input
stringlengths 205
73.3k
| output
stringlengths 64
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stringclasses 1
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|---|---|---|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public boolean isEquivalentTo(JSType otherType) {
if (!(otherType instanceof FunctionType)) {
return false;
}
FunctionType that = (FunctionType) otherType;
if (!that.isFunctionType()) {
return false;
}
if (this.isConstructor()) {
if (that.isConstructor()) {
return this == that;
}
return false;
}
if (this.isInterface()) {
if (that.isInterface()) {
return this.getReferenceName().equals(that.getReferenceName());
}
return false;
}
if (that.isInterface()) {
return false;
}
return this.typeOfThis.isEquivalentTo(that.typeOfThis) &&
this.call.isEquivalentTo(that.call);
}
#location 18
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public boolean isEquivalentTo(JSType otherType) {
FunctionType that =
JSType.toMaybeFunctionType(otherType.toMaybeFunctionType());
if (that == null) {
return false;
}
if (this.isConstructor()) {
if (that.isConstructor()) {
return this == that;
}
return false;
}
if (this.isInterface()) {
if (that.isInterface()) {
return this.getReferenceName().equals(that.getReferenceName());
}
return false;
}
if (that.isInterface()) {
return false;
}
return this.typeOfThis.isEquivalentTo(that.typeOfThis) &&
this.call.isEquivalentTo(that.call);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private List<JSSourceFile> getDefaultExterns() {
try {
InputStream input = Compiler.class.getResourceAsStream(
"/externs.zip");
ZipInputStream zip = new ZipInputStream(input);
List<JSSourceFile> externs = Lists.newLinkedList();
for (ZipEntry entry; (entry = zip.getNextEntry()) != null; ) {
LimitInputStream entryStream =
new LimitInputStream(zip, entry.getSize());
externs.add(
JSSourceFile.fromInputStream(entry.getName(), entryStream));
}
return externs;
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new BuildException(e);
}
}
#location 12
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
private List<JSSourceFile> getDefaultExterns() {
try {
return CommandLineRunner.getDefaultExterns();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new BuildException(e);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public Symbol getSymbolDeclaredBy(FunctionType fn) {
Preconditions.checkState(fn.isConstructor() || fn.isInterface());
ObjectType instanceType = fn.getInstanceType();
String name = instanceType.getReferenceName();
if (name == null || globalScope == null) {
return null;
}
Node source = fn.getSource();
return (source == null ?
globalScope : getEnclosingScope(source)).getSlot(name);
}
#location 11
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public Symbol getSymbolDeclaredBy(FunctionType fn) {
Preconditions.checkState(fn.isConstructor() || fn.isInterface());
ObjectType instanceType = fn.getInstanceType();
return getSymbolForName(fn.getSource(), instanceType.getReferenceName());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private void toDebugString(StringBuilder builder, Symbol symbol) {
SymbolScope scope = symbol.scope;
if (scope.isGlobalScope()) {
builder.append(
String.format("'%s' : in global scope:\n", symbol.getName()));
} else {
builder.append(
String.format("'%s' : in scope %s:%d\n",
symbol.getName(),
scope.getRootNode().getSourceFileName(),
scope.getRootNode().getLineno()));
}
int refCount = 0;
for (Reference ref : getReferences(symbol)) {
builder.append(
String.format(" Ref %d: %s:%d\n",
refCount,
ref.getNode().getSourceFileName(),
ref.getNode().getLineno()));
refCount++;
}
}
#location 10
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private void toDebugString(StringBuilder builder, Symbol symbol) {
SymbolScope scope = symbol.scope;
if (scope.isGlobalScope()) {
builder.append(
String.format("'%s' : in global scope:\n", symbol.getName()));
} else if (scope.getRootNode() != null) {
builder.append(
String.format("'%s' : in scope %s:%d\n",
symbol.getName(),
scope.getRootNode().getSourceFileName(),
scope.getRootNode().getLineno()));
} else if (scope.getSymbolForScope() != null) {
builder.append(
String.format("'%s' : in scope %s\n", symbol.getName(),
scope.getSymbolForScope().getName()));
} else {
builder.append(
String.format("'%s' : in unknown scope\n", symbol.getName()));
}
int refCount = 0;
for (Reference ref : getReferences(symbol)) {
builder.append(
String.format(" Ref %d: %s:%d\n",
refCount,
ref.getNode().getSourceFileName(),
ref.getNode().getLineno()));
refCount++;
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void setSqlSource(MappedStatement ms) {
MapperTemplate mapperTemplate = getMapperTemplate(ms.getId());
try {
mapperTemplate.setSqlSource(ms);
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new RuntimeException("调用方法异常:" + e.getMessage());
}
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public void setSqlSource(MappedStatement ms) {
MapperTemplate mapperTemplate = getMapperTemplate(ms.getId());
try {
if (mapperTemplate != null) {
mapperTemplate.setSqlSource(ms);
}
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new RuntimeException("调用方法异常:" + e.getMessage());
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
protected String read(InputStream inputStream) throws IOException {
BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(inputStream));
StringBuffer stringBuffer = new StringBuffer();
String line = reader.readLine();
while (line != null) {
stringBuffer.append(line).append("\n");
line = reader.readLine();
}
return stringBuffer.toString();
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
protected String read(InputStream inputStream) throws IOException {
BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(inputStream, encoding));
StringBuffer stringBuffer = new StringBuffer();
String line = reader.readLine();
while (line != null) {
stringBuffer.append(line).append("\n");
line = reader.readLine();
}
return stringBuffer.toString();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public static void main(String[] args) {
@SuppressWarnings("resource")
ApplicationContext context = new ClassPathXmlApplicationContext("exampleContext.xml");
SpringCacheExample example = context.getBean(SpringCacheExample.class);
example.getBook(0);
example.getBook(0);
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public static void main(String[] args) {
example();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public static void main(String[] args) {
Cache<Integer, Integer> cache = CacheBuilder.transactionalHeapCache()
.transactionCommitter(new TransactionCommitter<Integer, Integer>() {
int counter = 0;
public void doPut(Integer key, Integer value) {
if (counter < 3) {
System.out.println("key[" + key + "]," + "value[" + value + "]");
counter++;
} else {
throw new RuntimeException();
}
}
}).build();
Transaction transaction1 = CacheTransaction.get();
transaction1.begin();
try {
cache.put(3, 5);
cache.put(10, 14);
transaction1.commit();
} catch (TransactionException exception) {
transaction1.rollback();
} finally {
transaction1.close();
}
System.out.println("Value for the key 3 is " + cache.get(3));
System.out.println("Value for the key 10 is " + cache.get(10));
Transaction transaction2 = CacheTransaction.get();
transaction2.begin();
try {
cache.put(1, 10);
cache.put(10, 13);
transaction2.commit();
} catch (TransactionException exception) {
transaction2.rollback();
} finally {
transaction2.close();
}
System.out.println("Value for the key 1 is " + cache.get(1));
System.out.println("Value for the key 10 is " + cache.get(10));
}
#location 16
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public static void main(String[] args) {
example();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public static void main(String[] args) {
@SuppressWarnings({ "resource", "unused" })
ApplicationContext context = new ClassPathXmlApplicationContext("exampleContext.xml");
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
public static void main(String[] args) {
example();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public static void main(String[] args) {
Cache<Integer, Integer> cache = CacheBuilder.transactionalHeapCache()
.transactionCommitter(new TransactionCommitter<Integer, Integer>() {
int counter = 0;
public void doPut(Integer key, Integer value) {
if (counter < 3) {
System.out.println("key[" + key + "]," + "value[" + value + "]");
counter++;
} else {
throw new RuntimeException();
}
}
}).build();
Transaction transaction1 = CacheTransaction.get();
transaction1.begin();
try {
cache.put(3, 5);
cache.put(10, 14);
transaction1.commit();
} catch (TransactionException exception) {
transaction1.rollback();
} finally {
transaction1.close();
}
System.out.println("Value for the key 3 is " + cache.get(3));
System.out.println("Value for the key 10 is " + cache.get(10));
Transaction transaction2 = CacheTransaction.get();
transaction2.begin();
try {
cache.put(1, 10);
cache.put(10, 13);
transaction2.commit();
} catch (TransactionException exception) {
transaction2.rollback();
} finally {
transaction2.close();
}
System.out.println("Value for the key 1 is " + cache.get(1));
System.out.println("Value for the key 10 is " + cache.get(10));
}
#location 29
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public static void main(String[] args) {
example();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
static void installDependencies(PrintStream logger, Launcher launcher,
AndroidSdk sdk, EmulatorConfig emuConfig) throws IOException, InterruptedException {
// Get AVD platform from emulator config
String platform = getPlatformForEmulator(launcher, emuConfig);
// Install platform and any dependencies it may have
final boolean requiresAbi = emuConfig.getOsVersion().requiresAbi();
String abi = requiresAbi ? emuConfig.getTargetAbi() : null;
installPlatform(logger, launcher, sdk, platform, abi, emuConfig.isNamedEmulator());
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
static void installDependencies(PrintStream logger, Launcher launcher,
AndroidSdk sdk, EmulatorConfig emuConfig) throws IOException, InterruptedException {
// Get AVD platform from emulator config
String platform = getPlatformForEmulator(launcher, emuConfig);
// Install platform and any dependencies it may have
final boolean skipSystemImageInstall = emuConfig.isNamedEmulator()
|| !emuConfig.getOsVersion().requiresAbi();
installPlatform(logger, launcher, sdk, platform, emuConfig.getTargetAbi(), skipSystemImageInstall);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private void writeAvdConfigFile(File homeDir, Map<String,String> values) throws FileNotFoundException {
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
for (String key : values.keySet()) {
sb.append(key);
sb.append("=");
sb.append(values.get(key));
sb.append("\r\n");
}
File configFile = new File(getAvdDirectory(homeDir), "config.ini");
PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(configFile);
out.print(sb.toString());
out.flush();
out.close();
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
private void writeAvdConfigFile(File homeDir, Map<String,String> values) throws IOException {
final File configFile = getAvdConfigFile(homeDir);
ConfigFileUtils.writeConfigFile(configFile, values);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testTargetName() {
assertEquals("Google Inc.:Google APIs:23", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:23").getTargetName());
assertEquals("Google Inc.:Google APIs:24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:24").getTargetName());
assertEquals("Apple Inc.:Apple APIs:24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Apple Inc.:Apple APIs:24").getTargetName());
assertEquals("android-23", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("android-23").getTargetName());
assertEquals("android-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("android-24").getTargetName());
assertEquals("android-26", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("android-26").getTargetName());
assertEquals("android-10", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("2.3.3").getTargetName());
assertEquals("android-26", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("8.0").getTargetName());
assertEquals("android-26", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("26").getTargetName());
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testTargetName() {
assertEquals("Some:Addon:11", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Some:Addon:11").getTargetName());
assertEquals("Google Inc.:Google APIs:23", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:23").getTargetName());
assertEquals("Google Inc.:Google APIs:24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:24").getTargetName());
assertEquals("Apple Inc.:Apple APIs:24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Apple Inc.:Apple APIs:24").getTargetName());
assertEquals("android-23", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("android-23").getTargetName());
assertEquals("android-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("android-24").getTargetName());
assertEquals("android-26", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("android-26").getTargetName());
assertEquals("android-10", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("2.3.3").getTargetName());
assertEquals("android-26", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("8.0").getTargetName());
assertEquals("android-26", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("26").getTargetName());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testSystemImageName() {
assertEquals("sys-img-x86-android-23", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:23").getSystemImageName("x86"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86-android-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:24").getSystemImageName("x86"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86_64-android-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Apple Inc.:Apple APIs:24").getSystemImageName("x86_64"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86_64-android-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("MS Company:MS APIs:24").getSystemImageName("x86_64"));
assertEquals("sys-img-armabi-v7a-android-23", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("android-23").getSystemImageName("armabi-v7a"));
assertEquals("sys-img-armabi-v7a-android-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("android-24").getSystemImageName("armabi-v7a"));
assertEquals("sys-img-arm64-v8a-android-26", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("android-26").getSystemImageName("arm64-v8a"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86-test-23", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:23").getSystemImageName("test/x86"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86-test-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:24").getSystemImageName("test/x86"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86_64-test-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Apple Inc.:Apple APIs:24").getSystemImageName("test/x86_64"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86_64-test-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("MS Company:MS APIs:24").getSystemImageName("test/x86_64"));
assertEquals("sys-img-armabi-v7a-test-23", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("android-23").getSystemImageName("test/armabi-v7a"));
assertEquals("sys-img-armabi-v7a-test-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("android-24").getSystemImageName("test/armabi-v7a"));
assertEquals("sys-img-arm64-v8a-test-26", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("android-26").getSystemImageName("test/arm64-v8a"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86-android-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:24").getSystemImageName("/x86"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86-android-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:24").getSystemImageName("///////x86"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86_64-android-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:24").getSystemImageName("x86_64/"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86_64-android-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:24").getSystemImageName("x86_64////"));
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testSystemImageName() {
assertEquals("sys-img-x86-android-23", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("android-23").getSystemImageName("x86"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86-google_apis-23", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:23").getSystemImageName("x86"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86-google_apis-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:24").getSystemImageName("x86"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86_64-apple_apis-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Apple Inc.:Apple APIs:24").getSystemImageName("x86_64"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86_64-ms_apis-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("MS Company:MS APIs:24").getSystemImageName("x86_64"));
assertEquals("sys-img-armabi-v7a-android-23", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("android-23").getSystemImageName("armabi-v7a"));
assertEquals("sys-img-armabi-v7a-android-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("android-24").getSystemImageName("armabi-v7a"));
assertEquals("sys-img-arm64-v8a-android-26", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("android-26").getSystemImageName("arm64-v8a"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86-test-23", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:23").getSystemImageName("test/x86"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86-test-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:24").getSystemImageName("test/x86"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86_64-test-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Apple Inc.:Apple APIs:24").getSystemImageName("test/x86_64"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86_64-test-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("MS Company:MS APIs:24").getSystemImageName("test/x86_64"));
assertEquals("sys-img-armabi-v7a-test-23", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("android-23").getSystemImageName("test/armabi-v7a"));
assertEquals("sys-img-armabi-v7a-test-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("android-24").getSystemImageName("test/armabi-v7a"));
assertEquals("sys-img-arm64-v8a-test-26", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("android-26").getSystemImageName("test/arm64-v8a"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86-google_apis-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:24").getSystemImageName("/x86"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86-google_apis-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:24").getSystemImageName("///////x86"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86_64-google_apis-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:24").getSystemImageName("x86_64/"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86_64-google_apis-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:24").getSystemImageName("x86_64////"));
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void determinesItemBSourceSetter() {
Target target = new Target();
target.setItemB( new ItemB() );
SourceWithItemB source = new SourceWithItemB();
GenericsHierarchyMapper.INSTANCE.intoSourceWithItemB( target, source );
assertThat( source.getItem().typeParameterIsResolvedToItemB() ).isTrue();
}
#location 10
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void determinesItemBSourceSetter() {
Target target = new Target();
target.setKeyOfAllBeings( new KeyOfAllBeings() );
Child source = new Child();
GenericsHierarchyMapper.INSTANCE.updateSourceWithKeyOfAllBeings( target, source );
assertThat( source.getKey().typeParameterIsResolvedToKeyOfAllBeings() ).isTrue();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public boolean isIterableMapping() {
return getSingleSourceType().isIterableType() && resultType.isIterableType();
}
#location 2
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public boolean isIterableMapping() {
return getSingleSourceParameter().getType().isIterableType() && getResultType().isIterableType();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private Mapping getMapping(MappingPrism mapping) {
Type converterType = typeUtil.retrieveType( mapping.converter() );
return new Mapping(
mapping.source(),
mapping.target(),
converterType.getName().equals( "NoOpConverter" ) ? null : converterType
);
}
#location 6
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private Mapping getMapping(MappingPrism mapping) {
return new Mapping( mapping.source(), mapping.target() );
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
Element returnTypeElement = typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
Element parameterElement = typeUtils.asElement( method.getParameters().get( 0 ).asType() );
List<MappedProperty> properties = new ArrayList<MappedProperty>();
List<ExecutableElement> sourceGetters = Filters.getterMethodsIn( parameterElement.getEnclosedElements() );
List<ExecutableElement> targetSetters = Filters.setterMethodsIn( returnTypeElement.getEnclosedElements() );
reportErrorIfMappedPropertiesDontExist( method, mappings, sourceGetters, targetSetters );
for ( ExecutableElement getterMethod : sourceGetters ) {
String sourcePropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( getterMethod );
Mapping mapping = mappings.get( sourcePropertyName );
for ( ExecutableElement setterMethod : targetSetters ) {
String targetPropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( setterMethod );
if ( targetPropertyName.equals( mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : sourcePropertyName ) ) {
properties.add(
new MappedProperty(
sourcePropertyName,
getterMethod.getSimpleName().toString(),
Executables.getCorrespondingSetterMethod( parameterElement, getterMethod )
.getSimpleName()
.toString(),
retrieveReturnType( getterMethod ),
mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : targetPropertyName,
Executables.getCorrespondingGetterMethod( returnTypeElement, setterMethod )
.getSimpleName()
.toString(),
setterMethod.getSimpleName().toString(),
retrieveParameter( setterMethod ).getType()
)
);
}
}
}
return properties;
}
#location 24
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
TypeElement returnTypeElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
TypeElement parameterElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getParameters().get( 0 ).asType() );
List<MappedProperty> properties = new ArrayList<MappedProperty>();
List<ExecutableElement> sourceGetters = Filters.getterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( parameterElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> targetSetters = Filters.setterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( returnTypeElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> sourceSetters = Filters.setterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( parameterElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> targetGetters = Filters.getterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( returnTypeElement )
);
reportErrorIfMappedPropertiesDontExist( method, mappings, sourceGetters, targetSetters );
for ( ExecutableElement getterMethod : sourceGetters ) {
String sourcePropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( getterMethod );
Mapping mapping = mappings.get( sourcePropertyName );
for ( ExecutableElement setterMethod : targetSetters ) {
String targetPropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( setterMethod );
if ( targetPropertyName.equals( mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : sourcePropertyName ) ) {
properties.add(
new MappedProperty(
sourcePropertyName,
getterMethod.getSimpleName().toString(),
Executables.getCorrespondingPropertyAccessor( getterMethod, sourceSetters )
.getSimpleName()
.toString(),
retrieveReturnType( getterMethod ),
mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : targetPropertyName,
Executables.getCorrespondingPropertyAccessor( setterMethod, targetGetters )
.getSimpleName()
.toString(),
setterMethod.getSimpleName().toString(),
retrieveParameter( setterMethod ).getType()
)
);
}
}
}
return properties;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public boolean process(
final Set<? extends TypeElement> annotations,
final RoundEnvironment roundEnvironment) {
for ( TypeElement oneAnnotation : annotations ) {
//Indicates that the annotation's type isn't on the class path of the compiled
//project. Let the compiler deal with that and print an appropriate error.
if ( oneAnnotation.getKind() != ElementKind.ANNOTATION_TYPE ) {
continue;
}
for ( Element oneAnnotatedElement : roundEnvironment.getElementsAnnotatedWith( oneAnnotation ) ) {
oneAnnotatedElement.accept( new MapperGenerationVisitor( processingEnv, configuration ), null );
}
}
return ANNOTATIONS_CLAIMED_EXCLUSIVELY;
}
#location 15
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Override
public boolean process(
final Set<? extends TypeElement> annotations,
final RoundEnvironment roundEnvironment) {
for ( TypeElement oneAnnotation : annotations ) {
//Indicates that the annotation's type isn't on the class path of the compiled
//project. Let the compiler deal with that and print an appropriate error.
