LawInformedAI/overruling · Datasets at Hugging Face

label int64 0 1	sentence1 stringlengths 1 958
0	a party may file with the supreme court a petition to review an adverse decision by the court of appeals.
0	tex. r. civ. p. 166a(c); margetis v. frost nat'l bank, no. 02-12-00027-cv, 2012 wl 4936611, at *2 (tex. app.fort worth oct. 18, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). here, palacios is not arguing that patel failed to establish her entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law.
1	to the extent they are inconsistent with views expressed in this opinion hamm v. city of santa ana, supra, 273 cal.app.2d 84 and people v. marsh, supra, 30 cal.app. 424 are disapproved.
1	1980) was to the contrary, it was overruled.
1	we therefore disapprove of the holding to the contrary in san juan 1990-a, l.p. v. meridian oil inc.
0	a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of the courtif the trial court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, the court does not have authority to consider the matter.
0	bennett v. appaloosa horse club, 201 ariz. 372, 375, 11 (app. 2001).
1	in accordance with the court's internal rules this opinion was circulated to the court en banc and a majority have approved overruling the roberts case.
0	{12} here the trial court then determined there was a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
0	in the sixth circuit, ""[i]f a defendant fails to rebut a race-neutral explanation at the time it was made, the district court's ruling on the objection is reviewed for plain error, and the movant in this setting is in no position to register a procedural complaint that the district court failed to give a specific reason on the record for accepting the government's race-neutral explanation.
1	app. 1981), or voninski v. voninski, 661 s.w.2d 872, 878-79 (tenn.
0	we take this opportunity to clarify the definition of statutory nonhearsay pursuant to nrs 51.035.
0	as we have previously observed, rule 21 is not designed to swap in new plaintiffs for the sake of securing a judicial determination on the merits where the original plaintiffs no longer have a stake in the outcome.
1	however, in a footnote, the district court certified conflict with the third district's decision in gevertz, stating that "[t]o the extent thatgevertz . . . holds that the contract rate of interest is applicable to both prejudgment and post-judgment interest rates, with respect, we believe that gevertz is wrongly decided.
1	therefore, we overrule the case of martin v. vapor honing company insofar as it conflicts with this decision.
1	we acknowledge that, in rejecting the inadvertence prong as a component of the plain-view exception as articulated in bruzzese , we are setting forth a new rule of law.
1	if anything said in mitchell or the other cases above cited be deemed in conflict with our holding in the case now before us, we disagree with it.
0	certified for partial publication.
0	in re estate of baca, 1980-nmsc-135, 9-10, 95 n.m. 294, 621 p.2d 511 (upholding collateral attack on a 1950 judgment in an estate proceeding stating ""[a] judgment which is void is subject to direct or collateral attack at any time"").
0	this standard of review affords considerable deference to the trial court provided that the court acted in accordance with the governing rules of law.
0	the double jeopardy proscription is intended to shield individuals from the harassment of multiple prosecutions for the same misconduct.
1	contrary dicta contained in prior decisions (see people v. brock, supra, 66 cal.2d 645; people v. friend, supra, 50 cal. 2d at p. 578 and cases cited therein) are overruled.
0	any brief that appellant files must comply with the applicable provisions of the texas rules of appellate procedure, including rule 38.1, which sets out the requirements for an appellant's brief.
0	id., citing barnes v
0	46 defendant argues, in the alternative, that the circuit court failed to conduct a proper inquiry into his posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
1	the decision of the fourth district court of appeal holding section 550.081 unconstitutional is disapproved.
1	in sum, tomlin's per se approach to rule 60(b) is no longer good law.
1	to the extent mattias and subsequent cases suggest otherwise, we disavow them.
1	we overrule our prior opinions in state farm mutual auto insurance co. v. kay, 26 utah 2d 195, 487 p.2d 852, and kay v. kay, 30 utah 2d 94, 513 p.2d 1372, to the extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion.
1	we now overrule st. john's interpretation and affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.
1	r., 331 s.w.2d 314, was overruled to an extent in judge woodley's opinion in wilkerson, supra
0	in nath, the supreme court explained that in addition to complying with the requirements of the governing substantive law, a sanction must also comply with due process by being ""just and not excessive.""
0	bahtuoh, 840 n.w.2d at 820 (emphasis omitted).
0	in that case, at least two other property owners had an interest in the purported easement, because their properties abutted the easement, but were not named in the suit.
1	to the extent that lopez is inconsistent with this rule, it is hereby overruled.
