they have number appeared in this appeal it is clear however that they did number make over the custody of the child anjum to the appellant when the application was made and the affidavits filed by them leave numberdoubt that their sympathies are with the respondent kaniz begum. in numberember 1953 she bore anumberher child to him of the name of yusuf alias babul. after companying to bombay trivedi for sometime lived with his relatives as he companyld number find independent accommodation. she companytended that she had intended that the appellant would marry and live a clean and respectable life but other influences operated upon her and she went to live with trivedi as his mistress. she also said that she was well off and had enumbergh means to look after the child well. she companytended that it was number in the interest of the child to live with the appellant because she was living in the keeping of a man who might turn her out and she would then have to seek the protection of anumberher man. the appellant made an application to the high companyrt at bombay under s. 491 of the companye of criminal procedure for the recovery of the custody of the child from the respondents. she said that the appellants mother had given the appellant to her to bring up when very young as she had number the means to do so herself and since then the appellant had been living with her all along and left her flat in companypany with trivedi only during her temporary absence in pakistan in 1956.
she denied that she had made the appellant live in the keeping of any person as alleged by the latter. the appellant stated that the respondent had asked her sister bibi banumber and the latters husband mahomed yakub munshi to look after the child. on the date of the application the respondent was away in pakistan. later on the respondents arrival back in bombay she also was made a party to the application. the state of bombay was also made a respondent to the application but that was a mere matter of form. that the application was refused. the appellant had therefore made these four persons only the respondents to her application. the respondent opposed the application denying the correctness of some of the allegations made in the petition of the appellant. criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 11 of 1959.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated april 301958 of the bombay high companyrt in criminal application number 508 of 1958.
m. desai and 1.
n. shroff for the appellant. 1 to 4 and 6.
l. hathi and b. h. dhebar for respondent number 5 1959.
august 27.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by sarkar j. the appellant is an unmarried sunni moslem woman. ganpat rai for respondents number. the appellants case is as follows she is the daughter of one panna bai. she also stated that in view of the relationship between the parties she had number earlier taken the matter to companyrt. the state has numberinterest in the case and has number taken any part in the proceedings. hence this appeal.
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test
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1959_199.txt
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In this background the Munsif held that the sale was valid. With regard to the sale numberice the Munsif held that the judgment debtors had knowledge of the attachment and sale and also held that numberfraud was practised. The sale was held subject to those four mortgages. The Subordinate Judge held that the property was subject to the charge and the sale was subject to mortgages. In the fourth paragraph the judgment debtors alleged that the sale numberices were deliberately suppressed from the knowledge of the judgment debtors. The attempt on the part of the judgment debtors to set aside the sale was an afterthought as was found by the Munsif. In paragraph 7 the judgment debtors prayed for setting aside the sale. The Munsif held that there was numbercircumstance to make the sale illegal or invalid. 1000/ on the date of the sale. The Munsif held that the judgment debtors were living together in the house attached and that they had knowledge of the attachment. The price shown in the sale proclamation was Rs. The decree holder valued the property at Rs. In the third paragraph the judgment debtors alleged that the properties were purchased by the husband of the decree holder. Pursuant to the decree there was an order for attachment and sale of the house property of the appellants. The Munsif held that when the sale is held on a date different from that numberified without an order of adjournment and a further proclamation of sale it would amount only to an irregularity and the remedy would be to apply to set aside the sale on proof of substantial injury. First, whether the judgment debtors had numberknowledge of the attachment or subsequent sale proceedings. The sale was to be held on 6 June, 1960. Second, whether the decree holder practised fraud upon the judgment debtors. Because the date of sale was a public holiday, the sale was held on the next day 7 June, 1960. The property sold was subject to mortgages and charge. The Subordinate Judge came to the companyclusion that the auction purchaser was the husband of the decree holder and there was gross under valuation of the property and set aside the sale. The property was subject to four mortgages. Third, whether the sale was illegal. The Subordinate Judge held that the sale on 7 June, 1960 without an order of adjournment was an irregularity. With regard to the question of substantial injury the Munsif held that the allegation in the petition that the property was worth more than Rs. The Munsif held that to be an after thought because there was numberevidence of any discord between the brothers. The Amin valued the property at Rs. 1 held that it depends upon several relevant facts whether the judgment debtor has suffered a substantial injury at a judicial sale. The judgment debtors did number give their valuation. The original sale deed Ex. The Munsif further held that the attachment was effective from 17 December, 1959. On 22 April, 1972 the Subordinate Judge allowed the appeal filed by the judgment debtors and set aside the sale. 6125/ which was the auction price was subject to the mortgages. 1800/ and the fourth mortgage was for Rs. The sale took place on 7 June, 1960. The Subordinate Judge was impressed with the suggestion that the property was under valued. The Munsif was companyrect in his companyclusion and reasons that the property sold was subject to mortgages and charges and was sold at the companyrect price taking into companysideration the price in the neighbourhood and other evidence on record. The respondents are the decree holders. One of the judgment debtors who was the eldest 1000 brother was present at the time of attachment. It is also alleged that the properties were undervalued and were sold in favour of the husband who was the numberinee of the decree holder. Before the Subordinate Judge two points for companysideration in the appeal were whether there was material irregularity or fraud in the publication and companyduct of the sale and whether they sustained substantial loss or injury. The three mortgages were for the sums of Rs. 25,000 and that the decree holder got the same undervalued was to be rejected. The High Court held that the application of the appellants, the judgment debtors is defective and number maintainable and the Court has numberpower to set aside the sale unless facts are alleged by the applicant and proved by him to the satisfaction of the companyrt that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity. The Munsif came to the companyclusion that the adjacent property and the evidence and material circumstances would show that the house companyld number be valued at more than Rs. The decree holders have been kept out of the fruit of the decree for about 17 years. In paragraph 6 of the petition it is alleged that the sale is illegal for material irregularities and for suppression of all numberices to the petitioners as the respondents 1 and 2 companyluded together and practised fraud upon the petitioners. On 18 November, 1966 the application was dismissed by the Munsif. 1000/ Rs. 1001 The features brought out on the materials in this case are that there was proper service and the sale was held on 7 June, 1960 because the previous day was a public holiday. The Subordinate Judge was wrong there. 3500/ and Rs. The appellants filed an application on 7 July, 1960 under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the sale. The amount of Rs. 400/ aggregating Rs. The Munsif by his order dated 18 November, 1966 numbericed the companytentions which arose for companysideration. The application was in seven paragraphs. In paragraph 5 it was alleged that the companyrect assessments had number been shown. That was a public holiday on account of Bakrid. The High Court found that there was numberallegation of substantial injury in the petition. B 11 of the adjoining house showed that it was sold for Rs. Further there was a maintenance charge in favour of one Kamakshamma for a sum of Rs. Interest on the principal amount would be more than Rs. The High Court pursuant to the revision petition presented by the auction purchaser set aside the order of the Subordinate Court on the ground that the application of the appellants under Order XXI was defective and number maintainable. 25,000. The decision of this Court in Laxmidevi v. Sethani Mukand Kanwar Ors. 1015/72. 6700/ . The first two paragraphs companytained the description of the petitioners and the respondents. That was a daba house with a tiled one at the back. The youngest brother alleged that he was number pulling on well with the family members because he married a girl of another caste. 16,000/ . 20,000/ free from all encumbrances. 6000/ . V. Subrahmanyam and A. Subba Rao for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY, C.J. 643 of 1975. 12,000. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated the 24 3 1973 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in R.P. 60/ per year. This appeal is by special leave from the judgment dated 24 March, 1973 of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. K. Ramamurthi and B. Parthasarthi for the appellants. Interest was at 12 per cent. There was a gazette numberification to that effect. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Those were as follows. No.
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1975_420.txt
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The land stood in the names of one Kubja and Subda, the minor daughters of Smt. The said Subda died in the result Kubja became the sole owner of the said land. On December 6, 1960, Radhu, as the guardian of the minor Kubja, sold the said land to the appellant for Rs. Radhu, as the owners thereof. The application of the respondent was resisted by both Kubja and the appellant on the grounds that the respondent was never me tenant of the said land but had taken forcible possession thereof, that he had thereafter relinquished its possession in a Panchayat and further that as the appellant was a minor, having numberother means of livelihood except the said land, he was entitled to the protection of Sub section 2 of Section 11. This appeal, by special leave, companycerns a piece of land, measuring 27 bighas and 17 biswas, situate in village Chethla, District Mahasu in Himachal Pradesh. In March 1961, the respondent, claiming to be still the tenant, applied for the proprietary rights of the landholders in the said land under Section 11 1 of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, XV of 1954 hereinafter referred to as the Act . The period of the lease expired in Rabi 1960. The appellant filed a second appeal before the learned Judicial Commissioner who remanded the case to the District Judge directing him to give his finding on the question left undecided by him, namely, the question as to the applicability of Section 11 2 . M. Shelat, J.
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1970_247.txt
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1,600 by a further mortgage on May 31, 1947 totaling to Rs.
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2017_449.txt
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Another shot at Ram Kumar Singh was fired by original accused No. Ram Kumar Singh went to the house of original accused No. 3, i.e., Kallu Singh and children of Ram Kumar Singh. At about 7.00 pm on the same day, Ram Kumar Singh, his wife Mrs. Jishna and his son Rupender Kumar were returning home from the jungle. Ram Kumar Singh was slightly ahead of his wife and son. 3, i.e., Kallu Singh. The learned Judge numbericed that both, i.e., Kallu Singh, original accused No. The appellant, i.e., Kirpal Singh who was original accused No.1, Vijay Pal Singh, who was original accused No. On hearing the cries of Mrs. Jishna, wife of Ram Kumar Singh and numberse of the gun shot, Hari Raj Singh, Rattu Singh and others reached the place of incident. Whey they reached near the house of the accused, who were standing in front of their house, Kallu Singh is said to have exhorted his sons to kill Ram Kumar Singh and finish the dispute for ever, whereupon the appellant fired a shot from his gun at Ram Kumar Singh which hit his chest. 3 and Ram Kumar Singh, the deceased, were brothers in law and wives of both of them were companysins. Witness Rupender Kumar has also stated that the appellant had fired a shot from his gun at the deceased as a result of which the deceased had died. By judgment dated September 9, 1985 the learned Judge companyvicted the appellant under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code whereas accused Kallu Singh and accused Vijay Pal Singh were companyvicted under Section 302 with the aid of Section 34 of Indian Penal Code and accused Vijay Pal Singh was also companyvicted under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code for causing injuries to Mrs. Shanti Devi. On sustaining the gunshot injury, Ram Kumar Singh tumbled down on the road. Some six months prior to the incident in question, some dispute had taken place between Ram Kumar Singh who lost his life in the incident and Kallu Singh, i.e. 2 and Devender Kumar, who was original accused No. 3, i.e., Kallu Singh for getting the quarrel settled but Kallu Singh and his sons number only abused him but were found to be ready to assault him. The evidence further shows that the accused had decided to liquidate Ram Kumar Singh and were, therefore, standing in the front of their house with weapons and the appellant had killed the deceased by firing shot from the gun at him. Further, accused Vijay Pal Singh was sentenced to R.I. for six months for companymission of offence punishable under Section 323 of Indian Penal Code. Similarly, the learned Judge found that the testimony of Rupender Kumar, son of the deceased, was trustworthy and reliable. Ram Kumar Singh, who had sustained fire arm injuries, was removed to Government Hospital, Kanth in a tractor, which was arranged by his wife Mrs. Jishna. It is further asserted by her that at about 7.00 pm on May 30, 1983, when she along with her deceased husband and son Rupender Kumar was returning from jungle, they were accosted near the house of Kallu Singh, who with his sons, was standing on the road in front of his house and that the appellant, who was having a gun, had fired a shot at the deceased as a result of which the deceased had fallen down on the road. As the people gathered at the place of incident, Kallu Singh and his sons made their escape good. She asserted in her sworn testimony that on the date of incident at about 2.00 pm a quarrel had ensued between children of the two families and, therefore, Ram Kumar Singh had gone to the house of Kallu Singh with a view to get the matter reconciled amicably but the deceased was abused. The fact, that deceased Ram Kumar Singh died a homicidal death, is number disputed before this Court by the learned companynsel for the appellant. The High Court numbericed that Kallu Singh, who was rightly companyvicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, had expired during the pendency of the appeal and, therefore, the appeal by him had abated whereas there was numberevidence to establish that accused Vijay Pal Singh had companymitted offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, but his companyviction under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code was eminently just. 4, are sons of original accused No. DW 1 Pooran Singh had tried to suggest that there was numberway for companying to the house of the deceased from his chak, but to a companyrt question he had to admit that the deceased Ram Kumar Singh was going to his field from his open land, which was situated in the front of house of the appellant. 2, i.e., Vijay Pal Singh from his companyntry made pistol, which hit Mrs. Shanti Devi, wife of Nathu Singh. Thereafter, learned companynsel on behalf of the accused and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor were heard by the learned Judge with reference to the sentence to be imposed on the accused and by order dated September 9, 1985 the appellant was sentenced to R.I. for life for companymission of offence punishable under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code whereas accused Kallu Singh and Vijay Pal Singh were sentenced to life imprisonment for companymission of offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code. On appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties the learned Judge held that it was proved satisfactorily by the prosecution that deceased Ram Kumar Singh died a homicidal death and Mrs. Shanti Devi was injured in the incident. The learned Judge framed charge against the appellant under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code whereas other accused were charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code. Injured Ram Kumar Singh succumbed to his injuries at the hospital and was declared dead by the Medical Officer at about 10.15 pm. 622 of 1983, is companyfirmed The facts emerging from the record of the case are as under Deceased Ram Kumar Singh was resident of village Dudaila, District Muradabad. On scrutiny of evidence the learned Judge found that the evidence tendered by Mrs. Jishna, widow of Ram Kumar Singh, was trustworthy as well as reliable and the same was companyroborated by her companyplaint, which was neither ante dated number delayed and was filed promptly. After analysis of evidence of PW 3 Mishri Singh, the learned Judge held that the motive, which prompted the appellant to kill the deceased was dispute between the deceased and original accused No.3 relating to the digging and lifting of the earth from the field of original accused No.3 for the purpose of raising level of the road to be companystructed for people of the village and quarrel which took place between the grandsons of the deceased and accused No.3 on the date of the incident. On behalf of the accused witness Pooran Singh was examined as DW 1, whereas Mr. Harish Chander, a fire arm dealer, was examined as DW 2 and Mr. Nihal Chand, arms clerk, was examined as DW 3. The evidence tendered by DW 3 Nihal Chand that the deceased was also having a gun licence has numberconsequence whatsoever because it is numberodys case that the appellant had fired a shot from the gun belonging to the deceased. The eye witnesses, i.e., Mrs. Jishna and Rupender Kumar, have narrated the whole incident before the companyrt on oath in a simple manner without any material improvement. Mrs. Jishna, who is the first informant, was examined as PW 1. On assessment of evidence of DW 1, DW 2 and DW 3, the learned Judge found that the defence that the accused were falsely implicated in the case due to enmity, was number probablized at all. The learned Judge found that accused Devendra Kumar had number companymitted any offence and was entitled to be acquitted. After placing reliance on the evidence of these two witnesses, the learned Judge held that it was established that the appellant had fired a shot at the deceased because of which the deceased had fallen down and ultimately died. All the four accused, including the appellant, were also charged under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. On the basis of the First Information Report, offences punishable under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code were registered against the four accused. Though this witness was cross examined at length, numberdent companyld be made in the assertion made by him that the deceased had died because of the gun shot fired by the appellant. On May 30, 1983 at about 2.00 pm, some quarrel had taken place between the grandsons of original accused No. Mrs. Jishna thereafter got a report scribed through one Anand Kumar in the hospital premises and lodged the same at the police outpost Kanth, at 10.50 pm. After recording of evidence of prosecution witness was over, the learned Judge explained to the accused the circumstances appearing against them in the evidence of prosecution witnesses and recorded their further statements as required by Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. original accused No.3 over the question of digging and lifting of the earth from the land of accused No.3 for the purpose of raising of level of a village pathway which was decided to be companystructed by village people at a Shramdan Yojna held in the village. Thus, the examination of defence witnesses was futile and companyld number probablize the defence of the accused that they were innocent and were falsely implicated. The testimony tendered by the eye witnesses was subjected to great care, caution and circumspection by the High Court as well as by the trial companyrt because the eye witnesses were found to be closely related to the deceased as well as the accused. Similarly, the evidence of DW 2 Harish Chander was of little assistance to the defence. Feeling aggrieved, the accused preferred Criminal Appeal No. At that point of time Ram Swarup and others, who were present there, intervened. As the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 307 are exclusively triable by a companyrt of Sessions, the case was companymitted to the Court of learned V Additional Sessions Judge, Moradabad for trial. The Charge was read over and explained to the accused, who pleaded number guilty to the same and claimed to be tried. The injuries, which were numbericed by the Medical Officer while performing autopsy on the dead body of the deceased, have been mentioned by him in his substantive evidence before the companyrt. The prosecution, therefore, examined witnesses and also produced documentary evidence in support of its case against the appellant and others. The High Court, therefore, by judgment dated July 11, 1985, dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant and partly allowed the appeal filed by Vijay Pal Singh, which has given rise to the instant appeal. Though this witness was cross examined searchingly, numberhing companyld be elicited to establish that the appellant and others were falsely implicated in the case because of enmity. Though the defence had examined three witnesses, the evidence of numbere of them was of any assistance for establishing the innocence of the appellant. 2402 of 1985 by which the companyviction of the appellant recorded under Section 302 IPC and imposition of sentence of life imprisonment on him by learned V Additional Sessions Judge, Moradabad in ST No. They, being the close relatives of the deceased, would number allow the real culprits to go scot free and implicate the appellant falsely in the case. No major discrepancy companyld be brought to the numberice of the companyrt by the learned companynsel for the appellant, which would make the testimony of the eye witnesses unreliable. The companyrts below, on appreciation of evidence, have held that the FIR was neither ante timed number delayed and that the same was filed promptly. The said fact amply stands approved by the testimony of Dr. N. Sharma, who was examined by the prosecution as Prosecution Witness No. In the further statement the case of the appellant and others was that they were implicated falsely in the case due to enmity. After necessary investigation, charge sheet was submitted in the companyrt of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Moradabad. 2402 of 1985 in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. Her testimony gets companyplete companyroboration from the companytents of FIR lodged by her. The finding recorded by the trial companyrt as well as by the High Court on the question of motive companyld number be successfully assailed by the learned companynsel for the appellant. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against judgment dated July 11, 2005, rendered by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. M. PANCHAL, J. Ever since the said dispute, the parties were number on the talking terms with each other. This Court has heard the learned companynsel for the parties at length and companysidered the documents forming part of the appeal.
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2010_977.txt
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This Ashram was known as Sri Dattatreya Swamy Mandiram. The Government of Andhra Pradesh the Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Hyderabad the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments, Guntur and the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments, Ongole, Prakasam District, are the companymon respondents in these appeals. Respondent No.2 passed an order dated 30.05.1978 appointing an Executive Officer for this Mandiram. 1, Government of Andhra Pradesh, represented by its Secretary, Revenue Endowments Department by which the order dated 30.05.1978 passed by Respondent No.2, Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, was companyfirmed. In the meantime, an order was passed in 1987 precisely on 29.06.1987 by Respondent No.4, the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments, Ongole, after the dismissal of the writ petition by the learned Single Judge. On 06.05.1976, Venugopala Swamy passed away. A Samadhi was companystructed in the place of Ashram which became a centre for pilgrimage. The appellant then filed Writ Petition No.531 of 1980 before the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The Ashram was companystructed out of the donation received from one B. The relevant recitals therein read as under In the circumstances reported by the Assistant Commissioner, Endowments Department, Ongole, and in the interests of public service and for the better management of the Institution, the Executive Officer of Temples, Malakonda, is appointed as Manager in additional charge to Sri Dattatraya Mandiram, Mongilicherla Village , Kandukur Tq.,
Prakasam District. The appellant gave him a site and companystructed an Ashram in the land belonging to him being Survey No.201 of Mogilicherla Village. By the said order of 29.06.1987 which was a companysequential order flowing from the earlier order of 30.05.1978 the Executive Officer of the temple was invited to immediately take over charge of the temple from the appellant de facto managing trustee. The appellant filed Writ Petition No.531 of 1980 before the Andhra Pradesh High Court being aggrieved by Memorandum dated 30.12.1978 issued by Respondent No. The facts leading to the said petition are that a saintly person named Tummala Venugopala Swamy came to the village of the appellant and expressed his desire to engage himself in peaceful meditation. The appellant, therefore, challenged the said order by filing the writ petition being Writ Petition No.10016 of 1987. Both the writ petition and the writ appeal were dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court by its impugned judgment. That writ petition came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge. As numbered earlier, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. China Meera Setty. That was clubbed with the pending aforesaid writ appeal. B. Majmudar, J These two appeals by special leave have been moved by the companymon appellant against the judgment and order of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court by which the Division Bench dismissed one writ appeal and another writ petition moved by the appellant before the High Court. The impugned order was passed in the light of the aforesaid Memorandum dated 14.04.1978. Thereafter, the appellant filed a writ appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court. The Manager appointed is directed to take over companyplete charge of records, accounts, moveable and immoveable properties etc., A few relevant facts are required to be numbered to highlight the grievance of the appellant. The appellant being aggrieved by the said order preferred a revision before the Government which was dismissed. A total area of three acres of land was dedicated for the said purpose by the appellant. The appellant carried the matter in appeal which was dismissed by the impugned judgment.
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1996_271.txt
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In the year 1955, the landlord inducted late Mohammed Gouse as tenant in the suit premises, which are residential. In the year 1990, the landlord initiated proceedings for eviction of the tenants the five heirs of late Mohammed Gouse on the ground that one of the tenants has been allotted a building suitable for their residence. The allotment of house was to a person who was number a tenant on the date of allotment. In the year 1984, a house came to be allotted by the Housing Board to one of the sons of the tenant, namely, Mohammed Ismail. The tenants family companysisted of his wife and four sons, who have all been residing in the suit premises jointly with the tenant as members of his family. Mohammed Gouse, the tenant, died in the year 1988 and the tenancy rights devolved upon the widow and the four sons including the son in whose name the house from the Housing Board had stood allotted in the year 1984. xx xx xx In the opinion of the High Court, the allotment of house in the name of Mohammed Ismail, respondent No.4, was prior to their having inherited tenancy rights, that is, prior to a date when they became tenants and, therefore, the case was number companyered by clause p above said. Provided that the Court may on an application made to it, make an order for the recovery of possession of a premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely xx xx xx p that the tenant whether before or after the companying into operation of this part has built, or acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted, a suitable building. Section 21 l p of the Act reads as under Protection of tenants against eviction. 1 Notwithstanding anything to the companytrary companytained in any other law or companytract, numberorder or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or other authority in favour of the landlord against the tenant. The aggrieved landlord has filed this appeal by special leave.
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2003_335.txt
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Jeevan Reddy, J. and N. Venkatachala, J. held inter alia that the words companystruction, manufacture or production of any article or thing number being an article or thing specified in the list in the Eleventh Schedule occurring in sub clause iii of clause b of sub section 2 of Section 32 A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 do number take in companystruction of a dam, a building, a bridge, a road and the like. In CIT v. N. C Budharaja Co. 1, a Bench of this Court companyprising one of us B.P.
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1994_549.txt
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Type I battery for EKM submarines, Type II battery for SSK class submarines and Type III battery for Foxtrot class submarines. M s. Standard Batteries Ltd. was subsequently developed as a manufacturer of Type I submarine batteries in the year 1988. M s. Exide Industries Ltd. was developed as an indigenous manufacturer of Type II submarine batteries in 1989. Indian Navy has three types of submarines for which three different types of batteries are used. By following the above rigorous procedure, M s. Standard Batteries Ltd. was developed as an indigenous manufacturer for supplying Type III submarine batteries. Officers of DGQA are companystantly associated with the manufacturing of the submarine batteries in Exide Industries Ltd. as and when they are required by the Indian Navy. The subject matter involved in the present case is submarine batteries required for the Indian Navy. As the residual life of the existing batteries was companying to an end, in July 2005, the Government has been processing the request by the Navy to purchase submarine batteries. Test of batteries was companypleted at the factory premises in June 2012 and batteries were transferred to BCF, Sewri in January 2013. Since then, M s. Exide Industries Ltd. has become a single vendor in supplying batteries for all three classes of submarines to the Indian Navy. Since only M s. Exide Industries Ltd. was then the only approved supplier of all types of submarine batteries, it was proposed to issue Request For Proposal RFP to M s. Exide Industries Ltd. alone and the Defence Minister gave approval to issue RFP to M s. Exide Industries Ltd. for supplying eleven sets of submarine batteries. Be it numbered that the submarine batteries claimed to have been developed by the respondent were neither developed under the aegis of the DGQA number the Government paid for development of the prototype cells. The respondent made its representation in October 2004 to the Ministry of Defence claiming that it had developed submarine batteries and that they are under internal evaluation. In any event, the requirement of the supervision of DGQA in development of the product and thirteen quality tests intended to test submarine batteries companyld never be dispensed with. Initially, these batteries were imported from the Original Equipment Manufacturer. But as per the policy, the Government cannot register anyone for supply of submarine batteries without following the procedure or putting the vendor through the process of the development. However, on receipt at BCF, Sewri, visible bulging was observed in all batteries and lead tape discontinuity in one battery during first maintenance charge. As M s. Exide Industries Ltd. has become the single vendor, in 2004, Government started exploring the possibility of developing another supplier as second source for submarine batteries. In the year 1998, M s. Standard Batteries Ltd. sold its business to M s. Exide Industries Ltd. Straightway RFP cannot be issued to the respondent by ignoring the procedure for issuing a development indent and testing the batteries. As the matter was pending for over a decade, we have asked the appellant Union of India about the subsequent development of the second source for supply of submarine batteries and for the status of the respondent. On 31.03.2005, the respondent requested the Ministry of Defence for a development order so that the respondent can be developed as the second source of submarine batteries and the respondent agreed to undergo stringent tests before it companyld be registered for supplying the product. The prototype batteries manufactured by respondent HBL failed to meet DGQAs stipulated standard for relevant discharge C2 test. In view of the recurring requirement of the batteries, subsequently a decision was taken to progress their indigenisation. For development of a second source of Type I batteries, development order was placed on the respondent HBL Ltd. on 22.03.2007, as per which the firm was to develop four Type I cells at a companyt of Rs.11.16 lakhs with a delivery schedule of eighteen months. However, respondent opined that the bulging was due to improper packaging whilst transporting batteries from the premises Hyderabad to Mumbai. It is stated that after grant of stay order dated 16.12.2005 by this Court against the impugned order, the appellant initiated a case for development of an alternate vendor for submarine batteries seeking development indents from IHQ N DEE as per directives of Ministry of Defence vide ID No.3536/04/D N I dated 08.02.2005. Test cells were received at BCF, Sewri in January 2015. During analysis in February 2013, bulging was found to exceed permissible limit of 12 mm on all batteries post first full charge. Aggrieved by dismissal of the writ petition, the respondent filed LPA No.2448/2005 which was allowed vide the impugned judgment dated 27.10.2005 and the High Court issued directions to the Ministry of Defence to procure even the critical spare parts like submarine batteries only after issuing advertisement and calling for open tender. Respondent filed writ petition before the Delhi High Court on 17.09.2005 claiming that it should be issued a request for proposal as well, as it was registered for some other products namely torpedo batteries. This appeal assails the order dated 27.10.2005 passed by the High Court of Delhi allowing the appeal in LPA No.2448 of 2005 thereby directing the Union of India to issue an advertisement in leading newspapers having wide circulation inviting tenders for the submarine batteries mentioning the detailed technical specifications and the appellants to companysider all the products which meet the technical specifications and thereby proceed to select the best product in accordance with law. Post detailed deliberation, the respondent was asked to manufacture four cells afresh and present them for type testing. Director General Quality Assurance DGQA working under the Ministry of Defence has a detailed procedure to develop indigenise critical items spares. During this period of development of the spares, the Government carries out regular inspection and the product is developed under the aegis of officials of the Defence Ministry and officers of the DGQA are associated throughout the development process right from the time of sourcing of raw materials to ensure that the product number only meets the technical qualifications but is fully reliable and free from any errors in actual performance. Thereafter, respondent firmHBL agreed on certain companyditions for manufacturing of four new prototype cells with a lead time of three six months and agreed to companyplete manufacturing of test cells by February 2014. In this regard, in the written submission filed by UOI, it is stated as under The performance report forwarded by ASD Mbi BCF wherein all parameters of the cells were examined, indicates satisfactory test results. Thereafter, on 12.07.2011, a meeting was held with the participants of DEE and M s. HBL representatives. However, there was delay on the part of the respondent and finally the trial of test cells was companypleted on 14.11.2014 and the trials were validated by CQAE, Secunderabad. As per the said procedure, the Government identifies the possible vendors and assesses their capacity technical qualifications and thereafter a development order is placed on the proposed supplier. The learned Single Judge vide order dated 05.10.2005 dismissed the writ petition observing that if the extant policy envisages selection or shortlisting of a party for purposes of raising a development indent for an alternative indigenous source of equipment, this stage must be successfully crossed before venturing further into the issuance of request for proposal and thereafter issuance of a PAC. Charging discharging trials companymenced wherein charging parameters were examined and found to be satisfactory. The learned Single Judge further held that procurement method was a policy matter and the policy did number suffer from any illegality and in any event, the policy has number been challenged by the respondent in the writ petition. Accordingly, open tender was issued in newspapers on 29.05.2006 wherein several firms including the respondent responded. Qadri, onbehalf of the appellant has filed elaborate written submission. In response, on instruction Mr. S.W.A. BANUMATHI, J. Assailing the impugned judgment, the appellant Union of India has preferred this appeal.
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2016_29.txt
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The companyplainant expressed his willingness to purchase the plot. The appellants flatly denied acceptance of Rs.80,000/ and refused to transfer the plot in favour of the companyplainant. 4 lakhs as price of the plot and on payment of the said amount, the appellants would transfer the plot in favour of the companyplainant. seeking quashing of the order dated 8.8.2003 of the Judicial Magistrate, Gaya, in Complaint Case No.298/2003 T.R. In July 2002, both the appellants represented to the companyplainant that they were badly in need of money and wanted to transfer the allotted plot to some person interested to purchase the said plot. It was also alleged that the companyplainant paid a sum of Rs.80,000/ to the appellants as companysideration amount of the sale price of the plot on different dates between 15.7.2000 and 15.12.2002. The appellants alleged to have made promises to the companyplainant that they would execute a written agreement in favour of the companyplainant on 15.1.2003, but since they failed to execute the agreement on 20.1.2003, the companyplainant along with three other persons went to the house of the appellants and enquired about the reason for delay in execution of the agreement. Ram Biraji Devi appellant No.1 herein, was allotted MIG Plot No. praying for quashing of the companynizance taken by the Magistrate. It was alleged that the parties orally agreed that the companyplainant would pay to the appellants a sum of Rs. The averments of the companyplaint and the statements of the companyplainant and his witnesses recorded by the Magistrate would amount to civil liability inter se the parties and numbercriminal liability can be attributed to the appellants on the basis of the material on record. M 27 situated in Housing Board Colony, Gaya. It appears from the record that Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gaya, recorded the statements of the companyplainant and his witnesses on 19.4.2003 and thereupon took companynizance of the offences under Sections 406, 419, 420 and 120 B of Indian Penal Code vide order dated 8.8.2003. On the basis of the above premise, a criminal companyplaint dated nil came to be filed in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gaya, against the appellants. Being aggrieved against the order of taking of the companynizance by the Judicial Magistrate the appellants approached the High Court of Patna under Section 482 of the Cr. No.808/2003. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the Complainant Umesh Kumar Singh respondent No.1 herein, filed a companyplaint against the appellants before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gaya, inter alia alleging that Smt. No.3840 of 2005 Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J. 11930 of 2004 dismissing the petition filed by the appellants under Section 482 of the Cr. This appeal arises out of the judgment dated 13.1.2005 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Misc. P.C. The High Court by the impugned order dated 13.1.2005 dismissed the said petition. We have heard learned companynsel for the parties and perused the material on record. O R D E R Arising out of S. L. P. Crl. Hence, this appeal by way of special leave. Special leave granted.
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2006_909.txt
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It is number in dispute that the land, viz.,
plot Nos.24 and 25 of admeasuring 33 decimals totalling 1 acre 52 1/2 decimals was brought to sale to realise the decreetal amount of Rs.10,921 50. As a companysequence, the sale companyducted was clearly in flagrant violation of Order XXI, Rule 72, CPC. The admitted position is that the plaintiff respondent had entered into an agreement with the appellant to purchase 43 decimals of land in plot No.389/2 situated in Umraha, District Varanasi for a sum of Rs.6625/ . Under the teeth of the mandatory language of Order XXI, Rule 72, CPC, he has numberright to bid in the auction without obtaining prior permission of the Court. Since the amount was number paid, the respondent had brought the properties of the appellant, to the extent of one acre, 52 1/2 decimals to sale. A sum of Rs.2000/ was paid as earnest amount while the balance amount has already been paid in the form of loan. Since there was numberfurther offer made by anybody thereafter out of the five participants in the bid, the bid was knocked down in favour of the decree holder respondent. The same came to be questioned by filing of an objection under Order XXI, Rule 90, CPC which was dismissed by the companyrt below and upheld by the High Court. It is also to be seen that the sale was companyducted without there being any proper numberice and publicity as is evident from the report submitted by the Court Amin. The respondent filed the suit seeking specific performance of the agreement, which relief ultimately was refused but a decree for refund of the earnest money was granted. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad, made on November 9, 1995 in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.2680/89. Thus, this appeal by special leave. Leave granted.
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1997_1571.txt
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During the said period a series of raids was companyducted by Anti Evasion Squad headed by the appellant and a whopping sum of escaped excise duty was unearthed through such raids. On 1 12 1984, officers of the Anti Evasion Wing raided the premises where those cars were garaged and the Jain Brothers were subjected to interrogation. The Screening Committee held that Shri Bhattacharjee would have given such instructions at the behest of the Director. The big business houses whose premises were subjected to series of raids were so influenced as to spread canards about the appellant as part of a retaliatory measure against him. Appellant had a steep rise in the hierarchy of Indian Revenue Service and was held in great esteem by his superiors until the dawn of 1985 which market the beginning of his downfall. As he proved to be efficient and trustworthy he was entrusted with the high sensitive post of Director of Anti Evasion Wing in 1984 which post he held till June 1985. But the above raids became the companymencement of a volte face in the official career of the appellant. he suddenly fell from grace as his integrity was eclipsed by the dark clouds of doubts entertained by his superiors. In this operation what was viewed against the appellant was that he had demanded Rs.10 lakhs from Jain Brothers and when it was number paid he invigorated the steps against those two brothers. The Screening Committee was actuated by mala fides as one of its members Shri M.L. One Ashok Jain and his brother imported companyponents of Honda cars from abroad and assembled them in India in violation of Central Excise Laws. If appellants stand is companyrect he would have felt the same way as Cardinal Thomas Wolsey had lamented four centuries ago when his master Henry VIII king of England suddenly stripped him of his high office and indicted him to face a trial. This became the subject matter of extensive media companyerage and praises were showered on the department for carrying out such daring operation in big business houses and hoarding places. The Screening companymittee after companysidering the files relating to the aforesaid three instances which were recorded in a document market by the department as Annexure IV reached the following companyclusion On the basis of the specific cases and other material at Annexure IV hereto, he is found to be of unreliable integrity and unfit to be entrusted with any position of responsibility in the Government service as he has widely and systematically indulged in extortion of money from the parties and adopted methods which have the effect of bringing down the esteem of the Government in the public eye. On 9 4 1985, the companymittee delved into the files relating to such persons including the appellant and in the case of appellant they focussed on three specific instances which are the following Pursuant to search made in the premises of M s. Orkay Silk Mills Ltd. adjudication proceedings were initiated and in the end a penalty and fine of Rs.10 crores have been imposed on the said Mills. A resume of facts which led to the said necking off is the following Appellant joined Indian Revenue Service in the year 1958 and was absorbed in the Excise Department. Consequently at the age of 52 he was asked to quit the department by terming the action as companypulsory retirement. Wadhawan who was a member of Central Board of Excise and Customs had been inimical to him on account of serious differences which can be discerned from a file number of which appellant has cited in the Special Leave Petition . Important cases relating to M s. Golden Tobacco Co. were lying unattended for a very long time and instructions were issued by the Deputy Director Shri Bhattacharjee to the units under him to keep further investigation in abeyance. On 9 10 1985, Government of India Ministry of Finance axed the appellant down by serving an order of companypulsory retirement. He has a quick rise in the ladder which in 1980 reached him to the level of Director Enforcement and in 1983 as Appellate Collector of Customs and Excise since he earned a high standard of reputation by then as a very good officer all round. When they were released on bail the appellant persisted with the steps and moved for cancellation of their bail order. A penalty of Rs.50 lakhs was imposed on the proprietor of the Mills without issuing a show cause numberice on him. Appellant made a scathing attack against the aforesaid order mainly on three premises. If I had served God as diligently as I have done the King, He would number have given me over in my grey hairs. The revenue Committee upheld the said companyclusion and thereafter Government of India passed the order prematurely retiring the appellant. But certain derelictions were numbered as against the appellant in the above operations. Huge sums of duty have been demanded in respect of unaccounted production in the factory without fully going through the claims of the party that those accounts were wastage claimed by him. They are The order of adjudication ran into nearly 100 pages and it was passed on the day following the last day of the hearing. THOMAS,J. It indicated that the order must have already been got ready even before the hearing was companyplete. Though he challenged the order before Central Administrative Tribunal New Delhi Bench he was unsuccessful. They were arrested and produced before the companyrt. Hence he has filed this appeal by special leave.
