input
stringlengths 205
73.3k
| output
stringlengths 64
73.2k
| instruction
stringclasses 1
value |
|---|---|---|
#vulnerable code
private static void load(EscapeMode e, String file, int size) {
e.nameKeys = new String[size];
e.codeVals = new int[size];
e.codeKeys = new int[size];
e.nameVals = new String[size];
InputStream stream = Entities.class.getResourceAsStream(file);
if (stream == null)
throw new IllegalStateException("Could not read resource " + file + ". Make sure you copy resources for " + Entities.class.getCanonicalName());
int i = 0;
BufferedReader input = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(stream, ASCII));
CharacterReader reader = new CharacterReader(input);
while (!reader.isEmpty()) {
// NotNestedLessLess=10913,824;1887
final String name = reader.consumeTo('=');
reader.advance();
final int cp1 = Integer.parseInt(reader.consumeToAny(codeDelims), codepointRadix);
final char codeDelim = reader.current();
reader.advance();
final int cp2;
if (codeDelim == ',') {
cp2 = Integer.parseInt(reader.consumeTo(';'), codepointRadix);
reader.advance();
} else {
cp2 = empty;
}
String indexS = reader.consumeTo('\n');
// default git checkout on windows will add a \r there, so remove
if (indexS.charAt(indexS.length() - 1) == '\r') {
indexS = indexS.substring(0, indexS.length() - 1);
}
final int index = Integer.parseInt(indexS, codepointRadix);
reader.advance();
e.nameKeys[i] = name;
e.codeVals[i] = cp1;
e.codeKeys[index] = cp1;
e.nameVals[index] = name;
if (cp2 != empty) {
multipoints.put(name, new String(new int[]{cp1, cp2}, 0, 2));
}
i++;
}
Validate.isTrue(i == size, "Unexpected count of entities loaded for " + file);
}
#location 48
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
private static void load(EscapeMode e, String file, int size) {
e.nameKeys = new String[size];
e.codeVals = new int[size];
e.codeKeys = new int[size];
e.nameVals = new String[size];
InputStream stream = Entities.class.getResourceAsStream(file);
if (stream == null)
throw new IllegalStateException("Could not read resource " + file + ". Make sure you copy resources for " + Entities.class.getCanonicalName());
int i = 0;
BufferedReader input = null;
try {
input = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(stream, ASCII));
CharacterReader reader = new CharacterReader(input);
while (!reader.isEmpty()) {
// NotNestedLessLess=10913,824;1887
final String name = reader.consumeTo('=');
reader.advance();
final int cp1 = Integer.parseInt(reader.consumeToAny(codeDelims), codepointRadix);
final char codeDelim = reader.current();
reader.advance();
final int cp2;
if (codeDelim == ',') {
cp2 = Integer.parseInt(reader.consumeTo(';'), codepointRadix);
reader.advance();
} else {
cp2 = empty;
}
String indexS = reader.consumeTo('\n');
// default git checkout on windows will add a \r there, so remove
if (indexS.charAt(indexS.length() - 1) == '\r') {
indexS = indexS.substring(0, indexS.length() - 1);
}
final int index = Integer.parseInt(indexS, codepointRadix);
reader.advance();
e.nameKeys[i] = name;
e.codeVals[i] = cp1;
e.codeKeys[index] = cp1;
e.nameVals[index] = name;
if (cp2 != empty) {
multipoints.put(name, new String(new int[]{cp1, cp2}, 0, 2));
}
i++;
}
} finally {
try {
if (input != null) {
input.close();
}
} catch (IOException e1) {
//ignore exception
}
}
Validate.isTrue(i == size, "Unexpected count of entities loaded for " + file);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
protected void outerHtml(StringBuilder accum) {
new NodeTraversor(new OuterHtmlVisitor(accum, ownerDocument().outputSettings())).traverse(this);
}
#location 2
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
protected void outerHtml(StringBuilder accum) {
new NodeTraversor(new OuterHtmlVisitor(accum, getOutputSettings())).traverse(this);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public boolean matchesWord() {
return !isEmpty() && Character.isLetterOrDigit(peek());
}
#location 2
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public boolean matchesWord() {
return !isEmpty() && Character.isLetterOrDigit(queue.charAt(pos));
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testNextElementSiblings() {
Document doc = Jsoup.parse("<li id='a'>a</li>" +
"<li id='b'>b</li>" +
"<li id='c'>c</li>");
Element element = doc.getElementById("a");
List<Element> elementSiblings = element.nextElementSiblings();
assertNotNull(elementSiblings);
assertEquals(2, elementSiblings.size());
Element element1 = doc.getElementById("c");
List<Element> elementSiblings1 = element1.nextElementSiblings();
assertNull(elementSiblings1);
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testNextElementSiblings() {
Document doc = Jsoup.parse("<ul id='ul'>" +
"<li id='a'>a</li>" +
"<li id='b'>b</li>" +
"<li id='c'>c</li>" +
"</ul>" +
"<div id='div'>" +
"<li id='d'>d</li>" +
"</div>");
Element element = doc.getElementById("a");
List<Element> elementSiblings = element.nextElementSiblings();
assertNotNull(elementSiblings);
assertEquals(2, elementSiblings.size());
assertEquals("b", elementSiblings.get(0).id());
assertEquals("c", elementSiblings.get(1).id());
Element element1 = doc.getElementById("b");
List<Element> elementSiblings1 = element1.nextElementSiblings();
assertNotNull(elementSiblings1);
assertEquals(1, elementSiblings1.size());
assertEquals("c", elementSiblings1.get(0).id());
Element element2 = doc.getElementById("c");
List<Element> elementSiblings2 = element2.nextElementSiblings();
assertEquals(0, elementSiblings2.size());
Element ul = doc.getElementById("ul");
List<Element> elementSiblings3 = ul.nextElementSiblings();
assertNotNull(elementSiblings3);
assertEquals(1, elementSiblings3.size());
assertEquals("div", elementSiblings3.get(0).id());
Element div = doc.getElementById("div");
List<Element> elementSiblings4 = div.nextElementSiblings();
try {
Element elementSibling = elementSiblings4.get(0);
fail("This element should has no next siblings");
} catch (IndexOutOfBoundsException e) {
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public Document normalise() {
if (select("html").isEmpty())
appendElement("html");
if (head() == null)
select("html").first().prependElement("head");
if (body() == null)
select("html").first().appendElement("body");
// pull text nodes out of root, html, and head els, and push into body. non-text nodes are already taken care
// of. do in inverse order to maintain text order.
normalise(head());
normalise(select("html").first());
normalise(this);
return this;
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public Document normalise() {
Element htmlEl = findFirstElementByTagName("html", this);
if (htmlEl == null)
htmlEl = appendElement("html");
if (head() == null)
htmlEl.prependElement("head");
if (body() == null)
htmlEl.appendElement("body");
// pull text nodes out of root, html, and head els, and push into body. non-text nodes are already taken care
// of. do in inverse order to maintain text order.
normalise(head());
normalise(htmlEl);
normalise(this);
return this;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
protected void removeChild(Node out) {
Validate.isTrue(out.parentNode == this);
int index = indexInList(out, childNodes);
childNodes.remove(index);
out.parentNode = null;
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
protected void removeChild(Node out) {
Validate.isTrue(out.parentNode == this);
int index = out.siblingIndex();
childNodes.remove(index);
reindexChildren();
out.parentNode = null;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testNextElementSiblings() {
Document doc = Jsoup.parse("<li id='a'>a</li>" +
"<li id='b'>b</li>" +
"<li id='c'>c</li>");
Element element = doc.getElementById("a");
List<Element> elementSiblings = element.nextElementSiblings();
assertNotNull(elementSiblings);
assertEquals(2, elementSiblings.size());
Element element1 = doc.getElementById("c");
List<Element> elementSiblings1 = element1.nextElementSiblings();
assertNull(elementSiblings1);
}
#location 12
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testNextElementSiblings() {
Document doc = Jsoup.parse("<ul id='ul'>" +
"<li id='a'>a</li>" +
"<li id='b'>b</li>" +
"<li id='c'>c</li>" +
"</ul>" +
"<div id='div'>" +
"<li id='d'>d</li>" +
"</div>");
Element element = doc.getElementById("a");
List<Element> elementSiblings = element.nextElementSiblings();
assertNotNull(elementSiblings);
assertEquals(2, elementSiblings.size());
assertEquals("b", elementSiblings.get(0).id());
assertEquals("c", elementSiblings.get(1).id());
Element element1 = doc.getElementById("b");
List<Element> elementSiblings1 = element1.nextElementSiblings();
assertNotNull(elementSiblings1);
assertEquals(1, elementSiblings1.size());
assertEquals("c", elementSiblings1.get(0).id());
Element element2 = doc.getElementById("c");
List<Element> elementSiblings2 = element2.nextElementSiblings();
assertEquals(0, elementSiblings2.size());
Element ul = doc.getElementById("ul");
List<Element> elementSiblings3 = ul.nextElementSiblings();
assertNotNull(elementSiblings3);
assertEquals(1, elementSiblings3.size());
assertEquals("div", elementSiblings3.get(0).id());
Element div = doc.getElementById("div");
List<Element> elementSiblings4 = div.nextElementSiblings();
try {
Element elementSibling = elementSiblings4.get(0);
fail("This element should has no next siblings");
} catch (IndexOutOfBoundsException e) {
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private static void load(EscapeMode e, String file, int size) {
e.nameKeys = new String[size];
e.codeVals = new int[size];
e.codeKeys = new int[size];
e.nameVals = new String[size];
InputStream stream = Entities.class.getResourceAsStream(file);
if (stream == null)
throw new IllegalStateException("Could not read resource " + file + ". Make sure you copy resources for " + Entities.class.getCanonicalName());
int i = 0;
BufferedReader input = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(stream, ASCII));
CharacterReader reader = new CharacterReader(input);
while (!reader.isEmpty()) {
// NotNestedLessLess=10913,824;1887
final String name = reader.consumeTo('=');
reader.advance();
final int cp1 = Integer.parseInt(reader.consumeToAny(codeDelims), codepointRadix);
final char codeDelim = reader.current();
reader.advance();
final int cp2;
if (codeDelim == ',') {
cp2 = Integer.parseInt(reader.consumeTo(';'), codepointRadix);
reader.advance();
} else {
cp2 = empty;
}
String indexS = reader.consumeTo('\n');
// default git checkout on windows will add a \r there, so remove
if (indexS.charAt(indexS.length() - 1) == '\r') {
indexS = indexS.substring(0, indexS.length() - 1);
}
final int index = Integer.parseInt(indexS, codepointRadix);
reader.advance();
e.nameKeys[i] = name;
e.codeVals[i] = cp1;
e.codeKeys[index] = cp1;
e.nameVals[index] = name;
if (cp2 != empty) {
multipoints.put(name, new String(new int[]{cp1, cp2}, 0, 2));
}
i++;
}
Validate.isTrue(i == size, "Unexpected count of entities loaded for " + file);
}
#location 13
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
private static void load(EscapeMode e, String file, int size) {
e.nameKeys = new String[size];
e.codeVals = new int[size];
e.codeKeys = new int[size];
e.nameVals = new String[size];
InputStream stream = Entities.class.getResourceAsStream(file);
if (stream == null)
throw new IllegalStateException("Could not read resource " + file + ". Make sure you copy resources for " + Entities.class.getCanonicalName());
int i = 0;
BufferedReader input = null;
try {
input = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(stream, ASCII));
CharacterReader reader = new CharacterReader(input);
while (!reader.isEmpty()) {
// NotNestedLessLess=10913,824;1887
final String name = reader.consumeTo('=');
reader.advance();
final int cp1 = Integer.parseInt(reader.consumeToAny(codeDelims), codepointRadix);
final char codeDelim = reader.current();
reader.advance();
final int cp2;
if (codeDelim == ',') {
cp2 = Integer.parseInt(reader.consumeTo(';'), codepointRadix);
reader.advance();
} else {
cp2 = empty;
}
String indexS = reader.consumeTo('\n');
// default git checkout on windows will add a \r there, so remove
if (indexS.charAt(indexS.length() - 1) == '\r') {
indexS = indexS.substring(0, indexS.length() - 1);
}
final int index = Integer.parseInt(indexS, codepointRadix);
reader.advance();
e.nameKeys[i] = name;
e.codeVals[i] = cp1;
e.codeKeys[index] = cp1;
e.nameVals[index] = name;
if (cp2 != empty) {
multipoints.put(name, new String(new int[]{cp1, cp2}, 0, 2));
}
i++;
}
} finally {
try {
if (input != null) {
input.close();
}
} catch (IOException e1) {
//ignore exception
}
}
Validate.isTrue(i == size, "Unexpected count of entities loaded for " + file);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
void insert(Token.Character characterToken) {
final Node node;
final Element el = currentElement();
final String tagName = el.normalName();
final String data = characterToken.getData();
if (characterToken.isCData())
node = new CDataNode(data);
else if (tagName.equals("script") || tagName.equals("style"))
node = new DataNode(data);
else
node = new TextNode(data);
el.appendChild(node); // doesn't use insertNode, because we don't foster these; and will always have a stack.
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
ParseSettings defaultSettings() {
return ParseSettings.htmlDefault;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
void outerHtml(StringBuilder accum) {
String html = StringEscapeUtils.escapeHtml(getWholeText());
if (parent() instanceof Element && !((Element) parent()).preserveWhitespace()) {
html = normaliseWhitespace(html);
}
if (siblingIndex() == 0 && parentNode instanceof Element && ((Element) parentNode).tag().canContainBlock() && !isBlank())
indent(accum);
accum.append(html);
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
void outerHtmlHead(StringBuilder accum, int depth) {
String html = StringEscapeUtils.escapeHtml(getWholeText());
if (parent() instanceof Element && !((Element) parent()).preserveWhitespace()) {
html = normaliseWhitespace(html);
}
if (siblingIndex() == 0 && parentNode instanceof Element && ((Element) parentNode).tag().canContainBlock() && !isBlank())
indent(accum, depth);
accum.append(html);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public static Document load(File in, String charsetName, String baseUri) throws IOException {
InputStream inStream = new FileInputStream(in);
ByteBuffer byteData = readToByteBuffer(inStream);
Document doc = parseByteData(byteData, charsetName, baseUri);
inStream.close();
return doc;
}
#location 6
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public static Document load(File in, String charsetName, String baseUri) throws IOException {
InputStream inStream = null;
try {
inStream = new FileInputStream(in);
ByteBuffer byteData = readToByteBuffer(inStream);
return parseByteData(byteData, charsetName, baseUri);
} finally {
if (inStream != null)
inStream.close();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public String consumeCssIdentifier() {
StringBuilder accum = new StringBuilder();
Character c = peek();
while (!isEmpty() && (Character.isLetterOrDigit(c) || c.equals('-') || c.equals('_'))) {
accum.append(consume());
c = peek();
}
return accum.toString();
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public String consumeCssIdentifier() {
int start = pos;
while (!isEmpty() && (matchesWord() || matchesAny('-', '_')))
pos++;
return queue.substring(start, pos);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
protected void replaceChild(Node out, Node in) {
Validate.isTrue(out.parentNode == this);
Validate.notNull(in);
if (in.parentNode != null)
in.parentNode.removeChild(in);
Integer index = indexInList(out, childNodes);
childNodes.set(index, in);
in.parentNode = this;
out.parentNode = null;
}
#location 8
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
protected void replaceChild(Node out, Node in) {
Validate.isTrue(out.parentNode == this);
Validate.notNull(in);
if (in.parentNode != null)
in.parentNode.removeChild(in);
Integer index = out.siblingIndex();
childNodes.set(index, in);
in.parentNode = this;
in.setSiblingIndex(index);
out.parentNode = null;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
protected void addChildren(int index, Node... children) {
Validate.noNullElements(children);
final List<Node> nodes = ensureChildNodes();
for (Node child : children) {
reparentChild(child);
}
nodes.addAll(index, Arrays.asList(children));
reindexChildren(index);
}
#location 6
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
protected void addChildren(int index, Node... children) {
Validate.notNull(children);
if (children.length == 0) {
return;
}
final List<Node> nodes = ensureChildNodes();
// fast path - if used as a wrap (index=0, children = child[0].parent.children - do inplace
final Node firstParent = children[0].parent();
if (firstParent != null && firstParent.childNodeSize() == children.length) {
boolean sameList = true;
final List<Node> firstParentNodes = firstParent.childNodes();
// identity check contents to see if same
int i = children.length;
while (i-- > 0) {
if (children[i] != firstParentNodes.get(i)) {
sameList = false;
break;
}
}
firstParent.empty();
nodes.addAll(index, Arrays.asList(children));
i = children.length;
while (i-- > 0) {
children[i].parentNode = this;
}
reindexChildren(index);
return;
}
Validate.noNullElements(children);
for (Node child : children) {
reparentChild(child);
}
nodes.addAll(index, Arrays.asList(children));
reindexChildren(index);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
static String unescape(String string) {
if (!string.contains("&"))
return string;
Matcher m = unescapePattern.matcher(string); // &(#(x|X)?([0-9a-fA-F]+)|[a-zA-Z]+);?
StringBuffer accum = new StringBuffer(string.length()); // pity matcher can't use stringbuilder, avoid syncs
while (m.find()) {
int charval = -1;
String num = m.group(3);
if (num != null) {
try {
int base = m.group(2) != null ? 16 : 10; // 2 is hex indicator
charval = Integer.valueOf(num, base);
} catch (NumberFormatException e) {
} // skip
} else {
String name = m.group(1).toLowerCase();
if (full.containsKey(name))
charval = full.get(name);
}
if (charval != -1 || charval > 0xFFFF) { // out of range
String c = Character.toString((char) charval);
m.appendReplacement(accum, c);
} else {
m.appendReplacement(accum, m.group(0)); // replace with original string
}
}
m.appendTail(accum);
return accum.toString();
}
#location 18
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
static String unescape(String string) {
if (!string.contains("&"))
return string;
Matcher m = unescapePattern.matcher(string); // &(#(x|X)?([0-9a-fA-F]+)|[a-zA-Z]+);?
StringBuffer accum = new StringBuffer(string.length()); // pity matcher can't use stringbuilder, avoid syncs
while (m.find()) {
int charval = -1;
String num = m.group(3);
if (num != null) {
try {
int base = m.group(2) != null ? 16 : 10; // 2 is hex indicator
charval = Integer.valueOf(num, base);
} catch (NumberFormatException e) {
} // skip
} else {
String name = m.group(1);
if (full.containsKey(name))
charval = full.get(name);
}
if (charval != -1 || charval > 0xFFFF) { // out of range
String c = Character.toString((char) charval);
m.appendReplacement(accum, c);
} else {
m.appendReplacement(accum, m.group(0)); // replace with original string
}
}
m.appendTail(accum);
return accum.toString();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private static void load(EscapeMode e, String file, int size) {
e.nameKeys = new String[size];
e.codeVals = new int[size];
e.codeKeys = new int[size];
e.nameVals = new String[size];
InputStream stream = Entities.class.getResourceAsStream(file);
if (stream == null)
throw new IllegalStateException("Could not read resource " + file + ". Make sure you copy resources for " + Entities.class.getCanonicalName());
BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(stream));
String entry;
int i = 0;
try {
while ((entry = reader.readLine()) != null) {
// NotNestedLessLess=10913,824;1887
final Matcher match = entityPattern.matcher(entry);
if (match.find()) {
final String name = match.group(1);
final int cp1 = Integer.parseInt(match.group(2), codepointRadix);
final int cp2 = match.group(3) != null ? Integer.parseInt(match.group(3), codepointRadix) : empty;
final int index = Integer.parseInt(match.group(4), codepointRadix);
e.nameKeys[i] = name;
e.codeVals[i] = cp1;
e.codeKeys[index] = cp1;
e.nameVals[index] = name;
if (cp2 != empty) {
multipoints.put(name, new String(new int[]{cp1, cp2}, 0, 2));
}
i++;
}
}
reader.close();
} catch (IOException err) {
throw new IllegalStateException("Error reading resource " + file);
}
}
#location 36
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
private static void load(EscapeMode e, String file, int size) {
e.nameKeys = new String[size];
e.codeVals = new int[size];
e.codeKeys = new int[size];
e.nameVals = new String[size];
InputStream stream = Entities.class.getResourceAsStream(file);
if (stream == null)
throw new IllegalStateException("Could not read resource " + file + ". Make sure you copy resources for " + Entities.class.getCanonicalName());
int i = 0;
try {
ByteBuffer bytes = DataUtil.readToByteBuffer(stream, 0);
String contents = Charset.forName("ascii").decode(bytes).toString();
CharacterReader reader = new CharacterReader(contents);
while (!reader.isEmpty()) {
// NotNestedLessLess=10913,824;1887
final String name = reader.consumeTo('=');
reader.advance();
final int cp1 = Integer.parseInt(reader.consumeToAny(codeDelims), codepointRadix);
final char codeDelim = reader.current();
reader.advance();
final int cp2;
if (codeDelim == ',') {
cp2 = Integer.parseInt(reader.consumeTo(';'), codepointRadix);
reader.advance();
} else {
cp2 = empty;
}
final int index = Integer.parseInt(reader.consumeTo('\n'), codepointRadix);
reader.advance();
e.nameKeys[i] = name;
e.codeVals[i] = cp1;
e.codeKeys[index] = cp1;
e.nameVals[index] = name;
if (cp2 != empty) {
multipoints.put(name, new String(new int[]{cp1, cp2}, 0, 2));
}
i++;
}
} catch (IOException err) {
throw new IllegalStateException("Error reading resource " + file);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private void parseStartTag() {
tq.consume("<");
Attributes attributes = new Attributes();
String tagName = tq.consumeWord();
while (!tq.matches("<") && !tq.matches("/>") && !tq.matches(">") && !tq.isEmpty()) {
Attribute attribute = parseAttribute();
if (attribute != null)
attributes.put(attribute);
}
Tag tag = Tag.valueOf(tagName);
StartTag startTag = new StartTag(tag, attributes);
Element child = new Element(startTag);
boolean emptyTag;
if (tq.matchChomp("/>")) { // empty tag, don't add to stack
emptyTag = true;
} else {
tq.matchChomp(">"); // safe because checked above (or ran out of data)
emptyTag = false;
}
// pc data only tags (textarea, script): chomp to end tag, add content as text node
if (tag.isData()) {
String data = tq.chompTo("</" + tagName);
tq.chompTo(">");
TextNode textNode = TextNode.createFromEncoded(data);
child.addChild(textNode);
if (tag.equals(titleTag))
doc.setTitle(child.text());
}
// switch between html, head, body, to preserve doc structure
if (tag.equals(htmlTag)) {
doc.getAttributes().mergeAttributes(attributes);
} else if (tag.equals(headTag)) {
doc.getHead().getAttributes().mergeAttributes(attributes);
// head is on stack from start, no action required
} else if (last().getTag().equals(headTag) && !headTag.canContain(tag)) {
// switch to body
stack.removeLast();
stack.addLast(doc.getBody());
last().addChild(child);
if (!emptyTag)
stack.addLast(child);
} else if (tag.equals(bodyTag) && last().getTag().equals(htmlTag)) {
doc.getBody().getAttributes().mergeAttributes(attributes);
stack.removeLast();
stack.addLast(doc.getBody());
} else {
Element parent = popStackToSuitableContainer(tag);
parent.addChild(child);
if (!emptyTag && !tag.isData()) // TODO: only check for data here because last() == head is wrong; should be ancestor is head
stack.addLast(child);
}
}
#location 54
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private void parseStartTag() {
tq.consume("<");
Attributes attributes = new Attributes();
String tagName = tq.consumeWord();
while (!tq.matchesAny("<", "/>", ">") && !tq.isEmpty()) {
Attribute attribute = parseAttribute();
if (attribute != null)
attributes.put(attribute);
}
Tag tag = Tag.valueOf(tagName);
StartTag startTag = new StartTag(tag, attributes);
Element child = new Element(startTag);
boolean emptyTag;
if (tq.matchChomp("/>")) { // empty tag, don't add to stack
emptyTag = true;
} else {
tq.matchChomp(">"); // safe because checked above (or ran out of data)
emptyTag = false;
}
// pc data only tags (textarea, script): chomp to end tag, add content as text node
if (tag.isData()) {
String data = tq.chompTo("</" + tagName);
tq.chompTo(">");
TextNode textNode = TextNode.createFromEncoded(data); // TODO: maybe have this be another data type? So doesn't come back in text()?