if ( oneAnnotation.getKind() != ElementKind.ANNOTATION_TYPE ) {
continue;
}
for ( Element oneAnnotatedElement : roundEnvironment.getElementsAnnotatedWith( oneAnnotation ) ) {
oneAnnotatedElement.accept( new MapperGenerationVisitor( processingEnv ), null );
}
}
return ANNOTATIONS_CLAIMED_EXCLUSIVELY;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public Mapper process(ProcessorContext context, TypeElement mapperTypeElement, Mapper mapper) {
String componentModel = MapperPrism.getInstanceOn( mapperTypeElement ).componentModel();
if ( !componentModel.equals( "cdi" ) ) {
return mapper;
}
mapper.addAnnotation( new Annotation( new Type( "javax.enterprise.context", "ApplicationScoped" ) ) );
ListIterator<MapperReference> iterator = mapper.getReferencedMappers().listIterator();
while ( iterator.hasNext() ) {
MapperReference reference = iterator.next();
iterator.remove();
iterator.add( new CdiMapperReference( reference.getMapperType() ) );
}
return mapper;
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public Mapper process(ProcessorContext context, TypeElement mapperTypeElement, Mapper mapper) {
String componentModel = MapperPrism.getInstanceOn( mapperTypeElement ).componentModel();
String effectiveComponentModel = OptionsHelper.getEffectiveComponentModel(
context.getOptions(),
componentModel
);
if ( !"cdi".equalsIgnoreCase( effectiveComponentModel ) ) {
return mapper;
}
mapper.addAnnotation( new Annotation( new Type( "javax.enterprise.context", "ApplicationScoped" ) ) );
ListIterator<MapperReference> iterator = mapper.getReferencedMappers().listIterator();
while ( iterator.hasNext() ) {
MapperReference reference = iterator.next();
iterator.remove();
iterator.add( new CdiMapperReference( reference.getMapperType() ) );
}
return mapper;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
Element returnTypeElement = typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
Element parameterElement = typeUtils.asElement( method.getParameters().get( 0 ).asType() );
List<MappedProperty> properties = new ArrayList<MappedProperty>();
List<ExecutableElement> sourceGetters = Filters.getterMethodsIn( parameterElement.getEnclosedElements() );
List<ExecutableElement> targetSetters = Filters.setterMethodsIn( returnTypeElement.getEnclosedElements() );
reportErrorIfMappedPropertiesDontExist( method, mappings, sourceGetters, targetSetters );
for ( ExecutableElement getterMethod : sourceGetters ) {
String sourcePropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( getterMethod );
Mapping mapping = mappings.get( sourcePropertyName );
for ( ExecutableElement setterMethod : targetSetters ) {
String targetPropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( setterMethod );
if ( targetPropertyName.equals( mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : sourcePropertyName ) ) {
properties.add(
new MappedProperty(
sourcePropertyName,
getterMethod.getSimpleName().toString(),
Executables.getCorrespondingSetterMethod( parameterElement, getterMethod )
.getSimpleName()
.toString(),
retrieveReturnType( getterMethod ),
mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : targetPropertyName,
Executables.getCorrespondingGetterMethod( returnTypeElement, setterMethod )
.getSimpleName()
.toString(),
setterMethod.getSimpleName().toString(),
retrieveParameter( setterMethod ).getType()
)
);
}
}
}
return properties;
}
#location 24
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
TypeElement returnTypeElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
TypeElement parameterElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getParameters().get( 0 ).asType() );
List<MappedProperty> properties = new ArrayList<MappedProperty>();
List<ExecutableElement> sourceGetters = Filters.getterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( parameterElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> targetSetters = Filters.setterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( returnTypeElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> sourceSetters = Filters.setterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( parameterElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> targetGetters = Filters.getterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( returnTypeElement )
);
reportErrorIfMappedPropertiesDontExist( method, mappings, sourceGetters, targetSetters );
for ( ExecutableElement getterMethod : sourceGetters ) {
String sourcePropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( getterMethod );
Mapping mapping = mappings.get( sourcePropertyName );
for ( ExecutableElement setterMethod : targetSetters ) {
String targetPropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( setterMethod );
if ( targetPropertyName.equals( mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : sourcePropertyName ) ) {
properties.add(
new MappedProperty(
sourcePropertyName,
getterMethod.getSimpleName().toString(),
Executables.getCorrespondingPropertyAccessor( getterMethod, sourceSetters )
.getSimpleName()
.toString(),
retrieveReturnType( getterMethod ),
mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : targetPropertyName,
Executables.getCorrespondingPropertyAccessor( setterMethod, targetGetters )
.getSimpleName()
.toString(),
setterMethod.getSimpleName().toString(),
retrieveParameter( setterMethod ).getType()
)
);
}
}
}
return properties;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private List<Method> retrieveMethods(TypeElement element, boolean implementationRequired) {
List<Method> methods = new ArrayList<Method>();
MapperPrism mapperPrism = implementationRequired ? MapperPrism.getInstanceOn( element ) : null;
//TODO Extract to separate method
for ( ExecutableElement method : methodsIn( element.getEnclosedElements() ) ) {
Parameter parameter = executables.retrieveParameter( method );
Type returnType = executables.retrieveReturnType( method );
boolean mappingErroneous = false;
if ( implementationRequired ) {
if ( parameter.getType().isIterableType() && !returnType.isIterableType() ) {
printMessage(
ReportingPolicy.ERROR,
"Can't generate mapping method from iterable type to non-iterable type.",
method
);
mappingErroneous = true;
}
if ( !parameter.getType().isIterableType() && returnType.isIterableType() ) {
printMessage(
ReportingPolicy.ERROR,
"Can't generate mapping method from non-iterable type to iterable type.",
method
);
mappingErroneous = true;
}
if ( parameter.getType().isPrimitive() ) {
printMessage(
ReportingPolicy.ERROR,
"Can't generate mapping method with primitive parameter type.",
method
);
mappingErroneous = true;
}
if ( returnType.isPrimitive() ) {
printMessage(
ReportingPolicy.ERROR,
"Can't generate mapping method with primitive return type.",
method
);
mappingErroneous = true;
}
if ( mappingErroneous ) {
continue;
}
}
//add method with property mappings if an implementation needs to be generated
if ( implementationRequired ) {
methods.add(
Method.forMethodRequiringImplementation(
method,
parameter.getName(),
parameter.getType(),
returnType,
getMappings( method )
)
);
}
//otherwise add reference to existing mapper method
else {
methods.add(
Method.forReferencedMethod(
typeUtil.getType( typeUtils.getDeclaredType( element ) ),
method,
parameter.getName(),
parameter.getType(),
returnType
)
);
}
}
//Add all methods of used mappers in order to reference them in the aggregated model
if ( implementationRequired ) {
for ( TypeMirror usedMapper : mapperPrism.uses() ) {
methods.addAll(
retrieveMethods(
(TypeElement) ( (DeclaredType) usedMapper ).asElement(),
false
)
);
}
}
return methods;
}
#location 57
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private List<Method> retrieveMethods(TypeElement element, boolean implementationRequired) {
List<Method> methods = new ArrayList<Method>();
MapperPrism mapperPrism = implementationRequired ? MapperPrism.getInstanceOn( element ) : null;
for ( ExecutableElement executable : methodsIn( element.getEnclosedElements() ) ) {
Method method = getMethod( element, executable, implementationRequired );
if ( method != null ) {
methods.add( method );
}
}
//Add all methods of used mappers in order to reference them in the aggregated model
if ( implementationRequired ) {
for ( TypeMirror usedMapper : mapperPrism.uses() ) {
methods.addAll(
retrieveMethods(
(TypeElement) ( (DeclaredType) usedMapper ).asElement(),
false
)
);
}
}
return methods;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private PropertyMapping getPropertyMapping(List<MapperReference> mapperReferences, List<Method> methods,
Method method, Parameter parameter, ExecutableElement sourceAccessor,
ExecutableElement targetAcessor, String dateFormat) {
Type sourceType = typeFactory.getReturnType( sourceAccessor );
Type targetType = null;
String conversionString = null;
conversionString = parameter.getName() + "." + sourceAccessor.getSimpleName().toString() + "()";
if ( Executables.isSetterMethod( targetAcessor ) ) {
targetType = typeFactory.getSingleParameter( targetAcessor ).getType();
}
else if ( Executables.isGetterMethod( targetAcessor ) ) {
targetType = typeFactory.getReturnType( targetAcessor );
}
MethodReference propertyMappingMethod = getMappingMethodReference(
mapperReferences,
methods,
sourceType,
targetType
);
TypeConversion conversion = getConversion(
sourceType,
targetType,
dateFormat,
conversionString
);
PropertyMapping property = new PropertyMapping(
parameter.getName(),
Executables.getPropertyName( sourceAccessor ),
sourceAccessor.getSimpleName().toString(),
sourceType,
Executables.getPropertyName( targetAcessor ),
targetAcessor.getSimpleName().toString(),
targetType,
propertyMappingMethod,
conversion
);
reportErrorIfPropertyCanNotBeMapped(
method,
property
);
return property;
}
#location 10
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private PropertyMapping getPropertyMapping(List<MapperReference> mapperReferences, List<Method> methods,
Method method, Parameter parameter, ExecutableElement sourceAccessor,
ExecutableElement targetAcessor, String dateFormat) {
Type sourceType = typeFactory.getReturnType( sourceAccessor );
Type targetType = null;
String conversionString = null;
conversionString = parameter.getName() + "." + sourceAccessor.getSimpleName().toString() + "()";
if ( Executables.isSetterMethod( targetAcessor ) ) {
targetType = typeFactory.getSingleParameter( targetAcessor ).getType();
}
else if ( Executables.isGetterMethod( targetAcessor ) ) {
targetType = typeFactory.getReturnType( targetAcessor );
}
MethodReference propertyMappingMethod = getMappingMethodReference(
method,
"property '" + Executables.getPropertyName( sourceAccessor ) + "'",
mapperReferences,
methods,
sourceType,
targetType
);
TypeConversion conversion = getConversion(
sourceType,
targetType,
dateFormat,
conversionString
);
PropertyMapping property = new PropertyMapping(
parameter.getName(),
Executables.getPropertyName( sourceAccessor ),
sourceAccessor.getSimpleName().toString(),
sourceType,
Executables.getPropertyName( targetAcessor ),
targetAcessor.getSimpleName().toString(),
targetType,
propertyMappingMethod,
conversion
);
reportErrorIfPropertyCanNotBeMapped(
method,
property
);
return property;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public boolean isMapMapping() {
return getSingleSourceType().isMapType() && resultType.isMapType();
}
#location 2
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public boolean isMapMapping() {
return getSingleSourceParameter().getType().isMapType() && getResultType().isMapType();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private void deleteDirectory(File path) {
if ( path.exists() ) {
File[] files = path.listFiles();
for ( int i = 0; i < files.length; i++ ) {
if ( files[i].isDirectory() ) {
deleteDirectory( files[i] );
}
else {
files[i].delete();
}
}
}
path.delete();
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private void deleteDirectory(File path) {
if ( path.exists() ) {
File[] files = path.listFiles();
for ( File file : files ) {
if ( file.isDirectory() ) {
deleteDirectory( file );
}
else {
file.delete();
}
}
}
path.delete();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private List<Method> retrieveMethods(TypeElement element, boolean mapperRequiresImplementation) {
List<Method> methods = new ArrayList<Method>();
MapperPrism mapperPrism = mapperRequiresImplementation ? MapperPrism.getInstanceOn( element ) : null;
for ( ExecutableElement executable : methodsIn( element.getEnclosedElements() ) ) {
Method method = getMethod( element, executable, mapperRequiresImplementation );
if ( method != null ) {
methods.add( method );
}
}
//Add all methods of used mappers in order to reference them in the aggregated model
if ( mapperRequiresImplementation ) {
for ( TypeMirror usedMapper : mapperPrism.uses() ) {
methods.addAll(
retrieveMethods(
(TypeElement) ( (DeclaredType) usedMapper ).asElement(),
false
)
);
}
}
return methods;
}
#location 15
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private List<Method> retrieveMethods(TypeElement element, boolean mapperRequiresImplementation) {
List<Method> methods = new ArrayList<Method>();
for ( ExecutableElement executable : methodsIn( element.getEnclosedElements() ) ) {
Method method = getMethod( element, executable, mapperRequiresImplementation );
if ( method != null ) {
methods.add( method );
}
}
//Add all methods of used mappers in order to reference them in the aggregated model
if ( mapperRequiresImplementation ) {
MapperPrism mapperPrism = MapperPrism.getInstanceOn( element );
if ( !mapperPrism.isValid ) {
throw new AnnotationProcessingException(
"Couldn't retrieve @Mapper annotation", element, mapperPrism.mirror
);
}
for ( TypeMirror usedMapper : mapperPrism.uses() ) {
methods.addAll(
retrieveMethods(
(TypeElement) ( (DeclaredType) usedMapper ).asElement(),
false
)
);
}
}
return methods;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
TypeElement returnTypeElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
TypeElement parameterElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getParameters().get( 0 ).asType() );
List<MappedProperty> properties = new ArrayList<MappedProperty>();
List<ExecutableElement> sourceGetters = Filters.getterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( parameterElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> targetSetters = Filters.setterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( returnTypeElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> sourceSetters = Filters.setterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( parameterElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> targetGetters = Filters.getterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( returnTypeElement )
);
reportErrorIfMappedPropertiesDontExist( method, mappings, sourceGetters, targetSetters );
for ( ExecutableElement getterMethod : sourceGetters ) {
String sourcePropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( getterMethod );
Mapping mapping = mappings.get( sourcePropertyName );
for ( ExecutableElement setterMethod : targetSetters ) {
String targetPropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( setterMethod );
if ( targetPropertyName.equals( mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : sourcePropertyName ) ) {
properties.add(
new MappedProperty(
sourcePropertyName,
getterMethod.getSimpleName().toString(),
Executables.getCorrespondingPropertyAccessor( getterMethod, sourceSetters )
.getSimpleName()
.toString(),
retrieveReturnType( getterMethod ),
mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : targetPropertyName,
Executables.getCorrespondingPropertyAccessor( setterMethod, targetGetters )
.getSimpleName()
.toString(),
setterMethod.getSimpleName().toString(),
retrieveParameter( setterMethod ).getType()
)
);
}
}
}
return properties;
}
#location 35
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
TypeElement returnTypeElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
TypeElement parameterElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getParameters().get( 0 ).asType() );
List<MappedProperty> properties = new ArrayList<MappedProperty>();
List<ExecutableElement> sourceGetters = Filters.getterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( parameterElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> targetSetters = Filters.setterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( returnTypeElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> sourceSetters = Filters.setterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( parameterElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> targetGetters = Filters.getterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( returnTypeElement )
);
reportErrorIfMappedPropertiesDontExist( method, mappings, sourceGetters, targetSetters );
for ( ExecutableElement getterMethod : sourceGetters ) {
String sourcePropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( getterMethod );
Mapping mapping = mappings.get( sourcePropertyName );
for ( ExecutableElement setterMethod : targetSetters ) {
String targetPropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( setterMethod );
if ( targetPropertyName.equals( mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : sourcePropertyName ) ) {
ExecutableElement correspondingSetter = Executables.getCorrespondingPropertyAccessor(
getterMethod,
sourceSetters
);
ExecutableElement correspondingGetter = Executables.getCorrespondingPropertyAccessor(
setterMethod,
targetGetters
);
properties.add(
new MappedProperty(
sourcePropertyName,
getterMethod.getSimpleName().toString(),
correspondingSetter != null ? correspondingSetter.getSimpleName().toString() : null,
retrieveReturnType( getterMethod ),
mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : targetPropertyName,
correspondingGetter != null ? correspondingGetter.getSimpleName().toString() : null,
setterMethod.getSimpleName().toString(),
retrieveParameter( setterMethod ).getType()
)
);
}
}
}
return properties;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void determinesItemCSourceSetter() {
Target target = new Target();
target.setItemC( new ItemC() );
SourceWithItemC source = new SourceWithItemC();
GenericsHierarchyMapper.INSTANCE.intoSourceWithItemC( target, source );
assertThat( source.getItem().typeParameterIsResolvedToItemC() ).isTrue();
}
#location 10
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void determinesItemCSourceSetter() {
Target target = new Target();
target.setAnimalKey( new AnimalKey() );
Elephant source = new Elephant();
GenericsHierarchyMapper.INSTANCE.updateSourceWithAnimalKey( target, source );
assertThat( source.getKey().typeParameterIsResolvedToAnimalKey() ).isTrue();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private MappingMethod getBeanMappingMethod(List<Method> methods, Method method,
ReportingPolicy unmappedTargetPolicy) {
List<PropertyMapping> propertyMappings = new ArrayList<PropertyMapping>();
Set<String> mappedTargetProperties = new HashSet<String>();
Map<String, Mapping> mappings = method.getMappings();
TypeElement resultTypeElement = elementUtils.getTypeElement( method.getResultType().getCanonicalName() );
TypeElement parameterElement = elementUtils.getTypeElement( method.getSingleSourceType().getCanonicalName() );
List<ExecutableElement> sourceGetters = Filters.getterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( parameterElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> targetSetters = Filters.setterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( resultTypeElement )
);
Set<String> sourceProperties = executables.getPropertyNames(
Filters.getterMethodsIn( sourceGetters )
);
Set<String> targetProperties = executables.getPropertyNames(
Filters.setterMethodsIn( targetSetters )
);
reportErrorIfMappedPropertiesDontExist( method, sourceProperties, targetProperties );
for ( ExecutableElement getterMethod : sourceGetters ) {
String sourcePropertyName = executables.getPropertyName( getterMethod );
Mapping mapping = mappings.get( sourcePropertyName );
String dateFormat = mapping != null ? mapping.getDateFormat() : null;
for ( ExecutableElement setterMethod : targetSetters ) {
String targetPropertyName = executables.getPropertyName( setterMethod );
if ( targetPropertyName.equals( mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : sourcePropertyName ) ) {
PropertyMapping property = getPropertyMapping(
methods,
method,
getterMethod,
setterMethod,
dateFormat
);
propertyMappings.add( property );
mappedTargetProperties.add( targetPropertyName );
}
}
}
reportErrorForUnmappedTargetPropertiesIfRequired(
method,
unmappedTargetPolicy,
targetProperties,
mappedTargetProperties
);
return new BeanMappingMethod(
method.getName(),
method.getParameters(),
method.getSourceParameters(),
method.getResultType(),
method.getResultName(),
method.getReturnType(),
propertyMappings
);
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private MappingMethod getBeanMappingMethod(List<Method> methods, Method method,
ReportingPolicy unmappedTargetPolicy) {
List<PropertyMapping> propertyMappings = new ArrayList<PropertyMapping>();
Set<String> mappedTargetProperties = new HashSet<String>();
Map<String, Mapping> mappings = method.getMappings();
TypeElement resultTypeElement = elementUtils.getTypeElement( method.getResultType().getCanonicalName() );
TypeElement parameterElement = elementUtils.getTypeElement(
method.getSingleSourceParameter()
.getType()
.getCanonicalName()
);
List<ExecutableElement> sourceGetters = Filters.getterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( parameterElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> targetSetters = Filters.setterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( resultTypeElement )
);
Set<String> sourceProperties = executables.getPropertyNames(
Filters.getterMethodsIn( sourceGetters )
);
Set<String> targetProperties = executables.getPropertyNames(
Filters.setterMethodsIn( targetSetters )
);
reportErrorIfMappedPropertiesDontExist( method, sourceProperties, targetProperties );
for ( ExecutableElement getterMethod : sourceGetters ) {
String sourcePropertyName = executables.getPropertyName( getterMethod );
Mapping mapping = mappings.get( sourcePropertyName );
String dateFormat = mapping != null ? mapping.getDateFormat() : null;
for ( ExecutableElement setterMethod : targetSetters ) {
String targetPropertyName = executables.getPropertyName( setterMethod );
if ( targetPropertyName.equals( mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : sourcePropertyName ) ) {
PropertyMapping property = getPropertyMapping(
methods,
method,
getterMethod,
setterMethod,
dateFormat
);
propertyMappings.add( property );
mappedTargetProperties.add( targetPropertyName );
}
}
}
reportErrorForUnmappedTargetPropertiesIfRequired(
method,
unmappedTargetPolicy,
targetProperties,
mappedTargetProperties
);
return new BeanMappingMethod( method, propertyMappings );
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public boolean matches() {
// check & collect generic types.
List<? extends VariableElement> candidateParameters = candidateMethod.getExecutable().getParameters();
if ( candidateParameters.size() == parameters.length ) {
for ( int i = 0; i < parameters.length; i++ ) {
TypeMatcher parameterMatcher = new TypeMatcher();
typesMatch = parameterMatcher.visit( candidateParameters.get( i ).asType(),
parameters[i].getTypeMirror() );
if ( !typesMatch ) {
break;
}
}
}
else {
typesMatch = false;
}
// check return type
if ( typesMatch ) {
TypeMirror candidateReturnType = candidateMethod.getExecutable().getReturnType();
TypeMatcher returnTypeMatcher = new TypeMatcher();
typesMatch = returnTypeMatcher.visit( candidateReturnType, returnType.getTypeMirror() );
}
// check if all type parameters are indeed mapped
if ( candidateMethod.getExecutable().getTypeParameters().size() != this.genericTypesMap.size() ) {
typesMatch = false;
}
else {
// check if all entries are in the bounds
for (Map.Entry<TypeVariable, TypeMirror> entry : genericTypesMap.entrySet()) {
if (!isWithinBounds( entry.getValue(), getTypeParamFromCandite( entry.getKey() ) ) ) {
// checks if the found Type is in bounds of the TypeParameters bounds.
typesMatch = false;
}
}
}
return typesMatch;
}
#location 33
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public boolean matches() {
// check & collect generic types.
List<? extends VariableElement> candidateParameters = candidateMethod.getExecutable().getParameters();
if ( candidateParameters.size() != 1 ) {
typesMatch = false;
}
else {
TypeMatcher parameterMatcher = new TypeMatcher();
typesMatch = parameterMatcher.visit(
candidateParameters.iterator().next().asType(),
parameter.getTypeMirror()
);
}
// check return type
if ( typesMatch ) {
TypeMirror candidateReturnType = candidateMethod.getExecutable().getReturnType();
TypeMatcher returnTypeMatcher = new TypeMatcher();
typesMatch = returnTypeMatcher.visit( candidateReturnType, returnType.getTypeMirror() );
}
// check if all type parameters are indeed mapped
if ( candidateMethod.getExecutable().getTypeParameters().size() != this.genericTypesMap.size() ) {
typesMatch = false;
}
else {
// check if all entries are in the bounds
for (Map.Entry<TypeVariable, TypeMirror> entry : genericTypesMap.entrySet()) {
if (!isWithinBounds( entry.getValue(), getTypeParamFromCandidate( entry.getKey() ) ) ) {
// checks if the found Type is in bounds of the TypeParameters bounds.
