input
stringlengths 205
73.3k
| output
stringlengths 64
73.2k
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stringclasses 1
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|---|---|---|
#vulnerable code
public void leaveRtpSession() {
if (this.joined.get()) {
this.joined.set(false);
/*
* When the participant decides to leave the system, tp is reset to tc, the current time, members and pmembers are
* initialized to 1, initial is set to 1, we_sent is set to false, senders is set to 0, and avg_rtcp_size is set to
* the size of the compound BYE packet.
*
* The calculated interval T is computed. The BYE packet is then scheduled for time tn = tc + T.
*/
this.tp = this.statistics.getCurrentTime();
this.statistics.resetMembers();
this.initial.set(true);
this.statistics.clearSenders();
// XXX Sending the BYE packet NOW, since channel will be closed - hrosa
// long t = this.statistics.rtcpInterval(initial);
// this.tn = resolveDelay(t);
// this.scheduleRtcp(this.tn, RtcpPacketType.RTCP_BYE);
// cancel scheduled task and schedule BYE now
if(this.reportTaskFuture != null) {
this.reportTaskFuture.cancel(true);
}
scheduleNow(RtcpPacketType.RTCP_BYE);
}
}
#location 26
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void leaveRtpSession() {
if (this.joined.get()) {
this.joined.set(false);
/*
* When the participant decides to leave the system, tp is reset to tc, the current time, members and pmembers are
* initialized to 1, initial is set to 1, we_sent is set to false, senders is set to 0, and avg_rtcp_size is set to
* the size of the compound BYE packet.
*
* The calculated interval T is computed. The BYE packet is then scheduled for time tn = tc + T.
*/
this.tp = this.statistics.getCurrentTime();
this.statistics.resetMembers();
this.initial.set(true);
this.statistics.clearSenders();
// XXX Sending the BYE packet NOW, since channel will be closed - hrosa
// long t = this.statistics.rtcpInterval(initial);
// this.tn = resolveDelay(t);
// this.scheduleRtcp(this.tn, RtcpPacketType.RTCP_BYE);
// cancel scheduled task and schedule BYE now
if(this.reportTaskFuture != null) {
this.reportTaskFuture.cancel(true);
}
// Send BYE
// Do not run in separate thread so channel can be properly closed by the owner of this handler
this.statistics.setRtcpPacketType(RtcpPacketType.RTCP_BYE);
this.scheduledTask = new TxTask(RtcpPacketType.RTCP_BYE);
this.scheduledTask.run();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void startMixer() {
if (!started) {
started = true;
output.buffer.clear();
scheduler.submit(mixer,scheduler.MIXER_MIX_QUEUE);
mixCount = 0;
Iterator<Input> activeInputs=inputs.iterator();
while(activeInputs.hasNext())
activeInputs.next().start();
}
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void startMixer() {
if (!started) {
started = true;
output.resetBuffer();
mixCount = 0;
Iterator<Input> activeInputs=inputs.iterator();
Input currInput;
while(activeInputs.hasNext())
{
currInput=activeInputs.next();
currInput.resetBuffer();
currInput.start();
}
scheduler.submit(mixer,scheduler.MIXER_MIX_QUEUE);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
LOCK.lock();
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
LOCK.unlock();
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
}
#location 17
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
try {
LOCK.lock();
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
} finally {
LOCK.unlock();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testCodec() throws Exception {
boolean testPassed = false;
try {
final int packetSize = 480;
File outputFile = File.createTempFile("opustest", ".tmp");
FileInputStream inputStream = new FileInputStream("src\\test\\resources\\test_sound_mono_48.pcm");
FileOutputStream outputStream = new FileOutputStream(outputFile, false);
OpusJni opus = new OpusJni();
opus.initNative();
try {
byte[] input = new byte[packetSize];
short[] inputData = new short[packetSize];
byte[] output = new byte[2 * packetSize];
while (inputStream.read(input) == 2 * packetSize) {
ByteBuffer.wrap(input).order(ByteOrder.LITTLE_ENDIAN).asShortBuffer().get(inputData);
byte[] encodedData = opus.encodeNative(inputData);
short[] decodedData = opus.decodeNative(encodedData);
ByteBuffer.wrap(output).order(ByteOrder.LITTLE_ENDIAN).asShortBuffer().put(decodedData);
outputStream.write(output);
}
testPassed = true;
} finally {
inputStream.close();
outputStream.close();
opus.closeNative();
outputFile.delete();
}
} catch (IOException exc) {
log.error("IOException: " + exc.getMessage());
fail("Opus test file access error");
}
assertTrue(testPassed);
}
#location 33
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testCodec() throws Exception {
boolean testPassed = false;
try {
OpusJni opus = new OpusJni();
opus.initNative();
final int packetSize = 480;
File outputFile = File.createTempFile("opustest", ".tmp");
byte[] output = new byte[2 * packetSize];
try (FileInputStream inputStream = new FileInputStream("src\\test\\resources\\test_sound_mono_48.pcm");
FileOutputStream outputStream = new FileOutputStream(outputFile, false)) {
byte[] input = new byte[packetSize];
short[] inputData = new short[packetSize];
while (inputStream.read(input) == 2 * packetSize) {
ByteBuffer.wrap(input).order(ByteOrder.LITTLE_ENDIAN).asShortBuffer().get(inputData);
byte[] encodedData = opus.encodeNative(inputData);
short[] decodedData = opus.decodeNative(encodedData);
ByteBuffer.wrap(output).order(ByteOrder.LITTLE_ENDIAN).asShortBuffer().put(decodedData);
outputStream.write(output);
}
testPassed = true;
}
opus.closeNative();
outputFile.delete();
} catch (IOException exc) {
log.error("IOException: " + exc.getMessage());
fail("Opus test file access error");
}
assertTrue(testPassed);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void harvest(IceMediaStream mediaStream, PortManager portManager, Selector selector) throws HarvestException, NoCandidatesGatheredException {
// Safe copy of currently registered harvesters
Map<CandidateType, CandidateHarvester> copy;
synchronized (this.harvesters) {
copy = new HashMap<CandidateType, CandidateHarvester>(this.harvesters);
}
// Ask each harvester to gather candidates for the media stream
// HOST candidates take precedence and are mandatory
CandidateHarvester hostHarvester = copy.get(CandidateType.HOST);
if (hostHarvester != null) {
hostHarvester.harvest(portManager, mediaStream, selector);
} else {
throw new HarvestException("No HOST harvester registered!");
}
// Then comes the SRFLX, which depends on HOST candidates
CandidateHarvester srflxHarvester = copy.get(CandidateType.SRFLX);
if (srflxHarvester != null) {
srflxHarvester.harvest(portManager, mediaStream, selector);
}
// RELAY candidates come last
CandidateHarvester relayHarvester = copy.get(CandidateType.RELAY);
if (relayHarvester != null) {
relayHarvester.harvest(portManager, mediaStream, selector);
}
// Verify at least one candidate was gathered
if (!mediaStream.hasLocalRtpCandidates()) {
throw new NoCandidatesGatheredException("No RTP candidates were gathered for " + mediaStream.getName() + " stream");
}
// After harvesting all possible candidates, ask the media stream to
// select its default local candidates
mediaStream.getRtpComponent().selectDefaultLocalCandidate();
if (mediaStream.supportsRtcp() && !mediaStream.isRtcpMux()) {
mediaStream.getRtcpComponent().selectDefaultLocalCandidate();
}
}
#location 36
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void harvest(IceMediaStream mediaStream, PortManager portManager, Selector selector) throws HarvestException, NoCandidatesGatheredException {
// Ask each harvester to gather candidates for the media stream
// HOST candidates take precedence and are mandatory
CandidateHarvester hostHarvester = harvesters.get(CandidateType.HOST);
if (hostHarvester != null) {
hostHarvester.harvest(portManager, mediaStream, selector);
} else {
throw new HarvestException("No HOST harvester registered!");
}
// Then comes the SRFLX, which depends on HOST candidates
CandidateHarvester srflxHarvester = harvesters.get(CandidateType.SRFLX);
if (srflxHarvester != null) {
srflxHarvester.harvest(portManager, mediaStream, selector);
}
// RELAY candidates come last
CandidateHarvester relayHarvester = harvesters.get(CandidateType.RELAY);
if (relayHarvester != null) {
relayHarvester.harvest(portManager, mediaStream, selector);
}
// Verify at least one candidate was gathered
if (!mediaStream.hasLocalRtpCandidates()) {
throw new NoCandidatesGatheredException("No RTP candidates were gathered for " + mediaStream.getName() + " stream");
}
// After harvesting all possible candidates, ask the media stream to
// select its default local candidates
mediaStream.getRtpComponent().selectDefaultLocalCandidate();
if (mediaStream.supportsRtcp() && !mediaStream.isRtcpMux()) {
mediaStream.getRtcpComponent().selectDefaultLocalCandidate();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
LOCK.lock();
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
LOCK.unlock();
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
}
#location 16
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
try {
LOCK.lock();
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
} finally {
LOCK.unlock();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
LOCK.lock();
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
LOCK.unlock();
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
}
#location 35
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
try {
LOCK.lock();
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
} finally {
LOCK.unlock();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
LOCK.lock();
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
LOCK.unlock();
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
}
#location 23
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
try {
LOCK.lock();
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
} finally {
LOCK.unlock();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public Frame read(long timestamp) {
try {
if (queue.size() == 0) {
this.ready = false;
return null;
}
//extract packet
Frame frame = queue.remove(0);
//buffer empty now? - change ready flag.
if (queue.size() == 0) {
this.ready = false;
//arrivalDeadLine = 0;
//set it as 1 ms since otherwise will be dropped by pipe
frame.setDuration(1);
}
arrivalDeadLine = rtpClock.convertToRtpTime(frame.getTimestamp() + frame.getDuration());
//convert duration to nanoseconds
frame.setDuration(frame.getDuration() * 1000000L);
frame.setTimestamp(frame.getTimestamp() * 1000000L);
return frame;
} finally {
LOCK.unlock();
}
}
#location 21
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public Frame read(long timestamp) {
try {
LOCK.lock();
if (queue.size() == 0) {
this.ready = false;
return null;
}
//extract packet
Frame frame = queue.remove(0);
//buffer empty now? - change ready flag.
if (queue.size() == 0) {
this.ready = false;
//arrivalDeadLine = 0;
//set it as 1 ms since otherwise will be dropped by pipe
frame.setDuration(1);
}
arrivalDeadLine = rtpClock.convertToRtpTime(frame.getTimestamp() + frame.getDuration());
//convert duration to nanoseconds
frame.setDuration(frame.getDuration() * 1000000L);
frame.setTimestamp(frame.getTimestamp() * 1000000L);
return frame;
} finally {
LOCK.unlock();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
LOCK.lock();
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
LOCK.unlock();
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
}
#location 109
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
try {
LOCK.lock();
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
} finally {
LOCK.unlock();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
LOCK.lock();
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
LOCK.unlock();
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
}
#location 33
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
try {
LOCK.lock();
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
} finally {
LOCK.unlock();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
LOCK.lock();
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
LOCK.unlock();
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
try {
LOCK.lock();
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
} finally {
LOCK.unlock();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private byte[] processRequest(StunRequest request, InetSocketAddress localPeer, InetSocketAddress remotePeer)
throws IOException {
// Produce Binding Response
TransportAddress transportAddress = new TransportAddress(remotePeer.getAddress(), remotePeer.getPort(), TransportProtocol.UDP);
StunResponse response = StunMessageFactory.createBindingResponse(request, transportAddress);
byte[] transactionID = request.getTransactionId();
try {
response.setTransactionID(transactionID);
} catch (StunException e) {
throw new IOException("Illegal STUN Transaction ID: " + new String(transactionID), e);
}
// The agent MUST use a short-term credential to authenticate the request and perform a message integrity check.
UsernameAttribute remoteUnameAttribute;
String remoteUsername;
// Send binding error response if username is null
try {
remoteUnameAttribute = (UsernameAttribute) request.getAttribute(StunAttribute.USERNAME);
remoteUsername = new String(remoteUnameAttribute.getUsername());
}
catch(NullPointerException nullPointer) {
response.setMessageType(StunMessage.BINDING_ERROR_RESPONSE);
response.addAttribute(StunAttributeFactory.createErrorCodeAttribute(ErrorCodeAttribute.BAD_REQUEST,
ErrorCodeAttribute.getDefaultReasonPhrase(ErrorCodeAttribute.BAD_REQUEST)));
return response.encode();
}
// The agent MUST consider the username to be valid if it consists of two values separated by a colon, where the first
// value is equal to the username fragment generated by the agent in an offer or answer for a session in-progress.
if (!this.authenticator.validateUsername(remoteUsername)) {
// TODO return error response
throw new IOException("Invalid username " + remoteUsername);
}
// The username for the credential is formed by concatenating the username fragment provided by the peer with the
// username fragment of the agent sending the request, separated by a colon (":").
int colon = remoteUsername.indexOf(":");
String localUFrag = remoteUsername.substring(0, colon);
String remoteUfrag = remoteUsername.substring(colon + 1);
// Add USERNAME and MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute in the response.
// The responses utilize the same usernames and passwords as the requests.
String localUsername = remoteUfrag.concat(":").concat(localUFrag);
StunAttribute unameAttribute = StunAttributeFactory.createUsernameAttribute(localUsername);
response.addAttribute(unameAttribute);
byte[] localKey = this.authenticator.getLocalKey(localUFrag);
MessageIntegrityAttribute integrityAttribute = StunAttributeFactory.createMessageIntegrityAttribute(remoteUsername,
localKey);
response.addAttribute(integrityAttribute);
// If the client issues a USE-CANDIDATE, tell ICE Agent to select the candidate
if (request.containsAttribute(StunAttribute.USE_CANDIDATE)) {
if (!this.candidateSelected.get()) {
this.candidateSelected.set(true);
if (logger.isDebugEnabled()) {
logger.debug("Selected candidate " + remotePeer.toString());
}
this.iceListener.onSelectedCandidates(new SelectedCandidatesEvent(remotePeer));
}
}
// Pass response to the server
return response.encode();
}
#location 20
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private byte[] processRequest(StunRequest request, InetSocketAddress localPeer, InetSocketAddress remotePeer)
throws IOException {
// Produce Binding Response
TransportAddress transportAddress = new TransportAddress(remotePeer.getAddress(), remotePeer.getPort(), TransportProtocol.UDP);
StunResponse response = StunMessageFactory.createBindingResponse(request, transportAddress);
byte[] transactionID = request.getTransactionId();
try {
response.setTransactionID(transactionID);
} catch (StunException e) {
throw new IOException("Illegal STUN Transaction ID: " + new String(transactionID), e);
}
// The agent MUST use a short-term credential to authenticate the request and perform a message integrity check.
UsernameAttribute remoteUnameAttribute = (UsernameAttribute) request.getAttribute(StunAttribute.USERNAME);;
// Send binding error response if username is null
if (remoteUnameAttribute.getUsername()==null) {
response.setMessageType(StunMessage.BINDING_ERROR_RESPONSE);
response.addAttribute(StunAttributeFactory.createErrorCodeAttribute(ErrorCodeAttribute.BAD_REQUEST,
ErrorCodeAttribute.getDefaultReasonPhrase(ErrorCodeAttribute.BAD_REQUEST)));
return response.encode();
}
String remoteUsername = new String(remoteUnameAttribute.getUsername());
// The agent MUST consider the username to be valid if it consists of two values separated by a colon, where the first
// value is equal to the username fragment generated by the agent in an offer or answer for a session in-progress.
if (!this.authenticator.validateUsername(remoteUsername)) {
// TODO return error response
throw new IOException("Invalid username " + remoteUsername);
}
// The username for the credential is formed by concatenating the username fragment provided by the peer with the
// username fragment of the agent sending the request, separated by a colon (":").
int colon = remoteUsername.indexOf(":");
String localUFrag = remoteUsername.substring(0, colon);
String remoteUfrag = remoteUsername.substring(colon + 1);
// Add USERNAME and MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute in the response.
// The responses utilize the same usernames and passwords as the requests.
