output
stringlengths
64
73.2k
input
stringlengths
208
73.3k
instruction
stringclasses
1 value
#fixed code private void handleResponse(CloseableHttpResponse httpResponse) throws IOException, SaturnJobException { int status = httpResponse.getStatusLine().getStatusCode(); if (status == 201) { logger.info("raise alarm successfully."); return; } if (status >= 400 && status <= 500) { String responseBody = EntityUtils.toString(httpResponse.getEntity()); if (StringUtils.isNotBlank(responseBody)) { String errMsg = JSONObject.parseObject(responseBody).getString("message"); throw constructSaturnJobException(status, errMsg); } else { throw new SaturnJobException(SaturnJobException.SYSTEM_ERROR, "internal server error"); } } else { // if have unexpected status, then throw RuntimeException directly. String errMsg = "unexpected status returned from Saturn Server."; throw new SaturnJobException(SaturnJobException.SYSTEM_ERROR, errMsg); } }
#vulnerable code private void handleResponse(CloseableHttpResponse httpResponse) throws IOException, SaturnJobException { int status = httpResponse.getStatusLine().getStatusCode(); if (status == 201) { logger.info("raise alarm successfully."); return; } if (status >= 400 && status <= 500) { HttpEntity entity = httpResponse.getEntity(); StringBuffer buffer = new StringBuffer(); if (entity != null) { BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(entity.getContent())); String temp = null; while ((temp = in.readLine()) != null) { buffer.append(temp); } } if (buffer.toString().length() > 0) { String errMsg = JSONObject.parseObject(buffer.toString()).getString("message"); throw constructSaturnJobException(status, errMsg); } } else { // if have unexpected status, then throw RuntimeException directly. String errMsg = "unexpected status returned from Saturn Server."; throw new SaturnJobException(SaturnJobException.SYSTEM_ERROR, errMsg); } } #location 7 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public void init() { if (zkConfig.isUseNestedZookeeper()) { NestedZookeeperServers.getInstance().startServerIfNotStarted(zkConfig.getNestedPort(), zkConfig.getNestedDataDir()); } log.info("msg=Saturn job: zookeeper registry center init, server lists is: {}.", zkConfig.getServerLists()); Builder builder = CuratorFrameworkFactory.builder() .connectString(zkConfig.getServerLists()) .sessionTimeoutMs(SESSION_TIMEOUT) .connectionTimeoutMs(CONNECTION_TIMEOUT) .retryPolicy(new ExponentialBackoffRetry(zkConfig.getBaseSleepTimeMilliseconds(), zkConfig.getMaxRetries(), zkConfig.getMaxSleepTimeMilliseconds())) .namespace(zkConfig.getNamespace()); if (0 != zkConfig.getSessionTimeoutMilliseconds()) { builder.sessionTimeoutMs(zkConfig.getSessionTimeoutMilliseconds()); sessionTimeout = zkConfig.getSessionTimeoutMilliseconds(); } if (0 != zkConfig.getConnectionTimeoutMilliseconds()) { builder.connectionTimeoutMs(zkConfig.getConnectionTimeoutMilliseconds()); } if (!Strings.isNullOrEmpty(zkConfig.getDigest())) { builder.authorization("digest", zkConfig.getDigest().getBytes(Charset.forName("UTF-8"))) .aclProvider(new ACLProvider() { @Override public List<ACL> getDefaultAcl() { return ZooDefs.Ids.CREATOR_ALL_ACL; } @Override public List<ACL> getAclForPath(final String path) { return ZooDefs.Ids.CREATOR_ALL_ACL; } }); } client = builder.build(); client.start(); try { client.getZookeeperClient().blockUntilConnectedOrTimedOut(); if (!client.getZookeeperClient().isConnected()) { throw new Exception("the zk client is not connected"); } client.checkExists().forPath(SLASH_CONSTNAT + zkConfig.getNamespace()); // check namespace node by using client, for UnknownHostException of connection string. //CHECKSTYLE:OFF } catch (final Exception ex) { throw new RuntimeException("zk connect fail, zkList is " + zkConfig.getServerLists(),ex); } // start monitor. if (zkConfig.getMonitorPort() > 0) { monitorService = new MonitorService(this, zkConfig.getMonitorPort()); monitorService.listen(); log.info("msg=zk monitor port starts at {}. usage: telnet {jobServerIP} {} and execute dump {jobName}", zkConfig.getMonitorPort(), zkConfig.getMonitorPort()); } }
#vulnerable code @Override public void init() { if (zkConfig.isUseNestedZookeeper()) { NestedZookeeperServers.getInstance().startServerIfNotStarted(zkConfig.getNestedPort(), zkConfig.getNestedDataDir()); } log.info("msg=Saturn job: zookeeper registry center init, server lists is: {}.", zkConfig.getServerLists()); Builder builder = CuratorFrameworkFactory.builder() .connectString(zkConfig.getServerLists()) .sessionTimeoutMs(SESSION_TIMEOUT) .connectionTimeoutMs(CONNECTION_TIMEOUT) .retryPolicy(new ExponentialBackoffRetry(zkConfig.getBaseSleepTimeMilliseconds(), zkConfig.getMaxRetries(), zkConfig.getMaxSleepTimeMilliseconds())) .namespace(zkConfig.getNamespace()); if (0 != zkConfig.getSessionTimeoutMilliseconds()) { builder.sessionTimeoutMs(zkConfig.getSessionTimeoutMilliseconds()); sessionTimeout = zkConfig.getSessionTimeoutMilliseconds(); } if (0 != zkConfig.getConnectionTimeoutMilliseconds()) { builder.connectionTimeoutMs(zkConfig.getConnectionTimeoutMilliseconds()); } if (!Strings.isNullOrEmpty(zkConfig.getDigest())) { builder.authorization("digest", zkConfig.getDigest().getBytes(Charset.forName("UTF-8"))) .aclProvider(new ACLProvider() { @Override public List<ACL> getDefaultAcl() { return ZooDefs.Ids.CREATOR_ALL_ACL; } @Override public List<ACL> getAclForPath(final String path) { return ZooDefs.Ids.CREATOR_ALL_ACL; } }); } client = builder.build(); client.start(); try { client.getZookeeperClient().blockUntilConnectedOrTimedOut(); if (!client.getZookeeperClient().isConnected()) { throw new Exception("the zk client is not connected"); } client.checkExists().forPath(SLASH_CONSTNAT + zkConfig.getNamespace()); // check namespace node by using client, for UnknownHostException of connection string. //CHECKSTYLE:OFF } catch (final Exception ex) { throw new RuntimeException("zk connect fail, zkList is " + zkConfig.getServerLists(),ex); } // start monitor. if (zkConfig.getMonitorPort() > 0) { MonitorService monitorService = new MonitorService(this, zkConfig.getMonitorPort()); monitorService.listen(); log.info("msg=zk monitor port starts at {}. usage: telnet {jobServerIP} {} and execute dump {jobName}", zkConfig.getMonitorPort(), zkConfig.getMonitorPort()); } } #location 51 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public static List<Long> getPidsFromFile(String executorName, String jobName, String jobItem) { List<Long> pids = new ArrayList<Long>(); //兼容旧版PID目录 Long pid = _getPidFromFile(executorName, jobName, jobItem); if(pid > 0){ pids.add(pid); } String path = String.format(JOBITEMPIDSPATH, executorName, jobName, jobItem); File dir = new File(path); if (!dir.exists() || !dir.isDirectory()) { return pids; } File[] files = dir.listFiles(); if(files == null || files.length == 0){ return pids; } for(File file:files){ try { pids.add(Long.parseLong(file.getName())); } catch (Exception e) { log.error(String.format(SaturnConstant.ERROR_LOG_FORMAT, jobName, "Parsing the pid file error"), e); } } return pids; }
#vulnerable code public static List<Long> getPidsFromFile(String executorName, String jobName, String jobItem) { List<Long> pids = new ArrayList<Long>(); //兼容旧版PID目录 Long pid = _getPidFromFile(executorName, jobName, jobItem); if(pid > 0){ pids.add(pid); } String path = String.format(JOBITEMPIDSPATH, executorName, jobName, jobItem); File dir = new File(path); if (!dir.exists() || !dir.isDirectory()) { return pids; } File[] files = dir.listFiles(); if(files.length == 0){ return pids; } for(File file:files){ try { pids.add(Long.parseLong(file.getName())); } catch (Exception e) { log.error(String.format(SaturnConstant.ERROR_LOG_FORMAT, jobName, "Parsing the pid file error"), e); } } return pids; } #location 17 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public static void startNamespaceShardingManagerList(int count) throws Exception { assertThat(nestedZkUtils.isStarted()); for (int i = 0; i < count; i++) { ZookeeperRegistryCenter shardingRegCenter = new ZookeeperRegistryCenter(new ZookeeperConfiguration(-1, nestedZkUtils.getZkString(), NAMESPACE, 1000, 3000, 3)); shardingRegCenter.init(); NamespaceShardingManager namespaceShardingManager = new NamespaceShardingManager((CuratorFramework) shardingRegCenter.getRawClient(),NAMESPACE, "127.0.0.1-" + i); namespaceShardingManager.start(); namespaceShardingManagerList.add(namespaceShardingManager); } }
#vulnerable code public static void startNamespaceShardingManagerList(int count) throws Exception { assertThat(nestedZkUtils.isStarted()); for (int i = 0; i < count; i++) { shardingRegCenter = new ZookeeperRegistryCenter(new ZookeeperConfiguration(-1, nestedZkUtils.getZkString(), NAMESPACE, 1000, 3000, 3)); shardingRegCenter.init(); NamespaceShardingManager namespaceShardingManager = new NamespaceShardingManager((CuratorFramework) shardingRegCenter.getRawClient(),NAMESPACE, "127.0.0.1-" + i); namespaceShardingManager.start(); namespaceShardingManagerList.add(namespaceShardingManager); } } #location 6 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code private void refreshNamespaceShardingListenerManagerMap() { Collection<ZkCluster> zkClusters = RegistryCenterServiceImpl.ZKADDR_TO_ZKCLUSTER_MAP.values(); for (ZkCluster zkCluster: zkClusters) { for(RegistryCenterConfiguration conf: zkCluster.getRegCenterConfList()) { String nns = conf.getNameAndNamespace(); if(!namespaceShardingListenerManagerMap.containsKey(nns)) { // client 从缓存取,不再新建也就不需要关闭 try { CuratorFramework client = connect(conf.getNameAndNamespace()).getCuratorClient(); NamespaceShardingManager newObj = new NamespaceShardingManager(client, conf.getNamespace(), generateShardingLeadershipHostValue()); if (namespaceShardingListenerManagerMap.putIfAbsent(nns, newObj) == null) { log.info("start NamespaceShardingManager {}", nns); newObj.start(); log.info("done starting NamespaceShardingManager {}", nns); } } catch (Exception e) { log.error(e.getMessage(), e); } } } } // 关闭无用的 Iterator<Entry<String, NamespaceShardingManager>> iterator = namespaceShardingListenerManagerMap.entrySet().iterator(); while(iterator.hasNext()) { Entry<String, NamespaceShardingManager> next = iterator.next(); String nns = next.getKey(); NamespaceShardingManager namespaceShardingManager = next.getValue(); boolean find = false; for (ZkCluster zkCluster: zkClusters) { for(RegistryCenterConfiguration conf: zkCluster.getRegCenterConfList()) { if(conf.getNameAndNamespace().equals(nns)) { find = true; break; } } if(find) { break; } } if(!find) { namespaceShardingManager.stop(); iterator.remove(); // clear NNS_CURATOR_CLIENT_MAP RegistryCenterClient registryCenterClient = NNS_CURATOR_CLIENT_MAP.remove(nns); if (registryCenterClient != null) { log.info("close zk client in NNS_CURATOR_CLIENT_MAP, nns: {}"); CloseableUtils.closeQuietly(registryCenterClient.getCuratorClient()); } } } }
#vulnerable code private void refreshNamespaceShardingListenerManagerMap() { Collection<ZkCluster> zkClusters = RegistryCenterServiceImpl.ZKADDR_TO_ZKCLUSTER_MAP.values(); for (ZkCluster zkCluster: zkClusters) { for(RegistryCenterConfiguration conf: REGISTRY_CENTER_CONFIGURATION_MAP.get(zkCluster.getZkAddr())) { String namespace = conf.getNamespace(); if(!namespaceShardingListenerManagerMap.containsKey(namespace)) { // client 从缓存取,不再新建也就不需要关闭 try { CuratorFramework client = connect(conf.getNameAndNamespace()).getCuratorClient(); NamespaceShardingManager newObj = new NamespaceShardingManager(client, namespace, generateShardingLeadershipHostValue()); if (namespaceShardingListenerManagerMap.putIfAbsent(namespace, newObj) == null) { log.info("start NamespaceShardingManager {}", namespace); newObj.start(); log.info("done starting NamespaceShardingManager {}", namespace); } } catch (Exception e) { log.error(e.getMessage(), e); } } } } // 关闭无用的 Iterator<Entry<String, NamespaceShardingManager>> iterator = namespaceShardingListenerManagerMap.entrySet().iterator(); while(iterator.hasNext()) { Entry<String, NamespaceShardingManager> next = iterator.next(); String namespace = next.getKey(); NamespaceShardingManager namespaceShardingManager = next.getValue(); boolean find = false; for (ZkCluster zkCluster: zkClusters) { for(RegistryCenterConfiguration conf: REGISTRY_CENTER_CONFIGURATION_MAP.get(zkCluster.getZkAddr())) { if(conf.getNamespace().equals(namespace)) { find = true; break; } } } if(!find) { namespaceShardingManager.stop(); iterator.remove(); } } } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public <T> Cursor<T> queryForCursor(Query query, final Class<T> clazz) { return new DelegatingCursor<T>(queryParsers.getForClass(query.getClass()).constructSolrQuery(query)) { @Override protected org.springframework.data.solr.core.query.result.DelegatingCursor.PartialResult<T> doLoad( SolrQuery nativeQuery) { QueryResponse response = executeSolrQuery(nativeQuery, getSolrRequestMethod(getDefaultRequestMethod())); if (response == null) { return new PartialResult<T>("", Collections.<T> emptyList()); } return new PartialResult<T>(response.getNextCursorMark(), convertQueryResponseToBeans(response, clazz)); } }.open(); }
#vulnerable code public <T> Cursor<T> queryForCursor(Query query, final Class<T> clazz) { return new DelegatingCursor<T>(queryParsers.getForClass(query.getClass()).constructSolrQuery(query)) { @Override protected org.springframework.data.solr.core.query.result.DelegatingCursor.PartialResult<T> doLoad( SolrQuery nativeQuery) { QueryResponse response = executeSolrQuery(nativeQuery); if (response == null) { return new PartialResult<T>("", Collections.<T> emptyList()); } return new PartialResult<T>(response.getNextCursorMark(), convertQueryResponseToBeans(response, clazz)); } }.open(); } #location 17 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public void deliver() { if (actor.lifeCycle.isResuming()) { if (isStowed()) { internalDeliver(this); } else { internalDeliver(actor.lifeCycle.environment.suspended.swapWith(this)); } actor.lifeCycle.nextResuming(); } else if (actor.isDispersing()) { internalDeliver(this); actor.lifeCycle.nextDispersing(); } else { internalDeliver(this); } }
#vulnerable code @Override public void deliver() { if (actor.lifeCycle.isResuming()) { if (isStowed()) { internalDeliver(this); } else { internalDeliver(actor.lifeCycle.environment.suspended.swapWith(this)); } actor.lifeCycle.nextResuming(); } else if (actor.isDispersing()) { internalDeliver(actor.lifeCycle.environment.stowage.swapWith(this)); } else { internalDeliver(this); } } #location 7 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public void deliver() { if (actor.lifeCycle.isResuming()) { if (isStowed()) { internalDeliver(this); } else { internalDeliver(actor.lifeCycle.environment.suspended.swapWith(this)); } actor.lifeCycle.nextResuming(); } else if (actor.isDispersing()) { internalDeliver(actor.lifeCycle.environment.stowage.swapWith(this)); } else { internalDeliver(this); } }
#vulnerable code @Override public void deliver() { if (actor.__internal__IsResumed()) { if (isStowed()) { internalDeliver(this); } else { internalDeliver(actor.__internal__Environment().suspended.swapWith(this)); } actor.__internal__NextResuming(); } else if (actor.isDispersing()) { internalDeliver(actor.__internal__Environment().stowage.swapWith(this)); } else { internalDeliver(this); } } #location 7 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public void deliver() { if (actor.lifeCycle.isResuming()) { if (isStowed()) { internalDeliver(this); } else { internalDeliver(actor.lifeCycle.environment.suspended.swapWith(this)); } actor.lifeCycle.nextResuming(); } else if (actor.isDispersing()) { internalDeliver(this); actor.lifeCycle.nextDispersing(); } else { internalDeliver(this); } }
#vulnerable code @Override public void deliver() { if (actor.lifeCycle.isResuming()) { if (isStowed()) { internalDeliver(this); } else { internalDeliver(actor.lifeCycle.environment.suspended.swapWith(this)); } actor.lifeCycle.nextResuming(); } else if (actor.isDispersing()) { internalDeliver(actor.lifeCycle.environment.stowage.swapWith(this)); } else { internalDeliver(this); } } #location 11 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code void addChild(final Actor child) { children.add(child); }
#vulnerable code void stop() { if (stopped.compareAndSet(false, true)) { stopChildren(); // suspended.reset(); // stowage.reset(); mailbox.close(); } } #location 3 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code void addChild(final Actor child) { children.add(child); }
#vulnerable code void addChild(final Actor child) { children = children.plus(child); } #location 2 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public void deliver() { if (actor.lifeCycle.isResuming()) { if (isStowed()) { internalDeliver(this); } else { internalDeliver(actor.lifeCycle.environment.suspended.swapWith(this)); } actor.lifeCycle.nextResuming(); } else if (actor.isDispersing()) { internalDeliver(actor.lifeCycle.environment.stowage.swapWith(this)); } else { internalDeliver(this); } }
#vulnerable code @Override public void deliver() { if (actor.__internal__IsResumed()) { if (isStowed()) { internalDeliver(this); } else { internalDeliver(actor.__internal__Environment().suspended.swapWith(this)); } actor.__internal__NextResuming(); } else if (actor.isDispersing()) { internalDeliver(actor.__internal__Environment().stowage.swapWith(this)); } else { internalDeliver(this); } } #location 11 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public ZMQ.Event make(SendEvent sender, int eventFilter) { try (ZMQ.Context zctx = new ZMQ.Context(1); ZMQ.Socket s = zctx.socket(SocketType.PUB); ZMQ.Socket m = zctx.socket(SocketType.PAIR)) { s.monitor("inproc://TestEventResolution", eventFilter); m.connect("inproc://TestEventResolution"); sender.send(s.base(), "tcp://127.0.0.1:8000"); return ZMQ.Event.recv(m); } }
#vulnerable code public ZMQ.Event make(SendEvent sender, int eventFilter) { Ctx ctx = new Ctx(); @SuppressWarnings("deprecation") SocketBase s = ctx.createSocket(ZMQ.PUB); @SuppressWarnings("deprecation") SocketBase m = ctx.createSocket(ZMQ.PAIR); m.connect("inproc://TestEventResolution"); s.monitor("inproc://TestEventResolution", eventFilter); sender.send(s, "tcp://127.0.0.1:8000"); zmq.ZMQ.Event ev = zmq.ZMQ.Event.read(m); return new ZMQ.Event(ev.event, ev.arg, ev.addr); } #location 7 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testProxy() throws Exception { int frontendPort = Utils.findOpenPort(); int backendPort = Utils.findOpenPort(); Context ctx = ZMQ.context(1); assert (ctx != null); Main mt = new Main(ctx, frontendPort, backendPort); mt.start(); new Dealer(ctx, "AA", backendPort).start(); new Dealer(ctx, "BB", backendPort).start(); Thread.sleep(1000); Thread c1 = new Client(ctx, "X", frontendPort); c1.start(); Thread c2 = new Client(ctx, "Y", frontendPort); c2.start(); c1.join(); c2.join(); ctx.term(); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testProxy() throws Exception { Context ctx = ZMQ.context(1); assert (ctx != null); Main mt = new Main(ctx); mt.start(); new Dealer(ctx, "AA").start(); new Dealer(ctx, "BB").start(); Thread.sleep(1000); Thread c1 = new Client(ctx, "X"); c1.start(); Thread c2 = new Client(ctx, "Y"); c2.start(); c1.join(); c2.join(); ctx.term(); } #location 19 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override protected boolean xsend(Msg msg_) { // If this is the first part of the message it's the ID of the // peer to send the message to. if (!more_out) { assert (current_out == null); // If we have malformed message (prefix with no subsequent message) // then just silently ignore it. // TODO: The connections should be killed instead. if (msg_.has_more()) { more_out = true; // Find the pipe associated with the identity stored in the prefix. // If there's no such pipe just silently ignore the message, unless // mandatory is set. Blob identity = Blob.createBlob(msg_.data(), true); Outpipe op = outpipes.get(identity); if (op != null) { current_out = op.pipe; if (!current_out.check_write ()) { op.active = false; current_out = null; if (mandatory) { more_out = false; errno.set(ZError.EAGAIN); return false; } } } else if (mandatory) { more_out = false; errno.set(ZError.EHOSTUNREACH); return false; } } return true; } // Check whether this is the last part of the message. more_out = msg_.has_more(); // Push the message into the pipe. If there's no out pipe, just drop it. if (current_out != null) { boolean ok = current_out.write (msg_); if (!ok) current_out = null; else if (!more_out) { current_out.flush (); current_out = null; } } return true; }
