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33.535 | Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) based on 3GPP credentials in the 5G System (5GS) | TS | 18.8.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.535/33535-i80.zip | The present document specifies the security features and mechanisms to support authentication and key management aspects for applications based on subscription credential(s) in 5G system as defined in TS 33.501 [2]. |
33.536 | Security aspects of 3GPP support for advanced Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.536/33536-i00.zip | The present document provides the security aspects for the 5G system to facilitate vehicular communications for Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services. The architecture for these V2X services is described in TS 23.287 [2], which is based on the service requirements defined in TS 22.185 [3] and TS 22.186 [4]. |
33.537 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) Anchor Function (AAnF) | TS | 18.2.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.537/33537-i20.zip | |
33.558 | Security aspects of enhancement of support for enabling edge applications | TS | 18.2.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.558/33558-i20.zip | |
33.700-28 | Study on security aspects of satellite access | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.700-28/33700-28-i00.zip | The present document investigates the security and privacy aspects of satellite access/NTN. The study is based on the architectural and functional requirements on integration of satellite components in the 5GS/EPS architecture, so as to ensure that the proposed solutions address the security and privacy implications on the architecture enhancements agreed in TR 23.700-28 [x]. Specifically, it covers the following:
- The identified security and privacy issues, threats, and potential requirements for protecting the UE in the enhanced 5GS/EPS architecture supporting discontinuous coverage with satellite access;
- The potential solutions addressing the identified security and privacy issues as above. |
33.737 | Study on Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) phase 2 | TR | 18.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.737/33737-i10.zip | The present document studies key issues and potential solutions to support roaming aspects and the Authentication Proxy in AKMA, which is specified in TS 33.535 [2]. Specifically, the present document:
- Investigates AKMA roaming architecture and requirements by taking regulatory compliance into account;
- Studies the architecture impact and procedures of introducing the Authentication Proxy (similar as the AP specified in GBA) into AKMA. |
33.738 | Study on security aspects of enablers for network automation for the 5G system phase 3 | TR | 18.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.738/33738-i10.zip | The present document studies the security aspects of enablers for network automation for the 5G system based on the outcome of TR 23.700-81 [6]. More specifically, the present document will identify security issues and requirements and provide corresponding security solutions related to the following scenarios:
- Security aspects of potential architecture enhancement: roaming, supporting federated learning, interaction between NWDAF and MDAS/MDAF, etc.
- Handling of sensitive information inherent to application detection, roaming and location information.
- KIs from R17 which do not have enough time to proceed, e.g. NWDAF detection related issues.
- Any further security enhancements which need to be studied based upon the ongoing SA2 eNA Phase 3 work |
33.739 | Study on security enhancement of support for edge computing phase 2 | TR | 18.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.739/33739-i10.zip | The present document studies the security aspects related to the new features and procedures resulting from the continuation of the work on Edge Computing support in 5G Systems, i.e. 5G System Enhancements for Edge Computing in 3GPP TR 23.700-48 [2], and enhanced architecture for enabling Edge Applications in 3GPP TR 23.700-98 [3]. The study bases on the work done in the 3GPP TS 33.558 [4] and 3GPP TR 33.839 [5]. |
33.740 | Study on security aspects of Proximity Based Services (ProSe) in 5G System (5GS) phase 2 | TR | 18.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.740/33740-i10.zip | The present document studies the security and privacy aspects of proximity based services in 5G system phase 2. It ensures that the security solutions are aligned with the work in SA2 (i.e. TR 23.700-33 [2]), RANs, SA1 (i.e. TS 22.278 [3], TS 22.261 [4], and TS 22.115 [5]) and SA3 (i.e. TS 33.503 [6] and TR 33.870 [7]). The present document covers the following issues:
- Security and privacy key issues, threats and potential requirements of proximity based services in 5G system phase 2.
- Potential security solutions to cover these potential requirements.
Both roaming and non-roaming scenarios are considered. |
33.741 | Study on home network triggered primary authentication | TR | 18.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.741/33741-i01.zip | The present document studies the use cases which needs Home Network initiated primary authentication and the associated security threats and requirements. As part of this investigation, the study aims at identifying which network function in the HN is better suitable to trigger the primary authentication, corresponding procedures, the potential impacts on visited and home network, and the potential impacts on existing procedures. Moreover, solutions for potential normative work are also in the scope of this study. |
33.809 | Study on 5G security enhancements against False Base Stations (FBS) | TR | 18.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.809/33809-i10.zip | The present document studies the potential threats and privacy issues associated with false base station scenarios.
The present document identifies the potential solutions for mitigating the risks caused by false base station. |
33.848 | Study on security impacts of virtualisation | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.848/33848-i00.zip | The present document considers the consequences of virtualisation on 3GPP architectures, in order to identify threats and subsequent security requirements. 3GPP function security relies on the underlying implementation technology and physical environment being secure. In legacy deployments, physical rack security and separation implicitly provides underlying security. Many legacy physical security requirements are not formally documented in 3GPP standards and rely on proprietary domain knowledge by 3GPP operators and manufacturers. Legacy core network security models also assume that threats primarily apply at the edge of the function or network only, where the network or physical network functions are exposed by external interfaces.
To provide equivalent security in virtualised deployments, the underlying infrastructure needs to provide minimum security capabilities, in a standardized form, which can be requested and or consumed at the 3GPP layer. This is necessary since virtual functions need to co-exist in shared virtualisation environments and the legacy physical security models do not address the new threat vectors introduced by virtualisation.
While a number of the key issues identified in the present document may not necessarily fully be within the scope of 3GPP to resolve, in order to implement 3GPP functions securely, it is necessary for 3GPP to set requirements that may be addressed outside 3GPP.
The present document identifies security requirements which need to be addressed outside of 3GPP in order for 3GPP to specify fully secure virtualised 3GPP functions. The present document identifies extensions to 3GPP security capabilities which are required to provide direct, explicit, security visibility of the underlying virtualised infrastructure platform to the 3GPP layer. It also identifies extensions to 3GPP functions to make use of such capabilities.
The wider requirements captured within the present document are intended to allow external groups such as ETSI or open-source groups to develop any necessary capabilities and fill identified standardization gaps.
