LawInformedAI/overruling · Datasets at Hugging Face

label int64 0 1	sentence1 stringlengths 1 958
0	it was the day after this incident that the defendant called a friend and said, ""[t]hank god [the victim] didn't open the door because i would have kill[ed] her because i had a knife in my hand.""
1	to the extent that our holdings in dove, 710 p.2d 170, and cannon, 692 p.2d 740, do not abide by the bright-line standard articulated in rule 7(f)(2), we overrule those cases.
1	we disapprove the decision in mierzwa.
1	our cases to the contrary are overruled.
0	the court of criminal appeals resolved the certified question by holding that the badt fee statute violates ""due process principles.""
0	hope was not required to file a claim for new injury under code 65.2-601.
1	today, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and overrule that decision.
0	moreover, here, it was not only foreseeable that the co-employees would negligently fail to install the guardrails, it had actually occurred many times in the past.
1	in sheppard, the fourth district court of appeal disagreed, expressly rejecting sagaert, and stating that to allow the provision's application to repayment proceedings would be an inappropriate invasion by the judiciary into the legislative arena, contrary to the constitutional mandate which separates the two respective governmental powers.
1	we recede from prior opinions inconsistent with this holding.
0	2 k. o'malley, j. grenig, & w. lee, federal jury practice and instructions: criminal 31:03, p. 225 (6th ed. 2008) (emphasis added); see also id., 31:02, at 220 (explaining that a defendant must ""intend to agree and must intend that the substantive offense be committed "" (emphasis added)).
0	68 and yet the court's analysis unmistakably demanded of mr. talley something more than notice-pleading.
0	he appears to be smooching a large wad of money.
0	undeniably, the complaint paints a disturbing picture of some segregated and underperforming schools in and around the twin cities. although it is true that the judicial branch must ""say what the law is,"" marbury, 5 u.s. (1 cranch) at 177, it is also true that ""[q]uestions, in their nature political, . . . can never be made in this court,"" id. at 170.
1	such case is hereby overruled insofar as it holds the form of the complaint and information was not subject to the exception.
1	to the extent that people v. ulibarri, supra, can be read to hold that a defendant's failure to attend a suppression hearing automatically triggers an abandonment of the right to seek exclusion of or object to the challenged evidence, we decline to follow it.
0	because the defendant had agreed not to attempt to enforce either provision against the plaintiff, the court did not determine whether either was enforceable.
1	still other states with a similar rule of evidence to tenn.r.evid. 404 have concluded that the sex crimes exception cannot be reconciled with the restrictive language of tenn. r.evid. 404; as a result, they have overruled prior cases to the contrary and expressly rejected the "sex crimes" exception, holding instead that evidence of prior sexual misconduct is governed by the same evidentiary rules as evidence of other non-sexual misconduct.
0	we need rely only on the following ground to affirm: a reasonable person could have denied the ad&d claim based on captain eck's pre-existing condition having contributed to his cause of death.
0	the post-conviction court failed to address whether counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the petitioner's conviction for aggravated robbery relative to ms. williams in its written order.
0	the speedy trial clock tolled from february 28 until march 1, 2017, while martin was without counsel.
1	to the extent that lee suggests a hard-and-fast rule that there can be no claim for negligent display of merchandise, the suggestion conflicts with the general rule of landowner liability that we have described, and we disavow it.
0	defendant having moved for leave to prosecute, as a poor person, the appeal taken from a judgment of the supreme court, bronx county, rendered on or about may 15, 2017, for leave to have the appeal heard upon the original record and a reproduced appellant's brief, and for related relief, now, upon reading and filing the papers with respect to the motion, and due deliberation having been had thereon, it is ordered that the motion is granted to the extent of permitting the appeal to be heard on the original record, except that a certified copy of the indictment(s) shall be substituted in place of the original indictment(s), and upon a reproduced appellant's brief, on condition that appellant serves one copy of such brief upon the district attorney of said county and files 8 copies of such brief, together with the original record, pursuant to rule 600.11 of the rules of this court.
1	we expressly disapprove and overrule the procedure of converting the appeal from a non-final judgment to a supervisory writ and then considering the merits, as was done in karim v. finch shipping co., ltd., and walker, bordelon, hamlin, theriot and hardy, etc. v. dowe.
1	i agree with judge kerner's opinion to the extent that it affirms the judgment appealed from and that victor v. lane, 394 f.2d 268, a previous decision of this court, should be overruled.
0	id. perry has not identified any out-of-court statements he gave under compulsion.
0	see bagnara, 189 so. 3d at 172 (counsel's failure to properly move for joa when state did not prove value element of grand theft constituted ineffective assistance of counsel on the face of the record); gordon v. state, 126 so. 3d 292, 295-96 (fla. 3d dca 2011) (counsel's failure to properly move for joa when state did not prove all of the elements of charged crime constituted ineffective assistance of counsel on the face of the record).
1	this decision will be consistent with quenzer in general, although a somewhat different factual situation on jurisdiction was presented and expressly supersedes rosics in regard to the unmentioned pkpa-defined retained decree state jurisdiction.
