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741,605 |
The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage
|
Williams 14
|
Williams 14 Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver
|
Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the U S Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number requiring organs is likely higher This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains
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many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organ more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number is higher The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations a severe organ shortage remains.
|
Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514
Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs.1 Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the United States.2 Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number of Americans requiring organs is likely higher.3 This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen.4 The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations.9 Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains.
| 1,611 |
<h4>The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage</h4><p><strong>Williams 14</strong> Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver </p><p>Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514</p><p><u>Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, <mark>many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organ</mark>s</u>.1 <u>Currently, <mark>more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted</mark> for organs in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates.2 <u><mark>Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number</mark> </u>of Americans <u>requiring organs <mark>is</mark> likely <mark>higher</u></mark>.3 <u>This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen</u>.4 <u>The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, </u>and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 <u><mark>The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors.</mark> The</u> National Organ Transplantation Act <u>(<mark>NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs</mark> to be used for transplantation</u>.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, <u><mark>other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations</u></mark>.9 <u>Despite the implementation of these strategies, <mark>a severe organ shortage remains</u>.</p></mark>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives
| 430,245 | 16 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,606 |
Over 90% of women want to escape prostitution.
|
Post ’13 ]
|
Post ’13 [Dianne Post, Human Rights Lawyer, Bishakha Datta, filmmaker “Argument: Should prostitution be legalized?” New Internationalist Magazine April 2013 http://newint.org/features/2013/04/01/should-prostitution-be-legalized-argument/]
|
In a five-country survey, over 90 per cent said they wanted to escape prostitution immediately. Nearly 70 per cent of prostituted women meet the criteria for a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder and they constitute 15 per cent of all completed suicides The average age of entry into prostitution is 13 or 14 years of age. Children learn very young that their body does not belong to them but to others with power and money. . Women in prostitution tell us clearly they want the same options in life that others have: a decent job, safe housing, medical care and psychological counselling. We need exit strategies that include drug treatment, education, training, housing and other support.
|
In a five-country survey, over 90 per cent said they wanted to escape prostitution immediately 70 per cent of prostituted women meet the criteria for p t s d and they constitute 15 per cent of all completed suicides The average age of entry into prostitution is 13 or 14 years of age Children learn very young that their body does not belong to them but to others with power and money. Women in prostitution tell us clearly they want the same options in life that others have: We need exit strategies
|
We need to listen to the voices of the women. In a five-country survey, over 90 per cent said they wanted to escape prostitution immediately. Nearly 70 per cent of prostituted women meet the criteria for a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder and they constitute 15 per cent of all completed suicides. A Canadian report on prostitution and pornography concluded that girls and women in prostitution have a mortality rate 40 times higher than the national average. The average life span for a woman after entering prostitution is four years, with 50 per cent of the deaths due to murder. The average age of entry into prostitution is 13 or 14 years of age. Children learn very young that their body does not belong to them but to others with power and money. In Canada, 70 per cent of prostituted women are indigenous, despite those communities making up only seven per cent of the population. It’s colonialism writ small on their bodies. In dangerous jobs, we normally fight to eliminate harmful conditions so people can work in safety and with respect. The danger cannot be removed in prostitution because the act of prostitution is the harm. Women in prostitution tell us clearly they want the same options in life that others have: a decent job, safe housing, medical care and psychological counselling. We need exit strategies that include drug treatment, education, training, housing and other support. The answer is to demand equality and equitable distribution of resources.
| 1,488 |
<h4>Over 90% of women want to escape prostitution.</h4><p><strong>Post ’13 </strong>[Dianne Post, Human Rights Lawyer, Bishakha Datta, filmmaker “Argument: Should prostitution be legalized?” New Internationalist Magazine April 2013 http://newint.org/features/2013/04/01/should-prostitution-be-legalized-argument/<strong>]</p><p></strong>We need to listen to the voices of the women. <u><mark>In a five-country survey, over 90 per cent said they wanted to escape prostitution immediately</mark>. Nearly <mark>70 per cent of prostituted women meet the criteria for</mark> a diagnosis of <mark>p</mark>ost-<mark>t</mark>raumatic <mark>s</mark>tress <mark>d</mark>isorder <mark>and they constitute 15 per cent of all completed suicides</u></mark>. A Canadian report on prostitution and pornography concluded that girls and women in prostitution have a mortality rate 40 times higher than the national average. The average life span for a woman after entering prostitution is four years, with 50 per cent of the deaths due to murder. <u><mark>The average age of entry into prostitution is 13 or 14 years of age</mark>. <mark>Children learn very young that their body does not belong to them but to others with power</mark> <mark>and money.</u></mark> In Canada, 70 per cent of prostituted women are indigenous, despite those communities making up only seven per cent of the population. It’s colonialism writ small on their bodies. In dangerous jobs, we normally fight to eliminate harmful conditions so people can work in safety and with respect. The danger cannot be removed in prostitution because the act of prostitution is the harm<u>. <mark>Women in prostitution tell us clearly they want the same options in life that others have:</mark> a decent job, safe housing, medical care and psychological counselling. <mark>We need exit strategies</mark> that include drug treatment, education, training, housing and other support.</u> The answer is to demand equality and equitable distribution of resources.</p>
| null |
1NC
|
Stigma
| 430,309 | 1 | 17,057 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,292 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Washington Elizondo-Micovic
|
Stone
|
1AC - Prostitution
1NC - Trafficking Adv CP Decrim CP Politics Case
2NC - CPs Case
1NR - Politics
2NR - Adv CP Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,607 |
Legalization empowers pimps and traffickers instead of women.
|
Raymond ‘3 “Ten Reasons for Not Legalizing Prostitution And a Legal Response to the Demand for Prostitution” Journal of Trauma Practice, 2, 2003: pp. 315-332; and in Prostitution, Trafficking and Traumatic Stress. Melissa Farley (Ed.). Binghamton: Haworth Press, 2003]
|
Raymond ‘3 [Janice G. Raymond “Ten Reasons for Not Legalizing Prostitution And a Legal Response to the Demand for Prostitution” Journal of Trauma Practice, 2, 2003: pp. 315-332; and in Prostitution, Trafficking and Traumatic Stress. Melissa Farley (Ed.). Binghamton: Haworth Press, 2003]
|
Legalization/decriminalization of prostitution is a gift to pimps, traffickers and the sex industry. In the Netherlands, legalization amounts to sanctioning all aspects of the sex industry: the women themselves, the buyers, and the pimps who, under the regime of legalization, are transformed into third party businessmen and legitimate sexual entrepreneurs. Legalization/decriminalization of the sex industry also converts brothels, sex clubs, massage parlors and other sites of prostitution activities into legitimate venues where commercial sexual acts are allowed to flourish legally with few restraints. dignifying prostitution as work doesn’t dignify the women, it simply dignifies the sex industry decriminalization means decriminalization of the whole sex industry, not just the women in it In countries where women are criminalized for prostitution activities, it is crucial to advocate for the decriminalization of the women in prostitution
|
In the Netherlands, legalization amounts to sanctioning all aspects of the sex industry: pimps are transformed into third party businessmen and legitimate sexual entrepreneurs Legalization also converts brothels and other sites of prostitution into legitimate venues dignifying prostitution as work doesn’t dignify the women, it is crucial to advocate for the decriminalization of the women in prostitution
|
1. Legalization/decriminalization of prostitution is a gift to pimps, traffickers and the sex industry. What does legalization of prostitution or decriminalization of the sex industry mean? In the Netherlands, legalization amounts to sanctioning all aspects of the sex industry: the women themselves, the buyers, and the pimps who, under the regime of legalization, are transformed into third party businessmen and legitimate sexual entrepreneurs. Legalization/decriminalization of the sex industry also converts brothels, sex clubs, massage parlors and other sites of prostitution activities into legitimate venues where commercial sexual acts are allowed to flourish legally with few restraints. Some people believe that, in calling for legalization or decriminalization of prostitution, they dignify and professionalize the women in prostitution. But dignifying prostitution as work doesn’t dignify the women, it simply dignifies the sex industry. People often don’t realize that decriminalization means decriminalization of the whole sex industry, not just the women in it And they haven’t thought through the consequences of legalizing pimps as legitimate sex entrepreneurs or third party businessmen, or the fact that men who buy women for sexual activity are now accepted as legitimate consumers of sex. In countries where women are criminalized for prostitution activities, it is crucial to advocate for the decriminalization of the women in prostitution. No woman should be punished for her own exploitation. But States should never decriminalize pimps, buyers, procurers, brothels or other sex establishments.
| 1,619 |
<h4>Legalization empowers pimps and traffickers instead of women.</h4><p><strong>Raymond ‘3 </strong>[Janice G. Raymond <strong> “Ten Reasons for Not Legalizing Prostitution And a Legal Response to the Demand for Prostitution” Journal of Trauma Practice, 2, 2003: pp. 315-332; and in Prostitution, Trafficking and Traumatic Stress. Melissa Farley (Ed.). Binghamton: Haworth Press, 2003] </p><p></strong>1. <u>Legalization/decriminalization of prostitution is a gift to pimps, traffickers and the sex industry.</u> What does legalization of prostitution or decriminalization of the sex industry mean? <u><mark>In the Netherlands, legalization amounts to sanctioning all aspects of the sex industry:</mark> the women themselves, the buyers, and the <mark>pimps</mark> who, under the regime of legalization, <mark>are transformed into third party businessmen and legitimate sexual entrepreneurs</mark>. <mark>Legalization</mark>/decriminalization of the sex industry <mark>also converts brothels</mark>, sex clubs, massage parlors <mark>and other sites of prostitution</mark> activities <mark>into legitimate venues</mark> where commercial sexual acts are allowed to flourish legally with few restraints.</u> Some people believe that, in calling for legalization or decriminalization of prostitution, they dignify and professionalize the women in prostitution. But <u><mark>dignifying prostitution as work doesn’t dignify the women,</mark> it simply dignifies the sex industry</u>. People often don’t realize that <u>decriminalization means decriminalization of the whole sex industry, not just the women in it</u> And they haven’t thought through the consequences of legalizing pimps as legitimate sex entrepreneurs or third party businessmen, or the fact that men who buy women for sexual activity are now accepted as legitimate consumers of sex. <u>In countries where women are criminalized for prostitution activities, <mark>it is crucial to advocate for the decriminalization of the women in prostitution</u></mark>. No woman should be punished for her own exploitation. But States should never decriminalize pimps, buyers, procurers, brothels or other sex establishments. </p>
| null |
1NC
|
Stigma
| 431,927 | 40 | 17,057 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,292 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Washington Elizondo-Micovic
|
Stone
|
1AC - Prostitution
1NC - Trafficking Adv CP Decrim CP Politics Case
2NC - CPs Case
1NR - Politics
2NR - Adv CP Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,608 |
Varied efforts to increase voluntary donations fail – individually and in combination
|
Beard 8
|
Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy
|
the transplant industry has examined and adopted a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remote At least seven such actions have been implemented INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses. federal legislation requiring all hospitals to request organ donation additional legislation to refer potential organ donors the Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,” ■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES Finally, i legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct costs incurred by onors We must conclude that none of the policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage. . Rather, every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage
|
a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. the likelihood any of them will resolve the organ shortage is remote At least seven such actions have been implemented EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES incorporating organ donor cards on driver licenses requiring all hospitals to request organ donation the Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative Finally legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct costs incurred by donors We must conclude that none of the policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage
|
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf
Aware of the increasingly dire consequences of continued reliance on the existing approach to cadaveric organ procurement and alarmed at the figures shown above, the transplant industry has examined and adopted a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remote. At least seven such actions have been implemented over the last two decades or so: ■ INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount. ■ ORGAN DONOR CARDS A related activity has been the process of incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses. The cards can be easily completed and witnessed at the time the licenses are issued or renewed. They serve as a pre-mortem statement of the bearer’s wish to have his or her organs removed for transplantation purposes at the time of death. Their principal use, in practice, is to facilitate the opos’ efforts to convince surviving family members to consent to such removal by revealing the decedant’s wishes. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave all states the authority to issue donor cards and incorporate them in drivers’ licenses. Moreover, a few states have recently begun to rely entirely on donor cards to infer consent without requiring the surviving family’s permission when such cards are present. Survey evidence indicates that less than 40 percent of U.S. citizens have signed their donor cards. ■ REQUIRED REQUEST Some survey evidence published in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that in a number of cases families of potential deceased donors were not being asked to donate the organs. As a result, donation was apparently failing to occur in some of those instances simply because the request was not being presented. In response to this evidence, federal legislation was passed in 1987 requiring all hospitals receiving any federal funding (which, of course, is virtually all hospitals) to request organ donation in all deaths that occur under circumstances that would allow the deceased’s organs to be used in transplantation. It appears that this legal obligation is now being met in most, if not all, cases. Yet, the organ shortage has persisted and the waiting list has continued to grow. ■ REQUIRED REFERRAL While required-request legislation can compel hospitals to approach the families of recently deceased potential organ donors with an appeal for donation, it cannot ensure that the request will be made in a sincere, compassionate manner likely to elicit an agreement. Following implementation of the required-request law, there were a number of anecdotes in which the compulsory organ donation requests were presented in an insincere or even offensive manner that was clearly intended to elicit a negative response. The letter of the law was being met but not the spirit. As a result, additional legislation was passed that requires hospitals to refer potential organ donors to the regional opo so that trained procurement personnel can approach the surviving family with the donation request. This policy response has resulted in no perceptible progress in resolving the shortage. ■ COLLABORATION A fairly recent response to the organ shortage has been the so-called “Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,” which was championed by then-secretary of health and human services Tommy Thompson. The program was initiated shortly after Thompson took office in 2001 and is currently continuing. The program’s basic motivation is provided by the observation of a considerable degree of variation in performance across the existing opos. Specifically, the number of deceased organ donors per thousand hospital deaths has been found to vary by a factor of almost five across the organizations. The presumption, then, is that the relatively successful opos employ superior procurement techniques and/or knowledge that, if shared with the relatively unsuccessful organizations, would significantly improve their performance. Thus, diffusion of “best practice” techniques is seen as a promising method through which cadaveric donation rates may be greatly improved. A thorough and objective evaluation of the Thompson initiative has not, to our knowledge, been conducted. Figure 1, in conjunction with a recent econometric study of observed variations in opo efficiency, suggests that such an evaluation would yield both good news and bad news. The good news is that the program appears to have had a positive (and potentially significant) impact on the number of donations. In particular, it appears that, after 2002, the growth rate of the waiting list has slowed somewhat. Whether this effect will permanently lower the growth rate of the waiting list or simply cause a temporary intercept shift remains to be seen. The bad news, however, is unequivocal— the initiative is not going to resolve the organ shortage. Even if, contrary to reasonable expectations, all opo relative inefficiencies were miraculously eliminated (i.e., if al organizations’ performance were brought up to the most efficient unit), the increase in donor collection rates would still be insufficient to eliminate the shortage. ■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES Another approach that has received some attention recently involves the exchange of kidneys between families who have willing but incompatible living donors. Suppose, for example, a person in one family needs a kidney transplant and a sibling has offered to donate the needed organ. Further suppose that the two siblings are not compatible — perhaps their blood types differ. If this family can locate a second, similarly situated family, then it may be possible that the donor in the first family will match the recipient in the second, and vice versa. A relatively small number of such exchanges have recently occurred and a unos-based computerized system of matching such interfamily donors has been proposed to facilitate a larger number of these living donor transactions. Two observations regarding kidney exchanges are worth noting. First, such exchanges obviously constitute a crude type of market in living donor kidneys that is based upon barter rather than currency. Like all such barter markets, this exchange will be considerably less efficient than currency-based trade. Puzzlingly, some of the staunchest critics of using financial incentives for cadaveric donors have openly supported expanded use of living donor exchanges. Apparently, it is not market exchange per se that offends them but, rather, the use of money to facilitate efficient market exchange. This combination of positions merely highlights the critics’ lack of knowledge regarding the operation of market processes. It is quite apparent that living donor kidney exchanges are not going to resolve the organ shortage. Opportunities for such barter-based exchanges are simply too limited. ■ REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS Finally, in another effort to encourage an increase in the number of living (primarily kidney) donors, several states have passed legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct (explicit) costs incurred by such donors (e.g., travel expenses, lost wages, and so on). Economically, this policy action raises the price paid to living kidney donors from a negative amount to zero. As such, it should be expected to increase the quantity of organs supplied from this source. Because the explicit, out-of-pocket expenses associated with live kidney donation are unlikely to be large relative to the longer-term implicit costs of potential health risks, however, such reimbursement should not be expected to bring forth a flood of new donors. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors may have a negative impact on the number of deceased donors because of some degree of supply-side substitutability. Again, this policy is not a solution to the organ shortage. We must conclude that none of the above-listed policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage. We say this not because we oppose any of these policies; indeed, each appears sensible in its own right and some have unquestionably succeeded in raising the number of organ donors by some (perhaps nontrivial) amount. Rather, our concern is that every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage.