Identification of requirements for the standardization of the overall security framework (e.g. top to bottom, 3GPP, NFVI, hardware, SDN) and minimum-security capabilities which should be used by a virtualised implementation to meet Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) or other regulatory requirements are outside the scope of the present document.
Since there is no single approach to virtualisation, the security threats and risks will vary depending on the deployment use case and virtualisation technology choices. The present document considers both virtualisation threats and risks, that apply to specific implementations (e.g. Virtual Machine or Container based) and more generic threat and risks that apply in all use cases. |
33.858 | Study on security aspects of enhanced support of Non-Public Networks (NPN) phase 2 | TR | 18.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.858/33858-i10.zip | The aim of the present document is to study the security aspects for any potential enhancements to be developed based on the outcome of the study in TR 23.700-08 [2]. For each of the objectives in the scope of the study in TR 23.700-08 [2], potential security aspects that are to be covered in this study are as follows:
- Support for enhanced mobility by enabling support for idle and connected mode mobility between SNPNs without new network selection.
- Study if existing security mechanisms for mobility between PLMNs can be reused for SNPNs or if new security mechanisms are needed.
- Support for non-3GPP access for SNPN
- Study if existing security mechanisms for enabling non-3GPP access in a PLMN can be reused for enabling non-3GPP access in an SNPN or if new security mechanisms are needed.
- Address new requirements (e.g., TS 22.261 [3] requirements for Providing Access to Local Services) related to NPN
- Study the trust model for the resulting architecture for enabling Localized Services via a local hosting NPN.
- Study if existing mechanisms for a UE to access an NPN can be reused for enabling a UE to authenticate with and access the local hosting NPN and the localized services via the hosting NPN with proper authorization, or if new security mechanisms are needed. |
33.870 | Study of privacy of identifiers over radio access | TR | 0.8.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.870/33870-080.zip | The present document achieves the following objectives:
Analysis of 3GPP identifiers that represent either targets of privacy attacks themselves or may aid adversaries in privacy attacks.
Analysis of the feasibility of privacy attacks; the analysis should consider newer methodologies such as those involving AI/ML
Analysis of available countermeasures, including technical remedies, security guidance, to the identified and feasible privacy attacks; the analysis should consider newer methodologies such as those involving AI/ML
Recommendations to the identified and feasible privacy attacks. Recommendations may include but are not limited to non-technical remedies, architectural recommendations, and procedural fixes. |
33.874 | Study on enhanced security for network slicing phase 2 | TR | 18.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.874/33874-i10.zip | The present document identifies key issues, potential security and privacy requirements and solutions with respect to network slicing Phase 2 work TS 23.501 [2], TS 23.502 [3], TS 23.503 [4] and studies TR 23.700-40 [5] and TR 38.832 [6], specifically,
- Define the security requirements and security services for new NF(s) introduced for UEs' network slice access control.
- Study potential security risks/threats (i.e. DoS, sensitive information leakage) and solutions if needed with respect to slice-related quota management, data rate limitation, and constraints on simultaneous use of slices.
- Study potential security risks/threats related to broadcasting slice-related cell selection/reselection info, and provide security solutions if needed. |
33.875 | Study on enhanced security aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (SBA) | TR | 18.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.875/33875-i10.zip | The present document studies enhanced security aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture. It will analyse potential threats, study necessary security enhancements, and document decisions of solutions to be adopted or not adopted after evaluating the risks versus the complexity.
In particular, the following topics are addressed:
- Need and mechanism of enabling end to end authentication in roaming case if no cross-certification between operators is enabled;
- Need and mechanism of enabling NF Service Consumer authentication of NRF and the NF Service Producer;
- Need for addressing potential security impact of different deployment scenarios including the several SCPs;
- Verification of URI in subscription/notification;
- Dynamic authorization between SCPs or NF and SCP;
- End-to-End Critical HTTP headers/body parts integrity protection;
- Access token usage in NF Sets;
- Authorization mechanism determination;
- Security of NRF service management;
- Inter-Slice access authorization;
- N32 roaming security considerations for deployment scenarios including roaming hub and hosted SEPP. |
33.876 | Study on automated certificate management in Service-Based Architecture (SBA) | TR | 18.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.876/33876-i01.zip | The objectives of this study are to identify key issues, potential security and privacy requirements and solutions with respect to
- Standardise the use of a single automated certificate management protocol and procedures for certificate life cycle events within intra-PLMN 5G SBA (i.e. to be used by all 5GC NFs including NRF, SCP, SEPP etc.).
- Study the impact of service mesh in certificate management within 5G SBA.
- Study which lifecycle events (e.g., enrolment, renewal, revocation (e.g., OCSP, CRLs), status monitoring) of a certificate need to be covered.
- Study the relation between certificate management lifecycle and NF management lifecycle.
- Study to reference at minimum following principles:
- Principle to be reusable when 5G SBA is for NPN (standalone and PNI)
- Principles standardised to be able to support NFs doing mutual TLS in Slicing.
- Principles standardised to support both intra and inter PLMN, in the latter referring to SEPP certificates in N32 interfaces and potential cross-certification considerations.
- Principles involving 'Chain of Trust' of Certificate Authorities hierarchies.
- Principles for security of CA's cryptographic private key. |
33.877 | Study on the security aspects of Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) for the Next Generation Radio Access Network (NG-RAN) | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.877/33877-i00.zip | The study aims at identifying key issues and solutions in order to address the security aspects of employing AI/ML techniques in RAN. The motivation of this study is to provide potential security handling for the procedures of the NG-RAN AI/ML framework [2]. The NG-RAN AI/ML framework includes functional entities and information flows between functions in order to realize an AI/ML architecture for data collection, model training, data inference and actions/feedback for the NG-RAN and UEs. The NG-RAN AI/ML framework is also accompanied by three RAN-related use cases.
The study aims at studying the following aspects:
- The applicability of existing security mechanisms for the NG-RAN AI/ML framework.
- Whether user privacy issues exist for the selected use cases in the related RAN group studies, not disrupting the current system designs. Use cases not selected in AI/ML for NG RAN by RAN groups are out of scope of this study. The need for alignment with the study of privacy of identifiers over radio access would also be assessed.