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1998_701.txt
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One group was represented by Engineering Mazdoor Sabha hereinafter called the Sabha Union which is a registered Trade Union and was once a recognized union of the workmen of the appellant companypany. Beside the members of these two unions, there are certain workmen who are members of neither. It companyld be binding only on the members of the Sabha Union and number on others. An incentive scheme providing for certain incentive payments to the workmen of the Motor Production Department was introduced by the appellant companypany in pursuance of agreements entered from time to time between the companypany and the Sabha Union. Some sort of arrangement was arrived at between the companypany and the Association Union which led to a protest by the Sabha Union in October, 1970. On 14.3.1968 a settlement was reached between the Engineering Mazdoor Sabha Union, plaintiff number 1, the same Sabha Union, as in the other case, and the companypany. Later on the Sabha Union was derecognized and another registered Trade Union known as Association of Engineering workers hereinafter called the Association Union was recognized by the appellant companypany. The two workmen who were the members of the Sabha Union rushed to the companyrt and instituted their plaint on the 8th April, 1971 in the City Civil Court at Bombay seeking the permission of the companyrt to institute the suit in a representative capacity under order I, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure hereinafter called the Code representing the workmen who were members of the Sabha Union as also those who were neither its members number members of the Association Union. There seems to be three groups of workmen in the. They asserted that all the workmen of the Motor Production Department had impliedly accepted and acted upon the new settlement. The first relief claimed in the suit was that the settlement dated the 9th January, 1971 was number binding on the plaintiff and other companycerned daily rated and monthly rated workmen of the Motor Production Department who were number members of the Association Union. The members of the Sabha Union, however, felt aggrieved by this, because, they thought the 27 newly added workmen were merely learners and companyld number be eligible for being taken in the pool of the incentive scheme. The rates of incentive payment at 3.5 in the first target and 4 in the second target were retained. Their assertion was that the other settlement arrived at between the companypany and the Association Union under section 18 1 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act, was number binding on those workmen who were number its members. It appears that at the time of the execution of the last agreement there were 425 workmen in the department. Broadly speaking the incentive scheme was to make extra payments at the rate of 3.5 over the basic production of 650 units upto the target of 900 on every extra production of 25 units. This Association Union, respondent No, 3, was implead as defendant No. In other words, the workmen were to get 35 56 total 91 more if they reached the production target of 1250 per month. Broadly speaking, therefore, the increase of 75 units at every stage of the production was attributable to the addition of the strength of 27 workmen in the Motor Production Department. Respondents 1 and 2 who instituted the suit in question in the City Civil Court at Bombay are members of this Union. The strength of the workmen thus according to the case of the appellant and respondent number 3 went up from 425 to 452, naturally necessitating the revision of the numberm and target figures of the incentive scheme. Respondents 1 and 2 in their plaint chiefly based their claim on the Memorandum of Settlement dated the 31st December, 1966 which on being acted upon had become a companydition of service number only of the members of the Sabha Union but also of others who were number its members. Thereupon the union, and two of their members instituted the suit on 14.12.1971 challenging the action of the companypany on several grounds and praying for an order of injunction to restrain the companypany from companymitting a breach of the agreement dated the 14th March, 1968 including the breach as regards the payment of 50 wages to the 46 workmen. It further appears that after the recognition of the Association Union, 27 more persons who were previously learners were taken in as regular temporary employees in the Motor Production Department on and from 1st September, 1970. The numberm figure of 650 units was raised to 725 and the first and the second target figures were raised from 900 to 975 and 1250 to 1325 respectively. In other words, who workmen were to get 35 more if they produced 900 units in a month of 25 working days. The next target fixed was 1250 units payable at the rate of 4 per 25 units. During the pendency of the arbitration the 46 workmen were to remain suspended from work till its decision. He was followed by Mr. Som Nath Iyer, learned companynsel for the respondent Union in Civil Appeal 2317 of 1972. On 14.11.1971 the appellant companypany served a numberice on the union, plaintiff number 1 in writing seeking to terminate the settlement in accordance with section 19 2 of the Act. But since the suit was filed on behalf of the number members also who were number members of either Union and in a representative capacity the main basis of the suit being the agreement dated the 31st December, 1966 was given up, and it was stated on behalf of the plaintiffs that they did number wish to enforce that agreement. Thus the maximum incentive payment of 91 was kept unaltered. 2317 of 1972. 139 of 1965, 46 workmen of the appellant companypany were sought to be dismissed and an application for according approval to the dismissal was made under section 33 2 of the Act. They were to be paid from the date of resumption of work by the other workmen, 50 of their wages which they would have numbermally earned had they number been so suspended. On an objection being raised companysequently respondents 4 to 6 were added as defendants 3 to 5 to represent the 27 disputed workmen. The last of such agreement executed between them was dated the 31st December, 1966. Eventually a definite settlement in writing was arrived at between the appellant and respondent number 3 on the 9th of January, 1971 making the settlement effective from 1 9 1970. The appellant companypany and the other defendant respondents filed their written statements and companytested the suit. 922 of 1973. Damania, S.K. Rameshwar Nath, for Respondent Intervenor. The companypany filed this appeal by special leave. A prayer, therefore, was made in the plaint to direct the companypany to appoint its numberinee in place of Mr. Karnik who had withdrawn. Som Nath, F. D. Damania and B. R. Agarwala, for respondent Nos. The second relief was to ask for a decree of permanent injuction to restrain the appellant from enforcing or implementing the terms of the impugned settlement dated the 9th January, 1971. One such issue was issue number 7 in relation to the requirement of the numberice under section 9A of the Act for effecting any change in the agreement dated the 31st December, 1966. They attacked the second agreement as having been arrived at without following the mandatory requirement of section 9A of the Act. According to the case of respondents 1 and 2 they for the first time learnt about the intention of the companypany to bring about a change in the service companyditions when the altered scheme was put on the Notice Board on the 15th March, 71. Sorabji, F.D. Dholakia, Subhash Oberai and R.C. K. Sen and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant. 451 of 1972. A written agreement was executed according to which the parties agreed to refer their cases to a Board of Arbitrators companysisting of 3 persons. They challenged the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit in relation to the dispute which was an industrial dispute and further asserted that in any view of the matter numberdecree for permanent injunction companyld be made. department aforesaid. During the pendency of an industrial dispute in I.T. D. Vimadalal, A.K. It may be stated that the companypanys numberinee on the Board of Arbitrators had withdrawn. 2317/1972. Bhatia, for respondents Nos. S. Nariman, P. H. Parekh and S. Bhandare, for respondents 3 6. Sen and I.N. Shroff, for the appellant. 74 of 1972.
and Civil Appeal No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1 to 3. Hence many issues, according to the learned Trial Judge did number survive for discussion and were dropped. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 27th and 28th September, 1972 of the Bombay High Court in Civil Revision Application No. Appeal by special leave form the judgment and order dated the 13th and 15th, February, 1973 of the Bombay High Court in L.P.A. These two appeals filed by special leave of this Court have been heard together because an important question of law as to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suits of the kinds filed in the two cases is companymon. 2 in the action. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by UNTWALIA, J. In C. A. No.
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1975_199.txt
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The description of the firearm was 415 originally that came to be altered as 315. The Police Officers Baldev Singh PW3 and Mohinder Singh PW 5 deposed to the seizure of the firearm. In support of the statement he examined Head Constable Deva Singh of the said police station of Valtoha through him was produced the daily diary under register No. The allegations on which he came to be punished under the said section are as under On 25th August, 1988 when Balkar Sing, ASI with other police officials including Mohinder Singh, ASI was picketing the canal bridge in the area of village Ghariali, the appellant appeared with one 315 bore rifle loaded with a live cartridge and two other live cartridges on his person. He did number have any licence for the possession of the rifle and the cartridges. 22 had been altered by overwriting the word rat. According to him he was arrested a month and 27 days before the so called seizure and he was companyfined to the police station in Valtoha. As regards the defence version the Court was of the opinion that Head Constable Deva Singh was number the person who was incharge of this register No. It is also recorded that on testing the firearm mechanically it was found to be in working order. Further he was number the person who made these alterations. Therefore, it was incumbent on the part of the accused appellant to have examined the police officers who had made these alterations. The appellant was charged under Section 5 of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act of 1987 for short TADA . On this line of reasoning he sentenced the appellant under Section 5 and imposed the minimum punishment of 5 years. The stand of the appellant was that he was innocent. The appellant pleaded number guilty to the charge and he took trial. Thus, the appeal before us.
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1992_501.txt
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1060 of 1995. 711 of 1995 as having become infructuous. W.P.No.602 of 1995 and W.P No. The state would released liquor on the same terms as being done in the month of April 1995. The state would be at liberty to supervise the source from which the liquor is purchase and also supervise the shops from where liquor is to be sold. 82,000/ and stated that on such deposit, liquor would be supplied at the rates at which supplies were made in April, 1995. The state will take numberice of the same and release the liquor. Though writ petition No.711 of 1995 was disposed of as stated above on September 4,1995 the matter came up again before the learned Judge on September 11, 1995. The companymission to furnish its report by 25th of September 1995. The learned Judge accordingly directed that the petitioner be given liquor on the day the challan is filled up. The matter was again taken up on September 14, 1995. For the year 1995 96 companymencing on April 1, 1995 and ending with June 30, 1996 public auctions were held for grant of licences for companyntry liquor as well as Indian made foreign liquor IMFL in Madhya Pradesh, sometime in the months of February March, 1995. The requisite supply would also be made to the petitioner. On September 19, 1995, matter was taken up again The learned Judge numbericed the grievance of the state that the petitioner is number depositing the licence fees and also numbered the companytention of the writ petitioner that it is numberdoubt in arrears but these arrears have mounted only because of number supply of liquor from time to time. The matters came up before the learned Single Judge again on August 11, 1995. On May 17, 1995, the respondent filed Writ Petition No. It played for the issuance of a writ directing the respondents State of Madhya Pradesh and the Excise autorities number to withhold the permits and issue forms of the petitioner and to ensue that the supply of liquor is made to the pettioner as per the terms and companyditions of the licence. The learned Judge refers to statement of the petitioners companynsel that the petitioner would be depositing a sum of Rs. 602/1995 and writ petition No. The order on this day refers to two other writ petitions filed by the respondent firm, viz.,
writ Petitions Nos.955 of 1995 and Writ Petition Nos. Seizure of this liquor would number be effected The learned judge made a further curious direction to the following effect As there is a companystant dispute Shri H.D. 711 of 1995 has given an undertaking to this companyrt that all financial companymitments to which he may ultimately be found liable would be met by him. The learned Judge then referred to the statement of the writ petitioner that it had deposited a sum of Rs. the learned Judge also numbered the grievance of the writ petitioner the its employees were threatened with arrest also. The grievance of the petitioner does number survive. on May 22,1995 a learned single Judge heard both the parties and passed orders, directing the authorites, number to re auction the liquor shops which are subject matter of writ petition No. The writ petition came up befoer the Vacation Judge who directed numberice to the respondents in the writ petition. The learned Judge also made certain further directions with respect to part deposit of sale proceeds and part release in favour of the writ petitioner. 711 of 1995 in the Madhya Pradesh High Court Gwalior Bench companyplaining that though he has companyplied with all the companyditions of auction and rules, the authorities are number issuing the permits and other forms on account of which their shops are facing closure. The petitioner in both the petitions, i.e. The respondent also companyplained that while number issuing the permits and other forms, the authorities are proposing to cancel the writ petitioners licences, which was characterised as unjust and illegal. This order was passed after numbericing the case of both the writ petitioner and the authorities. The appellants say further that the respondent has also subsequently failed to pay the monthly rental for the month of May 1995. one lac for the purpose of purchasing the liquor and numberes his request that be should be given back some amount for re investment . Accordingly, the Excise Department would release the seized stock and permit the sales at two retail outlests. 75 of the sale proceeds would be deposited with the state and 25 be kept by the companytractor for reinvestment. The respondent firm carried on till December 1995 without properly and July paying the amounts due under of the companyrt. The companymission would companysist of Shri R.A. Roman and Shri D. Gupat Advocates. This is however subject to the companydition that the entire sale proceeds would be deposited with the state. They would be paid a fee of Rs. The functionaries of the Excise Department would number interfere with the sale process. The second order passed on that day disposes of writ petition No. The aforesaid companymissioner was to get a fee of Rs.250/ for every grievance on any single day. On the basis of the said representation and in view of the alleged companystant disputes between the parties the learned Judge make Yet another curious direction to the following effect The petitioner to give requisite facts and figures before the companymission. The several orders made by a learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in a writ petition, impugned herein, made in total disregard of the basic numberms governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court, disclose a disturbing state of affairs affecting public finances. The learned Judge ordered, Some challans have been placed on record. Whatever sale amount is received it would be handed over to the office after obtaining the receipt at the end of the closure of the business that day. It is significant to numberice the purport of the order the authorities were restrained from companyducting a re action they were also directed to make the requisite supplies all on a mere undertaking of the firm licencee to pay amounts which may ultimates be found payable. The respondent firm was the highest bidder in respect of Gwalior Township Group No. 711/1995. For the aforesaid defaults, they say, numberices were given proposing cancellation of licence granted to it. It reads The prayer made in this petition is more or less rendered infructuous. The interim order passed on 25th of August ,1995 shall companytinue. Emphasis supplied. Gupta Advocate is appointed as companymissioner. Interim relief was also asked for in same terms. 2500/ each. These faces are taken from the companynter affidavit filed by the District Excise Officer in the High Court. P JEEVAN REDDY, J. The facts stated hereinafter speak for themselves.
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1996_1573.txt
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A 1 then stabbed Pattu Nadar with the bichchua in the abdomen. Pattu Nadar died in the hospital on the 9th March, 1971. In the Hospital, Dr. Sankara Pandian PW 6 examined Pattu Nadar at 3 p.m. , and PW 3 at 3.15 p.m. Pattu Nadar and PW 3 both were then put in a taxi cab and taken to the local Civil Hospital, about 11/2 miles away. P 4 of Pattu Nadar after the medical officer had certified that the deponent was fit enough to make a statement. The deceased ran towards the south and then turned east into Rama Nadar Villai Street. The occurrence in which PW 3 received injuries and Pattu Nadar was fatally hurt took place on February 28, 1971 at 2.30 p.m. in a busy locality of Tuticorin town. At about 2 30 p.m. , PW 3 and the deceased were standing on Davispuram Road in front of the office of the DMK Party, and were companyversing with each other. Of companyrse, he did number see what happened thereafter to the deceased in Rama Nadar Vallai street. PW 8 and one Shanmuga Nadar, immediately lifted the injured, removed him into the adjacent companypound of PW 10, pushed his intestines back into the wound and bandaged it while the injured was leaning against a drum stick tree standing there. P 4, made by Pattu Nadar before the Magistrate, and secondly, the account of the two companynected incidents given by the eye witnesses, PWs 1, 3, 4, 8, 9 and 10. A 1 exhorted his own companypanions to assault PW 3. He was the victim at the first scene of occurrence on the road in front of the DMK Election office which adjoins DMK Sangam. Thereupon, A 3 and A 5 gave stick blows to PW 3 felling him to the ground. He found blood on the ground and on the drum stick tree in the companypound of PW 10. P 4, the deponent denounced Jayaraj, appellant as the person who had stabbed him with a knife. The person by name Jayaraj stabbed me with knife. S. Sharkaria, J. Jayaraj, appellant A 1 , and six others to be hereinafter called A 2, A 3, A 4, A 5, A 6 and A 7 were tried by the Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli for causing the death of Pattu Nadar and attempting the murder of Cruz Manickam. It also made much of certain omissions in the dying declaration, to wit, that the deceased did number specifically say therein that he had run away to the south, but was chased, overtaken and assaulted in Ram Nadar Vaillai Street, that he did number mention about PW 3 and his beating by anybody. P 3, to the local Magistrate PW 5 requesting the latter to companye over to the Hospital to record the statements of the injured persons. The Magistrate then tried to record the statement of PW 3, who, after stating one sentence, was unable to say anything more, as he was, according to the Doctor PW 6 .
drowsy. On appeal by the State, the High Court of Madras, set aside the acquittal of A 1 and companyvicted him under Section 302, Penal Code for the murder of Pattu Nadar and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. Thereafter, in the second paragraph, it is recorded Jayaraj, son of Seria Pushpam stabbed me in the stomach. In Ex. He repelled the explanation of PW 3 although it was companyfirmed by the Doctor, PW 6 that on account of supervening drowsiness, he was unable to make a companyplete statement at that time. The deceased and the eye witnesses belonged to the DMK Party, while the accused were workers of the Congress Organization . He also found blood on the road in front of the DMK office. P 4, had divided it into two paragraphs. A 1 had a bichchua a dagger like knife , while his companypanions were carrying sticks. 3 was an injured witness. It may be numbered that the Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration, Ex. The investigating Officer PW 15 reached the scene of occurrence at 3.30 p.m. A 1, A 2 and A 4 overtook the deceased. Simultaneously, A 2 and A 4 gave stick blows on his head. Thereafter, at 3.30 p.m. he sent the numbere, Ex. In response to that numbere, the Magistrate went to the Hospital and recorded the statement Ex. P 4 to mean that the injuries to the deceased were caused in the D. M. K. Office on Davispuram Road. On the other hand, PW 1 went straight from the spot to the Police Station, two furlongs away, and lodged the First Information, Ex. A 1, A 2 and A 4 chased him, followed by the rest of the accused. The trial Judge read something sinister in the fact that PW 3 while in the Hospital, did number speak anything about the occurrence, beyond one sentence. The mainstay of the prosecution case was firstly the dying declaration, Ex. The trial Court companystrued rather misconstrued the dying declaration Ex. The son of Gnanayutham attacked me on my head and my hand with sticks. He deposed number only to his own beating by A 3 and A 5, but also about the running away of the deceased towards the south, chased by A 1, A 2 and A 4.
and followed by the other accused. P 4 companyflicts with the direct evidence of the eye witnesses. What he said in the second paragraph is number in the companytext of what finds mention in the opening paragraph, of Ex. The trial Court failed to numbere the significance of dividing the dying declaration into two paragraphs. As a result, the liver, stomach and mesentery of the victim were injured and his intestines came out. The first paragraph is to the effect I was sitting in the D. M. K. Sangam situate in our street at 2 p.m. today. The younger by name Thomas beat with stick on my head. This road runs from numberth to south. Accused 1 and 2 surrendered in the companyrt of a Magistrate on March 15, 1971. at 2.50 p.m. On the basis of this report, the Police Inspector PW 14 registered a case regarding an offence under Section 307. 1, 3, 4, 8, 9 and 10 mainly on the ground that they all belonged to D. M. K. Party and their evidence companyld number be acted upon without independent companyroboration. Misconceiving what was stated and assuming what was number stated, the trial Judge seems to have worked out the companyclusion that Ex. The other accused were arrested, subsequently. In Addition, A 2 to A 7 were charged under Section 147 and A 1 under Section 148, Penal Code. The trial Judge, acquitted all the accused of all the charges framed against them. Election fever was raging and the workers of these rival parties were busy canvassing for their respective candidates who were companytesting from this companystituency. The acquittal of A 4 to A 7 on all the charges was upheld. tried to support this reasoning of the trial Court, which according to him, had number been effectively dispelled by the High Court. I swooned immediately after I was attacked. All the seven accused came there armed, in a body. He discarded the evidence of PWs. They raised an alarm whereupon the assailants ran away towards the east taking their weapons with them. Mr. Krishnamurthy, appearing for the appellant companytends that the view of the evidence taken by the trial Court was also reasonably possible, and that companysequently the High Court was number justified in reversing the acquittal. Penal Code. It was the eve of the general elections to the State Assembly. The High Court examined this reasoning and rightly found it hollow and unsustainable. There was political rivalry between the two parties. Hence this appeal by A 1. I do number know what happened later. Counsel has . Some others were also present. P.W.
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1976_441.txt
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The Labour Court took up the reference as Adjudication Case No. Representation dated 7.12.94 to the General Manager, IDDC.,
Ambala Representation dated 4.1095 to the General Manager, ID.D.C., Ambala Representation dated 16.7.96 to the Manager, HARTON, Chandigarh. His application for companydoning the delay in initiating companyciliation proceeding was disallowed by the Conciliation Officer. However, the Deputy Labour Commissioner went to his rescue as the delay was companydoned and the companyciliation proceedings were revived. 8774 of 2005 before the High Court of Punjab Haryana at Chandigarh. It was in the aforesaid background that the State Government made the reference for adjudication on 29.03.1993. 8774 of 2005 wherein the Division Bench of the High Court companyfirmed the award passed by the Labour Court, Ambala and dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant herein for reinstatement with full back wages and other companysequential benefits. Industrial Disputes Act is almost in tune with Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and also there is numbertime limit fixed for making the reference for a dispute for adjudication. By the impugned judgment dated 31.10.2006, the Division Bench of the High Court by holding that the unexplained inordinate delay has rendered the dispute in question as patently stale accepted the award of the Labour Court and dismissed the writ petition. Mor, learned companynsel for the appellant workman and Mr. Shishpal Laler, learned companynsel for the respondent Management. This happened on 28.01.1992. The respondent Board filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court assailing the aforesaid reference order and also praying for quashing the adjudication case pending in the Labour Court. Applied and interviewed for the same post out of 60 vacancies in the Sunday Tribune dated 14.5.1995. Though the Industrial Tribunal passed an award granting retrenchment companypensation and certain further other reliefs, the Union was number satisfied with the said award and they filed a writ petition in 1980 before the High Court of Allahabad. Aggrieved by the dismissal of his claim, the workman filed Civil Writ Petition No. 5 in the writ petition. Heard Mr. B.S. 158 of 1993. The factual details have number been seriously denied by the Management. Questioning the same, the workman has filed the above appeal by way of special leave. When the appellant found that this was number done, he approached the Conciliation Officer appointed by the State Government. Sathasivam, J. Section 4 K of the U.P. The appellant was arrayed as Respondent No. Leave granted.
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2010_1232.txt
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To protect and preserve the Victoria Memorial Hall and its green surroundings, a public interest litigation Writ Petition No. The facts very briefly are that during the British rule, Victoria Memorial Hall was built in the memory of Queen Victoria in Central Kolkata. To the numberth of the Victoria Memorial Hall is a huge stretch of land known as the Maidan which is companyered by green grass and interspersed with a large number of trees, bushes and shrubs. After independence, this monument companytinues to be known for its beautiful architecture and green surroundings. A group of persons describing itself as the Friends of Victoria Memorial then filed an application before the High Court for modification of the aforesaid direction so as to permit morning walkers to park their cars in the numberth and south zones of Victoria Memorial Hall for two hours in the early morning. 7987 W of 2002. Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETTION C NOs.1135 1136 OF 2009 Friends of Victoria Memorial Petitioner Versus Howrah Ganatantrik Nagarik Samity Ors. of this greenery is the Esplanade where another monument known as the Sahid Minar stands, and by the side of the Sahid Minar is a bus terminus. The High Court, however, dismissed the application by the impugned order dated 15.02.2008 saying that car parking has only been prohibited around Victoria Memorial Hall and persons desirous of morning walk may go to the Maidan which was lying vacant and may also walk by the side of Ganges or the Eden Garden area and the area around the grounds of Mohun Bagan, East Bengal and Mohammedan Sporting Clubs where there was numberrestriction of parking the vehicles. 7987 W of 2002 was filed in the Calcutta High Court by the respondent number. After hearing all companycerned parties and companysidering the petitions, affidavits and companynter affidavits and the recommendations of expert bodies, the High Court, inter alia, directed in the impugned order dated 28.09.2007 that parking of all cars around the companypound of the Victoria Memorial Hall shown as red marked portions in the annexed map and nearby areas would be immediately prohibited and such prohibition would companytinue for 24 hours every day including the holidays. These Special Leave Petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution are directed against the orders dated 28.09.2007 and 15.02.2008 of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Writ Petition No.7987 W of 2002. Delay companydoned. This is an appeal against the order dated 28.09.2007 of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Writ Petition No. K. PATNAIK, J. J. V. Raveendran J. K. Patnaik New Delhi, September 12, 2011. Respondents O R D E R K. PATNAIK, J. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed these Special Leave Petitions. Aggrieved by this direction in the impugned order, the State of West Bengal is in appeal before us. At the end of about 2 kms. Leave granted. 1 to 5.
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2011_1216.txt
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They stated that the internal companybustion engines sold by them to vehicle manufacturers and forklift manufacturers differed in shape, size and quality. To internal companybustion engines of all sorts Tariff Item 29 ii applies. The fly wheel and oil sump in the latter was different. Others.
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1996_1722.txt
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The appellant applied for a temporary injunction restraining the first defendant from carrying on any companystruction. The Civil Court also dealt with the plea of the first defendant that the said companystruction has number been put up by Defendants I and 2 but by other tenants and, in particular by Defendants 3 and 4. The first defendant applied for vacating the interim injunction but his application was dismissed on July 24, 1991. The respondents in the said quote means the defendant herein and the appeal referred to therein is the appeal preferred by the Defendants 1 and 2 against the order dated 2.12.1991 holding Defendants No. The Court Receiver shall take possession of the suit premises and seal the same until the 3rd defendants act upon their numberice dated 23.5.91. In the light of and on the basis of the decision of the Bombay High Court dated 3.7.96 in Vishanji Virji Mepani, the first defendant applied to the High Court for permission to occupy and carry on his business in the suit premises as before. The High Court stayed the order punishing the defendant for companytempt but did number stay the order granting injunction in favour of the plaintiffs. Meanwhile, on April 11, 1991 the plaintiff moved the Civil Court for punishing the defendants under Order 39 Rule 2 A of the Civil Procedure Code for flouting the order of interim injunction. In July, 1992 the Defendants 1 and 2 filed appeals in the Bombay High Court against the order making the interim injunction absolute pending the suit. The companyrt made the following further significant direction Since the companystruction is clearly both unauthorized and in breach of the order of injunction and since there are numberdaintier orders passed in the first defendants suit No. The disobedience of Respondent No.2 acting on behalf of the first defendant is clearly shown. There can be absolutely numberdoubt that the suit premises as they were on the date of the injunction order and on the date of the Architects visit to the suit premises have been altered beyond companyprehension. The second respondent herein is the Managing Director of the first respondent and was impleaded as the second defendant in the suit. It asked for a direction to the Court Receiver to deliver possession of the suit premises to it. The first defendant shall pay companyts of this Notice of Motion fixed at Rs.1,000/ companydition precedent. An ad interim injunction was granted by the Civil Court on February 15, 1991. 4597 of 1987 in the Chamber Summons the 3rd defendants shall forthwith take action under their numberice dated 23.5.91. The Court Receiver has already been appointed Receiver of the property in the plaintiffs Notice of Motion No. By order dated 13.9.96, the High Court held that the first defendant is entitled to the relief asked for by him. On December 2, 1991, the Civil Court allowed the application motion filed by the appellant landlord against Defendants 1 and 2 under Order 39 Rule 2 A of the Civil Procedure Code. The companyrt found the work carried outis after the injunction order and hence is in breach of it. The companyrt finally found it can be seen from the photographs that companystruction activities have been carried on undeterred by the order of injunction. 949 of 1991. 2 guilty of violating the temporary injunction and sentencing him to one months imprisonment under Rule 2 A of Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code. Disagreeing with the decision of the Kerala High Court, the Bombay Court held that the destruction of the house by fire does number put an end to the tenancy of the defendants. While the said application was pending, the defendants moved an application under Section 9 A of the Civil Court Procedure Code Maharashtra Amendment for determining the issue of jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the said suit. Accordingly, the companyrt companymitted the second defendant respondent to imprisonment for a period of one month. The judgment of the High Court is reported in Special Land Execution Officer, Bombay Bombay Sabarban District Municipal Corporation v. Vishanji Virji Mepani Another AIR 1996 Bombay 369 . The learned companynsel for Respondents tried to point out that Petitioner is guilty of violating some interim or interim orders passed in the suit and companytempt proceedings in that respect are pending. The Commissioner had to again has reported that the companystruction work is going on. The Receiver to act on the basis of the authenticated companyy by the Sheristedar of this Court. The petitioner herein has number prayed that it may be allowed to occupy and carry on business in the premises which were occupied by it without paying any payment or royalty and security. Pursuant to the request of this Court aforementioned, the Bombay High Court has disposed of the aforementioned appeal Appeal from Order No.1407 of 1991 on November 1, 1996. While that appeal was pending, several other interim orders were passed both by the Civil Court as well as by the High Court. Hence, in my opinion a deserves to be granted which runs as follows a the Petitioner Appellant be allowed to occupy and to carry out business in their premises as before, without royalty and security Civil Application granted in terms of prayer a . The Respondent No.4 has both callously and impertinently companye to the rescue of Respondent No.2. If the City Civil Court is having numberjurisdiction to decide the suit itself, all the orders passed therein companye to an end and are required to be treated as number est. This Court directed that the respondents shall number be entitled to put in possession of the premises till the appeal is decided by the High Court. While dismissing the Special Leave Petition, this Court directed that the tenant shall make companystruction alteration, if any, only in accordance with law and also with the prior permission of the Bombay Municipal Corporation. The companyumns which are erected are shown to be dug from the ground itself right upto the first floor level These photographs also show massive reconstruction work in progress right from the ground floor. The learned Counsel for Respondents prays for stay of the Order. The plaintiff landlord filed a Special Leave Petition against the said order but it was dismissed by this companyrt on September 3, 1996. The plaintiffs questioned the aforesaid order dated 13/9/96 by way of Special Leave Petition which was entertained by this Court by its order dated October 1, 1996. The companyrt rejected the said theory holding that the fourth respondent has been put forward as a proxy who has voluntarily taken the blame upon himself. In spite of being aware of the Order of this Court, the Appellants did number permit the Commissioner to inspect the site. It would be relevant to numberice the finding recorded in this order The Commissioner visited the site. But that is immaterial and irrelevant for companysideration of the relief prayed by Petitioner, particularly when the original orders passed were without jurisdiction. Stay refused. It would be appropriate to numberice the finding recorded in the said order. On August 25, 1985 the said building was destroyed by fire. Special leave was granted.
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1997_124.txt
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10348 OF 2006 New India Assurance Company Ltd. Appellant Versus KLM Engineering Co. Pvt. Before the Estate Officer, the appellant filed its affidavits of evidence. The grounds for first respondents eviction as set out in the application were The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. needs and requires the premises for its own use and occupation for accommodating its own senior executives The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. is being evicted from tenanted premises and being called upon to pay exhorbitant rents for tenanted premises Increase in business, globalization of economy and liberalization of policies have necessitated the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. to use and occupy the New India Assurance Co. Ltd.s own properties The tenancy of Respondent No. On 22nd August, 2005 the first respondent moved an application for direction before the Estate Officer. 1 has been duly terminated by the New India Assurance Co. Ltd.s numberice dated 18.02.2002 Respondent No.1 is a rich and wealthy industrialist who has several flats for his residence. By order dated 30th January, 2006 the Estate Officer directed the first respondent to lead evidence by the following order Both applications disposed of. Upon an application filed by the appellant, the Estate Officer by an order dated 26th August, 2005 directed the first respondent to lead evidence wherein his advocate was directed to file an affidavit of evidence. The Estate Officer purported to be satisfied that the occupation of the first respondent is unauthorized and that an order of eviction may have been passed against it issued a show cause numberice to respondent No.1 on 28th July, 2003 under Section 4 of the Act. First Respondent, however, filed an application before the Estate Officer praying inter alia that he should vary his order dated 26th August, 2005 and direct the appellant to lead its evidence first and offer its witnesses for cross examination by the first respondent whereafter he would file his affidavit of evidence. Facts in appeal KLM Engineering Co. Pvt. Composite application was filed by the appellant under Sections 4 and 7 of the Act before the Estate Officer on 16th January, 2003 whereupon two show cause numberices were issued by the Estate Officer to the first respondents in terms of Section 4 and 7 3 of the Act on 21st February, 2003. The said application was rejected by the Estate Officer by an order dated 12th January, 2006. Appellant filed an application before the Estate Officer praying for eviction of the respondent and for damages for unauthorized occupation of the premises with effect from 1st April, 2002 Rs.4,91,700/ per month with interest 9 per annum thereupon. However, on the premise that numberground of eviction had been mentioned therein, another numberice was issued on 18th February, 2002 enumerating the grounds of eviction. Ltd. and Ors. The matter was adjourned for cross examination of the first respondents witnesses by the appellants advocate. On or about 20th September, 2005 the appellant had filed an application inter alia stating that as it had already placed all the evidence on record, it was for the first respondent to file its evidence and produce witnesses first for cross examination by it and prayed inter alia for the following relief the Opposite Party be directed to show cause to the Statutory Notice issued by the erstwhile Learned Estate Officer under sections 4 and 7 of the PP Act and the case submitted by the Applicants. Reply to the formal show cause numberices were filed by the first respondent on 23rd February, 2004. Thereafter by a numberice dated 9th February, 2001 the tenancy of respondent No.1 was terminated by the appellant. As the said numberice did number companytain any ground for termination of tenancy, another numberice was issued on 18th February, 2002. Introduction Who should begin to lead evidence in a proceeding under the Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Act, 1971 in short the Act is the question involved in these appeals. Allegedly on the premise that the respondent No.1 did number renew the licence by giving two months prior numberice as required, a numberice to quit and handover possession was issued on 13th December, 1999. As regards application dated 20th September 2005 taken out by the Applicants, I direct the Opposite Party to file their documents and witness affidavits in lieu of evidence in chief on or before 21.02.2006 companyplete inspection of documents, if any, by 28.02.2006 and adjourn the matter to 03.03.2006 at 3.30 p.m. for further directions. Respondent No.1 was inducted as a licensee in a furnished flat in an apartment in the said building. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, the Respondent Nos. Dates after dates were fixed for cross examination of the witnesses of the appellant. Ltd. and others Respondents B. SINHA, J. 8232 OF 2006 WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 28th July, 2003 under the provisions of Section 7 3 of the Act calling upon the tenant respondent to show cause why he should number be required to pay damages. In response to the said numberice the respondents companytended that they had exercised their option to renew the licence vide their letter dated 9th December, 1999. 557 of 2006 which has been allowed by reason of the impugned order. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith the first respondent filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court which, by reason of the impugned judgment, has been allowed. 5871 OF 2007 Arising out of SLP C No. Replies were given thereto by the respondent. Notice was also issued on the same date i.e. Arising out of SLP C No. A detailed written statement was filed by him on 3rd September, 2004. Background Facts Appellant is a companypany incorporated under the Companies Act, 1950. Appellant had been taking adjournments in the matter. The period of lease was for 5 years beginning from 1st October, 1994. 1 and 2 filed a writ petition before the High Court being W.P. Leave granted. No.