child.addChild(textNode);
if (tag.equals(titleTag))
doc.setTitle(child.text());
}
// switch between html, head, body, to preserve doc structure
if (tag.equals(htmlTag)) {
doc.getAttributes().mergeAttributes(attributes);
} else if (tag.equals(headTag)) {
doc.getHead().getAttributes().mergeAttributes(attributes);
// head is on stack from start, no action required
} else if (last().getTag().equals(headTag) && !headTag.canContain(tag)) {
// switch to body
stack.removeLast();
stack.addLast(doc.getBody());
last().addChild(child);
if (!emptyTag)
stack.addLast(child);
} else if (tag.equals(bodyTag) && last().getTag().equals(htmlTag)) {
doc.getBody().getAttributes().mergeAttributes(attributes);
stack.removeLast();
stack.addLast(doc.getBody());
} else {
Element parent = popStackToSuitableContainer(tag);
parent.addChild(child);
if (!emptyTag && !tag.isData()) // TODO: only check for data here because last() == head is wrong; should be ancestor is head
stack.addLast(child);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private static String ihVal(String key, Document doc) {
return doc.select("th:contains(" + key + ") + td").first().text();
}
#location 2
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private static String ihVal(String key, Document doc) {
final Element first = doc.select("th:contains(" + key + ") + td").first();
return first != null ? first.text() : null;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
void outerHtmlHead(Appendable accum, int depth, Document.OutputSettings out) throws IOException {
if (out.prettyPrint() && ((siblingIndex() == 0 && parentNode instanceof Element && ((Element) parentNode).tag().formatAsBlock() && !isBlank()) || (out.outline() && siblingNodes().size()>0 && !isBlank()) ))
indent(accum, depth, out);
boolean normaliseWhite = out.prettyPrint() && !Element.preserveWhitespace(parent());
Entities.escape(accum, coreValue(), out, false, normaliseWhite, false);
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
void outerHtmlHead(Appendable accum, int depth, Document.OutputSettings out) throws IOException {
final boolean prettyPrint = out.prettyPrint();
if (prettyPrint && ((siblingIndex() == 0 && parentNode instanceof Element && ((Element) parentNode).tag().formatAsBlock() && !isBlank()) || (out.outline() && siblingNodes().size()>0 && !isBlank()) ))
indent(accum, depth, out);
final boolean normaliseWhite = prettyPrint && !Element.preserveWhitespace(parentNode);
final boolean stripWhite = prettyPrint && parentNode instanceof Document;
Entities.escape(accum, coreValue(), out, false, normaliseWhite, stripWhite);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testNamespace() throws Exception
{
final String namespace = "TestNamespace";
CuratorFrameworkFactory.Builder builder = CuratorFrameworkFactory.builder();
CuratorFramework client = builder.connectString(server.getConnectString()).retryPolicy(new RetryOneTime(1)).namespace(namespace).build();
client.start();
try
{
String actualPath = client.create().forPath("/test", new byte[0]);
Assert.assertEquals(actualPath, "/test");
Assert.assertNotNull(client.getZookeeperClient().getZooKeeper().exists("/" + namespace + "/test", false));
Assert.assertNull(client.getZookeeperClient().getZooKeeper().exists("/test", false));
actualPath = client.nonNamespaceView().create().forPath("/non", new byte[0]);
Assert.assertEquals(actualPath, "/non");
Assert.assertNotNull(client.getZookeeperClient().getZooKeeper().exists("/non", false));
client.create().forPath("/test/child", "hey".getBytes());
byte[] bytes = client.getData().forPath("/test/child");
Assert.assertEquals(bytes, "hey".getBytes());
bytes = client.nonNamespaceView().getData().forPath("/" + namespace + "/test/child");
Assert.assertEquals(bytes, "hey".getBytes());
}
finally
{
client.close();
}
}
#location 26
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testNamespace() throws Exception
{
final String namespace = "TestNamespace";
CuratorFrameworkFactory.Builder builder = CuratorFrameworkFactory.builder();
CuratorFramework client = builder.connectString(server.getConnectString()).retryPolicy(new RetryOneTime(1)).namespace(namespace).build();
client.start();
try
{
String actualPath = client.create().forPath("/test");
Assert.assertEquals(actualPath, "/test");
Assert.assertNotNull(client.getZookeeperClient().getZooKeeper().exists("/" + namespace + "/test", false));
Assert.assertNull(client.getZookeeperClient().getZooKeeper().exists("/test", false));
actualPath = client.nonNamespaceView().create().forPath("/non");
Assert.assertEquals(actualPath, "/non");
Assert.assertNotNull(client.getZookeeperClient().getZooKeeper().exists("/non", false));
client.create().forPath("/test/child", "hey".getBytes());
byte[] bytes = client.getData().forPath("/test/child");
Assert.assertEquals(bytes, "hey".getBytes());
bytes = client.nonNamespaceView().getData().forPath("/" + namespace + "/test/child");
Assert.assertEquals(bytes, "hey".getBytes());
}
finally
{
client.close();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testNamespaceInBackground() throws Exception
{
CuratorFrameworkFactory.Builder builder = CuratorFrameworkFactory.builder();
CuratorFramework client = builder.connectString(server.getConnectString()).namespace("aisa").retryPolicy(new RetryOneTime(1)).build();
client.start();
try
{
final SynchronousQueue<String> queue = new SynchronousQueue<String>();
CuratorListener listener = new CuratorListener()
{
@Override
public void eventReceived(CuratorFramework client, CuratorEvent event) throws Exception
{
if ( event.getType() == CuratorEventType.EXISTS )
{
queue.put(event.getPath());
}
}
};
client.getCuratorListenable().addListener(listener);
client.create().forPath("/base", new byte[0]);
client.checkExists().inBackground().forPath("/base");
String path = queue.poll(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
Assert.assertEquals(path, "/base");
client.getCuratorListenable().removeListener(listener);
BackgroundCallback callback = new BackgroundCallback()
{
@Override
public void processResult(CuratorFramework client, CuratorEvent event) throws Exception
{
queue.put(event.getPath());
}
};
client.getChildren().inBackground(callback).forPath("/base");
path = queue.poll(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
Assert.assertEquals(path, "/base");
}
finally
{
client.close();
}
}
#location 18
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testNamespaceInBackground() throws Exception
{
CuratorFrameworkFactory.Builder builder = CuratorFrameworkFactory.builder();
CuratorFramework client = builder.connectString(server.getConnectString()).namespace("aisa").retryPolicy(new RetryOneTime(1)).build();
client.start();
try
{
final SynchronousQueue<String> queue = new SynchronousQueue<String>();
CuratorListener listener = new CuratorListener()
{
@Override
public void eventReceived(CuratorFramework client, CuratorEvent event) throws Exception
{
if ( event.getType() == CuratorEventType.EXISTS )
{
queue.put(event.getPath());
}
}
};
client.getCuratorListenable().addListener(listener);
client.create().forPath("/base");
client.checkExists().inBackground().forPath("/base");
String path = queue.poll(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
Assert.assertEquals(path, "/base");
client.getCuratorListenable().removeListener(listener);
BackgroundCallback callback = new BackgroundCallback()
{
@Override
public void processResult(CuratorFramework client, CuratorEvent event) throws Exception
{
queue.put(event.getPath());
}
};
client.getChildren().inBackground(callback).forPath("/base");
path = queue.poll(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
Assert.assertEquals(path, "/base");
}
finally
{
client.close();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testNamespaceWithWatcher() throws Exception
{
CuratorFrameworkFactory.Builder builder = CuratorFrameworkFactory.builder();
CuratorFramework client = builder.connectString(server.getConnectString()).namespace("aisa").retryPolicy(new RetryOneTime(1)).build();
client.start();
try
{
final SynchronousQueue<String> queue = new SynchronousQueue<String>();
Watcher watcher = new Watcher()
{
@Override
public void process(WatchedEvent event)
{
try
{
queue.put(event.getPath());
}
catch ( InterruptedException e )
{
throw new Error(e);
}
}
};
client.create().forPath("/base", new byte[0]);
client.getChildren().usingWatcher(watcher).forPath("/base");
client.create().forPath("/base/child", new byte[0]);
String path = queue.take();
Assert.assertEquals(path, "/base");
}
finally
{
client.close();
}
}
#location 18
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testNamespaceWithWatcher() throws Exception
{
CuratorFrameworkFactory.Builder builder = CuratorFrameworkFactory.builder();
CuratorFramework client = builder.connectString(server.getConnectString()).namespace("aisa").retryPolicy(new RetryOneTime(1)).build();
client.start();
try
{
final SynchronousQueue<String> queue = new SynchronousQueue<String>();
Watcher watcher = new Watcher()
{
@Override
public void process(WatchedEvent event)
{
try
{
queue.put(event.getPath());
}
catch ( InterruptedException e )
{
throw new Error(e);
}
}
};
client.create().forPath("/base");
client.getChildren().usingWatcher(watcher).forPath("/base");
client.create().forPath("/base/child");
String path = queue.take();
Assert.assertEquals(path, "/base");
}
finally
{
client.close();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void transactionObject(final String trytes) {
if (StringUtils.isEmpty(trytes)) {
log.warn("Warning: empty trytes in input for transactionObject");
return;
}
// validity check
for (int i = 2279; i < 2295; i++) {
if (trytes.charAt(i) != '9') {
log.warn("Trytes {} does not seem a valid tryte", trytes);
return;
}
}
int[] transactionTrits = Converter.trits(trytes);
int[] hash = new int[243];
ICurl curl = SpongeFactory.create(SpongeFactory.Mode.CURL);
// generate the correct transaction hash
curl.reset();
curl.absorb(transactionTrits, 0, transactionTrits.length);
curl.squeeze(hash, 0, hash.length);
this.setHash(Converter.trytes(hash));
this.setSignatureFragments(trytes.substring(0, 2187));
this.setAddress(trytes.substring(2187, 2268));
this.setValue(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 6804, 6837)));
this.setTag(trytes.substring(2295, 2322));
this.setTimestamp(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 6966, 6993)));
this.setCurrentIndex(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 6993, 7020)));
this.setLastIndex(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 7020, 7047)));
this.setBundle(trytes.substring(2349, 2430));
this.setTrunkTransaction(trytes.substring(2430, 2511));
this.setBranchTransaction(trytes.substring(2511, 2592));
this.setNonce(trytes.substring(2592, 2673));
}
#location 21
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public void transactionObject(final String trytes) {
if (StringUtils.isEmpty(trytes)) {
log.warn("Warning: empty trytes in input for transactionObject");
return;
}
// validity check
for (int i = 2279; i < 2295; i++) {
if (trytes.charAt(i) != '9') {
log.warn("Trytes {} does not seem a valid tryte", trytes);
return;
}
}
int[] transactionTrits = Converter.trits(trytes);
int[] hash = new int[243];
ICurl curl = SpongeFactory.create(SpongeFactory.Mode.CURLP81);
// generate the correct transaction hash
curl.reset();
curl.absorb(transactionTrits, 0, transactionTrits.length);
curl.squeeze(hash, 0, hash.length);
this.setHash(Converter.trytes(hash));
this.setSignatureFragments(trytes.substring(0, 2187));
this.setAddress(trytes.substring(2187, 2268));
this.setValue(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 6804, 6837)));
this.setObsoleteTag(trytes.substring(2295, 2322));
this.setTimestamp(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 6966, 6993)));
this.setCurrentIndex(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 6993, 7020)));
this.setLastIndex(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 7020, 7047)));
this.setBundle(trytes.substring(2349, 2430));
this.setTrunkTransaction(trytes.substring(2430, 2511));
this.setBranchTransaction(trytes.substring(2511, 2592));
this.setTag(trytes.substring(2592, 2619));
this.setAttachmentTimestamp(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 7857, 7884)) / 1000);
this.setAttachmentTimestampLowerBound(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 7884, 7911)));
this.setAttachmentTimestampUpperBound(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 7911, 7938)));
this.setNonce(trytes.substring(2646, 2673));
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public GetTransferResponse getTransfers(String seed, Integer start, Integer end, Boolean inclusionStates) throws ArgumentException, InvalidBundleException, InvalidSignatureException {
start = start != null ? 0 : start;
end = end == null ? null : end;
inclusionStates = inclusionStates != null ? inclusionStates : null;
if (start > end || end > (start + 500)) {
throw new ArgumentException();
}
GetNewAddressResponse gnr = getNewAddress(seed, start, false, end == null ? end - start : end, true);
if (gnr != null && gnr.getAddresses() != null) {
Bundle[] bundles = bundlesFromAddresses(gnr.getAddresses().toArray(new String[gnr.getAddresses().size()]), inclusionStates);
return GetTransferResponse.create(bundles);
}
return null;
}
#location 6
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public GetTransferResponse getTransfers(String seed, Integer start, Integer end, Boolean inclusionStates) throws ArgumentException, InvalidBundleException, InvalidSignatureException {
// validate & if needed pad seed
if ( (seed = InputValidator.validateSeed(seed)) == null) {
throw new IllegalStateException("Invalid Seed");
}
start = start != null ? 0 : start;
end = end == null ? null : end;
inclusionStates = inclusionStates != null ? inclusionStates : null;
if (start > end || end > (start + 500)) {
throw new ArgumentException();
}
StopWatch sw = new StopWatch();
sw.start();
System.out.println("GetTransfer started");
GetNewAddressResponse gnr = getNewAddress(seed, start, false, end == null ? end - start : end, true);
if (gnr != null && gnr.getAddresses() != null) {
System.out.println("GetTransfers after getNewAddresses " + sw.getTime() + " ms");
Bundle[] bundles = bundlesFromAddresses(gnr.getAddresses().toArray(new String[gnr.getAddresses().size()]), inclusionStates);
System.out.println("GetTransfers after bundlesFromAddresses " + sw.getTime() + " ms");
sw.stop();
return GetTransferResponse.create(bundles);
}
sw.stop();
return null;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void transactionObject(final String trytes) {
if (StringUtils.isEmpty(trytes)) {
log.warn("Warning: empty trytes in input for transactionObject");
return;
}
// validity check
for (int i = 2279; i < 2295; i++) {
if (trytes.charAt(i) != '9') {
log.warn("Trytes {} does not seem a valid tryte", trytes);
return;
}
}
int[] transactionTrits = Converter.trits(trytes);
int[] hash = new int[243];
ICurl curl = SpongeFactory.create(SpongeFactory.Mode.CURL);
// generate the correct transaction hash
curl.reset();
curl.absorb(transactionTrits, 0, transactionTrits.length);
curl.squeeze(hash, 0, hash.length);
this.setHash(Converter.trytes(hash));
this.setSignatureFragments(trytes.substring(0, 2187));
this.setAddress(trytes.substring(2187, 2268));
this.setValue(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 6804, 6837)));
this.setTag(trytes.substring(2295, 2322));
this.setTimestamp(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 6966, 6993)));
this.setCurrentIndex(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 6993, 7020)));
this.setLastIndex(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 7020, 7047)));
this.setBundle(trytes.substring(2349, 2430));
this.setTrunkTransaction(trytes.substring(2430, 2511));
this.setBranchTransaction(trytes.substring(2511, 2592));
this.setNonce(trytes.substring(2592, 2673));
}
#location 21
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public void transactionObject(final String trytes) {
if (StringUtils.isEmpty(trytes)) {
log.warn("Warning: empty trytes in input for transactionObject");
return;
}
// validity check
for (int i = 2279; i < 2295; i++) {
if (trytes.charAt(i) != '9') {
log.warn("Trytes {} does not seem a valid tryte", trytes);
return;
}
}
int[] transactionTrits = Converter.trits(trytes);
int[] hash = new int[243];
ICurl curl = SpongeFactory.create(SpongeFactory.Mode.CURLP81);
// generate the correct transaction hash
curl.reset();
curl.absorb(transactionTrits, 0, transactionTrits.length);
curl.squeeze(hash, 0, hash.length);
this.setHash(Converter.trytes(hash));
this.setSignatureFragments(trytes.substring(0, 2187));
this.setAddress(trytes.substring(2187, 2268));
this.setValue(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 6804, 6837)));
this.setObsoleteTag(trytes.substring(2295, 2322));
this.setTimestamp(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 6966, 6993)));
this.setCurrentIndex(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 6993, 7020)));
this.setLastIndex(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 7020, 7047)));
this.setBundle(trytes.substring(2349, 2430));
this.setTrunkTransaction(trytes.substring(2430, 2511));
this.setBranchTransaction(trytes.substring(2511, 2592));
this.setTag(trytes.substring(2592, 2619));
this.setAttachmentTimestamp(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 7857, 7884)) / 1000);
this.setAttachmentTimestampLowerBound(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 7884, 7911)));
this.setAttachmentTimestampUpperBound(Converter.longValue(Arrays.copyOfRange(transactionTrits, 7911, 7938)));
this.setNonce(trytes.substring(2646, 2673));
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public GetTransferResponse getTransfers(String seed, Integer start, Integer end, Boolean inclusionStates) throws ArgumentException, InvalidBundleException, InvalidSignatureException {
start = start != null ? 0 : start;
end = end == null ? null : end;
inclusionStates = inclusionStates != null ? inclusionStates : null;
if (start > end || end > (start + 500)) {
throw new ArgumentException();
}
GetNewAddressResponse gnr = getNewAddress(seed, start, false, end == null ? end - start : end, true);
if (gnr != null && gnr.getAddresses() != null) {
Bundle[] bundles = bundlesFromAddresses(gnr.getAddresses().toArray(new String[gnr.getAddresses().size()]), inclusionStates);
return GetTransferResponse.create(bundles);
}
return null;
}
#location 12
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public GetTransferResponse getTransfers(String seed, Integer start, Integer end, Boolean inclusionStates) throws ArgumentException, InvalidBundleException, InvalidSignatureException {
// validate & if needed pad seed
if ( (seed = InputValidator.validateSeed(seed)) == null) {
throw new IllegalStateException("Invalid Seed");
}
start = start != null ? 0 : start;
end = end == null ? null : end;
inclusionStates = inclusionStates != null ? inclusionStates : null;
if (start > end || end > (start + 500)) {
throw new ArgumentException();
}
StopWatch sw = new StopWatch();
sw.start();
System.out.println("GetTransfer started");
GetNewAddressResponse gnr = getNewAddress(seed, start, false, end == null ? end - start : end, true);
if (gnr != null && gnr.getAddresses() != null) {
System.out.println("GetTransfers after getNewAddresses " + sw.getTime() + " ms");
Bundle[] bundles = bundlesFromAddresses(gnr.getAddresses().toArray(new String[gnr.getAddresses().size()]), inclusionStates);
System.out.println("GetTransfers after bundlesFromAddresses " + sw.getTime() + " ms");
sw.stop();
return GetTransferResponse.create(bundles);
}
sw.stop();
return null;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private synchronized boolean send(byte[] bytes) {
// buffering
if (pendings.position() + bytes.length > pendings.capacity()) {
LOG.severe("Cannot send logs to " + server.toString());
return false;
}
pendings.put(bytes);
try {
// suppress reconnection burst
if (!reconnector.enableReconnection(System.currentTimeMillis())) {
return true;
}
// check whether connection is established or not
reconnect();
// write data
out.write(getBuffer());
out.flush();
clearBuffer();
} catch (IOException e) {
// close socket
close();
}
return true;
}
#location 25
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
private synchronized boolean send(byte[] bytes) {
// buffering
if (pendings.position() + bytes.length > pendings.capacity()) {
LOG.severe("Cannot send logs to " + server.toString());
return false;
}
pendings.put(bytes);
try {
// suppress reconnection burst
if (!reconnector.enableReconnection(System.currentTimeMillis())) {
return true;
}
// send pending data
flush();
} catch (IOException e) {
// close socket
close();
}
return true;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testClose() throws Exception {
// use NullSender
Properties props = System.getProperties();
props.setProperty(Config.FLUENT_SENDER_CLASS, NullSender.class.getName());
// create logger objects
FluentLogger.getLogger("tag1");
FluentLogger.getLogger("tag2");
FluentLogger.getLogger("tag3");
Map<String, FluentLogger> loggers;
{
loggers = FluentLogger.getLoggers();
assertEquals(3, loggers.size());
}
// close and delete
FluentLogger.close();
{
loggers = FluentLogger.getLoggers();
assertEquals(0, loggers.size());
}
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testClose() throws Exception {
// use NullSender
Properties props = System.getProperties();
props.setProperty(Config.FLUENT_SENDER_CLASS, NullSender.class.getName());
// create logger objects
FluentLogger.getLogger("tag1");
FluentLogger.getLogger("tag2");
FluentLogger.getLogger("tag3");
Map<String, FluentLogger> loggers;
{
loggers = FluentLogger.getLoggers();
assertEquals(3, loggers.size());
}
// close and delete
FluentLogger.close();
{
loggers = FluentLogger.getLoggers();
assertEquals(0, loggers.size());
}
props.remove(Config.FLUENT_SENDER_CLASS);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void run() throws IOException {
Socket socket = serverSock.accept();
BufferedInputStream in = new BufferedInputStream(socket.getInputStream());
// TODO
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public void run() {
try {
final Socket socket = serverSocket.accept();
Thread th = new Thread() {
public void run() {
try {
process.process(msgpack, socket);
} catch (IOException e) { // ignore
}
}
};
th.start();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testClose() throws Exception {
// use NullSender
Properties props = System.getProperties();
props.setProperty(Config.FLUENT_SENDER_CLASS, NullSender.class.getName());
// create logger objects
FluentLogger.getLogger("tag1");
FluentLogger.getLogger("tag2");
FluentLogger.getLogger("tag3");
Map<String, FluentLogger> loggers;
{
loggers = FluentLogger.getLoggers();
assertEquals(3, loggers.size());
}
// close and delete
FluentLogger.close();
{
loggers = FluentLogger.getLoggers();
assertEquals(0, loggers.size());
}
}
#location 8
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testClose() throws Exception {
// use NullSender
Properties props = System.getProperties();
props.setProperty(Config.FLUENT_SENDER_CLASS, NullSender.class.getName());
// create logger objects
FluentLogger.getLogger("tag1");
FluentLogger.getLogger("tag2");
FluentLogger.getLogger("tag3");
Map<String, FluentLogger> loggers;
{
loggers = FluentLogger.getLoggers();
assertEquals(3, loggers.size());
}
// close and delete
FluentLogger.close();
{
loggers = FluentLogger.getLoggers();
assertEquals(0, loggers.size());
}
props.remove(Config.FLUENT_SENDER_CLASS);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private synchronized boolean send(byte[] bytes) {
// buffering
if (pendings.position() + bytes.length > pendings.capacity()) {
LOG.severe("Cannot send logs to " + server.toString());
return false;
}
pendings.put(bytes);
try {
// suppress reconnection burst
if (!reconnector.enableReconnection(System.currentTimeMillis())) {
return true;
}
// send pending data
flush();
} catch (IOException e) {
// close socket
close();
}
return true;
}
#location 19
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
private synchronized boolean send(byte[] bytes) {
// buffering
if (pendings.position() + bytes.length > pendings.capacity()) {
LOG.severe("Cannot send logs to " + server.toString());
return false;
}
pendings.put(bytes);
// suppress reconnection burst
if (!reconnector.enableReconnection(System.currentTimeMillis())) {
return true;
}
// send pending data
flush();
return true;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testClose() throws Exception {
// use NullSender
Properties props = System.getProperties();
props.setProperty(Config.FLUENT_SENDER_CLASS, NullSender.class.getName());
// create logger objects
FluentLogger.getLogger("tag1");
FluentLogger.getLogger("tag2");
FluentLogger.getLogger("tag3");
Map<String, FluentLogger> loggers;
{
loggers = FluentLogger.getLoggers();
assertEquals(3, loggers.size());
}
// close and delete
FluentLogger.close();
{
loggers = FluentLogger.getLoggers();
assertEquals(0, loggers.size());
}
}
#location 10
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testClose() throws Exception {
// use NullSender
Properties props = System.getProperties();
props.setProperty(Config.FLUENT_SENDER_CLASS, NullSender.class.getName());
// create logger objects
FluentLogger.getLogger("tag1");
FluentLogger.getLogger("tag2");
FluentLogger.getLogger("tag3");
Map<String, FluentLogger> loggers;
{
loggers = FluentLogger.getLoggers();
assertEquals(3, loggers.size());
}
// close and delete
FluentLogger.close();
{
loggers = FluentLogger.getLoggers();
assertEquals(0, loggers.size());
}
props.remove(Config.FLUENT_SENDER_CLASS);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void run() {
while (!finished.get()) {
try {
final Socket socket = serverSocket.accept();
Runnable r = new Runnable() {
public void run() {
try {
MessagePack msgpack = new MessagePack();
msgpack.register(Event.class, MockEventTemplate.INSTANCE);
process.process(msgpack, socket);
} catch (IOException e) {
// ignore
}
}
};
new Thread(r).start();
} catch (IOException e) {
// ignore
}
}
}
#location 16
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public void run() {
while (!finished.get()) {
try {
final Socket socket = serverSocket.accept();
socket.setSoLinger(true, 0);
clientSockets.add(socket);
Runnable r = new Runnable() {
public void run() {
try {
MessagePack msgpack = new MessagePack();
msgpack.register(Event.class, MockEventTemplate.INSTANCE);
process.process(msgpack, socket);
} catch (IOException e) {
// ignore
}
}
};
new Thread(r).start();
} catch (IOException e) {
// ignore
}
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void run() throws IOException {
Socket socket = serverSock.accept();
BufferedInputStream in = new BufferedInputStream(socket.getInputStream());
// TODO
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public void run() {
try {
final Socket socket = serverSocket.accept();
Thread th = new Thread() {
public void run() {
try {
process.process(msgpack, socket);
} catch (IOException e) { // ignore
}
}
};
th.start();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testRenderMultipleObjects() {
TestObject testObject = new TestObject();
// step 1: add one object.
Result result = new Result(200);
result.render(testObject);
assertEquals(testObject, result.getRenderable());
// step 2: add a second object (string is just a dummy)
// => we expect to get a map from the result now...
