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stringlengths 205
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stringlengths 64
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#vulnerable code
protected void checkKeycloakSession(Request request, HttpFacade facade) {
if (request.getSessionInternal(false) == null || request.getSessionInternal().getPrincipal() == null) return;
RefreshableKeycloakSecurityContext session = (RefreshableKeycloakSecurityContext) request.getSessionInternal().getNote(KeycloakSecurityContext.class.getName());
if (session == null) return;
// just in case session got serialized
if (session.getDeployment() == null) session.setDeployment(deploymentContext.resolveDeployment(facade));
if (session.isActive() && !session.getDeployment().isAlwaysRefreshToken()) return;
// FYI: A refresh requires same scope, so same roles will be set. Otherwise, refresh will fail and token will
// not be updated
boolean success = session.refreshExpiredToken(false);
if (success && session.isActive()) return;
request.getSessionInternal().removeNote(KeycloakSecurityContext.class.getName());
request.setUserPrincipal(null);
request.setAuthType(null);
request.getSessionInternal().setPrincipal(null);
request.getSessionInternal().setAuthType(null);
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
protected void checkKeycloakSession(Request request, HttpFacade facade) {
if (request.getSessionInternal(false) == null || request.getSessionInternal().getPrincipal() == null) return;
RefreshableKeycloakSecurityContext session = (RefreshableKeycloakSecurityContext) request.getSessionInternal().getNote(KeycloakSecurityContext.class.getName());
if (session == null) return;
// just in case session got serialized
if (session.getDeployment() == null) session.setDeployment(deploymentContext.resolveDeployment(facade));
if (session.isActive() && !session.getDeployment().isAlwaysRefreshToken()) return;
// FYI: A refresh requires same scope, so same roles will be set. Otherwise, refresh will fail and token will
// not be updated
boolean success = session.refreshExpiredToken(false);
if (success && session.isActive()) return;
// Refresh failed, so user is already logged out from keycloak. Cleanup and expire our session
Session catalinaSession = request.getSessionInternal();
log.debugf("Cleanup and expire session %s after failed refresh", catalinaSession.getId());
catalinaSession.removeNote(KeycloakSecurityContext.class.getName());
request.setUserPrincipal(null);
request.setAuthType(null);
catalinaSession.setPrincipal(null);
catalinaSession.setAuthType(null);
catalinaSession.expire();
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public static String getPemFromKey(Key key) {
StringWriter writer = new StringWriter();
PEMWriter pemWriter = new PEMWriter(writer);
try {
pemWriter.writeObject(key);
pemWriter.flush();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
String s = writer.toString();
return PemUtils.removeBeginEnd(s);
}
#location 6
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
public static String getPemFromKey(Key key) {
StringWriter writer = new StringWriter();
PEMWriter pemWriter = new PEMWriter(writer);
try {
pemWriter.writeObject(key);
pemWriter.flush();
pemWriter.close();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
String s = writer.toString();
return PemUtils.removeBeginEnd(s);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void backchannelLogout(UserSessionModel userSession, ClientSessionModel clientSession) {
ClientModel client = clientSession.getClient();
if (!(client instanceof ApplicationModel)) return;
ApplicationModel app = (ApplicationModel)client;
if (app.getManagementUrl() == null) return;
SAML2LogoutRequestBuilder logoutBuilder = new SAML2LogoutRequestBuilder()
.userPrincipal(userSession.getUser().getUsername())
.destination(client.getClientId());
if (requiresRealmSignature(client)) {
logoutBuilder.signatureAlgorithm(getSignatureAlgorithm(client));
logoutBuilder.sign(realm.getPrivateKey(), realm.getPublicKey());
}
/*
if (requiresEncryption(client)) {
PublicKey publicKey = null;
try {
publicKey = PemUtils.decodePublicKey(client.getAttribute(ClientModel.PUBLIC_KEY));
} catch (Exception e) {
logger.error("failed", e);
return;
}
logoutBuilder.encrypt(publicKey);
}
*/
String logoutRequestString = null;
try {
logoutRequestString = logoutBuilder.postBinding().encoded();
} catch (Exception e) {
logger.warn("failed to send saml logout", e);
return;
}
String adminUrl = ResourceAdminManager.getManagementUrl(uriInfo.getRequestUri(), app);
ApacheHttpClient4Executor executor = ResourceAdminManager.createExecutor();
try {
ClientRequest request = executor.createRequest(adminUrl);
request.formParameter(GeneralConstants.SAML_REQUEST_KEY, logoutRequestString);
request.formParameter(SAML2LogOutHandler.BACK_CHANNEL_LOGOUT, SAML2LogOutHandler.BACK_CHANNEL_LOGOUT);
ClientResponse response = null;
try {
response = request.post();
response.releaseConnection();
// Undertow will redirect root urls not ending in "/" to root url + "/". Test for this weird behavior
if (response.getStatus() == 302 && !adminUrl.endsWith("/")) {
String redirect = (String)response.getHeaders().getFirst(HttpHeaders.LOCATION);
String withSlash = adminUrl + "/";
if (withSlash.equals(redirect)) {
request = executor.createRequest(withSlash);
request.formParameter(GeneralConstants.SAML_REQUEST_KEY, logoutRequestString);
request.formParameter(SAML2LogOutHandler.BACK_CHANNEL_LOGOUT, SAML2LogOutHandler.BACK_CHANNEL_LOGOUT);
response = request.post();
response.releaseConnection();
}
}
} catch (Exception e) {
logger.warn("failed to send saml logout", e);
}
} finally {
executor.getHttpClient().getConnectionManager().shutdown();
}
}
#location 51
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
@Override
public void backchannelLogout(UserSessionModel userSession, ClientSessionModel clientSession) {
ClientModel client = clientSession.getClient();
if (!(client instanceof ApplicationModel)) return;
ApplicationModel app = (ApplicationModel)client;
if (app.getManagementUrl() == null) return;
SAML2LogoutRequestBuilder logoutBuilder = new SAML2LogoutRequestBuilder()
.userPrincipal(userSession.getUser().getUsername())
.destination(client.getClientId());
if (requiresRealmSignature(client)) {
logoutBuilder.signatureAlgorithm(getSignatureAlgorithm(client))
.signWith(realm.getPrivateKey(), realm.getPublicKey())
.signDocument();
}
/*
if (requiresEncryption(client)) {
PublicKey publicKey = null;
try {
publicKey = PemUtils.decodePublicKey(client.getAttribute(ClientModel.PUBLIC_KEY));
} catch (Exception e) {
logger.error("failed", e);
return;
}
logoutBuilder.encrypt(publicKey);
}
*/
String logoutRequestString = null;
try {
logoutRequestString = logoutBuilder.postBinding().encoded();
} catch (Exception e) {
logger.warn("failed to send saml logout", e);
return;
}
String adminUrl = ResourceAdminManager.getManagementUrl(uriInfo.getRequestUri(), app);
ApacheHttpClient4Executor executor = ResourceAdminManager.createExecutor();
try {
ClientRequest request = executor.createRequest(adminUrl);
request.formParameter(GeneralConstants.SAML_REQUEST_KEY, logoutRequestString);
request.formParameter(SAML2LogOutHandler.BACK_CHANNEL_LOGOUT, SAML2LogOutHandler.BACK_CHANNEL_LOGOUT);
ClientResponse response = null;
try {
response = request.post();
response.releaseConnection();
// Undertow will redirect root urls not ending in "/" to root url + "/". Test for this weird behavior
if (response.getStatus() == 302 && !adminUrl.endsWith("/")) {
String redirect = (String)response.getHeaders().getFirst(HttpHeaders.LOCATION);
String withSlash = adminUrl + "/";
if (withSlash.equals(redirect)) {
request = executor.createRequest(withSlash);
request.formParameter(GeneralConstants.SAML_REQUEST_KEY, logoutRequestString);
request.formParameter(SAML2LogOutHandler.BACK_CHANNEL_LOGOUT, SAML2LogOutHandler.BACK_CHANNEL_LOGOUT);
response = request.post();
response.releaseConnection();
}
}
} catch (Exception e) {
logger.warn("failed to send saml logout", e);
}
} finally {
executor.getHttpClient().getConnectionManager().shutdown();
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private String[] getReferrer() {
String referrer = uriInfo.getQueryParameters().getFirst("referrer");
if (referrer == null) {
return null;
}
String referrerUri = uriInfo.getQueryParameters().getFirst("referrer_uri");
ApplicationModel application = realm.getApplicationByName(referrer);
if (application != null) {
if (referrerUri != null) {
referrerUri = TokenService.verifyRedirectUri(uriInfo, referrerUri, application);
} else {
referrerUri = ResolveRelative.resolveRelativeUri(uriInfo.getRequestUri(), application.getBaseUrl());
}
if (referrerUri != null) {
return new String[]{referrer, referrerUri};
}
} else if (referrerUri != null) {
ClientModel client = realm.getOAuthClient(referrer);
if (client != null) {
referrerUri = TokenService.verifyRedirectUri(uriInfo, referrerUri, application);
if (referrerUri != null) {
return new String[]{referrer, referrerUri};
}
}
}
return null;
}
#location 12
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
private String[] getReferrer() {
String referrer = uriInfo.getQueryParameters().getFirst("referrer");
if (referrer == null) {
return null;
}
String referrerUri = uriInfo.getQueryParameters().getFirst("referrer_uri");
ApplicationModel application = realm.getApplicationByName(referrer);
if (application != null) {
if (referrerUri != null) {
referrerUri = TokenService.verifyRedirectUri(uriInfo, referrerUri, realm, application);
} else {
referrerUri = ResolveRelative.resolveRelativeUri(uriInfo.getRequestUri(), application.getBaseUrl());
}
if (referrerUri != null) {
return new String[]{referrer, referrerUri};
}
} else if (referrerUri != null) {
ClientModel client = realm.getOAuthClient(referrer);
if (client != null) {
referrerUri = TokenService.verifyRedirectUri(uriInfo, referrerUri, realm, application);
if (referrerUri != null) {
return new String[]{referrer, referrerUri};
}
}
}
return null;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public static String getPemFromCertificate(X509Certificate certificate) {
StringWriter writer = new StringWriter();
PEMWriter pemWriter = new PEMWriter(writer);
try {
pemWriter.writeObject(certificate);
pemWriter.flush();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
String s = writer.toString();
return PemUtils.removeBeginEnd(s);
}
#location 6
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
public static String getPemFromCertificate(X509Certificate certificate) {
StringWriter writer = new StringWriter();
PEMWriter pemWriter = new PEMWriter(writer);
try {
pemWriter.writeObject(certificate);
pemWriter.flush();
pemWriter.close();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
String s = writer.toString();
return PemUtils.removeBeginEnd(s);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
protected void checkKeycloakSession(Request request, HttpFacade facade) {
if (request.getSessionInternal(false) == null || request.getPrincipal() == null) return;
RefreshableKeycloakSecurityContext session = (RefreshableKeycloakSecurityContext) request.getSessionInternal().getNote(KeycloakSecurityContext.class.getName());
if (session == null) return;
// just in case session got serialized
if (session.getDeployment() == null) session.setDeployment(deploymentContext.resolveDeployment(facade));
if (session.isActive() && !session.getDeployment().isAlwaysRefreshToken()) return;
// FYI: A refresh requires same scope, so same roles will be set. Otherwise, refresh will fail and token will
// not be updated
boolean success = session.refreshExpiredToken(false);
if (success && session.isActive()) return;
request.getSessionInternal().removeNote(KeycloakSecurityContext.class.getName());
request.setUserPrincipal(null);
request.setAuthType(null);
request.getSessionInternal().setPrincipal(null);
request.getSessionInternal().setAuthType(null);
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
protected void checkKeycloakSession(Request request, HttpFacade facade) {
if (request.getSessionInternal(false) == null || request.getPrincipal() == null) return;
RefreshableKeycloakSecurityContext session = (RefreshableKeycloakSecurityContext) request.getSessionInternal().getNote(KeycloakSecurityContext.class.getName());
if (session == null) return;
// just in case session got serialized
if (session.getDeployment() == null) session.setDeployment(deploymentContext.resolveDeployment(facade));
if (session.isActive() && !session.getDeployment().isAlwaysRefreshToken()) return;
// FYI: A refresh requires same scope, so same roles will be set. Otherwise, refresh will fail and token will
// not be updated
boolean success = session.refreshExpiredToken(false);
if (success && session.isActive()) return;
// Refresh failed, so user is already logged out from keycloak. Cleanup and expire our session
Session catalinaSession = request.getSessionInternal();
log.fine("Cleanup and expire session " + catalinaSession + " after failed refresh");
catalinaSession.removeNote(KeycloakSecurityContext.class.getName());
request.setUserPrincipal(null);
request.setAuthType(null);
catalinaSession.setPrincipal(null);
catalinaSession.setAuthType(null);
catalinaSession.expire();
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void deploy(DeploymentPhaseContext phaseContext) throws DeploymentUnitProcessingException {
final DeploymentUnit deploymentUnit = phaseContext.getDeploymentUnit();
KeycloakAdapterConfigService service = KeycloakAdapterConfigService.find(phaseContext.getServiceRegistry());
if (service.isKeycloakDeployment(deploymentUnit.getName())) {
addModules(deploymentUnit);
}
}
#location 6
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
@Override
public void deploy(DeploymentPhaseContext phaseContext) throws DeploymentUnitProcessingException {
final DeploymentUnit deploymentUnit = phaseContext.getDeploymentUnit();
addModules(deploymentUnit);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void copySnapshot() {
int length = dirtyIndex.get();
if (length <= dirtyArray.length) {
for (int i = 0; i < length; i++) {
int index = dirtyArray[i];
this.snapshot[index] = live[index];
}
} else {
for (int i = 0; i < live.length; i++) {
this.snapshot[i] = live[i];
}
}
}
#location 6
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION | #fixed code
@Override
public void copySnapshot() {
int length = dirtyIndex.get();
if (length <= dirtySize) {
for (int i = 0; i < length; i++) {
int index = dirtyArray.get(i);
this.snapshot[index] = getLive(i);
}
} else {
for (int i = 0; i < snapshot.length; i++) {
this.snapshot[i] = getLive(i);
}
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@DelayedWrite
public short set(int index, short value) {
synchronized (live) {
live[index] = value;
}
int localDirtyIndex = dirtyIndex.getAndIncrement();
if (localDirtyIndex < dirtyArray.length) {
dirtyArray[localDirtyIndex] = index;
}
return snapshot[index];
}
#location 8
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION | #fixed code
@DelayedWrite
public short set(int index, short value) {
boolean success = false;
int divIndex = index >> 1;
boolean isZero = (index & 0x1) == 0;
short one;
short zero;
short old = 0;
while (!success) {
int packed = live.get(divIndex);
if (isZero) {
old = unpackZero(packed);
one = unpackOne(packed);
zero = value;
} else {
old = unpackOne(packed);
one = value;
zero = unpackZero(packed);
}
success = live.compareAndSet(divIndex, packed, pack(zero, one));
}
markDirty(index);
return old;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void copySnapshot() {
int length = dirtyIndex.get();
if (length <= dirtyArray.length) {
for (int i = 0; i < length; i++) {
int index = dirtyArray[i];
this.snapshot[index] = live[index];
}
} else {
for (int i = 0; i < live.length; i++) {
this.snapshot[i] = live[i];
}
}
}
#location 11
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION | #fixed code
@Override
public void copySnapshot() {
int length = dirtyIndex.get();
if (length <= dirtySize) {
for (int i = 0; i < length; i++) {
int index = dirtyArray.get(i);
this.snapshot[index] = getLive(i);
}
} else {
for (int i = 0; i < snapshot.length; i++) {
this.snapshot[i] = getLive(i);
}
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@DelayedWrite
public short set(int index, short value) {
synchronized (live) {
live[index] = value;
}
int localDirtyIndex = dirtyIndex.getAndIncrement();
if (localDirtyIndex < dirtyArray.length) {
dirtyArray[localDirtyIndex] = index;
}
return snapshot[index];
}
#location 10
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION | #fixed code
@DelayedWrite
public short set(int index, short value) {
boolean success = false;
int divIndex = index >> 1;
boolean isZero = (index & 0x1) == 0;
short one;
short zero;
short old = 0;
while (!success) {
int packed = live.get(divIndex);
if (isZero) {
old = unpackZero(packed);
one = unpackOne(packed);
zero = value;
} else {
old = unpackOne(packed);
one = value;
zero = unpackZero(packed);
}
success = live.compareAndSet(divIndex, packed, pack(zero, one));
}
markDirty(index);
return old;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public static KeePassDatabase getInstance(File keePassDatabaseFile) {
if(keePassDatabaseFile == null) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("You must provide a valid KeePass database file.");
}
try {
return getInstance(new FileInputStream(keePassDatabaseFile));
} catch (FileNotFoundException e) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("The KeePass database file could not be found. You must provide a valid KeePass database file.");
}
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
public static KeePassDatabase getInstance(File keePassDatabaseFile) {
if(keePassDatabaseFile == null) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("You must provide a valid KeePass database file.");
}
InputStream keePassDatabaseStream = null;
try {
keePassDatabaseStream = new FileInputStream(keePassDatabaseFile);
return getInstance(keePassDatabaseStream);
} catch (FileNotFoundException e) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("The KeePass database file could not be found. You must provide a valid KeePass database file.");
} finally {
if (keePassDatabaseStream != null) {
try {
keePassDatabaseStream.close();
} catch (IOException e) {
// Ignore
}
}
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectGroups() throws FileNotFoundException {
FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml");
KeePassFile keePassFile = new XmlParser().parse(fileInputStream, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey));
List<Group> groups = keePassFile.getTopGroups();
Assert.assertNotNull(groups);
Assert.assertEquals(6, groups.size());
Assert.assertEquals("General", groups.get(0).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("FqvMJ8yjlUSAEt9OmNSj2A==", groups.get(0).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Windows", groups.get(1).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("rXt7D+EM/0qW1rgPB4g5nw==", groups.get(1).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Network", groups.get(2).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("DwdAaKn4tEyXFlU56/2UBQ==", groups.get(2).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Internet", groups.get(3).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("COgUrPt5P0676DeyZn/auQ==", groups.get(3).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("eMail", groups.get(4).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("/xWfOfnC6ki76sNhrZR7rw==", groups.get(4).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Homebanking", groups.get(5).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("Rdjt21Jla0+E5Q9ElJHw1g==", groups.get(5).getUuid());
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Test
public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectGroups() throws FileNotFoundException {
KeePassFile keePassFile = parseKeePassXml();
List<Group> groups = keePassFile.getTopGroups();
Assert.assertNotNull(groups);
Assert.assertEquals(6, groups.size());
Assert.assertEquals("General", groups.get(0).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("FqvMJ8yjlUSAEt9OmNSj2A==", groups.get(0).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Windows", groups.get(1).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("rXt7D+EM/0qW1rgPB4g5nw==", groups.get(1).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Network", groups.get(2).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("DwdAaKn4tEyXFlU56/2UBQ==", groups.get(2).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Internet", groups.get(3).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("COgUrPt5P0676DeyZn/auQ==", groups.get(3).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("eMail", groups.get(4).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("/xWfOfnC6ki76sNhrZR7rw==", groups.get(4).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Homebanking", groups.get(5).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("Rdjt21Jla0+E5Q9ElJHw1g==", groups.get(5).getUuid());
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectGroups() throws FileNotFoundException {
FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml");
KeePassFile keePassFile = new XmlParser().parse(fileInputStream, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey));
List<Group> groups = keePassFile.getTopGroups();
Assert.assertNotNull(groups);
Assert.assertEquals(6, groups.size());
Assert.assertEquals("General", groups.get(0).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("FqvMJ8yjlUSAEt9OmNSj2A==", groups.get(0).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Windows", groups.get(1).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("rXt7D+EM/0qW1rgPB4g5nw==", groups.get(1).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Network", groups.get(2).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("DwdAaKn4tEyXFlU56/2UBQ==", groups.get(2).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Internet", groups.get(3).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("COgUrPt5P0676DeyZn/auQ==", groups.get(3).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("eMail", groups.get(4).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("/xWfOfnC6ki76sNhrZR7rw==", groups.get(4).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Homebanking", groups.get(5).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("Rdjt21Jla0+E5Q9ElJHw1g==", groups.get(5).getUuid());