0	it is unclear whether this means that behdadnia made an unconditional tender of the $400,000 (or more) due under the sales agreement.
0	but where a state statute criminalizes more conduct than the removable offense, it is overbroad and does not categorically make the offender removable.
0	during the bench trial, appellants also objected to a question by adams bank during cynthia mcvay's testimony.
0	in support of its position, the court cited several cases from foreign jurisdictions.
1	before the court takes the radical step to overrule cervantes and effectively to impugn the rationale of morales too, albeit sub silentio it would do well to explain why the requirement of article 26.13(a)(4) is not of sufficient import to defeat the state's otherwise compelling interest in the finality of convictions.
1	however, to the extent the case was not dismissed on procedural grounds, the johnson case is contrary to the supreme court's opinion in foremost insurance company v. shepard, supra.
1	we disapprove of miller v. miller, 848 s.w.2d 344 (tex.app. texarkana 1993, no writ), el paso sharky's billiard parlor, inc. v. amparan, 831 s.w.2d 3 (tex.app. el paso 1992, writ denied), and any other authorities in which the court of appeals has dismissed an appeal when the appellant has made a bona fide attempt to invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction by filing a bond within the fifteen days of the date the bond was due.
0	(in re victor l. (2010) 182 cal.app.4th 902, 910 (victor l.).)
0	reilly, judge ramsey county district courtfile no. 62-cr-17-1420 lori swanson, attorney general, st. paul, minnesota; and john choi, ramsey county attorney, thomas r. ragatz, assistant county attorney, st. paul, minnesota (for respondent) cathryn middlebrook, chief appellate public defender, john donovan, assistant public defender, st. paul, minnesota (for appellant) considered and decided by bjorkman, presiding judge; larkin, judge; and reilly, judge.
0	see id. a trial court may decree an unequal division of an estate as long as a reasonable basis for doing so exists.
0	""the statute does not simply govern applicable procedures; it obliterates the debtor's liability.""
1	instead, we choose to overrule quintana, based on the supreme court's subsequent decision in monge and the many court decisions tracking monge.
1	it follows that there was no valid judgment against defendant bond; that the execution and garnishment issued thereon was properly quashed; and that williams v. shrout, mo.app., 294 s.w.2d 640, relied on by garnishor, must be and is overruled.
0	(as last visited june 20, 2017) (bold in original).
0	treating ""the judgment rendered in the first action . . . now as it was in the beginning,"" we held that the people's claim was barred.
0	roberts express v. bauman, 6th dist. lucas no. l-89-197, 1990 ohio app. lexis 1513 (apr. 20, 1990).
1	accordingly, we overrule greenberg and conclude that federal courts may "look through" 10petitions, applying the ordinary principles of federal-question jurisdiction to the underlying dispute as defined by vaden .
0	the mother did not respond, and the maternal grandmother picked up the children and kept them ""all summer.""
1	arana v. koerner is overruled to the extent it indicates otherwise.
0	for these reasons, the district court did not err in determining that appellant did not overcome the presumption that she was palpably unfit to parent her four children.
1	we rejected the application of the collateral order doctrine set forth in cohen v. beneficial industrial loan corp.
1	statements in the following cases inconsistent with this holding are disapproved: allen v. department of personnel administration, supra; phillips v. state personnel bd., supra; harris v. state personnel bd., supra; goggin v. state personnel bd., supra; zike v. state personnel bd., supra; curia v. civil service com., supra; armistead v. state personnel bd., supra; and willson v. state personnel bd., supra
1	accordingly, we overrule broadnax and its progeny, and we reaffirm the holdings of cases like craft v. craft, 647 so.2d at 783; pilgrim v. pilgrim, 596 so.2d at 944; and whitehead v. whitehead, 494 so.2d at 458, that a request for an award of alimony after the reservation of the issue must be based upon a material change of circumstances.
0	the magistrate judge recommended that the district court sua sponte dismiss the action under 28 u.s.c. 1915(e)(2)(b)
0	plaintiffs filed the instant action seeking penalties and damages, urging that lammico failed to timely fund the settlement when it did not unconditionally tender the agreed upon sums by january 3, 2015.
1	"catalyst theory," allowing that result, is no longer available for that purpose, see farrar, ___ u.s. at ___, 113 s.ct. at 573-74, and cases such as bonnes v. long, 599 f.2d 1316 (4th cir. 1979), which applied that theory, are overruled.
0	see pearson v. wendell, 2015 me 136, 45, 47, 125 a.3d 1149.
1	miller, supra, and brunner, supra, are overruled to the extent that they conflict with this opinion.
1	we disapprove of rollenhagen to the extent that it states a public-interest privilege applicable against private figures.
1	however, insofar as that case may be in conflict with the opinion in the present case it is overruled.