typesMatch = false;
}
}
}
return typesMatch;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private Mapper retrieveModel(TypeElement element) {
//1.) build up "source" model
List<Method> methods = retrieveMethods( element, true );
//2.) build up aggregated "target" model
List<BeanMapping> mappings = getMappings(
methods,
ReportingPolicy.valueOf( MapperPrism.getInstanceOn( element ).unmappedTargetPolicy() )
);
List<Type> usedMapperTypes = getUsedMapperTypes( element );
Mapper mapper = new Mapper(
elementUtils.getPackageOf( element ).getQualifiedName().toString(),
element.getSimpleName().toString(),
element.getSimpleName() + IMPLEMENTATION_SUFFIX,
mappings,
usedMapperTypes,
options
);
return mapper;
}
#location 8
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private Mapper retrieveModel(TypeElement element) {
//1.) build up "source" model
List<Method> methods = retrieveMethods( element, true );
//2.) build up aggregated "target" model
List<BeanMapping> mappings = getMappings(
methods,
getEffectiveUnmappedTargetPolicy( element )
);
List<Type> usedMapperTypes = getUsedMapperTypes( element );
Mapper mapper = new Mapper(
elementUtils.getPackageOf( element ).getQualifiedName().toString(),
element.getSimpleName().toString(),
element.getSimpleName() + IMPLEMENTATION_SUFFIX,
mappings,
usedMapperTypes,
options
);
return mapper;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
TypeElement returnTypeElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
TypeElement parameterElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getParameters().get( 0 ).asType() );
List<MappedProperty> properties = new ArrayList<MappedProperty>();
List<ExecutableElement> sourceGetters = Filters.getterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( parameterElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> targetSetters = Filters.setterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( returnTypeElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> sourceSetters = Filters.setterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( parameterElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> targetGetters = Filters.getterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( returnTypeElement )
);
reportErrorIfMappedPropertiesDontExist( method, mappings, sourceGetters, targetSetters );
for ( ExecutableElement getterMethod : sourceGetters ) {
String sourcePropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( getterMethod );
Mapping mapping = mappings.get( sourcePropertyName );
for ( ExecutableElement setterMethod : targetSetters ) {
String targetPropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( setterMethod );
if ( targetPropertyName.equals( mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : sourcePropertyName ) ) {
properties.add(
new MappedProperty(
sourcePropertyName,
getterMethod.getSimpleName().toString(),
Executables.getCorrespondingPropertyAccessor( getterMethod, sourceSetters )
.getSimpleName()
.toString(),
retrieveReturnType( getterMethod ),
mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : targetPropertyName,
Executables.getCorrespondingPropertyAccessor( setterMethod, targetGetters )
.getSimpleName()
.toString(),
setterMethod.getSimpleName().toString(),
retrieveParameter( setterMethod ).getType()
)
);
}
}
}
return properties;
}
#location 35
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
TypeElement returnTypeElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
TypeElement parameterElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getParameters().get( 0 ).asType() );
List<MappedProperty> properties = new ArrayList<MappedProperty>();
List<ExecutableElement> sourceGetters = Filters.getterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( parameterElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> targetSetters = Filters.setterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( returnTypeElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> sourceSetters = Filters.setterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( parameterElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> targetGetters = Filters.getterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( returnTypeElement )
);
reportErrorIfMappedPropertiesDontExist( method, mappings, sourceGetters, targetSetters );
for ( ExecutableElement getterMethod : sourceGetters ) {
String sourcePropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( getterMethod );
Mapping mapping = mappings.get( sourcePropertyName );
for ( ExecutableElement setterMethod : targetSetters ) {
String targetPropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( setterMethod );
if ( targetPropertyName.equals( mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : sourcePropertyName ) ) {
ExecutableElement correspondingSetter = Executables.getCorrespondingPropertyAccessor(
getterMethod,
sourceSetters
);
ExecutableElement correspondingGetter = Executables.getCorrespondingPropertyAccessor(
setterMethod,
targetGetters
);
properties.add(
new MappedProperty(
sourcePropertyName,
getterMethod.getSimpleName().toString(),
correspondingSetter != null ? correspondingSetter.getSimpleName().toString() : null,
retrieveReturnType( getterMethod ),
mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : targetPropertyName,
correspondingGetter != null ? correspondingGetter.getSimpleName().toString() : null,
setterMethod.getSimpleName().toString(),
retrieveParameter( setterMethod ).getType()
)
);
}
}
}
return properties;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private PropertyMapping getConstantMapping(List<MapperReference> mapperReferences,
List<SourceMethod> methods,
SourceMethod method,
String constantExpression,
ExecutableElement targetAccessor,
String dateFormat,
List<TypeMirror> qualifiers) {
// source
String mappedElement = "constant '" + constantExpression + "'";
Type sourceType = typeFactory.getType( String.class );
// target
Type targetType = typeFactory.getSingleParameter( targetAccessor ).getType();
String targetPropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( targetAccessor );
Assignment assignment = mappingResolver.getTargetAssignment(
method,
mappedElement,
mapperReferences,
methods,
sourceType,
targetType,
targetPropertyName,
dateFormat,
qualifiers,
constantExpression
);
if ( assignment != null ) {
// target accessor is setter, so decorate assignment as setter
assignment = new SetterWrapper( assignment, method.getThrownTypes() );
}
else {
messager.printMessage(
Kind.ERROR,
String.format(
"Can't map \"%s %s\" to \"%s %s\".",
sourceType,
constantExpression,
targetType,
targetPropertyName
),
method.getExecutable()
);
}
return new PropertyMapping( targetAccessor.getSimpleName().toString(), targetType, assignment );
}
#location 14
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private PropertyMapping getConstantMapping(List<MapperReference> mapperReferences,
List<SourceMethod> methods,
SourceMethod method,
String constantExpression,
ExecutableElement targetAccessor,
String dateFormat,
List<TypeMirror> qualifiers) {
// source
String mappedElement = "constant '" + constantExpression + "'";
Type sourceType = typeFactory.getType( String.class );
// target
Type targetType;
if ( Executables.isSetterMethod( targetAccessor ) ) {
targetType = typeFactory.getSingleParameter( targetAccessor ).getType();
}
else {
targetType = typeFactory.getReturnType( targetAccessor );
}
String targetPropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( targetAccessor );
Assignment assignment = mappingResolver.getTargetAssignment(
method,
mappedElement,
mapperReferences,
methods,
sourceType,
targetType,
targetPropertyName,
dateFormat,
qualifiers,
constantExpression
);
if ( assignment != null ) {
// target accessor is setter, so decorate assignment as setter
assignment = new SetterWrapper( assignment, method.getThrownTypes() );
// wrap when dealing with getter only on target
if ( Executables.isGetterMethod( targetAccessor ) ) {
assignment = new GetterCollectionOrMapWrapper( assignment );
}
}
else {
messager.printMessage(
Kind.ERROR,
String.format(
"Can't map \"%s %s\" to \"%s %s\".",
sourceType,
constantExpression,
targetType,
targetPropertyName
),
method.getExecutable()
);
}
return new PropertyMapping( targetAccessor.getSimpleName().toString(), targetType, assignment );
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private void reportErrorIfPropertyCanNotBeMapped(Method method, PropertyMapping property) {
if ( property.getSourceType().equals( property.getTargetType() ) ||
property.getMappingMethod() != null ||
property.getConversion() != null ||
property.getTargetType().getImplementationType() != null ) {
return;
}
messager.printMessage(
Kind.ERROR,
String.format(
"Can't map property \"%s %s\" to \"%s %s\".",
property.getSourceType().getName(),
property.getSourceName(),
property.getTargetType().getName(),
property.getTargetName()
),
method.getExecutable()
);
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private void reportErrorIfPropertyCanNotBeMapped(Method method, PropertyMapping property) {
if ( property.getSourceType().isAssignableTo( property.getTargetType() ) ||
property.getMappingMethod() != null ||
property.getConversion() != null ||
property.getTargetType().getImplementationType() != null ) {
return;
}
messager.printMessage(
Kind.ERROR,
String.format(
"Can't map property \"%s %s\" to \"%s %s\".",
property.getSourceType(),
property.getSourceName(),
property.getTargetType(),
property.getTargetName()
),
method.getExecutable()
);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
TypeElement returnTypeElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
TypeElement parameterElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getParameters().get( 0 ).asType() );
List<MappedProperty> properties = new ArrayList<MappedProperty>();
List<ExecutableElement> sourceGetters = Filters.getterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( parameterElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> targetSetters = Filters.setterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( returnTypeElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> sourceSetters = Filters.setterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( parameterElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> targetGetters = Filters.getterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( returnTypeElement )
);
reportErrorIfMappedPropertiesDontExist( method, mappings, sourceGetters, targetSetters );
for ( ExecutableElement getterMethod : sourceGetters ) {
String sourcePropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( getterMethod );
Mapping mapping = mappings.get( sourcePropertyName );
for ( ExecutableElement setterMethod : targetSetters ) {
String targetPropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( setterMethod );
if ( targetPropertyName.equals( mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : sourcePropertyName ) ) {
properties.add(
new MappedProperty(
sourcePropertyName,
getterMethod.getSimpleName().toString(),
Executables.getCorrespondingPropertyAccessor( getterMethod, sourceSetters )
.getSimpleName()
.toString(),
retrieveReturnType( getterMethod ),
mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : targetPropertyName,
Executables.getCorrespondingPropertyAccessor( setterMethod, targetGetters )
.getSimpleName()
.toString(),
setterMethod.getSimpleName().toString(),
retrieveParameter( setterMethod ).getType()
)
);
}
}
}
return properties;
}
#location 43
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
TypeElement returnTypeElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
TypeElement parameterElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getParameters().get( 0 ).asType() );
List<MappedProperty> properties = new ArrayList<MappedProperty>();
List<ExecutableElement> sourceGetters = Filters.getterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( parameterElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> targetSetters = Filters.setterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( returnTypeElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> sourceSetters = Filters.setterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( parameterElement )
);
List<ExecutableElement> targetGetters = Filters.getterMethodsIn(
elementUtils.getAllMembers( returnTypeElement )
);
reportErrorIfMappedPropertiesDontExist( method, mappings, sourceGetters, targetSetters );
for ( ExecutableElement getterMethod : sourceGetters ) {
String sourcePropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( getterMethod );
Mapping mapping = mappings.get( sourcePropertyName );
for ( ExecutableElement setterMethod : targetSetters ) {
String targetPropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( setterMethod );
if ( targetPropertyName.equals( mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : sourcePropertyName ) ) {
ExecutableElement correspondingSetter = Executables.getCorrespondingPropertyAccessor(
getterMethod,
sourceSetters
);
ExecutableElement correspondingGetter = Executables.getCorrespondingPropertyAccessor(
setterMethod,
targetGetters
);
properties.add(
new MappedProperty(
sourcePropertyName,
getterMethod.getSimpleName().toString(),
correspondingSetter != null ? correspondingSetter.getSimpleName().toString() : null,
retrieveReturnType( getterMethod ),
mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : targetPropertyName,
correspondingGetter != null ? correspondingGetter.getSimpleName().toString() : null,
setterMethod.getSimpleName().toString(),
retrieveParameter( setterMethod ).getType()
)
);
}
}
}
return properties;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private PropertyMapping getPropertyMapping(List<MapperReference> mapperReferences,
List<SourceMethod> methods,
SourceMethod method,
Parameter parameter,
ExecutableElement sourceAccessor,
ExecutableElement targetAcessor,
String dateFormat) {
Type sourceType = typeFactory.getReturnType( sourceAccessor );
Type targetType = null;
String conversionString = parameter.getName() + "." + sourceAccessor.getSimpleName().toString() + "()";
if ( Executables.isSetterMethod( targetAcessor ) ) {
targetType = typeFactory.getSingleParameter( targetAcessor ).getType();
}
else if ( Executables.isGetterMethod( targetAcessor ) ) {
targetType = typeFactory.getReturnType( targetAcessor );
}
String targetPropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( targetAcessor );
String mappedElement = "property '" + Executables.getPropertyName( sourceAccessor ) + "'";
MethodReference mappingMethodReference = mappingMethodResolver.getMappingMethodReferenceBasedOnMethod(
method,
mappedElement,
mapperReferences,
methods,
sourceType,
targetType,
targetPropertyName,
dateFormat
);
TypeConversion conversion = mappingMethodResolver.getConversion(
sourceType,
targetType,
dateFormat,
conversionString
);
PropertyMapping property = new PropertyMapping(
parameter.getName(),
Executables.getPropertyName( sourceAccessor ),
sourceAccessor.getSimpleName().toString(),
sourceType,
Executables.getPropertyName( targetAcessor ),
targetAcessor.getSimpleName().toString(),
targetType,
mappingMethodReference,
conversion
);
if ( !isPropertyMappable( property ) ) {
// when not mappable, try again with another property mapping method based on parameter only.
mappingMethodReference = mappingMethodResolver.getMappingMethodReferenceBasedOnParameter(
method,
"property '" + Executables.getPropertyName( sourceAccessor ) + "'",
mapperReferences,
methods,
sourceType,
targetType,
targetPropertyName,
dateFormat
);
property = new PropertyMapping(
parameter.getName(),
Executables.getPropertyName( sourceAccessor ),
sourceAccessor.getSimpleName().toString(),
sourceType,
Executables.getPropertyName( targetAcessor ),
targetAcessor.getSimpleName().toString(),
targetType,
mappingMethodReference,
conversion
);
}
if ( !isPropertyMappable( property ) ) {
messager.printMessage(
Kind.ERROR,
String.format(
"Can't map property \"%s %s\" to \"%s %s\".",
property.getSourceType(),
property.getSourceName(),
property.getTargetType(),
property.getTargetName()
),
method.getExecutable()
);
}
return property;
}
#location 32
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private PropertyMapping getPropertyMapping(List<MapperReference> mapperReferences,
List<SourceMethod> methods,
SourceMethod method,
Parameter parameter,
ExecutableElement sourceAccessor,
ExecutableElement targetAcessor,
String dateFormat) {
Type sourceType = typeFactory.getReturnType( sourceAccessor );
Type targetType = null;
String conversionString = parameter.getName() + "." + sourceAccessor.getSimpleName().toString() + "()";
if ( Executables.isSetterMethod( targetAcessor ) ) {
targetType = typeFactory.getSingleParameter( targetAcessor ).getType();
}
else if ( Executables.isGetterMethod( targetAcessor ) ) {
targetType = typeFactory.getReturnType( targetAcessor );
}
String targetPropertyName = Executables.getPropertyName( targetAcessor );
String mappedElement = "property '" + Executables.getPropertyName( sourceAccessor ) + "'";
ParameterAssignment parameterAssignment = mappingResolver.getParameterAssignment(
method,
mappedElement,
mapperReferences,
methods,
sourceType,
targetType,
targetPropertyName,
dateFormat,
conversionString
);
PropertyMapping property = new PropertyMapping(
parameter.getName(),
Executables.getPropertyName( sourceAccessor ),
sourceAccessor.getSimpleName().toString(),
sourceType,
Executables.getPropertyName( targetAcessor ),
targetAcessor.getSimpleName().toString(),
targetType,
parameterAssignment != null ? parameterAssignment.getMethodReference() : null,
parameterAssignment != null ? parameterAssignment.getTypeConversion() : null
);
if ( !isPropertyMappable( property ) ) {
messager.printMessage(
Kind.ERROR,
String.format(
"Can't map property \"%s %s\" to \"%s %s\".",
property.getSourceType(),
property.getSourceName(),
property.getTargetType(),
property.getTargetName()
),
method.getExecutable()
);
}
return property;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private Type getType(TypeMirror mirror, boolean isLiteral) {
if ( !canBeProcessed( mirror ) ) {
throw new TypeHierarchyErroneousException( mirror );
}
ImplementationType implementationType = getImplementationType( mirror );
boolean isIterableType = typeUtils.isSubtype( mirror, iterableType );
boolean isCollectionType = typeUtils.isSubtype( mirror, collectionType );
boolean isMapType = typeUtils.isSubtype( mirror, mapType );
boolean isStreamType = streamType != null && typeUtils.isSubtype( mirror, streamType );
boolean isEnumType;
boolean isInterface;
String name;
String packageName;
String qualifiedName;
TypeElement typeElement;
Type componentType;
Boolean toBeImported = null;
if ( mirror.getKind() == TypeKind.DECLARED ) {
DeclaredType declaredType = (DeclaredType) mirror;
isEnumType = declaredType.asElement().getKind() == ElementKind.ENUM;
isInterface = declaredType.asElement().getKind() == ElementKind.INTERFACE;
name = declaredType.asElement().getSimpleName().toString();
typeElement = (TypeElement) declaredType.asElement();
if ( typeElement != null ) {
packageName = elementUtils.getPackageOf( typeElement ).getQualifiedName().toString();
qualifiedName = typeElement.getQualifiedName().toString();
}
else {
packageName = null;
qualifiedName = name;
}
componentType = null;
}
else if ( mirror.getKind() == TypeKind.ARRAY ) {
TypeMirror componentTypeMirror = getComponentType( mirror );
StringBuilder builder = new StringBuilder("[]");
while ( componentTypeMirror.getKind() == TypeKind.ARRAY ) {
componentTypeMirror = getComponentType( componentTypeMirror );
builder.append( "[]" );
}
if ( componentTypeMirror.getKind() == TypeKind.DECLARED ) {
DeclaredType declaredType = (DeclaredType) componentTypeMirror;
TypeElement componentTypeElement = (TypeElement) declaredType.asElement();
String arraySuffix = builder.toString();
name = componentTypeElement.getSimpleName().toString() + arraySuffix;
packageName = elementUtils.getPackageOf( componentTypeElement ).getQualifiedName().toString();
qualifiedName = componentTypeElement.getQualifiedName().toString() + arraySuffix;
}
else if (componentTypeMirror.getKind().isPrimitive()) {
// When the component type is primitive and is annotated with ElementType.TYPE_USE then
// the typeMirror#toString returns (@CustomAnnotation :: byte) for the javac compiler
name = NativeTypes.getName( componentTypeMirror.getKind() ) + builder.toString();
packageName = null;
// for primitive types only name (e.g. byte, short..) required as qualified name
qualifiedName = name;
toBeImported = false;
}
else {
name = mirror.toString();
packageName = null;
qualifiedName = name;
toBeImported = false;
}
isEnumType = false;
isInterface = false;
typeElement = null;
componentType = getType( getComponentType( mirror ) );
}
else {
isEnumType = false;
isInterface = false;
name = mirror.toString();
packageName = null;
qualifiedName = name;
typeElement = null;
componentType = null;
toBeImported = false;
}
return new Type(
typeUtils, elementUtils, this,
roundContext.getAnnotationProcessorContext().getAccessorNaming(),
mirror,
typeElement,
getTypeParameters( mirror, false ),
implementationType,
componentType,
packageName,
name,
qualifiedName,
isInterface,
isEnumType,
isIterableType,
isCollectionType,
isMapType,
isStreamType,
toBeImportedTypes,
notToBeImportedTypes,
toBeImported,
isLiteral,
loggingVerbose
);
}
#location 46
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private Type getType(TypeMirror mirror, boolean isLiteral) {
if ( !canBeProcessed( mirror ) ) {
throw new TypeHierarchyErroneousException( mirror );
}
ImplementationType implementationType = getImplementationType( mirror );
boolean isIterableType = typeUtils.isSubtype( mirror, iterableType );
boolean isCollectionType = typeUtils.isSubtype( mirror, collectionType );
boolean isMapType = typeUtils.isSubtype( mirror, mapType );
boolean isStreamType = streamType != null && typeUtils.isSubtype( mirror, streamType );
boolean isEnumType;
boolean isInterface;
String name;
String packageName;
String qualifiedName;
TypeElement typeElement;
Type componentType;
Boolean toBeImported = null;
if ( mirror.getKind() == TypeKind.DECLARED ) {
DeclaredType declaredType = (DeclaredType) mirror;
isEnumType = declaredType.asElement().getKind() == ElementKind.ENUM;
isInterface = declaredType.asElement().getKind() == ElementKind.INTERFACE;
name = declaredType.asElement().getSimpleName().toString();
typeElement = (TypeElement) declaredType.asElement();
if ( typeElement != null ) {
packageName = elementUtils.getPackageOf( typeElement ).getQualifiedName().toString();
qualifiedName = typeElement.getQualifiedName().toString();
}
else {
packageName = null;
qualifiedName = name;
}
componentType = null;
}
else if ( mirror.getKind() == TypeKind.ARRAY ) {
TypeMirror componentTypeMirror = getComponentType( mirror );
StringBuilder builder = new StringBuilder("[]");
while ( componentTypeMirror.getKind() == TypeKind.ARRAY ) {
componentTypeMirror = getComponentType( componentTypeMirror );
builder.append( "[]" );
}
if ( componentTypeMirror.getKind() == TypeKind.DECLARED ) {
DeclaredType declaredType = (DeclaredType) componentTypeMirror;
TypeElement componentTypeElement = (TypeElement) declaredType.asElement();
String arraySuffix = builder.toString();
name = componentTypeElement.getSimpleName().toString() + arraySuffix;
packageName = elementUtils.getPackageOf( componentTypeElement ).getQualifiedName().toString();
qualifiedName = componentTypeElement.getQualifiedName().toString() + arraySuffix;
}
else if (componentTypeMirror.getKind().isPrimitive()) {
// When the component type is primitive and is annotated with ElementType.TYPE_USE then
// the typeMirror#toString returns (@CustomAnnotation :: byte) for the javac compiler
name = NativeTypes.getName( componentTypeMirror.getKind() ) + builder.toString();
packageName = null;
// for primitive types only name (e.g. byte, short..) required as qualified name
qualifiedName = name;
toBeImported = false;
}
else {
name = mirror.toString();
packageName = null;
qualifiedName = name;
toBeImported = false;
}
isEnumType = false;
isInterface = false;
typeElement = null;
componentType = getType( getComponentType( mirror ) );
}
else {
isEnumType = false;
isInterface = false;
// When the component type is primitive and is annotated with ElementType.TYPE_USE then
// the typeMirror#toString returns (@CustomAnnotation :: byte) for the javac compiler
name = mirror.getKind().isPrimitive() ? NativeTypes.getName( mirror.getKind() ) : mirror.toString();
packageName = null;
qualifiedName = name;
typeElement = null;
componentType = null;
toBeImported = false;
}
return new Type(
typeUtils, elementUtils, this,
roundContext.getAnnotationProcessorContext().getAccessorNaming(),
mirror,
typeElement,
getTypeParameters( mirror, false ),
implementationType,
componentType,
packageName,
name,
qualifiedName,
isInterface,
isEnumType,
isIterableType,
isCollectionType,
isMapType,
isStreamType,
toBeImportedTypes,
notToBeImportedTypes,
toBeImported,
isLiteral,
loggingVerbose
);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
Element returnTypeElement = typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
Element parameterElement = typeUtils.asElement( method.getParameters().get( 0 ).asType() );
List<MappedProperty> properties = new ArrayList<MappedProperty>();
for ( ExecutableElement getterMethod : getterMethodsIn( parameterElement.getEnclosedElements() ) ) {
String sourcePropertyName = Introspector.decapitalize(
getterMethod.getSimpleName()
.toString()
.substring( 3 )
);
Mapping mapping = mappings.get( sourcePropertyName );
for ( ExecutableElement setterMethod : setterMethodsIn( returnTypeElement.getEnclosedElements() ) ) {
String targetPropertyName = Introspector.decapitalize(
setterMethod.getSimpleName()
.toString()
.substring( 3 )
);
if ( targetPropertyName.equals( mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : sourcePropertyName ) ) {
properties.add(
new MappedProperty(
sourcePropertyName,
retrieveReturnType( getterMethod ),
mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : targetPropertyName,
retrieveParameter( setterMethod ).getType(),
mapping != null ? mapping.getConverterType() : null
)
);
}
}
}
return properties;
}
#location 30
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
Element returnTypeElement = typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
Element parameterElement = typeUtils.asElement( method.getParameters().get( 0 ).asType() );
List<MappedProperty> properties = new ArrayList<MappedProperty>();
for ( ExecutableElement getterMethod : getterMethodsIn( parameterElement.getEnclosedElements() ) ) {
String sourcePropertyName = getPropertyName( getterMethod );
Mapping mapping = mappings.get( sourcePropertyName );