}
#location 27
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Test
public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectGroups() throws FileNotFoundException {
KeePassFile keePassFile = parseKeePassXml();
List<Group> groups = keePassFile.getTopGroups();
Assert.assertNotNull(groups);
Assert.assertEquals(6, groups.size());
Assert.assertEquals("General", groups.get(0).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("FqvMJ8yjlUSAEt9OmNSj2A==", groups.get(0).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Windows", groups.get(1).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("rXt7D+EM/0qW1rgPB4g5nw==", groups.get(1).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Network", groups.get(2).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("DwdAaKn4tEyXFlU56/2UBQ==", groups.get(2).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Internet", groups.get(3).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("COgUrPt5P0676DeyZn/auQ==", groups.get(3).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("eMail", groups.get(4).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("/xWfOfnC6ki76sNhrZR7rw==", groups.get(4).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Homebanking", groups.get(5).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("Rdjt21Jla0+E5Q9ElJHw1g==", groups.get(5).getUuid());
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectMetadata() throws FileNotFoundException {
FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml");
KeePassFile keePassFile = new XmlParser().parse(fileInputStream, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey));
Assert.assertEquals("KeePass", keePassFile.getMeta().getGenerator());
Assert.assertEquals("TestDatabase", keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseName());
Assert.assertEquals("Just a sample db", keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseDescription());
Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:59:39", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseNameChanged().getTime()));
Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:59:39", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseDescriptionChanged().getTime()));
Assert.assertEquals(365, keePassFile.getMeta().getMaintenanceHistoryDays());
Assert.assertEquals(true, keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinEnabled());
Assert.assertEquals("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==", keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:58:56", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinChanged().getTime()));
Assert.assertEquals(10, keePassFile.getMeta().getHistoryMaxItems());
Assert.assertEquals(6291456, keePassFile.getMeta().getHistoryMaxSize());
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Test
public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectMetadata() throws FileNotFoundException {
KeePassFile keePassFile = parseKeePassXml();
Assert.assertEquals("KeePass", keePassFile.getMeta().getGenerator());
Assert.assertEquals("TestDatabase", keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseName());
Assert.assertEquals("Just a sample db", keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseDescription());
Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:59:39", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseNameChanged().getTime()));
Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:59:39", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseDescriptionChanged().getTime()));
Assert.assertEquals(365, keePassFile.getMeta().getMaintenanceHistoryDays());
Assert.assertEquals(true, keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinEnabled());
Assert.assertEquals("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==", keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:58:56", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinChanged().getTime()));
Assert.assertEquals(10, keePassFile.getMeta().getHistoryMaxItems());
Assert.assertEquals(6291456, keePassFile.getMeta().getHistoryMaxSize());
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public boolean isPasswordProtected() {
return getPropertyByName(PASSWORD).isProtected();
}
#location 2
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
public boolean isPasswordProtected() {
return getPropertyByName(PASSWORD).isProtected();
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectGroups() throws FileNotFoundException {
FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml");
KeePassFile keePassFile = new XmlParser().parse(fileInputStream, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey));
List<Group> groups = keePassFile.getTopGroups();
Assert.assertNotNull(groups);
Assert.assertEquals(6, groups.size());
Assert.assertEquals("General", groups.get(0).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("FqvMJ8yjlUSAEt9OmNSj2A==", groups.get(0).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Windows", groups.get(1).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("rXt7D+EM/0qW1rgPB4g5nw==", groups.get(1).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Network", groups.get(2).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("DwdAaKn4tEyXFlU56/2UBQ==", groups.get(2).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Internet", groups.get(3).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("COgUrPt5P0676DeyZn/auQ==", groups.get(3).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("eMail", groups.get(4).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("/xWfOfnC6ki76sNhrZR7rw==", groups.get(4).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Homebanking", groups.get(5).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("Rdjt21Jla0+E5Q9ElJHw1g==", groups.get(5).getUuid());
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
@Test
public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectGroups() throws FileNotFoundException {
KeePassFile keePassFile = parseKeePassXml();
List<Group> groups = keePassFile.getTopGroups();
Assert.assertNotNull(groups);
Assert.assertEquals(6, groups.size());
Assert.assertEquals("General", groups.get(0).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("FqvMJ8yjlUSAEt9OmNSj2A==", groups.get(0).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Windows", groups.get(1).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("rXt7D+EM/0qW1rgPB4g5nw==", groups.get(1).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Network", groups.get(2).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("DwdAaKn4tEyXFlU56/2UBQ==", groups.get(2).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Internet", groups.get(3).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("COgUrPt5P0676DeyZn/auQ==", groups.get(3).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("eMail", groups.get(4).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("/xWfOfnC6ki76sNhrZR7rw==", groups.get(4).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("Homebanking", groups.get(5).getName());
Assert.assertEquals("Rdjt21Jla0+E5Q9ElJHw1g==", groups.get(5).getUuid());
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public boolean isTitleProtected() {
return getPropertyByName(TITLE).isProtected();
}
#location 2
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
public boolean isTitleProtected() {
return getPropertyByName(TITLE).isProtected();
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void whenWritingDatabaseFileShouldBeAbleToReadItAlso() throws FileNotFoundException {
FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml");
KeePassFile keePassFile = new KeePassDatabaseXmlParser().fromXml(fileInputStream,
Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey));
new ProtectedValueProcessor().processProtectedValues(new DecryptionStrategy(Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)), keePassFile);
FileOutputStream file = new FileOutputStream("target/test-classes/writeDatabase.kdbx");
KeePassDatabase.write(keePassFile, "abcdefg", file);
KeePassDatabase database = KeePassDatabase.getInstance("target/test-classes/writeDatabase.kdbx");
KeePassHeader header = database.getHeader();
Assert.assertEquals(CompressionAlgorithm.Gzip, header.getCompression());
Assert.assertEquals(CrsAlgorithm.Salsa20, header.getCrsAlgorithm());
Assert.assertEquals(8000, header.getTransformRounds());
KeePassFile openDatabase = database.openDatabase("abcdefg");
Entry sampleEntry = openDatabase.getEntryByTitle("Sample Entry");
Assert.assertEquals("User Name", sampleEntry.getUsername());
Assert.assertEquals("Password", sampleEntry.getPassword());
Entry sampleEntryTwo = openDatabase.getEntryByTitle("Sample Entry #2");
Assert.assertEquals("Michael321", sampleEntryTwo.getUsername());
Assert.assertEquals("12345", sampleEntryTwo.getPassword());
}
#location 27
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Test
public void whenWritingDatabaseFileShouldBeAbleToReadItAlso() throws FileNotFoundException {
FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml");
KeePassFile keePassFile = new KeePassDatabaseXmlParser().fromXml(fileInputStream);
new ProtectedValueProcessor().processProtectedValues(new DecryptionStrategy(Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)), keePassFile);
FileOutputStream file = new FileOutputStream("target/test-classes/writeDatabase.kdbx");
KeePassDatabase.write(keePassFile, "abcdefg", file);
KeePassDatabase database = KeePassDatabase.getInstance("target/test-classes/writeDatabase.kdbx");
KeePassHeader header = database.getHeader();
Assert.assertEquals(CompressionAlgorithm.Gzip, header.getCompression());
Assert.assertEquals(CrsAlgorithm.Salsa20, header.getCrsAlgorithm());
Assert.assertEquals(8000, header.getTransformRounds());
KeePassFile openDatabase = database.openDatabase("abcdefg");
Entry sampleEntry = openDatabase.getEntryByTitle("Sample Entry");
Assert.assertEquals("User Name", sampleEntry.getUsername());
Assert.assertEquals("Password", sampleEntry.getPassword());
Entry sampleEntryTwo = openDatabase.getEntryByTitle("Sample Entry #2");
Assert.assertEquals("Michael321", sampleEntryTwo.getUsername());
Assert.assertEquals("12345", sampleEntryTwo.getPassword());
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private byte[] processDatabaseEncryption(boolean encrypt, byte[] database, KeePassHeader header, byte[] aesKey)
throws IOException {
byte[] metaData = new byte[KeePassHeader.VERSION_SIGNATURE_LENGTH + header.getHeaderSize()];
BufferedInputStream bufferedInputStream = new BufferedInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(database));
bufferedInputStream.read(metaData);
byte[] payload = StreamUtils.toByteArray(bufferedInputStream);
byte[] processedPayload;
if (encrypt) {
processedPayload = Aes.encrypt(aesKey, header.getEncryptionIV(), payload);
} else {
processedPayload = Aes.decrypt(aesKey, header.getEncryptionIV(), payload);
}
ByteArrayOutputStream output = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
output.write(metaData);
output.write(processedPayload);
return output.toByteArray();
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
private byte[] processDatabaseEncryption(boolean encrypt, byte[] database, KeePassHeader header, byte[] aesKey)
throws IOException {
byte[] metaData = new byte[KeePassHeader.VERSION_SIGNATURE_LENGTH + header.getHeaderSize()];
SafeInputStream inputStream = new SafeInputStream(new BufferedInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(database)));
inputStream.readSafe(metaData);
byte[] payload = StreamUtils.toByteArray(inputStream);
byte[] processedPayload;
if (encrypt) {
processedPayload = Aes.encrypt(aesKey, header.getEncryptionIV(), payload);
} else {
processedPayload = Aes.decrypt(aesKey, header.getEncryptionIV(), payload);
}
ByteArrayOutputStream output = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
output.write(metaData);
output.write(processedPayload);
return output.toByteArray();
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private KeePassFile parseKeePassXml() throws FileNotFoundException {
FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml");
KeePassFile keePassFile = new KeePassDatabaseXmlParser().fromXml(fileInputStream,
Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey));
new ProtectedValueProcessor().processProtectedValues(new DecryptionStrategy(Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)), keePassFile);
return keePassFile;
}
#location 8
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
private KeePassFile parseKeePassXml() throws FileNotFoundException {
FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml");
KeePassFile keePassFile = new KeePassDatabaseXmlParser().fromXml(fileInputStream);
new ProtectedValueProcessor().processProtectedValues(new DecryptionStrategy(Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)), keePassFile);
return keePassFile;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectEntries() throws FileNotFoundException {
FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml");
KeePassFile keePassFile = new XmlParser().parse(fileInputStream, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey));
List<Entry> entries = keePassFile.getTopEntries();
Assert.assertNotNull(entries);
Assert.assertEquals(2, entries.size());
Assert.assertEquals("libdLW88cU6BvrPQlvKqMA==", entries.get(0).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals(5, entries.get(0).getProperties().size());
Assert.assertEquals("Sample Entry", entries.get(0).getTitle());
Assert.assertEquals("http://keepass.info/", entries.get(0).getUrl());
Assert.assertEquals("User Name", entries.get(0).getUsername());
Assert.assertEquals("Notes", entries.get(0).getNotes());
Assert.assertEquals("Password", entries.get(0).getPassword());
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
@Test
public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectEntries() throws FileNotFoundException {
KeePassFile keePassFile = parseKeePassXml();
List<Entry> entries = keePassFile.getTopEntries();
Assert.assertNotNull(entries);
Assert.assertEquals(2, entries.size());
Assert.assertEquals("libdLW88cU6BvrPQlvKqMA==", entries.get(0).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals(5, entries.get(0).getProperties().size());
Assert.assertEquals("Sample Entry", entries.get(0).getTitle());
Assert.assertEquals("http://keepass.info/", entries.get(0).getUrl());
Assert.assertEquals("User Name", entries.get(0).getUsername());
Assert.assertEquals("Notes", entries.get(0).getNotes());
Assert.assertEquals("Password", entries.get(0).getPassword());
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test(expected = UnsupportedOperationException.class)
public void whenVersionIsNotSupportedShouldThrowException() throws IOException {
KeePassHeader header = new KeePassHeader(new RandomGenerator());
// new v4 format
FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream(ResourceUtils.getResource("DatabaseWithV4Format.kdbx"));
byte[] rawHeader = StreamUtils.toByteArray(fileInputStream);
header.checkVersionSupport(rawHeader);
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Test(expected = UnsupportedOperationException.class)
public void whenVersionIsNotSupportedShouldThrowException() throws IOException {
KeePassHeader header = new KeePassHeader(new RandomGenerator());
// unsupported format --> e.g. v5
byte[] rawHeader = ByteUtils.hexStringToByteArray("03D9A29A67FB4BB501000500");
header.checkVersionSupport(rawHeader);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private byte[] processDatabaseEncryption(boolean encrypt, byte[] database, KeePassHeader header, byte[] aesKey)
throws IOException {
byte[] metaData = new byte[KeePassHeader.VERSION_SIGNATURE_LENGTH + header.getHeaderSize()];
BufferedInputStream bufferedInputStream = new BufferedInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(database));
bufferedInputStream.read(metaData);
byte[] payload = StreamUtils.toByteArray(bufferedInputStream);
byte[] processedPayload;
if (encrypt) {
processedPayload = Aes.encrypt(aesKey, header.getEncryptionIV(), payload);
} else {
processedPayload = Aes.decrypt(aesKey, header.getEncryptionIV(), payload);
}
ByteArrayOutputStream output = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
output.write(metaData);
output.write(processedPayload);
return output.toByteArray();
}
#location 19
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
private byte[] processDatabaseEncryption(boolean encrypt, byte[] database, KeePassHeader header, byte[] aesKey)
throws IOException {
byte[] metaData = new byte[KeePassHeader.VERSION_SIGNATURE_LENGTH + header.getHeaderSize()];
SafeInputStream inputStream = new SafeInputStream(new BufferedInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(database)));
inputStream.readSafe(metaData);
byte[] payload = StreamUtils.toByteArray(inputStream);
byte[] processedPayload;
if (encrypt) {
processedPayload = Aes.encrypt(aesKey, header.getEncryptionIV(), payload);
} else {
processedPayload = Aes.decrypt(aesKey, header.getEncryptionIV(), payload);
}
ByteArrayOutputStream output = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
output.write(metaData);
output.write(processedPayload);
return output.toByteArray();
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void whenWritingKeePassFileShouldBeAbleToReadItAgain() throws IOException {
// Read decrypted and write again
FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml");
KeePassDatabaseXmlParser parser = new KeePassDatabaseXmlParser();
KeePassFile keePassFile = parser.fromXml(fileInputStream, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey));
new ProtectedValueProcessor().processProtectedValues(new DecryptionStrategy(Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)), keePassFile);
ByteArrayOutputStream outputStream = parser.toXml(keePassFile, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey));
OutputStream fileOutputStream = new FileOutputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted2.xml");
outputStream.writeTo(fileOutputStream);
// Read written file
FileInputStream writtenInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted2.xml");
KeePassFile writtenKeePassFile = parser.fromXml(writtenInputStream, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey));
new ProtectedValueProcessor().processProtectedValues(new DecryptionStrategy(Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)), writtenKeePassFile);
Assert.assertEquals("Password", writtenKeePassFile.getEntryByTitle("Sample Entry").getPassword());
}
#location 19
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Test
public void whenWritingKeePassFileShouldBeAbleToReadItAgain() throws IOException {
// Read decrypted and write again
FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml");
KeePassDatabaseXmlParser parser = new KeePassDatabaseXmlParser();
KeePassFile keePassFile = parser.fromXml(fileInputStream);
ByteArrayOutputStream outputStream = parser.toXml(keePassFile);
OutputStream fileOutputStream = new FileOutputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted2.xml");
outputStream.writeTo(fileOutputStream);
// Read written file
FileInputStream writtenInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted2.xml");
KeePassFile writtenKeePassFile = parser.fromXml(writtenInputStream);
new ProtectedValueProcessor().processProtectedValues(new DecryptionStrategy(Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)), writtenKeePassFile);
Assert.assertEquals("Password", writtenKeePassFile.getEntryByTitle("Sample Entry").getPassword());
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public KeePassFile openDatabase(String password) {
try {
byte[] aesDecryptedDbFile = decrypter.decryptDatabase(password, keepassHeader, keepassFile);
byte[] startBytes = new byte[32];
ByteArrayInputStream decryptedStream = new ByteArrayInputStream(aesDecryptedDbFile);
decryptedStream.read(startBytes);
// compare startBytes
if(!Arrays.equals(keepassHeader.getStreamStartBytes(), startBytes)) {
throw new KeepassDatabaseUnreadable("The keepass database file seems to be corrupt or cannot be decrypted.");
}
HashedBlockInputStream hashedBlockInputStream = new HashedBlockInputStream(decryptedStream);
byte[] hashedBlockBytes = StreamUtils.toByteArray(hashedBlockInputStream);
byte[] decompressed = hashedBlockBytes;
// unzip if necessary
if(keepassHeader.getCompression().equals(CompressionAlgorithm.Gzip)) {
GZIPInputStream gzipInputStream = new GZIPInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(hashedBlockBytes));
decompressed = StreamUtils.toByteArray(gzipInputStream);
}
ProtectedStringCrypto protectedStringCrypto;
if(keepassHeader.getCrsAlgorithm().equals(CrsAlgorithm.Salsa20)) {
protectedStringCrypto = Salsa20.createInstance(keepassHeader.getProtectedStreamKey());
}
else {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("Only Salsa20 is supported as CrsAlgorithm at the moment!");
}
return xmlParser.parse(new ByteArrayInputStream(decompressed), protectedStringCrypto);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new RuntimeException("Could not open database file", e);
}
}
#location 22
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
public KeePassFile openDatabase(String password) {
try {
byte[] passwordBytes = password.getBytes("UTF-8");
byte[] hashedPassword = Sha256.hash(passwordBytes);
return decryptAndParseDatabase(hashedPassword);
} catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("The encoding UTF-8 is not supported");
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectEntries() throws FileNotFoundException {
FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml");
KeePassFile keePassFile = new XmlParser().parse(fileInputStream, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey));
List<Entry> entries = keePassFile.getTopEntries();
Assert.assertNotNull(entries);
Assert.assertEquals(2, entries.size());
Assert.assertEquals("libdLW88cU6BvrPQlvKqMA==", entries.get(0).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals(5, entries.get(0).getProperties().size());
Assert.assertEquals("Sample Entry", entries.get(0).getTitle());
Assert.assertEquals("http://keepass.info/", entries.get(0).getUrl());