0	the statute bars certain ""alien[s]"" from ""attempt[ing] to enter . . . the united states."" 8 u.s.c. 1326(a)(2).
1	accordingly, we disapprove the second district court of appeal's decision in floridaire to the extent it can be read as requiring notice to be served on an owner who shares a common identity with the contractor.
1	accordingly, we overrule state v. layne, 623 s.w.2d 629 (tenn.
0	schweiker v. hansen, 450 u. s. 785, 791 (1981) (marshall, j., dissenting).
0	summary judgment may be granted only when there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
0	even if the fourth amendment had required the officer to comply with the letter of the implied consent law, the blood test result would have been admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.
0	i. dish's appeal
1	consistent with this reasoning a number of jurisdictions have abandoned the acceptance rule in favor of what has been described as the so-called "modern rule" or "foreseeability doctrine."
0	in determining whether a complaint has alleged a plausible claim for relief, we ""consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.""
0	[20] thus, in the context of his due process challenge, davis was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the suggestive out-of-court identification was orchestrated by ""improper state conduct.""
0	furthermore, when objecting to the result, which was the trial judge's announcement of a judgment of acquittal and that he would dismiss the jury, the prosecution still failed to identify that article 778 provided no direct support for the acquittal.
0	because the warrant was supported by probable cause, we reverse the order granting the motion to suppress and remand the case for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
0	capps, 300 ga. at 8 (2).
1	we overrule marcum and owens to the extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion.
0	see franchise tax board v. construction laborers vacation trust, 463 u.s. 1, 13-14, 103 s.ct. 2841, 2848, 77 l.ed.2d 420 (1983); williams v. caterpillar tractor co., 786 f.2d 928, 931-32 (9th cir. 1986) ( williams).
0	(id.; r.r. at 260a-66a.)
0	musser davis land co. v union pac. res., 201 f.3d 561, 563, (5th cir. 2000) (citing exxon corp. v. crosby-miss res., ltd., 154 f.3d 202, 205 (5th cir. 1998)).
0	stale information cannot be used to establish probable cause.
0	id. (citing in re marriage of frederici, 338 n.w.2d 156, 158 (iowa 1983)).
1	however, after careful examination of the development and purpose of rule 296, we feel compelled to go further and overrule lassiter and all other decisions after 1957 which have required separate presentment of the initial request for findings and conclusions.
0	richard e. odoms, hamburg, minnesota (pro se relator) gregory s. paulson, brodeen & paulson pllp, minneapolis, minnesota (for respondent) lee b. nelson, minnesota department of employment and economic development, st. paul, minnesota (for respondent department)
0	we respectfully disagree with our colleague's finding on this point, though our decision is based on the trial record rather than the summary judgment record.
1	we hold that w.s. 35-10-205 does not grant counties the authority to enact more stringent regulations of the use, sale and possession of fireworks, and we overrule our decisions in haddenham ii and gueke to the extent those decisions hold to the contrary.
1	for all the foregoing reasons, the decision in woodlake, supra, 230 cal.app.3d 1058, is erroneous, and it is hereby disapproved.
1	to the extent that copper liquor inc. v. adolph coors co., 684 f.2d 1087 (5th cir. 1982), modified on other grounds en banc, 701 f.2d 542 (5th cir. 1983), held otherwise, it is overruled.
1	no such authority is required to be shown in cases involving the forgery of a check and the contrary holding in fain v. commonwealth is overruled.
1	we overrule this holding based upon our conclusion that review by the court of appeals under section 22-63-117(11) is predicated upon a final order of the school board resulting from proceedings conducted under section 22-63-117.
0	lerma, 877 f.3d 631 (quoting mathis, 136 s. ct. at 2249).
0	consequently, according to the sheriff, allowing this statute to summarily result in loss of firearm rights without further judicial process or notice would be confusing and absurd.
0	the parties agree that the issue in this case requires us to determine the applicable unit of prosecution.
0	this notice must be posted in the waiting room, printed and distributed to all clients, or provided digitally at check-in.
0	""every robber or burglar knows when he attempts to commit his crime that he is inviting dangerous resistance.""
0	moreover, the board's finding of no waiver in this case accords with its practice of ""appl[ying] cauthorne . . . 'narrowly,'"" only finding waiver ""where there is explicit contract language authorizing an employer to cancel its obligations.""
0	the ultimate question at issue in a case like this is whether ""there is a reasonable probability that [the jury] would have struck a different balance.""
1	thus, we hold that henceforth prohibition may not be employed to raise the defense of workers' compensation immunity.

