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#vulnerable code protected void checkKeycloakSession(Request request, HttpFacade facade) { if (request.getSessionInternal(false) == null || request.getSessionInternal().getPrincipal() == null) return; RefreshableKeycloakSecurityContext session = (RefreshableKeycloakSecurityContext) request.getSessionInternal().getNote(KeycloakSecurityContext.class.getName()); if (session == null) return; // just in case session got serialized if (session.getDeployment() == null) session.setDeployment(deploymentContext.resolveDeployment(facade)); if (session.isActive() && !session.getDeployment().isAlwaysRefreshToken()) return; // FYI: A refresh requires same scope, so same roles will be set. Otherwise, refresh will fail and token will // not be updated boolean success = session.refreshExpiredToken(false); if (success && session.isActive()) return; request.getSessionInternal().removeNote(KeycloakSecurityContext.class.getName()); request.setUserPrincipal(null); request.setAuthType(null); request.getSessionInternal().setPrincipal(null); request.getSessionInternal().setAuthType(null); } #location 7 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code protected void checkKeycloakSession(Request request, HttpFacade facade) { if (request.getSessionInternal(false) == null || request.getSessionInternal().getPrincipal() == null) return; RefreshableKeycloakSecurityContext session = (RefreshableKeycloakSecurityContext) request.getSessionInternal().getNote(KeycloakSecurityContext.class.getName()); if (session == null) return; // just in case session got serialized if (session.getDeployment() == null) session.setDeployment(deploymentContext.resolveDeployment(facade)); if (session.isActive() && !session.getDeployment().isAlwaysRefreshToken()) return; // FYI: A refresh requires same scope, so same roles will be set. Otherwise, refresh will fail and token will // not be updated boolean success = session.refreshExpiredToken(false); if (success && session.isActive()) return; // Refresh failed, so user is already logged out from keycloak. Cleanup and expire our session Session catalinaSession = request.getSessionInternal(); log.debugf("Cleanup and expire session %s after failed refresh", catalinaSession.getId()); catalinaSession.removeNote(KeycloakSecurityContext.class.getName()); request.setUserPrincipal(null); request.setAuthType(null); catalinaSession.setPrincipal(null); catalinaSession.setAuthType(null); catalinaSession.expire(); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public static String getPemFromKey(Key key) { StringWriter writer = new StringWriter(); PEMWriter pemWriter = new PEMWriter(writer); try { pemWriter.writeObject(key); pemWriter.flush(); } catch (IOException e) { throw new RuntimeException(e); } String s = writer.toString(); return PemUtils.removeBeginEnd(s); } #location 6 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code public static String getPemFromKey(Key key) { StringWriter writer = new StringWriter(); PEMWriter pemWriter = new PEMWriter(writer); try { pemWriter.writeObject(key); pemWriter.flush(); pemWriter.close(); } catch (IOException e) { throw new RuntimeException(e); } String s = writer.toString(); return PemUtils.removeBeginEnd(s); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public void backchannelLogout(UserSessionModel userSession, ClientSessionModel clientSession) { ClientModel client = clientSession.getClient(); if (!(client instanceof ApplicationModel)) return; ApplicationModel app = (ApplicationModel)client; if (app.getManagementUrl() == null) return; SAML2LogoutRequestBuilder logoutBuilder = new SAML2LogoutRequestBuilder() .userPrincipal(userSession.getUser().getUsername()) .destination(client.getClientId()); if (requiresRealmSignature(client)) { logoutBuilder.signatureAlgorithm(getSignatureAlgorithm(client)); logoutBuilder.sign(realm.getPrivateKey(), realm.getPublicKey()); } /* if (requiresEncryption(client)) { PublicKey publicKey = null; try { publicKey = PemUtils.decodePublicKey(client.getAttribute(ClientModel.PUBLIC_KEY)); } catch (Exception e) { logger.error("failed", e); return; } logoutBuilder.encrypt(publicKey); } */ String logoutRequestString = null; try { logoutRequestString = logoutBuilder.postBinding().encoded(); } catch (Exception e) { logger.warn("failed to send saml logout", e); return; } String adminUrl = ResourceAdminManager.getManagementUrl(uriInfo.getRequestUri(), app); ApacheHttpClient4Executor executor = ResourceAdminManager.createExecutor(); try { ClientRequest request = executor.createRequest(adminUrl); request.formParameter(GeneralConstants.SAML_REQUEST_KEY, logoutRequestString); request.formParameter(SAML2LogOutHandler.BACK_CHANNEL_LOGOUT, SAML2LogOutHandler.BACK_CHANNEL_LOGOUT); ClientResponse response = null; try { response = request.post(); response.releaseConnection(); // Undertow will redirect root urls not ending in "/" to root url + "/". Test for this weird behavior if (response.getStatus() == 302 && !adminUrl.endsWith("/")) { String redirect = (String)response.getHeaders().getFirst(HttpHeaders.LOCATION); String withSlash = adminUrl + "/"; if (withSlash.equals(redirect)) { request = executor.createRequest(withSlash); request.formParameter(GeneralConstants.SAML_REQUEST_KEY, logoutRequestString); request.formParameter(SAML2LogOutHandler.BACK_CHANNEL_LOGOUT, SAML2LogOutHandler.BACK_CHANNEL_LOGOUT); response = request.post(); response.releaseConnection(); } } } catch (Exception e) { logger.warn("failed to send saml logout", e); } } finally { executor.getHttpClient().getConnectionManager().shutdown(); } } #location 51 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code @Override public void backchannelLogout(UserSessionModel userSession, ClientSessionModel clientSession) { ClientModel client = clientSession.getClient(); if (!(client instanceof ApplicationModel)) return; ApplicationModel app = (ApplicationModel)client; if (app.getManagementUrl() == null) return; SAML2LogoutRequestBuilder logoutBuilder = new SAML2LogoutRequestBuilder() .userPrincipal(userSession.getUser().getUsername()) .destination(client.getClientId()); if (requiresRealmSignature(client)) { logoutBuilder.signatureAlgorithm(getSignatureAlgorithm(client)) .signWith(realm.getPrivateKey(), realm.getPublicKey()) .signDocument(); } /* if (requiresEncryption(client)) { PublicKey publicKey = null; try { publicKey = PemUtils.decodePublicKey(client.getAttribute(ClientModel.PUBLIC_KEY)); } catch (Exception e) { logger.error("failed", e); return; } logoutBuilder.encrypt(publicKey); } */ String logoutRequestString = null; try { logoutRequestString = logoutBuilder.postBinding().encoded(); } catch (Exception e) { logger.warn("failed to send saml logout", e); return; } String adminUrl = ResourceAdminManager.getManagementUrl(uriInfo.getRequestUri(), app); ApacheHttpClient4Executor executor = ResourceAdminManager.createExecutor(); try { ClientRequest request = executor.createRequest(adminUrl); request.formParameter(GeneralConstants.SAML_REQUEST_KEY, logoutRequestString); request.formParameter(SAML2LogOutHandler.BACK_CHANNEL_LOGOUT, SAML2LogOutHandler.BACK_CHANNEL_LOGOUT); ClientResponse response = null; try { response = request.post(); response.releaseConnection(); // Undertow will redirect root urls not ending in "/" to root url + "/". Test for this weird behavior if (response.getStatus() == 302 && !adminUrl.endsWith("/")) { String redirect = (String)response.getHeaders().getFirst(HttpHeaders.LOCATION); String withSlash = adminUrl + "/"; if (withSlash.equals(redirect)) { request = executor.createRequest(withSlash); request.formParameter(GeneralConstants.SAML_REQUEST_KEY, logoutRequestString); request.formParameter(SAML2LogOutHandler.BACK_CHANNEL_LOGOUT, SAML2LogOutHandler.BACK_CHANNEL_LOGOUT); response = request.post(); response.releaseConnection(); } } } catch (Exception e) { logger.warn("failed to send saml logout", e); } } finally { executor.getHttpClient().getConnectionManager().shutdown(); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code private String[] getReferrer() { String referrer = uriInfo.getQueryParameters().getFirst("referrer"); if (referrer == null) { return null; } String referrerUri = uriInfo.getQueryParameters().getFirst("referrer_uri"); ApplicationModel application = realm.getApplicationByName(referrer); if (application != null) { if (referrerUri != null) { referrerUri = TokenService.verifyRedirectUri(uriInfo, referrerUri, application); } else { referrerUri = ResolveRelative.resolveRelativeUri(uriInfo.getRequestUri(), application.getBaseUrl()); } if (referrerUri != null) { return new String[]{referrer, referrerUri}; } } else if (referrerUri != null) { ClientModel client = realm.getOAuthClient(referrer); if (client != null) { referrerUri = TokenService.verifyRedirectUri(uriInfo, referrerUri, application); if (referrerUri != null) { return new String[]{referrer, referrerUri}; } } } return null; } #location 12 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code private String[] getReferrer() { String referrer = uriInfo.getQueryParameters().getFirst("referrer"); if (referrer == null) { return null; } String referrerUri = uriInfo.getQueryParameters().getFirst("referrer_uri"); ApplicationModel application = realm.getApplicationByName(referrer); if (application != null) { if (referrerUri != null) { referrerUri = TokenService.verifyRedirectUri(uriInfo, referrerUri, realm, application); } else { referrerUri = ResolveRelative.resolveRelativeUri(uriInfo.getRequestUri(), application.getBaseUrl()); } if (referrerUri != null) { return new String[]{referrer, referrerUri}; } } else if (referrerUri != null) { ClientModel client = realm.getOAuthClient(referrer); if (client != null) { referrerUri = TokenService.verifyRedirectUri(uriInfo, referrerUri, realm, application); if (referrerUri != null) { return new String[]{referrer, referrerUri}; } } } return null; }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public static String getPemFromCertificate(X509Certificate certificate) { StringWriter writer = new StringWriter(); PEMWriter pemWriter = new PEMWriter(writer); try { pemWriter.writeObject(certificate); pemWriter.flush(); } catch (IOException e) { throw new RuntimeException(e); } String s = writer.toString(); return PemUtils.removeBeginEnd(s); } #location 6 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code public static String getPemFromCertificate(X509Certificate certificate) { StringWriter writer = new StringWriter(); PEMWriter pemWriter = new PEMWriter(writer); try { pemWriter.writeObject(certificate); pemWriter.flush(); pemWriter.close(); } catch (IOException e) { throw new RuntimeException(e); } String s = writer.toString(); return PemUtils.removeBeginEnd(s); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code protected void checkKeycloakSession(Request request, HttpFacade facade) { if (request.getSessionInternal(false) == null || request.getPrincipal() == null) return; RefreshableKeycloakSecurityContext session = (RefreshableKeycloakSecurityContext) request.getSessionInternal().getNote(KeycloakSecurityContext.class.getName()); if (session == null) return; // just in case session got serialized if (session.getDeployment() == null) session.setDeployment(deploymentContext.resolveDeployment(facade)); if (session.isActive() && !session.getDeployment().isAlwaysRefreshToken()) return; // FYI: A refresh requires same scope, so same roles will be set. Otherwise, refresh will fail and token will // not be updated boolean success = session.refreshExpiredToken(false); if (success && session.isActive()) return; request.getSessionInternal().removeNote(KeycloakSecurityContext.class.getName()); request.setUserPrincipal(null); request.setAuthType(null); request.getSessionInternal().setPrincipal(null); request.getSessionInternal().setAuthType(null); } #location 7 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code protected void checkKeycloakSession(Request request, HttpFacade facade) { if (request.getSessionInternal(false) == null || request.getPrincipal() == null) return; RefreshableKeycloakSecurityContext session = (RefreshableKeycloakSecurityContext) request.getSessionInternal().getNote(KeycloakSecurityContext.class.getName()); if (session == null) return; // just in case session got serialized if (session.getDeployment() == null) session.setDeployment(deploymentContext.resolveDeployment(facade)); if (session.isActive() && !session.getDeployment().isAlwaysRefreshToken()) return; // FYI: A refresh requires same scope, so same roles will be set. Otherwise, refresh will fail and token will // not be updated boolean success = session.refreshExpiredToken(false); if (success && session.isActive()) return; // Refresh failed, so user is already logged out from keycloak. Cleanup and expire our session Session catalinaSession = request.getSessionInternal(); log.fine("Cleanup and expire session " + catalinaSession + " after failed refresh"); catalinaSession.removeNote(KeycloakSecurityContext.class.getName()); request.setUserPrincipal(null); request.setAuthType(null); catalinaSession.setPrincipal(null); catalinaSession.setAuthType(null); catalinaSession.expire(); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public void deploy(DeploymentPhaseContext phaseContext) throws DeploymentUnitProcessingException { final DeploymentUnit deploymentUnit = phaseContext.getDeploymentUnit(); KeycloakAdapterConfigService service = KeycloakAdapterConfigService.find(phaseContext.getServiceRegistry()); if (service.isKeycloakDeployment(deploymentUnit.getName())) { addModules(deploymentUnit); } } #location 6 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code @Override public void deploy(DeploymentPhaseContext phaseContext) throws DeploymentUnitProcessingException { final DeploymentUnit deploymentUnit = phaseContext.getDeploymentUnit(); addModules(deploymentUnit); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public void copySnapshot() { int length = dirtyIndex.get(); if (length <= dirtyArray.length) { for (int i = 0; i < length; i++) { int index = dirtyArray[i]; this.snapshot[index] = live[index]; } } else { for (int i = 0; i < live.length; i++) { this.snapshot[i] = live[i]; } } } #location 6 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
#fixed code @Override public void copySnapshot() { int length = dirtyIndex.get(); if (length <= dirtySize) { for (int i = 0; i < length; i++) { int index = dirtyArray.get(i); this.snapshot[index] = getLive(i); } } else { for (int i = 0; i < snapshot.length; i++) { this.snapshot[i] = getLive(i); } } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @DelayedWrite public short set(int index, short value) { synchronized (live) { live[index] = value; } int localDirtyIndex = dirtyIndex.getAndIncrement(); if (localDirtyIndex < dirtyArray.length) { dirtyArray[localDirtyIndex] = index; } return snapshot[index]; } #location 8 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
#fixed code @DelayedWrite public short set(int index, short value) { boolean success = false; int divIndex = index >> 1; boolean isZero = (index & 0x1) == 0; short one; short zero; short old = 0; while (!success) { int packed = live.get(divIndex); if (isZero) { old = unpackZero(packed); one = unpackOne(packed); zero = value; } else { old = unpackOne(packed); one = value; zero = unpackZero(packed); } success = live.compareAndSet(divIndex, packed, pack(zero, one)); } markDirty(index); return old; }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public void copySnapshot() { int length = dirtyIndex.get(); if (length <= dirtyArray.length) { for (int i = 0; i < length; i++) { int index = dirtyArray[i]; this.snapshot[index] = live[index]; } } else { for (int i = 0; i < live.length; i++) { this.snapshot[i] = live[i]; } } } #location 11 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
#fixed code @Override public void copySnapshot() { int length = dirtyIndex.get(); if (length <= dirtySize) { for (int i = 0; i < length; i++) { int index = dirtyArray.get(i); this.snapshot[index] = getLive(i); } } else { for (int i = 0; i < snapshot.length; i++) { this.snapshot[i] = getLive(i); } } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @DelayedWrite public short set(int index, short value) { synchronized (live) { live[index] = value; } int localDirtyIndex = dirtyIndex.getAndIncrement(); if (localDirtyIndex < dirtyArray.length) { dirtyArray[localDirtyIndex] = index; } return snapshot[index]; } #location 10 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
#fixed code @DelayedWrite public short set(int index, short value) { boolean success = false; int divIndex = index >> 1; boolean isZero = (index & 0x1) == 0; short one; short zero; short old = 0; while (!success) { int packed = live.get(divIndex); if (isZero) { old = unpackZero(packed); one = unpackOne(packed); zero = value; } else { old = unpackOne(packed); one = value; zero = unpackZero(packed); } success = live.compareAndSet(divIndex, packed, pack(zero, one)); } markDirty(index); return old; }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public static KeePassDatabase getInstance(File keePassDatabaseFile) { if(keePassDatabaseFile == null) { throw new IllegalArgumentException("You must provide a valid KeePass database file."); } try { return getInstance(new FileInputStream(keePassDatabaseFile)); } catch (FileNotFoundException e) { throw new IllegalArgumentException("The KeePass database file could not be found. You must provide a valid KeePass database file."); } } #location 7 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code public static KeePassDatabase getInstance(File keePassDatabaseFile) { if(keePassDatabaseFile == null) { throw new IllegalArgumentException("You must provide a valid KeePass database file."); } InputStream keePassDatabaseStream = null; try { keePassDatabaseStream = new FileInputStream(keePassDatabaseFile); return getInstance(keePassDatabaseStream); } catch (FileNotFoundException e) { throw new IllegalArgumentException("The KeePass database file could not be found. You must provide a valid KeePass database file."); } finally { if (keePassDatabaseStream != null) { try { keePassDatabaseStream.close(); } catch (IOException e) { // Ignore } } } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectGroups() throws FileNotFoundException { FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml"); KeePassFile keePassFile = new XmlParser().parse(fileInputStream, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)); List<Group> groups = keePassFile.getTopGroups(); Assert.assertNotNull(groups); Assert.assertEquals(6, groups.size()); Assert.assertEquals("General", groups.get(0).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("FqvMJ8yjlUSAEt9OmNSj2A==", groups.get(0).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Windows", groups.get(1).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("rXt7D+EM/0qW1rgPB4g5nw==", groups.get(1).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Network", groups.get(2).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("DwdAaKn4tEyXFlU56/2UBQ==", groups.get(2).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Internet", groups.get(3).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("COgUrPt5P0676DeyZn/auQ==", groups.get(3).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("eMail", groups.get(4).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("/xWfOfnC6ki76sNhrZR7rw==", groups.get(4).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Homebanking", groups.get(5).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("Rdjt21Jla0+E5Q9ElJHw1g==", groups.get(5).getUuid()); } #location 4 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Test public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectGroups() throws FileNotFoundException { KeePassFile keePassFile = parseKeePassXml(); List<Group> groups = keePassFile.getTopGroups(); Assert.assertNotNull(groups); Assert.assertEquals(6, groups.size()); Assert.assertEquals("General", groups.get(0).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("FqvMJ8yjlUSAEt9OmNSj2A==", groups.get(0).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Windows", groups.get(1).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("rXt7D+EM/0qW1rgPB4g5nw==", groups.get(1).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Network", groups.get(2).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("DwdAaKn4tEyXFlU56/2UBQ==", groups.get(2).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Internet", groups.get(3).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("COgUrPt5P0676DeyZn/auQ==", groups.get(3).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("eMail", groups.get(4).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("/xWfOfnC6ki76sNhrZR7rw==", groups.get(4).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Homebanking", groups.get(5).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("Rdjt21Jla0+E5Q9ElJHw1g==", groups.get(5).getUuid()); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectGroups() throws FileNotFoundException { FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml"); KeePassFile keePassFile = new XmlParser().parse(fileInputStream, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)); List<Group> groups = keePassFile.getTopGroups(); Assert.assertNotNull(groups); Assert.assertEquals(6, groups.size()); Assert.assertEquals("General", groups.get(0).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("FqvMJ8yjlUSAEt9OmNSj2A==", groups.get(0).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Windows", groups.get(1).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("rXt7D+EM/0qW1rgPB4g5nw==", groups.get(1).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Network", groups.get(2).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("DwdAaKn4tEyXFlU56/2UBQ==", groups.get(2).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Internet", groups.get(3).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("COgUrPt5P0676DeyZn/auQ==", groups.get(3).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("eMail", groups.get(4).