1	in so agreeing, we overrule our holding in the matter of t r w , 533 s.w.2d 139, 142 (tex.civ.app. dallas 1976, no writ) insofar as we left to the discretion of the trial court whether to hear additional evidence or to render a different disposition, rather than render a proper order.
0	awards of enhanced damages under the patent act over the past 180 years establish that they are not to be meted out in a typical infringement case, but are instead designed as a ""punitive"" or ""vindictive"" sanction for egregious infringement behavior.
1	we therefore recede from that part of rivera holding that the form of the objection was facially insufficient to trigger an inquiry under abshire- melbourne as to whether a peremptory challenge was being improperly exercised.
0	bu does not even suggest that these results were accomplished by following the specification's teachings, or that achieving these results was within an ordinary artisan's skill as of the patent's effective filing date.
0	in the instant case, since the subject matter of the cross-examination did not concern prior crimes, acts or misconduct of the accused, a johnson hearing was not required.
1	having previously granted certiorari, we overrule the opinion of the court of appeals rendered in mullins v. john zink co., 733 p.2d 888 (okla.app. 1986), and affirm the opinion of the court of appeals herein.
0	texas defines ""bodily injury"" as ""physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.""
0	xtreme lashes, 576 f.3d at 228.
1	to the extent, therefore, that fuentes may be considered an opinion of this court, we admit our error and disapprove it.
1	we do not think the reasoning in elkins is persuasive, however, and to the extent that the holding in that case conflicts with this opinion, it is disapproved.
0	appellant francisco salazar appeals his convictions for one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child, one count of indecency with a child by sexual contact, and one count of sexual assault of a child.
0	moreover, here, as in ankrom, hicks followed the denial of her motion to dismiss the indictment with the entry of a guilty plea.
1	1989), can be read to conflict with our holding herein, and is to that extent overruled, we note that the petitioner in that case was not indigent and had already obtained an investigator at his own expense.
1	we therefore overrule the barker decision and adopt the economic interest rule as the test for determining the tax treatment of income derived from hard mineral extraction agreements.
0	because there was admissible evidence to support the accusation that beavers possessed a firearm while he was a convicted felon in violation of north carolina law, which constituted a violation of the conditions of his probation, we disagree that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's revocation of his probation.
1	any language in shymanovitz to the contrary is disapproved.
0	approximately one hour after beginning deliberations, the jury asked the following question: ""which one of proof need only one to be true?""
1	however, we do not read section 58-37-13 to require a showing of a profit motive on the part of the person involved in the transportation and distribution of drugs; to the extent one porsche is contrary it is overruled.
0	that interest continued intact following issuance of the checks and their deposits into their joint back account.
1	with regard to the conflict cases, we disapprove the decisions in israel and miller to the extent that they rejected the inherent authority of the trial court as a basis for awarding attorneys' fees.
0	therefore, 39-17-417 is divisible among the various subsections with respect to drug type and quantity, and the record documents further make clear that petitioner was convicted of violating subsections (a)(4) and (g)(2), see ar 821-825, which only apply to possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell between ten and seventy pounds of marijuana.
1	we therefore disavow the wording in the willys jeep case and similar wording in other cases and decline to address plaintiffs' argument that idaho code section 391392b is patently absurd when construed as written.
1	opn.] [ 97 cal.rptr. 40]; people v. miller, 12 cal.app.3d 922, 934 [ 91 cal.rptr. 97].)
0	plaintiff's motion should have been denied, since the new evidence that plaintiff submitted in support of renewal, a loan document purporting to reduce the interest rate to the legal rate in the event of a finding of usury, would not change the prior determination that the loan was criminally usurious (see bakhash v winston, 134 ad3d 468 [1st dept 2015]; cplr 2221[e][2]).
0	plaintiff argues the trial court's finding the closure ""relates to"" harassment of seals is supported by substantial evidence.
0	our review of this appeal reveals a jurisdictional defect.
1	we disapprove of all portions of prior opinions of this court to the extent the court concluded otherwise, including, but not limited to, the rule 45 analysis in the following cases:
0	in that case the biological mother gave her consent to adoption and then sought to withdraw it.
1	we now overrule our prior decisions in williams and nikaido, and hold that wetzel's claim was not time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations.
0	2011) (declining to resolve ""fundamental constitutional questions"" involving other branches of government).
0	the opening statement was based on what the prosecutor intended to prove by the evidence.
1	we now affirm the district court and overrule acorn, but only to the extent it is inconsistent with our en banc decision in this case.
1	because division of labor law enforcement v. barnes, supra, 205 cal.app.2d at p. 346, erroneously relied on jeffreys v. hancock (1881) 57 cal. 646, it held that an attachment defendant may not sue for damages arising from an alleged wrongful attachment in the same action in which the attachment issued, and to that extent it must be disapproved
0	over a year later, debora filed a pro se motion for release (satisfaction) of judgment based upon a release entered into between ryan and brewer, prior to the entry of judgment against debora.