- Security aspects of the RAN use cases from the point of view of AI/ML robustness in the face of AI/ML adversaries in AI/ML for NG-RAN. |
33.882 | Study on personal Internet of Things (IoT) networks security aspects | TR | 18.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.882/33882-i01.zip | The present document studies how 5G security architecture and procedures can be enhanced to support Personal IoT Network. The aim of the present document is to study the security aspects of Personal IoT Networks for any potential enhancements in alignment with the outcome of SA2 study in TR 23.700-88 [2]. The study will look at the following aspects, performing gap analysis where necessary:
1) Study potential security enhancements for authentications required to secure Personal IoT Networks.
2) Study the security protection and access control for communications required to secure Personal IoT Networks.
3) Study the security enhancements for privacy required to secure Personal IoT Networks.
4) Other security aspects for any potential enhancements in alignment with the outcome of SA2 study in TR 23.700-88 [2]. |
33.883 | Study on security enhancements for 5G multicast-broadcast services phase 2 | TR | 18.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.883/33883-i01.zip | The present document is to identify key issues, potential security and privacy requirements and solutions with respect to enhancement for 5G multicast-broadcast services. Specifically:
- Study the security enhancement enabling UE's receiving Multicast MBS Session data in RRC Inactive state. Analysis whether existing security mechanisms for UE in RRC connected state can be reused or new security enhancement are needed.
- Study the security impact and potential enhancement if supporting feasible and efficient resource utilization for the same broadcast content to be provided to 5G MOCN network sharing scenarios.
- Other security issues if identified. |
33.884 | Study on security of application enablement aspects for subscriber-aware northbound API access | TR | 18.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.884/33884-i01.zip | The scope of present document is based on the requirements for SNA (TS 22.261 clause 6.10.2) [2] and on the Study on application enablement aspects for subscriber-aware northbound API access (TR 23.700-95) [3].
The objective of this study is to:
1. Identify potential new security requirements related to API invocation (such as user authorization) and define potential solutions to fulfil these requirements. This encompasses:
- Whether and how CAPIF functions can determine the resource owner upon CAPIF invocation.
- Whether and how CAPIF can support obtaining authorization from the resource owner.
- Whether and how CAPIF can support revocation of authorization by the resource owner.
- Whether and how CAPIF can support security procedures with the aim to reduce authorization inquiries for a nested API invocation.
The study is not exclusively tailored to CAPIF, but should align with widely deployed authorization frameworks.
2. Identify potential security requirements for APIs used in SNAAPP and define potential solutions to fulfil these requirements.
This objective includes UE-originated API invocation. |
33.886 | Study on enhanced security for network slicing phase 3 | TR | 18.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.886/33886-i10.zip | The present document identifies key security issues, potential security and privacy requirements and solutions with respect to network slicing Phase 3 work. Specifically,
- It studies potential security impact/requirements/solutions (e.g. Steering of Roaming) to support the HPLMN to provide a roaming UE the VPLMN slice information in a secure manner
- It studies potential security impact/requirements/solutions to support temporary slices, slice service areas mismatched with Tracking Area (TA) boundaries, and slices where Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (NSSAI) are not available in some TAs of a Registration Areas (RA).
- It studies potential security impact/requirements/solutions to support secured Network Slice Admission Control (NSAC) procedures in the cases of NSAC for multiple service areas and network controlled UE behaviours. |
33.887 | Study on security aspects for support for 5G Wireless and Wireline Convergence (5WWC) phase 2 | TR | 18.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.887/33887-i01.zip | The objectives of the present document are to identify key issues, potential security and privacy requirements and solutions with respect to:
- Whether and how to identify, authenticate and authorize the Authenticable Non-3GPP devices behind the Residential Gateway (RG) connecting to the network.
- Whether and how to identify, authenticate and authorize the 3GPP devices (UE or N5CW devices) behind the Residential Gateway (RG) connecting to the network.
- Security aspects of supporting slice in 5WWC.
- Whether and how the security aspects for UE TNAP mobility can be supported in the 5GS without performing the full authentication. |
33.890 | Study on security support for next generation real time communication services | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.890/33890-i00.zip | The present document studies security aspects for any potential enhancements based on the ongoing study in TR 23.700-87 [2]. For each of the key issues in the scope of the SA WG2 study, the security aspects that are to be covered in this study are as follows:
- Analysing the potential security aspects on how to verify and authorize the 3rd party specific identity information during a call both on originating and terminating sides.
- Analysing potential security impacts from supporting service-based architecture in IMS media control interfaces.
- Analysing potential security aspects to support Data Channel usage in IMS network. |
33.891 | Study on security of phase 2 for Uncrewed Aerial System (UAS), Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and Urban Air Mobility (UAM) | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.891/33891-i00.zip | The present document investigates and identifies the security and privacy threats and corresponding security requirements for Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Urban Air Mobility (UAM) that derive from the architecture and system level enhancements studied in TR 23.700-58 [2]. Furthermore, the present document considers solutions and analyses these to make recommendations for possible normative work taking into consideration the conclusions of TR 23.700-58 [2]. |
33.892 | Study on UE Route Selection Policy (URSP) rules to securely identify applications | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.892/33892-i00.zip | The present document analyses mechanisms to ensure the identity of a genuine application in order to apply the URSP rule accordingly, such that malicious applications cannot get access towards the operator regulated resources. The present document identifies key issues and develops solutions for enhancements that enables a URSP rule to securely identify the application for which the URSP rule should be applied. |
33.893 | Study on security aspects of ranging-based services and sidelink positioning | TR | 18.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.893/33893-i01.zip | The present document investigates the security and privacy aspects of Ranging based services and sidelink positioning in 5G system. The study is based on the architectural and functional requirements on Ranging based services and sidelink positioning services, so as to ensure that the proposed solutions address the security and privacy implications on the architecture enhancements studied in TR 23.700-86 [2]. Specifically, it covers the following:
- The identified security and privacy issues, threats, and potential requirements for Ranging based services and sidelink positioning.
- The gap analysis in security and privacy issues between Ranging based services and ProSe/V2X applications.