String string = new String("test");
result.render(string);
assertTrue(result.getRenderable() instanceof Map);
Map<String, Object> resultMap = (Map) result.getRenderable();
assertEquals(string, resultMap.get("string"));
assertEquals(testObject, resultMap.get("testObject"));
// step 3: add same object => we expect an illegal argument exception as the map
// cannot handle that case:
TestObject anotherObject = new TestObject();
boolean gotException = false;
try {
result.render(anotherObject);
} catch (IllegalArgumentException e) {
gotException = true;
}
assertTrue(gotException);
// step 4: add an entry
Entry<String, Object> entry = new AbstractMap.SimpleImmutableEntry<String, Object>("anotherObject", anotherObject);
result.render(entry);
resultMap = (Map) result.getRenderable();
assertEquals(3, resultMap.size());
assertEquals(anotherObject, resultMap.get("anotherObject"));
// step 5: add another map and check that conversion works:
Map<String, Object> mapToRender = Maps.newHashMap();
String anotherString = new String("anotherString");
TestObject anotherTestObject = new TestObject();
mapToRender.put("anotherString", anotherString);
mapToRender.put("anotherTestObject", anotherTestObject);
result.render(mapToRender);
resultMap = (Map) result.getRenderable();
assertEquals(5, resultMap.size());
assertEquals(anotherString, resultMap.get("anotherString"));
assertEquals(anotherTestObject, resultMap.get("anotherTestObject"));
}
#location 21
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testRenderMultipleObjects() {
TestObject testObject = new TestObject();
// step 1: add one object.
Result result = new Result(200);
result.render(testObject);
assertEquals(testObject, result.getRenderable());
// step 2: add a second object (string is just a dummy)
// => we expect to get a map from the result now...
String string = new String("test");
result.render(string);
assertTrue(result.getRenderable() instanceof Map);
Map<String, Object> resultMap = (Map) result.getRenderable();
assertEquals(string, resultMap.get("string"));
assertEquals(testObject, resultMap.get("testObject"));
// step 3: add same object => we expect an illegal argument exception as the map
// cannot handle that case:
TestObject anotherObject = new TestObject();
boolean gotException = false;
try {
result.render(anotherObject);
} catch (IllegalArgumentException e) {
gotException = true;
}
assertTrue(gotException);
// step 4: add an entry
Entry<String, Object> entry = new AbstractMap.SimpleImmutableEntry<String, Object>("anotherObject", anotherObject);
result.render(entry);
resultMap = (Map) result.getRenderable();
assertEquals(3, resultMap.size());
assertEquals(anotherObject, resultMap.get("anotherObject"));
// step 5: add another map and check that conversion works:
Map<String, Object> mapToRender = Maps.newHashMap();
String anotherString = new String("anotherString");
TestObject anotherTestObject = new TestObject();
mapToRender.put("anotherString", anotherString);
mapToRender.put("anotherTestObject", anotherTestObject);
result.render(mapToRender);
resultMap = (Map) result.getRenderable();
assertEquals(2, resultMap.size());
assertEquals(anotherString, resultMap.get("anotherString"));
assertEquals(anotherTestObject, resultMap.get("anotherTestObject"));
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testRenderingOfStringObjectPairsWorks() {
String object1 = new String("stringy1");
String object2 = new String("stringy2");
// step 1: add one object.
Result result = new Result(200);
result.render("object1", object1);
result.render("object2", object2);
Map<String, Object> resultMap = (Map) result.getRenderable();
assertEquals(object1, resultMap.get("object1"));
assertEquals(object2, resultMap.get("object2"));
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// check that empty render throws exception
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
boolean gotException = false;
try {
// will throw exception
result.render();
} catch (IllegalArgumentException e) {
gotException = true;
}
assertTrue(gotException);
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// check that too many arguments in render(...) throws exception
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
gotException = false;
try {
// will throw exception
result.render(object1, object2, new String("three"));
} catch (IllegalArgumentException e) {
gotException = true;
}
assertTrue(gotException);
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// check that "correct" two string render throws exception
// when first parameter is not a string
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
gotException = false;
try {
// will throw exception
result.render(new TestObject(), object2);
} catch (IllegalArgumentException e) {
gotException = true;
}
assertTrue(gotException);
}
#location 12
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testRenderingOfStringObjectPairsWorks() {
String object1 = new String("stringy1");
String object2 = new String("stringy2");
// step 1: add one object.
Result result = new Result(200);
result.render("object1", object1);
result.render("object2", object2);
Map<String, Object> resultMap = (Map) result.getRenderable();
assertEquals(object1, resultMap.get("object1"));
assertEquals(object2, resultMap.get("object2"));
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public static String makeJsonRequest(String url) {
StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer();
try {
DefaultHttpClient httpClient = new DefaultHttpClient();
HttpGet getRequest = new HttpGet(url);
getRequest.addHeader("accept", "application/json");
HttpResponse response;
response = httpClient.execute(getRequest);
if (response.getStatusLine().getStatusCode() != 200) {
throw new RuntimeException("Failed : HTTP error code : "
+ response.getStatusLine().getStatusCode());
}
BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(
(response.getEntity().getContent())));
String output;
while ((output = br.readLine()) != null) {
sb.append(output);
}
httpClient.getConnectionManager().shutdown();
} catch (ClientProtocolException e) {
// TODO Auto-generated catch block
e.printStackTrace();
} catch (IOException e) {
// TODO Auto-generated catch block
e.printStackTrace();
}
return sb.toString();
}
#location 28
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public static String makeJsonRequest(String url) {
Map<String, String> headers = Maps.newHashMap();
headers.put("accept", "application/json");
return makeRequest(url, headers);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void parse() {
Map<String,RouteParameter> params;
RouteParameter param;
// no named parameters is null
params = RouteParameter.parse("/user");
assertThat(params, is(nullValue()));
params = RouteParameter.parse("/user/{id}/{email: [0-9]+}");
param = params.get("id");
assertThat(param.getName(), is("id"));
assertThat(param.getToken(), is("{id}"));
assertThat(param.getRegex(), is(nullValue()));
param = params.get("email");
assertThat(param.getName(), is("email"));
assertThat(param.getToken(), is("{email: [0-9]+}"));
assertThat(param.getRegex(), is("[0-9]+"));
}
#location 12
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void parse() {
Map<String,RouteParameter> params;
RouteParameter param;
// no named parameters is null
params = RouteParameter.parse("/user");
assertThat(params, aMapWithSize(0));
params = RouteParameter.parse("/user/{id}/{email: [0-9]+}");
param = params.get("id");
assertThat(param.getName(), is("id"));
assertThat(param.getToken(), is("{id}"));
assertThat(param.getRegex(), is(nullValue()));
param = params.get("email");
assertThat(param.getName(), is("email"));
assertThat(param.getToken(), is("{email: [0-9]+}"));
assertThat(param.getRegex(), is("[0-9]+"));
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testRenderEntryAndMakeSureMapIsCreated() {
String stringy = new String("stringy");
Entry<String, Object> entry
= new SimpleImmutableEntry("stringy", stringy);
// step 1: add one object.
Result result = new Result(200);
result.render(entry);
Map<String, Object> resultMap = (Map) result.getRenderable();
assertEquals(stringy, resultMap.get("stringy"));
}
#location 13
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testRenderEntryAndMakeSureMapIsCreated() {
String stringy = new String("stringy");
// step 1: add one object.
Result result = new Result(200);
result.render("stringy", stringy);
Map<String, Object> resultMap = (Map) result.getRenderable();
assertEquals(stringy, resultMap.get("stringy"));
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
static private SourceSnippet readFromInputStream(InputStream is,
URI source,
int lineFrom,
int lineTo) throws IOException {
if (lineTo <= 0) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("lineTo was <= 0");
}
// just zero this out
if (lineFrom < 0) {
lineFrom = 0;
}
if (lineTo < lineFrom) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("lineTo was < lineFrom");
}
BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(
new InputStreamReader(is));
List<String> lines = new ArrayList<>();
int i = 0;
String line;
while ((line = in.readLine()) != null) {
i++; // lines index are 1-based
if (i >= lineFrom) {
if (i <= lineTo) {
lines.add(line);
} else {
break;
}
}
}
if (lines.isEmpty()) {
return null;
}
// since file may not contain enough lines for requested lineTo --
// we caclulate the actual range here by number read "from" line.
return new SourceSnippet(source, lines, lineFrom, lineFrom + lines.size());
}
#location 42
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
static private SourceSnippet readFromInputStream(InputStream is,
URI source,
int lineFrom,
int lineTo) throws IOException {
// did the user provide a strange range (e.g. negative values)?
// this sometimes may happen when a range is provided like an error
// on line 3 and you want 5 before and 5 after
if (lineFrom < 1 && lineTo > 0) {
// calculate intended range
int intendedRange = lineTo - lineFrom;
lineFrom = 1;
lineTo = lineFrom + intendedRange;
}
else if (lineFrom < 0 && lineTo < 0) {
if (lineFrom < lineTo) {
int intendedRange = -1 * (lineFrom - lineTo);
lineFrom = 1;
lineTo = lineFrom + intendedRange;
}
else {
// giving up
return null;
}
}
BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(
new InputStreamReader(is));
List<String> lines = new ArrayList<>();
int i = 0;
String line;
while ((line = in.readLine()) != null) {
i++; // lines index are 1-based
if (i >= lineFrom) {
if (i <= lineTo) {
lines.add(line);
} else {
break;
}
}
}
if (lines.isEmpty()) {
return null;
}
// since file may not contain enough lines for requested lineTo --
// we caclulate the actual range here by number read "from" line
// since we are inclusive and not zero based we adjust the "from" by 1
return new SourceSnippet(source, lines, lineFrom, lineFrom + lines.size() - 1);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public String makeRequest(String url, Map<String, String> headers) {
StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer();
try {
HttpGet getRequest = new HttpGet(url);
if (headers != null) {
// add all headers
for (Entry<String, String> header : headers.entrySet()) {
getRequest.addHeader(header.getKey(), header.getValue());
}
}
HttpResponse response;
response = httpClient.execute(getRequest);
BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(
response.getEntity().getContent(), "UTF-8"));
String output;
while ((output = br.readLine()) != null) {
sb.append(output);
}
getRequest.releaseConnection();
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
return sb.toString();
}
#location 29
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public String makeRequest(String url, Map<String, String> headers) {
StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer();
BufferedReader br = null;
try {
HttpGet getRequest = new HttpGet(url);
if (headers != null) {
// add all headers
for (Entry<String, String> header : headers.entrySet()) {
getRequest.addHeader(header.getKey(), header.getValue());
}
}
HttpResponse response;
response = httpClient.execute(getRequest);
br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(response.getEntity().getContent(), "UTF-8"));
String output;
while ((output = br.readLine()) != null) {
sb.append(output);
}
getRequest.releaseConnection();
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
} finally {
if (br != null) {
try {
br.close();
} catch (IOException e) {
LOG.error("Failed to close resource", e);
}
}
}
return sb.toString();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void handleTemplateException(TemplateException te,
Environment env,
Writer out) {
if (ninjaProperties.isProd()) {
PrintWriter pw = (out instanceof PrintWriter) ? (PrintWriter) out
: new PrintWriter(out);
pw.println(
"<script language=javascript>//\"></script>"
+ "<script language=javascript>//\'></script>"
+ "<script language=javascript>//\"></script>"
+ "<script language=javascript>//\'></script>"
+ "</title></xmp></script></noscript></style></object>"
+ "</head></pre></table>"
+ "</form></table></table></table></a></u></i></b>"
+ "<div align=left "
+ "style='background-color:#FFFF00; color:#FF0000; "
+ "display:block; border-top:double; padding:2pt; "
+ "font-size:medium; font-family:Arial,sans-serif; "
+ "font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; "
+ "font-weight: normal; text-decoration: none; "
+ "text-transform: none'>");
pw.println("<b style='font-size:medium'>Ooops. A really strange error occurred. Please contact admin if error persists.</b>");
pw.println("</div></html>");
pw.flush();
pw.close();
logger.log(Level.SEVERE, "Templating error. This should not happen in production", te);
} else {
// print out full stacktrace if we are in test or dev mode
PrintWriter pw = (out instanceof PrintWriter) ? (PrintWriter) out
: new PrintWriter(out);
pw.println("<!-- FREEMARKER ERROR MESSAGE STARTS HERE -->"
+ "<script language=javascript>//\"></script>"
+ "<script language=javascript>//\'></script>"
+ "<script language=javascript>//\"></script>"
+ "<script language=javascript>//\'></script>"
+ "</title></xmp></script></noscript></style></object>"
+ "</head></pre></table>"
+ "</form></table></table></table></a></u></i></b>"
+ "<div align=left "
+ "style='background-color:#FFFF00; color:#FF0000; "
+ "display:block; border-top:double; padding:2pt; "
+ "font-size:medium; font-family:Arial,sans-serif; "
+ "font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; "
+ "font-weight: normal; text-decoration: none; "
+ "text-transform: none'>"
+ "<b style='font-size:medium'>FreeMarker template error!</b>"
+ "<pre><xmp>");
te.printStackTrace(pw);
pw.println("</xmp></pre></div></html>");
pw.flush();
pw.close();
logger.log(Level.SEVERE, "Templating error.", te);
}
}
#location 62
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public void handleTemplateException(TemplateException te,
Environment env,
Writer out) throws TemplateException {
if (!ninjaProperties.isProd()) {
// print out full stacktrace if we are in test or dev mode
PrintWriter pw = (out instanceof PrintWriter) ? (PrintWriter) out
: new PrintWriter(out);
pw.println("<!-- FREEMARKER ERROR MESSAGE STARTS HERE -->"
+ "<script language=javascript>//\"></script>"
+ "<script language=javascript>//\'></script>"
+ "<script language=javascript>//\"></script>"
+ "<script language=javascript>//\'></script>"
+ "</title></xmp></script></noscript></style></object>"
+ "</head></pre></table>"
+ "</form></table></table></table></a></u></i></b>"
+ "<div align=left "
+ "style='background-color:#FFFF00; color:#FF0000; "
+ "display:block; border-top:double; padding:2pt; "
+ "font-size:medium; font-family:Arial,sans-serif; "
+ "font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; "
+ "font-weight: normal; text-decoration: none; "
+ "text-transform: none'>"
+ "<b style='font-size:medium'>FreeMarker template error!</b>"
+ "<pre><xmp>");
te.printStackTrace(pw);
pw.println("</xmp></pre></div></html>");
pw.flush();
pw.close();
logger.error("Templating error.", te);
}
// Let the exception bubble up to the central handlers
// so the application can return the correct error page
// or perform some other application specific action.
throw te;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public Object invoke(MethodInvocation invocation) throws Throwable {
final UnitOfWork unitOfWork;
// Only start a new unit of work if the entitymanager is empty
// otherwise someone else has started the unit of work already
// and we do nothing
// Please compare to com.google.inject.persist.jpa.JpaLocalTxnInterceptor
// we just mimick that interceptor
//
// IMPORTANT:
// Nesting of begin() end() of unitOfWork is NOT allowed. Contrary to
// the documentation of Google Guice as of March 2014.
// Related Ninja issue: https://github.com/ninjaframework/ninja/issues/157
if (entityManagerProvider.get() == null) {
unitOfWork = unitOfWorkProvider.get();
unitOfWork.begin();
didWeStartWork.set(Boolean.TRUE);
} else {
// If unit of work already started we don't do anything here...
// another UnitOfWorkInterceptor point point will take care...
// This happens if you are nesting your calls.
return invocation.proceed();
}
try {
return invocation.proceed();
} finally {
if (null != didWeStartWork.get()) {
didWeStartWork.remove();
unitOfWork.end();
}
}
}
#location 19
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public Object invoke(MethodInvocation invocation) throws Throwable {
if (null == didWeStartWork.get()) {
unitOfWork.begin();
didWeStartWork.set(Boolean.TRUE);
} else {
// If unit of work already started we don't do anything here...
// another UnitOfWorkInterceptor point point will take care...
// This happens if you are nesting your calls.
return invocation.proceed();
}
try {
return invocation.proceed();
} finally {
if (null != didWeStartWork.get()) {
didWeStartWork.remove();
unitOfWork.end();
}
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public String makePostRequestWithFormParameters(String url,
Map<String, String> headers,
Map<String, String> formParameters) {
StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer();
try {
HttpPost postRequest = new HttpPost(url);
if (headers != null) {
// add all headers
for (Entry<String, String> header : headers.entrySet()) {
postRequest.addHeader(header.getKey(), header.getValue());
}
}
// add form parameters:
List<BasicNameValuePair> formparams = new ArrayList<BasicNameValuePair>();
if (formParameters != null) {
for (Entry<String, String> parameter : formParameters
.entrySet()) {
formparams.add(new BasicNameValuePair(parameter.getKey(),
parameter.getValue()));
}
}
// encode form parameters and add
UrlEncodedFormEntity entity = new UrlEncodedFormEntity(formparams);
postRequest.setEntity(entity);
HttpResponse response;
response = httpClient.execute(postRequest);
BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(
response.getEntity().getContent(), "UTF-8"));
String output;
while ((output = br.readLine()) != null) {
sb.append(output);
}
postRequest.releaseConnection();
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
return sb.toString();
}
#location 49
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public String makePostRequestWithFormParameters(String url,
Map<String, String> headers,
Map<String, String> formParameters) {
StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer();
BufferedReader br = null;
try {
HttpPost postRequest = new HttpPost(url);
if (headers != null) {
// add all headers
for (Entry<String, String> header : headers.entrySet()) {
postRequest.addHeader(header.getKey(), header.getValue());
}
}
// add form parameters:
List<BasicNameValuePair> formparams = new ArrayList<BasicNameValuePair>();
if (formParameters != null) {
for (Entry<String, String> parameter : formParameters
.entrySet()) {
formparams.add(new BasicNameValuePair(parameter.getKey(),
parameter.getValue()));
}
}
// encode form parameters and add
UrlEncodedFormEntity entity = new UrlEncodedFormEntity(formparams);
postRequest.setEntity(entity);
HttpResponse response;
response = httpClient.execute(postRequest);
br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(response.getEntity().getContent(), "UTF-8"));
String output;
while ((output = br.readLine()) != null) {
sb.append(output);
}
postRequest.releaseConnection();
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
} finally {
if (br != null) {
try {
br.close();
} catch (IOException e) {
LOG.error("Failed to close resource", e);
}
}
}
return sb.toString();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testAllConstants() {
Configuration configuration =
SwissKnife.loadConfigurationFromClasspathInUtf8("conf/all_constants.conf", this
.getClass());
assertEquals("LANGUAGES", configuration.getString(NinjaConstant.applicationLanguages));
assertEquals("PREFIX", configuration.getString(NinjaConstant.applicationCookiePrefix));
assertEquals("NAME", configuration.getString(NinjaConstant.applicationName));
assertEquals("SECRET", configuration.getString(NinjaConstant.applicationSecret));
assertEquals("SERVER_NAME", configuration.getString(NinjaConstant.serverName));
assertEquals(9999, configuration.getInt(NinjaConstant.sessionExpireTimeInSeconds));
assertEquals(false, configuration.getBoolean(NinjaConstant.sessionSendOnlyIfChanged));
assertEquals(false, configuration.getBoolean(NinjaConstant.sessionTransferredOverHttpsOnly));
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testAllConstants() {
Configuration configuration =
SwissKnife.loadConfigurationInUtf8("conf/all_constants.conf");
assertEquals("LANGUAGES", configuration.getString(NinjaConstant.applicationLanguages));
assertEquals("PREFIX", configuration.getString(NinjaConstant.applicationCookiePrefix));
assertEquals("NAME", configuration.getString(NinjaConstant.applicationName));
assertEquals("SECRET", configuration.getString(NinjaConstant.applicationSecret));
assertEquals("SERVER_NAME", configuration.getString(NinjaConstant.serverName));
assertEquals(9999, configuration.getInt(NinjaConstant.sessionExpireTimeInSeconds));
assertEquals(false, configuration.getBoolean(NinjaConstant.sessionSendOnlyIfChanged));
assertEquals(false, configuration.getBoolean(NinjaConstant.sessionTransferredOverHttpsOnly));
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public boolean runSteps(FlowSpec scenario, FlowStepStatusNotifier flowStepStatusNotifier) {
ScenarioExecutionState scenarioExecutionState = new ScenarioExecutionState();
for(Step thisStep : scenario.getSteps()){
// Another way to get the String
// String requestJson = objectMapper.valueToTree(thisStep.getRequest()).toString();
final String requestJsonAsString = thisStep.getRequest().toString();
LOGGER.info(String.format("\n###RAW: Journey:%s, Step:%s", scenario.getFlowName(), thisStep.getName()));
StepExecutionState stepExecutionState = new StepExecutionState();
stepExecutionState.addStep(thisStep.getName());
String resolvedRequestJson = jsonTestProcesor.resolveRequestJson(
requestJsonAsString,
scenarioExecutionState.getResolvedScenarioState()
);
stepExecutionState.addRequest(resolvedRequestJson);
String executionResult;
try{
String serviceName = thisStep.getUrl();
String operationName = thisStep.getOperation();
// REST call execution
Boolean isRESTCall = false;
if( serviceName != null && serviceName.contains("/")) {
isRESTCall = true;
}
if(isRESTCall) {
serviceName = getFullyQualifiedRestUrl(serviceName);
executionResult = serviceExecutor.executeRESTService(serviceName, operationName, resolvedRequestJson);
}
else {
executionResult = serviceExecutor.executeJavaService(serviceName, operationName, resolvedRequestJson);
}
stepExecutionState.addResponse(executionResult);
scenarioExecutionState.addStepState(stepExecutionState.getResolvedStep());
// Handle assertion section
String resolvedAssertionJson = jsonTestProcesor.resolveRequestJson(
thisStep.getAssertions().toString(),
scenarioExecutionState.getResolvedScenarioState()
);
LOGGER.info("\n---------> Assertion: <----------\n"
+ prettyPrintJson(resolvedAssertionJson));
// TODO: Collect the assertion result into this list, say field by field
List<JsonAsserter> asserters = jsonTestProcesor.createAssertersFrom(resolvedAssertionJson);
List<AssertionReport> failureResults = new ArrayList<>(); //<-- write code
// TODO: During this step: if assertion failed
if (!failureResults.isEmpty()) {
return flowStepStatusNotifier.notifyFlowStepAssertionFailed(scenario.getFlowName(), thisStep.getName(), failureResults);
}
// TODO: Otherwise test passed
//return flowStepStatusNotifier.notifyFlowStepExecutionPassed(scenario.getFlowName(), thisStep.getName());
} catch(Exception ex){
// During this step: if any exception occurred
return flowStepStatusNotifier.notifyFlowStepExecutionException(
scenario.getFlowName(),
thisStep.getName(),
new RuntimeException("Smart Step execution failed. Details:" + ex)
);
}
}
/*
* There were no steps to execute and the framework will display the test status as Green than Red.
* Red symbolises failure, but nothing has failed here.
*/
return true;
}
#location 33
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public boolean runSteps(FlowSpec scenario, FlowStepStatusNotifier flowStepStatusNotifier) {
LOGGER.info("\n-------------------------- Scenario:{} -------------------------\n", scenario.getFlowName());
ScenarioExecutionState scenarioExecutionState = new ScenarioExecutionState();
for(Step thisStep : scenario.getSteps()){
// Another way to get the String
// String requestJson = objectMapper.valueToTree(thisStep.getRequest()).toString();
final String requestJsonAsString = thisStep.getRequest().toString();
StepExecutionState stepExecutionState = new StepExecutionState();
stepExecutionState.addStep(thisStep.getName());
String resolvedRequestJson = jsonTestProcesor.resolveStringJson(
requestJsonAsString,
scenarioExecutionState.getResolvedScenarioState()
);
stepExecutionState.addRequest(resolvedRequestJson);
String executionResult;
final String logPrefixRelationshipId = createRelationshipId();
try{
String serviceName = thisStep.getUrl();
String operationName = thisStep.getOperation();
// Resolve the URL patterns if any
serviceName = jsonTestProcesor.resolveStringJson(
serviceName,
scenarioExecutionState.getResolvedScenarioState()
);
//
logCorelationshipPrinter.aRequestBuilder()
.relationshipId(logPrefixRelationshipId)
.requestTimeStamp(LocalDateTime.now())
.step(thisStep.getName())
.url(serviceName)
.method(operationName)
.request(SmartUtils.prettyPrintJson(resolvedRequestJson));
//
// REST call execution
Boolean isRESTCall = false;
if( serviceName != null && serviceName.contains("/")) {
isRESTCall = true;
}
if(isRESTCall) {
serviceName = getFullyQualifiedRestUrl(serviceName);
executionResult = serviceExecutor.executeRESTService(serviceName, operationName, resolvedRequestJson);
}
else {
executionResult = serviceExecutor.executeJavaService(serviceName, operationName, resolvedRequestJson);
}
//
logCorelationshipPrinter.aResponseBuilder()
.relationshipId(logPrefixRelationshipId)
.responseTimeStamp(LocalDateTime.now())
.response(executionResult);
//
stepExecutionState.addResponse(executionResult);
scenarioExecutionState.addStepState(stepExecutionState.getResolvedStep());
// Handle assertion section
String resolvedAssertionJson = jsonTestProcesor.resolveStringJson(
thisStep.getAssertions().toString(),
scenarioExecutionState.getResolvedScenarioState()
);
LOGGER.info("\n---------> Assertion: <----------\n{}", prettyPrintJson(resolvedAssertionJson));
List<JsonAsserter> asserters = jsonTestProcesor.createAssertersFrom(resolvedAssertionJson);
List<AssertionReport> failureResults = jsonTestProcesor.assertAllAndReturnFailed(asserters, executionResult); //<-- write code
// TODO: During this step: if assertion failed
if (!failureResults.isEmpty()) {
return flowStepStatusNotifier.notifyFlowStepAssertionFailed(scenario.getFlowName(), thisStep.getName(), failureResults);
}
// TODO: Otherwise test passed
flowStepStatusNotifier.notifyFlowStepExecutionPassed(scenario.getFlowName(), thisStep.getName());
} catch(Exception ex){
logCorelationshipPrinter.aResponseBuilder()
.relationshipId(logPrefixRelationshipId)
.responseTimeStamp(LocalDateTime.now())
.response(ex.getMessage());
// During this step: if any exception occurred
return flowStepStatusNotifier.notifyFlowStepExecutionException(
scenario.getFlowName(),
thisStep.getName(),
new RuntimeException("Smart Step execution failed. Details:" + ex)
);
}
finally {
logCorelationshipPrinter.print();
}
}
/*
* There were no steps to execute and the framework will display the test status as Green than Red.