1	language in people v. harrison, 176 cal.app.2d 330 [ 1 cal.rptr. 414], inconsistent with this holding, is disapproved.
1	as previously noted, we overrule in re hayes, supra, 70 cal.2d 604, 75 cal.rptr. 790, 451 p.2d 430, and disapprove people v. harrison, supra, 1 cal.app.3d 115, 81 cal.rptr. 396.
1	the contrary holding in prendiville v. contemporary homes, inc., 32 kan.app.2d 435, 83 p.3d 1257, rev. denied 278 kan. 847 (2004), is overruled.
0	however, even accepting that the initial stop was justified and the decision to impound the vehicle was not pretext for searching miller's vehicle without a warrant, i believe the mere existence of a police department policy is insufficient to satisfy the state's burden of proving the applicability of the inventory search exception to the fourth amendment.
1	1981), and sandefer v. reynolds securities, inc., 44 colo. app. 343, 618 p.2d 690 (1980), are overruled to the extent inconsistent with this opinion.
1	##note: am. fed'n. labor v. unemployment ins. app. bd. is the case at bar, reversed.
1	we therefore overrule webb and find that risinger and its progeny do not violate the principles of equal protection.
0	we reverse and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
1	having concluded that the statutory analysis set forth in shannon, part ii was fundamentally flawed, we now depart from its holding that krs 503.120 (1) precludes the assertion of self-protection and the other krs chapter 503 justifications as defenses to charges of wanton murder, second-degree manslaughter, or reckless homicide (as well as to charges of wanton or reckless assault), and reinstate the holdings in thompson v. commonwealth, supra, and kohlheim v. commonwealth.
1	any implication of floyd contrary to our decision in the case at bar is disapproved.
0	at the time the trial court entered its final judgment of dismissal in march 2016, the case law in this area was arguably in a state of flux, but that is no longer the situation.
1	pockman v. leonard, supra, 39 cal.2d 676, holding to the contrary, is overruled.
1	in so holding, we overrule moore v. skiles and the cases that have followed it.
0	interlocutory appeal from the district court
1	american underwriters group, inc. v. williamson, 496 n.e.2d 807 (ind.ct.app. 1986) expressly overruled one of the principal cases establishing this right in indiana, automobile underwriters, inc. v. stover, 148 ind. app. 555, 268 n.e.2d 114 (1971).
0	muoz-nava involved a downward variance from a 46-57-month guideline range to 12 months in prison and 12 months in home confinement.
1	in that vein, the sharp court reexamined the five-part test from bird , ultimately disapproving of the third part of the test requiring that the hearsay statement must have been made outside the presence of the accused.
0	he therefore contends that he should have received only a 14-level enhancement, as without the losses from renue therapy, the intended loss amount would be more than $550,000 but less than $1,500,000.
0	because the trial court acted under its discretionary authority, as authorized by statute, to order the defendant to serve his original sentence in confinement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm its judgment.
1	because of this, and because the johnson remedy also independently relied on coram nobis principles, we deem it inappropriate to continue to rely on the johnson remedy, and conclude that the restoration of a denied direct appeal through resentencing to establish a new appeal time frame is no longer feasible.
1	it did so, however, without considering irwin, and for that reason is overruled.
1	to the extent farmers suggests that the partridge analysis applies in the coverage determination, we disapprove of that decision.
0	here, the misdemeanor and felony convictions are intertwined to the point that the interests of justice may be better served by considering the matters together.
1	to the extent that extant oklahoma case law may be construed to reach a contrary conclusion, it is hereby disapproved and withdrawn.
1	the third district certified conflict with the decisions in hoenstine v. state farm fire casualty co., 736 so.2d 761 (fla. 5th dca 1999), and florida farm bureau casualty insurance co. v. sheaffer.
1	to the extent that state ex rel. nixon v. belt stands for the proposition that a trial court can never stay a judgment of ouster of a public official, it is overruled.
1	accordingly cochran and similar past holdings are hereby expressly overruled insofar as they collide with the enlightened view now here adopted.
0	the following facts are taken from the administrative record.
1	we are thus persuaded that it is time, indeed past time, to overrule hicks and the cases relying upon it and to recognize iaac claims premised upon appellate counsel's alleged failure to raise a particular issue on direct appeal.
0	third, floyd argues that, in refusing to find his substance abuse to be a mitigating circumstance, the trial court improperly required a causal connection between his substance abuse and the murder.
1	and in so far as wright v. state, supra, is in conflict with the rule in stephens, it is overruled.
1	to the extent that language in chiles v. state employees attorneys guild, 734 so.2d 1030, 1034 (fla. 1999), may be read as endorsing use of the "clearly erroneous" standard in this regard, we recede from that language
0	earls, 2017 ark. 171, at 9, 518 s.w.3d at 87.
1	because castillo may be interpreted to require both personal knowledge and trustworthy information, we overrule it and its progeny only to the extent that it requires both kinds of information to support probable cause.
0	it seems to me, to the contrary, that there was virtually nothing more to be said.
1	to the extent that our opinion conflicts with doney, we hereby recede from doney.
1	accordingly, we overrule those appellate decisions which employ the abuse of discretion standard in an appeal from the trial court's denial of a motion to recuse because it did not meet the criteria of uscr 25.3.
1	indeed, in the same year we decided latimer we overruled a different sentencing precedent in people v. king (1993) 5 cal.4th 59 ( king).