#vulnerable code @Override protected boolean xsend(Msg msg_) { // If this is the first part of the message it's the ID of the // peer to send the message to. if (!more_out) { assert (current_out == null); // If we have malformed message (prefix with no subsequent message) // then just silently ignore it. // TODO: The connections should be killed instead. if (msg_.has_more()) { more_out = true; // Find the pipe associated with the identity stored in the prefix. // If there's no such pipe just silently ignore the message, unless // mandatory is set. Blob identity = new Blob(msg_.data()); Outpipe op = outpipes.get(identity); if (op != null) { current_out = op.pipe; if (!current_out.check_write ()) { op.active = false; current_out = null; if (mandatory) { more_out = false; errno.set(ZError.EAGAIN); return false; } } } else if (mandatory) { more_out = false; errno.set(ZError.EHOSTUNREACH); return false; } } return true; } // Check whether this is the last part of the message. more_out = msg_.has_more(); // Push the message into the pipe. If there's no out pipe, just drop it. if (current_out != null) { boolean ok = current_out.write (msg_); if (!ok) current_out = null; else if (!more_out) { current_out.flush (); current_out = null; } } return true; } #location 19 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public int start () { int rc = 0; timers.addAll(newTimers); newTimers.clear(); // Recalculate all timers now for (STimer timer: timers) { timer.when = timer.delay + System.currentTimeMillis(); } Selector selector; try { selector = Selector.open(); } catch (IOException e) { System.err.println (e.getMessage()); return -1; } // Main reactor loop while (!Thread.currentThread().isInterrupted()) { if (dirty) { // If s_rebuild_pollset() fails, break out of the loop and // return its error rebuild (); } long wait = ticklessTimer(); rc = zmq.ZMQ.zmq_poll (selector, pollset, wait); if (rc == -1) { if (verbose) System.out.println("I: zloop: interrupted"); rc = 0; break; // Context has been shut down } // Handle any timers that have now expired Iterator<STimer> it = timers.iterator(); while (it.hasNext()) { STimer timer = it.next(); if (System.currentTimeMillis() >= timer.when && timer.when != -1) { if (verbose) System.out.println ("I: zloop: call timer handler"); rc = timer.handler.handle(this, null, timer.arg); if (rc == -1) break; // Timer handler signalled break if (timer.times != 0 && --timer.times == 0) { it.remove(); } else timer.when = timer.delay + System.currentTimeMillis(); } } if (rc == -1) break; // Some timer signalled break from the reactor loop // Handle any pollers that are ready for (int item_nbr = 0; item_nbr < poll_size; item_nbr++) { SPoller poller = pollact [item_nbr]; assert (pollset [item_nbr].getSocket() == poller.item.getSocket()); if (pollset [item_nbr].isError()) { if (verbose) System.out.printf ("I: zloop: can't poll %s socket (%s, %s)", poller.item.getSocket() != null? poller.item.getSocket().typeString(): "FD", poller.item.getSocket(), poller.item.getChannel()); // Give handler one chance to handle error, then kill // poller because it'll disrupt the reactor otherwise. if (poller.errors++ > 0) { pollerEnd (poller.item); } } else poller.errors = 0; // A non-error happened if (pollset [item_nbr].readyOps() > 0) { if (verbose) System.out.printf ("I: zloop: call %s socket handler (%s, %s)\n", poller.item.getSocket() != null? poller.item.getSocket().typeString(): "FD", poller.item.getSocket(), poller.item.getChannel()); rc = poller.handler.handle (this, poller.item, poller.arg); if (rc == -1) break; // Poller handler signalled break } } // Now handle any timer zombies // This is going to be slow if we have many zombies for (Object arg: zombies) { it = timers.iterator(); while (it.hasNext()) { STimer timer = it.next(); if (timer.arg == arg) { it.remove(); } } } // Now handle any new timers added inside the loop timers.addAll(newTimers); newTimers.clear(); if (rc == -1) break; } try { selector.close(); } catch (IOException e) { } return rc; }
#vulnerable code public int start () { int rc = 0; timers.addAll(newTimers); newTimers.clear(); // Recalculate all timers now for (STimer timer: timers) { timer.when = timer.delay + System.currentTimeMillis(); } Selector selector; try { selector = Selector.open(); } catch (IOException e) { System.err.println (e.getMessage()); return -1; } // Main reactor loop while (!Thread.currentThread().isInterrupted()) { if (dirty) { // If s_rebuild_pollset() fails, break out of the loop and // return its error rebuild (); } long wait = ticklessTimer(); rc = zmq.ZMQ.zmq_poll (selector, pollset, wait); if (rc == -1) { if (verbose) System.out.printf ("I: zloop: interrupted\n", rc); rc = 0; break; // Context has been shut down } // Handle any timers that have now expired Iterator<STimer> it = timers.iterator(); while (it.hasNext()) { STimer timer = it.next(); if (System.currentTimeMillis() >= timer.when && timer.when != -1) { if (verbose) System.out.println ("I: zloop: call timer handler"); rc = timer.handler.handle(this, null, timer.arg); if (rc == -1) break; // Timer handler signalled break if (timer.times != 0 && --timer.times == 0) { it.remove(); } else timer.when = timer.delay + System.currentTimeMillis(); } } if (rc == -1) break; // Some timer signalled break from the reactor loop // Handle any pollers that are ready for (int item_nbr = 0; item_nbr < poll_size; item_nbr++) { SPoller poller = pollact [item_nbr]; assert (pollset [item_nbr].getSocket() == poller.item.getSocket()); if (pollset [item_nbr].isError()) { if (verbose) System.out.printf ("I: zloop: can't poll %s socket (%s, %s)", poller.item.getSocket() != null? poller.item.getSocket().typeString(): "FD", poller.item.getSocket(), poller.item.getChannel()); // Give handler one chance to handle error, then kill // poller because it'll disrupt the reactor otherwise. if (poller.errors++ > 0) { pollerEnd (poller.item); } } else poller.errors = 0; // A non-error happened if (pollset [item_nbr].readyOps() > 0) { if (verbose) System.out.printf ("I: zloop: call %s socket handler (%s, %s)\n", poller.item.getSocket() != null? poller.item.getSocket().typeString(): "FD", poller.item.getSocket(), poller.item.getChannel()); rc = poller.handler.handle (this, poller.item, poller.arg); if (rc == -1) break; // Poller handler signalled break } } // Now handle any timer zombies // This is going to be slow if we have many zombies for (Object arg: zombies) { it = timers.iterator(); while (it.hasNext()) { STimer timer = it.next(); if (timer.arg == arg) { it.remove(); } } } // Now handle any new timers added inside the loop timers.addAll(newTimers); newTimers.clear(); if (rc == -1) break; } try { selector.close(); } catch (IOException e) { } return rc; } #location 32 #vulnerability type CHECKERS_PRINTF_ARGS
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public Command recv (long timeout_) { Command cmd_ = null; // Try to get the command straight away. if (active) { cmd_ = cpipe.read (); if (cmd_ != null) { return cmd_; } // If there are no more commands available, switch into passive state. active = false; signaler.recv (); } // Wait for signal from the command sender. boolean rc = signaler.wait_event (timeout_); if (!rc) return null; // We've got the signal. Now we can switch into active state. active = true; // Get a command. cmd_ = cpipe.read (); assert (cmd_ != null); return cmd_; }
#vulnerable code public Command recv (long timeout_) { Command cmd_ = null; // Try to get the command straight away. if (active) { cmd_ = cpipe.read (); if (cmd_ != null) { return cmd_; } // If there are no more commands available, switch into passive state. active = false; signaler.recv (); } // Wait for signal from the command sender. boolean rc = signaler.wait_event (timeout_); if (!rc) return null; assert (rc); // We've got the signal. Now we can switch into active state. active = true; // Get a command. cmd_ = cpipe.read (); assert (cmd_ != null); return cmd_; } #location 19 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public static void main (String[] args) throws Exception { // Prepare our context and sockets ZMQ.Context context = ZMQ.context(1); // Connect to task ventilator ZMQ.Socket receiver = context.socket(ZMQ.PULL); receiver.connect("tcp://localhost:5557"); // Connect to weather server ZMQ.Socket subscriber = context.socket(ZMQ.SUB); subscriber.connect("tcp://localhost:5556"); subscriber.subscribe("10001 ".getBytes(ZMQ.CHARSET)); // Process messages from both sockets // We prioritize traffic from the task ventilator while (!Thread.currentThread ().isInterrupted ()) { // Process any waiting tasks byte[] task; while((task = receiver.recv(ZMQ.DONTWAIT)) != null) { System.out.println("process task"); } // Process any waiting weather updates byte[] update; while ((update = subscriber.recv(ZMQ.DONTWAIT)) != null) { System.out.println("process weather update"); } // No activity, so sleep for 1 msec Thread.sleep(1000); } receiver.close (); subscriber.close (); context.term (); }
#vulnerable code public static void main (String[] args) throws Exception { // Prepare our context and sockets ZMQ.Context context = ZMQ.context(1); // Connect to task ventilator ZMQ.Socket receiver = context.socket(ZMQ.PULL); receiver.connect("tcp://localhost:5557"); // Connect to weather server ZMQ.Socket subscriber = context.socket(ZMQ.SUB); subscriber.connect("tcp://localhost:5556"); subscriber.subscribe("10001 ".getBytes(ZMQ.CHARSET)); // Process messages from both sockets // We prioritize traffic from the task ventilator while (!Thread.currentThread ().isInterrupted ()) { // Process any waiting tasks byte[] task; while((task = receiver.recv(ZMQ.DONTWAIT)) != null) { System.out.println("process task"); } // Process any waiting weather updates byte[] update; while ((update = subscriber.recv(ZMQ.DONTWAIT)) != null) { System.out.println("process weather update"); } // No activity, so sleep for 1 msec Thread.sleep(1000); } subscriber.close (); context.term (); } #location 21 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void destroySocket(Socket s) { if (s == null) { return; } s.setLinger(linger); s.close(); try { mutex.lock(); this.sockets.remove(s); } finally { mutex.unlock(); } }
#vulnerable code public void destroySocket(Socket s) { if (s == null) { return; } if (sockets.remove(s)) { s.setLinger(linger); s.close(); } } #location 8 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testConnectResolve() throws IOException { int port = Utils.findOpenPort(); System.out.println("test_connect_resolve running...\n"); Ctx ctx = ZMQ.init(1); assertThat(ctx, notNullValue()); // Create pair of socket, each with high watermark of 2. Thus the total // buffer space should be 4 messages. SocketBase sock = ZMQ.socket(ctx, ZMQ.ZMQ_PUB); assertThat(sock, notNullValue()); boolean brc = ZMQ.connect(sock, "tcp://localhost:" + port); assertThat(brc, is(true)); /* try { brc = ZMQ.connect (sock, "tcp://foobar123xyz:" + port); assertTrue(false); } catch (IllegalArgumentException e) { } */ ZMQ.close(sock); ZMQ.term(ctx); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testConnectResolve() { System.out.println("test_connect_resolve running...\n"); Ctx ctx = ZMQ.init(1); assertThat(ctx, notNullValue()); // Create pair of socket, each with high watermark of 2. Thus the total // buffer space should be 4 messages. SocketBase sock = ZMQ.socket(ctx, ZMQ.ZMQ_PUB); assertThat(sock, notNullValue()); boolean brc = ZMQ.connect(sock, "tcp://localhost:1234"); assertThat(brc, is(true)); /* try { brc = ZMQ.connect (sock, "tcp://foobar123xyz:1234"); assertTrue(false); } catch (IllegalArgumentException e) { } */ ZMQ.close(sock); ZMQ.term(ctx); } #location 26 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public ZMQ.Event make(SendEvent sender, int eventFilter) { try (ZMQ.Context zctx = new ZMQ.Context(1); ZMQ.Socket s = zctx.socket(SocketType.PUB); ZMQ.Socket m = zctx.socket(SocketType.PAIR)) { s.monitor("inproc://TestEventResolution", eventFilter); m.connect("inproc://TestEventResolution"); sender.send(s.base(), "tcp://127.0.0.1:8000"); return ZMQ.Event.recv(m); } }
#vulnerable code public ZMQ.Event make(SendEvent sender, int eventFilter) { Ctx ctx = new Ctx(); @SuppressWarnings("deprecation") SocketBase s = ctx.createSocket(ZMQ.PUB); @SuppressWarnings("deprecation") SocketBase m = ctx.createSocket(ZMQ.PAIR); m.connect("inproc://TestEventResolution"); s.monitor("inproc://TestEventResolution", eventFilter); sender.send(s, "tcp://127.0.0.1:8000"); zmq.ZMQ.Event ev = zmq.ZMQ.Event.read(m); return new ZMQ.Event(ev.event, ev.arg, ev.addr); } #location 8 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void destroy() { for (Socket socket : sockets) { destroySocket(socket); } sockets.clear(); // Only terminate context if we are on the main thread if (isMain() && context != null) { context.term(); context = null; } }
#vulnerable code public void destroy() { for (Socket socket : sockets) { socket.setLinger(linger); socket.close(); } sockets.clear(); // Only terminate context if we are on the main thread if (isMain() && context != null) { context.term(); } synchronized (this) { context = null; } } #location 4 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test(timeout = 1000) public void testSocketDoubleClose() { Context ctx = ZMQ.context(1); Socket socket = ctx.socket(ZMQ.PUSH); socket.close(); socket.close(); ctx.term(); }
#vulnerable code @Test(timeout = 1000) public void testSocketDoubleClose() { Context ctx = ZMQ.context(1); Socket socket = ctx.socket(ZMQ.PUSH); socket.close(); socket.close(); } #location 5 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testIssue476() throws InterruptedException, IOException, ExecutionException { final int front = Utils.findOpenPort(); final int back = Utils.findOpenPort(); final int max = 20; ExecutorService service = Executors.newFixedThreadPool(3); try (final ZContext ctx = new ZContext()) { service.submit(() -> { Thread.currentThread().setName("Proxy"); Socket xpub = ctx.createSocket(SocketType.XPUB); xpub.bind("tcp://*:" + back); Socket xsub = ctx.createSocket(SocketType.XSUB); xsub.bind("tcp://*:" + front); Socket ctrl = ctx.createSocket(SocketType.PAIR); ctrl.bind("inproc://ctrl-proxy"); ZMQ.proxy(xpub, xsub, null, ctrl); }); final AtomicReference<Throwable> error = testIssue476(front, back, max, service, ctx); ZMQ.Socket ctrl = ctx.createSocket(SocketType.PAIR); ctrl.connect("inproc://ctrl-proxy"); ctrl.send(ZMQ.PROXY_TERMINATE); ctrl.close(); service.shutdown(); service.awaitTermination(2, TimeUnit.SECONDS); assertThat(error.get(), nullValue()); } }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testIssue476() throws InterruptedException, IOException, ExecutionException { final int front = Utils.findOpenPort(); final int back = Utils.findOpenPort(); final int max = 10; ExecutorService service = Executors.newFixedThreadPool(3); final ZContext ctx = new ZContext(); service.submit(new Runnable() { @Override public void run() { Thread.currentThread().setName("Proxy"); ZMQ.Socket xpub = ctx.createSocket(SocketType.XPUB); xpub.bind("tcp://*:" + back); ZMQ.Socket xsub = ctx.createSocket(SocketType.XSUB); xsub.bind("tcp://*:" + front); ZMQ.Socket ctrl = ctx.createSocket(SocketType.PAIR); ctrl.bind("inproc://ctrl-proxy"); ZMQ.proxy(xpub, xsub, null, ctrl); } }); final AtomicReference<Throwable> error = testIssue476(front, back, max, service, ctx); ZMQ.Socket ctrl = ctx.createSocket(SocketType.PAIR); ctrl.connect("inproc://ctrl-proxy"); ctrl.send(ZMQ.PROXY_TERMINATE); ctrl.close(); service.shutdown(); service.awaitTermination(2, TimeUnit.SECONDS); assertThat(error.get(), nullValue()); ctx.close(); } #location 24 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public byte[] receive(int flags) { final Msg msg = socketBase.recv(flags); if (msg == null) { return null; } return msg.data(); }
#vulnerable code public byte[] receive(int flags) { final Msg msg = socketBase.recv(flags); return msg.data(); } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public static void main (String[] args) throws Exception { // Prepare our context and sockets ZMQ.Context context = ZMQ.context(1); // Connect to task ventilator ZMQ.Socket receiver = context.socket(ZMQ.PULL); receiver.connect("tcp://localhost:5557"); // Connect to weather server ZMQ.Socket subscriber = context.socket(ZMQ.SUB); subscriber.connect("tcp://localhost:5556"); subscriber.subscribe("10001 ".getBytes(ZMQ.CHARSET)); // Process messages from both sockets // We prioritize traffic from the task ventilator while (!Thread.currentThread ().isInterrupted ()) { // Process any waiting tasks byte[] task; while((task = receiver.recv(ZMQ.DONTWAIT)) != null) { System.out.println("process task"); } // Process any waiting weather updates byte[] update; while ((update = subscriber.recv(ZMQ.DONTWAIT)) != null) { System.out.println("process weather update"); } // No activity, so sleep for 1 msec Thread.sleep(1000); } receiver.close (); subscriber.close (); context.term (); }
#vulnerable code public static void main (String[] args) throws Exception { // Prepare our context and sockets ZMQ.Context context = ZMQ.context(1); // Connect to task ventilator ZMQ.Socket receiver = context.socket(ZMQ.PULL); receiver.connect("tcp://localhost:5557"); // Connect to weather server ZMQ.Socket subscriber = context.socket(ZMQ.SUB); subscriber.connect("tcp://localhost:5556"); subscriber.subscribe("10001 ".getBytes(ZMQ.CHARSET)); // Process messages from both sockets // We prioritize traffic from the task ventilator while (!Thread.currentThread ().isInterrupted ()) { // Process any waiting tasks byte[] task; while((task = receiver.recv(ZMQ.DONTWAIT)) != null) { System.out.println("process task"); } // Process any waiting weather updates byte[] update; while ((update = subscriber.recv(ZMQ.DONTWAIT)) != null) { System.out.println("process weather update"); } // No activity, so sleep for 1 msec Thread.sleep(1000); } subscriber.close (); context.term (); } #location 30 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code boolean wasPending (kvmsg msg) { Iterator<kvmsg> it = pending.iterator(); while (it.hasNext()) { if(java.util.Arrays.equals(msg.UUID(), it.next().UUID())){ it.remove(); return true; } } return false; }
#vulnerable code boolean wasPending (kvmsg msg) { Iterator<kvmsg> it = pending.iterator(); while (it.hasNext()) { if (msg.UUID().equals(it.next().UUID())) { it.remove(); return true; } } return false; } #location 5 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testHeartbeatTimeout() throws IOException, InterruptedException { testHeartbeatTimeout(false); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testHeartbeatTimeout() throws IOException, InterruptedException { Ctx ctx = ZMQ.createContext(); assertThat(ctx, notNullValue()); SocketBase server = prepServerSocket(ctx, true, false); assertThat(server, notNullValue()); SocketBase monitor = ZMQ.socket(ctx, ZMQ.ZMQ_PAIR); boolean rc = monitor.connect("inproc://monitor"); assertThat(rc, is(true)); String endpoint = (String) ZMQ.getSocketOptionExt(server, ZMQ.ZMQ_LAST_ENDPOINT); assertThat(endpoint, notNullValue()); Socket socket = new Socket("127.0.0.1", TestUtils.port(endpoint)); // Mock a ZMTP 3 client so we can forcibly time out a connection mockHandshake(socket); // By now everything should report as connected ZMQ.Event event = ZMQ.Event.read(monitor); assertThat(event.event, is(ZMQ.ZMQ_EVENT_ACCEPTED)); // We should have been disconnected event = ZMQ.Event.read(monitor); assertThat(event.event, is(ZMQ.ZMQ_EVENT_DISCONNECTED)); socket.close(); ZMQ.close(monitor); ZMQ.close(server); ZMQ.term(ctx); } #location 35 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void destroy() { for (Socket socket : sockets) { destroySocket(socket); } sockets.clear(); // Only terminate context if we are on the main thread if (isMain() && context != null) { context.term(); context = null; } }
#vulnerable code public void destroy() { for (Socket socket : sockets) { socket.setLinger(linger); socket.close(); } sockets.clear(); // Only terminate context if we are on the main thread if (isMain() && context != null) { context.term(); } synchronized (this) { context = null; } } #location 4 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testLastEndpoint() { // Create the infrastructure Ctx ctx = ZMQ.init(1); assertThat(ctx, notNullValue()); SocketBase sb = ZMQ.socket(ctx, ZMQ.ZMQ_ROUTER); assertThat(sb, notNullValue()); bindAndVerify(sb, "tcp://127.0.0.1:5560"); bindAndVerify(sb, "tcp://127.0.0.1:5561"); bindAndVerify(sb, "ipc:///tmp/testep" + UUID.randomUUID().toString()); sb.close(); ctx.terminate(); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testLastEndpoint() { // Create the infrastructure Ctx ctx = ZMQ.init(1); assertThat(ctx, notNullValue()); SocketBase sb = ZMQ.socket(ctx, ZMQ.ZMQ_ROUTER); assertThat(sb, notNullValue()); bindAndVerify(sb, "tcp://127.0.0.1:5560"); bindAndVerify(sb, "tcp://127.0.0.1:5561"); bindAndVerify(sb, "ipc:///tmp/testep"); sb.close(); ctx.terminate(); } #location 16 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void destroy() { for (Socket socket : sockets) { destroySocket(socket); } sockets.clear(); // Only terminate context if we are on the main thread if (isMain()) { context.term(); } }