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("/xWfOfnC6ki76sNhrZR7rw==", groups.get(4).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Homebanking", groups.get(5).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("Rdjt21Jla0+E5Q9ElJHw1g==", groups.get(5).getUuid()); } #location 27 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Test public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectGroups() throws FileNotFoundException { KeePassFile keePassFile = parseKeePassXml(); List<Group> groups = keePassFile.getTopGroups(); Assert.assertNotNull(groups); Assert.assertEquals(6, groups.size()); Assert.assertEquals("General", groups.get(0).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("FqvMJ8yjlUSAEt9OmNSj2A==", groups.get(0).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Windows", groups.get(1).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("rXt7D+EM/0qW1rgPB4g5nw==", groups.get(1).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Network", groups.get(2).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("DwdAaKn4tEyXFlU56/2UBQ==", groups.get(2).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Internet", groups.get(3).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("COgUrPt5P0676DeyZn/auQ==", groups.get(3).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("eMail", groups.get(4).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("/xWfOfnC6ki76sNhrZR7rw==", groups.get(4).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Homebanking", groups.get(5).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("Rdjt21Jla0+E5Q9ElJHw1g==", groups.get(5).getUuid()); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectMetadata() throws FileNotFoundException { FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml"); KeePassFile keePassFile = new XmlParser().parse(fileInputStream, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)); Assert.assertEquals("KeePass", keePassFile.getMeta().getGenerator()); Assert.assertEquals("TestDatabase", keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseName()); Assert.assertEquals("Just a sample db", keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseDescription()); Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:59:39", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseNameChanged().getTime())); Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:59:39", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseDescriptionChanged().getTime())); Assert.assertEquals(365, keePassFile.getMeta().getMaintenanceHistoryDays()); Assert.assertEquals(true, keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinEnabled()); Assert.assertEquals("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==", keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:58:56", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinChanged().getTime())); Assert.assertEquals(10, keePassFile.getMeta().getHistoryMaxItems()); Assert.assertEquals(6291456, keePassFile.getMeta().getHistoryMaxSize()); } #location 4 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Test public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectMetadata() throws FileNotFoundException { KeePassFile keePassFile = parseKeePassXml(); Assert.assertEquals("KeePass", keePassFile.getMeta().getGenerator()); Assert.assertEquals("TestDatabase", keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseName()); Assert.assertEquals("Just a sample db", keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseDescription()); Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:59:39", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseNameChanged().getTime())); Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:59:39", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseDescriptionChanged().getTime())); Assert.assertEquals(365, keePassFile.getMeta().getMaintenanceHistoryDays()); Assert.assertEquals(true, keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinEnabled()); Assert.assertEquals("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==", keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:58:56", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinChanged().getTime())); Assert.assertEquals(10, keePassFile.getMeta().getHistoryMaxItems()); Assert.assertEquals(6291456, keePassFile.getMeta().getHistoryMaxSize()); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public boolean isPasswordProtected() { return getPropertyByName(PASSWORD).isProtected(); } #location 2 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code public boolean isPasswordProtected() { return getPropertyByName(PASSWORD).isProtected(); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectGroups() throws FileNotFoundException { FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml"); KeePassFile keePassFile = new XmlParser().parse(fileInputStream, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)); List<Group> groups = keePassFile.getTopGroups(); Assert.assertNotNull(groups); Assert.assertEquals(6, groups.size()); Assert.assertEquals("General", groups.get(0).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("FqvMJ8yjlUSAEt9OmNSj2A==", groups.get(0).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Windows", groups.get(1).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("rXt7D+EM/0qW1rgPB4g5nw==", groups.get(1).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Network", groups.get(2).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("DwdAaKn4tEyXFlU56/2UBQ==", groups.get(2).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Internet", groups.get(3).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("COgUrPt5P0676DeyZn/auQ==", groups.get(3).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("eMail", groups.get(4).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("/xWfOfnC6ki76sNhrZR7rw==", groups.get(4).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Homebanking", groups.get(5).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("Rdjt21Jla0+E5Q9ElJHw1g==", groups.get(5).getUuid()); } #location 9 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code @Test public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectGroups() throws FileNotFoundException { KeePassFile keePassFile = parseKeePassXml(); List<Group> groups = keePassFile.getTopGroups(); Assert.assertNotNull(groups); Assert.assertEquals(6, groups.size()); Assert.assertEquals("General", groups.get(0).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("FqvMJ8yjlUSAEt9OmNSj2A==", groups.get(0).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Windows", groups.get(1).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("rXt7D+EM/0qW1rgPB4g5nw==", groups.get(1).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Network", groups.get(2).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("DwdAaKn4tEyXFlU56/2UBQ==", groups.get(2).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Internet", groups.get(3).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("COgUrPt5P0676DeyZn/auQ==", groups.get(3).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("eMail", groups.get(4).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("/xWfOfnC6ki76sNhrZR7rw==", groups.get(4).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("Homebanking", groups.get(5).getName()); Assert.assertEquals("Rdjt21Jla0+E5Q9ElJHw1g==", groups.get(5).getUuid()); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public boolean isTitleProtected() { return getPropertyByName(TITLE).isProtected(); } #location 2 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code public boolean isTitleProtected() { return getPropertyByName(TITLE).isProtected(); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test public void whenWritingDatabaseFileShouldBeAbleToReadItAlso() throws FileNotFoundException { FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml"); KeePassFile keePassFile = new KeePassDatabaseXmlParser().fromXml(fileInputStream, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)); new ProtectedValueProcessor().processProtectedValues(new DecryptionStrategy(Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)), keePassFile); FileOutputStream file = new FileOutputStream("target/test-classes/writeDatabase.kdbx"); KeePassDatabase.write(keePassFile, "abcdefg", file); KeePassDatabase database = KeePassDatabase.getInstance("target/test-classes/writeDatabase.kdbx"); KeePassHeader header = database.getHeader(); Assert.assertEquals(CompressionAlgorithm.Gzip, header.getCompression()); Assert.assertEquals(CrsAlgorithm.Salsa20, header.getCrsAlgorithm()); Assert.assertEquals(8000, header.getTransformRounds()); KeePassFile openDatabase = database.openDatabase("abcdefg"); Entry sampleEntry = openDatabase.getEntryByTitle("Sample Entry"); Assert.assertEquals("User Name", sampleEntry.getUsername()); Assert.assertEquals("Password", sampleEntry.getPassword()); Entry sampleEntryTwo = openDatabase.getEntryByTitle("Sample Entry #2"); Assert.assertEquals("Michael321", sampleEntryTwo.getUsername()); Assert.assertEquals("12345", sampleEntryTwo.getPassword()); } #location 27 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Test public void whenWritingDatabaseFileShouldBeAbleToReadItAlso() throws FileNotFoundException { FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml"); KeePassFile keePassFile = new KeePassDatabaseXmlParser().fromXml(fileInputStream); new ProtectedValueProcessor().processProtectedValues(new DecryptionStrategy(Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)), keePassFile); FileOutputStream file = new FileOutputStream("target/test-classes/writeDatabase.kdbx"); KeePassDatabase.write(keePassFile, "abcdefg", file); KeePassDatabase database = KeePassDatabase.getInstance("target/test-classes/writeDatabase.kdbx"); KeePassHeader header = database.getHeader(); Assert.assertEquals(CompressionAlgorithm.Gzip, header.getCompression()); Assert.assertEquals(CrsAlgorithm.Salsa20, header.getCrsAlgorithm()); Assert.assertEquals(8000, header.getTransformRounds()); KeePassFile openDatabase = database.openDatabase("abcdefg"); Entry sampleEntry = openDatabase.getEntryByTitle("Sample Entry"); Assert.assertEquals("User Name", sampleEntry.getUsername()); Assert.assertEquals("Password", sampleEntry.getPassword()); Entry sampleEntryTwo = openDatabase.getEntryByTitle("Sample Entry #2"); Assert.assertEquals("Michael321", sampleEntryTwo.getUsername()); Assert.assertEquals("12345", sampleEntryTwo.getPassword()); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code private byte[] processDatabaseEncryption(boolean encrypt, byte[] database, KeePassHeader header, byte[] aesKey) throws IOException { byte[] metaData = new byte[KeePassHeader.VERSION_SIGNATURE_LENGTH + header.getHeaderSize()]; BufferedInputStream bufferedInputStream = new BufferedInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(database)); bufferedInputStream.read(metaData); byte[] payload = StreamUtils.toByteArray(bufferedInputStream); byte[] processedPayload; if (encrypt) { processedPayload = Aes.encrypt(aesKey, header.getEncryptionIV(), payload); } else { processedPayload = Aes.decrypt(aesKey, header.getEncryptionIV(), payload); } ByteArrayOutputStream output = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); output.write(metaData); output.write(processedPayload); return output.toByteArray(); } #location 7 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code private byte[] processDatabaseEncryption(boolean encrypt, byte[] database, KeePassHeader header, byte[] aesKey) throws IOException { byte[] metaData = new byte[KeePassHeader.VERSION_SIGNATURE_LENGTH + header.getHeaderSize()]; SafeInputStream inputStream = new SafeInputStream(new BufferedInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(database))); inputStream.readSafe(metaData); byte[] payload = StreamUtils.toByteArray(inputStream); byte[] processedPayload; if (encrypt) { processedPayload = Aes.encrypt(aesKey, header.getEncryptionIV(), payload); } else { processedPayload = Aes.decrypt(aesKey, header.getEncryptionIV(), payload); } ByteArrayOutputStream output = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); output.write(metaData); output.write(processedPayload); return output.toByteArray(); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code private KeePassFile parseKeePassXml() throws FileNotFoundException { FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml"); KeePassFile keePassFile = new KeePassDatabaseXmlParser().fromXml(fileInputStream, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)); new ProtectedValueProcessor().processProtectedValues(new DecryptionStrategy(Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)), keePassFile); return keePassFile; } #location 8 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code private KeePassFile parseKeePassXml() throws FileNotFoundException { FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml"); KeePassFile keePassFile = new KeePassDatabaseXmlParser().fromXml(fileInputStream); new ProtectedValueProcessor().processProtectedValues(new DecryptionStrategy(Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)), keePassFile); return keePassFile; }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectEntries() throws FileNotFoundException { FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml"); KeePassFile keePassFile = new XmlParser().parse(fileInputStream, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)); List<Entry> entries = keePassFile.getTopEntries(); Assert.assertNotNull(entries); Assert.assertEquals(2, entries.size()); Assert.assertEquals("libdLW88cU6BvrPQlvKqMA==", entries.get(0).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals(5, entries.get(0).getProperties().size()); Assert.assertEquals("Sample Entry", entries.get(0).getTitle()); Assert.assertEquals("http://keepass.info/", entries.get(0).getUrl()); Assert.assertEquals("User Name", entries.get(0).getUsername()); Assert.assertEquals("Notes", entries.get(0).getNotes()); Assert.assertEquals("Password", entries.get(0).getPassword()); } #location 9 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code @Test public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectEntries() throws FileNotFoundException { KeePassFile keePassFile = parseKeePassXml(); List<Entry> entries = keePassFile.getTopEntries(); Assert.assertNotNull(entries); Assert.assertEquals(2, entries.size()); Assert.assertEquals("libdLW88cU6BvrPQlvKqMA==", entries.get(0).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals(5, entries.get(0).getProperties().size()); Assert.assertEquals("Sample Entry", entries.get(0).getTitle()); Assert.assertEquals("http://keepass.info/", entries.get(0).getUrl()); Assert.assertEquals("User Name", entries.get(0).getUsername()); Assert.assertEquals("Notes", entries.get(0).getNotes()); Assert.assertEquals("Password", entries.get(0).getPassword()); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test(expected = UnsupportedOperationException.class) public void whenVersionIsNotSupportedShouldThrowException() throws IOException { KeePassHeader header = new KeePassHeader(new RandomGenerator()); // new v4 format FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream(ResourceUtils.getResource("DatabaseWithV4Format.kdbx")); byte[] rawHeader = StreamUtils.toByteArray(fileInputStream); header.checkVersionSupport(rawHeader); } #location 7 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Test(expected = UnsupportedOperationException.class) public void whenVersionIsNotSupportedShouldThrowException() throws IOException { KeePassHeader header = new KeePassHeader(new RandomGenerator()); // unsupported format --> e.g. v5 byte[] rawHeader = ByteUtils.hexStringToByteArray("03D9A29A67FB4BB501000500"); header.checkVersionSupport(rawHeader); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code private byte[] processDatabaseEncryption(boolean encrypt, byte[] database, KeePassHeader header, byte[] aesKey) throws IOException { byte[] metaData = new byte[KeePassHeader.VERSION_SIGNATURE_LENGTH + header.getHeaderSize()]; BufferedInputStream bufferedInputStream = new BufferedInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(database)); bufferedInputStream.read(metaData); byte[] payload = StreamUtils.toByteArray(bufferedInputStream); byte[] processedPayload; if (encrypt) { processedPayload = Aes.encrypt(aesKey, header.getEncryptionIV(), payload); } else { processedPayload = Aes.decrypt(aesKey, header.getEncryptionIV(), payload); } ByteArrayOutputStream output = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); output.write(metaData); output.write(processedPayload); return output.toByteArray(); } #location 19 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code private byte[] processDatabaseEncryption(boolean encrypt, byte[] database, KeePassHeader header, byte[] aesKey) throws IOException { byte[] metaData = new byte[KeePassHeader.VERSION_SIGNATURE_LENGTH + header.getHeaderSize()]; SafeInputStream inputStream = new SafeInputStream(new BufferedInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(database))); inputStream.readSafe(metaData); byte[] payload = StreamUtils.toByteArray(inputStream); byte[] processedPayload; if (encrypt) { processedPayload = Aes.encrypt(aesKey, header.getEncryptionIV(), payload); } else { processedPayload = Aes.decrypt(aesKey, header.getEncryptionIV(), payload); } ByteArrayOutputStream output = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); output.write(metaData); output.write(processedPayload); return output.toByteArray(); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test public void whenWritingKeePassFileShouldBeAbleToReadItAgain() throws IOException { // Read decrypted and write again FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml"); KeePassDatabaseXmlParser parser = new KeePassDatabaseXmlParser(); KeePassFile keePassFile = parser.fromXml(fileInputStream, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)); new ProtectedValueProcessor().processProtectedValues(new DecryptionStrategy(Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)), keePassFile); ByteArrayOutputStream outputStream = parser.toXml(keePassFile, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)); OutputStream fileOutputStream = new FileOutputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted2.xml"); outputStream.writeTo(fileOutputStream); // Read written file FileInputStream writtenInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted2.xml"); KeePassFile writtenKeePassFile = parser.fromXml(writtenInputStream, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)); new ProtectedValueProcessor().processProtectedValues(new DecryptionStrategy(Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)), writtenKeePassFile); Assert.assertEquals("Password", writtenKeePassFile.getEntryByTitle("Sample Entry").getPassword()); } #location 19 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Test public void whenWritingKeePassFileShouldBeAbleToReadItAgain() throws IOException { // Read decrypted and write again FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml"); KeePassDatabaseXmlParser parser = new KeePassDatabaseXmlParser(); KeePassFile keePassFile = parser.fromXml(fileInputStream); ByteArrayOutputStream outputStream = parser.toXml(keePassFile); OutputStream fileOutputStream = new FileOutputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted2.xml"); outputStream.writeTo(fileOutputStream); // Read written file FileInputStream writtenInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted2.xml"); KeePassFile writtenKeePassFile = parser.fromXml(writtenInputStream); new ProtectedValueProcessor().processProtectedValues(new DecryptionStrategy(Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)), writtenKeePassFile); Assert.assertEquals("Password", writtenKeePassFile.getEntryByTitle("Sample Entry").getPassword()); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public KeePassFile openDatabase(String password) { try { byte[] aesDecryptedDbFile = decrypter.decryptDatabase(password, keepassHeader, keepassFile); byte[] startBytes = new byte[32]; ByteArrayInputStream decryptedStream = new ByteArrayInputStream(aesDecryptedDbFile); decryptedStream.read(startBytes); // compare startBytes if(!Arrays.equals(keepassHeader.getStreamStartBytes(), startBytes)) { throw new KeepassDatabaseUnreadable("The keepass database file seems to be corrupt or cannot be decrypted."); } HashedBlockInputStream hashedBlockInputStream = new HashedBlockInputStream(decryptedStream); byte[] hashedBlockBytes = StreamUtils.toByteArray(hashedBlockInputStream); byte[] decompressed = hashedBlockBytes; // unzip if necessary if(keepassHeader.getCompression().equals(CompressionAlgorithm.Gzip)) { GZIPInputStream gzipInputStream = new GZIPInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(hashedBlockBytes)); decompressed = StreamUtils.toByteArray(gzipInputStream); } ProtectedStringCrypto protectedStringCrypto; if(keepassHeader.getCrsAlgorithm().equals(CrsAlgorithm.Salsa20)) { protectedStringCrypto = Salsa20.createInstance(keepassHeader.getProtectedStreamKey()); } else { throw new UnsupportedOperationException("Only Salsa20 is supported as CrsAlgorithm at the moment!"); } return xmlParser.parse(new ByteArrayInputStream(decompressed), protectedStringCrypto); } catch (IOException e) { throw new RuntimeException("Could not open database file", e); } } #location 22 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code public KeePassFile openDatabase(String password) { try { byte[] passwordBytes = password.getBytes("UTF-8"); byte[] hashedPassword = Sha256.hash(passwordBytes); return decryptAndParseDatabase(hashedPassword); } catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException("The encoding UTF-8 is not supported"); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectEntries() throws FileNotFoundException { FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml"); KeePassFile keePassFile = new XmlParser().parse(fileInputStream, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)); List<Entry> entries = keePassFile.getTopEntries(); Assert.assertNotNull(entries); Assert.assertEquals(2, entries.size()); Assert.assertEquals("libdLW88cU6BvrPQlvKqMA==", entries.get(0).