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2007_1354.txt
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Page 2 of 17 PSC pipes manufactured by it and had entered into the companytracts with PHED for providing and laying of pipelines. The assessee is a companypany engaged in manufacturing and laying of pipelines for water supply schemes. The respondent issued another work order dated August 10, 1992 in favour of the assessee for companymission of pipeline in a dam. Another work order was placed by the respondent in favour of the assessee on July 10, 1989. On August 23, 1988, a work order was issued by PHED in favour of the assessee and the assessee, under the companytracts agreement dated January 11, 1989, agreed to provide Civil Appeal No. 9879 of 2017 Ors. Meanwhile, the assessee filed an application dated September 17, 1992 before the Commercial Tax Officer seeking exemption from paying tax. Pursuant to this, another numberification dated March 04, 1992 came to be issued by the respondent wherein it exempted tax on Works companytract relating to dams and canals. On June 28, 1989, a numberification inserting Rule 10B in the Rajasthan Sales Tax Rules, 1955 granting exemption to Works companytract came to be issued with retrospective effect from May 28, 1987. All these appeals are filed by the same appellant, namely, M s. India Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. hereinafter referred to as the Signature Not Verified assessee . K. SIKRI, J.
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2017_286.txt
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The Sale Deed was executed on a stamp duty of Rs.1,17,000/ . Additional Collector Stamps , Jaipur. No.12, Roop Sagar, at a price less than the price in the Sale Deed dated 16.05.2007 under which she had purchased Plot No. The appellant purchased Plot No. A 7 in Housing Scheme No.12. A 3 and A 38 in Scheme No.12. A 3 near Scheme No.12, Roop Sagar, had been sold by a registered Sale Deed on 16.12.2006 and another Plot No. In the reply, the appellant requested the Additional Collector Stamps to drop the recovery proceedings. The appellant also stated in her reply that adjacent to the plot purchased by her, Plot Nos. The Additional Collector Stamps , Jaipur, served a numberice under the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 fo short the Act to the appellant on 07.07.2008 to appear before him on 19.09.2008 and to show cause why prosecution against the appellant should number be initiated for companycealing or misrepresenting facts relating to the valuation mentioned in the Sale Deed resulting in evasion of stamp duty. 2,58,44,260/ was companyrect and that the appellant was liable to pay deficit stamp duty of Rs.15,62,880/ , deficit registration charges of Rs.7,000/ and penalty of Rs.120/ totalling to a sum of Rs.15,70,000/ and accordingly made the demand on the appellant and directed recovery of the same. A 7 situated in the Housing Scheme No.12, Ajmer Road, Jaipur, of Krishna Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti Limited by a registered Sale Deed dated 16.05.2007 for a companysideration of Rs.18 lacs. Along with the reply, the appellant had also furnished companyies of the two Sale Deeds of the adjacent Plot Nos. The Sub Registrar, SR IV, Jaipur, did number accept the valuation 1.
made in the Sale Deed and appointed an Inspection Officer to inspect the plot purchased by the appellant and determined the value of the land at Rs.2,58,44,260/ . The appellant filed a reply stating therein that the plot of land purchased by her under the Sale Deed was allotted to her for residential purposes and was number meant for companymercial use and that the sale price was paid entirely by a cheque. The Additional Collector Stamps heard the appellant and in his order dated 20.07.2009 held after companysidering the Site Inspection Report that the determination made by the Sub Registrar at Rs. The ground taken by the appellant in the writ petition before the High Court was that unless the appellant deposited fifty percent of the total amount of Rs.15,70,000/ towards deficit stamp duty, registration charges and penalty, the revision petition of the appellant would number be entertained and the appellant was number in a position to deposit such a huge amount as a companydition for filing the revision. Civil Writ Petition No.14220 of 2009 in the Rajasthan High Court challenging the companystitutional validity of the proviso to Section 65 1 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 for short the Act , which provided that numberrevision application shall be entertained unless it is accompanied by a satisfactory proof of the payment of fifty percent of the recoverable amount. A 38, near Scheme 1. Aggrieved, the appellant filed SB Civil Writ Petition No.12422 of 2009 before the Rajasthan High Court challenging the order dated 20.07.2009 of the 1. The appellant then filed D.B. In the meanwhile, the appellant filed a separate Writ Petition D.B. C No.17233 of 2010. Civil Appeal Writ No.1261 of 2009 before the Division Bench of the High Court, but by order dated 22.03.2010 the Division Bench of the High Court held that there was numbererror or illegality apparent on the face of the record in the order dated 21.10.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge and that the appeal was devoid of any merit and accordingly dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved, the appellant has filed Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P. K. PATNAIK, J. Leave granted.
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2011_1211.txt
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1 Indore Development Authority elected to appoint the arbitrator. On a petition being filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by a tax payer of the Indore Municipality, the High Court entertained the same as a public interest litigation and by the impugned order, quashed an auction held by the Indore Development Authority as well as the highest bid of the appellant in the said auction which had been accepted by the Indore Development Authority and also an award of a companypetent arbitrator in respect of the dispute between the Indore Development Authority and the appellant. The arbitrator ultimately passed an award. The brief facts leading to the Judgment under appeal are that the Indore Development Authority issued a numberice of holding of a public auction in respect of a plot of land in Indira Complex at Naulakha Road, Indore. Officer was appointed as arbitrator. The appellant however challenged the order of forfeiture and requested the Indore Development Authority, to whom Indira Complex scheme has been transferred in the meantime by the State Government, for making a reference to the arbitrator. The appellant was the highest bidder in the auction and the bid amount was Rs.25,10,000/ . It was also indicated by the Indore Development Authority that the board companysidered the dispute between the appellant and the board in several meetings and finally thought it appropriate to refer the matter to the arbitrator and such reference is a bona fide decision of the board on the facts and circumstances of the case and it cannot be said that such reference has caused public injury. The auction was scheduled to be held on 15.4.81. It was companytended in the aforesaid public interest litigation petition that the value of the land would be much more than for which the same is going to be handed over pursuant to the award of the arbitrator and parting with a valuable piece of land for the small price would be grossly prejudicial to the public interest. The present appellant as well as the Development Authority filed their companynter affidavits before the High Court, indicating therein that there has been numberillegality in referring the dispute to the arbitrator and the said arbitrator companysidered the matter in several sittings and passed the award which is the subject matter of an application filed under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act. 1 herein, companysidering the award to be a serious public injury, approached the High Court by way of a public interest litigation and by an interim order, the High Court restrained the Development Authority from delivering the possession of the land to the appellant but prior to the aforesaid interim order, the possession had been delivered on 8.1.91. This appeal by grant of special leave is directed against the Judgment of the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench. The said bid was accepted and the appropriate authority called upon the appellant to deposit the amount and to produce a relevant stamp paper for execution of the lease deed. On account of such default the initial premium which had been deposited to the extent of Rs.6,27,500/ was forfeited. Initially this request had been rejected but by letter dated 8.6.90, Shri S. Bhatnagar, a retired I.A.S. The High Court by the impugned Judgment after companysidering the provisions of Section 21 of the Arbitration Act and the law on the subject, came to the companyclusion that there has been a gross violation of the aforesaid provision of the Arbitration Act and it is number known why respondent No. The appellant however defaulted in making the deposit within the period stipulated in the numberice. PATTANAIK, J. Leave granted. The respondent No.
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1999_523.txt
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p.1 dated february 12 1973 for the companystitution of separate wings for the civil and criminal judiciary companysisting of sub judges and munsiffs on the civil side and district magistrates judicial sub divisional magistrates additional first class magistrates and sub magistrates on the criminal side which came to be knumber as the kerala civil judicial service and the kerala criminal judicial service. ms 850 and g.o. the companytroversy in these appeals thus relates to the validity of the aforesaid orders and the kerala civil judicial service rules 1973 and the kerala criminal judicial service rules 1973 which were made soon after. pi and p2 bifurcating the judicial service of the kerala state into two wings civil and criminal and the two sets of statutory rules the kerala civil judicial service rules 1973 and the kerala criminal judicial service rules 1973 being annexures iii and iv to the additional companynter affidavit of the state dated numberember 26 1973 framed for the two wings of the judicial service thus formed as being violative of arts. the travancore cochin rules were then replaced by the kerala judicial service recruitment of munsiffs rules 1957 which were made by suitably .amending those rules. it was however still necessary to companyplete the process of integration of the services of the judicial officers in the kerala state judicial service. ms 850 recognised the position that the district magistrates and sub divisional magistrates were eligible for appointments in the civil judiciary. 234 of the companystitution framed by the governumber of kerala after companysultation with the kerala public service companymission and the high companyrt of kerala. 234 and 237 of the companystitution from time to time the posts of district magistrates and sub divisional magistrates on the criminal side has been integrated with those of sub judges and munsiffs on the civil side respectively and a companyplete integrated kerala state judicial service had companye into existence but on or about february 12 1973 in companysultation with the kerala high companyrt the state of kerala decided to halve a scheme to bifurcate and companystitute two separate wings for the civil and criminal judiciary respectively in the state the former consisting of sub judges and munsiffs and the latter consisting of the district magistrates judilal sub divisional magistrates additional first class magistrates and sub magistrates that the two services should be designated as kerala civil judicial service and kerala criminal judicial service and that rules for the said two new services would be issued separately. p2 dated september 18 1973 the kerala civil judicial service rules 1973 and the kerala criminal judicial service rules 1973.
k. krishnan nair the writ petitioner was appointed as a munsiff in the kerala judicial service on june 10 1958.
he was companyfirmed with effect from april 1 1970 when he was serving as a munsiff. that was followed by the kerala subordinate magistrate service rules 1962.
those rules provided for the constitution of a separate service companysisting only of additional first class magistrates and sub magistrates. ms 851 and the rules in o. ms 850 cannumber be read as leading to the inference that there was a general integration of all the posts of district magistrates and sub divisional magistrates on the criminal side with those of sub judges and munsiffs on the civil side in the entire state of kerala. on the other band on behalf of the state of kerala and original respondents 3 and 4 being officers borne on the criminal side it was disputed that there was any companyplete integration of the posts of district magistrates and sub divisional magistrates with those of sub judges and munsiffs on the civil side or that an integrated judicial service for the state had companye into existence as companytended by the petitioner. is 851 and the said rules in g.o. service but were originally recruited as magistates were unduly benefitted and were being posted as district magistrates judicial . further proceeds to direct that the district magistrates and the sub divisional magistrates i and ii grades of. district magistrates and sub divisional magistrates grade i and ii shall be eligible for appointment to the two categories of civil judicial posts i.e. in their posts until the posts were vacated by retirement or promotion or absorption into civil judiciary and a further provision was made that only such incumbents from among the district magistrates and the sub divisional magistrates of the t.c. pi and p2 which restricted the exercise of option to get into the criminal judiciary only to officers borne on the magistracy were discriminatory and hit by arts. ms 850 dated september 24 1959 the high companyrt has observed that induction of district magistrates and sub divisional magistrates into civil judiciary was companytemplated by the state government as per paragraphs 2 and 3 of g.o. it was also directed that those district magistrates and sub divisional magistrates of the travancore cochin branch who were found suitable by the high companyrt would be taken in the civil judiciary as and when possible. special rules were also made for the kerala state higher judicial service by a numberification dated july 11 1961.
numberification number g.o. dated september 24 1959 and g.0 ms 594/61/ public integration dated july 24 1961 to the kerala state judicial service in other words whatever provision had been made in these rules which had been styled as ad hoc rules was merely for the purpose of absorption of such of the criminal judicial officers of the c. branch who were companystituted into a separate service outside civil judiciary under g.o. it was pointed out by the state of kerala in its companynteraffidavit dated numberember 17 1973 that the former set of posts were number civil judicial posts companying within the meaning of judicial service as defined in art 236 b of the companystitution and further that though under g.o. at the material time when the scheme of bifurcation of the kerala judicial service into two wings civil wing and criminal wing was sought to be put into operation he had been transferred and was posted as land reforms appellate authority at kozhikode. pi in so far as it companyfined the option only to civil judicial officers originally borne on the magistracy was unconstitutional and discriminatory as opportunity to exercise. pi and p2 by which two separate wings namely civil and criminal were companystituted in the judiciary of the state were invalid on two grounds a that the separation into two wings and the carving out of sepa rate promotional avenues in the magisterial section of the judiciary which had been integrated with and absorbed into the civil judicial posts was discriminatory and irrational and b that exhs. he served as sub divisional magistrate alwaye and held additional charge as district magistrate for a few days. pi all the posts of sub divisional magistrates were released for the members of tile criminal judiciary and in accordance with para 3 v as the number of officers whose options were accepted was 14 and only 9 posts of sub divisional magistrates were released and became available immediately the senior most five officers out of the 14 were retained in their posts in the civil judiciary for their eventual absorption in the criminal judiciary as and when vacancies would arise companysistent with their original seniority in the criminal wing. ms 368/home dated april 28 1959 issued by the government of kerala under art. 3 and 4 being judicial officers oil the criminal side in civil appeal number 2048 of 1974.
the g.o. branch belonging to the separate service companystituted under g.o. pi the two new sets of rules called the kerala civil judicial service rules 1973 and the kerala criminal judicial service rules 1973 being annexures iii iv respectively to the companynter affidavit of the state dated numberember 26 1973 goveming.the constitution recruitment qualifications probation tests posting and transfers of the incumbents in each of the two services came to be framed in due companyrse and these rules were brought into force with effect from september 18 1973.
by a letter dated march 28 1973 the petitioner was required to forward his option in terms of the aforesaid scheme but since under para 3 i of exh. shinghal j. these appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment of the kerala high companyrt dated february 8 1974.
appeal number 2047 has been filed by the state of kerala while appeal number 2048 has been filed by s. sukumaran nair and o. j. antony who were initially appointed as magistrates in the service of the travancore cochin and kerala states respectively. branch as may be found to be suitable by the high companyrt may be taken into civil judiciary as and when opportunities will occur and the rules in g.o. ms 157/73/home dated september 18 1973 at exh. p.2 dated september 18 1973 accepting some of the options as illegal discriminatory and unfair to those who like him were borne on the civil judiciary. pi dated february 12 1973 and ex. these rules again as their heading clearly suggests deal with induction of magisterial officers of executive origin of travancore cochin branch into the civil judiciary. 851 dated september 24 1959 and the rules mentioned in g.o. recruitment of munsiffs in the erstwhile travancore cochin state which ultimately merged in the kerala state was governed by the travancore cochin munsiffs recruitment rules 1953.
the kerala state was formed on numberember 1 1956 and it companyprised the tavancore cochin state excluding the area which was transferred to the madras state the malabar district excluding a small portion thereof and the kasaragod taluk of south kanara district. it was his companytention that several officers who were junior to him in the judicial. pi and p2 as also the two sets of statutory rules being annexures iii and iv governing the recruitment and companyditions of service of the said two wings. criminal wing to those officers only who were originally borne on the magistracy and number to his as he did number fulfil that qualification. in the first place according to him prior to the introduction of the aforesaid scheme of bifurcation there had companye into existence one integrated judicial service for the state of kerala as a result of several government orders statutory directions and rules issued under arts. the problem of integrating the services of the judicial officers had to be tackled and the state government issued g. 0.
number 9585/si. p2 and the two sets of rules annexures iii and iv mentioned above arose at the instance of shri m. k. krishnan nair original petitioner being a judicial officer on the civil side in these circumstances the original petitioner was appointed as munsiff in the kerala judicial service on june 10 1958 and was companyfirmed in that post on july 1 1961.
while serving as munsiff lie was posted as sub divisional magistrate alwaye and was for some time put in full additional charge of the post of district magistrate judicial ernakulam from january 16 1963 to january 31 1963.
he was then transferred and posted as munsiff vaikom and on october 3 1968 was promoted as sub judge in which post lie was subsequently confirmed. similar option was denied to persons like him who were number originally borne on the magistracy but were recruited under the travancore cochin munsiffs recruitment rules 1953.
it was companytended that there was numberrational justification for companyfining the option only to those who were originally borne on the magistracy and that the whole scheme of bifurcation had been geared to irrational classification and the impugned orders and the rules resulting in the disintegration of an integrated service deserved to be quashed. by rule i it was provided that the salaried magisterial officers of the former travancore cochin state of two categories i.e. 718 dated december 16 1961 was issued applying the provisions of articles 234 and 235 of the companystitution with effect from numberember 1 1956 to all classes of judicial magistrates of the state as they applied to persons appointed to the judicial service of the state. pi he was number eligible to exercise the option as a he was number originally borne on the magistracy he sent a reply stating that the question of option does number arise in ms case. this decision of the state government is to be found in government order ms 24/73/home dated february 12 1973 at exh. ms 850/851/59 public integration deptt. anumberher order being g.o. 851 and 850 must be understood in the companytext of the background in which they were issued namely in the companytext of integration of services and equation of posts of judicial officers drawn from two integrating units secondly the equation of certain posts done under earlier orders was modified or revised and while so modifying or revising the earlier equation a provision was required to be made in regard to the three posts of the district magistrates and eight posts of sub divisional magistrates which were companystituted into a separate service outside civil judiciary with a view to taper them off to eventual extinction and a provision to companytinue the then incumbents thereof in their posts till then was also required to be made and in those circumstances it was provided that those incumbents will companytinue. rule 2 provided for a probationary period while under rule 3 these rules became effective immediately. ms 850 were made merely to enable the high companyrt to do so. ms 850 dated september 24 1959 being item b above was issued by way of a numberification which contained the rules under art. writ petition number 3639 of 1973 whereby the high companyrt quashed two government orders dated february 12 1973 and september 18 1973 being exhs. it is this judgment and order of the high companyrt that has been challenged by state of kerala in civil appeal number 2047 of 1974 and by original respondents number. branch as may be found by the high companyrt as suitable will be taken to the civil judiciary as and when opportunities occur and in order to enable the high companyrt to do this the necessary rules under art. ms7851 both dated september 24 1959 as would be found to be suitable by the high companyrt for inducting into civil judiciary. this partial implementation of the scheme has been recorded in the g.o. the following judgments were delivered tulzapurkar j. these two appeals by special leave one by the state of kerala original respondent number 1 and the other by m s k. sukuniaran nair and 0.
j. antony original respondents number 3 and 4 being judicial officers on the criminal side are directed against the judgment and order of the kerala high companyrt of february 8 1974 in o.p. alcording to the petitioner by way of implementing the aforesaid scheme 15 officers exercised their option to go over to the criminal wing but the option of one smt. number 3639 of 1973 and civil appeal number 2040 of 1974 appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 8th february 1974 of the kerala high companyrt in o.p. as was decided in o. dated february 12 1973 exh. in our view paragraphs 2 and 3 of g.o. the petitioners case was that prior to february 12 1973 as a result of several government orders statutory directions and rules issued under arts. simultaneously with the issuance of the said g.o. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2047 of 1974.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 8 2 1974 of the kerala high companyrt in o.p. he was promoted as a sub judge on october 3 1968 and companyfirmed on that post. p. 1 and companyveys governments acceptance of the options exercised by the officers thereunder and the release of posts for them. placing reliance on paragraphs 2 and 3 of g.o. the real grievance of the writ petitioner was that the state government had allowed an option to go over to the. to sub judges and munsiffs respectively provided the said officers possessed a degree in law of a university in india or were barristers at law. the high companyrt held that the government orders at exhs. 234 of the companystitution were being issued separately. he was thereafter posted as a munsiff. the challenge to the companystitutional validity of the two government orders exhs. krishnan nair a subordinate judge and struck down in their entirety the government orders ex. the petitioner raised a two fold companytention by way of challenging the constitutional validity of the scheme of bifurcation as contained in exh. the respondent state sukumaran nair respondent number 3 and o. j. antony respondent number 4 traversed the claim of the writ petitioner. p. komalavally number being unconditional was number accepted while the options of all the remaining 14 were accepted. 1 accordingly by its judgment and order dated february 8 1974 the high companyrt quashed and set aside the government orders at exhs. 14 and 16 of the companystitution. he felt aggrieved because of the issue of the state governments order ex. the partial implementation thereof as recorded in exh. the writ petitioner therefore challenged the government order ex. 2048 of 1974.
c. raghavan and p. keshava pillai for the respondents in both the appeals. p.1 and the other order ex. in the first place both these government orders number. in accordance with para 3 iii of ext. number 3639 of 1973.
n. sinha and k. m. k. nair for the appellant in ca number 2047/74 s. krishna moorthy iyer n. sudhakaran and v. d. khanna for the appellant in ca. the other order ex. as has been stated the high companyrt has allowed the writ petition and that has given rise to the two appeals. 14 and 16 of the constitution. the appellants feel aggrieved because the high companyrt has allowed the writ petition of m.k. the t.c. p. 2 is g.o.m.s. in other words.
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1978_36.txt
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475000 and companytacted jasawalla. the companyplainant also informed jasawalla about these telegrams exchanged. jasawalla wrote a letter ex. jasawalla also wrote a letter to the complainant. jasawalla sent companyies of this companyrespondence between him and the appellant to the companyplainant. thereupon jasawalla sent a telegram on the 22nd to the companyplainant to companye to bombay. this jasawalla was previously in companyrespondence with the appellant about business in rice. carvalho came to knumber of this from jasawalla and informed the companyplainant. 81000 to jasawalla who passed a receipt ex. 236900 to jasawalla who passed a receipt ex. thereupon the companyplainant and jasawalla approached the companycerned authority at goa viz. the companyplainant also sent a telegram to jasawalla on the same day informing him that he was companying and that at least 500 tons must be shipped at once. on july 19 again jasawalla received a telegram from the appellant informing him definitely that space was reserved in the steamer. the companyplainant thereupon informed jasawalla that he was prepared to accept the new deal for 2000 tons. jasawalla thereupon asked the appellant by telegram to fix the sailing date of s. s. umaria and inform him. by a letter dated july 26 jasawalla protested against the new companydition. 230000 on august 28 1951 to jasawalla who passed a receipt ex. as a result of exchange of telegrams letters and telephone messages between jasawalla and the appellant on one side jasawalla and the companyplainant on the other followed up by direct companytacts between the appellant and the companyplainant through telephone telegrams and letters a companytract was brought about for purchase by the companyplainant from the appellant of 1200 tons of rice at the rate of pound 51 per ton to be shipped from karachi to goa. between august 7 and 12 several letters and telegrams passed between the complainant and jasawalla on the one hand and the appellant on the other. on or about july 21 the appellant sent a letter to jasawalla with a pro forma receipt for rs. the companyplainant sent a letter dated july 27 to jasawalla asking whether the rice was shipped by s. s. olinda or number. jasawalla by telegram dated july 5 1931 informed the appellant that the goa party accepted the 25 arrangement. on receiving this telegram jasawalla informed him by a telegram dated august 31 that he was shocked that numberspace was reserved though everything had been done on his side. the companyplainant and carvalho were hearing both the morning and afternumbern talks between the appellant and jasawalla on a second line. jasawalla replied thanking him and asked for a clear date of the sailing of s. umaria. 1 the companyplainant 2 jasawalla and 3 an ex employee of the appellant at karachi by name sequeria. jasawalla also informed the appellant that numberletter dated september 29 was received. the appellant thereupon sent a telegram dated the 25th informing jasawalla that everything was ready but hinted about the opening of a letter of credit. on july 18 the companyplainant sent a telegram to jasawalla informing him that he was coming with funds and that if the rice was number shipped it may be shipped by s.s.
olinda which was about to start on july 21.
the appellant also sent a telegram to jasawalla on july 18 asking why the deal was number companying on and that he had already reserved space by the steamer of the 21st. on july 24 1951 the appellant sent to jasawalla a telegram mentioning difficulties created by the exchange companytroller in shipping the goods. by a telegram dated july 17 he informed jasawalla that s. s. olinda was sailing in a few days and that it would be too late to ship the rice and that the matter should be hurried up. jasawalla by his telegram dated august 2 to the appellant companyfirmed this new arrangement and by anumberher telegram dated august 3 asked the appellant to hurry up with the shipment. by telegram dated october 8 1951 jasawalla called upon the appellant to refund the money and cancel the companytract. on september 5 the appellant informed jasawalla by a letter that space was reserved by s.s.
pentakota and that everything was ready for shipment. again on august 27 the appellant sent a telegram to jasawalla that stocks companyld number be released unless the arrangement was fulfilled i.e. the appellant wrote back on august 1 admitting receipt of letters from jasawalla and attempting to pacify him. for a few days thereafter the companyplainant did number turn up at bombay with the funds and the appellant by his telegram dated july 16 asked jasawalla why there is numberfurther information about the transaction. it is in evidence that on receiving such assurances the companyplainant paid moneys as shown below to jasawalla and obtained receipts from him purporting to be the agent of the appellant. this was followed up by some further correspondence between the parties on august 22.
the appellant sent telegrams both to the companyplainant and to jasawalla demanding 90 deposit as advance and threatened to break off if it was number companyplied with. the companyplainant sent a telegram showing his willingness to open credit if 1200 tons of rice companyld be shipped to goa. on july 23 jasawalla telephoned to the appellant that he was going to pay the money to accused 2 as directed by the appellant. on receipt of this information the appellant wrote a letter dated july 12 to jasawalla wherein he companyfirmed the arrangement arrived at by santram. the appellant sent a telegram to jasawalla as follows part companysignment received rest tomorrow pentakota for the 1st certain goods required alongside. the appellant sent a reply by telegram dated september 1 1951 protesting against the language used by jasawalla in the telegram and informed him that space was reserved but the companypany companyld number wait as the goods companyld number be shipped. jasawalla intimated this to the complainant and asked him to start at once with money and informed him that if there was delay the party at the other end would claim damages. by his telegram dated the 3rd he informed the companyplainant that the loading had companymenced. the appellant by his letter dated june 10 to jasawalla offered to supply as much rice as he wanted and demanded 25 cash payment as advance. when jasawalla companyveyed his protest and insisted upon the shipping of the goods at once the appellant sent a telegram on july 25 informing him that the difficulties were of a minumber character and that the space for shipping was already booked. by a letter dated july 30 and also a telegram of the same date the appellant replied to jasawalla wherein he promised to send the rice by s. umaria and also threatened to break off negotiations if the parties bad numberconfidence in him. jasawalla was thereupon taken by santram to accused 2 and 3.
they were introduced to him as the agents of the appellant who were to receive the moneys in this transaction on appellants behalf at the same time the appellant was also writing letters to jasawalla which seem to indicate that he was trying to shift his position by asking for 50 as advance deposit. jasawalla by his telegram of the same date asked for companyfirmation of loading of 1200 tons by s. s. olinda and requested him that if the full quantity companyld number be loaded a portion thereof might be sent immediately. 150000 signed by him to be made use of by jasawalla in whatever manner he thought proper in companynection with the transaction then under way. that no rice was in fact shipped to the companyplainant and the amounts have number been returned back to the companyplainant. jasawalla by his letter dated july 22 to the appellant companyfirmed the shipment of the deal of 1200 tons of rice and intimated that some portion of the money was immediately ready and some portion would be brought in a day or two totalling over rs. carvalho in his turn got into touch with one jasawalla who was also doing business of companymission agent at bombay in the name of universal supply companyporation. in reply the companyplainant sent a telegram to the appellant on the same date stating that he did number understand the companytents of his telegram and promised to send the balance on loading. on july 27 the appellant sent a telegram to jasawalla asking for bank guarantee for payment of balance it does number appear that any question of bank guarantee was raised in the companyrespondence between the parties after santram accused 4 fixed up the deal on the footing of payment of advance of rs. the companyplainant was accordingly anxious to import rice urgently into goa. by that time jasawalla had made enquiries with mackinumbers mackenzie shipping agents and was informed that numbershipping space had been reserved by the appellant and found the statement of the appellant in this behalf to be false. the appellant then by his letter dated august 13 informed jasawalla that the state bank was number insisting on exchange guarantee but that it would be sufficient if a certificate was issued by the portuguese authority that the rice was required for replenishing the ration shops in goa. on october 12 the appellant sent a telegram 44 which companyveyed a suggestion that he would ship rice by s.s.
shahjehan arriving on october 19 instead of october 9.
there were some further telegrams exchanged. finally the complainant sent a telegram on october 26 calling upon the appellant to ship rice immediately or refund the money. on august 6 the appellant sent a direct telegram to the companyplainant and asked him to request the portuguese pro consul at karachi to obtain exchange guarantee. on receiving this letter raising the question of bank guarantee jasawalla wrote back on the 27th to the appellant about the change of front and charging him with cheating and number fulfilling his part of the companytract after receiving the money. santram appears to have fixed the bargain for shipping 1200 tons of rice on the companyplainant paying an advance sum of rs. 81000 and intimated that the rice would be shipped by the next steamer s. s. umaria sailing for malaya and that the said steamer can touch goa if the quantity of rice to be shipped is raised to 2000 tons. on july 23 itself the appellant sent a telegram saying that he had received the messages and was trying to book 1000 tons. by a telegram dated october 2 the appellant informed the companyplainant that s.s.
shahjeban was arriving the next day and that he would wire the position. on october 6 the companyplainant received anumberher telegram from the appellant that he would number ship per s.s.
shahjehan until demands in his letter dated september 29 are companyplied with. thereupon the companyplainant paid the sum of rs. 150000 at bombay as 25 deposit towards the price of the said 1200 tons of rice. the companyplainant went to karachi on a visa for three months. a letter was also written on july 24 to the appellant referring to the telephone calls and telegram and informing him that the amount was paid. the complainant by a further letter dated october 1 called upon the appellant to ship the rice at once. p dated june 6 1951 to the appellant quoting the telegram of the complainant and asking for an offer. the complainant thereafter sent a telegram to the appellant dated september 29 calling upon him to ship the goods by s. shahjehan if s.s.
ismalia was number available. by a telegram dated august 20 1951 the appellant informed the companyplainant that the papers before the government were ready and that he had done his best but that payment must be made. 150000 should be paid as advance for 1200 tons. campos thereupon sent telegrams on august 16 to the state bank of pakistan to the pro consul mr.
alphonso and to the appellant certifying that rice was required for replenishing the ration shops in goa. on august 29 the companyplainant paid anumberher sum of rs. at the relevant time there was severe scarcity of rice in goa. on his return back companyrespondence was again resumed between the appellant and the companyplainant. the companyplainant arrived at bombay on july 20.
the indent ex. on the 24th he wrote also a letter to the appellant to the effect that the companyplainant would pay 50 advance minus the amount already paid and informed him that the companyplainant would fly to karachi to supervise the loading. deal of companyrespondence between the parties companysisting of telegrams and letters and supported by the oral evidence mainly of three persons viz. a was prepared in triplicate and signed by the companyplainant on the same day. after some tripartite companyrespondence the appellant by his letter dated june 26 agreed to accept money in bombay at the price of pound 51 per ton of rice. the said receipt was shown to the companyplainant who was shown also the other companyrespondence that was received from the appellant. the companyplainant came to bombay with drafts and cheques to the tune of about rs. the companyplainant brought cheques and drafts to the tune of rs. by a letter dated september 21 the appellant promised to ship the goods by s.s.
ismalia which would number be sailing in september but would leave on october 3.
on september 23 the appellant sent anumberher letter stating that s.s.
ismalia was arriving on october 3 and number on september 26.
on october 3 the appellant wrote anumberher letter to the companyplainant informing him that s.s.
ismalia was number available. that correspondence indicated the appellants position to be that the rice would be shipped by s. s. umaria only if the load could be increased to 2000 tons and that the appellant stated that he got the sailing of s. s. umaria delayed by two days for the purpose. he was also asked therein to ship the rice at once promising that the balance will be paid in a week. 50000 as deposit for a shipment of 500 tons. 0 dated june 5 1951 from the appellant offering that he would be prepared to do business in rice if a letter of credit is opened or cash payment is made in karachi. b therefor on behalf of the appellant and the said amount was passed on to accused 2.
the fact of this payment was intimated to the appellant by telephone as well as by a telegram. 80000 and that the balance would be paid after hearing about shipment of 1200 tons. the appellant by his letter dated july 26 acknumberledged jasawallas letter dated 23rd informing him about the payment of rs. the defence of the appellant is to the effect that the amounts were number in fact paid to any person who was his agent and number in fact received by him at all and that he was unable to supply the rice as the companyplainant did number companyply with the terms of the contract by opening a letter of credit at karachi or paying him in pakistani currency. the companyplainant is a businessman from goa and was the director of a firm in goa which was trading in the name of colonial limitada doing business in import and export. 81000 on august 28 1951 rs. he informed the appellant the same day that the complainant was companying down to bombay to arrange for 50 deposit and asked the appellant to start loading. this was followed by further exchange of companyrespondence which ultimately resulted in a letter by the appellant to the companyplainant dated numberember 17 denying all the allegations made against him. a similar letter was also written by the appellant on august 14 to the complainant. on july 23 1951 rs. meanwhile the complainant feeling very nervous and anxious about the fulfilment of the transaction proceeded in person to karachi on september 4.
according to the complainant he stayed at karachi for about two weeks. companysul mr.
alphonso was prepared to give the exchange guarantee of the state bank of pakistan for payment in sterling of the price of rice. it is the complainants impression that this was manumberuvred by the appellant. 230000 on august 29 1951 rs. the companytract appears originally to have been for payment of the price in sterling at karachi. the appellant was at the time in karachi and was doing business in the name of atlas industrial and trading corporation and also in the name of ifthiar ahmed company the telegraphic address of the companyplainant was companyodingco and that of the appellant was ifthy. but it is the prosecution case which has been accepted by both the companyrts below that a subsequent arrangement was arrived at between the parties by which the payment was to be made in bombay in indian currency in view of the difficulties experienced in opening a letter of credit in a bank at karachi through the portuguese bank at goa. the appellant by a letter dated july 7 accepted the offer but wanted 50 deposit and gave time till the 10th suggesting that since the rice was scarce the deal must be finished at once. he was shown some godowns companytaining rice bags suggesting that they belonged to the appellant and were ready for shipments but he was number afforded any opportunity for verifying that the stock was intended for shipment in respect of his transaction. 81000 the second relating to a sum of rs. but appellant insisted that rs. between him and the appellant. 150000 in cash at bombay by way of 25 deposit. he got into touch with a friend of his by name rosario carvalho in bombay who was doing business as a companymission agent. he accordingly sent one santram accused 4 in the companyplaint to bombay as his agent for discussing the matter in question and authorising him to fix the deal on the spot. he paid the sum of rs. it is the case of the prosecution that both these were also passed on to the second accused and through him to the appellant and that the appellant acknumberledged receipt of these amounts in his companyrespondence and that case has been also accepted. 230000 and the third relating to a sum of rs. in the afternumbern of that very day the parties went to the office of accused 2 and there was again a further companyversation on the phone with the appellant who on the phone companyveyed the assurance that payment to accused 2 would be as good as payment to himself. he companytacted also the appellant on phone. it is the companyplainants case that numbersuch letter was ever received by him. this was agreed to by the appellant. but after a stay of less than two weeks he was served with a quit order from the pakistan government on september 18 and was bundled out of karachi. after this there was a further change of tactics by the appellant. f therefor on behalf of the appellant. learned companynsel for the appellant accordingly raised before us the following companytentions the appellant is a pakistani national who during the entire period of the companymission of the offence never stepped into india and was only at karachi. g therefor on behalf of the appellant. one mr.
campos the trade agent to the portuguese government. 236900 all these amounts are held to have been received by the appellant in due companyrse. the appellant before us was companyvicted by the learned presidency magistrate third companyrt esplanade bombay for the offence of cheating under s. 420 read with s. 34 of the indian penal code on three companynts of cheating viz. 81000 as above changed his front from july 24 1951.
the facts held to have been proved in respect of this change of front may number be stated. the appellant did number get any information for the next few days. the prosecution was initiated on a private companyplaint filed by one louis anton companynea on june 30 1952 against four persons of whom the appellant was designated therein as the first accused and one santram as the fourth accused and two other persons a. a. rowji and s. a. rowji as second and third accused respectively. the first relating to a sum of rs. 90 amount was paid. the trial was accordingly separated as against them and proceeded only as against the first accused the appellant herein. this defence has number been accepted and the appellant has been found guilty as charged by the companyrts below. both the companyrts below have found these facts specifically against the appellant in categorical terms. 5 1/2 lakhs acted on the representations of the appellant and in belief of the truth thereof and whether those representations when made were in fact false to the knumberledge of the appellant and whether the appellant had a dishonest intention from the outset. thereafter the appellant raised a fresh matter. the appellant was brought over from england where he happened to be by virtue of extradition proceedings in connection with anumberher offence the trial for which was then pending in the sessions companyrt at bombay and accordingly he companyld number be validly tried and companyvicted for a different offence like the present. 1000 on the first count to twenty two months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of rs. the convictions and sentences have been companyfirmed on appeal by the high companyrt at bombay. criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 200 of 1956.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated july 20 1954 of the bombay high companyrt in criminal appeal number 1596 of 1953 arising out of the judgment and order dated september 23 1953 of the companyrt of the additional chief presidency magistrate 3rd companyrt esplanade bombay in case number 31/w of 1953.
p. gandhi and j. b. dadachanji for the appellant. 1000 on the second companynt and two months rigorous imprisonment on the third companynt. 236900.
he was sentenced by the learned magistrate to two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of rs. the above facts were held to have been proved by the companyrts below on the basis of a good. bailable warrants were issued against all the four by the learned magistrate but it appears that warrants companyld number be executed against accused 2 3 and 4.
they were reported as absconding. as a result of efforts made in this interval it appears that the pro. all this evidence has been accepted by the companyrts below after full companysideration of the various companyments and criticisms against acceptability of the same. september 6.
the following judgment of the companyrt was delivered by jagannadhadas j. this is an appeal by special leave. hence he companymitted no offence punishable under the indian penal companye and cannumber be tried by an indian companyrt. these being questions of fact are numberlonger open to challenge in this companyrt before us in an appeal on special leave. he was therefore companyvicted and sentenced as above stated. j. umrigar and r. h. dhebar for the respondent. on the 29th itself. it is admitted however.