#vulnerable code public void destroy() { for (Socket socket : sockets) { destroySocket(socket); } sockets.clear(); // Only terminate context if we are on the main thread if (isMain() && context != null) { context.term(); context = null; } } #location 9 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public ZMQ.Event make(SendEvent sender, int eventFilter) { try (ZMQ.Context zctx = new ZMQ.Context(1); ZMQ.Socket s = zctx.socket(SocketType.PUB); ZMQ.Socket m = zctx.socket(SocketType.PAIR)) { s.monitor("inproc://TestEventResolution", eventFilter); m.connect("inproc://TestEventResolution"); sender.send(s.base(), "tcp://127.0.0.1:8000"); return ZMQ.Event.recv(m); } }
#vulnerable code public ZMQ.Event make(SendEvent sender, int eventFilter) { Ctx ctx = new Ctx(); @SuppressWarnings("deprecation") SocketBase s = ctx.createSocket(ZMQ.PUB); @SuppressWarnings("deprecation") SocketBase m = ctx.createSocket(ZMQ.PAIR); m.connect("inproc://TestEventResolution"); s.monitor("inproc://TestEventResolution", eventFilter); sender.send(s, "tcp://127.0.0.1:8000"); zmq.ZMQ.Event ev = zmq.ZMQ.Event.read(m); return new ZMQ.Event(ev.event, ev.arg, ev.addr); } #location 12 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public boolean send(Msg msg_, int flags_) { // Drop the message if required. If we are at the end of the message // switch back to non-dropping mode. if (dropping) { more = msg_.has_more(); dropping = more; msg_.close (); return true; } while (active > 0) { if (pipes.get(current).write (msg_)) break; assert (!more); active--; if (current < active) Utils.swap (pipes, current, active); else current = 0; } // If there are no pipes we cannot send the message. if (active == 0) { ZError.errno(ZError.EAGAIN); return false; } // If it's final part of the message we can fluch it downstream and // continue round-robinning (load balance). more = msg_.has_more(); if (!more) { pipes.get(current).flush (); if (active > 1) current = (current + 1) % active; } return true; }
#vulnerable code public boolean send(Msg msg_, int flags_) { // Drop the message if required. If we are at the end of the message // switch back to non-dropping mode. if (dropping) { more = msg_.has_more(); dropping = more; msg_.close (); return true; } Pipe pipe = null; while (active > start) { pipe = pipes.get(current); if (pipe.write (msg_)) break; assert (!more); current++; start = current; if (current == active) current = start = active = 0; } // If there are no pipes we cannot send the message. if (active == start) { ZError.errno(ZError.EAGAIN); return false; } // If it's final part of the message we can fluch it downstream and // continue round-robinning (load balance). more = msg_.has_more(); if (!more) { pipe.flush (); current++; if (current == active) current = start; } return true; } #location 36 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void test_streaming_changes() throws IOException { HttpResponse httpResponse = ResponseOnFileStub.newInstance(200, "changes/changes_full.json"); StreamingChangesResult changes = new StreamingChangesResult(new ObjectMapper(), httpResponse); int i = 0; for (DocumentChange documentChange : changes) { Assert.assertEquals(++i, documentChange.getSequence()); } Assert.assertEquals(5, changes.getLastSeq()); changes.close(); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void test_streaming_changes() throws IOException { HttpResponse httpResponse = ResponseOnFileStub.newInstance(200, "changes/changes_full.json"); StreamingChangesResult changes = new StreamingChangesResult(new ObjectMapper(), httpResponse); int i = 0; for (DocumentChange documentChange : changes) { Assert.assertEquals(++i, documentChange.getSequence()); } Assert.assertEquals(5, changes.getLastSeq()); } #location 10 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override protected ReadResponse doRead(ServerIdentity identity, ReadRequest request) { LwM2mPath path = request.getPath(); // Manage Object case if (path.isObject()) { List<LwM2mObjectInstance> lwM2mObjectInstances = new ArrayList<>(); for (LwM2mInstanceEnabler instance : instances.values()) { ReadResponse response = instance.read(identity); if (response.isSuccess()) { lwM2mObjectInstances.add((LwM2mObjectInstance) response.getContent()); } } return ReadResponse.success(new LwM2mObject(getId(), lwM2mObjectInstances)); } // Manage Instance case LwM2mInstanceEnabler instance = instances.get(path.getObjectInstanceId()); if (instance == null) return ReadResponse.notFound(); if (path.getResourceId() == null) { return instance.read(identity); } // Manage Resource case return instance.read(identity, path.getResourceId()); }
#vulnerable code @Override protected ReadResponse doRead(ServerIdentity identity, ReadRequest request) { LwM2mPath path = request.getPath(); // Manage Object case if (path.isObject()) { List<LwM2mObjectInstance> lwM2mObjectInstances = new ArrayList<>(); for (Entry<Integer, LwM2mInstanceEnabler> entry : instances.entrySet()) { lwM2mObjectInstances.add(getLwM2mObjectInstance(entry.getKey(), entry.getValue(), identity, false)); } return ReadResponse.success(new LwM2mObject(getId(), lwM2mObjectInstances)); } // Manage Instance case LwM2mInstanceEnabler instance = instances.get(path.getObjectInstanceId()); if (instance == null) return ReadResponse.notFound(); if (path.getResourceId() == null) { return ReadResponse.success(getLwM2mObjectInstance(path.getObjectInstanceId(), instance, identity, false)); } // Manage Resource case return instance.read(identity, path.getResourceId()); } #location 20 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void createRPKClient() { ObjectsInitializer initializer = new ObjectsInitializer(); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.SECURITY, Security.rpk( "coaps://" + server.getSecuredAddress().getHostString() + ":" + server.getSecuredAddress().getPort(), 12345, clientPublicKey.getEncoded(), clientPrivateKey.getEncoded(), serverPublicKey.getEncoded())); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.SERVER, new Server(12345, LIFETIME, BindingMode.U, false)); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.DEVICE, new Device("Eclipse Leshan", MODEL_NUMBER, "12345", "U")); List<LwM2mObjectEnabler> objects = initializer.createMandatory(); objects.add(initializer.create(2)); InetSocketAddress clientAddress = new InetSocketAddress(InetAddress.getLoopbackAddress(), 0); DtlsConnectorConfig.Builder config = new DtlsConnectorConfig.Builder().setAddress(clientAddress); // TODO we should read the config from the security object // TODO no way to provide a dynamic config with the current scandium API config.setIdentity(clientPrivateKey, clientPublicKey); CoapServer coapServer = new CoapServer(); coapServer.addEndpoint(new CoapEndpoint(new DTLSConnector(config.build()), NetworkConfig.getStandard())); LeshanClientBuilder builder = new LeshanClientBuilder(getCurrentEndpoint()); builder.setLocalAddress(clientAddress.getHostString(), clientAddress.getPort()); builder.setObjects(objects); client = builder.build(); }
#vulnerable code public void createRPKClient() { ObjectsInitializer initializer = new ObjectsInitializer(); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.SECURITY, Security.rpk( "coaps://" + server.getSecureAddress().getHostString() + ":" + server.getSecureAddress().getPort(), 12345, clientPublicKey.getEncoded(), clientPrivateKey.getEncoded(), serverPublicKey.getEncoded())); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.SERVER, new Server(12345, LIFETIME, BindingMode.U, false)); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.DEVICE, new Device("Eclipse Leshan", MODEL_NUMBER, "12345", "U")); List<LwM2mObjectEnabler> objects = initializer.createMandatory(); objects.add(initializer.create(2)); InetSocketAddress clientAddress = new InetSocketAddress(InetAddress.getLoopbackAddress(), 0); DtlsConnectorConfig.Builder config = new DtlsConnectorConfig.Builder().setAddress(clientAddress); // TODO we should read the config from the security object // TODO no way to provide a dynamic config with the current scandium API config.setIdentity(clientPrivateKey, clientPublicKey); CoapServer coapServer = new CoapServer(); coapServer.addEndpoint(new CoapEndpoint(new DTLSConnector(config.build()), NetworkConfig.getStandard())); LeshanClientBuilder builder = new LeshanClientBuilder(getCurrentEndpoint()); builder.setLocalAddress(clientAddress.getHostString(), clientAddress.getPort()); builder.setObjects(objects); client = builder.build(); } #location 5 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") private void loadFromFile() { try { File file = new File(filename); if (file.exists()) { try (InputStreamReader in = new InputStreamReader(new FileInputStream(file))) { Map<String, BootstrapConfig> config = gson.fromJson(in, gsonType); bootstrapByEndpoint.putAll(config); } } else { // TODO temporary code for retro compatibility: remove it later. if (DEFAULT_FILE.equals(filename)) { file = new File("data/bootstrap.data");// old bootstrap configurations default filename if (file.exists()) { try (ObjectInputStream in = new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream(file))) { bootstrapByEndpoint.putAll((Map<String, BootstrapConfig>) in.readObject()); } } } } } catch (Exception e) { LOG.error("Could not load bootstrap infos from file", e); } }
#vulnerable code @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") private void loadFromFile() { try { File file = new File(filename); if (file.exists()) { try (ObjectInputStream in = new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream(file))) { bootstrapByEndpoint.putAll((Map<String, BootstrapConfig>) in.readObject()); } } } catch (Exception e) { LOG.error("Could not load bootstrap infos from file", e); } } #location 6 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") private static <T extends LwM2mNode> T parseTlv(Tlv[] tlvs, LwM2mPath path, LwM2mModel model, Class<T> nodeClass) throws CodecException { LOG.trace("Parsing TLV content for path {}: {}", path, tlvs); // Object if (nodeClass == LwM2mObject.class) { List<LwM2mObjectInstance> instances = new ArrayList<>(); // is it an array of TLV resources? if (tlvs.length > 0 && // (tlvs[0].getType() == TlvType.MULTIPLE_RESOURCE || tlvs[0].getType() == TlvType.RESOURCE_VALUE)) { ObjectModel oModel = model.getObjectModel(path.getObjectId()); if (oModel == null) { LOG.warn("No model for object {}. The tlv is decoded assuming this is a single instance object", path.getObjectId()); instances.add(parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs, path.getObjectId(), 0, model)); } else if (!oModel.multiple) { instances.add(parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs, path.getObjectId(), 0, model)); } else { throw new CodecException(String .format("Object instance TLV is mandatory for multiple instances object [path:%s]", path)); } } else { for (Tlv tlv : tlvs) { if (tlv.getType() != TlvType.OBJECT_INSTANCE) throw new CodecException( String.format("Expected TLV of type OBJECT_INSTANCE but was %s [path:%s]", tlv.getType().name(), path)); instances.add(parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlv.getChildren(), path.getObjectId(), tlv.getIdentifier(), model)); } } return (T) new LwM2mObject(path.getObjectId(), instances); } // Object instance else if (nodeClass == LwM2mObjectInstance.class) { if (tlvs.length == 1 && tlvs[0].getType() == TlvType.OBJECT_INSTANCE) { if (path.isObjectInstance() && tlvs[0].getIdentifier() != path.getObjectInstanceId()) { throw new CodecException(String.format("Id conflict between path [%s] and instance TLV [%d]", path, tlvs[0].getIdentifier())); } // object instance TLV return (T) parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs[0].getChildren(), path.getObjectId(), tlvs[0].getIdentifier(), model); } else { // array of TLV resources // try to retrieve the instanceId from the path or the model Integer instanceId = path.getObjectInstanceId(); if (instanceId == null) { // single instance object? ObjectModel oModel = model.getObjectModel(path.getObjectId()); if (oModel != null && !oModel.multiple) { instanceId = 0; } else { instanceId = LwM2mObjectInstance.UNDEFINED; } } return (T) parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs, path.getObjectId(), instanceId, model); } } // Resource else if (nodeClass == LwM2mResource.class) { ResourceModel resourceModel = model.getResourceModel(path.getObjectId(), path.getResourceId()); if (tlvs.length == 0 && resourceModel != null && !resourceModel.multiple) { // If there is no TlV value and we know that this resource is a single resource we raise an exception // else we consider this is a multi-instance resource throw new CodecException(String.format("TLV payload is mandatory for single resource %s", path)); } else if (tlvs.length == 1 && tlvs[0].getType() != TlvType.RESOURCE_INSTANCE) { if (path.isResource() && path.getResourceId() != tlvs[0].getIdentifier()) { throw new CodecException(String.format("Id conflict between path [%s] and resource TLV [%s]", path, tlvs[0].getIdentifier())); } return (T) parseResourceTlv(tlvs[0], path.getObjectId(), path.getObjectInstanceId(), model); } else { Type expectedRscType = getResourceType(path, model); return (T) LwM2mMultipleResource.newResource(path.getResourceId(), parseTlvValues(tlvs, expectedRscType, path), expectedRscType); } } else { throw new IllegalArgumentException("invalid node class: " + nodeClass); } }
#vulnerable code @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") private static <T extends LwM2mNode> T parseTlv(Tlv[] tlvs, LwM2mPath path, LwM2mModel model, Class<T> nodeClass) throws CodecException { LOG.trace("Parsing TLV content for path {}: {}", path, tlvs); // Object if (nodeClass == LwM2mObject.class) { List<LwM2mObjectInstance> instances = new ArrayList<>(); // is it an array of TLV resources? if (tlvs.length > 0 && // (tlvs[0].getType() == TlvType.MULTIPLE_RESOURCE || tlvs[0].getType() == TlvType.RESOURCE_VALUE)) { ObjectModel oModel = model.getObjectModel(path.getObjectId()); if (oModel == null) { LOG.warn("No model for object {}. The tlv is decoded assuming this is a single instance object", path.getObjectId()); instances.add(parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs, path.getObjectId(), 0, model)); } else if (!oModel.multiple) { instances.add(parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs, path.getObjectId(), 0, model)); } else { throw new CodecException(String .format("Object instance TLV is mandatory for multiple instances object [path:%s]", path)); } } else { for (Tlv tlv : tlvs) { if (tlv.getType() != TlvType.OBJECT_INSTANCE) throw new CodecException( String.format("Expected TLV of type OBJECT_INSTANCE but was %s [path:%s]", tlv.getType().name(), path)); instances.add(parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlv.getChildren(), path.getObjectId(), tlv.getIdentifier(), model)); } } return (T) new LwM2mObject(path.getObjectId(), instances); } // Object instance else if (nodeClass == LwM2mObjectInstance.class) { if (tlvs.length == 1 && tlvs[0].getType() == TlvType.OBJECT_INSTANCE) { if (path.isObjectInstance() && tlvs[0].getIdentifier() != path.getObjectInstanceId()) { throw new CodecException(String.format("Id conflict between path [%s] and instance TLV [%d]", path, tlvs[0].getIdentifier())); } // object instance TLV return (T) parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs[0].getChildren(), path.getObjectId(), tlvs[0].getIdentifier(), model); } else { // array of TLV resources // try to retrieve the instanceId from the path or the model Integer instanceId = path.getObjectInstanceId(); if (instanceId == null) { // single instance object? ObjectModel oModel = model.getObjectModel(path.getObjectId()); if (oModel != null && !oModel.multiple) { instanceId = 0; } else { instanceId = LwM2mObjectInstance.UNDEFINED; } } return (T) parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs, path.getObjectId(), instanceId, model); } } // Resource else if (nodeClass == LwM2mResource.class) { if (tlvs.length == 1 && tlvs[0].getType() != TlvType.RESOURCE_INSTANCE) { if (path.isResource() && path.getResourceId() != tlvs[0].getIdentifier()) { throw new CodecException(String.format("Id conflict between path [%s] and resource TLV [%s]", path, tlvs[0].getIdentifier())); } return (T) parseResourceTlv(tlvs[0], path.getObjectId(), path.getObjectInstanceId(), model); } else { Type expectedRscType = getResourceType(path, model); return (T) LwM2mMultipleResource.newResource(path.getResourceId(), parseTlvValues(tlvs, expectedRscType, path), expectedRscType); } } else { throw new IllegalArgumentException("invalid node class: " + nodeClass); } } #location 76 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public void visit(final UpdateRequest request) { coapRequest = Request.newPut(); buildRequestSettings(); coapRequest.getOptions().setUriPath(request.getRegistrationId()); Long lifetime = request.getLifeTimeInSec(); if (lifetime != null) coapRequest.getOptions().addUriQuery("lt=" + lifetime); String smsNumber = request.getSmsNumber(); if (smsNumber != null) coapRequest.getOptions().addUriQuery("sms=" + smsNumber); BindingMode bindingMode = request.getBindingMode(); if (bindingMode != null) coapRequest.getOptions().addUriQuery("b=" + bindingMode.toString()); LinkObject[] linkObjects = request.getObjectLinks(); if (linkObjects != null) coapRequest.setPayload(LinkObject.serialyse(linkObjects)); }
#vulnerable code @Override public void visit(final UpdateRequest request) { coapRequest = Request.newPut(); buildRequestSettings(); coapRequest.getOptions().setUriPath(request.getRegistrationId()); Long lifetime = request.getLifeTimeInSec(); if (lifetime != null) coapRequest.getOptions().addUriQuery("lt=" + lifetime); String smsNumber = request.getSmsNumber(); if (smsNumber != null) coapRequest.getOptions().addUriQuery("sms=" + smsNumber); BindingMode bindingMode = request.getBindingMode(); if (bindingMode != null) coapRequest.getOptions().addUriQuery("b=" + bindingMode.toString()); LinkObject[] linkObjects = request.getObjectLinks(); if (linkObjects == null) coapRequest.setPayload(LinkObject.serialyse(linkObjects)); } #location 21 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void createPSKClient() { ObjectsInitializer initializer = new ObjectsInitializer(); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.SECURITY, Security.psk( "coaps://" + server.getSecuredAddress().getHostString() + ":" + server.getSecuredAddress().getPort(), 12345, GOOD_PSK_ID.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8), GOOD_PSK_KEY)); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.SERVER, new Server(12345, LIFETIME, BindingMode.U, false)); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.DEVICE, new Device("Eclipse Leshan", MODEL_NUMBER, "12345", "U")); List<LwM2mObjectEnabler> objects = initializer.createMandatory(); objects.add(initializer.create(2)); InetSocketAddress clientAddress = new InetSocketAddress(InetAddress.getLoopbackAddress(), 0); LeshanClientBuilder builder = new LeshanClientBuilder(getCurrentEndpoint()); builder.setLocalAddress(clientAddress.getHostString(), clientAddress.getPort()); builder.setObjects(objects); client = builder.build(); }
#vulnerable code public void createPSKClient() { ObjectsInitializer initializer = new ObjectsInitializer(); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.SECURITY, Security.psk( "coaps://" + server.getSecureAddress().getHostString() + ":" + server.getSecureAddress().getPort(), 12345, GOOD_PSK_ID.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8), GOOD_PSK_KEY)); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.SERVER, new Server(12345, LIFETIME, BindingMode.U, false)); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.DEVICE, new Device("Eclipse Leshan", MODEL_NUMBER, "12345", "U")); List<LwM2mObjectEnabler> objects = initializer.createMandatory(); objects.add(initializer.create(2)); InetSocketAddress clientAddress = new InetSocketAddress(InetAddress.getLoopbackAddress(), 0); LeshanClientBuilder builder = new LeshanClientBuilder(getCurrentEndpoint()); builder.setLocalAddress(clientAddress.getHostString(), clientAddress.getPort()); builder.setObjects(objects); client = builder.build(); } #location 5 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code protected void fireResourcesChanged(int instanceid, int... resourceIds) { transactionalListener.resourceChanged(this, instanceid, resourceIds); }