- The potential solutions addressing the security and privacy issues specific to Ranging based services and sidelink positioning. |
33.894 | Study on applicability of the zero trust security principles in mobile networks | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.894/33894-i00.zip | The present document studies some Zero Trust Security principles that can be applied to the 5G System core network. The present document will further analyse potential threats, study necessary security enhancements, and document various decisions related to solutions as to be adopted or not adopted after evaluating the associated risks and the complexity. The present document specifically covers the following aspects:
- Analyse the 3GPP 5GS security scenarios related to the 5G core network that may benefit from a Zero Trust principle and identify the associated threats.
- Analyse the suitable Zero Trust security mechanisms (i.e. for enabling trust evaluation and ensuring trust) to address the threats identified where potential security risk exists.
- Provide recommendations for support of additional Zero Trust principles in 5GS security architecture with suitable future normative work directions, where such recommendations may include 3GPP 5G security requirements, technical enhancements, and procedural enhancements. |
33.896 | Study of security aspects on user consent for 3GPP services phase 2 | TR | 18.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.896/33896-i01.zip | The present document is to investigate potential enhancements of 5GS that would enable broader use cases in relation with user consent.
The following aspects are in the scope of the study:
1. Investigating the potential issues and solutions with user consent for:
- eNA in case of roaming.
- MEC in case of roaming.
- NTN.
- AI/ML for NG-RAN.
2. Investigating the potential generic security requirements, services and guidance for user consent derived from objective 1.
NOTE 1: Principles, regulations, and definitions related to privacy, which are recognized differently in each different country or area, are taken into account when deriving the concept of user consent for 3GPP users.
Even where solutions exist to obtain user consent, collection and exposure of user sensitive data should be minimized and identification of the users should only be allowed where critical to the operation of the related feature. |
33.898 | Study on security and privacy of Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML)-based services and applications in 5G | TR | 18.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.898/33898-i01.zip | The present document will study, based on requirements as specified in clauses 6.40 and 7.10 of TS 22.261 [2] and architecture and key issues captured in TR 23.700-80 [3], 5GS assistance to support Artificial Intelligence (AI) / Machine Learning (ML) model distribution, transfer, training for various applications, e.g. video/speech recognition, robot control, automotive, etc.
The scope of this study is on how to provide security and privacy to the AI/ML-based service and applications in 5G based on the following objectives of identifying key issues, potential threats, requirements, and solutions to enable:
1. 5G system assistance for the security management which requires data transmission support for application layer AI/ML operation over the 5G system.
2. The authentication and authorization involving data collection and sharing among UE, AF and the network to take part in application layer AI/ML operation, i.e., UE and network privacy protections to support application AI/ML services over 5G system.
3. UE and 5G system to secure AI/ML based services and operations.
4. Secure provisioning of the external parameter required for AI/ML (e.g., expected UE activity behaviors, expected UE mobility, etc.) |
33.905 | Recommendations for Trusted Open Platforms | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.905/33905-i00.zip | This technical report investigates relevant trust standards and technologies, both existing as well as the ones that are work-in-progress. It develops the recommendations for trusted open platforms for delivery of new applications and services to open platforms. |
33.916 | Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM) for 3GPP network products | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.916/33916-i00.zip | The present document defines the complete Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM) evaluation process (evaluation, relation to SECAM Accreditation Body, roles, etc.) as well as the components of SECAM that are intended to provide the expected security assurance. It will thus describe the general scheme providing an overview of the entire scheme and explaining how to create and apply the Security Assurance Specifications (SCASs). It will detail the different evaluation tasks (vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management process assessment, Security Compliance Testing, Basic Vulnerability Testing and Enhanced Vulnerability Analysis) and the different actors involved. Enhanced Vulnerability Analysis is outside the scope of the present release of SECAM. The present document will help all involved parties to have a clear understanding of the overall process and the covered threats.
The concrete security requirements will be part of the Security Assurance Specifications (SCASs) for each network product class and not part of this overall process document. Some of the tasks described in the SECAM scheme are meant to be performed by 3GPP, while other tasks are meant to be performed by the SECAM Accreditation Body. This accreditation body has been agreed to be the GSMA. 3GPP maintains the overall responsibility for the SECAM scheme and creates the SCASs. The SECAM Accreditation Body is tasked to develop requirements on vendor network product development, the network product lifecycle management process, and SECAM-accreditation for vendors and test laboratories, and describe these requirements in separate documents that will complement the present document. The SECAM Accreditation Body defines its own scheme that covers all these tasks. |
33.919 | 3G Security; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); System description | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.919/33919-i00.zip | This 3GPP Technical Report aims to give an overview of the different mechanisms that mobile applications can rely upon for authentication between server and client (i.e. the UE). Additionally it provides guidelines related to the use of GAA and to the choice of authentication mechanism in a given situation and for a given application.
To this end the TR puts the different 3GPP GAA related specifications, into perspective. It clarifies the logic for having the technical specifications and technical reports, sketches their content and explains the inter-relation between these 3GPP TSs and TRs and their relation with this TR.
The heart of GAA consists out of the Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA): The GBA core specifications consist out of TS 33.220, TS 24.109 and TS 29.109. Figure 2 depicts protocols used over the GBA core interfaces and the relationships between different GBA core specifications.