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals(5, entries.get(0).getProperties().size()); Assert.assertEquals("Sample Entry", entries.get(0).getTitle()); Assert.assertEquals("http://keepass.info/", entries.get(0).getUrl()); Assert.assertEquals("User Name", entries.get(0).getUsername()); Assert.assertEquals("Notes", entries.get(0).getNotes()); Assert.assertEquals("Password", entries.get(0).getPassword()); } #location 4 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Test public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectEntries() throws FileNotFoundException { KeePassFile keePassFile = parseKeePassXml(); List<Entry> entries = keePassFile.getTopEntries(); Assert.assertNotNull(entries); Assert.assertEquals(2, entries.size()); Assert.assertEquals("libdLW88cU6BvrPQlvKqMA==", entries.get(0).getUuid()); Assert.assertEquals(5, entries.get(0).getProperties().size()); Assert.assertEquals("Sample Entry", entries.get(0).getTitle()); Assert.assertEquals("http://keepass.info/", entries.get(0).getUrl()); Assert.assertEquals("User Name", entries.get(0).getUsername()); Assert.assertEquals("Notes", entries.get(0).getNotes()); Assert.assertEquals("Password", entries.get(0).getPassword()); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code private byte[] unHashBlockStream(SafeInputStream decryptedStream) throws IOException { HashedBlockInputStream hashedBlockInputStream = new HashedBlockInputStream(decryptedStream); byte[] hashedBlockBytes = StreamUtils.toByteArray(hashedBlockInputStream); return hashedBlockBytes; } #location 3 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code private byte[] unHashBlockStream(SafeInputStream decryptedStream) throws IOException { HashedBlockInputStream hashedBlockInputStream = new HashedBlockInputStream(decryptedStream); return StreamUtils.toByteArray(hashedBlockInputStream); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public void checkVersionSupport(byte[] keepassFile) throws IOException { BufferedInputStream bufferedInputStream = new BufferedInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(keepassFile)); byte[] signature = new byte[VERSION_SIGNATURE_LENGTH]; bufferedInputStream.read(signature); ByteBuffer signatureBuffer = ByteBuffer.wrap(signature); signatureBuffer.order(ByteOrder.LITTLE_ENDIAN); int signaturePart1 = ByteUtils.toUnsignedInt(signatureBuffer.getInt()); int signaturePart2 = ByteUtils.toUnsignedInt(signatureBuffer.getInt()); if (signaturePart1 == DATABASE_V2_FILE_SIGNATURE_1_INT && signaturePart2 == DATABASE_V2_FILE_SIGNATURE_2_INT) { return; } else if (signaturePart1 == OLD_DATABASE_V1_FILE_SIGNATURE_1_INT && signaturePart2 == OLD_DATABASE_V1_FILE_SIGNATURE_2_INT) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException( "The provided KeePass database file seems to be from KeePass 1.x which is not supported!"); } else { throw new UnsupportedOperationException("The provided file seems to be no KeePass database file!"); } } #location 5 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code public void checkVersionSupport(byte[] keepassFile) throws IOException { BufferedInputStream inputStream = new BufferedInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(keepassFile)); byte[] signature = new byte[VERSION_SIGNATURE_LENGTH]; int readBytes = inputStream.read(signature); if(readBytes == -1) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException("Could not read KeePass header. The provided file seems to be no KeePass database file!"); } ByteBuffer signatureBuffer = ByteBuffer.wrap(signature); signatureBuffer.order(ByteOrder.LITTLE_ENDIAN); int signaturePart1 = ByteUtils.toUnsignedInt(signatureBuffer.getInt()); int signaturePart2 = ByteUtils.toUnsignedInt(signatureBuffer.getInt()); if (signaturePart1 == DATABASE_V2_FILE_SIGNATURE_1_INT && signaturePart2 == DATABASE_V2_FILE_SIGNATURE_2_INT) { return; } else if (signaturePart1 == OLD_DATABASE_V1_FILE_SIGNATURE_1_INT && signaturePart2 == OLD_DATABASE_V1_FILE_SIGNATURE_2_INT) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException( "The provided KeePass database file seems to be from KeePass 1.x which is not supported!"); } else { throw new UnsupportedOperationException("The provided file seems to be no KeePass database file!"); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public KeePassFile openDatabase(String password) { try { byte[] aesDecryptedDbFile = decrypter.decryptDatabase(password, keepassHeader, keepassFile); byte[] startBytes = new byte[32]; ByteArrayInputStream decryptedStream = new ByteArrayInputStream(aesDecryptedDbFile); decryptedStream.read(startBytes); // compare startBytes if(!Arrays.equals(keepassHeader.getStreamStartBytes(), startBytes)) { throw new KeepassDatabaseUnreadable("The keepass database file seems to be corrupt or cannot be decrypted."); } HashedBlockInputStream hashedBlockInputStream = new HashedBlockInputStream(decryptedStream); byte[] hashedBlockBytes = StreamUtils.toByteArray(hashedBlockInputStream); byte[] decompressed = hashedBlockBytes; // unzip if necessary if(keepassHeader.getCompression().equals(CompressionAlgorithm.Gzip)) { GZIPInputStream gzipInputStream = new GZIPInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(hashedBlockBytes)); decompressed = StreamUtils.toByteArray(gzipInputStream); } ProtectedStringCrypto protectedStringCrypto; if(keepassHeader.getCrsAlgorithm().equals(CrsAlgorithm.Salsa20)) { protectedStringCrypto = Salsa20.createInstance(keepassHeader.getProtectedStreamKey()); } else { throw new UnsupportedOperationException("Only Salsa20 is supported as CrsAlgorithm at the moment!"); } return xmlParser.parse(new ByteArrayInputStream(decompressed), protectedStringCrypto); } catch (IOException e) { throw new RuntimeException("Could not open database file", e); } } #location 15 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code public KeePassFile openDatabase(String password) { try { byte[] passwordBytes = password.getBytes("UTF-8"); byte[] hashedPassword = Sha256.hash(passwordBytes); return decryptAndParseDatabase(hashedPassword); } catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException("The encoding UTF-8 is not supported"); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test public void whenInputIsKeyFileShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectData() throws FileNotFoundException { FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/DatabaseWithKeyfile.key"); KeyFile keyFile = new KeyFileXmlParser().fromXml(fileInputStream); Assert.assertEquals("RP+rYNZL4lrGtDMBPzOuctlh3NAutSG5KGsT38C+qPQ=", keyFile.getKey().getData()); } #location 4 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Test public void whenInputIsKeyFileShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectData() throws IOException { FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/DatabaseWithKeyfile.key"); byte[] keyFileContent = StreamUtils.toByteArray(fileInputStream); KeyFile keyFile = new KeyFileXmlParser().fromXml(keyFileContent); Assert.assertEquals("RP+rYNZL4lrGtDMBPzOuctlh3NAutSG5KGsT38C+qPQ=", keyFile.getKey().getData()); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectMetadata() throws FileNotFoundException { FileInputStream fileInputStream = new FileInputStream("target/test-classes/testDatabase_decrypted.xml"); KeePassFile keePassFile = new XmlParser().parse(fileInputStream, Salsa20.createInstance(protectedStreamKey)); Assert.assertEquals("KeePass", keePassFile.getMeta().getGenerator()); Assert.assertEquals("TestDatabase", keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseName()); Assert.assertEquals("Just a sample db", keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseDescription()); Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:59:39", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseNameChanged().getTime())); Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:59:39", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseDescriptionChanged().getTime())); Assert.assertEquals(365, keePassFile.getMeta().getMaintenanceHistoryDays()); Assert.assertEquals(true, keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinEnabled()); Assert.assertEquals("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==", keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:58:56", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinChanged().getTime())); Assert.assertEquals(10, keePassFile.getMeta().getHistoryMaxItems()); Assert.assertEquals(6291456, keePassFile.getMeta().getHistoryMaxSize()); } #location 16 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Test public void whenInputIsValidKeePassXmlShouldParseFileAndReturnCorrectMetadata() throws FileNotFoundException { KeePassFile keePassFile = parseKeePassXml(); Assert.assertEquals("KeePass", keePassFile.getMeta().getGenerator()); Assert.assertEquals("TestDatabase", keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseName()); Assert.assertEquals("Just a sample db", keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseDescription()); Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:59:39", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseNameChanged().getTime())); Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:59:39", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getDatabaseDescriptionChanged().getTime())); Assert.assertEquals(365, keePassFile.getMeta().getMaintenanceHistoryDays()); Assert.assertEquals(true, keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinEnabled()); Assert.assertEquals("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==", keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinUuid()); Assert.assertEquals("2014-11-22 18:58:56", dateFormatter.format(keePassFile.getMeta().getRecycleBinChanged().getTime())); Assert.assertEquals(10, keePassFile.getMeta().getHistoryMaxItems()); Assert.assertEquals(6291456, keePassFile.getMeta().getHistoryMaxSize()); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public static void main(String[] args) { String allExtractRegularUrl = "http://localhost:8080/HtmlExtractorServer/api/all_extract_regular.jsp"; String redisHost = "localhost"; int redisPort = 6379; HtmlExtractor htmlExtractor = HtmlExtractor.getInstance(allExtractRegularUrl, redisHost, redisPort); String url = "http://money.163.com/08/1219/16/4THR2TMP002533QK.html"; List<ExtractResult> extractResults = htmlExtractor.extract(url, "gb2312"); int i = 1; for (ExtractResult extractResult : extractResults) { System.out.println((i++) + "、网页 " + extractResult.getUrl() + " 的抽取结果"); for(ExtractResultItem extractResultItem : extractResult.getExtractResultItems()){ System.out.print("\t"+extractResultItem.getField()+" = "+extractResultItem.getValue()); } System.out.println("\tdescription = "+extractResult.getDescription()); System.out.println("\tkeywords = "+extractResult.getKeywords()); } } #location 6 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
#fixed code public static void main(String[] args) { usage1(); //usage2(); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public static void main(String[] args) { //下面的三种方法代表了3种不同的使用模式,只能单独使用 //usage1(); //usage2(); usage3(); } #location 5 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
#fixed code public static void main(String[] args) { //下面的三种方法代表了3种不同的使用模式,只能单独使用 //usage1(); usage2(); //usage3(); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public ValueBlock filter(PositionBlock positions) { // find selected positions Set<Integer> indexes = new HashSet<>(); for (long position : positions.getPositions()) { if (range.contains(position)) { indexes.add((int) (position - range.lowerEndpoint())); } } // if no positions are selected, we are done if (indexes.isEmpty()) { return EmptyValueBlock.INSTANCE; } // build a buffer containing only the tuples from the selected positions DynamicSliceOutput sliceOutput = new DynamicSliceOutput(1024); int currentOffset = 0; for (int index = 0; index < getCount(); ++index) { Slice currentPositionToEnd = slice.slice(currentOffset, slice.length() - currentOffset); int size = tupleInfo.size(currentPositionToEnd); // only write selected tuples if (indexes.contains(index)) { sliceOutput.writeBytes(slice, currentOffset, size); } currentOffset += size; } // todo what is the start position return new UncompressedValueBlock(Ranges.closed(0L, (long) indexes.size() - 1), tupleInfo, sliceOutput.slice()); } #location 35 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Override public ValueBlock filter(PositionBlock positions) { return MaskedValueBlock.maskBlock(this, positions); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test public void testAverageAll() { List<Tuple> expected = computeExpected("SELECT AVG(totalprice) FROM orders", DOUBLE); TupleStream price = createBlockStream(ordersData, Column.ORDER_TOTALPRICE, DOUBLE); AggregationOperator aggregation = new AggregationOperator(price, AverageAggregation.PROVIDER); assertEqualsIgnoreOrder(tuples(aggregation), expected); } #location 9 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Test public void testAverageAll() { List<Tuple> expected = computeExpected("SELECT AVG(totalprice) FROM orders", DOUBLE); TupleStream price = createTupleStream(ordersData, Column.ORDER_TOTALPRICE, DOUBLE); AggregationOperator aggregation = new AggregationOperator(price, AverageAggregation.PROVIDER); assertEqualsIgnoreOrder(tuples(aggregation), expected); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code private Tuple createTuple(String value) { byte[] bytes = value.getBytes(UTF_8); Slice slice = Slices.allocate(bytes.length + SIZE_OF_SHORT); slice.output() .appendShort(bytes.length + 2) .appendBytes(bytes); return new Tuple(slice, new TupleInfo(VARIABLE_BINARY)); } #location 7 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code private Tuple createTuple(String value) { TupleInfo tupleInfo = new TupleInfo(VARIABLE_BINARY); Tuple tuple = tupleInfo.builder() .append(Slices.wrappedBuffer(value.getBytes(UTF_8))) .build(); return tuple; }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test public void testCountAll() { List<Tuple> expected = computeExpected("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM orders", FIXED_INT_64); TupleStream orders = createBlockStream(ordersData, Column.ORDER_ORDERKEY, FIXED_INT_64); AggregationOperator aggregation = new AggregationOperator(orders, CountAggregation.PROVIDER); assertEqualsIgnoreOrder(tuples(aggregation), expected); } #location 9 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Test public void testCountAll() { List<Tuple> expected = computeExpected("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM orders", FIXED_INT_64); TupleStream orders = createTupleStream(ordersData, Column.ORDER_ORDERKEY, FIXED_INT_64); AggregationOperator aggregation = new AggregationOperator(orders, CountAggregation.PROVIDER); assertEqualsIgnoreOrder(tuples(aggregation), expected); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public void writeTo(List<UncompressedBlock> blocks, Class<?> type, Type genericType, Annotation[] annotations, MediaType mediaType, MultivaluedMap<String, Object> httpHeaders, OutputStream output) throws IOException, WebApplicationException { for (UncompressedBlock block : blocks) { Slice slice = block.getSlice(); // write header ByteArraySlice blockHeader = Slices.allocate(SIZE_OF_INT + SIZE_OF_INT + SIZE_OF_LONG); blockHeader.output() .appendInt(slice.length()) .appendInt(block.getCount()) .appendLong(block.getRange().getStart()); output.write(blockHeader.getRawArray()); // write slice slice.getBytes(0, output, slice.length()); } } #location 19 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Override public void writeTo(List<UncompressedBlock> blocks, Class<?> type, Type genericType, Annotation[] annotations, MediaType mediaType, MultivaluedMap<String, Object> httpHeaders, OutputStream output) throws IOException, WebApplicationException { OutputStreamSliceOutput sliceOutput = new OutputStreamSliceOutput(output); for (UncompressedBlock block : blocks) { Slice slice = block.getSlice(); sliceOutput.appendInt(slice.length()) .appendInt(block.getCount()) .appendLong(block.getRange().getStart()) .appendBytes(slice) .flush(); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test public void testCountAllWithComparison() { List<Tuple> expected = computeExpected("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM lineitem WHERE tax < discount", FIXED_INT_64); TupleStream discount = createBlockStream(lineitemData, Column.LINEITEM_DISCOUNT, DOUBLE); TupleStream tax = createBlockStream(lineitemData, Column.LINEITEM_TAX, DOUBLE); ComparisonOperator comparison = new ComparisonOperator(tax, discount, new DoubleLessThanComparison()); AggregationOperator aggregation = new AggregationOperator(comparison, CountAggregation.PROVIDER); assertEqualsIgnoreOrder(tuples(aggregation), expected); } #location 12 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Test public void testCountAllWithComparison() { List<Tuple> expected = computeExpected("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM lineitem WHERE tax < discount", FIXED_INT_64); TupleStream discount = createTupleStream(lineitemData, Column.LINEITEM_DISCOUNT, DOUBLE); TupleStream tax = createTupleStream(lineitemData, Column.LINEITEM_TAX, DOUBLE); ComparisonOperator comparison = new ComparisonOperator(tax, discount, new DoubleLessThanComparison()); AggregationOperator aggregation = new AggregationOperator(comparison, CountAggregation.PROVIDER); assertEqualsIgnoreOrder(tuples(aggregation), expected); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public void writeTo(UncompressedBlock block, Class<?> type, Type genericType, Annotation[] annotations, MediaType mediaType, MultivaluedMap<String, Object> httpHeaders, OutputStream output) throws IOException, WebApplicationException { Slice slice = block.getSlice(); // write header ByteArraySlice header = Slices.allocate(SIZE_OF_INT + SIZE_OF_INT + SIZE_OF_LONG); header.output() .appendInt(slice.length()) .appendInt(block.getCount()) .appendLong(block.getRange().getStart()); output.write(header.getRawArray()); // write slice slice.getBytes(0, output, slice.length()); } #location 18 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Override public void writeTo(UncompressedBlock block, Class<?> type, Type genericType, Annotation[] annotations, MediaType mediaType, MultivaluedMap<String, Object> httpHeaders, OutputStream output) throws IOException, WebApplicationException { Slice slice = block.getSlice(); new OutputStreamSliceOutput(output) .appendInt(slice.length()) .appendInt(block.getCount()) .appendLong(block.getRange().getStart()) .appendBytes(slice); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test public void testCountAllWithPredicate() { List<Tuple> expected = computeExpected("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM orders WHERE orderstatus = 'F'", FIXED_INT_64); TupleStream orderStatus = createBlockStream(ordersData, Column.ORDER_ORDERSTATUS, VARIABLE_BINARY); ApplyPredicateOperator filtered = new ApplyPredicateOperator(orderStatus, new Predicate<Cursor>() { @Override public boolean apply(Cursor input) { return input.getSlice(0).equals(Slices.copiedBuffer("F", Charsets.UTF_8)); } }); AggregationOperator aggregation = new AggregationOperator(filtered, CountAggregation.PROVIDER); assertEqualsIgnoreOrder(tuples(aggregation), expected); } #location 19 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Test public void testCountAllWithPredicate() { List<Tuple> expected = computeExpected("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM orders WHERE orderstatus = 'F'", FIXED_INT_64); TupleStream orderStatus = createTupleStream(ordersData, Column.ORDER_ORDERSTATUS, VARIABLE_BINARY); ApplyPredicateOperator filtered = new ApplyPredicateOperator(orderStatus, new Predicate<Cursor>() { @Override public boolean apply(Cursor input) { return input.getSlice(0).equals(Slices.copiedBuffer("F", Charsets.UTF_8)); } }); AggregationOperator aggregation = new AggregationOperator(filtered, CountAggregation.PROVIDER); assertEqualsIgnoreOrder(tuples(aggregation), expected); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test public void testSelectWithComparison() { List<Tuple> expected = computeExpected("SELECT orderkey FROM lineitem WHERE tax < discount", FIXED_INT_64); RowSourceBuilder orderKey = createBlockStream(lineitemData, Column.LINEITEM_ORDERKEY, FIXED_INT_64); TupleStream discount = createBlockStream(lineitemData, Column.LINEITEM_DISCOUNT, DOUBLE); TupleStream tax = createBlockStream(lineitemData, Column.LINEITEM_TAX, DOUBLE); ComparisonOperator comparison = new ComparisonOperator(tax, discount, new DoubleLessThanComparison()); FilterOperator result = new FilterOperator(orderKey.getTupleInfo(), orderKey, comparison); assertEqualsIgnoreOrder(tuples(result), expected); } #location 13 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Test public void testSelectWithComparison() { List<Tuple> expected = computeExpected("SELECT orderkey FROM lineitem WHERE tax < discount", FIXED_INT_64); RowSourceBuilder orderKey = createTupleStream(lineitemData, Column.LINEITEM_ORDERKEY, FIXED_INT_64); TupleStream discount = createTupleStream(lineitemData, Column.LINEITEM_DISCOUNT, DOUBLE); TupleStream tax = createTupleStream(lineitemData, Column.LINEITEM_TAX, DOUBLE); ComparisonOperator comparison = new ComparisonOperator(tax, discount, new DoubleLessThanComparison()); FilterOperator result = new FilterOperator(orderKey.getTupleInfo(), orderKey, comparison); assertEqualsIgnoreOrder(tuples(result), expected); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code private Tuple createTuple(String key, long count) { byte[] bytes = key.getBytes(Charsets.UTF_8); Slice slice = Slices.allocate(SIZE_OF_LONG + SIZE_OF_SHORT + bytes.length); slice.output() .appendLong(count) .appendShort(10 + bytes.length) .appendBytes(bytes); return new Tuple(slice, new TupleInfo(VARIABLE_BINARY, FIXED_INT_64)); } #location 9 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code private Tuple createTuple(String key, long count) { TupleInfo tupleInfo = new TupleInfo(VARIABLE_BINARY, FIXED_INT_64); Tuple