0

a party may file with the supreme court a petition to review an adverse decision by the court of appeals.

0

tex. r. civ. p. 166a(c); margetis v. frost nat'l bank, no. 02-12-00027-cv, 2012 wl 4936611, at *2 (tex. app.fort worth oct. 18, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). here, palacios is not arguing that patel failed to establish her entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law.

1

to the extent they are inconsistent with views expressed in this opinion hamm v. city of santa ana, supra, 273 cal.app.2d 84 and people v. marsh, supra, 30 cal.app. 424 are disapproved.

1

1980) was to the contrary, it was overruled.

1

we therefore disapprove of the holding to the contrary in san juan 1990-a, l.p. v. meridian oil inc.

0

a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of the courtif the trial court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, the court does not have authority to consider the matter.

0

bennett v. appaloosa horse club, 201 ariz. 372, 375, 11 (app. 2001).

1

in accordance with the court's internal rules this opinion was circulated to the court en banc and a majority have approved overruling the roberts case.

0

{12} here the trial court then determined there was a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

0

in the sixth circuit, ""[i]f a defendant fails to rebut a race-neutral explanation at the time it was made, the district court's ruling on the objection is reviewed for plain error, and the movant in this setting is in no position to register a procedural complaint that the district court failed to give a specific reason on the record for accepting the government's race-neutral explanation.

1

app. 1981), or voninski v. voninski, 661 s.w.2d 872, 878-79 (tenn.

0

we take this opportunity to clarify the definition of statutory nonhearsay pursuant to nrs 51.035.

0

as we have previously observed, rule 21 is not designed to swap in new plaintiffs for the sake of securing a judicial determination on the merits where the original plaintiffs no longer have a stake in the outcome.

1

however, in a footnote, the district court certified conflict with the third district's decision in gevertz, stating that "[t]o the extent thatgevertz . . . holds that the contract rate of interest is applicable to both prejudgment and post-judgment interest rates, with respect, we believe that gevertz is wrongly decided.