String localUsername = remoteUfrag.concat(":").concat(localUFrag);
StunAttribute unameAttribute = StunAttributeFactory.createUsernameAttribute(localUsername);
response.addAttribute(unameAttribute);
byte[] localKey = this.authenticator.getLocalKey(localUFrag);
MessageIntegrityAttribute integrityAttribute = StunAttributeFactory.createMessageIntegrityAttribute(remoteUsername,
localKey);
response.addAttribute(integrityAttribute);
// If the client issues a USE-CANDIDATE, tell ICE Agent to select the candidate
if (request.containsAttribute(StunAttribute.USE_CANDIDATE)) {
if (!this.candidateSelected.get()) {
this.candidateSelected.set(true);
if (logger.isDebugEnabled()) {
logger.debug("Selected candidate " + remotePeer.toString());
}
this.iceListener.onSelectedCandidates(new SelectedCandidatesEvent(remotePeer));
}
}
// Pass response to the server
return response.encode();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
LOCK.lock();
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
LOCK.unlock();
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
}
#location 52
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
try {
LOCK.lock();
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
} finally {
LOCK.unlock();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
LOCK.lock();
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
LOCK.unlock();
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
}
#location 29
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
try {
LOCK.lock();
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
} finally {
LOCK.unlock();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public String open(String sdp) throws MgcpConnectionException {
synchronized (this.stateLock) {
switch (this.state) {
case CLOSED:
case HALF_OPEN:
// Update state
this.state = MgcpConnectionState.OPEN;
// Parse remote SDP
try {
this.remoteSdp = SessionDescriptionParser.parse(sdp);
} catch (SdpException e) {
throw new MgcpConnectionException(e.getMessage(), e);
}
// Open connection
openConnection();
if(log.isDebugEnabled()) {
log.debug("Connection " + getHexIdentifier() + " state is " + this.state.name());
}
// Submit timer
if (this.timeout > 0) {
expireIn(this.timeout);
}
break;
default:
throw new MgcpConnectionException(
"Cannot open connection " + this.getHexIdentifier() + " because state is " + this.state.name());
}
}
return this.localSdp.toString();
}
#location 35
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Override
public String open(String sdp) throws MgcpConnectionException {
synchronized (this.stateLock) {
switch (this.state) {
case CLOSED:
case HALF_OPEN:
// Update state
this.state = MgcpConnectionState.OPEN;
// Parse remote SDP
try {
this.remoteSdp = SessionDescriptionParser.parse(sdp);
} catch (SdpException e) {
throw new MgcpConnectionException(e.getMessage(), e);
}
// Open connection
openConnection();
if(log.isDebugEnabled()) {
log.debug("Connection " + getHexIdentifier() + " state is " + this.state.name());
}
// Submit timer
if (this.timeout > 0) {
expireIn(this.timeout);
}
break;
default:
throw new MgcpConnectionException("Cannot open connection " + this.getHexIdentifier() + " because state is " + this.state.name());
}
}
return this.localSdp.toString();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
LOCK.lock();
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
LOCK.unlock();
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
}
#location 34
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
try {
LOCK.lock();
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
} finally {
LOCK.unlock();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
LOCK.lock();
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
LOCK.unlock();
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
}
#location 15
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
try {
LOCK.lock();
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
} finally {
LOCK.unlock();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testCodec() throws Exception {
boolean testPassed = false;
try {
final int packetSize = 480;
File outputFile = File.createTempFile("opustest", ".tmp");
FileInputStream inputStream = new FileInputStream("src\\test\\resources\\test_sound_mono_48.pcm");
FileOutputStream outputStream = new FileOutputStream(outputFile, false);
OpusJni opus = new OpusJni();
opus.initNative();
try {
byte[] input = new byte[packetSize];
short[] inputData = new short[packetSize];
byte[] output = new byte[2 * packetSize];
while (inputStream.read(input) == 2 * packetSize) {
ByteBuffer.wrap(input).order(ByteOrder.LITTLE_ENDIAN).asShortBuffer().get(inputData);
byte[] encodedData = opus.encodeNative(inputData);
short[] decodedData = opus.decodeNative(encodedData);
ByteBuffer.wrap(output).order(ByteOrder.LITTLE_ENDIAN).asShortBuffer().put(decodedData);
outputStream.write(output);
}
testPassed = true;
} finally {
inputStream.close();
outputStream.close();
opus.closeNative();
outputFile.delete();
}
} catch (IOException exc) {
log.error("IOException: " + exc.getMessage());
fail("Opus test file access error");
}
assertTrue(testPassed);
}
#location 33
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testCodec() throws Exception {
boolean testPassed = false;
try {
OpusJni opus = new OpusJni();
opus.initNative();
final int packetSize = 480;
File outputFile = File.createTempFile("opustest", ".tmp");
byte[] output = new byte[2 * packetSize];
try (FileInputStream inputStream = new FileInputStream("src\\test\\resources\\test_sound_mono_48.pcm");
FileOutputStream outputStream = new FileOutputStream(outputFile, false)) {
byte[] input = new byte[packetSize];
short[] inputData = new short[packetSize];
while (inputStream.read(input) == 2 * packetSize) {
ByteBuffer.wrap(input).order(ByteOrder.LITTLE_ENDIAN).asShortBuffer().get(inputData);
byte[] encodedData = opus.encodeNative(inputData);
short[] decodedData = opus.decodeNative(encodedData);
ByteBuffer.wrap(output).order(ByteOrder.LITTLE_ENDIAN).asShortBuffer().put(decodedData);
outputStream.write(output);
}
testPassed = true;
}
opus.closeNative();
outputFile.delete();
} catch (IOException exc) {
log.error("IOException: " + exc.getMessage());
fail("Opus test file access error");
}
assertTrue(testPassed);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public Frame read(long timestamp) {
try {
if (queue.size() == 0) {
this.ready = false;
return null;
}
//extract packet
Frame frame = queue.remove(0);
//buffer empty now? - change ready flag.
if (queue.size() == 0) {
this.ready = false;
//arrivalDeadLine = 0;
//set it as 1 ms since otherwise will be dropped by pipe
frame.setDuration(1);
}
arrivalDeadLine = rtpClock.convertToRtpTime(frame.getTimestamp() + frame.getDuration());
//convert duration to nanoseconds
frame.setDuration(frame.getDuration() * 1000000L);
frame.setTimestamp(frame.getTimestamp() * 1000000L);
return frame;
} finally {
LOCK.unlock();
}
}
#location 21
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public Frame read(long timestamp) {
try {
LOCK.lock();
if (queue.size() == 0) {
this.ready = false;
return null;
}
//extract packet
Frame frame = queue.remove(0);
//buffer empty now? - change ready flag.
if (queue.size() == 0) {
this.ready = false;
//arrivalDeadLine = 0;
//set it as 1 ms since otherwise will be dropped by pipe
frame.setDuration(1);
}
arrivalDeadLine = rtpClock.convertToRtpTime(frame.getTimestamp() + frame.getDuration());
//convert duration to nanoseconds
frame.setDuration(frame.getDuration() * 1000000L);
frame.setTimestamp(frame.getTimestamp() * 1000000L);
return frame;
} finally {
LOCK.unlock();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void stop() {
while (buffer.size() > 0) {
buffer.poll().recycle();
}
super.stop();
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public void stop() {
while (buffer.size() > 0) {
Frame frame = buffer.poll();
if(frame != null) {
frame.recycle();
}
}
super.stop();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
LOCK.lock();
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
LOCK.unlock();
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
}
#location 46
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
try {
LOCK.lock();
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
} finally {
LOCK.unlock();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
LOCK.lock();
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
LOCK.unlock();
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
}
#location 30
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
try {
LOCK.lock();
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
} finally {
LOCK.unlock();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
LOCK.lock();
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
LOCK.unlock();
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
}
#location 14
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
try {
LOCK.lock();
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
} finally {
LOCK.unlock();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
LOCK.lock();
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
LOCK.unlock();
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
}
#location 41
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
try {
LOCK.lock();
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
} finally {
LOCK.unlock();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
LOCK.lock();
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
LOCK.unlock();
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
}
#location 111
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void write(RtpPacket packet, RTPFormat format) {
try {
LOCK.lock();
// checking format
if (format == null) {
logger.warn("No format specified. Packet dropped!");
return;
}
if (this.format == null || this.format.getID() != format.getID()) {
this.format = format;
logger.info("Format has been changed: " + this.format.toString());
}
// if this is first packet then synchronize clock
if (isn == -1) {
rtpClock.synchronize(packet.getTimestamp());
isn = packet.getSeqNumber();
initJitter(packet);
} else {
estimateJitter(packet);
}
// update clock rate
rtpClock.setClockRate(this.format.getClockRate());
// drop outstanding packets
// packet is outstanding if its timestamp of arrived packet is less
// then consumer media time
if (packet.getTimestamp() < this.arrivalDeadLine) {
logger.warn("drop packet: dead line=" + arrivalDeadLine + ", packet time=" + packet.getTimestamp() + ", seq=" + packet.getSeqNumber() + ", payload length=" + packet.getPayloadLength() + ", format=" + this.format.toString());
dropCount++;
// checking if not dropping too much
droppedInRaw++;
if (droppedInRaw == QUEUE_SIZE / 2 || queue.size() == 0) {
arrivalDeadLine = 0;
} else {
return;
}
}
Frame f = Memory.allocate(packet.getPayloadLength());
// put packet into buffer irrespective of its sequence number
f.setHeader(null);
f.setSequenceNumber(packet.getSeqNumber());
// here time is in milliseconds
f.setTimestamp(rtpClock.convertToAbsoluteTime(packet.getTimestamp()));
f.setOffset(0);
f.setLength(packet.getPayloadLength());
packet.getPayload(f.getData(), 0);
// set format
f.setFormat(this.format.getFormat());
// make checks only if have packet
if (f != null) {
droppedInRaw = 0;
// find correct position to insert a packet
// use timestamp since its always positive
int currIndex = queue.size() - 1;
while (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getTimestamp() > f.getTimestamp()) {
currIndex--;
}
// check for duplicate packet
if (currIndex >= 0 && queue.get(currIndex).getSequenceNumber() == f.getSequenceNumber()) {
LOCK.unlock();
return;
}
queue.add(currIndex + 1, f);
// recalculate duration of each frame in queue and overall duration
// since we could insert the frame in the middle of the queue
duration = 0;
if (queue.size() > 1) {
duration = queue.get(queue.size() - 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(0).getTimestamp();
}
for (int i = 0; i < queue.size() - 1; i++) {
// duration measured by wall clock
long d = queue.get(i + 1).getTimestamp() - queue.get(i).getTimestamp();
// in case of RFC2833 event timestamp remains same
queue.get(i).setDuration(d > 0 ? d : 0);
}
// if overall duration is negative we have some mess here,try to
// reset
if (duration < 0 && queue.size() > 1) {
logger.warn("Something messy happened. Reseting jitter buffer!");
reset();
return;
}
// overflow?
// only now remove packet if overflow , possibly the same packet we just received
if (queue.size() > QUEUE_SIZE) {
logger.warn("Buffer overflow!");
dropCount++;
queue.remove(0).recycle();
}
// check if this buffer already full
if (!ready) {
ready = !useBuffer || (duration >= jitterBufferSize && queue.size() > 1);
if (ready && listener != null) {
listener.onFill();
}
}
}
} finally {
LOCK.unlock();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public int count() {
return this.count;
}
#location 2
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public int count() {
return this.count;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private byte[] processRequest(StunRequest request, InetSocketAddress localPeer, InetSocketAddress remotePeer) throws IOException {
/*
* The agent MUST use a short-term credential to authenticate the
* request and perform a message integrity check.
*/
// Produce Binding Response
TransportAddress transportAddress = new TransportAddress(remotePeer.getAddress(), remotePeer.getPort(), TransportProtocol.UDP);
StunResponse response = StunMessageFactory.createBindingResponse(request, transportAddress);
byte[] transactionID = request.getTransactionId();
try {
response.setTransactionID(transactionID);
} catch (StunException e) {
throw new IOException("Illegal STUN Transaction ID: " + new String(transactionID), e);
}
UsernameAttribute remoteUnameAttribute;
String remoteUsername;
// Send binding error response if username is null
try {
remoteUnameAttribute = (UsernameAttribute) request.getAttribute(StunAttribute.USERNAME);
remoteUsername = new String(remoteUnameAttribute.getUsername());
}
catch(NullPointerException nullPointer) {
response.setMessageType(StunMessage.BINDING_ERROR_RESPONSE);
response.addAttribute(StunAttributeFactory.createErrorCodeAttribute(ErrorCodeAttribute.BAD_REQUEST,
ErrorCodeAttribute.getDefaultReasonPhrase(ErrorCodeAttribute.BAD_REQUEST)));
return response.encode();
}
/*
* The agent MUST consider the username to be valid if it consists of
* two values separated by a colon, where the first value is equal to
* the username fragment generated by the agent in an offer or answer
* for a session in-progress.
*/
if(!this.iceAuthenticator.validateUsername(remoteUsername)) {
// TODO return error response
throw new IOException("Invalid username "+ remoteUsername);
}
/*
* The username for the credential is formed by concatenating the
* username fragment provided by the peer with the username fragment of
* the agent sending the request, separated by a colon (":").
*/
int colon = remoteUsername.indexOf(":");
String localUFrag = remoteUsername.substring(0, colon);
String remoteUfrag = remoteUsername.substring(colon);
/*
* An agent MUST include the PRIORITY attribute in its Binding request.
* This priority value will be computed identically to how the priority
* for the local candidate of the pair was computed, except that the
* type preference is set to the value for peer reflexive candidate
* types
*/
long priority = extractPriority(request);
/*
* Add USERNAME and MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute in the response. The
* responses utilize the same usernames and passwords as the requests
*/
String localUsername = remoteUfrag.concat(":").concat(localUFrag);
StunAttribute unameAttribute = StunAttributeFactory.createUsernameAttribute(localUsername);
response.addAttribute(unameAttribute);
byte[] localKey = this.iceAuthenticator.getLocalKey(localUFrag);
MessageIntegrityAttribute messageIntegrityAttribute = StunAttributeFactory.createMessageIntegrityAttribute(remoteUsername, localKey);
response.addAttribute(messageIntegrityAttribute);
// If the client issues a USE-CANDIDATE, tell ICE Agent to select the candidate
if (request.containsAttribute(StunAttribute.USE_CANDIDATE)) {
fireStunBindingEvent(localPeer, remotePeer);
}
// Pass response to the server
return response.encode();
}
#location 22
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private byte[] processRequest(StunRequest request, InetSocketAddress localPeer, InetSocketAddress remotePeer) throws IOException {
/*
* The agent MUST use a short-term credential to authenticate the
* request and perform a message integrity check.
*/
// Produce Binding Response
TransportAddress transportAddress = new TransportAddress(remotePeer.getAddress(), remotePeer.getPort(), TransportProtocol.UDP);
StunResponse response = StunMessageFactory.createBindingResponse(request, transportAddress);
byte[] transactionID = request.getTransactionId();
try {
response.setTransactionID(transactionID);
} catch (StunException e) {
throw new IOException("Illegal STUN Transaction ID: " + new String(transactionID), e);
}
UsernameAttribute remoteUnameAttribute = (UsernameAttribute) request.getAttribute(StunAttribute.USERNAME);
// Send binding error response if username is null
if (remoteUnameAttribute.getUsername()== null) {
response.setMessageType(StunMessage.BINDING_ERROR_RESPONSE);
response.addAttribute(StunAttributeFactory.createErrorCodeAttribute(ErrorCodeAttribute.BAD_REQUEST,
ErrorCodeAttribute.getDefaultReasonPhrase(ErrorCodeAttribute.BAD_REQUEST)));
return response.encode();
}
String remoteUsername = new String(remoteUnameAttribute.getUsername());
/*
* The agent MUST consider the username to be valid if it consists of
* two values separated by a colon, where the first value is equal to
* the username fragment generated by the agent in an offer or answer
* for a session in-progress.
*/
if(!this.iceAuthenticator.validateUsername(remoteUsername)) {
// TODO return error response
throw new IOException("Invalid username "+ remoteUsername);
}
/*
* The username for the credential is formed by concatenating the
* username fragment provided by the peer with the username fragment of
* the agent sending the request, separated by a colon (":").
*/
int colon = remoteUsername.indexOf(":");
String localUFrag = remoteUsername.substring(0, colon);
String remoteUfrag = remoteUsername.substring(colon);
/*
* An agent MUST include the PRIORITY attribute in its Binding request.