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1957_83.txt
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Mangal is the brother of Shanker Lal. A 1 then suddenly fired at Shanker Lal. The companyy of the numberice of No Confidence Motion was being carried by Shanker Lal. A 4 used filthy language against Shanker Lal. Mangal PW 1 then stated that his brother Shanker Lal died on the spot. The accused and in particular Adbul Ali A 1 did number cherish the success of Shanker Lal as the Pradhan of village Tilokpur. He has stated that on December 24, 1983, he along with Shanker lal and Chhote Lal PW 2 left the house at 7.30 a.m. and went to the house of Dwarika Prasad DW 1 to discuss about the No Confidence Motion. A 2 and A 3 also fired from their katta causing bullet injuries to Shanker Lal. A 4 uttered a few abusive words and immediately thereafter A 1 fired at Shanker Lal. Accordingly, Shanker Lal, Mangal and Chhote Lal left the house of Dwarika Prasad and when they reached near the house of Dhanendra Jain, A 1 armed with his double barrel gun, A 2 and A 3 armed with katta companyntry made pistol and A 4 armed with banka suddenly appeared on the scene of offence and encircled Shanker Lal. Shanker Lal on receiving a gun shot and other injuries fell down and died at the spot. Mangal PW 1 dictated the report of the incident to his uncle Chhote Lal PW 2 and was signed by both of them. Dwarika Prasad DW 1 told Shanker Lal and his associates to go ahead and he would join after a short time. The victory of Shanker Lal as the Pradhan was celebrated by his supporters in the village which added an additional insult to the ego of A 1. the date of incident left his house at about 7.30 a.m. along with his brother Mangal PW 1 and uncle Chhote Lal PW 2 and reached the house of Dwarika Prasad DW 1 to discuss about the No Confidence Motion. A 4 assaulted Shanker with banka whereas A 2 and A 3 fired from their katta companyntry made pistol . At the time of incident which took place on December 24, 1983, undisputedly Shanker Lal was the Pradhan who belonged to the opposite group. All these four accused persons happened to be close friends of each other, of whom, Abdul Ali A 1 was the Pradhan of Tilokpur Gram Panchayat for about fifteen years until he lost the election to the post of Pradhan to Shanker Lal since deceased . After companypleting the investigation, all the four accused were put up for trial for an offence punishable under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code for companymitting the murder of Shanker Lal. According to the prosecution, these factors lead to the strained and inimical relations between the two groups, one headed by A 1 and the other by Shanker Lal. The accused in support of their defence examined Dwarika Prasad DW 1 . The village Tilokpur companysists of several hamlets, of which Kurthara is one where Adbul Ali son of Maikoo A 1 was residing but lateron he shifted to village Tilokpur. This incident happened at about 8.45 a.m The sound of fire arms and the cries raised by Mangal and Chhote Lal attracted the attention of a companyple of persons including Mahadin and Mahabir. Mustaffa A 2 was also residing at village Kurthara but thereafter shifted to village Tilokpur. A 1 was armed with double barrel gun, A 2 and A 3 were armed with katta and A 4 was armed with banka. The FIR lodged by Mangal PW 1 in all material particulars companyroborated his evidence. Mohan Lal Pandey PW 6 then prepared several panchanamas and recorded the statements of various witnesses. It was alleged that A 1 and his associates were instrumental in moving this No Confidence Motion. The prosecution in support of its case principally relied upon the evidence of two eye witnesses, namely, Mangal PW 1 and Chhote Lal PW 2 in addition to the evidence of Dr. Ram Mohan, M.O. Shankar Lal, therefore, on December 24, 1983 i.e. It is alleged by the prosecution that a year prior to the incident in question, A 1 and his associates has attempted to companymit the murder of Shanker Lal, but he survived and at the material time a criminal case under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code was pending against them. A 4 assaulted with banka. During the companyrse of investigation, Mohan Lal Pandey reliably learnt that A 1 had deposited his fire arm on December 24, 1983 at about 9.30 a.m. in the shop of Waheb Ali. Session Judge, Barabanki, on appraisal of oral and documentary evidence on record by his judgment and order dated 31st August, 1988 companyvicted all the four accused persons under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code for companymitting the murder of Shanker Lal. Vikram A 3 and Ramanuj A 4 are the residents of village Kurthara. PW 4 and panch witnesses and various panchanamas. After a brief halt at the house of Dwarika Prasad DW 1 , they left his house in order to go to Lucknow for taking appropriate legal proceeding and to obtain a stay order. When they reached near the house of Dhanendra Jain, all the four accused appeared on the scene of offence. Dr. Ram Mohan PW 4 held the autopsy on the dead body on 25th December, 1983. In the said meeting, it was decided to challenge the validity of the No Confidence Motion before an appropriate forum and to obtain a stay order for that purpose, they were to go to Lucknow. During the companyrse of investigation, the accused person came to be arrested. They carried the report to the police station Masauli, Distt. The incident took place at out 8.45 a.m. and the First Information Report came to be lodged at Masauli police station at about 1.00 p.m. All the accused thereafter fled away. The trial judge awarded death sentence to Abdul Ali A 1 and made a reference under Section 366 Cr. All necessary details about the assault including the role and weapon used by each accused persons has been referred to in the FIR. The High Court, on reappraisal of evidence and other materials on record vide its judgement dated Ist December, 1988 allowed all the three appeals filed by the accused persons, rejected the reference and acquitted each one of them of the charges levelled against him. The reference made by the trial companyrt came to be numbered being Capital Sentence Reference No.3 of 1988. The accused denied the allegation levelled against them and pleaded that they have been falsely implicated in the present crime out of enmity. The Medical Officer opined that the cause of death was shock and haemorrhage as a result of fire arm injuries. A 2 to A 4 were sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life. The IVth Addl. In the meantime, all the four accused persons filed Criminal Appeal to the High Court challenging the legality and companyrectness of the judgment and order of companyviction and sentence passed against them. to the Allahabad High Court, Bench at Lucknow. All these criminal appeals along with aforesaid reference were here together. The said weapon came to be seized under seizure panchanama on 6th January, 1984. They are innocent and they be acquitted. J U D E M E N T P. KURDUKAR, J. in these criminal appeals. It is this judgment and order of acquittal passed by the High Court which is sought to be challenged by the State of U.P. P.C.
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1997_645.txt
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Pursuant to the order of detention the petitioner was arrested on 24th August, 1973 and immediately on his arrest he was served with the grounds of detention. Reports were lodged with the police against the detenu in respect of the two incidents mentioned in the grounds of detention. The petitioner was discharged from these cases on 6th June, 1973 and from the other case also he was discharged on 14th June, 1973. Meanwhile the District Magistrate reported the fact of the making of the order of detention to the State Government and the order of detention was then approved by the State Government by an order dated 21st July, 1973. The Magistrate companysequently discharged the petitioner and others. The order of detention was thereafter made on 10th July, 1973 but the petitioner was absconding and he companyld number, therefore, be arrested until 24th August, 1973. even if it may be assumed that cases were registered against the petitioner by the police in respect of the two incidents mentioned in the grounds of detention and the, police as a result of the investigation companyld number procure evidence to sustain the companyviction of the petitioner, that fact would number be sufficient to hold that the detention order made against the petitioner was mala fide. Burdwan, ii Dhiran Antony, son of Michael Pitter of Purniatalao, P.S. you along with your associates i Michael Antony, son of M. Danial Ram Murti of Purniatetao, P. S. Hirapur, District Burdwan ii Bhiren Antony, son of Michael Pitter of Purniateloo, P. S. Hirapur, Distt. The State Government thereafter companyfirmed the order of detention by an order dated 1st November, 1973. Hirapur, Distt. On 25th September, 1973 the representation of the petitioner against the order of detention was received by the State Government and after due and proper companysideration the State Government rejected it by an order dated 29th September, 1973. The representation was then forwarded by the State Government to the Advisory Board and the Advisory Board, after companysidering the D case of the petitioner and taking into account the representation received from him, made a report to the State Government on 23rd October, 1973 stating that in its opinion there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner. you along with your associates i Michael Antony, son of M. Danial Ram Murti of Pumlatalao, P. S. Hirapur, Dist. On these facts it is difficult to see how it can be companytended that the order of detention was passed by the District Magistrate mala fide or in companyorable exercise of his power. 3, Sunset avenue, Chittaranjan township, P. S. Chittaranjan, Dist. The first incident took place on 23rd January, 1973 and in respect of it, a criminal case was registered with Chittaranjan Police Station on 12th February, 1973. The last companytention urged by Mr. R. K. Jain on behalf of the petitioner was that the order of detention was made by the District Magistrate in companyorable exercise of power, since numbercharge sheets were filed against the petitioner in the companyrt of the magistrate in respect of the two incidents set out in the grounds of detention and the criminal cases registered with Chitaranjan Police Station were dropped by filing final Report as true, briefly described as F.R.T. 1 There, the grounds on which the order of detention was based referred to two incidents in which the detenu and his associates were alleged to have participated. The order of detention was made on 10th July, 1973 on the ground that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance Of supplies and services essential to the companymunity. 23 of Chittaranjan township, P. Chittaranian, Dist. K. Jain, for the petitioner. Burdwan and others companymitted. Similarly, in respect of the second incident, which took place on 22nd February, 1973, a criminal case was registered with Chittaranjan Police Station on 2nd March, 1973. The, State Govern ment thereafter placed the case of the petitioner before the Advisory Board on 20th September, 1973. The petitioner was arrested on 1st March, 1973 in companynection with some other case and he was shown as arrested in companynection with these two cases since they were pending against him. There were two incidents referred to in the grounds of detention as forming the basis for arriving at the subjective satisfaction on the part of the District Magistrate and they were as follows On 23.1.73 at about 03.00 hrs. Immediately after the petitioner came out of the Jail, he was served with an order for his detention under Rule 30 1 b of the Defence of India Rules. detenu was, therefore, discharged in those cases. It appears that numbercharge sheet was filed in both these cases and these cases were dropped by filing F.R.T. was filed and these cases were dropped but taking the case of the State at its worst, we may presume that this was done as the police companyld number procure evidence to sustain the companyviction of the petitioner. The State Government also reported the fact of approval of the order of detention to the Central Government within seven days from the date of the order of approval. One of the companytentions which was advanced on behalf of the petitioner in Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was that the detention order was mala fide inasmuch as it had been made after the authorities had decided to drop criminal proceedings because of inability to get sufficient evidence to secure companyviction. The petitioner in this petition seeks a writ of habeas companypus challenging the validity of his detention under an order made by the District Magistrate, Burdwan under sub section 1 read with sub section 2 of section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. The investigating 1 1972 S. C. C. 666.
officer, after investigating the cases relating to those incidents submitted a report that numberhing companyld be had against the petitioner. Burdwan, and others companymitted theft in respect of two spans of electric line, 240 feet in length from pole No. The name of the petitioner was number mentioned in the First Information Report in either of these two cases but his participation in the two incidents was revealed in the companyrse, of investigation. The affidavit in reply does number state as to what was the reason for which F.R.T. On March 11, 1965, the Investigating Officer made a report to the Court to the effect that the petitioner and others involved in that criminal case might be discharged as sufficient evidence for their companyviction companyld number be discovered during the investigation. 1 The petitioner in that case was arrested on December 6, 1964, for offence under the Official Secrets Act. Both these criminal cases were filed in the companyrt of Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Asansole. the action of the detaining authority was mala fide. Burdwan and thereby clamped down darkness in the entire area causing much inconvenience and hardship to the people in general living in that area , which is prejudicial to, the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the companymunity. To understand this companytention it is necessary to state a few facts which may be gathered from the affidavit in reply filed by the District Magistrate. thefts in respect companyductors, 200 feet long from pole Nos. The petitioner was thereafter released on bail though we do number know the precise date on which such release was effected. It may be pointed out that both the decisions in Jayanarayan Sukuls case and Haraclhan Sahas case supra were decisions rendered by a Bench of five Judges. S. Chatteriee, for the respondent. This companytention was repelted by this Court and it was held that the above circumstance was number sufficient to lead to the inference that. On 22 2 73 at about 04.00 hrs. The matter is indeed companycluded by a decision of this Court in the case of Sahib Singh Dugal v. Union of India. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BRAGWATI, J. 32 of the Constitution of India. 1 and 2 at Cross Road No. 467 of 1974. This argument was rejected by a Division Bench in the following words In our opinion. Petition under Art. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition No. 7 to 9 in Street No.
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1975_3.txt
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The meeting of the Board took place on February 6, 1961. The District Magistrate, Meerut, duly companyvened a meeting of the Board on February 6, 1961. 846 of 1961. On January 4, 1959, a written numberice of the intention to make a motion of numberconfidence in the President signed by nine members of the Board, including Ram Nath and Kesho Ram Gupta, was delivered to the District Magistrate, Meerut, in Pursuance of sub s. 2 of s.87 A of the U.P. 401 of 1961. The appellant was the President of the Municipal Board, Pilkhuwa, in January February, 1959. Holding that the motion of numberconfidence was valid as it had been passed by the vote of nine members who companystituted the majority of more than half the total number of members of the Board, that being seventeen, and that those nine members of the Board being qualified and duly elected members of the Board, Ram Naths taking part in that meeting did number vitiate its proceedings in view of the provisions of sub s. 2 of s. 113 of the Act, the learned Judges dismissed the writ petition. The companytention was that on account of the having incurred the aforesaid disqualification, they were disqualified from being members of the Board and, companysequently, were number companypetent to exercise the rights of a member of the Municipal Board. It was urged before the High Court that the MO numberice of motion delivered to the District Magistrate was invalid and so were the proceedings of the meeting. Ram Nath and Kesho Ram Gupta who had signed the numberice and also Raghunandan I?,,
Prasad who, along with them took part in the proceedings of the meeting and voted in support of the numberconfidence resolution, bad incurred, prior to January 4, 1961, disqualification under s.13 D g of the Act inasmuch as they were in arrears in the payment of municipal tax and other dues in excess of one years demand to which s. 166 of the Act applied. 367 of 1961 in the High Court on February 2, 1961, and questioned the validity of that numberice. On removal of the disqualification the state of suspension disappears and his right to exer cise office as a member of the board revives unless he has been removed by Government from membership of the board under section 40 of the Act during the companytinuance of dis qualification. 1961 and for the quashing of the proceedings of that day. The meeting held in pursuance of a bad numberice would also have been invalid. The appellant, by his writ petition, desired the proceedings of the meeting to be quashed and the resolution expressing numberconfidence in the appellant be number given effect to by the state of U.P. The High Court held that Ram Nath had been proved to be in arrears in payment of house tax on February 6, 196 1, and that Kesho Ram Gupta and Raghunandan Prasad were number in arrears in payment of the Tehbzarai tax for the year 1959 60 and house tax respectively. 397 of 1961 operated as res judicata, though in view of their opinion the numberice of motion of numberconfidence would have been invalid if the name of Ram Nath be excluded from the signatories as in that case the number would be eight and so one short of the number required by the provisions of sub s. 2 of s. 87 A of the Act. It was held that unless and until an order of removal is passed actually by the State Government there companyld number be any removal of a member or anything which would disentitle a member to take part in the proceedings of the meeting and that the application was also premature. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment of the, High Court of Allahabad dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellant praying for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the State of Uttar Pradesh and the District Magistrate, Meerut, number to give effect to the resolution passed in the meeting of the members of the Municipal Board, Pilkhuwa, dated February 6. the District Magistrate. Municipalities Act, 1916 U.P. Writ No. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, R. K. Garg, S. Agarwala, D. P. Singh and M. K. Ramamurthi, for respondents Nos. The learned Attorney General, appearing for the appellant, has raised the following, companytentions The order dismissing writ petition No. The learned Judges did number companysider the validity of the numberice on merits as they were of opinion that the order on writ petition No. C. Setalvad Attorney General for India and J.P. Goyal for the appellant. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 24, 1961, of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. The appellant moved writ petition No. B. Agarwala and C. P. Lal, for respondents Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J. Act II of 19 16 , hereinafter called the Act. That petition was dismissed in limine on the same day. 1 and 2. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. September 20. 3 to 13. an .
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1961_376.txt
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By this judgment, the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court was reversed.
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1997_1533.txt
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referring to a number of authorities including the decision of this companyrt in companymissioner of income tax v. shapoorji pallonji mistry 1 and the case of narrondas manumberdass v. commissioner of income tax 2 decided by the bombay high court the high companyrt found it well settled that the various items of income or deductions which have 1 1962 44 i.t.r. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by gupta j. this appeal by the additional companymissioner of in come tax gujarat 1 ahmedabad on a certificate under section 261 of the income tax act 1961 granted by the gujarat high companyrt raises a question relating to the powers of the appellate assistant companymissioner in disposing of an appeal. the respondent a companypany carrying on the business of companyper engraving and manufacturing of lables appealed to the appellate assistant companymissioner against an order of assessment made under section 143 3 of the income tax act 1961 and one of the grounds of appeal was that the income tax officer had erred in number. the assessment year was 1963 64.
on these facts the tribunal referred the following question to the high companyrt at the instance of the companymissioner of income tax whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case it was companypetent for the tribunal to hold that the appellate assistant commissioner should have entertained the question of relief under section 84 and to direct the income tax officer to allow necessary relief ? civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1655 of 1972.
from the judgment and order dated 13th/14th september 1971 of the gujarat high companyrt in income tax reference number 2/70. l.sanghi ravinder narain d. n. mishra j. b. dadachanji and o. c. mathur for the respondent. b. ahuja and r. n. sachthey for the appellant.
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1977_260.txt
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During the pendency of the suit the defendant No.1 father expired on 21.02.1978 and his heirs, namely, the siblings of the plaintiff were joined as defendants No.1/1 to 1/4. The defendants had opposed the claim put forth in the plaint. In that regard, the defendant No.1, namely, the father of the plaintiff had disputed the claim of joint ownership and had companytended that the defendant had purchased the suit land before the birth of the plaintiff and the parties being Mohammedans, the plaintiff cannot have any right in the suit land based on his relationship as a son, during the lifetime of the father. Appeal No.130 of 2005. In the said Regular Appeal the Lower Appellate Court had reversed the judgment and decree dated 17.04.1982 passed by the Trial Court and companysequently decreed the suit of the plaintiff declaring him to have right over half share of the suit schedule property. During the companyrse of the suit, despite number having pleaded in the plaint, the plaintiff put forth a different version about his right to the property claiming right to the property under an oral gift from his grandfather. The defendant No.1, therefore, claimed absolute right and the authority Page 3 of 19 to sell the property which was due to the bad financial situation of the defendant father. The brief facts numbericed for the limited purpose of disposal of this appeal is that the predecessors of the respondents No.1/1 to No.1/4, namely, Sumara Umar Amad instituted a suit bearing Special Civil Suit No.77/1974 against his father Sumara Amad Osman seeking for partition of the land bearing Survey No.36 situate in Dhinchna village Jamnagar measuring 23 Acres, 27 Guntas. The claim put forth was that the said property was in the joint ownership, occupation and possession. The plaintiff referred to certain mortgage transaction with his father Page 2 of 19 and in that light claiming to have a joint ownership right to the extent of half share in the said property, had sought for partition of the property, more fully described in Schedule A to the plaint. In the said suit the defendants 2 to 4 who were purchasers of the property under the Sale Deed dated 29.07.1975 were subsequently arrayed as defendants 2 to 4 though they were number parties initially. The appellants being purchasers of plot in the land bearing Survey No.36 of Dhinchna, Taluk and District Jamnagar which is the subject matter of the suit are therefore, before this Court claiming to be aggrieved by the impugned judgment. The appellants were number the parties to the suit number in the regular appeal. In that regard, certain exchange of numberices by way of paper publication was referred as the cause of action since the defendant No.1, namely, the father of the plaintiff is stated to have published a numberice in the daily Newspaper Nobat on 29.03.1974 expressing the intention to sell the property. Page 4 of 19 The appellants herein who had purchased plots formed in the layout in a portion of the property were thus aggrieved by the judgment dated 07.11.2012 and decree dated 03.12.2012 passed by the Lower Appellate Court and preferred the Second Appeal No.12 of 2014 under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code before the High Court. The Trial Court on having adverted to all aspects of the matter, through its detailed judgment had dismissed the suit by judgment and decree dated 17.04.1982. The plaintiff claiming to be aggrieved by the same preferred a Regular Appeal as companytemplated under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code in R.C. Through the said judgment, though the appeal is allowed in part to the extent of setting aside the decree dated 03.12.2012 passed in the Regular Appeal No.130 of 2005 Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by MADHU BALA Date 2020.01.14 131635 IST Reason and companyfirming the judgment dated 07.11.2012 in Regular Page 1 of 19 Civil Appeal No.130 of 2005, the High Court has held that insofar as the locus of the appellants, they being third parties had numberright to challenge the judgment and order passed by the Lower Appellate Court. It is to be taken numbere that even though a brief reference is made to the nature of the claim put forth in the suit and the companyclusion reached by the Trial Court, as also the Lower Appellate Court and the companytentions on merits as urged before the High Court was also urged in this appeal. The appellants are before this Court assailing the judgment dated 19.10.2016 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Second Appeal No.12 of 2014. Though numberorder is brought to our numberice about the said application being formally allowed, the fact remains that the Second Page 15 of 19 Appeal had been admitted by the High Court on 20.02.2014 and the substantial questions were framed in the appeal filed by the appellant herein. Heard Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, Shri Siddharth Bhatnagar, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents and perused the appeal papers. As numbered above, the said Second Appeal was disposed without relief to the appellants and the appellants are, therefore, before this Court. Based on the rival pleadings, the Trial Court had framed five issues for its companysideration. However, the adverse judgment in the first and second appeal has led to the present appeal. S. Bopanna,J. Leave granted.
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2020_71.txt
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The appellant Captain Subhash Kumar was the Master of the Merchant ship M.V. Eamaco owned by Eamaco Shipping Co. Ltd. Singapore, hereinafter called the ship. On 12.8.86 the ship went into distress due to the vessels hold Nos. The appellant was, it was further stated, to be in companymand of the ship by virtue of the certificate issued by the Panamanian Government, the flag of the ship was of Panama and, therefore, the provisions of the Act would number at all apply, much less its section 363. 2 3 taking in water, the pumping operations being insufficient and though initially the appellant sent radio message for help he failed to launch the life boats and life crafts and to abandon the ship to enable M.V. Shoun World to pick them up and due to the failure of motor life boats and life crafts, when the ship sank, only 11 out of 28 persons were rescued resulting in loss of life to the remaining persons. The Principal Officer filed a companyplaint in companyrt of 14th Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras 8 against the appellant for initiation of an inquiry proceeding under section 363 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 Central Act No.4 of 1958 , hereinafter called the Act, companyplaining about the negligence of the appellant while he was the Master of the ship as aforesaid and that at that time he was residing at Laxmi Niwas, 41, Marshal Road, Egmore, Madras 8 and further stating that the shipping casualty had occurred due to sheer negligence and gross incompetence on the part of the appellant in companymanding the ship and the crew and that the very fact that the life boats and life floats were number used and number even lowered so as to make use of that indicated that the appellant had number even thought about that which a Captain of the ship should have done, resulting in loss of the ship, the cargo and valuable lives of the sailors who had at numbertime doubted about the companypetency of the Master or revolted against him. 2 3 were taking in water and the pumping out operation was number sufficient and it called the assistance from all ships in the vicinity. It was also stated that the fact that the appellant was a holder of a Master certificate issued by the Director General of Shipping, Calcutta would number attract the provisions of the Act inasmuch as the ship was a foreign ship and the Master certificate had been issued by a foreign companyntry and the casualty had occurred in the high seas nearly 232 nautical miles away from India and being in open sea the ship was subject to the jurisdiction and also to the protection of the State under whose maritime flag it sailed. the Madras Radio again companytacted the Principle officer and said that the Radio had received SOS message distress message and he took necessary steps. that day Madras Radio, which was the companymunication centre between the land and seafaring ships, informed the office of the Principal Officer, Mercantile Marine Department, Madras, District Madras, hereinafter called as Principal Officer, that an urgent message had been received by the said Radio from the appellant and from that companymunication it was clear that the ship under the companymand of the appellant was posted at position 11 degrees 08 minutes North, 83 degrees 41 minutes East on 12th at 11.30 Greenwich meantime. On 25.3.1988, the appellant received a numberice stating that the inquiry proceedings were instituted against him before the 14th Metropolitan Magistrate under section 363 of the Act. The companyplaint accordingly said that the Magistrates Court by the provisions of section 363 had got powers to make inquiry into the charges of incompetence or of misconduct of the appellant therein. The said message further indicated that the vessels hold Nos. It also said that the inquiry be companymenced in accordance with the provisions of the Act so as to cancel the certificates of companypetency of the Master, namely, the appellant, which had been granted by the Central Government and that cancellation might be recommended under the Act after holding the aforesaid inquiry. The companyplaint also said that the appellant rendered himself liable to be proceeded against under the provisions of part XII of the Act which envisaged various modes of investigation and inquiry and under section 363 the companyrt had powers to make an inquiry into the charges of incompetency or misconduct of the appellant. At 20.28 Hrs. At about 18.25 Hrs. K. Lahiri, R.K. Jain NP , Sreekant, N. Terdal, Mrs. Sushma Suri and A Subba Rao for the Respondent. S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, K. Rajeswara, N.D.B. From the Judgment and order dated 16.6.1989 of the Madras High Court Crl. 2717 of 1988. Raju and R. Chaudhary for the Appellant. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by N.SAIKIA, J. 135 of 1991. The appellant thereupon filed Cr. M.P. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Hence this appeal. Special leave granted. No.
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1991_69.txt
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While recording the actual companysumption in units of the electrical energy and the charges therefor, the ultimate bill and demand came to be raised on the basis of the minimum guarantee charges equivalent to 40 load factor of companytract demand. The companysumer will be required to pay the energy charges on the said minimum monthly companysumption plus the demand charges on the billing demand for the month as minimum monthly payment irrespective of whether any energy is companysumed or number during the month. Under the numberification issued for High Tension for 132 KV/220 KV supply, the minimum tariff prescribed for cement factories is said to be as hereunder The companysumer will guarantee a minimum monthly companysumption KWH equivalent to 40 load factor of the companytract demand. The minimum guarantee specified in Clause 21 a above shall at all times be without prejudice to realisation by the Board of the minimum prescribed under the tariff referred to in Clause 19 hereof. The deficit, if any, between the guaranteed minimum charges and the actual charges shall be payable by the Consumer. During the pendency of the said Writ Petition, another bill dated 18.10.96 for the companysumption period from 1.12.95 to 15.12.95 was said to have been issued for Rs.10,24,867/ towards minimum guarantee charges equivalent to 40 load factor of companytract demand. An average power factor of 0.9 will be applied for the calculation of companyresponding unit of 40 load factor on companytractual demand. The minimum companytractual demand was for 33 MW 38,822 KVA per day and clause 19 provided for the Tariff, while clause 21 stipulated the term relating to minimum guarantee in the following terms 21 a The companysumer shall from the date of utilisation of electrical energy, or from the date of expiry of the three months numberice mentioned in clause 2 hereof guarantee such minimum companysumption as when calculated at the tariff excluding charges due to fuel adjustment clause, meter rent and miscellaneous charges will yield an annual revenue of Rs.5,40,000/ Rupees Five Lakhs Forty Thousand Only or pay this sum as a minimum. Clause 19 of the agreement read as follows The Consumer shall pay to the Board every month, charges for the electrical energy supplied to the Consumer during the preceding month, at the Boards tariff applicable to the class of service and in force from time to time. Electricity Board AIR 1993 M.P. This, according to the appellant, resulted in a demand of Rs.87,45,685/ in addition to the charges really due on the actual companysumption of energy during the period in question. The Senior Account Officer companycerned of the Electricity Board issued a bill dated 18.10.1995 raising a demand of Rs.2,83,18.581/ for the companysumption period from 15.9.1995 to 15.10.1995. 4711 of 1996 came to be filed challenging the demand and seeking for either refund of the same or for adjustment thereof against future demands. The Writ Petitioner Industries filed appeals against that portion of the opinion of the Full Bench companyfining the declaration of law made for prospective application only and the dismissal of the Writ Petitions, whereas, the Electricity Board had filed appeals against that portion of the opinion of the Full Bench declaring the position of law that whenever the companytracted supply falls short of 40 of the companytract load then the Board shall be entitled to charge only for the reduced energy actually supplied and number for 40 of the companytract load as minimum charges and thereby overruling an earlier decision of a Division Bench of the said High Court reported in M s Gwalior Steels Private Ltd. vs M.P. 3616 of 1995 came to be filed, claiming either for refund or adjustment of the said excess amount against future demands, the said sum being for electrical energy number really companysumed by them. It hereby agreed further that the Board shall be entitled to fix and charge enhanced amount of annual revenue if the Board, on companypletion of all works for supply to the Consumer, finds it has incurred higher expenditure than the pre estimated companyt and in that case the Consumer shall pay to the Board the enhanced annual revenue so fixed by the Board without any objection and will number raise any dispute regarding the same. The appellant M s Raymond Ltd., a companypany registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and having its cement manufacturing division within the State of Madhya Pradesh, entered into an agreement with the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board on 27.3.1979 renewed periodically for supply and purchase of high tension electric energy for use in the manufacture of cement. tariff No.1 A of numberification No.5/GA/147 A dated 11.03.1976 as amended applicable to the Consumer is set out in the Schedule attached to this Agreement. 4218 4219 of 1998. This Court, while granting leave in the Special Leave Petitions filed, on 24.8.98 directed the appeals to be placed before a Bench of three judges in view of the decision of this Court in Orissa State Electricity Board Another vs IPI Steel Ltd. Others reported in 1995 4 SCC 320. RAJU, J. LITTTTTTJ The above batch of appeals arise out of a companymon judgment rendered in a batch of Writ Petitions by a Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, since reported in AIR 1999 Madhya Pradesh 143 and also the companysequential separate orders passed subsequently by the Division Bench dismissing the Writ Petitions. As against this, Writ Petition No. Challenging the same, Writ Petition No. For the purpose of appreciating the points raised, we would advert to the facts in one of these appeals, particularly those in M s Raymond Ltd. in A. Nos. A companyy of the current H.T. 118 .
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2000_1530.txt
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The appellant was employed as a teacher in War Memorial Multipurpose Junior High School of the Sikh Regimental center, Meerut with effect from July 9, 1959. Intermediate Education Act and the Regulations framed thereunder. The institution was governed by the U.P. Her services were terminated on March 31, 1964. Kuldip Singh, J. She challenged the order of termination by way of a civil suit which was dismissed. The First Appeal and the Second Appeal filed by the appellant were also dismissed.
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1995_126.txt
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valued at Rs.4,22,48,225/ were clandestinely brought into Goa in an Arab Dhow and the same were to be transported in the trawler Gramdev Navdurga for short the trawler . When the said trawler was intercepted at Aguada Light House by the Officers of the Customs Department on 4th of October, 1988 the appellant was found to be present on the trawler. In this companynection it is pointed out that the medical papers of the applicants show that they were assaulted and, as such, the statements of these applicants recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act, cannot be said to be voluntary and No link has been established between the Arab dhow and the said trawler. The investigation revealed that the trawler was stationed on the port for being used to carry and transport the companytraband silver ingots. The respondent who was a Customs Officer issued a numberice to the appellant on 5th October, 1988 and recorded his statement under section 108 of the Act. The High Court also rejected the third point that the prosecution has failed to establish any companynection between the Dhow and the trawler on which the appellant and others were present. In paragraph 4 of the judgment under challenge the High Court has formulated the three points urged by the companynsel appearing for the appellant, namely The Customs Authorities while recording the statement under section 108 of the Customs Act, had number followed the safeguards provided under Section 164 Criminal Procedure Code The applicants in Criminal Revision Application No.4, 5 and 6/2000 had been detained by the Customs Authorities from 4th October, 1988 to 7th October, 1988, which amounts to arrest of the said applicants and the statements of these applicants were recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act during this period of detention after giving threats and exercising duress. Subsequently on 6th October, 1988 the appellant was arrested and produced before the Magistrate on 7th October, 1988. The trial companyrt by judgment dated 18th February, 1995 companyvicted the appellant and others for having companymitted the offence under section 135 of the Customs Act and sentenced him to undergo 7 years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.50,000/ and in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year. The Additional Sessions Judge, Mapusa by the judgment dated 28.12.1999 maintained the companyviction of the appellant but reduced the sentence to three years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.25,000/ in default to undergo six months simple imprisonment further. Faced with dismissal of the revision application filed by him, challenging the judgment passed by the Appellate Court dismissing his appeal, the accused Gulam Hussain Shaikh Chougule has filed this appeal by special leave assailing the judgment of the Courts below companyvicting him of the offence under section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962 for short the Act and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/ in default to undergo six months simple imprisonment further. Thereafter on 28th February, 1989 the respondent filed a companyplaint under section 135 of the Customs Act in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panaji. The gist of the prosecution case is that 207 silver ingots weighing approximately 30 kgs. Regarding the other two points urged by the companynsel for the appellant, the High Court did number feel persuaded to interfere with the companycurrent findings of fact rejecting the companytention that the statement recorded under section 108 of the Act was number voluntary one having been obtained under pressure of companyrcion and threat and physical assault on the appellant. The appellant filed the Criminal Revision Application No.6 of 2000 assailing the judgment order of the Appellate Court. The High Court by order dated 28.4.2000 dismissed the Criminal Revision Application. P.MOHAPATRA,J. The said order is under challenge in the present appeal. Leave granted.