| 9,339 |
<h4>Varied efforts to increase voluntary donations fail – individually and in combination </h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p>Aware of the increasingly dire consequences of continued reliance on the existing approach to cadaveric organ procurement and alarmed at the figures shown above, <u>the transplant industry has examined and adopted <mark>a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance.</mark> All of these, <mark>however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system.</mark> As a result, <mark>the likelihood</mark> that <mark>any of them</mark>, even in combination, <mark>will resolve the organ shortage is remote</u></mark>. <u><mark>At least seven such actions have been implemented</u></mark> over the last two decades or so: ■ <u>INCREASED <mark>EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES</u></mark> In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount. ■ ORGAN DONOR CARDS A related activity has been the process of <u><mark>incorporating organ donor cards on</mark> states’ <mark>driver licenses</mark>.</u> The cards can be easily completed and witnessed at the time the licenses are issued or renewed. They serve as a pre-mortem statement of the bearer’s wish to have his or her organs removed for transplantation purposes at the time of death. Their principal use, in practice, is to facilitate the opos’ efforts to convince surviving family members to consent to such removal by revealing the decedant’s wishes. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave all states the authority to issue donor cards and incorporate them in drivers’ licenses. Moreover, a few states have recently begun to rely entirely on donor cards to infer consent without requiring the surviving family’s permission when such cards are present. Survey evidence indicates that less than 40 percent of U.S. citizens have signed their donor cards.<u> </u>■ REQUIRED REQUEST Some survey evidence published in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that in a number of cases families of potential deceased donors were not being asked to donate the organs. As a result, donation was apparently failing to occur in some of those instances simply because the request was not being presented. In response to this evidence, <u>federal legislation</u> was passed in 1987 <u><mark>requiring all hospitals</u></mark> receiving any federal funding (which, of course, is virtually all hospitals) <u><mark>to request organ donation</u></mark> in all deaths that occur under circumstances that would allow the deceased’s organs to be used in transplantation. It appears that this legal obligation is now being met in most, if not all, cases. Yet, the organ shortage has persisted and the waiting list has continued to grow. ■ REQUIRED REFERRAL While required-request legislation can compel hospitals to approach the families of recently deceased potential organ donors with an appeal for donation, it cannot ensure that the request will be made in a sincere, compassionate manner likely to elicit an agreement. Following implementation of the required-request law, there were a number of anecdotes in which the compulsory organ donation requests were presented in an insincere or even offensive manner that was clearly intended to elicit a negative response. The letter of the law was being met but not the spirit. As a result, <u>additional legislation</u> was passed that requires hospitals<u> to refer potential organ donors </u>to the regional opo so that trained procurement personnel can approach the surviving family with the donation request. This policy response has resulted in no perceptible progress in resolving the shortage. ■ COLLABORATION A fairly recent response to the organ shortage has been <u><mark>the</mark> </u>so-called “<u><mark>Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative</mark>,” </u>which was championed by then-secretary of health and human services Tommy Thompson. The program was initiated shortly after Thompson took office in 2001 and is currently continuing. The program’s basic motivation is provided by the observation of a considerable degree of variation in performance across the existing opos. Specifically, the number of deceased organ donors per thousand hospital deaths has been found to vary by a factor of almost five across the organizations. The presumption, then, is that the relatively successful opos employ superior procurement techniques and/or knowledge that, if shared with the relatively unsuccessful organizations, would significantly improve their performance. Thus, diffusion of “best practice” techniques is seen as a promising method through which cadaveric donation rates may be greatly improved. A thorough and objective evaluation of the Thompson initiative has not, to our knowledge, been conducted. Figure 1, in conjunction with a recent econometric study of observed variations in opo efficiency, suggests that such an evaluation would yield both good news and bad news. The good news is that the program appears to have had a positive (and potentially significant) impact on the number of donations. In particular, it appears that, after 2002, the growth rate of the waiting list has slowed somewhat. Whether this effect will permanently lower the growth rate of the waiting list or simply cause a temporary intercept shift remains to be seen. The bad news, however, is unequivocal— the initiative is not going to resolve the organ shortage. Even if, contrary to reasonable expectations, all opo relative inefficiencies were miraculously eliminated (i.e., if al organizations’ performance were brought up to the most efficient unit), the increase in donor collection rates would still be insufficient to eliminate the shortage. <u>■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES</u> Another approach that has received some attention recently involves the exchange of kidneys between families who have willing but incompatible living donors. Suppose, for example, a person in one family needs a kidney transplant and a sibling has offered to donate the needed organ. Further suppose that the two siblings are not compatible — perhaps their blood types differ. If this family can locate a second, similarly situated family, then it may be possible that the donor in the first family will match the recipient in the second, and vice versa. A relatively small number of such exchanges have recently occurred and a unos-based computerized system of matching such interfamily donors has been proposed to facilitate a larger number of these living donor transactions. Two observations regarding kidney exchanges are worth noting. First, such exchanges obviously constitute a crude type of market in living donor kidneys that is based upon barter rather than currency. Like all such barter markets, this exchange will be considerably less efficient than currency-based trade. Puzzlingly, some of the staunchest critics of using financial incentives for cadaveric donors have openly supported expanded use of living donor exchanges. Apparently, it is not market exchange per se that offends them but, rather, the use of money to facilitate efficient market exchange. This combination of positions merely highlights the critics’ lack of knowledge regarding the operation of market processes. It is quite apparent that living donor kidney exchanges are not going to resolve the organ shortage. Opportunities for such barter-based exchanges are simply too limited. ■ REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS <u><mark>Finally</mark>, i</u>n another effort to encourage an increase in the number of living (primarily kidney) donors, several states have passed <u><mark>legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct</mark> </u>(explicit) <u><mark>costs incurred by</u></mark> such <mark>d<u>onors</mark> </u>(e.g., travel expenses, lost wages, and so on). Economically, this policy action raises the price paid to living kidney donors from a negative amount to zero. As such, it should be expected to increase the quantity of organs supplied from this source. Because the explicit, out-of-pocket expenses associated with live kidney donation are unlikely to be large relative to the longer-term implicit costs of potential health risks, however, such reimbursement should not be expected to bring forth a flood of new donors. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors may have a negative impact on the number of deceased donors because of some degree of supply-side substitutability. Again, this policy is not a solution to the organ shortage. <u><mark>We must conclude that none of the</u></mark> above-listed <u><mark>policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage</mark>.</u> We say this not because we oppose any of these policies; indeed, each appears sensible in its own right and some have unquestionably succeeded in raising the number of organ donors by some (perhaps nontrivial) amount<u>. Rather,</u> our concern is that <u><mark>every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage</u></mark>.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives
| 430,246 | 21 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
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Hurricanedebates2015
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1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
741,609 |
The shortage means many die
|
Beard 8
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Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy
|
our failure to adapt our organ procurement policy suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists We run the forecasts out 10 years a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.
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more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of future waiting lists 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage
|
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf
WAITING LISTS YET TO COME
The consequences of our failure to adapt our cadaveric organ procurement policy to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists for each of our sample periods. We run the forecasts out 10 years from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage. Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.
| 5,967 |
<h4>The shortage means many die</h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p>WAITING LISTS YET TO COME</p><p>The consequences of <u>our failure to adapt our</u> cadaveric <u>organ procurement policy</u> to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, <u>suggests that <mark>more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system.</mark> In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, <mark>the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents</mark> thus far <mark>pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming</u></mark>. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, <u><mark>we are able to produce forecasts of </mark>the expected size of <mark>future waiting lists</u></mark> for each of our sample periods. <u>We run the forecasts out 10 years</u> from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, <u>a cumulative total of<mark> 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage</mark>.</u> Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives
| 430,247 | 16 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
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Hurricanedebates2015
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1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,610 |
Must evaluate consequences
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Issac 2
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Issac 2 [Jeffrey, professor of political science at Indiana University, Dissent, Spring, ebsco]
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an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. and it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
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an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility the purity of one’s intention does not ensure achievement in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply powerlessness; it is complicity in injustice politics is as much about unintended consequences as intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives
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As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
| 1,800 |
<h4>Must evaluate consequences</h4><p><u><strong>Issac 2</u></strong> [Jeffrey, professor of political science at Indiana University, Dissent, Spring, ebsco<u>]</p><p></u>As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, <u><mark>an unyielding concern</mark> <mark>with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility</mark>.</u> The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) <u>It fails to see that <mark>the purity of one’s intention does not</mark> <mark>ensure</mark> the <mark>achievement</mark> of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that <mark>in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply</mark> a form of <mark>powerlessness; it is</mark> often a form of <strong><mark>complicity in injustice</strong></mark>.</u> This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; <u>and</u> (3) <u>it fails to see that <mark>politics is as much about unintended consequences as</mark> it is about <mark>intentions; it is the <strong>effects of action, rather than the motives</strong></mark> of action, that is most significant.</u> Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, <u>it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil.</u> This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. <u>Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.</p></u>
| null |
1NC
|
Stigma
| 26,721 | 1,533 | 17,057 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,292 |
N
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Cedanats
|
1
|
Washington Elizondo-Micovic
|
Stone
|
1AC - Prostitution
1NC - Trafficking Adv CP Decrim CP Politics Case
2NC - CPs Case
1NR - Politics
2NR - Adv CP Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
741,611 |
Extinction first
|
Bostrom 02
|
Nick Bostrom, Department of Philosophy, Yale University, 2002, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,” http://www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html // vkoneru
|
Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors. The see what happens and learn from experience – is unworkable we must take a proactive approach. This requires a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs of such actions Existential risks are different We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters Existential risks are a menace for everybody and require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk. If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied by another factor, the size of which depends on whether and how much we discount future benefits
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Our approach to existential risks cannot be trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors we must take a proactive approach. This requires willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs Existential risks are hard to take seriously because we have never yet witnessed such disasters If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied , the size of which depends on whether and how much we discount future benefits
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Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach – see what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience – is unworkable. Rather, we must take a proactive approach. This requires foresight to anticipate new types of threats and a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions. We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast. We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters.[5] Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat. Reductions in existential risks are global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for everybody and may require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk. If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied by another factor, the size of which depends on whether and how much we discount future benefits [15,16].