* This priority value will be computed identically to how the priority
* for the local candidate of the pair was computed, except that the
* type preference is set to the value for peer reflexive candidate
* types
*/
long priority = extractPriority(request);
/*
* Add USERNAME and MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute in the response. The
* responses utilize the same usernames and passwords as the requests
*/
String localUsername = remoteUfrag.concat(":").concat(localUFrag);
StunAttribute unameAttribute = StunAttributeFactory.createUsernameAttribute(localUsername);
response.addAttribute(unameAttribute);
byte[] localKey = this.iceAuthenticator.getLocalKey(localUFrag);
MessageIntegrityAttribute messageIntegrityAttribute = StunAttributeFactory.createMessageIntegrityAttribute(remoteUsername, localKey);
response.addAttribute(messageIntegrityAttribute);
// If the client issues a USE-CANDIDATE, tell ICE Agent to select the candidate
if (request.containsAttribute(StunAttribute.USE_CANDIDATE)) {
fireStunBindingEvent(localPeer, remotePeer);
}
// Pass response to the server
return response.encode();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void train(String dataFile, int maxite, float c) throws IOException {
fp = File.createTempFile("train-features", null, new File("./tmp/"));
buildInstanceList(dataFile);
LabelAlphabet postagAlphabet = factory.buildLabelAlphabet("postag");
IFeatureAlphabet features = factory.DefaultFeatureAlphabet();
SFGenerator generator = new SFGenerator();
Linear[] models = new Linear[postagAlphabet.size()];
int fsize = features.size();
for (int i = 0; i < postagAlphabet.size(); i++) {
String pos = postagAlphabet.lookupString(i);
InstanceSet instset = readInstanceSet(pos);
LabelAlphabet alphabet = factory.buildLabelAlphabet(pos);
int ysize = alphabet.size();
System.out.printf("Training with data: %s\n", pos);
System.out.printf("Number of labels: %d\n", ysize);
LinearMax solver = new LinearMax(generator, ysize);
ZeroOneLoss loss = new ZeroOneLoss();
Update update = new LinearMaxPAUpdate(loss);
OnlineTrainer trainer = new OnlineTrainer(solver, update, loss,
fsize, maxite, c);
models[i] = trainer.train(instset, null);
instset = null;
solver = null;
loss = null;
trainer = null;
System.out.println();
}
factory.setStopIncrement(true);
saveModels(modelfile, models,factory);
fp.delete();
fp = null;
}
#location 13
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public void train(String dataFile, int maxite, float c) throws IOException {
fp = File.createTempFile("train-features", null, new File("./tmp/"));
buildInstanceList(dataFile);
LabelAlphabet postagAlphabet = factory.buildLabelAlphabet("postag");
SFGenerator generator = new SFGenerator();
Linear[] models = new Linear[postagAlphabet.size()];
for (int i = 0; i < postagAlphabet.size(); i++) {
String pos = postagAlphabet.lookupString(i);
InstanceSet instset = readInstanceSet(pos);
LabelAlphabet alphabet = factory.buildLabelAlphabet(pos);
int ysize = alphabet.size();
System.out.printf("Training with data: %s\n", pos);
System.out.printf("Number of labels: %d\n", ysize);
LinearMax solver = new LinearMax(generator, ysize);
ZeroOneLoss loss = new ZeroOneLoss();
Update update = new LinearMaxPAUpdate(loss);
OnlineTrainer trainer = new OnlineTrainer(solver, update, loss,
factory, maxite, c);
models[i] = trainer.train(instset, null);
instset = null;
solver = null;
loss = null;
trainer = null;
System.out.println();
}
factory.setStopIncrement(true);
saveModels(modelfile, models,factory);
fp.delete();
fp = null;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public static void main(String[] args)
{
try
{
String ls_1;
Process process =null;
File handle = new File("./tmpdata/ctb/data3");
BufferedWriter bout = new BufferedWriter(new OutputStreamWriter(
new FileOutputStream("./tmpdata/malt.train"), "UTF-8"));
for (File sub : Arrays.asList(handle.listFiles())){
String str = sub.getAbsolutePath();
process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("cmd /c java -jar ./tmpdata/ctb/Penn2Malt.jar "+str+" ./tmpdata/ctb/headrules.txt 3 2 chtb");
BufferedReader bufferedReader = new BufferedReader(
new InputStreamReader(process.getInputStream()));
while ( (ls_1=bufferedReader.readLine()) != null)
{
System.out.println(ls_1);
}
}
}
catch(IOException e)
{
System.err.println(e);
}
}
#location 21
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public static void main(String[] args)
{
try
{
String ls_1;
Process process =null;
// File handle = new File("../tmp/ctb_v1/data");
File handle = new File("../tmp/ctb_v6/data/bracketed");
BufferedWriter bout = new BufferedWriter(new OutputStreamWriter(
new FileOutputStream("../tmp/malt.train"), "UTF-8"));
for (File sub : Arrays.asList(handle.listFiles())){
String file = sub.getAbsolutePath();
if(!file.endsWith(".fid"))
continue;
clean(file);
process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("cmd /c java -jar ../tmp/Penn2Malt.jar "+file+" ../tmp/headrules.txt 3 2 chtb");
BufferedReader bufferedReader = new BufferedReader(
new InputStreamReader(process.getInputStream()));
while ( (ls_1=bufferedReader.readLine()) != null)
{
System.out.println(ls_1);
}
bufferedReader = new BufferedReader(
new InputStreamReader(process.getErrorStream()));
while ( (ls_1=bufferedReader.readLine()) != null)
{
System.out.println(ls_1);
}
}
}
catch(IOException e)
{
System.err.println(e);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private InstanceSet buildInstanceList(String file) throws IOException {
System.out.print("生成训练数据 ...");
FNLPReader reader = new FNLPReader(file);
InstanceSet instset = new InstanceSet();
LabelAlphabet la = factory.DefaultLabelAlphabet();
int count = 0;
while (reader.hasNext()) {
Sentence sent = (Sentence) reader.next();
// int[] heads = (int[]) instance.getTarget();
String depClass = null;
Target targets = (Target)sent.getTarget();
JointParsingState state = new JointParsingState(sent);
while (!state.isFinalState()) {
// 左右焦点词在句子中的位置
int[] lr = state.getFocusIndices();
ArrayList<String> features = state.getFeatures();
JointParsingState.Action action = getAction(lr[0], lr[1],
targets);
switch (action) {
case LEFT:
depClass = targets.getDepClass(lr[1]);
break;
case RIGHT:
depClass = targets.getDepClass(lr[0]);
break;
default:
}
state.next(action,depClass);
if (action == JointParsingState.Action.LEFT)
targets.setHeads(lr[1],-1);
if (action == JointParsingState.Action.RIGHT)
targets.setHeads(lr[0],-1);
String label = "";
switch (action) {
case LEFT:
label += "L"+sent.getDepClass(lr[1]);
break;
case RIGHT:
label+="R"+sent.getDepClass(lr[0]);
break;
default:
label = "S";
}
int id = la.lookupIndex(label);
Instance inst = new Instance();
inst.setTarget(id);
inst.setData(features);
instset.add(inst);
}
count++;
// System.out.println(count);
}
la.setStopIncrement(true);
//重新生成特征
int ysize = la.size();
IFeatureAlphabet fa = factory.DefaultFeatureAlphabet();
for(Instance inst:instset){
ArrayList<String> data = (ArrayList<String>) inst.getData();
int[] idx = JointParser.addFeature(fa, data, ysize);
inst.setData(idx);
}
instset.setAlphabetFactory(factory);
System.out.printf("共生成实例:%d个\n", count);
return instset;
}
#location 14
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private InstanceSet buildInstanceList(String file) throws IOException {
System.out.print("生成训练数据 ...");
FNLPReader reader = new FNLPReader(file);
FNLPReader preReader = new FNLPReader(file);
InstanceSet instset = new InstanceSet();
LabelAlphabet la = factory.DefaultLabelAlphabet();
IFeatureAlphabet fa = factory.DefaultFeatureAlphabet();
int count = 0;
//preReader为了把ysize定下来
la.lookupIndex("S");
while(preReader.hasNext()){
Sentence sent = (Sentence) preReader.next();
Target targets = (Target)sent.getTarget();
for(int i=0; i<sent.length(); i++){
String label;
if(targets.getHead(i) != -1){
if(targets.getHead(i) < i){
label = "L" + targets.getDepClass(i);
}
//else if(targets.getHead(i) > i){
else{
label = "R" + targets.getDepClass(i);
}
la.lookupIndex(label);
}
}
}
int ysize = la.size();
la.setStopIncrement(true);
while (reader.hasNext()) {
Sentence sent = (Sentence) reader.next();
// int[] heads = (int[]) instance.getTarget();
String depClass = null;
Target targets = (Target)sent.getTarget();
JointParsingState state = new JointParsingState(sent);
while (!state.isFinalState()) {
// 左右焦点词在句子中的位置
int[] lr = state.getFocusIndices();
ArrayList<String> features = state.getFeatures();
JointParsingState.Action action = getAction(lr[0], lr[1],
targets);
switch (action) {
case LEFT:
depClass = targets.getDepClass(lr[1]);
break;
case RIGHT:
depClass = targets.getDepClass(lr[0]);
break;
default:
}
state.next(action,depClass);
if (action == JointParsingState.Action.LEFT)
targets.setHeads(lr[1],-1);
if (action == JointParsingState.Action.RIGHT)
targets.setHeads(lr[0],-1);
String label = "";
switch (action) {
case LEFT:
label += "L"+sent.getDepClass(lr[1]);
break;
case RIGHT:
label+="R"+sent.getDepClass(lr[0]);
break;
default:
label = "S";
}
int id = la.lookupIndex(label);
Instance inst = new Instance();
inst.setTarget(id);
int[] idx = JointParser.addFeature(fa, features, ysize);
inst.setData(idx);
instset.add(inst);
}
count++;
// System.out.println(count);
}
instset.setAlphabetFactory(factory);
System.out.printf("共生成实例:%d个\n", count);
return instset;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public static void main(String[] args)
{
try
{
String ls_1;
Process process =null;
File handle = new File("./tmpdata/ctb/data3");
BufferedWriter bout = new BufferedWriter(new OutputStreamWriter(
new FileOutputStream("./tmpdata/malt.train"), "UTF-8"));
for (File sub : Arrays.asList(handle.listFiles())){
String str = sub.getAbsolutePath();
process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("cmd /c java -jar ./tmpdata/ctb/Penn2Malt.jar "+str+" ./tmpdata/ctb/headrules.txt 3 2 chtb");
BufferedReader bufferedReader = new BufferedReader(
new InputStreamReader(process.getInputStream()));
while ( (ls_1=bufferedReader.readLine()) != null)
{
System.out.println(ls_1);
}
}
}
catch(IOException e)
{
System.err.println(e);
}
}
#location 14
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public static void main(String[] args)
{
try
{
String ls_1;
Process process =null;
// File handle = new File("../tmp/ctb_v1/data");
File handle = new File("../tmp/ctb_v6/data/bracketed");
BufferedWriter bout = new BufferedWriter(new OutputStreamWriter(
new FileOutputStream("../tmp/malt.train"), "UTF-8"));
for (File sub : Arrays.asList(handle.listFiles())){
String file = sub.getAbsolutePath();
if(!file.endsWith(".fid"))
continue;
clean(file);
process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("cmd /c java -jar ../tmp/Penn2Malt.jar "+file+" ../tmp/headrules.txt 3 2 chtb");
BufferedReader bufferedReader = new BufferedReader(
new InputStreamReader(process.getInputStream()));
while ( (ls_1=bufferedReader.readLine()) != null)
{
System.out.println(ls_1);
}
bufferedReader = new BufferedReader(
new InputStreamReader(process.getErrorStream()));
while ( (ls_1=bufferedReader.readLine()) != null)
{
System.out.println(ls_1);
}
}
}
catch(IOException e)
{
System.err.println(e);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void train(String dataFile, int maxite, float c) throws IOException {
InstanceSet instset = buildInstanceList(dataFile);
IFeatureAlphabet features = factory.DefaultFeatureAlphabet();
SFGenerator generator = new SFGenerator();
int fsize = features.size();
LabelAlphabet la = factory.DefaultLabelAlphabet();
int ysize = la.size();
System.out.printf("开始训练");
LinearMax solver = new LinearMax(generator, ysize);
ZeroOneLoss loss = new ZeroOneLoss();
Update update = new LinearMaxPAUpdate(loss);
OnlineTrainer trainer = new OnlineTrainer(solver, update, loss,
fsize, maxite, c);
Linear models = trainer.train(instset, null);
instset = null;
solver = null;
loss = null;
trainer = null;
System.out.println();
factory.setStopIncrement(true);
models.saveTo(modelfile);
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public void train(String dataFile, int maxite, float c) throws IOException {
InstanceSet instset = buildInstanceList(dataFile);
SFGenerator generator = new SFGenerator();
LabelAlphabet la = factory.DefaultLabelAlphabet();
int ysize = la.size();
System.out.printf("开始训练");
LinearMax solver = new LinearMax(generator, ysize);
ZeroOneLoss loss = new ZeroOneLoss();
Update update = new LinearMaxPAUpdate(loss);
OnlineTrainer trainer = new OnlineTrainer(solver, update, loss,
factory, maxite, c);
Linear models = trainer.train(instset, null);
instset = null;
solver = null;
loss = null;
trainer = null;
System.out.println();
factory.setStopIncrement(true);
models.saveTo(modelfile);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testStartNewSpanSampleNullNotPartOfExistingSpan() {
final ServerSpan mockServerSpan = mock(ServerSpan.class);
when(mockServerSpan.getSpan()).thenReturn(null);
when(mockState.sample()).thenReturn(null);
when(mockState.getCurrentServerSpan()).thenReturn(mockServerSpan);
when(mockRandom.nextLong()).thenReturn(1l).thenReturn(2l);
final SpanId newSpanId = clientTracer.startNewSpan(REQUEST_NAME);
assertNotNull(newSpanId);
assertEquals(1l, newSpanId.getTraceId());
assertEquals(1l, newSpanId.getSpanId());
assertNull(newSpanId.getParentSpanId());
final Span expectedSpan = new Span();
expectedSpan.setTrace_id(1);
expectedSpan.setId(1);
expectedSpan.setName(REQUEST_NAME);
verify(mockState).sample();
verify(mockTraceFilter).trace(REQUEST_NAME);
verify(mockTraceFilter2).trace(REQUEST_NAME);
verify(mockRandom, times(1)).nextLong();
verify(mockState).getCurrentServerSpan();
verify(mockState).setCurrentClientSpan(expectedSpan);
verifyNoMoreInteractions(mockState, mockRandom, mockCollector, mockTraceFilter, mockTraceFilter2);
}
#location 12
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testStartNewSpanSampleNullNotPartOfExistingSpan() {
final ServerSpan mockServerSpan = mock(ServerSpan.class);
when(mockServerSpan.getSpan()).thenReturn(null);
when(mockState.sample()).thenReturn(null);
when(mockState.getCurrentServerSpan()).thenReturn(mockServerSpan);
when(mockRandom.nextLong()).thenReturn(TRACE_ID).thenReturn(2l);
final SpanId newSpanId = clientTracer.startNewSpan(REQUEST_NAME);
assertNotNull(newSpanId);
assertEquals(TRACE_ID, newSpanId.getTraceId());
assertEquals(TRACE_ID, newSpanId.getSpanId());
assertNull(newSpanId.getParentSpanId());
final Span expectedSpan = new Span();
expectedSpan.setTrace_id(TRACE_ID);
expectedSpan.setId(TRACE_ID);
expectedSpan.setName(REQUEST_NAME);
verify(mockState).sample();
verify(mockTraceFilter).trace(TRACE_ID, REQUEST_NAME);
verify(mockTraceFilter2).trace(TRACE_ID, REQUEST_NAME);
verify(mockRandom, times(1)).nextLong();
verify(mockState).getCurrentServerSpan();
verify(mockState).setCurrentClientSpan(expectedSpan);
verifyNoMoreInteractions(mockState, mockRandom, mockCollector, mockTraceFilter, mockTraceFilter2);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void finishSpan() {
Span finished = new Span().setTimestamp(1000L); // set in start span
finished.startTick = 500000L; // set in start span
state.setCurrentLocalSpan(finished);
PowerMockito.when(System.nanoTime()).thenReturn(1000000L);
localTracer.finishSpan();
verify(mockCollector).collect(finished);
verifyNoMoreInteractions(mockCollector);
assertEquals(500L, finished.getDuration().longValue());
}
#location 14
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void finishSpan() {
Span finished = new Span().setName("foo").setTimestamp(1000L); // set in start span
finished.startTick = 500000L; // set in start span
state.setCurrentLocalSpan(finished);
PowerMockito.when(System.nanoTime()).thenReturn(1000000L);
localTracer.finishSpan();
verify(mockReporter).report(finished.toZipkin());
verifyNoMoreInteractions(mockReporter);
assertEquals(500L, finished.getDuration().longValue());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public T call() throws Exception {
serverSpanThreadBinder().setCurrentSpan(currentServerSpan());
final long start = System.currentTimeMillis();
try {
return wrappedCallable().call();
} finally {
final long duration = System.currentTimeMillis() - start;
currentServerSpan().incThreadDuration(duration);
}
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public T call() throws Exception {
serverSpanThreadBinder().setCurrentSpan(currentServerSpan());
return wrappedCallable().call();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private void recordClientSentAnnotations(Endpoint serverAddress) {
if (serverAddress == null) {
clientTracer.setClientSent();
} else {
clientTracer.setClientSent(serverAddress.ipv4, serverAddress.port, serverAddress.service_name);
}
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private void recordClientSentAnnotations(Endpoint serverAddress) {
if (serverAddress == null) {