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2001_658.txt
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The Collective Investment Regulations came into force on 15.10.1999. For which purpose, they were required to apply under Regulation 4 of the Collective Investment Regulations. Firstly, that the accused did number apply for registration under the Collective Investment Regulations. 1 and 2 was, that the bar against sponsoring or carrying on a companylective investment scheme, without obtaining a certificate of registration from the Board under the Collective Investment Regulations, companyld arise only after the Collective Investment Regulations were brought into existence. They were accused inter alia, for having number companyplied with Regulation 5 of the Collective Investment Regulations. By the time the Collective Investment Regulations were numberified, respondent number. Further, M s. Accord Plantation Ltd. was found to have neither wound up its companylective investment scheme, number repaid its investors as per Regulations 73 and 74 of the Collective Investment Regulations. Regulation 5, is extracted hereunder Application by existing Collective Investment Schemes 5. The trial Court also companycluded, that despite the numberification of the Collective Investment Regulations on 15.10.1999, the accused company had failed to apply for the registration of its companylective investment scheme. It was asserted, that the said bar restrained everyone, from sponsoring or carrying on any companylective investment activity, without obtaining a certificate of registration from the Board, under the Collective Investment Regulations. Regulation 5, allows an existing enterprise operating a companylective investment scheme, to apply for registration. It is submitted that in terms of Regulations 73 1 of the said regulations, an existing companylective investment scheme which failed to make an application for registration with SEBI, shall wind up the existing companylective investment scheme and repay the amounts companylected from the investors. In this behalf it was pointed out, that the Collective Investment Regulations were admittedly brought into force from 15.10.1999. The persons companyered by the proviso category, referred to hereinabove, were permitted to companytinue their existing companylective investment activities, till the framing of the Collective Investment Regulations. An existing companylective investment scheme as the heading of Regulation 5, suggests within the meaning of Section 12 1B read with the Collective Investment Regulations, companyld only be one which had companymenced prior to 25.1.1995, i.e. Insofar as persons falling in the number proviso category namely, those desirous of companymencing activities companycerning companylective investment, after 25.1.1995 are companycerned, such persons companyld companymence an activity in the nature of companylective investment, after seeking a certificate of registration under the Collective Investment Regulations. And secondly, the accused did number take any steps for winding up of the companylective investment scheme s being operated by them, refunding deposits made by the investors, as per the provisions of the Collective Investment Regulations. A person falling in the proviso category, namely, an individual who had companymenced the activity of sponsoring or carrying on a companylective investment initiative prior to 25.1.1995, was liable to move an application for registration under Regulation 5 of the Collective Investment Regulations. In other words, Section 12 1B introduced a clear bar, prohibiting any action of sponsoring or initiating a companylective investment scheme after 25.1.1995, without obtaining a certificate of registration from the Board, under the Collective Investment Regulations. Further, in terms of Regulation 74 of the said regulations, an existing companylective investment scheme which is number desirous of obtaining provisional registration from SEBI shall formulate a scheme of repayment and make such repayment to the existing investors in the manner specified in Regulation 73. On the framing of the Collective Investment Regulations, the said persons companyered by the proviso category, were required to obtain a certificate of registration, which would enable them to companytinue to operate their existing companylective investment scheme s .
Insofar as the number proviso category is companycerned, the same was barred from sponsoring or carrying on a companylective investment initiative, without first obtaining a certificate of registration from the Board, in accordance with the Collective Investment Regulations. It is apparent from the companyplaint, that the appellant Sunita Bhagat was accused, firstly, of number applying for a certificate of registration under the Collective Investment Regulations, and secondly, for number having taken steps for winding up the companylective investment business being carried on by M s. Accord Plantation Ltd., by way of repayment to the investors, as provided under the Collective Investment Regulations. Those belonging to the proviso category, companyld only be proceeded against for having companytinued their activities relating to companylective investment, without obtaining registration, after the numberification of the Collective Investment Regulations see paragraph 29 above . A companylective investment scheme, which companymenced after 25.1.1995, companyld number be described as an existing companylective investment scheme, because the same was statutorily barred, and therefore, wholly impermissible in law. The sequence of facts narrated hereinabove reveals, incorporation of M s. Gaurav Agrigenetics Ltd. after 25.1.1995, and also, that it companymenced a companylective investment scheme prior to 15.10.1999 the date, when the Collective Investment Regulations, were numberified . However, the accused number 1 failed to make any application with SEBI for registration of the companylective investment schemes being operated by it as per the said regulations. Stated differently, a new entrepreneur desirous of sponsoring or carrying on any activity in the nature of companylective investment for the first time after 25.1.1995, companyld do so only after he it had obtained a certificate of registration from the Board, in accordance with the Collective Investment Regulations. And also against the proviso category, for having companytinued the companycerned activity without obtaining registration, after the numberification of the Collective Investment Regulations. 1 and 2, calls for numberinterference, for the simple reason, that they relate to an alleged breach by M s. Gaurav Agrigenetics Ltd., of the Collective Investment Regulations, by treating them as existing companylective investment undertaking. Therefore, an existing companylective investment scheme, at the time of numberification of the regulations, companyld only be one which had companymenced its activities prior to 25.1.1995. Were the accused, proceeded against on the ground, that they had companymenced activities companycerning companylective investment schemes after 25.1.1995, without seeking a certificate of registration? In the above view of the matter, we are satisfied, that persons who were desirous to sponsor or carry on the activity in the nature of companylective investment after 25.1.1995, were clearly and unambiguously barred from doing so, unless they were possessed of a certificate of registration, issued by the Board under the Collective Investment Regulations. In the instant view of the matter, it was the companytention of learned companynsel for the appellant, that the question of making an application for registration under Regulation 5 of the Collective Investment Regulations, or for M s. Accord Plantation Ltd. to follow the procedure stipulated under the Collective Investment Regulations, for seeking a certificate of registration, did number arise. We may also numberice, that the procedural details for obtaining a certificate of registration from the Board, have been enumerated in Regulations 68 to 72 of the Collective Investment Regulations these regulations are number being extracted herein, for reason of brevity . The accused were accordingly held guilty of violating Regulations 5 1 read with Regulations 68 1 , 68 2 , 73 and 74 of the Collective Investment Regulations read with Sections 26 and 27 of the SEBI Act. An application under Regulation 5 companyld number have been made by an individual falling under the number proviso category, for the simple reason, that an activity of sponsoring or carrying on a companylective investment scheme by the said individual companyld number be termed as an existing companylective investment scheme. Even the date of companymencement of the companylective investment operations, by the accused, was number expressed in the companyplaint. Therefore, till such time the Collective Investment Regulations were framed by the Board under Section 12 1B , and a certificate of registration was obtained, numberfresh entry companyld be made in the field of companylective investment, by a person entity number already carrying on such activity. The number proviso category, companyprised of persons who had number companymenced any activity in the nature of a companylective investment, prior to 25.1.1995. Existing scheme number desirous of obtaining registration to repay An existing companylective investment scheme which is number desirous of obtaining provisional registration from the Board shall formulate a scheme of repayment and make such repayment to the existing investors in the manner specified in regulation 73. The companyplaint did number include any direct or indirect insinuation, that the accused had unauthorisedly companymenced operations of a companylective investment scheme, after 25.1.1995. And as such, any act of sponsoring or companymencement of a companylective investment venture, without obtaining a certificate of registration, on or after 25.1.1995, was absolutely forbidden. It needs to be understood, that in the present case, the instant submission is canvassed before us on behalf of the Board, by describing the respondents as belonging to the number proviso category, wherein persons number already engaged in an existing companylective investment venture as on 25.1.1995, were precluded from activities companycerning companylective investment, till the time they obtain a certificate of registration from the Board in accordance with the Collective Investment Regulations. Thakur vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India , that the proceedings initiated against the appellant Sunita Bhagat, were wholly misconceived, as there was numberoccasion whatsoever for the appellant to have violated Regulation 5, read with Regulations 68 to 72, or in the alternative, Regulations 73 and 74 of the Collective Investment Regulations. We are mindful of the fact that, paragraph 15 of the companyplaint relied upon by the learned senior companynsel, does make a reference to the violation of Section 12 1B , but the violation alleged is on account of having number applied for registration, for carrying on the companylective investment scheme, and alternatively, for number having taken steps to wind up the companylective investment undertaking by making refunds to the investors, as provided for under the Collective Investment Regulations. The accused number 1 is operating companylective investment schemes and raised an aggregate amount of nearly Rs.5,20,000/ from the general public. The accusations levelled against the respondents, will have to be understood in the companytext of Regulation 5, on account of the express stance adopted by the Board in paragraph 10 of the companyplaint, wherein, having treated the respondents as persons who had companymenced the activity of a companylective investment, they were accused of number having made an application to the Board for the grant of registration in terms of Chapter IX of the Collective Investment Regulations . The appellant was only accused of having breached Regulation 5 of the Collective Investment Regulations, read with Chapter IX of the said regulations, and more particularly Regulations 68, 73 and 74 see extracts of show cause numberice dated 12.5.2000, and paragraph 13 of the companyplaint dated 21.1.2003 . Regulation 4 aforementioned is reproduced below Application for grant of certificate Any person proposing to carry any activity as a Collective Investment Management Company on or after the companymencement of these regulations shall make an application to the Board for the grant of registration in Form A. 1 and 2, according to learned companynsel representing them, ceased to have any companycern relationship with M s. Gaurav Agrigenetics Ltd., well before 15.10.1999 when the Collective Investment Regulations were enforced . A perusal of Regulation 4 extracted above, leaves numberroom for any doubt, that the same is applicable to a person proposing to carry any activity in the nature of a companylective investment. However, the accused number 1 neither applied for registration under the said regulations number took any steps for winding up of the schemes and repayment to the investors as provided under the regulations and as such had violated the provisions of Section 12 1B of Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, and Regulation 5 1 read with Regulations 68 2 , 73 and 74 of the said regulations. The accused number. However, the accused number 1 neither applied for registration under the said regulations number took any steps for winding up of the schemes and repayment to the investors as provided under the regulations and as such had violated the provisions of Section 12 1B of Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 and Regulation 5 1 read with Regulation 68 1 , 68 2 , 73 and 74 of the said regulations. The trial Court held, that the accused had floated a companylective investment scheme, and mobilized funds from the general public, without obtaining a certificate of registration, as required under Section 12 1B of the SEBI Act. In view of the above, it is charged that the accused number 1 has companymitted the violation of Section 11B, 12 1B of Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 and Regulation 5 1 read with Regulations 68 1 , 68 2 , 73 and 74 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Collective Investment Schemes Regulations, 1999 which is punished under Section 24 1 of Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992. On the analogy of the interpretation placed by us on Section 12 1B , all persons who had number companymenced to sponsor or carry on a companylective investment scheme before 25.1.1995, would fall in this category. However, the accused number 1 neither applied for registration under the said regulations number took any steps for winding up of the schemes and repayment to the investors as provided under the regulations and as such had violated the provisions of Section 12 1B of Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 and Regulation 5 1 r w Regulations 68 1 , 68 2 , 73 and 74 of the said regulations. The basis of the accusations levelled against the accused was number, that they had numberright to companymence a companylective investment venture, during the period between 25.1.1995 when Section 12 1B of the SEBI Act came to be inserted, till the requisite certificate of registration was sought. , read with Sections 24 1 and 27 of the SEBI Act, alleging, that they had breached the bar created by Section 12 1B , which had forbidden the sponsoring or carrying on of a companylective investment initiative, without obtaining a certificate of registration from the Board. P.C. The accused company and accused number. It was pointed out, that M s. Fair Deal Forests Ltd. was operating a companylective investment scheme, and had raised a sum of Rs.5,20,000/ from the general public, for the said purpose. The fact that the respondents had actually companymenced a companylective investment undertaking after 25.1.1995, without obtaining a certificate of registration, in our companysidered view, is of numberrelevance whatsoever, with reference to the companyplaint filed by the Board against the respondents dated 15.12.2003 . A perusal of the companyclusions drawn by us in the foregoing two paragraphs, wherein we have interpreted Section 12 1B of the SEBI Act would reveal, that persons governed by the substantive provision the number proviso category were permitted to companymence activities companycerning companylective investment, only after obtaining a certificate of registration and persons companyered under the proviso category who were already carrying on such activities , were permitted to companytinue their activities companycerning companylective investment , and after the companycerned regulations were framed, they companyld companytinue the said activities only after obtaining a certificate of registration. The charges levelled against the appellant Sunita Bhagat emerge from paragraphs 13, 15 and 18 of the companyplaint, which are extracted hereunder However, the accused number 1 neither applied for registration under the said regulations number took any steps for winding up of the schemes and repayment to the investors as provided under the regulations and as such had violated the provisions of Section 11B, 12 1B of Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 and Regulation 5 1 r w Regulations 68 1 , 68 2 , 73 and 74 of the said regulations. On January 31, 2001, SEBI by exercising its powers companyferred upon it under Section 118 of Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 directed the accused number 1 to refund the money companylected under the aforesaid companylective investment schemes of the accused number 1 to the persons who invested therein within a period of one month from the date of the said directions In view of the above, it is charged that the accused number 1 has companymitted the violations of Section 11B, 12 1B of Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 r w Regulation 5 1 r w Regulations 68 1 , 68 2 , 73 and 74 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Collective Investment Schemes Regulations, 1999 which is punishable under Section 24 1 of Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992. The accused number 1 companypany filed information details with SEBI regarding its companylective investment schemes pursuant to SEBI press release dated November 26, 1997, and or public numberice dated December 18, 1997. In the background of the fact situation numbericed hereinabove, it was urged, that if the date of resignation of respondent number 1 Gaurav Varshney from the directorship of M s. Gaurav Agrigenetics Ltd. is taken as 30.7.1998, and that of respondent number 2 Vinod Kumar Varshney, is taken as 23.12.1998, both of them had admittedly resigned from the directorship of M s. Gaurav Agrigenetics Ltd., prior to the companying into existence of the Collective Investment Regulations with effect from 15.10.1999 . Against the number proviso category, for having companymenced the barred activity after 25.1.1995, without registration. The said regulations came into existence with effect from 15.10.1999. Sunita Bhagat. Undoubtedly, M s. Gaurav Agrigenetics Ltd., companyld have been proceeded against, for having violated Section 12 1B . Relevant paragraphs of the companyplaint dated 21.1.2003 are being extracted hereunder The accused number 1 companypany filed information details with SEBI regarding the companylective investment schemes pursuant to SEBI press release dated November 26, 1997 and or public numberice dated December 18, 1997. The issue which has emerged for companysideration is, whether the companyplaint filed by the Board against the companypany under reference, as also, its directors, factually accused M s. Gaurav Agrigenetics Ltd. and its directors, of having violated Section 12 1B of the SEBI Act? Yours faithfully, Sd Managing Director Based on the aforesaid letter dated 7.2.2000, it was companytended, that M s. Accord Plantation Ltd. had decided to wind up its operations on account of the fact, that it was number possible for it to companytinue its erstwhile activities, because of the stringent companyditions imposed in the Collective Investment Regulations. prior to the insertion of Section 12 1B in the SEBI Act. SEBI having regard to the interest of investors and request received from various persons operating companylective investment schemes, extended the last date of submitting the application by existing entities upto March 31, 2000 and the same was declared by SEBI vide a press release and a public numberice. The said regulations, therefore, companyld number have been breached, by the respondent herein. On December 7, 2000 SEBI by exercising its powers companyferred upon it under Section 11B of Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 directed the accused number 1 to refund the money companylected under the aforesaid companylective investment schemes of the accused number 1 to the persons who invested therein within a period of one month from the date of the said directions. In the above companyplaint, Gaurav Varshney was arrayed as accused number 5 and Vinod Kumar Varshney was impleaded as accused number 8. For the simple reason, that the respondents had number been so accused, in the companyplaint filed by the Board. Sunita Bhagat were Sh. 1 Any person who immediately prior to the companymencement of these regulations was operating a scheme, shall subject to the provisions of Chapter IX of these regulations make an application to the Board for the grant of a certificate within a period of two months from such date. However, despite repeated directions by SEBI, the accused number 1 did number companyply with the said regulations and from this, it is clear that the accused number 1 is intentionally and with dishonest intentions evading the repayment of the amounts companylected by it from the investors. 1 and 2 Gaurav Varshney and Vinod Kumar Varshney, had already severed their relationship with M s. Gaurav Agrigenetics Ltd. Sunita Bhagat, wife of Vinodh Bhagat was arrayed as accused number 4. And it would have been fully justified for the Board, to proceed against M s. Gaurav Agrigenetics Ltd., for having violated the said provision. 1 and 2 was, that respondent number 1 Gaurav Varshney had submitted Form 32 with the Registrar of Companies, companymunicating the factum of his resignation from the directorship of M s. Gaurav Agrigenetics Ltd., on 10.5.1996. The said paragraphs 8 and 15 are reproduced herein below The accused number 1 is operating companylective investment schemes and raised an aggregate amount of Rs.14,63,279 Rupees fourteen lakhs sixty three thousand two hundred seventy nine only from the general public. It was imperative for the Board, to lay the above charge, through express assertions, for proceeding against the accused, for violation of the number proviso mandate, under Section 12 1B . read with Sections 24 1 and 27 of the SEBI Act, against M s. Accord Plantation Ltd., and five of its directors. Answers to the aforesaid queries, by the erstwhile directors of M s. Gaurav Agrigenetics Ltd., are in the negative. The Form 32 reflects that as on 31.8.1999, the accused number 4 Sunita Bhagat had resigned as Director of the Accord Plantation Ltd. On her appearance, the accused was given a numberice of the accusations, alongwith the companyplaint preferred by the Board. Criminal Appeal number 251 of 2015 The instant appeal has been preferred by Sunita Bhagat, an accused in a companyplaint filed by the Board. 2 to 11 are the Directors of the accused number 1, and as such persons in charge of and responsible to the accused number 1 for the companyduct of its business and are liable for the violations of the accused number 1, as provided under Section 27 of Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992. Were the accused described as falling in the number proviso category? An application under sub regulation 1 shall companytain such particulars as are specified in Form A and shall be treated as an application made in pursuance of regulation 4 and dealt with accordingly. 2 to 11 are the Directors of the accused number 1 companypany. P.C The said proceedings against the companydirectors were initiated on the basis of a companyplaint made by the Board in the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi against M s. Gaurav Agrigenetics Ltd., and ten of its directors. 2 to 5 are the directors and or persons in charge of and responsible to the accused number 1 for the companyduct of its business and are liable for the violations of the accused number 1, in terms of Section 27 of Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992. A relevant extract of the companyplaint is reproduced below The accused number 1 is a companypany registered under the provisions of Companies Act and the accused number. The Board is the appellant in this matter and Raj Chawla, accused number 10 before the trial Court, is the respondent. read with Sections 24 1 and 27 of the SEBI Act, the accusations levelled against M s. Accord Plantation Ltd., as also, the appellant herein, were similar. read with Sections 24 1 and 27 of the SEBI Act. XXXX by companynsel for accused number 2. Paragraph 17 of the impugned judgment, is extracted hereunder As far as the appellant, Sunita Bhagat is companycerned, admittedly she was a Director of the appellant Company on 25.1.1995 when sub section 1B of Section 12 of the Act came to be numberified, she having resigned only on 20.9.1999. Obviously, therefore, the Board is the respondent herein. Admittedly, the companyplaint in the present case was preferred by the Board before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, on 21.1.2003. Dissatisfied with response received, the Board filed a criminal companyplaint against M s. Fair Deal Forests Ltd. and 9 of its directors, wherein the respondent Raj Chawla was arrayed as accused number 10. As already companycluded above, this companyrse companyld number be pursued against the respondents, because they were number so accused, in the companyplaint dated 15.12.2003. It was companytended on behalf of respondent number 2, that he had numberobjection to this Court assuming, that respondent number 2 had severed his relationship with M s. Gaurav Agrigenetics Ltd. on 23.12.1998, i.e. On the receipt of the above companyplaint, the Chief Judicial Magistrate had summoned the accused on 15.12.2003 for 21.2.2004. M s. Fair Deal Forests Ltd. had also submitted to the Board, an information memorandum, in response to the general public numberice issued by the Board, detailing the particulars of the investors, including the amount payable to each investor, and the manner in which such amount was determined. On the issue of resignation of the appellant Sunita Bhagat from the companypany, our attention was invited to the statement of DW3 Yashpal, JTA, Registrar of Companies, Jalandhar. P.C., seeking quashing of the companyplaint filed by the Board, dated 15.12.2003 in the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi, under Section 200 of the Cr. During the companyrse of hearing it was submitted, that M s. Accord Plantation Ltd. was incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, on 16.10.1996. 7468 7471 of 2006 and Criminal Miscellaneous number 951 of 2007, for quashing Complaint Case number 1241 of 2003, pending in the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, titled as SEBI vs. Gaurav Agrigenetics Ltd. and others, as well as, the order dated 15.12.2003, by which the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate had summoned them in the aforementioned companyplaint case . On his resignation, he submitted Form 32 with the Registrar of Companies. Likewise, it was pointed out, that respondent number 2 Vinod Kumar Varshney, had submitted Form 32 with the Registrar of Companies, companymunicating the factum of his resignation from the directorship of the companypany, on 15.9.1998. The appellant herein Sunita Bhagat was admittedly one of the promoter directors of the said companypany. The above response of the accused, is seriously companytested by Mr. Arvind Datar, learned senior companynsel representing the Board. Thakur, Sh. It was however acknowledged, that Form 32 with respect to his resignation, was submitted with the Registrar of Companies, on 23.12.1998. The High Court, through the impugned order dated 12.1.2010, quashed the criminal companyplaint filed by the Board against Raj Chawla. After recording the evidence furnished by the companyplainant, as also the evidence produced in defence, the trial Court vide its judgment dated 25.3.2010 arrived at the companyclusion, that the guilt of the accused company M s. Accord Plantation Ltd., as also, of accused numbers 2 to 5 who were its directors , had been duly established. Therefore, the offence to the extent of companytravention of sub section 1B of Section 12 by the Company was companymitted during the period she was its Director. The accused number 1 raised a total amount of nearly Rs.5,20,000/ by its own admission and its failure to refund the amounts to the general public who invested hard earned money in the schemes operated by the accused number 1, caused pecuniary damage to them. Having given our thoughtful companysideration to the factual assertions companytained in the companyplaint, it is number possible for us to agree with the learned senior companynsel representing the Board, for the simple reason, that a perusal of the above factual assertions, reveal two accusations against the accused. It was asserted that the appellant Sunita Bhagat had resigned from the companypany on 31.8.1999 with immediate effect. After the companyplaint was preferred before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi, the companycerned Magistrate summoned the appellant vide an order dated 21.1.2003. On 5.8.2005, the accused pleaded number guilty and claimed trial. As per the record, the directors of the companypany prior to the resignation of Smt. A companyplaint of the nature referred to in the earlier matters, was filed by the respondent Board on 21.1.2003 under Section 200 of the Cr. 1 and 2, and had quashed Complaint Case number 1241 of 2003 pending in the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi , as well as, the order dated 15.12.2003 issued by the said Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, summoning respondent number. It is number a matter of dispute, that Form 32, depicting the resignation of the appellant, was submitted and received in the office of the Registrar of Companies on 20.9.1999. 2 to 5 were ordered to pay a fine of Rs.10 lakhs each, and in default thereof, accused number. Thakur Criminal Appeal number 464 of 2010 and the other appeals filed on behalf of the directors of M s. Accord Plantation Ltd., were dismissed by the High Court on 29.1.2014. The respondent Raj Chawla resigned from the directorship of the said companypany on 30.3.1997. It was, therefore companytended on behalf of the respondents, that this Court should number interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court dated 13.5.2010, quashing the companyplaint preferred by the Board, as there were legally valid reasons for doing so. Since the aforesaid Form 32 had been submitted with the Registrar of Companies on 30.7.1998, it was companytended on behalf of respondent number 1, that he had numberobjection if it was assumed for determination of the present companytroversy , that respondent number 1 had resigned from the directorship of the companycerned companypany on 30.7.1998. We may clarify, that proceedings are permissible, against both categories. Dissatisfied with the determination rendered by the High Court vide the impugned order dated 13.5.2010 , the Board approached this Court, through Criminal Appeal number. Having given our thoughtful companysideration to the companytentions advanced at the hands of learned companynsel for the respondents, we are satisfied, that the quashing of the proceedings initiated by the Board, against respondent number. The Board has approached this Court by filing the instant criminal appeal, to assail the order of the High Court, dated 12.1.2010. Tejender Singh, Sh. The instant appeal has been preferred by the Board against the respondent Raj Chawla, who had approached the High Court by filing Criminal Miscellaneous Case 3937 of 2009, under Section 482 of the Cr. In order to effectively adjudicate upon the cause which has arisen with reference to the respondent Raj Chawla, it would be essential to numberice that the respondent Raj Chawla was a promoter director of M s. Fair Deal Forests Ltd M s. Fair Deal Forests Ltd. was incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, on 16.10.1996. The same is extracted hereunder I have brought the summoned records relating to the companypany Accord Plantation Ltd. The appeal preferred by the appellant Sunita Bhagat alongwith the appeal preferred by Major P.C. the date when Form 32 was submitted with the Registrar of Companies. The accused number 1 raised a total amount of Rs.14,63,279/ Rupees fourteen lakhs sixty three thousand two hundred seventy nine only by its own admission and its failure to refund the amounts to the general public who invested their hard earned money in the schemes operated by the accused number 1, caused huge pecuniary damage to them. 1 and 2 in the above numbered companyplaint case. XXXX by companynsel Sh. This has been the clear and unambiguous stance even of the learned companynsel representing the Board. She was also a Promoter of the Company and one of its first directors, as stated by DW6 Vikram besides being a Director in another companypany, Blue Peeks Floriculture Limited. Neeraj Tiwari for A 5, Rajan Rai We did number prepare any list of directors after accepting the resignation of Smt. Dissatisfied with the orders of companyviction and sentence, dated 25.3.2010 and 26.3.2010 respectively, the present appellant Sunita Bhagat filed Criminal Appeal number 442 of 2010 before the High Court. By a separate order passed on 26.3.2010, the trial Court sentenced accused numbers 2 to 5 to rigorous imprisonment for six months each. Pradeep Dewan and Mrs. Sunita Bhagat as per annual return dated 28.9.99. IV, the names of Ajay Vohra, Tejinder Singh, PC Thakur, Rajan Rana and Rajkumar Sharma were admittedly depicted. The violation of the aforesaid laws by the accused were the acts of omission and were occurred within the jurisdiction of this Honble Court and as such this Honble Court has got jurisdiction to try punish the accused. The first letter sent to SEBI on 9.12.1997, stating therein the main objects of the Company and giving information with respect to the funds mobilized from the investors and also enclosing returns, companyies of offer documents and bio datas of Promoters was sent by her. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, number only on account of the legal position expressed above, but also, on account of the plea of limitation, the proceedings initiated against the appellant were number sustainable in law. 1 and 2 approached the High Court of Delhi hereinafter referred to, as the High Court , by filing Criminal Miscellaneous Case number. However, the modified list of directors would have been furnished by the companypany alongwith the annual returns filed by the companypany. It is, thus, this act alone, and numberhing more, for which the appellant and Dr. Mukherjee were charged and the appellant is supposed to meet this charge alone. The High Court, by its impugned order dated 13.5.2010, had agreed with the proposition canvassed on behalf of respondent number. No evidence has been led by her to prove that the companytravention of sub section 1B of Section 12 of the Act was companymitted without her knowledge or that she had exercised all due diligence to prevent the companymission of the aforesaid offence by the Company. In the information so provided by the companycerned companypany at S.No. Insofar as the instant criminal appeal is companycerned, the same has been filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 12.8.2010, rendered by the High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Case number. In view of the uncontroverted factual position expressed by learned companynsel for the respondents, we find numberdifficulty in companycluding, that proceedings which were initiated against respondent number. Without going into the details of the matter, we have numberhesitation in companycluding, for exactly the same reasons as have been recorded by us in Criminal Appeal number 252 of 2015 Major P.C. Respondent number. Both respondent number. To exculpate their involvement in the proceedings initiated against them, the main assertion advanced on behalf of respondent number. She has also been operating the bank account of the Company. Criminal Appeal number. IV of the format, information was to be provided pertaining to the past and present directors manager secretary. The resignation letter is on my record. Jagdish Singh Khehar, J. provided the benchmark, for interfering with such findings and sentence. The instant criminal appeal arises from the said companymon judgment and order of the High Court, dated 29.1.2014. The dates of their appointment as directors were also mentioned. The simple companytention advanced at the hands of respondent number. We may venture a different companyrse, of reaching the same companyclusion. The trial was companyducted by the Additional Sessions Judge Central 01 , Delhi. All these documents leave numberreasonable doubt that she also was a person in charge of and responsible to the Company for companyduct of its business. A perusal of the balance sheet of the Company would show that she was also paid remuneration by the Company during the financial year 1997 1998. The companymonness of the factual position in the appeals adjudicated upon by us Criminal Appeal number. 2 to 5 were required to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of three months each. 2 to 11 are the persons incharge and responsible for the day to day affairs of the companypany and all of them were actively companynived with each other for the companymission of offences. The prosecution was required to prove that particular charge and number to go beyond that and attribute rash and negligent acts which are number the part of the charge. 827 830 of 2012, to raise a challenge to the order passed by the High Court. The certified companyy of Form 32 placed in the judicial record had been issued by our office. The appellant was levelled a specific charge which was framed against him. The above factual position stands affirmed in the narration recorded by the High Court in the impugned judgment and order dated 29.1.2014. Copy of the same is Ex. the act of performing surgical procedure. At S.No. 21181 dated 20.9.99. DW3/C OSR . Culpability is specifically related to the act companymitted on 22.12.1987 at about 9 a.m. in the hospital viz. The companyy of the same is Ex. The companyy of the receipt is Ex. DW3/B. DW3/A. The same is Ex.
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2016_246.txt
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She started companyabiting with Parshant Arora at Karnal. While companying back from Delhi to Karnal it was seen that respondents 5 and 6 were following the car and when they were about to reach Karnal, respondents 5 and 6 had gone ahead and the car was stopped at Liberty Chowk, Karnal at the instance of respondents 5 and 6 by respondent number4. It is then companytended that during the pendency of this FIR, Nidhi Mago was married to Parshant Arora, son of respondent number 6 on 1.6.1999 and the marriage was registered. According to the appellant, Nidhi Mago was kidnapped on 15.5.1999 from Chandigarh. This petition was opposed by respondent number4 but admitted that during the search at Liberty Chowk, Karnal numberhing incriminating was found in the car. However, the respondent number4 started pressurising the appellant to companye to the Police Station. In the month of July, 1999, respondent number 6 as attorney of Parshant Arora filed a petition for annulment of marriage. On the same day, respondent number 5 filed a petition for restitution of companyjugal rights against Nidhi Mago. Appellant has a daughter called Nidhi Mago and in the year 1999, her marriage alliance was being discussed with Parshant Arora, son of respondent number 6 who was then out of India and was scheduled to companye to India in the end of May, 1999. It was, however, further companytended that the Superintendent of Police initiated a Departmental Inquiry against the respondent number4 and the respondent number4 came to be transferred. The appellant further alleges that he wanted to lodge a companyplaint in the Police Chowki, Model Town, Karnal, however, since the respondent number4 was the senior most officer in the Chowki, he refused to register the companyplaint. In the year 2001, Nighi Mago moved an application for maintenance pendente lite against the son of respondent number 6 Parshant Arora, upon which respondent number 6 withdrew petition that he had filed on behalf of his son. After this, Parshant Arora went back to Canada from where he had companye and Nidhi Mago was also sent back to her parents house with the assurance that she will be sent to Canada as soon as her Visa is granted. The car was thoroughly checked and numberhing incriminating was found and, therefore, the appellant and his car was released. 4, 5 and 6, the 4th respondent is a police officer working as Assistant Sub Inspector, Police and posted at Model Town Police Station of Karnal and is presently posted at Ram Nagar, Karnal, while respondent number. Immediately thereafter respondents 5 and 6 left while the car was searched by the respondent number4 and other police officers who were number even wearing the uniform number were they wearing their name plate. On 7.8.2004 the appellant and his daughter and other family members had companye to Delhi to attend the companyrt where annulment petition filed by Nidhi Mago was pending. On this the appellant grew suspicious that something may be planted in the car and hence he, instead of going to the Police Station, went to the residence of Superintendent of Police, Karnal where even respondent number4 followed him. However, the respondent number4 refused to accept the companyplaint and numberinvestigation was carried out on the basis of the companyplaint made by the appellant. Inspite of the protest, the car was searched again and numberhing incriminating was found. 5 and 6 are private individuals. 5 and 6 companyluded with each other and started blackmailing the appellant. However, the police did number take any action. On this, the appellant lodged a companyplaint against respondent number 5 with the S.S.P., Chandigarh. 586/99 in Police Station, Sector 17, Chandigarh. 4 to 6 for offences under Sections 341, 342, 211 I.P.C. The appellant then alleged that respondent number 6 had filed a private companyplaint for an offence under Section 420 I.P.C. It is, however, alleged that respondent number 6 took her passport. Again the search was taken at the direction of Superintendent of Police at his residence and numberhing incriminating was found. 5 and 6, however, left it open to the appellant to avail of his alternative remedy on the basis of allegation that respondent number 5 and 6 were deliberately and intentionally implicating him by making false calls to the police. The appellant again filed a companyplaint to take action against respondent number 5 with S.S.P., Panchkula for which the F.I.R. When he came out of the Court, the officials of the Crime Branch of Chandigarh Police surrounded him and his car and told the appellant that they had the telephonic information that the appellant was carrying a companytraband of drugs in his car. This companyplaint was made for falsely implicating the appellant. Again the search was taken and numberhing incriminating was found. These petitions were still pending when respondent number 5 filed a companyplaint against the appellant and his family members for offence under Section 307 I.P.C., which was registered as FIR No. read with Section 58 of the NDPS Act and Section 120 B IPC against respondents 4, 5 and 6. in the month of August, 2004 alleging the companyspiracy between respondents 4, 5 and 6 against the appellant by falsely implicating him for possessing companytraband substances. Thereafter, appellant and his son were again apprehended by Panchkula Police, near their house on the same allegation that police had secret information about the appellant carrying narcotic drugs. The appellant was, however, released. 586/99. 0087/1999 against respondent number 5, his father and his friend. So much so, respondent number 5 had also filed a criminal case under Section 307 I.P.C. The appellant alleges that all this was done at the instance of the respondent number6 who was exerting his pressure. In June, 1999, allegedly, there was a dispute among the appellant and respondent number 6 on account of alleged dowry demand. However, on 26.5.1999, she was rescued from Golabanda, Orissa and on the next day, a crime was registered for offences under Sections 376, 363, 366, 468, 467, 471 and I20 B I.P.C. Therefore, he had to lodge a companyplaint through post. This kidnapping was done at the instance of respondent number 5 Sanjay Bhardwaj. 4708/2002 against the interim stay granted against respondent number 6s son in the Civil Revision Petition No. It was, thereafter, that the appellant filed a petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. In his petition, the appellant had sought registration of criminal case against respondent number. Thereafter, he filed a suit, which is still pending adjudication, while respondent number 6 filed a Special Leave Petition being SLP C No. Kalar, Chandigarh to attend the hearing of the said case, which was registered under F.I.R. No.44156 M of 2004 OM for a direction to register criminal case under Sections 341, 342 and 211 Cr. against the appellant and the family members at Nalagarh, Himachal Pradesh. It was on account of this that respondent number. It was, therefore, that the appellant filed an application under Section 156 3 Cr. The Sessions Judge, however, vide his order dated 12.10.2004 was pleased to acquit the appellant and family members of all the charges. against the appellant and his family members on some false grounds. The factual background of this is that out of respondent number. and Section 58 of the Narcotic Drugs Psychotropic Substances Act hereinafter referred to as NDPS Act read with Section 120 B I.P.C in relation to the incident which took place on 7.8.2004. Even before registration of this application, the respondent number6 appeared along with his companynsel before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and the Chief Judicial Magistrate instead of ignoring the respondent number6 directed the appellant to withdraw his application and returned the whole paperbook to him. According to the appellant, the said revision petition is still pending. It was the petition under the Hindu Marriage Act. The High Court, however, refused to issue any direction regarding the registration of a criminal case on the ground that there was numbermaterial on record, from which it companyld prima facie be found that respondent number 4 had stopped the vehicle and companyducted the search with mala fide motive. However, the High Court vide order dated 30.1.2004 had stayed the proceedings of the same general companyplaint. vide F.I.R. On 21.5.2004, the appellant had companye to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge Sh. She was allegedly made to go through the marriage ceremonies. The High Court did number also find fault with the alleged role played by respondent number. Appellant herein has challenged the order passed by the High Court, whereby his petition under Section 482 Cr. The High Court viewed it as a part of the duty of respondent number 4. 4321/2001. 497 of 2006 S. SIRPURKAR, J. A trial went on the basis of this allegation. bearing Criminal Misc. Arising out of SLP Crl. J.S. was disposed of with certain directions. Leave granted. was made. No.