1

therefore, we overrule the case of martin v. vapor honing company insofar as it conflicts with this decision.

1

we acknowledge that, in rejecting the inadvertence prong as a component of the plain-view exception as articulated in bruzzese , we are setting forth a new rule of law.

1

if anything said in mitchell or the other cases above cited be deemed in conflict with our holding in the case now before us, we disagree with it.

0

certified for partial publication.

0

in re estate of baca, 1980-nmsc-135, 9-10, 95 n.m. 294, 621 p.2d 511 (upholding collateral attack on a 1950 judgment in an estate proceeding stating ""[a] judgment which is void is subject to direct or collateral attack at any time"").

0

this standard of review affords considerable deference to the trial court provided that the court acted in accordance with the governing rules of law.

0

the double jeopardy proscription is intended to shield individuals from the harassment of multiple prosecutions for the same misconduct.

1

contrary dicta contained in prior decisions (see people v. brock, supra, 66 cal.2d 645; people v. friend, supra, 50 cal. 2d at p. 578 and cases cited therein) are overruled.

0

any brief that appellant files must comply with the applicable provisions of the texas rules of appellate procedure, including rule 38.1, which sets out the requirements for an appellant's brief.

0

id., citing barnes v

0

46 defendant argues, in the alternative, that the circuit court failed to conduct a proper inquiry into his posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

1

the decision of the fourth district court of appeal holding section 550.081 unconstitutional is disapproved.

1

in sum, tomlin's per se approach to rule 60(b) is no longer good law.

1

to the extent mattias and subsequent cases suggest otherwise, we disavow them.

1

we overrule our prior opinions in state farm mutual auto insurance co. v. kay, 26 utah 2d 195, 487 p.2d 852, and kay v. kay, 30 utah 2d 94, 513 p.2d 1372, to the extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion.

1

we now overrule st. john's interpretation and affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.

1

r., 331 s.w.2d 314, was overruled to an extent in judge woodley's opinion in wilkerson, supra

0

in nath, the supreme court explained that in addition to complying with the requirements of the governing substantive law, a sanction must also comply with due process by being ""just and not excessive.""

0

bahtuoh, 840 n.w.2d at 820 (emphasis omitted).

0

in that case, at least two other property owners had an interest in the purported easement, because their properties abutted the easement, but were not named in the suit.

1

to the extent that lopez is inconsistent with this rule, it is hereby overruled.

0

it is unclear whether this means that behdadnia made an unconditional tender of the $400,000 (or more) due under the sales agreement.

0

but where a state statute criminalizes more conduct than the removable offense, it is overbroad and does not categorically make the offender removable.

0

during the bench trial, appellants also objected to a question by adams bank during cynthia mcvay's testimony.

0

in support of its position, the court cited several cases from foreign jurisdictions.

1

before the court takes the radical step to overrule cervantes and effectively to impugn the rationale of morales too, albeit sub silentio it would do well to explain why the requirement of article 26.13(a)(4) is not of sufficient import to defeat the state's otherwise compelling interest in the finality of convictions.

1

however, to the extent the case was not dismissed on procedural grounds, the johnson case is contrary to the supreme court's opinion in foremost insurance company v. shepard, supra.

1

we disapprove of miller v. miller, 848 s.w.2d 344 (tex.app. texarkana 1993, no writ), el paso sharky's billiard parlor, inc. v. amparan, 831 s.w.2d 3 (tex.app. el paso 1992, writ denied), and any other authorities in which the court of appeals has dismissed an appeal when the appellant has made a bona fide attempt to invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction by filing a bond within the fifteen days of the date the bond was due.

0

(in re victor l. (2010) 182 cal.app.4th 902, 910 (victor l.).)