for ( ExecutableElement setterMethod : setterMethodsIn( returnTypeElement.getEnclosedElements() ) ) {
String targetPropertyName = getPropertyName( setterMethod );
if ( targetPropertyName.equals( mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : sourcePropertyName ) ) {
properties.add(
new MappedProperty(
sourcePropertyName,
retrieveReturnType( getterMethod ),
mapping != null ? mapping.getTargetName() : targetPropertyName,
retrieveParameter( setterMethod ).getType(),
mapping != null ? mapping.getConverterType() : null
)
);
}
}
}
return properties;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private static Object getValue(final V8Array array, final int index, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = array.getType(index);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return array.getInteger(index);
case V8Value.DOUBLE:
return array.getDouble(index);
case V8Value.BOOLEAN:
return array.getBoolean(index);
case V8Value.STRING:
return array.getString(index);
case V8Value.V8_FUNCTION:
return IGNORE;
case V8Value.V8_ARRAY_BUFFER:
V8ArrayBuffer buffer = (V8ArrayBuffer) array.get(index);
try {
return buffer.getBackingStore();
} finally {
buffer.release();
}
case V8Value.V8_TYPED_ARRAY:
V8Array typedArray = array.getArray(index);
try {
return toTypedArray(typedArray);
} finally {
if (typedArray instanceof V8Array) {
typedArray.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_ARRAY:
V8Array arrayValue = array.getArray(index);
try {
return toList(arrayValue, cache);
} finally {
if (arrayValue instanceof V8Array) {
arrayValue.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_OBJECT:
V8Object objectValue = array.getObject(index);
try {
return toMap(objectValue, cache);
} finally {
if (objectValue instanceof V8Object) {
objectValue.release();
}
}
case V8Value.NULL:
return null;
case V8Value.UNDEFINED:
return V8.getUndefined();
default:
throw new IllegalStateException("Cannot find type for index: " + index);
}
}
#location 33
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private static Object getValue(final V8Array array, final int index, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = array.getType(index);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return array.getInteger(index);
case V8Value.DOUBLE:
return array.getDouble(index);
case V8Value.BOOLEAN:
return array.getBoolean(index);
case V8Value.STRING:
return array.getString(index);
case V8Value.V8_FUNCTION:
return IGNORE;
case V8Value.V8_ARRAY_BUFFER:
V8ArrayBuffer buffer = (V8ArrayBuffer) array.get(index);
try {
return new ArrayBuffer(buffer.getBackingStore());
} finally {
buffer.release();
}
case V8Value.V8_TYPED_ARRAY:
V8Array typedArray = array.getArray(index);
try {
return toTypedArray(typedArray);
} finally {
if (typedArray instanceof V8Array) {
typedArray.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_ARRAY:
V8Array arrayValue = array.getArray(index);
try {
return toList(arrayValue, cache);
} finally {
if (arrayValue instanceof V8Array) {
arrayValue.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_OBJECT:
V8Object objectValue = array.getObject(index);
try {
return toMap(objectValue, cache);
} finally {
if (objectValue instanceof V8Object) {
objectValue.release();
}
}
case V8Value.NULL:
return null;
case V8Value.UNDEFINED:
return V8.getUndefined();
default:
throw new IllegalStateException("Cannot find type for index: " + index);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public static V8 createV8Runtime(final String globalAlias, final String tempDirectory) {
if (!nativeLibraryLoaded) {
synchronized (lock) {
if (!nativeLibraryLoaded) {
load(tempDirectory);
}
}
}
checkNativeLibraryLoaded();
if (!initialized) {
_setFlags(v8Flags);
initialized = true;
}
if (debugThread == null) {
debugThread = Thread.currentThread();
}
V8 runtime = new V8(globalAlias);
synchronized (lock) {
runtimeCounter++;
}
return runtime;
}
#location 14
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public static V8 createV8Runtime(final String globalAlias, final String tempDirectory) {
if (!nativeLibraryLoaded) {
synchronized (lock) {
if (!nativeLibraryLoaded) {
load(tempDirectory);
}
}
}
checkNativeLibraryLoaded();
if (!initialized) {
_setFlags(v8Flags);
initialized = true;
}
V8 runtime = new V8(globalAlias);
synchronized (lock) {
runtimeCounter++;
}
return runtime;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void release(final boolean reportMemoryLeaks) {
if (isReleased()) {
return;
}
checkThread();
if (debugEnabled) {
disableDebugSupport();
}
releaseResources();
shutdownExecutors(forceTerminateExecutors);
if (executors != null) {
executors.clear();
}
synchronized (lock) {
runtimeCounter--;
}
_releaseRuntime(v8RuntimePtr);
v8RuntimePtr = 0L;
released = true;
if (reportMemoryLeaks && (objectReferences > 0)) {
throw new IllegalStateException(objectReferences + " Object(s) still exist in runtime");
}
}
#location 6
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void release(final boolean reportMemoryLeaks) {
if (isReleased()) {
return;
}
checkThread();
releaseResources();
shutdownExecutors(forceTerminateExecutors);
if (executors != null) {
executors.clear();
}
synchronized (lock) {
runtimeCounter--;
}
_releaseRuntime(v8RuntimePtr);
v8RuntimePtr = 0L;
released = true;
if (reportMemoryLeaks && (objectReferences > 0)) {
throw new IllegalStateException(objectReferences + " Object(s) still exist in runtime");
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void release(final boolean reportMemoryLeaks) {
checkThread();
if (isReleased()) {
return;
}
if (debugEnabled) {
disableDebugSupport();
}
runtimeCounter--;
_releaseRuntime(v8RuntimePtr);
v8RuntimePtr = 0L;
released = true;
if (reportMemoryLeaks && (objectReferences > 0)) {
throw new IllegalStateException(objectReferences + " Object(s) still exist in runtime");
}
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void release(final boolean reportMemoryLeaks) {
checkThread();
if (isReleased()) {
return;
}
if (debugEnabled) {
disableDebugSupport();
}
synchronized (lock) {
runtimeCounter--;
}
_releaseRuntime(v8RuntimePtr);
v8RuntimePtr = 0L;
released = true;
if (reportMemoryLeaks && (objectReferences > 0)) {
throw new IllegalStateException(objectReferences + " Object(s) still exist in runtime");
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private static Object getValue(final V8Object object, final String key, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = object.getType(key);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return object.getInteger(key);
case V8Value.DOUBLE:
return object.getDouble(key);
case V8Value.BOOLEAN:
return object.getBoolean(key);
case V8Value.STRING:
return object.getString(key);
case V8Value.V8_FUNCTION:
return IGNORE;
case V8Value.V8_ARRAY_BUFFER:
V8ArrayBuffer buffer = (V8ArrayBuffer) object.get(key);
try {
return buffer.getBackingStore();
} finally {
buffer.release();
}
case V8Value.V8_TYPED_ARRAY:
V8Array typedArray = object.getArray(key);
try {
return toByteBuffer(typedArray);
} finally {
if (typedArray instanceof V8Array) {
typedArray.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_ARRAY:
V8Array array = object.getArray(key);
try {
return toList(array, cache);
} finally {
if (array instanceof V8Array) {
array.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_OBJECT:
V8Object child = object.getObject(key);
try {
return toMap(child, cache);
} finally {
if (child instanceof V8Object) {
child.release();
}
}
case V8Value.NULL:
return null;
case V8Value.UNDEFINED:
return V8.getUndefined();
default:
throw new IllegalStateException("Cannot find type for key: " + key);
}
}
#location 24
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private static Object getValue(final V8Object object, final String key, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = object.getType(key);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return object.getInteger(key);
case V8Value.DOUBLE:
return object.getDouble(key);
case V8Value.BOOLEAN:
return object.getBoolean(key);
case V8Value.STRING:
return object.getString(key);
case V8Value.V8_FUNCTION:
return IGNORE;
case V8Value.V8_ARRAY_BUFFER:
V8ArrayBuffer buffer = (V8ArrayBuffer) object.get(key);
try {
return buffer.getBackingStore();
} finally {
buffer.release();
}
case V8Value.V8_TYPED_ARRAY:
V8Array typedArray = object.getArray(key);
try {
return toTypedArray(typedArray);
} finally {
if (typedArray instanceof V8Array) {
typedArray.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_ARRAY:
V8Array array = object.getArray(key);
try {
return toList(array, cache);
} finally {
if (array instanceof V8Array) {
array.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_OBJECT:
V8Object child = object.getObject(key);
try {
return toMap(child, cache);
} finally {
if (child instanceof V8Object) {
child.release();
}
}
case V8Value.NULL:
return null;
case V8Value.UNDEFINED:
return V8.getUndefined();
default:
throw new IllegalStateException("Cannot find type for key: " + key);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public static V8 createV8Runtime(final String globalAlias, final String tempDirectory) {
if (!nativeLibraryLoaded) {
synchronized (lock) {
if (!nativeLibraryLoaded) {
load(tempDirectory);
}
}
}
checkNativeLibraryLoaded();
if (!initialized) {
_setFlags(v8Flags);
initialized = true;
}
if (debugThread == null) {
debugThread = Thread.currentThread();
}
V8 runtime = new V8(globalAlias);
synchronized (lock) {
runtimeCounter++;
}
return runtime;
}
#location 15
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public static V8 createV8Runtime(final String globalAlias, final String tempDirectory) {
if (!nativeLibraryLoaded) {
synchronized (lock) {
if (!nativeLibraryLoaded) {
load(tempDirectory);
}
}
}
checkNativeLibraryLoaded();
if (!initialized) {
_setFlags(v8Flags);
initialized = true;
}
V8 runtime = new V8(globalAlias);
synchronized (lock) {
runtimeCounter++;
}
return runtime;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private static Object getValue(final V8Array array, final int index, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = array.getType(index);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return array.getInteger(index);
case V8Value.DOUBLE:
return array.getDouble(index);
case V8Value.BOOLEAN:
return array.getBoolean(index);
case V8Value.STRING:
return array.getString(index);
case V8Value.V8_FUNCTION:
return IGNORE;
case V8Value.V8_ARRAY_BUFFER:
V8ArrayBuffer buffer = (V8ArrayBuffer) array.get(index);
try {
return buffer.getBackingStore();
} finally {
buffer.release();
}
case V8Value.V8_TYPED_ARRAY:
V8Array typedArray = array.getArray(index);
try {
return toByteBuffer(typedArray);
} finally {
if (typedArray instanceof V8Array) {
typedArray.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_ARRAY:
V8Array arrayValue = array.getArray(index);
try {
return toList(arrayValue, cache);
} finally {
if (arrayValue instanceof V8Array) {
arrayValue.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_OBJECT:
V8Object objectValue = array.getObject(index);
try {
return toMap(objectValue, cache);
} finally {
if (objectValue instanceof V8Object) {
objectValue.release();
}
}
case V8Value.NULL:
return null;
case V8Value.UNDEFINED:
return V8.getUndefined();
default:
throw new IllegalStateException("Cannot find type for index: " + index);
}
}
#location 24
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private static Object getValue(final V8Array array, final int index, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = array.getType(index);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return array.getInteger(index);
case V8Value.DOUBLE:
return array.getDouble(index);
case V8Value.BOOLEAN:
return array.getBoolean(index);
case V8Value.STRING:
return array.getString(index);
case V8Value.V8_FUNCTION:
return IGNORE;
case V8Value.V8_ARRAY_BUFFER:
V8ArrayBuffer buffer = (V8ArrayBuffer) array.get(index);
try {
return buffer.getBackingStore();
} finally {
buffer.release();
}
case V8Value.V8_TYPED_ARRAY:
V8Array typedArray = array.getArray(index);
try {
return toTypedArray(typedArray);
} finally {
if (typedArray instanceof V8Array) {
typedArray.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_ARRAY:
V8Array arrayValue = array.getArray(index);
try {
return toList(arrayValue, cache);
} finally {
if (arrayValue instanceof V8Array) {
arrayValue.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_OBJECT:
V8Object objectValue = array.getObject(index);
try {
return toMap(objectValue, cache);
} finally {
if (objectValue instanceof V8Object) {
objectValue.release();
}
}
case V8Value.NULL:
return null;
case V8Value.UNDEFINED:
return V8.getUndefined();
default:
throw new IllegalStateException("Cannot find type for index: " + index);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void release(final boolean reportMemoryLeaks) {
if (isReleased()) {
return;
}
checkThread();
try {
notifyReleaseHandlers(this);
} finally {
releaseResources();
shutdownExecutors(forceTerminateExecutors);
if (executors != null) {
executors.clear();
}
releaseNativeMethodDescriptors();
synchronized (lock) {
runtimeCounter--;
}
_releaseRuntime(v8RuntimePtr);
v8RuntimePtr = 0L;
released = true;
if (reportMemoryLeaks && (getObjectReferenceCount() > 0)) {
throw new IllegalStateException(objectReferences + " Object(s) still exist in runtime");
}
}
}
#location 22
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void release(final boolean reportMemoryLeaks) {
if (isReleased()) {
return;
}
checkThread();
try {
notifyReleaseHandlers(this);
} finally {
releaseResources();
shutdownExecutors(forceTerminateExecutors);
if (executors != null) {
executors.clear();
}
releaseNativeMethodDescriptors();
synchronized (lock) {
runtimeCounter--;
}
_releaseRuntime(v8RuntimePtr);
v8RuntimePtr = 0L;
released = true;
if (reportMemoryLeaks && (getObjectReferenceCount() > 0)) {
throw new IllegalStateException(getObjectReferenceCount() + " Object(s) still exist in runtime");
}
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private static Object getValue(final V8Array array, final int index, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = array.getType(index);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return array.getInteger(index);
case V8Value.DOUBLE:
return array.getDouble(index);
case V8Value.BOOLEAN:
return array.getBoolean(index);
case V8Value.STRING:
return array.getString(index);
case V8Value.V8_FUNCTION:
return IGNORE;
case V8Value.V8_TYPED_ARRAY:
V8Array typedArray = array.getArray(index);
try {
return ((V8TypedArray) typedArray).getByteBuffer();
} finally {
if (typedArray instanceof V8Array) {
typedArray.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_ARRAY:
V8Array arrayValue = array.getArray(index);
try {
return toList(arrayValue, cache);
} finally {
if (arrayValue instanceof V8Array) {
arrayValue.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_OBJECT:
V8Object objectValue = array.getObject(index);
try {
return toMap(objectValue, cache);
} finally {
if (objectValue instanceof V8Object) {
objectValue.release();
}
}
case V8Value.NULL:
return null;
case V8Value.UNDEFINED:
return V8.getUndefined();
default:
throw new IllegalStateException("Cannot find type for index: " + index);
}
}
#location 17
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private static Object getValue(final V8Array array, final int index, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = array.getType(index);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return array.getInteger(index);
case V8Value.DOUBLE:
return array.getDouble(index);
case V8Value.BOOLEAN:
return array.getBoolean(index);
case V8Value.STRING:
return array.getString(index);
case V8Value.V8_FUNCTION:
return IGNORE;
case V8Value.V8_TYPED_ARRAY:
V8Array typedArray = array.getArray(index);
try {
return toByteBuffer(typedArray);
} finally {
if (typedArray instanceof V8Array) {
typedArray.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_ARRAY:
V8Array arrayValue = array.getArray(index);
try {
return toList(arrayValue, cache);
} finally {
if (arrayValue instanceof V8Array) {
arrayValue.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_OBJECT:
V8Object objectValue = array.getObject(index);
try {
return toMap(objectValue, cache);
} finally {
if (objectValue instanceof V8Object) {
objectValue.release();
}
}
case V8Value.NULL:
return null;
case V8Value.UNDEFINED:
return V8.getUndefined();
default:
throw new IllegalStateException("Cannot find type for index: " + index);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testTypedArrayGetValue_Float32Array() {
V8Array floatsArray = v8.executeArrayScript("var buf = new ArrayBuffer(100);\n"
+ "var floatsArray = new Float32Array(buf);\n"
+ "floatsArray[0] = 16.2;\n"
+ "floatsArray;\n");
V8TypedArray result = (V8TypedArray) V8ObjectUtils.getValue(floatsArray);
assertEquals(25, result.length());
assertEquals(16.2, (Float) result.get(0), 0.00001);
floatsArray.close();
}
#location 11
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testTypedArrayGetValue_Float32Array() {
V8Array floatsArray = v8.executeArrayScript("var buf = new ArrayBuffer(100);\n"
+ "var floatsArray = new Float32Array(buf);\n"
+ "floatsArray[0] = 16.2;\n"
+ "floatsArray;\n");
V8TypedArray result = ((TypedArray) V8ObjectUtils.getValue(floatsArray)).getV8TypedArray();
assertEquals(25, result.length());
assertEquals(16.2, (Float) result.get(0), 0.00001);
floatsArray.close();
result.close();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private static Object getValue(final V8Object object, final String key, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = object.getType(key);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return object.getInteger(key);
case V8Value.DOUBLE:
return object.getDouble(key);
case V8Value.BOOLEAN:
return object.getBoolean(key);
case V8Value.STRING:
return object.getString(key);
case V8Value.V8_FUNCTION:
return IGNORE;
case V8Value.V8_TYPED_ARRAY:
V8Array typedArray = object.getArray(key);
try {
return toByteBuffer(typedArray);
} finally {
if (typedArray instanceof V8Array) {
typedArray.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_ARRAY:
V8Array array = object.getArray(key);
try {
return toList(array, cache);
} finally {
if (array instanceof V8Array) {
array.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_OBJECT:
V8Object child = object.getObject(key);
try {
return toMap(child, cache);
} finally {
if (child instanceof V8Object) {
child.release();
}
}
case V8Value.NULL:
return null;
case V8Value.UNDEFINED:
return V8.getUndefined();
default:
throw new IllegalStateException("Cannot find type for key: " + key);
}
}
#location 26
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private static Object getValue(final V8Object object, final String key, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = object.getType(key);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return object.getInteger(key);
case V8Value.DOUBLE:
return object.getDouble(key);
case V8Value.BOOLEAN:
return object.getBoolean(key);
case V8Value.STRING:
return object.getString(key);
case V8Value.V8_FUNCTION:
return IGNORE;
case V8Value.V8_ARRAY_BUFFER:
V8ArrayBuffer buffer = (V8ArrayBuffer) object.get(key);
try {
return buffer.getBackingStore();
} finally {
buffer.release();
}
case V8Value.V8_TYPED_ARRAY:
V8Array typedArray = object.getArray(key);
try {
return toByteBuffer(typedArray);
} finally {
if (typedArray instanceof V8Array) {
typedArray.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_ARRAY:
V8Array array = object.getArray(key);
try {
return toList(array, cache);
} finally {
if (array instanceof V8Array) {
array.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_OBJECT:
V8Object child = object.getObject(key);
try {
return toMap(child, cache);
} finally {
if (child instanceof V8Object) {
child.release();
}
}
case V8Value.NULL:
return null;
case V8Value.UNDEFINED:
return V8.getUndefined();
default:
throw new IllegalStateException("Cannot find type for key: " + key);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void release(final boolean reportMemoryLeaks) {
if (isReleased()) {
return;
}
checkThread();
if (debugEnabled) {
disableDebugSupport();
}
releaseResources();
shutdownExecutors(forceTerminateExecutors);
if (executors != null) {
executors.clear();
}
synchronized (lock) {
runtimeCounter--;
}
_releaseRuntime(v8RuntimePtr);
v8RuntimePtr = 0L;
released = true;
if (reportMemoryLeaks && (objectReferences > 0)) {
throw new IllegalStateException(objectReferences + " Object(s) still exist in runtime");
}
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void release(final boolean reportMemoryLeaks) {
if (isReleased()) {
return;
}
checkThread();
releaseResources();
shutdownExecutors(forceTerminateExecutors);
if (executors != null) {
executors.clear();
}
synchronized (lock) {
runtimeCounter--;
}
_releaseRuntime(v8RuntimePtr);
v8RuntimePtr = 0L;
released = true;
if (reportMemoryLeaks && (objectReferences > 0)) {
throw new IllegalStateException(objectReferences + " Object(s) still exist in runtime");
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testTypedArrayGetValue_Float64Array() {
V8Array floatsArray = v8.executeArrayScript("var buf = new ArrayBuffer(80);\n"
+ "var floatsArray = new Float64Array(buf);\n"
+ "floatsArray[0] = 16.2;\n"
+ "floatsArray;\n");
V8TypedArray result = (V8TypedArray) V8ObjectUtils.getValue(floatsArray);
assertEquals(10, result.length());
assertEquals(16.2, (Double) result.get(0), 0.0001);
floatsArray.close();
}
#location 11
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testTypedArrayGetValue_Float64Array() {
V8Array floatsArray = v8.executeArrayScript("var buf = new ArrayBuffer(80);\n"
+ "var floatsArray = new Float64Array(buf);\n"
+ "floatsArray[0] = 16.2;\n"
+ "floatsArray;\n");
V8TypedArray result = ((TypedArray) V8ObjectUtils.getValue(floatsArray)).getV8TypedArray();
assertEquals(10, result.length());
assertEquals(16.2, (Double) result.get(0), 0.0001);
floatsArray.close();
result.close();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private static Object getValue(final V8Object object, final String key, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = object.getType(key);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return object.getInteger(key);
case V8Value.DOUBLE:
return object.getDouble(key);
case V8Value.BOOLEAN:
return object.getBoolean(key);
case V8Value.STRING:
return object.getString(key);
case V8Value.V8_FUNCTION:
return IGNORE;
case V8Value.V8_TYPED_ARRAY:
V8Array typedArray = object.getArray(key);
try {
return ((V8TypedArray) typedArray).getByteBuffer();
} finally {
if (typedArray instanceof V8Array) {
typedArray.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_ARRAY:
V8Array array = object.getArray(key);
try {
return toList(array, cache);
} finally {
if (array instanceof V8Array) {
array.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_OBJECT:
V8Object child = object.getObject(key);
try {
return toMap(child, cache);
} finally {
if (child instanceof V8Object) {
child.release();
}
}
case V8Value.NULL:
return null;
case V8Value.UNDEFINED:
return V8.getUndefined();
default:
throw new IllegalStateException("Cannot find type for key: " + key);
}
}
#location 17
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private static Object getValue(final V8Object object, final String key, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = object.getType(key);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return object.getInteger(key);
case V8Value.DOUBLE:
return object.getDouble(key);
case V8Value.BOOLEAN:
return object.getBoolean(key);
case V8Value.STRING:
return object.getString(key);
case V8Value.V8_FUNCTION:
return IGNORE;
case V8Value.V8_TYPED_ARRAY:
V8Array typedArray = object.getArray(key);
try {
return toByteBuffer(typedArray);
} finally {
if (typedArray instanceof V8Array) {
typedArray.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_ARRAY:
V8Array array = object.getArray(key);
try {
return toList(array, cache);
} finally {
if (array instanceof V8Array) {
array.release();
}
}
case V8Value.V8_OBJECT:
V8Object child = object.getObject(key);
try {
return toMap(child, cache);
} finally {
if (child instanceof V8Object) {
child.release();
}
}
case V8Value.NULL:
return null;
case V8Value.UNDEFINED:
return V8.getUndefined();
default:
throw new IllegalStateException("Cannot find type for key: " + key);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public boolean enableDebugSupport(final int port, final boolean waitForConnection) {
V8.checkDebugThread();
debugEnabled = enableDebugSupport(getHandle(), port, waitForConnection);
return debugEnabled;
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public boolean enableDebugSupport(final int port, final boolean waitForConnection) {
V8.checkDebugThread();
debugEnabled = enableDebugSupport(getV8RuntimePtr(), port, waitForConnection);
return debugEnabled;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public CommandLine parse(final String[] args) throws ParseException, IllegalArgumentException {
final CommandLine cmd = super.parse(args);
final Report report = ReportFactory.createReport(cmd, ReportType.REDIS);
ExtractionResult match = null;
if (cmd.hasOption("reporter-status")) {
match = ExtractionResult.get(((Number) cmd.getParsedOptionValue("reporter-status")));
if (null == match) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException(String.format("%s is not a valid report status.",
cmd.getOptionValue("reporter-status")));
}
}
final ProgressBar progressBar = ConsoleProgressBar.on(System.err)
.withFormat("[:bar] :percent% :elapsed/:total ETA: :eta")
.withTotalSteps(report.size());
final ObjectMapper mapper = new ObjectMapper();
final SimpleModule module = new SimpleModule();
module.addSerializer(Report.class, new ReportSerializer(progressBar, match));
mapper.registerModule(module);
try (
final JsonGenerator jsonGenerator = new JsonFactory()
.setCodec(mapper)
.createGenerator(System.out, JsonEncoding.UTF8)
) {
jsonGenerator.useDefaultPrettyPrinter();
jsonGenerator.writeObject(report);
jsonGenerator.writeRaw('\n');
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new RuntimeException("Unable to output JSON.", e);
}
try {
report.close();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new RuntimeException("Exception while closing report.", e);
}
return cmd;
}
#location 18
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
public CommandLine parse(final String[] args) throws ParseException, IllegalArgumentException {
final CommandLine cmd = super.parse(args);
final String[] files = cmd.getArgs();
if (files.length > 1) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Only one dump file path may be passed at a time.");
}
final Report report = ReportFactory.createReport(cmd, ReportType.REDIS);
final OutputStream output;
// Write to stdout if no path is specified.