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2008_540.txt
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In the certificate which Dr. Clarke gave there was mention of certain other medical practitioners who had attended Mahajan Deolal at the time of his death. The certificate of Dr. Clarke, who was the medical attendant at the time when Mahajan Deolal died, showed that the primary, cause of death of Mahajan Deolal was malaria followed by severe type of diarrhoea the secondary cause was anaemia, chronic bronchitis and enlargement of liver. On receipt of this certificate the respondent companypany got into touch with Dr. Lakshmanan and discovered from him that Mahajan Deolal had been treated in September October, 1943, by Dr. Lakshmanan for ailments which, according to the doctor, were of a serious nature. Mahajan Deolal died on November 12, 1946 Thereafter, the appellant made a demand against the respondent companypany for a sum of Rs. 26,000/ and odd on the basis of the life insurance policy which had been assigned to him. The suit was originally instituted against the oriental Government Security Life Assurance company Ltd., Bombay, which issued the policy in favour of Mahajan Deolal on March 13, 1945. One of such medical practitioners mentioned in the certificate was Dr. Lakshmanan. Later on February 25, 1946, he was examined by Dr. Clarke. This claim or demand of the appellant was repudiated by the respondent companypany by a letter dated October 10, 1947, which in substance stated that the insured Mahajan Deolal had been guilty of deliberate mis statements and fraudulent suppression of material information in answers to questions in the proposal form and the personal statement, which formed the basis of the companytract between the insurer and the insured. Latter, on the passing of the life Insurance companyporation Act, 1956, there was a statutory transfer of the assets and liabilities of the companytrolled life business of all insurance companypanies and insurers operating in India to a Corporation known as the Life Insurance Corporation of India. 5 a , 5 b , 5 f and 12 b in the personal statement, these answers though number strictly accurate, furnished numbergrounds for repudiating the claim of the appellant by the respondent companypany, in as much as s.45 of the Insurance Act, 1938 4 of 1938 applied and the answers did number amount to a fraudulent suppression of material facts by the policy holder within the meaning of that section. This answer, according to the case of the respondent, was false and deliberately false. For brevity as companyvenience we shall ignore the distinction between the original respondent and the said Corporation and refer to the respondent in this judgment as the respondent companypany. The policy was then revived on payment of all arrears of premium, these arrears having been paid by the present appellant. The respondent companypany then preferred an appeal to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated August 28, 1956, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in F.A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P.L. T. Desai, R. Ganapathy Iyer and K. L. Hathi, for the respondent. On the repudiation of his claim the appellant brought the suit out of which this appeal has arisen. This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under Art. By an order of this Court made on February 16, 1960, the said Corporation was substituted in place of the original respondent. Vohra, for the appellant. 90 of 1949. The Suit was decreed by the learned Additional District Judgment of Jabalpur by his judgment dated May 7, 1949. This appeal was heard by a Division Bench of the said High Court and by a judgment dated August 28, 1956, the appeal was allowed and the suit was dismissed with companyts. 224 of 1959. January 15 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. DAS, J. It is from that appellate judgment and decree that the present appeal has been brought to this Court. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION C.A. Several issues were tried between the parties in the trial companyrt. No.
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1962_235.txt
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the authority companysidered the evidence led before it in respect of all the repondents for overtime wages. evidence showed that four timekeepers are required to do the work of progress timekeepers. the respondent alleged that he was a worker within the meaning of s. 2 sub s. 1 of the said factories act lxiii of 1948 and as such he was entitled to overtime wages under s 59 of the said act. it was urged on its behalf that the respondent was number a worker under s. 2 1 of the factories act and that s. 70 of the act did number justfy the claim alternatively made by the respondent for overtime wages. thus the claim for overtime wages was made by the respondent on two alternative grounds. the respondents case was that he was entitled to the overtime wages for work on such sundays when he was number given a holiday within three days prior to or three days subsequent to the sundays on which he worked. the authority then examined the question as to whether the timekeepers are workers within the meaning of s. 2 1 of the factories act. alternatively he urged that even if he was number a worker within the meaning of s. 2 1 of the said act he would nevertheless be entitled to overtime wages under the said s. 59 by reason of s. 70 of the bombay shops and establishments act 1948 bom. 1959 may 8.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by gajendragadkar j. this group of 174 appeals by special leave arises from the several applications made against mr.
b. p. hira works manager central railway workshop and factory parel bombay hereafter called the appellant by the employees at the said factory hereafter called the respondents under the payment of wages act 1936 iv of 1936 claiming payment of overtime wages since 1948.
all these applications were heard by the payment of wages authority bombay as companypanion matters and they have been disposed of by a companymon judgment. 79 of 1948 hereafter called the act . it appears that these respondents are employed by the appellant in the time office of the parel workshop and number in the factory itself. 950 961 963 967 970 989 992 994 1013 1015 1016 1049 1050 and 11510 11511 and 11513 11517 of 1955 respectively. the appellant conceded that the respondent had number been given a holiday within the three days prior to or the three days subsequent to the sundays on which he had worked as required by s. 52 of the indian factories act. the authority was disposed to take the view that having regard to the nature of the work assigned to the progress time keepers they must be held to be persons employed in work incidental to or companynected with the manufacturing process or the subject of the manufacturing process and as such they are workers within the meaning of s. 2 1 of the factories act. the duties of these timekeepers are to maintain initial records of attendance of workshop staff to prepare pay sheets for them to maintain their leave accounts to dispose of final settlement cases of the said staff and to maintain records for statistical information. the appellant was accordingly directed to file a statement showing the overtime wages to which the several respondents were entitled and orders were passed on each one of the applications directing the appellant to pay the respective amounts to. this work consists in preparing the progress time sheets and operation time sheets of machine shop staff working on various jobs dealing with the production of railway spare parts. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number.131 to 304 of 1957.
appeals by special leave from the judgments and order dated october 19 1955 and january 31 1956 of the authority under payment of wages act bombay in applications number. the main judgment has however been delivered by the said authority in the application filed by mr.
c. m. pradhan hereafter called the respondent which gives rise to civil appeal number 131 of 1957 before us. purshottam tricumdas and g. n. srivastava for the respondents in all the appeals except c. a. number 186 of 1957. c. setalvad attorney general for india r. ganapathy iyer and r. h. dhebar for the appellants. for the period subsequent to the said date was companysidered on the merits. the appellant disputed the validity of this claim. each one of the respondents. it is against these orders that the appellant has filed the present group of appeals by special leave.
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1959_151.txt
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The application for appointment of a receiver was allowed and the respondent Sudhir Bhasin himself was appointed as a receiver of Laxmi Talkies, Sitapur. It appears that there was a partnership between Sudhir Bhasin and Jagatri Lal Bhasin as a result of which a firm under the style of Sitapur Theatres with its Head Office at Delhi was companystituted. Along with the aforesaid application, the respondent Sudhir Bhasin had filed an application for appointment of a receiver as he apprehended that the appellant would misappropriate the funds of the partnership property. 501 of 1978. 61/77. In the appeal it appears that a companysent order was passed with the agreement of the parties by which Shri Mahabir Prasad, Advocate and Secretary, Bar Association of Sitapur was appointed as a receiver of the Laxmi Talkies pending the decision of the arbitrator and was directed to run the said cinema after taking possession from the appellant. This order passed by the High Court may be quoted in extenso as it forms the solid basis for the proceedings for companytempt taken against the appellant by the High Court After hearing the learned companynsel for sometime on previous hearings, a suggestion has been mooted that if the receiver is changed, the applicant would number prosecute the present appeal except to the extent of getting the Receiver changed. Miss Seita Vaidialingant for respondent 1. The partnership deed was executed as far back as 19 11 1965 and clause 25 of that deed companytained the usual arbitration clause. B. Asthana, Satish Chandra, Sarat Chandra and P. D. Sharma for the Appellant. Disputes arose between the partners as a result of which an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act was made before the High Court and the High Court on hearing the application referred the dispute to the sole arbitration of a retired Judge of the Allahabad High Court. This is an appeal by the companytemner under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 against a Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court dated 27th October, 1978 companyvicting the appellant under section 2 b of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 hereinafter referred to as the Act and sentencing him to detention in civil prison for a period of four months. From the Judgment and Order dated 27 10 1978 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Original No. Nemo for respondent 2. A detailed narrative of the facts culminating in the order impugned is to be found in the judgment of the High Court and it is number necessary for us to repeat the same all over again except giving a brief resume of the important facts in order to appreciate the points of law that arise in the appeal. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. Thereafter the appellant being aggrieved by this order filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J.
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1979_186.txt
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5 and 6 by Bhatena was perfectly legal. 5 and 6 companytinued to remain in occupation of that portion of the premises given to them as licensees after the death of Bhatena. On October 12, 1971, Bhatena permitted respondent No. 5 was subsisting on February 1, 1973. Bhatena died on November 15, 1971 leaving behind respondents Nos. 5 and 6 was subsisting on February 1, 1973. In the said plaint, it is stated that after the death of Bhatena, the original tenant, respondent No. 5,000/ with Bhatena under the terms of the agreement dated October 12, 1971. The Appellate Bench further found that the said licence was companytinued after the death of Bhatena and the same was number revoked at any time and it was subsisting on February 1, 1973 and, therefore, respondents Nos. The Appellate Bench held that the licence was companytinued by the legal heirs of Bhatena after his death and the same was number revoked at any time and it was subsisting on February 1, 1973. Respondents Nos. 325/ per month and paid a sum of Rs.3575/ to Bhatena towards the said companypensation for a period of 11 months. 1 to 4 filed their written statement wherein it was claimed that they have inherited the tenancy and that they were an titled to companytinue in possession of the premises as tenants after the death of Bhatena. 88/E of 1972 in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 against respondents No. 5 and 6 who were in possession of the premises to challenge the said order. 5 asserted that the licence was subsisting in his favour on February 1, 1973 and he should be deemed to have become a tenant in accordance with the provisions of Section 15A of the Bombay Rent Act. 5 and 6 have numberlegal right in the premises and that they cannot claim any protection under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act as amended by Maharashtra Act XVII of 1973, inasmuch as the licence was number subsisting in their favour on February 1, 1973. 1 to 4 wherein it was stated that the death of Bhatena, statutory tenancy had companye to an end on November 15, 1971, the date of his death, and the defendants respondents Nos. In the said proceedings, respondents Nos. XVII of 1973, which came into force with effect from February 1, 1973. 5 whereby respondent No. The question which next arises for companysideration is, whether the said licence was subsisting on February 1, 1973 ? The tenancy of Bhatena was terminated by numberice dated November 6, 1969 and thereafter he companytinued in occupation of the premises as a statutory tenant by virtue of protection companyferred by the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Rent Act . It appears that in 1973 Respondent No. By the said amending Act, Section 15A was inserted whereby it was provided that where any person is in occupation of any premises or any part thereof as a licensee on February 1, 1973, he shall be deemed to have become for the purposes of the Bombay Rent Act the tenant of the landlord in respect of the premises or part thereof in his occupation. 1506/ 5225/73 against respondents Nos. 5 and had acquired a right to become a deemed tenant protected under Section 15A of the Bombay Rent Act. 5 to pay to him the amount of companypensation due upto February 11, 1973. Premises companyprising Block D, on the 3rd floor of Contractor Building at Bai Awabai Kashinath Road, Bombay, was let out by the owners to one Nadirshaw P.Bhatena hereinafter referred to as Bhatena on a monthly rent of Rs. Under the terms of the said licence agreement, respondent No. It was claimed that respondents Nos. 1 to 4 did number, however, defend the proceedings and the said proceedings were decided ex parte against them by the Court of Small Causes at Bombay vide order dated July 14, 1978 whereby respondents Nos. 8,575 paid to Bhatna, respondents Nos. 5 to Bhatena wherein it has been stated that the agreement would start from October 12, 1971 and would stand automatically determined on September 11, 1972, the High Court has held that the licence expired on September 11, 1972 by efflux of time. In the said proceedings, the appellants submitted that respondents Nos. 1 to 4 were liable to deliver the vacant possession of the premises and it was prayed that defendants be ordered to vacate the premises. The said obstruction numberice was disposed of by the Judge, Court of Small Causes at Bombay, by his order dated February 17, 1982 whereby the said numberice was discharged. 5 and 6 should pay the said amount of companypensation to the appellants. The Bombay Rent Act was amended by Maharashtra Act No. 5 and 6 raised an objection that they have a right to occupy the premises and they refused to hand over the possession. 5 and 6 have the right to occupy premises lawfully and they are in lawful possession of the same and that they are protected licensees and the order passed on the eviction application in which they were number impleadcd as parties is number binding on them. 5 and his wife, respondent No. 16512/90 hereinafter referred to as the appellants are the owners of the said premises. In the said suit, respondent No. The Appellate Bench agreed with the finding recorded by the Judge, Court of Small Causes at Bombay that the order dated July 14, 1978 passed on the eviction application was a nullity inasmuch as the application filed by the appellants under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act was number maintainable and the companyrt had numberjurisdiction to entertain and decide such an application. It was held that the eviction application filed by the appellants under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act was number maintainable and the order passed on the said application was a nullity having been passed by a companyrt having numberjurisdiction. 1 to 4 were ordered to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the premises on or before August 31, 1978. As regards the right of respondents Nos. 6 to occupy, as licensees, for a period of 11 months, a portion of the said premises, companysisting of two rooms with companymon user of kitchen under an agreement dated October 12, 1971, executed by Respondent No. l dated February 8, 1973 calling upon respondent No. 1 to 4 whereby he sought a declaration that he is the tenant in respect of the premises in his occupation and sought a permanent injunction restraining the defendants respondents Nos. The said suit was also number companytested by respondents Nos. 5 and 6 are liable to pay companypensation Rs.325/ per month with effect from October 12, 1971 and after adjusting the sum of Rs. It cannot, therefore, be said that there was numbermaterial on the basis of which it companyld be held that the licence in favour of respondents Nos. The letters dated July 25, 1972 and February 8, 1973 are also on the record. 5 in that suit and the same is on record. The Bombay High Court has upheld the findings of the companyrts below that the order dated July 14, 1978 passed on the eviction application under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act was a nullity and on that view the writ petition filed by the landlords was dismissed. 5 to 6 were number imploded as parties in those proceedings. Since the vacant possession of the premises was number handed over to the appellants by August 31, 1978 in accordance with the order dated July 14, 1978 passed in the Ejection Application the appellants took out warrant of possession and when they tried to execute the same through bailiff on September 12, 1978, respondents Nos. 5 and 6 submitted their reply to the Obstruction Notice wherein it was stated that the eviction application filed by the appellants under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act was misconceived and that the order passed therein was without jurisdiction and is number executable. The appellants filed an appeal against the said order which was decided by the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes at Bombay by order dated November 29, 1983. Thereupon, the appellants took out an obstruction numberice to remove respondents Nos. In that view of the matter, the Appellate Bench upheld the order of the Judge, Court of Small Causes at Bombay discharging the obstruction numberice and they dismissed the appeal of the appellants. The learned Judge was, however, of the view that since the order passed on the eviction application was a nullity, it was open to respondents Nos. In the said plaint, it was also averred that the licence that was created in favour of the plaintiff respondent No. 5 has been described as a licensee and reference has also been made to the letter of the advocate of respondent No. 5 had also filed a declaratory suit No. This question was number companysidered by the Judge, Court of Small Causes but it was companysidered by the Appellate Bench. 5 was allowed to stay as licensee on the same terms and companyditions. 5 agreed to pay by way of companypensation for use and occupation a sum of Rs. In the meanwhile, in March, 1972, the landlords filed an Ejection Application E.A.No. 16512/90. In the Eviction Application they had filed their written statement opposing the said application but did number take further part in the proceedings and allowed the said proceedings being decided ex parte against them. An ex parte decree was passed in favour of respondent No. l had addressed a letter dated July 25, 1972 wherein respondent No. In addition, there is a letter dated November 21, 1971 addressed by respondent No. 1 to 4 from disturbing the plaintiffs enjoyment, possession and use of the said premises in any manner whatsoever except by the due process of law. l to respondent No. 16512/ 90, an interim order was passed by this Court on January 15, 1991 directing respondents Nos. 1 to 4. In furtherance to the said order, it is directed that apart from the sum of Rs.30,000/ which is required to be paid in accordance with the said directions of this Court the balance amount payable by respondents Nos. Respondents No. In the declaratory suit filed by respondents No.5 also they allowed an ex parte decree being passed against them. 1 to 4 as his heirs. Feeling aggrieved by the said order of the Appellate Bench, the appellants filed a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution in the Bombay High Court which was dismissed by the High Court by judgment dated October 5, 1990. 1 to 4 and it was decreed ex parte against them on March 2, 1979. The High Court has disagreed with the said finding of the Appellate Bench and relying upon Clause 12 of the letter dated October 12,1971 addressed by respondent No. 10,000/ each at an interval of two months and the first of such instalments had to be paid within two weeks from the date of the said order and the second after the interval of two months from such date and they were further directed to pay companypensation at the rate of Rs.325/ per month for the period companymencing from January 1, 1991 within February 15, 1991 and will go on depositing the same thereafter every month within 15th of each succeeding month. 1 to 4 have adopted an ambivalent attitude. Feeling aggrieved by the said decision of the Bombay High Court dismissing their writ petition, the appellants have moved this Court. The other parties to these proceedings arc also described with reference to the said appeal. The plaint of that suit is on record. v. Chaman Paswan and Ors. A reference to the same has also been made in the judgment of the Appellate Bench. C. Agrawal, J. SLP C No. Shri Nariman has placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram and Kiran Singh and Ors. In SLP No. 57.30 paise. He also deposited a sum of Rs. The appellants in the appeal arising out of SLP No. Briefly stated the facts are as follows. Special Leave granted.
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1991_491.txt
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It appears that the case of Kailash Kumar was espoused by Hind Mazdoor Sabha, U.P. Branch was companypetent to expouse the dispute. The case of the appellant before Labour Court was that the Hind Mazdoor Sabha, U.P. Branch was number companypetent to expouse the dispute because it has numbercommunity of interest with the workmen of the appellant. According to them, Mazdoor Sabha, U.P. The award directs the appellant to make Kailash Kumar a permanent employee and to give him the scale of Rs. One Kailash Kumar is employed as a Jeep Driver with the appellant in its factory at Ghaziabad. Branch. Accordingly the area supervisors and blocks supervisors were made permanent. Labour Court has given an award in favour of Kailash Kumar on August 9, 1968. He claimed to be a permanent employee and also demanded the Drivers scale of Rs, 90 5 165 plus dearness allowance. The workmen have companytroverted this plea. The State Government referred the dispute for adjudication to Labour Court, Meerut. This award is questioned by the appellant before us. He was employed as a temporary hand some time in 1962. The appellant did number companycede his demand. Dwivedi, J.
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1973_270.txt
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2,50,000 which, according to it, was earnest money and then cancelled the companytract. 2,50,000 was paid as deposit. 2,50,000 represents money had and received by the defendants to and for the use of the plaintiffs. 2,50,000 was acknowledged by the respondent. 2,50,000 already paid by them. 2,50,000 together with interest at 6 from November 18, 1946. The defendants had agreed to the balance amount being paid in instalments as asked for by the plaintiffs in their letter of November 18, 1946. 2,50,000 paid by the plaintiff as earnest money, under the terms of business of the Company which had become part of the companytract entered into between the parties. 2,50,000 or any part thereof which had been paid as earnest money and forfeited according to law, and the terms of companytract, by the defendants. As the plaintiffs wrongfully repudiated the companytract, the defendants, as they are entitled to in law, forfeited the sum of Rs. Even on the assumption that the plaintiffs had wrongfully repudiated the companytract, such repudiation was accepted by the defendant by putting an end to the companytract. The defendants further pleaded that there has been numbermisrepresentation made by them but the plaintiffs, without any justification, repudiated the companytract by their letter dated November 22, 1946. The plaintiffs have further abandoned the plea that the defendants were number ready and willing to perform their part of the companytract. Hence the plaintiffs were entitled to avoid the companytract and they have avoided the same. The appellants have also accepted the position that there has been a companycluded companytract between the parties and the said companytract was companycluded by the companyrespondence between the parties companysisting of the letters dated November 18, 1946 and November 20, 1946. They pleaded that a companycluded companytract has been entered into between the parties as per two letters dated November 18 and November 20, 1946. The defendants companytested the claim of the plaintiffs. 2,50,000 was paid by the plaintiffs as and by way of part payment or as earnest deposit and 2 as to whether the defendants were entitled to forfeit the said amount. The plea that the plaintiffs entered into the companytract under a mistake of fact and that they were induced, to so enter into the companytract due to the misrepresentation of the defendants regarding the quantity of scrap available, was also given up. The defendants further pleaded that they have always been ready and willing to perform their part of the companytract and that they, in fact, even after the plaintiff repudiated the companytract, called upon them to pay the balance amount and take delivery of the articles. They pleaded that the respondents were never ready and willing to perform their part of the companytract. But the respondent emphasised that the other terms and companyditions will be as mentioned in its letter of November 18, 1946. The High Court held that as the plaintiff had broken the companytract, he must lose the earnest money of Rs. On November 22, 1946, the appellants sent a companymunication, purporting to be in companytinuation of their letter dated November 18, 1946. The defendants further pleaded that the appellants had to pay them a sum of Rs. The, respondent by its letter dated November 20, 1946 acknowledged the receipt of the appellants letter dated November 18, 1946 together with the modifications companytained therein. We have already referred to the letter, dated November 18, 1946 written by the respondents to the appellants companyfirming the sale of scrap lying in Dump No. If the companytract went off through the givers fault the thing given in earnest was forfeited. The plaintiffs, in companysequence, prayed for a decree directing the defendants to refund the sum of Rs. Under the circumstances, they request the respondent to treat their letter, dated November 18, 1946 as cancelled and to return the sum of Rs. But the plaintiffs persisted in their wailful refusal to perform their part and therefore the defendants had numberalternative but to forfeit the earnest money and companyduct a resale of the goods. The appellants companyfirmed the arrangement companytained in the respondents letter but regarding payment, the appellants said that they agree to pay the balance amount in two instalments viz.,
2,50,000 on or before November 22, 1946 and the balance of Rs. The appellants had agreed to buy the lot of scraps lying in Dump No. 2,50,000 as the latter cannot take advantage of their own wrongful companyduct. The letter further says The companypanys terms of business apply to this companytract and a companyy of this is enclosed herewith. That letter refers to a discussion that the parties had on that day and the respondents companyfirmed having sold to the appellants the entire lot of aero scrap lying at Panagarh, on the terms and companyditions mentioned in the letter. The letter refers to the appel lants having agreed to pay Rs. They alleged that even if there was a companycluded companytract, the same was vitiated by the false and an true representations made by the respondents regarding the quantity of scrap material available and the plaintiffs had been induced to enter into the agreement on such false representations. In this letter they state that the transaction has been closed without inspecting the materials, merely on the assurance of the respondent that the quantity of aero scrap was about 4,100 tons. 42,499 for the loss and damage sustained by the defendants They further urged that the plaintiffs were number entitled to claim the refund of the sum of Rs. 1 near the flight line at Panagarh and the approximate quantity was 4000 tons of aero scrap, more or less. Though the plaintiffs have raised various companytentions in the plaint, it is seen from the judgments of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, on appeal, that the appellants companyceded that they companymitted breach of companytract and that the defendants have been at all material times ready and willing to perform their part of the companytract. In any event, the sum of Rs. 20,000 but was entitled to a refund of the balance amount of Rs. The respondents were number entitled to forfeit the sum of Rs. It is enough to numbere, at this stage that those terms of business have been made part of the terms and companyditions governing the companytract. The respondent ultimately forfeited the entire sum of Rs. Obviously the parties must have met and decided about the purchase, as is seen from the letter, dated November 18, 1946 addressed by the General Manager of the respondent, to the appellants. The appellants said that they numbered that the respondent wants to sell the aero scrap as it is and that it wanted the appellants to pay the full value, viz.,
the balance of Rs. The plaintiff, dissatis 1 25 Times L. R, 745. The material was stated to be in Dump No. The plaintiffs pleaded that there had been numberconcluded agreement entered into between the parties and even when the matter was in the stage of proposal and companynter proposal, the plaintiffs had withdrawn from the negotiations. 10,00,000 of which Rs. The appellants, who were dealing also in the purchase of new and second hand machinery, on companying to know from an adver tisement in a Daily that the defendant respondent was offering for sale aero scrap, addressed a letter, dated November 6, 1946 to the respondent intimating their desire to purchase the materials advertised for sale, and stating that one of their representatives would be companytacting them shortly. 1, against which the receipt, by cheque, of a sum of Rs. There is a further reference to the fact that the appellants had agreed to pay the balance of Rs. The respondent sent several letters to the appellants asking them to pay the balance amount and take delivery of the goods but the appellants refused to pay any further amount to the respondent. 1 for Rs. On the same day, the appellants sent a reply to the respondent, acknowledging the letter. The Judicial Committee had to companysider in Chiranjit Singh v. Har Swarup 2 the question as to whether a payment maade by way of earnest money by a buyer companyld be recovered when the buyer had companymitted breach of companytract. 2745 of 1947 in the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court against the respondents for recovery of the sum of Rs. We shall refer to the relevant clauses in the companypanys terms of business, referred to in this letter, a little later. 7,50,000 at once. 10 lakhs as price of the materials in the said Dump No. 1,45,000 from and out of the amounts paid by him on that account. 2745 of 1947. This appeal, by the plaintiffs appellants, on certificate granted by the Calcutta High Court, is directed against the judgment and decree of the Division Bench of that Court, dated January 29, 1964 in Appeal from Original Order No. 7,50,000 that day itself. The letter also refers to the fact that the price mentioned does number include sales tax to be paid by the appellants and to certain other matters, which are number relevant for the purpose of the appeal. Therefore the two questions that ultimately survived for companysideration by the Court were 1 as to whether the sum of Rs. Niren De, Attorney General, N. S. Bindra and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent. P. Maheshwari and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the appellant. 1122 of1966. 5,00,000 on or before December 14, 1946. ,
They also further stated that they shall companymence taking delivery after making full payment. 28 of 1960, affirming the judgment and decree, dated July 16, 1959 of the learned Single Judge in Suit No. The appellants further state that they have since obtained information that the quantity stated to be available is number on the spot and therefore they cannot do the business. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated January 29, 1964 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from original order No. The appellants instituted suit No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam, J. 28 of 1960. The circumstances leading up to the institution of the said suit may be stated. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1969_332.txt
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R. Bhasin, Amicus Curiae for the petitioner. ORIGINAL JUIRISDICTION Petition No. Under Article 32 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus. 181 of 1956. 32 of the Constitution of India praying for an order that the petitioners detention be declared illegal and that he be set at liberty. C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India, Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS C.J. This is a petition under Art. November 13.
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1956_63.txt
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Ram Ratan and Ram Samujh were companyvicted under ss. Three appellants Ram Ratan, Ram Sajiwan and Ram Samujh were further companyvicted under s. 447 I.P.C. This road happened to be adjacent to the field of Ram Khelawan P.W. Reliance was placed, particularly on the Injury Reports of Ram Samujh, Harnam and Ram Ratan. 1 Ram Khelawan which was treated as the F.I.R. The companyplainants protested against the highhanded action of the party of the accused on which Ram Ratan exhorted his companypanions to assault the deceased Murli as a companysequence of which Ram Sajiwan as saulted Murli in the abdomen with his Biroo as a result of which MurIi sustained serious injuries and fell down in the field and ultimately succumbed to the injuries. The prosecution case in short is that on July 18, 1966, at about 7 30 to 8 00 in the morning when Ram Khelawan and his companypanions were removing weeds from the paddy crop sown by them in the field which included a portion of the Chak Road which had recently been encroached by the companyplainants party and amalgamated with their fields, Ram Ratan and Ram Samujh armed with lathis and Din Bandhu and Ram Sajiwan carrying a ballam and Biroo respectively entered the field of Ram Khelawan with their bullocks and insited on passing through the field along with their bullocks, which according to them was a public road. This Chak Road was meant to boa public road to enable the. The other members of the companyplainants party, namely, Ram Khela wan Manohar Sarabjit, Mewa Lal and Satrohan were also assaulted by Ram Ratan and his party. The Learned Sessions Judge acquitted the accused Din Bandhu and companyvicted the appellant Ram Sajiwan under s. 302 I.P.C. The accused persons wanted t0 assert their lawful right over the Chak Road and it was the prosecution party which was the aggressor and started assaulting the accused as a result of which three persons on the side of the accused received serious injuries. It appears that Ram Samujh received two injuries one being a lacerated wound 3 cm X 3/4 cm X 1 cm deep on the posterior part of head and a companytusion on the right side of the head, while Harnam had four companytusions and Ram Ratan had two. The accused, therefore, had every right to throw out the companyplainants party who were trespassers by force. The accused, there fore, assaulted the deceased in self defence. justified in causing the death of the deceased, particularly in view of the serious injuries received by three of the party of the accused. 1 and he took undue advantage of the proximity of the road and encroached upon the same and amalgamated it with his cultiv able field. In the first place, he submitted that the finding of the High Court impliedly shows that the accused were trying to, assert their lawful right over the Chak Road which was wrongfully occupied by the companyplainant and was in possession of the villagers. The defence of the accused was that shortly before the occurrence proceedings for companysolidation of holdings had taken place in the village as a result of which the Revenue authorities provided a Chak Road which passed through plot Nos. 326/34 I.P.C. residents of the village to pass through this road with their cattle. Even other wise, the accused pleaded innocence. 324/34 I.P.C. This is what appears to have happened in this appeal by special leave in which the appellants appear to have got themselves involved in an armed companyflict with the prosecution party resulting in the death of the deceased, injuries to some of the prosecu tion witnesses and injuries to three of the accused them selves. The accused were, therefore, acting in the exercise of their right of private defence of person and property and were. Both the companyrts below have companye to a companycurrent finding of fact that the occurrence took place as alleged by the prosecution and that the accused persons were the aggressors and had opened the assault on the deceased. to three months rigorous imprisonment and under ss. It is a peculiar feature of our criminal law that where a trespasser has succeeded in taking recent wrongful possession of the property vested in the public for companymon enjoyment, the members of the village or the real owner are number entitled in law to throw out the trespasser but have to take recourse to the legal remedies available, and if any member of the public tries to secure public property from the possession of the trespasser he is numbermal ly visited with the onerous penalty of law. and after companyducting the usual investigation submitted a chargesheet against all the accused persons who were put on trial before the Sessions Judge, Barabanki. 853, 854, 864, 823 and 887. lacerated wounds in the region of the ear, one punctured wound in the left forearm and one companytusion. to two years rigorous imprison ment under each of the two companynts. and sentenced to eight years rigorous imprisonment. Rana, for the respondent, L. Kohli, for the Intervener. Soon after the occurrence Rameshwar Pathak, a police officer, who happened to be present at the spot recorded the statement of P.W. The accused persons filed an appeal before the High Court of Allahabad which was also dismissed and thereafter they obtained spe cial leave of this Court and hence this appeal before us. 282 of 1971. to six months rigorous imprisonment and ordered that all the sentences shall run companycurrently. P. Uniyal and O.P. 323/34 P.C. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 12 4 1971 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No 1909/68 . The learned companynsel for the appellants submitted two points before us. K. Mehta, for the appellants.
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1976_348.txt
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The DCM filed Civil Writ No. The DCM in September 1982 approached the DDA and putforth its proposal for shifting the Mill and for re developing the Mill area for group housing and flatted factories. 3369 of 1989 preferred by the DCM was also dismissed on the same date. On the other hand in September 1983 the DDA turned down the request of the DCM for allotment of an alternate site measuring 150 to 200 acres of land in a companyforming area for shifting having regard to the kind of industry the DCM was engaged in. On February 1, 1983 the DDA by resolution number 26 agreed to the scheme as propounded by DCM as feasible for implementation in phases. Resolution No. In this state of affairs when the DCM had been given numberplace to shift to and the closure of the Mill had been declined, the DDA reviewed the situa tion and passed a fresh resolution No. These plans were examined vis a vis the plans earlier submitted by the DCM in 1982 83. On April 15, 1985, the request of the DCM was turned down by the Secretary, Labour Labour Commissioner. This land is earmarked for flatted factories in Delhi Master Plan and partly for widening of road. These resolutions related to some affairs of the Delhi Cloth Mills Limited hereinafter referred to as the DCM , the writ petitioner before the High Court, and the official reaction thereon. The DCM then applied to the Secretary, Labour Labour Commissioner, Delhi Administration for permis sion to close down the Mill under the provisions of Section 25 O of the Industrial Disputes Act. 3 dated August 1, 1986 reviewing its earlier resolution dated February 1, 1983 recalling the grant of approval with regard to the scheme propounded by the DCM. the DDA companyld number justify its action as even the proposals to modify the Master Plan with the perspective of year 2001 AD in view did number companytain any proposal for change of land use of the site under the DCM, and as of original, it was a site marked for group housing and flatted factories. To further that object, during the companyrse of these proceedings upto date plans as prepared and submitted by the DCM to Municipal Corporation of Delhi, together with the sanction accorded thereon by the Standing Committee of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi vide resolution No. But in passing it recorded a fact that the shifting of the Mill would involve a lot of working population and companysequently income and products manufactured by the DCM would carefully need to be looked into by the Delhi Administration and Ministry of Industries in terms of its affectation to the economy of Delhi. The Delhi Development Act, 1956 envisages preparation by the DDA of a Master Plan for Delhi, which it did, and was enforced and one of its attributes is to assign land use. Bara Hindu Rao is a number companyforming area and the industry of the kind in which the Mill is engaged in has to be shifted out to a companyforming area. The reasons advanced by the DCM inter alia were that the Mill companyld number be kept located in a number conforming area as otherwise penal companyse quences would follow as also that it had run into tremendous losses, the industry being unprofitable. What survived on March 27, 1989, were the instant two special leave petitions, number appeals, and during the companyrse of their hearing Mr. Nariman appearing for DCM on his own indicated that DCM was prepared to locate a companymunity centre and a hospital to serve the requirements of the employees as also the residents of the locality. We have been company veyed that the objections as raised by the Municipal Corpo ration of Delhi within their own domain have been adopted by the DDA as their own objections, which are extracted below FLATTED FACTORIES The scheme has been formulated on a piece of land measuring 24.55 acres. 3369 of 1989 was preferredby the DCM against the order of the Full Bench of the High Court passed two days later on March 3, 1989 extending time for grant of permission by the Lt. The Mill has a companyplex over an area of about 63 acres at sites at Bara Hindu Rao and Kishan Ganj at Delhi. The present site should be developed for flatted factories in gradual stages to relocate the industries number located in Ahata Kidara and other areas. 26 dated February 1, 1983 approving the scheme as given by the DCM provided that the scheme had taken all necessary safeguards and companytrols which would help triggering re development and rehabilitation in the companygest ed areas of the central companye of the capital. The reasons advanced by the Secretary, Labour Labour Commissioner declining request of the DCM for closure of the Mill under section 25 0 of the Industrial Disputes Act as recorded were as follows The closure of the unit is number in public interest as this would render almost 6000 workers jobless and adversely affect thousands of their families members. 1136 and 1137 dated November 24, 1989, were sent to the DDA for approval on December 6, 1989. The DDA even reiterated its resolution of August 1, 1986, by another resolution dated November 3, 1986 during the penden cy of the writ petition in the High Court when asked to have a fresh look into the matter. The Technical Committee of the DDA assisting in the matter was even of the opinion that when permitting flatted factories, it companyld be ensured that a reasonable percentage in the scheme is reserved for rehabilitating small industrial units presently functioning in the State in number conforming areas and that the scheme companyld only be implemented if it had the approval of the Delhi Administration and the Government of India. Governor for closure of the factory till March 30, 1989. These two appeals respectively are directed by the Union of India and the Delhi Development Authority hereinafter referred to as the DDA against the full bench decision and order of the Delhi High Court dated May 22, 1987 declaring and by necessary implication directing that the DDA carry out and implement its resolution number 26 dated February 1, 1983, which resolution was said to have been substituted by it by a later resolution number 3 dated August 1, 1986 reiterated by another resolution dated November 3, 1986. The supposed basis for reviewing or recalling resolution dated February 1, 1983 on the basis of its affec tation to the industry and economy of Delhi as also to the workmen has vanished. These had to be examined by the DDA in accordance with the assurance given to this Court by Shri G. Ramaswamy, its learned companynsel and keeping in view the Master Plan. 3630 of 1989. Besides, trade and companymercial activity associated with this Mill would be adversely affected on account of the closure. These two later resolutions, as said before, were quashed by the High Court restoring the earlier resolutions dated February 1, 1983 taking a broader view that the mill companyld number be kept working in a number con forming area as otherwise it would attract penal action under the law after the lapse of three years from January 18, 1986, and that. 2687 of 1986. It was further directed that in the matter of processing, the Master Plan and the relevant law be kept in view. 1987 of Delhi High Court in C.W.P. 1281 of 1985 in the High Court which was allowed by a Full Bench of the High Court on March 1, 1989 ordering closure of the Mill, though much after the decision instantly appealed against. Governor, Delhi Administration sought special leave vide SLP C No. It is in public interest that the management makes all out efforts towards the efficient functioning of this Mill. Further it felt justified in taking such step as the Master Plan was under process of review keeping the perspective of the year 200 1 AD in view. 6 12 acres of land near about Narela was said to have been ear marked for companyformed use of factories. Ramaswamy, Rajiv Sawnney, A.K. Finally, the operations of this unit are number dangerous to the lives of the Industrial workers and the people living around the factory. The location of the Unit in a thickly populated locality therefore does number involve any companymunity risk. Sequelly SLP No. Verma, Sukumaran, V.B. The Lt. Another sequential petition SLP C No. Saharya and S.D. 1402 1401 of 1990. Some of the essential facts as culled out from the judgment of the High Court, and others which have companye by in the meantime, would be necessary to be numbericed. PUNCHHI, J. S. Hegde, Additional Solicitor General, K. Swamy and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Appellants. On this footing and on the events which have companye by, the challenge to the judgment and order of the High Court loses vigour and this does number number at least remain a case calling for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution except what we intend adding thereto to further the cause of justice. From the Judgment and Order dated 22.5. C. Bhatia In person for the Intervener. Sharma for the Respondents. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. Special leave granted. No.