Assert.assertEquals("User Name", entries.get(0).getUsername());
Assert.assertEquals("Notes", entries.get(0).getNotes());
Assert.assertEquals("Password", entries.get(0).getPassword());
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Test
public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectEntries() throws FileNotFoundException {
KeePassFile keePassFile = parseKeePassXml();
List<Entry> entries = keePassFile.getTopEntries();
Assert.assertNotNull(entries);
Assert.assertEquals(2, entries.size());
Assert.assertEquals("libdLW88cU6BvrPQlvKqMA==", entries.get(0).getUuid());
Assert.assertEquals(5, entries.get(0).getProperties().size());
Assert.assertEquals("Sample Entry", entries.get(0).getTitle());
Assert.assertEquals("http://keepass.info/", entries.get(0).getUrl());
Assert.assertEquals("User Name", entries.get(0).getUsername());
Assert.assertEquals("Notes", entries.get(0).getNotes());
Assert.assertEquals("Password", entries.get(0).getPassword());
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private byte[] unHashBlockStream(SafeInputStream decryptedStream) throws IOException {
HashedBlockInputStream hashedBlockInputStream = new HashedBlockInputStream(decryptedStream);
byte[] hashedBlockBytes = StreamUtils.toByteArray(hashedBlockInputStream);
return hashedBlockBytes;
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
private byte[] unHashBlockStream(SafeInputStream decryptedStream) throws IOException {
HashedBlockInputStream hashedBlockInputStream = new HashedBlockInputStream(decryptedStream);
return StreamUtils.toByteArray(hashedBlockInputStream);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public void checkVersionSupport(byte[] keepassFile) throws IOException {
BufferedInputStream bufferedInputStream = new BufferedInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(keepassFile));
byte[] signature = new byte[VERSION_SIGNATURE_LENGTH];
bufferedInputStream.read(signature);
ByteBuffer signatureBuffer = ByteBuffer.wrap(signature);
signatureBuffer.order(ByteOrder.LITTLE_ENDIAN);
int signaturePart1 = ByteUtils.toUnsignedInt(signatureBuffer.getInt());
int signaturePart2 = ByteUtils.toUnsignedInt(signatureBuffer.getInt());
if (signaturePart1 == DATABASE_V2_FILE_SIGNATURE_1_INT && signaturePart2 == DATABASE_V2_FILE_SIGNATURE_2_INT) {
return;
} else if (signaturePart1 == OLD_DATABASE_V1_FILE_SIGNATURE_1_INT
&& signaturePart2 == OLD_DATABASE_V1_FILE_SIGNATURE_2_INT) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException(
"The provided KeePass database file seems to be from KeePass 1.x which is not supported!");
} else {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("The provided file seems to be no KeePass database file!");
}
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
public void checkVersionSupport(byte[] keepassFile) throws IOException {
BufferedInputStream inputStream = new BufferedInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(keepassFile));
byte[] signature = new byte[VERSION_SIGNATURE_LENGTH];
int readBytes = inputStream.read(signature);
if(readBytes == -1) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("Could not read KeePass header. The provided file seems to be no KeePass database file!");
}
ByteBuffer signatureBuffer = ByteBuffer.wrap(signature);
signatureBuffer.order(ByteOrder.LITTLE_ENDIAN);
int signaturePart1 = ByteUtils.toUnsignedInt(signatureBuffer.getInt());
int signaturePart2 = ByteUtils.toUnsignedInt(signatureBuffer.getInt());
if (signaturePart1 == DATABASE_V2_FILE_SIGNATURE_1_INT && signaturePart2 == DATABASE_V2_FILE_SIGNATURE_2_INT) {
return;
} else if (signaturePart1 == OLD_DATABASE_V1_FILE_SIGNATURE_1_INT
&& signaturePart2 == OLD_DATABASE_V1_FILE_SIGNATURE_2_INT) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException(
"The provided KeePass database file seems to be from KeePass 1.x which is not supported!");
} else {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("The provided file seems to be no KeePass database file!");
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public KeePassFile openDatabase(String password) {
try {
byte[] aesDecryptedDbFile = decrypter.decryptDatabase(password, keepassHeader, keepassFile);
byte[] startBytes = new byte[32];
ByteArrayInputStream decryptedStream = new ByteArrayInputStream(aesDecryptedDbFile);
decryptedStream.read(startBytes);
// compare startBytes
if(!Arrays.equals(keepassHeader.getStreamStartBytes(), startBytes)) {
throw new KeepassDatabaseUnreadable("The keepass database file seems to be corrupt or cannot be decrypted.");
}
HashedBlockInputStream hashedBlockInputStream = new HashedBlockInputStream(decryptedStream);
byte[] hashedBlockBytes = StreamUtils.toByteArray(hashedBlockInputStream);
byte[] decompressed = hashedBlockBytes;
// unzip if necessary
if(keepassHeader.getCompression().equals(CompressionAlgorithm.Gzip)) {
GZIPInputStream gzipInputStream = new GZIPInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(hashedBlockBytes));
decompressed = StreamUtils.toByteArray(gzipInputStream);
}
ProtectedStringCrypto protectedStringCrypto;
if(keepassHeader.getCrsAlgorithm().equals(CrsAlgorithm.Salsa20)) {
protectedStringCrypto = Salsa20.createInstance(keepassHeader.getProtectedStreamKey());
}
else {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("Only Salsa20 is supported as CrsAlgorithm at the moment!");
}
return xmlParser.parse(new ByteArrayInputStream(decompressed), protectedStringCrypto);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new RuntimeException("Could not open database file", e);
}
}
#location 15
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
public KeePassFile openDatabase(String password) {
try {
byte[] passwordBytes = password.getBytes("UTF-8");
byte[] hashedPassword = Sha256.hash(passwordBytes);
return decryptAndParseDatabase(hashedPassword);
} catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("The encoding UTF-8 is not supported");
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void whenInputIsKeyFileShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectData() throws FileNotFoundException {
FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/DatabaseWithKeyfile.key");
KeyFile keyFile = new KeyFileXmlParser().fromXml(fileInputStream);
Assert.assertEquals("RP+rYNZL4lrGtDMBPzOuctlh3NAutSG5KGsT38C+qPQ=", keyFile.getKey().getData());
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Test
public void whenInputIsKeyFileShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectData() throws IOException {
FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/DatabaseWithKeyfile.key");
byte[] keyFileContent = StreamUtils.toByteArray(fileInputStream);
KeyFile keyFile = new KeyFileXmlParser().fromXml(keyFileContent);
Assert.assertEquals("RP+rYNZL4lrGtDMBPzOuctlh3NAutSG5KGsT38C+qPQ=", keyFile.getKey().getData());
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectMetadata() throws FileNotFoundException {
FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml");
KeePassFile keePassFile = new XmlParser().parse(fileInputStream, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey));
Assert.assertEquals("KeePass", keePassFile.getMeta().getGenerator());
Assert.assertEquals("TestDatabase", keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseName());
Assert.assertEquals("Just a sample db", keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseDescription());
Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:59:39", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseNameChanged().getTime()));
Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:59:39", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseDescriptionChanged().getTime()));
Assert.assertEquals(365, keePassFile.getMeta().getMaintenanceHistoryDays());
Assert.assertEquals(true, keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinEnabled());
Assert.assertEquals("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==", keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:58:56", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinChanged().getTime()));
Assert.assertEquals(10, keePassFile.getMeta().getHistoryMaxItems());
Assert.assertEquals(6291456, keePassFile.getMeta().getHistoryMaxSize());
}
#location 16
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Test
public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectMetadata() throws FileNotFoundException {
KeePassFile keePassFile = parseKeePassXml();
Assert.assertEquals("KeePass", keePassFile.getMeta().getGenerator());
Assert.assertEquals("TestDatabase", keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseName());
Assert.assertEquals("Just a sample db", keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseDescription());
Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:59:39", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseNameChanged().getTime()));
Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:59:39", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseDescriptionChanged().getTime()));
Assert.assertEquals(365, keePassFile.getMeta().getMaintenanceHistoryDays());
Assert.assertEquals(true, keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinEnabled());
Assert.assertEquals("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==", keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinUuid());
Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:58:56", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinChanged().getTime()));
Assert.assertEquals(10, keePassFile.getMeta().getHistoryMaxItems());
Assert.assertEquals(6291456, keePassFile.getMeta().getHistoryMaxSize());
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public static void main(String[] args) {
String allExtractRegularUrl = "http://localhost:8080/HtmlExtractorServer/api/all_extract_regular.jsp";
String redisHost = "localhost";
int redisPort = 6379;
HtmlExtractor htmlExtractor = HtmlExtractor.getInstance(allExtractRegularUrl, redisHost, redisPort);
String url = "http://money.163.com/08/1219/16/4THR2TMP002533QK.html";
List<ExtractResult> extractResults = htmlExtractor.extract(url, "gb2312");
int i = 1;
for (ExtractResult extractResult : extractResults) {
System.out.println((i++) + "、网页 " + extractResult.getUrl() + " 的抽取结果");
for(ExtractResultItem extractResultItem : extractResult.getExtractResultItems()){
System.out.print("\t"+extractResultItem.getField()+" = "+extractResultItem.getValue());
}
System.out.println("\tdescription = "+extractResult.getDescription());
System.out.println("\tkeywords = "+extractResult.getKeywords());
}
}
#location 6
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION | #fixed code
public static void main(String[] args) {
usage1();
//usage2();
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public static void main(String[] args) {
//下面的三种方法代表了3种不同的使用模式，只能单独使用
//usage1();
//usage2();
usage3();
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION | #fixed code
public static void main(String[] args) {
//下面的三种方法代表了3种不同的使用模式，只能单独使用
//usage1();
usage2();
//usage3();
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public ValueBlock filter(PositionBlock positions)
{
// find selected positions
Set<Integer> indexes = new HashSet<>();
for (long position : positions.getPositions()) {
if (range.contains(position)) {
indexes.add((int) (position - range.lowerEndpoint()));
}
}
// if no positions are selected, we are done
if (indexes.isEmpty()) {
return EmptyValueBlock.INSTANCE;
}
// build a buffer containing only the tuples from the selected positions
DynamicSliceOutput sliceOutput = new DynamicSliceOutput(1024);
int currentOffset = 0;
for (int index = 0; index < getCount(); ++index) {
Slice currentPositionToEnd = slice.slice(currentOffset, slice.length() - currentOffset);
int size = tupleInfo.size(currentPositionToEnd);
// only write selected tuples
if (indexes.contains(index)) {
sliceOutput.writeBytes(slice, currentOffset, size);
}
currentOffset += size;
}
// todo what is the start position
return new UncompressedValueBlock(Ranges.closed(0L, (long) indexes.size() - 1), tupleInfo, sliceOutput.slice());
}
#location 35
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Override
public ValueBlock filter(PositionBlock positions)
{
return MaskedValueBlock.maskBlock(this, positions);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testAverageAll()
{
List<Tuple> expected = computeExpected("SELECT AVG(totalprice) FROM orders", DOUBLE);
TupleStream price = createBlockStream(ordersData, Column.ORDER_TOTALPRICE, DOUBLE);
AggregationOperator aggregation = new AggregationOperator(price, AverageAggregation.PROVIDER);
assertEqualsIgnoreOrder(tuples(aggregation), expected);
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Test
public void testAverageAll()
{
List<Tuple> expected = computeExpected("SELECT AVG(totalprice) FROM orders", DOUBLE);
TupleStream price = createTupleStream(ordersData, Column.ORDER_TOTALPRICE, DOUBLE);
AggregationOperator aggregation = new AggregationOperator(price, AverageAggregation.PROVIDER);
assertEqualsIgnoreOrder(tuples(aggregation), expected);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private Tuple createTuple(String value)
{
byte[] bytes = value.getBytes(UTF_8);
Slice slice = Slices.allocate(bytes.length + SIZE_OF_SHORT);
slice.output()
.appendShort(bytes.length + 2)
.appendBytes(bytes);
return new Tuple(slice, new TupleInfo(VARIABLE_BINARY));
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
private Tuple createTuple(String value)
{
TupleInfo tupleInfo = new TupleInfo(VARIABLE_BINARY);
Tuple tuple = tupleInfo.builder()
.append(Slices.wrappedBuffer(value.getBytes(UTF_8)))
.build();
return tuple;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testCountAll()
{
List<Tuple> expected = computeExpected("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM orders", FIXED_INT_64);
TupleStream orders = createBlockStream(ordersData, Column.ORDER_ORDERKEY, FIXED_INT_64);
AggregationOperator aggregation = new AggregationOperator(orders, CountAggregation.PROVIDER);
assertEqualsIgnoreOrder(tuples(aggregation), expected);
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Test
public void testCountAll()
{
List<Tuple> expected = computeExpected("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM orders", FIXED_INT_64);
TupleStream orders = createTupleStream(ordersData, Column.ORDER_ORDERKEY, FIXED_INT_64);
AggregationOperator aggregation = new AggregationOperator(orders, CountAggregation.PROVIDER);
assertEqualsIgnoreOrder(tuples(aggregation), expected);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void writeTo(List<UncompressedBlock> blocks,
Class<?> type,
Type genericType,
Annotation[] annotations,
MediaType mediaType,
MultivaluedMap<String, Object> httpHeaders,
OutputStream output)
throws IOException, WebApplicationException
{
for (UncompressedBlock block : blocks) {
Slice slice = block.getSlice();
// write header
ByteArraySlice blockHeader = Slices.allocate(SIZE_OF_INT + SIZE_OF_INT + SIZE_OF_LONG);
blockHeader.output()
.appendInt(slice.length())
.appendInt(block.getCount())
.appendLong(block.getRange().getStart());
output.write(blockHeader.getRawArray());
// write slice
slice.getBytes(0, output, slice.length());
}
}
#location 19
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Override
public void writeTo(List<UncompressedBlock> blocks,
Class<?> type,
Type genericType,
Annotation[] annotations,
MediaType mediaType,
MultivaluedMap<String, Object> httpHeaders,
OutputStream output)
throws IOException, WebApplicationException
{
OutputStreamSliceOutput sliceOutput = new OutputStreamSliceOutput(output);
for (UncompressedBlock block : blocks) {
Slice slice = block.getSlice();
sliceOutput.appendInt(slice.length())
.appendInt(block.getCount())
.appendLong(block.getRange().getStart())
.appendBytes(slice)
.flush();
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testCountAllWithComparison()
{
List<Tuple> expected = computeExpected("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM lineitem WHERE tax < discount", FIXED_INT_64);
TupleStream discount = createBlockStream(lineitemData, Column.LINEITEM_DISCOUNT, DOUBLE);
TupleStream tax = createBlockStream(lineitemData, Column.LINEITEM_TAX, DOUBLE);
ComparisonOperator comparison = new ComparisonOperator(tax, discount, new DoubleLessThanComparison());
AggregationOperator aggregation = new AggregationOperator(comparison, CountAggregation.PROVIDER);
assertEqualsIgnoreOrder(tuples(aggregation), expected);
}
#location 12
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Test
public void testCountAllWithComparison()
{
List<Tuple> expected = computeExpected("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM lineitem WHERE tax < discount", FIXED_INT_64);
TupleStream discount = createTupleStream(lineitemData, Column.LINEITEM_DISCOUNT, DOUBLE);
TupleStream tax = createTupleStream(lineitemData, Column.LINEITEM_TAX, DOUBLE);
ComparisonOperator comparison = new ComparisonOperator(tax, discount, new DoubleLessThanComparison());
AggregationOperator aggregation = new AggregationOperator(comparison, CountAggregation.PROVIDER);
assertEqualsIgnoreOrder(tuples(aggregation), expected);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void writeTo(UncompressedBlock block,
Class<?> type,
Type genericType,
Annotation[] annotations,
MediaType mediaType,
MultivaluedMap<String, Object> httpHeaders,
OutputStream output)
throws IOException, WebApplicationException
{
Slice slice = block.getSlice();
// write header
ByteArraySlice header = Slices.allocate(SIZE_OF_INT + SIZE_OF_INT + SIZE_OF_LONG);
header.output()
.appendInt(slice.length())
.appendInt(block.getCount())
.appendLong(block.getRange().getStart());
output.write(header.getRawArray());
// write slice
slice.getBytes(0, output, slice.length());
}
#location 18
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Override
public void writeTo(UncompressedBlock block,
Class<?> type,
Type genericType,
Annotation[] annotations,
MediaType mediaType,
MultivaluedMap<String, Object> httpHeaders,
OutputStream output)
throws IOException, WebApplicationException
{
Slice slice = block.getSlice();
new OutputStreamSliceOutput(output)
.appendInt(slice.length())
.appendInt(block.getCount())
.appendLong(block.getRange().getStart())
.appendBytes(slice);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testCountAllWithPredicate()
{
List<Tuple> expected = computeExpected("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM orders WHERE orderstatus = 'F'", FIXED_INT_64);
TupleStream orderStatus = createBlockStream(ordersData, Column.ORDER_ORDERSTATUS, VARIABLE_BINARY);
ApplyPredicateOperator filtered = new ApplyPredicateOperator(orderStatus, new Predicate<Cursor>()
{
@Override
public boolean apply(Cursor input)
{
return input.getSlice(0).equals(Slices.copiedBuffer("F", Charsets.UTF_8));
}
});
AggregationOperator aggregation = new AggregationOperator(filtered, CountAggregation.PROVIDER);
assertEqualsIgnoreOrder(tuples(aggregation), expected);
}
#location 19
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Test
public void testCountAllWithPredicate()
{
List<Tuple> expected = computeExpected("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM orders WHERE orderstatus = 'F'", FIXED_INT_64);
TupleStream orderStatus = createTupleStream(ordersData, Column.ORDER_ORDERSTATUS, VARIABLE_BINARY);
ApplyPredicateOperator filtered = new ApplyPredicateOperator(orderStatus, new Predicate<Cursor>()
{
@Override
public boolean apply(Cursor input)
{
return input.getSlice(0).equals(Slices.copiedBuffer("F", Charsets.UTF_8));
}
});
AggregationOperator aggregation = new AggregationOperator(filtered, CountAggregation.PROVIDER);
assertEqualsIgnoreOrder(tuples(aggregation), expected);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testSelectWithComparison()
{
List<Tuple> expected = computeExpected("SELECT orderkey FROM lineitem WHERE tax < discount", FIXED_INT_64);
RowSourceBuilder orderKey = createBlockStream(lineitemData, Column.LINEITEM_ORDERKEY, FIXED_INT_64);
TupleStream discount = createBlockStream(lineitemData, Column.LINEITEM_DISCOUNT, DOUBLE);
TupleStream tax = createBlockStream(lineitemData, Column.LINEITEM_TAX, DOUBLE);
ComparisonOperator comparison = new ComparisonOperator(tax, discount, new DoubleLessThanComparison());
FilterOperator result = new FilterOperator(orderKey.getTupleInfo(), orderKey, comparison);
assertEqualsIgnoreOrder(tuples(result), expected);
}
#location 13
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Test
public void testSelectWithComparison()
{
List<Tuple> expected = computeExpected("SELECT orderkey FROM lineitem WHERE tax < discount", FIXED_INT_64);
RowSourceBuilder orderKey = createTupleStream(lineitemData, Column.LINEITEM_ORDERKEY, FIXED_INT_64);
TupleStream discount = createTupleStream(lineitemData, Column.LINEITEM_DISCOUNT, DOUBLE);
TupleStream tax = createTupleStream(lineitemData, Column.LINEITEM_TAX, DOUBLE);
ComparisonOperator comparison = new ComparisonOperator(tax, discount, new DoubleLessThanComparison());
FilterOperator result = new FilterOperator(orderKey.getTupleInfo(), orderKey, comparison);
assertEqualsIgnoreOrder(tuples(result), expected);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private Tuple createTuple(String key, long count)
{
byte[] bytes = key.getBytes(Charsets.UTF_8);
Slice slice = Slices.allocate(SIZE_OF_LONG + SIZE_OF_SHORT + bytes.length);
slice.output()
.appendLong(count)
.appendShort(10 + bytes.length)
.appendBytes(bytes);
return new Tuple(slice, new TupleInfo(VARIABLE_BINARY, FIXED_INT_64));
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
private Tuple createTuple(String key, long count)
{
TupleInfo tupleInfo = new TupleInfo(VARIABLE_BINARY, FIXED_INT_64);
Tuple tuple = tupleInfo.builder()
.append(Slices.wrappedBuffer(key.getBytes(UTF_8)))
.append(count)
.build();
return tuple;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testCreatePipelineAggregatedSharedTask() throws Exception {
FreeStyleProject build1 = jenkins.createFreeStyleProject("build1");
FreeStyleProject build2 = jenkins.createFreeStyleProject("build2");
FreeStyleProject sonar = jenkins.createFreeStyleProject("sonar1");
build1.getPublishersList().add(new BuildTrigger("sonar1", true));
build2.getPublishersList().add(new BuildTrigger("sonar1", true));
build1.save();
build2.save();