* Red symbolises failure, but nothing has failed here.
*/
return true;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testRawRecordingSpeed() throws Exception {
Histogram histogram = new Histogram(highestTrackableValue, numberOfSignificantValueDigits);
// Warm up:
long startTime = System.nanoTime();
recordLoop(histogram, warmupLoopLength);
long endTime = System.nanoTime();
long deltaUsec = (endTime - startTime) / 1000L;
long rate = 1000000 * warmupLoopLength / deltaUsec;
System.out.println("Warmup:\n" + warmupLoopLength + " value recordings completed in " +
deltaUsec + " usec, rate = " + rate + " value recording calls per sec.");
histogram.reset();
// Wait a bit to make sure compiler had a cache to do it's stuff:
try {
Thread.sleep(1000);
} catch (InterruptedException e) {
}
startTime = System.nanoTime();
recordLoop(histogram, timingLoopCount);
endTime = System.nanoTime();
deltaUsec = (endTime - startTime) / 1000L;
rate = 1000000 * timingLoopCount / deltaUsec;
System.out.println("Timing:");
System.out.println(timingLoopCount + " value recordings completed in " +
deltaUsec + " usec, rate = " + rate + " value recording calls per sec.");
rate = 1000000 * histogram.getHistogramData().getTotalCount() / deltaUsec;
System.out.println(histogram.getHistogramData().getTotalCount() + " raw recorded entries completed in " +
deltaUsec + " usec, rate = " + rate + " recorded values per sec.");
}
#location 26
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testRawRecordingSpeed() throws Exception {
testRawRecordingSpeedAtExpectedInterval(1000000000);
testRawRecordingSpeedAtExpectedInterval(10000);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private static synchronized List<Menu> loadJson() throws IOException {
InputStream inStream = MenuJsonUtils.class.getResourceAsStream(config);
BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(inStream, Charset.forName("UTF-8")));
StringBuilder json = new StringBuilder();
String tmp;
while ((tmp = reader.readLine()) != null) {
json.append(tmp);
}
List<Menu> menus = JSONArray.parseArray(json.toString(), Menu.class);
return menus;
}
#location 12
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
private static synchronized List<Menu> loadJson() throws IOException {
InputStream inStream = MenuJsonUtils.class.getResourceAsStream(config);
BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(inStream, Charset.forName("UTF-8")));
StringBuilder json = new StringBuilder();
String tmp;
try {
while ((tmp = reader.readLine()) != null) {
json.append(tmp);
}
} catch (IOException e) {
throw e;
} finally {
reader.close();
inStream.close();
}
List<Menu> menus = JSONArray.parseArray(json.toString(), Menu.class);
return menus;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void postHandle(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response, HandlerMethod handler, ModelAndView modelAndView) throws Exception {
PostVO ret = (PostVO) modelAndView.getModelMap().get("view");
Object editing = modelAndView.getModel().get("editing");
if (null == editing && ret != null) {
PostVO post = new PostVO();
BeanUtils.copyProperties(ret, post);
if (check(ret.getId(), ret.getAuthor().getId())) {
post.setContent(replace(post.getContent()));
} else {
String c = post.getContent().replaceAll("<hide>", "<hide>");
c = c.replaceAll("</hide>", "</hide>");
post.setContent(c);
}
modelAndView.getModelMap().put("view", post);
}
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public void postHandle(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response, HandlerMethod handler, ModelAndView modelAndView) throws Exception {
PostVO ret = (PostVO) modelAndView.getModelMap().get("view");
Object editing = modelAndView.getModel().get("editing");
if (null == editing && ret != null) {
PostVO post = new PostVO();
BeanUtils.copyProperties(ret, post);
if (check(ret.getId(), ret.getAuthor().getId())) {
String c = post.getContent().replaceAll("\\[hide\\]([\\s\\S]*)\\[\\/hide\\]", SHOW);
post.setContent(c);
} else {
String c = post.getContent().replaceAll("\\[hide\\]([\\s\\S]*)\\[\\/hide\\]", "$1");
post.setContent(c);
}
modelAndView.getModelMap().put("view", post);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
// STEP-1: read input parameters and validate them
if (args.length < 2) {
System.err.println("Usage: SecondarySortUsingGroupByKey <input> <output>");
System.exit(1);
}
String inputPath = args[0];
System.out.println("inputPath=" + inputPath);
String outputPath = args[1];
System.out.println("outputPath=" + outputPath);
// STEP-2: Connect to the Sark master by creating JavaSparkContext object
final JavaSparkContext ctx = SparkUtil.createJavaSparkContext();
// STEP-3: Use ctx to create JavaRDD<String>
// input record format: <name><,><time><,><value>
JavaRDD<String> lines = ctx.textFile(inputPath, 1);
// STEP-4: create (key, value) pairs from JavaRDD<String> where
// key is the {name} and value is a pair of (time, value).
// The resulting RDD will be JavaPairRDD<String, Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>.
// convert each record into Tuple2(name, time, value)
// PairFunction<T, K, V> T => Tuple2(K, V) where K=String and V=Tuple2<Integer, Integer>
// input K V
System.out.println("=== DEBUG STEP-4 ===");
JavaPairRDD<String, Tuple2<Integer, Integer>> pairs = lines.mapToPair(new PairFunction<String, String, Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>() {
@Override
public Tuple2<String, Tuple2<Integer, Integer>> call(String s) {
String[] tokens = s.split(","); // x,2,5
System.out.println(tokens[0] + "," + tokens[1] + "," + tokens[2]);
Tuple2<Integer, Integer> timevalue = new Tuple2<Integer, Integer>(Integer.parseInt(tokens[1]), Integer.parseInt(tokens[2]));
return new Tuple2<String, Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>(tokens[0], timevalue);
}
});
// STEP-5: validate STEP-4, we collect all values from JavaPairRDD<> and print it.
List<Tuple2<String, Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>> output = pairs.collect();
for (Tuple2 t : output) {
Tuple2<Integer, Integer> timevalue = (Tuple2<Integer, Integer>) t._2;
System.out.println(t._1 + "," + timevalue._1 + "," + timevalue._1);
}
// STEP-6: We group JavaPairRDD<> elements by the key ({name}).
JavaPairRDD<String, Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>> groups = pairs.groupByKey();
// STEP-7: validate STEP-6, we collect all values from JavaPairRDD<> and print it.
System.out.println("=== DEBUG STEP-6 ===");
List<Tuple2<String, Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>>> output2 = groups.collect();
for (Tuple2<String, Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>> t : output2) {
Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>> list = t._2;
System.out.println(t._1);
for (Tuple2<Integer, Integer> t2 : list) {
System.out.println(t2._1 + "," + t2._2);
}
System.out.println("=====");
}
//STEP-8: Sort the reducer's values and this will give us the final output.
// OPTION-1: worked
// mapValues[U](f: (V) ⇒ U): JavaPairRDD[K, U]
// Pass each value in the key-value pair RDD through a map function without changing the keys;
// this also retains the original RDD's partitioning.
JavaPairRDD<String, Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>> sorted = groups.mapValues(new Function<Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>, // input
Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>> // output
>() {
@Override
public Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>> call(Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>> s) {
List<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>> newList = new ArrayList<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>(iterableToList(s));
Collections.sort(newList, SparkTupleComparator.INSTANCE);
return newList;
}
});
// STEP-9: validate STEP-8, we collect all values from JavaPairRDD<> and print it.
System.out.println("=== DEBUG STEP-8 ===");
List<Tuple2<String, Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>>> output3 = sorted.collect();
for (Tuple2<String, Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>> t : output3) {
Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>> list = t._2;
System.out.println(t._1);
for (Tuple2<Integer, Integer> t2 : list) {
System.out.println(t2._1 + "," + t2._2);
}
System.out.println("=====");
}
sorted.saveAsTextFile(outputPath);
System.exit(0);
}
#location 18
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
// STEP-1: read input parameters and validate them
if (args.length < 2) {
System.err.println("Usage: SecondarySortUsingGroupByKey <input> <output>");
System.exit(1);
}
String inputPath = args[0];
System.out.println("inputPath=" + inputPath);
String outputPath = args[1];
System.out.println("outputPath=" + outputPath);
// STEP-2: Connect to the Spark master by creating JavaSparkContext object
final JavaSparkContext ctx = SparkUtil.createJavaSparkContext("SecondarySorting");
// STEP-3: Use ctx to create JavaRDD<String>
// input record format: <name><,><time><,><value>
JavaRDD<String> lines = ctx.textFile(inputPath, 1);
// STEP-4: create (key, value) pairs from JavaRDD<String> where
// key is the {name} and value is a pair of (time, value).
// The resulting RDD will be JavaPairRDD<String, Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>.
// convert each record into Tuple2(name, time, value)
// PairFunction<T, K, V> T => Tuple2(K, V) where K=String and V=Tuple2<Integer, Integer>
// input K V
System.out.println("=== DEBUG STEP-4 ===");
JavaPairRDD<String, Tuple2<Integer, Integer>> pairs = lines.mapToPair(new PairFunction<String, String, Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>() {
@Override
public Tuple2<String, Tuple2<Integer, Integer>> call(String s) {
String[] tokens = s.split(","); // x,2,5
System.out.println(tokens[0] + "," + tokens[1] + "," + tokens[2]);
Tuple2<Integer, Integer> timevalue = new Tuple2<Integer, Integer>(Integer.parseInt(tokens[1]), Integer.parseInt(tokens[2]));
return new Tuple2<String, Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>(tokens[0], timevalue);
}
});
// STEP-5: validate STEP-4, we collect all values from JavaPairRDD<> and print it.
List<Tuple2<String, Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>> output = pairs.collect();
for (Tuple2 t : output) {
Tuple2<Integer, Integer> timevalue = (Tuple2<Integer, Integer>) t._2;
System.out.println(t._1 + "," + timevalue._1 + "," + timevalue._2);
}
// STEP-6: We group JavaPairRDD<> elements by the key ({name}).
JavaPairRDD<String, Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>> groups = pairs.groupByKey();
// STEP-7: validate STEP-6, we collect all values from JavaPairRDD<> and print it.
System.out.println("=== DEBUG STEP-6 ===");
List<Tuple2<String, Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>>> output2 = groups.collect();
for (Tuple2<String, Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>> t : output2) {
Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>> list = t._2;
System.out.println(t._1);
for (Tuple2<Integer, Integer> t2 : list) {
System.out.println(t2._1 + "," + t2._2);
}
System.out.println("=====");
}
//STEP-8: Sort the reducer's values and this will give us the final output.
// OPTION-1: worked
// mapValues[U](f: (V) ⇒ U): JavaPairRDD[K, U]
// Pass each value in the key-value pair RDD through a map function without changing the keys;
// this also retains the original RDD's partitioning.
JavaPairRDD<String, Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>> sorted = groups.mapValues(new Function<Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>, // input
Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>> // output
>() {
@Override
public Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>> call(Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>> s) {
List<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>> newList = new ArrayList<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>(iterableToList(s));
Collections.sort(newList, SparkTupleComparator.INSTANCE);
return newList;
}
});
// STEP-9: validate STEP-8, we collect all values from JavaPairRDD<> and print it.
System.out.println("=== DEBUG STEP-8 ===");
List<Tuple2<String, Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>>> output3 = sorted.collect();
for (Tuple2<String, Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>>> t : output3) {
Iterable<Tuple2<Integer, Integer>> list = t._2;
System.out.println(t._1);
for (Tuple2<Integer, Integer> t2 : list) {
System.out.println(t2._1 + "," + t2._2);
}
System.out.println("=====");
}
sorted.saveAsTextFile(outputPath);
System.exit(0);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public static Map<String, String> readService(String path) throws IOException {
InputStreamReader fr = new InputStreamReader(FileUtil.class.getResourceAsStream(path));
BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(fr);
String line = "";
Map<String, String> result = new HashMap<String, String>();
while ((line = br.readLine()) != null) {
String sl = line.trim();
if ((sl.startsWith("//")) || sl.startsWith("#") || sl.equals("")) {
continue;
}
String[] kv = sl.split("=");
if (kv == null || kv.length != 2) {
close(br, fr);
throw new RuntimeException("Illegal flow config:" + path + ", sl");
}
result.put(kv[0].trim(), kv[1].trim());
}
close(br, fr);
return result;
}
#location 19
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public static Map<String, String> readService(String path) throws IOException {
InputStreamReader fr = new InputStreamReader(FileUtil.class.getResourceAsStream(path),Constant.ENCODING_UTF_8);
BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(fr);
String line;
Map<String, String> result = new HashMap<String, String>();
while ((line = br.readLine()) != null) {
String sl = line.trim();
if ((sl.startsWith("//")) || sl.startsWith("#") || sl.equals("")) {
continue;
}
String[] kv = sl.split("=");
if (kv == null || kv.length != 2) {
close(br, fr);
throw new RuntimeException("Illegal flow config:" + path + ", sl");
}
result.put(kv[0].trim(), kv[1].trim());
}
close(br, fr);
return result;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public static CacheManager get() {
if (instance == null) {
synchronized (log) {
if (instance == null) {
instance = new CacheManager();
}
}
}
return instance;
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public static CacheManager get() {
return get(defaultCacheManager);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@SuppressWarnings({"unchecked", "rawtypes"})
public void onReceive(ServiceContext serviceContext) throws Throwable {
FlowMessage fm = serviceContext.getFlowMessage();
if (serviceContext.isSync() && !syncActors.containsKey(serviceContext.getId())) {
syncActors.putIfAbsent(serviceContext.getId(), getSender());
}
// TODO 没有必要设置默认值,下面执行异常就会抛出异常
Object result = null;// DefaultMessage.getMessage();// set default
try {
this.service = ServiceFactory.getService(serviceName);
result = ((Service) service).process(fm.getMessage(), serviceContext);
} catch (Throwable e) {
Web web = serviceContext.getWeb();
if (web != null) {
web.complete();
}
throw new FlowerException("fail to invoke service " + serviceName + " : " + service + ", param : " + fm.getMessage(), e);
}
if (serviceContext.isSync() && !hasChildActor()) {
syncActors.get(serviceContext.getId()).tell(result, getSelf());
syncActors.remove(serviceContext.getId());
return;
}
Web web = serviceContext.getWeb();
if (service instanceof Complete) {
// FlowContext.removeServiceContext(fm.getTransactionId());
}
if (web != null) {
if (service instanceof Flush) {
web.flush();
}
if (service instanceof HttpComplete || service instanceof Complete) {
web.complete();
}
}
if (result == null)// for joint service
return;
if (hasChildActor()) {
for (RefType refType : nextServiceActors) {
ServiceContext context = serviceContext.newInstance();
context.getFlowMessage().setMessage(result);
// if (refType.isJoint()) {
// FlowMessage flowMessage1 = CloneUtil.clone(fm);
// flowMessage1.setMessage(result);
// context.setFlowMessage(flowMessage1);
// }
// condition fork for one-service to multi-service
if (refType.getMessageType().isInstance(result)) {
if (!(result instanceof Condition) || !(((Condition) result).getCondition() instanceof String)
|| stringInStrings(refType.getServiceName(), ((Condition) result).getCondition().toString())) {
refType.getActorRef().tell(context, getSelf());
}
}
}
} else {
}
}
#location 45
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@SuppressWarnings({"unchecked", "rawtypes"})
public void onReceive(ServiceContext serviceContext) throws Throwable {
FlowMessage fm = serviceContext.getFlowMessage();
if (serviceContext.isSync() && !syncActors.containsKey(serviceContext.getId())) {
syncActors.putIfAbsent(serviceContext.getId(), getSender());
}
// TODO 没有必要设置默认值,下面执行异常就会抛出异常
Object result = null;// DefaultMessage.getMessage();// set default
try {
this.service = ServiceFactory.getService(serviceName);
result = ((Service) service).process(fm.getMessage(), serviceContext);
} catch (Throwable e) {
Web web = serviceContext.getWeb();
if (web != null) {
web.complete();
}
throw new FlowerException("fail to invoke service " + serviceName + " : " + service + ", param : " + fm.getMessage(), e);
}
logger.info("同步处理 ： {}, hasChild : {}", serviceContext.isSync(), hasChildActor());
if (serviceContext.isSync() && !hasChildActor()) {
logger.info("返回响应 {}", result);
ActorRef actor = syncActors.get(serviceContext.getId());
if(actor !=null) {
actor.tell(result, getSelf());
syncActors.remove(serviceContext.getId());
}
return;
}
Web web = serviceContext.getWeb();
if (service instanceof Complete) {
// FlowContext.removeServiceContext(fm.getTransactionId());
}
if (web != null) {
if (service instanceof Flush) {
web.flush();
}
if (service instanceof HttpComplete || service instanceof Complete) {
web.complete();
}
}
if (result == null)// for joint service
return;
if (hasChildActor()) {
for (RefType refType : nextServiceActors) {
ServiceContext context = serviceContext.newInstance();
context.getFlowMessage().setMessage(result);
// if (refType.isJoint()) {
// FlowMessage flowMessage1 = CloneUtil.clone(fm);
// flowMessage1.setMessage(result);
// context.setFlowMessage(flowMessage1);
// }
// condition fork for one-service to multi-service
if (refType.getMessageType().isInstance(result)) {
if (!(result instanceof Condition) || !(((Condition) result).getCondition() instanceof String)
|| stringInStrings(refType.getServiceName(), ((Condition) result).getCondition().toString())) {
refType.getActorRef().tell(context, getSelf());
}
}
}
} else {
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public String toString() {
StringBuilder builder = new StringBuilder();
builder.append("ServiceFlow [\r\n\tflowName = ");
builder.append(flowName);
builder.append("\r\n\t");
Set<ServiceConfig> nextServices = servicesOfFlow.get(getHeadServiceConfig().getServiceName());
builder.append(getHeadServiceConfig().getSimpleDesc());
builder.append(" --> ");
getHeadServiceConfig().getNextServiceConfigs().forEach(item -> {
builder.append(item.getSimpleDesc()).append(",");
});
if (nextServices != null) {
for (Map.Entry<String, Set<ServiceConfig>> entry : servicesOfFlow.entrySet()) {
if (getHeadServiceConfig().getServiceName().equals(entry.getKey())) {
continue;
}
builder.append("\r\n\t");
builder.append(getServiceConfig(entry.getKey()).getSimpleDesc());
builder.append(" -- > ");
entry.getValue().forEach(item -> {
builder.append(item.getSimpleDesc()).append(", ");
});
}
}
builder.append("\n]");
return builder.toString();
}
#location 11
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public String toString() {
StringBuilder builder = new StringBuilder();
builder.append("ServiceFlow [ flowName = ");
builder.append(flowName);
builder.append("\r\n\t");
ServiceConfig hh = header;
buildString(hh, builder);
builder.append("\n]");
return builder.toString();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@SuppressWarnings({"unchecked", "rawtypes"})
@Override
public void onServiceContextReceived(ServiceContext serviceContext) throws Throwable {
FlowMessage flowMessage = serviceContext.getFlowMessage();
if (serviceContext.isSync()) {
CacheManager.get(serviceActorCachePrefix + serviceContext.getFlowName()).add(serviceContext.getId(), getSender(),
defaultTimeToLive);
}
Serializer serializer = ExtensionLoader.load(Serializer.class).load(serviceContext.getCodec());
Object result = null;
Object param = null;
try {
ServiceContextUtil.fillServiceContext(serviceContext);
String pType = getParamType(serviceContext);
if (flowMessage.getMessage() != null && ClassUtil.exists(flowMessage.getMessageType())) {
pType = flowMessage.getMessageType();
}
param = serializer.decode(flowMessage.getMessage(), pType);
if (getFilter(serviceContext) != null) {
getFilter(serviceContext).filter(param, serviceContext);
}
// logger.info("服务参数类型 {} : {}", pType, getService(serviceContext));
result = ((Service) getService(serviceContext)).process(param, serviceContext);
} catch (Throwable e) {
handleException(serviceContext, e, param, serializer);
}
if (result != null && result instanceof CompletableFuture) {
final Object tempParam = param;
((CompletableFuture<Object>) result).whenComplete((r, e) -> {
if (e != null) {
handleException(serviceContext, e, tempParam, serializer);
return;
}
handleNextServices(serviceContext, r, flowMessage.getTransactionId(), serializer);
});
} else {
handleNextServices(serviceContext, result, flowMessage.getTransactionId(), serializer);
}
}
#location 19
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@SuppressWarnings({"unchecked", "rawtypes"})
@Override
public void onServiceContextReceived(ServiceContext serviceContext) throws Throwable {
FlowMessage flowMessage = serviceContext.getFlowMessage();
if (serviceContext.isSync()) {
CacheManager.get(serviceActorCachePrefix + serviceContext.getFlowName()).add(serviceContext.getId(), getSender(),
defaultTimeToLive);
}
Serializer serializer = ExtensionLoader.load(Serializer.class).load(serviceContext.getCodec());
Object result = null;
Object param = null;
try {
ServiceContextUtil.fillServiceContext(serviceContext);
param = getAndDecodeParam(serviceContext);
if (getFilter(serviceContext) != null) {
getFilter(serviceContext).filter(param, serviceContext);
}
// logger.info("服务参数类型 {} : {}", pType, getService(serviceContext));
result = ((Service) getService(serviceContext)).process(param, serviceContext);
} catch (Throwable e) {
handleException(serviceContext, e, param, serializer);
}
if (result != null && result instanceof CompletableFuture) {
final Object tempParam = param;
((CompletableFuture<Object>) result).whenComplete((r, e) -> {
if (e != null) {
handleException(serviceContext, e, tempParam, serializer);
return;
}
handleNextServices(serviceContext, r, flowMessage.getTransactionId(), serializer);
});
} else {
handleNextServices(serviceContext, result, flowMessage.getTransactionId(), serializer);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void doStartup(String configLocation) {
ClassPathXmlApplicationContext applicationContext = null;
try {
applicationContext = new ClassPathXmlApplicationContext(configLocation);
applicationContext.start();
} catch (Exception e) {
if (applicationContext != null) {
applicationContext.close();
}
logger.error("", e);
}
logger.info("spring初始化完成");
}
#location 14
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@Override
public void doStartup(String configLocation) throws Throwable {
Class<?> applicationContextClazz =
Class.forName("org.springframework.context.support.ClassPathXmlApplicationContext", true, getClassLoader());
Object flowerFactory = applicationContextClazz.getConstructor(String.class).newInstance(configLocation);
Method startMethod = applicationContextClazz.getMethod("start");
startMethod.invoke(flowerFactory);
logger.info("spring初始化完成");
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public static List<Pair<String, String>> readFlow(String path) throws IOException {
InputStreamReader fr = new InputStreamReader(FileUtil.class.getResourceAsStream(path));
BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(fr);
String line = "";
List<Pair<String, String>> flow = new ArrayList<>();
while ((line = br.readLine()) != null) {
String sl = line.trim();
if ((sl.startsWith("//")) || sl.startsWith("#") || sl.equals("")) {
continue;
}
String[] connection = sl.split("->");
if (connection == null || connection.length != 2) {
close(br, fr);
throw new RuntimeException("Illegal flow config:" + path);
} else {
flow.add(new Pair<String, String>(connection[0].trim(), connection[1].trim()));
}
}
close(br, fr);
return flow;
}
#location 20
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public static List<Pair<String, String>> readFlow(String path) throws IOException {
InputStreamReader fr = new InputStreamReader(FileUtil.class.getResourceAsStream(path),Constant.ENCODING_UTF_8);
BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(fr);
String line;
List<Pair<String, String>> flow = new ArrayList<>();
while ((line = br.readLine()) != null) {
String sl = line.trim();
if ((sl.startsWith("//")) || sl.startsWith("#") || sl.equals("")) {
continue;
}
String[] connection = sl.split("->");
if (connection == null || connection.length != 2) {
close(br, fr);
throw new RuntimeException("Illegal flow config:" + path);
} else {
flow.add(new Pair<String, String>(connection[0].trim(), connection[1].trim()));
}
}
close(br, fr);
return flow;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public boolean isEquivalentTo(JSType otherType) {
if (!(otherType instanceof FunctionType)) {
return false;
}
FunctionType that = (FunctionType) otherType;
if (!that.isFunctionType()) {
return false;
}
if (this.isConstructor()) {
if (that.isConstructor()) {
return this == that;
}
return false;
}
if (this.isInterface()) {
if (that.isInterface()) {
return this.getReferenceName().equals(that.getReferenceName());
}
return false;
}
if (that.isInterface()) {
return false;
}
return this.typeOfThis.isEquivalentTo(that.typeOfThis) &&
this.call.isEquivalentTo(that.call);
}
#location 18
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public boolean isEquivalentTo(JSType otherType) {
FunctionType that =
JSType.toMaybeFunctionType(otherType.toMaybeFunctionType());
if (that == null) {
return false;
}
if (this.isConstructor()) {
if (that.isConstructor()) {
return this == that;
}
return false;
}
if (this.isInterface()) {
if (that.isInterface()) {
return this.getReferenceName().equals(that.getReferenceName());
}
return false;
}
if (that.isInterface()) {
return false;
}
return this.typeOfThis.isEquivalentTo(that.typeOfThis) &&
this.call.isEquivalentTo(that.call);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
FunctionTypeBuilder inferThisType(JSDocInfo info,
@Nullable Node owner) {
ObjectType maybeThisType = null;
if (info != null && info.hasThisType()) {
maybeThisType = ObjectType.cast(
info.getThisType().evaluate(scope, typeRegistry));
}
if (maybeThisType != null) {
thisType = maybeThisType;
thisType.setValidator(new ThisTypeValidator());
} else if (owner != null &&
(info == null || !info.hasType())) {
// If the function is of the form:
// x.prototype.y = function() {}
// then we can assume "x" is the @this type. On the other hand,
// if it's of the form:
// /** @type {Function} */ x.prototype.y;
// then we should not give it a @this type.