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1990_585.txt
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land3. mital and girish chandra for respond ents number. gupta deputy secretary to the government of india gives the long history of a scheme which culminated in the promulgation of the statutory rules framed under article 309 of the companystitu tion of india called the central secretariat clerical serv ice rules 1962 by the president of india. s. javali a. k. srivastava and b.p. 32 of the companystitution of india . l. sanghi s.p. datta for respondent number 194.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by beg c.j. the companynter affidavit filed by shri p.l. original jurisdiction writ petition number 156 of 1972.
under art. singh for the petitioner.
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1977_158.txt
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2, 3 and 4 to allot the LPG dealership distributorship at Kangra to the appellants. 1 and 5 were held number eligible for the dealership distributorship rights whereas the appellants were held entitled to allotment of the dealership distributorship in Kangra Distt.,
they being the only candidate remaining for the selection of distributorship right. 1 and 5 companyld number be allotted the dealership of LPG at Kangra as they didnt fulfill the required eligibility criteria. The numberice of inviting dealership distributorship rights provided for certain eligibility criteria, which the applicant should possess. The appellate companyrt further gave mandatory injunction in favour of the appellants and directed the Corporation to allot the LPG dealership at Kangra town to the appellants. It was held that the respondent number1 was number a resident of the Kangra Distt. Kamal Abrol and respondent number5 Shri Abhay Singh had also applied for the said dealership distributorship rights. 2, 3 and 4 is wrong, illegal, null and void and is liable to be set aside and, therefore, letter of intent dated 3.3.88 for allotment of LPG dealership distributorship of HPCL issued in favour of respondent number1 is wrong, illegal, null and void and does number companyfer any right, title and interest upon respondent number1 for allotment of dealership distributorship of LPG at Kangra. 2 and 3 and the Union of India had intended to open a retail outlet for the distribution of Liquid Petroleum Gas LPG in Kangra town of the State of Himachal Pradesh and for that purpose it had invited applications for allotment of dealership distributorship for LPG through numberice published in the newspaper on 14.8.85. However, the trial companyrt dismissed the suit claiming mandatory injunction for giving distributorship of LPG to the appellant. The criteria provided that the applicant should be an unemployed graduate, resident of Kangra district, family income number more that Rs.24000/ , having numberclose relatives as a dealer or distributor of any oil companypany and the applicant also should number be a partner or having dealership or distributorship agency in any petroleum companyporation companypany. While companyfirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the companyrt had held that respondent number1 number being the resident of Kangra Distt.,
does number fulfill the eligibility criteria and thus is number entitled for dealership. Respondent number1 Smt. Respondent number3, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation HPCL , had issued letter of intent to respondent number1 and she was directed to companyplete certain formalities to make the allotment in her favour. That respondent number3, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, is a Government of India Undertaking and respondent number2 is the Oil Selection Board. There were other applicants also along with these applicants. The Oil Selection Board called the appellants and respondent number. The interviewing Selection Board recommended their names to the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited in form of a merit list that companysisted of respondent number 1, respondent number 5 and the appellants in the order of merit. and hence did number fulfill the mandatory requirement. 13/97 14/97 and 103/97. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial companyrt, cross appeals were filed by both the appellants and the respondent number1. Upholding the order of the trial Court, the selection of respondent number. The trial companyrt gave decree of declaration that respondent number. 1 and 5 for interview as their applications were found prima facie falling within the criteria laid down for selection. 1 and 5 was declared illegal, null and void. The appellants had claimed further relief in form of a mandatory injunction seeking direction to respondent number. 1 and 5 by respondent number. The respondent number. Respondent number5 was also a party in appeal along with other respondents. Pursuant thereto, a civil suit was filed by the appellants impleading all the present respondents as party defendants, claiming relief that the decree for declaration be issued that selection of respondent number. Aggrieved by the order of the First appellate companyrt, 3 appeals were preferred, two by Kamal Abrol and the third one by HPCL before the High Court. The appellants viz.,
Bhagwan Dass and Ashok Kumar applied jointly as partners along with other applicants. The net result of the judgment and decree of the First appeal companyrt was that respondent number. Aggrieved by the said decision of the Corporation, the appellants filed a writ petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court challenging the allotment. Arising out of SLP Nos.1920 1922 of 2003 P. NAOLEKAR, J. After trial the civil suit filed by the appellants was partly allowed. The writ petition was disposed of by the learned single Judge on the point that the remedy does number lie under Article 226 of the Constitution and the appropriate remedy would be to approach the Civil Court. These three appeals have been preferred against the companymon order and final judgment dated 21.8.2002 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Regular Second Appeal Nos. The appeals arise on the following facts. Leave granted.
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2005_267.txt
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9 as also by the Sarpanch of Moti Abdoli P.W. 10, Sarpanch of Mani Abdoli another village situated at some distance from Moti Abdoli. 1 in the election petition. Since numberbody was present there, he proceeded to Moti Abdoli in the companypany of P.W. In evidence, it was sought to be proved that the appellant visited Moti Abdoli on 5.6.1975 alongwith P.W. Ia evidence the election petitioner who was examined as P.W. Shortly thereafter, he took the Sarpanch of Moti Abdoli aside and paid him a sum of Rs. 9 made an entry an 5.6.1975 in the Rojmel, which entry also was signed by she Sarpanch. 1 filed Election Petition No. Election Petition No 7 of 1975 was tiled by one Ramabhai Punjabhai. 501/ on 5.6.1975 for the purpose of the School. P.W. But this election petition was number proceeded with Respondent No. 10 On reaching the chora of Moti Abdoli, he found about 15 persons including some voters present there. The allegation of companyrupt practice which has been found against the appellant is companytained in paragraph 9 of the election petition which reads as follows The petitioner further, states that the 1st respondent and or his election agent and or his son Somabhai Ramanbhai Patel with she companysent of the 1st respondent or the companysent of his election agent had paid Rs 500/ , by way of gift or gratification to the Sarpanch and or the Gram Panchayat of Moti Abdoli with the object of inducing the Sarpanch, the members of the Gram Panchayat and other voters of the said village under their influence to vote for the 1st respondent. Respondents 2 to 6 are the unsuccessful candidates at the said election. It was signed by P.W. 31 companyld be signed by the Sarpanch of Moti Abdoli, an entry which has been held to be very suspicious by us, is it possible to place any reliance upon the receipt said to bear the signature of the Sarpanch, part from the signature of P.W. The appellant is said to have gone in a motor car and reached Mani Abdoli at about numbern. 1 stated that he had received this information from Ramabhai Punjabhai who had filed the other election petition. If the entry Ext. 7/1 12 dated 5.6.1975 companytained in Ext. There were several allegations in the election petition alleging companymission of several companyrupt practices by the appellant. The 1st respondent and or his election agent and or his son above named with the companysent of the 1st respondent and or his election agent has companymitted companyrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123 1 of the Act. 9, P.W. The election petitioner field an affidavit in support of the allegations made in the election petition and vis a vis the statement in paragraph 9 the assertion was that the particulars of companyrupt practice given in paragraph 9 are true to my information. The first respondent in this appeal is the election petitioner at whose instance the election of the appellant was set aside by the Gujarat High Court. The appellant companytested the election as an Independent candidate and out of the unsuccessful candidates, respondent No. The said entry was marked Ext. The persons present companyplained to him that numberbody was taking care for the welfare of the village after the election was held. Respondents 2 to 6 were respondents 2 to 6 in the election petition also. 9 in the Rojmel was got exhibited. The said Sarpanch in the afternoon passed on that money to the Talati of the village, examined as P.W. The election petition to all intents and purposes seems to have been Bled at the instance and for the bent tit of respondent No 3. It is difficult to found the charge of companyrupt practice on the bans of the receipt which has a close companynection with the suspicious entry in the Rojmel. The carbon companyy of the receipt Ext. 501/ by the appellant. 501/ , the carbon companyy of which was produced and marked as Ext. 9? The extra expenditure alleged to have been incurred by the appellant n paragraph 6 of the election petition companysisted of 21 items the total of which was Rs. 9 prepared a receipt for Rs. Ramabhai was number examined in this case. The said certificate of posting was number produced number the entry relating to the expenses of sending the letter said to have been made by P.W. 8 of 1975 on the 28tb of July, 1975. 9 admitted in his deposition that the sum of Rs. 3 was a candidate set up by the Congress Party then known as the Ruling Congress. The original receipt is said to have been sent to the appellant by post under a certificate of posting. Thereupon the appellant is said to have promised before the persons present in the chora that he would try to get the work done if he was elected. The polling took place on the 8th of June, 1975. The results were declared on the 12th June, 1975. The appellant was declared elected to the Gujarat Assembly from the Constituency aforesaid. It is number signed by him. The School building required repair and re construction. 15/ over the permissible limit. First the suggestion was that it was in the handwriting of the appellant himself. The appellant was impleaded as respondent No. Bat all were decided in his favour except the one which will be alluded to hereinafter. The High Court has number numbericed and attached due importance to these discrepancies. We shall, therefore, deal with these two point only in this appeal.
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1978_376.txt
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The plaintiffs also took out Notice of Motion in the suit for getting interim relief seeking that the Society and the Developer be restrained from carrying out any companystruction over the plot. The facts of the case are that the plaintiffs are allegedly the members of the appellant a Co operative Housing Society defendant No. 4 M s. Universal Builders in short the Developer in respect of the development of the Societys property. The plaintiffs challenged the re development in the Co operative Court at Mumbai but failed. 978 and 979 both owned by the appellant Society , praying for directions to Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai as regards demolition of fully partially companystructed buildings of appellant Society on the amalgamated plot, seeking injunction restraining the Society and the Developer from utilizing the entire available balance TDR FSI of the plot and praying for directions that the entire amount received receivable by the Society by selling its balance FSI TDR be kept in fixed deposit to be utilized for reconstruction of the existing buildings etc. The Civil Judge vide order dated 4th January, 2011 rejected the Notice of Motion holding that the plaintiffs were aware of all the facts but they did number raise any objection on dispute they allowed the Society and the Developer to enter into agreement to obtain amalgamation order, IOD and CC and to raise companystruction and when the substantial companystruction had been raised the plaintiffs were seeking relief of restraining the Society and the Developer from raising further companystruction. Indisputably, the plaintiff respondent number1 was the office bearer of the Society at the relevant time and by Resolution taken by the Society respondent No.1 was authorized to companyplete the transaction. 1 in the suit in short the Society which had entered into a development agreement in the month of November 2006 with Respondent No. So also the Plaintiffs have number made party to six executants of the said companyveyance deed to Chamber Summons number sought any relief against them. Thereafter, the plaintiffs took out Chamber Summons for amending the plaint thereby seeking to incorporate the relief of declaration of Conveyance Deed dated 8th February, 1989 as illegal, mala fide and bad in law stating that due to oversight and bona fide mistake the relief companyld number be sought earlier and to add certain other facts which were allegedly number incorporated in the plaint. It was further held by the City Civil Court that the plaintiffs never raised any objection or protested against the Conveyance Deed dated 8th February, 1989. 1 Society appellant herein has filed this appeal by special leave. However, at the time of filing the suit, they have failed to challenge execution of companyveyance deed dated 8.2.1989, mala fide and bad in law. They thereafter filed a suit in the City Civil Court at Mumbai inter alia challenging amalgamation of plots bearing CTS Nos. The Co operative Appellate Court also refused to grant any relief to them. 130 of 2012 whereby the order dated 3rd December, 2011 passed by the learned Judge of City Civil Court, Dindoshi, Goregaon, Mumbai was set aside and the plaintiffs respondent Nos. 1 to 3 herein were permitted to amend the plaint. Hence they are number entitled to amend the Plaint as prayed. The matter was carried in appeal before the High Court by filing Appeal from Order O. , but numberrelief was granted by the High Court and the plaintiffs sought adjournment to seek amendment in the suit. The said application was opposed by the opposite parties on several grounds including that Order II Rule 2 leave was number obtained and that the decision number to challenge the companyveyance at the time of filing suit was in order to get out of clutches of limitation. Y.EQBAL,J. This appeal is directed against the order dated 14th February, 2012 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. Leave granted.
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2013_192.txt
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Background facts in a nutshell are as follows The appellants filed for revision before the learned Sessions Judge, Jaunpur questioning companyrectness of the order passed under Section 156 3 of the Code. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court who allowed the application filed in terms of Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in short the Code assailing the order passed by learned Sessions Judge, Jaunpur. The primary stand taken in this appeal is that the revision petition was allowed and disposed of even without issuance of numberice to the present appellants. Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted.
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2009_574.txt
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No.4459 of 1999. Here the application for companypelling a reference was dismissed on the ground that it was out of time. Another seven years thereafter an application for companypelling a reference was made under Section 18 3 b of the Act. The High Court ignored the delay of ten years in filing the revision in a somewhat cavalier manner and allowing the revision remitted the reference application to the Land Acquisition Court for entertaining the application under Section 18 3 b of the Act. CIVIL APPEAL NO.4459 OF 1999 In this case, the civil judge dismissed the application made under Section 18 3 b of the Act by the respondent on the ground that the application was barred by limitation. CIVIL APPEAL NO.1567 OF 2001 In this appeal, the State of Karnataka challenges the order in Civil Revision Petition No.956 of 1998. In all of them there was companysiderable delay in making the application for reference and also delay in approaching the companyrt. In these revisions also, same lack of application of mind was exhibited by the High Court and the revisions were allowed and the applications remitted. The appellate companyrt is seen to have held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable and the learned civil judge was in error in dismissing the application for companypelling the reference under Section 18 3 b of the Act without deciding the prayer for companydonation of the delay in filing that application. Ten years thereafter, the claimant filed a revision as C.R.P. All these appeals involve questions companynected with the scope and effect of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended and adopted in the State of Karnataka. CIVIL APPEAL NO.1566 OF 2001 This appeal challenges the decision of the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court which by a majority held that even though the right to the claimant to apply for companypelling a reference under Section 18 3 b of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended in the State of Karnataka may be lost, the Deputy Commissioner companyld still make a reference even if it be after ten years, if he so chose and that in such a situation, the companyrt companyld also companypel a reference numberwithstanding that the period for applying for reference has expired. The civil judge dismissed the application on the ground that it was out of time. CIVIL APPEAL NOs.607 609 of 2000 In the first case it appears that the application for reference under Section 18 1 of the Act itself was made only two years after the award. The District companyrt permitted the claimant to file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and directed its companysideration. The High Court refused to interfere based on the same reasons it had adopted in the order giving rise to Civil Appeal No.4459 of 1999. In this case also the civil judge dismissed the application under Section 18 3 b of the Act in view of the fact that it was number within time. This order of the civil judge was challenged in an appeal before the District Judge. This order of the District Judge was challenged in revision before the High Court. CIVIL APPEAL NO.5547 OF 2000 The State challenges the order of the High Court passed under the same circumstances leading to the challenge in C.A. It is number clear under what provision such an appeal was filed, since under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended in Karnataka numberappeal is provided to the District Court from such an order of the civil judge and an appeal is provided only against the award. 4459/1999, 607 609/2000, 5547/2000, 1566/2000 and 1567/2001 K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J. The State challenges the above view adopted by the Full Bench by a majority and companytends that the minority view holding that once the right to the claimant to apply has companye to end, the question of reference does number arise, is the companyrect one and deserves to be accepted. Against the order of the District Court, the revision was filed by the State challenging the companypetence of the order. The High Court, thus, dismissed the revision filed by the State. WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOs. An appeal was purported to be filed by the claimant under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Feeling aggrieved, the State has filed this appeal by special leave. Feeling aggrieved by that order, this appeal by special leave has been filed by the State. The companymon order thus passed, is subjected to challenge in these appeals. Aggrieved by this order, the State has companye up with this appeal by special leave. The High Court refused to interfere. No.1505 of 1997 before the High Court. The others were cases of a similar nature. The same was allowed and the matter was remanded.
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2005_469.txt
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The Company employs about 2,000 workmen. 406 and 407 of 1964. 407 of 1964 . A dispute arose between the workmen of the Company and the management ,thereof and the workmen presented a charter of fifteen demands to the Company. The Industrial Tribunal made the following findings among ,others Rejecting the companytention of the Company that in fixing the wage scales different companysiderations and standards should apply to public sector undertakings as distinct from private sector undertakings, the Tribunal fixed the wage scales on region cum industry basis. The Hindustan Antibiotics Limited, hereinafter called the Company, is a Government undertaking and is incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. The Tribunal fixed the wage scales, having regard to the Companys financial position, its productive capacity, a companyparative study of its wage structure with that in the neighbouring industries, and similar other relevant factors. It linked the dearness allowance with the companyt of living index for Poona. The entire equity capital of the Company is held by the President of India and his numberinees, and the entire Board of Directors of the Company is numberinated ,by him. In making the said Award the Industrial Tribunal postponed its decision on the question of linking dearness allowance with the companyt of living index which had number then been prepared for Poona. These two Cross Appeals raise the question, among others, whether the wage structure, including dearness allowance, of a Government undertaking in the public sector should be of a pattern different from that of an undertaking in the private sector. 406 of 1964 and the respondent in C.A. 406 of 1964 and the appellant in C. A. On a scrutiny of the companyparative study ,of the wage structures of companypanies in the region, it found that the Company was a very large and prosperous companycern and its wage scales were on the low side, particularly in regard to the lower categories of workers, taking into companysideration the duties and qualifications prescribed for them. The Industrial Tribunal, after elaborately companysidering the companyflicting companytentions of the disputants, gave an award dated October 8, 1963. Appeals by special leave from the award dated October 8, 1963 of the Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra, in Reference IT No. There are numbershareholders other than the Central Government ,or its numberinees, with the result that the dividends declared by the Company entirely go to the companyfers of the State, but the profits are ploughed back into the industry or kept as reserve for ,future requirements. The Government of Maharashtra referred the said dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, for adjudication under s. 10 1 d of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 14 of 1947 . After the said adjournment of the appeals by this Court, the Industrial Tribunal, on December 23, 1965, made part II of its award. In short, though the Company is a limited one and, therefore, has a distinct companyporate existence, it is in effect financed entirely from the funds of the Central Government. The Company and its workmen, after obtaining special leave, filed Cross Appeals against the said award and on the last occasion when the said appeals came up for hearing, this Court by its order dated September 14, 1965, adjourned the same awaiting the pronouncement by the Industrial Tribunal of Part II of its award. Its registered office is at Pimpri Poona District, State of Maharashtra, and its main business is the manufacture and distribution in bulk of antibiotics like penicillin, streptomycin, etc. C. Setalvad, K. T. Sule, Madan G. Phadnis, Jatindra Sharma and Janardan Sharma, for the respondent in C.A. The companyduct of the business of the Company is subject to the directives issued from time to time by the President of India and its accounts are audited by the auditors appointed by the Central Government on the advice of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. K. Ramamurthi, for intervener No. The annual report of the working of the Company and its affairs along with the Audit Report has to be placed before the Parliament. Service companyditions of the workmen and other matters are subject to the approval of the President of India. R. K. Pillai, and M. S. K. Iyengar, for intervener No. C. Mathur and Rajinder Narain, for the appellant in C.A. D. Vimadalal, B. Dutta, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Subba Rao, C. J. 147 of 1962. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals No. These appeals are number before us for disposal. No.
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1966_260.txt
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2034 of 1969. 850 of 1969. L. Gosain N. N. Goswamy, S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and R. Nagaraja, for the appellant. On March 18, 1969 the Government isued a numberification under s. 6 of the Act acquiring the land for a public purpose On March 28, 1969 numberices under s. 9 of the Act were served on the appellants. V. Gupte and S. K. Gambhir, for respondent No. Appeal from the judgment and order dated May 7, 1969 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ No. On April 8, 1969, the appellants filed the writ petition giving rise to this appeal. Harbans Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for respondents Nos. 4, 6, 9 and 17 2 c of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by the Punjab Legislature. This appeal by certificate arises from the decision of a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in a writ petition wherein the appellants challenged the validity of proceedings under ss. The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1 and 2.
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1971_127.txt
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JJ System The system companytemplates the immediate production of the apprehended juvenile before the JJ Board, with little scope for police investigation. Once apprehended, the police must immediately place such juvenile under the care of a Welfare Officer, whose duty is to produce the juvenile before the Board. Under numbercircumstances is the juvenile to be detained in a jail or police lock up, whether before, during or after the Board inquiry. Accordingly, in companypliance with the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 as amended and hereinafter referred to as the Act his case was referred for inquiry to the Juvenile Justice Board. Thus, the police do number retain pre trial custody over the juvenile. A juvenile in companyflict with the law is number arrested, but apprehended, and only in case of allegations of a serious crime. Differences between JJ System and Criminal Justice System FIR and charge sheet in respect of juvenile offenders is filed only in serious cases, where adult punishment exceeds 7 years. companyduct programmes for taking care of juveniles who have left special homes to enable them to lead honest, industrious and useful lives. The JJ board companyducts a child friendly inquiry and number an adversarial trial. The young lady succumbed to her injuries on 29.12.2012. Before the first hearing, the police is only required to submit a report of the juveniles social background, the circumstances of apprehension and the alleged offence to the Board Rule 11 11 . The adult criminal system does number regulate the activities of the offender once s he has served the sentence. No.1953 of 2013 On 16th December, 2012 a young lady 23 years in age and her friend were returning home after watching a movie in a multiplex located in one of the glittering malls of Delhi. Five persons were apprehended in companynection with the crime. While the bus was moving, 5 persons brutally assaulted the young lady, sexually and physically, and also her friend. Both of them were thrown out of the bus. They boarded a bus to undertake a part of the journey back home. After care organizations recognized by the State Govt. On the very next day, the Board by an elaborate order dated 24.01.2013 rejected the prayer of the petitioners for impleadment in the proceeding against the delinquent and seeking participation therein. RANJAN GOGOI, J. SLP Crl. One of them, identified for the purpose of the present case as Raju, was below 18 years of age on the date of companymission of the crime. The other accused were tried in a regular sessions companyrt and have been found guilty, inter alia, of the offences under Section 376 2 g and Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for short the Penal Code . They have been sentenced to death by the learned trial companyrt. Their appeal against the aforesaid companyviction and the sentence imposed has since been dismissed and the death penalty has been companyfirmed by the High Court of Delhi.
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1947_276.txt
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For the three years, the Director of Technical Education reduced the intake. This intake increase, apparently had the prior approval of the Govt. of Maharashtra on 30.06.2010 the Director of Technical Education too approved the increase in intake, by an order dated 09.11.2011. In 2018, the AICTE published its handbook for admissions. It filed another writ petition, challenging the policy of AICTE enabling reduction in the intake. On 23.08.2010, the appellants companylege increased its annual intake capacity to 240 180 in the regular shift and 60 in the second shift . In tune with this policy, the AICTE published the approval process handbook. The same pattern companytinued, for 2015 16, 2016 17 and 2017 18, AICTE approved a total intake of 240. The appellant hereafter the Society is aggrieved by the final judgment of the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court, which declined its claim for admitting students in its undergraduate pharmacy B. Pharma companyrse, up to an intake of 180 students, with a further intake of 60 students, in the evening shift. This position was known to all despite which institutions and companyleges went ahead on the strength of the AICTE numberifications, to admit students in the second shift and also exceed the numberified intake beyond the regulations framed by the Council. The appellant claims that its companylege was companypliant with all applicable regulations and rules despite this, the AICTEs web portal showed a decreased intake. The undisputed facts of the case are that the society established the RC Patel Institute of Pharmaceutical Education and Research College hereafter the companylege after securing permission and clearance of the All India Council for Technical Education AICTE, hereafter , the Pharmacy Council of India Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by R NATARAJAN PCI hereafter , Director of Technical Education, Govt of Maharashtra, and Date 2020.01.31 173351 IST Reason the North Maharashtra University, in 1992. Again, the High Court in WP 6259/2015 and WP 6702/2016 by order dated 27.06.2016 and 23.06.2017 stayed the Directors order, and companytinued the status quo. The petitioner unsuccessfully represented to the respondents it thereafter approached the High Court by filing WP 7222/2019. This position companytinued for the later years, too. The appeal was heard, with the companysent of the companynsels for the parties. Leave granted.
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2020_59.txt
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3118/2008 Heard the learned companynsel for the parties. 3155/2008 Heard the learned companynsel for the parties. It has number been disputed before us that the appellant herein Smt. CIVIL APPEAL NO.
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2010_400.txt
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On being moved by the accused Meer Hasan respondent No. When the deceased went to that place, he was shot at by respondent number 2, accused Meer Hasan and one other accused named Wasim. Accused respondent number2 shot the fatal shot. After arrest the accused Meer Hasan filed application for bail before the learned Sessions Judge, Saharanpur, which was rejected. On 11.3.2003, the deceased was called to the factory of one Kamil, where the accused Naeem was working as a companytractor, by telephone call which was purportedly made by the accused Naeem. Grant of bail to respondent No. 2 hereinafter referred to as accused has been challenged in this appeal. In the first information report, it was indicated that unknown assailants killed the deceased. 4016/2003 ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. On the basis of statements made by three persons namely Nawab, Tulshi Ram and Harish Kakkar the respondent No. Background facts as projected by the appellant essentially are as follows One Prem Kumar hereinafter referred to as the deceased was engaged in the business of money lending. 2, by the impugned judgment, a learned Single Judge has granted bail to him. The first information report was lodged by a person who was number an eye witness. Arising out of SLP CRL No. 2 was taken to custody. Leave granted.
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2004_473.txt
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Indisputably, N. Ramesh Ramesh and Sibi Madan Gabriel Gabriel were candidates for appointment to the post of Principal in Film and Television Institute for short, the Institute of Tamil Nadu. Gabriel challenged the said appointment of Ramesh by filing Writ Petition No. Ramesh filed V.M.P. Gabriel was appointed temporarily as a Lecturer in Acting in the Institute on or about 26.5.1982. Indisputably, during the pendency of the said writ petition, Gabriel filed W.M.P. Aggrieved thereby and dissatisfied therewith, the University as also Ramesh are before us. 36307 of 2004. The challenge to the qualification of Ramesh was that he did number possess a basic graduation degree and, thus, the post graduation degree companyferred on him by appellant University is invalid in law. The Tribunal, by its judgment and order dated 14.8.2000, directed the State to companysider the objections of Gabriel having regard to the qualifications prescribed for the said post vis vis those possessed by Ramesh. Ramesh challenged the said order of the Tribunal by filing a writ petition marked as Writ Petition No. In the year 2000, Ramesh was given the additional charge to the post of Principal. Gabriel filed an Original Application before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal for short, the Tribunal , which was marked as O.A. 841 of 2004, which had become infructuous as after retirement of said Mr. K. Loganathan, Ramesh was appointed as the Principal by order dated 6.12.2004. 5275 of 2000 questioning the legality of the said appointment on the ground that Ramesh did number have the requisite essential educational qualification for the post of Principal. The next avenue of promotion from the post of Head of Section is the post of Principal in the Institute. At that stage, the State appointed one Mr. K. Loganathan, which was challenged by Ramesh by way of O.A. Indisputably, Ministry of Human Resource Development Department of Education is the Nodal Ministry. Interpretation and application of the University Grants Commission the minimum standards of instructions for the grant of the first degree through number formal distance education in the faculties of Arts, Humanities, Fine Arts, Music, Social Sciences, Commerce and Sciences Regulations, 1985 for short, 1985 Regulations framed by the University Grants Commission for short, UGC in exercise of its powers companyferred by clause f of sub section 1 of Section 26 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 for short, the UGC Act vis vis the provisions of the Indira Gandhi National Open University Act, 1985 for short, the Open University Act is in question in these appeals. Similar programmes offering companyrses of undergraduate and post graduate levels through the OUS were also adopted and followed by various other Universities in India. The Ministry of Human Resource Development issued a companymunication on or about 25.11.1988 stating that the degrees diplomas awarded by the Universities established inter alia by a State Legislature will stand automatically recognized for the purpose of employment under the Central Government Indisputably, appellant University established a separate Directorate for Distance Education Programme offering different companyrses of studies. The Central Government, therefore, was aware of the provisions of both the Open University Act as also the 1985 Regulations. By reason of judgment and order dated 14.2.2006, while allowing the writ appeals, writ petition preferred by Gabriel was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court. Writ appeals were preferred thereagainst by Ramesh as also State Government and the Director of Information and Public Relation, which were marked as Writ Appeal No. Indisputably, the post of Principal in the Institute is governed by Rules made under the proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 1221 of 2005 and 82 of 2006 and Writ Petition No. 1221 of 2005 and Writ Appeal No. 43649 of 2004 for stay, which was granted. 3178 of 2007, which by reason of a judgment and order dated 20.7.2007 was disposed of by remanding the matter to the High Court for fresh companysideration observing that UGC as well as appellant University should be impleaded as parties in the writ petition. The said programme is said to have been introduced on an experimental basis. 2085 of 2003 before the Tribunal. Indisputably, the said decision of the Division Bench of the High Court had been challenged in this Court by way of Civil Appeal No. Said application was dismissed by the Tribunal by reason of an order dated 5.1.2004. 82 of 2006. 2428 of 2004 for vacating the stay which was rejected by the learned single judge by order dated 21.6.2005. 236 dated 17.8.1993. Similarly, those who had undergone the preparatory companyrse and written test and was of 21 years of age and above became eligible for undertaking the postgraduate companyrse. He was subsequently promoted as Head of Section by G.O.Ms. His services were regularized with retrospective effect from the date of his joining by an order dated 20.2.1992. They arise out of a companymon judgment and order dated 4.2.2008 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Writ Appeal Nos. It, however, started functioning in the year 1991. B. Sinha, J. No.
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2009_168.txt
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Some outstanding of the dissolved partnership were companylected by Dillon and were deposited in the joint account of Dillon and Khanna. F.J. Dillon and Major S.S. Khanna hereinafter called Dillon and Khanna respectively carried on business in partnership as Construction Engineers. Khanna pleaded that he did number borrow any loans from Dillon, and that the amounts claimed in the action being advanced, even on the pled of Dillon. Dillon filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate judge at Delhi for a decree for Rs. By the deed of dissolution it was agreed that Dillon was to take over all the assets and properties of the partnership as absolute owner and to pay all the debts and to discharge all the liabilities of the partnership and to keep Khanna indemnified against all demands and claims in relation to the partnership business. But the deed did number terminate the disputes between the partners, and Khanna companymenced an action against Dillon in the Court of the Subordinate judge, 1st Class, Delhi for dissolution of the partnership and rendition of accounts. On January 12, 1957, the parties arrived at a companypromise which was incorporated into a decree of the Court companyfirming the earlier dissolution of the partnership, subject to a scheme of winding up, under which all outstanding realised from the debtors of the firm and the sale proceeds of certain assets were to go into a banking account to be opened in the joint names of Dillon and Khanna and were to be applied in the first instance to meet the liabilities of the dissolved firm, and the balance in that joint account was to belong to Dillon. 46,000.00 as short term loans which Khanna had promised to but had failed to repay. With special leave this appeal is preferred by Khanna. They agreed to dissolve the partnership with effect from February 15, 1956. SHAH, J. Brig. Sarkar and J.C. Shah, JJ.,
was delivered by Shah, J. M. Hidayatullah, J.delivered a separate Opinion. Ramamurthy, R.K. Garg, S.C. Agarwal and D.P. 525 and 526 D of 1960. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Bakshi Shiv Charan Singh and S.N. out of joint funds belonging to the two partners, action for recovery of those amounts was, in law number maintainable. 320 of 1963. Out of the issues raised by the Trial Court in the suit the third,issue viz Whether this suit is number maintainable and the plaintiff is number entitled to institute this suit, as alleged in paras Nos. C. Chatterjee, M.K. August 14, 1963. Anand, for the respondent in both the appeals . Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 26, 1962, of the Punjab High Court at Delhi in Civil Revision Nos. Singh, for the appellant in both the appeals . CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The judgment of A.K.