Figure 2: Relationships between GBA core specifications and the protocols used by GBA interfaces
GBA in turn is then used by many other TSs and TRs to enable specific usages e.g. HTTPS, subscriber certificates. |
33.924 | Identity management and 3GPP security interworking; Identity management and Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) interworking | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.924/33924-i00.zip | The objective is to extend the current identity management as outlined in TS 33.220, TS 33.222, TS 29.109 and TR 33.980 with the latest developments on identity management outside of the 3GPP sphere. This will allow a better integration and usage of identity management for services in 3GPP and seamless integration with existing services that are not standardized in 3GPP. This report outlines the interworking of GBA and OpenID. |
33.926 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes | TR | 18.4.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.926/33926-i40.zip | |
33.927 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); threats and critical assets in 3GPP virtualized network product classes | TR | 18.2.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.927/33927-i20.zip | The present document captures the virtualized network product class descriptions, threats and critical assets that have been identified in the course of the work on 3GPP security assurance specifications. The present document contains generic aspects that are believed to apply to more than one network product class. In another aspect, present document defines different types of virtualized network products compared to only one type defined in [2]. |
33.928 | ADMF logic for provisioning Lawful Interception (LI) | TR | 18.6.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.928/33928-i60.zip | |
33.935 | Study on detailed Long Term Key Update Process (LTKUP) detailed solutions | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.935/33935-i00.zip | The present document describes LTKUP solution 4b and LTKUP solution 5 from 3GPP TR 33.834 [2] in implementable detail. |
33.936 | Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM) for 3GPP virtualized network products | TR | 18.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.936/33936-i01.zip | The present document defines the complete Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM) evaluation process (evaluation, relation to SECAM Accreditation Body, roles, etc.) as well as the components of SECAM that are intended to provide the expected security assurance for virtualized network product. It will thus describe the general scheme providing an overview of the entire scheme and explaining how to create and apply the Security Assurance Specifications (SCASs). It will detail the different evaluation tasks (vendor network product development and network product lifecycle management process assessment, Security Compliance Testing, Basic Vulnerability Testing and Enhanced Vulnerability Analysis) and the different actors involved. Enhanced Vulnerability Analysis is outside the scope of the present release of SECAM. The present document will help all involved parties to have a clear understanding of the overall process and the covered threats.
In another aspect, compared to [2], present document shows specific methodology to virtualized network product in addition. |
33.937 | Study of mechanisms for Protection against Unsolicited Communication for IMS (PUCI) | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.937/33937-i00.zip | The scope of this report is to highlight alternative solutions that could be used to protect mobile subscribers from receiving unsolicited communication over IMS and to analyze these solutions in respect of their requirements and impacts on standardized interfaces.
This activity took into account the study done in TISPAN TR 187 009 on “Feasibility study of prevention of unsolicited communications in the NGN”. |
33.969 | Study on security aspects of Public Warning System (PWS) | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.969/33969-i00.zip | The present document studies security features and mechanisms for protection against false Base Stations broadcasting False Warning Notifications.
The default terminal behaviour is to accept all Warning Notifications even if their authenticity is unknown (i.e. no security protection). The default terminal behaviour is therefore open to the presentation of false Warning Notifications issued by false BSs even in countries without a Public Warning System (PWS) deployed.
Examples of false BS risks include, but are not limited to:
• False Warning Notifications to induce panic;
• Abuse of warning system broadcast channel to send advertising / spam. |
33.980 | Liberty Alliance and 3GPP security interworking; Interworking of Liberty Alliance Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF), Identity Web Services Framework (ID-WSF) and Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.980/33980-i00.zip | The present document provides guidelines on the interworking of the Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) and the Liberty Alliance architecture. The document studies the details of possible interworking methods between the Security Assertion Markup Language v2.0, SAML v2.0 (or alternatively the Liberty Alliance Identity Federation Framework, ID-FF), the Identity Web Services Framework (ID-WSF) , the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) and a component of GAA called the Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA). This document only applies if Liberty Alliance and GBA or SAML v2.0 and GBA are used in combination. |
33.995 | Study on security aspects of integration of Single Sign-On (SSO) frameworks with 3GPP operator-controlled resources and mechanisms | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.995/33995-i00.zip | The present study investigates the security aspects of the service requirements specified by SA1 in TS 22.101 [11] clause 26, on the integration of SSO frameworks with 3GPP networks for various operator authentication configurations (e.g. configurations using GBA or not using GBA).
In particular, this study evaluates existing interworking solutions between SSO frameworks and 3GPP authentication mechanisms against the SA1 service requirements. The study is not limited to evaluation of existing interworking solutions and new interworking solutions may be developed as appropriate.
The study covers the security requirements to enable the operator to become the preferred SSO Identity Provider by allowing the usage of credentials on the UE for SSO services, as well as ways for the 3GPP operator to leverage its trust framework and its reliable and robust secure credential handling infra-structure to provide SSO service based on operator-controlled credentials. |
34.109 | Terminal logical test interface; Special conformance testing functions | TS | 18.0.0 | R2 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.109/34109-i00.zip | The present document specifies for User Equipment (UE), in UMTS system, for FDD and TDD modes, those UE functions that are required for conformance testing purposes.
For conformance tests, functions are activated via the radio interface. These functions shall be capable of being activated when a test USIM is present. Any USIM related features such as subsidy-related UE features should also not interfere with the functions. In the loopback state, the UE shall be able to perform all functions specified in the present document except where otherwise stated; in addition however, the conformance testing functions must be operational.
USIM, in general, is described in TS 31.101 [7]. The ME recognises the test USIM by the Administrative Data Field. Test USIM data fields are described in TS 34.108 [10].
The present document applies to the unit that includes the hardware to establish a connection across the radio interface. |
34.123-3 | User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 3: Abstract test suite (ATS) | TS | 18.1.0 | R5 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.123-3/34123-3-i10.zip | The present document specifies the protocol conformance testing in TTCN for the 3GPP User Equipment (UE) at the Uu interface.
The present document is the 3rd part of a multi-part test specification, 3GPP TS 34.123. The following TTCN test specification and design considerations can be found in the present document:
- the overall test suite structure;
- the testing architecture;
- the test methods and PCO definitions;
- the test configurations;
- the design principles, assumptions, and used interfaces to the TTCN tester (System Simulator);
- TTCN styles and conventions;
- the partial PIXIT proforma;
- the TTCN.MP and TTCN.GR forms for the mentioned protocols tests.
The Abstract Test Suites designed in the document are based on the test cases specified in prose (3GPP TS 34.123‑1 [1]).
The present document is valid for UE implemented according to 3GPP releases starting from Release 1999 up to the Release indicated on the cover page of the present document. |
34.124 | Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) requirements for mobile terminals and ancillary equipment | TS | 18.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.124/34124-i00.zip | The present document establishes the essential EMC requirements for UTRA terminal equipment and ancillary accessories in combination with a 3GPP user equipment (UE).