tuple = tupleInfo.builder() .append(Slices.wrappedBuffer(key.getBytes(UTF_8))) .append(count) .build(); return tuple; }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test public void testCreatePipelineAggregatedSharedTask() throws Exception { FreeStyleProject build1 = jenkins.createFreeStyleProject("build1"); FreeStyleProject build2 = jenkins.createFreeStyleProject("build2"); FreeStyleProject sonar = jenkins.createFreeStyleProject("sonar1"); build1.getPublishersList().add(new BuildTrigger("sonar1", true)); build2.getPublishersList().add(new BuildTrigger("sonar1", true)); build1.save(); build2.save(); jenkins.getInstance().rebuildDependencyGraph(); jenkins.setQuietPeriod(0); jenkins.buildAndAssertSuccess(build1); jenkins.waitUntilNoActivity(); assertNotNull(sonar.getLastBuild()); PipelineFactory factory = new PipelineFactory(); final Pipeline pipe1 = factory.extractPipeline("pipe1", build1); final Pipeline pipe2 = factory.extractPipeline("pipe2", build2); assertEquals(pipe1.getStages().size(), 2); assertEquals(pipe2.getStages().size(), 2); assertNotNull(sonar.getBuild("1")); Pipeline aggregated1 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe1); Pipeline aggregated2 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe2); assertEquals("#1", aggregated1.getStages().get(1).getVersion()); assertEquals(true, aggregated2.getStages().get(1).getStatus().isIdle()); jenkins.buildAndAssertSuccess(build2); jenkins.waitUntilNoActivity(); Pipeline aggregated3 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe1); Pipeline aggregated4 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe2); assertEquals("#1", aggregated3.getStages().get(1).getVersion()); assertEquals("#1", aggregated4.getStages().get(1).getVersion()); } #location 27 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code @Test public void testCreatePipelineAggregatedSharedTask() throws Exception { FreeStyleProject build1 = jenkins.createFreeStyleProject("build1"); FreeStyleProject build2 = jenkins.createFreeStyleProject("build2"); FreeStyleProject sonar = jenkins.createFreeStyleProject("sonar1"); build1.getPublishersList().add(new BuildTrigger("sonar1", true)); build2.getPublishersList().add(new BuildTrigger("sonar1", true)); build1.save(); build2.save(); jenkins.getInstance().rebuildDependencyGraph(); jenkins.setQuietPeriod(0); PipelineFactory factory = new PipelineFactory(); final Pipeline pipe1 = factory.extractPipeline("pipe1", build1); final Pipeline pipe2 = factory.extractPipeline("pipe2", build2); Pipeline aggregated1 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe1); Pipeline aggregated2 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe2); assertNull(aggregated1.getStages().get(0).getVersion()); assertNull(aggregated2.getStages().get(0).getVersion()); assertTrue(aggregated1.getStages().get(0).getTasks().get(0).getStatus().isIdle()); assertTrue(aggregated2.getStages().get(0).getTasks().get(0).getStatus().isIdle()); jenkins.buildAndAssertSuccess(build1); jenkins.waitUntilNoActivity(); assertNotNull(sonar.getLastBuild()); assertEquals(pipe1.getStages().size(), 2); assertEquals(pipe2.getStages().size(), 2); assertNotNull(sonar.getBuild("1")); aggregated1 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe1); aggregated2 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe2); assertEquals("#1", aggregated1.getStages().get(1).getVersion()); assertEquals(jenkins.getInstance().getRootUrl() + "job/sonar1/1/", aggregated1.getStages().get(1).getTasks().get(0).getLink()); assertEquals(true, aggregated2.getStages().get(1).getTasks().get(0).getStatus().isIdle()); assertEquals(jenkins.getInstance().getRootUrl() + "job/sonar1/", aggregated2.getStages().get(1).getTasks().get(0).getLink()); jenkins.buildAndAssertSuccess(build2); jenkins.waitUntilNoActivity(); aggregated1 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe1); aggregated2 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe2); assertEquals("#1", aggregated1.getStages().get(1).getVersion()); assertEquals("#1", aggregated2.getStages().get(1).getVersion()); assertEquals(true, aggregated2.getStages().get(1).getTasks().get(0).getStatus().isSuccess()); assertEquals(jenkins.getInstance().getRootUrl() + "job/sonar1/2/", aggregated2.getStages().get(1).getTasks().get(0).getLink()); jenkins.buildAndAssertSuccess(build1); jenkins.waitUntilNoActivity(); aggregated1 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe1); aggregated2 = factory.createPipelineAggregated(pipe2); assertEquals("#2", aggregated1.getStages().get(1).getVersion()); assertEquals("#1", aggregated2.getStages().get(1).getVersion()); assertEquals(jenkins.getInstance().getRootUrl() + "job/sonar1/3/", aggregated1.getStages().get(1).getTasks().get(0).getLink()); assertEquals(jenkins.getInstance().getRootUrl() + "job/sonar1/2/", aggregated2.getStages().get(1).getTasks().get(0).getLink()); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public Pipeline getPipeline() { AbstractProject first = Jenkins.getInstance().getItem(firstJob, Jenkins.getInstance(), AbstractProject.class); AbstractBuild prevBuild = null; List<Stage> stages = newArrayList(); boolean isFirst = true; for (AbstractProject job : getAllDownstreamJobs(first)) { AbstractBuild build = job.getLastBuild(); Task task; if (isFirst || build.equals(getDownstreamBuild(job, prevBuild))) { Status status = resolveStatus(build); if (status == Status.RUNNING) { task = new Task(job.getDisplayName(), status, (int) Math.round((double) (System.currentTimeMillis() - build.getTimestamp().getTimeInMillis()) / build.getEstimatedDuration() * 100.0)); } else { task = new Task(job.getDisplayName(), status, 100); } prevBuild = build; } else { task = new Task(job.getDisplayName(), Status.NOTRUNNED, 0); prevBuild = null; } Stage stage = new Stage(job.getDisplayName(), singletonList(task)); stages.add(stage); isFirst = false; } return new Pipeline(title, stages); } #location 10 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code public Pipeline getPipeline() { AbstractProject first = Jenkins.getInstance().getItem(firstJob, Jenkins.getInstance(), AbstractProject.class); AbstractBuild prevBuild = null; List<Stage> stages = newArrayList(); for (AbstractProject job : getAllDownstreamJobs(first)) { AbstractBuild build = job.getLastBuild(); Task task; if (stages.isEmpty() || build != null && build.equals(getDownstreamBuild(job, prevBuild))) { Status status = build != null? resolveStatus(build): idle(); task = new Task(job.getDisplayName(), status); prevBuild = build; } else { task = new Task(job.getDisplayName(), idle()); prevBuild = null; } Stage stage = new Stage(job.getDisplayName(), singletonList(task)); stages.add(stage); } return new Pipeline(title, stages); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public Pipeline createPipelineAggregated(Pipeline pipeline) { List<Stage> stages = new ArrayList<>(); for (Stage stage : pipeline.getStages()) { List<Task> tasks = new ArrayList<>(); AbstractBuild firstTask = getJenkinsJob(stage.getTasks().get(0)).getLastBuild(); AbstractBuild versionBuild = getFirstUpstreamBuild(firstTask); String version = versionBuild.getDisplayName(); for (Task task : stage.getTasks()) { AbstractProject job = getJenkinsJob(task); AbstractBuild currentBuild = match(job.getBuilds(), versionBuild); if (currentBuild != null) { tasks.add(new Task(task.getId(), task.getName(), resolveStatus(job, currentBuild), Jenkins.getInstance().getRootUrl() + currentBuild.getUrl(), getTestResult(currentBuild))); } else { tasks.add(new Task(task.getId(), task.getName(), StatusFactory.idle(), task.getLink(), null)); } } stages.add(new Stage(stage.getName(), tasks, version)); } //TODO add triggeredBy return new Pipeline(pipeline.getName(), null, null, stages); } #location 10 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code public Pipeline createPipelineAggregated(Pipeline pipeline) { List<Stage> stages = new ArrayList<>(); for (Stage stage : pipeline.getStages()) { List<Task> tasks = new ArrayList<>(); AbstractBuild firstTask = getJenkinsJob(stage.getTasks().get(0)).getLastBuild(); AbstractBuild versionBuild = getFirstUpstreamBuild(firstTask); String version = null; if (versionBuild != null) { version = versionBuild.getDisplayName(); } for (Task task : stage.getTasks()) { AbstractProject job = getJenkinsJob(task); AbstractBuild currentBuild = match(job.getBuilds(), versionBuild); if (currentBuild != null) { tasks.add(new Task(task.getId(), task.getName(), resolveStatus(job, currentBuild), Jenkins.getInstance().getRootUrl() + currentBuild.getUrl(), getTestResult(currentBuild))); } else { tasks.add(new Task(task.getId(), task.getName(), StatusFactory.idle(), task.getLink(), null)); } } stages.add(new Stage(stage.getName(), tasks, version)); } //TODO add triggeredBy return new Pipeline(pipeline.getName(), null, null, stages); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public void parseContent() { String temp = StringUtils.decodeXml(Content); if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_EMOTICON) { text = new EmojiMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this); } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_IMAGE) { text = new ImageMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this); } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_APP) { text = new AppMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this); } // else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_FILE) { // text = new FileMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink()); // } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VIDEO) { text = "视频消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOICE) { text = "语音消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_MICROVIDEO) { text = "小视频(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VERIFYMSG) { text = "验证消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOIPINVITE) { text = "视频邀请消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else { text = temp; } } #location 7 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code public void parseContent() { if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_EMOTICON) { text = new EmojiMsgXmlHandler(this).getHtml(getMediaLink()); } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_IMAGE) { text = new ImageMsgXmlHandler(this).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this); } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_APP) { text = new AppMsgXmlHandler(this).getHtml(getMediaLink()); } // else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_FILE) { // text = new FileMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink()); // } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VIDEO) { text = "视频消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOICE) { text = "语音消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_MICROVIDEO) { text = "小视频(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VERIFYMSG) { text = "验证消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOIPINVITE) { text = "视频邀请消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else { String temp = StringUtils.decodeXml(Content); text = temp; } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Before public void setUp() throws Exception { String content = File2String.read("appmsg-file.xml"); handler = new AppMsgXmlHandler(content); } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code @Before public void setUp() throws Exception { String content = File2String.read("appmsg-file.xml"); WechatMessage m = new WechatMessage(); m.Content = content; handler = new AppMsgXmlHandler(m); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{ // 创建一个新对象时需要扫描二维码登录,并且传一个处理接收到消息的回调,如果你不需要接收消息,可以传null final SmartQQClient client = new SmartQQClient(); client.setWorkDir(new File("target").getAbsoluteFile()); DefaultLoginCallback loginCallback = new DefaultLoginCallback(); loginCallback.setTitle("QQ", "请使用手机QQ扫描"); client.setLoginCallback(loginCallback); client.login(); // 登录成功后便可以编写你自己的业务逻辑了 List<Category> categories = client.getFriendListWithCategory(); for (Category category : categories) { System.out.println(category.getName()); for (Friend friend : category.getFriends()) { System.out.println("————" + friend.getNickname()); } } client.setReceiveCallback(new ReceiveCallback() { @Override public void onReceiveMessage(AbstractMessage message, AbstractFrom from) { System.out.println("from " + from + " msg: " + message); } @Override public void onReceiveError(Throwable e) { e.printStackTrace(System.err); } }); client.start(); // 使用后调用close方法关闭,你也可以使用try-with-resource创建该对象并自动关闭 // client.close(); } #location 11 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { // 创建一个新对象时需要扫描二维码登录,并且传一个处理接收到消息的回调,如果你不需要接收消息,可以传null final SmartQQClient client = new SmartQQClient(); client.setWorkDir(new File("target").getAbsoluteFile()); DefaultLoginCallback loginCallback = new DefaultLoginCallback(); loginCallback.setTitle("QQ", "请使用手机QQ扫描"); client.setLoginCallback(loginCallback); client.login(); client.setReceiveCallback(new ReceiveCallback() { @Override public void onReceiveMessage(AbstractMessage message, AbstractFrom from) { System.out.println(from + " > " + message.getText()); boolean unkown = false; QQContact qqContact = null; if (from instanceof GroupFrom) { GroupFrom gf = (GroupFrom) from; unkown = (gf.getGroupUser() == null || gf.getGroupUser().isUnknown()); qqContact = client.getGroup(gf.getGroup().getId()); } else if (from instanceof DiscussFrom) { DiscussFrom gf = (DiscussFrom) from; unkown = (gf.getDiscussUser() == null || gf.getDiscussUser().isUnknown()); qqContact = client.getGroup(gf.getDiscuss().getId()); } else { qqContact = (Friend) (from.getContact()); } System.out.println( String.format("unknown?%s, newbie?%s, contact:%s", unkown, from.isNewbie(), qqContact)); } @Override public void onReceiveError(Throwable e) { e.printStackTrace(System.err); } }); while (true) { if (client.isLogin()) { break; } Thread.sleep(1000); } client.init(); // 登录成功后便可以编写你自己的业务逻辑了 List<Category> categories = client.getFriendListWithCategory(); for (Category category : categories) { System.out.println(category.getName()); for (Friend friend : category.getFriends()) { System.out.println("————" + friend.getNickname()); } } client.parseRecents(client.getRecentList()); client.start(); // 使用后调用close方法关闭,你也可以使用try-with-resource创建该对象并自动关闭 // client.close(); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public void parseContent() { String temp = StringUtils.decodeXml(Content); if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_EMOTICON) { text = new EmojiMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this); } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_IMAGE) { text = new ImageMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this); } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_APP) { text = new AppMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this); } // else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_FILE) { // text = new FileMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink()); // } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VIDEO) { text = "视频消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOICE) { text = "语音消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_MICROVIDEO) { text = "小视频(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VERIFYMSG) { text = "验证消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOIPINVITE) { text = "视频邀请消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else { text = temp; } } #location 10 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code public void parseContent() { if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_EMOTICON) { text = new EmojiMsgXmlHandler(this).getHtml(getMediaLink()); } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_IMAGE) { text = new ImageMsgXmlHandler(this).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this); } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_APP) { text = new AppMsgXmlHandler(this).getHtml(getMediaLink()); } // else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_FILE) { // text = new FileMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink()); // } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VIDEO) { text = "视频消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOICE) { text = "语音消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_MICROVIDEO) { text = "小视频(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VERIFYMSG) { text = "验证消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOIPINVITE) { text = "视频邀请消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else { String temp = StringUtils.decodeXml(Content); text = temp; } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Before public void setUp() throws Exception { String content = File2String.read("init.xml"); handler = new InitMsgXmlHandler(content); } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code @Before public void setUp() throws Exception { String content = File2String.read("init.xml"); WechatMessage m = new WechatMessage(); m.Content = content; handler = new InitMsgXmlHandler(m); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test public void testGetRecents() { AppMsgInfo info = handler.decode(); Assert.assertEquals("南京abc.xlsx", info.title); System.out.println(info); handler = new AppMsgXmlHandler( File2String.read("appmsg-publisher.xml")); info = handler.decode(); Assert.assertEquals("谷歌开发者", info.appName); System.out.println(info); } #location 8 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code @Test public void testGetRecents() { AppMsgInfo info = handler.decode(); Assert.assertEquals("南京abc.xlsx", info.title); System.out.println(info); WechatMessage m = new WechatMessage(); m.Content = File2String.read("appmsg-publisher.xml"); handler = new AppMsgXmlHandler(m); info = handler.decode(); Assert.assertEquals("谷歌开发者", info.appName); System.out.println(info); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public void parseContent() { String temp = StringUtils.decodeXml(Content); if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_EMOTICON) { text = new EmojiMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this); } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_IMAGE) { text = new ImageMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this); } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_APP) { text = new AppMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this); } // else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_FILE) { // text = new FileMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink()); // } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VIDEO) { text = "视频消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOICE) { text = "语音消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_MICROVIDEO) { text = "小视频(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VERIFYMSG) { text = "验证消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOIPINVITE) { text = "视频邀请消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else { text = temp; } } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code public void parseContent() { if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_EMOTICON) { text = new EmojiMsgXmlHandler(this).getHtml(getMediaLink()); } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_IMAGE) { text = new ImageMsgXmlHandler(this).getHtml(getMediaLink(), this); } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_APP) { text = new AppMsgXmlHandler(this).getHtml(getMediaLink()); } // else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_FILE) { // text = new FileMsgXmlHandler(temp).getHtml(getMediaLink()); // } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VIDEO) { text = "视频消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOICE) { text = "语音消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_MICROVIDEO) { text = "小视频(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VERIFYMSG) { text = "验证消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else if (MsgType == WechatMessage.MSGTYPE_VOIPINVITE) { text = "视频邀请消息(请在手机上查看)"; } else { String temp = StringUtils.decodeXml(Content); text = temp; } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public static Connection getConnection(String dbPath) throws SQLException { // 先进先出原则 SqliteBaseConnection currCon = null; synchronized (idleConList) { // 当可用连接池不为空时候 if (SqliteUtils.isNotEmpty(idleConList)) { currCon = idleConList.get(0); idleConList.remove(0); addRunningConnection(currCon); } if (currCon == null || currCon.getConnection() == null || currCon.getConnection().isClosed()) { currCon = createBaseConnection(dbPath); addRunningConnection(currCon); } } return currCon.getConnection(); } #location 11 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
#fixed code public static Connection getConnection(String dbPath) throws SQLException { if(DEFAULT_DB_PATH.equals(dbPath)){ return getConnection(); }else { SqliteBaseConnection currCon = createBaseConnection(dbPath); addRunningConnection(currCon); return currCon.getConnection(); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public static Connection getConnection(String dbPath) throws SQLException { // 先进先出原则 SqliteBaseConnection currCon = null; synchronized (idleConList) { // 当可用连接池不为空时候 if (SqliteUtils.isNotEmpty(idleConList)) { currCon = idleConList.get(0); idleConList.remove(0); addRunningConnection(currCon); } if (currCon == null || currCon.getConnection() == null || currCon.getConnection().isClosed()) { currCon = createBaseConnection(dbPath); addRunningConnection(currCon); } } return currCon.getConnection(); } #location 16 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