0

reilly, judge ramsey county district courtfile no. 62-cr-17-1420 lori swanson, attorney general, st. paul, minnesota; and john choi, ramsey county attorney, thomas r. ragatz, assistant county attorney, st. paul, minnesota (for respondent) cathryn middlebrook, chief appellate public defender, john donovan, assistant public defender, st. paul, minnesota (for appellant) considered and decided by bjorkman, presiding judge; larkin, judge; and reilly, judge.

0

see id. a trial court may decree an unequal division of an estate as long as a reasonable basis for doing so exists.

0

""the statute does not simply govern applicable procedures; it obliterates the debtor's liability.""

1

instead, we choose to overrule quintana, based on the supreme court's subsequent decision in monge and the many court decisions tracking monge.

1

it follows that there was no valid judgment against defendant bond; that the execution and garnishment issued thereon was properly quashed; and that williams v. shrout, mo.app., 294 s.w.2d 640, relied on by garnishor, must be and is overruled.

0

(as last visited june 20, 2017) (bold in original).

0

treating ""the judgment rendered in the first action . . . now as it was in the beginning,"" we held that the people's claim was barred.

0

roberts express v. bauman, 6th dist. lucas no. l-89-197, 1990 ohio app. lexis 1513 (apr. 20, 1990).

1

accordingly, we overrule greenberg and conclude that federal courts may "look through" 10petitions, applying the ordinary principles of federal-question jurisdiction to the underlying dispute as defined by vaden .

0

the mother did not respond, and the maternal grandmother picked up the children and kept them ""all summer.""

1

arana v. koerner is overruled to the extent it indicates otherwise.

0

for these reasons, the district court did not err in determining that appellant did not overcome the presumption that she was palpably unfit to parent her four children.

1

we rejected the application of the collateral order doctrine set forth in cohen v. beneficial industrial loan corp.

1

statements in the following cases inconsistent with this holding are disapproved: allen v. department of personnel administration, supra; phillips v. state personnel bd., supra; harris v. state personnel bd., supra; goggin v. state personnel bd., supra; zike v. state personnel bd., supra; curia v. civil service com., supra; armistead v. state personnel bd., supra; and willson v. state personnel bd., supra

1

accordingly, we overrule broadnax and its progeny, and we reaffirm the holdings of cases like craft v. craft, 647 so.2d at 783; pilgrim v. pilgrim, 596 so.2d at 944; and whitehead v. whitehead, 494 so.2d at 458, that a request for an award of alimony after the reservation of the issue must be based upon a material change of circumstances.

0

the magistrate judge recommended that the district court sua sponte dismiss the action under 28 u.s.c. 1915(e)(2)(b)

0

plaintiffs filed the instant action seeking penalties and damages, urging that lammico failed to timely fund the settlement when it did not unconditionally tender the agreed upon sums by january 3, 2015.

1

"catalyst theory," allowing that result, is no longer available for that purpose, see farrar, ___ u.s. at ___, 113 s.ct. at 573-74, and cases such as bonnes v. long, 599 f.2d 1316 (4th cir. 1979), which applied that theory, are overruled.

0

see pearson v. wendell, 2015 me 136, 45, 47, 125 a.3d 1149.

1

miller, supra, and brunner, supra, are overruled to the extent that they conflict with this opinion.

1

we disapprove of rollenhagen to the extent that it states a public-interest privilege applicable against private figures.

1

however, insofar as that case may be in conflict with the opinion in the present case it is overruled.

0

the statute bars certain ""alien[s]"" from ""attempt[ing] to enter . . . the united states."" 8 u.s.c. 1326(a)(2).

1

accordingly, we disapprove the second district court of appeal's decision in floridaire to the extent it can be read as requiring notice to be served on an owner who shares a common identity with the contractor.

1

accordingly, we overrule state v. layne, 623 s.w.2d 629 (tenn.

0

schweiker v. hansen, 450 u. s. 785, 791 (1981) (marshall, j., dissenting).

0

summary judgment may be granted only when there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

0

even if the fourth amendment had required the officer to comply with the letter of the implied consent law, the blood test result would have been admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.