The equipment conforming to the requirements laid out in the present document and used in its intended electromagnetic environment in accordance with the manufacturers instructions
- shall not generate electromagnetic disturbances at a level .which may interfere with the intended operation of other equipment;
- has an adequate level of intrinsic immunity to electromagnetic disturbances to operate as intended;
The present document specifies the applicable EMC tests, the methods of measurement, the frequency range, the limits and the minimum performance criteria for all types of UTRA UE´s operating in FDD or TDD modes and their accessories. The TDD has two options. The two options are the 3,84Mcps and 1,28Mcps options respectively. The requirements are listed in different subsections only if the parameters deviate. Base station equipment operating within network infrastructure is outside the scope of the present document. However, the present document does cover mobile and portable equipment that is intended to be operated in a fixed location while connected to the AC mains. Base stations in the radio access network are covered by the technical specification TS25.113 [1].
Requirements for the radiated emission from the enclosure port of integral antenna equipment and ancillaries have been included. Technical specifications for conducted emissions from the antenna connector are found in the 3GPP specifications for the radio interface, e.g. TS34.121 [2] and TS34.122 [3], for the effective use of the radio spectrum.
The immunity requirements have been selected to ensure an adequate level of compatibility for apparatus in residential, commercial, light industrial and vehicular environments. The levels however, do not cover extreme cases, which may occur in any location but with low probability of occurrence.
The environment classification used in the present document refers to the environment classification used in the Generic Standards IEC 61000-6-1 [4], IEC 61000-6-3 [5], except the vehicular environment class which refers to ISO 7637 Part 1 [6] and Part 2 [7].
Compliance of radio equipment to the requirements of the present document does not signify compliance to any requirement related to the use of the equipment (i.e. licensing requirements).
Compliance to the requirements of the present document does not signify compliance to any safety requirement. However, any temporary or permanent unsafe condition caused by EMC is considered as non-compliance. |
34.131 | Test Specification for C-language binding to (Universal) Subscriber Interface Module ((U)SIM) Application Programming Interface (API) | TS | 18.0.0 | C6 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.131/34131-i00.zip | The present document describes the technical characteristics and methods of test for testing the SIM API for the C programming language 3GPP TS 31.131 [11] implemented in the subscriber identity modules for GSM and 3G networks. It specifies the following parts:
- test applicability
- test environment description
- tests format
- test area reference
- conformance requirements
- test suite files
- test procedure
- test coverage and,
- a description of the associated testing tools that may be used. |
34.229-1 | Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 1: Protocol conformance specification | TS | 18.1.1 | R5 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.229-1/34229-1-i11.zip | |
34.229-2 | Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 2: Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) specification | TS | 18.1.0 | R5 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.229-2/34229-2-i10.zip | |
34.229-3 | Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 3: Abstract test suite (ATS) | TS | 18.3.0 | R5 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.229-3/34229-3-i30.zip | |
34.229-5 | Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 5: Protocol conformance specification using 5G System (5GS) | TS | 18.1.0 | R5 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.229-5/34229-5-i10.zip | |
35.203 | 3G Security; Specification of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms; Document 3: Implementors' test data | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.203/35203-i00.zip | This specification gives detailed test data for implementors of the algorithm set. It provides visibility of the internal state of the algorithm to aid in the realisation of the algorithms. |
35.201 | 3G Security; Specification of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms; Document 1: f8 and f9 specification | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.201/35201-i00.zip | This specification gives a detailed specification of the 3GPP confidentiality algorithm f8, and the 3GPP integrity algorithm f9.
NORMATIVE SECTION
This part of the document contains the normative specification of the Confidentiality and Integrity algorithms. |
35.202 | 3G Security; Specification of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms; Document 2: Kasumi specification | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.202/35202-i00.zip | This specification gives a detailed specification of the 3GPP Algorithm KASUMI. KASUMI is a block cipher that forms the heart of the 3GPP confidentiality algorithm f8, and the 3GPP integrity algorithm f9.
NORMATIVE SECTION
This part of the document contains the normative specification of the KASUMI algorithm. |
34.926 | Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC); Table of international requirements for mobile terminals and ancillary equipment | TR | 18.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.926/34926-i00.zip | The present document shows in tabular form most of the current regulatory and voluntary requirements by region or nation, and is for information purposes only. |
35.204 | 3G Security; Specification of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms; Document 4: Design conformance test data | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.204/35204-i00.zip | This specification gives black-box test data for the algorithm set. The test data has been selected to give a high degree of confidence that the implementation is correct. However, no claim is made that conformance with this test data guarantees a correct implementation. |
35.205 | 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 1: General | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.205/35205-i00.zip | |
35.206 | 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 2: Algorithm specification | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.206/35206-i00.zip | |
35.207 | 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 3: Implementors' test data | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.207/35207-i00.zip | |
35.208 | 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 4: Design conformance test data | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.208/35208-i00.zip | |
35.215 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms UEA2 & UIA2; Document 1: UEA2 and UIA2 specifications | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.215/35215-i00.zip | The present document specifies the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms known as UEA2 and UIA2. |
35.216 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms UEA2 & UIA2; Document 2: SNOW 3G specification | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.216/35216-i00.zip | The present document specifies the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms known as UEA2 and UIA2. |
35.217 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms UEA2 & UIA2; Document 3: Implementors' test data | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.217/35217-i00.zip | The present document specifies the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms known as UEA2 and UIA2. |
35.218 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms UEA2 & UIA2; Document 4: Design conformance test data | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.218/35218-i00.zip | The present document specifies the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms known as UEA2 and UIA2. |
35.221 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms EEA3 & EIA3; Document 1: EEA3 and EIA3 specifications | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.221/35221-i00.zip | The present document specifies the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms known as EEA3 and EIA3. |
35.222 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms EEA3 & EIA3; Document 2: ZUC specification | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.222/35222-i00.zip | The present document specifies the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms known as EEA3 and EIA3. |
35.223 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms EEA3 & EIA3; Document 3: Implementors' test data | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.223/35223-i00.zip | The present document specifies the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms known as EEA3 and EIA3. |
35.231 | Specification of the TUAK algorithm set: A second example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 1: Algorithm specification | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.231/35231-i00.zip | |
35.232 | Specification of the TUAK algorithm set: A second example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 2: Implementers’ test data | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.232/35232-i00.zip | The present document and the other Technical Specifications in the series, TS 35.231 [4] and TS 35.233 [6], contain an example set of algorithms which could be used as the authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5* for 3GPP systems. In particular, the present document defines the test data:
- for the Keccak permutation used within Tuak,
- for the authentication algorithms f1 and f1*,
- for the algorithms f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*. |
35.233 | Specification of the TUAK algorithm set: A second example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 3: Design conformance test data | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.233/35233-i00.zip | The present document and the other Technical Specifications in the series, TS 35.231 [4] and TS 35.232 [5], contain an example set of algorithms which could be used as the authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5* for 3GPP systems. The present document provides sets of input/output test data for ‘black box’ testing of physical realizations of all algorithms, and in particular:
- Test data for the Keccak permutation used within Tuak.