clientTracer.setClientSent();
} else {
clientTracer.setClientSent(serverAddress);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void finishSpan_userSuppliedTimestamp() {
Span finished = new Span().setTimestamp(1000L); // Set by user
state.setCurrentLocalSpan(finished);
PowerMockito.when(System.currentTimeMillis()).thenReturn(2L);
localTracer.finishSpan();
verify(mockCollector).collect(finished);
verifyNoMoreInteractions(mockCollector);
assertEquals(1000L, finished.getDuration().longValue());
}
#location 13
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void finishSpan_userSuppliedTimestamp() {
Span finished = new Span().setName("foo").setTimestamp(1000L); // Set by user
state.setCurrentLocalSpan(finished);
PowerMockito.when(System.currentTimeMillis()).thenReturn(2L);
localTracer.finishSpan();
verify(mockReporter).report(finished.toZipkin());
verifyNoMoreInteractions(mockReporter);
assertEquals(1000L, finished.getDuration().longValue());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void finishSpan_userSuppliedTimestampAndDuration() {
Span finished = new Span().setTimestamp(1000L); // Set by user
state.setCurrentLocalSpan(finished);
localTracer.finishSpan(500L);
verify(mockCollector).collect(finished);
verifyNoMoreInteractions(mockCollector);
assertEquals(500L, finished.getDuration().longValue());
}
#location 11
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void finishSpan_userSuppliedTimestampAndDuration() {
Span finished = new Span().setName("foo").setTimestamp(1000L); // Set by user
state.setCurrentLocalSpan(finished);
localTracer.finishSpan(500L);
verify(mockReporter).report(finished.toZipkin());
verifyNoMoreInteractions(mockReporter);
assertEquals(500L, finished.getDuration().longValue());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void finishSpan_lessThanMicrosRoundUp() {
Span finished = new Span().setTimestamp(1000L); // set in start span
finished.startTick = 500L; // set in start span
state.setCurrentLocalSpan(finished);
PowerMockito.when(System.nanoTime()).thenReturn(1000L);
localTracer.finishSpan();
verify(mockCollector).collect(finished);
verifyNoMoreInteractions(mockCollector);
assertEquals(1L, finished.getDuration().longValue());
}
#location 14
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void finishSpan_lessThanMicrosRoundUp() {
Span finished = new Span().setName("foo").setTimestamp(1000L); // set in start span
finished.startTick = 500L; // set in start span
state.setCurrentLocalSpan(finished);
PowerMockito.when(System.nanoTime()).thenReturn(1000L);
localTracer.finishSpan();
verify(mockReporter).report(finished.toZipkin());
verifyNoMoreInteractions(mockReporter);
assertEquals(1L, finished.getDuration().longValue());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void finishSpan_userSuppliedDuration() {
Span finished = new Span().setTimestamp(1000L); // set in start span
finished.startTick = 500L; // set in start span
state.setCurrentLocalSpan(finished);
localTracer.finishSpan(500L);
verify(mockCollector).collect(finished);
verifyNoMoreInteractions(mockCollector);
assertEquals(500L, finished.getDuration().longValue());
}
#location 12
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void finishSpan_userSuppliedDuration() {
Span finished = new Span().setName("foo").setTimestamp(1000L); // set in start span
finished.startTick = 500L; // set in start span
state.setCurrentLocalSpan(finished);
localTracer.finishSpan(500L);
verify(mockReporter).report(finished.toZipkin());
verifyNoMoreInteractions(mockReporter);
assertEquals(500L, finished.getDuration().longValue());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void run() {
serverSpanThreadBinder().setCurrentSpan(currentServerSpan());
final long start = System.currentTimeMillis();
try {
wrappedRunnable().run();
} finally {
final long duration = System.currentTimeMillis() - start;
currentServerSpan().incThreadDuration(duration);
}
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public void run() {
serverSpanThreadBinder().setCurrentSpan(currentServerSpan());
wrappedRunnable().run();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
protected boolean checkQuiesceLock() {
final String methodName = "checkQuiesceLock";
// if (quiescing && actualInFlight == 0 && pendingFlows.size() == 0 &&
// inFlightPubRels == 0 && callback.isQuiesced()) {
int tokC = tokenStore.count();
if (quiescing && tokC == 0 && pendingFlows.size() == 0 && callback.isQuiesced()) {
// @TRACE 626=quiescing={0} actualInFlight={1} pendingFlows={2}
// inFlightPubRels={3} callbackQuiesce={4} tokens={5}
log.fine(CLASS_NAME, methodName, "626",
new Object[] { new Boolean(quiescing), Integer.valueOf(actualInFlight),
Integer.valueOf(pendingFlows.size()), Integer.valueOf(inFlightPubRels),
Boolean.valueOf(callback.isQuiesced()), Integer.valueOf(tokC) });
synchronized (quiesceLock) {
quiesceLock.notifyAll();
}
return true;
}
return false;
}
#location 10
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
protected boolean checkQuiesceLock() {
final String methodName = "checkQuiesceLock";
// if (quiescing && actualInFlight == 0 && pendingFlows.size() == 0 &&
// inFlightPubRels == 0 && callback.isQuiesced()) {
int tokC = tokenStore.count();
if (quiescing && tokC == 0 && pendingFlows.size() == 0 && callback.isQuiesced()) {
// @TRACE 626=quiescing={0} actualInFlight={1} pendingFlows={2}
// inFlightPubRels={3} callbackQuiesce={4} tokens={5}
log.fine(CLASS_NAME, methodName, "626",
new Object[] { Boolean.valueOf(quiescing), Integer.valueOf(actualInFlight),
Integer.valueOf(pendingFlows.size()), Integer.valueOf(inFlightPubRels),
Boolean.valueOf(callback.isQuiesced()), Integer.valueOf(tokC) });
synchronized (quiesceLock) {
quiesceLock.notifyAll();
}
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testGetStructure() {
try {
SimpleFormatter sf = new SimpleFormatter();
String delimiter = "/";
String bucket = "maven.kuali.org";
AmazonS3Client client = getClient();
KualiMavenBucketBaseCase baseCase1 = new KualiMavenBucketBaseCase();
baseCase1.setDelimiter(delimiter);
baseCase1.setToken("latest");
JavaxServletOnlyBaseCase baseCase2 = new JavaxServletOnlyBaseCase();
baseCase2.setDelimiter(delimiter);
baseCase2.setToken("latest");
long start = System.currentTimeMillis();
List<String> prefixes = new ArrayList<String>();
buildPrefixList(client, bucket, prefixes, null, delimiter, baseCase2);
long elapsed = System.currentTimeMillis() - start;
DefaultMutableTreeNode node = buildTree(prefixes, delimiter);
List<DefaultMutableTreeNode> leaves = getLeaves(node);
log.info("Total Prefixes: " + prefixes.size());
log.info("Total Time: " + sf.getTime(elapsed));
log.info("Leaves: " + leaves.size());
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
#location 20
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testGetStructure() {
try {
long now = System.currentTimeMillis();
long bytes = Long.MAX_VALUE;
SimpleFormatter sf = new SimpleFormatter();
log.info(sf.getSize(bytes));
log.info(sf.getRate(now, bytes));
log.info(sf.getTime(now));
String delimiter = "/";
String bucket = "maven.kuali.org";
AmazonS3Client client = getClient();
KualiMavenBucketBaseCase baseCase1 = new KualiMavenBucketBaseCase();
baseCase1.setDelimiter(delimiter);
baseCase1.setToken("latest");
JavaxServletOnlyBaseCase baseCase2 = new JavaxServletOnlyBaseCase();
baseCase2.setDelimiter(delimiter);
baseCase2.setToken("latest");
long start = System.currentTimeMillis();
List<String> prefixes = new ArrayList<String>();
buildPrefixList(client, bucket, prefixes, null, delimiter, baseCase2);
long elapsed = System.currentTimeMillis() - start;
DefaultMutableTreeNode node = buildTree(prefixes, delimiter);
List<DefaultMutableTreeNode> leaves = getLeaves(node);
log.info("Total Prefixes: " + prefixes.size());
log.info("Total Time: " + sf.getTime(elapsed));
log.info("Leaves: " + leaves.size());
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void transitionInto(RunState state) {
switch (state.state()) {
case SUBMITTING:
try {
final String executionId = dockerRunnerStart(state);
// this is racy
final Event submitted = Event.submitted(state.workflowInstance(), executionId);
try {
stateManager.receive(submitted);
} catch (StateManager.IsClosed isClosed) {
LOG.warn("Could not send 'created' event", isClosed);
}
} catch (Exception e) {
LOG.warn("Failed the docker starting procedure for " + state.workflowInstance().toKey(), e);
stateManager.receiveIgnoreClosed(Event.halt(state.workflowInstance()));
}
break;
case TERMINATED:
case FAILED:
case ERROR:
if (state.executionId().isPresent()) {
final String executionId = state.executionId().get();
LOG.info("Cleaning up {} pod: {}", state.workflowInstance().toKey(), executionId);
dockerRunner.cleanup(executionId);
}
break;
default:
// do nothing
}
}
#location 15
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public void transitionInto(RunState state) {
switch (state.state()) {
case SUBMITTING:
try {
final String executionId = dockerRunnerStart(state);
// this is racy
final Event submitted = Event.submitted(state.workflowInstance(), executionId);
try {
stateManager.receive(submitted);
} catch (StateManager.IsClosed isClosed) {
LOG.warn("Could not send 'created' event", isClosed);
}
} catch (ResourceNotFoundException e) {
LOG.error("Unable to start docker procedure.", e);
stateManager.receiveIgnoreClosed(Event.halt(state.workflowInstance()));
} catch (IOException e) {
try {
LOG.error("Failed the docker starting procedure for " + state.workflowInstance().toKey(), e);
stateManager.receive(Event.runError(state.workflowInstance(), e.getMessage()));
} catch (StateManager.IsClosed isClosed) {
LOG.warn("Failed to send 'runError' event", isClosed);
}
}
break;
case TERMINATED:
case FAILED:
case ERROR:
if (state.executionId().isPresent()) {
final String executionId = state.executionId().get();
LOG.info("Cleaning up {} pod: {}", state.workflowInstance().toKey(), executionId);
dockerRunner.cleanup(executionId);
}
break;
default:
// do nothing
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public Map<WorkflowInstance, RunState> activeStates() {
final ImmutableMap.Builder<WorkflowInstance, RunState> builder = ImmutableMap.builder();
states.entrySet().forEach(entry -> builder.put(entry.getKey(), entry.getValue().runState));
return builder.build();
}
#location 2
#vulnerability type CHECKERS_IMMUTABLE_CAST
|
#fixed code
@Override
public Map<WorkflowInstance, RunState> activeStates() {
return states.entrySet().stream()
.collect(Collectors.toMap(Map.Entry::getKey, (entry) -> entry.getValue().runState));
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
Map<WorkflowInstance, Long> readActiveWorkflowInstances() throws IOException {
final Table activeStatesTable = connection.getTable(ACTIVE_STATES_TABLE_NAME);
final ImmutableMap.Builder<WorkflowInstance, Long> map = ImmutableMap.builder();
for (Result result : activeStatesTable.getScanner(STATE_CF, STATE_QUALIFIER)) {
final WorkflowInstance workflowInstance =
WorkflowInstance.parseKey(Bytes.toString(result.getRow()));
final long counter = Long.parseLong(Bytes.toString(result.value()));
map.put(workflowInstance, counter);
}
return map.build();
}
#location 1
#vulnerability type CHECKERS_IMMUTABLE_CAST
|
#fixed code
BigtableStorage(Connection connection, Duration retryBaseDelay) {
this.connection = Objects.requireNonNull(connection);
this.retryBaseDelay = Objects.requireNonNull(retryBaseDelay);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private static KubernetesClient getKubernetesClient(Config config, String id) {
try {
final HttpTransport httpTransport = GoogleNetHttpTransport.newTrustedTransport();
final JsonFactory jsonFactory = Utils.getDefaultJsonFactory();
final GoogleCredential credential =
GoogleCredential.getApplicationDefault(httpTransport, jsonFactory)
.createScoped(ContainerScopes.all());
final Container gke = new Container.Builder(httpTransport, jsonFactory, credential)
.setApplicationName(SERVICE_NAME)
.build();
final String projectKey = GKE_CLUSTER_PREFIX + id + GKE_CLUSTER_PROJECT_ID;
final String zoneKey = GKE_CLUSTER_PREFIX + id + GKE_CLUSTER_ZONE;
final String clusterIdKey = GKE_CLUSTER_PREFIX + id + GKE_CLUSTER_ID;
final Cluster cluster = gke.projects().zones().clusters()
.get(config.getString(projectKey),
config.getString(zoneKey),
config.getString(clusterIdKey)).execute();
final io.fabric8.kubernetes.client.Config kubeConfig = new ConfigBuilder()
.withMasterUrl("https://" + cluster.getEndpoint())
.withCaCertData(cluster.getMasterAuth().getClusterCaCertificate())
.withClientCertData(cluster.getMasterAuth().getClientCertificate())
.withClientKeyData(cluster.getMasterAuth().getClientKey())
.build();
return new AutoAdaptableKubernetesClient(kubeConfig).inNamespace(KUBERNETES_NAMESPACE);
} catch (GeneralSecurityException | IOException e) {
throw Throwables.propagate(e);
}
}
#location 28
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
private static KubernetesClient getKubernetesClient(Config config, String id) {
try {
final HttpTransport httpTransport = GoogleNetHttpTransport.newTrustedTransport();
final JsonFactory jsonFactory = Utils.getDefaultJsonFactory();
final GoogleCredential credential =
GoogleCredential.getApplicationDefault(httpTransport, jsonFactory)
.createScoped(ContainerScopes.all());
final Container gke = new Container.Builder(httpTransport, jsonFactory, credential)
.setApplicationName(SERVICE_NAME)
.build();
final String projectKey = GKE_CLUSTER_PREFIX + id + GKE_CLUSTER_PROJECT_ID;
final String zoneKey = GKE_CLUSTER_PREFIX + id + GKE_CLUSTER_ZONE;
final String clusterIdKey = GKE_CLUSTER_PREFIX + id + GKE_CLUSTER_ID;
final Cluster cluster = gke.projects().zones().clusters()
.get(config.getString(projectKey),
config.getString(zoneKey),
config.getString(clusterIdKey)).execute();
final io.fabric8.kubernetes.client.Config kubeConfig = new ConfigBuilder()
.withMasterUrl("https://" + cluster.getEndpoint())
.withCaCertData(cluster.getMasterAuth().getClusterCaCertificate())
.withClientCertData(cluster.getMasterAuth().getClientCertificate())
.withClientKeyData(cluster.getMasterAuth().getClientKey())
.build();
return new DefaultKubernetesClient(kubeConfig);
} catch (GeneralSecurityException | IOException e) {
throw Throwables.propagate(e);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
List<Backfill> getBackfills() {
final EntityQuery query = Query.entityQueryBuilder().kind(KIND_BACKFILL).build();
final QueryResults<Entity> results = datastore.run(query);
final ImmutableList.Builder<Backfill> resources = ImmutableList.builder();
while (results.hasNext()) {
resources.add(entityToBackfill(results.next()));
}
return resources.build();
}
#location 1
#vulnerability type CHECKERS_IMMUTABLE_CAST
|
#fixed code
DatastoreStorage(Datastore datastore, Duration retryBaseDelay) {
this.datastore = Objects.requireNonNull(datastore);
this.retryBaseDelay = Objects.requireNonNull(retryBaseDelay);
this.componentKeyFactory = datastore.newKeyFactory().kind(KIND_COMPONENT);
this.globalConfigKey = datastore.newKeyFactory().kind(KIND_STYX_CONFIG).newKey(KEY_GLOBAL_CONFIG);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void transitionInto(RunState state) {
switch (state.state()) {
case SUBMITTING:
try {
final String executionId = dockerRunnerStart(state);
// this is racy
final Event submitted = Event.submitted(state.workflowInstance(), executionId);
try {
stateManager.receive(submitted);
} catch (StateManager.IsClosed isClosed) {
LOG.warn("Could not send 'created' event", isClosed);
}
} catch (ResourceNotFoundException e) {
LOG.error("Unable to start docker procedure.", e);
stateManager.receiveIgnoreClosed(Event.halt(state.workflowInstance()));
} catch (Throwable e) {
try {
LOG.error("Failed the docker starting procedure for " + state.workflowInstance().toKey(), e);
stateManager.receive(Event.runError(state.workflowInstance(), e.getMessage()));
} catch (StateManager.IsClosed isClosed) {
LOG.warn("Failed to send 'runError' event", isClosed);
}
}
break;
case TERMINATED:
case FAILED:
case ERROR:
if (state.data().executionId().isPresent()) {
final String executionId = state.data().executionId().get();
boolean debugEnabled = false;
try {
debugEnabled = storage.debugEnabled();
} catch (IOException e) {
LOG.info("Couldn't fetch debug flag. Will clean up pod anyway.");
}
if (!debugEnabled) {
LOG.info("Cleaning up {} pod: {}", state.workflowInstance().toKey(), executionId);
dockerRunner.cleanup(executionId);
} else {
LOG.info("Keeping {} pod: {}", state.workflowInstance().toKey(), executionId);
}
}
break;
default:
// do nothing
}
}
#location 19
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public void transitionInto(RunState state) {
switch (state.state()) {
case SUBMITTING:
// Perform rate limited submission on a separate thread pool to avoid blocking the caller.