0

it was the day after this incident that the defendant called a friend and said, ""[t]hank god [the victim] didn't open the door because i would have kill[ed] her because i had a knife in my hand.""

1

to the extent that our holdings in dove, 710 p.2d 170, and cannon, 692 p.2d 740, do not abide by the bright-line standard articulated in rule 7(f)(2), we overrule those cases.

1

we disapprove the decision in mierzwa.

1

our cases to the contrary are overruled.

0

the court of criminal appeals resolved the certified question by holding that the badt fee statute violates ""due process principles.""

0

hope was not required to file a claim for new injury under code 65.2-601.

1

today, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and overrule that decision.

0

moreover, here, it was not only foreseeable that the co-employees would negligently fail to install the guardrails, it had actually occurred many times in the past.

1

in sheppard, the fourth district court of appeal disagreed, expressly rejecting sagaert, and stating that to allow the provision's application to repayment proceedings would be an inappropriate invasion by the judiciary into the legislative arena, contrary to the constitutional mandate which separates the two respective governmental powers.

1

we recede from prior opinions inconsistent with this holding.

0

2 k. o'malley, j. grenig, & w. lee, federal jury practice and instructions: criminal 31:03, p. 225 (6th ed. 2008) (emphasis added); see also id., 31:02, at 220 (explaining that a defendant must ""intend to agree and must intend that the substantive offense be committed "" (emphasis added)).

0

68 and yet the court's analysis unmistakably demanded of mr. talley something more than notice-pleading.

0

he appears to be smooching a large wad of money.

0

undeniably, the complaint paints a disturbing picture of some segregated and underperforming schools in and around the twin cities. although it is true that the judicial branch must ""say what the law is,"" marbury, 5 u.s. (1 cranch) at 177, it is also true that ""[q]uestions, in their nature political, . . . can never be made in this court,"" id. at 170.

1

such case is hereby overruled insofar as it holds the form of the complaint and information was not subject to the exception.

1

to the extent that people v. ulibarri, supra, can be read to hold that a defendant's failure to attend a suppression hearing automatically triggers an abandonment of the right to seek exclusion of or object to the challenged evidence, we decline to follow it.