if (0 == files.length) {
logger.info("No path given. Writing to standard output.");
output = System.out;
} else {
try {
output = new FileOutputStream(files[0]);
} catch (FileNotFoundException e) {
throw new RuntimeException("Unable to open dump file for writing.", e);
}
}
ExtractionResult match = null;
if (cmd.hasOption("reporter-status")) {
match = ExtractionResult.get(((Number) cmd.getParsedOptionValue("reporter-status")));
if (null == match) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException(String.format("%s is not a valid report status.",
cmd.getOptionValue("reporter-status")));
}
}
final ProgressBar progressBar = ConsoleProgressBar.on(System.err)
.withFormat("[:bar] :percent% :elapsed/:total ETA: :eta")
.withTotalSteps(report.size());
final ObjectMapper mapper = new ObjectMapper();
final SimpleModule module = new SimpleModule();
module.addSerializer(Report.class, new ReportSerializer(progressBar, match));
mapper.registerModule(module);
try (
final JsonGenerator jsonGenerator = new JsonFactory()
.setCodec(mapper)
.createGenerator(output, JsonEncoding.UTF8)
) {
jsonGenerator.useDefaultPrettyPrinter();
jsonGenerator.writeObject(report);
jsonGenerator.writeRaw('\n');
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new RuntimeException("Unable to output JSON.", e);
}
try {
report.close();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new RuntimeException("Exception while closing report.", e);
}
return cmd;
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
@Override
public void run() {
// restart the clock.
lastResponseMs = clock.currentTimeMillis();
this.rowMerger = new RowMerger(rowObserver);
synchronized (callLock) {
super.run();
// pre-fetch one more result, for performance reasons.
adapter = new CallToStreamObserverAdapter<ReadRowsRequest>(call);
adapter.request(1);
if (rowObserver instanceof ClientResponseObserver) {
((ClientResponseObserver<ReadRowsRequest, FlatRow>) rowObserver).beforeStart(adapter);
}
}
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
@Override
public void run() {
// restart the clock.
this.rowMerger = new RowMerger(rowObserver);
adapter = new CallToStreamObserverAdapter();
synchronized (callLock) {
super.run();
// pre-fetch one more result, for performance reasons.
adapter.request(1);
if (rowObserver instanceof ClientResponseObserver) {
((ClientResponseObserver<ReadRowsRequest, FlatRow>) rowObserver).beforeStart(adapter);
}
lastResponseMs = clock.currentTimeMillis();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
@Test
public void testMutation() throws IOException, InterruptedException {
final ReentrantLock lock = new ReentrantLock();
final Condition mutateRowAsyncCalled = lock.newCondition();
when(mockClient.mutateRowAsync(any(MutateRowRequest.class)))
.thenAnswer(
new Answer<ListenableFuture<Empty>>() {
@Override
public ListenableFuture<Empty> answer(InvocationOnMock invocation) throws Throwable {
lock.lock();
try {
mutateRowAsyncCalled.signalAll();
return mockFuture;
} finally {
lock.unlock();
}
}
});
BigtableBufferedMutator underTest = createMutator(new Configuration(false));
underTest.mutate(SIMPLE_PUT);
Assert.assertTrue(underTest.hasInflightRequests());
// Leave some time for the async worker to handle the request.
lock.lock();
try {
mutateRowAsyncCalled.await(100, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
} finally {
lock.unlock();
}
verify(mockClient, times(1)).mutateRowAsync(any(MutateRowRequest.class));
Assert.assertTrue(underTest.hasInflightRequests());
completeCall();
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.hasInflightRequests());
}
#location 20
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
@Test
public void testMutation() throws IOException, InterruptedException {
when(mockClient.mutateRowAsync(any(MutateRowRequest.class)))
.thenReturn(mockFuture);
BigtableBufferedMutator underTest = createMutator(new Configuration(false));
underTest.mutate(SIMPLE_PUT);
Assert.assertTrue(underTest.hasInflightRequests());
// Leave some time for the async worker to handle the request.
Thread.sleep(100);
verify(mockClient, times(1)).mutateRowAsync(any(MutateRowRequest.class));
Assert.assertTrue(underTest.hasInflightRequests());
completeCall();
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.hasInflightRequests());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public static Credentials getCredentialFromPrivateKeyServiceAccount(
String serviceAccountEmail, String privateKeyFile, List<String> scopes)
throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException {
PrivateKey privateKey =
SecurityUtils.loadPrivateKeyFromKeyStore(
SecurityUtils.getPkcs12KeyStore(),
new FileInputStream(privateKeyFile),
"notasecret",
"privatekey",
"notasecret");
// Since the user specified scopes, we can't use JWT tokens
return ServiceAccountCredentials.newBuilder()
.setClientEmail(serviceAccountEmail)
.setPrivateKey(privateKey)
.setScopes(scopes)
.setHttpTransportFactory(getHttpTransportFactory())
.build();
}
#location 18
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public static Credentials getCredentialFromPrivateKeyServiceAccount(
String serviceAccountEmail, String privateKeyFile, List<String> scopes)
throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException {
PrivateKey privateKey =
SecurityUtils.loadPrivateKeyFromKeyStore(
SecurityUtils.getPkcs12KeyStore(),
new FileInputStream(privateKeyFile),
"notasecret",
"privatekey",
"notasecret");
// Since the user specified scopes, we can't use JWT tokens
return patchCredentials(
ServiceAccountCredentials.newBuilder()
.setClientEmail(serviceAccountEmail)
.setPrivateKey(privateKey)
.setScopes(scopes)
.setHttpTransportFactory(getHttpTransportFactory())
.build());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testRefresh() throws IOException {
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken()).thenReturn(
new AccessToken("", new Date(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 1)));
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(MoreExecutors.newDirectExecutorService(),
credentials);
underTest.syncRefresh();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing());
}
#location 8
#vulnerability type UNSAFE_GUARDED_BY_ACCESS
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testRefresh() throws IOException {
Mockito.when(mockCredentials.refreshAccessToken()).thenReturn(
new AccessToken("", new Date(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 1)));
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(MoreExecutors.newDirectExecutorService(),
mockCredentials);
underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, underTest.getCacheState());
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
/**
* Test that checks that concurrent requests to RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor refresh
* logic doesn't cause hanging behavior. Specifically, when an Expired condition occurs it
* triggers a call to syncRefresh() which potentially waits for refresh that was initiated
* from another thread either through syncRefresh() or asyncRefresh(). This test case simulates
* that condition.
*/
public void testRefreshDoesntHang() throws Exception,
TimeoutException {
// Assume that the user starts at this time... it's an arbitrarily big number which will
// assure that subtracting HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS and TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS will not
// be negative.
long start = HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS * 10;
setTime(start);
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor will show that the access token is stale.
final long expiration = start + HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS + 1;
// Create a mechanism that will allow us to control when the accessToken is returned.
// credentials.refreshAccessToken() will get called asynchronously and will wait until the
// lock is notified before returning. That will allow us to set up multiple concurrent calls
final Object lock = new String("");
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken()).thenAnswer(new Answer<AccessToken>() {
@Override
public AccessToken answer(InvocationOnMock invocation) throws Throwable {
synchronized (lock) {
lock.wait();
}
return new AccessToken("", new Date(expiration));
}
});
// Force a synchronous refresh. This ought to wait until a refresh happening in another thread
// completes.
Callable<Void> syncRefreshCallable = new Callable<Void>() {
@Override
public Void call() throws Exception {
underTest.syncRefresh();
return null;
}
};
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
// At this point, the access token wasn't retrieved yet. The
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor considers null to be Expired.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Expired,
RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor.getCacheState(underTest.headerCache.get()));
Future<Void> future = executorService.submit(syncRefreshCallable);
// let the Thread running syncRefreshCallable() have a turn so that it can initiate the call
// to refreshAccessToken().
Thread.yield();
synchronized(lock) {
lock.notifyAll();
}
// Try to get the access token, which should be calculated at this point. There's
// a possibility that some hanging occurs in the test code. If the operation times out
// so timeout after 1 second, this will throw a TimeoutException.
future.get(1, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
// Check to make sure that the AccessToken was retrieved.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale,
RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor.getCacheState(underTest.headerCache.get()));
// Check to make sure we're no longer refreshing.
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing.get());
// Kick off a couple of asynchronous refreshes. Kicking off more than one shouldn't be
// necessary, but also should not be harmful, since there are likely to be multiple concurrent
// requests that call asyncRefresh() when the token turns stale.
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
future = executorService.submit(syncRefreshCallable);
// Let the asyncRefreshes do their thing.
Thread.yield();
// There should be a single thread kicked off by the underTest.asyncRefresh() calls about
// actually doing a refresh at this point; the other ones will have see that a refresh is in
// progress and finish the invocation of the Thread without performing a refres().. Make sure
// that at least 1 refresh process is in progress.
Assert.assertTrue(underTest.isRefreshing.get());
synchronized(lock) {
// Release the lock so that all of the async refreshing can complete.
lock.notifyAll();
}
// Wait for no more than a second to make sure that the call to underTest.syncRefresh()
// completes properly. If a second passes without syncRefresh() completing, future.get(..)
// will throw a TimeoutException.
future.get(1, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing.get());
}
#location 49
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Test
/**
* Test that checks that concurrent requests to RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor refresh
* logic doesn't cause hanging behavior. Specifically, when an Expired condition occurs it
* triggers a call to syncRefresh() which potentially waits for refresh that was initiated
* from another thread either through syncRefresh() or asyncRefresh(). This test case simulates
* that condition.
*/
public void testRefreshDoesntHang() throws Exception,
TimeoutException {
// Assume that the user starts at this time... it's an arbitrarily big number which will
// assure that subtracting HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS and TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS will not
// be negative.
long start = HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS * 10;
setTime(start);
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor will show that the access token is stale.
final long expiration = start + HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS + 1;
// Create a mechanism that will allow us to control when the accessToken is returned.
// credentials.refreshAccessToken() will get called asynchronously and will wait until the
// lock is notified before returning. That will allow us to set up multiple concurrent calls
final Object lock = new String("");
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken()).thenAnswer(new Answer<AccessToken>() {
@Override
public AccessToken answer(InvocationOnMock invocation) throws Throwable {
synchronized (lock) {
lock.wait();
}
return new AccessToken("", new Date(expiration));
}
});
// Force a synchronous refresh. This ought to wait until a refresh happening in another thread
// completes.
Callable<Void> syncRefreshCallable = new Callable<Void>() {
@Override
public Void call() throws Exception {
underTest.syncRefresh();
return null;
}
};
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
// At this point, the access token wasn't retrieved yet. The
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor considers null to be Expired.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Expired,
RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor.getCacheState(underTest.headerCache.get()));
syncCall(lock, syncRefreshCallable);
// Check to make sure that the AccessToken was retrieved.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale,
RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor.getCacheState(underTest.headerCache.get()));
// Check to make sure we're no longer refreshing.
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing.get());
// Kick off a couple of asynchronous refreshes. Kicking off more than one shouldn't be
// necessary, but also should not be harmful, since there are likely to be multiple concurrent
// requests that call asyncRefresh() when the token turns stale.
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
syncCall(lock, syncRefreshCallable);
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing.get());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
/**
* Test that checks that concurrent requests to RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor refresh
* logic doesn't cause hanging behavior. Specifically, when an Expired condition occurs it
* triggers a call to syncRefresh() which potentially waits for refresh that was initiated
* from another thread either through syncRefresh() or asyncRefresh(). This test case simulates
* that condition.
*/
public void testRefreshDoesntHang() throws Exception,
TimeoutException {
// Assume that the user starts at this time... it's an arbitrarily big number which will
// assure that subtracting HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS and TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS will not
// be negative.
long start = HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS * 10;
setTime(start);
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor will show that the access token is stale.
final long expiration = start + HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS + 1;
// Create a mechanism that will allow us to control when the accessToken is returned.
// credentials.refreshAccessToken() will get called asynchronously and will wait until the
// lock is notified before returning. That will allow us to set up multiple concurrent calls
final Object lock = new String("");
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken()).thenAnswer(new Answer<AccessToken>() {
@Override
public AccessToken answer(InvocationOnMock invocation) throws Throwable {
synchronized (lock) {
lock.wait();
}
return new AccessToken("", new Date(expiration));
}
});
// Force a synchronous refresh. This ought to wait until a refresh happening in another thread
// completes.
Callable<Void> syncRefreshCallable = new Callable<Void>() {
@Override
public Void call() throws Exception {
underTest.syncRefresh();
return null;
}
};
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
// At this point, the access token wasn't retrieved yet. The
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor considers null to be Expired.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Expired,
RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor.getCacheState(underTest.headerCache.get()));
Future<Void> future = executorService.submit(syncRefreshCallable);
// let the Thread running syncRefreshCallable() have a turn so that it can initiate the call
// to refreshAccessToken().
Thread.yield();
synchronized(lock) {
lock.notifyAll();
}
// Try to get the access token, which should be calculated at this point. There's
// a possibility that some hanging occurs in the test code. If the operation times out
// so timeout after 1 second, this will throw a TimeoutException.
future.get(1, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
// Check to make sure that the AccessToken was retrieved.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale,
RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor.getCacheState(underTest.headerCache.get()));
// Check to make sure we're no longer refreshing.
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing.get());
// Kick off a couple of asynchronous refreshes. Kicking off more than one shouldn't be
// necessary, but also should not be harmful, since there are likely to be multiple concurrent
// requests that call asyncRefresh() when the token turns stale.
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
future = executorService.submit(syncRefreshCallable);
// Let the asyncRefreshes do their thing.
Thread.yield();
// There should be a single thread kicked off by the underTest.asyncRefresh() calls about
// actually doing a refresh at this point; the other ones will have see that a refresh is in
// progress and finish the invocation of the Thread without performing a refres().. Make sure
// that at least 1 refresh process is in progress.
Assert.assertTrue(underTest.isRefreshing.get());
synchronized(lock) {
// Release the lock so that all of the async refreshing can complete.
lock.notifyAll();
}
// Wait for no more than a second to make sure that the call to underTest.syncRefresh()
// completes properly. If a second passes without syncRefresh() completing, future.get(..)
// will throw a TimeoutException.
future.get(1, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing.get());
}
#location 70
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Test
/**
* Test that checks that concurrent requests to RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor refresh
* logic doesn't cause hanging behavior. Specifically, when an Expired condition occurs it
* triggers a call to syncRefresh() which potentially waits for refresh that was initiated
* from another thread either through syncRefresh() or asyncRefresh(). This test case simulates
* that condition.
*/
public void testRefreshDoesntHang() throws Exception,
TimeoutException {
// Assume that the user starts at this time... it's an arbitrarily big number which will
// assure that subtracting HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS and TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS will not
// be negative.
long start = HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS * 10;
setTime(start);
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor will show that the access token is stale.
final long expiration = start + HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS + 1;
// Create a mechanism that will allow us to control when the accessToken is returned.
// credentials.refreshAccessToken() will get called asynchronously and will wait until the
// lock is notified before returning. That will allow us to set up multiple concurrent calls
final Object lock = new String("");
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken()).thenAnswer(new Answer<AccessToken>() {
@Override
public AccessToken answer(InvocationOnMock invocation) throws Throwable {
synchronized (lock) {
lock.wait();
}
return new AccessToken("", new Date(expiration));
}
});
// Force a synchronous refresh. This ought to wait until a refresh happening in another thread
// completes.
Callable<Void> syncRefreshCallable = new Callable<Void>() {
@Override
public Void call() throws Exception {
underTest.syncRefresh();
return null;
}
};
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
// At this point, the access token wasn't retrieved yet. The
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor considers null to be Expired.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Expired,
RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor.getCacheState(underTest.headerCache.get()));
syncCall(lock, syncRefreshCallable);
// Check to make sure that the AccessToken was retrieved.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale,
RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor.getCacheState(underTest.headerCache.get()));
// Check to make sure we're no longer refreshing.
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing.get());
// Kick off a couple of asynchronous refreshes. Kicking off more than one shouldn't be
// necessary, but also should not be harmful, since there are likely to be multiple concurrent
// requests that call asyncRefresh() when the token turns stale.
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
syncCall(lock, syncRefreshCallable);
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing.get());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testCBC_UserAgentUsingPlainTextNegotiation() throws Exception{
ServerSocket serverSocket = new ServerSocket(0);
final int availablePort = serverSocket.getLocalPort();
serverSocket.close();
//Creates non-ssl server.
createServer(availablePort);
BigtableOptions bigtableOptions =
BigtableOptions.builder()
.setDataHost("localhost")
.setAdminHost("localhost")
.setProjectId(TEST_PROJECT_ID)
.setInstanceId(TEST_INSTANCE_ID)
.setUserAgent(TEST_USER_AGENT)
.setUsePlaintextNegotiation(true)
.setCredentialOptions(CredentialOptions.nullCredential())
.setPort(availablePort)
.build();
xGoogApiPattern = Pattern.compile(".* cbt/.*");
try (BigtableSession session = new BigtableSession(bigtableOptions)) {
session.getDataClient()
.readFlatRows(ReadRowsRequest.getDefaultInstance()).next();
Assert.assertTrue(serverPasses.get());
}
}
#location 25
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testCBC_UserAgentUsingPlainTextNegotiation() throws Exception{
ServerSocket serverSocket = new ServerSocket(0);
final int availablePort = serverSocket.getLocalPort();
serverSocket.close();
//Creates non-ssl server.
createServer(availablePort);
BigtableOptions bigtableOptions =
BigtableOptions.builder()
.setDataHost("localhost")
.setAdminHost("localhost")
.setProjectId(TEST_PROJECT_ID)
.setInstanceId(TEST_INSTANCE_ID)
.setUserAgent(TEST_USER_AGENT)
.setUsePlaintextNegotiation(true)
.setCredentialOptions(CredentialOptions.nullCredential())
.setPort(availablePort)
.build();
xGoogApiPattern = Pattern.compile(".* cbt/.*");
try (BigtableSession session = new BigtableSession(bigtableOptions)) {
session.getClientWrapper()
.readFlatRows(Query.create("fake-table")).next();
Assert.assertTrue(serverPasses.get());
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
/**
* Test that checks that concurrent requests to RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor refresh
* logic doesn't cause hanging behavior. Specifically, when an Expired condition occurs it
* triggers a call to syncRefresh() which potentially waits for refresh that was initiated
* from another thread either through syncRefresh() or asyncRefresh(). This test case simulates
* that condition.
*/
public void testRefreshDoesntHang() throws Exception,
TimeoutException {
// Assume that the user starts at this time... it's an arbitrarily big number which will
// assure that subtracting HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS and TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS will not
// be negative.
long start = HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS * 10;
setTime(start);
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor will show that the access token is stale.
final long expiration = start + HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS + 1;
// Create a mechanism that will allow us to control when the accessToken is returned.
// credentials.refreshAccessToken() will get called asynchronously and will wait until the
// lock is notified before returning. That will allow us to set up multiple concurrent calls
final Object lock = new String("");
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken()).thenAnswer(new Answer<AccessToken>() {
@Override
public AccessToken answer(InvocationOnMock invocation) throws Throwable {
synchronized (lock) {
lock.wait();
}
return new AccessToken("", new Date(expiration));
}
});
// Force a synchronous refresh. This ought to wait until a refresh happening in another thread
// completes.
Callable<Void> syncRefreshCallable = new Callable<Void>() {
@Override
public Void call() throws Exception {
underTest.syncRefresh();
return null;
}
};
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
// At this point, the access token wasn't retrieved yet. The
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor considers null to be Expired.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Expired,
RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor.getCacheState(underTest.headerCache.get()));
Future<Void> future = executorService.submit(syncRefreshCallable);
// let the Thread running syncRefreshCallable() have a turn so that it can initiate the call
// to refreshAccessToken().
Thread.yield();
synchronized(lock) {
lock.notifyAll();
}
// Try to get the access token, which should be calculated at this point. There's
// a possibility that some hanging occurs in the test code. If the operation times out
// so timeout after 1 second, this will throw a TimeoutException.
future.get(1, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
// Check to make sure that the AccessToken was retrieved.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale,
RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor.getCacheState(underTest.headerCache.get()));
// Check to make sure we're no longer refreshing.
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing.get());
// Kick off a couple of asynchronous refreshes. Kicking off more than one shouldn't be
// necessary, but also should not be harmful, since there are likely to be multiple concurrent
// requests that call asyncRefresh() when the token turns stale.
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
future = executorService.submit(syncRefreshCallable);
// Let the asyncRefreshes do their thing.
Thread.yield();
// There should be a single thread kicked off by the underTest.asyncRefresh() calls about
// actually doing a refresh at this point; the other ones will have see that a refresh is in
// progress and finish the invocation of the Thread without performing a refres().. Make sure
// that at least 1 refresh process is in progress.
Assert.assertTrue(underTest.isRefreshing.get());
synchronized(lock) {
// Release the lock so that all of the async refreshing can complete.
lock.notifyAll();
}
// Wait for no more than a second to make sure that the call to underTest.syncRefresh()
// completes properly. If a second passes without syncRefresh() completing, future.get(..)