executor.submit(() -> {
rateLimiter.acquire();
try {
final String executionId = dockerRunnerStart(state);
// this is racy
final Event submitted = Event.submitted(state.workflowInstance(), executionId);
try {
stateManager.receive(submitted);
} catch (StateManager.IsClosed isClosed) {
LOG.warn("Could not send 'created' event", isClosed);
}
} catch (ResourceNotFoundException e) {
LOG.error("Unable to start docker procedure.", e);
stateManager.receiveIgnoreClosed(Event.halt(state.workflowInstance()));
} catch (Throwable e) {
try {
LOG.error("Failed the docker starting procedure for " + state.workflowInstance().toKey(), e);
stateManager.receive(Event.runError(state.workflowInstance(), e.getMessage()));
} catch (StateManager.IsClosed isClosed) {
LOG.warn("Failed to send 'runError' event", isClosed);
}
}
});
break;
case TERMINATED:
case FAILED:
case ERROR:
if (state.data().executionId().isPresent()) {
final String executionId = state.data().executionId().get();
boolean debugEnabled = false;
try {
debugEnabled = storage.debugEnabled();
} catch (IOException e) {
LOG.info("Couldn't fetch debug flag. Will clean up pod anyway.");
}
if (!debugEnabled) {
LOG.info("Cleaning up {} pod: {}", state.workflowInstance().toKey(), executionId);
dockerRunner.cleanup(executionId);
} else {
LOG.info("Keeping {} pod: {}", state.workflowInstance().toKey(), executionId);
}
}
break;
default:
// do nothing
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
Map<WorkflowInstance, Long> allActiveStates() throws IOException {
final EntityQuery activeStatesQuery = Query.entityQueryBuilder()
.kind(KIND_ACTIVE_STATE)
.build();
final ImmutableMap.Builder<WorkflowInstance, Long> mapBuilder = ImmutableMap.builder();
final QueryResults<Entity> results = datastore.run(activeStatesQuery);
while (results.hasNext()) {
final Entity activeState = results.next();
final WorkflowInstance instance = parseWorkflowInstance(activeState);
final long counter = activeState.getLong(PROPERTY_ACTIVE_STATE_COUNTER);
mapBuilder.put(instance, counter);
}
return mapBuilder.build();
}
#location 1
#vulnerability type CHECKERS_IMMUTABLE_CAST
|
#fixed code
DatastoreStorage(Datastore datastore, Duration retryBaseDelay) {
this.datastore = Objects.requireNonNull(datastore);
this.retryBaseDelay = Objects.requireNonNull(retryBaseDelay);
this.componentKeyFactory = datastore.newKeyFactory().kind(KIND_COMPONENT);
this.globalConfigKey = datastore.newKeyFactory().kind(KIND_STYX_CONFIG).newKey(KEY_GLOBAL_CONFIG);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
protected void doRequest(ServletTransaction transaction)
throws ServletException {
try {
HttpServletRequest request = transaction.getServletRequest();
Client client = ClientCatalog
.getClient(request.getParameter("use"));
String report = request.getParameter("report");
String emails = request.getParameter("emails");
if (emails == null)
return;
HtmlEmail htmlEmail = client.getMailer().getHtmlEmail(emails, null);
StringWriter sw = new StringWriter();
PrintWriter pw = new PrintWriter(sw);
if ("statistics".equals(report)) {
htmlEmail.setSubject("OpenSearchServer statistics report");
doStatistics(client, request.getParameter("stat"), request
.getParameter("period"), pw);
}
htmlEmail.setHtmlMsg(sw.toString());
htmlEmail.send();
transaction.addXmlResponse("MailSent", emails);
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new ServletException(e);
}
}
#location 15
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@Override
protected void doRequest(ServletTransaction transaction)
throws ServletException {
try {
HttpServletRequest request = transaction.getServletRequest();
Client client = ClientCatalog
.getClient(request.getParameter("use"));
String report = request.getParameter("report");
String emails = request.getParameter("emails");
if (emails == null)
return;
HtmlEmail htmlEmail = client.getMailer().getHtmlEmail(emails, null);
StringWriter sw = new StringWriter();
PrintWriter pw = new PrintWriter(sw);
if ("statistics".equals(report)) {
htmlEmail.setSubject("OpenSearchServer statistics report");
doStatistics(client, request.getParameter("stat"), request
.getParameter("period"), pw);
}
pw.close();
sw.close();
String html = sw.toString();
if (html == null || html.length() == 0) {
transaction.addXmlResponse("Result", "Nothing to send");
} else {
htmlEmail.setHtmlMsg(sw.toString());
htmlEmail
.setTextMsg("Your email client does not support HTML messages");
htmlEmail.send();
}
transaction.addXmlResponse("MailSent", emails);
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new ServletException(e);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void deleteUrl(String sUrl) throws SearchLibException {
try {
client.deleteDocument(sUrl);
} catch (CorruptIndexException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (LockObtainFailedException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (URISyntaxException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (InstantiationException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (IllegalAccessException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
}
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void deleteUrl(String sUrl) throws SearchLibException {
try {
targetClient.deleteDocument(sUrl);
urlDbClient.deleteDocument(sUrl);
} catch (CorruptIndexException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (LockObtainFailedException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (URISyntaxException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (InstantiationException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (IllegalAccessException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
protected void reloadPage() {
fieldLeft = null;
selectedFacet = null;
super.reloadPage();
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Override
protected void reloadPage() {
synchronized (this) {
fieldLeft = null;
selectedFacet = null;
super.reloadPage();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
protected void reloadPage() {
highlightFieldLeft = null;
selectedHighlight = null;
super.reloadPage();
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Override
protected void reloadPage() {
synchronized (this) {
highlightFieldLeft = null;
selectedHighlight = null;
super.reloadPage();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void readExternal(ObjectInput in) throws IOException,
ClassNotFoundException {
super.readExternal(in);
fragmenter = External.readObject(in);
tag = External.readUTF(in);
maxDocChar = in.readInt();
separator = External.readUTF(in);
maxSnippetSize = in.readInt();
maxSnippetNumber = in.readInt();
int l = in.readInt();
if (l > 0) {
searchTerms = new String[l];
External.readArray(in, searchTerms);
} else
searchTerms = null;
}
#location 13
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void readExternal(ObjectInput in) throws IOException,
ClassNotFoundException {
super.readExternal(in);
fragmenter = External.readObject(in);
tag = External.readUTF(in);
maxDocChar = in.readInt();
separator = External.readUTF(in);
maxSnippetSize = in.readInt();
maxSnippetNumber = in.readInt();
searchTerms = External.readStringArray(in);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void onUpload() throws InterruptedException,
XPathExpressionException, NoSuchAlgorithmException,
ParserConfigurationException, SAXException, IOException,
URISyntaxException, SearchLibException, InstantiationException,
IllegalAccessException, ClassNotFoundException {
Media media = Fileupload.get();
if (media == null)
return;
setCurrentDocument(null);
ParserSelector parserSelector = getClient().getParserSelector();
Parser parser = null;
String contentType = media.getContentType();
if (contentType != null)
parser = parserSelector.getParserFromMimeType(contentType);
if (parser == null) {
String extension = FileUtils.getFileNameExtension(media.getName());
parser = parserSelector.getParserFromExtension(extension);
}
if (parser == null) {
Messagebox.show("No parser found for that document type ("
+ contentType + " - " + media.getName() + ')');
return;
}
BasketDocument basketDocument = parser.getBasketDocument();
setCurrentDocument(basketDocument);
basketDocument.addIfNoEmpty("filename", media.getName());
basketDocument.addIfNoEmpty("content_type", contentType);
synchronized (this) {
if (media.inMemory()) {
if (media.isBinary())
parser.parseContent(media.getByteData());
else
parser.parseContent(media.getStringData());
} else {
if (media.isBinary())
parser.parseContent(media.getStreamData());
else
parser.parseContent(media.getReaderData());
}
reloadPage();
}
}
#location 28
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void onUpload() throws InterruptedException,
XPathExpressionException, NoSuchAlgorithmException,
ParserConfigurationException, SAXException, IOException,
URISyntaxException, SearchLibException, InstantiationException,
IllegalAccessException, ClassNotFoundException {
Media media = Fileupload.get();
if (media == null)
return;
synchronized (this) {
setCurrentDocument(null);
ParserSelector parserSelector = getClient().getParserSelector();
Parser parser = null;
String contentType = media.getContentType();
if (contentType != null)
parser = parserSelector.getParserFromMimeType(contentType);
if (parser == null) {
String extension = FileUtils.getFileNameExtension(media
.getName());
parser = parserSelector.getParserFromExtension(extension);
}
if (parser == null) {
Messagebox.show("No parser found for that document type ("
+ contentType + " - " + media.getName() + ')');
return;
}
BasketDocument basketDocument = parser.getBasketDocument();
basketDocument.addIfNoEmpty("filename", media.getName());
basketDocument.addIfNoEmpty("content_type", contentType);
if (media.inMemory()) {
if (media.isBinary())
parser.parseContent(media.getByteData());
else
parser.parseContent(media.getStringData());
} else {
if (media.isBinary())
parser.parseContent(media.getStreamData());
else
parser.parseContent(media.getReaderData());
}
setCurrentDocument(basketDocument);
reloadPage();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
protected void reloadPage() {
fieldLeft = null;
selectedFacet = null;
super.reloadPage();
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Override
protected void reloadPage() {
synchronized (this) {
fieldLeft = null;
selectedFacet = null;
super.reloadPage();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
protected void doRequest(ServletTransaction transaction)
throws ServletException {
try {
Client client = Client.getWebAppInstance();
HttpServletRequest request = transaction.getServletRequest();
String indexName = request.getParameter("index");
String uniq = request.getParameter("uniq");
Object result = null;
if (uniq != null)
result = deleteDoc(client, indexName, uniq);
else
result = doObjectRequest(request, indexName);
PrintWriter pw = transaction.getWriter("UTF-8");
pw.println(result);
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new ServletException(e);
}
}
#location 11
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
protected void doRequest(ServletTransaction transaction)
throws ServletException {
try {
Client client = Client.getWebAppInstance();
HttpServletRequest request = transaction.getServletRequest();
String indexName = request.getParameter("index");
String uniq = request.getParameter("uniq");
String docId = request.getParameter("docId");
boolean byId = request.getParameter("byId") != null;
Object result = null;
if (uniq != null)
result = deleteUniqDoc(client, indexName, uniq);
else if (docId != null)
result = deleteDocById(client, indexName, Integer
.parseInt(docId));
else
result = doObjectRequest(request, indexName, byId);
PrintWriter pw = transaction.getWriter("UTF-8");
pw.println(result);
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new ServletException(e);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void reload(boolean optimize) throws IOException,
URISyntaxException, SearchLibException, InstantiationException,
IllegalAccessException, ClassNotFoundException {
if (optimize) {
client.reload(null);
client.getIndex().optimize(null);
}
client.reload(null);
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void reload(boolean optimize) throws IOException,
URISyntaxException, SearchLibException, InstantiationException,
IllegalAccessException, ClassNotFoundException {
if (optimize) {
urlDbClient.reload(null);
urlDbClient.getIndex().optimize(null);
targetClient.reload(null);
targetClient.getIndex().optimize(null);
}
urlDbClient.reload(null);
targetClient.reload(null);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void deleteUrls(Collection<String> workDeleteUrlList)
throws SearchLibException {
try {
client.deleteDocuments(workDeleteUrlList);
} catch (CorruptIndexException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (LockObtainFailedException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (URISyntaxException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (InstantiationException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (IllegalAccessException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
}
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void deleteUrls(Collection<String> workDeleteUrlList)
throws SearchLibException {
try {
targetClient.deleteDocuments(workDeleteUrlList);
urlDbClient.deleteDocuments(workDeleteUrlList);
} catch (CorruptIndexException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (LockObtainFailedException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (URISyntaxException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (InstantiationException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (IllegalAccessException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void writeXmlConfig(XmlWriter xmlWriter) throws SAXException,
SearchLibException {
xmlWriter.startElement("system");
xmlWriter.startElement("availableProcessors", "value", Integer
.toString(getAvailableProcessors()));
xmlWriter.endElement();
xmlWriter.startElement("freeMemory", "value", Long
.toString(getFreeMemory()), "rate", Double
.toString(getMemoryRate()));
xmlWriter.endElement();
xmlWriter.startElement("maxMemory", "value", Long
.toString(getMaxMemory()));
xmlWriter.endElement();
xmlWriter.startElement("totalMemory", "value", Long
.toString(getTotalMemory()));
xmlWriter.endElement();
xmlWriter.startElement("indexCount", "value", Integer
.toString(getIndexCount()));
xmlWriter.endElement();
xmlWriter.startElement("freeDiskSpace", "value", getFreeDiskSpace()
.toString());
xmlWriter.endElement();
xmlWriter.startElement("dataDirectoryPath", "value",
getDataDirectoryPath());
xmlWriter.endElement();
xmlWriter.endElement();
xmlWriter.startElement("properties");
for (Entry<Object, Object> prop : getProperties()) {
xmlWriter.startElement("property", "name",
prop.getKey().toString(), "value", prop.getValue()
.toString());
xmlWriter.endElement();
}
xmlWriter.endElement();
}
#location 27
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public void writeXmlConfig(XmlWriter xmlWriter) throws SAXException,
SearchLibException, SecurityException, IOException {
xmlWriter.startElement("system");
xmlWriter.startElement("availableProcessors", "value", Integer
.toString(getAvailableProcessors()));
xmlWriter.endElement();
xmlWriter.startElement("freeMemory", "value", Long
.toString(getFreeMemory()), "rate", Double
.toString(getMemoryRate()));
xmlWriter.endElement();
xmlWriter.startElement("maxMemory", "value", Long
.toString(getMaxMemory()));
xmlWriter.endElement();
xmlWriter.startElement("totalMemory", "value", Long
.toString(getTotalMemory()));
xmlWriter.endElement();
xmlWriter.startElement("indexCount", "value", Integer
.toString(getIndexCount()));
xmlWriter.endElement();
Double rate = getDiskRate();
if (rate == null)
xmlWriter.startElement("freeDiskSpace", "value", getFreeDiskSpace()
.toString());
else
xmlWriter.startElement("freeDiskSpace", "value", getFreeDiskSpace()
.toString(), "rate", rate.toString());
xmlWriter.endElement();
xmlWriter.startElement("dataDirectoryPath", "value",
getDataDirectoryPath());
xmlWriter.endElement();
xmlWriter.endElement();
xmlWriter.startElement("properties");
for (Entry<Object, Object> prop : getProperties()) {
xmlWriter.startElement("property", "name",
prop.getKey().toString(), "value", prop.getValue()
.toString());
xmlWriter.endElement();
}
xmlWriter.endElement();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void onAdd() throws SearchLibException,
UnsupportedEncodingException, ParseException, InterruptedException {
synchronized (this) {
if (getSelectedFile() != null) {
// Already In
if (getClient().getFilePathManager().getStrictPaths(
getSelectedFile().getPath(), 0, 0, null) > 0) {
Messagebox
.show("Already In.", "Jaeksoft OpenSearchServer",
Messagebox.OK,
org.zkoss.zul.Messagebox.INFORMATION);
} else {
List<PathItem> list = FilePathManager.addPath(
getSelectedFile().getPath(), getSelectedFile()
.isDirectory()
&& isSelectedFileCheck());
if (list.size() > 0) {
getClient().getFilePathManager().addList(list, false);
}
pathList = null;
setSelectedFileCheck(false);
setSelectedFilePath(null);
reloadPage();
}
}
}
}
#location 18
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public void onAdd() throws SearchLibException,
UnsupportedEncodingException, ParseException, InterruptedException {
synchronized (this) {
if (getSelectedFile() != null) {
// Already In
if (getClient().getFilePathManager().getFilePaths(
getSelectedFile().getPath(), 0, 0, null) > 0) {
Messagebox
.show("Already In.", "Jaeksoft OpenSearchServer",
Messagebox.OK,
org.zkoss.zul.Messagebox.INFORMATION);
} else {
/*
* List<FilePathItem> list = FilePathManager(
* getSelectedFile().getPath(), getSelectedFile()
* .isDirectory() && isSelectedFileCheck());
*
* if (list.size() > 0) {
* getClient().getFilePathManager().addList(list, false); }
*/
pathList = null;
setSelectedFileCheck(false);
setSelectedFilePath(null);
reloadPage();
}
}
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void getNewUrlToFetch(NamedItem host, long limit,
List<UrlItem> urlList) throws SearchLibException, ParseException,
IOException, SyntaxError, URISyntaxException,
ClassNotFoundException, InterruptedException,
InstantiationException, IllegalAccessException {
SearchRequest searchRequest = client.getNewSearchRequest("urlSearch");
searchRequest.addFilter("host:\""
+ SearchRequest.escapeQuery(host.getName()) + "\"");