String ownerTypeName = owner.getQualifiedName();
ObjectType ownerType = ObjectType.cast(
typeRegistry.getForgivingType(
scope, ownerTypeName, sourceName,
owner.getLineno(), owner.getCharno()));
if (ownerType != null) {
thisType = ownerType;
}
}
return this;
}
#location 21
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
FunctionTypeBuilder(String fnName, AbstractCompiler compiler,
Node errorRoot, String sourceName, Scope scope) {
Preconditions.checkNotNull(errorRoot);
this.fnName = fnName == null ? "" : fnName;
this.codingConvention = compiler.getCodingConvention();
this.typeRegistry = compiler.getTypeRegistry();
this.errorRoot = errorRoot;
this.sourceName = sourceName;
this.compiler = compiler;
this.scope = scope;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private EnvTypePair analyzeLooseCallNodeBwd(
Node callNode, TypeEnv outEnv, JSType retType) {
Preconditions.checkArgument(callNode.isCall());
Preconditions.checkNotNull(retType);
Node callee = callNode.getFirstChild();
TypeEnv tmpEnv = outEnv;
FunctionTypeBuilder builder = new FunctionTypeBuilder();
for (int i = callNode.getChildCount() - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
Node arg = callNode.getChildAtIndex(i + 1);
tmpEnv = analyzeExprBwd(arg, tmpEnv).env;
// Wait until FWD to get more precise argument types.
builder.addReqFormal(JSType.BOTTOM);
}
JSType looseRetType = retType.isUnknown() ? JSType.BOTTOM : retType;
JSType looseFunctionType =
builder.addRetType(looseRetType).addLoose().buildType();
looseFunctionType.getFunType().checkValid();
println("loose function type is ", looseFunctionType);
EnvTypePair calleePair = analyzeExprBwd(callee, tmpEnv, looseFunctionType);
return new EnvTypePair(calleePair.env, retType);
}
#location 17
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private EnvTypePair analyzeLooseCallNodeBwd(
Node callNode, TypeEnv outEnv, JSType retType) {
Preconditions.checkArgument(callNode.isCall());
Preconditions.checkNotNull(retType);
Node callee = callNode.getFirstChild();
TypeEnv tmpEnv = outEnv;
FunctionTypeBuilder builder = new FunctionTypeBuilder();
for (int i = callNode.getChildCount() - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
Node arg = callNode.getChildAtIndex(i + 1);
tmpEnv = analyzeExprBwd(arg, tmpEnv).env;
// Wait until FWD to get more precise argument types.
builder.addReqFormal(JSType.BOTTOM);
}
JSType looseRetType = retType.isUnknown() ? JSType.BOTTOM : retType;
JSType looseFunctionType =
builder.addRetType(looseRetType).addLoose().buildType();
println("loose function type is ", looseFunctionType);
EnvTypePair calleePair = analyzeExprBwd(callee, tmpEnv, looseFunctionType);
return new EnvTypePair(calleePair.env, retType);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private List<JSSourceFile> getDefaultExterns() {
try {
InputStream input = Compiler.class.getResourceAsStream(
"/externs.zip");
ZipInputStream zip = new ZipInputStream(input);
List<JSSourceFile> externs = Lists.newLinkedList();
for (ZipEntry entry; (entry = zip.getNextEntry()) != null; ) {
LimitInputStream entryStream =
new LimitInputStream(zip, entry.getSize());
externs.add(
JSSourceFile.fromInputStream(entry.getName(), entryStream));
}
return externs;
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new BuildException(e);
}
}
#location 16
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
private List<JSSourceFile> getDefaultExterns() {
try {
return CommandLineRunner.getDefaultExterns();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new BuildException(e);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private Node tryOptimizeSwitch(Node n) {
Preconditions.checkState(n.getType() == Token.SWITCH);
Node defaultCase = findDefaultCase(n);
if (defaultCase != null && isUselessCase(defaultCase)) {
NodeUtil.redeclareVarsInsideBranch(defaultCase);
n.removeChild(defaultCase);
reportCodeChange();
defaultCase = null;
}
// Removing cases when there exists a default case is not safe.
// TODO(johnlenz): Allow this if the same code is executed.
if (defaultCase == null) {
Node next = null;
// The first child is the switch conditions skip it.
for (Node c = n.getFirstChild().getNext(); c != null; c = next) {
next = c.getNext();
if (!mayHaveSideEffects(c.getFirstChild()) && isUselessCase(c)) {
NodeUtil.redeclareVarsInsideBranch(c);
n.removeChild(c);
reportCodeChange();
}
}
}
if (n.hasOneChild()) {
Node condition = n.removeFirstChild();
Node parent = n.getParent();
Node replacement = new Node(Token.EXPR_RESULT, condition)
.copyInformationFrom(n);
parent.replaceChild(n, replacement);
reportCodeChange();
return replacement;
}
return null;
}
#location 17
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private Node tryOptimizeSwitch(Node n) {
Preconditions.checkState(n.getType() == Token.SWITCH);
Node defaultCase = tryOptimizeDefaultCase(n);
// Removing cases when there exists a default case is not safe.
if (defaultCase == null) {
Node next = null;
Node prev = null;
// The first child is the switch conditions skip it.
for (Node c = n.getFirstChild().getNext(); c != null; c = next) {
next = c.getNext();
if (!mayHaveSideEffects(c.getFirstChild()) && isUselessCase(c, prev)) {
removeCase(n, c);
} else {
prev = c;
}
}
}
// Remove the switch if there are no remaining cases.
if (n.hasOneChild()) {
Node condition = n.removeFirstChild();
Node parent = n.getParent();
Node replacement = new Node(Token.EXPR_RESULT, condition)
.copyInformationFrom(n);
parent.replaceChild(n, replacement);
reportCodeChange();
return replacement;
}
return null;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private void writeResult(String source) {
if (this.outputFile.getParentFile().mkdirs()) {
log("Created missing parent directory " +
this.outputFile.getParentFile(), Project.MSG_DEBUG);
}
try {
FileWriter out = new FileWriter(this.outputFile);
out.append(source);
out.close();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new BuildException(e);
}
log("Compiled javascript written to " + this.outputFile.getAbsolutePath(),
Project.MSG_DEBUG);
}
#location 11
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
private void writeResult(String source) {
if (this.outputFile.getParentFile().mkdirs()) {
log("Created missing parent directory " +
this.outputFile.getParentFile(), Project.MSG_DEBUG);
}
try {
OutputStreamWriter out = new OutputStreamWriter(
new FileOutputStream(this.outputFile), outputEncoding);
out.append(source);
out.flush();
out.close();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new BuildException(e);
}
log("Compiled javascript written to " + this.outputFile.getAbsolutePath(),
Project.MSG_DEBUG);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private Writer fileNameToOutputWriter(String fileName) throws IOException {
if (fileName == null) {
return null;
}
if (testMode) {
return new StringWriter();
}
return streamToOutputWriter(new FileOutputStream(fileName));
}
#location 8
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
private Writer fileNameToOutputWriter(String fileName) throws IOException {
if (fileName == null) {
return null;
}
if (testMode) {
return new StringWriter();
}
return streamToOutputWriter(filenameToOutputStream(fileName));
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public List<INPUT> getSortedDependenciesOf(List<INPUT> roots) {
Preconditions.checkArgument(inputs.containsAll(roots));
Set<INPUT> included = Sets.newHashSet();
Deque<INPUT> worklist = new ArrayDeque<INPUT>(roots);
while (!worklist.isEmpty()) {
INPUT current = worklist.pop();
if (included.add(current)) {
for (String req : current.getRequires()) {
INPUT dep = provideMap.get(req);
if (dep != null) {
worklist.add(dep);
}
}
}
}
ImmutableList.Builder<INPUT> builder = ImmutableList.builder();
for (INPUT current : sortedList) {
if (included.contains(current)) {
builder.add(current);
}
}
return builder.build();
}
#location 1
#vulnerability type CHECKERS_IMMUTABLE_CAST
|
#fixed code
public List<INPUT> getSortedDependenciesOf(List<INPUT> roots) {
return getDependenciesOf(roots, true);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
Node result = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
compiler, fnTemplateRoot, null, argMap);
Preconditions.checkState(result == fnTemplateRoot);
return result;
} else {
// Create local alias of names that can not be safely
// used directly.
// An arg map that will be updated to contain the
// safe aliases.
Map<String, Node> newArgMap = Maps.newHashMap(argMap);
// Declare the alias in the same order as they
// are declared.
List<Node> newVars = Lists.newLinkedList();
// NOTE: argMap is a linked map so we get the parameters in the
// order that they were declared.
for (Entry<String, Node> entry : argMap.entrySet()) {
String name = entry.getKey();
if (namesToAlias.contains(name)) {
if (name.equals(THIS_MARKER)) {
boolean referencesThis = NodeUtil.referencesThis(fnTemplateRoot);
// Update "this", this is only necessary if "this" is referenced
// and the value of "this" is not Token.THIS, or the value of "this"
// has side effects.
Node value = entry.getValue();
if (value.getType() != Token.THIS
&& (referencesThis
|| NodeUtil.mayHaveSideEffects(value, compiler))) {
String newName = getUniqueThisName();
Node newValue = entry.getValue().cloneTree();
Node newNode = NodeUtil.newVarNode(newName, newValue)
.copyInformationFromForTree(newValue);
newVars.add(0, newNode);
// Remove the parameter from the list to replace.
newArgMap.put(THIS_MARKER,
Node.newString(Token.NAME, newName)
.copyInformationFromForTree(newValue));
}
} else {
Node newValue = entry.getValue().cloneTree();
Node newNode = NodeUtil.newVarNode(name, newValue)
.copyInformationFromForTree(newValue);
newVars.add(0, newNode);
// Remove the parameter from the list to replace.
newArgMap.remove(name);
}
}
}
// Inline the arguments.
Node result = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
compiler, fnTemplateRoot, null, newArgMap);
Preconditions.checkState(result == fnTemplateRoot);
// Now that the names have been replaced, add the new aliases for
// the old names.
for (Node n : newVars) {
fnTemplateRoot.addChildToFront(n);
}
return result;
}
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
Node result = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
compiler, fnTemplateRoot, null, argMap);
Preconditions.checkState(result == fnTemplateRoot);
return result;
} else {
// Create local alias of names that can not be safely
// used directly.
// An arg map that will be updated to contain the
// safe aliases.
Map<String, Node> newArgMap = Maps.newHashMap(argMap);
// Declare the alias in the same order as they
// are declared.
List<Node> newVars = Lists.newLinkedList();
// NOTE: argMap is a linked map so we get the parameters in the
// order that they were declared.
for (Entry<String, Node> entry : argMap.entrySet()) {
String name = entry.getKey();
if (namesToAlias.contains(name)) {
if (name.equals(THIS_MARKER)) {
boolean referencesThis = NodeUtil.referencesThis(fnTemplateRoot);
// Update "this", this is only necessary if "this" is referenced
// and the value of "this" is not Token.THIS, or the value of "this"
// has side effects.
Node value = entry.getValue();
if (!value.isThis()
&& (referencesThis
|| NodeUtil.mayHaveSideEffects(value, compiler))) {
String newName = getUniqueThisName();
Node newValue = entry.getValue().cloneTree();
Node newNode = NodeUtil.newVarNode(newName, newValue)
.copyInformationFromForTree(newValue);
newVars.add(0, newNode);
// Remove the parameter from the list to replace.
newArgMap.put(THIS_MARKER,
Node.newString(Token.NAME, newName)
.copyInformationFromForTree(newValue));
}
} else {
Node newValue = entry.getValue().cloneTree();
Node newNode = NodeUtil.newVarNode(name, newValue)
.copyInformationFromForTree(newValue);
newVars.add(0, newNode);
// Remove the parameter from the list to replace.
newArgMap.remove(name);
}
}
}
// Inline the arguments.
Node result = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
compiler, fnTemplateRoot, null, newArgMap);
Preconditions.checkState(result == fnTemplateRoot);
// Now that the names have been replaced, add the new aliases for
// the old names.
for (Node n : newVars) {
fnTemplateRoot.addChildToFront(n);
}
return result;
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public boolean shouldTraverse(NodeTraversal t, Node n, Node parent) {
if (n.isScript()) {
this.inExterns = n.getStaticSourceFile().isExtern();
}
return true;
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public boolean shouldTraverse(NodeTraversal t, Node n, Node parent) {
return true;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public Set<String> getOwnPropertyNames() {
return ImmutableSet.of();
}
#location 1
#vulnerability type CHECKERS_IMMUTABLE_CAST
|
#fixed code
public Set<String> getOwnPropertyNames() {
return getPropertyMap().getOwnPropertyNames();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {
new GraphReachability<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch>(
t.getControlFlowGraph(), new ReachablePredicate()).compute(
t.getControlFlowGraph().getEntry().getValue());
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {
scopeNeedsInit = true;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private void initEdgeEnvsFwd() {
// TODO(user): Revisit what we throw away after the bwd analysis
DiGraphNode<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch> entry = cfg.getEntry();
DiGraphEdge<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch> entryOutEdge =
cfg.getOutEdges(entry.getValue()).get(0);
TypeEnv entryEnv = envs.get(entryOutEdge);
initEdgeEnvs(new TypeEnv());
// For function scopes, add the formal parameters and the free variables
// from outer scopes to the environment.
if (currentScope.isFunction()) {
Set<String> formalsAndOuters = currentScope.getOuterVars();
formalsAndOuters.addAll(currentScope.getFormals());
if (currentScope.hasThis()) {
formalsAndOuters.add("this");
}
for (String name : formalsAndOuters) {
JSType declType = currentScope.getDeclaredTypeOf(name);
JSType initType;
if (declType == null) {
initType = envGetType(entryEnv, name);
} else if (declType.getFunTypeIfSingletonObj() != null &&
declType.getFunTypeIfSingletonObj().isConstructor()) {
initType =
declType.getFunTypeIfSingletonObj().createConstructorObject();
} else {
initType = declType;
}
entryEnv = envPutType(entryEnv, name, initType.withLocation(name));
}
entryEnv = envPutType(entryEnv, RETVAL_ID, JSType.UNDEFINED);
}
// For all scopes, add local variables and (local) function definitions
// to the environment.
for (String local : currentScope.getLocals()) {
entryEnv = envPutType(entryEnv, local, JSType.UNDEFINED);
}
for (String fnName : currentScope.getLocalFunDefs()) {
JSType summaryType = summaries.get(currentScope.getScope(fnName));
FunctionType fnType = summaryType.getFunType();
if (fnType.isConstructor()) {
summaryType = fnType.createConstructorObject();
} else {
summaryType = summaryType.withProperty("prototype", JSType.TOP_OBJECT);
}
entryEnv = envPutType(entryEnv, fnName, summaryType);
}
println("Keeping env: ", entryEnv);
envs.put(entryOutEdge, entryEnv);
}
#location 29
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private void initEdgeEnvsFwd() {
// TODO(user): Revisit what we throw away after the bwd analysis
DiGraphNode<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch> entry = cfg.getEntry();
DiGraphEdge<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch> entryOutEdge =
cfg.getOutEdges(entry.getValue()).get(0);
TypeEnv entryEnv = envs.get(entryOutEdge);
initEdgeEnvs(new TypeEnv());
// For function scopes, add the formal parameters and the free variables
// from outer scopes to the environment.
if (currentScope.isFunction()) {
Set<String> formalsAndOuters = currentScope.getOuterVars();
formalsAndOuters.addAll(currentScope.getFormals());
if (currentScope.hasThis()) {
formalsAndOuters.add("this");
}
for (String name : formalsAndOuters) {
JSType declType = currentScope.getDeclaredTypeOf(name);
JSType initType;
if (declType == null) {
initType = envGetType(entryEnv, name);
} else if (declType.getFunTypeIfSingletonObj() != null &&
declType.getFunTypeIfSingletonObj().isConstructor()) {
initType =
declType.getFunTypeIfSingletonObj().createConstructorObject();
} else {
initType = declType;
}
entryEnv = envPutType(entryEnv, name, initType.withLocation(name));
}
entryEnv = envPutType(entryEnv, RETVAL_ID, JSType.UNDEFINED);
}
// For all scopes, add local variables and (local) function definitions
// to the environment.
for (String local : currentScope.getLocals()) {
entryEnv = envPutType(entryEnv, local, JSType.UNDEFINED);
}
for (String fnName : currentScope.getLocalFunDefs()) {
JSType summaryType = summaries.get(currentScope.getScope(fnName));
FunctionType fnType = summaryType.getFunType();
if (fnType.isConstructor()) {
summaryType = fnType.createConstructorObject();
} else {
summaryType = summaryType.withProperty(
new QualifiedName("prototype"), JSType.TOP_OBJECT);
}
entryEnv = envPutType(entryEnv, fnName, summaryType);
}
println("Keeping env: ", entryEnv);
envs.put(entryOutEdge, entryEnv);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private void removeUnreferencedVars() {
CodingConvention convention = compiler.getCodingConvention();
for (Iterator<Var> it = maybeUnreferenced.iterator(); it.hasNext(); ) {
Var var = it.next();
// Regardless of what happens to the original declaration,
// we need to remove all assigns, because they may contain references
// to other unreferenced variables.
removeAllAssigns(var);
compiler.addToDebugLog("Unreferenced var: " + var.name);
Node nameNode = var.nameNode;
Node toRemove = nameNode.getParent();
Node parent = toRemove.getParent();
Preconditions.checkState(
toRemove.getType() == Token.VAR ||
toRemove.getType() == Token.FUNCTION ||
toRemove.getType() == Token.LP &&
parent.getType() == Token.FUNCTION,
"We should only declare vars and functions and function args");
if (toRemove.getType() == Token.LP &&
parent.getType() == Token.FUNCTION) {
// Don't remove function arguments here. That's a special case
// that's taken care of in removeUnreferencedFunctionArgs.
} else if (NodeUtil.isFunctionExpression(toRemove)) {
if (!preserveFunctionExpressionNames) {
toRemove.getFirstChild().setString("");
compiler.reportCodeChange();
}
// Don't remove bleeding functions.
} else if (parent != null &&
parent.getType() == Token.FOR &&
parent.getChildCount() < 4) {
// foreach iterations have 3 children. Leave them alone.
} else if (toRemove.getType() == Token.VAR &&
nameNode.hasChildren() &&
NodeUtil.mayHaveSideEffects(nameNode.getFirstChild())) {
// If this is a single var declaration, we can at least remove the
// declaration itself and just leave the value, e.g.,
// var a = foo(); => foo();
if (toRemove.getChildCount() == 1) {
parent.replaceChild(toRemove,
new Node(Token.EXPR_RESULT, nameNode.removeFirstChild()));
compiler.reportCodeChange();
}
} else if (toRemove.getType() == Token.VAR &&
toRemove.getChildCount() > 1) {
// For var declarations with multiple names (i.e. var a, b, c),
// only remove the unreferenced name
toRemove.removeChild(nameNode);
compiler.reportCodeChange();
} else if (parent != null) {
NodeUtil.removeChild(parent, toRemove);
compiler.reportCodeChange();
}
}
}
#location 45
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private void removeUnreferencedVars() {
CodingConvention convention = codingConvention;
for (Iterator<Var> it = maybeUnreferenced.iterator(); it.hasNext(); ) {
Var var = it.next();
// Remove calls to inheritance-defining functions where the unreferenced
// class is the subclass.
for (Node exprCallNode : inheritsCalls.get(var)) {
NodeUtil.removeChild(exprCallNode.getParent(), exprCallNode);
compiler.reportCodeChange();
}
// Regardless of what happens to the original declaration,
// we need to remove all assigns, because they may contain references
// to other unreferenced variables.
removeAllAssigns(var);
compiler.addToDebugLog("Unreferenced var: " + var.name);
Node nameNode = var.nameNode;
Node toRemove = nameNode.getParent();
Node parent = toRemove.getParent();
Preconditions.checkState(
toRemove.getType() == Token.VAR ||
toRemove.getType() == Token.FUNCTION ||
toRemove.getType() == Token.LP &&
parent.getType() == Token.FUNCTION,
"We should only declare vars and functions and function args");
if (toRemove.getType() == Token.LP &&
parent.getType() == Token.FUNCTION) {
// Don't remove function arguments here. That's a special case
// that's taken care of in removeUnreferencedFunctionArgs.
} else if (NodeUtil.isFunctionExpression(toRemove)) {
if (!preserveFunctionExpressionNames) {
toRemove.getFirstChild().setString("");
compiler.reportCodeChange();
}
// Don't remove bleeding functions.
} else if (parent != null &&
parent.getType() == Token.FOR &&
parent.getChildCount() < 4) {
// foreach iterations have 3 children. Leave them alone.
} else if (toRemove.getType() == Token.VAR &&
nameNode.hasChildren() &&
NodeUtil.mayHaveSideEffects(nameNode.getFirstChild())) {
// If this is a single var declaration, we can at least remove the
// declaration itself and just leave the value, e.g.,
// var a = foo(); => foo();
if (toRemove.getChildCount() == 1) {
parent.replaceChild(toRemove,
new Node(Token.EXPR_RESULT, nameNode.removeFirstChild()));
compiler.reportCodeChange();
}
} else if (toRemove.getType() == Token.VAR &&
toRemove.getChildCount() > 1) {
// For var declarations with multiple names (i.e. var a, b, c),
// only remove the unreferenced name
toRemove.removeChild(nameNode);
compiler.reportCodeChange();
} else if (parent != null) {
NodeUtil.removeChild(parent, toRemove);
compiler.reportCodeChange();
}
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
Node result = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
compiler, fnTemplateRoot, null, argMap);
Preconditions.checkState(result == fnTemplateRoot);
return result;
} else {
// Create local alias of names that can not be safely
// used directly.
// An arg map that will be updated to contain the
// safe aliases.
Map<String, Node> newArgMap = Maps.newHashMap(argMap);
// Declare the alias in the same order as they
// are declared.
List<Node> newVars = Lists.newLinkedList();
// NOTE: argMap is a linked map so we get the parameters in the
// order that they were declared.
for (Entry<String, Node> entry : argMap.entrySet()) {
String name = entry.getKey();
if (namesToAlias.contains(name)) {
if (name.equals(THIS_MARKER)) {
boolean referencesThis = NodeUtil.referencesThis(fnTemplateRoot);
// Update "this", this is only necessary if "this" is referenced
// and the value of "this" is not Token.THIS, or the value of "this"
// has side effects.
Node value = entry.getValue();
if (value.getType() != Token.THIS
&& (referencesThis
|| NodeUtil.mayHaveSideEffects(value, compiler))) {
String newName = getUniqueThisName();
Node newValue = entry.getValue().cloneTree();
Node newNode = NodeUtil.newVarNode(newName, newValue)
.copyInformationFromForTree(newValue);
newVars.add(0, newNode);
// Remove the parameter from the list to replace.
newArgMap.put(THIS_MARKER,
Node.newString(Token.NAME, newName)
.copyInformationFromForTree(newValue));
}
} else {
Node newValue = entry.getValue().cloneTree();
Node newNode = NodeUtil.newVarNode(name, newValue)
.copyInformationFromForTree(newValue);
newVars.add(0, newNode);
// Remove the parameter from the list to replace.
newArgMap.remove(name);
}
}
}
// Inline the arguments.