0

i. dish's appeal

1

consistent with this reasoning a number of jurisdictions have abandoned the acceptance rule in favor of what has been described as the so-called "modern rule" or "foreseeability doctrine."

0

in determining whether a complaint has alleged a plausible claim for relief, we ""consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.""

0

[20] thus, in the context of his due process challenge, davis was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the suggestive out-of-court identification was orchestrated by ""improper state conduct.""

0

furthermore, when objecting to the result, which was the trial judge's announcement of a judgment of acquittal and that he would dismiss the jury, the prosecution still failed to identify that article 778 provided no direct support for the acquittal.

0

because the warrant was supported by probable cause, we reverse the order granting the motion to suppress and remand the case for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

0

capps, 300 ga. at 8 (2).

1

we overrule marcum and owens to the extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion.

0

see franchise tax board v. construction laborers vacation trust, 463 u.s. 1, 13-14, 103 s.ct. 2841, 2848, 77 l.ed.2d 420 (1983); williams v. caterpillar tractor co., 786 f.2d 928, 931-32 (9th cir. 1986) ( williams).

0

(id.; r.r. at 260a-66a.)

0

musser davis land co. v union pac. res., 201 f.3d 561, 563, (5th cir. 2000) (citing exxon corp. v. crosby-miss res., ltd., 154 f.3d 202, 205 (5th cir. 1998)).

0

stale information cannot be used to establish probable cause.

0

id. (citing in re marriage of frederici, 338 n.w.2d 156, 158 (iowa 1983)).

1

however, after careful examination of the development and purpose of rule 296, we feel compelled to go further and overrule lassiter and all other decisions after 1957 which have required separate presentment of the initial request for findings and conclusions.

0

richard e. odoms, hamburg, minnesota (pro se relator) gregory s. paulson, brodeen & paulson pllp, minneapolis, minnesota (for respondent) lee b. nelson, minnesota department of employment and economic development, st. paul, minnesota (for respondent department)

0

we respectfully disagree with our colleague's finding on this point, though our decision is based on the trial record rather than the summary judgment record.

1

we hold that w.s. 35-10-205 does not grant counties the authority to enact more stringent regulations of the use, sale and possession of fireworks, and we overrule our decisions in haddenham ii and gueke to the extent those decisions hold to the contrary.

1

for all the foregoing reasons, the decision in woodlake, supra, 230 cal.app.3d 1058, is erroneous, and it is hereby disapproved.

1

to the extent that copper liquor inc. v. adolph coors co., 684 f.2d 1087 (5th cir. 1982), modified on other grounds en banc, 701 f.2d 542 (5th cir. 1983), held otherwise, it is overruled.

1

no such authority is required to be shown in cases involving the forgery of a check and the contrary holding in fain v. commonwealth is overruled.

1

we overrule this holding based upon our conclusion that review by the court of appeals under section 22-63-117(11) is predicated upon a final order of the school board resulting from proceedings conducted under section 22-63-117.

0

lerma, 877 f.3d 631 (quoting mathis, 136 s. ct. at 2249).

0

consequently, according to the sheriff, allowing this statute to summarily result in loss of firearm rights without further judicial process or notice would be confusing and absurd.

0

the parties agree that the issue in this case requires us to determine the applicable unit of prosecution.

0

this notice must be posted in the waiting room, printed and distributed to all clients, or provided digitally at check-in.

0

""every robber or burglar knows when he attempts to commit his crime that he is inviting dangerous resistance.""

0

moreover, the board's finding of no waiver in this case accords with its practice of ""appl[ying] cauthorne . . . 'narrowly,'"" only finding waiver ""where there is explicit contract language authorizing an employer to cancel its obligations.""

0

the ultimate question at issue in a case like this is whether ""there is a reasonable probability that [the jury] would have struck a different balance.""

1

thus, we hold that henceforth prohibition may not be employed to raise the defense of workers' compensation immunity.