searchRequest.setQueryString("*:*");
filterQueryToFetchNew(searchRequest);
searchRequest.setRows((int) limit);
Result result = client.search(searchRequest);
for (ResultDocument item : result)
urlList.add(new UrlItem(item));
}
#location 12
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void getNewUrlToFetch(NamedItem host, long limit,
List<UrlItem> urlList) throws SearchLibException, ParseException,
IOException, SyntaxError, URISyntaxException,
ClassNotFoundException, InterruptedException,
InstantiationException, IllegalAccessException {
SearchRequest searchRequest = urlDbClient
.getNewSearchRequest("urlSearch");
searchRequest.addFilter("host:\""
+ SearchRequest.escapeQuery(host.getName()) + "\"");
searchRequest.setQueryString("*:*");
filterQueryToFetchNew(searchRequest);
searchRequest.setRows((int) limit);
Result result = urlDbClient.search(searchRequest);
for (ResultDocument item : result)
urlList.add(new UrlItem(item));
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
protected void reloadPage() {
selectedSort = null;
sortFieldLeft = null;
super.reloadPage();
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Override
protected void reloadPage() {
synchronized (this) {
selectedSort = null;
sortFieldLeft = null;
super.reloadPage();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void updateUrlItems(List<UrlItem> urlItems)
throws SearchLibException {
try {
List<IndexDocument> documents = new ArrayList<IndexDocument>(
urlItems.size());
for (UrlItem urlItem : urlItems) {
IndexDocument indexDocument = new IndexDocument();
urlItem.populate(indexDocument);
documents.add(indexDocument);
}
client.updateDocuments(documents);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (URISyntaxException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (InstantiationException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (IllegalAccessException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
}
}
#location 11
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void updateUrlItems(List<UrlItem> urlItems)
throws SearchLibException {
try {
List<IndexDocument> documents = new ArrayList<IndexDocument>(
urlItems.size());
for (UrlItem urlItem : urlItems) {
IndexDocument indexDocument = new IndexDocument();
urlItem.populate(indexDocument);
documents.add(indexDocument);
}
urlDbClient.updateDocuments(documents);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (URISyntaxException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (InstantiationException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (IllegalAccessException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void getStartingWith(String queryString, Field field, String start,
int limit, List<NamedItem> list) throws ParseException,
IOException, SyntaxError, URISyntaxException,
ClassNotFoundException, InterruptedException, SearchLibException,
InstantiationException, IllegalAccessException {
SearchRequest searchRequest = client.getNewSearchRequest(field
+ "Facet");
searchRequest.setQueryString(queryString);
searchRequest.getFilterList().add(field + ":" + start + "*",
Source.REQUEST);
getFacetLimit(field, searchRequest, limit, list);
}
#location 11
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void getStartingWith(String queryString, Field field, String start,
int limit, List<NamedItem> list) throws ParseException,
IOException, SyntaxError, URISyntaxException,
ClassNotFoundException, InterruptedException, SearchLibException,
InstantiationException, IllegalAccessException {
SearchRequest searchRequest = urlDbClient.getNewSearchRequest(field
+ "Facet");
searchRequest.setQueryString(queryString);
searchRequest.getFilterList().add(field + ":" + start + "*",
Source.REQUEST);
getFacetLimit(field, searchRequest, limit, list);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public long getUrls(SearchRequest searchRequest, Field orderBy,
boolean orderAsc, long start, long rows, List<UrlItem> list)
throws SearchLibException {
searchRequest.setStart((int) start);
searchRequest.setRows((int) rows);
try {
if (orderBy != null)
searchRequest.addSort(orderBy.name, !orderAsc);
Result result = client.search(searchRequest);
if (list != null)
for (ResultDocument doc : result)
list.add(new UrlItem(doc));
return result.getNumFound();
} catch (ParseException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (SyntaxError e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (URISyntaxException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (InterruptedException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (InstantiationException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (IllegalAccessException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
}
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public long getUrls(SearchRequest searchRequest, Field orderBy,
boolean orderAsc, long start, long rows, List<UrlItem> list)
throws SearchLibException {
searchRequest.setStart((int) start);
searchRequest.setRows((int) rows);
try {
if (orderBy != null)
searchRequest.addSort(orderBy.name, !orderAsc);
Result result = urlDbClient.search(searchRequest);
if (list != null)
for (ResultDocument doc : result)
list.add(new UrlItem(doc));
return result.getNumFound();
} catch (ParseException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (SyntaxError e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (URISyntaxException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (InterruptedException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (InstantiationException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (IllegalAccessException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private void renderDocument(int pos) throws CorruptIndexException,
IOException, ParseException, SyntaxError {
writer.print("\t<doc score=\"");
writer.print(result.getDocs()[pos].score);
writer.print("\" pos=\"");
writer.print(pos);
writer.println("\">");
ResultDocument doc = result.getDocument(pos);
for (Field field : searchRequest.getReturnFieldList())
renderField(doc, field);
for (HighlightField field : searchRequest.getHighlightFieldList())
renderHighlightValue(doc, field);
int cc = result.getCollapseCount(pos);
if (cc > 0) {
writer.print("\t\t<collapseCount>");
writer.print(cc);
writer.println("</collapseCount>");
}
writer.println("\t</doc>");
}
#location 10
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private void renderDocument(int pos) throws CorruptIndexException,
IOException, ParseException, SyntaxError {
writer.print("\t<doc score=\"");
writer.print(result.getScore(pos));
writer.print("\" pos=\"");
writer.print(pos);
writer.println("\">");
ResultDocument doc = result.getDocument(pos);
for (Field field : searchRequest.getReturnFieldList())
renderField(doc, field);
for (HighlightField field : searchRequest.getHighlightFieldList())
renderHighlightValue(doc, field);
int cc = result.getCollapseCount(pos);
if (cc > 0) {
writer.print("\t\t<collapseCount>");
writer.print(cc);
writer.println("</collapseCount>");
}
writer.println("\t</doc>");
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
protected void reloadPage() {
highlightFieldLeft = null;
selectedHighlight = null;
super.reloadPage();
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Override
protected void reloadPage() {
synchronized (this) {
highlightFieldLeft = null;
selectedHighlight = null;
super.reloadPage();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void updateCrawls(List<Crawl> crawls) throws SearchLibException {
try {
List<IndexDocument> documents = new ArrayList<IndexDocument>(crawls
.size());
for (Crawl crawl : crawls) {
IndexDocument indexDocument = new IndexDocument();
crawl.getUrlItem().populate(indexDocument);
documents.add(indexDocument);
}
client.updateDocuments(documents);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (URISyntaxException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (InstantiationException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (IllegalAccessException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
}
}
#location 10
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void updateCrawls(List<Crawl> crawls) throws SearchLibException {
try {
// Update target index
List<IndexDocument> documents = new ArrayList<IndexDocument>(crawls
.size());
for (Crawl crawl : crawls) {
IndexDocument indexDocument = crawl.getTargetIndexDocument();
documents.add(indexDocument);
}
targetClient.updateDocuments(documents);
// Update URL DB
documents.clear();
for (Crawl crawl : crawls) {
IndexDocument indexDocument = new IndexDocument();
crawl.getUrlItem().populate(indexDocument);
documents.add(indexDocument);
}
urlDbClient.updateDocuments(documents);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (URISyntaxException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (InstantiationException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (IllegalAccessException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
throw new SearchLibException(e);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void getOldUrlToFetch(NamedItem host, Date fetchIntervalDate,
long limit, List<UrlItem> urlList) throws SearchLibException,
ParseException, IOException, SyntaxError, URISyntaxException,
ClassNotFoundException, InterruptedException,
InstantiationException, IllegalAccessException {
SearchRequest searchRequest = client.getNewSearchRequest("urlSearch");
searchRequest.addFilter("host:\""
+ SearchRequest.escapeQuery(host.getName()) + "\"");
searchRequest.setQueryString("*:*");
filterQueryToFetchOld(searchRequest, fetchIntervalDate);
searchRequest.setRows((int) limit);
Result result = client.search(searchRequest);
for (ResultDocument item : result)
urlList.add(new UrlItem(item));
}
#location 12
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void getOldUrlToFetch(NamedItem host, Date fetchIntervalDate,
long limit, List<UrlItem> urlList) throws SearchLibException,
ParseException, IOException, SyntaxError, URISyntaxException,
ClassNotFoundException, InterruptedException,
InstantiationException, IllegalAccessException {
SearchRequest searchRequest = urlDbClient
.getNewSearchRequest("urlSearch");
searchRequest.addFilter("host:\""
+ SearchRequest.escapeQuery(host.getName()) + "\"");
searchRequest.setQueryString("*:*");
filterQueryToFetchOld(searchRequest, fetchIntervalDate);
searchRequest.setRows((int) limit);
Result result = urlDbClient.search(searchRequest);
for (ResultDocument item : result)
urlList.add(new UrlItem(item));
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
protected void reloadPage() {
selectedSort = null;
sortFieldLeft = null;
super.reloadPage();
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Override
protected void reloadPage() {
synchronized (this) {
selectedSort = null;
sortFieldLeft = null;
super.reloadPage();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void reload(boolean optimize) throws IOException,
URISyntaxException, SearchLibException, InstantiationException,
IllegalAccessException, ClassNotFoundException {
if (optimize) {
client.reload(null);
client.getIndex().optimize(null);
}
client.reload(null);
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void reload(boolean optimize) throws IOException,
URISyntaxException, SearchLibException, InstantiationException,
IllegalAccessException, ClassNotFoundException {
if (optimize) {
urlDbClient.reload(null);
urlDbClient.getIndex().optimize(null);
targetClient.reload(null);
targetClient.getIndex().optimize(null);
}
urlDbClient.reload(null);
targetClient.reload(null);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void run(ResultScoreDoc[] fetchedDocs, int fetchLength)
throws IOException {
collapsedDoc = null;
if (fetchedDocs == null)
return;
if (fetchLength > fetchedDocs.length)
fetchLength = fetchedDocs.length;
OpenBitSet collapsedSet = new OpenBitSet(fetchLength);
String lastTerm = null;
int adjacent = 0;
collapsedDocCount = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < fetchLength; i++) {
String term = fetchedDocs[i].collapseTerm;
if (term != null && term.equals(lastTerm)) {
if (++adjacent >= collapseMax)
collapsedSet.set(i);
} else {
lastTerm = term;
adjacent = 0;
}
}
collapsedDocCount = (int) collapsedSet.cardinality();
collapsedDoc = new ResultScoreDoc[fetchLength - collapsedDocCount];
int currentPos = 0;
ResultScoreDoc collapseDoc = null;
for (int i = 0; i < fetchLength; i++) {
if (!collapsedSet.get(i)) {
collapseDoc = fetchedDocs[i];
collapseDoc.collapseCount = 0;
collapsedDoc[currentPos++] = collapseDoc;
} else {
collapseDoc.collapseCount++;
}
}
}
#location 39
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public void run(ResultScoreDoc[] fetchedDocs, int fetchLength)
throws IOException {
collapsedDoc = null;
if (fetchedDocs == null)
return;
if (fetchLength > fetchedDocs.length)
fetchLength = fetchedDocs.length;
collapse(fetchedDocs, fetchLength);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
final protected void getFragments(String originalText,
FragmentList fragments, int vectorOffset) {
originalTextLength = originalText.length();
if (splitPos == null)
splitPos = new TreeSet<Integer>();
splitPos.clear();
check(originalText);
Iterator<Integer> splitIterator = splitPos.iterator();
int pos = 0;
Fragment lastFragment = null;
while (splitIterator.hasNext()) {
int nextSplitPos = splitIterator.next();
lastFragment = fragments.addOriginalText(originalText.substring(
pos, nextSplitPos), vectorOffset, lastFragment == null);
pos = nextSplitPos;
}
if (pos < originalText.length())
lastFragment = fragments.addOriginalText(originalText
.substring(pos), vectorOffset, lastFragment == null);
lastFragment.setEdge(true);
}
#location 20
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
final protected void getFragments(String originalText,
FragmentList fragments, int vectorOffset) {
originalTextLength = originalText.length();
if (splitPos == null)
splitPos = new TreeSet<Integer>();
splitPos.clear();
check(originalText);
Iterator<Integer> splitIterator = splitPos.iterator();
int pos = 0;
Fragment lastFragment = null;
while (splitIterator.hasNext()) {
int nextSplitPos = splitIterator.next();
lastFragment = fragments.addOriginalText(originalText.substring(
pos, nextSplitPos), vectorOffset, lastFragment == null);
pos = nextSplitPos;
}
if (pos < originalText.length())
lastFragment = fragments.addOriginalText(originalText
.substring(pos), vectorOffset, lastFragment == null);
if (lastFragment != null)
lastFragment.setEdge(true);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public static HTMLDocument fetch(final URL url) throws IOException {
final URLConnection conn = url.openConnection();
final String charset = conn.getContentEncoding();
Charset cs = Charset.forName("Cp1252");
if (charset != null) {
try {
cs = Charset.forName(charset);
} catch (UnsupportedCharsetException e) {
// keep default
}
}
InputStream in = conn.getInputStream();
final String encoding = conn.getContentEncoding();
if(encoding != null) {
if("gzip".equalsIgnoreCase(encoding)) {
in = new GZIPInputStream(in);
} else {
System.err.println("WARN: unsupported Content-Encoding: "+encoding);
}
}
ByteArrayOutputStream bos = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
byte[] buf = new byte[4096];
int r;
while ((r = in.read(buf)) != -1) {
bos.write(buf, 0, r);
}
in.close();
final byte[] data = bos.toByteArray();
return new HTMLDocument(data, cs);
}
#location 35
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public static HTMLDocument fetch(final URL url) throws IOException {
final URLConnection conn = url.openConnection();
final String ct = conn.getContentType();
Charset cs = Charset.forName("Cp1252");
if (ct != null) {
Matcher m = PAT_CHARSET.matcher(ct);
if(m.find()) {
final String charset = m.group(1);
try {
cs = Charset.forName(charset);
} catch (UnsupportedCharsetException e) {
// keep default
}
}
}
InputStream in = conn.getInputStream();
final String encoding = conn.getContentEncoding();
if(encoding != null) {
if("gzip".equalsIgnoreCase(encoding)) {
in = new GZIPInputStream(in);
} else {
System.err.println("WARN: unsupported Content-Encoding: "+encoding);
}
}
ByteArrayOutputStream bos = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
byte[] buf = new byte[4096];
int r;
while ((r = in.read(buf)) != -1) {
bos.write(buf, 0, r);
}
in.close();
final byte[] data = bos.toByteArray();
return new HTMLDocument(data, cs);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public String getText(final URL url) throws BoilerpipeProcessingException {
try {
final URLConnection conn = url.openConnection();
final String encoding = conn.getContentEncoding();
Charset cs = Charset.forName("Cp1252");
if (encoding != null) {
try {
cs = Charset.forName(encoding);
} catch (UnsupportedCharsetException e) {
// keep default
}
}
final InputStream in = conn.getInputStream();
InputSource is = new InputSource(in);
if(cs != null) {
is.setEncoding(cs.name());
}
final String text = getText(is);
in.close();
return text;
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new BoilerpipeProcessingException(e);
}
}
#location 15
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public String getText(final URL url) throws BoilerpipeProcessingException {
try {
return getText(HTMLFetcher.fetch(url).toInputSource());
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new BoilerpipeProcessingException(e);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public static HTMLDocument fetch(final URL url) throws IOException {
final URLConnection conn = url.openConnection();
final String charset = conn.getContentEncoding();
Charset cs = Charset.forName("Cp1252");
if (charset != null) {
try {
cs = Charset.forName(charset);
} catch (UnsupportedCharsetException e) {
// keep default
}
}
InputStream in = conn.getInputStream();
final String encoding = conn.getContentEncoding();
if(encoding != null) {
if("gzip".equalsIgnoreCase(encoding)) {
in = new GZIPInputStream(in);
} else {
System.err.println("WARN: unsupported Content-Encoding: "+encoding);
}
}
ByteArrayOutputStream bos = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
byte[] buf = new byte[4096];
int r;
while ((r = in.read(buf)) != -1) {
bos.write(buf, 0, r);
}
in.close();
final byte[] data = bos.toByteArray();
return new HTMLDocument(data, cs);
}
#location 35
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public static HTMLDocument fetch(final URL url) throws IOException {