| 1,417 |
<h4>Extinction first</h4><p>Nick <strong>Bostrom</strong>, Department of Philosophy, Yale University, 20<strong>02</strong>, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,” http://www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html // vkoneru</p><p><u><mark>Our approach to existential risks cannot be</mark> one of <mark>trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors</mark>. The</u> reactive approach – <u>see what happens</u>, limit damages, <u>and learn from experience – is unworkable</u>. Rather, <u><mark>we must take a proactive approach. This requires</u></mark> foresight to anticipate new types of threats and <u>a <mark>willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs</u></mark> (moral and economic) <u>of such actions</u>. We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. <u><mark>Existential risks are</u></mark> a <u>different</u> kind of beast. <u>We might find it <mark>hard to take</mark> them as <mark>seriously</mark> as we should simply <mark>because we have never yet witnessed such disasters</u></mark>.[5] Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat. Reductions in existential risks are global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. <u>Existential risks are a menace for everybody and</u> may <u>require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk. <mark>If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied</mark> by another factor<mark>, the size of which depends on whether and how much we discount future benefits</u></mark> [15,16].</p>
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1NC
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Stigma
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
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Cedanats
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1
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Washington Elizondo-Micovic
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Stone
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1AC - Prostitution
1NC - Trafficking Adv CP Decrim CP Politics Case
2NC - CPs Case
1NR - Politics
2NR - Adv CP Politics
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
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Organ sales would be the most effective way to solve the transplant shortage
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Study by Becker and Elias 14
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Study by Becker and Elias 14 Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina. Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth
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Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. Paying for organs would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.
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The most effective change would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap. , sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors waiting times have been largely eliminated The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear the claim that payments would be ineffective isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use Paying for organs would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs.
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Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change, we believe, would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap. In particular, sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. Paying for organs would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.
| 10,692 |
<h4><strong>Organ sales would be the most effective way to solve the transplant shortage</h4><p>Study by Becker and Elias 14 </strong>Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina.<strong> </strong>Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs</p><p><u>http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth</p><p>Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. <mark>The most effective change</u></mark>, we believe, <u><mark>would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs</mark>—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. </u>Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. <u><mark>Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap</u>.</mark> In particular<mark>, <u>sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant</mark>. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. </u>These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. <u><mark>Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney</mark>.</u> That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but <u><mark>Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors</mark>.</u> Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that <u><mark>waiting times</mark> to get kidneys <mark>have been largely eliminated</u></mark>. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. <u>Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. <mark>The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear</mark>. </u>Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But <u><mark>the claim that payments would be ineffective</mark> in eliminating the shortage of organs <mark>isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use</mark>.</u> For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. <u><mark>Paying for organs</mark> </u>would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it <u><mark>would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs.</mark> More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.</p></u>
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Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
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A
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Hurricanedebates2015
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1
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West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
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Rumbaugh
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1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
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The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market
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Hughes 9
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Hughes 9 J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.
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U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid
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. A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world
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Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351
Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models
U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global black market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales. n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid. n92
| 2,620 |
<h4>The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market</h4><p><strong>Hughes 9</strong> J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.</p><p>Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351</p><p>Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models</p><p><u>U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage<mark>. A thriving global</u> </mark>black<mark> <u>market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales</u></mark>. n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 <u><mark>The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry</mark>.</u> n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 <u><mark>U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too,</mark> often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related</u>. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 <u><mark>The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world</mark>.</u> n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 <u>In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid</u>. n92</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,256 | 14 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,614 |
No solvency – traffickers will move to less regulated areas
|
GAATW 11
|
GAATW 11 (Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women, Alliance of more than 100 non-governmental organisations from Africa , Asia, Europe, LAC and North America. The GAATW International Secretariat is based in Bangkok, Thailand and co-ordinates the activities of the Alliance, collects and disseminates information, and advocates on behalf of the Alliance at regional and international levels. Member Organisations include migrant rights organisations; anti-trafficking organisations; self-organised groups of migrant workers, domestic workers, survivors of trafficking and sex workers; human rights and women's rights organisations; and direct service providers. “Moving Beyond Supply and Demand Catchphrases” http://www.gaatw.org/publications/MovingBeyond_SupplyandDemand_GAATW2011.pdf)
|
Trafficking is about profit and exploitation – eliminating a whole sector wouldn’t necessarily eliminate trafficking, but would move it to another sector or site where workers lack rights protection The argument that trafficking occurs mainly because men pay for sexual services ignores the significant structural factors that cause forced labour and debt bondage in various sectors. A ‘demand-based’ focus hides the fact that trafficking is not about prostitution but about poverty
|
Trafficking is about profit and exploitation – eliminating a whole sector wouldn’t eliminate trafficking, but move it to another sector or site where workers lack rights protection significant structural factors cause forced labour and debt bondage in various sectors trafficking is not about prostitution but poverty
|
Trafficking in the sex work sector ‘End demand for prostitution’ advocates have sometimes argued that because trafficking occurs in the commercial sex sector, eliminating sex work will eliminate trafficking.69 70 This argument has been critiqued by anti-trafficking organisations, including GAATW, and sex workers rights organisations for being a simplistic and misguided solution. For instance, feminists have also struggled to get domestic violence recognised as violence. However, few have publicly argued that the institution of marriage should be abolished to eradicate domestic violence. Trafficking is about profit and exploitation – eliminating a whole sector wouldn’t necessarily eliminate trafficking, but would move it to another sector or site where workers lack rights protection. It would be nonsensical to abolish all forms of garment manufacturing in which people are trafficked; rather, states must monitor recruitment practices, protect labour rights of garment workers, ensure occupational health and safety and like measures.71 – GAATW The argument that trafficking occurs mainly because men pay for sexual services ignores the significant structural factors that cause forced labour and debt bondage in various sectors. A ‘demand-based’ focus hides the fact that trafficking is not about prostitution but about poverty. It blames clients instead of putting the responsibility onto governments to address these injustices.72 – English Collective of Prostitutes [C]lients demand for sexual services cannot in general be understood as what causes trafficking into the sex sector.73 – International Labour Organisation Anti-trafficking and anti-violence efforts need to distinguish between seeking commercial sexual services from a sex worker, and seeking out trafficked or exploited labour. There is more research available on clients of sex workers than on clients of trafficked women in prostitution.74 There is no evidence that the bulk of clients wish to receive services provided by exploited labour, whether for ethical reasons and/ or selfish reasons. There is evidence that some violent offenders seek out sex workers, partially because their extremely marginalised status is unlikely to attract notice or concern from authorities.75 76
| 2,262 |
<h4>No solvency – traffickers will move to less regulated areas </h4><p><strong>GAATW 11</strong> (Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women, Alliance of more than 100 non-governmental organisations from Africa , Asia, Europe, LAC and North America. The GAATW International Secretariat is based in Bangkok, Thailand and co-ordinates the activities of the Alliance, collects and disseminates information, and advocates on behalf of the Alliance at regional and international levels. Member Organisations include migrant rights organisations; anti-trafficking organisations; self-organised groups of migrant workers, domestic workers, survivors of trafficking and sex workers; human rights and women's rights organisations; and direct service providers. “Moving Beyond Supply and Demand Catchphrases” http://www.gaatw.org/publications/MovingBeyond_SupplyandDemand_GAATW2011.pdf) </p><p>Trafficking in the sex work sector ‘End demand for prostitution’ advocates have sometimes argued that because trafficking occurs in the commercial sex sector, eliminating sex work will eliminate trafficking.69 70 This argument has been critiqued by anti-trafficking organisations, including GAATW, and sex workers rights organisations for being a simplistic and misguided solution. For instance, feminists have also struggled to get domestic violence recognised as violence. However, few have publicly argued that the institution of marriage should be abolished to eradicate domestic violence. <u><mark>Trafficking is</mark> <mark>about <strong>profit and exploitation – eliminating a whole sector wouldn’t</mark> necessarily <mark>eliminate trafficking, but</mark> would <mark>move it to another sector or site where workers lack rights protection</u></strong></mark>. It would be nonsensical to abolish all forms of garment manufacturing in which people are trafficked; rather, states must monitor recruitment practices, protect labour rights of garment workers, ensure occupational health and safety and like measures.71 – GAATW <u>The argument that trafficking occurs mainly because men pay for sexual services <strong>ignores the <mark>significant structural factors</mark> that <mark>cause forced labour and debt bondage in various sectors</strong></mark>. A ‘demand-based’ focus hides the fact that <mark>trafficking is <strong>not about prostitution but</mark> about <mark>poverty</u></strong></mark>. It blames clients instead of putting the responsibility onto governments to address these injustices.72 – English Collective of Prostitutes [C]lients demand for sexual services cannot in general be understood as what causes trafficking into the sex sector.73 – International Labour Organisation Anti-trafficking and anti-violence efforts need to distinguish between seeking commercial sexual services from a sex worker, and seeking out trafficked or exploited labour. There is more research available on clients of sex workers than on clients of trafficked women in prostitution.74 There is no evidence that the bulk of clients wish to receive services provided by exploited labour, whether for ethical reasons and/ or selfish reasons. There is evidence that some violent offenders seek out sex workers, partially because their extremely marginalised status is unlikely to attract notice or concern from authorities.75 76</p>
| null |
1NC
|
Trafficking
| 430,310 | 6 | 17,057 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,292 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Washington Elizondo-Micovic
|
Stone
|
1AC - Prostitution
1NC - Trafficking Adv CP Decrim CP Politics Case
2NC - CPs Case
1NR - Politics
2NR - Adv CP Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,615 |
Economically desperate people are coerced into selling their organs in the hope of bettering their situation. As a result of the actions of unscrupulous organ brokers and inadequate medical care, they are actually made worse off.
|
Jaycox 12
|
Jaycox 12 Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,
Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
|
Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:
|
almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority (17) of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady and expressed regret the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them
|
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf
Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority (17) of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them: In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.