#vulnerable code protected void fireResourcesChanged(int instanceid, int... resourceIds) { if (listener != null) { listener.resourceChanged(this, instanceid, resourceIds); } } #location 3 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") private static <T extends LwM2mNode> T parseTlv(Tlv[] tlvs, LwM2mPath path, LwM2mModel model, Class<T> nodeClass) throws CodecException { LOG.trace("Parsing TLV content for path {}: {}", path, tlvs); // Object if (nodeClass == LwM2mObject.class) { List<LwM2mObjectInstance> instances = new ArrayList<>(); // is it an array of TLV resources? if (tlvs.length > 0 && // (tlvs[0].getType() == TlvType.MULTIPLE_RESOURCE || tlvs[0].getType() == TlvType.RESOURCE_VALUE)) { ObjectModel oModel = model.getObjectModel(path.getObjectId()); if (oModel == null) { LOG.warn("No model for object {}. The tlv is decoded assuming this is a single instance object", path.getObjectId()); instances.add(parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs, path.getObjectId(), 0, model)); } else if (!oModel.multiple) { instances.add(parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs, path.getObjectId(), 0, model)); } else { throw new CodecException(String .format("Object instance TLV is mandatory for multiple instances object [path:%s]", path)); } } else { for (Tlv tlv : tlvs) { if (tlv.getType() != TlvType.OBJECT_INSTANCE) throw new CodecException( String.format("Expected TLV of type OBJECT_INSTANCE but was %s [path:%s]", tlv.getType().name(), path)); instances.add(parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlv.getChildren(), path.getObjectId(), tlv.getIdentifier(), model)); } } return (T) new LwM2mObject(path.getObjectId(), instances); } // Object instance else if (nodeClass == LwM2mObjectInstance.class) { if (tlvs.length == 1 && tlvs[0].getType() == TlvType.OBJECT_INSTANCE) { if (path.isObjectInstance() && tlvs[0].getIdentifier() != path.getObjectInstanceId()) { throw new CodecException(String.format("Id conflict between path [%s] and instance TLV [%d]", path, tlvs[0].getIdentifier())); } // object instance TLV return (T) parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs[0].getChildren(), path.getObjectId(), tlvs[0].getIdentifier(), model); } else { // array of TLV resources // try to retrieve the instanceId from the path or the model Integer instanceId = path.getObjectInstanceId(); if (instanceId == null) { // single instance object? ObjectModel oModel = model.getObjectModel(path.getObjectId()); if (oModel != null && !oModel.multiple) { instanceId = 0; } else { instanceId = LwM2mObjectInstance.UNDEFINED; } } return (T) parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs, path.getObjectId(), instanceId, model); } } // Resource else if (nodeClass == LwM2mResource.class) { ResourceModel resourceModel = model.getResourceModel(path.getObjectId(), path.getResourceId()); if (tlvs.length == 0 && resourceModel != null && !resourceModel.multiple) { // If there is no TlV value and we know that this resource is a single resource we raise an exception // else we consider this is a multi-instance resource throw new CodecException(String.format("TLV payload is mandatory for single resource %s", path)); } else if (tlvs.length == 1 && tlvs[0].getType() != TlvType.RESOURCE_INSTANCE) { if (path.isResource() && path.getResourceId() != tlvs[0].getIdentifier()) { throw new CodecException(String.format("Id conflict between path [%s] and resource TLV [%s]", path, tlvs[0].getIdentifier())); } return (T) parseResourceTlv(tlvs[0], path.getObjectId(), path.getObjectInstanceId(), model); } else { Type expectedRscType = getResourceType(path, model); return (T) LwM2mMultipleResource.newResource(path.getResourceId(), parseTlvValues(tlvs, expectedRscType, path), expectedRscType); } } else { throw new IllegalArgumentException("invalid node class: " + nodeClass); } }
#vulnerable code @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") private static <T extends LwM2mNode> T parseTlv(Tlv[] tlvs, LwM2mPath path, LwM2mModel model, Class<T> nodeClass) throws CodecException { LOG.trace("Parsing TLV content for path {}: {}", path, tlvs); // Object if (nodeClass == LwM2mObject.class) { List<LwM2mObjectInstance> instances = new ArrayList<>(); // is it an array of TLV resources? if (tlvs.length > 0 && // (tlvs[0].getType() == TlvType.MULTIPLE_RESOURCE || tlvs[0].getType() == TlvType.RESOURCE_VALUE)) { ObjectModel oModel = model.getObjectModel(path.getObjectId()); if (oModel == null) { LOG.warn("No model for object {}. The tlv is decoded assuming this is a single instance object", path.getObjectId()); instances.add(parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs, path.getObjectId(), 0, model)); } else if (!oModel.multiple) { instances.add(parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs, path.getObjectId(), 0, model)); } else { throw new CodecException(String .format("Object instance TLV is mandatory for multiple instances object [path:%s]", path)); } } else { for (Tlv tlv : tlvs) { if (tlv.getType() != TlvType.OBJECT_INSTANCE) throw new CodecException( String.format("Expected TLV of type OBJECT_INSTANCE but was %s [path:%s]", tlv.getType().name(), path)); instances.add(parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlv.getChildren(), path.getObjectId(), tlv.getIdentifier(), model)); } } return (T) new LwM2mObject(path.getObjectId(), instances); } // Object instance else if (nodeClass == LwM2mObjectInstance.class) { if (tlvs.length == 1 && tlvs[0].getType() == TlvType.OBJECT_INSTANCE) { if (path.isObjectInstance() && tlvs[0].getIdentifier() != path.getObjectInstanceId()) { throw new CodecException(String.format("Id conflict between path [%s] and instance TLV [%d]", path, tlvs[0].getIdentifier())); } // object instance TLV return (T) parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs[0].getChildren(), path.getObjectId(), tlvs[0].getIdentifier(), model); } else { // array of TLV resources // try to retrieve the instanceId from the path or the model Integer instanceId = path.getObjectInstanceId(); if (instanceId == null) { // single instance object? ObjectModel oModel = model.getObjectModel(path.getObjectId()); if (oModel != null && !oModel.multiple) { instanceId = 0; } else { instanceId = LwM2mObjectInstance.UNDEFINED; } } return (T) parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs, path.getObjectId(), instanceId, model); } } // Resource else if (nodeClass == LwM2mResource.class) { if (tlvs.length == 1 && tlvs[0].getType() != TlvType.RESOURCE_INSTANCE) { if (path.isResource() && path.getResourceId() != tlvs[0].getIdentifier()) { throw new CodecException(String.format("Id conflict between path [%s] and resource TLV [%s]", path, tlvs[0].getIdentifier())); } return (T) parseResourceTlv(tlvs[0], path.getObjectId(), path.getObjectInstanceId(), model); } else { Type expectedRscType = getResourceType(path, model); return (T) LwM2mMultipleResource.newResource(path.getResourceId(), parseTlvValues(tlvs, expectedRscType, path), expectedRscType); } } else { throw new IllegalArgumentException("invalid node class: " + nodeClass); } } #location 49 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void register_with_invalid_request() throws InterruptedException, IOException { // Check registration helper.assertClientNotRegisterered(); // create a register request without the list of supported object Request coapRequest = new Request(Code.POST); coapRequest.setDestination(helper.server.getUnsecuredAddress().getAddress()); coapRequest.setDestinationPort(helper.server.getUnsecuredAddress().getPort()); coapRequest.getOptions().setContentFormat(ContentFormat.LINK.getCode()); coapRequest.getOptions().addUriPath("rd"); coapRequest.getOptions().addUriQuery("ep=" + helper.currentEndpointIdentifier); // send request CoapEndpoint coapEndpoint = new CoapEndpoint(new InetSocketAddress(0)); coapEndpoint.start(); coapEndpoint.sendRequest(coapRequest); // check response Response response = coapRequest.waitForResponse(1000); assertEquals(response.getCode(), org.eclipse.californium.core.coap.CoAP.ResponseCode.BAD_REQUEST); coapEndpoint.stop(); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void register_with_invalid_request() throws InterruptedException, IOException { // Check registration helper.assertClientNotRegisterered(); // create a register request without the list of supported object Request coapRequest = new Request(Code.POST); coapRequest.setDestination(helper.server.getNonSecureAddress().getAddress()); coapRequest.setDestinationPort(helper.server.getNonSecureAddress().getPort()); coapRequest.getOptions().setContentFormat(ContentFormat.LINK.getCode()); coapRequest.getOptions().addUriPath("rd"); coapRequest.getOptions().addUriQuery("ep=" + helper.currentEndpointIdentifier); // send request CoapEndpoint coapEndpoint = new CoapEndpoint(new InetSocketAddress(0)); coapEndpoint.start(); coapEndpoint.sendRequest(coapRequest); // check response Response response = coapRequest.waitForResponse(1000); assertEquals(response.getCode(), org.eclipse.californium.core.coap.CoAP.ResponseCode.BAD_REQUEST); coapEndpoint.stop(); } #location 8 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void register_with_invalid_request() throws InterruptedException, IOException { // Check registration helper.assertClientNotRegisterered(); // create a register request without the list of supported object Request coapRequest = new Request(Code.POST); coapRequest.setDestinationContext(new AddressEndpointContext(helper.server.getUnsecuredAddress())); coapRequest.getOptions().setContentFormat(ContentFormat.LINK.getCode()); coapRequest.getOptions().addUriPath("rd"); coapRequest.getOptions().addUriQuery("ep=" + helper.currentEndpointIdentifier); // send request CoapEndpoint coapEndpoint = new CoapEndpoint(new InetSocketAddress(0)); coapEndpoint.start(); coapEndpoint.sendRequest(coapRequest); // check response Response response = coapRequest.waitForResponse(1000); assertEquals(response.getCode(), org.eclipse.californium.core.coap.CoAP.ResponseCode.BAD_REQUEST); coapEndpoint.stop(); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void register_with_invalid_request() throws InterruptedException, IOException { // Check registration helper.assertClientNotRegisterered(); // create a register request without the list of supported object Request coapRequest = new Request(Code.POST); coapRequest.setDestination(helper.server.getUnsecuredAddress().getAddress()); coapRequest.setDestinationPort(helper.server.getUnsecuredAddress().getPort()); coapRequest.getOptions().setContentFormat(ContentFormat.LINK.getCode()); coapRequest.getOptions().addUriPath("rd"); coapRequest.getOptions().addUriQuery("ep=" + helper.currentEndpointIdentifier); // send request CoapEndpoint coapEndpoint = new CoapEndpoint(new InetSocketAddress(0)); coapEndpoint.start(); coapEndpoint.sendRequest(coapRequest); // check response Response response = coapRequest.waitForResponse(1000); assertEquals(response.getCode(), org.eclipse.californium.core.coap.CoAP.ResponseCode.BAD_REQUEST); coapEndpoint.stop(); } #location 8 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void createX509CertClient(PrivateKey privatekey, Certificate[] trustedCertificates) { ObjectsInitializer initializer = new ObjectsInitializer(); // TODO security instance with certificate info initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.SECURITY, Security.noSec( "coaps://" + server.getSecuredAddress().getHostString() + ":" + server.getSecuredAddress().getPort(), 12345)); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.SERVER, new Server(12345, LIFETIME, BindingMode.U, false)); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.DEVICE, new Device("Eclipse Leshan", MODEL_NUMBER, "12345", "U")); List<LwM2mObjectEnabler> objects = initializer.createMandatory(); objects.add(initializer.create(2)); InetSocketAddress clientAddress = new InetSocketAddress(InetAddress.getLoopbackAddress(), 0); DtlsConnectorConfig.Builder config = new DtlsConnectorConfig.Builder().setAddress(clientAddress); // TODO we should read the config from the security object config.setIdentity(privatekey, clientX509CertChain, false); config.setTrustStore(trustedCertificates); CoapServer coapServer = new CoapServer(); coapServer.addEndpoint(new CoapEndpoint(new DTLSConnector(config.build()), NetworkConfig.getStandard())); LeshanClientBuilder builder = new LeshanClientBuilder(getCurrentEndpoint()); builder.setLocalAddress(clientAddress.getHostString(), clientAddress.getPort()); builder.setObjects(objects); client = builder.build(); }
#vulnerable code public void createX509CertClient(PrivateKey privatekey, Certificate[] trustedCertificates) { ObjectsInitializer initializer = new ObjectsInitializer(); // TODO security instance with certificate info initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.SECURITY, Security.noSec( "coaps://" + server.getSecureAddress().getHostString() + ":" + server.getSecureAddress().getPort(), 12345)); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.SERVER, new Server(12345, LIFETIME, BindingMode.U, false)); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.DEVICE, new Device("Eclipse Leshan", MODEL_NUMBER, "12345", "U")); List<LwM2mObjectEnabler> objects = initializer.createMandatory(); objects.add(initializer.create(2)); InetSocketAddress clientAddress = new InetSocketAddress(InetAddress.getLoopbackAddress(), 0); DtlsConnectorConfig.Builder config = new DtlsConnectorConfig.Builder().setAddress(clientAddress); // TODO we should read the config from the security object config.setIdentity(privatekey, clientX509CertChain, false); config.setTrustStore(trustedCertificates); CoapServer coapServer = new CoapServer(); coapServer.addEndpoint(new CoapEndpoint(new DTLSConnector(config.build()), NetworkConfig.getStandard())); LeshanClientBuilder builder = new LeshanClientBuilder(getCurrentEndpoint()); builder.setLocalAddress(clientAddress.getHostString(), clientAddress.getPort()); builder.setObjects(objects); client = builder.build(); } #location 5 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override protected BootstrapWriteResponse doWrite(ServerIdentity identity, BootstrapWriteRequest request) { LwM2mPath path = request.getPath(); // Manage Object case if (path.isObject()) { for (LwM2mObjectInstance instanceNode : ((LwM2mObject) request.getNode()).getInstances().values()) { LwM2mInstanceEnabler instanceEnabler = instances.get(instanceNode.getId()); if (instanceEnabler == null) { doCreate(identity, new CreateRequest(path.getObjectId(), instanceNode)); } else { doWrite(identity, new WriteRequest(Mode.REPLACE, path.getObjectId(), instanceEnabler.getId(), instanceNode.getResources().values())); } } return BootstrapWriteResponse.success(); } // Manage Instance case if (path.isObjectInstance()) { LwM2mObjectInstance instanceNode = (LwM2mObjectInstance) request.getNode(); LwM2mInstanceEnabler instanceEnabler = instances.get(path.getObjectInstanceId()); if (instanceEnabler == null) { doCreate(identity, new CreateRequest(path.getObjectId(), instanceNode)); } else { doWrite(identity, new WriteRequest(Mode.REPLACE, request.getContentFormat(), path.getObjectId(), path.getObjectInstanceId(), instanceNode.getResources().values())); } return BootstrapWriteResponse.success(); } // Manage resource case LwM2mResource resource = (LwM2mResource) request.getNode(); LwM2mInstanceEnabler instanceEnabler = instances.get(path.getObjectInstanceId()); if (instanceEnabler == null) { doCreate(identity, new CreateRequest(path.getObjectId(), new LwM2mObjectInstance(path.getObjectInstanceId(), resource))); } else { instanceEnabler.write(identity, path.getResourceId(), resource); } return BootstrapWriteResponse.success(); }
#vulnerable code @Override protected BootstrapWriteResponse doWrite(ServerIdentity identity, BootstrapWriteRequest request) { LwM2mPath path = request.getPath(); // Manage Object case if (path.isObject()) { for (LwM2mObjectInstance instanceNode : ((LwM2mObject) request.getNode()).getInstances().values()) { LwM2mInstanceEnabler instanceEnabler = instances.get(instanceNode.getId()); if (instanceEnabler == null) { doCreate(identity, new CreateRequest(path.getObjectId(), instanceNode)); } else { doWrite(identity, new WriteRequest(Mode.REPLACE, path.getObjectId(), path.getObjectInstanceId(), instanceNode.getResources().values())); } } return BootstrapWriteResponse.success(); } // Manage Instance case if (path.isObjectInstance()) { LwM2mObjectInstance instanceNode = (LwM2mObjectInstance) request.getNode(); LwM2mInstanceEnabler instanceEnabler = instances.get(path.getObjectInstanceId()); if (instanceEnabler == null) { doCreate(identity, new CreateRequest(path.getObjectId(), instanceNode)); } else { doWrite(identity, new WriteRequest(Mode.REPLACE, request.getContentFormat(), path.getObjectId(), path.getObjectInstanceId(), instanceNode.getResources().values())); } return BootstrapWriteResponse.success(); } // Manage resource case LwM2mResource resource = (LwM2mResource) request.getNode(); LwM2mInstanceEnabler instanceEnabler = instances.get(path.getObjectInstanceId()); if (instanceEnabler == null) { doCreate(identity, new CreateRequest(path.getObjectId(), new LwM2mObjectInstance(path.getObjectInstanceId(), resource))); } else { instanceEnabler.write(identity, path.getResourceId(), resource); } return BootstrapWriteResponse.success(); } #location 12 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override protected ObserveResponse doObserve(final ServerIdentity identity, final ObserveRequest request) { final LwM2mPath path = request.getPath(); // Manage Object case if (path.isObject()) { List<LwM2mObjectInstance> lwM2mObjectInstances = new ArrayList<>(); for (LwM2mInstanceEnabler instance : instances.values()) { ReadResponse response = instance.observe(identity); if (response.isSuccess()) { lwM2mObjectInstances.add((LwM2mObjectInstance) response.getContent()); } } return ObserveResponse.success(new LwM2mObject(getId(), lwM2mObjectInstances)); } // Manage Instance case final LwM2mInstanceEnabler instance = instances.get(path.getObjectInstanceId()); if (instance == null) return ObserveResponse.notFound(); if (path.getResourceId() == null) { return instance.observe(identity); } // Manage Resource case return instance.observe(identity, path.getResourceId()); }
#vulnerable code @Override protected ObserveResponse doObserve(final ServerIdentity identity, final ObserveRequest request) { final LwM2mPath path = request.getPath(); // Manage Object case if (path.isObject()) { List<LwM2mObjectInstance> lwM2mObjectInstances = new ArrayList<>(); for (Entry<Integer, LwM2mInstanceEnabler> entry : instances.entrySet()) { lwM2mObjectInstances.add(getLwM2mObjectInstance(entry.getKey(), entry.getValue(), identity, true)); } return ObserveResponse.success(new LwM2mObject(getId(), lwM2mObjectInstances)); } // Manage Instance case final LwM2mInstanceEnabler instance = instances.get(path.getObjectInstanceId()); if (instance == null) return ObserveResponse.notFound(); if (path.getResourceId() == null) { return ObserveResponse .success(getLwM2mObjectInstance(path.getObjectInstanceId(), instance, identity, true)); } // Manage Resource case return instance.observe(identity, path.getResourceId()); } #location 21 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public void remove(byte[] token) { try (Jedis j = pool.getResource()) { byte[] tokenKey = toKey(OBS_TKN, token); // fetch the observation by token byte[] serializedObs = j.get(tokenKey); if (serializedObs == null) return; org.eclipse.californium.core.observe.Observation obs = deserializeObs(serializedObs); String registrationId = obs.getRequest().getUserContext().get(CoapRequestBuilder.CTX_REGID); Registration registration = getRegistration(j, registrationId); if (registration == null) { LOG.warn("Unable to remove observation {}, registration {} does not exist anymore", obs.getRequest(), registrationId); return; } String endpoint = registration.getEndpoint(); byte[] lockValue = null; byte[] lockKey = toKey(LOCK_EP, endpoint); try { lockValue = RedisLock.acquire(j, lockKey); unsafeRemoveObservation(j, registrationId, token); } finally { RedisLock.release(j, lockKey, lockValue); } } }
#vulnerable code @Override public void remove(byte[] token) { try (Jedis j = pool.getResource()) { byte[] tokenKey = toKey(OBS_TKN, token); // fetch the observation by token byte[] serializedObs = j.get(tokenKey); if (serializedObs == null) return; org.eclipse.californium.core.observe.Observation obs = deserializeObs(serializedObs); String registrationId = obs.getRequest().getUserContext().get(CoapRequestBuilder.CTX_REGID); Registration registration = getRegistration(j, registrationId); String endpoint = registration.getEndpoint(); byte[] lockValue = null; byte[] lockKey = toKey(LOCK_EP, endpoint); try { lockValue = RedisLock.acquire(j, lockKey); unsafeRemoveObservation(j, registrationId, token); } finally { RedisLock.release(j, lockKey, lockValue); } } } #location 14 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code private void handleUpdate(CoapExchange exchange, Request request, String registrationId) { // Get identity Identity sender = extractIdentity(exchange); // Create LwM2m request from CoAP request Long lifetime = null; String smsNumber = null; BindingMode binding = null; Link[] objectLinks = null; for (String param : request.getOptions().getUriQuery()) { if (param.startsWith(QUERY_PARAM_LIFETIME)) { lifetime = Long.valueOf(param.substring(3)); } else if (param.startsWith(QUERY_PARAM_SMS)) { smsNumber = param.substring(4); } else if (param.startsWith(QUERY_PARAM_BINDING_MODE)) { binding = BindingMode.valueOf(param.substring(2)); } } if (request.getPayload() != null && request.getPayload().length > 0) { objectLinks = Link.parse(request.getPayload()); } UpdateRequest updateRequest = new UpdateRequest(registrationId, lifetime, smsNumber, binding, objectLinks); // Handle request final SendableResponse<UpdateResponse> sendableResponse = registrationHandler.update(sender, updateRequest); UpdateResponse updateResponse = sendableResponse.getResponse(); // Create CoAP Response from LwM2m request exchange.respond(fromLwM2mCode(updateResponse.getCode()), updateResponse.getErrorMessage()); sendableResponse.sent(); }