final URLConnection conn = url.openConnection();
final String ct = conn.getContentType();
Charset cs = Charset.forName("Cp1252");
if (ct != null) {
Matcher m = PAT_CHARSET.matcher(ct);
if(m.find()) {
final String charset = m.group(1);
try {
cs = Charset.forName(charset);
} catch (UnsupportedCharsetException e) {
// keep default
}
}
}
InputStream in = conn.getInputStream();
final String encoding = conn.getContentEncoding();
if(encoding != null) {
if("gzip".equalsIgnoreCase(encoding)) {
in = new GZIPInputStream(in);
} else {
System.err.println("WARN: unsupported Content-Encoding: "+encoding);
}
}
ByteArrayOutputStream bos = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
byte[] buf = new byte[4096];
int r;
while ((r = in.read(buf)) != -1) {
bos.write(buf, 0, r);
}
in.close();
final byte[] data = bos.toByteArray();
return new HTMLDocument(data, cs);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private void insertLoginLog(String username) {
UmsAdmin admin = getAdminByUsername(username);
UmsAdminLoginLog loginLog = new UmsAdminLoginLog();
loginLog.setAdminId(admin.getId());
loginLog.setCreateTime(new Date());
ServletRequestAttributes attributes = (ServletRequestAttributes) RequestContextHolder.getRequestAttributes();
HttpServletRequest request = attributes.getRequest();
loginLog.setIp(request.getRemoteAddr());
loginLogMapper.insert(loginLog);
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private void insertLoginLog(String username) {
UmsAdmin admin = getAdminByUsername(username);
if(admin==null) return;
UmsAdminLoginLog loginLog = new UmsAdminLoginLog();
loginLog.setAdminId(admin.getId());
loginLog.setCreateTime(new Date());
ServletRequestAttributes attributes = (ServletRequestAttributes) RequestContextHolder.getRequestAttributes();
HttpServletRequest request = attributes.getRequest();
loginLog.setIp(request.getRemoteAddr());
loginLogMapper.insert(loginLog);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public String getUserNameFromToken(String token) {
String username;
try {
Claims claims = getClaimsFromToken(token);
username = claims.getSubject();
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
username = null;
}
return username;
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public String getUserNameFromToken(String token) {
String username;
try {
Claims claims = getClaimsFromToken(token);
username = claims.getSubject();
} catch (Exception e) {
username = null;
}
return username;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private Date getExpiredDateFromToken(String token) {
Date expiredDate = null;
try {
Claims claims = getClaimsFromToken(token);
expiredDate = claims.getExpiration();
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
return expiredDate;
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private Date getExpiredDateFromToken(String token) {
Claims claims = getClaimsFromToken(token);
return claims.getExpiration();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void onHttpFinish(QQHttpResponse response) {
try {
LOG.debug(response.getContentType());
String type = response.getContentType();
if((type.startsWith("application/x-javascript")
|| type.startsWith("application/json")
|| type.indexOf("text") >= 0
) && response.getContentLength() > 0){
LOG.debug(response.getResponseString());
}
if(response.getResponseCode() == QQHttpResponse.S_OK){
onHttpStatusOK(response);
}else{
onHttpStatusError(response);
}
} catch (QQException e) {
notifyActionEvent(QQActionEvent.Type.EVT_ERROR, e);
} catch (JSONException e) {
notifyActionEvent(QQActionEvent.Type.EVT_ERROR, new QQException(QQErrorCode.JSON_ERROR, e));
} catch (Throwable e){
notifyActionEvent(QQActionEvent.Type.EVT_ERROR, new QQException(QQErrorCode.UNKNOWN_ERROR, e));
}
}
#location 6
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public void onHttpFinish(QQHttpResponse response) {
try {
LOG.debug(response.getContentType());
String type = response.getContentType();
if(type!=null && (type.startsWith("application/x-javascript")
|| type.startsWith("application/json")
|| type.indexOf("text") >= 0
) && response.getContentLength() > 0){
LOG.debug(response.getResponseString());
}
if(response.getResponseCode() == QQHttpResponse.S_OK){
onHttpStatusOK(response);
}else{
onHttpStatusError(response);
}
} catch (QQException e) {
notifyActionEvent(QQActionEvent.Type.EVT_ERROR, e);
} catch (JSONException e) {
notifyActionEvent(QQActionEvent.Type.EVT_ERROR, new QQException(QQErrorCode.JSON_ERROR, e));
} catch (Throwable e){
notifyActionEvent(QQActionEvent.Type.EVT_ERROR, new QQException(QQErrorCode.UNKNOWN_ERROR, e));
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void progressCallbackSend() throws Exception {
final AtomicReference<String> body = new AtomicReference<String>();
handler = new RequestHandler() {
@Override
public void handle(Request request, HttpServletResponse response) {
body.set(new String(read()));
response.setStatus(HTTP_OK);
}
};
final File file = File.createTempFile("post", ".txt");
new FileWriter(file).append("hello").close();
final AtomicInteger tx = new AtomicInteger(0);
ProgressCallback progress = new ProgressCallback() {
public void onProgress(int transferred, int total) {
assertEquals(file.length(), total);
assertEquals(tx.incrementAndGet(), transferred);
}
};
post(url).bufferSize(1).progress(progress).send(file);
assertEquals(file.length(), tx.get());
}
#location 22
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void progressCallbackSend() throws Exception {
final AtomicReference<String> body = new AtomicReference<String>();
handler = new RequestHandler() {
@Override
public void handle(Request request, HttpServletResponse response) {
body.set(new String(read()));
response.setStatus(HTTP_OK);
}
};
final File file = File.createTempFile("post", ".txt");
new FileWriter(file).append("hello").close();
final AtomicInteger tx = new AtomicInteger(0);
ProgressCallback progress = new ProgressCallback() {
public void onProgress(int transferred, int total) {
assertEquals(file.length(), total);
assertEquals(tx.incrementAndGet(), transferred);
}
};
post(url).bufferSize(1).progress(progress).send(file).code();
assertEquals(file.length(), tx.get());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void progressCallbackSendInputStream() throws Exception {
final AtomicReference<String> body = new AtomicReference<String>();
handler = new RequestHandler() {
@Override
public void handle(Request request, HttpServletResponse response) {
body.set(new String(read()));
response.setStatus(HTTP_OK);
}
};
File file = File.createTempFile("post", ".txt");
new FileWriter(file).append("hello").close();
InputStream input = new FileInputStream(file);
final AtomicInteger tx = new AtomicInteger(0);
ProgressCallback progress = new ProgressCallback() {
public void onProgress(int transferred, int total) {
assertEquals(0, total);
assertEquals(tx.incrementAndGet(), transferred);
}
};
post(url).bufferSize(1).progress(progress).send(input);
assertEquals(file.length(), tx.get());
}
#location 22
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void progressCallbackSendInputStream() throws Exception {
final AtomicReference<String> body = new AtomicReference<String>();
handler = new RequestHandler() {
@Override
public void handle(Request request, HttpServletResponse response) {
body.set(new String(read()));
response.setStatus(HTTP_OK);
}
};
File file = File.createTempFile("post", ".txt");
new FileWriter(file).append("hello").close();
InputStream input = new FileInputStream(file);
final AtomicInteger tx = new AtomicInteger(0);
ProgressCallback progress = new ProgressCallback() {
public void onProgress(int transferred, int total) {
assertEquals(0, total);
assertEquals(tx.incrementAndGet(), transferred);
}
};
post(url).bufferSize(1).progress(progress).send(input).code();
assertEquals(file.length(), tx.get());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@org.junit.Test
public void test() throws InterruptedException, IOException {
Node node = new StandbyNode(new Configuration("com.zuoxiaolong.niubi.job.jobs"), "localhost:2181,localhost:3181,localhost:4181");
node.join();
new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(System.in)).readLine();
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@org.junit.Test
public void test() throws InterruptedException, IOException {
Node node = new StandbyNode();
node.join();
new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(System.in)).readLine();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@org.junit.Test
public void test() throws InterruptedException, IOException {
Node node = new StandbyNode("localhost:2181,localhost:3181,localhost:4181", "http://localhost:8080/job");
node.join();
new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(System.in)).readLine();
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@org.junit.Test
public void test() throws InterruptedException, IOException {
Node node = new StandbyNode("localhost:2181,localhost:3181,localhost:4181", "http://localhost:8080/job", StringHelper.emptyArray());
node.join();
new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(System.in)).readLine();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@org.junit.Test
public void test() throws InterruptedException, IOException {
Node node = new MasterSlaveNode(new Configuration("com.zuoxiaolong.niubi.job.jobs"), "localhost:2181,localhost:3181,localhost:4181");
node.join();
new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(System.in)).readLine();
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@org.junit.Test
public void test() throws InterruptedException, IOException {
Node node = new MasterSlaveNode();
node.join();
new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(System.in)).readLine();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@org.junit.Test
public void test() throws InterruptedException, IOException {
Node node = new StandbyNode(new Configuration("com.zuoxiaolong.niubi.job.jobs"), "localhost:2181,localhost:3181,localhost:4181");
node.join();
new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(System.in)).readLine();
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@org.junit.Test
public void test() throws InterruptedException, IOException {
Node node = new StandbyNode();
node.join();
new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(System.in)).readLine();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public List<MasterSlaveNodeData> getAllNodes() {
List<ChildData> childDataList = getChildren(PathHelper.getParentPath(getMasterSlavePathApi().getNodePath()));
List<MasterSlaveNodeData> masterSlaveNodeDataList = childDataList.stream().map(MasterSlaveNodeData::new).collect(Collectors.toList());
return masterSlaveNodeDataList;
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public List<MasterSlaveNodeData> getAllNodes() {
List<ChildData> childDataList = getChildren(PathHelper.getParentPath(getMasterSlavePathApi().getNodePath()));
if (ListHelper.isEmpty(childDataList)) {
return null;
}
List<MasterSlaveNodeData> masterSlaveNodeDataList = childDataList.stream().map(MasterSlaveNodeData::new).collect(Collectors.toList());
return masterSlaveNodeDataList;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@org.junit.Test
public void test() throws InterruptedException, IOException {
Node node = new StandbyNode("localhost:2181,localhost:3181,localhost:4181", "http://localhost:8080/job");
node.join();
new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(System.in)).readLine();
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@org.junit.Test
public void test() throws InterruptedException, IOException {
Node node = new StandbyNode("localhost:2181,localhost:3181,localhost:4181", "http://localhost:8080/job", StringHelper.emptyArray());
node.join();
new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(System.in)).readLine();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public List<StandbyNodeData> getAllNodes() {
List<ChildData> childDataList = getChildren(PathHelper.getParentPath(getStandbyPathApi().getNodePath()));
List<StandbyNodeData> standbyNodeDataList = childDataList.stream().map(StandbyNodeData::new).collect(Collectors.toList());
return standbyNodeDataList;
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public List<StandbyNodeData> getAllNodes() {
List<ChildData> childDataList = getChildren(PathHelper.getParentPath(getStandbyPathApi().getNodePath()));
if (ListHelper.isEmpty(childDataList)) {
return null;
}
List<StandbyNodeData> standbyNodeDataList = childDataList.stream().map(StandbyNodeData::new).collect(Collectors.toList());
return standbyNodeDataList;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@org.junit.Test
public void test() throws InterruptedException, IOException {
Node node = new MasterSlaveNode(new Configuration("com.zuoxiaolong.niubi.job.jobs"), "localhost:2181,localhost:3181,localhost:4181");
node.join();
new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(System.in)).readLine();
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@org.junit.Test
public void test() throws InterruptedException, IOException {
Node node = new MasterSlaveNode();
node.join();
new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(System.in)).readLine();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public List<Pair<String, String>> getColumns(String schema, String table) throws VerdictDBDbmsException {
List<Pair<String, String>> columns = new ArrayList<>();
DbmsQueryResult queryResult = execute(syntax.getColumnsCommand(schema, table));
JdbcResultSet jdbcResultSet = new JdbcResultSet(queryResult);
try {
while (queryResult.next()) {
String type = jdbcResultSet.getString(syntax.getColumnTypeColumnIndex()+1);
type = type.toLowerCase();
// // remove the size of type
// type = type.replaceAll("\\(.*\\)", "");
columns.add(
new ImmutablePair<>(jdbcResultSet.getString(syntax.getColumnNameColumnIndex()+1), type));
}
} catch (SQLException e) {
throw new VerdictDBDbmsException(e);
} finally {
jdbcResultSet.close();
}
return columns;
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public List<Pair<String, String>> getColumns(String schema, String table) throws VerdictDBDbmsException {
List<Pair<String, String>> columns = new ArrayList<>();
DbmsQueryResult queryResult = execute(syntax.getColumnsCommand(schema, table));
while (queryResult.next()) {
String type = (String) queryResult.getValue(syntax.getColumnTypeColumnIndex());
type = type.toLowerCase();
columns.add(
new ImmutablePair<>((String) queryResult.getValue(syntax.getColumnNameColumnIndex()), type));
}
return columns;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public List<String> getSchemas() throws SQLException {
if (!schemaCache.isEmpty()){
return schemaCache;
}
DbmsQueryResult queryResult = connection.executeQuery(syntax.getSchemaCommand());
JdbcResultSet jdbcQueryResult = new JdbcResultSet(queryResult);
while (queryResult.next()) {
schemaCache.add(jdbcQueryResult.getString(syntax.getSchemaNameColumnIndex()));
}
return schemaCache;
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public List<String> getSchemas() throws SQLException {
if (!schemaCache.isEmpty()){
return schemaCache;
}
schemaCache.addAll(connection.getSchemas());
return schemaCache;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public ApproxRelation approx() throws VerdictException {
List<Expr> exprs = exprsInSelectElems(elems);
// for each expression, we obtain pairs of sample candidates and the costs of using them.
List<Pair<Map<Set<SampleParam>, List<Double>>, SelectElem>> candidates_list = new ArrayList<Pair<Map<Set<SampleParam>, List<Double>>, SelectElem>>();
for (int i = 0; i < exprs.size(); i++) {
Map<Set<SampleParam>, List<Double>> candidates = source.findSample(exprs.get(i));
candidates_list.add(Pair.of(candidates, elems.get(i)));
}
// We test if we can consolidate those sample candidates so that the number of select statements is less than
// the number of the expressions. In the worst case (e.g., all count-distinct), the number of select statements
// will be equal to the number of the expressions. If the cost of running those select statements individually
// is higher than the cost of running a single select statement using the original tables, we do not use samples.
List<Pair<Set<SampleParam>, List<SelectElem>>> consolidated = consolidate(candidates_list);
List<ApproxAggregatedRelation> individuals = new ArrayList<ApproxAggregatedRelation>();
for (Pair<Set<SampleParam>, List<SelectElem>> p : consolidated) {
List<SelectElem> elemsPart = p.getRight();
Set<SampleParam> samplesPart = p.getLeft();
individuals.add(new ApproxAggregatedRelation(vc, source.approxWith(attachTableMapping(samplesPart)), elemsPart));
}
// join the results from those multiple relations (if there are more than one)
ApproxRelation r = null;
for (ApproxAggregatedRelation r1 : individuals) {
if (r == null) {
r = r1;
} else {
String ln = Relation.genTableAlias();
String rn = Relation.genTableAlias();
r.setAliasName(ln);
r1.setAliasName(rn);
if (r1.getSource() instanceof ApproxGroupedRelation) {
List<ColNameExpr> groupby = ((ApproxGroupedRelation) r1.getSource()).getGroupby();
List<Pair<Expr, Expr>> joincols = new ArrayList<Pair<Expr, Expr>>();
for (ColNameExpr col : groupby) {
joincols.add(Pair.of((Expr) new ColNameExpr(col.getCol(), ln), (Expr) new ColNameExpr(col.getCol(), rn)));
}
r = new ApproxJoinedRelation(vc, r, r1, joincols);
} else {
r = new ApproxJoinedRelation(vc, r, r1, null);
}
}
}
r.setAliasName(getAliasName());
return r;
}
#location 46
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public ApproxRelation approx() throws VerdictException {
// for each expression, we obtain pairs of sample candidates and the costs of using them.
List<List<SampleGroup>> candidates_list = new ArrayList<List<SampleGroup>>();
for (int i = 0; i < elems.size(); i++) {
List<SampleGroup> candidates = source.findSample(elems.get(i));
candidates_list.add(candidates);
}
// We test if we can consolidate those sample candidates so that the number of select statements is less than
// the number of the expressions. In the worst case (e.g., all count-distinct), the number of select statements
// will be equal to the number of the expressions. If the cost of running those select statements individually
// is higher than the cost of running a single select statement using the original tables, we do not use samples.