#fixed code public static Connection getConnection(String dbPath) throws SQLException { if(DEFAULT_DB_PATH.equals(dbPath)){ return getConnection(); }else { SqliteBaseConnection currCon = createBaseConnection(dbPath); addRunningConnection(currCon); return currCon.getConnection(); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public Map<String, GssFunction> get() { return new ImmutableMap.Builder<String, GssFunction>() // Arithmetic functions. .put("add", new GssFunctions.AddToNumericValue()) .put("sub", new GssFunctions.SubtractFromNumericValue()) .put("mult", new GssFunctions.Mult()) // Not named "div" so it will not be confused with the HTML element. .put("divide", new GssFunctions.Div()) .put("min", new GssFunctions.MinValue()) .put("max", new GssFunctions.MaxValue()) // Color functions. .put("blendColors", new BlendColors()) .put("blendColorsRgb", new BlendColorsRGB()) .put("makeMutedColor", new MakeMutedColor()) .put("addHsbToCssColor", new AddHsbToCssColor()) .put("makeContrastingColor", new MakeContrastingColor()) .put("addToNumericValue", new AddToNumericValue()) .put("subtractFromNumericValue", new SubtractFromNumericValue()) .put("adjustBrightness", new AdjustBrightness()) // Logic functions. .put("selectFrom", new SelectFrom()) .build(); } #location 1 #vulnerability type CHECKERS_IMMUTABLE_CAST
#fixed code public Map<String, GssFunction> get() { return GssFunctions.getFunctionMap(); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public Map<String, String> getFilenameProvideMap() { return ImmutableMap.copyOf(filenameProvideMap); } #location 1 #vulnerability type CHECKERS_IMMUTABLE_CAST
#fixed code public Map<String, String> getFilenameProvideMap() { return filenameProvideMap; }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public ZooKeeper getClient(){ if (zooKeeper==null) { try { if (INSTANCE_INIT_LOCK.tryLock(2, TimeUnit.SECONDS)) { if (zooKeeper==null) { // 二次校验,防止并发创建client try { zooKeeper = new ZooKeeper(zkaddress, 10000, watcher); // TODO,本地变量方式,成功才会赋值 if (zkdigest!=null && zkdigest.trim().length()>0) { zooKeeper.addAuthInfo("digest",zkdigest.getBytes()); // like "account:password" } zooKeeper.exists(zkpath, false); // sync } catch (Exception e) { logger.error(e.getMessage(), e); } finally { INSTANCE_INIT_LOCK.unlock(); } logger.info(">>>>>>>>>> xxl-rpc, XxlZkClient init success."); } } } catch (InterruptedException e) { logger.error(e.getMessage(), e); } } if (zooKeeper == null) { throw new XxlRpcException("XxlZkClient.zooKeeper is null."); } return zooKeeper; } #location 2 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
#fixed code public ZooKeeper getClient(){ if (zooKeeper==null) { try { if (INSTANCE_INIT_LOCK.tryLock(2, TimeUnit.SECONDS)) { if (zooKeeper==null) { // 二次校验,防止并发创建client // init new-client ZooKeeper newZk = null; try { newZk = new ZooKeeper(zkaddress, 10000, watcher); if (zkdigest!=null && zkdigest.trim().length()>0) { newZk.addAuthInfo("digest",zkdigest.getBytes()); // like "account:password" } newZk.exists(zkpath, false); // sync wait until succcess conn // set success new-client zooKeeper = newZk; logger.info(">>>>>>>>>> xxl-rpc, XxlZkClient init success."); } catch (Exception e) { // close fail new-client if (newZk != null) { newZk.close(); } logger.error(e.getMessage(), e); } finally { INSTANCE_INIT_LOCK.unlock(); } } } } catch (InterruptedException e) { logger.error(e.getMessage(), e); } } if (zooKeeper == null) { throw new XxlRpcException("XxlZkClient.zooKeeper is null."); } return zooKeeper; }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code private static String getAddress() { if (LOCAL_ADDRESS != null) { return LOCAL_ADDRESS; } InetAddress localAddress = getFirstValidAddress(); LOCAL_ADDRESS = localAddress.getHostAddress(); return LOCAL_ADDRESS; } #location 6 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code private static String getAddress() { if (LOCAL_ADDRESS != null) { return LOCAL_ADDRESS; } InetAddress localAddress = getFirstValidAddress(); LOCAL_ADDRESS = localAddress != null ? localAddress.getHostAddress() : null; return LOCAL_ADDRESS; }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @SuppressWarnings("rawtypes") @Override public void onFinished(Invocation invocation,Object result) { Object[] args = invocation.getArgs(); MappedStatement mt = (MappedStatement)args[0]; String mapperNameSpace = mt.getId().substring(0, mt.getId().lastIndexOf(SPLIT_PONIT)); QueryMethodCache cacheInfo = null; if(mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.SELECT)){ if(result == null)return; if((cacheInfo = getQueryMethodCache(mt.getId())) == null)return; if(result instanceof List){ List list = (List)result; if(list.isEmpty())return; result = cacheInfo.collectionResult ? result : list.get(0); } final String cacheKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(cacheInfo.keyPattern, args[1]); //按主键查询以及标记非引用关系的缓存直接读取缓存 if(cacheInfo.isSecondQueryById() == false){ if(cacheProvider.set(cacheKey,result, cacheInfo.expire)){ if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] put result to cache,cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),cacheKey); } //结果为集合的情况,增加key到cacheGroup if(cacheInfo.groupRalated){ cacheProvider.putGroupKeys(cacheInfo.cacheGroupKey, cacheKey,cacheInfo.expire); logger.debug("method[{}] add key:[{}] to group key:[{}]",mt.getId(),cacheInfo.cacheGroupKey, cacheKey); }else{ // cacheUniqueSelectRef(result, mt, cacheKey); } }else{ //之前没有按主键的缓存,增加按主键缓存 String idCacheKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(getQueryByPkMethodCache(mt.getId()).keyPattern,result); if(idCacheKey != null && cacheKey != null && cacheProvider.set(idCacheKey,result, cacheInfo.expire) && cacheProvider.set(cacheKey,idCacheKey, cacheInfo.expire)){ if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] put result to cache,cacheKey:{},and add ref cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),idCacheKey,cacheKey); } } }else{ //返回0,未更新成功 if(result != null && ((int)result) == 0)return; if(updateCacheMethods.containsKey(mt.getId())){ String cacheByPkKey = null; UpdateByPkMethodCache updateMethodCache = updateCacheMethods.get(mt.getId()); if(updateMethodCache.sqlCommandType.equals(SqlCommandType.DELETE)){ cacheByPkKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(updateMethodCache.keyPattern,args[1]); cacheProvider.remove(cacheByPkKey); if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] remove cacheKey:{} from cache",mt.getId(),cacheByPkKey); }else{ cacheByPkKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(updateMethodCache.keyPattern,args[1]); boolean insertCommond = mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.INSERT); if(insertCommond || mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.UPDATE)){ if(result != null){ QueryMethodCache queryByPkMethodCache = getQueryByPkMethodCache(mt.getId()); cacheProvider.set(cacheByPkKey,args[1], queryByPkMethodCache.expire); if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] update cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),cacheByPkKey); //插入其他唯一字段引用 if(insertCommond)cacheUniqueSelectRef(args[1], mt, cacheByPkKey); // addCurrentThreadCacheKey(cacheByPkKey); } } } }else{//按条件删除和更新的情况 System.out.println(args); System.out.println(mt); BoundSql boundSql = mt.getBoundSql(args[1]); Object parameterObject2 = boundSql.getParameterObject(); System.out.println(parameterObject2); System.out.println(boundSql.getSql()); System.out.println(); } //删除同一cachegroup关联缓存 removeCacheByGroup(mt.getId(), mapperNameSpace); } } #location 35 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code @SuppressWarnings("rawtypes") @Override public void onFinished(Invocation invocation,Object result) { Object[] args = invocation.getArgs(); MappedStatement mt = (MappedStatement)args[0]; String mapperNameSpace = mt.getId().substring(0, mt.getId().lastIndexOf(SPLIT_PONIT)); QueryMethodCache cacheInfo = null; if(mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.SELECT)){ if(result == null)return; if((cacheInfo = getQueryMethodCache(mt.getId())) == null)return; if(result instanceof List){ List list = (List)result; if(list.isEmpty())return; result = cacheInfo.collectionResult ? result : list.get(0); } final String cacheKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(cacheInfo.keyPattern, args[1]); //按主键查询以及标记非引用关系的缓存直接读取缓存 if(cacheInfo.isSecondQueryById() == false){ if(cacheProvider.set(cacheKey,result, cacheInfo.expire)){ if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("_autocache_ method[{}] put result to cache,cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),cacheKey); } //结果为集合的情况,增加key到cacheGroup if(cacheInfo.groupRalated){ cacheProvider.putGroupKeys(cacheInfo.cacheGroupKey, cacheKey,cacheInfo.expire); logger.debug("_autocache_ method[{}] add key:[{}] to group key:[{}]",mt.getId(),cacheInfo.cacheGroupKey, cacheKey); }else{ // cacheUniqueSelectRef(result, mt, cacheKey); } }else{ //之前没有按主键的缓存,增加按主键缓存 String idCacheKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(getQueryByPkMethodCache(mt.getId()).keyPattern,result); if(idCacheKey != null && cacheKey != null && cacheProvider.set(idCacheKey,result, cacheInfo.expire) && cacheProvider.set(cacheKey,idCacheKey, cacheInfo.expire)){ if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("_autocache_ method[{}] put result to cache,cacheKey:{},and add ref cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),idCacheKey,cacheKey); } } }else{ if(!cacheEnableMappers.contains(mapperNameSpace))return; //返回0,未更新成功 if(result != null && ((int)result) == 0)return; if(updateCacheMethods.containsKey(mt.getId())){ String cacheByPkKey = null; UpdateByPkMethodCache updateMethodCache = updateCacheMethods.get(mt.getId()); if(updateMethodCache.sqlCommandType.equals(SqlCommandType.DELETE)){ cacheByPkKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(updateMethodCache.keyPattern,args[1]); cacheProvider.remove(cacheByPkKey); if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("_autocache_ method[{}] remove cacheKey:{} from cache",mt.getId(),cacheByPkKey); }else{ cacheByPkKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(updateMethodCache.keyPattern,args[1]); boolean insertCommond = mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.INSERT); if(insertCommond || mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.UPDATE)){ if(result != null){ QueryMethodCache queryByPkMethodCache = getQueryByPkMethodCache(mt.getId()); cacheProvider.set(cacheByPkKey,args[1], queryByPkMethodCache.expire); if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("_autocache_ method[{}] update cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),cacheByPkKey); //插入其他唯一字段引用 if(insertCommond)cacheUniqueSelectRef(args[1], mt, cacheByPkKey); // addCurrentThreadCacheKey(cacheByPkKey); } } } }else{//按条件删除和更新的情况 try { Executor executor = (Executor) invocation.getTarget(); Object parameterObject = args[1]; ResultHandler resultHandler = null; EntityInfo entityInfo = MybatisMapperParser.getEntityInfoByMapper(mapperNameSpace); MappedStatement statement = getQueryIdsMappedStatementForUpdateCache(mt,entityInfo); List<?> idsResult = executor.query(statement, parameterObject, RowBounds.DEFAULT, resultHandler); if(idsResult != null){ for (Object id : idsResult) { String cacheKey = entityInfo.getEntityClass().getSimpleName() + ".id:" + id.toString(); cacheProvider.remove(cacheKey); } if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("_autocache_ update Method[{}] executed,remove ralate cache {}.id:[{}]",mt.getId(),entityInfo.getEntityClass().getSimpleName(),idsResult); } } catch (Exception e) { logger.error("_autocache_ update Method[{}] remove ralate cache error",e); } } //删除同一cachegroup关联缓存 removeCacheByGroup(mt.getId(), mapperNameSpace); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code private void resetCorrectOffsets() { KafkaConsumerCommand consumerCommand = new KafkaConsumerCommand(consumerContext.getProperties().getProperty(ConsumerConfig.BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS_CONFIG)); try { List<TopicInfo> topicInfos = consumerCommand.consumerGroup(consumerContext.getGroupId()).getTopics(); for (TopicInfo topic : topicInfos) { List<TopicPartitionInfo> partitions = topic.getPartitions(); for (TopicPartitionInfo partition : partitions) { try { //期望的偏移 long expectOffsets = consumerContext.getLatestProcessedOffsets(topic.getTopicName(), partition.getPartition()); // if(expectOffsets < partition.getOffset()){ consumer.seek(new TopicPartition(topic.getTopicName(), partition.getPartition()), expectOffsets); logger.info("seek Topic[{}] partition[{}] from {} to {}",topic.getTopicName(), partition.getPartition(),partition.getOffset(),expectOffsets); } } catch (Exception e) { logger.warn("try seek topic["+topic.getTopicName()+"] partition["+partition.getPartition()+"] offsets error",e); } } } } catch (Exception e) { logger.warn("KafkaConsumerCommand.consumerGroup("+consumerContext.getGroupId()+") error",e); } consumerCommand.close(); } #location 5 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code private void resetCorrectOffsets() { consumer.pause(consumer.assignment()); Map<String, List<PartitionInfo>> topicInfos = consumer.listTopics(); Set<String> topics = topicInfos.keySet(); List<String> expectTopics = new ArrayList<>(topicHandlers.keySet()); List<PartitionInfo> patitions = null; for (String topic : topics) { if(!expectTopics.contains(topic))continue; patitions = topicInfos.get(topic); for (PartitionInfo partition : patitions) { try { //期望的偏移 long expectOffsets = consumerContext.getLatestProcessedOffsets(topic, partition.partition()); // TopicPartition topicPartition = new TopicPartition(topic, partition.partition()); OffsetAndMetadata metadata = consumer.committed(new TopicPartition(partition.topic(), partition.partition())); if(expectOffsets >= 0){ if(expectOffsets < metadata.offset()){ consumer.seek(topicPartition, expectOffsets); logger.info("seek Topic[{}] partition[{}] from {} to {}",topic, partition.partition(),metadata.offset(),expectOffsets); } } } catch (Exception e) { logger.warn("try seek topic["+topic+"] partition["+partition.partition()+"] offsets error"); } } } consumer.resume(consumer.assignment()); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public void start() { for (int i = 0; i < topicHandlers.size(); i++) { ConsumerWorker<String, DefaultMessage> consumer = new ConsumerWorker<>(configs, topicHandlers,processExecutor); consumers.add(consumer); fetcheExecutor.submit(consumer); } } #location 7 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Override public void start() { createKafkaConsumer(); //按主题数创建ConsumerWorker线程 for (int i = 0; i < topicHandlers.size(); i++) { ConsumerWorker consumer = new ConsumerWorker(); consumerWorks.add(consumer); fetcheExecutor.submit(consumer); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code private synchronized static void load() { try { if(!properties.isEmpty())return; File dir = new File(Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader().getResource("").getPath()); File[] propFiles = dir.listFiles(new FilenameFilter() { @Override public boolean accept(File dir, String name) { return name.endsWith("properties"); } }); for (File file : propFiles) { Properties p = new Properties(); p.load(new FileReader(file)); properties.add(p); } inited = true; } catch (Exception e) { inited = true; throw new RuntimeException(e); } } #location 15 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code private synchronized static void load() { try { if(inited)return; File dir = new File(Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader().getResource("").getPath()); loadPropertiesFromFile(dir); inited = true; } catch (Exception e) { inited = true; throw new RuntimeException(e); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @SuppressWarnings({ "rawtypes", "unchecked" }) @Override public Object onInterceptor(Invocation invocation) throws Throwable { final Executor executor = (Executor) invocation.getTarget(); final Object[] args = invocation.getArgs(); final RowBounds rowBounds = (RowBounds) args[2]; final ResultHandler resultHandler = (ResultHandler) args[3]; final MappedStatement orignMappedStatement = (MappedStatement)args[0]; final Object parameter = args[1]; if(!orignMappedStatement.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.SELECT))return null; if(!pageMappedStatements.keySet().contains(orignMappedStatement.getId()))return null; PageParams pageParams = PageExecutor.getPageParams(); if(pageParams == null && pageMappedStatements.get(orignMappedStatement.getId())){ if(parameter instanceof Map){ Collection parameterValues = ((Map)parameter).values(); for (Object val : parameterValues) { if(val instanceof PageParams){ pageParams = (PageParams) val; break; } } }else{ pageParams = (PageParams) parameter; } } if(pageParams == null)return null; BoundSql boundSql = orignMappedStatement.getBoundSql(parameter); //查询总数 MappedStatement countMappedStatement = getCountMappedStatement(orignMappedStatement); Long total = executeQueryCount(executor, countMappedStatement, parameter, boundSql, rowBounds, resultHandler); //按分页查询 MappedStatement limitMappedStatement = getLimitMappedStatementIfNotCreate(orignMappedStatement); boundSql = limitMappedStatement.getBoundSql(parameter); boundSql.setAdditionalParameter(PARAMETER_OFFSET, pageParams.getOffset()); boundSql.setAdditionalParameter(PARAMETER_SIZE, pageParams.getPageSize()); List<?> datas = executor.query(limitMappedStatement, parameter, RowBounds.DEFAULT, resultHandler,null,boundSql); Page<Object> page = new Page<Object>(pageParams,total,(List<Object>) datas); List<Page<?>> list = new ArrayList<Page<?>>(1); list.add(page); return list; } #location 42 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code @SuppressWarnings({ "rawtypes", "unchecked" }) @Override public Object onInterceptor(Invocation invocation) throws Throwable { final Executor executor = (Executor) invocation.getTarget(); final Object[] args = invocation.getArgs(); final MappedStatement orignMappedStatement = (MappedStatement)args[0]; if(!orignMappedStatement.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.SELECT))return null; if(!pageMappedStatements.keySet().contains(orignMappedStatement.getId()))return null; final RowBounds rowBounds = (RowBounds) args[2]; final ResultHandler resultHandler = (ResultHandler) args[3]; final Object parameter = args[1]; PageParams pageParams = PageExecutor.getPageParams(); if(pageParams == null && pageMappedStatements.get(orignMappedStatement.getId())){ if(parameter instanceof Map){ Collection parameterValues = ((Map)parameter).values(); for (Object val : parameterValues) { if(val instanceof PageParams){ pageParams = (PageParams) val; break; } } }else{ pageParams = (PageParams) parameter; } } if(pageParams == null)return null; BoundSql boundSql = orignMappedStatement.getBoundSql(parameter); //查询总数 MappedStatement countMappedStatement = getCountMappedStatement(orignMappedStatement); Long total = executeQueryCount(executor, countMappedStatement, parameter, boundSql, rowBounds, resultHandler); //按分页查询 MappedStatement limitMappedStatement = getLimitMappedStatementIfNotCreate(orignMappedStatement); boundSql = limitMappedStatement.getBoundSql(parameter); boundSql.setAdditionalParameter(PARAMETER_OFFSET, pageParams.getOffset()); boundSql.setAdditionalParameter(PARAMETER_SIZE, pageParams.getPageSize()); List<?> datas = executor.query(limitMappedStatement, parameter, RowBounds.DEFAULT, resultHandler,null,boundSql); Page<Object> page = new Page<Object>(pageParams,total,(List<Object>) datas); List<Page<?>> list = new ArrayList<Page<?>>(1); list.add(page); return list; }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public void setRuning(String jobName, Date fireTime) { updatingStatus = false; try { JobConfig config = getConf(jobName,false); config.setRunning(true); config.setLastFireTime(fireTime); config.setCurrentNodeId(JobContext.getContext().getNodeId()); config.setModifyTime(Calendar.getInstance().getTimeInMillis()); config.setErrorMsg(null); //更新本地 schedulerConfgs.put(jobName, config); try { if(zkAvailabled)zkClient.writeData(getPath(config), JsonUtils.toJson(config)); } catch (Exception e) { checkZkAvailabled(); logger.warn(String.format("Job[{}] setRuning error...", jobName),e); } } finally { updatingStatus = false; } } #location 8 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