| 2,479 |
<h4>Economically desperate people are coerced into selling their organs in the hope of bettering their situation. As a result of the actions of unscrupulous organ brokers and inadequate medical care, they are actually made worse off.</h4><p><strong>Jaycox 12</strong> Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,</p><p>Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION</p><p>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf</p><p><u>Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study </u>in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 <u>He found that <mark>almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys</mark>;</u> the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. <u><mark>Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority </u>(17) <u>of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’</mark> </u>at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, <u><mark>a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady</mark> as a result of their nephrectomies, <mark>and</mark> a majority also <mark>expressed regret</mark> or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act.</u> When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and<u> </u>ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,<u><strong>Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that<mark> the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them</mark>:</strong> </u>In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,255 | 14 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,616 |
U.S. policy changes are insufficient to solve – 70% of victims are trafficked to Asia and the Pacific
|
Haken 11
|
Haken 11 – Jeremy, currently pursuing M.A. degree @ American University’s School of International Service with a concentration on African conflict in the age of globalization, “Transnational Crime In The Developing World” http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/transcrime/gfi_transnational_crime_web.pdf
|
Though it is difficult to know where trafficking victims originate, it is likely the vast majority are from developing countries With most trafficking victims originating in developing countries, there is no doubt many are destined for the developed world main destinations include the U S Canada E U Japan, and Australia. It would be oversimplifying, however, to suggest that this is merely a ‘South-to-North’ phenomenon Other main destinations include Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and further complicating matters, China, India, Pakistan, Poland, and the Czech Republic are frequently reported as both origin and destination countries Belser estimates that 70 percent of sex trafficking victims and 38 percent of people trafficked for economic exploitation are destined for Asia and the Pacific
|
With most trafficking victims in developing countries many are destined for the developed world . It would be oversimplifying, however, to suggest this is merely a ‘South-to-North’ phenomenon main destinations include Saudi Arabia Turkey China, India, Pakistan, Poland and the Czech Republic Belser estimates 70 percent of sex trafficking victims are destined for Asia and the Pacific
|
Analyzing the Flow of Human Trafficking Though it is difficult to know where all human trafficking victims originate, it is likely that the vast majority are from developing countries. In UNODC’s analysis of sex trafficking to Europe, for example, the majority of victims come from developing countries in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union.43 In general, trafficking victims are rarely kidnapped or taken by force. In most cases they are either lured away from their homes with the promise of a better life and greater economic opportunity, or they are voluntary migrants who unwittingly fall into the hands of predatory traffickers. Other commonly listed countries of origin include Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Nigeria, Morocco, Myanmar, and Vietnam.44 With most trafficking victims originating in developing countries, there is no doubt that many are destined for the developed world. According to a 2006 UNODC report, main destinations include the United States, Canada, the European Union, Japan, and Australia. It would be oversimplifying, however, to suggest that this is merely a ‘South-to-North’ phenomenon. Other main destinations include Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and further complicating matters, China, India, Pakistan, Poland, and the Czech Republic are frequently reported as both origin and destination countries.45 Belser estimates that 70 percent of sex trafficking victims and 38 percent of people trafficked for economic exploitation are destined for Asia and the Pacific.46
| 1,496 |
<h4>U.S. policy changes are insufficient to solve – 70% of victims are trafficked to Asia and the Pacific </h4><p><strong>Haken 11</strong> – Jeremy, currently pursuing M.A. degree @ American University’s School of International Service with a concentration on African conflict in the age of globalization, “Transnational Crime In The Developing World” http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/transcrime/gfi_transnational_crime_web.pdf</p><p>Analyzing the Flow of Human Trafficking <u>Though it is difficult to know where</u> all human <u>trafficking victims originate, it is likely</u> that <u>the vast majority are from developing countries</u>. In UNODC’s analysis of sex trafficking to Europe, for example, the majority of victims come from developing countries in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union.43 In general, trafficking victims are rarely kidnapped or taken by force. In most cases they are either lured away from their homes with the promise of a better life and greater economic opportunity, or they are voluntary migrants who unwittingly fall into the hands of predatory traffickers. Other commonly listed countries of origin include Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Nigeria, Morocco, Myanmar, and Vietnam.44<u> <mark>With most trafficking victims</mark> originating <mark>in developing countries</mark>, there is no doubt</u> that <u><mark>many are</u> <u>destined for the developed world</u></mark>. According to a 2006 UNODC report, <u>main destinations include the <strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, <u>Canada</u>, the <u><strong>E</u></strong>uropean <u><strong>U</u></strong>nion, <u>Japan, and Australia<mark>.<strong> It would be oversimplifying,</mark> <mark>however, to suggest</mark> that <mark>this is merely a ‘South-to-North’ phenomenon</u></strong></mark>. <u>Other <mark>main destinations</mark> <mark>include Saudi Arabia</mark> and <mark>Turkey</mark>, and further complicating matters, <mark>China, India, Pakistan, Poland</mark>, <mark>and the Czech Republic</mark> are frequently reported as both origin and destination countries</u>.45 <u><strong><mark>Belser estimates</mark> that <mark>70 percent of sex trafficking victims</mark> and 38 percent of people trafficked for economic exploitation <mark>are destined for Asia and the Pacific</u></strong></mark>.46 </p>
| null |
1NC
|
US Insufficient
| 430,311 | 2 | 17,057 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,292 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Washington Elizondo-Micovic
|
Stone
|
1AC - Prostitution
1NC - Trafficking Adv CP Decrim CP Politics Case
2NC - CPs Case
1NR - Politics
2NR - Adv CP Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,617 |
For many, the coercion is more violent
|
Bowden 13
|
Bowden 13 Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis
|
Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades Imagine living in a poor country As you walk peacefully you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live , there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem.
|
Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades Imagine living in a poor country you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality there is evidence of governmental involvement, which exacerbates the problem
|
[*452] Introduction
Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades. n1 Imagine living in a poor country, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. As you walk peacefully to your home at the end of the day, you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live. Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [*453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However, there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10
| 1,530 |
<h4>For many, the coercion is more violent</h4><p><strong>Bowden 13</strong> Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis</p><p> [*452] Introduction</p><p><u><mark>Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades</u></mark>. n1 <u><mark>Imagine living in a poor country</u></mark>, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. <u>As you walk peacefully</u> to your home at the end of the day, <u><mark>you are grabbed and</mark> <mark>thrown into the back of an unmarked truck</mark>. </u>n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as <u><mark>a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney</u></mark>. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, <u><mark>no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection</u></mark>. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. <u><mark>Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live</u></mark>. Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [*453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However<u>, <mark>there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality</mark> of organ trafficking.</u> n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 <u>Furthermore, <mark>there is evidence of governmental involvement, which</mark> contributes to and <mark>exacerbates the problem</mark>. </u>n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10</p><p> </p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,258 | 14 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,618 |
Legal prostitution shields traffickers and increases illegal prostitution
|
Hodge ‘8
|
Hodge, Associate Professor in the School of Social Work at Arizona State University, ‘8 [David, “Sexual Trafficking in the United States: A Domestic Problem with Transnational Dimensions”, Social Work, Vol. 53, No. 2, April 2008, RSR]
|
Little if any research, , has illustrated that legalizing certain forms of adult prostitution decreases illegal forms of prostitution the converse seems more accurate legalization appears to increase the prevalence of illegal prostitution Illegal activities are shielded behind legal activities.
|
Little research has illustrated that legalizing certain forms of adult prostitution decreases illegal prostitution the converse seems more accurate legalization appears to increase the prevalence of illegal prostitution Illegal activities are shielded behind legal activities
|
One of the more controversial proposals to address trafficking is to legalize adult prostitution (Long, 2004). Proponents of this approach argue that the sex industry should be brought out of the shadows and subjected to government regulation. Subsequently, child prostitution will be eliminated and women will be protected from violence and exploitation. Little if any research, however, has illustrated that legalizing certain forms of adult prostitution decreases illegal forms of prostitution (Farley, 2004). Rather the converse seems to be more accurate—legalization appears to increase the prevalence of illegal and legal prostitution (Farley, 2004; Raymond, 2004). Illegal activities are shielded behind legal activities. Nations such as the Netherlands, which have legalized prostitution, appear to have become magnets for traffickers and have witnessed significant increases in child prostitution (Raymond, 2003; Sullivan & Jeffreys, 2001). Similarly, in the United States, research suggests that the presence of large adult prostitution markets fosters higher levels of child sexual exploitation (Estes & Weiner, 2001).
| 1,129 |
<h4><strong>Legal prostitution <u>shields traffickers</u> and increases illegal prostitution</h4><p>Hodge</strong>, Associate Professor in the School of Social Work at Arizona State University, <strong>‘8<u></strong> [David, “Sexual Trafficking in the United States: A Domestic Problem with Transnational Dimensions”, Social Work, Vol. 53, No. 2, April 2008, RSR]</p><p></u>One of the more controversial proposals to address trafficking is to legalize adult prostitution (Long, 2004). Proponents of this approach argue that the sex industry should be brought out of the shadows and subjected to government regulation. Subsequently, child prostitution will be eliminated and women will be protected from violence and exploitation. <u><mark>Little</mark> if any <mark>research</mark>, </u>however<u>, <mark>has illustrated that legalizing certain forms of adult prostitution decreases illegal</mark> forms of <mark>prostitution</u></mark> (Farley, 2004). Rather <u><strong><mark>the converse seems </u></strong></mark>to be<u><strong><mark> more accurate</u></strong></mark>—<u><mark>legalization appears to increase the prevalence of illegal </u></mark>and legal <u><mark>prostitution</u></mark> (Farley, 2004; Raymond, 2004). <u><mark>Illegal activities are <strong>shielded</strong> behind legal activities</mark>. </u>Nations such as the Netherlands, which have legalized prostitution, appear to have become magnets for traffickers and have witnessed significant increases in child prostitution (Raymond, 2003; Sullivan & Jeffreys, 2001). Similarly, in the United States, research suggests that the presence of large adult prostitution markets fosters higher levels of child sexual exploitation (Estes & Weiner, 2001).</p>
| null |
1NC
|
1NC Link Turn
| 430,314 | 16 | 17,057 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,292 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Washington Elizondo-Micovic
|
Stone
|
1AC - Prostitution
1NC - Trafficking Adv CP Decrim CP Politics Case
2NC - CPs Case
1NR - Politics
2NR - Adv CP Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,619 |
T (framework) versus affs nothing to do with the topic
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>T (framework) versus affs<u> nothing to do with the topic</h4></u>
| null | null |
1NC
| 430,312 | 1 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,620 |
trafficking for organs is widespread
|
Kendrick 12
|
Kendrick 12 The Kendrick Theme 2012 Organ Removal http://fightslaverynow.org/why-fight-there-are-27-million-reasons/otherformsoftrafficking/organ-removal/
|
Organ removal, while not as prevalent as sex and labor trafficking, is quite real and widespread. Those targeted are sometimes killed or left for dead. More frequently poor and desperate people are lured by false promises.
|
Organ removal is quite real and widespread. More frequently poor and desperate people are lured by false promises
|
Organ removal, while not as prevalent as sex and labor trafficking, is quite real and widespread. Those targeted are sometimes killed or left for dead. More frequently poor and desperate people are lured by false promises. The World Health Organization estimates that as many as 7,000 kidneys are illegally obtained by traffickers every year as demand outstrips the supply of organs legally available for transplant. A black market thrives as well in the trade of bones, blood and other body tissues. This activity is listed in the United Nations’ Trafficking in Persons Protocol: Article 3(a)… Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
| 826 |
<h4>trafficking for organs is widespread</h4><p><strong>Kendrick 12</strong> The Kendrick Theme 2012 Organ Removal http://fightslaverynow.org/why-fight-there-are-27-million-reasons/otherformsoftrafficking/organ-removal/</p><p><u><mark>Organ removal</mark>, while not as prevalent as sex and labor trafficking, <mark>is quite real and widespread.</mark> Those targeted are sometimes killed or left for dead. <mark>More frequently poor and desperate people are lured by false promises</mark>.</u> The World Health Organization estimates that as many as 7,000 kidneys are illegally obtained by traffickers every year as demand outstrips the supply of organs legally available for transplant. A black market thrives as well in the trade of bones, blood and other body tissues. This activity is listed in the United Nations’ Trafficking in Persons Protocol: Article 3(a)… Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour<strong> or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.</p></strong>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,315 | 22 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,621 |
Legalized prostitution increases sex trafficking
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>Legalized prostitution increases sex trafficking </h4></strong>
| null |
1NC
|
2NC L/Turn Wall
| 430,313 | 1 | 17,057 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,292 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Washington Elizondo-Micovic
|
Stone
|
1AC - Prostitution
1NC - Trafficking Adv CP Decrim CP Politics Case
2NC - CPs Case
1NR - Politics
2NR - Adv CP Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,622 |
Our interpretation is that the affirmative’s advantages must stem from topical action. The aff does not advocate topical action.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><u>Our interpretation is that the affirmative’s advantages must stem from topical action. The aff does not advocate topical action.</h4></u>
| null | null |
1NC
| 430,316 | 1 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,623 |
Prefer our evidence – the best cross-sectional quantitative analysis proves legalization increases trafficking
|
Cho 12
|
Cho 12 (Soo-Young, German Institute for Economic Research-DIW Berlin, Germany, “Does Legalized Prostitution Increase Human Trafficking?” World Development, 41 (1), 2013, pp. 67-82)
|
This paper investigated the impact of legalized prostitution on inflows of human trafficking. According to economic theory there are two effects of unknown magnitude. The scale effect of legalizing prostitution leads to an expansion of the market and thus an increase in trafficking, while the substitution effect reduces demand for trafficked prostitutes by favoring prostitutes who have legal residence Our quantitative empirical analysis for a cross-section of up to 150 countries shows that the scale effect dominates the substitution effect On average countries with legalized prostitution experience a larger degree of reported human trafficking inflows We corroborated this quantitative evidence with three case studies of Sweden, Denmark and Germany Consistent with quantitative analysis, legalization led to substantial scale effects in these cases Both the cross-country comparisons as well as the temporal comparison before and after legalization suggest compositional changes in the share of trafficked individuals have been small and the substitution effect has been dominated by the scale effect to find hard evidence establishing this relationship. Our central finding is therefore best regarded as being based on the most reliable existing data
|
According to economic theory The scale effect of legalizing prostitution leads to expansion of the market while the substitution effect reduces demand favoring prostitutes who have legal residence quantitative empirical analysis for a cross-section of 150 countries shows the scale effect dominates the substitution effect countries with legalized prostitution experience a larger degree of trafficking inflows We corroborated this with case studies of Sweden, Denmark and Germany legalization led to substantial scale effects in these cross-country comparisons as well as temporal comparison suggest the substitution effect has been dominated Our central finding is best regarded as the most reliable existing data
|
7. CONCLUSION This paper has investigated the impact of legalized prostitution on inflows of human trafficking. According to economic theory, there are two effects of unknown magnitude. The scale effect of legalizing prostitution leads to an expansion of the prostitution market and thus an increase in human trafficking, while the substitution effect reduces demand for trafficked prostitutes by favoring prostitutes who have legal residence in a country. Our quantitative empirical analysis for a cross-section of up to 150 countries shows that the scale effect dominates the substitution effect. On average, countries with legalized prostitution experience a larger degree of reported human trafficking inflows. We have corroborated this quantitative evidence with three brief case studies of Sweden, Denmark and Germany. Consistent with the results from our quantitative analysis, the legalization of prostitution has led to substantial scale effects in these cases. Both the cross-country comparisons among Sweden, Denmark and Germany, with their different prostitution regimes, as well as the temporal comparison within Germany before and after the further legalization of prostitution, suggest that any compositional changes in the share of trafficked individuals among all prostitutes have been small and the substitution effect has therefore been dominated by the scale effect. Naturally, this qualitative evidence is also somewhat tentative as there is no “smoking gun” proving that the scale effect dominates the substitution effect and that the legalization of prostitution definitely increases inward trafficking flows. The problem here lies in the clandestine nature of both the prostitution and trafficking markets, making it difficult, perhaps impossible, to find hard evidence establishing this relationship. Our central finding, i.e., that countries with legalized prostitution experience a larger reported incidence of trafficking inflows, is therefore best regarded as being based on the most reliable existing data, but needs to be subjected to future scrutiny. More research in this area is definitely warranted, but it will require the collection of more reliable data to establish firmer conclusions.