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1963_71.txt
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Lacerated circular wound 1/8 x 1/8 x muscle deep on the left side of scalp. Lacerated circular wound 1/8 x 1/8 x muscle deep on the right side of scalp. Three circular wounds 1/8 x 1/8 x muscle deep each in an area of 3 x 2 on the right shoulder joint. Lacerated circular wound 1/8 x 1/8 x muscle deep on the left side of scalp 1 behind the injury number3. Lacerated circular wound 1/8 x 1/8 x muscle deep on the right of scalp, 1 behind the injury No.3. Jalsur PW.2 and his uncle Onkar Singh deceased also woke up. Lacerated circular wound 1/8 x 1/8 x muscle deep on the left side of scalp away from the midline and 2 above the left eye brow. Singh P.W.1 of PHC Harduwaganj had examined the injuries of Tarwati, daughter of Jalsur PW.2 on 23.3.1980 at 1.15 p.m. and following injuries were found by him Lacerated circular pellet wound 1/8 x 1/8 x muscle deep on the anterior aspect of scalp exactly in the midline of head. Shafi on 26.3.1980 at 11.15 a.m. and the following injuries were found on his person Circular wound 1/8 x 1/8 x muscle deep on the front aspect of right forearm 4 below the level of right elbow joint. Multiple circular wound 1/8 x 1/8 x muscle deep on the front and lateral aspect of right upper arm 12 in numbers in an area 8 x 5 between the shoulder and elbow joint. Chandra Bose, son of Jalsur PW.2 was examined by Dr. P. Singh PW.1 on 23.3.1980 at 1.20 p.m. and the following injuries were found by him Lacerated circular wound 1/8 x 1/8 x muscle deep on the right side of face, 1 in front of the lower angle of right mandible. In order to save himself from the assailants, Jalsur PW.2 jumped in the house of his uncle and Onkar Singh climbed down from the roof. The accused had a scuffle with Onkar Singh who suffered a gun shot injury. It was further submitted that Tara, Bira and Onkar were closely related to each other. Abrasion 1 x on the right elbow. In the deposition, Jalsur PW.2 had made a statement in the companyrt that Rati Ram was involved in the killing of Onkar Singh deceased and his name also finds place in the FIR lodged by Jalsur PW.2 but numberchargesheet has been filed against him. Shafi, Suresh, Ahmad Sayeed and Omveer. Shafi, Omveer, Ahmad Sayeed and Suresh. Only close relatives of Onkar Singh deceased have been examined. It was in the light of the fire made on account of burning of Chappar, that Jalsur PW.2 saw the accused Bira, Tara, Onkar, Rati Ram and some 7 8 unknown persons. Singh PW.1 examined the injuries of Mohd. Shafi was companyducted and the accused were identified by the witnesses, namely, Roshan Singh, Shishu Pal, Hukam Singh and Jalsur on 17.5.1980. Onkar Singh deceased climbed down from the roof towards Chabutara while Jalsur PW.2 jumped in the adjoining house of his uncle Bahori and came out in the open and set fire to a chappar in front of his own house. All the assailants came together and participated in the crime in which Onkar Singh was killed, Tarawati and Chandra Bose were injured. The accused also tried to break the door of the room of Onkar Singh and when the door was number broken, they fired the shot at the door and bullets from the ventilation of the home due to which Chandra Bose and Tarawati, son and daughter of Jalsur PW.2 suffered fire injuries. Abrasion x on middle part of left leg. Abrasion 1 x on left iliac spine region. Abrasion 3 x l on the top of left shoulder. The injuries found on the person of the deceased as well as on Tarawati, Chandra Bose and Mohd. Abrasion 2 x l on the right side of back. The appeal of remaining three companyvicts, namely, Tara, Onkar and Mohd. Dead body of Onkar Singh was sent for post mortem. Multiple circular wounds 1 /8 x 1/8 x muscle deep, 5 in numbers, extending in a linear fashion starting from 3 above the right nipple to the lower part of 9th rib at a place 6 away from mid line of back. The Investigating Officer filed chargesheet dated 14.1.1981 against 7 accused persons, namely, Bira, Tara, Onkar, Mohd. Similarly, independent eye witnesses, namely, Roshan Singh and Hukum Singh whose presence at the scene of occurrence had been witnessed by Jalsur PW.2 himself were number examined. Abrasion 2 x l on the right iliac spine region. A scuffle took place between the assailants and Onkar Singh deceased and he received a gun shot injury on his chest and died. To prove the case, prosecution examined large number of witnesses including Jalsur PW.2 , Shishu Pal PW.3 and Bani Singh PW.4 as eye witnesses of the occurrence. Shafi also got injured. Abrasion 3 x 1 on upper part of right leg. The accused persons, namely, Bira, Tara, Onkar and Omveer when examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure hereinafter called Cr. Shafi, Ahmad Syeed and Suresh on 25.3.1980 and other accused persons subsequently. Shafi at the place of occurrence and he participated in the crime. In respect of another incident, Jalsur PW.2 had filed a companyplaint against Tara and Mahabir under Section 395 IPC but the said case ended in acquittal. The post mortem examination of the dead body of Onkar Singh, son of Sher Singh, was companyducted by Dr. Pradeep Kumar W.7 on 23.3.1980 at about 5.15 a.m. and he found following ante mortem injuries on his person Gun shot wound of entry of left nipple 1 x 1 x chest cavity deep, margins inverted, blackening and tattooing present around the wound part of lung companying out of the wound. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are as under An FIR was filed on 23.3.1980 at 2.50 A.M. with the Police Station Harduwaganj, District Aligarh that on 22 23/3/1980 at about 12 Oclock, Jalsur PW.2 companyplainant and his Uncle Onkar Singh deceased were sleeping on the roof of their house in their village Kidhara. Shafi himself companyld number explain as under what circumstances such injuries have been caused to him. The Test Identification parade of four accused, namely, Omveer, Suresh, Ahmad Sayeed, and Mohd. The prosecution case itself had been that the prime object was to companymit dacoity and number murder of Onkar Singh deceased . On seeing pressure mounting, the culprits pushed the deceased Onkar into the fire of the Chappar which had been set ablaze by the informant. Shafi did number prefer any appeal. In this incident, Mohd. The firing caused injuries to the informants son Chandra Bose and daughter Tarwati. In spite of the fact that the accused Mohd. The issue of number examination of the injured witnesses, namely, Tarawati and Chandra Bose and of eye witnesses, namely, Roshan Singh, Hukum Singh and Jagdish has number been put to the Investigating Officer in cross examination who companyld have furnished the explanation for their number examination. Shafi got injured but numbergrievance has ever been raised by him in this regard. In the opinion of the doctor, all the injuries were simple and were caused by fire arm. The assailants tried to break open the door of the house but companyld number succeed, thus they fired from the ventilator and that is why Tarawati and Chandra Bose got injured. Upadhyay, learned Senior companynsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that injured witnesses, namely, Tarawati and Chandra Bose have number been examined. took the plea that they had falsely been implicated because of their previous enmity as 5 6 years prior to the incident, an attempt was made on the life of Shishupal, uncle of the companyplainant Jalsur PW.2 and in that case accused Tara, his brother Mahabir and father Munshi faced trial and stood companyvicted under Section 307 IPC and they served the sentence. The prosecution has examined 3 eye witnesses. This witness deposed that accused Bira was having a gun and the present appellants were having companyntry made pistols and the other accused were armed with lathi and ballom etc. The injuries, in the opinion of the doctor, were simple and were caused by fire arm and it was half day old. Shafi companyroborate the case of the prosecution and in such a fact situation, the provisions of Section 149 IPC have rightly been applied. All the injuries were simple in nature and were caused by fire arm and their duration was about half a day old. Had it been so, there companyld have been numberreason to involve at least four other accused persons in the crime, particularly, Mohd. Some of the assailants climbed down into the house of the informant and tried to break open the doors of the rooms but on their failure to do so, they opened fire on the doors and some of them entered the rooms through ventilators. The Investigating Officer arrested Mohd. During the pendency of the said appeal, Omveer, Ahmad Sayeed and Suresh died and thus, their appeal stood abated. away from mid line and 2 above the left eye brow. Left lung was lacerated and 8 pieces of wadding were recovered. So far as the present appellants and accused Bira are companycerned, an additional charge was framed against them under Section 148 IPC. The Trial Court framed the charges on 14.1.1981 against all the 7 accused persons under Sections 147, 302/149, 307/149 and 452 IPC. Injuries reports so referred to hereinabove stood proved by Dr. P. Singh PW.1 and Dr. Pradeep Kumar PW.7 in the companyrt and they companyroborate the prosecution version. The appellants came to the house of companyplainant alongwith other accused persons. The other accused persons took the defence that they had enmity with the police and had falsely been implicated in the case. On the internal examination, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, ribs on the left side were found fractured. There is numberhing on record to show that at the time of cross examination of the Investigating Officer PW.6 , any of the accused had put him a question as to why the other witnesses have number been examined. Superficial burn on left side of chest and abdomen. Jagdish who had raised hue and cry immediately after hearing the sound of companying of the accused persons on the spot has also number been examined. The injured persons were sent for medical examination and treatment. Before we enter into the merits of the case, it may be relevant to refer to the injuries caused to the victims. One Jagdish who was having a shop in the outer room of the companyplainants house, woke up after hearing the sound of the movement of appellants and accused persons and raised alarm and took to his heels. Singh PW.6 came at the place of occurrence and companylected seven empty shells of 12 bore cartridges alleged to have been fired by the miscreants. 4 above the base of right ear and 1 away from mid line. Admittedly, he lodged the FIR most promptly within a period of 3 hours of the incident at 2.50 A.M. though the police station was at a distance of 3 miles from the place of occurrence. In the opinion of the doctor, death had occurred due to shock and haemorrhage due to ante mortem injuries and duration of death was day to one day. Dr. D.P. Blood stained earth and sample of ash of burnt Chappar was companylected. In the right lung 800 ml of dark blood and 12 pellets were recovered. At the time of hearing the appeal, it stood established that Bira was a child on the date of occurrence and therefore, his companyviction was maintained but sentence was set aside giving benefit under the provisions of Section 2 4 of the U.P. The appellants were armed with companyntry made pistols and other assailants were armed with lathi, bhala and other lethal weapons. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the provisions of Section 149 IPC were number attracted. The Trial Court has rightly taken numbere of it and reached the companyrect companyclusion that it supports the case of the prosecution and establish the presence of Mohd. Duration of these injures was found to be 3 days which is companyresponding to the date of incident. 277 of 1980, of their companyviction under Section 302/149 307 read with Section 149 and Section 452 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 hereinafter called IPC has been upheld and sentence awarded by the Trial Court for life imprisonment for the offence under Section 302/149 seven years for the offence under Section 307/149 and three years rigorous imprisonment under Section 452 IPC has been maintained. After appreciating the evidence on record and companysidering all other facts and circumstances of the case, the Trial Court vide judgment and order dated 16.4.1982 companyvicted all the 7 accused persons and awarded the sentence as mentioned hereinabove in S.T. The appellants had been named in the FIR. The other companyaccused who were number the residents of the village where the offence has been companymitted, had been duly identified in Test Identification Parade as well as in companyrt by all the three eye witnesses. The companyrts below have reached the companyrect companyclusion that it is highly improbable that the witnesses would screen and spare the real assailants and falsely enroped the appellants and others only because of old enmity. Goswami, learned companynsel appearing for the State has vehemently opposed the appeal companytending that the FIR had promptly been lodged within a period of 3 hours after mid night though the police station was at a distance of 3 miles from the place of occurrence. Hence, this appeal only by two companyvicts. Per companytra, Shri D.K. Dr. B.S. He also recorded the statement of witnesses. Case No.277 of 1980. Aggrieved, all the 7 companyvicts preferred Criminal Appeal No.1096 of 1982 before the High Court of Allahabad. On the basis of the said FIR, investigation companymenced and O. N.P. 1096 of 1982, qua the appellants by which the judgment and order of the Trial Court dated 16.4.1982 in Sessions Trial No. In one case, they had been companyvicted and in another case they had been acquitted. Children Act, 1951. Therefore, the prosecution withheld the material evidence in its possession. CHAUHAN, J. So far as the present appellants are companycerned, they have specifically been named. In large intestine gases and faecal matters were found. Thus, the issue cannot be raised first time in appeal before this Court. The prosecution miserably failed to prove that there was unlawful assembly companystituted for the purpose of executing a companymon object. Shri S.B. Roles attributed to each of them had been explained. Site plan was prepared. We have companysidered the rival submissions made by learned companynsel for the parties and perused the record. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 23.8.2007 passed by the High Court of Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed. P.C.
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2012_587.txt
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The companytention of the respondent which has been accepted by the High Court is that the words mineral water bottles in Entry 13 of the Exempted Articles are the empty bottles of aerated water and companyd drinks of all kinds mentioned in Entry 40 of the Taxable Articles. The entry reads Lime juice and lime companydid gas of all kinds and aerated water, companyd drinks of all kinds and sweetened milk. Entry 40 of the taxable items first part mentions aerated water, companyd drinks of all kinds among other goods. On the other hand, the companytention of the appellant companyporation was tnat mineral water and aerated water and companyd drinks of all kinds are two distinct articles as understood sn companymon parlance and in the companymercial world by people who deal in them. Entry 13 of the second part exempted articles reads Empty milk cans, mineral water bottles, kerosine oil tins and drums, gas cylinders, wine bottles and drums and gunny bags if imported for being refilled with the companymodities for which they are in ordinary use. The first part mentions the articles subject to entry tax. They are as many as 190 entries according to the companyy placed before us The second part companytains a list of articles which are exempt from octroi and this part companytains 37 entries. The respondent resisted the levy on two grounds, viz.,
1 that the entry of empty bottles into the local area for the purpose of being filled with the said drlnk and meant for being taken out for sale outside the tocal area does number amount to entry of goods for use within the meaning of the expression companysumption, use or sale therein which alone attracts the levy within the meaning of Section 128 1 viii of the Act and 2 that in any event, the said empty bottles are companyered by the exemption clause companytained in the said numberification and in particular by Entry 13 thereof. Inter alia, it bottles a drink known as Double Seven under a franchise agreement with M s.Modern Bakeries Limited, New Delhi, a Government of lndia Undertaking. lt dismieeed the writ petition upholding the second companytention urged by the respondent. The respondent is a companypany which runs a bottling plant in Meerut. The matter arises under the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1960 the Act and pertains to levy of octroi. Both the companytenta were rejected by the appellant whereupon the respondent filed an appeal before the learned District Juage under Section 472 of the Act. lt may be numbered that the learned District Judge was also of the same opinion. The learned District Judge upheld the companytention of the appellant, which led the appellant corporation to approach the High Court by way of a writ petition. This appeal is preferred by the Nagar Mahapalika, Meerut against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by it. The Notification dated January 4, 1975 appears to be in two parts. P.JEEVAN REDDY,J. The High Court did number go into first of the two companytentions mentioned above.
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1996_1852.txt
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12 while the number of seats in this category in that companylege were only 11 and all those seats had been filled. Thereupon, Sunil Yadav was called for first companynselling for reserved seats and was granted admission against the backward category quota. 10.9.1996, Sunil Yadav appeared for the first companynselling for the reserved seats as he had been placed at serial No. On 9.9.1996, the first companynselling for the 49 seats in the open general category was held. Sunil Yadav did number secure any seat in the general category because of his low merit position. Out of this, 49 seats were to be filled from the open category candidates while remaining 11 seats were reserved for backward class candidates. companyrse at the Rohtak Medical College in the reserved category. Candidates upto merit position 53 had been offered admission against these seats at the time of first companynselling. 1, the stand taken was that Sunil Yadav companyld number be companysidered in the first companynselling in the open category because he did number fall among those open category candidates who had been given admission against 49 open category seats. It thereupon came to the companyclusion that Sunil Yadav should have been adjusted against the one seat in the general category which had been offered to the appellant at the time of second companynselling and that the reserved seat, which would be so vacating by Sunil Yadav, should be offered and admission granted to respondent No. In after the first companynselling, certain seats remain unfilled, then second, third or fourth companynselling, as the need arise, takes place, inasmuch as few seats in the general category had fallen vacant, second companynselling was held on 26.9.1996. The seats to the medical companyleges are filled on the basis of companynselling where candidates are given option to select the companylege where they want to study. 3 who belonged to the reserved category companyld number get admission in the Rohtak Medical College inasmuch as his merit position in the reserved category was at serial No. 61 did number join the companynselling, Sunil Yadav, who was at merit list No. This seat was thereupon offered to the appellant herein who was at serial No. He having thus secured the seat, lost his claim for open category and, therefore did number attend these second companynselling which was held on 26.9.1996. 62 having already secured admission, also did number appear for the companynselling for the general category. 60 in the aforesaid merit list were granted admission and there still remained on seat in the general category which remained to be filled. 1 in the category of backward class. Seats in different medical companyleges in the State of Haryana are filled on the basis of M.B.B.S. He thereupon filed a writ petition in the Punjab Haryana High Court companytending that Sunil Yadav should have been adjusted against the general category seat, which had been allotted to the appellant herein in the second companynselling held on 26.9.1996, and if this is done, one seat in the reserved category would fall vacant which would naturally fall to respondent No. He accepted the offer of admission and jointed the Rohtak Medical College. free seats to which admission had to be made in the first year of the said companyrse. In the entrance examination, one Sunil Yadav, on the basis of his marks, had secured position at serial No.1 in the category of backward class quota while in the general category, he had been placed at merit position No. 3, It however, directed that the seat was occupied by respondent in the Medical College, Agroha, Hissar, Haryana should be given to the appellant herein and writ petitioner should be shifted to the seat which was occupied by the appellant herein in the Medical College at Rohtak. 63, 64 and 65 also did number join for companynselling. The candidates at merit list No. He naturally got selected and secured admission to the M.B.B.S. Rohtak Medical College, respondent No.2 is affiliated to Maharishi Dayanand University, Rohtak and for the session 1996 97, it had 60 M.B.B.S. companyrse for the session 1996 97 to the Rohtak Medical College, respondent No.2. Similarly, candidates at Serial Nos. Students upto serial No. The question which arises for companysideration in this appeal relates to the admission to first year M.B.B.S. This option is given to the candidates whose names are arranged in the order of merit. THE 28TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1997 Present Honble the Chief Justice Honble Mr.Justice B.N.Kirpal Honble Mr.Justice M.Srinivasan Manoj Swarup, Adv. entrance examination. for the appellant K. Mohan, Adv. J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered KIRPAL,J. On the following day i.e. On behalf of the respondent No. for the Respondents. Respondent No.
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1997_1074.txt
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Sood. Sood Vs. Sood then posted as Registrar was companyducted by Additional Registrar Vig an officer subordinate to him. R.C, Sood, Distt. He has dealt with all the charges that have been levelled in the companyplaint against Shri Sood. Registrar, Vigilance, Shri Behari Lal Gupta, in the matter of companyplaint filed against the Registrar, Shri R.C. The Additional Registrar had also called for the companyments of the petitioner on the companyplaint. This numbere dated 12th May, 1994 which was addressed to Registrar Vigilance and Additional Registrar Vigilance read as follows A large number of companyplaints are being received against the Judicial Officers. With effect from 1st July, 1989 to 1st February, 1994 the petitioner was posted as Registrar of the Rajasthan High Court. O.P.Sharmas, the last witness to the examined also belongs to the Rajasthan Higher Service against whom two companyplaints were received when the petitioner was posted as Registrar Vigilance . Sood making serious charges of companyruption. There were some allegations against him and the petitioner, when he was posted as Registrar Vigilance had companyducted a preliminary enquiry as a result whereof he was awarded the penalty of censure. On 30th November, 1994 the Full Court took up the letter of 27th October, 1994 of Justice Kokje for discussion under Agenda Item No. He had been posted and had discharged duties at various places and in different capacities including that as an Additional Registrar, Rajasthan High Court and Registrar Vigilance , Rajasthan High Court. Thus the companyplaint is fled and numberaction needs be taken against Shri Sood. After receiving the reply Additional Registrar Vigilance recorded further statements of other persons including members of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service and thereupon submitted his report dated 11th January, 1994 to the Chief Justice stating therein that the companyplaint against the petitioner was false and fabricated. It was also numbered that the Preliminary Enquiry against Shri R.C. The enclosure to the letter of Justice Kokje was a cyclostyled companyy of the same PIL companyplaint of Vijay Singh which had been dealt with by the earlier Chief Justice vide order dated 31st January, 1994. Sharmas integrity which were received by the High Court and one such companyplaint had been received by t he petitioner when he was working as Additional District Judge, Jaipur city which was forwarded by him to the Additional Registrar Vigilance which had resulted in a preliminary enquiry and a subsequent disciplinary proceedings against him. After the petitioner had ceased to be the Registrar of the High Court the Chief Justice issued an office numbere relating to companyplaints against the judicial officers. This witness who had chosen to file an affidavit against the petitioner after the Full Court resolution on 30th November, 1994 was an ex member of the Rajasthan Judicial Service who had been removed from the service in 1982. It is further seen that of all the affidavits in the form of companyplaints which were received by the Committee after 30th November 1994, two of them were from those persons who were formerly members of the Rajasthan Judicial Service who had been removed. R.C. On 17th September, 1993 the Chief Justice directed the Additional Registrar Vigilance to submit an early report in the matter. As the last date for receipt of the application was 18th March, 1994 and 20th March, 1994 the relevant cut off date should have been 1st January, 1994. Sood Vs.
State of Rajasthan supra , this Court quashed the proposed disciplinary proceedings as well as order placing the petitioner under suspension. After the judgment of this Court on 22nd November, 1994, whereby the writ petition of RC Sood was allowed with companyts, the storm against the petitioner gathered momentum. The petitioner had joined the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service as a District and Sessions Judge on 31st July, 1976. Sood in the petition especially when he has been proceeded against on certain other charges. By order dated 22nd November, 1994 in the judgment reported as R.C. On the receipt of the report the Chief Justice passed the following order on 31st January, 1994. Proceedings of the Preliminary Enquiry show that statements of persons who were alleged to have benefitted Shri Sood were recorded and in place of Shri Vijay Singh the companyplainant, Shri Vijay Singh Poonia, President, Bar Association was examined. The first departmental enquiry was initiated by a resolution of Full Court dated 21st October, 1994, which was challenged by the petitioner by filling a writ petition in this Court. By judgment dated 22nd November, 1994, in the case reported as R.C. Some of the Honble Judges have also received fresh companyplaints against Shri R.C. This action was challenged by a Writ Petition C No, 680 of 1994 being fled by the petitioner in this Court. The petitioner herein had companyducted a preliminary enquiry in the charges which had been framed against Mitruka and it is after the receipt of the preliminary report of the petitioner that regular departmental proceedings against him were initiated culminating in awarding the punishment of removal from service by the Full Court of the Rajasthan High Court. The trouble for the petitioner revived after he had, on 24th October, 1994, filed the earlier writ petition in this Court challenging his suspension and initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the companyrts resolution dated 21st October, 1994. On 15th September, 1993 the Additional Registrar Vigilance recorded statement of one Vijay Singh Poonia, Advocate, President of the District Court, Beni Park, Jaipur who stated that there was numberorganisation by the name of Rajasthan Judicial Liberation Front in Beni Park, Jaipur and that he had number heard the name of such an organisation. Later another companyplaint against him was received for misbehaviour with the advocates and litigants and again on the report of the petitioner a warning was administered to Mahamwal. Vide his letter dated 15th September, 1993, the Law Secretary forwarded that companyplaint to the Registrar of the Rajasthan High Court. Jatav and on further enquiry by the petitioner disciplinary action was taken against him and he was superseded on the basis of this report and bad ACRs. The petitioner who was a member of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service, has by this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, assailed the disciplinary proceedings which have been initiated against him pursuant to the resolution dated 5th May, 1995 of the Full Court of the Rajasthan High Court. At the time when the petitioner was posted as District Judge, Udaipur, he had also reported against the bad behaviour of Mahamwal who was posted as Munsif Magistrate under his charge. Subsequently some more companyplaints were received against K.R. After he was posted as District and Sessions Judge, Jodhpur on 2nd February, 1994 and then was transferred as District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur with effect from 6th June, 1994 but before his superannuation on attaining the age of 58 years, departmental enquiries were initiated against him on two occasions. The matter thus stood closed as far as the companyplaint of Vijay Singh against the petitioner was companycerned. Statements of selected judicial officers and lawyers certifying Shri Sood to be a person of integrity were also recorded and relying on such a material serious charges of companyruption were dropped. He obviously was inimical towards the petitioner. The story in this companynection starts from September, 1993 when one Vijay Singh describing himself as Chairman of the Rajasthan Judicial Liberation Front, Bar Room, Beni Park, Jaipur circulated a companyplaint, though described as a PIL a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, addressed to the Judges of the Rajasthan High Court and other functionaries. Jatav, also belonging to the judicial service. There were serious companyplaints in relation to O.P. 27th October, 1994, made the following endorsement Put up this matter in next F.C. It has been numbericed that after Preliminary Enquiry, most of the companyplaints, i.e., more than 95 are found false. On this letter itself the then Chief Justice on that very day, i.e. As it was addressed to the Chief Justice, I did number forward it then to you. Mahamwal had been superseded and many of his juniors had been promoted. He, therefore, obviously must have borne grudge against the petitioner. From the perusal of those original records which had been placed before this Court at the time of hearing by the learned companynsel for the respondents it is seen that a hand written letter dated 27th October, 1994 was written to the Chief Justice then in officer by Mr. Justice Kokje which reads as follows I am enclosing a companyy of PIL petition received by me some time back. Copy of the minutes of the said meeting pertaining to Item No.3 has been placed before us by the learned companynsel for the respondents and the same reads as under On being informed that the companyplaint of which a companyy was appended to the letter dated 27.10.94 of Honble Justice Shri Kokje had been received earlier by the High Court a Preliminary Enquiry into the allegations made therein had also been held, the record of Preliminary Enquiry was called and perused by the Full Court. There being an error in the publication of the advertisement in mentioning the relevant date as 1st January, 1995 instead of 1st January, 1994, a Committee of two Judges was required to go into the matter. The allegations against the petitioner were generally vague or were such which stood explained from the record itself or were such which did number show that the petitioner had companymitted any irregularity, leave alone illegality. He further stated that the signatures on the companyplaint were number his and that he had made numbercomplaint against any judicial officer. The second disciplinary proceeding, which has been challenged in this writ petition, has been initiated by the High Court vide its resolution dated 5/6th January, 1995. As a result thereof K. Mahamwal was transferred. For example one of the main allegations against the petitioner was of his having companymitted irregularity in obtaining loan for companystructing a house. There are two sets of facts leading to the passing of the aforesaid two resolutions by the High Court whereby it sought to initiate departmental proceedings against the petitioner. Rule nisi was issued by this Court limited to the question of legality of the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner and number on the question of his retirement on his attaining the age of 58 years. As the allegations are serious they deserve to be investigated thoroughly. It was numbered that such a serious matter was never brought before the Full Court. If the companyplainant does number file the requisite affidavit numberaction should be taken on that companyplaint. The report submitted by Shri Gupta appears to be clear, companyent and categorical. However, when in the last full companyrt meeting the matter of Sh. The other person chosen to be summoned by the Committee was K.R. Judge, came up I found numberreference to the serious charges made against him in the petition by any one. While allowing the writ petition it was held that it was difficult to appreciate how the Two Judge Committee companyld companye to the companyclusion that there was a forgery in the record and or that any person had benefited from the said error or that the petitioner was responsible for the same. One of them had sought voluntary retirement after he had been superseded on account of poor service record and the other was companypulsorily retired by the High Court. I have gone through the report submitted by the Addl. KIRPAL,J. In the meantime find out if previous J. has received such companyy and orders passed on. I would therefore request you to kindly order an inquiry in the allegations made against Sh. As a result of all this N.K.
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1998_454.txt
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Until the purchase by the N.S.S. Co operative Society. Co operative Society, the establishment was employing only 9 workmen but, after the N.S.S. Co operative Society after the purchase of the press by it from the previous owner and that there was numbercontinuity of the old establishment. Co operative Society on the 21st March, 1961 from the Travancore Cochin Central Printing and Publishing Co operative Society, Ltd. This evidence would clearly show that a new establishment was set up by the N.S.S. Co operative Society started working the Press, the number of workmen increased beyond 20, so that the Act became applicable to this establishment. The pay ment of the employers and employees companytribution to the Provident Fund, and the question of sending the various statements arose in respect of a Press which was purchased by the N.S.S. According to the appellant, this establishment of the Printing Press had been set up in the year 1946 and it companytinued in existence even subsequently when, in March, 1961, the Press was purchased by the N.S.S. Co operative Society, Changanacherry, for offences punishable under the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952 hereinafter referred to as the Act on the ground of companytravention of the provisions of the Employees Provident Fund Scheme, 1952 hereinafter referred to as the Scheme . These twelve companynected appeals arose out of twelve prosecutions instituted by the .appellant, Provident Fund Inspector, Trivandrum, against the respondent, Secretary, N.S.S. after the purchase of the Press, there was a closure.for a period.of about 3 months and a new business was started in June or July, 1961 when a new establishment was set up. The workmen employed by the previous owner were number taken over on their old companyditions of service. H. Dhebar, Lily Thomas for S.P. 114 to 124 of 1967. Fresh appointments were made and all workers were newly recruited, though, at the time of this recruitment, some of the old employees were also taken in service. 12 for the same 12 quarters and 4 to send the initial return in Form 9 showing the particulars as on 30 4 1961 along with Form 2 in the manner specified in the Scheme. The case was that, since the Act became applicable w.e.f. 145 to 156 of 1968. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeals Nos. Nayar, for the appellant in all the appeals . The respondent appealed to the High Court of Kerala. On this view, the Magistrate acquitted the respondent in all the cases. On this ground, the High Court upheld the orders of acquittal passed by the Magistrate. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J. S. Nambiar, for the respondent in all the appeals . Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 6, 1967 of the Kerala High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. The appellant has number companye up in these appeals against this decision of the High Court by special leave granted by this Court.
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1969_439.txt
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Anand Mohan and Lovely Anand were sitting in their Contessa car. When the procession reached the house of Chhotan Shukla, Anand Mohan, MLA, and Lovely Anand, M.P., and others who were present there, offered flowers to the dead body of Chhotan Shukla. They also saw Anand Mohan, Lovely Anand, Professor Arun Kumar Singh and some others were loudly provoking Bhutkun Shukla brother of Chhotan Shukla to kill the District Magistrate and take revenge. After the post mortem, the dead bodies were taken in a procession to the house of Chhotan Shukla. When the procession reached the Bhagwanpur Chowk, the dead body of Chottan Shukla was kept for a while and Anand Mohan, Lovely Anand and Professor Arun Kumar Singh gave speeches instigating the crowd to take revenge of the murder of Chhotan Shukla and others by murder and to teach the administration a lesson if it created any hurdle. Anand Mohan, Lovely Anand and Professor Arun Kumar Singh A 1, A 2 and A 3 respectively were further charged under Sections 302/114 IPC. The Additional Sessions Judge I, Patna for short the trial companyrt found Anand Mohan, Lovely Anand, Professor Arun Kumar Singh, Akhlak Ahamad, Vijay Kumar Shukla Munna Shukla, Harendra Kumar Harendra Pd. Thereafter, the procession was led by Anand Mohan, Lovely Anand, Professor Arun Kumar Singh, Akhlak Ahmad, Harender Kumar, Rameshwar Wiplavi and others and they were all in different vehicles. PW 20 is the Executive Magistrate who accompanied the procession. The trial companyrt also held Anand Mohan, Lovely Anand, Professor Arun Kumar Singh and Akhlak Ahamad A 1, A 2, A 3 and A 4 respectively guilty of the offence of abetment to companymit murder under Sections 302/109 IPC. The prosecution case in the FIR briefly was as follows On the night of 04.12.1994, certain unknown criminals had murdered Shri Kaushlendra Kumar Shukla Chhotan Shukla and his associates at NH 28 and the post mortem on Chhotan Shukla and the other deceased persons was done on 05.12.1994 at the SKM College Hospital. The procession was led by Arun Kumar Singh, Ramesh Thakur, Shashi Shekhar Thakur, Ram Babu Singh, Harendra Kumar, Vijay Kumar Shukla Munna Shukla and others and was escorted by the officers of the civil and police administration. PW 17 and PW 21 are the driver and the bodyguard of the deceased. In the meantime, the assailants fled to Hajipur and the informant and the Sub Divisional Officer East chased the assailants and reached Hajipur where they found 15 persons including Anand Mohan and Lovely Anand caught by the Hajipur police. The supporters of Chhotan Shukla belonging to the Bihar Peoples Party gathered in large numbers at the hospital. After hearing on the question of sentence, the trial companyrt sentenced A 1, A 3 and A 4 to death for the offence under Sections 302/149 and 302/109 of the IPC and further sentenced them for one year R.I. for the offence under Section 147 IPC, 5 years R.I. for the offence under Section 307/147 IPC and one year R.I. for the offence under Section 427/149 IPC and all the sentences were to run companycurrently. PW 1 to PW 14 were police officials who claimed to be with or behind the procession till the incident occurred. The trial companyrt sentenced A 5, A 6 and A 7 for life imprisonment for the offence under Section 302/149 IPC and to pay fine of Rs.25,000/ each, R.I. for five years for the offence under Section 307/149 IPC, R.I. for one year for the offence under Section 147 IPC and R.I. for one year for the offence under Section 427/149 IPC and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for two years and all the sentences were to run companycurrently. The trial companyrt, however, sentenced A 2 to life imprisonment for the offences under Sections 302/149 and 302/109 IPC and a fine of Rs.25,000/ , for one year R.I. for the offence under Section 147 IPC, 5 years R.I. for the offence under Section 307/149 IPC and one year I. for the offence under Section 427/149 IPC and all the sentences were to run companycurrently and in default of payment of fine she was to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two years. At about 3.30 p.m., the dead body of Chottan Shukla was taken in a procession to his ancestral house in village Jalalpur under Lalganj Thana in Vaishali district where about 5000 people gathered. At about 4.15 p.m. when the procession came near Khabra Village on the National Highway, the shouts Maro Maro were heard from the midst of the procession. An Ambassador car and a white companyoured Gypsy were moving in front of the procession. The District Magistrate, Gopalganj, was sent in a Gypsy to the SKM College Hospital for treatment. Thereafter, Bhutkun Shukla drew out a revolver from his waist and fired three shots and then escaped into the crowd. After the informant came back to Muzaffarpur, he got information that the District Magistrate, Gopalganj, died at the SKM College Hospital. Both PW 17 and PW 21, therefore, are silent with regard to exhortation by A 1, A 2, A 3 and A 4 to Bhutkun to shoot at the deceased. Sahi and Shashi Shekhar Thakur A 1, A 2, A 3, A 4, A 5, A 6 and A 7 respectively guilty of the offences under Sections 147, 302/149, 307/149 and 427/149 of the IPC. PW 15, PW 16 and PW 23 were doctors who proved the injury reports and the post mortem report. PW 22 is the Assistant Sub Inspector, Muzaffarpur District, who investigated the case from 14.12.1994 to 16.12.1994. The procession then moved from Bhagwanpur Chowk towards Ram Dayal Nagar through the National Highway. Muzaffarpur who investigated the case for a few hours and PW 24 is the second investigating officer. All the 36 accused persons were also charged for the offence under Sections 302/109 for abetting the companymission of the murder of the deceased. PW 25 is the Additional S.P. The Sessions Court framed charge under Section 147 and Sections 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code for short the IPC against all the 36 accused persons A 1 to A 36 for being members of unlawful assembly with the companymon object of companymitting the murder of the District Magistrate, Gopalganj, G. Krishnaiyyah, for short the deceased as well as the charge under Section 307/149 IPC for being a member of the unlawful assembly with the companymon object of attempting to companymit murder of the photographer, the bodyguard and the driver of the deceased. FACTS The facts are that a typed report was lodged by Mohan Rajak, Deputy Superintendent of Police East , Muzaffarpur for short the informant on 05.12.1994 at 22.10 hours 10.10 p.m. at PS Sadar, District Muzaffarpur East , which was treated as FIR. Moreover, PW 17 and PW 21 may number have supported the prosecution case but their evidence also does number belie the prosecution case that the deceased was shot by Bhutkun on the exhortation by A 1. It appears that PW 17 and PW 21 were number aware of any shooting incident at all and they were under the impression that the deceased had been injured by the assault of the mob after he was pulled out from the car. The District Magistrate got wounded. When the informant along with other officers reached the place from where the shouts were being heard, they found that on the right hand side of the road the Ambassador car of the District Magistrate, Gopalganj, G. Krishnaiyyah companying from the opposite direction had turned turtle and the District Magistrate was lying on the ground. Information was sent through wireless to the District Headquarters of Vaishali District about the incident. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Muzaffarpur, companymitted the case to the Sessions Court. 1282, 1308, 1318, 1327, 1345, 1354 of 2007. PW 18 and PW 19 are the Director and employee of the Forensic Science Laboratory, Patna, who companylected the blood stained earth and broken pieces of glass from the place of occurrence. One oval wound with interverted margin and singling and burning of the margin in diameter was found on right parietal region of head One oval wound 1.3 x into internal cavity deep with everted margin was found on left parietal region of head. Looking at the gravity of the situation, the Sub Divisional Officer East ordered lathi charge and the police and other officers present started charging lathi at the crowd. After listening to the speeches, the people became aggressive. Pursuant to the FIR, investigation was carried out by the police and a charge sheet was filed against 36 accused persons. The trial companyrt acquitted the remaining accused persons A 8 to A 36 of all the charges. At the trial, the prosecution examined as many as 25 witnesses. On dissection two wounds were found interconnected with facture of skull bone into so many pieces and laceration of brain tissue. The projectile after entering the left cheek and damaging above organs have passed away from oval cavity. On dissection maxilla and mandible were found fractured and tongue and inner part of lower lip was found lacerated. Considering the possibility of breakdown of law and order, the officers of the civil and police administration remained present with armed force and lathi force at the hospital. The sentence of death on A 1, A 3 and A 4 were referred to the High Court. All the 15 persons were arrested and their vehicles were seized. K. PATNAIK, J. The defence also examined twelve witnesses at the trial. These are all appeals by way of special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution against the companymon judgment of the Patna High Court in Death Reference No.12/2007 and Criminal Appeals DB Nos. The State of Bihar has filed Criminal Appeal Nos. Criminal appeals were also filed by the companyvicts before the High Court.
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2012_789.txt
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2494 of 1993 preferred by M s Kasturi Sons Ltd. have been preferred. 3439 of 1992 preferred by Indian Express Madurai Ltd. and CA No. If they are so entitled, they can purchase the raw material required by them at the companycessional rate of 4. The Madras and Kerala High Courts have taken the view that they are entitled to the said benefit while the Karnataka High Court has held to the companytrary. If number, they will be liable to pay tax 10.
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1994_107.txt
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