- Test data for the MILENAGE authentication and key generation algorithms f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*. |
35.240 | Specification of the Snow 5G based 256-bits algorithm set: specification of the 256-NEA4 encryption, the 256-NIA4 integrity, and the 256-NCA4 authenticated encryption algorithm for 5G; Document 1: algorithm specification | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.240/35240-i00.zip | The present document contains the algorithm specification which could be used as the encryption and integrity protection function 256-NEA4, 256-NIA4 and the combined authenticated encryption 256-NCA4 protection function for 3GPP systems. |
35.241 | Specification of the Snow 5G based 256-bits algorithm set: Specification of the 256-NEA4 encryption, the 256-NIA4 integrity algorithm, and the 256-NCA4 authenticated encryption algorithm for 5G; Document 2: implementation test data | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.241/35241-i00.zip | The present document contains the implementation test data of the encryption and integrity protection function 256-NEA4, 256-NIA4 and the combined authenticated encryption 256-NCA4 protection function for 3GPP systems. |
35.242 | Specification of the Snow 5G based 256-bits algorithm set: Specification of the 256-NEA4 encryption, the 256-NIA4 integrity, and the 256-NCA4 authenticated encryption algorithm for 5G; Document 3: design conformance test data | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.242/35242-i00.zip | The present document contains the design conformance test data of the encryption and integrity protection function 256-NEA1, 256-NIA1 and the combined authenticated encryption 256-NCA1 protection function for 3GPP systems. |
35.243 | Specification of the AES based 256-bits algorithm set: Specification of the 256-NEA5 encryption, the 256-NIA5 integrity, and the 256-NCA5 authenticated encryption algorithm for 5G; Document 1: algorithm specification | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.243/35243-i00.zip | The present document contains the algorithm specification which could be used as the encryption and integrity protection function 256-NEA5, 256-NIA5 and the combined authenticated encryption 256-NCA5 protection function for 3GPP systems. |
35.244 | Specification of the AES based 256-bits algorithm set: Specification of the 256-NEA5 encryption, the 256-NIA5 integrity, and the 256-NCA5 authenticated encryption algorithm for 5G; Document 2: implementation test data | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.244/35244-i00.zip | The present document contains the implementation test data of the encryption and integrity protection function 256-NEA5, 256-NIA5 and the combined authenticated encryption 256-NCA5 protection function for 3GPP systems. |
35.245 | Specification of the AES based 256-bits algorithm set: Specification of the 256-NEA5 encryption, the 256-NIA5 integrity, and the 256-NCA5 authenticated encryption algorithm for 5G; Document 3: design conformance test data | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.245/35245-i00.zip | The present document contains the design conformance test data of the encryption and integrity protection function 256-NEA5, 256-NIA5 and the combined authenticated encryption 256-NCA5 protection function for 3GPP systems. |
35.246 | Specification of the ZUC based 256-bits algorithm set: Specification of the 256-NEA6 encryption, the 256-NIA6 integrity, and the 256-NCA6 authenticated encryption algorithm for 5G; Document 1: algorithm specification | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.246/35246-i00.zip | |
35.247 | Specification of the ZUC based 256-bits algorithm set: Specification of the 256-NEA6 encryption, the 256-NIA6 integrity, and the 256-NCA6 authenticated encryption algorithm for 5G; Document 2: implementation test data | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.247/35247-i00.zip | The present document contains the implementers’ test data of the encryption and integrity protection function 256-NEA6, 256-NIA6 and the combined authenticated encryption 256-NCA6 protection function for 3GPP systems. |
35.248 | Specification of the ZUC based 256-bits algorithm set: Specification of the 256-NEA6 encryption, the 256-NIA6 integrity, and the 256-NCA6 authenticated encryption algorithm for 5G; Document 3: design conformance test data | TS | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.248/35248-i00.zip | The present document contains the design conformance test data of the encryption and integrity protection function 256-NEA6, 256-NIA6 and the combined authenticated encryption 256-NCA6 protection function for 3GPP systems. |
35.909 | 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set: an example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 5: Summary and results of design and evaluation | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.909/35909-i00.zip | This report contains a detailed summary of the work performed during the design and evaluation of the 3GPP Authentication Functions denoted as the MILENAGE algorithm set. It contains all results and findings from this work and should be read as a supplement to the specifications of the algorithms in ref. [3] and the general project report, ref. [4]. |
35.919 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms UEA2 & UIA2; Document 5: Design and evaluation report | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.919/35919-i00.zip | The present document specifies the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms known as UEA2 and UIA2. |
35.924 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms EEA3 & EIA3; Document 4: Design and Evaluation Report | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.924/35924-i00.zip | The present document specifies the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms known as EEA3 and EIA3. |
35.934 | Specification of the TUAK algorithm set: A second example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 4: Report on the design and evaluation | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.934/35934-i00.zip | The present document (together with three accompanying documents, [8], [9] and [10] describes the design rationale, and presents evaluation results, on the Tuak algorithm set [5] – a second example set of algorithms which may be used as the authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*, e.g. as an alternative to MILENAGE. |
35.935 | Specification of the TUAK algorithm set: A second example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 5: Performance evaluation | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.935/35935-i00.zip | The present document provides a reference to an independent performance evaluation report of the Tuak algorithm set carried out by the ISG Smart Card Centre of the Royal Holloway University of London. |
35.936 | Specification of the TUAK algorithm set: A second example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2 ,f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 6: Security assessment | TR | 18.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.936/35936-i00.zip | The present document provides a reference to an independent security assessment of the Tuak algorithm set carried out by the University of Waterloo, Canada. |
36.101 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); User Equipment (UE) radio transmission and reception | TS | 18.10.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.101/36101-ia0.zip | |
36.102 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); User Equipment (UE) radio transmission and reception for satellite access | TS | 18.9.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.102/36102-i90.zip | |