| 2,224 |
<h4><u>Prefer our evidence</u> – the best cross-sectional quantitative analysis proves legalization increases trafficking </h4><p><strong>Cho 12</strong> (Soo-Young, German Institute for Economic Research-DIW Berlin, Germany, “Does Legalized Prostitution Increase Human Trafficking?” World Development, 41 (1), 2013, pp. 67-82) </p><p>7. CONCLUSION <u>This paper</u> has <u>investigated the impact of legalized prostitution on inflows of human trafficking. <mark>According to <strong>economic theory</u></strong></mark>, <u>there are two effects of unknown magnitude. <mark>The scale effect of legalizing prostitution</u> <u>leads to</mark> an <mark>expansion of the</u></mark> prostitution <u><mark>market </mark>and thus</u> <u>an increase in</u> human <u>trafficking, <mark>while the substitution effect</u> <u>reduces demand</mark> for trafficked prostitutes by <mark>favoring prostitutes who have legal residence</u></mark> in a country. <u><strong>Our <mark>quantitative empirical analysis</mark> <mark>for a cross-section of</mark> up to <mark>150 countries shows</mark> that <mark>the scale effect dominates the substitution effect</u></strong></mark>. <u>On average</u>, <u><mark>countries with legalized prostitution experience</u> <u>a <strong>larger degree of</mark> reported human <mark>trafficking inflows</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>We</u></mark> have <u><mark>corroborated this</mark> quantitative</u> <u>evidence</u> <u><mark>with</u></mark> <u>three</u> brief <u><mark>case studies of Sweden, Denmark and Germany</u></mark>. <u>Consistent with</u> the results from our <u>quantitative analysis,</u> the <u><mark>legalization</u></mark> of prostitution has <u><mark>led to <strong>substantial scale effects in these</mark> cases</u></strong>. <u>Both the <mark>cross-country comparisons</u></mark> among Sweden, Denmark and Germany, with their different prostitution regimes, <u><mark>as well as</mark> the <mark>temporal</mark> <mark>comparison</u></mark> within Germany <u>before and after</u> the further <u>legalization</u> of prostitution, <u><mark>suggest</u></mark> that any <u>compositional changes in the share of trafficked individuals</u> among all prostitutes <u>have been</u> <u>small and <mark>the substitution effect has</u></mark> therefore <u><mark>been <strong>dominated</mark> by the scale effect</u></strong>. Naturally, this qualitative evidence is also somewhat tentative as there is no “smoking gun” proving that the scale effect dominates the substitution effect and that the legalization of prostitution definitely increases inward trafficking flows. The problem here lies in the clandestine nature of both the prostitution and trafficking markets, making it difficult, perhaps impossible, <u>to find hard evidence establishing this relationship. <mark>Our central finding</u></mark>, i.e., that countries with legalized prostitution experience a larger reported incidence of trafficking inflows, <u><mark>is</u></mark> <u>therefore <strong><mark>best regarded as</mark> being based on <mark>the most reliable existing data</u></strong></mark>, but needs to be subjected to future scrutiny. More research in this area is definitely warranted, but it will require the collection of more reliable data to establish firmer conclusions. </p>
| null |
1NC
|
2NC L/Turn Wall
| 430,318 | 23 | 17,057 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,292 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Washington Elizondo-Micovic
|
Stone
|
1AC - Prostitution
1NC - Trafficking Adv CP Decrim CP Politics Case
2NC - CPs Case
1NR - Politics
2NR - Adv CP Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,624 |
Structural violence is the largest proximate cause of war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation
|
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4
|
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4
|
Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. , the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. . Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified They harbor the “priming” that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life
|
central to our approach is a blurring of wartime and peacetime violence Close attention to the “little” violences produced in structures of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons it is absolutely necessary to make existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. an even greater risk lies in in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices daily enacted by “ordinary” citizens These are “invisible” genocides because they are right before our eyes and war crimes are ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically in the extreme context of war it is essential that we exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity of ordinary people, to enforce genocidal like crimes There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence mass violence is socially incremental and often experienced as expected, routine They harbor the priming that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life
|
(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22) **Answers no root cause- because there is no root cause we must be attentative to structural inequality of all kinds because it primes people for broader violence- our impact is about the scale of violence and the disproportionate relationship between that scale and warfare, not that one form of social exclusion comes first
This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).
| 13,177 |
<h4><strong>Structural violence is the largest proximate cause of war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation</h4><p>Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4</p><p></strong>(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22) **Answers no root cause- because there is no root cause we must be attentative to structural inequality of all kinds because it primes people for broader violence- our impact is about the scale of violence and the disproportionate relationship between that scale and warfare, not that one form of social exclusion comes first</p><p>This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). <u>Absolutely <mark>central</mark> <mark>to our approach</mark> <mark>is a blurring of</mark> categories and distinctions between <mark>wartime and peacetime violence</mark>. <mark>Close attention to the “little” violences produced in</mark> the <mark>structures</mark>, habituses, and mentalites <mark>of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities</mark>.</u> More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. <u>The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which <strong><mark>humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons</strong></mark> and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder.</u> We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, <u><mark>it is absolutely necessary to make</mark> just such <mark>existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times.</u></mark> Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and <u>there is), <mark>an even greater</mark> <mark>risk</mark> <mark>lies in</mark> failing to sensitize ourselves, <mark>in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices</mark> and sentiments <mark>daily enacted</mark> as normative behavior <mark>by “ordinary”</mark> good-enough <mark>citizens</mark>. Peacetime crimes</u>, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), <u>constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides”</u> to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. <u><mark>These are “invisible” genocides</mark> not <mark>because they are</mark> secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite.</u> As Wittgenstein observed<u>, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are <mark>right before our eyes and</mark> therefore taken for granted.</u> In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. <u>Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that <mark>war crimes are</mark> merely <mark>ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically</mark> and dramatically <mark>in the extreme context of war</u></mark>. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. <u>The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? </u>What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end <u><mark>it is essential that we</mark> recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to <mark>exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the</mark> less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded <mark>everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts</mark> <mark>and policies</mark> <mark>possible</u></mark> (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. <u>Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency”</u> (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” <u><mark>Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence</mark> <mark>allows us to see the capacity</mark> and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - <mark>of ordinary people,</mark> the practical technicians of the social consensus, <mark>to enforce genocidal</mark>-<mark>like</mark> <mark>crimes</mark> against categories of rubbish people. <mark>There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life</mark>. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment.</u> Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence<u>. <mark>Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence</mark> and genocide.</u> But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. <u>Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations.</u> It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting <u>that <mark>mass violence</mark> is part of a continuum, and that it <mark>is socially incremental and often experienced</mark> by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - <mark>as expected, routine</mark>, even justified</u>. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. <u><mark>They harbor the</u></mark> early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the <u>“<mark>priming</mark>”</u> (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) <u><mark>that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life</u></mark> and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 16,028 | 483 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,625 |
Each term in the resolution is necessary to establish a reasonable limit on the number of possible affirmatives:
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Each term in the resolution is necessary to establish a reasonable limit on the number of possible affirmatives:</h4>
| null | null |
1NC
| 430,317 | 1 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,626 |
The illegal market is also a threat to public health
|
Kelly 13
|
Kelly 13 Emily Kelly, Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Spring, 2013 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1317 NOTE: INTERNATIONAL ORGAN TRAFFICKING CRISIS: SOLUTIONS ADDRESSING THE HEART OF THE MATTER lexis
[*1324] With regard to recipients, the dangers of receiving medical care in developing countries can outweigh the benefits of life-saving transplant tourism. n66 Because governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV. n67 Tragically, transplant tourists also have "a higher cumulative incidence of acute [organ] rejection in the first year after transplantation." n68 Transplant tourism also harms global public health policies. n69 Most notably, the underground market impedes the success of legal organ donation frameworks. n70 For example, Thai patients have difficulty accessing health care because local doctors are preoccupied with the lucrative practice of treating transplant tourists. n71 In 2007, China banned transplant tourism because wealthy foreigners--rather than the 1.5 million Chinese on the waiting list--received an overwhelming amount of organ transplants. n72 Grisly tales of transplant tourism and conspiracy theories surrounding organ theft may also discourage individuals from agreeing to altruistic donation upon death out of fear that their bodies may be exploited. n73 This further contributes to the global organ shortage and exacerbates the underlying causes of OTC trafficking. n74 Additionally, transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. n75 Because such bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across borders upon returning to their home countries. n76 As a result of these effects, transplant tourism has drawn increasing attention to the root of the problem: organ shortages. n77
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More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in the number of immunocompromised hosts in the last decade, there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts in endemic and non-endemic settings The epidemiologic reasons for the growing number of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients include increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries and ( many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases
|
More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in immunocompromised hosts there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts in endemic and non-endemic settings The epidemiologic reasons include increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries and transplant tourism’
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Increasing reliance on the illegal market means the threat is serious
Franco-Paredes 10 Carlos Franco-Paredes, Jesse T. Jacob. Alicia Hidrona, Alfonso J. Rodriguez-Morales,David Kuhara, and Angela M. Caliendoa all with Division of Infectious Diseases, Emory University School of Medicine except Redriguez-Morales at Division of Immunoparasitology, Tropical Medicine Institute, Universidad Central de Venezuela International Journal of Infectious Diseases Volume 14, Issue 3, March 2010, Pages e189–e196 Transplantation and tropical infectious diseases http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1201971209002045
More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in the number of immunocompromised hosts.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 Most of the literature in infectious diseases in transplantation has focused on common pathogens prevalent in industrialized Western countries, where most transplantation surgeries occur.1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 However, in the last decade, there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts in endemic and non-endemic settings.3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 The epidemiologic reasons for the growing number of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients include: (1) increasing travel of transplanted patients to the tropics and subtropics;8, 12 and 13 (2) increasing population immigration from endemic areas for tropical infections to non-endemic settings;6, 14 and 15 (3) increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries;11, 16, 17, 18 and 19 and (4) many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases.20 and 21 In general, transmission of these infections occurs through three main routes: donor-derived infections,3, 4, 6, 15 and 22 reactivation or recrudescence of latent infections,16, 22, 23 and 24 or transmission de novo during the post-transplant period.4 and 16 Infectious pathogens may be carried by the graft or the infection may be acquired through transfusion of blood products during or after the transplantation.3, 4
| 2,194 |
<h4>The illegal market is also a threat to public health</h4><p><strong>Kelly 13</strong> Emily Kelly, Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Spring, 2013 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1317 NOTE: INTERNATIONAL ORGAN TRAFFICKING CRISIS: SOLUTIONS ADDRESSING THE HEART OF THE MATTER lexis</p><p> [*1324] With regard to recipients, the dangers of receiving medical care in developing countries can outweigh the benefits of life-saving transplant tourism. n66 <u><mark>Because governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV</u></mark>. n67 Tragically, transplant tourists also have "a higher cumulative incidence of acute [organ] rejection in the first year after transplantation." n68 <u><mark>Transplant tourism</u></mark> also <u><mark>harms global public health policies</u></mark>. n69 Most notably, the underground market impedes the success of legal organ donation frameworks. n70 For example, Thai patients have difficulty accessing health care because local doctors are preoccupied with the lucrative practice of treating transplant tourists. n71 In 2007, China banned transplant tourism because wealthy foreigners--rather than the 1.5 million Chinese on the waiting list--received an overwhelming amount of organ transplants. n72 Grisly tales of transplant tourism and conspiracy theories surrounding organ theft may also discourage individuals from agreeing to altruistic donation upon death out of fear that their bodies may be exploited. n73 This further contributes to the global organ shortage and exacerbates the underlying causes of OTC trafficking. n74 <u>Additionally, <mark>transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria</mark>.</u> n75 <u><mark>Because such bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across borders</mark> upon returning to their home countries</u>. n76<strong> As a result of these effects, transplant tourism has drawn increasing attention to the root of the problem: organ shortages. n77</p><p>Increasing reliance on the illegal market means the threat is serious</p><p>Franco-Paredes</strong> <strong>10 </strong> Carlos Franco-Paredes, Jesse T. Jacob. Alicia Hidrona, Alfonso J. Rodriguez-Morales,David Kuhara, and Angela M. Caliendoa all with Division of Infectious Diseases, Emory University School of Medicine except Redriguez-Morales at Division of Immunoparasitology, Tropical Medicine Institute, Universidad Central de Venezuela International Journal of Infectious Diseases Volume 14, Issue 3, March 2010, Pages e189–e196 Transplantation and tropical infectious diseases http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1201971209002045</p><p><u><mark>More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in</mark> the number of <mark>immunocompromised hosts</u></mark>.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 Most of the literature in infectious diseases in transplantation has focused on common pathogens prevalent in industrialized Western countries, where most transplantation surgeries occur.1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 However, <u>in the last decade, <mark>there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts in endemic and non-endemic settings</u></mark>.3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 <u><mark>The epidemiologic reasons</mark> for the growing number of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients <mark>include</u></mark>: (1) increasing travel of transplanted patients to the tropics and subtropics;8, 12 and 13 (2) increasing population immigration from endemic areas for tropical infections to non-endemic settings;6, 14 and 15 (3) <u><mark>increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries</u></mark>;11, 16, 17, 18 and 19 <u><mark>and</mark> (</u>4) <u>many individuals traveling overseas for ‘<mark>transplant tourism’</mark> in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases</u>.20 and 21 In general, transmission of these infections occurs through three main routes: donor-derived infections,3, 4, 6, 15 and 22 reactivation or recrudescence of latent infections,16, 22, 23 and 24 or transmission de novo during the post-transplant period.4 and 16 Infectious pathogens may be carried by the graft or the infection may be acquired through transfusion of blood products during or after the transplantation.3, 4</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,319 | 6 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,627 |