jenkins.getInstance().rebuildDependencyGraph();
jenkins.setQuietPeriod(0);
jenkins.buildAndAssertSuccess(build1);
jenkins.waitUntilNoActivity();
assertNotNull(sonar.getLastBuild());
PipelineFactory factory = new PipelineFactory();
final Pipeline pipe1 = factory.extractPipeline("pipe1", build1);
final Pipeline pipe2 = factory.extractPipeline("pipe2", build2);
assertEquals(pipe1.getStages().size(), 2);
assertEquals(pipe2.getStages().size(), 2);
assertNotNull(sonar.getBuild("1"));
Pipeline aggregated1 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe1);
Pipeline aggregated2 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe2);
assertEquals("#1", aggregated1.getStages().get(1).getVersion());
assertEquals(true, aggregated2.getStages().get(1).getStatus().isIdle());
jenkins.buildAndAssertSuccess(build2);
jenkins.waitUntilNoActivity();
Pipeline aggregated3 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe1);
Pipeline aggregated4 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe2);
assertEquals("#1", aggregated3.getStages().get(1).getVersion());
assertEquals("#1", aggregated4.getStages().get(1).getVersion());
}
#location 27
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
@Test
public void testCreatePipelineAggregatedSharedTask() throws Exception {
FreeStyleProject build1 = jenkins.createFreeStyleProject("build1");
FreeStyleProject build2 = jenkins.createFreeStyleProject("build2");
FreeStyleProject sonar = jenkins.createFreeStyleProject("sonar1");
build1.getPublishersList().add(new BuildTrigger("sonar1", true));
build2.getPublishersList().add(new BuildTrigger("sonar1", true));
build1.save();
build2.save();
jenkins.getInstance().rebuildDependencyGraph();
jenkins.setQuietPeriod(0);
PipelineFactory factory = new PipelineFactory();
final Pipeline pipe1 = factory.extractPipeline("pipe1", build1);
final Pipeline pipe2 = factory.extractPipeline("pipe2", build2);
Pipeline aggregated1 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe1);
Pipeline aggregated2 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe2);
assertNull(aggregated1.getStages().get(0).getVersion());
assertNull(aggregated2.getStages().get(0).getVersion());
assertTrue(aggregated1.getStages().get(0).getTasks().get(0).getStatus().isIdle());
assertTrue(aggregated2.getStages().get(0).getTasks().get(0).getStatus().isIdle());
jenkins.buildAndAssertSuccess(build1);
jenkins.waitUntilNoActivity();
assertNotNull(sonar.getLastBuild());
assertEquals(pipe1.getStages().size(), 2);
assertEquals(pipe2.getStages().size(), 2);
assertNotNull(sonar.getBuild("1"));
aggregated1 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe1);
aggregated2 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe2);
assertEquals("#1", aggregated1.getStages().get(1).getVersion());
assertEquals(jenkins.getInstance().getRootUrl() + "job/sonar1/1/", aggregated1.getStages().get(1).getTasks().get(0).getLink());
assertEquals(true, aggregated2.getStages().get(1).getTasks().get(0).getStatus().isIdle());
assertEquals(jenkins.getInstance().getRootUrl() + "job/sonar1/", aggregated2.getStages().get(1).getTasks().get(0).getLink());
jenkins.buildAndAssertSuccess(build2);
jenkins.waitUntilNoActivity();
aggregated1 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe1);
aggregated2 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe2);
assertEquals("#1", aggregated1.getStages().get(1).getVersion());
assertEquals("#1", aggregated2.getStages().get(1).getVersion());
assertEquals(true, aggregated2.getStages().get(1).getTasks().get(0).getStatus().isSuccess());
assertEquals(jenkins.getInstance().getRootUrl() + "job/sonar1/2/", aggregated2.getStages().get(1).getTasks().get(0).getLink());
jenkins.buildAndAssertSuccess(build1);
jenkins.waitUntilNoActivity();
aggregated1 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe1);
aggregated2 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe2);
assertEquals("#2", aggregated1.getStages().get(1).getVersion());
assertEquals("#1", aggregated2.getStages().get(1).getVersion());
assertEquals(jenkins.getInstance().getRootUrl() + "job/sonar1/3/", aggregated1.getStages().get(1).getTasks().get(0).getLink());
assertEquals(jenkins.getInstance().getRootUrl() + "job/sonar1/2/", aggregated2.getStages().get(1).getTasks().get(0).getLink());
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public Pipeline getPipeline() {
AbstractProject first = Jenkins.getInstance().getItem(firstJob, Jenkins.getInstance(), AbstractProject.class);
AbstractBuild prevBuild = null;
List<Stage> stages = newArrayList();
boolean isFirst = true;
for (AbstractProject job : getAllDownstreamJobs(first)) {
AbstractBuild build = job.getLastBuild();
Task task;
if (isFirst || build.equals(getDownstreamBuild(job, prevBuild))) {
Status status = resolveStatus(build);
if (status == Status.RUNNING) {
task = new Task(job.getDisplayName(), status, (int) Math.round((double) (System.currentTimeMillis() - build.getTimestamp().getTimeInMillis()) / build.getEstimatedDuration() * 100.0));
} else {
task = new Task(job.getDisplayName(), status, 100);
}
prevBuild = build;
} else {
task = new Task(job.getDisplayName(), Status.NOTRUNNED, 0);
prevBuild = null;
}
Stage stage = new Stage(job.getDisplayName(), singletonList(task));
stages.add(stage);
isFirst = false;
}
return new Pipeline(title, stages);
}
#location 10
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
public Pipeline getPipeline() {
AbstractProject first = Jenkins.getInstance().getItem(firstJob, Jenkins.getInstance(), AbstractProject.class);
AbstractBuild prevBuild = null;
List<Stage> stages = newArrayList();
for (AbstractProject job : getAllDownstreamJobs(first)) {
AbstractBuild build = job.getLastBuild();
Task task;
if (stages.isEmpty() || build != null && build.equals(getDownstreamBuild(job, prevBuild))) {
Status status = build != null? resolveStatus(build): idle();
task = new Task(job.getDisplayName(), status);
prevBuild = build;
} else {
task = new Task(job.getDisplayName(), idle());
prevBuild = null;
}
Stage stage = new Stage(job.getDisplayName(), singletonList(task));
stages.add(stage);
}
return new Pipeline(title, stages);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public Pipeline createPipelineAggregated(Pipeline pipeline) {
List<Stage> stages = new ArrayList<>();
for (Stage stage : pipeline.getStages()) {
List<Task> tasks = new ArrayList<>();
AbstractBuild firstTask = getJenkinsJob(stage.getTasks().get(0)).getLastBuild();
AbstractBuild versionBuild = getFirstUpstreamBuild(firstTask);
String version = versionBuild.getDisplayName();
for (Task task : stage.getTasks()) {
AbstractProject job = getJenkinsJob(task);
AbstractBuild currentBuild = match(job.getBuilds(), versionBuild);
if (currentBuild != null) {
tasks.add(new Task(task.getId(), task.getName(), resolveStatus(job, currentBuild), Jenkins.getInstance().getRootUrl() + currentBuild.getUrl(), getTestResult(currentBuild)));
} else {
tasks.add(new Task(task.getId(), task.getName(), StatusFactory.idle(), task.getLink(), null));
}
}
stages.add(new Stage(stage.getName(), tasks, version));
}
//TODO add triggeredBy
return new Pipeline(pipeline.getName(), null, null, stages);
}
#location 10
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
public Pipeline createPipelineAggregated(Pipeline pipeline) {
List<Stage> stages = new ArrayList<>();
for (Stage stage : pipeline.getStages()) {
List<Task> tasks = new ArrayList<>();
AbstractBuild firstTask = getJenkinsJob(stage.getTasks().get(0)).getLastBuild();
AbstractBuild versionBuild = getFirstUpstreamBuild(firstTask);
String version = null;
if (versionBuild != null) {
version = versionBuild.getDisplayName();
}
for (Task task : stage.getTasks()) {
AbstractProject job = getJenkinsJob(task);
AbstractBuild currentBuild = match(job.getBuilds(), versionBuild);
if (currentBuild != null) {
tasks.add(new Task(task.getId(), task.getName(), resolveStatus(job, currentBuild), Jenkins.getInstance().getRootUrl() + currentBuild.getUrl(), getTestResult(currentBuild)));
} else {
tasks.add(new Task(task.getId(), task.getName(), StatusFactory.idle(), task.getLink(), null));
}
}
stages.add(new Stage(stage.getName(), tasks, version));
}
//TODO add triggeredBy
return new Pipeline(pipeline.getName(), null, null, stages);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public void parseContent() {
String temp = StringUtils.decodeXml(Content);
if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_EMOTICON) {
text = new EmojiMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this);
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_IMAGE) {
text = new ImageMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this);
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_APP) {
text = new AppMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this);
}
// else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_FILE) {
// text = new FileMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink());
// }
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VIDEO) {
text = "视频消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOICE) {
text = "语音消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_MICROVIDEO) {
text = "小视频（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VERIFYMSG) {
text = "验证消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOIPINVITE) {
text = "视频邀请消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else {
text = temp;
}
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
public void parseContent() {
if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_EMOTICON) {
text = new EmojiMsgXmlHandler(this).getHtml(getMediaLink());
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_IMAGE) {
text = new ImageMsgXmlHandler(this).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this);
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_APP) {
text = new AppMsgXmlHandler(this).getHtml(getMediaLink());
}
// else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_FILE) {
// text = new FileMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink());
// }
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VIDEO) {
text = "视频消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOICE) {
text = "语音消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_MICROVIDEO) {
text = "小视频（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VERIFYMSG) {
text = "验证消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOIPINVITE) {
text = "视频邀请消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else {
String temp = StringUtils.decodeXml(Content);
text = temp;
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Before
public void setUp() throws Exception {
String content = File2String.read("appmsg-file.xml");
handler = new AppMsgXmlHandler(content);
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
@Before
public void setUp() throws Exception {
String content = File2String.read("appmsg-file.xml");
WechatMessage m = new WechatMessage();
m.Content = content;
handler = new AppMsgXmlHandler(m);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{
// 创建一个新对象时需要扫描二维码登录，并且传一个处理接收到消息的回调，如果你不需要接收消息，可以传null
final SmartQQClient client = new SmartQQClient();
client.setWorkDir(new File("target").getAbsoluteFile());
DefaultLoginCallback loginCallback = new DefaultLoginCallback();
loginCallback.setTitle("QQ", "请使用手机QQ扫描");
client.setLoginCallback(loginCallback);
client.login();
// 登录成功后便可以编写你自己的业务逻辑了
List<Category> categories = client.getFriendListWithCategory();
for (Category category : categories) {
System.out.println(category.getName());
for (Friend friend : category.getFriends()) {
System.out.println("————" + friend.getNickname());
}
}
client.setReceiveCallback(new ReceiveCallback() {
@Override
public void onReceiveMessage(AbstractMessage message, AbstractFrom from) {
System.out.println("from " + from + " msg: " + message);
}
@Override
public void onReceiveError(Throwable e) {
e.printStackTrace(System.err);
}
});
client.start();
// 使用后调用close方法关闭，你也可以使用try-with-resource创建该对象并自动关闭
// client.close();
}
#location 11
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
// 创建一个新对象时需要扫描二维码登录，并且传一个处理接收到消息的回调，如果你不需要接收消息，可以传null
final SmartQQClient client = new SmartQQClient();
client.setWorkDir(new File("target").getAbsoluteFile());
DefaultLoginCallback loginCallback = new DefaultLoginCallback();
loginCallback.setTitle("QQ", "请使用手机QQ扫描");
client.setLoginCallback(loginCallback);
client.login();
client.setReceiveCallback(new ReceiveCallback() {
@Override
public void onReceiveMessage(AbstractMessage message,
AbstractFrom from) {
System.out.println(from + " > " + message.getText());
boolean unkown = false;
QQContact qqContact = null;
if (from instanceof GroupFrom) {
GroupFrom gf = (GroupFrom) from;
unkown = (gf.getGroupUser() == null
|| gf.getGroupUser().isUnknown());
qqContact = client.getGroup(gf.getGroup().getId());
}
else if (from instanceof DiscussFrom) {
DiscussFrom gf = (DiscussFrom) from;
unkown = (gf.getDiscussUser() == null
|| gf.getDiscussUser().isUnknown());
qqContact = client.getGroup(gf.getDiscuss().getId());
}
else {
qqContact = (Friend) (from.getContact());
}
System.out.println(
String.format("unknown?%s, newbie?%s, contact:%s",
unkown, from.isNewbie(), qqContact));
}
@Override
public void onReceiveError(Throwable e) {
e.printStackTrace(System.err);
}
});
while (true) {
if (client.isLogin()) {
break;
}
Thread.sleep(1000);
}
client.init();
// 登录成功后便可以编写你自己的业务逻辑了
List<Category> categories = client.getFriendListWithCategory();
for (Category category : categories) {
System.out.println(category.getName());
for (Friend friend : category.getFriends()) {
System.out.println("————" + friend.getNickname());
}
}
client.parseRecents(client.getRecentList());
client.start();
// 使用后调用close方法关闭，你也可以使用try-with-resource创建该对象并自动关闭
// client.close();
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public void parseContent() {
String temp = StringUtils.decodeXml(Content);
if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_EMOTICON) {
text = new EmojiMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this);
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_IMAGE) {
text = new ImageMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this);
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_APP) {
text = new AppMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this);
}
// else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_FILE) {
// text = new FileMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink());
// }
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VIDEO) {
text = "视频消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOICE) {
text = "语音消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_MICROVIDEO) {
text = "小视频（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VERIFYMSG) {
text = "验证消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOIPINVITE) {
text = "视频邀请消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else {
text = temp;
}
}
#location 10
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
public void parseContent() {
if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_EMOTICON) {
text = new EmojiMsgXmlHandler(this).getHtml(getMediaLink());
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_IMAGE) {
text = new ImageMsgXmlHandler(this).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this);
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_APP) {
text = new AppMsgXmlHandler(this).getHtml(getMediaLink());
}
// else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_FILE) {
// text = new FileMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink());
// }
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VIDEO) {
text = "视频消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOICE) {
text = "语音消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_MICROVIDEO) {
text = "小视频（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VERIFYMSG) {
text = "验证消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOIPINVITE) {
text = "视频邀请消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else {
String temp = StringUtils.decodeXml(Content);
text = temp;
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Before
public void setUp() throws Exception {
String content = File2String.read("init.xml");
handler = new InitMsgXmlHandler(content);
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
@Before
public void setUp() throws Exception {
String content = File2String.read("init.xml");
WechatMessage m = new WechatMessage();
m.Content = content;
handler = new InitMsgXmlHandler(m);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testGetRecents() {
AppMsgInfo info = handler.decode();
Assert.assertEquals("南京abc.xlsx", info.title);
System.out.println(info);
handler = new AppMsgXmlHandler(
File2String.read("appmsg-publisher.xml"));
info = handler.decode();
Assert.assertEquals("谷歌开发者", info.appName);
System.out.println(info);
}
#location 8
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
@Test
public void testGetRecents() {
AppMsgInfo info = handler.decode();
Assert.assertEquals("南京abc.xlsx", info.title);
System.out.println(info);
WechatMessage m = new WechatMessage();
m.Content = File2String.read("appmsg-publisher.xml");
handler = new AppMsgXmlHandler(m);
info = handler.decode();
Assert.assertEquals("谷歌开发者", info.appName);
System.out.println(info);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public void parseContent() {
String temp = StringUtils.decodeXml(Content);
if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_EMOTICON) {
text = new EmojiMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this);
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_IMAGE) {
text = new ImageMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this);
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_APP) {
text = new AppMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this);
}
// else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_FILE) {
// text = new FileMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink());
// }
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VIDEO) {
text = "视频消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOICE) {
text = "语音消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_MICROVIDEO) {
text = "小视频（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VERIFYMSG) {
text = "验证消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOIPINVITE) {
text = "视频邀请消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else {
text = temp;
}
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
public void parseContent() {
if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_EMOTICON) {
text = new EmojiMsgXmlHandler(this).getHtml(getMediaLink());
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_IMAGE) {
text = new ImageMsgXmlHandler(this).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this);
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_APP) {
text = new AppMsgXmlHandler(this).getHtml(getMediaLink());
}
// else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_FILE) {
// text = new FileMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink());
// }
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VIDEO) {
text = "视频消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOICE) {
text = "语音消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_MICROVIDEO) {
text = "小视频（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VERIFYMSG) {
text = "验证消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOIPINVITE) {
text = "视频邀请消息（请在手机上查看）";
}
else {
String temp = StringUtils.decodeXml(Content);
text = temp;
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public static Connection getConnection(String dbPath) throws SQLException {
// 先进先出原则
SqliteBaseConnection currCon = null;
synchronized (idleConList) {
// 当可用连接池不为空时候
if (SqliteUtils.isNotEmpty(idleConList)) {
currCon = idleConList.get(0);
idleConList.remove(0);
addRunningConnection(currCon);
}
if (currCon == null || currCon.getConnection() == null || currCon.getConnection().isClosed()) {
currCon = createBaseConnection(dbPath);
addRunningConnection(currCon);
}
}
return currCon.getConnection();
}
#location 11
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION | #fixed code
public static Connection getConnection(String dbPath) throws SQLException {
if(DEFAULT_DB_PATH.equals(dbPath)){
return getConnection();
}else {
SqliteBaseConnection currCon = createBaseConnection(dbPath);
addRunningConnection(currCon);
return currCon.getConnection();
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public static Connection getConnection(String dbPath) throws SQLException {
// 先进先出原则
SqliteBaseConnection currCon = null;
synchronized (idleConList) {
// 当可用连接池不为空时候
if (SqliteUtils.isNotEmpty(idleConList)) {
currCon = idleConList.get(0);
idleConList.remove(0);
addRunningConnection(currCon);
}
if (currCon == null || currCon.getConnection() == null || currCon.getConnection().isClosed()) {
currCon = createBaseConnection(dbPath);
addRunningConnection(currCon);
}
}
return currCon.getConnection();
}
#location 16
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION | #fixed code
public static Connection getConnection(String dbPath) throws SQLException {
if(DEFAULT_DB_PATH.equals(dbPath)){
return getConnection();
}else {
SqliteBaseConnection currCon = createBaseConnection(dbPath);
addRunningConnection(currCon);
return currCon.getConnection();
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public Map<String, GssFunction> get() {
return new ImmutableMap.Builder<String, GssFunction>()
// Arithmetic functions.
.put("add", new GssFunctions.AddToNumericValue())
.put("sub", new GssFunctions.SubtractFromNumericValue())
.put("mult", new GssFunctions.Mult())
// Not named "div" so it will not be confused with the HTML element.
.put("divide", new GssFunctions.Div())
.put("min", new GssFunctions.MinValue())
.put("max", new GssFunctions.MaxValue())
// Color functions.
.put("blendColors", new BlendColors())
.put("blendColorsRgb", new BlendColorsRGB())
.put("makeMutedColor", new MakeMutedColor())
.put("addHsbToCssColor", new AddHsbToCssColor())
.put("makeContrastingColor", new MakeContrastingColor())
.put("addToNumericValue", new AddToNumericValue())
.put("subtractFromNumericValue", new SubtractFromNumericValue())
.put("adjustBrightness", new AdjustBrightness())
// Logic functions.