// will throw a TimeoutException.
future.get(1, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing.get());
}
#location 15
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Test
/**
* Test that checks that concurrent requests to RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor refresh
* logic doesn't cause hanging behavior. Specifically, when an Expired condition occurs it
* triggers a call to syncRefresh() which potentially waits for refresh that was initiated
* from another thread either through syncRefresh() or asyncRefresh(). This test case simulates
* that condition.
*/
public void testRefreshDoesntHang() throws Exception,
TimeoutException {
// Assume that the user starts at this time... it's an arbitrarily big number which will
// assure that subtracting HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS and TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS will not
// be negative.
long start = HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS * 10;
setTime(start);
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor will show that the access token is stale.
final long expiration = start + HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS + 1;
// Create a mechanism that will allow us to control when the accessToken is returned.
// credentials.refreshAccessToken() will get called asynchronously and will wait until the
// lock is notified before returning. That will allow us to set up multiple concurrent calls
final Object lock = new String("");
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken()).thenAnswer(new Answer<AccessToken>() {
@Override
public AccessToken answer(InvocationOnMock invocation) throws Throwable {
synchronized (lock) {
lock.wait();
}
return new AccessToken("", new Date(expiration));
}
});
// Force a synchronous refresh. This ought to wait until a refresh happening in another thread
// completes.
Callable<Void> syncRefreshCallable = new Callable<Void>() {
@Override
public Void call() throws Exception {
underTest.syncRefresh();
return null;
}
};
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
// At this point, the access token wasn't retrieved yet. The
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor considers null to be Expired.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Expired,
RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor.getCacheState(underTest.headerCache.get()));
syncCall(lock, syncRefreshCallable);
// Check to make sure that the AccessToken was retrieved.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale,
RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor.getCacheState(underTest.headerCache.get()));
// Check to make sure we're no longer refreshing.
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing.get());
// Kick off a couple of asynchronous refreshes. Kicking off more than one shouldn't be
// necessary, but also should not be harmful, since there are likely to be multiple concurrent
// requests that call asyncRefresh() when the token turns stale.
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
syncCall(lock, syncRefreshCallable);
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing.get());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testRetyableCheckAndMutateRow() throws InterruptedException {
final CheckAndMutateRowRequest request = CheckAndMutateRowRequest.getDefaultInstance();
final AtomicBoolean done = new AtomicBoolean(false);
executor.submit(new Callable<Void>(){
@Override
public Void call() throws Exception {
underTest.checkAndMutateRow(request);
done.set(true);
synchronized (done) {
done.notify();
}
return null;
}
});
Thread.sleep(100);
future.set(CheckAndMutateRowResponse.getDefaultInstance());
synchronized (done) {
done.wait(1000);
}
assertTrue(done.get());
verify(clientCallService, times(1)).listenableAsyncCall(any(ClientCall.class), same(request));
}
#location 17
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testRetyableCheckAndMutateRow() throws Exception {
final CheckAndMutateRowRequest request = CheckAndMutateRowRequest.getDefaultInstance();
when(mockFuture.get()).thenReturn(CheckAndMutateRowResponse.getDefaultInstance());
underTest.checkAndMutateRow(request);
verify(clientCallService, times(1)).listenableAsyncCall(any(ClientCall.class), same(request));
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testRefreshAfterStale() throws Exception {
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
underTest.rateLimiter.setRate(100000);
final AccessToken staleToken = new AccessToken("stale", new Date(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 1));
AccessToken goodToken = new AccessToken("good", new Date(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 11));
//noinspection unchecked
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken())
// First call will setup a stale token
.thenReturn(staleToken)
// Second call will give a good token
.thenReturn(goodToken);
// First call - setup
HeaderCacheElement firstResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, firstResult.getCacheState());
Assert.assertThat(firstResult.header, containsString("stale"));
// Fast forward until token is stale
setTimeInMillieconds(10);
// Second call - return stale token, but schedule refresh
HeaderCacheElement secondResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale, secondResult.getCacheState());
Assert.assertThat(secondResult.header, containsString("stale"));
// Wait for the refresh to finish
final Future<?> waiter;
synchronized (underTest.lock) {
waiter = underTest.isRefreshing ? underTest.futureToken : Futures.immediateFuture(null);
}
waiter.get();
// Third call - now returns good token
HeaderCacheElement thirdResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, thirdResult.getCacheState());
Assert.assertThat(thirdResult.header, containsString("good"));
// Make sure that the token was only requested twice: once for the stale token & second time for the good token
Mockito.verify(credentials, times(2)).refreshAccessToken();
}
#location 37
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testRefreshAfterStale() throws Exception {
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
final AccessToken staleToken = new AccessToken("stale", new Date(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 1));
AccessToken goodToken = new AccessToken("good", new Date(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 11));
//noinspection unchecked
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken())
// First call will setup a stale token
.thenReturn(staleToken)
// Second call will give a good token
.thenReturn(goodToken);
// First call - setup
HeaderCacheElement firstResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, firstResult.getCacheState());
Assert.assertThat(firstResult.header, containsString("stale"));
// Fast forward until token is stale
setTimeInMillieconds(10);
// Second call - return stale token, but schedule refresh
HeaderCacheElement secondResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale, secondResult.getCacheState());
Assert.assertThat(secondResult.header, containsString("stale"));
// Wait for the refresh to finish
underTest.syncRefresh();
// Third call - now returns good token
HeaderCacheElement thirdResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, thirdResult.getCacheState());
Assert.assertThat(thirdResult.header, containsString("good"));
// Make sure that the token was only requested twice: once for the stale token & second time for the good token
Mockito.verify(credentials, times(2)).refreshAccessToken();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
protected void run() {
try (Scope scope = TRACER.withSpan(operationSpan)) {
rpcTimerContext = rpc.getRpcMetrics().timeRpc();
operationSpan.addAnnotation(Annotation.fromDescriptionAndAttributes("rpcStart",
ImmutableMap.of("attempt", AttributeValue.longAttributeValue(failedCount))));
Metadata metadata = new Metadata();
metadata.merge(originalMetadata);
synchronized (callLock) {
// There's a subtle race condition in RetryingStreamOperation which requires a separate
// newCall/start split. The call variable needs to be set before onMessage() happens; that
// usually will occur, but some unit tests broke with a merged newCall and start.
call = rpc.newCall(getRpcCallOptions());
rpc.start(getRetryRequest(), this, metadata, call);
}
} catch (Exception e) {
setException(e);
}
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
protected void run() {
try (Scope scope = TRACER.withSpan(operationSpan)) {
rpcTimerContext = rpc.getRpcMetrics().timeRpc();
operationSpan.addAnnotation(Annotation.fromDescriptionAndAttributes("rpcStart",
ImmutableMap.of("attempt", AttributeValue.longAttributeValue(failedCount))));
Metadata metadata = new Metadata();
metadata.merge(originalMetadata);
callWrapper.setCallAndStart(rpc, getRpcCallOptions(), getRetryRequest(), this, metadata);
} catch (Exception e) {
setException(e);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testRefreshAfterStale() throws Exception {
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
underTest.rateLimiter.setRate(100000);
final AccessToken staleToken = new AccessToken("stale", new Date(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 1));
AccessToken goodToken = new AccessToken("good", new Date(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 11));
//noinspection unchecked
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken())
// First call will setup a stale token
.thenReturn(staleToken)
// Second call will give a good token
.thenReturn(goodToken);
// First call - setup
HeaderCacheElement firstResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, firstResult.getCacheState());
Assert.assertThat(firstResult.header, containsString("stale"));
// Fast forward until token is stale
setTimeInMillieconds(10);
// Second call - return stale token, but schedule refresh
HeaderCacheElement secondResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale, secondResult.getCacheState());
Assert.assertThat(secondResult.header, containsString("stale"));
// Wait for the refresh to finish
final Future<?> waiter;
synchronized (underTest.lock) {
waiter = underTest.isRefreshing ? underTest.futureToken : Futures.immediateFuture(null);
}
waiter.get();
// Third call - now returns good token
HeaderCacheElement thirdResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, thirdResult.getCacheState());
Assert.assertThat(thirdResult.header, containsString("good"));
// Make sure that the token was only requested twice: once for the stale token & second time for the good token
Mockito.verify(credentials, times(2)).refreshAccessToken();
}
#location 33
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testRefreshAfterStale() throws Exception {
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
final AccessToken staleToken = new AccessToken("stale", new Date(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 1));
AccessToken goodToken = new AccessToken("good", new Date(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 11));
//noinspection unchecked
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken())
// First call will setup a stale token
.thenReturn(staleToken)
// Second call will give a good token
.thenReturn(goodToken);
// First call - setup
HeaderCacheElement firstResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, firstResult.getCacheState());
Assert.assertThat(firstResult.header, containsString("stale"));
// Fast forward until token is stale
setTimeInMillieconds(10);
// Second call - return stale token, but schedule refresh
HeaderCacheElement secondResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale, secondResult.getCacheState());
Assert.assertThat(secondResult.header, containsString("stale"));
// Wait for the refresh to finish
underTest.syncRefresh();
// Third call - now returns good token
HeaderCacheElement thirdResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, thirdResult.getCacheState());
Assert.assertThat(thirdResult.header, containsString("good"));
// Make sure that the token was only requested twice: once for the stale token & second time for the good token
Mockito.verify(credentials, times(2)).refreshAccessToken();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testPartialResults() throws Exception {
byte[] key1 = randomBytes(8);
byte[] key2 = randomBytes(8);
FlatRow response1 =
FlatRow.newBuilder()
.withRowKey(ByteString.copyFrom(key1))
.addCell(
new Cell(
"cf",
ByteString.EMPTY,
10,
ByteString.copyFromUtf8("hi!"),
new ArrayList<String>()))
.build();
RuntimeException exception = new RuntimeException("Something bad happened");
when(mockBulkRead.add(any(Query.class)))
.thenReturn(ApiFutures.immediateFuture(response1))
.thenReturn(ApiFutures.<FlatRow>immediateFailedFuture(exception));
List<Get> gets = Arrays.asList(new Get(key1), new Get(key2));
Object[] results = new Object[2];
try {
createExecutor(options).batch(gets, results);
} catch (RetriesExhaustedWithDetailsException ignored) {
}
Assert.assertTrue("first result is a result", results[0] instanceof Result);
Assert.assertTrue(Bytes.equals(((Result) results[0]).getRow(), key1));
Assert.assertEquals(exception, results[1]);
}
#location 26
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testPartialResults() throws Exception {
byte[] key1 = randomBytes(8);
byte[] key2 = randomBytes(8);
FlatRow response1 =
FlatRow.newBuilder()
.withRowKey(ByteString.copyFrom(key1))
.addCell(
new Cell(
"cf",
ByteString.EMPTY,
10,
ByteString.copyFromUtf8("hi!"),
new ArrayList<String>()))
.build();
RuntimeException exception = new RuntimeException("Something bad happened");
when(mockBulkRead.add(any(Query.class)))
.thenReturn(ApiFutures.immediateFuture(response1))
.thenReturn(ApiFutures.<FlatRow>immediateFailedFuture(exception));
List<Get> gets = Arrays.asList(new Get(key1), new Get(key2));
Object[] results = new Object[2];
try {
createExecutor().batch(gets, results);
} catch (RetriesExhaustedWithDetailsException ignored) {
}
Assert.assertTrue("first result is a result", results[0] instanceof Result);
Assert.assertTrue(Bytes.equals(((Result) results[0]).getRow(), key1));
Assert.assertEquals(exception, results[1]);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testSyncRefresh() throws IOException {
initialize(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 1);
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing());
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type UNSAFE_GUARDED_BY_ACCESS
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testSyncRefresh() throws IOException {
Mockito.when(mockCredentials.refreshAccessToken()).thenReturn(
new AccessToken("", new Date(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 1)));
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, mockCredentials);
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Expired, underTest.getCacheState());
underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertNotEquals(CacheState.Exception, underTest.getCacheState());
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, underTest.getCacheState());
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
/*
* Test that checks that concurrent requests to RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor refresh
* logic doesn't cause hanging behavior. Specifically, when an Expired condition occurs it
* triggers a call to syncRefresh() which potentially waits for refresh that was initiated
* from another thread either through syncRefresh() or asyncRefresh(). This test case simulates
* that condition.
*/
public void testRefreshDoesntHang() throws Exception {
// Assume that the user starts at this time... it's an arbitrarily big number which will
// assure that subtracting HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS and TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS will not
// be negative.
long start = HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS * 10;
setTimeInMillieconds(start);
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor will show that the access token is stale.
final long expiration = start + HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS + 1;
// Create a mechanism that will allow us to control when the accessToken is returned.
// credentials.refreshAccessToken() will get called asynchronously and will wait until the
// lock is notified before returning. That will allow us to set up multiple concurrent calls
final Object lock = new Object();
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken()).thenAnswer(new Answer<AccessToken>() {
@Override
public AccessToken answer(InvocationOnMock invocation) throws Throwable {
synchronized (lock) {
lock.wait();
}
return new AccessToken("", new Date(expiration));
}
});
// Force a synchronous refresh. This ought to wait until a refresh happening in another thread
// completes.
Callable<Void> syncRefreshCallable = new Callable<Void>() {
@Override
public Void call() throws Exception {
underTest.syncRefresh();
return null;
}
};
underTest =
new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
underTest.rateLimiter.setRate(100000);
// At this point, the access token wasn't retrieved yet. The
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor considers null to be Expired.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Expired, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
syncCall(lock, syncRefreshCallable);
// Check to make sure that the AccessToken was retrieved.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
// Check to make sure we're no longer refreshing.
synchronized (underTest.lock) {
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing);
}
// Kick off a couple of asynchronous refreshes. Kicking off more than one shouldn't be
// necessary, but also should not be harmful, since there are likely to be multiple concurrent
// requests that call asyncRefresh() when the token turns stale.
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
syncCall(lock, syncRefreshCallable);
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing);
}
#location 51
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Test
/*
* Test that checks that concurrent requests to RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor refresh
* logic doesn't cause hanging behavior. Specifically, when an Expired condition occurs it
* triggers a call to syncRefresh() which potentially waits for refresh that was initiated
* from another thread either through syncRefresh() or asyncRefresh(). This test case simulates
* that condition.
*/
public void testRefreshDoesntHang() throws Exception {
// Assume that the user starts at this time... it's an arbitrarily big number which will
// assure that subtracting HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS and TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS will not
// be negative.
long start = HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS * 10;
setTimeInMillieconds(start);
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor will show that the access token is stale.
final long expiration = start + HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS + 1;
// Create a mechanism that will allow us to control when the accessToken is returned.
// credentials.refreshAccessToken() will get called asynchronously and will wait until the
// lock is notified before returning. That will allow us to set up multiple concurrent calls
final Object lock = new Object();
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken()).thenAnswer(new Answer<AccessToken>() {
@Override
public AccessToken answer(InvocationOnMock invocation) throws Throwable {
synchronized (lock) {
lock.wait();
}
return new AccessToken("", new Date(expiration));
}
});
// Force a synchronous refresh. This ought to wait until a refresh happening in another thread
// completes.
Callable<Void> syncRefreshCallable = new Callable<Void>() {
@Override
public Void call() throws Exception {
underTest.syncRefresh();
return null;
}
};
underTest =
new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
// At this point, the access token wasn't retrieved yet. The
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor considers null to be Expired.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Expired, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
syncCall(lock, syncRefreshCallable);
// Check to make sure that the AccessToken was retrieved.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
// Check to make sure we're no longer refreshing.
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing());
// Kick off a couple of asynchronous refreshes. Kicking off more than one shouldn't be
// necessary, but also should not be harmful, since there are likely to be multiple concurrent
// requests that call asyncRefresh() when the token turns stale.
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
syncCall(lock, syncRefreshCallable);
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void flush() throws IOException {
// If there is a bulk mutation in progress, then send it.
if (bulkMutation != null) {
try {
bulkMutation.flush();
} catch (InterruptedException e) {
Thread.currentThread().interrupt();
throw new IOException("flush() was interrupted", e);
}
}
asyncExecutor.flush();
}
#location 11
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void flush() throws IOException {
// If there is a bulk mutation in progress, then send it.
if (bulkMutation != null) {
try {
bulkMutation.flush();
} catch (InterruptedException e) {
Thread.currentThread().interrupt();
throw new IOException("flush() was interrupted", e);
}
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
/**
* Test that checks that concurrent requests to RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor refresh
* logic doesn't cause hanging behavior. Specifically, when an Expired condition occurs it
* triggers a call to syncRefresh() which potentially waits for refresh that was initiated
* from another thread either through syncRefresh() or asyncRefresh(). This test case simulates
* that condition.
*/
public void testRefreshDoesntHang() throws Exception,
TimeoutException {
// Assume that the user starts at this time... it's an arbitrarily big number which will
// assure that subtracting HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS and TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS will not
// be negative.
long start = HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS * 10;
setTime(start);
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor will show that the access token is stale.
final long expiration = start + HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS + 1;
// Create a mechanism that will allow us to control when the accessToken is returned.
// credentials.refreshAccessToken() will get called asynchronously and will wait until the
// lock is notified before returning. That will allow us to set up multiple concurrent calls
final Object lock = new String("");
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken()).thenAnswer(new Answer<AccessToken>() {
@Override
public AccessToken answer(InvocationOnMock invocation) throws Throwable {
synchronized (lock) {
lock.wait();
}
return new AccessToken("", new Date(expiration));
}
});
// Force a synchronous refresh. This ought to wait until a refresh happening in another thread
// completes.
Callable<Void> syncRefreshCallable = new Callable<Void>() {
@Override
public Void call() throws Exception {
underTest.syncRefresh();
return null;
}
};
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
// At this point, the access token wasn't retrieved yet. The
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor considers null to be Expired.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Expired,
RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor.getCacheState(underTest.headerCache.get()));
Future<Void> future = executorService.submit(syncRefreshCallable);
// let the Thread running syncRefreshCallable() have a turn so that it can initiate the call
// to refreshAccessToken().
Thread.yield();
synchronized(lock) {
lock.notifyAll();
}
// Try to get the access token, which should be calculated at this point. There's
// a possibility that some hanging occurs in the test code. If the operation times out
// so timeout after 1 second, this will throw a TimeoutException.
future.get(1, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
// Check to make sure that the AccessToken was retrieved.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale,
RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor.getCacheState(underTest.headerCache.get()));
// Check to make sure we're no longer refreshing.
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing.get());
// Kick off a couple of asynchronous refreshes. Kicking off more than one shouldn't be
// necessary, but also should not be harmful, since there are likely to be multiple concurrent
// requests that call asyncRefresh() when the token turns stale.
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
future = executorService.submit(syncRefreshCallable);
// Let the asyncRefreshes do their thing.
Thread.yield();
// There should be a single thread kicked off by the underTest.asyncRefresh() calls about
// actually doing a refresh at this point; the other ones will have see that a refresh is in
// progress and finish the invocation of the Thread without performing a refres().. Make sure
// that at least 1 refresh process is in progress.
Assert.assertTrue(underTest.isRefreshing.get());
synchronized(lock) {
// Release the lock so that all of the async refreshing can complete.
lock.notifyAll();
}
// Wait for no more than a second to make sure that the call to underTest.syncRefresh()
// completes properly. If a second passes without syncRefresh() completing, future.get(..)
// will throw a TimeoutException.
future.get(1, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing.get());
}
#location 79
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Test
/**
* Test that checks that concurrent requests to RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor refresh
* logic doesn't cause hanging behavior. Specifically, when an Expired condition occurs it
* triggers a call to syncRefresh() which potentially waits for refresh that was initiated
* from another thread either through syncRefresh() or asyncRefresh(). This test case simulates
* that condition.
*/
public void testRefreshDoesntHang() throws Exception,
TimeoutException {
// Assume that the user starts at this time... it's an arbitrarily big number which will
// assure that subtracting HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS and TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS will not
// be negative.
long start = HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS * 10;
setTime(start);
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor will show that the access token is stale.
final long expiration = start + HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS + 1;
// Create a mechanism that will allow us to control when the accessToken is returned.
// credentials.refreshAccessToken() will get called asynchronously and will wait until the
// lock is notified before returning. That will allow us to set up multiple concurrent calls
final Object lock = new String("");
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken()).thenAnswer(new Answer<AccessToken>() {
@Override
public AccessToken answer(InvocationOnMock invocation) throws Throwable {
synchronized (lock) {
lock.wait();
}
return new AccessToken("", new Date(expiration));
}
});
// Force a synchronous refresh. This ought to wait until a refresh happening in another thread
// completes.
Callable<Void> syncRefreshCallable = new Callable<Void>() {
@Override
public Void call() throws Exception {
underTest.syncRefresh();
return null;
}
};
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
// At this point, the access token wasn't retrieved yet. The
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor considers null to be Expired.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Expired,
RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor.getCacheState(underTest.headerCache.get()));
syncCall(lock, syncRefreshCallable);
// Check to make sure that the AccessToken was retrieved.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale,
RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor.getCacheState(underTest.headerCache.get()));
// Check to make sure we're no longer refreshing.
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing.get());
// Kick off a couple of asynchronous refreshes. Kicking off more than one shouldn't be
// necessary, but also should not be harmful, since there are likely to be multiple concurrent
// requests that call asyncRefresh() when the token turns stale.