Best Evidence from Netherlands prove
|
Raymond ‘3
|
Raymond ‘3 [Janice G. Raymond “Ten Reasons for Not Legalizing Prostitution And a Legal Response to the Demand for Prostitution” Journal of Trauma Practice, 2, 2003: pp. 315-332; and in Prostitution, Trafficking and Traumatic Stress. Melissa Farley (Ed.). Binghamton: Haworth Press, 2003]
|
Legalization/decriminalization of prostitution and the sex industry promotes sex trafficking 80% of women in the brothels of the Netherlands were trafficked from other countries the International Organization of Migration (IOM) stated that in the Netherlands alone, “nearly 70 % of trafficked women were from CEEC Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Europe report that traffickers use the work permits to bring foreign women into the Dutch prostitution industry, masking the fact that women have been trafficked, by coaching them to describe themselves as independent “migrant sex workers” In the year since lifting the ban on brothels in the Netherlands, eight Dutch victim support organizations reported an increase in the number of victims of trafficking, and twelve victim support organization reported that the number of victims from other countries has not diminished The sheer volume of foreign women in the German prostitution industry suggests that these women were trafficked into Germany, a process euphemistically described as facilitated migration. It is almost impossible for poor women to facilitate their own migration, underwrite the costs of travel and travel documents, and set themselves up in “business” without intervention
| null |
2. Legalization/decriminalization of prostitution and the sex industry promotes sex trafficking. Legalized or decriminalized prostitution industries are one of the root causes of sex trafficking. One argument for legalizing prostitution in the Netherlands was that legalization would help to end the exploitation of desperate immigrant women who had been trafficked there for prostitution. However, one report found that 80% of women in the brothels of the Netherlands were trafficked from other countries (Budapest Group, 1999)(1). In 1994, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) stated that in the Netherlands alone, “nearly 70 % of trafficked women were from CEEC [Central and Eastern European Countries]” (IOM, 1995, p. 4). The government of the Netherlands presents itself as a champion of anti-trafficking policies and programs, yet it has removed every legal impediment to pimping, procuring and brothels. In the year 2000, the Dutch Ministry of Justice argued in favor of a legal quota of foreign “sex workers,” because the Dutch prostitution market demanded a variety of “bodies” (Dutting, 2001, p. 16). Also in 2000, the Dutch government sought and received a judgment from the European Court recognizing prostitution as an economic activity, thereby enabling women from the European Union and former Soviet bloc countries to obtain working permits as “sex workers” in the Dutch sex industry if they could prove that they are self employed. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Europe report that traffickers use the work permits to bring foreign women into the Dutch prostitution industry, masking the fact that women have been trafficked, by coaching them to describe themselves as independent “migrant sex workers” (Personal Communication, Representative of the International Human Rights Network, 1999). In the year since lifting the ban on brothels in the Netherlands, eight Dutch victim support organizations reported an increase in the number of victims of trafficking, and twelve victim support organization reported that the number of victims from other countries has not diminished (Bureau NRM, 2002, p. 75). Forty-three of the 348 municipalities (12%) in the Netherlands choose to follow a no-brothel policy, but the Minister of Justice has indicated that the complete banning of prostitution within any municipality could conflict with the federally guaranteed “right to free choice of work” (Bureau NRM, 2002, p.19). The first steps toward legalization of prostitution in Germany occurred in the 1980s. By 1993, it was widely recognized that 75% of the women in Germany’s prostitution industry were foreigners from Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay and other countries in South America (Altink, 1993, p. 33). After the fall of the Berlin wall, 80% of the estimated 10,000 women trafficked into Germany were from Central and Eastern Europe and CIS countries (IOM. 1998a , p. 17). In 2002, prostitution in Germany was established as a legitimate job after years of being legalized in tolerance zones. Promotion of prostitution, pimping and brothels are now legal in Germany. The sheer volume of foreign women in the German prostitution industry suggests that these women were trafficked into Germany, a process euphemistically described as facilitated migration. It is almost impossible for poor women to facilitate their own migration, underwrite the costs of travel and travel documents, and set themselves up in “business” without intervention. In 1984, a Labor government in the Australian State of Victoria introduced legislation to legalize prostitution in brothels. Subsequent Australian governments expanded legalization culminating in the Prostitution Control Act of 1994. Noting the link between legalization of prostitution and trafficking in Australia, the US Department of State observed: “Trafficking in East Asian women for the sex trade is a growing problem…lax laws – including legalized prostitution in parts of the country – make [anti-trafficking] enforcement difficult at the working level” (U.S. Department of State, 2000, p. 6F).
| 4,083 |
<h4><strong> Best Evidence from Netherlands prove</h4><p>Raymond ‘3 </strong>[Janice G. Raymond “Ten Reasons for Not Legalizing Prostitution And a Legal Response to the Demand for Prostitution” Journal of Trauma Practice, 2, 2003: pp. 315-332; and in Prostitution, Trafficking and Traumatic Stress. Melissa Farley (Ed.). Binghamton: Haworth Press, 2003] </p><p>2.<u><strong> Legalization/decriminalization of prostitution and the sex industry promotes sex trafficking</u></strong>. Legalized or decriminalized prostitution industries are one of the root causes of sex trafficking. One argument for legalizing prostitution in the Netherlands was that legalization would help to end the exploitation of desperate immigrant women who had been trafficked there for prostitution. However, one report found that <u><strong>80% of women in the brothels of the Netherlands were trafficked from other countries</u></strong> (Budapest Group, 1999)(1). In 1994, <u><strong>the International Organization of Migration (IOM) stated that in the Netherlands alone, “nearly 70 % of trafficked women were from CEEC</u></strong> [Central and Eastern European Countries]” (IOM, 1995, p. 4). The government of the Netherlands presents itself as a champion of anti-trafficking policies and programs, yet it has removed every legal impediment to pimping, procuring and brothels. In the year 2000, the Dutch Ministry of Justice argued in favor of a legal quota of foreign “sex workers,” because the Dutch prostitution market demanded a variety of “bodies” (Dutting, 2001, p. 16). Also in 2000, the Dutch government sought and received a judgment from the European Court recognizing prostitution as an economic activity, thereby enabling women from the European Union and former Soviet bloc countries to obtain working permits as “sex workers” in the Dutch sex industry if they could prove that they are self employed. <u><strong>Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Europe report that traffickers use the work permits to bring foreign women into the Dutch prostitution industry, masking the fact that women have been trafficked, by coaching them to describe themselves as independent “migrant sex workers”</u></strong> (Personal Communication, Representative of the International Human Rights Network, 1999). <u><strong>In the year since lifting the ban on brothels in the Netherlands, eight Dutch victim support organizations reported an increase in the number of victims of trafficking, and twelve victim support organization reported that the number of victims from other countries has not diminished</u></strong> (Bureau NRM, 2002, p. 75). Forty-three of the 348 municipalities (12%) in the Netherlands choose to follow a no-brothel policy, but the Minister of Justice has indicated that the complete banning of prostitution within any municipality could conflict with the federally guaranteed “right to free choice of work” (Bureau NRM, 2002, p.19). The first steps toward legalization of prostitution in Germany occurred in the 1980s. By 1993, it was widely recognized that 75% of the women in Germany’s prostitution industry were foreigners from Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay and other countries in South America (Altink, 1993, p. 33). After the fall of the Berlin wall, 80% of the estimated 10,000 women trafficked into Germany were from Central and Eastern Europe and CIS countries (IOM. 1998a , p. 17). In 2002, prostitution in Germany was established as a legitimate job after years of being legalized in tolerance zones. Promotion of prostitution, pimping and brothels are now legal in Germany. <u><strong>The sheer volume of foreign women in the German prostitution industry suggests that these women were trafficked into Germany, a process euphemistically described as facilitated migration. It is almost impossible for poor women to facilitate their own migration, underwrite the costs of travel and travel documents, and set themselves up in “business” without intervention</u></strong>. In 1984, a Labor government in the Australian State of Victoria introduced legislation to legalize prostitution in brothels. Subsequent Australian governments expanded legalization culminating in the Prostitution Control Act of 1994. Noting the link between legalization of prostitution and trafficking in Australia, the US Department of State observed: “Trafficking in East Asian women for the sex trade is a growing problem…lax laws – including legalized prostitution in parts of the country – make [anti-trafficking] enforcement difficult at the working level” (U.S. Department of State, 2000, p. 6F).</p>
| null |
1NC
|
2NC L/Turn Wall
| 431,927 | 40 | 17,057 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,292 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Washington Elizondo-Micovic
|
Stone
|
1AC - Prostitution
1NC - Trafficking Adv CP Decrim CP Politics Case
2NC - CPs Case
1NR - Politics
2NR - Adv CP Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,628 |
“US should” proscribes both a stable agent and mechanism
|
Ericson ‘03
|
Ericson ‘03
|
The Debater’s Guide
each topic contains certain key elements . 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should that urges action For example, should adopt means to put a policy into action though governmental means The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur.
|
each topic contains An agent doing the acting The U S should adopt The verb should urges action should means to put a policy into action though governmental means The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur
|
(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)
The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.
| 1,420 |
<h4><strong>“US should” proscribes both a stable agent and mechanism</h4><p>Ericson ‘03</p><p></strong>(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., <u>The Debater’s Guide</u>, Third Edition, p. 4)</p><p>The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, <u><mark>each topic contains</mark> certain key elements</u>, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions<u>. 1. <mark>An agent doing the acting</mark> ---“The United States” in “<mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>should adopt</u></mark> a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, <u>the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. <mark>The verb should</u></mark>—the first part of a verb phrase <u>that <mark>urges action</u></mark>. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. <u>For example, <mark>should</mark> adopt</u> here <u><strong><mark>means to put a</u></strong></mark> program or <u><strong><mark>policy into action though governmental means</u></strong></mark>. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. <u><mark>The <strong>entire debate</strong> is about whether something ought to occur</mark>.</u> What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side<strong> in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose. </p></strong>
| null | null |
1NC
| 1,149 | 3,809 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,629 |
antibiotic-resistance risks extinction
|
MacKenzie 13
|
MacKenzie 13 Debora MacKenzie 13 March 2013 New Scientist Antibiotic resistance an 'apocalyptic threat' http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21729084.000-antibiotic-resistance-an-apocalyptic-threat.html
|
ANTIBIOTIC resistance poses an "apocalyptic" threat to human health. We are facing "nightmare bacteria our predicament is even worse than these words suggest, with antibiotic-resistant bacteria out of control in some areas.
|
ANTIBIOTIC resistance poses an "apocalyptic" threat to human health. We are facing "nightmare bacteria our predicament is even worse with antibiotic-resistant bacteria out of control
|
ANTIBIOTIC resistance poses an "apocalyptic" threat to human health. We are facing "nightmare bacteria" and are losing a "war" against them. Such language, in statements made over the past week by the top UK and US medical authorities – normally a very cautious breed – reflects the enormity of the situation they feel we must now confront. In fact, our predicament is even worse than these words suggest, with antibiotic-resistant bacteria out of control in some areas. What's more, New Scientist can reveal that effective new drugs may already exist – but are stuck in the final stages of development because they cannot overcome economic and regulatory hurdles.
| 664 |
<h4>antibiotic-resistance risks extinction</h4><p><strong>MacKenzie 13</strong> Debora MacKenzie 13 March 2013 New Scientist Antibiotic resistance an 'apocalyptic threat' http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21729084.000-antibiotic-resistance-an-apocalyptic-threat.html </p><p><u><mark>ANTIBIOTIC resistance poses an "apocalyptic" threat to human health. We are facing "nightmare bacteria</u></mark>" and are losing a "war" against them. Such language, in statements made over the past week by the top UK and US medical authorities – normally a very cautious breed – reflects the enormity of the situation they feel we must now confront. In fact, <u><mark>our predicament is even worse</mark> than these words suggest, <mark>with antibiotic-resistant bacteria out of control</mark> in some areas.</u> What's more, New Scientist can reveal that effective new drugs may already exist – but are stuck in the final stages of development because they cannot overcome economic and regulatory hurdles. </p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,319 | 6 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,630 |
Germany
|
Cho et al ’10
|
Cho et al ’10 [Cho, Seo-Young; Dreher, Axel; Neumayer, Eric, Department of Economics, Alfred-Weber-Institute for Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science “Does Legalized Prostitution Increase Human Trafficking?” Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers, No. 96 January 2012]
|
prostitution in Germany is regulated by law the number of prostitutes in Germany is 25 more than 60 times that of Sweden . In terms of human trafficking victims, the ILO estimated the stock of victims in Germany in 2004 to be approximately 32,800 – about 62 times more than in Sweden the share of trafficked individuals among all prostitutes appears to be quite similar in both countries, corroborating the view that any compositional differences across prohibitionist and legalized prostitution regimes are likely to be small the number of trafficked prostitutes increased upon fully legalizing prostitution in 2002, as well as in 2003 This is consistent with our result from the quantitative analysis indicating a positive correlation between the legal status of prostitution and inward trafficking.