#vulnerable code private void handleUpdate(CoapExchange exchange, Request request, String registrationId) { // Get identity Identity sender = extractIdentity(exchange); // Create LwM2m request from CoAP request Long lifetime = null; String smsNumber = null; BindingMode binding = null; Link[] objectLinks = null; for (String param : request.getOptions().getUriQuery()) { if (param.startsWith(QUERY_PARAM_LIFETIME)) { lifetime = Long.valueOf(param.substring(3)); } else if (param.startsWith(QUERY_PARAM_SMS)) { smsNumber = param.substring(4); } else if (param.startsWith(QUERY_PARAM_BINDING_MODE)) { binding = BindingMode.valueOf(param.substring(2)); } } if (request.getPayload() != null && request.getPayload().length > 0) { objectLinks = Link.parse(request.getPayload()); } UpdateRequest updateRequest = new UpdateRequest(registrationId, lifetime, smsNumber, binding, objectLinks); // Handle request UpdateResponse updateResponse = registrationHandler.update(sender, updateRequest); // Create CoAP Response from LwM2m request exchange.respond(fromLwM2mCode(updateResponse.getCode()), updateResponse.getErrorMessage()); } #location 25 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code protected void beginTransaction() { transactionalListener.beginTransaction(); }
#vulnerable code protected void beginTransaction() { if (listener != null) { listener.beginTransaction(); } } #location 3 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void createRPKClient() { createRPKClient(false); }
#vulnerable code public void createRPKClient() { ObjectsInitializer initializer = new ObjectsInitializer(); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.SECURITY, Security.rpk( "coaps://" + server.getSecuredAddress().getHostString() + ":" + server.getSecuredAddress().getPort(), 12345, clientPublicKey.getEncoded(), clientPrivateKey.getEncoded(), serverPublicKey.getEncoded())); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.SERVER, new Server(12345, LIFETIME, BindingMode.U, false)); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.DEVICE, new Device("Eclipse Leshan", MODEL_NUMBER, "12345", "U")); List<LwM2mObjectEnabler> objects = initializer.createMandatory(); objects.add(initializer.create(2)); InetSocketAddress clientAddress = new InetSocketAddress(InetAddress.getLoopbackAddress(), 0); DtlsConnectorConfig.Builder config = new DtlsConnectorConfig.Builder().setAddress(clientAddress); // TODO we should read the config from the security object // TODO no way to provide a dynamic config with the current scandium API config.setIdentity(clientPrivateKey, clientPublicKey); CoapServer coapServer = new CoapServer(); CoapEndpoint.CoapEndpointBuilder coapBuilder = new CoapEndpoint.CoapEndpointBuilder(); coapBuilder.setConnector(new DTLSConnector(config.build())); coapBuilder.setNetworkConfig(new NetworkConfig()); coapServer.addEndpoint(coapBuilder.build()); LeshanClientBuilder builder = new LeshanClientBuilder(getCurrentEndpoint()); builder.setLocalAddress(clientAddress.getHostString(), clientAddress.getPort()); builder.setObjects(objects); client = builder.build(); setupClientMonitoring(); } #location 5 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public void createClient() { // Create Security Object (with bootstrap server only) String bsUrl = "coap://" + bootstrapServer.getUnsecuredAddress().getHostString() + ":" + bootstrapServer.getUnsecuredAddress().getPort(); Security security = new Security(bsUrl, true, 3, new byte[0], new byte[0], new byte[0], 12345); createClient(security); }
#vulnerable code @Override public void createClient() { // Create Security Object (with bootstrap server only) String bsUrl = "coap://" + bootstrapServer.getNonSecureAddress().getHostString() + ":" + bootstrapServer.getNonSecureAddress().getPort(); Security security = new Security(bsUrl, true, 3, new byte[0], new byte[0], new byte[0], 12345); createClient(security); } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code protected void fireInstancesAdded(int... instanceIds) { transactionalListener.objectInstancesAdded(this, instanceIds); }
#vulnerable code protected void fireInstancesAdded(int... instanceIds) { if (listener != null) { listener.objectInstancesAdded(this, instanceIds); } } #location 3 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public static Registration deserialize(JsonObject jObj) { Registration.Builder b = new Registration.Builder(jObj.getString("regId", null), jObj.getString("ep", null), IdentitySerDes.deserialize(jObj.get("identity").asObject()), new InetSocketAddress(jObj.getString("regAddr", null), jObj.getInt("regPort", 0))); b.bindingMode(BindingMode.valueOf(jObj.getString("bnd", null))); b.lastUpdate(new Date(jObj.getLong("lastUp", 0))); b.lifeTimeInSec(jObj.getLong("lt", 0)); b.lwM2mVersion(jObj.getString("ver", "1.0")); b.registrationDate(new Date(jObj.getLong("regDate", 0))); if (jObj.get("sms") != null) { b.smsNumber(jObj.getString("sms", "")); } JsonArray links = (JsonArray) jObj.get("objLink"); Link[] linkObjs = new Link[links.size()]; for (int i = 0; i < links.size(); i++) { JsonObject ol = (JsonObject) links.get(i); Map<String, Object> attMap = new HashMap<>(); JsonObject att = (JsonObject) ol.get("at"); for (String k : att.names()) { JsonValue jsonValue = att.get(k); if (jsonValue.isNumber()) { attMap.put(k, jsonValue.asInt()); } else { attMap.put(k, jsonValue.asString()); } } Link o = new Link(ol.getString("url", null), attMap); linkObjs[i] = o; } b.objectLinks(linkObjs); Map<String, String> addAttr = new HashMap<>(); JsonObject o = (JsonObject) jObj.get("addAttr"); for (String k : o.names()) { addAttr.put(k, o.getString(k, "")); } b.additionalRegistrationAttributes(addAttr); return b.build(); }
#vulnerable code public static Registration deserialize(JsonObject jObj) { Registration.Builder b = new Registration.Builder(jObj.getString("regId", null), jObj.getString("ep", null), new InetSocketAddress(jObj.getString("address", null), jObj.getInt("port", 0)).getAddress(), jObj.getInt("port", 0), new InetSocketAddress(jObj.getString("regAddr", null), jObj.getInt("regPort", 0))); b.bindingMode(BindingMode.valueOf(jObj.getString("bnd", null))); b.lastUpdate(new Date(jObj.getLong("lastUp", 0))); b.lifeTimeInSec(jObj.getLong("lt", 0)); b.lwM2mVersion(jObj.getString("ver", "1.0")); b.registrationDate(new Date(jObj.getLong("regDate", 0))); if (jObj.get("sms") != null) { b.smsNumber(jObj.getString("sms", "")); } JsonArray links = (JsonArray) jObj.get("objLink"); Link[] linkObjs = new Link[links.size()]; for (int i = 0; i < links.size(); i++) { JsonObject ol = (JsonObject) links.get(i); Map<String, Object> attMap = new HashMap<>(); JsonObject att = (JsonObject) ol.get("at"); for (String k : att.names()) { JsonValue jsonValue = att.get(k); if (jsonValue.isNumber()) { attMap.put(k, jsonValue.asInt()); } else { attMap.put(k, jsonValue.asString()); } } Link o = new Link(ol.getString("url", null), attMap); linkObjs[i] = o; } b.objectLinks(linkObjs); Map<String, String> addAttr = new HashMap<>(); JsonObject o = (JsonObject) jObj.get("addAttr"); for (String k : o.names()) { addAttr.put(k, o.getString(k, "")); } b.additionalRegistrationAttributes(addAttr); return b.build(); } #location 16 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code private void sendNotification(byte[] payload, Response firstCoapResponse, int contentFormat) { // encode and send it try (DatagramSocket clientSocket = new DatagramSocket()) { // create observe response Response response = new Response(org.eclipse.californium.core.coap.CoAP.ResponseCode.CONTENT); response.setType(Type.NON); response.setPayload(payload); response.setMID(firstCoapResponse.getMID() + 1); response.setToken(firstCoapResponse.getToken()); OptionSet options = new OptionSet().setContentFormat(contentFormat) .setObserve(firstCoapResponse.getOptions().getObserve() + 1); response.setOptions(options); // serialize response UdpDataSerializer serializer = new UdpDataSerializer(); RawData data = serializer.serializeResponse(response); // send it clientSocket.send(new DatagramPacket(data.bytes, data.bytes.length, helper.server.getUnsecuredAddress().getAddress(), helper.server.getUnsecuredAddress().getPort())); } catch (IOException e) { throw new AssertionError("Error while timestamped notification", e); } }
#vulnerable code private void sendNotification(byte[] payload, Response firstCoapResponse, int contentFormat) { // encode and send it try (DatagramSocket clientSocket = new DatagramSocket()) { // create observe response Response response = new Response(org.eclipse.californium.core.coap.CoAP.ResponseCode.CONTENT); response.setType(Type.NON); response.setPayload(payload); response.setMID(firstCoapResponse.getMID() + 1); response.setToken(firstCoapResponse.getToken()); OptionSet options = new OptionSet().setContentFormat(contentFormat) .setObserve(firstCoapResponse.getOptions().getObserve() + 1); response.setOptions(options); // serialize response UdpDataSerializer serializer = new UdpDataSerializer(); RawData data = serializer.serializeResponse(response); // send it clientSocket.send(new DatagramPacket(data.bytes, data.bytes.length, helper.server.getNonSecureAddress().getAddress(), helper.server.getNonSecureAddress().getPort())); } catch (IOException e) { throw new AssertionError("Error while timestamped notification", e); } } #location 22 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code protected void fireInstancesRemoved(int... instanceIds) { transactionalListener.objectInstancesRemoved(this, instanceIds); }
#vulnerable code protected void fireInstancesRemoved(int... instanceIds) { if (listener != null) { listener.objectInstancesRemoved(this, instanceIds); } } #location 3 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void createPSKClient() { createPSKClient(false); }
#vulnerable code public void createPSKClient() { ObjectsInitializer initializer = new ObjectsInitializer(); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.SECURITY, Security.psk( "coaps://" + server.getSecuredAddress().getHostString() + ":" + server.getSecuredAddress().getPort(), 12345, GOOD_PSK_ID.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8), GOOD_PSK_KEY)); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.SERVER, new Server(12345, LIFETIME, BindingMode.U, false)); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.DEVICE, new Device("Eclipse Leshan", MODEL_NUMBER, "12345", "U")); initializer.setDummyInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.ACCESS_CONTROL); List<LwM2mObjectEnabler> objects = initializer.createAll(); InetSocketAddress clientAddress = new InetSocketAddress(InetAddress.getLoopbackAddress(), 0); LeshanClientBuilder builder = new LeshanClientBuilder(getCurrentEndpoint()); builder.setLocalAddress(clientAddress.getHostString(), clientAddress.getPort()); builder.setObjects(objects); // set an editable PSK store for tests builder.setEndpointFactory(new EndpointFactory() { @Override public CoapEndpoint createUnsecuredEndpoint(InetSocketAddress address, NetworkConfig coapConfig, ObservationStore store) { CoapEndpoint.Builder builder = new CoapEndpoint.Builder(); builder.setInetSocketAddress(address); builder.setNetworkConfig(coapConfig); return builder.build(); } @Override public CoapEndpoint createSecuredEndpoint(DtlsConnectorConfig dtlsConfig, NetworkConfig coapConfig, ObservationStore store) { CoapEndpoint.Builder builder = new CoapEndpoint.Builder(); Builder dtlsConfigBuilder = new Builder(dtlsConfig); if (dtlsConfig.getPskStore() != null) { PskPublicInformation identity = dtlsConfig.getPskStore().getIdentity(null); SecretKey key = dtlsConfig.getPskStore().getKey(identity); singlePSKStore = new SinglePSKStore(identity, key); dtlsConfigBuilder.setPskStore(singlePSKStore); } builder.setConnector(new DTLSConnector(dtlsConfigBuilder.build())); builder.setNetworkConfig(coapConfig); return builder.build(); } }); // create client; client = builder.build(); setupClientMonitoring(); } #location 5 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void can_observe_timestamped_resource() throws InterruptedException { TestObservationListener listener = new TestObservationListener(); helper.server.getObservationService().addListener(listener); // observe device timezone ObserveResponse observeResponse = helper.server.send(helper.getCurrentRegistration(), new ObserveRequest(3, 0, 15)); assertEquals(ResponseCode.CONTENT, observeResponse.getCode()); assertNotNull(observeResponse.getCoapResponse()); assertThat(observeResponse.getCoapResponse(), is(instanceOf(Response.class))); // an observation response should have been sent Observation observation = observeResponse.getObservation(); assertEquals("/3/0/15", observation.getPath().toString()); assertEquals(helper.getCurrentRegistration().getId(), observation.getRegistrationId()); // *** HACK send time-stamped notification as Leshan client does not support it *** // // create time-stamped nodes TimestampedLwM2mNode mostRecentNode = new TimestampedLwM2mNode(System.currentTimeMillis(), LwM2mSingleResource.newStringResource(15, "Paris")); List<TimestampedLwM2mNode> timestampedNodes = new ArrayList<>(); timestampedNodes.add(mostRecentNode); timestampedNodes.add(new TimestampedLwM2mNode(mostRecentNode.getTimestamp() - 2, LwM2mSingleResource.newStringResource(15, "Londres"))); byte[] payload = LwM2mNodeJsonEncoder.encodeTimestampedData(timestampedNodes, new LwM2mPath("/3/0/15"), new LwM2mModel(helper.createObjectModels()), new DefaultLwM2mValueConverter()); Response firstCoapResponse = (Response) observeResponse.getCoapResponse(); sendNotification(payload, firstCoapResponse, ContentFormat.JSON_CODE); // *** Hack End *** // // verify result listener.waitForNotification(2000); assertTrue(listener.receivedNotify().get()); assertEquals(mostRecentNode.getNode(), listener.getResponse().getContent()); assertEquals(timestampedNodes, listener.getResponse().getTimestampedLwM2mNode()); assertNotNull(listener.getResponse().getCoapResponse()); assertThat(listener.getResponse().getCoapResponse(), is(instanceOf(Response.class))); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void can_observe_timestamped_resource() throws InterruptedException { TestObservationListener listener = new TestObservationListener(); helper.server.getObservationService().addListener(listener); // observe device timezone ObserveResponse observeResponse = helper.server.send(helper.getCurrentRegistration(), new ObserveRequest(3, 0, 15)); assertEquals(ResponseCode.CONTENT, observeResponse.getCode()); assertNotNull(observeResponse.getCoapResponse()); assertThat(observeResponse.getCoapResponse(), is(instanceOf(Response.class))); // an observation response should have been sent Observation observation = observeResponse.getObservation(); assertEquals("/3/0/15", observation.getPath().toString()); assertEquals(helper.getCurrentRegistration().getId(), observation.getRegistrationId()); // *** HACK send time-stamped notification as Leshan client does not support it *** // // create time-stamped nodes TimestampedLwM2mNode mostRecentNode = new TimestampedLwM2mNode(System.currentTimeMillis(), LwM2mSingleResource.newStringResource(15, "Paris")); List<TimestampedLwM2mNode> timestampedNodes = new ArrayList<>(); timestampedNodes.add(mostRecentNode); timestampedNodes.add(new TimestampedLwM2mNode(mostRecentNode.getTimestamp() - 2, LwM2mSingleResource.newStringResource(15, "Londres"))); byte[] payload = LwM2mNodeJsonEncoder.encodeTimestampedData(timestampedNodes, new LwM2mPath("/3/0/15"), new LwM2mModel(helper.createObjectModels())); Response firstCoapResponse = (Response) observeResponse.getCoapResponse(); sendNotification(payload, firstCoapResponse, ContentFormat.JSON_CODE); // *** Hack End *** // // verify result listener.waitForNotification(2000); assertTrue(listener.receivedNotify().get()); assertEquals(mostRecentNode.getNode(), listener.getResponse().getContent()); assertEquals(timestampedNodes, listener.getResponse().getTimestampedLwM2mNode()); assertNotNull(listener.getResponse().getCoapResponse()); assertThat(listener.getResponse().getCoapResponse(), is(instanceOf(Response.class))); } #location 35 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") private static <T extends LwM2mNode> T parseTlv(Tlv[] tlvs, LwM2mPath path, LwM2mModel model, Class<T> nodeClass) throws CodecException { LOG.trace("Parsing TLV content for path {}: {}", path, tlvs); // Object if (nodeClass == LwM2mObject.class) { Map<Integer, LwM2mObjectInstance> instances = new HashMap<>(tlvs.length); // is it an array of TLV resources? if (tlvs.length > 0 && // (tlvs[0].getType() == TlvType.MULTIPLE_RESOURCE || tlvs[0].getType() == TlvType.RESOURCE_VALUE)) { ObjectModel oModel = model.getObjectModel(path.getObjectId()); if (oModel == null) { LOG.warn("No model for object {}. The tlv is decoded assuming this is a single instance object", path.getObjectId()); instances.put(0, parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs, path.getObjectId(), 0, model)); } else if (!oModel.multiple) { instances.put(0, parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs, path.getObjectId(), 0, model)); } else { throw new CodecException("Object instance TLV is mandatory for multiple instances object [path:%s]", path); } } else { for (Tlv tlv : tlvs) { if (tlv.getType() != TlvType.OBJECT_INSTANCE) throw new CodecException("Expected TLV of type OBJECT_INSTANCE but was %s [path:%s]", tlv.getType().name(), path); LwM2mObjectInstance objectInstance = parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlv.getChildren(), path.getObjectId(), tlv.getIdentifier(), model); LwM2mObjectInstance previousObjectInstance = instances.put(objectInstance.getId(), objectInstance); if (previousObjectInstance != null) { throw new CodecException( "2 OBJECT_INSTANCE nodes (%s,%s) with the same identifier %d for path %s", previousObjectInstance, objectInstance, objectInstance.getId(), path); } } } return (T) new LwM2mObject(path.getObjectId(), instances.values()); } // Object instance else if (nodeClass == LwM2mObjectInstance.class) { if (tlvs.length == 1 && tlvs[0].getType() == TlvType.OBJECT_INSTANCE) { if (path.isObjectInstance() && tlvs[0].getIdentifier() != path.getObjectInstanceId()) { throw new CodecException("Id conflict between path [%s] and instance TLV [object instance id=%d]", path, tlvs[0].getIdentifier()); } // object instance TLV return (T) parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs[0].getChildren(), path.getObjectId(), tlvs[0].getIdentifier(), model); } else { // array of TLV resources // try to retrieve the instanceId from the path or the model Integer instanceId = path.getObjectInstanceId(); if (instanceId == null) { // single instance object? ObjectModel oModel = model.getObjectModel(path.getObjectId()); if (oModel != null && !oModel.multiple) { instanceId = 0; } else { instanceId = LwM2mObjectInstance.UNDEFINED; } } return (T) parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs, path.getObjectId(), instanceId, model); } } // Resource else if (nodeClass == LwM2mResource.class) { // The object instance level should not be here, but if it is provided and consistent we tolerate it if (tlvs.length == 1 && tlvs[0].getType() == TlvType.OBJECT_INSTANCE) { if (tlvs[0].getIdentifier() != path.getObjectInstanceId()) { throw new CodecException("Id conflict between path [%s] and instance TLV [object instance id=%d]", path, tlvs[0].getIdentifier()); } tlvs = tlvs[0].getChildren(); } ResourceModel resourceModel = model.getResourceModel(path.getObjectId(), path.getResourceId()); if (tlvs.length == 0 && resourceModel != null && !resourceModel.multiple) { // If there is no TlV value and we know that this resource is a single resource we raise an exception // else we consider this is a multi-instance resource throw new CodecException("TLV payload is mandatory for single resource %s", path); } else if (tlvs.length == 1 && tlvs[0].getType() != TlvType.RESOURCE_INSTANCE) { Tlv tlv = tlvs[0]; if (tlv.getType() != TlvType.RESOURCE_VALUE && tlv.getType() != TlvType.MULTIPLE_RESOURCE) { throw new CodecException( "Expected TLV of type RESOURCE_VALUE or MUlTIPLE_RESOURCE but was %s [path:%s]", tlv.getType().name(), path); } if (path.isResource() && path.getResourceId() != tlv.getIdentifier()) { throw new CodecException("Id conflict between path [%s] and resource TLV [resource id=%s]", path, tlv.getIdentifier()); } return (T) parseResourceTlv(tlv, path, model); } else { Type expectedRscType = getResourceType(path, model); return (T) LwM2mMultipleResource.newResource(path.getResourceId(), parseTlvValues(tlvs, expectedRscType, path), expectedRscType); } } else { throw new IllegalArgumentException("invalid node class: " + nodeClass); } }