0

because the defendant had agreed not to attempt to enforce either provision against the plaintiff, the court did not determine whether either was enforceable.

1

still other states with a similar rule of evidence to tenn.r.evid. 404 have concluded that the sex crimes exception cannot be reconciled with the restrictive language of tenn. r.evid. 404; as a result, they have overruled prior cases to the contrary and expressly rejected the "sex crimes" exception, holding instead that evidence of prior sexual misconduct is governed by the same evidentiary rules as evidence of other non-sexual misconduct.

0

we need rely only on the following ground to affirm: a reasonable person could have denied the ad&d claim based on captain eck's pre-existing condition having contributed to his cause of death.

0

the post-conviction court failed to address whether counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the petitioner's conviction for aggravated robbery relative to ms. williams in its written order.

0

the speedy trial clock tolled from february 28 until march 1, 2017, while martin was without counsel.

1

to the extent that lee suggests a hard-and-fast rule that there can be no claim for negligent display of merchandise, the suggestion conflicts with the general rule of landowner liability that we have described, and we disavow it.

0

defendant having moved for leave to prosecute, as a poor person, the appeal taken from a judgment of the supreme court, bronx county, rendered on or about may 15, 2017, for leave to have the appeal heard upon the original record and a reproduced appellant's brief, and for related relief, now, upon reading and filing the papers with respect to the motion, and due deliberation having been had thereon, it is ordered that the motion is granted to the extent of permitting the appeal to be heard on the original record, except that a certified copy of the indictment(s) shall be substituted in place of the original indictment(s), and upon a reproduced appellant's brief, on condition that appellant serves one copy of such brief upon the district attorney of said county and files 8 copies of such brief, together with the original record, pursuant to rule 600.11 of the rules of this court.

1

we expressly disapprove and overrule the procedure of converting the appeal from a non-final judgment to a supervisory writ and then considering the merits, as was done in karim v. finch shipping co., ltd., and walker, bordelon, hamlin, theriot and hardy, etc. v. dowe.

1

i agree with judge kerner's opinion to the extent that it affirms the judgment appealed from and that victor v. lane, 394 f.2d 268, a previous decision of this court, should be overruled.

0

id. perry has not identified any out-of-court statements he gave under compulsion.

0

see bagnara, 189 so. 3d at 172 (counsel's failure to properly move for joa when state did not prove value element of grand theft constituted ineffective assistance of counsel on the face of the record); gordon v. state, 126 so. 3d 292, 295-96 (fla. 3d dca 2011) (counsel's failure to properly move for joa when state did not prove all of the elements of charged crime constituted ineffective assistance of counsel on the face of the record).

1

this decision will be consistent with quenzer in general, although a somewhat different factual situation on jurisdiction was presented and expressly supersedes rosics in regard to the unmentioned pkpa-defined retained decree state jurisdiction.

1

in so agreeing, we overrule our holding in the matter of t r w , 533 s.w.2d 139, 142 (tex.civ.app. dallas 1976, no writ) insofar as we left to the discretion of the trial court whether to hear additional evidence or to render a different disposition, rather than render a proper order.

0

awards of enhanced damages under the patent act over the past 180 years establish that they are not to be meted out in a typical infringement case, but are instead designed as a ""punitive"" or ""vindictive"" sanction for egregious infringement behavior.

1

we therefore recede from that part of rivera holding that the form of the objection was facially insufficient to trigger an inquiry under abshire- melbourne as to whether a peremptory challenge was being improperly exercised.

0

bu does not even suggest that these results were accomplished by following the specification's teachings, or that achieving these results was within an ordinary artisan's skill as of the patent's effective filing date.

0

in the instant case, since the subject matter of the cross-examination did not concern prior crimes, acts or misconduct of the accused, a johnson hearing was not required.

1

having previously granted certiorari, we overrule the opinion of the court of appeals rendered in mullins v. john zink co., 733 p.2d 888 (okla.app. 1986), and affirm the opinion of the court of appeals herein.

0

texas defines ""bodily injury"" as ""physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.""

0

xtreme lashes, 576 f.3d at 228.

1

to the extent, therefore, that fuentes may be considered an opinion of this court, we admit our error and disapprove it.

1

we do not think the reasoning in elkins is persuasive, however, and to the extent that the holding in that case conflicts with this opinion, it is disapproved.

0

appellant francisco salazar appeals his convictions for one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child, one count of indecency with a child by sexual contact, and one count of sexual assault of a child.