|
the number of prostitutes in Germany is 25 more than 60 times that of Sweden the ILO estimated the stock of victims in Germany in 2004 to be approximately 32,800 compositional differences across prohibitionist and legalized prostitution regimes are likely to be small. the number of trafficked prostitutes increased upon fully legalizing prostitution in 2002 This is consistent with our ntitative analysis indicating a positive correlation between the legal status of prostitution and inward trafficking
|
Contrary to Sweden, Germany introduced a more liberal prostitution law in 2002. Today, prostitution in Germany is regulated by law and regarded as a ‘regular job’ subject to tax payment and retirement schemes (Di Nicola et al., 2005). Prior to 2002, Germany only allowed individual, self-employed prostitution without third party involvement. Having a liberal prostitution regime, Germany is known to have one of the largest prostitution markets in Europe, with about 150,000 people working as prostitutes (Global report data used in Danailova-Trainor and Belser, 2006). This means that the number of prostitutes in Germany is 25 more than 60 times that of Sweden, while having a population (82 million inhabitants) less than 10 times larger. In terms of human trafficking victims, the ILO estimated the stock of victims in Germany in 2004 to be approximately 32,800 – about 62 times more than in Sweden (Danailova-Trainor & Belser, 2006). Again, the share of trafficked individuals among all prostitutes appears to be quite similar in both countries, corroborating the view that any compositional differences across prohibitionist and legalized prostitution regimes are likely to be small. Additionally, Di Nicola et al. (2005) provide annual estimates of trafficking victims used for sexual exploitation in Germany over the 1996-2003 period, which can shed some light on the changing number of trafficked prostitutes. The estimates show that the number of victims gradually declined between 1996/97, the first years of data collection, and 2001, when the minimum estimate was 9,870 and the maximum 19,740.37 However, this number increased upon fully legalizing prostitution in 2002, as well as in 2003, rising to 11,080- 22,160 and 12,350-24,700, respectively.38 This is consistent with our result from the quantitative analysis indicating a positive correlation between the legal status of prostitution and inward trafficking.
| 1,929 |
<h4>Germany</h4><p><strong>Cho et al ’10 </strong>[Cho, Seo-Young; Dreher, Axel; Neumayer, Eric, Department of Economics, Alfred-Weber-Institute for Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science “Does Legalized Prostitution Increase Human Trafficking?” Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers, No. 96 January 2012]</p><p>Contrary to Sweden, Germany introduced a more liberal prostitution law in 2002. Today, <u>prostitution in Germany is regulated by law</u> and regarded as a ‘regular job’ subject to tax payment and retirement schemes (Di Nicola et al., 2005). Prior to 2002, Germany only allowed individual, self-employed prostitution without third party involvement. Having a liberal prostitution regime, Germany is known to have one of the largest prostitution markets in Europe, with about 150,000 people working as prostitutes (Global report data used in Danailova-Trainor and Belser, 2006). This means that <u><mark>the number of prostitutes in Germany is 25 more than 60 times that of Sweden</u></mark>, while having a population (82 million inhabitants) less than 10 times larger<u>. In terms of human trafficking victims, <mark>the ILO estimated the stock of victims in Germany in 2004 to be approximately 32,800</mark> – about 62 times more than in Sweden</u> (Danailova-Trainor & Belser, 2006). Again, <u>the share of trafficked individuals among all prostitutes appears to be quite similar in both countries, corroborating the view that any <mark>compositional differences across prohibitionist and legalized prostitution regimes are likely to be small</u>.</mark> Additionally, Di Nicola et al. (2005) provide annual estimates of trafficking victims used for sexual exploitation in Germany over the 1996-2003 period, which can shed some light on<u> <mark>the</u></mark> changing <u><mark>number of trafficked prostitutes</u></mark>. The estimates show that the number of victims gradually declined between 1996/97, the first years of data collection, and 2001, when the minimum estimate was 9,870 and the maximum 19,740.37 However, this number <u><mark>increased upon fully legalizing prostitution in 2002</mark>, as well as in 2003</u>, rising to 11,080- 22,160 and 12,350-24,700, respectively.38 <u><mark>This is consistent with our</mark> result from the qua<mark>ntitative analysis indicating a positive correlation between the legal status of prostitution and inward trafficking</mark>.</p></u>
| null |
2NC
|
Trafficking
| 430,320 | 5 | 17,057 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,292 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Washington Elizondo-Micovic
|
Stone
|
1AC - Prostitution
1NC - Trafficking Adv CP Decrim CP Politics Case
2NC - CPs Case
1NR - Politics
2NR - Adv CP Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,631 |
Legalize means to make lawful by judicial or legislative sanction
|
Business Dictionary No Date
|
Business Dictionary No Date, "legalize", www.businessdictionary.com/definition/legalize.html
|
legalize Definition To make enforceable, justifiable, or lawful by judicial or legislative sanction.
|
legalize Definition To make lawful by judicial or legislative sanction
|
legalize¶ Definition¶ To make enforceable, justifiable, or lawful by judicial or legislative sanction.
| 102 |
<h4><strong>Legalize means to make lawful by judicial or legislative sanction</h4><p>Business Dictionary No Date</strong>, "legalize", www.businessdictionary.com/definition/legalize.html</p><p><u><mark>legalize</u></mark>¶ <u><mark>Definition</u></mark>¶ <u><mark>To make</mark> enforceable, justifiable, or <mark>lawful by judicial or legislative sanction</mark>.</p></u>
| null | null |
1NC
| 430,325 | 65 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,632 |
Violation – there are 3,108 death row inmates in the US in a population of 320 million
|
Death Penalty Focus 13
|
Death Penalty Focus 13 http://deathpenalty.org/article.php?id=86
| null | null |
TOTAL NUMBER OF DEATH ROW INMATES IN THE USA: 3,108
| 51 |
<h4>Violation – there are 3,108 death row inmates in the US in a population of 320 million</h4><p><strong>Death Penalty Focus 13</strong> http://deathpenalty.org/article.php?id=86</p><p>TOTAL NUMBER OF DEATH ROW INMATES IN THE USA: 3,108</p>
| null | null |
T
| 430,323 | 1 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
7
|
Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
|
1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,633 |
Infectious disease risks extinction
Franca et al. 13 (R. Franca, Department of Pharmacology, School of Medicine of Ribeirao Preto, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, C. C. de Silva, Department of General Biology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, S.O. De Paula, Laboratory of Molecular Immunovirology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, “Recent Advances in Molecular Medicine Techniques for the Diagnosis, Prevention, and Control of Infectious Diseases,” Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, submitted November 26, 2012, published January 22, 2013, pg. 1)In recent years we have observed great advances in our ability to combat infectious diseases. Through the development of novel genetic methodologies, including a better understanding of pathogen biology, pathogenic mechanisms, advances in vaccine development, designing new therapeutic drugs, and optimization of diagnostic tools, significant infectious diseases are now better controlled. Here, we briefly describe recent reports in the literature concentrating on infectious disease control. The focus of this review is to describe the molecular methods widely used in the diagnosis, prevention, and control of infectious diseases with regard to the innovation of molecular techniques. Since the list of pathogenic microorganisms is extensive, we emphasize some of the major human infectious diseases (AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, rotavirus, herpes virus, viral hepatitis, and dengue fever). As a consequence of these developments, infectious diseases will be more accurately and effectively treated; safe and effective vaccines are being developed and rapid detection of infectious agents now permits countermeasures to avoid potential outbreaks and epidemics. But, despite considerable progress, infectious diseases remain a strong challenge to human survival. Introduction Despite the great advances in medicine, particularly in new therapeutic drugs, diagnostic tools, and even ways to pre- vent diseases, the human species still faces serious health problems. Among these problems, those that draw the most attention are infectious diseases, especially in poor regions. An important feature of infectious disease is its potential to arise globally, as exemplified by known devastating past and present pandemics such as the bubonic–pneumonic plague, Spanish flu (1918 influenza pandemic), and the present pandemic of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), in which an estimated 33.3 million persons were living with the HIV infection worldwide at the end of 2009 [1–3]. In addition, other non-viral diseases are significant public health problems, as exemplified by tuberculosis (TB). This infectious disease accounts for one third of the world’s bacterial infections (TB infected), and in 2010 a total of 8.8 million people worldwide became sick with TB [1, 4]. In recent years, new forms of infectious diseases have become significantly important to medical and scientific communities; these forms are now widely known as emergent and re-emergent infectious diseases. With the appearance of new transmissible diseases, such as SARS, West Nile and H5N1/H1N1 Influenza viruses, in addition to reemerging diseases like dengue fever, the concerns about a global epidemic are not unfounded [5]. Moreover, in the tropical and subtropical regions of the world, parasitic infections are a common cause of death. Since one of the major characteristics of infectious diseases is its inter-individual transmission, advances in personal protection, effective public policy, and immunological procedures are efficient means of controlling the spread of these diseases. Thus, improvement of pre-existing technologies commonly used to monitor, prevent, and treat infectious diseases is of crucial importance not only to the medical community, but also to humankind.
|
Franca et al. 13
| null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Infectious disease risks extinction </h4><p><strong>Franca et al. 13</strong> (R. Franca, Department of Pharmacology, School of Medicine of Ribeirao Preto, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, C. C. de Silva, Department of General Biology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, S.O. De Paula, Laboratory of Molecular Immunovirology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, “Recent Advances in Molecular Medicine Techniques for the Diagnosis, Prevention, and Control of Infectious Diseases,” Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, submitted November 26, 2012, published January 22, 2013, pg. 1)In recent years we have observed great advances in our ability to combat infectious diseases. Through the development of novel genetic methodologies, including a better understanding of pathogen biology, pathogenic mechanisms, advances in vaccine development, designing new therapeutic drugs, and optimization of diagnostic tools, significant infectious diseases are now better controlled. Here, we briefly describe recent reports in the literature concentrating on infectious disease control. The focus of this review is to describe the molecular methods widely used in the diagnosis, prevention, and control of infectious diseases with regard to the innovation of molecular techniques. Since the list of pathogenic microorganisms is extensive, we emphasize some of the major human infectious diseases (AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, rotavirus, herpes virus, viral hepatitis, and dengue fever). As a consequence of these developments, infectious diseases will be more accurately and effectively treated; safe and effective vaccines are being developed and rapid detection of infectious agents now permits countermeasures to avoid potential outbreaks and epidemics. But, despite considerable progress<u>, <mark>infectious diseases remain a strong challenge to human survival</u>.</mark> Introduction Despite the great advances in medicine, particularly in new therapeutic drugs, diagnostic tools, and even ways to pre- vent diseases, the human species still faces serious health problems. <u>Among these problems, those that draw the most attention are infectious diseases, especially in poor regions. <mark>An important feature of infectious disease is its potential to arise globally, as exemplified by known devastating past and present pandemics such</mark> as the bubonic</u>–pneumonic <u>plague,</u> Spanish flu (1918 influenza pandemic), <u>and the present pandemic of</u> human immunodeficiency virus <u>(<mark>HIV)</mark>,</u> in which an estimated 33.3 million persons were living with the HIV infection worldwide at the end of 2009 [1–3]. In addition, other non-viral diseases are significant public health problems, as exemplified by tuberculosis (TB). This infectious disease accounts for one third of the world’s bacterial infections (TB infected), and in 2010 a total of 8.8 million people worldwide became sick with TB [1, 4]. In recent years, new forms of infectious diseases have become significantly important to medical and scientific communities; these forms are now widely known as emergent and re-emergent infectious diseases. With the appearance of new transmissible diseases, such as SARS, West Nile and H5N1/H1N1 Influenza viruses, <u><mark>in addition to reemerging diseases</mark> like dengue fever, <mark>the concerns about a global epidemic are not unfounded</mark> </u>[5]. Moreover, in the tropical and subtropical regions of the world, parasitic infections are a common cause of death. Since one of the major characteristics of infectious diseases is its inter-individual transmission, advances in personal protection, effective public policy, and immunological procedures are efficient means of controlling the spread of these diseases. Thus, improvement of pre-existing technologies commonly used to monitor, prevent, and treat infectious diseases is of crucial importance not only to the medical community, but also to humankind.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,322 | 1 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,634 |
Germany proves legalization increases trafficking
|
Bramham 6 don't acknowledge that it is not a job of choice SECTION: EDITORIAL; Pg. C4 lexis
|
Bramham 6 Daphne Bramham, Vancouver Sun The Vancouver Sun (British Columbia) December 16, 2006 Prostitution is a crime -- against prostitutes: THE LAW I By calling them 'sex-trade workers,' the legalizers and decriminalizers don't acknowledge that it is not a job of choice SECTION: EDITORIAL; Pg. C4 lexis
|
In Germany, where prostitution is legal, only one in every 10 of the licensed prostitutes was born there. Even so, with more than 400,000 licensed prostitutes in the country, it means 40,000 are daughters and sisters from local neighbourhoods.¶ The other 360,000 were seduced or coerced from poor countries in the former Soviet bloc, Africa and Asia by the prospect of money and a better life.