#vulnerable code @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") private static <T extends LwM2mNode> T parseTlv(Tlv[] tlvs, LwM2mPath path, LwM2mModel model, Class<T> nodeClass) throws CodecException { LOG.trace("Parsing TLV content for path {}: {}", path, tlvs); // Object if (nodeClass == LwM2mObject.class) { Map<Integer, LwM2mObjectInstance> instances = new HashMap<>(tlvs.length); // is it an array of TLV resources? if (tlvs.length > 0 && // (tlvs[0].getType() == TlvType.MULTIPLE_RESOURCE || tlvs[0].getType() == TlvType.RESOURCE_VALUE)) { ObjectModel oModel = model.getObjectModel(path.getObjectId()); if (oModel == null) { LOG.warn("No model for object {}. The tlv is decoded assuming this is a single instance object", path.getObjectId()); instances.put(0, parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs, path.getObjectId(), 0, model)); } else if (!oModel.multiple) { instances.put(0, parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs, path.getObjectId(), 0, model)); } else { throw new CodecException("Object instance TLV is mandatory for multiple instances object [path:%s]", path); } } else { for (Tlv tlv : tlvs) { if (tlv.getType() != TlvType.OBJECT_INSTANCE) throw new CodecException("Expected TLV of type OBJECT_INSTANCE but was %s [path:%s]", tlv.getType().name(), path); LwM2mObjectInstance objectInstance = parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlv.getChildren(), path.getObjectId(), tlv.getIdentifier(), model); LwM2mObjectInstance previousObjectInstance = instances.put(objectInstance.getId(), objectInstance); if (previousObjectInstance != null) { throw new CodecException( "2 OBJECT_INSTANCE nodes (%s,%s) with the same identifier %d for path %s", previousObjectInstance, objectInstance, objectInstance.getId(), path); } } } return (T) new LwM2mObject(path.getObjectId(), instances.values()); } // Object instance else if (nodeClass == LwM2mObjectInstance.class) { if (tlvs.length == 1 && tlvs[0].getType() == TlvType.OBJECT_INSTANCE) { if (path.isObjectInstance() && tlvs[0].getIdentifier() != path.getObjectInstanceId()) { throw new CodecException("Id conflict between path [%s] and instance TLV [%d]", path, tlvs[0].getIdentifier()); } // object instance TLV return (T) parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs[0].getChildren(), path.getObjectId(), tlvs[0].getIdentifier(), model); } else { // array of TLV resources // try to retrieve the instanceId from the path or the model Integer instanceId = path.getObjectInstanceId(); if (instanceId == null) { // single instance object? ObjectModel oModel = model.getObjectModel(path.getObjectId()); if (oModel != null && !oModel.multiple) { instanceId = 0; } else { instanceId = LwM2mObjectInstance.UNDEFINED; } } return (T) parseObjectInstanceTlv(tlvs, path.getObjectId(), instanceId, model); } } // Resource else if (nodeClass == LwM2mResource.class) { ResourceModel resourceModel = model.getResourceModel(path.getObjectId(), path.getResourceId()); if (tlvs.length == 0 && resourceModel != null && !resourceModel.multiple) { // If there is no TlV value and we know that this resource is a single resource we raise an exception // else we consider this is a multi-instance resource throw new CodecException("TLV payload is mandatory for single resource %s", path); } else if (tlvs.length == 1 && tlvs[0].getType() != TlvType.RESOURCE_INSTANCE) { if (path.isResource() && path.getResourceId() != tlvs[0].getIdentifier()) { throw new CodecException("Id conflict between path [%s] and resource TLV [%s]", path, tlvs[0].getIdentifier()); } LwM2mPath resourcePath = new LwM2mPath(path.getObjectId(), path.getObjectInstanceId(), tlvs[0].getIdentifier()); return (T) parseResourceTlv(tlvs[0], resourcePath, model); } else { Type expectedRscType = getResourceType(path, model); return (T) LwM2mMultipleResource.newResource(path.getResourceId(), parseTlvValues(tlvs, expectedRscType, path), expectedRscType); } } else { throw new IllegalArgumentException("invalid node class: " + nodeClass); } } #location 86 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void createPSKClient(String pskIdentity, byte[] pskKey) { // Create Security Object (with bootstrap server only) String bsUrl = "coaps://" + bootstrapServer.getSecuredAddress().getHostString() + ":" + bootstrapServer.getSecuredAddress().getPort(); byte[] pskId = pskIdentity.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8); Security security = Security.pskBootstrap(bsUrl, pskId, pskKey); createClient(security); }
#vulnerable code public void createPSKClient(String pskIdentity, byte[] pskKey) { // Create Security Object (with bootstrap server only) String bsUrl = "coaps://" + bootstrapServer.getSecureAddress().getHostString() + ":" + bootstrapServer.getSecureAddress().getPort(); byte[] pskId = pskIdentity.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8); Security security = Security.pskBootstrap(bsUrl, pskId, pskKey); createClient(security); } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void createClient() { // Create objects Enabler ObjectsInitializer initializer = new ObjectsInitializer(new LwM2mModel(createObjectModels())); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.SECURITY, Security.noSec( "coap://" + server.getUnsecuredAddress().getHostString() + ":" + server.getUnsecuredAddress().getPort(), 12345)); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.SERVER, new Server(12345, LIFETIME, BindingMode.U, false)); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.DEVICE, new Device("Eclipse Leshan", MODEL_NUMBER, "12345", "U") { @Override public ExecuteResponse execute(int resourceid, String params) { if (resourceid == 4) { return ExecuteResponse.success(); } else { return super.execute(resourceid, params); } } }); List<LwM2mObjectEnabler> objects = initializer.createMandatory(); objects.addAll(initializer.create(2, 2000)); // Build Client LeshanClientBuilder builder = new LeshanClientBuilder(currentEndpointIdentifier.get()); builder.setObjects(objects); client = builder.build(); }
#vulnerable code public void createClient() { // Create objects Enabler ObjectsInitializer initializer = new ObjectsInitializer(new LwM2mModel(createObjectModels())); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.SECURITY, Security.noSec( "coap://" + server.getNonSecureAddress().getHostString() + ":" + server.getNonSecureAddress().getPort(), 12345)); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.SERVER, new Server(12345, LIFETIME, BindingMode.U, false)); initializer.setInstancesForObject(LwM2mId.DEVICE, new Device("Eclipse Leshan", MODEL_NUMBER, "12345", "U") { @Override public ExecuteResponse execute(int resourceid, String params) { if (resourceid == 4) { return ExecuteResponse.success(); } else { return super.execute(resourceid, params); } } }); List<LwM2mObjectEnabler> objects = initializer.createMandatory(); objects.addAll(initializer.create(2, 2000)); // Build Client LeshanClientBuilder builder = new LeshanClientBuilder(currentEndpointIdentifier.get()); builder.setObjects(objects); client = builder.build(); } #location 5 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code private static boolean checkRpkIdentity(String endpoint, Identity clientIdentity, SecurityInfo securityInfo) { // Manage RPK authentication // ---------------------------------------------------- PublicKey publicKey = clientIdentity.getRawPublicKey(); if (publicKey == null || !publicKey.equals(securityInfo.getRawPublicKey())) { if (LOG.isDebugEnabled()) { LOG.debug("Invalid rpk for client {}: expected \n'{}'\n but was \n'{}'", endpoint, Hex.encodeHexString(securityInfo.getRawPublicKey().getEncoded()), publicKey != null ? Hex.encodeHexString(publicKey.getEncoded()) : "null"); } return false; } else { LOG.trace("authenticated client '{}' using DTLS RPK", endpoint); return true; } }
#vulnerable code private static boolean checkRpkIdentity(String endpoint, Identity clientIdentity, SecurityInfo securityInfo) { // Manage RPK authentication // ---------------------------------------------------- PublicKey publicKey = clientIdentity.getRawPublicKey(); if (publicKey == null || !publicKey.equals(securityInfo.getRawPublicKey())) { if (LOG.isDebugEnabled()) { LOG.debug("Invalid rpk for client {}: expected \n'{}'\n but was \n'{}'", endpoint, Hex.encodeHexString(securityInfo.getRawPublicKey().getEncoded()), Hex.encodeHexString(publicKey.getEncoded())); } return false; } else { LOG.trace("authenticated client '{}' using DTLS RPK", endpoint); return true; } } #location 9 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public static byte[] encodeInteger(Number number) { ByteBuffer iBuf = null; long lValue = number.longValue(); if (lValue >= Byte.MIN_VALUE && lValue <= Byte.MAX_VALUE) { iBuf = ByteBuffer.allocate(1); iBuf.put((byte) lValue); } else if (lValue >= Short.MIN_VALUE && lValue <= Short.MAX_VALUE) { iBuf = ByteBuffer.allocate(2); iBuf.putShort((short) lValue); } else if (lValue >= Integer.MIN_VALUE && lValue <= Integer.MAX_VALUE) { iBuf = ByteBuffer.allocate(4); iBuf.putInt((int) lValue); } else { iBuf = ByteBuffer.allocate(8); iBuf.putLong(lValue); } return iBuf.array(); }
#vulnerable code public static byte[] encodeInteger(Number number) { ByteBuffer iBuf = null; long longValue = number.longValue(); if (longValue == Long.MIN_VALUE) { throw new IllegalArgumentException( "Could not encode Long.MIN_VALUE, because of signed magnitude representation."); } long positiveValue = longValue < 0 ? -longValue : longValue; if (positiveValue <= Byte.MAX_VALUE) { iBuf = ByteBuffer.allocate(1); iBuf.put((byte) positiveValue); } else if (positiveValue <= Short.MAX_VALUE) { iBuf = ByteBuffer.allocate(2); iBuf.putShort((short) positiveValue); } else if (positiveValue <= Integer.MAX_VALUE) { iBuf = ByteBuffer.allocate(4); iBuf.putInt((int) positiveValue); } else if (positiveValue <= Long.MAX_VALUE) { iBuf = ByteBuffer.allocate(8); iBuf.putLong(positiveValue); } byte[] bytes = iBuf.array(); // set the most significant bit to 1 if negative value if (number.longValue() < 0) { bytes[0] |= 0b1000_0000; } return bytes; } #location 25 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code protected void endTransaction() { transactionalListener.endTransaction(); }
#vulnerable code protected void endTransaction() { if (listener != null) { listener.endTransaction(); } } #location 3 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code private Object findInList(final Object current, final Method m, Node mapEq, String map) throws IllegalArgumentException, IllegalAccessException, InvocationTargetException { if (m.getParameterTypes().length != 1 && m.getParameterTypes()[0] != int.class) { fail("Unable to navigate " + current.getClass().getCanonicalName() + " with method " + m.getName()); } Method countM = GwtReflectionUtils.getMethod(current.getClass(), m.getName() + "Count"); if (countM == null) { fail("Count method not found in " + current.getClass().getCanonicalName() + " method " + m.getName()); return null; } if (countM.getParameterTypes().length > 0) { fail("Too many parameter in count method " + current.getClass().getCanonicalName() + " method " + countM.getName()); } logger.debug("Searching in list, field " + mapEq + ", value " + map); final int count = (Integer) countM.invoke(current); return findInIterable(new Iterable<Object>() { public Iterator<Object> iterator() { return new Iterator<Object>() { int counter = 0; public boolean hasNext() { return counter < count; } public Object next() { try { return m.invoke(current, counter++); } catch (Exception e) { throw new GwtTestCsvException("Iterator exception", e); } } public void remove() { throw new UnsupportedOperationException("Remove not implemented"); } }; } }, mapEq, map, current, m); }
#vulnerable code private Object findInList(final Object current, final Method m, Node mapEq, String map) throws IllegalArgumentException, IllegalAccessException, InvocationTargetException { if (m.getParameterTypes().length != 1 && m.getParameterTypes()[0] != int.class) { fail("Unable to navigate " + current.getClass().getCanonicalName() + " with method " + m.getName()); } Method countM = GwtReflectionUtils.getMethod(current.getClass(), m.getName() + "Count"); if (countM == null) { fail("Count method not found in " + current.getClass().getCanonicalName() + " method " + m.getName()); } if (countM.getParameterTypes().length > 0) { fail("Too many parameter in count method " + current.getClass().getCanonicalName() + " method " + countM.getName()); } logger.debug("Searching in list, field " + mapEq + ", value " + map); final int count = (Integer) countM.invoke(current); return findInIterable(new Iterable<Object>() { public Iterator<Object> iterator() { return new Iterator<Object>() { int counter = 0; public boolean hasNext() { return counter < count; } public Object next() { try { return m.invoke(current, counter++); } catch (Exception e) { throw new GwtTestCsvException("Iterator exception", e); } } public void remove() { throw new UnsupportedOperationException("Remove not implemented"); } }; } }, mapEq, map, current, m); } #location 12 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code private void initCsvTests(CsvDirectory csvDirectory) throws FileNotFoundException, IOException { File testsRoot = getDirectory(csvDirectory.value()); String extension = csvDirectory.extension(); testMethods = new ArrayList<Method>(); tests = new HashMap<String, List<List<String>>>(); collectCsvTests(testsRoot, extension, tests); }
#vulnerable code private void initCsvTests(CsvDirectory csvDirectory) throws FileNotFoundException, IOException { File directory = getDirectory(csvDirectory.value()); testMethods = new ArrayList<Method>(); tests = new HashMap<String, List<List<String>>>(); for (File f : directory.listFiles()) { if (f.getName().endsWith(csvDirectory.extension())) { tests.put(f.getAbsolutePath(), CsvReader.readCsv(new FileReader(f))); } } } #location 7 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void close () { super.close(); synchronized (updateLock) { // Blocks to avoid a select while the selector is used to bind the server connection. } // Select one last time to complete closing the socket. if (!isClosed) { isClosed = true; selector.wakeup(); try { selector.selectNow(); } catch (IOException ignored) { } } }
#vulnerable code public void close () { super.close(); // Select one last time to complete closing the socket. synchronized (updateLock) { if (!isClosed) { isClosed = true; selector.wakeup(); try { selector.selectNow(); } catch (IOException ignored) { } } } } #location 5 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public static String toString(final InputStream stream) { StringBuilder out = new StringBuilder(); try { final char[] buffer = new char[0x10000]; Reader in = new InputStreamReader(stream, StandardCharsets.UTF_8); int read; do { read = in.read(buffer, 0, buffer.length); if (read > 0) { out.append(buffer, 0, read); } } while (read >= 0); } catch (IOException e) { throw new RuntimeException(e); } return out.toString(); }
#vulnerable code public static String toString(final InputStream stream) { StringBuilder out = new StringBuilder(); try { final char[] buffer = new char[0x10000]; Reader in = new InputStreamReader(stream, "UTF-8"); int read; do { read = in.read(buffer, 0, buffer.length); if (read > 0) { out.append(buffer, 0, read); } } while (read >= 0); } catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e) { throw new RuntimeException(e); } catch (IOException e) { throw new RuntimeException(e); } return out.toString(); } #location 19 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public Field<O> setLiteralInitializer(final String value) { String stub = "public class Stub { private String stub = " + value + " }"; JavaClass temp = (JavaClass) JavaParser.parse(stub); VariableDeclarationFragment tempFrag = (VariableDeclarationFragment) temp.getFields().get(0).getInternal(); fragment.setInitializer((Expression) ASTNode.copySubtree(ast, tempFrag.getInitializer())); return this; }
#vulnerable code @Override public Field<O> setLiteralInitializer(final String value) { String stub = "public class Stub { private String stub = " + value + " }"; JavaClass temp = (JavaClass) JavaParser.parse(stub); FieldDeclaration internal = (FieldDeclaration) temp.getFields().get(0).getInternal(); for (Object f : internal.fragments()) { if (f instanceof VariableDeclarationFragment) { VariableDeclarationFragment tempFrag = (VariableDeclarationFragment) f; VariableDeclarationFragment localFrag = getFragment(field); localFrag.setInitializer((Expression) ASTNode.copySubtree(ast, tempFrag.getInitializer())); break; } } return this; } #location 14 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public static String toString(final InputStream stream) { StringBuilder out = new StringBuilder(); try { final char[] buffer = new char[0x10000]; Reader in = new InputStreamReader(stream, StandardCharsets.UTF_8); int read; do { read = in.read(buffer, 0, buffer.length); if (read > 0) { out.append(buffer, 0, read); } } while (read >= 0); } catch (IOException e) { throw new RuntimeException(e); } return out.toString(); }
#vulnerable code public static String toString(final InputStream stream) { StringBuilder out = new StringBuilder(); try { final char[] buffer = new char[0x10000]; Reader in = new InputStreamReader(stream, "UTF-8"); int read; do { read = in.read(buffer, 0, buffer.length); if (read > 0) { out.append(buffer, 0, read); } } while (read >= 0); } catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e) { throw new RuntimeException(e); } catch (IOException e) { throw new RuntimeException(e); } return out.toString(); } #location 27 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public boolean isReturnTypeVoid() { return getReturnType() == null || getReturnType().isType(Void.TYPE); }
#vulnerable code @Override public boolean isReturnTypeVoid() { return getReturnType().isType(Void.TYPE); } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public Predicate toPredicate(Root<T> root, CriteriaQuery<?> query, CriteriaBuilder cb) { Specification<T> combinedSpecs = null; for (Specification<T> spec : innerSpecs) { if (combinedSpecs == null) { combinedSpecs = Specification.where(spec); } else { combinedSpecs = combinedSpecs.or(spec); } } return combinedSpecs.toPredicate(root, query, cb); }