#fixed code @Override public void setRuning(String jobName, Date fireTime) { updatingStatus = false; try { JobConfig config = getConf(jobName,false); config.setRunning(true); config.setLastFireTime(fireTime); config.setModifyTime(Calendar.getInstance().getTimeInMillis()); config.setErrorMsg(null); //更新本地 schedulerConfgs.put(jobName, config); try { if(zkAvailabled)zkClient.writeData(getPath(config), JsonUtils.toJson(config)); } catch (Exception e) { checkZkAvailabled(); logger.warn(String.format("Job[{}] setRuning error...", jobName),e); } } finally { updatingStatus = false; } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @SuppressWarnings("rawtypes") @Override public void onFinished(Invocation invocation,Object result) { Object[] args = invocation.getArgs(); MappedStatement mt = (MappedStatement)args[0]; QueryMethodCache cacheInfo = null; if(mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.SELECT)){ if(result == null)return; if((cacheInfo = getQueryMethodCache(mt.getId())) == null)return; if(result instanceof List){ List list = (List)result; if(list.isEmpty())return; result = cacheInfo.uniqueResult ? list.get(0) : result; } final String cacheKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(cacheInfo.keyPattern, args[1]); //按主键查询以及标记非引用关系的缓存直接读取缓存 if(cacheInfo.isPk || !cacheInfo.uniqueResult){ if(cacheProvider.set(cacheKey,result, cacheInfo.expire)){ if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] put result to cache,cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),cacheKey); } //结果为集合的情况,增加key到cacheGroup if(!cacheInfo.uniqueResult){ cacheProvider.putGroupKeys(cacheInfo.cacheGroupKey, cacheKey,cacheInfo.expire); } }else{ //之前没有按主键的缓存,增加按主键缓存 String idCacheKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(getQueryByPkMethodCache(mt.getId()).keyPattern,result); if(idCacheKey != null && cacheKey != null && cacheProvider.set(idCacheKey,result, cacheInfo.expire) && cacheProvider.set(cacheKey,idCacheKey, cacheInfo.expire)){ if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] put result to cache,cacheKey:{},and add ref cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),idCacheKey,cacheKey); } } }else{ if(updateCacheMethods.containsKey(mt.getId())){ String cacheByPkKey = null; UpdateByPkMethodCache updateMethodCache = updateCacheMethods.get(mt.getId()); if(updateMethodCache.sqlCommandType.equals(SqlCommandType.DELETE)){ cacheByPkKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(updateMethodCache.keyPattern,args[1]); cacheProvider.remove(cacheByPkKey); if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] remove cacheKey:{} from cache",mt.getId(),cacheByPkKey); //TODO 清除关联缓存 }else{ cacheByPkKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(updateMethodCache.keyPattern,args[1]); boolean insertCommond = mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.INSERT); if(insertCommond || mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.UPDATE)){ if(result != null){ QueryMethodCache queryByPkMethodCache = getQueryByPkMethodCache(mt.getId()); cacheProvider.set(cacheByPkKey,args[1], queryByPkMethodCache.expire); if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] update cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),cacheByPkKey); //插入其他唯一字段引用 if(insertCommond)cacheUniqueSelectRef(args[1], mt, cacheByPkKey); // addCurrentThreadCacheKey(cacheByPkKey); } } } //TODO 删除同一cachegroup关联缓存 cacheProvider.clearGroupKeys(updateMethodCache.cacheGroupKey); } } } #location 29 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code @SuppressWarnings("rawtypes") @Override public void onFinished(Invocation invocation,Object result) { Object[] args = invocation.getArgs(); MappedStatement mt = (MappedStatement)args[0]; String mapperNameSpace = mt.getId().substring(0, mt.getId().lastIndexOf(SPLIT_PONIT)); QueryMethodCache cacheInfo = null; if(mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.SELECT)){ if(result == null)return; if((cacheInfo = getQueryMethodCache(mt.getId())) == null)return; if(result instanceof List){ List list = (List)result; if(list.isEmpty())return; result = cacheInfo.uniqueResult ? list.get(0) : result; } final String cacheKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(cacheInfo.keyPattern, args[1]); //按主键查询以及标记非引用关系的缓存直接读取缓存 if(cacheInfo.isPk || !cacheInfo.uniqueResult){ if(cacheProvider.set(cacheKey,result, cacheInfo.expire)){ if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] put result to cache,cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),cacheKey); } //结果为集合的情况,增加key到cacheGroup if(!cacheInfo.uniqueResult){ cacheProvider.putGroupKeys(cacheInfo.cacheGroupKey, cacheKey,cacheInfo.expire); logger.debug("method[{}] add key:[{}] to group key:[{}]",mt.getId(),cacheInfo.cacheGroupKey, cacheKey); }else{ // cacheUniqueSelectRef(result, mt, cacheKey); } }else{ //之前没有按主键的缓存,增加按主键缓存 String idCacheKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(getQueryByPkMethodCache(mt.getId()).keyPattern,result); if(idCacheKey != null && cacheKey != null && cacheProvider.set(idCacheKey,result, cacheInfo.expire) && cacheProvider.set(cacheKey,idCacheKey, cacheInfo.expire)){ if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] put result to cache,cacheKey:{},and add ref cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),idCacheKey,cacheKey); } } }else{ //返回0,未更新成功 if(result != null && ((int)result) == 0)return; if(updateCacheMethods.containsKey(mt.getId())){ String cacheByPkKey = null; UpdateByPkMethodCache updateMethodCache = updateCacheMethods.get(mt.getId()); if(updateMethodCache.sqlCommandType.equals(SqlCommandType.DELETE)){ cacheByPkKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(updateMethodCache.keyPattern,args[1]); cacheProvider.remove(cacheByPkKey); if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] remove cacheKey:{} from cache",mt.getId(),cacheByPkKey); }else{ cacheByPkKey = genarateQueryCacheKey(updateMethodCache.keyPattern,args[1]); boolean insertCommond = mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.INSERT); if(insertCommond || mt.getSqlCommandType().equals(SqlCommandType.UPDATE)){ if(result != null){ QueryMethodCache queryByPkMethodCache = getQueryByPkMethodCache(mt.getId()); cacheProvider.set(cacheByPkKey,args[1], queryByPkMethodCache.expire); if(logger.isDebugEnabled())logger.debug("method[{}] update cacheKey:{}",mt.getId(),cacheByPkKey); //插入其他唯一字段引用 if(insertCommond)cacheUniqueSelectRef(args[1], mt, cacheByPkKey); // addCurrentThreadCacheKey(cacheByPkKey); } } } } //删除同一cachegroup关联缓存 removeCacheByGroup(mt.getId(), mapperNameSpace); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code protected XInputStream open(String path) throws Exception { // final RandomAccessFile file = new RandomAccessFile(path, "r"); final XInputStream is = new XInputStreamImpl(new RamdomAccessFileInputStream(file)); try { // Check binlog magic final byte[] magic = is.readBytes(MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length); if(!CodecUtils.equals(magic, MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC)) { throw new NestableRuntimeException("invalid binlog magic, file: " + path); } // if(this.startPosition > MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length) { is.skip(this.startPosition - MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length); } return is; } catch(Exception e) { IOUtils.closeQuietly(is); throw e; } } #location 18 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code protected XInputStream open(String path) throws Exception { // final XInputStream is = new XInputStreamImpl(new FileInputStream(path)); try { // Check binlog magic final byte[] magic = is.readBytes(MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length); if(!CodecUtils.equals(magic, MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC)) { throw new NestableRuntimeException("invalid binlog magic, file: " + path); } // if(this.startPosition > MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length) { is.skip(this.startPosition - MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length); } return is; } catch(Exception e) { IOUtils.closeQuietly(is); throw e; } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code protected XInputStream open(String path) throws Exception { // final RandomAccessFile file = new RandomAccessFile(path, "r"); final XInputStream is = new XInputStreamImpl(new RamdomAccessFileInputStream(file)); try { // Check binlog magic final byte[] magic = is.readBytes(MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length); if(!CodecUtils.equals(magic, MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC)) { throw new NestableRuntimeException("invalid binlog magic, file: " + path); } // if(this.startPosition > MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length) { is.skip(this.startPosition - MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length); } return is; } catch(Exception e) { IOUtils.closeQuietly(is); throw e; } } #location 18 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code protected XInputStream open(String path) throws Exception { // final XInputStream is = new XInputStreamImpl(new RamdomAccessFileInputStream(new File(path))); try { // Check binlog magic final byte[] magic = is.readBytes(MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length); if(!CodecUtils.equals(magic, MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC)) { throw new NestableRuntimeException("invalid binlog magic, file: " + path); } // if(this.startPosition > MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length) { is.skip(this.startPosition - MySQLConstants.BINLOG_MAGIC.length); } return is; } catch(Exception e) { IOUtils.closeQuietly(is); throw e; } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException { AnsiConsole.systemInstall(); PrintStream out = System.out; FileInputStream f = new FileInputStream("src/test/resources/jansi.ans"); int c; while( (c=f.read())>=0 ) { out.write(c); } f.close(); } #location 8 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException { String file = "src/test/resources/jansi.ans"; if( args.length>0 ) file = args[0]; // Allows us to disable ANSI processing. if( "true".equals(System.getProperty("jansi", "true")) ) { AnsiConsole.systemInstall(); } PrintStream out = System.out; FileInputStream f = new FileInputStream(file); int c; while( (c=f.read())>=0 ) { out.write(c); } f.close(); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code Country Country(String ip_address) { DefaultHttpClient httpclient = new DefaultHttpClient(); try { HttpGet httpget = new HttpGet("https://geoip.maxmind.com/geoip/country/" + ip_address); httpget.addHeader("Accept","application/json"); httpget.addHeader(BasicScheme.authenticate( new UsernamePasswordCredentials(user_id,license_key),"UTF-8",false)); HttpResponse response = httpclient.execute(httpget); HttpEntity entity = response.getEntity(); if (entity != null) { InputStream instream = entity.getContent(); BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader( new InputStreamReader(instream)); return new Country(reader.readLine()); } } catch (IOException e) { e.printStackTrace(); } finally { httpclient.getConnectionManager().shutdown(); } return null; } #location 19 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code Client(String user_id, String license_key) { this.user_id = user_id; this.license_key = license_key; }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public static void main( String[] args ) { try { String user_id = args[0]; String license_key = args[1]; String ip_address = args[2]; Client cl = new Client(user_id,license_key); JSONObject o = cl.Country(ip_address); o = o.getJSONObject("country"); o = o.getJSONObject("name"); String name = o.getString("en"); System.out.println(name); } catch (JSONException e) { e.printStackTrace(); } } #location 9 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code public static void main( String[] args ) { String user_id = args[0]; String license_key = args[1]; String ip_address = args[2]; Client cl = new Client(user_id,license_key); Country c = cl.Country(ip_address); System.out.println(c.get_country_name("en")); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code private JSONObject responseFor(String path, String ip_address) throws GeoIP2Exception { DefaultHttpClient httpclient = new DefaultHttpClient(); try { // String uri = "https://ct4-test.maxmind.com/geoip/" + path + "/" + // ip_address; String uri = "https://" + host; if (host.startsWith("localhost")) { uri = "http://" + host; } uri = uri + "/geoip/v2.0/" + path + "/" + ip_address; HttpGet httpget = new HttpGet(uri); httpget.addHeader("Accept", "application/json"); httpget.addHeader(BasicScheme.authenticate( new UsernamePasswordCredentials(userId, licenseKey), "UTF-8", false)); HttpResponse response = httpclient.execute(httpget); int status = response.getStatusLine().getStatusCode(); if (status == 200) { return handleSuccess(response, uri); } else { handleErrorStatus(response, status, uri); } } catch (IOException e) { e.printStackTrace(); } finally { httpclient.getConnectionManager().shutdown(); } return null; } #location 27 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code private JSONObject responseFor(String path, String ip_address) throws GeoIP2Exception { DefaultHttpClient httpclient = new DefaultHttpClient(); String uri = "https://" + host; if (host.startsWith("localhost")) { uri = "http://" + host; } uri = uri + "/geoip/v2.0/" + path + "/" + ip_address; HttpGet httpget = new HttpGet(uri); httpget.addHeader("Accept", "application/json"); httpget.addHeader(BasicScheme.authenticate( new UsernamePasswordCredentials(userId, licenseKey), "UTF-8", false)); HttpResponse response = null; try { response = httpclient.execute(httpget); } catch (IOException e) { e.printStackTrace(); } finally { httpclient.getConnectionManager().shutdown(); } int status = response.getStatusLine().getStatusCode(); if (status == 200) { return handleSuccess(response, uri); } else { handleErrorStatus(response, status, uri); } return null; }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code Country Country(String ip_address) { DefaultHttpClient httpclient = new DefaultHttpClient(); try { HttpGet httpget = new HttpGet("https://geoip.maxmind.com/geoip/country/" + ip_address); httpget.addHeader("Accept","application/json"); httpget.addHeader(BasicScheme.authenticate( new UsernamePasswordCredentials(user_id,license_key),"UTF-8",false)); HttpResponse response = httpclient.execute(httpget); HttpEntity entity = response.getEntity(); if (entity != null) { InputStream instream = entity.getContent(); BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader( new InputStreamReader(instream)); return new Country(reader.readLine()); } } catch (IOException e) { e.printStackTrace(); } finally { httpclient.getConnectionManager().shutdown(); } return null; } #location 14 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code Client(String user_id, String license_key) { this.user_id = user_id; this.license_key = license_key; }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public <T> Collection<T> loadAll(Class<T> type, Filters filters, SortOrder sortOrder, Pagination pagination, int depth) { String url = session.ensureTransaction().url(); String entityType = session.entityType(type.getName()); QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type); // all this business about selecting which type of model/response to handle is horribly hacky // it should be possible for the response handler to select based on the model implementation // and we should have a single method loadAll(...). Filters should not be a special case // though they are at the moment because of the problems with "graph" response format. if (filters.isEmpty()) { Query qry = queryStatements.findByType(entityType, depth) .setSortOrder(sortOrder) .setPagination(pagination); try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, url)) { return session.responseHandler().loadAll(type, response); } } else { filters = resolvePropertyAnnotations(type, filters); Query qry = queryStatements.findByProperties(entityType, filters, depth) .setSortOrder(sortOrder) .setPagination(pagination); if (depth != 0) { try (Neo4jResponse<GraphRowModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute((GraphRowModelQuery) qry, url)) { return session.responseHandler().loadByProperty(type, response); } } else { try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, url)) { return session.responseHandler().loadAll(type, response); } } } } #location 4 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Override public <T> Collection<T> loadAll(Class<T> type, Filters filters, SortOrder sortOrder, Pagination pagination, int depth) { Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction(); String entityType = session.entityType(type.getName()); QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type); // all this business about selecting which type of model/response to handle is horribly hacky // it should be possible for the response handler to select based on the model implementation // and we should have a single method loadAll(...). Filters should not be a special case // though they are at the moment because of the problems with "graph" response format. if (filters.isEmpty()) { Query qry = queryStatements.findByType(entityType, depth) .setSortOrder(sortOrder) .setPagination(pagination); try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, tx)) { return session.responseHandler().loadAll(type, response); } } else { filters = resolvePropertyAnnotations(type, filters); Query qry = queryStatements.findByProperties(entityType, filters, depth) .setSortOrder(sortOrder) .setPagination(pagination); if (depth != 0) { try (Neo4jResponse<GraphRowModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute((GraphRowModelQuery) qry, tx)) { return session.responseHandler().loadByProperty(type, response); } } else { try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, tx)) { return session.responseHandler().loadAll(type, response); } } } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public <T> T load(Class<T> type, Long id, int depth) { String url = session.ensureTransaction().url(); QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type); Query qry = queryStatements.findOne(id,depth); try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, url)) { return session.responseHandler().loadById(type, response, id); } } #location 3 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Override public <T> T load(Class<T> type, Long id, int depth) { Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction(); QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type); Query qry = queryStatements.findOne(id,depth); try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, tx)) { return session.responseHandler().loadById(type, response, id); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code private boolean bothWayMappingRequired(Object srcObject, String relationshipType, Object tgtObject, String relationshipDirection) { boolean mapBothWays = false; ClassInfo tgtInfo = metaData.classInfo(tgtObject); for (FieldInfo tgtRelReader : tgtInfo.relationshipFields()) { String tgtRelationshipDirection = tgtRelReader.relationshipDirection(); if ((tgtRelationshipDirection.equals(Relationship.OUTGOING) || tgtRelationshipDirection.equals(Relationship.INCOMING)) //The relationship direction must be explicitly incoming or outgoing && tgtRelReader.relationshipType().equals(relationshipType)) { //The source must have the same relationship type to the target as the target to the source //Moreover, the source must be related to the target and vice versa in the SAME direction if (relationshipDirection.equals(tgtRelationshipDirection)) { Object target = tgtRelReader.read(tgtObject); if (target != null) { if (target instanceof Iterable) { for (Object relatedObject : (Iterable<?>) target) { if (relatedObject.equals(srcObject)) { //the target is mapped to the source as well mapBothWays = true; } } } else if (target.getClass().isArray()) { for (Object relatedObject : (Object[]) target) { if (relatedObject.equals(srcObject)) { //the target is mapped to the source as well mapBothWays = true; } } } else { if (target.equals(srcObject)) { //the target is mapped to the source as well mapBothWays = true; } } } } } } return mapBothWays; } #location 5 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code private boolean bothWayMappingRequired(Object srcObject, String relationshipType, Object tgtObject, String relationshipDirection) { boolean mapBothWays = false; ClassInfo tgtInfo = metaData.classInfo(tgtObject); if(tgtInfo == null) { LOGGER.warn("Unable to process {} on {}. Checck the mapping.", relationshipType, srcObject.getClass()); // #347. attribute is not a rel ? maybe would be better to change FieldInfo.persistableAsProperty ? return false; } for (FieldInfo tgtRelReader : tgtInfo.relationshipFields()) { String tgtRelationshipDirection = tgtRelReader.relationshipDirection(); if ((tgtRelationshipDirection.equals(Relationship.OUTGOING) || tgtRelationshipDirection.equals(Relationship.INCOMING)) //The relationship direction must be explicitly incoming or outgoing && tgtRelReader.relationshipType().equals(relationshipType)) { //The source must have the same relationship type to the target as the target to the source //Moreover, the source must be related to the target and vice versa in the SAME direction if (relationshipDirection.equals(tgtRelationshipDirection)) { Object target = tgtRelReader.read(tgtObject); if (target != null) { if (target instanceof Iterable) { for (Object relatedObject : (Iterable<?>) target) { if (relatedObject.equals(srcObject)) { //the target is mapped to the source as well mapBothWays = true; } } } else if (target.getClass().isArray()) { for (Object relatedObject : (Object[]) target) { if (relatedObject.equals(srcObject)) { //the target is mapped to the source as well mapBothWays = true; } } } else { if (target.equals(srcObject)) { //the target is mapped to the source as well mapBothWays = true; } } } } } } return mapBothWays; }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public <T> void deleteAll(Class<T> type) { ClassInfo classInfo = session.metaData().classInfo(type.getName()); if (classInfo != null) { String url = session.ensureTransaction().url(); ParameterisedStatement request = getDeleteStatementsBasedOnType(type).deleteByType(session.entityType(classInfo.name())); try (Neo4jResponse<String> response = session.requestHandler().execute(request, url)) { session.context().clear(type); } } else { session.info(type.getName() + " is not a persistable class"); } } #location 5 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Override public <T> void deleteAll(Class<T> type) { ClassInfo classInfo = session.metaData().classInfo(type.getName()); if (classInfo != null) { Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction(); ParameterisedStatement request = getDeleteStatementsBasedOnType(type).deleteByType(session.entityType(classInfo.name())); try (Neo4jResponse<String> response = session.requestHandler().execute(request, tx)) { session.context().clear(type); } } else { session.info(type.getName() + " is not a persistable class"); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public Result query(String cypher, Map<String, ?> parameters, boolean readOnly) { validateQuery(cypher, parameters, readOnly); //If readOnly=true, just execute the query. If false, execute the query and return stats as well if(readOnly) { return new QueryResult(executeAndMap(null, cypher, parameters, new MapRowModelMapper()),null); } else { String url = session.ensureTransaction().url(); RowModelQueryWithStatistics parameterisedStatement = new RowModelQueryWithStatistics(cypher, parameters); try (Neo4jResponse<RowQueryStatisticsResult> response = session.requestHandler().execute(parameterisedStatement, url)) { RowQueryStatisticsResult result = response.next(); RowModelMapper rowModelMapper = new MapRowModelMapper(); Collection rowResult = new LinkedHashSet(); for (Iterator<Object> iterator = result.getRows().iterator(); iterator.hasNext(); ) { List next = (List) iterator.next(); rowModelMapper.mapIntoResult(rowResult, next.toArray(), response.columns()); } return new QueryResult(rowResult, result.getStats()); } } } #location 10 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Override public Result query(String cypher, Map<String, ?