Node result = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
compiler, fnTemplateRoot, null, newArgMap);
Preconditions.checkState(result == fnTemplateRoot);
// Now that the names have been replaced, add the new aliases for
// the old names.
for (Node n : newVars) {
fnTemplateRoot.addChildToFront(n);
}
return result;
}
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
Node result = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
fnTemplateRoot, null, argMap);
Preconditions.checkState(result == fnTemplateRoot);
return result;
} else {
// Create local alias of names that can not be safely
// used directly.
// An arg map that will be updated to contain the
// safe aliases.
Map<String, Node> newArgMap = Maps.newHashMap(argMap);
// Declare the alias in the same order as they
// are declared.
List<Node> newVars = Lists.newLinkedList();
// NOTE: argMap is a linked map so we get the parameters in the
// order that they were declared.
for (Entry<String, Node> entry : argMap.entrySet()) {
String name = entry.getKey();
if (namesToAlias.contains(name)) {
Node newValue = entry.getValue().cloneTree();
Node newNode = NodeUtil.newVarNode(name, newValue)
.copyInformationFromForTree(newValue);
newVars.add(0, newNode);
// Remove the parameter from the list to replace.
newArgMap.remove(name);
}
}
// Inline the arguments.
Node result = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
fnTemplateRoot, null, newArgMap);
Preconditions.checkState(result == fnTemplateRoot);
// Now that the names have been replaced, add the new aliases for
// the old names.
for (Node n : newVars) {
fnTemplateRoot.addChildToFront(n);
}
return result;
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private void outputTracerReport() {
OutputStreamWriter output = new OutputStreamWriter(this.err);
try {
int runtime = 0;
int runs = 0;
int changes = 0;
int diff = 0;
int gzDiff = 0;
// header
output.write("Summary:\n");
output.write("pass,runtime,runs,chancingRuns,reduction,gzReduction\n");
Map<String, Stats> runtimeMap = compiler.tracker.getStats();
for (Entry<String, Stats> entry : runtimeMap.entrySet()) {
String key = entry.getKey();
Stats stats = entry.getValue();
output.write(key);
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.runtime));
runtime += stats.runtime;
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.runs));
runs += stats.runs;
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.changes));
changes += stats.changes;
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.diff));
diff += stats.diff;
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.gzDiff));
gzDiff += stats.gzDiff;
output.write("\n");
}
output.write("TOTAL");
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(runtime));
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(runs));
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(changes));
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(diff));
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(gzDiff));
output.write("\n");
output.write("\n");
output.write("Log:\n");
output.write(
"pass,runtime,runs,chancingRuns,reduction,gzReduction,size,gzSize\n");
List<Stats> runtimeLog = compiler.tracker.getLog();
for (Stats stats : runtimeLog) {
output.write(stats.pass);
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.runtime));
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.runs));
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.changes));
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.diff));
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.gzDiff));
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.size));
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.gzSize));
output.write("\n");
}
output.write("\n");
output.close();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
#location 74
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
private void outputTracerReport() {
JvmMetrics.maybeWriteJvmMetrics(this.err, "verbose:pretty:all");
OutputStreamWriter output = new OutputStreamWriter(this.err);
try {
int runtime = 0;
int runs = 0;
int changes = 0;
int diff = 0;
int gzDiff = 0;
// header
output.write("Summary:\n");
output.write("pass,runtime,runs,chancingRuns,reduction,gzReduction\n");
Map<String, Stats> runtimeMap = compiler.tracker.getStats();
for (Entry<String, Stats> entry : runtimeMap.entrySet()) {
String key = entry.getKey();
Stats stats = entry.getValue();
output.write(key);
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.runtime));
runtime += stats.runtime;
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.runs));
runs += stats.runs;
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.changes));
changes += stats.changes;
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.diff));
diff += stats.diff;
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.gzDiff));
gzDiff += stats.gzDiff;
output.write("\n");
}
output.write("TOTAL");
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(runtime));
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(runs));
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(changes));
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(diff));
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(gzDiff));
output.write("\n");
output.write("\n");
output.write("Log:\n");
output.write(
"pass,runtime,runs,chancingRuns,reduction,gzReduction,size,gzSize\n");
List<Stats> runtimeLog = compiler.tracker.getLog();
for (Stats stats : runtimeLog) {
output.write(stats.pass);
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.runtime));
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.runs));
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.changes));
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.diff));
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.gzDiff));
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.size));
output.write(",");
output.write(String.valueOf(stats.gzSize));
output.write("\n");
}
output.write("\n");
output.close();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private void escapeParameters(MustDef output) {
for (Iterator<Var> i = jsScope.getVars(); i.hasNext();) {
Var v = i.next();
if (v.getParentNode().getType() == Token.LP) {
// Assume we no longer know where the parameter comes from
// anymore.
output.reachingDef.put(v, null);
}
}
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private void escapeParameters(MustDef output) {
for (Iterator<Var> i = jsScope.getVars(); i.hasNext();) {
Var v = i.next();
if (isParameter(v)) {
// Assume we no longer know where the parameter comes from
// anymore.
output.reachingDef.put(v, null);
}
}
// Also, assume we no longer know anything that depends on a parameter.
for (Entry<Var, Definition> pair: output.reachingDef.entrySet()) {
Definition value = pair.getValue();
if (value == null) {
continue;
}
for (Var dep : value.depends) {
if (isParameter(dep)) {
output.reachingDef.put(pair.getKey(), null);
}
}
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {
Scope scope = t.getScope();
// Computes the control flow graph.
ControlFlowAnalysis cfa = new ControlFlowAnalysis(compiler, false, false);
cfa.process(null, scope.getRootNode());
cfgStack.push(curCfg);
curCfg = cfa.getCfg();
new GraphReachability<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch>(curCfg)
.compute(curCfg.getEntry().getValue());
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {
// TODO(user): We CAN do this in the global scope, just need to be
// careful when something is exported. Liveness uses bit-vector for live
// sets so I don't see compilation time will be a problem for running this
// pass in the global scope.
if (t.inGlobalScope()) {
return;
}
Scope scope = t.getScope();
ControlFlowGraph<Node> cfg = t.getControlFlowGraph();
LiveVariablesAnalysis liveness =
new LiveVariablesAnalysis(cfg, scope, compiler);
// If the function has exactly 2 params, mark them as escaped. This is
// a work-around for an IE bug where it throws an exception if you
// write to the parameters of the callback in a sort(). See:
// http://code.google.com/p/closure-compiler/issues/detail?id=58
if (scope.getRootNode().getFirstChild().getNext().getChildCount() == 2) {
liveness.markAllParametersEscaped();
}
liveness.analyze();
UndiGraph<Var, Void> interferenceGraph =
computeVariableNamesInterferenceGraph(
t, cfg, liveness.getEscapedLocals());
GraphColoring<Var, Void> coloring =
new GreedyGraphColoring<Var, Void>(interferenceGraph,
coloringTieBreaker);
coloring.color();
colorings.push(coloring);
}
#location 19
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {
Scope scope = t.getScope();
if (!shouldOptimizeScope(scope)) {
return;
}
ControlFlowGraph<Node> cfg = t.getControlFlowGraph();
LiveVariablesAnalysis liveness =
new LiveVariablesAnalysis(cfg, scope, compiler);
// If the function has exactly 2 params, mark them as escaped. This is
// a work-around for an IE bug where it throws an exception if you
// write to the parameters of the callback in a sort(). See:
// http://code.google.com/p/closure-compiler/issues/detail?id=58
if (scope.getRootNode().getFirstChild().getNext().getChildCount() == 2) {
liveness.markAllParametersEscaped();
}
liveness.analyze();
UndiGraph<Var, Void> interferenceGraph =
computeVariableNamesInterferenceGraph(
t, cfg, liveness.getEscapedLocals());
GraphColoring<Var, Void> coloring =
new GreedyGraphColoring<Var, Void>(interferenceGraph,
coloringTieBreaker);
coloring.color();
colorings.push(coloring);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private String getFunctionAnnotation(Node fnNode) {
Preconditions.checkState(fnNode.getType() == Token.FUNCTION);
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder("/**\n");
JSType type = fnNode.getJSType();
if (type == null || type.isUnknownType()) {
return "";
}
FunctionType funType = type.toMaybeFunctionType();
// We need to use the child nodes of the function as the nodes for the
// parameters of the function type do not have the real parameter names.
// FUNCTION
// NAME
// LP
// NAME param1
// NAME param2
if (fnNode != null) {
Node paramNode = NodeUtil.getFunctionParameters(fnNode).getFirstChild();
// Param types
for (Node n : funType.getParameters()) {
// Bail out if the paramNode is not there.
if (paramNode == null) {
break;
}
sb.append(" * @param {" + getParameterNodeJSDocType(n) + "} ");
sb.append(paramNode.getString());
sb.append("\n");
paramNode = paramNode.getNext();
}
}
// Return type
JSType retType = funType.getReturnType();
if (retType != null && !retType.isUnknownType() && !retType.isEmptyType()) {
sb.append(" * @return {" + retType + "}\n");
}
// Constructor/interface
if (funType.isConstructor() || funType.isInterface()) {
FunctionType superConstructor = funType.getSuperClassConstructor();
if (superConstructor != null) {
ObjectType superInstance =
funType.getSuperClassConstructor().getInstanceType();
if (!superInstance.toString().equals("Object")) {
sb.append(" * @extends {" + superInstance + "}\n");
}
}
if (funType.isInterface()) {
for (ObjectType interfaceType : funType.getExtendedInterfaces()) {
sb.append(" * @extends {" + interfaceType + "}\n");
}
}
// Avoid duplicates, add implemented type to a set first
Set<String> interfaces = Sets.newTreeSet();
for (ObjectType interfaze : funType.getImplementedInterfaces()) {
interfaces.add(interfaze.toString());
}
for (String interfaze : interfaces) {
sb.append(" * @implements {" + interfaze + "}\n");
}
if (funType.isConstructor()) {
sb.append(" * @constructor\n");
} else if (funType.isInterface()) {
sb.append(" * @interface\n");
}
}
if (fnNode != null && fnNode.getBooleanProp(Node.IS_DISPATCHER)) {
sb.append(" * @javadispatch\n");
}
sb.append(" */\n");
return sb.toString();
}
#location 24
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private String getFunctionAnnotation(Node fnNode) {
Preconditions.checkState(fnNode.getType() == Token.FUNCTION);
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder("/**\n");
JSType type = fnNode.getJSType();
if (type == null || type.isUnknownType()) {
return "";
}
FunctionType funType = (FunctionType) fnNode.getJSType();
// We need to use the child nodes of the function as the nodes for the
// parameters of the function type do not have the real parameter names.
// FUNCTION
// NAME
// LP
// NAME param1
// NAME param2
if (fnNode != null) {
Node paramNode = NodeUtil.getFunctionParameters(fnNode).getFirstChild();
// Param types
for (Node n : funType.getParameters()) {
// Bail out if the paramNode is not there.
if (paramNode == null) {
break;
}
sb.append(" * @param {" + getParameterNodeJSDocType(n) + "} ");
sb.append(paramNode.getString());
sb.append("\n");
paramNode = paramNode.getNext();
}
}
// Return type
JSType retType = funType.getReturnType();
if (retType != null && !retType.isUnknownType() && !retType.isEmptyType()) {
sb.append(" * @return {" + retType + "}\n");
}
// Constructor/interface
if (funType.isConstructor() || funType.isInterface()) {
FunctionType superConstructor = funType.getSuperClassConstructor();
if (superConstructor != null) {
ObjectType superInstance =
funType.getSuperClassConstructor().getInstanceType();
if (!superInstance.toString().equals("Object")) {
sb.append(" * @extends {" + superInstance + "}\n");
}
}
if (funType.isInterface()) {
for (ObjectType interfaceType : funType.getExtendedInterfaces()) {
sb.append(" * @extends {" + interfaceType + "}\n");
}
}
// Avoid duplicates, add implemented type to a set first
Set<String> interfaces = Sets.newTreeSet();
for (ObjectType interfaze : funType.getImplementedInterfaces()) {
interfaces.add(interfaze.toString());
}
for (String interfaze : interfaces) {
sb.append(" * @implements {" + interfaze + "}\n");
}
if (funType.isConstructor()) {
sb.append(" * @constructor\n");
} else if (funType.isInterface()) {
sb.append(" * @interface\n");
}
}
if (fnNode != null && fnNode.getBooleanProp(Node.IS_DISPATCHER)) {
sb.append(" * @javadispatch\n");
}
sb.append(" */\n");
return sb.toString();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private Node inlineReturnValue(Node callNode, Node fnNode) {
Node block = fnNode.getLastChild();
Node callParentNode = callNode.getParent();
// NOTE: As the normalize pass guarantees globals aren't being
// shadowed and an expression can't introduce new names, there is
// no need to check for conflicts.
// Create an argName -> expression map, checking for side effects.
Map<String, Node> argMap =
FunctionArgumentInjector.getFunctionCallParameterMap(
fnNode, callNode, this.safeNameIdSupplier);
Node newExpression;
if (!block.hasChildren()) {
Node srcLocation = block;
newExpression = NodeUtil.newUndefinedNode(srcLocation);
} else {
Node returnNode = block.getFirstChild();
Preconditions.checkArgument(returnNode.getType() == Token.RETURN);
// Clone the return node first.
Node safeReturnNode = returnNode.cloneTree();
Node inlineResult = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
null, safeReturnNode, null, argMap);
Preconditions.checkArgument(safeReturnNode == inlineResult);
newExpression = safeReturnNode.removeFirstChild();
}
callParentNode.replaceChild(callNode, newExpression);
return newExpression;
}
#location 24
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private Node inlineReturnValue(Node callNode, Node fnNode) {
Node block = fnNode.getLastChild();
Node callParentNode = callNode.getParent();
// NOTE: As the normalize pass guarantees globals aren't being
// shadowed and an expression can't introduce new names, there is
// no need to check for conflicts.
// Create an argName -> expression map, checking for side effects.
Map<String, Node> argMap =
FunctionArgumentInjector.getFunctionCallParameterMap(
fnNode, callNode, this.safeNameIdSupplier);
Node newExpression;
if (!block.hasChildren()) {
Node srcLocation = block;
newExpression = NodeUtil.newUndefinedNode(srcLocation);
} else {
Node returnNode = block.getFirstChild();
Preconditions.checkArgument(returnNode.getType() == Token.RETURN);
// Clone the return node first.
Node safeReturnNode = returnNode.cloneTree();
Node inlineResult = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
safeReturnNode, null, argMap);
Preconditions.checkArgument(safeReturnNode == inlineResult);
newExpression = safeReturnNode.removeFirstChild();
}
callParentNode.replaceChild(callNode, newExpression);
return newExpression;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
FunctionTypeBuilder inferThisType(JSDocInfo info,
@Nullable Node owner) {
ObjectType maybeThisType = null;
if (info != null && info.hasThisType()) {
maybeThisType = ObjectType.cast(
info.getThisType().evaluate(scope, typeRegistry));
}
if (maybeThisType != null) {
// TODO(user): Doing an instanceof check here is too
// restrictive as (Date,Error) is, for instance, an object type
// even though its implementation is a UnionType. Would need to
// create interfaces JSType, ObjectType, FunctionType etc and have
// separate implementation instead of the class hierarchy, so that
// union types can also be object types, etc.
thisType = maybeThisType;
} else if (owner != null &&
(info == null || !info.hasType())) {
// If the function is of the form:
// x.prototype.y = function() {}
// then we can assume "x" is the @this type. On the other hand,
// if it's of the form:
// /** @type {Function} */ x.prototype.y;
// then we should not give it a @this type.
String ownerTypeName = owner.getQualifiedName();
ObjectType ownerType = ObjectType.cast(
typeRegistry.getType(
scope, ownerTypeName, sourceName,
owner.getLineno(), owner.getCharno()));
if (ownerType != null) {
thisType = ownerType;
}
}
return this;
}
#location 26
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
FunctionTypeBuilder(String fnName, AbstractCompiler compiler,
Node errorRoot, String sourceName, Scope scope) {
Preconditions.checkNotNull(errorRoot);
this.fnName = fnName == null ? "" : fnName;
this.codingConvention = compiler.getCodingConvention();
this.typeRegistry = compiler.getTypeRegistry();
this.errorRoot = errorRoot;
this.sourceName = sourceName;
this.compiler = compiler;
this.scope = scope;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private void createPropertyScopeFor(Symbol s) {
// In order to build a property scope for s, we will need to build
// a property scope for all its implicit prototypes first. This means
// that sometimes we will already have built its property scope
// for a previous symbol.
if (s.propertyScope != null) {
return;
}
SymbolScope parentPropertyScope = null;
ObjectType type = s.getType().toObjectType();
ObjectType proto = type.getParentScope();
if (proto != null && proto != type && proto.getConstructor() != null) {
Symbol parentSymbol = getSymbolForInstancesOf(proto.getConstructor());
if (parentSymbol != null) {
createPropertyScopeFor(parentSymbol);
parentPropertyScope = parentSymbol.getPropertyScope();
}
}
ObjectType instanceType = type;
Iterable<String> propNames = type.getOwnPropertyNames();
if (instanceType.isFunctionPrototypeType()) {
// Merge the properties of "Foo.prototype" and "new Foo()" together.
instanceType = instanceType.getOwnerFunction().getInstanceType();
Set<String> set = Sets.newHashSet(propNames);
Iterables.addAll(set, instanceType.getOwnPropertyNames());
propNames = set;
}
s.propertyScope = new SymbolScope(null, parentPropertyScope, type);
for (String propName : propNames) {
StaticSlot<JSType> newProp = instanceType.getSlot(propName);
if (newProp.getDeclaration() == null) {
// Skip properties without declarations. We won't know how to index
// them, because we index things by node.
continue;
}
// We have symbol tables that do not do type analysis. They just try
// to build a complete index of all objects in the program. So we might
// already have symbols for things like "Foo.bar". If this happens,
// throw out the old symbol and use the type-based symbol.
Symbol oldProp = getScope(s).getSlot(s.getName() + "." + propName);
if (oldProp != null) {
removeSymbol(oldProp);
}
Symbol newSym = copySymbolTo(newProp, s.propertyScope);
if (oldProp != null) {
if (newSym.getJSDocInfo() == null) {
newSym.setJSDocInfo(oldProp.getJSDocInfo());
}
newSym.propertyScope = oldProp.propertyScope;
for (Reference ref : oldProp.references.values()) {
newSym.defineReferenceAt(ref.getNode());
}
}
}
}
#location 12
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private void createPropertyScopeFor(Symbol s) {
// In order to build a property scope for s, we will need to build
// a property scope for all its implicit prototypes first. This means
// that sometimes we will already have built its property scope
// for a previous symbol.
if (s.propertyScope != null) {
return;
}
SymbolScope parentPropertyScope = null;
ObjectType type = s.getType() == null ? null : s.getType().toObjectType();
if (type == null) {
return;
}
ObjectType proto = type.getParentScope();
if (proto != null && proto != type && proto.getConstructor() != null) {
Symbol parentSymbol = getSymbolForInstancesOf(proto.getConstructor());
if (parentSymbol != null) {
createPropertyScopeFor(parentSymbol);
parentPropertyScope = parentSymbol.getPropertyScope();
}
}
ObjectType instanceType = type;
Iterable<String> propNames = type.getOwnPropertyNames();
if (instanceType.isFunctionPrototypeType()) {
// Merge the properties of "Foo.prototype" and "new Foo()" together.
instanceType = instanceType.getOwnerFunction().getInstanceType();
Set<String> set = Sets.newHashSet(propNames);
Iterables.addAll(set, instanceType.getOwnPropertyNames());
propNames = set;
}
s.setPropertyScope(new SymbolScope(null, parentPropertyScope, type, s));
for (String propName : propNames) {
StaticSlot<JSType> newProp = instanceType.getSlot(propName);
if (newProp.getDeclaration() == null) {
// Skip properties without declarations. We won't know how to index
// them, because we index things by node.
continue;
}
// We have symbol tables that do not do type analysis. They just try
// to build a complete index of all objects in the program. So we might
// already have symbols for things like "Foo.bar". If this happens,
// throw out the old symbol and use the type-based symbol.
Symbol oldProp = getScope(s).getSlot(s.getName() + "." + propName);
if (oldProp != null) {
removeSymbol(oldProp);
}
Symbol newSym = copySymbolTo(newProp, s.propertyScope);
if (oldProp != null) {
if (newSym.getJSDocInfo() == null) {
newSym.setJSDocInfo(oldProp.getJSDocInfo());
}
newSym.setPropertyScope(oldProp.propertyScope);
for (Reference ref : oldProp.references.values()) {
newSym.defineReferenceAt(ref.getNode());
}
}
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private FlowScope traverse(Node n, FlowScope scope) {
switch (n.getType()) {
case Token.ASSIGN:
scope = traverseAssign(n, scope);
break;
case Token.NAME:
scope = traverseName(n, scope);
break;
case Token.GETPROP:
scope = traverseGetProp(n, scope);
break;
case Token.AND:
scope = traverseAnd(n, scope).getJoinedFlowScope()
.createChildFlowScope();
break;
case Token.OR:
scope = traverseOr(n, scope).getJoinedFlowScope()
.createChildFlowScope();
break;
case Token.HOOK:
scope = traverseHook(n, scope);
break;
case Token.OBJECTLIT:
scope = traverseObjectLiteral(n, scope);
break;
case Token.CALL:
scope = traverseCall(n, scope);
break;
case Token.NEW:
scope = traverseNew(n, scope);
break;
case Token.ASSIGN_ADD:
case Token.ADD:
scope = traverseAdd(n, scope);
break;
case Token.POS:
case Token.NEG:
scope = traverse(n.getFirstChild(), scope); // Find types.
n.setJSType(getNativeType(NUMBER_TYPE));
break;
case Token.ARRAYLIT:
scope = traverseArrayLiteral(n, scope);
break;
case Token.THIS:
n.setJSType(scope.getTypeOfThis());
break;
case Token.ASSIGN_LSH:
case Token.ASSIGN_RSH:
case Token.LSH:
case Token.RSH:
case Token.ASSIGN_URSH:
case Token.URSH:
case Token.ASSIGN_DIV:
case Token.ASSIGN_MOD:
case Token.ASSIGN_BITAND:
case Token.ASSIGN_BITXOR:
case Token.ASSIGN_BITOR:
case Token.ASSIGN_MUL:
case Token.ASSIGN_SUB:
case Token.DIV:
case Token.MOD:
case Token.BITAND:
case Token.BITXOR:
case Token.BITOR:
case Token.MUL:
case Token.SUB:
case Token.DEC:
case Token.INC:
case Token.BITNOT:
scope = traverseChildren(n, scope);
n.setJSType(getNativeType(NUMBER_TYPE));
break;
case Token.PARAM_LIST:
scope = traverse(n.getFirstChild(), scope);
n.setJSType(getJSType(n.getFirstChild()));
break;
case Token.COMMA:
scope = traverseChildren(n, scope);
n.setJSType(getJSType(n.getLastChild()));
break;
case Token.TYPEOF:
scope = traverseChildren(n, scope);
n.setJSType(getNativeType(STRING_TYPE));
break;
case Token.DELPROP:
case Token.LT:
case Token.LE:
case Token.GT:
case Token.GE:
case Token.NOT:
case Token.EQ:
case Token.NE:
case Token.SHEQ:
case Token.SHNE:
case Token.INSTANCEOF:
case Token.IN:
scope = traverseChildren(n, scope);
n.setJSType(getNativeType(BOOLEAN_TYPE));
break;
case Token.GETELEM:
scope = traverseGetElem(n, scope);
break;
case Token.EXPR_RESULT:
scope = traverseChildren(n, scope);
if (n.getFirstChild().isGetProp()) {
ensurePropertyDeclared(n.getFirstChild());
}
break;
case Token.SWITCH:
scope = traverse(n.getFirstChild(), scope);
break;
case Token.RETURN:
scope = traverseReturn(n, scope);
break;
case Token.VAR:
case Token.THROW:
scope = traverseChildren(n, scope);
break;
case Token.CATCH:
scope = traverseCatch(n, scope);
break;
case Token.CAST:
scope = traverseChildren(n, scope);
break;
}
// TODO(johnlenz): remove this after the CAST node change has shaken out.
if (!n.isFunction()) {
JSDocInfo info = n.getJSDocInfo();
if (info != null && info.hasType()) {
JSType castType = info.getType().evaluate(syntacticScope, registry);
// A stubbed type declaration on a qualified name should take
// effect for all subsequent accesses of that name,
// so treat it the same as an assign to that name.
if (n.isQualifiedName() &&
n.getParent().isExprResult()) {
updateScopeForTypeChange(scope, n, n.getJSType(), castType);
}
n.setJSType(castType);
}
}
return scope;
}
#location 155
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private FlowScope traverse(Node n, FlowScope scope) {
switch (n.getType()) {
case Token.ASSIGN:
scope = traverseAssign(n, scope);
break;
case Token.NAME:
scope = traverseName(n, scope);
break;
case Token.GETPROP:
scope = traverseGetProp(n, scope);
break;
case Token.AND:
scope = traverseAnd(n, scope).getJoinedFlowScope()
.createChildFlowScope();
break;
case Token.OR:
scope = traverseOr(n, scope).getJoinedFlowScope()
.createChildFlowScope();
break;
case Token.HOOK:
scope = traverseHook(n, scope);
break;
case Token.OBJECTLIT:
scope = traverseObjectLiteral(n, scope);
break;
case Token.CALL:
scope = traverseCall(n, scope);
break;
case Token.NEW:
scope = traverseNew(n, scope);
break;
case Token.ASSIGN_ADD:
case Token.ADD:
scope = traverseAdd(n, scope);
break;
case Token.POS:
case Token.NEG:
scope = traverse(n.getFirstChild(), scope); // Find types.
n.setJSType(getNativeType(NUMBER_TYPE));
break;
case Token.ARRAYLIT:
scope = traverseArrayLiteral(n, scope);
break;
case Token.THIS:
n.setJSType(scope.getTypeOfThis());
break;
case Token.ASSIGN_LSH:
case Token.ASSIGN_RSH:
case Token.LSH:
case Token.RSH:
case Token.ASSIGN_URSH:
case Token.URSH:
case Token.ASSIGN_DIV:
case Token.ASSIGN_MOD:
case Token.ASSIGN_BITAND:
case Token.ASSIGN_BITXOR:
case Token.ASSIGN_BITOR:
case Token.ASSIGN_MUL:
case Token.ASSIGN_SUB:
case Token.DIV:
case Token.MOD:
case Token.BITAND:
case Token.BITXOR:
case Token.BITOR:
case Token.MUL:
case Token.SUB:
case Token.DEC:
case Token.INC:
case Token.BITNOT:
scope = traverseChildren(n, scope);
n.setJSType(getNativeType(NUMBER_TYPE));
break;
case Token.PARAM_LIST:
scope = traverse(n.getFirstChild(), scope);
n.setJSType(getJSType(n.getFirstChild()));
break;
case Token.COMMA:
scope = traverseChildren(n, scope);
n.setJSType(getJSType(n.getLastChild()));
break;
case Token.TYPEOF:
scope = traverseChildren(n, scope);
n.setJSType(getNativeType(STRING_TYPE));
break;
case Token.DELPROP:
case Token.LT:
case Token.LE:
case Token.GT:
case Token.GE:
case Token.NOT:
case Token.EQ:
case Token.NE:
case Token.SHEQ:
case Token.SHNE:
case Token.INSTANCEOF:
case Token.IN:
scope = traverseChildren(n, scope);
n.setJSType(getNativeType(BOOLEAN_TYPE));
break;
case Token.GETELEM:
scope = traverseGetElem(n, scope);
break;
case Token.EXPR_RESULT:
scope = traverseChildren(n, scope);
if (n.getFirstChild().isGetProp()) {
ensurePropertyDeclared(n.getFirstChild());
}
break;
case Token.SWITCH:
scope = traverse(n.getFirstChild(), scope);
break;
case Token.RETURN:
scope = traverseReturn(n, scope);
break;
case Token.VAR:
case Token.THROW:
scope = traverseChildren(n, scope);
break;
case Token.CATCH:
scope = traverseCatch(n, scope);
break;
case Token.CAST:
scope = traverseChildren(n, scope);
JSDocInfo info = n.getJSDocInfo();
if (info != null && info.hasType()) {
n.setJSType(info.getType().evaluate(syntacticScope, registry));
}
break;
}
return scope;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private Node inlineReturnValue(Node callNode, Node fnNode) {
Node block = fnNode.getLastChild();
Node callParentNode = callNode.getParent();
// NOTE: As the normalize pass guarantees globals aren't being
// shadowed and an expression can't introduce new names, there is
// no need to check for conflicts.