.put("selectFrom", new SelectFrom())
.build();
}
#location 1
#vulnerability type CHECKERS_IMMUTABLE_CAST | #fixed code
public Map<String, GssFunction> get() {
return GssFunctions.getFunctionMap();
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public Map<String, String> getFilenameProvideMap() {
return ImmutableMap.copyOf(filenameProvideMap);
}
#location 1
#vulnerability type CHECKERS_IMMUTABLE_CAST | #fixed code
public Map<String, String> getFilenameProvideMap() {
return filenameProvideMap;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public ZooKeeper getClient(){
if (zooKeeper==null) {
try {
if (INSTANCE_INIT_LOCK.tryLock(2, TimeUnit.SECONDS)) {
if (zooKeeper==null) { // 二次校验，防止并发创建client
try {
zooKeeper = new ZooKeeper(zkaddress, 10000, watcher); // TODO，本地变量方式，成功才会赋值
if (zkdigest!=null && zkdigest.trim().length()>0) {
zooKeeper.addAuthInfo("digest",zkdigest.getBytes()); // like "account:password"
}
zooKeeper.exists(zkpath, false); // sync
} catch (Exception e) {
logger.error(e.getMessage(), e);
} finally {
INSTANCE_INIT_LOCK.unlock();
}
logger.info(">>>>>>>>>> xxl-rpc, XxlZkClient init success.");
}
}
} catch (InterruptedException e) {
logger.error(e.getMessage(), e);
}
}
if (zooKeeper == null) {
throw new XxlRpcException("XxlZkClient.zooKeeper is null.");
}
return zooKeeper;
}
#location 2
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION | #fixed code
public ZooKeeper getClient(){
if (zooKeeper==null) {
try {
if (INSTANCE_INIT_LOCK.tryLock(2, TimeUnit.SECONDS)) {
if (zooKeeper==null) { // 二次校验，防止并发创建client
// init new-client
ZooKeeper newZk = null;
try {
newZk = new ZooKeeper(zkaddress, 10000, watcher);
if (zkdigest!=null && zkdigest.trim().length()>0) {
newZk.addAuthInfo("digest",zkdigest.getBytes()); // like "account:password"
}
newZk.exists(zkpath, false); // sync wait until succcess conn
// set success new-client
zooKeeper = newZk;
logger.info(">>>>>>>>>> xxl-rpc, XxlZkClient init success.");
} catch (Exception e) {
// close fail new-client
if (newZk != null) {
newZk.close();
}
logger.error(e.getMessage(), e);
} finally {
INSTANCE_INIT_LOCK.unlock();
}
}
}
} catch (InterruptedException e) {
logger.error(e.getMessage(), e);
}
}
if (zooKeeper == null) {
throw new XxlRpcException("XxlZkClient.zooKeeper is null.");
}
return zooKeeper;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private static String getAddress() {
if (LOCAL_ADDRESS != null) {
return LOCAL_ADDRESS;
}
InetAddress localAddress = getFirstValidAddress();
LOCAL_ADDRESS = localAddress.getHostAddress();
return LOCAL_ADDRESS;
}
#location 6
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
private static String getAddress() {
if (LOCAL_ADDRESS != null) {
return LOCAL_ADDRESS;
}
InetAddress localAddress = getFirstValidAddress();
LOCAL_ADDRESS = localAddress != null ? localAddress.getHostAddress() : null;
return LOCAL_ADDRESS;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@SuppressWarnings("rawtypes")
@Override
public void onFinished(Invocation invocation,Object result) {
Object[] args = invocation.getArgs();
MappedStatement mt = (MappedStatement)args[0];
String mapperNameSpace = mt.getId().substring(0, mt.getId().lastIndexOf(SPLIT_PONIT));
QueryMethodCache cacheInfo = null;
if(mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.SELECT)){
if(result == null)return;
if((cacheInfo = getQueryMethodCache(mt.getId())) == null)return;
if(result instanceof List){
List list = (List)result;
if(list.isEmpty())return;
result = cacheInfo.collectionResult ? result : list.get(0);
}
final String cacheKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(cacheInfo.keyPattern, args[1]);
//按主键查询以及标记非引用关系的缓存直接读取缓存
if(cacheInfo.isSecondQueryById() == false){
if(cacheProvider.set(cacheKey,result, cacheInfo.expire)){
if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] put result to cache，cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),cacheKey);
}
//结果为集合的情况，增加key到cacheGroup
if(cacheInfo.groupRalated){
cacheProvider.putGroupKeys(cacheInfo.cacheGroupKey, cacheKey,cacheInfo.expire);
logger.debug("method[{}] add key:[{}] to group key:[{}]",mt.getId(),cacheInfo.cacheGroupKey, cacheKey);
}else{
//
cacheUniqueSelectRef(result, mt, cacheKey);
}
}else{
//之前没有按主键的缓存，增加按主键缓存
String idCacheKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(getQueryByPkMethodCache(mt.getId()).keyPattern,result);
if(idCacheKey != null && cacheKey != null && cacheProvider.set(idCacheKey,result, cacheInfo.expire)
&& cacheProvider.set(cacheKey,idCacheKey, cacheInfo.expire)){
if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] put result to cache，cacheKey:{},and add ref cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),idCacheKey,cacheKey);
}
}
}else{
//返回0，未更新成功
if(result != null && ((int)result) == 0)return;
if(updateCacheMethods.containsKey(mt.getId())){
String cacheByPkKey = null;
UpdateByPkMethodCache updateMethodCache = updateCacheMethods.get(mt.getId());
if(updateMethodCache.sqlCommandType.equals(SqlCommandType.DELETE)){
cacheByPkKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(updateMethodCache.keyPattern,args[1]);
cacheProvider.remove(cacheByPkKey);
if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] remove cacheKey:{} from cache",mt.getId(),cacheByPkKey);
}else{
cacheByPkKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(updateMethodCache.keyPattern,args[1]);
boolean insertCommond = mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.INSERT);
if(insertCommond || mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.UPDATE)){
if(result != null){
QueryMethodCache queryByPkMethodCache = getQueryByPkMethodCache(mt.getId());
cacheProvider.set(cacheByPkKey,args[1], queryByPkMethodCache.expire);
if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] update cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),cacheByPkKey);
//插入其他唯一字段引用
if(insertCommond)cacheUniqueSelectRef(args[1], mt, cacheByPkKey);
//
addCurrentThreadCacheKey(cacheByPkKey);
}
}
}
}else{//按条件删除和更新的情况
System.out.println(args);
System.out.println(mt);
BoundSql boundSql = mt.getBoundSql(args[1]);
Object parameterObject2 = boundSql.getParameterObject();
System.out.println(parameterObject2);
System.out.println(boundSql.getSql());
System.out.println();
}
//删除同一cachegroup关联缓存
removeCacheByGroup(mt.getId(), mapperNameSpace);
}
}
#location 35
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
@SuppressWarnings("rawtypes")
@Override
public void onFinished(Invocation invocation,Object result) {
Object[] args = invocation.getArgs();
MappedStatement mt = (MappedStatement)args[0];
String mapperNameSpace = mt.getId().substring(0, mt.getId().lastIndexOf(SPLIT_PONIT));
QueryMethodCache cacheInfo = null;
if(mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.SELECT)){
if(result == null)return;
if((cacheInfo = getQueryMethodCache(mt.getId())) == null)return;
if(result instanceof List){
List list = (List)result;
if(list.isEmpty())return;
result = cacheInfo.collectionResult ? result : list.get(0);
}
final String cacheKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(cacheInfo.keyPattern, args[1]);
//按主键查询以及标记非引用关系的缓存直接读取缓存
if(cacheInfo.isSecondQueryById() == false){
if(cacheProvider.set(cacheKey,result, cacheInfo.expire)){
if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("_autocache_ method[{}] put result to cache，cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),cacheKey);
}
//结果为集合的情况，增加key到cacheGroup
if(cacheInfo.groupRalated){
cacheProvider.putGroupKeys(cacheInfo.cacheGroupKey, cacheKey,cacheInfo.expire);
logger.debug("_autocache_ method[{}] add key:[{}] to group key:[{}]",mt.getId(),cacheInfo.cacheGroupKey, cacheKey);
}else{
//
cacheUniqueSelectRef(result, mt, cacheKey);
}
}else{
//之前没有按主键的缓存，增加按主键缓存
String idCacheKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(getQueryByPkMethodCache(mt.getId()).keyPattern,result);
if(idCacheKey != null && cacheKey != null && cacheProvider.set(idCacheKey,result, cacheInfo.expire)
&& cacheProvider.set(cacheKey,idCacheKey, cacheInfo.expire)){
if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("_autocache_ method[{}] put result to cache，cacheKey:{},and add ref cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),idCacheKey,cacheKey);
}
}
}else{
if(!cacheEnableMappers.contains(mapperNameSpace))return;
//返回0，未更新成功
if(result != null && ((int)result) == 0)return;
if(updateCacheMethods.containsKey(mt.getId())){
String cacheByPkKey = null;
UpdateByPkMethodCache updateMethodCache = updateCacheMethods.get(mt.getId());
if(updateMethodCache.sqlCommandType.equals(SqlCommandType.DELETE)){
cacheByPkKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(updateMethodCache.keyPattern,args[1]);
cacheProvider.remove(cacheByPkKey);
if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("_autocache_ method[{}] remove cacheKey:{} from cache",mt.getId(),cacheByPkKey);
}else{
cacheByPkKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(updateMethodCache.keyPattern,args[1]);
boolean insertCommond = mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.INSERT);
if(insertCommond || mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.UPDATE)){
if(result != null){
QueryMethodCache queryByPkMethodCache = getQueryByPkMethodCache(mt.getId());
cacheProvider.set(cacheByPkKey,args[1], queryByPkMethodCache.expire);
if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("_autocache_ method[{}] update cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),cacheByPkKey);
//插入其他唯一字段引用
if(insertCommond)cacheUniqueSelectRef(args[1], mt, cacheByPkKey);
//
addCurrentThreadCacheKey(cacheByPkKey);
}
}
}
}else{//按条件删除和更新的情况
try {
Executor executor = (Executor) invocation.getTarget();
Object parameterObject = args[1];
ResultHandler resultHandler = null;
EntityInfo entityInfo = MybatisMapperParser.getEntityInfoByMapper(mapperNameSpace);
MappedStatement statement = getQueryIdsMappedStatementForUpdateCache(mt,entityInfo);
List<?> idsResult = executor.query(statement, parameterObject, RowBounds.DEFAULT, resultHandler);
if(idsResult != null){
for (Object id : idsResult) {
String cacheKey = entityInfo.getEntityClass().getSimpleName() + ".id:" + id.toString();
cacheProvider.remove(cacheKey);
}
if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("_autocache_ update Method[{}] executed,remove ralate cache {}.id:[{}]",mt.getId(),entityInfo.getEntityClass().getSimpleName(),idsResult);
}
} catch (Exception e) {
logger.error("_autocache_ update Method[{}] remove ralate cache error",e);
}
}
//删除同一cachegroup关联缓存
removeCacheByGroup(mt.getId(), mapperNameSpace);
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private void resetCorrectOffsets() {
KafkaConsumerCommand consumerCommand = new KafkaConsumerCommand(consumerContext.getProperties().getProperty(ConsumerConfig.BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS_CONFIG));
try {
List<TopicInfo> topicInfos = consumerCommand.consumerGroup(consumerContext.getGroupId()).getTopics();
for (TopicInfo topic : topicInfos) {
List<TopicPartitionInfo> partitions = topic.getPartitions();
for (TopicPartitionInfo partition : partitions) {
try {
//期望的偏移
long expectOffsets = consumerContext.getLatestProcessedOffsets(topic.getTopicName(), partition.getPartition());
//
if(expectOffsets < partition.getOffset()){
consumer.seek(new TopicPartition(topic.getTopicName(), partition.getPartition()), expectOffsets);
logger.info("seek Topic[{}] partition[{}] from {} to {}",topic.getTopicName(), partition.getPartition(),partition.getOffset(),expectOffsets);
}
} catch (Exception e) {
logger.warn("try seek topic["+topic.getTopicName()+"] partition["+partition.getPartition()+"] offsets error",e);
}
}
}
} catch (Exception e) {
logger.warn("KafkaConsumerCommand.consumerGroup("+consumerContext.getGroupId()+") error",e);
}
consumerCommand.close();
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
private void resetCorrectOffsets() {
consumer.pause(consumer.assignment());
Map<String, List<PartitionInfo>> topicInfos = consumer.listTopics();
Set<String> topics = topicInfos.keySet();
List<String> expectTopics = new ArrayList<>(topicHandlers.keySet());
List<PartitionInfo> patitions = null;
for (String topic : topics) {
if(!expectTopics.contains(topic))continue;
patitions = topicInfos.get(topic);
for (PartitionInfo partition : patitions) {
try {
//期望的偏移
long expectOffsets = consumerContext.getLatestProcessedOffsets(topic, partition.partition());
//
TopicPartition topicPartition = new TopicPartition(topic, partition.partition());
OffsetAndMetadata metadata = consumer.committed(new TopicPartition(partition.topic(), partition.partition()));
if(expectOffsets >= 0){
if(expectOffsets < metadata.offset()){
consumer.seek(topicPartition, expectOffsets);
logger.info("seek Topic[{}] partition[{}] from {} to {}",topic, partition.partition(),metadata.offset(),expectOffsets);
}
}
} catch (Exception e) {
logger.warn("try seek topic["+topic+"] partition["+partition.partition()+"] offsets error");
}
}
}
consumer.resume(consumer.assignment());
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void start() {
for (int i = 0; i < topicHandlers.size(); i++) {
ConsumerWorker<String, DefaultMessage> consumer = new ConsumerWorker<>(configs, topicHandlers,processExecutor);
consumers.add(consumer);
fetcheExecutor.submit(consumer);
}
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Override
public void start() {
createKafkaConsumer();
//按主题数创建ConsumerWorker线程
for (int i = 0; i < topicHandlers.size(); i++) {
ConsumerWorker consumer = new ConsumerWorker();
consumerWorks.add(consumer);
fetcheExecutor.submit(consumer);
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private synchronized static void load() {
try {
if(!properties.isEmpty())return;
File dir = new File(Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader().getResource("").getPath());
File[] propFiles = dir.listFiles(new FilenameFilter() {
@Override
public boolean accept(File dir, String name) {
return name.endsWith("properties");
}
});
for (File file : propFiles) {
Properties p = new Properties();
p.load(new FileReader(file));
properties.add(p);
}
inited = true;
} catch (Exception e) {
inited = true;
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
}
#location 15
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
private synchronized static void load() {
try {
if(inited)return;
File dir = new File(Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader().getResource("").getPath());
loadPropertiesFromFile(dir);
inited = true;
} catch (Exception e) {
inited = true;
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@SuppressWarnings({ "rawtypes", "unchecked" })
@Override
public Object onInterceptor(Invocation invocation) throws Throwable {
final Executor executor = (Executor) invocation.getTarget();
final Object[] args = invocation.getArgs();
final RowBounds rowBounds = (RowBounds) args[2];
final ResultHandler resultHandler = (ResultHandler) args[3];
final MappedStatement orignMappedStatement = (MappedStatement)args[0];
final Object parameter = args[1];
if(!orignMappedStatement.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.SELECT))return null;
if(!pageMappedStatements.keySet().contains(orignMappedStatement.getId()))return null;
PageParams pageParams = PageExecutor.getPageParams();
if(pageParams == null && pageMappedStatements.get(orignMappedStatement.getId())){
if(parameter instanceof Map){
Collection parameterValues = ((Map)parameter).values();
for (Object val : parameterValues) {
if(val instanceof PageParams){
pageParams = (PageParams) val;
break;
}
}
}else{
pageParams = (PageParams) parameter;
}
}
if(pageParams == null)return null;
BoundSql boundSql = orignMappedStatement.getBoundSql(parameter);
//查询总数
MappedStatement countMappedStatement = getCountMappedStatement(orignMappedStatement);
Long total = executeQueryCount(executor, countMappedStatement, parameter, boundSql, rowBounds, resultHandler);
//按分页查询
MappedStatement limitMappedStatement = getLimitMappedStatementIfNotCreate(orignMappedStatement);
boundSql = limitMappedStatement.getBoundSql(parameter);
boundSql.setAdditionalParameter(PARAMETER_OFFSET, pageParams.getOffset());
boundSql.setAdditionalParameter(PARAMETER_SIZE, pageParams.getPageSize());
List<?> datas = executor.query(limitMappedStatement, parameter, RowBounds.DEFAULT, resultHandler,null,boundSql);
Page<Object> page = new Page<Object>(pageParams,total,(List<Object>) datas);
List<Page<?>> list = new ArrayList<Page<?>>(1);
list.add(page);
return list;
}
#location 42
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
@SuppressWarnings({ "rawtypes", "unchecked" })
@Override
public Object onInterceptor(Invocation invocation) throws Throwable {
final Executor executor = (Executor) invocation.getTarget();
final Object[] args = invocation.getArgs();
final MappedStatement orignMappedStatement = (MappedStatement)args[0];
if(!orignMappedStatement.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.SELECT))return null;
if(!pageMappedStatements.keySet().contains(orignMappedStatement.getId()))return null;
final RowBounds rowBounds = (RowBounds) args[2];
final ResultHandler resultHandler = (ResultHandler) args[3];
final Object parameter = args[1];
PageParams pageParams = PageExecutor.getPageParams();
if(pageParams == null && pageMappedStatements.get(orignMappedStatement.getId())){
if(parameter instanceof Map){
Collection parameterValues = ((Map)parameter).values();
for (Object val : parameterValues) {
if(val instanceof PageParams){
pageParams = (PageParams) val;
break;
}
}
}else{
pageParams = (PageParams) parameter;
}
}
if(pageParams == null)return null;
BoundSql boundSql = orignMappedStatement.getBoundSql(parameter);
//查询总数
MappedStatement countMappedStatement = getCountMappedStatement(orignMappedStatement);
Long total = executeQueryCount(executor, countMappedStatement, parameter, boundSql, rowBounds, resultHandler);
//按分页查询
MappedStatement limitMappedStatement = getLimitMappedStatementIfNotCreate(orignMappedStatement);
boundSql = limitMappedStatement.getBoundSql(parameter);
boundSql.setAdditionalParameter(PARAMETER_OFFSET, pageParams.getOffset());
boundSql.setAdditionalParameter(PARAMETER_SIZE, pageParams.getPageSize());
List<?> datas = executor.query(limitMappedStatement, parameter, RowBounds.DEFAULT, resultHandler,null,boundSql);
Page<Object> page = new Page<Object>(pageParams,total,(List<Object>) datas);
List<Page<?>> list = new ArrayList<Page<?>>(1);
list.add(page);
return list;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void setRuning(String jobName, Date fireTime) {
updatingStatus = false;
try {
JobConfig config = getConf(jobName,false);
config.setRunning(true);
config.setLastFireTime(fireTime);
config.setCurrentNodeId(JobContext.getContext().getNodeId());
config.setModifyTime(Calendar.getInstance().getTimeInMillis());
config.setErrorMsg(null);
//更新本地
schedulerConfgs.put(jobName, config);
try {
if(zkAvailabled)zkClient.writeData(getPath(config), JsonUtils.toJson(config));
} catch (Exception e) {
checkZkAvailabled();
logger.warn(String.format("Job[{}] setRuning error...", jobName),e);
}
} finally {
updatingStatus = false;
}
}
#location 8
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION | #fixed code
@Override
public void setRuning(String jobName, Date fireTime) {
updatingStatus = false;
try {
JobConfig config = getConf(jobName,false);
config.setRunning(true);
config.setLastFireTime(fireTime);
config.setModifyTime(Calendar.getInstance().getTimeInMillis());
config.setErrorMsg(null);
//更新本地
schedulerConfgs.put(jobName, config);
try {
if(zkAvailabled)zkClient.writeData(getPath(config), JsonUtils.toJson(config));
} catch (Exception e) {
checkZkAvailabled();
logger.warn(String.format("Job[{}] setRuning error...", jobName),e);
}
} finally {
updatingStatus = false;
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@SuppressWarnings("rawtypes")
@Override
public void onFinished(Invocation invocation,Object result) {
Object[] args = invocation.getArgs();
MappedStatement mt = (MappedStatement)args[0];
QueryMethodCache cacheInfo = null;