> parameters, boolean readOnly) { validateQuery(cypher, parameters, readOnly); //If readOnly=true, just execute the query. If false, execute the query and return stats as well if(readOnly) { return new QueryResult(executeAndMap(null, cypher, parameters, new MapRowModelMapper()),null); } else { Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction(); RowModelQueryWithStatistics parameterisedStatement = new RowModelQueryWithStatistics(cypher, parameters); try (Neo4jResponse<RowQueryStatisticsResult> response = session.requestHandler().execute(parameterisedStatement, tx)) { RowQueryStatisticsResult result = response.next(); RowModelMapper rowModelMapper = new MapRowModelMapper(); Collection rowResult = new LinkedHashSet(); for (Iterator<Object> iterator = result.getRows().iterator(); iterator.hasNext(); ) { List next = (List) iterator.next(); rowModelMapper.mapIntoResult(rowResult, next.toArray(), response.columns()); } return new QueryResult(rowResult, result.getStats()); } } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public <T> Collection<T> loadAll(Collection<T> objects, SortOrder sortOrder, Pagination pagination, int depth) { if (objects == null || objects.isEmpty()) { return objects; } Set<Serializable> ids = new LinkedHashSet<>(); Class type = objects.iterator().next().getClass(); ClassInfo classInfo = session.metaData().classInfo(type.getName()); for (Object o : objects) { FieldInfo idField; if (classInfo.hasPrimaryIndexField()) { idField = classInfo.primaryIndexField(); } else { idField = classInfo.identityField(); } ids.add((Serializable) idField.readProperty(o)); } return session.loadAll(type, ids, sortOrder, pagination, depth); } #location 12 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code public <T> Collection<T> loadAll(Collection<T> objects, SortOrder sortOrder, Pagination pagination, int depth) { if (objects == null || objects.isEmpty()) { return objects; } ClassInfo commonClassInfo = findCommonClassInfo(objects); Set<Serializable> ids = new LinkedHashSet<>(); for (Object o : objects) { FieldInfo idField; if (commonClassInfo.hasPrimaryIndexField()) { idField = commonClassInfo.primaryIndexField(); } else { idField = commonClassInfo.identityField(); } ids.add((Serializable) idField.readProperty(o)); } return session.loadAll((Class<T>) commonClassInfo.getUnderlyingClass(), ids, sortOrder, pagination, depth); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public void scan(List<String> classPaths, ClassFileProcessor processor) { this.classPaths = classPaths; this.processor = processor; List<File> classPathElements = getUniqueClasspathElements(classPaths); try { for (File classPathElement : classPathElements) { String path = classPathElement.getPath(); if (classPathElement.isDirectory()) { scanFolder(classPathElement, path.length() + 1); } else if (classPathElement.isFile()) { String pathLower = path.toLowerCase(); if (pathLower.endsWith(".jar") || pathLower.endsWith(".zip")) { scanZipFile(new ZipFile(classPathElement)); } else { scanFile(classPathElement, classPathElement.getName()); } } } processor.finish(); } catch (IOException e) { throw new RuntimeException(e); } } #location 15 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code public void scan(List<String> classPaths, ClassFileProcessor processor) { this.classPaths = classPaths; this.processor = processor; Set<File> classPathElements = getUniqueClasspathElements(classPaths); LOGGER.debug("Classpath elements:"); for (File classPathElement : classPathElements) { LOGGER.debug(classPathElement.getPath()); } try { for (File classPathElement : classPathElements) { String path = classPathElement.getPath(); if (classPathElement.isDirectory()) { scanFolder(classPathElement, path.length() + 1); } else if (classPathElement.isFile()) { String pathLower = path.toLowerCase(); if (pathLower.endsWith(".jar") || pathLower.endsWith(".zip")) { scanZipFile(new ZipFile(classPathElement)); } else { scanFile(classPathElement, classPathElement.getName()); } } } processor.finish(); } catch (IOException e) { throw new RuntimeException(e); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public <T> Collection<T> loadAll(Class<T> type, Filters filters, SortOrder sortOrder, Pagination pagination, int depth) { String url = session.ensureTransaction().url(); String entityType = session.entityType(type.getName()); QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type); // all this business about selecting which type of model/response to handle is horribly hacky // it should be possible for the response handler to select based on the model implementation // and we should have a single method loadAll(...). Filters should not be a special case // though they are at the moment because of the problems with "graph" response format. if (filters.isEmpty()) { Query qry = queryStatements.findByType(entityType, depth) .setSortOrder(sortOrder) .setPagination(pagination); try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, url)) { return session.responseHandler().loadAll(type, response); } } else { filters = resolvePropertyAnnotations(type, filters); Query qry = queryStatements.findByProperties(entityType, filters, depth) .setSortOrder(sortOrder) .setPagination(pagination); if (depth != 0) { try (Neo4jResponse<GraphRowModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute((GraphRowModelQuery) qry, url)) { return session.responseHandler().loadByProperty(type, response); } } else { try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, url)) { return session.responseHandler().loadAll(type, response); } } } } #location 4 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Override public <T> Collection<T> loadAll(Class<T> type, Filters filters, SortOrder sortOrder, Pagination pagination, int depth) { Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction(); String entityType = session.entityType(type.getName()); QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type); // all this business about selecting which type of model/response to handle is horribly hacky // it should be possible for the response handler to select based on the model implementation // and we should have a single method loadAll(...). Filters should not be a special case // though they are at the moment because of the problems with "graph" response format. if (filters.isEmpty()) { Query qry = queryStatements.findByType(entityType, depth) .setSortOrder(sortOrder) .setPagination(pagination); try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, tx)) { return session.responseHandler().loadAll(type, response); } } else { filters = resolvePropertyAnnotations(type, filters); Query qry = queryStatements.findByProperties(entityType, filters, depth) .setSortOrder(sortOrder) .setPagination(pagination); if (depth != 0) { try (Neo4jResponse<GraphRowModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute((GraphRowModelQuery) qry, tx)) { return session.responseHandler().loadByProperty(type, response); } } else { try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, tx)) { return session.responseHandler().loadAll(type, response); } } } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public static void configure(Configuration configuration) { driver = null; Components.configuration = configuration; } #location 2 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
#fixed code public static void configure(Configuration configuration) { destroy(); Components.configuration = configuration; }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public Collection<Injectable<?>> start(GraphDatabaseService graphDatabaseService, Configuration config) { EmbeddedDriver embeddedDriver = new EmbeddedDriver(graphDatabaseService); sessionFactory = new SessionFactory(packages); return Arrays.asList(new OgmInjectable<>(sessionFactory, SessionFactory.class)); } #location 3 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Override public Collection<Injectable<?>> start(GraphDatabaseService graphDatabaseService, Configuration config) { EmbeddedDriver embeddedDriver = new EmbeddedDriver(graphDatabaseService); sessionFactory = createSessionFactory(embeddedDriver); return Arrays.asList(new OgmInjectable<>(sessionFactory, SessionFactory.class)); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test public void shouldParseDataInRowResponseCorrectly() { try (Response<DefaultRestModel> rsp = new TestRestHttpResponse((rowResultsAndNoErrors()))) { DefaultRestModel restModel = rsp.next(); assertNotNull(restModel); Object[] rows = restModel.getValues(); assertEquals(3,rows.length); assertEquals(1, rows[0]); Map data = (Map) rows[1]; assertEquals(1931,((Map)data.get("data")).get("born")); data = (Map) rows[2]; assertEquals("The Birdcage", ((Map)data.get("data")).get("title")); assertEquals(395, ((Map)data.get("metadata")).get("id")); restModel = rsp.next(); rows = restModel.getValues(); assertEquals(3,rows.length); assertEquals(1, rows[0]); data = (Map) rows[1]; assertEquals(1931,((Map)data.get("data")).get("born")); data = (Map) rows[2]; assertEquals(2007, ((Map)data.get("data")).get("released")); } } #location 23 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Test public void shouldParseDataInRowResponseCorrectly() { try (Response<DefaultRestModel> rsp = new TestRestHttpResponse((rowResultsAndNoErrors()))) { DefaultRestModel restModel = rsp.next(); assertNotNull(restModel); Map<String,Object> rows = restModel.getRow(); assertEquals(3,rows.entrySet().size()); assertEquals(1, rows.get("count")); NodeModel data = (NodeModel) rows.get("director"); assertEquals(1931,data.property("born")); data = (NodeModel) rows.get("movie"); assertEquals("The Birdcage", data.property("title")); assertEquals(395L, data.getId().longValue()); restModel = rsp.next(); rows = restModel.getRow(); assertEquals(3,rows.entrySet().size()); assertEquals(1, rows.get("count")); data = (NodeModel) rows.get("director"); assertEquals(1931,data.property("born")); data = (NodeModel) rows.get("movie"); assertEquals(2007,data.property("released")); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test public void testIndexesAreSuccessfullyAsserted() { createLoginConstraint(); Components.getConfiguration().setAutoIndex("assert"); AutoIndexManager indexManager = new AutoIndexManager(metaData, Components.driver()); assertEquals(AutoIndexMode.ASSERT.getName(), Components.getConfiguration().getAutoIndex()); assertEquals(1, indexManager.getIndexes().size()); indexManager.build(); dropLoginConstraint(); } #location 10 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code @Test public void testIndexesAreSuccessfullyAsserted() { createLoginConstraint(); baseConfiguration.setAutoIndex("assert"); AutoIndexManager indexManager = new AutoIndexManager(metaData, Components.driver(), baseConfiguration); assertEquals(AutoIndexMode.ASSERT.getName(), baseConfiguration.getAutoIndex()); assertEquals(1, indexManager.getIndexes().size()); indexManager.build(); dropLoginConstraint(); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public RelationalWriter getIterableWriter(ClassInfo classInfo, Class<?> parameterType, String relationshipType, String relationshipDirection) { if(iterableWriterCache.get(classInfo) == null) { iterableWriterCache.put(classInfo, new HashMap<DirectedRelationshipForType, RelationalWriter>()); } DirectedRelationshipForType directedRelationshipForType = new DirectedRelationshipForType(relationshipType,relationshipDirection, parameterType); if(iterableWriterCache.get(classInfo).containsKey(directedRelationshipForType)) { return iterableWriterCache.get(classInfo).get(directedRelationshipForType); } //1st find a method annotated with type and direction MethodInfo methodInfo = getIterableSetterMethodInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, STRICT_MODE); if (methodInfo != null) { MethodWriter methodWriter = new MethodWriter(classInfo, methodInfo); cacheIterableMethodWriter(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, directedRelationshipForType, methodInfo, methodWriter); return methodWriter; } //2nd find a field annotated with type and direction FieldInfo fieldInfo = getIterableFieldInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, STRICT_MODE); if (fieldInfo != null) { FieldWriter fieldWriter = new FieldWriter(classInfo, fieldInfo); cacheIterableFieldWriter(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, directedRelationshipForType, fieldInfo, fieldWriter); return fieldWriter; } //If relationshipDirection=INCOMING, we should have found an annotated field already if(!relationshipDirection.equals(Relationship.INCOMING)) { //3rd find a method with implied type and direction methodInfo = getIterableSetterMethodInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, INFERRED_MODE); if (methodInfo != null) { MethodWriter methodWriter = new MethodWriter(classInfo, methodInfo); cacheIterableMethodWriter(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, directedRelationshipForType, methodInfo, methodWriter); return methodWriter; } //4th find a field with implied type and direction fieldInfo = getIterableFieldInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, INFERRED_MODE); if (fieldInfo != null) { FieldWriter fieldWriter = new FieldWriter(classInfo, fieldInfo); cacheIterableFieldWriter(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, directedRelationshipForType, fieldInfo, fieldWriter); return fieldWriter; } } iterableWriterCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, null); return null; } #location 7 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code @Override public RelationalWriter getIterableWriter(ClassInfo classInfo, Class<?> parameterType, String relationshipType, String relationshipDirection) { if(!iterableWriterCache.containsKey(classInfo)) { iterableWriterCache.put(classInfo, new HashMap<DirectedRelationshipForType, RelationalWriter>()); } DirectedRelationshipForType directedRelationshipForType = new DirectedRelationshipForType(relationshipType,relationshipDirection, parameterType); if(iterableWriterCache.get(classInfo).containsKey(directedRelationshipForType)) { return iterableWriterCache.get(classInfo).get(directedRelationshipForType); } //1st find a method annotated with type and direction MethodInfo methodInfo = getIterableSetterMethodInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, STRICT_MODE); if (methodInfo != null) { MethodWriter methodWriter = new MethodWriter(classInfo, methodInfo); cacheIterableMethodWriter(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, directedRelationshipForType, methodInfo, methodWriter); return methodWriter; } //2nd find a field annotated with type and direction FieldInfo fieldInfo = getIterableFieldInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, STRICT_MODE); if (fieldInfo != null) { FieldWriter fieldWriter = new FieldWriter(classInfo, fieldInfo); cacheIterableFieldWriter(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, directedRelationshipForType, fieldInfo, fieldWriter); return fieldWriter; } //If relationshipDirection=INCOMING, we should have found an annotated field already if(!relationshipDirection.equals(Relationship.INCOMING)) { //3rd find a method with implied type and direction methodInfo = getIterableSetterMethodInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, INFERRED_MODE); if (methodInfo != null) { MethodWriter methodWriter = new MethodWriter(classInfo, methodInfo); cacheIterableMethodWriter(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, directedRelationshipForType, methodInfo, methodWriter); return methodWriter; } //4th find a field with implied type and direction fieldInfo = getIterableFieldInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, INFERRED_MODE); if (fieldInfo != null) { FieldWriter fieldWriter = new FieldWriter(classInfo, fieldInfo); cacheIterableFieldWriter(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, directedRelationshipForType, fieldInfo, fieldWriter); return fieldWriter; } } iterableWriterCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, null); return null; }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code private void setProperties(List<Property<String, Object>> propertyList, Object instance) { ClassInfo classInfo = metadata.classInfo(instance); Collection<FieldInfo> compositeFields = classInfo.fieldsInfo().compositeFields(); if (compositeFields.size() > 0) { Map<String, ?> propertyMap = toMap(propertyList); for (FieldInfo field : compositeFields) { CompositeAttributeConverter<?> converter = field.getCompositeConverter(); Object value = converter.toEntityAttribute(propertyMap); FieldInfo writer = classInfo.getFieldInfo(field.getName()); writer.write(instance, value); } } for (Property<?, ?> property : propertyList) { writeProperty(classInfo, instance, property); } } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code private void setProperties(List<Property<String, Object>> propertyList, Object instance) { ClassInfo classInfo = metadata.classInfo(instance); getCompositeProperties(propertyList, classInfo).forEach( (field, v) -> field.write(instance, v)); for (Property<?, ?> property : propertyList) { writeProperty(classInfo, instance, property); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public void purgeDatabase() { String url = session.ensureTransaction().url(); session.requestHandler().execute(new DeleteNodeStatements().purge(), url).close(); session.context().clear(); } #location 3 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Override public void purgeDatabase() { Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction(); session.requestHandler().execute(new DeleteNodeStatements().purge(), tx).close(); session.context().clear(); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public <T, ID extends Serializable> T load(Class<T> type, ID id, int depth) { final FieldInfo primaryIndexField = session.metaData().classInfo(type.getName()).primaryIndexField(); if (primaryIndexField != null && !primaryIndexField.isTypeOf(id.getClass())) { throw new Neo4jException("Supplied id does not match primary index type on supplied class."); } QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type); PagingAndSortingQuery qry = queryStatements.findOne(id, depth); try (Response<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute((GraphModelRequest) qry)) { new GraphEntityMapper(session.metaData(), session.context()).map(type, response); return lookup(type, id); } } #location 3 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code public <T, ID extends Serializable> T load(Class<T> type, ID id, int depth) { ClassInfo classInfo = session.metaData().classInfo(type.getName()); if (classInfo == null) { throw new IllegalArgumentException(type + " is not a managed entity."); } final FieldInfo primaryIndexField = classInfo.primaryIndexField(); if (primaryIndexField != null && !primaryIndexField.isTypeOf(id.getClass())) { throw new Neo4jException("Supplied id does not match primary index type on supplied class."); } QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type); PagingAndSortingQuery qry = queryStatements.findOne(id, depth); try (Response<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute((GraphModelRequest) qry)) { new GraphEntityMapper(session.metaData(), session.context()).map(type, response); return lookup(type, id); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public <T> Collection<T> loadAll(Class<T> type, Collection<Long> ids, SortOrder sortOrder, Pagination pagination, int depth) { String url = session.ensureTransaction().url(); String entityType = session.entityType(type.getName()); QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type); Query qry = queryStatements.findAllByType(entityType, ids, depth) .setSortOrder(sortOrder) .setPagination(pagination); try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, url)) { return session.responseHandler().loadAll(type, response); } } #location 4 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Override public <T> Collection<T> loadAll(Class<T> type, Collection<Long> ids, SortOrder sortOrder, Pagination pagination, int depth) { Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction(); String entityType = session.entityType(type.getName()); QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type); Query qry = queryStatements.findAllByType(entityType, ids, depth) .setSortOrder(sortOrder) .setPagination(pagination); try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, tx)) { return session.responseHandler().loadAll(type, response); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public long countEntitiesOfType(Class<?> entity) { ClassInfo classInfo = session.metaData().classInfo(entity.getName()); if (classInfo == null) { return 0; } RowModelQuery countStatement = new AggregateStatements().countNodesLabelledWith(classInfo.labels()); String url = session.ensureTransaction().url(); try (Neo4jResponse<RowModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(countStatement, url)) { RowModel queryResult = response.next(); return queryResult == null ? 0 : ((Number) queryResult.getValues()[0]).longValue(); } } #location 9 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Override public long countEntitiesOfType(Class<?> entity) { ClassInfo classInfo = session.metaData().classInfo(entity.getName()); if (classInfo == null) { return 0; } RowModelQuery countStatement = new AggregateStatements().countNodesLabelledWith(classInfo.labels()); Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction(); try (Neo4jResponse<RowModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(countStatement, tx)) { RowModel queryResult = response.next(); return queryResult == null ? 