// Create an argName -> expression map, checking for side effects.
Map<String, Node> argMap =
FunctionArgumentInjector.getFunctionCallParameterMap(
fnNode, callNode, this.safeNameIdSupplier);
Node newExpression;
if (!block.hasChildren()) {
Node srcLocation = block;
newExpression = NodeUtil.newUndefinedNode(srcLocation);
} else {
Node returnNode = block.getFirstChild();
Preconditions.checkArgument(returnNode.getType() == Token.RETURN);
// Clone the return node first.
Node safeReturnNode = returnNode.cloneTree();
Node inlineResult = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
safeReturnNode, null, argMap);
Preconditions.checkArgument(safeReturnNode == inlineResult);
newExpression = safeReturnNode.removeFirstChild();
}
callParentNode.replaceChild(callNode, newExpression);
return newExpression;
}
#location 30
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private Node inlineReturnValue(Node callNode, Node fnNode) {
Node block = fnNode.getLastChild();
Node callParentNode = callNode.getParent();
// NOTE: As the normalize pass guarantees globals aren't being
// shadowed and an expression can't introduce new names, there is
// no need to check for conflicts.
// Create an argName -> expression map, checking for side effects.
Map<String, Node> argMap =
FunctionArgumentInjector.getFunctionCallParameterMap(
fnNode, callNode, this.safeNameIdSupplier);
Node newExpression;
if (!block.hasChildren()) {
Node srcLocation = block;
newExpression = NodeUtil.newUndefinedNode(srcLocation);
} else {
Node returnNode = block.getFirstChild();
Preconditions.checkArgument(returnNode.getType() == Token.RETURN);
// Clone the return node first.
Node safeReturnNode = returnNode.cloneTree();
Node inlineResult = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
null, safeReturnNode, null, argMap);
Preconditions.checkArgument(safeReturnNode == inlineResult);
newExpression = safeReturnNode.removeFirstChild();
}
callParentNode.replaceChild(callNode, newExpression);
return newExpression;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private UndiGraph<Var, Void> computeVariableNamesInterferenceGraph(
NodeTraversal t, ControlFlowGraph<Node> cfg, Set<Var> escaped) {
UndiGraph<Var, Void> interferenceGraph =
LinkedUndirectedGraph.create();
Scope scope = t.getScope();
// First create a node for each non-escaped variable.
for (Iterator<Var> i = scope.getVars(); i.hasNext();) {
Var v = i.next();
if (!escaped.contains(v)) {
// TODO(user): In theory, we CAN coalesce function names just like
// any variables. Our Liveness analysis captures this just like it as
// described in the specification. However, we saw some zipped and
// and unzipped size increase after this. We are not totally sure why
// that is but, for now, we will respect the dead functions and not play
// around with it.
if (!NodeUtil.isFunction(v.getParentNode())) {
interferenceGraph.createNode(v);
}
}
}
// Go through each variable and try to connect them.
for (Iterator<Var> i1 = scope.getVars(); i1.hasNext();) {
Var v1 = i1.next();
NEXT_VAR_PAIR:
for (Iterator<Var> i2 = scope.getVars(); i2.hasNext();) {
Var v2 = i2.next();
// Skip duplicate pairs.
if (v1.index >= v2.index) {
continue;
}
if (!interferenceGraph.hasNode(v1) ||
!interferenceGraph.hasNode(v2)) {
// Skip nodes that were not added. They are globals and escaped
// locals. Also avoid merging a variable with itself.
continue NEXT_VAR_PAIR;
}
if (v1.getParentNode().getType() == Token.LP &&
v2.getParentNode().getType() == Token.LP) {
interferenceGraph.connectIfNotFound(v1, null, v2);
continue NEXT_VAR_PAIR;
}
// Go through every CFG node in the program and look at
// this variable pair. If they are both live at the same
// time, add an edge between them and continue to the next pair.
NEXT_CROSS_CFG_NODE:
for (DiGraphNode<Node, Branch> cfgNode : cfg.getDirectedGraphNodes()) {
if (cfg.isImplicitReturn(cfgNode)) {
continue NEXT_CROSS_CFG_NODE;
}
FlowState<LiveVariableLattice> state = cfgNode.getAnnotation();
// Check the live states and add edge when possible.
if ((state.getIn().isLive(v1) && state.getIn().isLive(v2)) ||
(state.getOut().isLive(v1) && state.getOut().isLive(v2))) {
interferenceGraph.connectIfNotFound(v1, null, v2);
continue NEXT_VAR_PAIR;
}
}
// v1 and v2 might not have an edge between them! woohoo. there's
// one last sanity check that we have to do: we have to check
// if there's a collision *within* the cfg node.
NEXT_INTRA_CFG_NODE:
for (DiGraphNode<Node, Branch> cfgNode : cfg.getDirectedGraphNodes()) {
if (cfg.isImplicitReturn(cfgNode)) {
continue NEXT_INTRA_CFG_NODE;
}
FlowState<LiveVariableLattice> state = cfgNode.getAnnotation();
boolean v1OutLive = state.getOut().isLive(v1);
boolean v2OutLive = state.getOut().isLive(v2);
CombinedLiveRangeChecker checker = new CombinedLiveRangeChecker(
new LiveRangeChecker(v1, v2OutLive ? null : v2),
new LiveRangeChecker(v2, v1OutLive ? null : v1));
NodeTraversal.traverse(
compiler,
cfgNode.getValue(),
checker);
if (checker.connectIfCrossed(interferenceGraph)) {
continue NEXT_VAR_PAIR;
}
}
}
}
return interferenceGraph;
}
#location 18
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private UndiGraph<Var, Void> computeVariableNamesInterferenceGraph(
NodeTraversal t, ControlFlowGraph<Node> cfg, Set<Var> escaped) {
UndiGraph<Var, Void> interferenceGraph =
LinkedUndirectedGraph.create();
// For all variables V not in unsafeCrossRange,
// LiveRangeChecker(V, X) and LiveRangeChecker(Y, V) will never add a edge
// to the interferenceGraph. In other words, we don't need to use
// LiveRangeChecker on variable pair (A, B) if both A and B are not
// in the unsafeCrossRangeSet. See PrescreenCrossLiveRange for details.
Set<Var> unsafeCrossRangeSet = Sets.newHashSet();
Scope scope = t.getScope();
for (DiGraphNode<Node, Branch> cfgNode : cfg.getDirectedGraphNodes()) {
if (cfg.isImplicitReturn(cfgNode)) {
continue;
}
for (Iterator<Var> i = scope.getVars(); i.hasNext();) {
final Var v = i.next();
if (!unsafeCrossRangeSet.contains(v)) {
FlowState<LiveVariableLattice> state = cfgNode.getAnnotation();
PrescreenCrossLiveRange check =
new PrescreenCrossLiveRange(v, state.getOut());
NodeTraversal.traverse(compiler, cfgNode.getValue(), check);
if (!check.isSafe()) {
unsafeCrossRangeSet.add(v);
}
}
}
}
// First create a node for each non-escaped variable.
for (Iterator<Var> i = scope.getVars(); i.hasNext();) {
Var v = i.next();
if (!escaped.contains(v)) {
// TODO(user): In theory, we CAN coalesce function names just like
// any variables. Our Liveness analysis captures this just like it as
// described in the specification. However, we saw some zipped and
// and unzipped size increase after this. We are not totally sure why
// that is but, for now, we will respect the dead functions and not play
// around with it.
if (!NodeUtil.isFunction(v.getParentNode())) {
interferenceGraph.createNode(v);
}
}
}
// Go through each variable and try to connect them.
for (Iterator<Var> i1 = scope.getVars(); i1.hasNext();) {
Var v1 = i1.next();
NEXT_VAR_PAIR:
for (Iterator<Var> i2 = scope.getVars(); i2.hasNext();) {
Var v2 = i2.next();
// Skip duplicate pairs.
if (v1.index >= v2.index) {
continue;
}
if (!interferenceGraph.hasNode(v1) ||
!interferenceGraph.hasNode(v2)) {
// Skip nodes that were not added. They are globals and escaped
// locals. Also avoid merging a variable with itself.
continue NEXT_VAR_PAIR;
}
if (v1.getParentNode().getType() == Token.LP &&
v2.getParentNode().getType() == Token.LP) {
interferenceGraph.connectIfNotFound(v1, null, v2);
continue NEXT_VAR_PAIR;
}
// Go through every CFG node in the program and look at
// this variable pair. If they are both live at the same
// time, add an edge between them and continue to the next pair.
NEXT_CROSS_CFG_NODE:
for (DiGraphNode<Node, Branch> cfgNode : cfg.getDirectedGraphNodes()) {
if (cfg.isImplicitReturn(cfgNode)) {
continue NEXT_CROSS_CFG_NODE;
}
FlowState<LiveVariableLattice> state = cfgNode.getAnnotation();
// Check the live states and add edge when possible.
if ((state.getIn().isLive(v1) && state.getIn().isLive(v2)) ||
(state.getOut().isLive(v1) && state.getOut().isLive(v2))) {
interferenceGraph.connectIfNotFound(v1, null, v2);
continue NEXT_VAR_PAIR;
}
}
// v1 and v2 might not have an edge between them! woohoo. there's
// one last sanity check that we have to do: we have to check
// if there's a collision *within* the cfg node.
if (!unsafeCrossRangeSet.contains(v1) &&
!unsafeCrossRangeSet.contains(v2)) {
continue NEXT_VAR_PAIR;
}
NEXT_INTRA_CFG_NODE:
for (DiGraphNode<Node, Branch> cfgNode : cfg.getDirectedGraphNodes()) {
if (cfg.isImplicitReturn(cfgNode)) {
continue NEXT_INTRA_CFG_NODE;
}
FlowState<LiveVariableLattice> state = cfgNode.getAnnotation();
boolean v1OutLive = state.getOut().isLive(v1);
boolean v2OutLive = state.getOut().isLive(v2);
CombinedLiveRangeChecker checker = new CombinedLiveRangeChecker(
new LiveRangeChecker(v1, v2OutLive ? null : v2),
new LiveRangeChecker(v2, v1OutLive ? null : v1));
NodeTraversal.traverse(
compiler,
cfgNode.getValue(),
checker);
if (checker.connectIfCrossed(interferenceGraph)) {
continue NEXT_VAR_PAIR;
}
}
}
}
return interferenceGraph;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public Symbol getSymbolForInstancesOf(FunctionType fn) {
Preconditions.checkState(fn.isConstructor() || fn.isInterface());
ObjectType pType = fn.getPrototype();
String name = pType.getReferenceName();
if (name == null || globalScope == null) {
return null;
}
Node source = fn.getSource();
return (source == null ?
globalScope : getEnclosingScope(source)).getSlot(name);
}
#location 11
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public Symbol getSymbolForInstancesOf(FunctionType fn) {
Preconditions.checkState(fn.isConstructor() || fn.isInterface());
ObjectType pType = fn.getPrototype();
return getSymbolForName(fn.getSource(), pType.getReferenceName());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {
Scope scope = t.getScope();
// Computes the control flow graph.
ControlFlowAnalysis cfa = new ControlFlowAnalysis(compiler, false, false);
cfa.process(null, scope.getRootNode());
cfgStack.push(curCfg);
curCfg = cfa.getCfg();
new GraphReachability<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch>(curCfg)
.compute(curCfg.getEntry().getValue());
}
#location 12
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
Node result = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
compiler, fnTemplateRoot, null, argMap);
Preconditions.checkState(result == fnTemplateRoot);
return result;
} else {
// Create local alias of names that can not be safely
// used directly.
// An arg map that will be updated to contain the
// safe aliases.
Map<String, Node> newArgMap = Maps.newHashMap(argMap);
// Declare the alias in the same order as they
// are declared.
List<Node> newVars = Lists.newLinkedList();
// NOTE: argMap is a linked map so we get the parameters in the
// order that they were declared.
for (Entry<String, Node> entry : argMap.entrySet()) {
String name = entry.getKey();
if (namesToAlias.contains(name)) {
if (name.equals(THIS_MARKER)) {
boolean referencesThis = NodeUtil.referencesThis(fnTemplateRoot);
// Update "this", this is only necessary if "this" is referenced
// and the value of "this" is not Token.THIS, or the value of "this"
// has side effects.
Node value = entry.getValue();
if (value.getType() != Token.THIS
&& (referencesThis
|| NodeUtil.mayHaveSideEffects(value, compiler))) {
String newName = getUniqueThisName();
Node newValue = entry.getValue().cloneTree();
Node newNode = NodeUtil.newVarNode(newName, newValue)
.copyInformationFromForTree(newValue);
newVars.add(0, newNode);
// Remove the parameter from the list to replace.
newArgMap.put(THIS_MARKER,
Node.newString(Token.NAME, newName)
.copyInformationFromForTree(newValue));
}
} else {
Node newValue = entry.getValue().cloneTree();
Node newNode = NodeUtil.newVarNode(name, newValue)
.copyInformationFromForTree(newValue);
newVars.add(0, newNode);
// Remove the parameter from the list to replace.
newArgMap.remove(name);
}
}
}
// Inline the arguments.
Node result = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
compiler, fnTemplateRoot, null, newArgMap);
Preconditions.checkState(result == fnTemplateRoot);
// Now that the names have been replaced, add the new aliases for
// the old names.
for (Node n : newVars) {
fnTemplateRoot.addChildToFront(n);
}
return result;
}
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
Node result = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
fnTemplateRoot, null, argMap);
Preconditions.checkState(result == fnTemplateRoot);
return result;
} else {
// Create local alias of names that can not be safely
// used directly.
// An arg map that will be updated to contain the
// safe aliases.
Map<String, Node> newArgMap = Maps.newHashMap(argMap);
// Declare the alias in the same order as they
// are declared.
List<Node> newVars = Lists.newLinkedList();
// NOTE: argMap is a linked map so we get the parameters in the
// order that they were declared.
for (Entry<String, Node> entry : argMap.entrySet()) {
String name = entry.getKey();
if (namesToAlias.contains(name)) {
Node newValue = entry.getValue().cloneTree();
Node newNode = NodeUtil.newVarNode(name, newValue)
.copyInformationFromForTree(newValue);
newVars.add(0, newNode);
// Remove the parameter from the list to replace.
newArgMap.remove(name);
}
}
// Inline the arguments.
Node result = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
fnTemplateRoot, null, newArgMap);
Preconditions.checkState(result == fnTemplateRoot);
// Now that the names have been replaced, add the new aliases for
// the old names.
for (Node n : newVars) {
fnTemplateRoot.addChildToFront(n);
}
return result;
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private void removeUnreferencedVars() {
CodingConvention convention = compiler.getCodingConvention();
for (Iterator<Var> it = maybeUnreferenced.iterator(); it.hasNext(); ) {
Var var = it.next();
// Regardless of what happens to the original declaration,
// we need to remove all assigns, because they may contain references
// to other unreferenced variables.
removeAllAssigns(var);
compiler.addToDebugLog("Unreferenced var: " + var.name);
Node nameNode = var.nameNode;
Node toRemove = nameNode.getParent();
Node parent = toRemove.getParent();
Preconditions.checkState(
toRemove.getType() == Token.VAR ||
toRemove.getType() == Token.FUNCTION ||
toRemove.getType() == Token.LP &&
parent.getType() == Token.FUNCTION,
"We should only declare vars and functions and function args");
if (toRemove.getType() == Token.LP &&
parent.getType() == Token.FUNCTION) {
// Don't remove function arguments here. That's a special case
// that's taken care of in removeUnreferencedFunctionArgs.
} else if (NodeUtil.isFunctionExpression(toRemove)) {
if (!preserveFunctionExpressionNames) {
toRemove.getFirstChild().setString("");
compiler.reportCodeChange();
}
// Don't remove bleeding functions.
} else if (parent != null &&
parent.getType() == Token.FOR &&
parent.getChildCount() < 4) {
// foreach iterations have 3 children. Leave them alone.
} else if (toRemove.getType() == Token.VAR &&
nameNode.hasChildren() &&
NodeUtil.mayHaveSideEffects(nameNode.getFirstChild())) {
// If this is a single var declaration, we can at least remove the
// declaration itself and just leave the value, e.g.,
// var a = foo(); => foo();
if (toRemove.getChildCount() == 1) {
parent.replaceChild(toRemove,
new Node(Token.EXPR_RESULT, nameNode.removeFirstChild()));
compiler.reportCodeChange();
}
} else if (toRemove.getType() == Token.VAR &&
toRemove.getChildCount() > 1) {
// For var declarations with multiple names (i.e. var a, b, c),
// only remove the unreferenced name
toRemove.removeChild(nameNode);
compiler.reportCodeChange();
} else if (parent != null) {
NodeUtil.removeChild(parent, toRemove);
compiler.reportCodeChange();
}
}
}
#location 45
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private void removeUnreferencedVars() {
CodingConvention convention = codingConvention;
for (Iterator<Var> it = maybeUnreferenced.iterator(); it.hasNext(); ) {
Var var = it.next();
// Remove calls to inheritance-defining functions where the unreferenced
// class is the subclass.
for (Node exprCallNode : inheritsCalls.get(var)) {
NodeUtil.removeChild(exprCallNode.getParent(), exprCallNode);
compiler.reportCodeChange();
}
// Regardless of what happens to the original declaration,
// we need to remove all assigns, because they may contain references
// to other unreferenced variables.
removeAllAssigns(var);
compiler.addToDebugLog("Unreferenced var: " + var.name);
Node nameNode = var.nameNode;
Node toRemove = nameNode.getParent();
Node parent = toRemove.getParent();
Preconditions.checkState(
toRemove.getType() == Token.VAR ||
toRemove.getType() == Token.FUNCTION ||
toRemove.getType() == Token.LP &&
parent.getType() == Token.FUNCTION,
"We should only declare vars and functions and function args");
if (toRemove.getType() == Token.LP &&
parent.getType() == Token.FUNCTION) {
// Don't remove function arguments here. That's a special case
// that's taken care of in removeUnreferencedFunctionArgs.
} else if (NodeUtil.isFunctionExpression(toRemove)) {
if (!preserveFunctionExpressionNames) {
toRemove.getFirstChild().setString("");
compiler.reportCodeChange();
}
// Don't remove bleeding functions.
} else if (parent != null &&
parent.getType() == Token.FOR &&
parent.getChildCount() < 4) {
// foreach iterations have 3 children. Leave them alone.
} else if (toRemove.getType() == Token.VAR &&
nameNode.hasChildren() &&
NodeUtil.mayHaveSideEffects(nameNode.getFirstChild())) {
// If this is a single var declaration, we can at least remove the
// declaration itself and just leave the value, e.g.,
// var a = foo(); => foo();
if (toRemove.getChildCount() == 1) {
parent.replaceChild(toRemove,
new Node(Token.EXPR_RESULT, nameNode.removeFirstChild()));
compiler.reportCodeChange();
}
} else if (toRemove.getType() == Token.VAR &&
toRemove.getChildCount() > 1) {
// For var declarations with multiple names (i.e. var a, b, c),
// only remove the unreferenced name
toRemove.removeChild(nameNode);
compiler.reportCodeChange();
} else if (parent != null) {
NodeUtil.removeChild(parent, toRemove);
compiler.reportCodeChange();
}
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
Node result = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
compiler, fnTemplateRoot, null, argMap);
Preconditions.checkState(result == fnTemplateRoot);
return result;
} else {
// Create local alias of names that can not be safely
// used directly.
// An arg map that will be updated to contain the
// safe aliases.
Map<String, Node> newArgMap = Maps.newHashMap(argMap);
// Declare the alias in the same order as they
// are declared.
List<Node> newVars = Lists.newLinkedList();
// NOTE: argMap is a linked map so we get the parameters in the
// order that they were declared.
for (Entry<String, Node> entry : argMap.entrySet()) {
String name = entry.getKey();
if (namesToAlias.contains(name)) {
if (name.equals(THIS_MARKER)) {
boolean referencesThis = NodeUtil.referencesThis(fnTemplateRoot);
// Update "this", this is only necessary if "this" is referenced
// and the value of "this" is not Token.THIS, or the value of "this"
// has side effects.
Node value = entry.getValue();
if (value.getType() != Token.THIS
&& (referencesThis
|| NodeUtil.mayHaveSideEffects(value, compiler))) {
String newName = getUniqueThisName();
Node newValue = entry.getValue().cloneTree();
Node newNode = NodeUtil.newVarNode(newName, newValue)
.copyInformationFromForTree(newValue);
newVars.add(0, newNode);
// Remove the parameter from the list to replace.
newArgMap.put(THIS_MARKER,
Node.newString(Token.NAME, newName)
.copyInformationFromForTree(newValue));
}
} else {
Node newValue = entry.getValue().cloneTree();
Node newNode = NodeUtil.newVarNode(name, newValue)
.copyInformationFromForTree(newValue);
newVars.add(0, newNode);
// Remove the parameter from the list to replace.
newArgMap.remove(name);
}
}
}
// Inline the arguments.
Node result = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
compiler, fnTemplateRoot, null, newArgMap);
Preconditions.checkState(result == fnTemplateRoot);
// Now that the names have been replaced, add the new aliases for
// the old names.
for (Node n : newVars) {
fnTemplateRoot.addChildToFront(n);
}
return result;
}
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
Node result = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
compiler, fnTemplateRoot, null, argMap);
Preconditions.checkState(result == fnTemplateRoot);
return result;
} else {
// Create local alias of names that can not be safely
// used directly.
// An arg map that will be updated to contain the
// safe aliases.
Map<String, Node> newArgMap = Maps.newHashMap(argMap);
// Declare the alias in the same order as they
// are declared.
List<Node> newVars = Lists.newLinkedList();
// NOTE: argMap is a linked map so we get the parameters in the
// order that they were declared.
for (Entry<String, Node> entry : argMap.entrySet()) {
String name = entry.getKey();
if (namesToAlias.contains(name)) {
if (name.equals(THIS_MARKER)) {
boolean referencesThis = NodeUtil.referencesThis(fnTemplateRoot);
// Update "this", this is only necessary if "this" is referenced
// and the value of "this" is not Token.THIS, or the value of "this"
// has side effects.