#vulnerable code @Override public Predicate toPredicate(Root<T> root, CriteriaQuery<?> query, CriteriaBuilder cb) { Specifications<T> combinedSpecs = null; for (Specification<T> spec : innerSpecs) { if (combinedSpecs == null) { combinedSpecs = Specifications.where(spec); } else { combinedSpecs = combinedSpecs.or(spec); } } return combinedSpecs.toPredicate(root, query, cb); } #location 11 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Bean(name = KAFKA_BEAN_NAME, destroyMethod = "stop") @DependsOn("zookeeper") public GenericContainer kafka( KafkaStatusCheck kafkaStatusCheck, KafkaConfigurationProperties kafkaProperties, @Value("${embedded.zookeeper.containerZookeeperConnect}") String containerZookeeperConnect, ConfigurableEnvironment environment, Network network) { int kafkaInternalPort = kafkaProperties.getContainerBrokerPort(); // for access from other containers int kafkaExternalPort = kafkaProperties.getBrokerPort(); // for access from host int saslPlaintextKafkaExternalPort = kafkaProperties.getSaslPlaintextBrokerPort(); // https://docs.confluent.io/current/installation/docker/docs/configuration.html search by KAFKA_ADVERTISED_LISTENERS String dockerImageVersion = kafkaProperties.getDockerImageVersion(); log.info("Starting kafka broker. Docker image version: {}", dockerImageVersion); KafkaContainer kafka = new KafkaContainer(dockerImageVersion) { @Override public String getBootstrapServers() { super.getBootstrapServers(); return "EXTERNAL_PLAINTEXT://" + getHost() + ":" + getMappedPort(kafkaExternalPort) + "," + "EXTERNAL_SASL_PLAINTEXT://" + getHost() + ":" + getMappedPort(saslPlaintextKafkaExternalPort) + "," + "INTERNAL_PLAINTEXT://" + KAFKA_HOST_NAME + ":" + kafkaInternalPort; } } .withLogConsumer(containerLogsConsumer(log)) .withCreateContainerCmdModifier(cmd -> cmd.withHostName(KAFKA_HOST_NAME)) .withCreateContainerCmdModifier(cmd -> cmd.withCapAdd(Capability.NET_ADMIN)) .withExternalZookeeper(containerZookeeperConnect) .withEnv("KAFKA_BROKER_ID", "-1") //see: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/41868161/kafka-in-kubernetes-cluster-how-to-publish-consume-messages-from-outside-of-kub //see: https://github.com/wurstmeister/kafka-docker/blob/master/README.md // order matters: external then internal since kafka.client.ClientUtils.getPlaintextBrokerEndPoints take first for simple consumers .withEnv("KAFKA_LISTENER_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_MAP", "EXTERNAL_PLAINTEXT:PLAINTEXT," + "EXTERNAL_SASL_PLAINTEXT:SASL_PLAINTEXT," + "INTERNAL_PLAINTEXT:PLAINTEXT," + "BROKER:PLAINTEXT" ) .withEnv("KAFKA_LISTENERS", "EXTERNAL_PLAINTEXT://0.0.0.0:" + kafkaExternalPort + "," + "EXTERNAL_SASL_PLAINTEXT://0.0.0.0:" + saslPlaintextKafkaExternalPort + "," + "INTERNAL_PLAINTEXT://0.0.0.0:" + kafkaInternalPort + "," + "BROKER://0.0.0.0:9092" ) .withEnv("KAFKA_INTER_BROKER_LISTENER_NAME", "INTERNAL_PLAINTEXT") .withEnv("KAFKA_OFFSETS_TOPIC_NUM_PARTITIONS", "1") .withEnv("KAFKA_OFFSETS_TOPIC_REPLICATION_FACTOR", String.valueOf(kafkaProperties.getReplicationFactor())) .withEnv("KAFKA_TRANSACTION_STATE_LOG_MIN_ISR", "1") .withEnv("KAFKA_CONFLUENT_SUPPORT_METRICS_ENABLE", "false") .withEnv("KAFKA_TRANSACTION_STATE_LOG_REPLICATION_FACTOR", "1") .withEnv("KAFKA_LOG_FLUSH_INTERVAL_MS", String.valueOf(kafkaProperties.getLogFlushIntervalMs())) .withEnv("KAFKA_REPLICA_SOCKET_TIMEOUT_MS", String.valueOf(kafkaProperties.getReplicaSocketTimeoutMs())) .withEnv("KAFKA_CONTROLLER_SOCKET_TIMEOUT_MS", String.valueOf(kafkaProperties.getControllerSocketTimeoutMs())) .withEnv("KAFKA_SASL_ENABLED_MECHANISMS", "PLAIN") .withEnv("ZOOKEEPER_SASL_ENABLED", "false") .withCopyFileToContainer(MountableFile.forClasspathResource("kafka_server_jaas.conf"), "/etc/kafka/kafka_server_jaas.conf") .withEnv("KAFKA_OPTS", "-Djava.security.auth.login.config=/etc/kafka/kafka_server_jaas.conf") .withExposedPorts(kafkaInternalPort, kafkaExternalPort, saslPlaintextKafkaExternalPort, KAFKA_PORT) .withNetwork(network) .withNetworkAliases(KAFKA_HOST_NAME) .withExtraHost(KAFKA_HOST_NAME, "127.0.0.1") .waitingFor(kafkaStatusCheck) .withStartupTimeout(kafkaProperties.getTimeoutDuration()); KafkaConfigurationProperties.FileSystemBind fileSystemBind = kafkaProperties.getFileSystemBind(); if (fileSystemBind.isEnabled()) { String currentTimestamp = LocalDateTime.now().format(DateTimeFormatter.ofPattern("HH-mm-ss-nnnnnnnnn")); String dataFolder = fileSystemBind.getDataFolder(); String kafkaData = Paths.get(dataFolder, currentTimestamp).toAbsolutePath().toString(); log.info("Writing kafka data to: {}", kafkaData); kafka.withFileSystemBind(kafkaData, "/var/lib/kafka/data", BindMode.READ_WRITE); } startAndLogTime(kafka); registerKafkaEnvironment(kafka, environment, kafkaProperties); return kafka; }
#vulnerable code @Bean(name = KAFKA_BEAN_NAME, destroyMethod = "stop") @DependsOn("zookeeper") public GenericContainer kafka( KafkaStatusCheck kafkaStatusCheck, KafkaConfigurationProperties kafkaProperties, @Value("${embedded.zookeeper.containerZookeeperConnect}") String containerZookeeperConnect, ConfigurableEnvironment environment, Network network) { int kafkaInternalPort = kafkaProperties.getContainerBrokerPort(); // for access from other containers int kafkaExternalPort = kafkaProperties.getBrokerPort(); // for access from host int saslPlaintextKafkaExternalPort = kafkaProperties.getSaslPlaintextBrokerPort(); // https://docs.confluent.io/current/installation/docker/docs/configuration.html search by KAFKA_ADVERTISED_LISTENERS log.info("Starting kafka broker. Docker image: {}", kafkaProperties.getDockerImage()); GenericContainer kafka = new FixedHostPortGenericContainer<>(kafkaProperties.getDockerImage()) .withLogConsumer(containerLogsConsumer(log)) .withCreateContainerCmdModifier(cmd -> cmd.withHostName(KAFKA_HOST_NAME)) .withCreateContainerCmdModifier(cmd -> cmd.withCapAdd(Capability.NET_ADMIN)) .withEnv("KAFKA_ZOOKEEPER_CONNECT", containerZookeeperConnect) .withEnv("KAFKA_BROKER_ID", "-1") //see: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/41868161/kafka-in-kubernetes-cluster-how-to-publish-consume-messages-from-outside-of-kub //see: https://github.com/wurstmeister/kafka-docker/blob/master/README.md // order matters: external then internal since kafka.client.ClientUtils.getPlaintextBrokerEndPoints take first for simple consumers .withEnv("KAFKA_LISTENER_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_MAP", "EXTERNAL_PLAINTEXT:PLAINTEXT," + "EXTERNAL_SASL_PLAINTEXT:SASL_PLAINTEXT," + "INTERNAL_PLAINTEXT:PLAINTEXT" ) .withEnv("KAFKA_ADVERTISED_LISTENERS", "EXTERNAL_PLAINTEXT://" + kafkaHost() + ":" + kafkaExternalPort + "," + "EXTERNAL_SASL_PLAINTEXT://" + kafkaHost() + ":" + saslPlaintextKafkaExternalPort + "," + "INTERNAL_PLAINTEXT://" + KAFKA_HOST_NAME + ":" + kafkaInternalPort ) .withEnv("KAFKA_LISTENERS", "EXTERNAL_PLAINTEXT://0.0.0.0:" + kafkaExternalPort + "," + "EXTERNAL_SASL_PLAINTEXT://0.0.0.0:" + saslPlaintextKafkaExternalPort + "," + "INTERNAL_PLAINTEXT://0.0.0.0:" + kafkaInternalPort ) .withEnv("KAFKA_INTER_BROKER_LISTENER_NAME", "INTERNAL_PLAINTEXT") .withEnv("KAFKA_OFFSETS_TOPIC_NUM_PARTITIONS", "1") .withEnv("KAFKA_OFFSETS_TOPIC_REPLICATION_FACTOR", String.valueOf(kafkaProperties.getReplicationFactor())) .withEnv("KAFKA_TRANSACTION_STATE_LOG_MIN_ISR", "1") .withEnv("KAFKA_CONFLUENT_SUPPORT_METRICS_ENABLE", "false") .withEnv("KAFKA_TRANSACTION_STATE_LOG_REPLICATION_FACTOR", "1") .withEnv("KAFKA_LOG_FLUSH_INTERVAL_MS", String.valueOf(kafkaProperties.getLogFlushIntervalMs())) .withEnv("KAFKA_REPLICA_SOCKET_TIMEOUT_MS", String.valueOf(kafkaProperties.getReplicaSocketTimeoutMs())) .withEnv("KAFKA_CONTROLLER_SOCKET_TIMEOUT_MS", String.valueOf(kafkaProperties.getControllerSocketTimeoutMs())) .withEnv("KAFKA_SASL_ENABLED_MECHANISMS", "PLAIN") .withEnv("ZOOKEEPER_SASL_ENABLED", "false") .withCopyFileToContainer(MountableFile.forClasspathResource("kafka_server_jaas.conf"), "/etc/kafka/kafka_server_jaas.conf") .withEnv("KAFKA_OPTS", "-Djava.security.auth.login.config=/etc/kafka/kafka_server_jaas.conf") .withExposedPorts(kafkaInternalPort, kafkaExternalPort, saslPlaintextKafkaExternalPort) .withFixedExposedPort(kafkaInternalPort, kafkaInternalPort) .withFixedExposedPort(kafkaExternalPort, kafkaExternalPort) .withFixedExposedPort(saslPlaintextKafkaExternalPort, saslPlaintextKafkaExternalPort) .withNetwork(network) .withNetworkAliases(KAFKA_HOST_NAME) .withExtraHost(KAFKA_HOST_NAME, "127.0.0.1") .waitingFor(kafkaStatusCheck) .withStartupTimeout(kafkaProperties.getTimeoutDuration()); KafkaConfigurationProperties.FileSystemBind fileSystemBind = kafkaProperties.getFileSystemBind(); if (fileSystemBind.isEnabled()) { String currentTimestamp = LocalDateTime.now().format(DateTimeFormatter.ofPattern("HH-mm-ss-nnnnnnnnn")); String dataFolder = fileSystemBind.getDataFolder(); String kafkaData = Paths.get(dataFolder, currentTimestamp).toAbsolutePath().toString(); log.info("Writing kafka data to: {}", kafkaData); kafka.withFileSystemBind(kafkaData, "/var/lib/kafka/data", BindMode.READ_WRITE); } startAndLogTime(kafka); registerKafkaEnvironment(kafka, environment, kafkaProperties); return kafka; } #location 18 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Bean(name = BEAN_NAME_EMBEDDED_SELENIUM, destroyMethod = "stop") @ConditionalOnMissingBean public BrowserWebDriverContainer selenium( ConfigurableEnvironment environment, SeleniumProperties properties, MutableCapabilities capabilities ) { String imageName = properties.getImageName(); BrowserWebDriverContainer container = isNotBlank(imageName) ? new BrowserWebDriverContainer<>(imageName) : new BrowserWebDriverContainer<>(); container.withCapabilities(capabilities); container.withRecordingFileFactory(getRecordingFileFactory()); File recordingDirOrNull = null; if (properties.getVnc().getMode().convert() != BrowserWebDriverContainer.VncRecordingMode.SKIP) { recordingDirOrNull = getOrCreateTempDir(properties.getVnc().getRecordingDir()); } container.withRecordingMode(properties.getVnc().getMode().convert(), recordingDirOrNull); log.info("Starting Selenium. Docker image: {}", container.getDockerImageName()); ContainerUtils.configureCommonsAndStart(container, properties, log); Map<String, Object> seleniumEnv = registerSeleniumEnvironment(environment, container, properties.getVnc().getMode().convert(), recordingDirOrNull); log.info("Started Selenium server. Connection details: {}", seleniumEnv); return container; }
#vulnerable code @Bean(name = BEAN_NAME_EMBEDDED_SELENIUM, destroyMethod = "stop") @ConditionalOnMissingBean public BrowserWebDriverContainer selenium( ConfigurableEnvironment environment, SeleniumProperties properties, MutableCapabilities capabilities ) { BrowserWebDriverContainer container = new BrowserWebDriverContainer<>().withCapabilities(capabilities); container.withRecordingFileFactory(getRecordingFileFactory()); File recordingDirOrNull = null; if (properties.getVnc().getMode().convert() != BrowserWebDriverContainer.VncRecordingMode.SKIP) { recordingDirOrNull = getOrCreateTempDir(properties.getVnc().getRecordingDir()); } container.withRecordingMode(properties.getVnc().getMode().convert(), recordingDirOrNull); log.info("Starting Selenium. Docker image: {}", container.getDockerImageName()); ContainerUtils.configureCommonsAndStart(container, properties, log); Map<String, Object> seleniumEnv = registerSeleniumEnvironment(environment, container, properties.getVnc().getMode().convert(), recordingDirOrNull); log.info("Started Selenium server. Connection details: {}", seleniumEnv); return container; } #location 9 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") protected void createBean(AbstractClassBean<?> bean, Set<AbstractBean<?, ?>> beans) { beans.add(bean); manager.getResolver().addInjectionPoints(bean.getInjectionPoints()); for (AnnotatedMethod<Object> producerMethod : bean.getProducerMethods()) { ProducerMethodBean<?> producerMethodBean = createProducerMethodBean(producerMethod, bean, manager); beans.add(producerMethodBean); manager.getResolver().addInjectionPoints(producerMethodBean.getInjectionPoints()); registerEvents(producerMethodBean.getInjectionPoints(), beans); log.info("Web Bean: " + producerMethodBean); } for (AnnotatedField<Object> producerField : bean.getProducerFields()) { ProducerFieldBean<?> producerFieldBean = createProducerFieldBean(producerField, bean, manager); beans.add(producerFieldBean); log.info("Web Bean: " + producerFieldBean); } for (AnnotatedMethod<Object> initializerMethod : bean.getInitializerMethods()) { for (AnnotatedParameter<Object> parameter : initializerMethod.getAnnotatedParameters(Observable.class)) { registerEvent(parameter, beans); } } for (AnnotatedItem injectionPoint : bean.getInjectionPoints()) { if ( injectionPoint.isAnnotationPresent(Observable.class) ) { registerEvent(injectionPoint, beans); } if ( injectionPoint.isAnnotationPresent(Obtainable.class) ) { InstanceBean<Object, Field> instanceBean = createInstanceBean(injectionPoint, manager); beans.add(instanceBean); log.info("Web Bean: " + instanceBean); } } for (AnnotatedMethod<Object> observerMethod : bean.getObserverMethods()) { ObserverImpl<?> observer = createObserver(observerMethod, bean, manager); if (observerMethod.getAnnotatedParameters(Observes.class).size() == 1) { registerObserver(observer, observerMethod.getAnnotatedParameters(Observes.class).get(0).getType(), observerMethod.getAnnotatedParameters(Observes.class).get(0).getBindingTypesAsArray()); } else { throw new DefinitionException("Observer method can only have one parameter annotated @Observes " + observer); } } log.info("Web Bean: " + bean); }
#vulnerable code @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") protected void createBean(AbstractClassBean<?> bean, Set<AbstractBean<?, ?>> beans) { beans.add(bean); manager.getResolver().addInjectionPoints(bean.getInjectionPoints()); for (AnnotatedMethod<Object> producerMethod : bean.getProducerMethods()) { ProducerMethodBean<?> producerMethodBean = createProducerMethodBean(producerMethod, bean, manager); beans.add(producerMethodBean); manager.getResolver().addInjectionPoints(producerMethodBean.getInjectionPoints()); for (AnnotatedItem injectionPoint : producerMethodBean.getInjectionPoints()) { if ( injectionPoint.isAnnotationPresent(Observable.class) ) { EventBean<Object, Method> eventBean = createEventBean(injectionPoint, manager); beans.add(eventBean); log.info("Web Bean: " + eventBean); } } log.info("Web Bean: " + producerMethodBean); } for (AnnotatedField<Object> producerField : bean.getProducerFields()) { ProducerFieldBean<?> producerFieldBean = createProducerFieldBean(producerField, bean, manager); beans.add(producerFieldBean); log.info("Web Bean: " + producerFieldBean); } for (AnnotatedItem injectionPoint : bean.getInjectionPoints()) { if ( injectionPoint.isAnnotationPresent(Observable.class) ) { EventBean<Object, Field> eventBean = createEventBean(injectionPoint, manager); beans.add(eventBean); log.info("Web Bean: " + eventBean); } if ( injectionPoint.isAnnotationPresent(Obtainable.class) ) { InstanceBean<Object, Field> instanceBean = createInstanceBean(injectionPoint, manager); beans.add(instanceBean); log.info("Web Bean: " + instanceBean); } } for (AnnotatedMethod<Object> observerMethod : bean.getObserverMethods()) { ObserverImpl<?> observer = createObserver(observerMethod, bean, manager); if (observerMethod.getAnnotatedParameters(Observes.class).size() == 1) { registerObserver(observer, observerMethod.getAnnotatedParameters(Observes.class).get(0).getType(), observerMethod.getAnnotatedParameters(Observes.class).get(0).getBindingTypesAsArray()); } else { throw new DefinitionException("Observer method can only have one parameter annotated @Observes " + observer); } } log.info("Web Bean: " + bean); } #location 11 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public static void beginRequest(HttpServletRequest request) { }
#vulnerable code public static void beginRequest(HttpServletRequest request) { ManagerImpl manager = (ManagerImpl) JNDI.lookup("manager"); SessionContext sessionContext = (SessionContext) manager.getContext(SessionScoped.class); BeanMap sessionBeans = (BeanMap) request.getAttribute(SESSION_BEANMAP_KEY); sessionContext.setBeans(sessionBeans); } #location 3 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public String toString() { if (toString != null) { return toString; } toString = toDetailedString(); return toString; }
#vulnerable code @Override public String toString() { if (toString != null) { return toString; } toString = "Annotated parameter " + Names.type2String(getDelegate().getClass()); return toString; } #location 8 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public String toString() { StringBuilder buffer = new StringBuilder(); buffer.append("Manager\n"); buffer.append("Enabled deployment types: " + getEnabledDeploymentTypes() + "\n"); buffer.append("Registered contexts: " + contextMap.keySet() + "\n"); buffer.append("Registered beans: " + getBeans().size() + "\n"); buffer.append("Registered decorators: " + decorators.size() + "\n"); buffer.append("Registered interceptors: " + interceptors.size() + "\n"); return buffer.toString(); }
#vulnerable code @Override public String toString() { StringBuilder buffer = new StringBuilder(); buffer.append(Strings.collectionToString("Enabled deployment types: ", getEnabledDeploymentTypes())); buffer.append(eventManager.toString() + "\n"); buffer.append(MetaDataCache.instance().toString() + "\n"); buffer.append(resolver.toString() + "\n"); buffer.append(contextMap.toString() + "\n"); buffer.append(proxyPool.toString() + "\n"); buffer.append(Strings.collectionToString("Registered beans: ", getBeans())); buffer.append(Strings.collectionToString("Registered decorators: ", decorators)); buffer.append(Strings.collectionToString("Registered interceptors: ", interceptors)); return buffer.toString(); } #location 8 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public final boolean isWebElementSufficientlyShown(WebElement webElement){ final WebView webView = viewFetcher.getFreshestView(viewFetcher.getCurrentViews(WebView.class)); final int[] xyWebView = new int[2]; if(webView != null && webElement != null){ webView.getLocationOnScreen(xyWebView); if(xyWebView[1] + webView.getHeight() > webElement.getLocationY()) return true; } return false; }
#vulnerable code public final boolean isWebElementSufficientlyShown(WebElement webElement){ final WebView webView = viewFetcher.getFreshestView(viewFetcher.getCurrentViews(WebView.class)); final int[] xyWebView = new int[2]; if(webElement != null){ webView.getLocationOnScreen(xyWebView); if(xyWebView[1] + webView.getHeight() > webElement.getLocationY()) return true; } return false; } #location 6 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code private View getViewOnListLine(AbsListView absListView, int lineIndex){ final long endTime = SystemClock.uptimeMillis() + Timeout.getSmallTimeout(); View view = absListView.getChildAt(lineIndex); while(view == null){ final boolean timedOut = SystemClock.uptimeMillis() > endTime; if (timedOut){ Assert.fail("View is null and can therefore not be clicked!"); } sleeper.sleep(); absListView = (AbsListView) viewFetcher.getIdenticalView(absListView); if(absListView != null){ view = absListView.getChildAt(lineIndex); } } return view; }
#vulnerable code private View getViewOnListLine(AbsListView absListView, int lineIndex){ final long endTime = SystemClock.uptimeMillis() + Timeout.getSmallTimeout(); View view = absListView.getChildAt(lineIndex); while(view == null){ final boolean timedOut = SystemClock.uptimeMillis() > endTime; if (timedOut){ Assert.fail("View is null and can therefore not be clicked!"); } sleeper.sleep(); absListView = (AbsListView) viewFetcher.getIdenticalView(absListView); view = absListView.getChildAt(lineIndex); } return view; } #location 12 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code private boolean scrollScrollView(int direction, ArrayList<ScrollView> scrollViews){ ScrollView scroll = viewFetcher.getView(ScrollView.class, scrollViews, 0); if(scroll !=null){ int height = scroll.getHeight(); height--; int scrollTo = 0; if (direction == DOWN) { scrollTo = (height); } else if (direction == UP) { scrollTo = (-height); } scrollAmount = scroll.getScrollY(); scrollScrollViewTo(scroll,0, scrollTo); if (scrollAmount == scroll.getScrollY()) { return false; } else{ return true; } } return false; }
#vulnerable code private boolean scrollScrollView(int direction, ArrayList<ScrollView> scrollViews){ ScrollView scroll = viewFetcher.getView(ScrollView.class, scrollViews, 0); int height = scroll.getHeight(); height--; int scrollTo = 0; if (direction == DOWN) { scrollTo = (height); } else if (direction == UP) { scrollTo = (-height); } scrollAmount = scroll.getScrollY(); scrollScrollViewTo(scroll,0, scrollTo); if (scrollAmount == scroll.getScrollY()) { return false; } else{ return true; } } #location 3 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code private Bitmap getBitmapOfView(final View view){ view.destroyDrawingCache(); view.buildDrawingCache(false); Bitmap orig = view.getDrawingCache(); Bitmap.Config config = null; if(orig == null) { return null; } config = orig.getConfig(); if(config == null) { config = Bitmap.Config.ARGB_8888; } Bitmap b = orig.copy(config, false); view.destroyDrawingCache(); return b; }
#vulnerable code private Bitmap getBitmapOfView(final View view){ view.destroyDrawingCache(); view.buildDrawingCache(false); Bitmap orig = view.getDrawingCache(); Bitmap.Config config = null; if(orig != null) { config = orig.getConfig(); } if(config == null) { config = Bitmap.Config.ARGB_8888; } Bitmap b = orig.copy(config, false); view.destroyDrawingCache(); return b; } #location 14 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code private View getViewOnRecyclerItemIndex(ViewGroup recyclerView, int recyclerViewIndex, int itemIndex){ final long endTime = SystemClock.uptimeMillis() + Timeout.getSmallTimeout(); View view = recyclerView.getChildAt(itemIndex); while(view == null){ final boolean timedOut = SystemClock.uptimeMillis() > endTime; if (timedOut){ Assert.fail("View is null and can therefore not be clicked!"); } sleeper.sleep(); recyclerView = (ViewGroup) viewFetcher.getIdenticalView(recyclerView); if(recyclerView == null){ recyclerView = (ViewGroup) viewFetcher.getRecyclerView(false, recyclerViewIndex); } if(recyclerView != null){ view = recyclerView.getChildAt(itemIndex); } } return view; }
#vulnerable code private View getViewOnRecyclerItemIndex(ViewGroup recyclerView, int recyclerViewIndex, int itemIndex){ final long endTime = SystemClock.uptimeMillis() + Timeout.getSmallTimeout(); View view = recyclerView.getChildAt(itemIndex); while(view == null){ final boolean timedOut = SystemClock.uptimeMillis() > endTime; if (timedOut){ Assert.fail("View is null and can therefore not be clicked!"); } sleeper.sleep(); recyclerView = (ViewGroup) viewFetcher.getIdenticalView(recyclerView); if(recyclerView == null){ recyclerView = (ViewGroup) viewFetcher.getRecyclerView(false, recyclerViewIndex); } view = recyclerView.getChildAt(itemIndex); } return view; } #location 18 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void finishOpenedActivities(){ // Stops the activityStack listener activitySyncTimer.cancel(); ArrayList<Activity> activitiesOpened = getAllOpenedActivities(); // Finish all opened activities for (int i = activitiesOpened.size()-1; i >= 0; i--) { sleeper.sleep(MINISLEEP); finishActivity(activitiesOpened.get(i)); } // Finish the initial activity, pressing Back for good measure finishActivity(getCurrentActivity()); sleeper.sleepMini(); try { inst.sendKeyDownUpSync(KeyEvent.KEYCODE_BACK); sleeper.sleep(MINISLEEP); inst.sendKeyDownUpSync(KeyEvent.KEYCODE_BACK); } catch (Throwable ignored) { // Guard against lack of INJECT_EVENT permission } activityStack.clear(); }