0

moreover, here, as in ankrom, hicks followed the denial of her motion to dismiss the indictment with the entry of a guilty plea.

1

1989), can be read to conflict with our holding herein, and is to that extent overruled, we note that the petitioner in that case was not indigent and had already obtained an investigator at his own expense.

1

we therefore overrule the barker decision and adopt the economic interest rule as the test for determining the tax treatment of income derived from hard mineral extraction agreements.

0

because there was admissible evidence to support the accusation that beavers possessed a firearm while he was a convicted felon in violation of north carolina law, which constituted a violation of the conditions of his probation, we disagree that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's revocation of his probation.

1

any language in shymanovitz to the contrary is disapproved.

0

approximately one hour after beginning deliberations, the jury asked the following question: ""which one of proof need only one to be true?""

1

however, we do not read section 58-37-13 to require a showing of a profit motive on the part of the person involved in the transportation and distribution of drugs; to the extent one porsche is contrary it is overruled.

0

that interest continued intact following issuance of the checks and their deposits into their joint back account.

1

with regard to the conflict cases, we disapprove the decisions in israel and miller to the extent that they rejected the inherent authority of the trial court as a basis for awarding attorneys' fees.

0

therefore, 39-17-417 is divisible among the various subsections with respect to drug type and quantity, and the record documents further make clear that petitioner was convicted of violating subsections (a)(4) and (g)(2), see ar 821-825, which only apply to possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell between ten and seventy pounds of marijuana.

1

we therefore disavow the wording in the willys jeep case and similar wording in other cases and decline to address plaintiffs' argument that idaho code section 391392b is patently absurd when construed as written.

1

opn.] [ 97 cal.rptr. 40]; people v. miller, 12 cal.app.3d 922, 934 [ 91 cal.rptr. 97].)

0

plaintiff's motion should have been denied, since the new evidence that plaintiff submitted in support of renewal, a loan document purporting to reduce the interest rate to the legal rate in the event of a finding of usury, would not change the prior determination that the loan was criminally usurious (see bakhash v winston, 134 ad3d 468 [1st dept 2015]; cplr 2221[e][2]).

0

plaintiff argues the trial court's finding the closure ""relates to"" harassment of seals is supported by substantial evidence.

0

our review of this appeal reveals a jurisdictional defect.

1

we disapprove of all portions of prior opinions of this court to the extent the court concluded otherwise, including, but not limited to, the rule 45 analysis in the following cases:

0

in that case the biological mother gave her consent to adoption and then sought to withdraw it.

1

we now overrule our prior decisions in williams and nikaido, and hold that wetzel's claim was not time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations.

0

2011) (declining to resolve ""fundamental constitutional questions"" involving other branches of government).

0

the opening statement was based on what the prosecutor intended to prove by the evidence.

1

we now affirm the district court and overrule acorn, but only to the extent it is inconsistent with our en banc decision in this case.

1

because division of labor law enforcement v. barnes, supra, 205 cal.app.2d at p. 346, erroneously relied on jeffreys v. hancock (1881) 57 cal. 646, it held that an attachment defendant may not sue for damages arising from an alleged wrongful attachment in the same action in which the attachment issued, and to that extent it must be disapproved

0

over a year later, debora filed a pro se motion for release (satisfaction) of judgment based upon a release entered into between ryan and brewer, prior to the entry of judgment against debora.

1

language in people v. harrison, 176 cal.app.2d 330 [ 1 cal.rptr. 414], inconsistent with this holding, is disapproved.

1

as previously noted, we overrule in re hayes, supra, 70 cal.2d 604, 75 cal.rptr. 790, 451 p.2d 430, and disapprove people v. harrison, supra, 1 cal.app.3d 115, 81 cal.rptr. 396.

1

the contrary holding in prendiville v. contemporary homes, inc., 32 kan.app.2d 435, 83 p.3d 1257, rev. denied 278 kan. 847 (2004), is overruled.

0

however, even accepting that the initial stop was justified and the decision to impound the vehicle was not pretext for searching miller's vehicle without a warrant, i believe the mere existence of a police department policy is insufficient to satisfy the state's burden of proving the applicability of the inventory search exception to the fourth amendment.

1

1981), and sandefer v. reynolds securities, inc., 44 colo. app. 343, 618 p.2d 690 (1980), are overruled to the extent inconsistent with this opinion.