Node value = entry.getValue();
if (!value.isThis()
&& (referencesThis
|| NodeUtil.mayHaveSideEffects(value, compiler))) {
String newName = getUniqueThisName();
Node newValue = entry.getValue().cloneTree();
Node newNode = NodeUtil.newVarNode(newName, newValue)
.copyInformationFromForTree(newValue);
newVars.add(0, newNode);
// Remove the parameter from the list to replace.
newArgMap.put(THIS_MARKER,
Node.newString(Token.NAME, newName)
.copyInformationFromForTree(newValue));
}
} else {
Node newValue = entry.getValue().cloneTree();
Node newNode = NodeUtil.newVarNode(name, newValue)
.copyInformationFromForTree(newValue);
newVars.add(0, newNode);
// Remove the parameter from the list to replace.
newArgMap.remove(name);
}
}
}
// Inline the arguments.
Node result = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
compiler, fnTemplateRoot, null, newArgMap);
Preconditions.checkState(result == fnTemplateRoot);
// Now that the names have been replaced, add the new aliases for
// the old names.
for (Node n : newVars) {
fnTemplateRoot.addChildToFront(n);
}
return result;
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public static List<JSSourceFile> getDefaultExterns() throws IOException {
InputStream input = CommandLineRunner.class.getResourceAsStream(
"/externs.zip");
ZipInputStream zip = new ZipInputStream(input);
Map<String, JSSourceFile> externsMap = Maps.newHashMap();
for (ZipEntry entry = null; (entry = zip.getNextEntry()) != null; ) {
LimitInputStream entryStream = new LimitInputStream(zip, entry.getSize());
externsMap.put(entry.getName(),
JSSourceFile.fromInputStream(
// Give the files an odd prefix, so that they do not conflict
// with the user's files.
"externs.zip//" + entry.getName(),
entryStream));
}
Preconditions.checkState(
externsMap.keySet().equals(Sets.newHashSet(DEFAULT_EXTERNS_NAMES)),
"Externs zip must match our hard-coded list of externs.");
// Order matters, so the resources must be added to the result list
// in the expected order.
List<JSSourceFile> externs = Lists.newArrayList();
for (String key : DEFAULT_EXTERNS_NAMES) {
externs.add(externsMap.get(key));
}
return externs;
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public static List<JSSourceFile> getDefaultExterns() throws IOException {
InputStream input = CommandLineRunner.class.getResourceAsStream(
"/externs.zip");
ZipInputStream zip = new ZipInputStream(input);
Map<String, JSSourceFile> externsMap = Maps.newHashMap();
for (ZipEntry entry = null; (entry = zip.getNextEntry()) != null; ) {
BufferedInputStream entryStream = new BufferedInputStream(
new LimitInputStream(zip, entry.getSize()));
externsMap.put(entry.getName(),
JSSourceFile.fromInputStream(
// Give the files an odd prefix, so that they do not conflict
// with the user's files.
"externs.zip//" + entry.getName(),
entryStream));
}
Preconditions.checkState(
externsMap.keySet().equals(Sets.newHashSet(DEFAULT_EXTERNS_NAMES)),
"Externs zip must match our hard-coded list of externs.");
// Order matters, so the resources must be added to the result list
// in the expected order.
List<JSSourceFile> externs = Lists.newArrayList();
for (String key : DEFAULT_EXTERNS_NAMES) {
externs.add(externsMap.get(key));
}
return externs;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
int processResults(Result result, List<JSModule> modules, B options)
throws FlagUsageException, IOException {
if (config.computePhaseOrdering) {
return 0;
}
if (config.printPassGraph) {
if (compiler.getRoot() == null) {
return 1;
} else {
jsOutput.append(
DotFormatter.toDot(compiler.getPassConfig().getPassGraph()));
jsOutput.append('\n');
return 0;
}
}
if (config.printAst) {
if (compiler.getRoot() == null) {
return 1;
} else {
ControlFlowGraph<Node> cfg = compiler.computeCFG();
DotFormatter.appendDot(
compiler.getRoot().getLastChild(), cfg, jsOutput);
jsOutput.append('\n');
return 0;
}
}
if (config.printTree) {
if (compiler.getRoot() == null) {
jsOutput.append("Code contains errors; no tree was generated.\n");
return 1;
} else {
compiler.getRoot().appendStringTree(jsOutput);
jsOutput.append("\n");
return 0;
}
}
rootRelativePathsMap = constructRootRelativePathsMap();
if (config.skipNormalOutputs) {
// Output the manifest and bundle files if requested.
outputManifest();
outputBundle();
return 0;
} else if (result.success) {
if (modules == null) {
writeOutput(
jsOutput, compiler, compiler.toSource(), config.outputWrapper,
OUTPUT_WRAPPER_MARKER);
// Output the source map if requested.
outputSourceMap(options, config.jsOutputFile);
} else {
parsedModuleWrappers = parseModuleWrappers(
config.moduleWrapper, modules);
maybeCreateDirsForPath(config.moduleOutputPathPrefix);
// If the source map path is in fact a pattern for each
// module, create a stream per-module. Otherwise, create
// a single source map.
Writer mapOut = null;
if (!shouldGenerateMapPerModule(options)) {
mapOut = fileNameToOutputWriter2(expandSourceMapPath(options, null));
}
for (JSModule m : modules) {
if (shouldGenerateMapPerModule(options)) {
mapOut = fileNameToOutputWriter2(expandSourceMapPath(options, m));
}
Writer writer =
fileNameToLegacyOutputWriter(getModuleOutputFileName(m));
if (options.sourceMapOutputPath != null) {
compiler.getSourceMap().reset();
}
writeModuleOutput(writer, m);
if (options.sourceMapOutputPath != null) {
compiler.getSourceMap().appendTo(mapOut, m.getName());
}
writer.close();
if (shouldGenerateMapPerModule(options) && mapOut != null) {
mapOut.close();
mapOut = null;
}
}
if (mapOut != null) {
mapOut.close();
}
}
// Output the externs if required.
if (options.externExportsPath != null) {
Writer eeOut =
openExternExportsStream(options, config.jsOutputFile);
eeOut.append(result.externExport);
eeOut.close();
}
// Output the variable and property name maps if requested.
outputNameMaps(options);
// Output the manifest and bundle files if requested.
outputManifest();
outputBundle();
if (options.tracer.isOn()) {
outputTracerReport();
}
}
// return 0 if no errors, the error count otherwise
return Math.min(result.errors.length, 0x7f);
}
#location 105
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
AbstractCommandLineRunner() {
this(System.out, System.err);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
Node tryFoldFor(Node n) {
Preconditions.checkArgument(n.getType() == Token.FOR);
// This is not a FOR-IN loop
if (n.getChildCount() != 4) {
return n;
}
// There isn't an initializer
if (n.getFirstChild().getType() != Token.EMPTY) {
return n;
}
Node cond = NodeUtil.getConditionExpression(n);
if (NodeUtil.getBooleanValue(cond) != TernaryValue.FALSE) {
return n;
}
NodeUtil.redeclareVarsInsideBranch(n);
NodeUtil.removeChild(n.getParent(), n);
reportCodeChange();
return null;
}
#location 13
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
Node tryOptimizeBlock(Node n) {
// Remove any useless children
for (Node c = n.getFirstChild(); c != null; ) {
Node next = c.getNext(); // save c.next, since 'c' may be removed
if (!mayHaveSideEffects(c)) {
// TODO(johnlenz): determine what this is actually removing. Candidates
// include: EMPTY nodes, control structures without children
// (removing infinite loops), empty try blocks. What else?
n.removeChild(c); // lazy kids
reportCodeChange();
} else {
tryOptimizeConditionalAfterAssign(c);
}
c = next;
}
if (n.isSyntheticBlock() || n.getParent() == null) {
return n;
}
// Try to remove the block.
if (NodeUtil.tryMergeBlock(n)) {
reportCodeChange();
return null;
}
return n;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private void outputManifest() throws IOException {
String outputManifest = config.outputManifest;
if (Strings.isEmpty(outputManifest)) {
return;
}
JSModuleGraph graph = compiler.getModuleGraph();
if (shouldGenerateManifestPerModule()) {
// Generate per-module manifests.
Iterable<JSModule> modules = graph.getAllModules();
for (JSModule module : modules) {
Writer out = fileNameToOutputWriter(expandManifest(module));
printManifestTo(module.getInputs(), out);
out.close();
}
} else {
// Generate a single file manifest.
Writer out = fileNameToOutputWriter(expandManifest(null));
if (graph == null) {
printManifestTo(compiler.getInputsInOrder(), out);
} else {
printModuleGraphManifestTo(graph, out);
}
out.close();
}
}
#location 14
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private void outputManifest() throws IOException {
List<String> outputManifests = config.outputManifests;
if (outputManifests.isEmpty()) {
return;
}
for (String outputManifest : outputManifests) {
if (outputManifest.isEmpty()) {
continue;
}
JSModuleGraph graph = compiler.getModuleGraph();
if (shouldGenerateManifestPerModule(outputManifest)) {
// Generate per-module manifests.
Iterable<JSModule> modules = graph.getAllModules();
for (JSModule module : modules) {
Writer out = fileNameToOutputWriter(
expandManifest(module, outputManifest));
printManifestTo(module.getInputs(), out);
out.close();
}
} else {
// Generate a single file manifest.
Writer out = fileNameToOutputWriter(
expandManifest(null, outputManifest));
if (graph == null) {
printManifestTo(compiler.getInputsInOrder(), out);
} else {
printModuleGraphManifestTo(graph, out);
}
out.close();
}
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private Node inlineReturnValue(Node callNode, Node fnNode) {
Node block = fnNode.getLastChild();
Node callParentNode = callNode.getParent();
// NOTE: As the normalize pass guarantees globals aren't being
// shadowed and an expression can't introduce new names, there is
// no need to check for conflicts.
// Create an argName -> expression map, checking for side effects.
Map<String, Node> argMap =
FunctionArgumentInjector.getFunctionCallParameterMap(
fnNode, callNode, this.safeNameIdSupplier);
Node newExpression;
if (!block.hasChildren()) {
Node srcLocation = block;
newExpression = NodeUtil.newUndefinedNode(srcLocation);
} else {
Node returnNode = block.getFirstChild();
Preconditions.checkArgument(returnNode.getType() == Token.RETURN);
// Clone the return node first.
Node safeReturnNode = returnNode.cloneTree();
Node inlineResult = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
safeReturnNode, null, argMap);
Preconditions.checkArgument(safeReturnNode == inlineResult);
newExpression = safeReturnNode.removeFirstChild();
}
callParentNode.replaceChild(callNode, newExpression);
return newExpression;
}
#location 30
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private Node inlineReturnValue(Node callNode, Node fnNode) {
Node block = fnNode.getLastChild();
Node callParentNode = callNode.getParent();
// NOTE: As the normalize pass guarantees globals aren't being
// shadowed and an expression can't introduce new names, there is
// no need to check for conflicts.
// Create an argName -> expression map, checking for side effects.
Map<String, Node> argMap =
FunctionArgumentInjector.getFunctionCallParameterMap(
fnNode, callNode, this.safeNameIdSupplier);
Node newExpression;
if (!block.hasChildren()) {
Node srcLocation = block;
newExpression = NodeUtil.newUndefinedNode(srcLocation);
} else {
Node returnNode = block.getFirstChild();
Preconditions.checkArgument(returnNode.getType() == Token.RETURN);
// Clone the return node first.
Node safeReturnNode = returnNode.cloneTree();
Node inlineResult = FunctionArgumentInjector.inject(
null, safeReturnNode, null, argMap);
Preconditions.checkArgument(safeReturnNode == inlineResult);
newExpression = safeReturnNode.removeFirstChild();
}
callParentNode.replaceChild(callNode, newExpression);
return newExpression;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void process(Node externs, Node root) {
Map<String, TweakInfo> tweakInfos = collectTweaks(root);
applyCompilerDefaultValueOverrides(tweakInfos);
boolean changed = false;
if (stripTweaks) {
changed = stripAllCalls(tweakInfos);
} else if (!compilerDefaultValueOverrides.isEmpty()) {
// Pass the compiler default value overrides to the JS through a specially
// named variable.
Node varNode = createCompilerDefaultValueOverridesVarNode(
root.getFirstChild());
root.getFirstChild().addChildToFront(varNode);
changed = true;
}
if (changed) {
compiler.reportCodeChange();
}
}
#location 15
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public void process(Node externs, Node root) {
CollectTweaksResult result = collectTweaks(root);
applyCompilerDefaultValueOverrides(result.tweakInfos);
boolean changed = false;
if (stripTweaks) {
changed = stripAllCalls(result.tweakInfos);
} else if (!compilerDefaultValueOverrides.isEmpty()) {
changed = replaceGetCompilerOverridesCalls(result.getOverridesCalls);
}
if (changed) {
compiler.reportCodeChange();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private Node fuseIntoOneStatement(Node parent, Node first, Node last) {
// Nothing to fuse if there is only one statement.
if (first == last) {
return first;
}
// Step one: Create a comma tree that contains all the statements.
Node commaTree = first.removeFirstChild();
Node onePastLast = last.getNext();
Node next = null;
for (Node cur = first.getNext(); cur != onePastLast; cur = next) {
commaTree = fuseExpressionIntoExpression(
commaTree, cur.removeFirstChild());
next = cur.getNext();
parent.removeChild(cur);
}
// Step two: The last EXPR_RESULT will now hold the comma tree with all
// the fused statements.
first.addChildToBack(commaTree);
return first;
}
#location 21
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private Node fuseIntoOneStatement(Node parent, Node first, Node last) {
// Nothing to fuse if there is only one statement.
if (first.getNext() == last) {
return first;
}
// Step one: Create a comma tree that contains all the statements.
Node commaTree = first.removeFirstChild();
Node next = null;
for (Node cur = first.getNext(); cur != last; cur = next) {
commaTree = fuseExpressionIntoExpression(
commaTree, cur.removeFirstChild());
next = cur.getNext();
parent.removeChild(cur);
}
// Step two: The last EXPR_RESULT will now hold the comma tree with all
// the fused statements.
first.addChildToBack(commaTree);
return first;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
FunctionTypeBuilder inferReturnType(@Nullable JSDocInfo info) {
if (info != null && info.hasReturnType()) {
returnType = info.getReturnType().evaluate(scope, typeRegistry);
returnTypeInferred = false;
}
return this;
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
FunctionTypeBuilder(String fnName, AbstractCompiler compiler,
Node errorRoot, String sourceName, Scope scope) {
Preconditions.checkNotNull(errorRoot);
this.fnName = fnName == null ? "" : fnName;
this.codingConvention = compiler.getCodingConvention();
this.typeRegistry = compiler.getTypeRegistry();
this.errorRoot = errorRoot;
this.sourceName = sourceName;
this.compiler = compiler;
this.scope = scope;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private void analyzeFunctionBwd(
List<DiGraphNode<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch>> workset) {
for (DiGraphNode<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch> dn : workset) {
Node n = dn.getValue();
TypeEnv outEnv = getOutEnv(n);
TypeEnv inEnv;
System.out.println("\tBWD Statment: " + n);
System.out.println("\t\toutEnv: " + outEnv);
switch (n.getType()) {
case Token.EXPR_RESULT:
inEnv = analyzeExprBwd(n.getFirstChild(), outEnv, JSType.TOP).env;
break;
case Token.RETURN: {
Node retExp = n.getFirstChild();
if (retExp == null) {
inEnv = outEnv;
} else {
JSType declRetType = currentScope.getDeclaredType().getReturnType();
declRetType = declRetType == null ? JSType.UNKNOWN : declRetType;
inEnv = analyzeExprBwd(retExp, outEnv, declRetType).env;
}
break;
}
case Token.VAR: {
inEnv = null;
for (Node nameNode = n.getFirstChild(); nameNode != null;
nameNode = nameNode.getNext()) {
String varName = nameNode.getQualifiedName();
Node rhs = nameNode.getFirstChild();
JSType declType = currentScope.getDeclaredTypeOf(varName);
inEnv = envPutType(outEnv, varName, JSType.UNKNOWN);
if (rhs == null || currentScope.isLocalFunDef(varName)) {
continue;
}
JSType requiredType = (declType == null) ?
JSType.UNKNOWN : declType;
inEnv = analyzeExprBwd(rhs, inEnv,
JSType.meet(requiredType, envGetType(outEnv, varName))).env;
}
break;
}
default:
inEnv = outEnv;
break;
}
System.out.println("\t\tinEnv: " + inEnv);
setInEnv(n, inEnv);
}
}
#location 38
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private void analyzeFunctionBwd(
List<DiGraphNode<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch>> workset) {
for (DiGraphNode<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch> dn : workset) {
Node n = dn.getValue();
if (n.isThrow()) { // Throw statements have no out edges.
// TODO(blickly): Support analyzing the body of the THROW
continue;
}
TypeEnv outEnv = getOutEnv(n);
TypeEnv inEnv;
System.out.println("\tBWD Statment: " + n);
System.out.println("\t\toutEnv: " + outEnv);
switch (n.getType()) {
case Token.EXPR_RESULT:
inEnv = analyzeExprBwd(n.getFirstChild(), outEnv, JSType.TOP).env;
break;
case Token.RETURN: {
Node retExp = n.getFirstChild();
if (retExp == null) {
inEnv = outEnv;
} else {
JSType declRetType = currentScope.getDeclaredType().getReturnType();
declRetType = declRetType == null ? JSType.UNKNOWN : declRetType;
inEnv = analyzeExprBwd(retExp, outEnv, declRetType).env;
}
break;
}
case Token.VAR: {
inEnv = null;
for (Node nameNode = n.getFirstChild(); nameNode != null;
nameNode = nameNode.getNext()) {
String varName = nameNode.getQualifiedName();
Node rhs = nameNode.getFirstChild();
JSType declType = currentScope.getDeclaredTypeOf(varName);
inEnv = envPutType(outEnv, varName, JSType.UNKNOWN);
if (rhs == null || currentScope.isLocalFunDef(varName)) {
continue;
}
JSType requiredType = (declType == null) ?
JSType.UNKNOWN : declType;
inEnv = analyzeExprBwd(rhs, inEnv,
JSType.meet(requiredType, envGetType(outEnv, varName))).env;
}
break;
}
case Token.BLOCK:
case Token.EMPTY:
inEnv = outEnv;
break;
case Token.FOR: // TODO(blickly): Analyze these statements
case Token.WHILE:
case Token.DO:
case Token.IF:
inEnv = outEnv;
break;
default:
if (NodeUtil.isStatement(n)) {
throw new RuntimeException("Unhandled statement type: "
+ Token.name(n.getType()));
} else {
inEnv = analyzeExprBwd(n, outEnv).env;
break;
}
}
System.out.println("\t\tinEnv: " + inEnv);
setInEnv(n, inEnv);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
int processResults(Result result, List<JSModule> modules, B options)
throws FlagUsageException, IOException {
if (config.computePhaseOrdering) {
return 0;
}
if (config.printPassGraph) {
if (compiler.getRoot() == null) {
return 1;
} else {
jsOutput.append(
DotFormatter.toDot(compiler.getPassConfig().getPassGraph()));
jsOutput.append('\n');
return 0;
}
}
if (config.printAst) {
if (compiler.getRoot() == null) {
return 1;
} else {
ControlFlowGraph<Node> cfg = compiler.computeCFG();
DotFormatter.appendDot(
compiler.getRoot().getLastChild(), cfg, jsOutput);
jsOutput.append('\n');
return 0;
}
}
if (config.printTree) {
if (compiler.getRoot() == null) {
jsOutput.append("Code contains errors; no tree was generated.\n");
return 1;
} else {
compiler.getRoot().appendStringTree(jsOutput);
jsOutput.append("\n");
return 0;
}
}
rootRelativePathsMap = constructRootRelativePathsMap();
if (config.skipNormalOutputs) {
// Output the manifest and bundle files if requested.
outputManifest();
outputBundle();
return 0;
} else if (result.success) {
if (modules == null) {
writeOutput(
jsOutput, compiler, compiler.toSource(), config.outputWrapper,
OUTPUT_WRAPPER_MARKER);
// Output the source map if requested.
outputSourceMap(options, config.jsOutputFile);
} else {
parsedModuleWrappers = parseModuleWrappers(
config.moduleWrapper, modules);
maybeCreateDirsForPath(config.moduleOutputPathPrefix);
// If the source map path is in fact a pattern for each
// module, create a stream per-module. Otherwise, create
// a single source map.
Writer mapOut = null;
if (!shouldGenerateMapPerModule(options)) {
mapOut = fileNameToOutputWriter2(expandSourceMapPath(options, null));
}
for (JSModule m : modules) {
if (shouldGenerateMapPerModule(options)) {
mapOut = fileNameToOutputWriter2(expandSourceMapPath(options, m));
}
Writer writer =
fileNameToLegacyOutputWriter(getModuleOutputFileName(m));
if (options.sourceMapOutputPath != null) {
compiler.getSourceMap().reset();
}
writeModuleOutput(writer, m);
if (options.sourceMapOutputPath != null) {
compiler.getSourceMap().appendTo(mapOut, m.getName());
}
writer.close();
if (shouldGenerateMapPerModule(options) && mapOut != null) {
mapOut.close();
mapOut = null;
}
}
if (mapOut != null) {
mapOut.close();
}
}
// Output the externs if required.
if (options.externExportsPath != null) {
Writer eeOut =
openExternExportsStream(options, config.jsOutputFile);
eeOut.append(result.externExport);
eeOut.close();
}
// Output the variable and property name maps if requested.
outputNameMaps(options);
// Output the manifest and bundle files if requested.
outputManifest();
outputBundle();
if (options.tracer.isOn()) {
outputTracerReport();
}
}
// return 0 if no errors, the error count otherwise
return Math.min(result.errors.length, 0x7f);
}
#location 105
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
AbstractCommandLineRunner() {
this(System.out, System.err);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private void ensureTyped(NodeTraversal t, Node n, JSType type) {
// Make sure FUNCTION nodes always get function type.
Preconditions.checkState(!n.isFunction() ||
type.isFunctionType() ||
type.isUnknownType());
JSDocInfo info = n.getJSDocInfo();
if (info != null) {
if (info.hasType()) {
// TODO(johnlenz): Change this so that we only look for casts on CAST
// nodes one the misplaced type annotation warning is on by default and
// people have been given a chance to fix them. As is, this is here
// simply for legacy casts.
JSType infoType = info.getType().evaluate(t.getScope(), typeRegistry);
validator.expectCanCast(t, n, infoType, type);
type = infoType;
}
if (info.isImplicitCast() && !inExterns) {
String propName = n.isGetProp() ?
n.getLastChild().getString() : "(missing)";
compiler.report(
t.makeError(n, ILLEGAL_IMPLICIT_CAST, propName));
}
}
if (n.getJSType() == null) {
n.setJSType(type);
}
}
#location 13
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private void ensureTyped(NodeTraversal t, Node n, JSType type) {
// Make sure FUNCTION nodes always get function type.
Preconditions.checkState(!n.isFunction() ||
type.isFunctionType() ||
type.isUnknownType());
// TODO(johnlenz): this seems like a strange place to check "@implicitCast"
JSDocInfo info = n.getJSDocInfo();
if (info != null) {
if (info.isImplicitCast() && !inExterns) {
String propName = n.isGetProp() ?
n.getLastChild().getString() : "(missing)";
compiler.report(
t.makeError(n, ILLEGAL_IMPLICIT_CAST, propName));
}
}
if (n.getJSType() == null) {
n.setJSType(type);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private void outputManifest() throws IOException {
String outputManifest = config.outputManifest;
if (Strings.isEmpty(outputManifest)) {
return;
}
JSModuleGraph graph = compiler.getModuleGraph();
if (shouldGenerateManifestPerModule()) {
// Generate per-module manifests.
Iterable<JSModule> modules = graph.getAllModules();
for (JSModule module : modules) {
Writer out = fileNameToOutputWriter(expandManifest(module));
printManifestTo(module.getInputs(), out);
out.close();
}
} else {
// Generate a single file manifest.
Writer out = fileNameToOutputWriter(expandManifest(null));
if (graph == null) {
printManifestTo(compiler.getInputsInOrder(), out);
} else {
printModuleGraphManifestTo(graph, out);
}
out.close();
}
}
#location 20
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private void outputManifest() throws IOException {
List<String> outputManifests = config.outputManifests;
if (outputManifests.isEmpty()) {
return;
}
for (String outputManifest : outputManifests) {
if (outputManifest.isEmpty()) {
continue;
}
JSModuleGraph graph = compiler.getModuleGraph();
if (shouldGenerateManifestPerModule(outputManifest)) {
// Generate per-module manifests.
Iterable<JSModule> modules = graph.getAllModules();
for (JSModule module : modules) {
Writer out = fileNameToOutputWriter(
expandManifest(module, outputManifest));
printManifestTo(module.getInputs(), out);
out.close();
}
} else {
// Generate a single file manifest.
Writer out = fileNameToOutputWriter(
expandManifest(null, outputManifest));
if (graph == null) {
printManifestTo(compiler.getInputsInOrder(), out);
} else {
printModuleGraphManifestTo(graph, out);
}
out.close();
}
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
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