if(mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.SELECT)){
if(result == null)return;
if((cacheInfo = getQueryMethodCache(mt.getId())) == null)return;
if(result instanceof List){
List list = (List)result;
if(list.isEmpty())return;
result = cacheInfo.uniqueResult ? list.get(0) : result;
}
final String cacheKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(cacheInfo.keyPattern, args[1]);
//按主键查询以及标记非引用关系的缓存直接读取缓存
if(cacheInfo.isPk || !cacheInfo.uniqueResult){
if(cacheProvider.set(cacheKey,result, cacheInfo.expire)){
if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] put result to cache，cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),cacheKey);
}
//结果为集合的情况，增加key到cacheGroup
if(!cacheInfo.uniqueResult){
cacheProvider.putGroupKeys(cacheInfo.cacheGroupKey, cacheKey,cacheInfo.expire);
}
}else{
//之前没有按主键的缓存，增加按主键缓存
String idCacheKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(getQueryByPkMethodCache(mt.getId()).keyPattern,result);
if(idCacheKey != null && cacheKey != null && cacheProvider.set(idCacheKey,result, cacheInfo.expire)
&& cacheProvider.set(cacheKey,idCacheKey, cacheInfo.expire)){
if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] put result to cache，cacheKey:{},and add ref cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),idCacheKey,cacheKey);
}
}
}else{
if(updateCacheMethods.containsKey(mt.getId())){
String cacheByPkKey = null;
UpdateByPkMethodCache updateMethodCache = updateCacheMethods.get(mt.getId());
if(updateMethodCache.sqlCommandType.equals(SqlCommandType.DELETE)){
cacheByPkKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(updateMethodCache.keyPattern,args[1]);
cacheProvider.remove(cacheByPkKey);
if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] remove cacheKey:{} from cache",mt.getId(),cacheByPkKey);
//TODO 清除关联缓存
}else{
cacheByPkKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(updateMethodCache.keyPattern,args[1]);
boolean insertCommond = mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.INSERT);
if(insertCommond || mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.UPDATE)){
if(result != null){
QueryMethodCache queryByPkMethodCache = getQueryByPkMethodCache(mt.getId());
cacheProvider.set(cacheByPkKey,args[1], queryByPkMethodCache.expire);
if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] update cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),cacheByPkKey);
//插入其他唯一字段引用
if(insertCommond)cacheUniqueSelectRef(args[1], mt, cacheByPkKey);
//
addCurrentThreadCacheKey(cacheByPkKey);
}
}
}
//TODO 删除同一cachegroup关联缓存
cacheProvider.clearGroupKeys(updateMethodCache.cacheGroupKey);
}
}
}
#location 29
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
@SuppressWarnings("rawtypes")
@Override
public void onFinished(Invocation invocation,Object result) {
Object[] args = invocation.getArgs();
MappedStatement mt = (MappedStatement)args[0];
String mapperNameSpace = mt.getId().substring(0, mt.getId().lastIndexOf(SPLIT_PONIT));
QueryMethodCache cacheInfo = null;
if(mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.SELECT)){
if(result == null)return;
if((cacheInfo = getQueryMethodCache(mt.getId())) == null)return;
if(result instanceof List){
List list = (List)result;
if(list.isEmpty())return;
result = cacheInfo.uniqueResult ? list.get(0) : result;
}
final String cacheKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(cacheInfo.keyPattern, args[1]);
//按主键查询以及标记非引用关系的缓存直接读取缓存
if(cacheInfo.isPk || !cacheInfo.uniqueResult){
if(cacheProvider.set(cacheKey,result, cacheInfo.expire)){
if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] put result to cache，cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),cacheKey);
}
//结果为集合的情况，增加key到cacheGroup
if(!cacheInfo.uniqueResult){
cacheProvider.putGroupKeys(cacheInfo.cacheGroupKey, cacheKey,cacheInfo.expire);
logger.debug("method[{}] add key:[{}] to group key:[{}]",mt.getId(),cacheInfo.cacheGroupKey, cacheKey);
}else{
//
cacheUniqueSelectRef(result, mt, cacheKey);
}
}else{
//之前没有按主键的缓存，增加按主键缓存
String idCacheKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(getQueryByPkMethodCache(mt.getId()).keyPattern,result);
if(idCacheKey != null && cacheKey != null && cacheProvider.set(idCacheKey,result, cacheInfo.expire)
&& cacheProvider.set(cacheKey,idCacheKey, cacheInfo.expire)){
if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] put result to cache，cacheKey:{},and add ref cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),idCacheKey,cacheKey);
}
}
}else{
//返回0，未更新成功
if(result != null && ((int)result) == 0)return;
if(updateCacheMethods.containsKey(mt.getId())){
String cacheByPkKey = null;
UpdateByPkMethodCache updateMethodCache = updateCacheMethods.get(mt.getId());
if(updateMethodCache.sqlCommandType.equals(SqlCommandType.DELETE)){
cacheByPkKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(updateMethodCache.keyPattern,args[1]);
cacheProvider.remove(cacheByPkKey);
if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] remove cacheKey:{} from cache",mt.getId(),cacheByPkKey);
}else{
cacheByPkKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(updateMethodCache.keyPattern,args[1]);
boolean insertCommond = mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.INSERT);
if(insertCommond || mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.UPDATE)){
if(result != null){
QueryMethodCache queryByPkMethodCache = getQueryByPkMethodCache(mt.getId());
cacheProvider.set(cacheByPkKey,args[1], queryByPkMethodCache.expire);
if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] update cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),cacheByPkKey);
//插入其他唯一字段引用
if(insertCommond)cacheUniqueSelectRef(args[1], mt, cacheByPkKey);
//
addCurrentThreadCacheKey(cacheByPkKey);
}
}
}
}
//删除同一cachegroup关联缓存
removeCacheByGroup(mt.getId(), mapperNameSpace);
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
protected XInputStream open(String path) throws Exception {
//
final RandomAccessFile file = new RandomAccessFile(path, "r");
final XInputStream is = new XInputStreamImpl(new RamdomAccessFileInputStream(file));
try {
// Check binlog magic
final byte[] magic = is.readBytes(MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length);
if(!CodecUtils.equals(magic, MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC)) {
throw new NestableRuntimeException("invalid binlog magic, file: " + path);
}
//
if(this.startPosition > MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length) {
is.skip(this.startPosition - MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length);
}
return is;
} catch(Exception e) {
IOUtils.closeQuietly(is);
throw e;
}
}
#location 18
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
protected XInputStream open(String path) throws Exception {
//
final XInputStream is = new XInputStreamImpl(new FileInputStream(path));
try {
// Check binlog magic
final byte[] magic = is.readBytes(MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length);
if(!CodecUtils.equals(magic, MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC)) {
throw new NestableRuntimeException("invalid binlog magic, file: " + path);
}
//
if(this.startPosition > MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length) {
is.skip(this.startPosition - MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length);
}
return is;
} catch(Exception e) {
IOUtils.closeQuietly(is);
throw e;
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
protected XInputStream open(String path) throws Exception {
//
final RandomAccessFile file = new RandomAccessFile(path, "r");
final XInputStream is = new XInputStreamImpl(new RamdomAccessFileInputStream(file));
try {
// Check binlog magic
final byte[] magic = is.readBytes(MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length);
if(!CodecUtils.equals(magic, MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC)) {
throw new NestableRuntimeException("invalid binlog magic, file: " + path);
}
//
if(this.startPosition > MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length) {
is.skip(this.startPosition - MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length);
}
return is;
} catch(Exception e) {
IOUtils.closeQuietly(is);
throw e;
}
}
#location 18
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
protected XInputStream open(String path) throws Exception {
//
final XInputStream is = new XInputStreamImpl(new RamdomAccessFileInputStream(new File(path)));
try {
// Check binlog magic
final byte[] magic = is.readBytes(MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length);
if(!CodecUtils.equals(magic, MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC)) {
throw new NestableRuntimeException("invalid binlog magic, file: " + path);
}
//
if(this.startPosition > MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length) {
is.skip(this.startPosition - MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length);
}
return is;
} catch(Exception e) {
IOUtils.closeQuietly(is);
throw e;
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException {
AnsiConsole.systemInstall();
PrintStream out = System.out;
FileInputStream f = new FileInputStream("src/test/resources/jansi.ans");
int c;
while( (c=f.read())>=0 ) {
out.write(c);
}
f.close();
}
#location 8
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException {
String file = "src/test/resources/jansi.ans";
if( args.length>0 )
file = args[0];
// Allows us to disable ANSI processing.
if( "true".equals(System.getProperty("jansi", "true")) ) {
AnsiConsole.systemInstall();
}
PrintStream out = System.out;
FileInputStream f = new FileInputStream(file);
int c;
while( (c=f.read())>=0 ) {
out.write(c);
}
f.close();
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
Country Country(String ip_address) {
DefaultHttpClient httpclient = new DefaultHttpClient();
try {
HttpGet httpget = new HttpGet("https://geoip.maxmind.com/geoip/country/" + ip_address);
httpget.addHeader("Accept","application/json");
httpget.addHeader(BasicScheme.authenticate(
new UsernamePasswordCredentials(user_id,license_key),"UTF-8",false));
HttpResponse response = httpclient.execute(httpget);
HttpEntity entity = response.getEntity();
if (entity != null) {
InputStream instream = entity.getContent();
BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader(
new InputStreamReader(instream));
return new Country(reader.readLine());
}
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
} finally {
httpclient.getConnectionManager().shutdown();
}
return null;
}
#location 19
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
Client(String user_id, String license_key) {
this.user_id = user_id;
this.license_key = license_key;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public static void main( String[] args )
{
try {
String user_id = args[0];
String license_key = args[1];
String ip_address = args[2];
Client cl = new Client(user_id,license_key);
JSONObject o = cl.Country(ip_address);
o = o.getJSONObject("country");
o = o.getJSONObject("name");
String name = o.getString("en");
System.out.println(name);
} catch (JSONException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
public static void main( String[] args )
{
String user_id = args[0];
String license_key = args[1];
String ip_address = args[2];
Client cl = new Client(user_id,license_key);
Country c = cl.Country(ip_address);
System.out.println(c.get_country_name("en"));
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private JSONObject responseFor(String path, String ip_address)
throws GeoIP2Exception {
DefaultHttpClient httpclient = new DefaultHttpClient();
try {
// String uri = "https://ct4-test.maxmind.com/geoip/" + path + "/" +
// ip_address;
String uri = "https://" + host;
if (host.startsWith("localhost")) {
uri = "http://" + host;
}
uri = uri + "/geoip/v2.0/" + path + "/" + ip_address;
HttpGet httpget = new HttpGet(uri);
httpget.addHeader("Accept", "application/json");
httpget.addHeader(BasicScheme.authenticate(
new UsernamePasswordCredentials(userId, licenseKey),
"UTF-8", false));
HttpResponse response = httpclient.execute(httpget);
int status = response.getStatusLine().getStatusCode();
if (status == 200) {
return handleSuccess(response, uri);
} else {
handleErrorStatus(response, status, uri);
}
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
} finally {
httpclient.getConnectionManager().shutdown();
}
return null;
}
#location 27
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
private JSONObject responseFor(String path, String ip_address)
throws GeoIP2Exception {
DefaultHttpClient httpclient = new DefaultHttpClient();
String uri = "https://" + host;
if (host.startsWith("localhost")) {
uri = "http://" + host;
}
uri = uri + "/geoip/v2.0/" + path + "/" + ip_address;
HttpGet httpget = new HttpGet(uri);
httpget.addHeader("Accept", "application/json");
httpget.addHeader(BasicScheme.authenticate(
new UsernamePasswordCredentials(userId, licenseKey), "UTF-8",
false));
HttpResponse response = null;
try {
response = httpclient.execute(httpget);
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
} finally {
httpclient.getConnectionManager().shutdown();
}
int status = response.getStatusLine().getStatusCode();
if (status == 200) {
return handleSuccess(response, uri);
} else {
handleErrorStatus(response, status, uri);
}
return null;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
Country Country(String ip_address) {
DefaultHttpClient httpclient = new DefaultHttpClient();
try {
HttpGet httpget = new HttpGet("https://geoip.maxmind.com/geoip/country/" + ip_address);
httpget.addHeader("Accept","application/json");
httpget.addHeader(BasicScheme.authenticate(
new UsernamePasswordCredentials(user_id,license_key),"UTF-8",false));
HttpResponse response = httpclient.execute(httpget);
HttpEntity entity = response.getEntity();
if (entity != null) {
InputStream instream = entity.getContent();
BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader(
new InputStreamReader(instream));
return new Country(reader.readLine());
}
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
} finally {
httpclient.getConnectionManager().shutdown();
}
return null;
}
#location 14
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
Client(String user_id, String license_key) {
this.user_id = user_id;
this.license_key = license_key;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public <T> Collection<T> loadAll(Class<T> type, Filters filters, SortOrder sortOrder, Pagination pagination, int depth) {
String url = session.ensureTransaction().url();
String entityType = session.entityType(type.getName());
QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type);
// all this business about selecting which type of model/response to handle is horribly hacky
// it should be possible for the response handler to select based on the model implementation
// and we should have a single method loadAll(...). Filters should not be a special case
// though they are at the moment because of the problems with "graph" response format.
if (filters.isEmpty()) {
Query qry = queryStatements.findByType(entityType, depth)
.setSortOrder(sortOrder)
.setPagination(pagination);
try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, url)) {
return session.responseHandler().loadAll(type, response);
}
} else {
filters = resolvePropertyAnnotations(type, filters);
Query qry = queryStatements.findByProperties(entityType, filters, depth)
.setSortOrder(sortOrder)
.setPagination(pagination);
if (depth != 0) {
try (Neo4jResponse<GraphRowModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute((GraphRowModelQuery) qry, url)) {
return session.responseHandler().loadByProperty(type, response);
}
} else {
try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, url)) {
return session.responseHandler().loadAll(type, response);
}
}
}
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Override
public <T> Collection<T> loadAll(Class<T> type, Filters filters, SortOrder sortOrder, Pagination pagination, int depth) {
Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction();
String entityType = session.entityType(type.getName());
QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type);
// all this business about selecting which type of model/response to handle is horribly hacky
// it should be possible for the response handler to select based on the model implementation
// and we should have a single method loadAll(...). Filters should not be a special case
// though they are at the moment because of the problems with "graph" response format.
if (filters.isEmpty()) {
Query qry = queryStatements.findByType(entityType, depth)
.setSortOrder(sortOrder)
.setPagination(pagination);
try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, tx)) {
return session.responseHandler().loadAll(type, response);
}
} else {
filters = resolvePropertyAnnotations(type, filters);
Query qry = queryStatements.findByProperties(entityType, filters, depth)
.setSortOrder(sortOrder)
.setPagination(pagination);
if (depth != 0) {
try (Neo4jResponse<GraphRowModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute((GraphRowModelQuery) qry, tx)) {
return session.responseHandler().loadByProperty(type, response);
}
} else {
try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, tx)) {
return session.responseHandler().loadAll(type, response);
}
}
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public <T> T load(Class<T> type, Long id, int depth) {
String url = session.ensureTransaction().url();
QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type);
Query qry = queryStatements.findOne(id,depth);
try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, url)) {
return session.responseHandler().loadById(type, response, id);
}
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Override
public <T> T load(Class<T> type, Long id, int depth) {
Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction();
QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type);
Query qry = queryStatements.findOne(id,depth);
try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, tx)) {
return session.responseHandler().loadById(type, response, id);
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private boolean bothWayMappingRequired(Object srcObject, String relationshipType, Object tgtObject, String relationshipDirection) {
boolean mapBothWays = false;
ClassInfo tgtInfo = metaData.classInfo(tgtObject);
for (FieldInfo tgtRelReader : tgtInfo.relationshipFields()) {
String tgtRelationshipDirection = tgtRelReader.relationshipDirection();
if ((tgtRelationshipDirection.equals(Relationship.OUTGOING) || tgtRelationshipDirection.equals(Relationship.INCOMING)) //The relationship direction must be explicitly incoming or outgoing
&& tgtRelReader.relationshipType().equals(relationshipType)) { //The source must have the same relationship type to the target as the target to the source
//Moreover, the source must be related to the target and vice versa in the SAME direction
if (relationshipDirection.equals(tgtRelationshipDirection)) {
Object target = tgtRelReader.read(tgtObject);
if (target != null) {
if (target instanceof Iterable) {
for (Object relatedObject : (Iterable<?>) target) {
if (relatedObject.equals(srcObject)) { //the target is mapped to the source as well
mapBothWays = true;
}
}
} else if (target.getClass().isArray()) {
for (Object relatedObject : (Object[]) target) {
if (relatedObject.equals(srcObject)) { //the target is mapped to the source as well
mapBothWays = true;
}
}
} else {
if (target.equals(srcObject)) { //the target is mapped to the source as well
mapBothWays = true;
}
}
}
}
}
}
return mapBothWays;
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
private boolean bothWayMappingRequired(Object srcObject, String relationshipType, Object tgtObject, String relationshipDirection) {
boolean mapBothWays = false;
ClassInfo tgtInfo = metaData.classInfo(tgtObject);
if(tgtInfo == null) {
LOGGER.warn("Unable to process {} on {}. Checck the mapping.", relationshipType, srcObject.getClass());
// #347. attribute is not a rel ? maybe would be better to change FieldInfo.persistableAsProperty ?