0 : ((Number) queryResult.getValues()[0]).longValue(); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public FieldInfo propertyField(String propertyName) { for (FieldInfo fieldInfo : propertyFields()) { if (fieldInfo.property().equalsIgnoreCase(propertyName)) { return fieldInfo; } } return null; } #location 3 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code public FieldInfo propertyField(String propertyName) { if (propertyFields == null) { Collection<FieldInfo> fieldInfos = propertyFields(); propertyFields = new HashMap<>(fieldInfos.size()); for (FieldInfo fieldInfo : fieldInfos) { propertyFields.put(fieldInfo.property(), fieldInfo); } } return propertyFields.get(propertyName); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public <T> void delete(T object) { if (object.getClass().isArray() || Iterable.class.isAssignableFrom(object.getClass())) { deleteAll(object); } else { ClassInfo classInfo = session.metaData().classInfo(object); if (classInfo != null) { Field identityField = classInfo.getField(classInfo.identityField()); Long identity = (Long) FieldWriter.read(identityField, object); if (identity != null) { String url = session.ensureTransaction().url(); ParameterisedStatement request = getDeleteStatementsBasedOnType(object.getClass()).delete(identity); try (Neo4jResponse<String> response = session.requestHandler().execute(request, url)) { session.context().clear(object); } } } else { session.info(object.getClass().getName() + " is not an instance of a persistable class"); } } } #location 11 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Override public <T> void delete(T object) { if (object.getClass().isArray() || Iterable.class.isAssignableFrom(object.getClass())) { deleteAll(object); } else { ClassInfo classInfo = session.metaData().classInfo(object); if (classInfo != null) { Field identityField = classInfo.getField(classInfo.identityField()); Long identity = (Long) FieldWriter.read(identityField, object); if (identity != null) { Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction(); ParameterisedStatement request = getDeleteStatementsBasedOnType(object.getClass()).delete(identity); try (Neo4jResponse<String> response = session.requestHandler().execute(request, tx)) { session.context().clear(object); } } } else { session.info(object.getClass().getName() + " is not an instance of a persistable class"); } } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public RelationalReader getIterableReader(ClassInfo classInfo, Class<?> parameterType, String relationshipType, String relationshipDirection) { if(iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo) == null) { iterableReaderCache.put(classInfo, new HashMap<DirectedRelationshipForType, RelationalReader>()); } DirectedRelationshipForType directedRelationshipForType = new DirectedRelationshipForType(relationshipType,relationshipDirection, parameterType); if(iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).containsKey(directedRelationshipForType)) { return iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).get(directedRelationshipForType); } //1st find a method annotated with type and direction MethodInfo methodInfo = getIterableGetterMethodInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, STRICT_MODE); if (methodInfo != null) { MethodReader methodReader = new MethodReader(classInfo, methodInfo); iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, methodReader); return methodReader; } //2nd find a field annotated with type and direction FieldInfo fieldInfo = getIterableFieldInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, STRICT_MODE); if (fieldInfo != null) { FieldReader fieldReader = new FieldReader(classInfo, fieldInfo); iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, fieldReader); return fieldReader; } //If relationshipDirection=INCOMING, we should have found an annotated field already if(!relationshipDirection.equals(Relationship.INCOMING)) { //3rd find a method with implied type and direction methodInfo = getIterableGetterMethodInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, INFERRED_MODE); if (methodInfo != null) { MethodReader methodReader = new MethodReader(classInfo, methodInfo); iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, methodReader); return methodReader; } //4th find a field with implied type and direction fieldInfo = getIterableFieldInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, INFERRED_MODE); if (fieldInfo != null) { FieldReader fieldReader = new FieldReader(classInfo, fieldInfo); iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, fieldReader); return fieldReader; } } iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, null); return null; } #location 7 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code @Override public RelationalReader getIterableReader(ClassInfo classInfo, Class<?> parameterType, String relationshipType, String relationshipDirection) { if(!iterableReaderCache.containsKey(classInfo)) { iterableReaderCache.put(classInfo, new HashMap<DirectedRelationshipForType, RelationalReader>()); } DirectedRelationshipForType directedRelationshipForType = new DirectedRelationshipForType(relationshipType,relationshipDirection, parameterType); if(iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).containsKey(directedRelationshipForType)) { return iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).get(directedRelationshipForType); } //1st find a method annotated with type and direction MethodInfo methodInfo = getIterableGetterMethodInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, STRICT_MODE); if (methodInfo != null) { MethodReader methodReader = new MethodReader(classInfo, methodInfo); iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, methodReader); return methodReader; } //2nd find a field annotated with type and direction FieldInfo fieldInfo = getIterableFieldInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, STRICT_MODE); if (fieldInfo != null) { FieldReader fieldReader = new FieldReader(classInfo, fieldInfo); iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, fieldReader); return fieldReader; } //If relationshipDirection=INCOMING, we should have found an annotated field already if(!relationshipDirection.equals(Relationship.INCOMING)) { //3rd find a method with implied type and direction methodInfo = getIterableGetterMethodInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, INFERRED_MODE); if (methodInfo != null) { MethodReader methodReader = new MethodReader(classInfo, methodInfo); iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, methodReader); return methodReader; } //4th find a field with implied type and direction fieldInfo = getIterableFieldInfo(classInfo, parameterType, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, INFERRED_MODE); if (fieldInfo != null) { FieldReader fieldReader = new FieldReader(classInfo, fieldInfo); iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, fieldReader); return fieldReader; } } iterableReaderCache.get(classInfo).put(directedRelationshipForType, null); return null; }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Test public void testChangedPropertyDetected() { ClassInfo classInfo = metaData.classInfo(Teacher.class.getName()); Teacher teacher = new Teacher("Miss White"); objectMemo.remember(teacher, classInfo); teacher.setId(115L); // the id field must not be part of the memoised property list teacher.setName("Mrs Jones"); // the teacher's name property has changed. assertFalse(objectMemo.remembered(teacher, classInfo)); } #location 7 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code @Test public void testChangedPropertyDetected() { Teacher teacher = new Teacher("Miss White"); teacher.setId(115L); // the id field must not be part of the memoised property list mappingContext.remember(teacher); teacher.setName("Mrs Jones"); // the teacher's name property has changed. assertTrue(mappingContext.isDirty(teacher)); }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public <T> T load(Class<T> type, Long id, int depth) { String url = session.ensureTransaction().url(); QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type); Query qry = queryStatements.findOne(id,depth); try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, url)) { return session.responseHandler().loadById(type, response, id); } } #location 3 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Override public <T> T load(Class<T> type, Long id, int depth) { Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction(); QueryStatements queryStatements = session.queryStatementsFor(type); Query qry = queryStatements.findOne(id,depth); try (Neo4jResponse<GraphModel> response = session.requestHandler().execute(qry, tx)) { return session.responseHandler().loadById(type, response, id); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code public Long nativeId(Object entity) { ClassInfo classInfo = metaData.classInfo(entity); generateIdIfNecessary(entity, classInfo); if (classInfo.hasIdentityField()) { return EntityUtils.identity(entity, metaData); } else { FieldInfo fieldInfo = classInfo.primaryIndexField(); Object primaryId = fieldInfo.readProperty(entity); if (primaryId == null) { throw new MappingException("Field with primary id is null for entity " + entity); } LabelPrimaryId key = new LabelPrimaryId(classInfo, primaryId); Long graphId = primaryIdToNativeId.get(key); if (graphId == null) { graphId = EntityUtils.nextRef(); primaryIdToNativeId.put(key, graphId); } return graphId; } } #location 3 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code public Long nativeId(Object entity) { ClassInfo classInfo = metaData.classInfo(entity); if (classInfo == null) { throw new IllegalArgumentException("Class " + entity.getClass() + " is not a valid entity class. " + "Please check the entity mapping."); } generateIdIfNecessary(entity, classInfo); if (classInfo.hasIdentityField()) { return EntityUtils.identity(entity, metaData); } else { FieldInfo fieldInfo = classInfo.primaryIndexField(); Object primaryId = fieldInfo.readProperty(entity); if (primaryId == null) { throw new MappingException("Field with primary id is null for entity " + entity); } LabelPrimaryId key = new LabelPrimaryId(classInfo, primaryId); Long graphId = primaryIdToNativeId.get(key); if (graphId == null) { graphId = EntityUtils.nextRef(); primaryIdToNativeId.put(key, graphId); } return graphId; } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code private void mapOneToMany(Collection<Edge> oneToManyRelationships) { EntityCollector entityCollector = new EntityCollector(); List<MappedRelationship> relationshipsToRegister = new ArrayList<>(); Set<Edge> registeredEdges = new HashSet<>(); // first, build the full set of related entities of each type and direction for each source entity in the relationship for (Edge edge : oneToManyRelationships) { Object instance = mappingContext.getNodeEntity(edge.getStartNode()); Object parameter = mappingContext.getNodeEntity(edge.getEndNode()); // is this a relationship entity we're trying to map? Object relationshipEntity = mappingContext.getRelationshipEntity(edge.getId()); if (relationshipEntity != null) { // establish a relationship between FieldInfo outgoingWriter = findIterableWriter(instance, relationshipEntity, edge.getType(), OUTGOING); if (outgoingWriter != null) { entityCollector.recordTypeRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), relationshipEntity, edge.getType(), OUTGOING); relationshipsToRegister.add(new MappedRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), edge.getType(), edge.getEndNode(), edge.getId(), instance.getClass(), ClassUtils.getType(outgoingWriter.typeParameterDescriptor()))); } FieldInfo incomingWriter = findIterableWriter(parameter, relationshipEntity, edge.getType(), Relationship.INCOMING); if (incomingWriter != null) { entityCollector.recordTypeRelationship(edge.getEndNode(), relationshipEntity, edge.getType(), Relationship.INCOMING); relationshipsToRegister.add(new MappedRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), edge.getType(), edge.getEndNode(), edge.getId(), instance.getClass(), ClassUtils.getType(incomingWriter.typeParameterDescriptor()))); } if (incomingWriter != null || outgoingWriter != null) { registeredEdges.add(edge); } } else { FieldInfo outgoingWriter = findIterableWriter(instance, parameter, edge.getType(), OUTGOING); if (outgoingWriter != null) { entityCollector.recordTypeRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), parameter, edge.getType(), OUTGOING); relationshipsToRegister.add(new MappedRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), edge.getType(), edge.getEndNode(), edge.getId(), instance.getClass(), ClassUtils.getType(outgoingWriter.typeParameterDescriptor()))); } FieldInfo incomingWriter = findIterableWriter(parameter, instance, edge.getType(), Relationship.INCOMING); if (incomingWriter != null) { entityCollector.recordTypeRelationship(edge.getEndNode(), instance, edge.getType(), Relationship.INCOMING); relationshipsToRegister.add(new MappedRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), edge.getType(), edge.getEndNode(), edge.getId(), instance.getClass(), ClassUtils.getType(incomingWriter.typeParameterDescriptor()))); } if (incomingWriter != null || outgoingWriter != null) { registeredEdges.add(edge); } } } // then set the entire collection at the same time for each owning type for (Long instanceId : entityCollector.getOwningTypes()) { //get all relationship types for which we're trying to set collections of instances for (String relationshipType : entityCollector.getOwningRelationshipTypes(instanceId)) { //for each relationship type, get all the directions for which we're trying to set collections of instances for (String relationshipDirection : entityCollector.getRelationshipDirectionsForOwningTypeAndRelationshipType(instanceId, relationshipType)) { //for each direction, get all the entity types for which we're trying to set collections of instances for (Class entityClass : entityCollector.getEntityClassesForOwningTypeAndRelationshipTypeAndRelationshipDirection(instanceId, relationshipType, relationshipDirection)) { Collection<?> entities = entityCollector.getCollectiblesForOwnerAndRelationship(instanceId, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, entityClass); //Class entityType = entityCollector.getCollectibleTypeForOwnerAndRelationship(instanceId, relationshipType, relationshipDirection); mapOneToMany(mappingContext.getNodeEntity(instanceId), entityClass, entities, relationshipType, relationshipDirection); } } } } // now register all the relationships we've mapped as iterable types into the mapping context for (MappedRelationship mappedRelationship : relationshipsToRegister) { mappingContext.addRelationship(mappedRelationship); } // finally, register anything left over. These will be singleton relationships that // were not mapped during one->one mapping, or one->many mapping. for (Edge edge : oneToManyRelationships) { if (!registeredEdges.contains(edge)) { Object source = mappingContext.getNodeEntity(edge.getStartNode()); Object target = mappingContext.getNodeEntity(edge.getEndNode()); FieldInfo writer = getRelationalWriter(metadata.classInfo(source), edge.getType(), OUTGOING, target); if (writer == null) { writer = getRelationalWriter(metadata.classInfo(target), edge.getType(), INCOMING, source); } // ensures its tracked in the domain if (writer != null) { MappedRelationship mappedRelationship = new MappedRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), edge.getType(), edge.getEndNode(), edge.getId(), source.getClass(), ClassUtils.getType(writer.typeParameterDescriptor())); if (!mappingContext.containsRelationship(mappedRelationship)) { mappingContext.addRelationship(mappedRelationship); } } } } } #location 31 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
#fixed code private void mapOneToMany(Collection<Edge> oneToManyRelationships) { EntityCollector entityCollector = new EntityCollector(); List<MappedRelationship> relationshipsToRegister = new ArrayList<>(); // first, build the full set of related entities of each type and direction for each source entity in the relationship for (Edge edge : oneToManyRelationships) { Object instance = mappingContext.getNodeEntity(edge.getStartNode()); Object parameter = mappingContext.getNodeEntity(edge.getEndNode()); // is this a relationship entity we're trying to map? Object relationshipEntity = mappingContext.getRelationshipEntity(edge.getId()); if (relationshipEntity != null) { // establish a relationship between FieldInfo outgoingWriter = findIterableWriter(instance, relationshipEntity, edge.getType(), OUTGOING); if (outgoingWriter != null) { entityCollector.recordTypeRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), relationshipEntity, edge.getType(), OUTGOING); relationshipsToRegister.add(new MappedRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), edge.getType(), edge.getEndNode(), edge.getId(), instance.getClass(), ClassUtils.getType(outgoingWriter.typeParameterDescriptor()))); } FieldInfo incomingWriter = findIterableWriter(parameter, relationshipEntity, edge.getType(), INCOMING); if (incomingWriter != null) { entityCollector.recordTypeRelationship(edge.getEndNode(), relationshipEntity, edge.getType(), INCOMING); relationshipsToRegister.add(new MappedRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), edge.getType(), edge.getEndNode(), edge.getId(), instance.getClass(), ClassUtils.getType(incomingWriter.typeParameterDescriptor()))); } } else { // Use getRelationalWriter instead of findIterableWriter // findIterableWriter will return matching iterable even when there is better matching single field FieldInfo outgoingWriter = getRelationalWriter(metadata.classInfo(instance), edge.getType(), OUTGOING, parameter); if (outgoingWriter != null) { if (!outgoingWriter.forScalar()) { entityCollector.recordTypeRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), parameter, edge.getType(), OUTGOING); } else { outgoingWriter.write(instance, parameter); } MappedRelationship mappedRelationship = new MappedRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), edge.getType(), edge.getEndNode(), edge.getId(), instance.getClass(), ClassUtils.getType(outgoingWriter.typeParameterDescriptor())); relationshipsToRegister.add(mappedRelationship); } FieldInfo incomingWriter = getRelationalWriter(metadata.classInfo(parameter), edge.getType(), INCOMING, instance); if (incomingWriter != null) { if (!incomingWriter.forScalar()) { entityCollector.recordTypeRelationship(edge.getEndNode(), instance, edge.getType(), INCOMING); } else { incomingWriter.write(parameter, instance); } relationshipsToRegister.add(new MappedRelationship(edge.getStartNode(), edge.getType(), edge.getEndNode(), edge.getId(), instance.getClass(), ClassUtils.getType(incomingWriter.typeParameterDescriptor()))); } } } // then set the entire collection at the same time for each owning type for (Long instanceId : entityCollector.getOwningTypes()) { //get all relationship types for which we're trying to set collections of instances for (String relationshipType : entityCollector.getOwningRelationshipTypes(instanceId)) { //for each relationship type, get all the directions for which we're trying to set collections of instances for (String relationshipDirection : entityCollector.getRelationshipDirectionsForOwningTypeAndRelationshipType(instanceId, relationshipType)) { //for each direction, get all the entity types for which we're trying to set collections of instances for (Class entityClass : entityCollector.getEntityClassesForOwningTypeAndRelationshipTypeAndRelationshipDirection(instanceId, relationshipType, relationshipDirection)) { Collection<?> entities = entityCollector.getCollectiblesForOwnerAndRelationship(instanceId, relationshipType, relationshipDirection, entityClass); //Class entityType = entityCollector.getCollectibleTypeForOwnerAndRelationship(instanceId, relationshipType, relationshipDirection); mapOneToMany(mappingContext.getNodeEntity(instanceId), entityClass, entities, relationshipType, relationshipDirection); } } } } // now register all the relationships we've mapped as iterable types into the mapping context for (MappedRelationship mappedRelationship : relationshipsToRegister) { mappingContext.addRelationship(mappedRelationship); } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#vulnerable code @Override public Result query(String cypher, Map<String, ?> parameters, boolean readOnly) { validateQuery(cypher, parameters, readOnly); //If readOnly=true, just execute the query. If false, execute the query and return stats as well if(readOnly) { return new QueryResult(executeAndMap(null, cypher, parameters, new MapRowModelMapper()),null); } else { String url = session.ensureTransaction().url(); RowModelQueryWithStatistics parameterisedStatement = new RowModelQueryWithStatistics(cypher, parameters); try (Neo4jResponse<RowQueryStatisticsResult> response = session.requestHandler().execute(parameterisedStatement, url)) { RowQueryStatisticsResult result = response.next(); RowModelMapper rowModelMapper = new MapRowModelMapper(); Collection rowResult = new LinkedHashSet(); for (Iterator<Object> iterator = result.getRows().iterator(); iterator.hasNext(); ) { List next = (List) iterator.next(); rowModelMapper.mapIntoResult(rowResult, next.toArray(), response.columns()); } return new QueryResult(rowResult, result.getStats()); } } } #location 10 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
#fixed code @Override public Result query(String cypher, Map<String, ?> parameters, boolean readOnly) { validateQuery(cypher, parameters, readOnly); //If readOnly=true, just execute the query. If false, execute the query and return stats as well if(readOnly) { return new QueryResult(executeAndMap(null, cypher, parameters, new MapRowModelMapper()),null); } else { Transaction tx = session.ensureTransaction(); RowModelQueryWithStatistics parameterisedStatement = new RowModelQueryWithStatistics(cypher, parameters); try (Neo4jResponse<RowQueryStatisticsResult> response = session.requestHandler().execute(parameterisedStatement, tx)) { RowQueryStatisticsResult result = response.next(); RowModelMapper rowModelMapper = new MapRowModelMapper(); Collection rowResult = new LinkedHashSet(); for (Iterator<Object> iterator = result.getRows().iterator(); iterator.hasNext(); ) { List next = (List) iterator.next(); rowModelMapper.mapIntoResult(rowResult, next.toArray(), response.columns()); } return new QueryResult(rowResult, result.getStats()); } } }
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.