SamplePlan plan = consolidate(candidates_list);
List<ApproxAggregatedRelation> individuals = new ArrayList<ApproxAggregatedRelation>();
for (SampleGroup group : plan.getSampleGroups()) {
List<SelectElem> elems = group.getElems();
Set<SampleParam> samplesPart = group.sampleSet();
individuals.add(new ApproxAggregatedRelation(vc, source.approxWith(attachTableMapping(samplesPart)), elems));
}
// join the results from those multiple relations (if there are more than one)
ApproxRelation r = null;
for (ApproxAggregatedRelation r1 : individuals) {
if (r == null) {
r = r1;
} else {
String ln = Relation.genTableAlias();
String rn = Relation.genTableAlias();
r.setAliasName(ln);
r1.setAliasName(rn);
if (r1.getSource() instanceof ApproxGroupedRelation) {
List<ColNameExpr> groupby = ((ApproxGroupedRelation) r1.getSource()).getGroupby();
List<Pair<Expr, Expr>> joincols = new ArrayList<Pair<Expr, Expr>>();
for (ColNameExpr col : groupby) {
joincols.add(Pair.of((Expr) new ColNameExpr(col.getCol(), ln), (Expr) new ColNameExpr(col.getCol(), rn)));
}
r = new ApproxJoinedRelation(vc, r, r1, joincols);
} else {
r = new ApproxJoinedRelation(vc, r, r1, null);
}
}
}
r.setAliasName(getAliasName());
return r;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public ExactRelation rewriteWithSubsampledErrorBounds() {
ExactRelation newSource = source.rewriteWithSubsampledErrorBounds();
List<SelectElem> sourceElems = null; // newSource.getSelectList();
Set<String> colAliases = new HashSet<String>();
for (SelectElem e : sourceElems) {
if (e.aliasPresent()) {
// we're only interested in the columns for which aliases are present.
// note that every column with aggregate function must have an alias (enforced by ColNameExpr class).
colAliases.add(e.getAlias());
}
}
// we search for error bound columns based on the assumption that the error bound columns have the suffix attached
// to the original agg columns. The suffix is obtained from the ApproxRelation#errColSuffix() method.
// ApproxAggregatedRelation#rewriteWithSubsampledErrorBounds() method is responsible for having those columns.
List<SelectElem> elemsWithErr = new ArrayList<SelectElem>();
for (SelectElem e : elems) {
elemsWithErr.add(e);
String errColName = errColName(e.getExpr().getText());
if (colAliases.contains(errColName)) {
elemsWithErr.add(new SelectElem(new ColNameExpr(errColName), errColName));
}
}
ExactRelation r = new ProjectedRelation(vc, newSource, elemsWithErr);
r.setAliasName(getAliasName());
return r;
}
#location 6
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public ExactRelation rewriteWithSubsampledErrorBounds() {
ExactRelation r = rewriteWithPartition(true);
// construct a new list of select elements. the last element is __vpart, which should be omitted.
// newElems and newAggs hold almost the same info; just replicate them to follow the structure
// of AggregatedRelation-ProjectedRelation.
List<SelectElem> newElems = new ArrayList<SelectElem>();
List<Expr> newAggs = new ArrayList<Expr>();
List<SelectElem> elems = ((ProjectedRelation) r).getSelectElems();
for (int i = 0; i < elems.size() - 1; i++) {
SelectElem elem = elems.get(i);
if (!elem.isagg()) {
newElems.add(new SelectElem(ColNameExpr.from(elem.getAlias()), elem.getAlias()));
} else {
if (elem.getAlias().equals(partitionSizeAlias)) {
continue;
}
ColNameExpr est = new ColNameExpr(elem.getAlias(), r.getAliasName());
ColNameExpr psize = new ColNameExpr(partitionSizeAlias, r.getAliasName());
// average estimate
Expr averaged = null;
if (elem.getExpr().isCountDistinct()) {
// for count-distinct (i.e., universe samples), weighted average should not be used.
averaged = FuncExpr.round(FuncExpr.avg(est));
} else {
// weighted average
averaged = BinaryOpExpr.from(FuncExpr.sum(BinaryOpExpr.from(est, psize, "*")),
FuncExpr.sum(psize), "/");
if (elem.getExpr().isCount()) {
averaged = FuncExpr.round(averaged);
}
}
newElems.add(new SelectElem(averaged, elem.getAlias()));
newAggs.add(averaged);
// error estimation
// scale by sqrt(subsample size) / sqrt(sample size)
Expr error = BinaryOpExpr.from(
BinaryOpExpr.from(FuncExpr.stddev(est), FuncExpr.sqrt(FuncExpr.avg(psize)), "*"),
FuncExpr.sqrt(FuncExpr.sum(psize)),
"/");
error = BinaryOpExpr.from(error, ConstantExpr.from(confidenceIntervalMultiplier()), "*");
newElems.add(new SelectElem(error, Relation.errorBoundColumn(elem.getAlias())));
newAggs.add(error);
}
}
// this extra aggregation stage should be grouped by non-agg elements except for __vpart
List<Expr> newGroupby = new ArrayList<Expr>();
for (SelectElem elem : elems) {
if (!elem.isagg() && !elem.getAlias().equals(partitionColumnName())) {
newGroupby.add(ColNameExpr.from(elem.getAlias()));
}
}
r = new GroupedRelation(vc, r, newGroupby);
r = new AggregatedRelation(vc, r, newAggs);
r = new ProjectedRelation(vc, r, newElems);
return r;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public String visitQuery_specification(VerdictSQLParser.Query_specificationContext ctx) {
List<Pair<String, String>> subqueryColName2Aliases = null;
BootstrapSelectStatementRewriter singleRewriter = null;
StringBuilder unionedFrom = new StringBuilder(2000);
int trialNum = vc.getConf().getInt("bootstrap_trial_num");
for (int i = 0; i < trialNum; i++) {
singleRewriter = new BootstrapSelectStatementRewriter(vc, queryString);
singleRewriter.setIndentLevel(2);
singleRewriter.setDepth(1);
String singleTrialQuery = singleRewriter.visitQuery_specificationForSingleTrial(ctx);
if (i == 0) {
subqueryColName2Aliases = singleRewriter.getColName2Aliases();
}
if (i > 0) unionedFrom.append("\n UNION\n");
unionedFrom.append(singleTrialQuery);
}
StringBuilder sql = new StringBuilder(2000);
sql.append("SELECT");
int selectElemIndex = 0;
for (Pair<String, String> e : subqueryColName2Aliases) {
selectElemIndex++;
sql.append((selectElemIndex > 1)? ", " : " ");
if (singleRewriter.isAggregateColumn(selectElemIndex)) {
String alias = genAlias();
sql.append(String.format("AVG(%s) AS %s",
e.getRight(), alias));
colName2Aliases.add(Pair.of(e.getLeft(), alias));
} else {
if (e.getLeft().equals(e.getRight())) sql.append(e.getLeft());
else sql.append(String.format("%s AS %s", e.getLeft(), e.getRight()));
colName2Aliases.add(Pair.of(e.getLeft(), e.getRight()));
}
}
sql.append("\nFROM (\n");
sql.append(unionedFrom.toString());
sql.append("\n) AS t");
sql.append("\nGROUP BY");
for (int colIndex = 1; colIndex <= subqueryColName2Aliases.size(); colIndex++) {
if (!singleRewriter.isAggregateColumn(colIndex)) {
if (colIndex > 1) {
sql.append(String.format(", %s", subqueryColName2Aliases.get(colIndex-1).getRight()));
} else {
sql.append(String.format(" %s", subqueryColName2Aliases.get(colIndex-1).getRight()));
}
}
}
return sql.toString();
}
#location 23
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public String visitQuery_specification(VerdictSQLParser.Query_specificationContext ctx) {
StringBuilder sql = new StringBuilder(2000);
// this statement computes the mean value
AnalyticSelectStatementRewriter meanRewriter = new AnalyticSelectStatementRewriter(vc, queryString);
meanRewriter.setDepth(depth+1);
meanRewriter.setIndentLevel(defaultIndent + 6);
String mainSql = meanRewriter.visit(ctx);
cumulativeReplacedTableSources.putAll(meanRewriter.getCumulativeSampleTables());
// this statement computes the standard deviation
BootstrapSelectStatementRewriter varianceRewriter = new BootstrapSelectStatementRewriter(vc, queryString);
varianceRewriter.setDepth(depth+1);
varianceRewriter.setIndentLevel(defaultIndent + 6);
String subSql = varianceRewriter.varianceComputationStatement(ctx);
String leftAlias = genAlias();
String rightAlias = genAlias();
// we combine those two statements using join.
List<Pair<String, String>> thisColumnName2Aliases = new ArrayList<Pair<String, String>>();
List<Pair<String, String>> leftColName2Aliases = meanRewriter.getColName2Aliases();
// List<Boolean> leftAggColIndicator = meanRewriter.getAggregateColumnIndicator();
List<Pair<String, String>> rightColName2Aliases = varianceRewriter.getColName2Aliases();
// List<Boolean> rightAggColIndicator = varianceRewriter.getAggregateColumnIndicator();
sql.append(String.format("%sSELECT", indentString));
int leftSelectElemIndex = 0;
int totalSelectElemIndex = 0;
for (Pair<String, String> colName2Alias : leftColName2Aliases) {
leftSelectElemIndex++;
if (leftSelectElemIndex == 1) sql.append(" ");
else sql.append(", ");
if (meanRewriter.isAggregateColumn(leftSelectElemIndex)) {
// mean
totalSelectElemIndex++;
String alias = genAlias();
sql.append(String.format("%s.%s AS %s", leftAlias, colName2Alias.getRight(), alias));
thisColumnName2Aliases.add(Pair.of(colName2Alias.getLeft(), alias));
// error (standard deviation * 1.96 (for 95% confidence interval))
totalSelectElemIndex++;
alias = genAlias();
String matchingAliasName = null;
for (Pair<String, String> r : rightColName2Aliases) {
if (colName2Alias.getLeft().equals(r.getLeft())) {
matchingAliasName = r.getRight();
}
}
sql.append(String.format(", %s.%s AS %s", rightAlias, matchingAliasName, alias));
thisColumnName2Aliases.add(Pair.of(colName2Alias.getLeft(), alias));
meanColIndex2ErrColIndex.put(totalSelectElemIndex-1, totalSelectElemIndex);
} else {
totalSelectElemIndex++;
sql.append(String.format("%s.%s AS %s", leftAlias, colName2Alias.getRight(), colName2Alias.getRight()));
thisColumnName2Aliases.add(Pair.of(colName2Alias.getLeft(), colName2Alias.getRight()));
}
}
colName2Aliases = thisColumnName2Aliases;
sql.append(String.format("\n%sFROM (\n", indentString));
sql.append(mainSql);
sql.append(String.format("\n%s ) AS %s", indentString, leftAlias));
sql.append(" LEFT JOIN (\n");
sql.append(subSql);
sql.append(String.format("%s) AS %s", indentString, rightAlias));
sql.append(String.format(" ON %s.l_shipmode = %s.l_shipmode", leftAlias, rightAlias));
return sql.toString();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public List<String> getPartitionColumns(String schema, String table) throws SQLException {
if (!syntax.doesSupportTablePartitioning()) {
throw new SQLException("Database does not support table partitioning");
}
if (!partitionCache.isEmpty()){
return partitionCache;
}
DbmsQueryResult queryResult = connection.executeQuery(syntax.getPartitionCommand(schema, table));
JdbcResultSet jdbcQueryResult = new JdbcResultSet(queryResult);
while (queryResult.next()) {
partitionCache.add(jdbcQueryResult.getString(0));
}
return partitionCache;
}
#location 6
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public List<String> getPartitionColumns(String schema, String table) throws SQLException {
if (!syntax.doesSupportTablePartitioning()) {
throw new SQLException("Database does not support table partitioning");
}
if (!partitionCache.isEmpty()){
return partitionCache;
}
partitionCache.addAll(getPartitionColumns(schema, table));
return partitionCache;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public ExactRelation rewriteWithSubsampledErrorBounds() {
ExactRelation r = rewriteWithPartition();
// List<SelectElem> selectElems = r.selectElemsWithAggregateSource();
List<SelectElem> selectElems = ((AggregatedRelation) r).getAggList();
// another wrapper to combine all subsampled aggregations.
List<SelectElem> finalAgg = new ArrayList<SelectElem>();
for (int i = 0; i < selectElems.size() - 1; i++) { // excluding the last one which is psize
SelectElem e = selectElems.get(i);
ColNameExpr est = new ColNameExpr(e.getAlias(), r.getAliasName());
ColNameExpr psize = new ColNameExpr(partitionSizeAlias, r.getAliasName());
// average estimate
// Expr meanEst = BinaryOpExpr.from(
// FuncExpr.sum(BinaryOpExpr.from(est, psize, "*")),
// FuncExpr.sum(psize), "/");
Expr meanEst = FuncExpr.avg(est);
Expr originalAggExpr = elems.get(i).getExpr();
if (originalAggExpr instanceof FuncExpr) {
if (((FuncExpr) originalAggExpr).getFuncName().equals(FuncExpr.FuncName.COUNT)
|| ((FuncExpr) originalAggExpr).getFuncName().equals(FuncExpr.FuncName.COUNT_DISTINCT)) {
meanEst = FuncExpr.round(meanEst);
}
}
finalAgg.add(new SelectElem(meanEst, e.getAlias()));
// error estimation
finalAgg.add(new SelectElem(
BinaryOpExpr.from(
BinaryOpExpr.from(FuncExpr.stddev(est), FuncExpr.sqrt(FuncExpr.avg(psize)), "*"),
FuncExpr.sqrt(FuncExpr.sum(psize)),
"/"),
e.getAlias() + errColSuffix()));
}
/*
* Example input query:
* select category, avg(col)
* from t
* group by category
*
* Transformed query:
* select category, sum(est * psize) / sum(psize) AS final_est
* from (
* select category, avg(col) AS est, count(*) as psize
* from t
* group by category, verdict_partition) AS vt1
* group by category
*
* where t1 was obtained by rewriteWithPartition().
*/
if (source instanceof ApproxGroupedRelation) {
List<ColNameExpr> groupby = ((ApproxGroupedRelation) source).getGroupby();
List<ColNameExpr> groupbyInNewSource = new ArrayList<ColNameExpr>();
for (ColNameExpr g : groupby) {
groupbyInNewSource.add(new ColNameExpr(g.getCol(), r.getAliasName()));
}
r = new GroupedRelation(vc, r, groupbyInNewSource);
}
r = new AggregatedRelation(vc, r, finalAgg);
r.setAliasName(getAliasName());
return r;
}
#location 12
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public ExactRelation rewriteWithSubsampledErrorBounds() {
ExactRelation r = rewriteWithPartition();
// List<SelectElem> selectElems = r.selectElemsWithAggregateSource();
List<SelectElem> selectElems = ((AggregatedRelation) r).getAggList();
// another wrapper to combine all subsampled aggregations.
List<SelectElem> finalAgg = new ArrayList<SelectElem>();
for (int i = 0; i < selectElems.size() - 1; i++) { // excluding the last one which is psize
// odd columns are for mean estimation
// even columns are for err estimation
if (i%2 == 1) continue;
SelectElem meanElem = selectElems.get(i);
SelectElem errElem = selectElems.get(i+1);
ColNameExpr est = new ColNameExpr(meanElem.getAlias(), r.getAliasName());
ColNameExpr errEst = new ColNameExpr(errElem.getAlias(), r.getAliasName());
ColNameExpr psize = new ColNameExpr(partitionSizeAlias, r.getAliasName());
Expr originalAggExpr = elems.get(i/2).getExpr();
// average estimate
Expr meanEstExpr = null;
if (originalAggExpr.isCountDistinct()) {
meanEstExpr = FuncExpr.round(FuncExpr.avg(est));
} else {
meanEstExpr = BinaryOpExpr.from(FuncExpr.sum(BinaryOpExpr.from(est, psize, "*")),
FuncExpr.sum(psize), "/");
if (originalAggExpr.isCount()) {
meanEstExpr = FuncExpr.round(meanEstExpr);
}
}
finalAgg.add(new SelectElem(meanEstExpr, meanElem.getAlias()));
// error estimation
Expr errEstExpr = BinaryOpExpr.from(
BinaryOpExpr.from(FuncExpr.stddev(errEst), FuncExpr.sqrt(FuncExpr.avg(psize)), "*"),
FuncExpr.sqrt(FuncExpr.sum(psize)),
"/");
finalAgg.add(new SelectElem(errEstExpr, errElem.getAlias()));
}
/*
* Example input query:
* select category, avg(col)
* from t
* group by category
*
* Transformed query:
* select category, sum(est * psize) / sum(psize) AS final_est
* from (
* select category, avg(col) AS est, count(*) as psize
* from t
* group by category, verdict_partition) AS vt1
* group by category
*
* where t1 was obtained by rewriteWithPartition().
*/
if (source instanceof ApproxGroupedRelation) {
List<ColNameExpr> groupby = ((ApproxGroupedRelation) source).getGroupby();
List<ColNameExpr> groupbyInNewSource = new ArrayList<ColNameExpr>();
for (ColNameExpr g : groupby) {
groupbyInNewSource.add(new ColNameExpr(g.getCol(), r.getAliasName()));
}
r = new GroupedRelation(vc, r, groupbyInNewSource);
}
r = new AggregatedRelation(vc, r, finalAgg);
r.setAliasName(getAliasName());
return r;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
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