36.104 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Base Station (BS) radio transmission and reception | TS | 18.7.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.104/36104-i70.zip | |
36.106 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); FDD repeater radio transmission and reception | TS | 18.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.106/36106-i00.zip | The present document establishes the minimum RF characteristics of E-UTRA FDD Repeater. |
36.108 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Satellite Access Node radio transmission and reception | TS | 18.8.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.108/36108-i80.zip | |
36.111 | Location Measurement Unit (LMU) performance specification; Network based positioning systems in Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) | TS | 18.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.111/36111-i00.zip | The present document establishes the Location Measurement Unit (LMU) minimum UTDOA positioning requirement for the FDD and TDD mode of E-UTRAN. |
36.112 | Location Measurement Unit (LMU) conformance specification; Network based positioning systems in Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) | TS | 18.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.112/36112-i00.zip | The present document establishes the conformance requirements for E-UTRAN Location Measurement Units (LMU) operating in the FDD or TDD mode. |
36.113 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Base Station (BS) and repeater ElectroMagnetic Compatibility (EMC) | TS | 18.1.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.113/36113-i10.zip | The present document covers the assessment of E-UTRA, E-UTRA with NB-IoT or NB-IoT base stations, repeaters and associated ancillary equipment in respect of Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC).
The present document specifies the applicable test conditions, performance assessment and performance criteria for E-UTRA, E-UTRA with NB-IoT or NB-IoT base stations, repeaters and associated ancillary equipment in one of the following categories:
- base sations of E-UTRA, E-UTRA with NB-IoT or NB-IoT meeting the requirements of TS 36.104 [2], with conformance demonstrated by compliance to TS 36.141 [3].
- repeaters of E-UTRA meeting the requirements of TS 36.106 [4], with conformance demonstrated by compliance to TS 36.143 [5].
Technical requirements related to the antenna port of E-UTRA, E-UTRA with NB-IoT or NB-IoT base stations or repeaters are not included in the present document. These are found in the relevant product standards [2-5].
The environment classification used in the present document refers to the residential, commercial and light industrial environment classification used in IEC 61000-6-1 [6], IEC 61000-6-3 [7] and IEC 61000-6-8 [27].
The EMC requirements have been selected to ensure an adequate level of compatibility for apparatus at residential, commercial and light industrial environments. The levels, however, do not cover extreme cases which may occur in any location but with low probability of occurrence. |
36.116 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Relay radio transmission and reception | TS | 18.1.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.116/36116-i10.zip | The present document establishes the minimum RF characteristics and minimum performance requirements of E-UTRA Relay. |
36.117 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Relay conformance testing | TS | 18.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.117/36117-i00.zip | The present document specifies the Radio Frequency (RF) test methods and conformance requirements for E-UTRA Relay. These have been derived from, and are consistent with the E-UTRA Relay specifications defined in [2]. |
36.124 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) requirements for mobile terminals and ancillary equipment | TS | 18.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.124/36124-i00.zip | The present document establishes the essential EMC requirements for "3rd generation" digital cellular mobile terminal equipment and ancillary accessories in combination with a 3GPP E-UTRA user equipment (UE).
The equipment conforming to the requirements laid out in the present document and used in its intended electromagnetic environment in accordance with the manufacturers instructions
- shall not generate electromagnetic disturbances at a level which may interfere with the intended operation of other equipment;
- has an adequate level of intrinsic immunity to electromagnetic disturbances to operate as intended;
The present document specifies the applicable EMC tests, the methods of measurement, the frequency range, the limits and the minimum performance criteria for all types of E-UTRA UE´s and their accessories. E-UTRA base station equipment operating within network infrastructure is outside the scope of the present document. However, the present document does cover mobile and portable equipment that is intended to be operated in a fixed location while connected to the AC mains. E-UTRA base stations in the radio access network are covered by the technical specification TS36.113 [2].
Requirements for the radiated emission from the enclosure port of integral antenna equipment and ancillaries have been included. Technical specifications for conducted emissions from the antenna connector are found in the 3GPP specifications for the radio interface, e.g. TS36.521 [3], for the effective use of the radio spectrum.
The immunity requirements have been selected to ensure an adequate level of compatibility for apparatus in residential, commercial, light industrial and vehicular environments. The levels however, do not cover extreme cases, which may occur in any location but with low probability of occurrence.
The environment classification used in the present document refers to the environment classification used in the Generic Standards IEC 61000-6-1 [4], IEC 61000-6-3 [5], except the vehicular environment class which refers to ISO 7637 Part 1 [6] and Part 2 [7].
Compliance of radio equipment to the requirements of the present document does not signify compliance to any requirement related to the use of the equipment (i.e. licensing requirements).
Compliance to the requirements of the present document does not signify compliance to any safety requirement. However, any temporary or permanent unsafe condition caused by EMC is considered as non-compliance. |
36.133 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Requirements for support of radio resource management | TS | 18.10.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.133/36133-ia0.zip | |
36.141 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Base Station (BS) conformance testing | TS | 18.6.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.141/36141-i60.zip | |
36.143 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); FDD repeater conformance testing | TS | 18.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.143/36143-i00.zip | The present document specifies the Radio Frequency (RF) test methods and conformance requirements for E-UTRA FDD Repeater. These have been derived from, and are consistent with the E-UTRA FDD repeater specifications defined in [2]. |
36.171 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Requirements for Support of Assisted Global Navigation Satellite System (A-GNSS) | TS | 18.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.171/36171-i00.zip |
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