return false;
}
for (FieldInfo tgtRelReader : tgtInfo.relationshipFields()) {
String tgtRelationshipDirection = tgtRelReader.relationshipDirection();
if ((tgtRelationshipDirection.equals(Relationship.OUTGOING) || tgtRelationshipDirection.equals(Relationship.INCOMING)) //The relationship direction must be explicitly incoming or outgoing
&& tgtRelReader.relationshipType().equals(relationshipType)) { //The source must have the same relationship type to the target as the target to the source
//Moreover, the source must be related to the target and vice versa in the SAME direction
if (relationshipDirection.equals(tgtRelationshipDirection)) {
Object target = tgtRelReader.read(tgtObject);
if (target != null) {
if (target instanceof Iterable) {
for (Object relatedObject : (Iterable<?>) target) {
if (relatedObject.equals(srcObject)) { //the target is mapped to the source as well
mapBothWays = true;
}
}
} else if (target.getClass().isArray()) {
for (Object relatedObject : (Object[]) target) {
if (relatedObject.equals(srcObject)) { //the target is mapped to the source as well
mapBothWays = true;
}
}
} else {
if (target.equals(srcObject)) { //the target is mapped to the source as well
mapBothWays = true;
}
}
}
}
}
}
return mapBothWays;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public <T> void deleteAll(Class<T> type) {
ClassInfo classInfo = session.metaData().classInfo(type.getName());
if (classInfo != null) {
String url = session.ensureTransaction().url();
ParameterisedStatement request = getDeleteStatementsBasedOnType(type).deleteByType(session.entityType(classInfo.name()));
try (Neo4jResponse<String> response = session.requestHandler().execute(request, url)) {
session.context().clear(type);
}
} else {
session.info(type.getName() + " is not a persistable class");
}
}
#location 5
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Override
public <T> void deleteAll(Class<T> type) {
ClassInfo classInfo = session.metaData().classInfo(type.getName());
if (classInfo != null) {
Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction();
ParameterisedStatement request = getDeleteStatementsBasedOnType(type).deleteByType(session.entityType(classInfo.name()));
try (Neo4jResponse<String> response = session.requestHandler().execute(request, tx)) {
session.context().clear(type);
}
} else {
session.info(type.getName() + " is not a persistable class");
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public Result query(String cypher, Map<String, ?> parameters, boolean readOnly) {
validateQuery(cypher, parameters, readOnly);
//If readOnly=true, just execute the query. If false, execute the query and return stats as well
if(readOnly) {
return new QueryResult(executeAndMap(null, cypher, parameters, new MapRowModelMapper()),null);
}
else {
String url = session.ensureTransaction().url();
RowModelQueryWithStatistics parameterisedStatement = new RowModelQueryWithStatistics(cypher, parameters);
try (Neo4jResponse<RowQueryStatisticsResult> response = session.requestHandler().execute(parameterisedStatement, url)) {
RowQueryStatisticsResult result = response.next();
RowModelMapper rowModelMapper = new MapRowModelMapper();
Collection rowResult = new LinkedHashSet();
for (Iterator<Object> iterator = result.getRows().iterator(); iterator.hasNext(); ) {
List next = (List) iterator.next();
rowModelMapper.mapIntoResult(rowResult, next.toArray(), response.columns());
}
return new QueryResult(rowResult, result.getStats());
}
}
}
#location 10
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Override
public Result query(String cypher, Map<String, ?> parameters, boolean readOnly) {
validateQuery(cypher, parameters, readOnly);
//If readOnly=true, just execute the query. If false, execute the query and return stats as well
if(readOnly) {
return new QueryResult(executeAndMap(null, cypher, parameters, new MapRowModelMapper()),null);
}
else {
Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction();
RowModelQueryWithStatistics parameterisedStatement = new RowModelQueryWithStatistics(cypher, parameters);
try (Neo4jResponse<RowQueryStatisticsResult> response = session.requestHandler().execute(parameterisedStatement, tx)) {
RowQueryStatisticsResult result = response.next();
RowModelMapper rowModelMapper = new MapRowModelMapper();
Collection rowResult = new LinkedHashSet();
for (Iterator<Object> iterator = result.getRows().iterator(); iterator.hasNext(); ) {
List next = (List) iterator.next();
rowModelMapper.mapIntoResult(rowResult, next.toArray(), response.columns());
}
return new QueryResult(rowResult, result.getStats());
}
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public <T> Collection<T> loadAll(Collection<T> objects, SortOrder sortOrder, Pagination pagination, int depth) {
if (objects == null || objects.isEmpty()) {
return objects;
}
Set<Serializable> ids = new LinkedHashSet<>();
Class type = objects.iterator().next().getClass();
ClassInfo classInfo = session.metaData().classInfo(type.getName());
for (Object o : objects) {
FieldInfo idField;
if (classInfo.hasPrimaryIndexField()) {
idField = classInfo.primaryIndexField();
} else {
idField = classInfo.identityField();
}
ids.add((Serializable) idField.readProperty(o));
}
return session.loadAll(type, ids, sortOrder, pagination, depth);
}
#location 12
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
public <T> Collection<T> loadAll(Collection<T> objects, SortOrder sortOrder, Pagination pagination, int depth) {
if (objects == null || objects.isEmpty()) {
return objects;
}
ClassInfo commonClassInfo = findCommonClassInfo(objects);
Set<Serializable> ids = new LinkedHashSet<>();
for (Object o : objects) {
FieldInfo idField;
if (commonClassInfo.hasPrimaryIndexField()) {
idField = commonClassInfo.primaryIndexField();
} else {
idField = commonClassInfo.identityField();
}
ids.add((Serializable) idField.readProperty(o));
}
return session.loadAll((Class<T>) commonClassInfo.getUnderlyingClass(), ids, sortOrder, pagination, depth);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public void scan(List<String> classPaths, ClassFileProcessor processor) {
this.classPaths = classPaths;
this.processor = processor;
List<File> classPathElements = getUniqueClasspathElements(classPaths);
try {
for (File classPathElement : classPathElements) {
String path = classPathElement.getPath();
if (classPathElement.isDirectory()) {
scanFolder(classPathElement, path.length() + 1);
} else if (classPathElement.isFile()) {
String pathLower = path.toLowerCase();
if (pathLower.endsWith(".jar") || pathLower.endsWith(".zip")) {
scanZipFile(new ZipFile(classPathElement));
} else {
scanFile(classPathElement, classPathElement.getName());
}
}
}
processor.finish();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
}
#location 15
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
public void scan(List<String> classPaths, ClassFileProcessor processor) {
this.classPaths = classPaths;
this.processor = processor;
Set<File> classPathElements = getUniqueClasspathElements(classPaths);
LOGGER.debug("Classpath elements:");
for (File classPathElement : classPathElements) {
LOGGER.debug(classPathElement.getPath());
}
try {
for (File classPathElement : classPathElements) {
String path = classPathElement.getPath();
if (classPathElement.isDirectory()) {
scanFolder(classPathElement, path.length() + 1);
} else if (classPathElement.isFile()) {
String pathLower = path.toLowerCase();
if (pathLower.endsWith(".jar") || pathLower.endsWith(".zip")) {
scanZipFile(new ZipFile(classPathElement));
} else {
scanFile(classPathElement, classPathElement.getName());
}
}
}
processor.finish();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public <T> Collection<T> loadAll(Class<T> type, Filters filters, SortOrder sortOrder, Pagination pagination, int depth) {
String url = session.ensureTransaction().url();
String entityType = session.entityType(type.getName());
QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type);
// all this business about selecting which type of model/response to handle is horribly hacky
// it should be possible for the response handler to select based on the model implementation
// and we should have a single method loadAll(...). Filters should not be a special case
// though they are at the moment because of the problems with "graph" response format.
if (filters.isEmpty()) {
Query qry = queryStatements.findByType(entityType, depth)
.setSortOrder(sortOrder)
.setPagination(pagination);
try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, url)) {
return session.responseHandler().loadAll(type, response);
}
} else {
filters = resolvePropertyAnnotations(type, filters);
Query qry = queryStatements.findByProperties(entityType, filters, depth)
.setSortOrder(sortOrder)
.setPagination(pagination);
if (depth != 0) {
try (Neo4jResponse<GraphRowModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute((GraphRowModelQuery) qry, url)) {
return session.responseHandler().loadByProperty(type, response);
}
} else {
try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, url)) {
return session.responseHandler().loadAll(type, response);
}
}
}
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Override
public <T> Collection<T> loadAll(Class<T> type, Filters filters, SortOrder sortOrder, Pagination pagination, int depth) {
Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction();
String entityType = session.entityType(type.getName());
QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type);
// all this business about selecting which type of model/response to handle is horribly hacky
// it should be possible for the response handler to select based on the model implementation
// and we should have a single method loadAll(...). Filters should not be a special case
// though they are at the moment because of the problems with "graph" response format.
if (filters.isEmpty()) {
Query qry = queryStatements.findByType(entityType, depth)
.setSortOrder(sortOrder)
.setPagination(pagination);
try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, tx)) {
return session.responseHandler().loadAll(type, response);
}
} else {
filters = resolvePropertyAnnotations(type, filters);
Query qry = queryStatements.findByProperties(entityType, filters, depth)
.setSortOrder(sortOrder)
.setPagination(pagination);
if (depth != 0) {
try (Neo4jResponse<GraphRowModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute((GraphRowModelQuery) qry, tx)) {
return session.responseHandler().loadByProperty(type, response);
}
} else {
try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, tx)) {
return session.responseHandler().loadAll(type, response);
}
}
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public static void configure(Configuration configuration) {
driver = null;
Components.configuration = configuration;
}
#location 2
#vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION | #fixed code
public static void configure(Configuration configuration) {
destroy();
Components.configuration = configuration;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public Collection<Injectable<?>> start(GraphDatabaseService graphDatabaseService, Configuration config) {
EmbeddedDriver embeddedDriver = new EmbeddedDriver(graphDatabaseService);
sessionFactory = new SessionFactory(packages);
return Arrays.asList(new OgmInjectable<>(sessionFactory, SessionFactory.class));
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Override
public Collection<Injectable<?>> start(GraphDatabaseService graphDatabaseService, Configuration config) {
EmbeddedDriver embeddedDriver = new EmbeddedDriver(graphDatabaseService);
sessionFactory = createSessionFactory(embeddedDriver);
return Arrays.asList(new OgmInjectable<>(sessionFactory, SessionFactory.class));
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void shouldParseDataInRowResponseCorrectly() {
try (Response<DefaultRestModel> rsp = new TestRestHttpResponse((rowResultsAndNoErrors()))) {
DefaultRestModel restModel = rsp.next();
assertNotNull(restModel);
Object[] rows = restModel.getValues();
assertEquals(3,rows.length);
assertEquals(1, rows[0]);
Map data = (Map) rows[1];
assertEquals(1931,((Map)data.get("data")).get("born"));
data = (Map) rows[2];
assertEquals("The Birdcage", ((Map)data.get("data")).get("title"));
assertEquals(395, ((Map)data.get("metadata")).get("id"));
restModel = rsp.next();
rows = restModel.getValues();
assertEquals(3,rows.length);
assertEquals(1, rows[0]);
data = (Map) rows[1];
assertEquals(1931,((Map)data.get("data")).get("born"));
data = (Map) rows[2];
assertEquals(2007, ((Map)data.get("data")).get("released"));
}
}
#location 23
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Test
public void shouldParseDataInRowResponseCorrectly() {
try (Response<DefaultRestModel> rsp = new TestRestHttpResponse((rowResultsAndNoErrors()))) {
DefaultRestModel restModel = rsp.next();
assertNotNull(restModel);
Map<String,Object> rows = restModel.getRow();
assertEquals(3,rows.entrySet().size());
assertEquals(1, rows.get("count"));
NodeModel data = (NodeModel) rows.get("director");
assertEquals(1931,data.property("born"));
data = (NodeModel) rows.get("movie");
assertEquals("The Birdcage", data.property("title"));
assertEquals(395L, data.getId().longValue());
restModel = rsp.next();
rows = restModel.getRow();
assertEquals(3,rows.entrySet().size());
assertEquals(1, rows.get("count"));
data = (NodeModel) rows.get("director");
assertEquals(1931,data.property("born"));
data = (NodeModel) rows.get("movie");
assertEquals(2007,data.property("released"));
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testIndexesAreSuccessfullyAsserted() {
createLoginConstraint();
Components.getConfiguration().setAutoIndex("assert");
AutoIndexManager indexManager = new AutoIndexManager(metaData, Components.driver());
assertEquals(AutoIndexMode.ASSERT.getName(), Components.getConfiguration().getAutoIndex());
assertEquals(1, indexManager.getIndexes().size());
indexManager.build();
dropLoginConstraint();
}
#location 10
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
@Test
public void testIndexesAreSuccessfullyAsserted() {
createLoginConstraint();
baseConfiguration.setAutoIndex("assert");
AutoIndexManager indexManager = new AutoIndexManager(metaData, Components.driver(), baseConfiguration);
assertEquals(AutoIndexMode.ASSERT.getName(), baseConfiguration.getAutoIndex());
assertEquals(1, indexManager.getIndexes().size());
indexManager.build();
dropLoginConstraint();
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public RelationalWriter getIterableWriter(ClassInfo classInfo, Class<?> parameterType, String relationshipType, String relationshipDirection) {
if(iterableWriterCache.get(classInfo) == null) {
iterableWriterCache.put(classInfo, new HashMap<DirectedRelationshipForType, RelationalWriter>());
}
DirectedRelationshipForType directedRelationshipForType = new DirectedRelationshipForType(relationshipType,relationshipDirection, parameterType);
if(iterableWriterCache.get(classInfo).containsKey(directedRelationshipForType)) {
return iterableWriterCache.get(classInfo).get(directedRelationshipForType);
}
//1st find a method annotated with type and direction
MethodInfo methodInfo = getIterableSetterMethodInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, STRICT_MODE);
if (methodInfo != null) {
MethodWriter methodWriter = new MethodWriter(classInfo, methodInfo);
cacheIterableMethodWriter(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, directedRelationshipForType, methodInfo, methodWriter);
return methodWriter;
}
//2nd find a field annotated with type and direction
FieldInfo fieldInfo = getIterableFieldInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, STRICT_MODE);
if (fieldInfo != null) {
FieldWriter fieldWriter = new FieldWriter(classInfo, fieldInfo);
cacheIterableFieldWriter(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, directedRelationshipForType, fieldInfo, fieldWriter);
return fieldWriter;
}
//If relationshipDirection=INCOMING, we should have found an annotated field already
if(!relationshipDirection.equals(Relationship.INCOMING)) {
//3rd find a method with implied type and direction
methodInfo = getIterableSetterMethodInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, INFERRED_MODE);
if (methodInfo != null) {
MethodWriter methodWriter = new MethodWriter(classInfo, methodInfo);
cacheIterableMethodWriter(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, directedRelationshipForType, methodInfo, methodWriter);
return methodWriter;
}
//4th find a field with implied type and direction
fieldInfo = getIterableFieldInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, INFERRED_MODE);
if (fieldInfo != null) {
FieldWriter fieldWriter = new FieldWriter(classInfo, fieldInfo);
cacheIterableFieldWriter(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, directedRelationshipForType, fieldInfo, fieldWriter);
return fieldWriter;
}
}
iterableWriterCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, null);
return null;
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
@Override
public RelationalWriter getIterableWriter(ClassInfo classInfo, Class<?> parameterType, String relationshipType, String relationshipDirection) {
if(!iterableWriterCache.containsKey(classInfo)) {
iterableWriterCache.put(classInfo, new HashMap<DirectedRelationshipForType, RelationalWriter>());
}
DirectedRelationshipForType directedRelationshipForType = new DirectedRelationshipForType(relationshipType,relationshipDirection, parameterType);
if(iterableWriterCache.get(classInfo).containsKey(directedRelationshipForType)) {
return iterableWriterCache.get(classInfo).get(directedRelationshipForType);
}
//1st find a method annotated with type and direction
MethodInfo methodInfo = getIterableSetterMethodInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, STRICT_MODE);
if (methodInfo != null) {
MethodWriter methodWriter = new MethodWriter(classInfo, methodInfo);
cacheIterableMethodWriter(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, directedRelationshipForType, methodInfo, methodWriter);
return methodWriter;
}
//2nd find a field annotated with type and direction
FieldInfo fieldInfo = getIterableFieldInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, STRICT_MODE);
if (fieldInfo != null) {
FieldWriter fieldWriter = new FieldWriter(classInfo, fieldInfo);
cacheIterableFieldWriter(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, directedRelationshipForType, fieldInfo, fieldWriter);
return fieldWriter;
}
//If relationshipDirection=INCOMING, we should have found an annotated field already
if(!relationshipDirection.equals(Relationship.INCOMING)) {
//3rd find a method with implied type and direction
methodInfo = getIterableSetterMethodInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, INFERRED_MODE);
if (methodInfo != null) {
MethodWriter methodWriter = new MethodWriter(classInfo, methodInfo);
cacheIterableMethodWriter(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, directedRelationshipForType, methodInfo, methodWriter);
return methodWriter;
}
//4th find a field with implied type and direction
fieldInfo = getIterableFieldInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, INFERRED_MODE);
if (fieldInfo != null) {
FieldWriter fieldWriter = new FieldWriter(classInfo, fieldInfo);
cacheIterableFieldWriter(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, directedRelationshipForType, fieldInfo, fieldWriter);
return fieldWriter;
}
}
iterableWriterCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, null);
return null;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private void setProperties(List<Property<String, Object>> propertyList, Object instance) {
ClassInfo classInfo = metadata.classInfo(instance);
Collection<FieldInfo> compositeFields = classInfo.fieldsInfo().compositeFields();
if (compositeFields.size() > 0) {
Map<String, ?> propertyMap = toMap(propertyList);
for (FieldInfo field : compositeFields) {
CompositeAttributeConverter<?> converter = field.getCompositeConverter();
Object value = converter.toEntityAttribute(propertyMap);
FieldInfo writer = classInfo.getFieldInfo(field.getName());
writer.write(instance, value);
}
}
for (Property<?, ?> property : propertyList) {
writeProperty(classInfo, instance, property);
}
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
private void setProperties(List<Property<String, Object>> propertyList, Object instance) {
ClassInfo classInfo = metadata.classInfo(instance);
getCompositeProperties(propertyList, classInfo).forEach( (field, v) -> field.write(instance, v));
for (Property<?, ?> property : propertyList) {
writeProperty(classInfo, instance, property);
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void purgeDatabase() {
String url = session.ensureTransaction().url();
session.requestHandler().execute(new DeleteNodeStatements().purge(), url).close();
session.context().clear();
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Override
public void purgeDatabase() {
Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction();
session.requestHandler().execute(new DeleteNodeStatements().purge(), tx).close();
session.context().clear();
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public <T, ID extends Serializable> T load(Class<T> type, ID id, int depth) {
final FieldInfo primaryIndexField = session.metaData().classInfo(type.getName()).primaryIndexField();
if (primaryIndexField != null && !primaryIndexField.isTypeOf(id.getClass())) {
throw new Neo4jException("Supplied id does not match primary index type on supplied class.");
}
QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type);
PagingAndSortingQuery qry = queryStatements.findOne(id, depth);
try (Response<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute((GraphModelRequest) qry)) {
new GraphEntityMapper(session.metaData(), session.context()).map(type, response);
return lookup(type, id);
}
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
public <T, ID extends Serializable> T load(Class<T> type, ID id, int depth) {
ClassInfo classInfo = session.metaData().classInfo(type.getName());
if (classInfo == null) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException(type + " is not a managed entity.");
}
final FieldInfo primaryIndexField = classInfo.primaryIndexField();
if (primaryIndexField != null && !primaryIndexField.isTypeOf(id.getClass())) {
throw new Neo4jException("Supplied id does not match primary index type on supplied class.");
}
QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type);
PagingAndSortingQuery qry = queryStatements.findOne(id, depth);
try (Response<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute((GraphModelRequest) qry)) {
new GraphEntityMapper(session.metaData(), session.context()).map(type, response);
return lookup(type, id);
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public <T> Collection<T> loadAll(Class<T> type, Collection<Long> ids, SortOrder sortOrder, Pagination pagination, int depth) {
String url = session.ensureTransaction().url();
String entityType = session.entityType(type.getName());
QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type);
Query qry = queryStatements.findAllByType(entityType, ids, depth)
.setSortOrder(sortOrder)
.setPagination(pagination);
try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, url)) {
return session.responseHandler().loadAll(type, response);
}
}
#location 4
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Override
public <T> Collection<T> loadAll(Class<T> type, Collection<Long> ids, SortOrder sortOrder, Pagination pagination, int depth) {
Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction();
String entityType = session.entityType(type.getName());
QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type);
Query qry = queryStatements.findAllByType(entityType, ids, depth)
.setSortOrder(sortOrder)
.setPagination(pagination);