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
syncCall(lock, syncRefreshCallable);
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing.get());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testStaleAndExpired() throws IOException {
long expiration = HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 1;
initialize(expiration);
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
long startTime = 2L;
setTimeInMillieconds(startTime);
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
long expiredStaleDiff =
HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS - HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS;
setTimeInMillieconds(startTime + expiredStaleDiff);
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Expired, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type UNSAFE_GUARDED_BY_ACCESS
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testStaleAndExpired() throws IOException {
long expiration = HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 1;
initialize(expiration);
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, underTest.getCacheState());
long startTime = 2L;
setTimeInMillieconds(startTime);
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale, underTest.getCacheState());
long expiredStaleDiff =
HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS - HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS;
setTimeInMillieconds(startTime + expiredStaleDiff);
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Expired, underTest.getCacheState());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testOptionsAreConstructedWithValidInput() throws IOException {
configuration.set(BigtableOptionsFactory.BIGTABLE_HOST_KEY, TEST_HOST);
configuration.setBoolean(BigtableOptionsFactory.BIGTABLE_USE_SERVICE_ACCOUNTS_KEY, false);
configuration.setBoolean(BigtableOptionsFactory.BIGTABLE_NULL_CREDENTIAL_ENABLE_KEY, true);
configuration.setLong(BIGTABLE_BUFFERED_MUTATOR_MAX_MEMORY_KEY, 100_000L);
BigtableOptions options =
((BigtableHBaseClassicSettings) BigtableHBaseSettings.create(configuration))
.getBigtableOptions();
assertEquals(TEST_HOST, options.getDataHost());
assertEquals(TEST_PROJECT_ID, options.getProjectId());
assertEquals(TEST_INSTANCE_ID, options.getInstanceId());
assertEquals(100_000L, options.getBulkOptions().getMaxMemory());
}
#location 12
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testOptionsAreConstructedWithValidInput() throws IOException {
configuration.set(BigtableOptionsFactory.BIGTABLE_HOST_KEY, TEST_HOST);
configuration.setBoolean(BigtableOptionsFactory.BIGTABLE_USE_SERVICE_ACCOUNTS_KEY, false);
configuration.setBoolean(BigtableOptionsFactory.BIGTABLE_NULL_CREDENTIAL_ENABLE_KEY, true);
configuration.setBoolean(BigtableOptionsFactory.ALLOW_NO_TIMESTAMP_RETRIES_KEY, true);
configuration.setLong(BIGTABLE_BUFFERED_MUTATOR_MAX_MEMORY_KEY, 100_000L);
BigtableHBaseSettings settings = BigtableHBaseSettings.create(configuration);
assertTrue(settings.isRetriesWithoutTimestampAllowed());
BigtableOptions options = ((BigtableHBaseClassicSettings) settings).getBigtableOptions();
assertEquals(TEST_HOST, options.getDataHost());
assertEquals(TEST_PROJECT_ID, options.getProjectId());
assertEquals(TEST_INSTANCE_ID, options.getInstanceId());
assertEquals(100_000L, options.getBulkOptions().getMaxMemory());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testRetyableCheckAndMutateRow() throws InterruptedException {
final CheckAndMutateRowRequest request = CheckAndMutateRowRequest.getDefaultInstance();
final AtomicBoolean done = new AtomicBoolean(false);
executor.submit(new Callable<Void>(){
@Override
public Void call() throws Exception {
underTest.checkAndMutateRow(request);
done.set(true);
synchronized (done) {
done.notify();
}
return null;
}
});
Thread.sleep(100);
future.set(CheckAndMutateRowResponse.getDefaultInstance());
synchronized (done) {
done.wait(1000);
}
assertTrue(done.get());
verify(clientCallService, times(1)).listenableAsyncCall(any(ClientCall.class), same(request));
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testRetyableCheckAndMutateRow() throws Exception {
final CheckAndMutateRowRequest request = CheckAndMutateRowRequest.getDefaultInstance();
when(mockFuture.get()).thenReturn(CheckAndMutateRowResponse.getDefaultInstance());
underTest.checkAndMutateRow(request);
verify(clientCallService, times(1)).listenableAsyncCall(any(ClientCall.class), same(request));
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void onClose(Status status, Metadata trailers) {
if (status.getCode() == Status.Code.CANCELLED
&& status.getDescription().contains(TIMEOUT_CANCEL_MSG)) {
// If this was canceled because of handleTimeout(). The cancel is immediately retried or
// completed in another fashion.
return;
}
super.onClose(status, trailers);
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public void onClose(Status status, Metadata trailers) {
if (status.getCode() == Status.Code.CANCELLED
&& status.getDescription() != null
&& status.getDescription().contains(TIMEOUT_CANCEL_MSG)) {
// If this was canceled because of handleTimeout(). The cancel is immediately retried or
// completed in another fashion.
return;
}
super.onClose(status, trailers);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
/*
* Test that checks that concurrent requests to RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor refresh
* logic doesn't cause hanging behavior. Specifically, when an Expired condition occurs it
* triggers a call to syncRefresh() which potentially waits for refresh that was initiated
* from another thread either through syncRefresh() or asyncRefresh(). This test case simulates
* that condition.
*/
public void testRefreshDoesntHang() throws Exception {
// Assume that the user starts at this time... it's an arbitrarily big number which will
// assure that subtracting HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS and TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS will not
// be negative.
long start = HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS * 10;
setTimeInMillieconds(start);
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor will show that the access token is stale.
final long expiration = start + HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS + 1;
// Create a mechanism that will allow us to control when the accessToken is returned.
// credentials.refreshAccessToken() will get called asynchronously and will wait until the
// lock is notified before returning. That will allow us to set up multiple concurrent calls
final Object lock = new Object();
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken()).thenAnswer(new Answer<AccessToken>() {
@Override
public AccessToken answer(InvocationOnMock invocation) throws Throwable {
synchronized (lock) {
lock.wait();
}
return new AccessToken("", new Date(expiration));
}
});
// Force a synchronous refresh. This ought to wait until a refresh happening in another thread
// completes.
Callable<Void> syncRefreshCallable = new Callable<Void>() {
@Override
public Void call() throws Exception {
underTest.syncRefresh();
return null;
}
};
underTest =
new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
underTest.rateLimiter.setRate(100000);
// At this point, the access token wasn't retrieved yet. The
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor considers null to be Expired.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Expired, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
syncCall(lock, syncRefreshCallable);
// Check to make sure that the AccessToken was retrieved.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
// Check to make sure we're no longer refreshing.
synchronized (underTest.lock) {
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing);
}
// Kick off a couple of asynchronous refreshes. Kicking off more than one shouldn't be
// necessary, but also should not be harmful, since there are likely to be multiple concurrent
// requests that call asyncRefresh() when the token turns stale.
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
syncCall(lock, syncRefreshCallable);
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing);
}
#location 14
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Test
/*
* Test that checks that concurrent requests to RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor refresh
* logic doesn't cause hanging behavior. Specifically, when an Expired condition occurs it
* triggers a call to syncRefresh() which potentially waits for refresh that was initiated
* from another thread either through syncRefresh() or asyncRefresh(). This test case simulates
* that condition.
*/
public void testRefreshDoesntHang() throws Exception {
// Assume that the user starts at this time... it's an arbitrarily big number which will
// assure that subtracting HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS and TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS will not
// be negative.
long start = HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS * 10;
setTimeInMillieconds(start);
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor will show that the access token is stale.
final long expiration = start + HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS + 1;
// Create a mechanism that will allow us to control when the accessToken is returned.
// credentials.refreshAccessToken() will get called asynchronously and will wait until the
// lock is notified before returning. That will allow us to set up multiple concurrent calls
final Object lock = new Object();
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken()).thenAnswer(new Answer<AccessToken>() {
@Override
public AccessToken answer(InvocationOnMock invocation) throws Throwable {
synchronized (lock) {
lock.wait();
}
return new AccessToken("", new Date(expiration));
}
});
// Force a synchronous refresh. This ought to wait until a refresh happening in another thread
// completes.
Callable<Void> syncRefreshCallable = new Callable<Void>() {
@Override
public Void call() throws Exception {
underTest.syncRefresh();
return null;
}
};
underTest =
new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
// At this point, the access token wasn't retrieved yet. The
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor considers null to be Expired.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Expired, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
syncCall(lock, syncRefreshCallable);
// Check to make sure that the AccessToken was retrieved.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
// Check to make sure we're no longer refreshing.
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing());
// Kick off a couple of asynchronous refreshes. Kicking off more than one shouldn't be
// necessary, but also should not be harmful, since there are likely to be multiple concurrent
// requests that call asyncRefresh() when the token turns stale.
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
syncCall(lock, syncRefreshCallable);
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testMutateRowPredicate() {
Predicate<MutateRowRequest> predicate = BigtableDataGrpcClient.IS_RETRYABLE_MUTATION;
assertFalse(predicate.apply(null));
MutateRowRequest.Builder request = MutateRowRequest.newBuilder();
assertTrue(predicate.apply(request.build()));
request.addMutations(
Mutation.newBuilder().setSetCell(SetCell.newBuilder().setTimestampMicros(-1)));
assertFalse(predicate.apply(request.build()));
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testMutateRowPredicate() {
Predicate<MutateRowRequest> defaultPredicate = BigtableDataGrpcClient.IS_RETRYABLE_MUTATION;
createClient(true);
Predicate<MutateRowRequest> allowNoTimestampsPredicate =
predicates.get(BigtableServiceGrpc.METHOD_MUTATE_ROW.getFullMethodName());
assertFalse(defaultPredicate.apply(null));
assertTrue(allowNoTimestampsPredicate.apply(null));
MutateRowRequest noDataRequest = MutateRowRequest.getDefaultInstance();
assertTrue(defaultPredicate.apply(noDataRequest));
assertTrue(allowNoTimestampsPredicate.apply(noDataRequest));
MutateRowRequest requestWithCells = MutateRowRequest.newBuilder()
.addMutations(Mutation.newBuilder().setSetCell(SetCell.newBuilder().setTimestampMicros(-1)))
.build();
assertFalse(defaultPredicate.apply(requestWithCells));
assertTrue(allowNoTimestampsPredicate.apply(requestWithCells));
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
/*
* Test that checks that concurrent requests to RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor refresh
* logic doesn't cause hanging behavior. Specifically, when an Expired condition occurs it
* triggers a call to syncRefresh() which potentially waits for refresh that was initiated
* from another thread either through syncRefresh() or asyncRefresh(). This test case simulates
* that condition.
*/
public void testRefreshDoesntHang() throws Exception {
// Assume that the user starts at this time... it's an arbitrarily big number which will
// assure that subtracting HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS and TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS will not
// be negative.
long start = HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS * 10;
setTimeInMillieconds(start);
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor will show that the access token is stale.
final long expiration = start + HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS + 1;
// Create a mechanism that will allow us to control when the accessToken is returned.
// credentials.refreshAccessToken() will get called asynchronously and will wait until the
// lock is notified before returning. That will allow us to set up multiple concurrent calls
final Object lock = new Object();
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken()).thenAnswer(new Answer<AccessToken>() {
@Override
public AccessToken answer(InvocationOnMock invocation) throws Throwable {
synchronized (lock) {
lock.wait();
}
return new AccessToken("", new Date(expiration));
}
});
// Force a synchronous refresh. This ought to wait until a refresh happening in another thread
// completes.
Callable<Void> syncRefreshCallable = new Callable<Void>() {
@Override
public Void call() throws Exception {
underTest.syncRefresh();
return null;
}
};
underTest =
new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
underTest.rateLimiter.setRate(100000);
// At this point, the access token wasn't retrieved yet. The
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor considers null to be Expired.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Expired, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
syncCall(lock, syncRefreshCallable);
// Check to make sure that the AccessToken was retrieved.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
// Check to make sure we're no longer refreshing.
synchronized (underTest.lock) {
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing);
}
// Kick off a couple of asynchronous refreshes. Kicking off more than one shouldn't be
// necessary, but also should not be harmful, since there are likely to be multiple concurrent
// requests that call asyncRefresh() when the token turns stale.
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
syncCall(lock, syncRefreshCallable);
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing);
}
#location 58
#vulnerability type UNSAFE_GUARDED_BY_ACCESS
|
#fixed code
@Test
/*
* Test that checks that concurrent requests to RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor refresh
* logic doesn't cause hanging behavior. Specifically, when an Expired condition occurs it
* triggers a call to syncRefresh() which potentially waits for refresh that was initiated
* from another thread either through syncRefresh() or asyncRefresh(). This test case simulates
* that condition.
*/
public void testRefreshDoesntHang() throws Exception {
// Assume that the user starts at this time... it's an arbitrarily big number which will
// assure that subtracting HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS and TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS will not
// be negative.
long start = HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS * 10;
setTimeInMillieconds(start);
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor will show that the access token is stale.
final long expiration = start + HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_EXPIRES_MS + 1;
// Create a mechanism that will allow us to control when the accessToken is returned.
// credentials.refreshAccessToken() will get called asynchronously and will wait until the
// lock is notified before returning. That will allow us to set up multiple concurrent calls
final Object lock = new Object();
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken()).thenAnswer(new Answer<AccessToken>() {
@Override
public AccessToken answer(InvocationOnMock invocation) throws Throwable {
synchronized (lock) {
lock.wait();
}
return new AccessToken("", new Date(expiration));
}
});
// Force a synchronous refresh. This ought to wait until a refresh happening in another thread
// completes.
Callable<Void> syncRefreshCallable = new Callable<Void>() {
@Override
public Void call() throws Exception {
underTest.syncRefresh();
return null;
}
};
underTest =
new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
// At this point, the access token wasn't retrieved yet. The
// RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor considers null to be Expired.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Expired, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
syncCall(lock, syncRefreshCallable);
// Check to make sure that the AccessToken was retrieved.
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
// Check to make sure we're no longer refreshing.
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing());
// Kick off a couple of asynchronous refreshes. Kicking off more than one shouldn't be
// necessary, but also should not be harmful, since there are likely to be multiple concurrent
// requests that call asyncRefresh() when the token turns stale.
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
underTest.asyncRefresh();
syncCall(lock, syncRefreshCallable);
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testSyncRefresh() throws IOException {
initialize(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 1);
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testSyncRefresh() throws IOException {
initialize(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 1);
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testSyncRefresh() throws IOException {
initialize(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 1);
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testSyncRefresh() throws IOException {
initialize(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 1);
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, underTest.headerCache.getCacheState());
Assert.assertFalse(underTest.isRefreshing());
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testBatchBulkGets() throws Exception {
final List<Get> gets = new ArrayList<>(10);
final List<ApiFuture<FlatRow>> expected = new ArrayList<>(10);
gets.add(new Get(Bytes.toBytes("key0")));
expected.add(ApiFutures.<FlatRow>immediateFuture(null));
for (int i = 1; i < 10; i++) {
byte[] row_key = randomBytes(8);
gets.add(new Get(row_key));
ByteString key = ByteStringer.wrap(row_key);
ByteString cellValue = ByteString.copyFrom(randomBytes(8));
expected.add(
ApiFutures.immediateFuture(
FlatRow.newBuilder()
.withRowKey(key)
.addCell("family", ByteString.EMPTY, System.nanoTime() / 1000, cellValue)
.build()));
}
// Test 10 gets, but return only 9 to test the row not found case.
when(mockBulkRead.add(any(Query.class)))
.then(
new Answer<ApiFuture<FlatRow>>() {
final AtomicInteger counter = new AtomicInteger();
@Override
public ApiFuture<FlatRow> answer(InvocationOnMock invocation) throws Throwable {
return expected.get(counter.getAndIncrement());
}
});
ByteString key = ByteStringer.wrap(randomBytes(8));
ByteString cellValue = ByteString.copyFrom(randomBytes(8));
FlatRow row =
FlatRow.newBuilder()
.withRowKey(key)
.addCell("family", ByteString.EMPTY, System.nanoTime() / 1000, cellValue)
.build();
when(mockFuture.get()).thenReturn(row);
BatchExecutor underTest = createExecutor(options);
Result[] results = underTest.batch(gets);
verify(mockBulkRead, times(10)).add(any(Query.class));
verify(mockBulkRead, times(1)).flush();
Assert.assertTrue(matchesRow(Result.EMPTY_RESULT).matches(results[0]));
for (int i = 1; i < results.length; i++) {
Assert.assertTrue(
"Expected "
+ Bytes.toString(gets.get(i).getRow())
+ " but was "
+ Bytes.toString(results[i].getRow()),
Bytes.equals(results[i].getRow(), gets.get(i).getRow()));
}
}
#location 42
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testBatchBulkGets() throws Exception {
final List<Get> gets = new ArrayList<>(10);
final List<ApiFuture<FlatRow>> expected = new ArrayList<>(10);
gets.add(new Get(Bytes.toBytes("key0")));
expected.add(ApiFutures.<FlatRow>immediateFuture(null));
for (int i = 1; i < 10; i++) {
byte[] row_key = randomBytes(8);
gets.add(new Get(row_key));
ByteString key = ByteStringer.wrap(row_key);
ByteString cellValue = ByteString.copyFrom(randomBytes(8));
expected.add(
ApiFutures.immediateFuture(
FlatRow.newBuilder()
.withRowKey(key)
.addCell("family", ByteString.EMPTY, System.nanoTime() / 1000, cellValue)
.build()));
}
// Test 10 gets, but return only 9 to test the row not found case.
when(mockBulkRead.add(any(Query.class)))
.then(
new Answer<ApiFuture<FlatRow>>() {
final AtomicInteger counter = new AtomicInteger();
@Override
public ApiFuture<FlatRow> answer(InvocationOnMock invocation) throws Throwable {
return expected.get(counter.getAndIncrement());
}
});
ByteString key = ByteStringer.wrap(randomBytes(8));
ByteString cellValue = ByteString.copyFrom(randomBytes(8));
FlatRow row =
FlatRow.newBuilder()
.withRowKey(key)
.addCell("family", ByteString.EMPTY, System.nanoTime() / 1000, cellValue)
.build();
when(mockFuture.get()).thenReturn(row);
Result[] results = createExecutor().batch(gets);
verify(mockBulkRead, times(10)).add(any(Query.class));
verify(mockBulkRead, times(1)).flush();
Assert.assertTrue(matchesRow(Result.EMPTY_RESULT).matches(results[0]));
for (int i = 1; i < results.length; i++) {
Assert.assertTrue(
"Expected "
+ Bytes.toString(gets.get(i).getRow())
+ " but was "
+ Bytes.toString(results[i].getRow()),
Bytes.equals(results[i].getRow(), gets.get(i).getRow()));
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void setMessageCompression(boolean enable) {
call.setMessageCompression(enable);
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Override
public void setMessageCompression(boolean enable) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("setMessageCompression()");
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void modifyTable(TableName tableName, TableDescriptor tableDescriptor) throws IOException {
if (isTableAvailable(tableName)) {
TableDescriptor currentTableDescriptor = getTableDescriptor(tableName);
List<Modification> modifications = new ArrayList<>();
List<HColumnDescriptor> columnDescriptors = tableAdapter2x.toHColumnDescriptors(tableDescriptor);
List<HColumnDescriptor> currentColumnDescriptors = tableAdapter2x.toHColumnDescriptors(currentTableDescriptor);
modifications.addAll(tableModificationAdapter.buildModifications(columnDescriptors, currentColumnDescriptors));
modifyColumn(tableName, "modifyTable", "update", (Modification[]) modifications.toArray());
} else {
throw new TableNotFoundException(tableName);
}
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Override
public void modifyTable(TableName tableName, TableDescriptor tableDescriptor) throws IOException {
super.modifyTable(tableName, new HTableDescriptor(tableDescriptor));
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void onClose(Status status, Metadata trailers) {
synchronized (callLock) {
call = null;
}
rpcTimerContext.close();
Status.Code code = status.getCode();
// OK
if (code == Status.Code.OK) {
if (onOK()) {
operationTimerContext.close();
}
return;
}
// CANCELLED
if (code == Status.Code.CANCELLED) {
// An explicit user cancellation is not considered a failure.
operationTimerContext.close();
return;
}
// Non retry scenario
if (!retryOptions.enableRetries()
|| !retryOptions.isRetryable(code)
// Unauthenticated is special because the request never made it to
// to the server, so all requests are retryable
|| !(isRequestRetryable() || code == Code.UNAUTHENTICATED)) {
rpc.getRpcMetrics().markFailure();
operationTimerContext.close();
setException(status.asRuntimeException());
return;
}
// Attempt retry with backoff
long nextBackOff = getNextBackoff();
failedCount += 1;
// Backoffs timed out.
if (nextBackOff == BackOff.STOP) {
rpc.getRpcMetrics().markRetriesExhasted();
operationTimerContext.close();
String message = String.format("Exhausted retries after %d failures.", failedCount);
StatusRuntimeException cause = status.asRuntimeException();
setException(new BigtableRetriesExhaustedException(message, cause));
return;
} else {
String channelId = ChannelPool.extractIdentifier(trailers);
LOG.info("Retrying failed call. Failure #%d, got: %s on channel %s",
status.getCause(), failedCount, status, channelId);
}
performRetry(nextBackOff);
}
#location 39
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Override
public void onClose(Status status, Metadata trailers) {
synchronized (callLock) {
call = null;
}
rpcTimerContext.close();
// OK
if (status.isOk()) {
if (onOK(trailers)) {
operationTimerContext.close();
}
} else {
onError(status, trailers);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testChannelsAreRoundRobinned() throws IOException {
MockChannelFactory factory = new MockChannelFactory();
MethodDescriptor descriptor = mock(MethodDescriptor.class);
MockitoAnnotations.initMocks(this);
ChannelPool pool = new ChannelPool(null, factory);
pool.ensureChannelCount(2);
pool.newCall(descriptor, CallOptions.DEFAULT);
verify(factory.channels.get(0), times(1)).newCall(same(descriptor), same(CallOptions.DEFAULT));
verify(factory.channels.get(1), times(0)).newCall(same(descriptor), same(CallOptions.DEFAULT));
pool.newCall(descriptor, CallOptions.DEFAULT);
verify(factory.channels.get(0), times(1)).newCall(same(descriptor), same(CallOptions.DEFAULT));
verify(factory.channels.get(1), times(1)).newCall(same(descriptor), same(CallOptions.DEFAULT));
}
#location 8
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testChannelsAreRoundRobinned() throws IOException {
MockChannelFactory factory = new MockChannelFactory();
MethodDescriptor descriptor = mock(MethodDescriptor.class);
MockitoAnnotations.initMocks(this);
ChannelPool pool = new ChannelPool(null, factory);
pool.ensureChannelCount(2);
pool.newCall(descriptor, CallOptions.DEFAULT);
verify(factory.channels.get(0), times(1)).newCall(same(descriptor), same(CallOptions.DEFAULT));
verify(factory.channels.get(1), times(0)).newCall(same(descriptor), same(CallOptions.DEFAULT));
pool.newCall(descriptor, CallOptions.DEFAULT);
verify(factory.channels.get(0), times(1)).newCall(same(descriptor), same(CallOptions.DEFAULT));
verify(factory.channels.get(1), times(1)).newCall(same(descriptor), same(CallOptions.DEFAULT));
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testRefreshAfterFailure() throws Exception {
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
underTest.rateLimiter.setRate(100000);
final AccessToken accessToken = new AccessToken("hi", new Date(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 1));
//noinspection unchecked
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken())
// First call will throw Exception & bypass retries
.thenThrow(new IOException())
// Second call will succeed
.thenReturn(accessToken);
// First call
HeaderCacheElement firstResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Exception, firstResult.getCacheState());
// Now the second token should be available
HeaderCacheElement secondResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, secondResult.getCacheState());
Assert.assertThat(secondResult.header, containsString("hi"));
// Make sure that the token was only requested twice: once for the first failure & second time for background recovery
Mockito.verify(credentials, times(2)).refreshAccessToken();
}
#location 20
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testRefreshAfterFailure() throws Exception {
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
final AccessToken accessToken = new AccessToken("hi", new Date(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 1));
//noinspection unchecked
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken())
// First call will throw Exception & bypass retries
.thenThrow(new IOException())
// Second call will succeed
.thenReturn(accessToken);
// First call
HeaderCacheElement firstResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Exception, firstResult.getCacheState());
// Now the second token should be available
HeaderCacheElement secondResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, secondResult.getCacheState());
Assert.assertThat(secondResult.header, containsString("hi"));
// Make sure that the token was only requested twice: once for the first failure & second time for background recovery
Mockito.verify(credentials, times(2)).refreshAccessToken();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testCBC_UserAgentUsingPlainTextNegotiation() throws Exception{
ServerSocket serverSocket = new ServerSocket(0);
final int availablePort = serverSocket.getLocalPort();
serverSocket.close();
//Creates non-ssl server.