1

##note: am. fed'n. labor v. unemployment ins. app. bd. is the case at bar, reversed.

1

we therefore overrule webb and find that risinger and its progeny do not violate the principles of equal protection.

0

we reverse and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

1

having concluded that the statutory analysis set forth in shannon, part ii was fundamentally flawed, we now depart from its holding that krs 503.120 (1) precludes the assertion of self-protection and the other krs chapter 503 justifications as defenses to charges of wanton murder, second-degree manslaughter, or reckless homicide (as well as to charges of wanton or reckless assault), and reinstate the holdings in thompson v. commonwealth, supra, and kohlheim v. commonwealth.

1

any implication of floyd contrary to our decision in the case at bar is disapproved.

0

at the time the trial court entered its final judgment of dismissal in march 2016, the case law in this area was arguably in a state of flux, but that is no longer the situation.

1

pockman v. leonard, supra, 39 cal.2d 676, holding to the contrary, is overruled.

1

in so holding, we overrule moore v. skiles and the cases that have followed it.

0

interlocutory appeal from the district court

1

american underwriters group, inc. v. williamson, 496 n.e.2d 807 (ind.ct.app. 1986) expressly overruled one of the principal cases establishing this right in indiana, automobile underwriters, inc. v. stover, 148 ind. app. 555, 268 n.e.2d 114 (1971).

0

muoz-nava involved a downward variance from a 46-57-month guideline range to 12 months in prison and 12 months in home confinement.

1

in that vein, the sharp court reexamined the five-part test from bird , ultimately disapproving of the third part of the test requiring that the hearsay statement must have been made outside the presence of the accused.

0

he therefore contends that he should have received only a 14-level enhancement, as without the losses from renue therapy, the intended loss amount would be more than $550,000 but less than $1,500,000.

0

because the trial court acted under its discretionary authority, as authorized by statute, to order the defendant to serve his original sentence in confinement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm its judgment.

1

because of this, and because the johnson remedy also independently relied on coram nobis principles, we deem it inappropriate to continue to rely on the johnson remedy, and conclude that the restoration of a denied direct appeal through resentencing to establish a new appeal time frame is no longer feasible.

1

it did so, however, without considering irwin, and for that reason is overruled.

1

to the extent farmers suggests that the partridge analysis applies in the coverage determination, we disapprove of that decision.

0

here, the misdemeanor and felony convictions are intertwined to the point that the interests of justice may be better served by considering the matters together.

1

to the extent that extant oklahoma case law may be construed to reach a contrary conclusion, it is hereby disapproved and withdrawn.

1

the third district certified conflict with the decisions in hoenstine v. state farm fire casualty co., 736 so.2d 761 (fla. 5th dca 1999), and florida farm bureau casualty insurance co. v. sheaffer.

1

to the extent that state ex rel. nixon v. belt stands for the proposition that a trial court can never stay a judgment of ouster of a public official, it is overruled.

1

accordingly cochran and similar past holdings are hereby expressly overruled insofar as they collide with the enlightened view now here adopted.

0

the following facts are taken from the administrative record.

1

we are thus persuaded that it is time, indeed past time, to overrule hicks and the cases relying upon it and to recognize iaac claims premised upon appellate counsel's alleged failure to raise a particular issue on direct appeal.

0

third, floyd argues that, in refusing to find his substance abuse to be a mitigating circumstance, the trial court improperly required a causal connection between his substance abuse and the murder.

1

and in so far as wright v. state, supra, is in conflict with the rule in stephens, it is overruled.

1

to the extent that language in chiles v. state employees attorneys guild, 734 so.2d 1030, 1034 (fla. 1999), may be read as endorsing use of the "clearly erroneous" standard in this regard, we recede from that language

0

earls, 2017 ark. 171, at 9, 518 s.w.3d at 87.

1

because castillo may be interpreted to require both personal knowledge and trustworthy information, we overrule it and its progeny only to the extent that it requires both kinds of information to support probable cause.

0

it seems to me, to the contrary, that there was virtually nothing more to be said.

1

to the extent that our opinion conflicts with doney, we hereby recede from doney.

1

accordingly, we overrule those appellate decisions which employ the abuse of discretion standard in an appeal from the trial court's denial of a motion to recuse because it did not meet the criteria of uscr 25.3.

1

indeed, in the same year we decided latimer we overruled a different sentencing precedent in people v. king (1993) 5 cal.4th 59 ( king).