try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, tx)) {
return session.responseHandler().loadAll(type, response);
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public long countEntitiesOfType(Class<?> entity) {
ClassInfo classInfo = session.metaData().classInfo(entity.getName());
if (classInfo == null) {
return 0;
}
RowModelQuery countStatement = new AggregateStatements().countNodesLabelledWith(classInfo.labels());
String url = session.ensureTransaction().url();
try (Neo4jResponse<RowModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(countStatement, url)) {
RowModel queryResult = response.next();
return queryResult == null ? 0 : ((Number) queryResult.getValues()[0]).longValue();
}
}
#location 9
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Override
public long countEntitiesOfType(Class<?> entity) {
ClassInfo classInfo = session.metaData().classInfo(entity.getName());
if (classInfo == null) {
return 0;
}
RowModelQuery countStatement = new AggregateStatements().countNodesLabelledWith(classInfo.labels());
Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction();
try (Neo4jResponse<RowModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(countStatement, tx)) {
RowModel queryResult = response.next();
return queryResult == null ? 0 : ((Number) queryResult.getValues()[0]).longValue();
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public FieldInfo propertyField(String propertyName) {
for (FieldInfo fieldInfo : propertyFields()) {
if (fieldInfo.property().equalsIgnoreCase(propertyName)) {
return fieldInfo;
}
}
return null;
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
public FieldInfo propertyField(String propertyName) {
if (propertyFields == null) {
Collection<FieldInfo> fieldInfos = propertyFields();
propertyFields = new HashMap<>(fieldInfos.size());
for (FieldInfo fieldInfo : fieldInfos) {
propertyFields.put(fieldInfo.property(), fieldInfo);
}
}
return propertyFields.get(propertyName);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public <T> void delete(T object) {
if (object.getClass().isArray() || Iterable.class.isAssignableFrom(object.getClass())) {
deleteAll(object);
} else {
ClassInfo classInfo = session.metaData().classInfo(object);
if (classInfo != null) {
Field identityField = classInfo.getField(classInfo.identityField());
Long identity = (Long) FieldWriter.read(identityField, object);
if (identity != null) {
String url = session.ensureTransaction().url();
ParameterisedStatement request = getDeleteStatementsBasedOnType(object.getClass()).delete(identity);
try (Neo4jResponse<String> response = session.requestHandler().execute(request, url)) {
session.context().clear(object);
}
}
} else {
session.info(object.getClass().getName() + " is not an instance of a persistable class");
}
}
}
#location 11
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Override
public <T> void delete(T object) {
if (object.getClass().isArray() || Iterable.class.isAssignableFrom(object.getClass())) {
deleteAll(object);
} else {
ClassInfo classInfo = session.metaData().classInfo(object);
if (classInfo != null) {
Field identityField = classInfo.getField(classInfo.identityField());
Long identity = (Long) FieldWriter.read(identityField, object);
if (identity != null) {
Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction();
ParameterisedStatement request = getDeleteStatementsBasedOnType(object.getClass()).delete(identity);
try (Neo4jResponse<String> response = session.requestHandler().execute(request, tx)) {
session.context().clear(object);
}
}
} else {
session.info(object.getClass().getName() + " is not an instance of a persistable class");
}
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public RelationalReader getIterableReader(ClassInfo classInfo, Class<?> parameterType, String relationshipType, String relationshipDirection) {
if(iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo) == null) {
iterableReaderCache.put(classInfo, new HashMap<DirectedRelationshipForType, RelationalReader>());
}
DirectedRelationshipForType directedRelationshipForType = new DirectedRelationshipForType(relationshipType,relationshipDirection, parameterType);
if(iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).containsKey(directedRelationshipForType)) {
return iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).get(directedRelationshipForType);
}
//1st find a method annotated with type and direction
MethodInfo methodInfo = getIterableGetterMethodInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, STRICT_MODE);
if (methodInfo != null) {
MethodReader methodReader = new MethodReader(classInfo, methodInfo);
iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, methodReader);
return methodReader;
}
//2nd find a field annotated with type and direction
FieldInfo fieldInfo = getIterableFieldInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, STRICT_MODE);
if (fieldInfo != null) {
FieldReader fieldReader = new FieldReader(classInfo, fieldInfo);
iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, fieldReader);
return fieldReader;
}
//If relationshipDirection=INCOMING, we should have found an annotated field already
if(!relationshipDirection.equals(Relationship.INCOMING)) {
//3rd find a method with implied type and direction
methodInfo = getIterableGetterMethodInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, INFERRED_MODE);
if (methodInfo != null) {
MethodReader methodReader = new MethodReader(classInfo, methodInfo);
iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, methodReader);
return methodReader;
}
//4th find a field with implied type and direction
fieldInfo = getIterableFieldInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, INFERRED_MODE);
if (fieldInfo != null) {
FieldReader fieldReader = new FieldReader(classInfo, fieldInfo);
iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, fieldReader);
return fieldReader;
}
}
iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, null);
return null;
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
@Override
public RelationalReader getIterableReader(ClassInfo classInfo, Class<?> parameterType, String relationshipType, String relationshipDirection) {
if(!iterableReaderCache.containsKey(classInfo)) {
iterableReaderCache.put(classInfo, new HashMap<DirectedRelationshipForType, RelationalReader>());
}
DirectedRelationshipForType directedRelationshipForType = new DirectedRelationshipForType(relationshipType,relationshipDirection, parameterType);
if(iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).containsKey(directedRelationshipForType)) {
return iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).get(directedRelationshipForType);
}
//1st find a method annotated with type and direction
MethodInfo methodInfo = getIterableGetterMethodInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, STRICT_MODE);
if (methodInfo != null) {
MethodReader methodReader = new MethodReader(classInfo, methodInfo);
iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, methodReader);
return methodReader;
}
//2nd find a field annotated with type and direction
FieldInfo fieldInfo = getIterableFieldInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, STRICT_MODE);
if (fieldInfo != null) {
FieldReader fieldReader = new FieldReader(classInfo, fieldInfo);
iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, fieldReader);
return fieldReader;
}
//If relationshipDirection=INCOMING, we should have found an annotated field already
if(!relationshipDirection.equals(Relationship.INCOMING)) {
//3rd find a method with implied type and direction
methodInfo = getIterableGetterMethodInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, INFERRED_MODE);
if (methodInfo != null) {
MethodReader methodReader = new MethodReader(classInfo, methodInfo);
iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, methodReader);
return methodReader;
}
//4th find a field with implied type and direction
fieldInfo = getIterableFieldInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, INFERRED_MODE);
if (fieldInfo != null) {
FieldReader fieldReader = new FieldReader(classInfo, fieldInfo);
iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, fieldReader);
return fieldReader;
}
}
iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, null);
return null;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testChangedPropertyDetected() {
ClassInfo classInfo = metaData.classInfo(Teacher.class.getName());
Teacher teacher = new Teacher("Miss White");
objectMemo.remember(teacher, classInfo);
teacher.setId(115L); // the id field must not be part of the memoised property list
teacher.setName("Mrs Jones"); // the teacher's name property has changed.
assertFalse(objectMemo.remembered(teacher, classInfo));
}
#location 7
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
@Test
public void testChangedPropertyDetected() {
Teacher teacher = new Teacher("Miss White");
teacher.setId(115L); // the id field must not be part of the memoised property list
mappingContext.remember(teacher);
teacher.setName("Mrs Jones"); // the teacher's name property has changed.
assertTrue(mappingContext.isDirty(teacher));
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public <T> T load(Class<T> type, Long id, int depth) {
String url = session.ensureTransaction().url();
QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type);
Query qry = queryStatements.findOne(id,depth);
try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, url)) {
return session.responseHandler().loadById(type, response, id);
}
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Override
public <T> T load(Class<T> type, Long id, int depth) {
Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction();
QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type);
Query qry = queryStatements.findOne(id,depth);
try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, tx)) {
return session.responseHandler().loadById(type, response, id);
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public Long nativeId(Object entity) {
ClassInfo classInfo = metaData.classInfo(entity);
generateIdIfNecessary(entity, classInfo);
if (classInfo.hasIdentityField()) {
return EntityUtils.identity(entity, metaData);
} else {
FieldInfo fieldInfo = classInfo.primaryIndexField();
Object primaryId = fieldInfo.readProperty(entity);
if (primaryId == null) {
throw new MappingException("Field with primary id is null for entity " + entity);
}
LabelPrimaryId key = new LabelPrimaryId(classInfo, primaryId);
Long graphId = primaryIdToNativeId.get(key);
if (graphId == null) {
graphId = EntityUtils.nextRef();
primaryIdToNativeId.put(key, graphId);
}
return graphId;
}
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
public Long nativeId(Object entity) {
ClassInfo classInfo = metaData.classInfo(entity);
if (classInfo == null) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Class " + entity.getClass() + " is not a valid entity class. "
+ "Please check the entity mapping.");
}
generateIdIfNecessary(entity, classInfo);
if (classInfo.hasIdentityField()) {
return EntityUtils.identity(entity, metaData);
} else {
FieldInfo fieldInfo = classInfo.primaryIndexField();
Object primaryId = fieldInfo.readProperty(entity);
if (primaryId == null) {
throw new MappingException("Field with primary id is null for entity " + entity);
}
LabelPrimaryId key = new LabelPrimaryId(classInfo, primaryId);
Long graphId = primaryIdToNativeId.get(key);
if (graphId == null) {
graphId = EntityUtils.nextRef();
primaryIdToNativeId.put(key, graphId);
}
return graphId;
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private void mapOneToMany(Collection<Edge> oneToManyRelationships) {
EntityCollector entityCollector = new EntityCollector();
List<MappedRelationship> relationshipsToRegister = new ArrayList<>();
Set<Edge> registeredEdges = new HashSet<>();
// first, build the full set of related entities of each type and direction for each source entity in the relationship
for (Edge edge : oneToManyRelationships) {
Object instance = mappingContext.getNodeEntity(edge.getStartNode());
Object parameter = mappingContext.getNodeEntity(edge.getEndNode());
// is this a relationship entity we're trying to map?
Object relationshipEntity = mappingContext.getRelationshipEntity(edge.getId());
if (relationshipEntity != null) {
// establish a relationship between
FieldInfo outgoingWriter = findIterableWriter(instance, relationshipEntity, edge.getType(), OUTGOING);
if (outgoingWriter != null) {
entityCollector.recordTypeRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), relationshipEntity, edge.getType(), OUTGOING);
relationshipsToRegister.add(new MappedRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), edge.getType(), edge.getEndNode(), edge.getId(), instance.getClass(), ClassUtils.getType(outgoingWriter.typeParameterDescriptor())));
}
FieldInfo incomingWriter = findIterableWriter(parameter, relationshipEntity, edge.getType(), Relationship.INCOMING);
if (incomingWriter != null) {
entityCollector.recordTypeRelationship(edge.getEndNode(), relationshipEntity, edge.getType(), Relationship.INCOMING);
relationshipsToRegister.add(new MappedRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), edge.getType(), edge.getEndNode(), edge.getId(), instance.getClass(), ClassUtils.getType(incomingWriter.typeParameterDescriptor())));
}
if (incomingWriter != null || outgoingWriter != null) {
registeredEdges.add(edge);
}
} else {
FieldInfo outgoingWriter = findIterableWriter(instance, parameter, edge.getType(), OUTGOING);
if (outgoingWriter != null) {
entityCollector.recordTypeRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), parameter, edge.getType(), OUTGOING);
relationshipsToRegister.add(new MappedRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), edge.getType(), edge.getEndNode(), edge.getId(), instance.getClass(), ClassUtils.getType(outgoingWriter.typeParameterDescriptor())));
}
FieldInfo incomingWriter = findIterableWriter(parameter, instance, edge.getType(), Relationship.INCOMING);
if (incomingWriter != null) {
entityCollector.recordTypeRelationship(edge.getEndNode(), instance, edge.getType(), Relationship.INCOMING);
relationshipsToRegister.add(new MappedRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), edge.getType(), edge.getEndNode(), edge.getId(), instance.getClass(), ClassUtils.getType(incomingWriter.typeParameterDescriptor())));
}
if (incomingWriter != null || outgoingWriter != null) {
registeredEdges.add(edge);
}
}
}
// then set the entire collection at the same time for each owning type
for (Long instanceId : entityCollector.getOwningTypes()) {
//get all relationship types for which we're trying to set collections of instances
for (String relationshipType : entityCollector.getOwningRelationshipTypes(instanceId)) {
//for each relationship type, get all the directions for which we're trying to set collections of instances
for (String relationshipDirection : entityCollector.getRelationshipDirectionsForOwningTypeAndRelationshipType(instanceId, relationshipType)) {
//for each direction, get all the entity types for which we're trying to set collections of instances
for (Class entityClass : entityCollector.getEntityClassesForOwningTypeAndRelationshipTypeAndRelationshipDirection(instanceId, relationshipType, relationshipDirection)) {
Collection<?> entities = entityCollector.getCollectiblesForOwnerAndRelationship(instanceId, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, entityClass);
//Class entityType = entityCollector.getCollectibleTypeForOwnerAndRelationship(instanceId, relationshipType, relationshipDirection);
mapOneToMany(mappingContext.getNodeEntity(instanceId), entityClass, entities, relationshipType, relationshipDirection);
}
}
}
}
// now register all the relationships we've mapped as iterable types into the mapping context
for (MappedRelationship mappedRelationship : relationshipsToRegister) {
mappingContext.addRelationship(mappedRelationship);
}
// finally, register anything left over. These will be singleton relationships that
// were not mapped during one->one mapping, or one->many mapping.
for (Edge edge : oneToManyRelationships) {
if (!registeredEdges.contains(edge)) {
Object source = mappingContext.getNodeEntity(edge.getStartNode());
Object target = mappingContext.getNodeEntity(edge.getEndNode());
FieldInfo writer = getRelationalWriter(metadata.classInfo(source), edge.getType(), OUTGOING, target);
if (writer == null) {
writer = getRelationalWriter(metadata.classInfo(target), edge.getType(), INCOMING, source);
}
// ensures its tracked in the domain
if (writer != null) {
MappedRelationship mappedRelationship = new MappedRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), edge.getType(), edge.getEndNode(), edge.getId(), source.getClass(), ClassUtils.getType(writer.typeParameterDescriptor()));
if (!mappingContext.containsRelationship(mappedRelationship)) {
mappingContext.addRelationship(mappedRelationship);
}
}
}
}
}
#location 31
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
private void mapOneToMany(Collection<Edge> oneToManyRelationships) {
EntityCollector entityCollector = new EntityCollector();
List<MappedRelationship> relationshipsToRegister = new ArrayList<>();
// first, build the full set of related entities of each type and direction for each source entity in the relationship
for (Edge edge : oneToManyRelationships) {
Object instance = mappingContext.getNodeEntity(edge.getStartNode());
Object parameter = mappingContext.getNodeEntity(edge.getEndNode());
// is this a relationship entity we're trying to map?
Object relationshipEntity = mappingContext.getRelationshipEntity(edge.getId());
if (relationshipEntity != null) {
// establish a relationship between
FieldInfo outgoingWriter = findIterableWriter(instance, relationshipEntity, edge.getType(), OUTGOING);
if (outgoingWriter != null) {
entityCollector.recordTypeRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), relationshipEntity, edge.getType(), OUTGOING);
relationshipsToRegister.add(new MappedRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), edge.getType(), edge.getEndNode(), edge.getId(), instance.getClass(), ClassUtils.getType(outgoingWriter.typeParameterDescriptor())));
}
FieldInfo incomingWriter = findIterableWriter(parameter, relationshipEntity, edge.getType(), INCOMING);
if (incomingWriter != null) {
entityCollector.recordTypeRelationship(edge.getEndNode(), relationshipEntity, edge.getType(), INCOMING);
relationshipsToRegister.add(new MappedRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), edge.getType(), edge.getEndNode(), edge.getId(), instance.getClass(), ClassUtils.getType(incomingWriter.typeParameterDescriptor())));
}
} else {
// Use getRelationalWriter instead of findIterableWriter
// findIterableWriter will return matching iterable even when there is better matching single field
FieldInfo outgoingWriter = getRelationalWriter(metadata.classInfo(instance), edge.getType(), OUTGOING, parameter);
if (outgoingWriter != null) {
if (!outgoingWriter.forScalar()) {
entityCollector.recordTypeRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), parameter, edge.getType(), OUTGOING);
} else {
outgoingWriter.write(instance, parameter);
}
MappedRelationship mappedRelationship = new MappedRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), edge.getType(), edge.getEndNode(), edge.getId(), instance.getClass(), ClassUtils.getType(outgoingWriter.typeParameterDescriptor()));
relationshipsToRegister.add(mappedRelationship);
}
FieldInfo incomingWriter = getRelationalWriter(metadata.classInfo(parameter), edge.getType(), INCOMING, instance);
if (incomingWriter != null) {
if (!incomingWriter.forScalar()) {
entityCollector.recordTypeRelationship(edge.getEndNode(), instance, edge.getType(), INCOMING);
} else {
incomingWriter.write(parameter, instance);
}
relationshipsToRegister.add(new MappedRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), edge.getType(), edge.getEndNode(), edge.getId(), instance.getClass(), ClassUtils.getType(incomingWriter.typeParameterDescriptor())));
}
}
}
// then set the entire collection at the same time for each owning type
for (Long instanceId : entityCollector.getOwningTypes()) {
//get all relationship types for which we're trying to set collections of instances
for (String relationshipType : entityCollector.getOwningRelationshipTypes(instanceId)) {
//for each relationship type, get all the directions for which we're trying to set collections of instances
for (String relationshipDirection : entityCollector.getRelationshipDirectionsForOwningTypeAndRelationshipType(instanceId, relationshipType)) {
//for each direction, get all the entity types for which we're trying to set collections of instances
for (Class entityClass : entityCollector.getEntityClassesForOwningTypeAndRelationshipTypeAndRelationshipDirection(instanceId, relationshipType, relationshipDirection)) {
Collection<?> entities = entityCollector.getCollectiblesForOwnerAndRelationship(instanceId, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, entityClass);
//Class entityType = entityCollector.getCollectibleTypeForOwnerAndRelationship(instanceId, relationshipType, relationshipDirection);
mapOneToMany(mappingContext.getNodeEntity(instanceId), entityClass, entities, relationshipType, relationshipDirection);
}
}
}
}
// now register all the relationships we've mapped as iterable types into the mapping context
for (MappedRelationship mappedRelationship : relationshipsToRegister) {
mappingContext.addRelationship(mappedRelationship);
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public Result query(String cypher, Map<String, ?> parameters, boolean readOnly) {
validateQuery(cypher, parameters, readOnly);
//If readOnly=true, just execute the query. If false, execute the query and return stats as well
if(readOnly) {
return new QueryResult(executeAndMap(null, cypher, parameters, new MapRowModelMapper()),null);
}
else {
String url = session.ensureTransaction().url();
RowModelQueryWithStatistics parameterisedStatement = new RowModelQueryWithStatistics(cypher, parameters);
try (Neo4jResponse<RowQueryStatisticsResult> response = session.requestHandler().execute(parameterisedStatement, url)) {
RowQueryStatisticsResult result = response.next();
RowModelMapper rowModelMapper = new MapRowModelMapper();
Collection rowResult = new LinkedHashSet();
for (Iterator<Object> iterator = result.getRows().iterator(); iterator.hasNext(); ) {
List next = (List) iterator.next();
rowModelMapper.mapIntoResult(rowResult, next.toArray(), response.columns());
}
return new QueryResult(rowResult, result.getStats());
}
}
}
#location 10
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK | #fixed code
@Override
public Result query(String cypher, Map<String, ?> parameters, boolean readOnly) {
validateQuery(cypher, parameters, readOnly);
//If readOnly=true, just execute the query. If false, execute the query and return stats as well
if(readOnly) {
return new QueryResult(executeAndMap(null, cypher, parameters, new MapRowModelMapper()),null);
}
else {
Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction();
RowModelQueryWithStatistics parameterisedStatement = new RowModelQueryWithStatistics(cypher, parameters);
try (Neo4jResponse<RowQueryStatisticsResult> response = session.requestHandler().execute(parameterisedStatement, tx)) {
RowQueryStatisticsResult result = response.next();
RowModelMapper rowModelMapper = new MapRowModelMapper();
Collection rowResult = new LinkedHashSet();
for (Iterator<Object> iterator = result.getRows().iterator(); iterator.hasNext(); ) {
List next = (List) iterator.next();
rowModelMapper.mapIntoResult(rowResult, next.toArray(), response.columns());
}
return new QueryResult(rowResult, result.getStats());
}
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
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