createServer(availablePort);
BigtableOptions bigtableOptions =
BigtableOptions.builder()
.setDataHost("localhost")
.setAdminHost("localhost")
.setProjectId(TEST_PROJECT_ID)
.setInstanceId(TEST_INSTANCE_ID)
.setUserAgent(TEST_USER_AGENT)
.setUsePlaintextNegotiation(true)
.setCredentialOptions(CredentialOptions.nullCredential())
.setPort(availablePort)
.build();
xGoogApiPattern = Pattern.compile(".* cbt/.*");
new BigtableSession(bigtableOptions).getDataClient()
.readFlatRows(ReadRowsRequest.getDefaultInstance()).next();
Assert.assertTrue(serverPasses.get());
}
#location 24
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testCBC_UserAgentUsingPlainTextNegotiation() throws Exception{
ServerSocket serverSocket = new ServerSocket(0);
final int availablePort = serverSocket.getLocalPort();
serverSocket.close();
//Creates non-ssl server.
createServer(availablePort);
BigtableOptions bigtableOptions =
BigtableOptions.builder()
.setDataHost("localhost")
.setAdminHost("localhost")
.setProjectId(TEST_PROJECT_ID)
.setInstanceId(TEST_INSTANCE_ID)
.setUserAgent(TEST_USER_AGENT)
.setUsePlaintextNegotiation(true)
.setCredentialOptions(CredentialOptions.nullCredential())
.setPort(availablePort)
.build();
xGoogApiPattern = Pattern.compile(".* cbt/.*");
try (BigtableSession session = new BigtableSession(bigtableOptions)) {
session.getDataClient()
.readFlatRows(ReadRowsRequest.getDefaultInstance()).next();
Assert.assertTrue(serverPasses.get());
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
@Override
public void run() {
try {
// restart the clock.
this.rowMerger = new RowMerger(rowObserver);
adapter = new CallToStreamObserverAdapter();
synchronized (callLock) {
super.run();
// pre-fetch one more result, for performance reasons.
adapter.request(1);
if (rowObserver instanceof ClientResponseObserver) {
((ClientResponseObserver<ReadRowsRequest, FlatRow>) rowObserver).beforeStart(adapter);
}
lastResponseMs = clock.currentTimeMillis();
}
} catch (Exception e) {
setException(e);
}
}
#location 13
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
@Override
public void run() {
try {
// restart the clock.
synchronized (callLock) {
super.run();
// pre-fetch one more result, for performance reasons.
adapter.request(1);
if (rowObserver instanceof ClientResponseObserver) {
((ClientResponseObserver<ReadRowsRequest, FlatRow>) rowObserver).beforeStart(adapter);
}
lastResponseMs = clock.currentTimeMillis();
}
} catch (Exception e) {
setException(e);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private void retryOnTimeout(ScanTimeoutException rte) throws BigtableRetriesExhaustedException {
LOG.info("The client could not get a response in %d ms. Retrying the scan.",
retryOptions.getReadPartialRowTimeoutMillis());
// Cancel the existing rpc.
cancel(TIMEOUT_CANCEL_MSG);
rpcTimerContext.close();
failedCount++;
// Can this request be retried
int maxRetries = retryOptions.getMaxScanTimeoutRetries();
if (retryOptions.enableRetries() && ++timeoutRetryCount <= maxRetries) {
rpc.getRpcMetrics().markRetry();
resetStatusBasedBackoff();
run();
} else {
throw getExhaustedRetriesException(Status.ABORTED);
}
}
#location 15
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
|
#fixed code
private void retryOnTimeout(ScanTimeoutException rte) throws BigtableRetriesExhaustedException {
LOG.info("The client could not get a response in %d ms. Retrying the scan.",
retryOptions.getReadPartialRowTimeoutMillis());
// Cancel the existing rpc.
cancel(TIMEOUT_CANCEL_MSG);
rpcTimerContext.close();
failedCount++;
// Can this request be retried
int maxRetries = retryOptions.getMaxScanTimeoutRetries();
if (retryOptions.enableRetries() && ++timeoutRetryCount <= maxRetries) {
resetStatusBasedBackoff();
performRetry(0);
} else {
throw getExhaustedRetriesException(Status.ABORTED);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void onClose(Status status, Metadata trailers) {
try (Scope scope = TRACER.withSpan(operationSpan)) {
synchronized (callLock) {
call = NULL_CALL;
}
rpcTimerContext.close();
// OK
if (status.isOk()) {
if (onOK(trailers)) {
finalizeStats(status);
}
} else {
onError(status, trailers);
}
} catch (Exception e) {
setException(e);
}
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Override
public void onClose(Status status, Metadata trailers) {
try (Scope scope = TRACER.withSpan(operationSpan)) {
callWrapper.resetCall();
rpcTimerContext.close();
// OK
if (status.isOk()) {
if (onOK(trailers)) {
finalizeStats(status);
}
} else {
onError(status, trailers);
}
} catch (Exception e) {
setException(e);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public static Credentials getCredentials(CredentialOptions options)
throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException {
switch (options.getCredentialType()) {
case DefaultCredentials:
return getApplicationDefaultCredential();
case P12:
P12CredentialOptions p12Options = (P12CredentialOptions) options;
return getCredentialFromPrivateKeyServiceAccount(
p12Options.getServiceAccount(), p12Options.getKeyFile());
case SuppliedCredentials:
return ((UserSuppliedCredentialOptions) options).getCredential();
case SuppliedJson:
JsonCredentialsOptions jsonCredentialsOptions = (JsonCredentialsOptions) options;
synchronized (jsonCredentialsOptions) {
if (jsonCredentialsOptions.getCachedCredentials() == null) {
jsonCredentialsOptions.setCachedCredentails(
getInputStreamCredential(jsonCredentialsOptions.getInputStream()));
}
return jsonCredentialsOptions.getCachedCredentials();
}
case None:
return null;
default:
throw new IllegalStateException(
"Cannot process Credential type: " + options.getCredentialType());
}
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public static Credentials getCredentials(CredentialOptions options)
throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException {
return patchCredentials(getCredentialsInner(options));
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
public void awaitCompletion() throws InterruptedException {
boolean performedWarning = false;
lock.lock();
try {
while (!isFlushed()) {
flushedCondition.await(finishWaitMillis, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS);
long now = clock.nanoTime();
if (now >= noSuccessWarningDeadline) {
logNoSuccessWarning(now);
resetNoSuccessWarningDeadline();
performedWarning = true;
}
}
if (performedWarning) {
LOG.info("awaitCompletion() completed");
}
} finally {
lock.unlock();
}
}
#location 10
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
public void awaitCompletion() throws InterruptedException {
boolean performedWarning = false;
lock.lock();
try {
while (!isFlushed()) {
flushedCondition.await(finishWaitMillis, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS);
long now = clock.nanoTime();
if (now >= noSuccessWarningDeadlineNanos) {
logNoSuccessWarning(now);
resetNoSuccessWarningDeadline();
performedWarning = true;
}
}
if (performedWarning) {
LOG.info("awaitCompletion() completed");
}
} finally {
lock.unlock();
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testRefreshAfterStale() throws Exception {
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
underTest.rateLimiter.setRate(100000);
final AccessToken staleToken = new AccessToken("stale", new Date(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 1));
AccessToken goodToken = new AccessToken("good", new Date(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 11));
//noinspection unchecked
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken())
// First call will setup a stale token
.thenReturn(staleToken)
// Second call will give a good token
.thenReturn(goodToken);
// First call - setup
HeaderCacheElement firstResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, firstResult.getCacheState());
Assert.assertThat(firstResult.header, containsString("stale"));
// Fast forward until token is stale
setTimeInMillieconds(10);
// Second call - return stale token, but schedule refresh
HeaderCacheElement secondResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale, secondResult.getCacheState());
Assert.assertThat(secondResult.header, containsString("stale"));
// Wait for the refresh to finish
final Future<?> waiter;
synchronized (underTest.lock) {
waiter = underTest.isRefreshing ? underTest.futureToken : Futures.immediateFuture(null);
}
waiter.get();
// Third call - now returns good token
HeaderCacheElement thirdResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, thirdResult.getCacheState());
Assert.assertThat(thirdResult.header, containsString("good"));
// Make sure that the token was only requested twice: once for the stale token & second time for the good token
Mockito.verify(credentials, times(2)).refreshAccessToken();
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testRefreshAfterStale() throws Exception {
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(executorService, credentials);
final AccessToken staleToken = new AccessToken("stale", new Date(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 1));
AccessToken goodToken = new AccessToken("good", new Date(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 11));
//noinspection unchecked
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken())
// First call will setup a stale token
.thenReturn(staleToken)
// Second call will give a good token
.thenReturn(goodToken);
// First call - setup
HeaderCacheElement firstResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, firstResult.getCacheState());
Assert.assertThat(firstResult.header, containsString("stale"));
// Fast forward until token is stale
setTimeInMillieconds(10);
// Second call - return stale token, but schedule refresh
HeaderCacheElement secondResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Stale, secondResult.getCacheState());
Assert.assertThat(secondResult.header, containsString("stale"));
// Wait for the refresh to finish
underTest.syncRefresh();
// Third call - now returns good token
HeaderCacheElement thirdResult = underTest.getHeaderSafe();
Assert.assertEquals(CacheState.Good, thirdResult.getCacheState());
Assert.assertThat(thirdResult.header, containsString("good"));
// Make sure that the token was only requested twice: once for the stale token & second time for the good token
Mockito.verify(credentials, times(2)).refreshAccessToken();
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
@Override
public void run() {
try {
// restart the clock.
this.rowMerger = new RowMerger(rowObserver);
adapter = new CallToStreamObserverAdapter();
synchronized (callLock) {
super.run();
// pre-fetch one more result, for performance reasons.
adapter.request(1);
if (rowObserver instanceof ClientResponseObserver) {
((ClientResponseObserver<ReadRowsRequest, FlatRow>) rowObserver).beforeStart(adapter);
}
lastResponseMs = clock.currentTimeMillis();
}
} catch (Exception e) {
setException(e);
}
}
#location 6
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
@Override
public void run() {
try {
// restart the clock.
synchronized (callLock) {
super.run();
// pre-fetch one more result, for performance reasons.
adapter.request(1);
if (rowObserver instanceof ClientResponseObserver) {
((ClientResponseObserver<ReadRowsRequest, FlatRow>) rowObserver).beforeStart(adapter);
}
lastResponseMs = clock.currentTimeMillis();
}
} catch (Exception e) {
setException(e);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testBatchBulkGets() throws Exception {
final List<Get> gets = new ArrayList<>(10);
final List<ApiFuture<FlatRow>> expected = new ArrayList<>(10);
gets.add(new Get(Bytes.toBytes("key0")));
expected.add(ApiFutures.<FlatRow>immediateFuture(null));
for (int i = 1; i < 10; i++) {
byte[] row_key = randomBytes(8);
gets.add(new Get(row_key));
ByteString key = ByteStringer.wrap(row_key);
ByteString cellValue = ByteString.copyFrom(randomBytes(8));
expected.add(
ApiFutures.immediateFuture(
FlatRow.newBuilder()
.withRowKey(key)
.addCell("family", ByteString.EMPTY, System.nanoTime() / 1000, cellValue)
.build()));
}
// Test 10 gets, but return only 9 to test the row not found case.
when(mockBulkRead.add(any(Query.class)))
.then(
new Answer<ApiFuture<FlatRow>>() {
final AtomicInteger counter = new AtomicInteger();
@Override
public ApiFuture<FlatRow> answer(InvocationOnMock invocation) throws Throwable {
return expected.get(counter.getAndIncrement());
}
});
ByteString key = ByteStringer.wrap(randomBytes(8));
ByteString cellValue = ByteString.copyFrom(randomBytes(8));
FlatRow row =
FlatRow.newBuilder()
.withRowKey(key)
.addCell("family", ByteString.EMPTY, System.nanoTime() / 1000, cellValue)
.build();
when(mockFuture.get()).thenReturn(row);
Result[] results = createExecutor().batch(gets);
verify(mockBulkRead, times(10)).add(any(Query.class));
verify(mockBulkRead, times(1)).flush();
Assert.assertTrue(matchesRow(Result.EMPTY_RESULT).matches(results[0]));
for (int i = 1; i < results.length; i++) {
Assert.assertTrue(
"Expected "
+ Bytes.toString(gets.get(i).getRow())
+ " but was "
+ Bytes.toString(results[i].getRow()),
Bytes.equals(results[i].getRow(), gets.get(i).getRow()));
}
}
#location 41
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testBatchBulkGets() throws Exception {
final List<Get> gets = new ArrayList<>(10);
final List<ApiFuture<Result>> expected = new ArrayList<>(10);
gets.add(new Get(Bytes.toBytes("key0")));
expected.add(ApiFutures.<Result>immediateFuture(null));
for (int i = 1; i < 10; i++) {
byte[] row_key = randomBytes(8);
gets.add(new Get(row_key));
ByteString key = ByteStringer.wrap(row_key);
ByteString cellValue = ByteString.copyFrom(randomBytes(8));
expected.add(
ApiFutures.immediateFuture(
Result.create(
ImmutableList.<Cell>of(
new RowCell(
key.toByteArray(),
Bytes.toBytes("family"),
Bytes.toBytes(""),
System.nanoTime() / 1000,
cellValue.toByteArray())))));
}
// Test 10 gets, but return only 9 to test the row not found case.
when(mockBulkRead.add(any(Query.class)))
.then(
new Answer<ApiFuture<Result>>() {
final AtomicInteger counter = new AtomicInteger();
@Override
public ApiFuture<Result> answer(InvocationOnMock invocation) throws Throwable {
return expected.get(counter.getAndIncrement());
}
});
ByteString key = ByteStringer.wrap(randomBytes(8));
ByteString cellValue = ByteString.copyFrom(randomBytes(8));
Result row =
Result.create(
ImmutableList.<Cell>of(
new RowCell(
key.toByteArray(),
Bytes.toBytes("family"),
Bytes.toBytes(""),
1000L,
cellValue.toByteArray())));
when(mockFuture.get()).thenReturn(row);
Result[] results = createExecutor().batch(gets);
verify(mockBulkRead, times(10)).add(any(Query.class));
verify(mockBulkRead, times(1)).flush();
assertTrue(matchesRow(Result.EMPTY_RESULT).matches(results[0]));
for (int i = 1; i < results.length; i++) {
assertTrue(
"Expected "
+ Bytes.toString(gets.get(i).getRow())
+ " but was "
+ Bytes.toString(results[i].getRow()),
Bytes.equals(results[i].getRow(), gets.get(i).getRow()));
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testPartialResults() throws Exception {
when(mockBigtableApi.getDataClient()).thenReturn(mockDataClientWrapper);
when(mockDataClientWrapper.createBulkRead(isA(String.class))).thenReturn(mockBulkRead);
byte[] key1 = randomBytes(8);
byte[] key2 = randomBytes(8);
Result result =
Result.create(
ImmutableList.<org.apache.hadoop.hbase.Cell>of(
new RowCell(
key1,
"cf".getBytes(),
"".getBytes(),
10,
"hi!".getBytes(),
ImmutableList.<String>of())));
RuntimeException exception = new RuntimeException("Something bad happened");
when(mockBulkRead.add(any(Query.class)))
.thenReturn(ApiFutures.immediateFuture(result))
.thenReturn(ApiFutures.<Result>immediateFailedFuture(exception));
List<Get> gets = Arrays.asList(new Get(key1), new Get(key2));
Object[] results = new Object[2];
try {
createExecutor().batch(gets, results);
} catch (RetriesExhaustedWithDetailsException ignored) {
}
Assert.assertTrue("first result is a result", results[0] instanceof Result);
Assert.assertArrayEquals(key1, ((Result) results[0]).getRow());
Assert.assertEquals(exception, results[1]);
}
#location 26
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testPartialResults() throws Exception {
when(mockBigtableApi.getDataClient()).thenReturn(mockDataClientWrapper);
when(mockDataClientWrapper.createBulkRead(isA(String.class))).thenReturn(mockBulkRead);
byte[] key1 = randomBytes(8);
byte[] key2 = randomBytes(8);
Result expected =
Result.create(
ImmutableList.<org.apache.hadoop.hbase.Cell>of(
new RowCell(
key1,
Bytes.toBytes("cf"),
Bytes.toBytes(""),
10,
Bytes.toBytes("hi!"),
ImmutableList.<String>of())));
RuntimeException exception = new RuntimeException("Something bad happened");
when(mockBulkRead.add(any(Query.class)))
.thenReturn(ApiFutures.immediateFuture(expected))
.thenReturn(ApiFutures.<Result>immediateFailedFuture(exception));
List<Get> gets = Arrays.asList(new Get(key1), new Get(key2));
Object[] results = new Object[2];
try {
createExecutor().batch(gets, results);
} catch (RetriesExhaustedWithDetailsException ignored) {
}
assertTrue("first result is a result", results[0] instanceof Result);
assertTrue(matchesRow(expected).matches(results[0]));
Assert.assertEquals(exception, results[1]);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void onClose(Status status, Metadata trailers) {
try (Scope scope = TRACER.withSpan(operationSpan)) {
synchronized (callLock) {
call = NULL_CALL;
}
rpcTimerContext.close();
// OK
if (status.isOk()) {
if (onOK(trailers)) {
finalizeStats(status);
}
} else {
onError(status, trailers);
}
} catch (Exception e) {
setException(e);
}
}
#location 14
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Override
public void onClose(Status status, Metadata trailers) {
try (Scope scope = TRACER.withSpan(operationSpan)) {
callWrapper.resetCall();
rpcTimerContext.close();
// OK
if (status.isOk()) {
if (onOK(trailers)) {
finalizeStats(status);
}
} else {
onError(status, trailers);
}
} catch (Exception e) {
setException(e);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testCBC_UserAgentUsingPlainTextNegotiation() throws Exception{
ServerSocket serverSocket = new ServerSocket(0);
final int availablePort = serverSocket.getLocalPort();
serverSocket.close();
//Creates non-ssl server.
createServer(availablePort);
BigtableOptions bigtableOptions =
BigtableOptions.builder()
.setDataHost("localhost")
.setAdminHost("localhost")
.setProjectId(TEST_PROJECT_ID)
.setInstanceId(TEST_INSTANCE_ID)
.setUserAgent(TEST_USER_AGENT)
.setUsePlaintextNegotiation(true)
.setCredentialOptions(CredentialOptions.nullCredential())
.setPort(availablePort)
.build();
xGoogApiPattern = Pattern.compile(".* cbt/.*");
new BigtableSession(bigtableOptions).getDataClient()
.readFlatRows(ReadRowsRequest.getDefaultInstance()).next();
Assert.assertTrue(serverPasses.get());
}
#location 23
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
@Test
public void testCBC_UserAgentUsingPlainTextNegotiation() throws Exception{
ServerSocket serverSocket = new ServerSocket(0);
final int availablePort = serverSocket.getLocalPort();
serverSocket.close();
//Creates non-ssl server.
createServer(availablePort);
BigtableOptions bigtableOptions =
BigtableOptions.builder()
.setDataHost("localhost")
.setAdminHost("localhost")
.setProjectId(TEST_PROJECT_ID)
.setInstanceId(TEST_INSTANCE_ID)
.setUserAgent(TEST_USER_AGENT)
.setUsePlaintextNegotiation(true)
.setCredentialOptions(CredentialOptions.nullCredential())
.setPort(availablePort)
.build();
xGoogApiPattern = Pattern.compile(".* cbt/.*");
try (BigtableSession session = new BigtableSession(bigtableOptions)) {
session.getDataClient()
.readFlatRows(ReadRowsRequest.getDefaultInstance()).next();
Assert.assertTrue(serverPasses.get());
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
private Result[] batch(final List<? extends org.apache.hadoop.hbase.client.Row> actions)
throws Exception {
return createExecutor(options).batch(actions);
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
|
#fixed code
private Result[] batch(final List<? extends org.apache.hadoop.hbase.client.Row> actions)
throws Exception {
return createExecutor().batch(actions);
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void onClose(Status status, Metadata trailers) {
synchronized (callLock) {
call = null;
}
rpcTimerContext.close();
Status.Code code = status.getCode();
// OK
if (code == Status.Code.OK) {
if (onOK()) {
operationTimerContext.close();
}
return;
}
// CANCELLED
if (code == Status.Code.CANCELLED) {
// An explicit user cancellation is not considered a failure.
operationTimerContext.close();
return;
}
// Non retry scenario
if (!retryOptions.enableRetries()
|| !retryOptions.isRetryable(code)
// Unauthenticated is special because the request never made it to
// to the server, so all requests are retryable
|| !(isRequestRetryable() || code == Code.UNAUTHENTICATED)) {
rpc.getRpcMetrics().markFailure();
operationTimerContext.close();
setException(status.asRuntimeException());
return;
}
// Attempt retry with backoff
long nextBackOff = getNextBackoff();
failedCount += 1;
// Backoffs timed out.
if (nextBackOff == BackOff.STOP) {
rpc.getRpcMetrics().markRetriesExhasted();
operationTimerContext.close();
String message = String.format("Exhausted retries after %d failures.", failedCount);
StatusRuntimeException cause = status.asRuntimeException();
setException(new BigtableRetriesExhaustedException(message, cause));
return;
} else {
String channelId = ChannelPool.extractIdentifier(trailers);
LOG.info("Retrying failed call. Failure #%d, got: %s on channel %s",
status.getCause(), failedCount, status, channelId);
}
performRetry(nextBackOff);
}
#location 53
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
|
#fixed code
@Override
public void onClose(Status status, Metadata trailers) {
synchronized (callLock) {
call = null;
}
rpcTimerContext.close();
// OK
if (status.isOk()) {
if (onOK(trailers)) {
operationTimerContext.close();
}
} else {
onError(status, trailers);
}
}
|
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
|
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