#vulnerable code public void finishOpenedActivities(){ ArrayList<Activity> activitiesOpened = getAllOpenedActivities(); // Finish all opened activities for (int i = activitiesOpened.size()-1; i >= 0; i--) { sleeper.sleep(MINISLEEP); finishActivity(activitiesOpened.get(i)); } // Finish the initial activity, pressing Back for good measure finishActivity(getCurrentActivity()); sleeper.sleepMini(); try { inst.sendKeyDownUpSync(KeyEvent.KEYCODE_BACK); sleeper.sleep(MINISLEEP); inst.sendKeyDownUpSync(KeyEvent.KEYCODE_BACK); } catch (Throwable ignored) { // Guard against lack of INJECT_EVENT permission } activityList.clear(); } #location 9 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void colorize(InputFile i) { final File f = i.file(); LOGGER.info("Color the file: " + f.getPath()); highlighting.onFile(i); try (final BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader( new InputStreamReader(new FileInputStream(f), StandardCharsets.UTF_8))) { String line; int lineNumber = 1; while ((line = br.readLine()) != null) { searchAndColor(line, lineNumber); lineNumber++; } br.close(); } catch (final IOException e) { LOGGER.error("IO Exception", e); } highlighting.save(); }
#vulnerable code public void colorize(InputFile i) { final File f = i.file(); LOGGER.info("Color the file: " + f.getPath()); highlighting.onFile(i); try { final BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader( new InputStreamReader(new FileInputStream(f), StandardCharsets.UTF_8)); String line; int lineNumber = 1; while ((line = br.readLine()) != null) { searchAndColor(line, lineNumber); lineNumber++; } br.close(); } catch (final IOException e) { LOGGER.error("IO Exception", e); } highlighting.save(); } #location 15 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testExecution() { final CoverageSensor sensor = new CoverageSensor(); initFile(); sensor.execute(testerContext); Map<String, Map<Integer, Integer>> map = new HashMap<>(); map.put("myProjectKey:mathutil/mathutil.go", ImmutableMap.of(7, 1)); map.put("myProjectKey:pixel/pixel.go", ImmutableMap.of(21, 0, 37, 0)); Map<Integer, Integer> testValuesMap = new HashMap<>(); testValuesMap.put(3, null); testValuesMap.put(1, null); testValuesMap.put(4, null); testValuesMap.put(8, 0); testValuesMap.put(12, 0); map.put("myProjectKey:mathutil/filewithnocoverage.go", testValuesMap); map.put("myProjectKey:issue60/a.go", ImmutableMap.of(8, 0, 9, 0)); Map<Integer, Integer> testValuesMap2 = new HashMap<>(); testValuesMap2.put(1, null); testValuesMap2.put(2, null); testValuesMap2.put(3, null); testValuesMap2.put(4, null); testValuesMap2.put(5, null); testValuesMap2.put(6, null); testValuesMap2.put(8, 0); testValuesMap2.put(9, 0); testValuesMap2.put(11, null); map.put("myProjectKey:issue61/simplelinecomment.go", testValuesMap2); Map<Integer, Integer> testValuesMap3 = new HashMap<>(); for (int i = 1; i <= 20; i++) { testValuesMap3.put(i, null); } testValuesMap3.put(26, null); testValuesMap3.put(27, null); testValuesMap3.put(28, null); testValuesMap3.put(30, 0); testValuesMap3.put(31, 0); map.put("myProjectKey:issue61/multilinecomment.go", testValuesMap3); Map<Integer, Integer> testValuesMap4 = new HashMap<>(); for (int i = 6; i <= 48; i++) { testValuesMap4.put(i, null); } map.put("myProjectKey:issue61/typestruct.go", testValuesMap4); map.forEach((key, mapValue) -> { mapValue.forEach((line, value) -> { assertEquals("line " + line + " " + key, value, testerContext.lineHits(key, CoverageType.UNIT, line)); }); }); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testExecution() { final CoverageSensor sensor = new CoverageSensor(); try { BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader( new FileReader(new File(CoverageSensor.class.getResource("/coverage/util/util.go").getFile()))); String sCurrentLine; StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); while ((sCurrentLine = reader.readLine()) != null) { sb.append(sCurrentLine + "\n"); } testerContext.fileSystem().add(new DefaultInputFile("myProjectKey", "util/util.go") .setLanguage(GoLanguage.KEY).initMetadata(sb.toString())); reader = new BufferedReader(new FileReader( new File(CoverageSensor.class.getResource("/coverage/mathutil/mathutil.go").getFile()))); sb = new StringBuilder(); while ((sCurrentLine = reader.readLine()) != null) { sb.append(sCurrentLine + "\n"); } testerContext.fileSystem().add(new DefaultInputFile("myProjectKey", "mathutil/mathutil.go") .setLanguage(GoLanguage.KEY).initMetadata(sb.toString())); reader = new BufferedReader( new FileReader(new File(CoverageSensor.class.getResource("/coverage/pixel/pixel.go").getFile()))); sb = new StringBuilder(); while ((sCurrentLine = reader.readLine()) != null) { sb.append(sCurrentLine + "\n"); } testerContext.fileSystem().add(new DefaultInputFile("myProjectKey", "pixel/pixel.go") .setLanguage(GoLanguage.KEY).initMetadata(sb.toString())); reader = new BufferedReader(new FileReader( new File(CoverageSensor.class.getResource("/coverage/mathutil/filewithnocoverage.go").getFile()))); sb = new StringBuilder(); while ((sCurrentLine = reader.readLine()) != null) { sb.append(sCurrentLine + "\n"); } testerContext.fileSystem().add(new DefaultInputFile("myProjectKey", "mathutil/filewithnocoverage.go") .setLanguage(GoLanguage.KEY).initMetadata(sb.toString())); reader = new BufferedReader( new FileReader(new File(CoverageSensor.class.getResource("/coverage/mathutil/a.go").getFile()))); sb = new StringBuilder(); while ((sCurrentLine = reader.readLine()) != null) { sb.append(sCurrentLine + "\n"); } testerContext.fileSystem().add(new DefaultInputFile("myProjectKey", "mathutil/a.go") .setLanguage(GoLanguage.KEY).initMetadata(sb.toString())); sensor.execute(testerContext); Map<String, Map<Integer, Integer>> map = new HashMap<>(); map.put("myProjectKey:mathutil/mathutil.go", ImmutableMap.of(7, 1)); map.put("myProjectKey:pixel/pixel.go", ImmutableMap.of(21, 0, 37, 0)); Map<Integer, Integer> testValuesMap = new HashMap<>(); testValuesMap.put(3, null); testValuesMap.put(1, null); testValuesMap.put(4, null); testValuesMap.put(8, 0); testValuesMap.put(12, 0); map.put("myProjectKey:mathutil/filewithnocoverage.go", testValuesMap); map.put("myProjectKey:mathutil/a.go", ImmutableMap.of(8, 0, 9, 0)); map.forEach((key, mapValue) -> { mapValue.forEach((line, value) -> { assertEquals("line " + line + " " + key, value, testerContext.lineHits(key, CoverageType.UNIT, line)); }); }); } catch (final FileNotFoundException e) { e.printStackTrace(); } catch (final IOException e) { e.printStackTrace(); } } #location 87 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code private static void init() { try { LOGGER.info("Load "+PATH_FILE); InputStream input=GoKeyRule.class.getResourceAsStream(PATH_FILE); if(input==null){ throw new FileNotFoundException(PATH_FILE); } prop.load(input); } catch (IOException e) { LOGGER.error("Unable to load the config file", e); } }
#vulnerable code private static void init() { try { prop.load(new FileInputStream(new File(PATH_FILE))); } catch (FileNotFoundException e) { LOGGER.error("Unable to load the config file", e); } catch (IOException e) { LOGGER.error("Unable to load the config file", e); } } #location 3 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code private CharBuffer getFileAsBufferFromPath(Path p) { try (FileInputStream input = new FileInputStream(p.toString())) { FileChannel channel = input.getChannel(); ByteBuffer bbuf = channel.map(FileChannel.MapMode.READ_ONLY, 0, (int) channel.size()); return Charset.forName("utf8").newDecoder().decode(bbuf); } catch (FileNotFoundException e) { LOGGER.warn("IO Exception caught -", e); } catch (IOException e) { LOGGER.warn("IO Exception caught -", e); } return null; }
#vulnerable code private CharBuffer getFileAsBufferFromPath(Path p) throws IOException { FileInputStream input = new FileInputStream(p.toString()); FileChannel channel = input.getChannel(); ByteBuffer bbuf = channel.map(FileChannel.MapMode.READ_ONLY, 0, (int) channel.size()); return Charset.forName("utf8").newDecoder().decode(bbuf); } #location 4 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public RulesProfile createProfile(ValidationMessages validation) { LOGGER.info("Golint Quality profile"); RulesProfile profile = RulesProfile.create("Golint Rules", GoLanguage.KEY); profile.setDefaultProfile(Boolean.TRUE); Properties prop=new Properties(); try { prop.load(GoQualityProfile.class.getResourceAsStream(GoQualityProfile.PROFILE_PATH)); for (Entry<Object, Object> e : prop.entrySet()) { if(Boolean.TRUE.equals(Boolean.parseBoolean((String) e.getValue()))){ profile.activateRule(Rule.create(REPO_KEY,(String) e.getKey(),REPO_NAME), null); } } }catch (IOException e) { LOGGER.error((new StringBuilder()).append("Unable to load ").append(PROFILE_PATH).toString(), e); } LOGGER.info((new StringBuilder()).append("Profil generate: ").append(profile.getActiveRules()).toString()); return profile; }
#vulnerable code @Override public RulesProfile createProfile(ValidationMessages validation) { LOGGER.info("Golint Quality profile"); RulesProfile profile = RulesProfile.create("Golint Rules", GoLanguage.KEY); profile.setDefaultProfile(Boolean.TRUE); Properties prop=new Properties(); try { prop.load(new FileInputStream(new File(PROFILE_PATH))); for (Entry<Object, Object> e : prop.entrySet()) { if(Boolean.TRUE.equals(Boolean.parseBoolean((String) e.getValue()))){ profile.activateRule(Rule.create(REPO_KEY,(String) e.getKey(),REPO_NAME), null); } } }catch (IOException e) { LOGGER.error((new StringBuilder()).append("Unable to load ").append(PROFILE_PATH).toString(), e); } LOGGER.info((new StringBuilder()).append("Profil generate: ").append(profile.getActiveRules()).toString()); return profile; } #location 12 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void check(GitlabMergeRequest gitlabMergeRequest) { if (_mergeRequestStatus == null) { _mergeRequestStatus = new GitlabMergeRequestStatus(); } if (_iid == null) { _iid = gitlabMergeRequest.getIid(); } if (_targetBranch == null) { _targetBranch = gitlabMergeRequest.getTargetBranch(); } if (_sourceBranch == null) { _sourceBranch = gitlabMergeRequest.getSourceBranch(); } if (_sourceProject == null) { try { GitlabAPI api = _builder.getGitlab().get(); _sourceProject = getSourceProject(gitlabMergeRequest, api); } catch (IOException e) { _logger.log(Level.SEVERE, "Failed to get source project for Merge request " + gitlabMergeRequest.getId() + " :\n" + e.getMessage()); return; } } try { GitlabAPI api = _builder.getGitlab().get(); GitlabNote lastJenkinsNote = getJenkinsNote(gitlabMergeRequest, api); GitlabCommit latestCommit = getLatestCommit(gitlabMergeRequest, api); if (lastJenkinsNote == null) { _shouldRun = true; } else if (latestCommit == null) { _logger.log(Level.SEVERE, "Failed to determine the lastest commit for merge request {" + gitlabMergeRequest.getId() + "}. This might be caused by a stalled MR in gitlab."); return; } else { _shouldRun = latestCommitIsNotReached(latestCommit); } if (_shouldRun) { _mergeRequestStatus.setLatestCommitOfMergeRequest(_id.toString(), latestCommit.getId()); } } catch (IOException e) { _logger.log(Level.SEVERE, "Failed to fetch commits for Merge Request " + gitlabMergeRequest.getId()); } if (_shouldRun) { build(); } }
#vulnerable code public void check(GitlabMergeRequest gitlabMergeRequest) { if (_iid == null) { _iid = gitlabMergeRequest.getIid(); } if (_targetBranch == null) { _targetBranch = gitlabMergeRequest.getTargetBranch(); } if (_sourceBranch == null) { _sourceBranch = gitlabMergeRequest.getSourceBranch(); } if (_sourceProject == null) { try { GitlabAPI api = _builder.getGitlab().get(); _sourceProject = getSourceProject(gitlabMergeRequest, api); } catch (IOException e) { _logger.log(Level.SEVERE, "Failed to get source project for Merge request " + gitlabMergeRequest.getId() + " :\n" + e.getMessage()); return; } } try { GitlabAPI api = _builder.getGitlab().get(); GitlabNote lastJenkinsNote = getJenkinsNote(gitlabMergeRequest, api); GitlabCommit latestCommit = getLatestCommit(gitlabMergeRequest, api); if (lastJenkinsNote == null) { _shouldRun = true; } else { _shouldRun = latestCommitIsNotReached(latestCommit); } if (_shouldRun) { _mergeRequestStatus.setLatestCommitOfMergeRequest(_id.toString(), latestCommit.getId()); } } catch (IOException e) { _logger.log(Level.SEVERE, "Failed to fetch commits for Merge Request " + gitlabMergeRequest.getId()); } if (_shouldRun) { build(); } } #location 35 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void check(GitlabMergeRequest gitlabMergeRequest) { if (mergeRequestStatus == null) { mergeRequestStatus = new GitlabMergeRequestStatus(); } if (iid == null) { iid = gitlabMergeRequest.getIid(); } if (targetBranch == null || targetBranch.trim().isEmpty()) { targetBranch = gitlabMergeRequest.getTargetBranch(); } if (sourceBranch == null || sourceBranch.trim().isEmpty()) { sourceBranch = gitlabMergeRequest.getSourceBranch(); } if (description == null || description.trim().isEmpty()) { description = gitlabMergeRequest.getDescription(); if (description == null) { description = ""; } } if (sourceProject == null || sourceProject.getId() == null || sourceProject.getName() == null) { try { GitlabAPI api = builder.getGitlab().get(); sourceProject = getSourceProject(gitlabMergeRequest, api); } catch (IOException e) { LOGGER.log(Level.SEVERE, "Failed to get source project for Merge request " + gitlabMergeRequest.getId() + " :\n" + e.getMessage()); return; } } try { GitlabAPI api = builder.getGitlab().get(); GitlabCommit latestCommit = getLatestCommit(gitlabMergeRequest, api); if (latestCommit == null) { // the source branch has been removed return; } Map<String, String> customParameters = getSpecifiedCustomParameters(gitlabMergeRequest, api); build(customParameters, latestCommit.getId(), gitlabMergeRequest); } catch (IOException e) { LOGGER.log(Level.SEVERE, "Failed to fetch commits for Merge Request " + gitlabMergeRequest.getId()); } }
#vulnerable code public void check(GitlabMergeRequest gitlabMergeRequest) { if (mergeRequestStatus == null) { mergeRequestStatus = new GitlabMergeRequestStatus(); } if (iid == null) { iid = gitlabMergeRequest.getIid(); } if (targetBranch == null || targetBranch.trim().isEmpty()) { targetBranch = gitlabMergeRequest.getTargetBranch(); } if (sourceBranch == null || sourceBranch.trim().isEmpty()) { sourceBranch = gitlabMergeRequest.getSourceBranch(); } if (description == null || description.trim().isEmpty()) { description = gitlabMergeRequest.getDescription(); if (description == null) { description = ""; } } if (sourceProject == null || sourceProject.getId() == null || sourceProject.getName() == null) { try { GitlabAPI api = builder.getGitlab().get(); sourceProject = getSourceProject(gitlabMergeRequest, api); } catch (IOException e) { LOGGER.log(Level.SEVERE, "Failed to get source project for Merge request " + gitlabMergeRequest.getId() + " :\n" + e.getMessage()); return; } } try { GitlabAPI api = builder.getGitlab().get(); GitlabCommit latestCommit = getLatestCommit(gitlabMergeRequest, api); Map<String, String> customParameters = getSpecifiedCustomParameters(gitlabMergeRequest, api); build(customParameters, latestCommit.getId(), gitlabMergeRequest); } catch (IOException e) { LOGGER.log(Level.SEVERE, "Failed to fetch commits for Merge Request " + gitlabMergeRequest.getId()); } } #location 40 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public static Field getField(final Class<?> clazz, final String fieldName) throws Exception { Field field = clazz.getDeclaredField(fieldName); if (field != null) field.setAccessible(true); else if (clazz.getSuperclass() != null) field = getField(clazz.getSuperclass(), fieldName); return field; }
#vulnerable code public static Field getField(final Class<?> clazz, final String fieldName) throws Exception { Field field = clazz.getDeclaredField(fieldName); if (field == null && clazz.getSuperclass() != null) { field = getField(clazz.getSuperclass(), fieldName); } field.setAccessible(true); return field; } #location 6 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testShortArray_AsShorts() throws Exception { assertArrayEquals(new byte[]{1, 2, 3, 4}, BeginBin().Short((short)0x0102, (short)0x0304).End().toByteArray()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testShortArray_AsShorts() throws Exception { assertArrayEquals(new byte[]{1, 2, 3, 4}, binStart().Short((short)0x0102, (short)0x0304).end().toByteArray()); } #location 3 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testBitArrayAsBytes() throws Exception { assertArrayEquals(new byte[]{(byte) 0xE3}, BeginBin().Bit(new byte[]{(byte) 1, (byte) 3, (byte) 0, (byte) 2, (byte) 4, (byte) 1, (byte) 3, (byte) 7}).End().toByteArray()); assertArrayEquals(new byte[]{(byte) 0x0B}, BeginBin().Bit(new byte[]{(byte) 1, (byte) 3, (byte) 0, (byte) 7}).End().toByteArray()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testBitArrayAsBytes() throws Exception { assertArrayEquals(new byte[]{(byte) 0xE3}, binStart().Bit(new byte[]{(byte) 1, (byte) 3, (byte) 0, (byte) 2, (byte) 4, (byte) 1, (byte) 3, (byte) 7}).end().toByteArray()); assertArrayEquals(new byte[]{(byte) 0x0B}, binStart().Bit(new byte[]{(byte) 1, (byte) 3, (byte) 0, (byte) 7}).end().toByteArray()); } #location 3 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public int read() throws IOException { final int result; if (this.bitsInBuffer == 0) { result = this.readByteFromStream(); if (result >= 0) { this.byteCounter++; } return result; } else { return this.readBits(JBBPBitNumber.BITS_8); } }
#vulnerable code @Override public int read() throws IOException { final int result; if (this.bitsInBuffer == 0) { result = this.readByteFromStream(); if (result < 0) { return result; } return result; } else { return this.readBits(JBBPBitNumber.BITS_8); } } #location 5 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testByteArrayAsByteArray() throws Exception { assertArrayEquals(new byte[]{1, 3, 0, 2, 4, 1, 3, 7}, BeginBin().Byte(new byte[]{1, 3, 0, 2, 4, 1, 3, 7}).End().toByteArray()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testByteArrayAsByteArray() throws Exception { assertArrayEquals(new byte[]{1, 3, 0, 2, 4, 1, 3, 7}, binStart().Byte(new byte[]{1, 3, 0, 2, 4, 1, 3, 7}).end().toByteArray()); } #location 3 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testBit_MSB0() throws Exception { assertArrayEquals(new byte[]{(byte) 0x80}, BeginBin(JBBPByteOrder.BIG_ENDIAN, JBBPBitOrder.MSB0).Bit(1).End().toByteArray()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testBit_MSB0() throws Exception { assertArrayEquals(new byte[]{(byte) 0x80}, binStart(JBBPByteOrder.BIG_ENDIAN, JBBPBitOrder.MSB0).Bit(1).end().toByteArray()); } #location 3 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testByte() throws Exception { assertArrayEquals(new byte[]{-34}, BeginBin().Byte(-34).End().toByteArray()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testByte() throws Exception { assertArrayEquals(new byte[]{-34}, binStart().Byte(-34).end().toByteArray()); } #location 3 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testBitArrayAsInts() throws Exception { assertArrayEquals(new byte[]{(byte) 0xE3}, BeginBin().Bit(1, 3, 0, 2, 4, 1, 3, 7).End().toByteArray()); assertArrayEquals(new byte[]{(byte) 0x0B}, BeginBin().Bit(1, 3, 0, 7).End().toByteArray()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testBitArrayAsInts() throws Exception { assertArrayEquals(new byte[]{(byte) 0xE3}, binStart().Bit(1, 3, 0, 2, 4, 1, 3, 7).end().toByteArray()); assertArrayEquals(new byte[]{(byte) 0x0B}, binStart().Bit(1, 3, 0, 7).end().toByteArray()); } #location 4 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testFlush() throws Exception { final ByteArrayOutputStream buffer = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); final JBBPOut out = BeginBin(buffer); out.Bit(true); assertEquals(0, buffer.size()); out.Flush(); assertEquals(1, buffer.size()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testFlush() throws Exception { final ByteArrayOutputStream buffer = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); final JBBPOut out = binStart(buffer); out.Bit(true); assertEquals(0, buffer.size()); out.Flush(); assertEquals(1, buffer.size()); } #location 8 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.