|
In Germany where prostitution is legal, only one in 10 prostitutes was born there 40,000 are daughters and sisters from local neighbourhoods The other 360,000 were seduced or coerced from poor countries by the prospect of money and a better life
|
In Germany, where prostitution is legal, only one in every 10 of the licensed prostitutes was born there. Even so, with more than 400,000 licensed prostitutes in the country, it means 40,000 are daughters and sisters from local neighbourhoods.¶ The other 360,000 were seduced or coerced from poor countries in the former Soviet bloc, Africa and Asia by the prospect of money and a better life.
| 393 |
<h4>Germany proves legalization increases trafficking</h4><p><strong>Bramham 6</strong> Daphne Bramham, Vancouver Sun The Vancouver Sun (British Columbia) December 16, 2006 Prostitution is a crime -- against prostitutes: THE LAW I By calling them 'sex-trade workers,' the legalizers and decriminalizers<u><strong> don't acknowledge that it is not a job of choice SECTION: EDITORIAL; Pg. C4 lexis</p><p></strong><mark>In Germany</mark>, <mark>where prostitution is legal, only one in</mark> every <mark>10</mark> of the licensed <mark>prostitutes was born there</mark>. Even so, with more than 400,000 licensed prostitutes in the country, it means <mark>40,000 are daughters and sisters from local neighbourhoods</mark>.¶ <mark>The other 360,000 were seduced or coerced from poor countries</mark> in the former Soviet bloc, Africa and Asia <mark>by the prospect of money and a better life</mark>.</p></u>
| null |
2NC
|
Trafficking
| 430,324 | 1 | 17,057 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,292 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Washington Elizondo-Micovic
|
Stone
|
1AC - Prostitution
1NC - Trafficking Adv CP Decrim CP Politics Case
2NC - CPs Case
1NR - Politics
2NR - Adv CP Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,635 |
Our interpretation is key to limits – the aff opens the floodgates to an infinite number of affirmatives that legalize areas for specific populations only – creates all sorts of unpredictable affs like online gambling for particular firms, legal marijuana for NFL athletes that dodge all the topic Das and drastically distort the literature.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Our interpretation is key to limits – the aff opens the floodgates to an infinite number of affirmatives that legalize areas for specific populations only – creates all sorts of unpredictable affs like online gambling for particular firms, legal marijuana for NFL athletes that dodge all the topic Das and drastically distort the literature. </h4>
| null | null |
T
| 430,326 | 1 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
7
|
Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
|
1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,636 |
Topicality should be a voter
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><u>Topicality should be a voter</h4></u>
| null | null |
1NC
| 430,327 | 1 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,637 |
The availability of organs in the US would dry up demand in the illegal market
|
Upchurch 12
|
Upchurch 12 Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18
|
By increasing the supply of available organs in the U S through compensation, citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ If demand dried up transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible
|
By increasing the supply of available organs in the U S citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere If demand dried up , transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens
|
By increasing the supply of available organs in the United States through compensation, American citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ. For example, Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.118 If demand dried up from foreign citizens, transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure. Statistical information is difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs succinctly stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens.”119 The black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients. Rather, it is driven upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire what they need domestically.120 One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.121 Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer.”122 Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.123 The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal deficiency.124 Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.125 If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible that stories like this would become much less commonplace.
| 2,141 |
<h4>The availability of organs in the US would dry up demand in the illegal market</h4><p><strong>Upchurch 12</strong> Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination <u>of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18</p><p><mark>By increasing the supply of available organs in the U</u></mark>nited<u> <mark>S</u></mark>tates<u> through compensation, </u>American<u> <mark>citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere</mark> to pay for an organ</u>. For example, Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.118 <u><mark>If demand dried up</u> </mark>from foreign citizens<mark>, <u>transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit</u></mark> because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure. Statistical information is difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but <u><mark>presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients</mark> seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report </u>about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs<u> </u>succinctly <u>stated, “<mark>Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens</u></mark>.”119 The<u> </u>black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients. Rather, it is driven<u> </u>upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire<u> </u>what they need domestically.120 One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.121 Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer.”122 Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.123 The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal deficiency.124 Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.125 <u>If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible </u>that stories like this would become much less commonplace.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,262 | 14 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,638 |
Sweden proves a causal link
|
Cho et al ’10
|
Cho et al ’10 [Cho, Seo-Young; Dreher, Axel; Neumayer, Eric, Department of Economics, Alfred-Weber-Institute for Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science “Does Legalized Prostitution Increase Human Trafficking?” Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers, No. 96 January 2012]
|
Sweden allowed self-employed individual prostitution while prohibiting brothel operation this new law links prostitution to human trafficking and specifically states the former as an alleged cause of the latter the number of prostitutes in Sweden decreased rather substantially from 2,500 in 1999 to 1,500 in 2002, with street prostitution in particular decreasing by between 30-50% after the prohibition of prostitution
|
Sweden allowed self-employed individual prostitution while prohibiting brothel operation new law links prostitution to human trafficking and specifically states the former as an alleged cause of the latter
|
Sweden amended its prostitution law in 1999 by prohibiting all forms of commercial sex and punishing the purchase of sex with a fine or imprisonment for a maximum of six months. Prior to the amendment, Sweden allowed self-employed individual prostitution while prohibiting brothel operation (Di Nicola et al., 2005). The amendment was introduced after 23 long debates over the root causes of prostitution in Swedish society, with the new law stating that prostitution by nature is always exploitative, and that the purchase of sexual services provided by women and girls amounts to discrimination against them (Ekberg, 2004). Furthermore, this new law links prostitution to human trafficking and specifically states the former as an alleged cause of the latter (Ekberg, 2004). Ekberg estimates – based on various cases reported to the Swedish Ministry of Industry, Employment, and Communications – that the number of prostitutes in Sweden decreased rather substantially from 2,500 in 1999 to 1,500 in 2002, with street prostitution in particular decreasing by between 30-50% after the prohibition of prostitution. At the same time, Ekberg points out that even though so-called ‘hidden prostitution’ via internet and escort services may have increased, it is generally agreed that the prostitution market in Sweden contracted after prohibition, as a buyer now risks facing criminal charges for purchasing sex (Di Nicola et al., 2005; Ekberg, 2004; Jakobsson & Kotsadam, 2011). Such evidence of a shrinking market indicates that the prohibition of prostitution in this particular case has a negative scale effect on prostitution markets, as theory predicts.
| 1,655 |
<h4>Sweden proves a causal link</h4><p><strong>Cho et al ’10 </strong>[Cho, Seo-Young; Dreher, Axel; Neumayer, Eric, Department of Economics, Alfred-Weber-Institute for Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science “Does Legalized Prostitution Increase Human Trafficking?” Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers, No. 96 January 2012]</p><p>Sweden amended its prostitution law in 1999 by prohibiting all forms of commercial sex and punishing the purchase of sex with a fine or imprisonment for a maximum of six months. Prior to the amendment, <u><mark>Sweden allowed self-employed individual prostitution</mark> <mark>while prohibiting brothel operation</u></mark> (Di Nicola et al., 2005). The amendment was introduced after 23 long debates over the root causes of prostitution in Swedish society, with the new law stating that prostitution by nature is always exploitative, and that the purchase of sexual services provided by women and girls amounts to discrimination against them (Ekberg, 2004). Furthermore, <u>this <mark>new law links prostitution to human trafficking and specifically states the former as an alleged cause of the latter</u></mark> (Ekberg, 2004). Ekberg estimates – based on various cases reported to the Swedish Ministry of Industry, Employment, and Communications – that <u>the number of prostitutes in Sweden decreased rather substantially from 2,500 in 1999 to 1,500 in 2002, with street prostitution in particular decreasing by between 30-50% after the prohibition of prostitution</u>. At the same time, Ekberg points out that even though so-called ‘hidden prostitution’ via internet and escort services may have increased, it is generally agreed that the prostitution market in Sweden contracted after prohibition, as a buyer now risks facing criminal charges for purchasing sex (Di Nicola et al., 2005; Ekberg, 2004; Jakobsson & Kotsadam, 2011). Such evidence of a shrinking market indicates that the prohibition of prostitution in this particular case has a negative scale effect on prostitution markets, as theory predicts.</p>
| null |
2NC
|
Trafficking
| 430,320 | 5 | 17,057 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,292 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Washington Elizondo-Micovic
|
Stone
|
1AC - Prostitution
1NC - Trafficking Adv CP Decrim CP Politics Case
2NC - CPs Case
1NR - Politics
2NR - Adv CP Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,639 |
T is a voter because it is necessary for there to be debate
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>T is a voter because it is necessary for there to be debate</h4>
| null | null |
T
| 430,328 | 1 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
7
|
Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
|
1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,640 |
Limits
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><u>Limits</h4></u>
| null | null |
1NC
| 430,330 | 1 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,641 |
Legalizing sales in the US would take down the illegal market
|
Calandrillo 4
|
Calandrillo 4 Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis
|
if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad.
|
a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. may lead to similar structures abroad
|
Moreover, if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today's black markets lead to a host of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy's advantage. n180 Stephen Spurr details the potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality. n181 Gloria Banks decries the exploitation of society's most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection. n182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness today. n183 FOOTNOTE ATTACHED n183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that regulated markets are superior to the existing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad. On the other hand, one might argue that competing markets might lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of regulatory standards, as each country tries to gain more market share.
| 1,779 |
<h4>Legalizing sales in the US would take down the illegal market </h4><p><strong>Calandrillo 4</strong> Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis</p><p>Moreover, <u>if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, <mark>a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response</u></mark>. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today's black markets lead to a host of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy's advantage. n180 Stephen Spurr details the potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality. n181 Gloria Banks decries the exploitation of society's most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection. n182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness today. n183 FOOTNOTE ATTACHED n183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that regulated markets are superior to the existing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even <u>a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide </u>if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. <u>However, <mark>it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would <strong>significantly reduce the demand for black market organs</strong>, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S.</mark> (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) <strong><mark>may lead to similar structures abroad</strong></mark>.</u> On the other hand, one might argue that competing markets might lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of regulatory standards, as each country tries to gain more market share. </p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,264 | 17 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,642 |
Regulation doesn’t solve - incentives to ignore trafficking at all levels
|
Outshoorn ’12
|
Outshoorn ’12 [Joyce Outshoorn, Institute of Political Science, University of Leiden “Policy Change in Prostitution in the Netherlands: from Legalization to Strict Control” Sexuality Research and Social Policy 19 June 2012]
|
The traffickers had operated quite openly in the licensed sector for several years, Prostitutes want the coercion to end but will not report from fear of deportation; clients might want to help but also want to have sex; club owners and managers’ overriding concern is turnover, and they profit from low labor costs despite the risk of contravening regulations; social workers hesitate reporting, possibly jeopardizing their contact with the victim; local authorities work under pressure and want to avoid fuss; police, faced by performance measurement, are tempted to take up cases which are less time consuming and easier to prove; the public prosecutor worries whether the witnesses will turn up or the case holds in court and may abstain from prosecuting. The KLPD report questioned the distinction between the licensed and non-licensed sector it also overturned the distinction between the emancipated prostitute from the EU and the sorry victims from non-EU countries, as most of the trafficked women turned out to be EU citizens, notably from the Netherlands and Germany
|
traffickers operated quite openly in the licensed sector for several years Prostitutes want the coercion to end but will not report from fear of deportation clients want to help but also want to have sex managers’ overriding concern is turnover and they profit from low labor costs social workers hesitate jeopardizing their contact with the victim al authorities work under pressure and want to avoid fuss; police are tempted to take up cases which are less time consuming and easier to prove the public prosecutor worries whether the witnesses will turn up or the case holds in court The KLPD report overturned the distinction between the emancipated prostitute from the EU and the sorry victims as most trafficked women turned out to be EU citizens, from the Netherlands and Germany
|
The strongest indictment of the situation came in 2008 when the investigative unit of the national police published a report on human trafficking during a widely publicized case of three Turkish traffickers who ran a major prostitution network in three cities, including Amsterdam (KLPD 2008) (Originally known as the Sneep case, it is now usually called the ‘Saban B.’ case after its prime mover). At least 78 women can be regarded as the victims of the gang (idem, 11). Notable was that the majority came from the Netherlands and Germany; the others were generally from EU countries such as Ireland, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. The investigation reported many instances of severe violence against the women, including forced tattooing, coerced cosmetic surgery and even cases of forced abortion. The traffickers had operated quite openly in the licensed sector for several years, leading the researchers to investigate how this could have happened. To analyze this question, the researchers examined the entire process from the first signals of forced prostitution, for instance by a prostitute in a contact with a social welfare or health care worker or a client, to local authority granting licenses and residence permits to workers, the police who take up a signal of trafficking and report to their superiors, and finally the public prosecution and the courts. The report shows how there are barriers to signaling abuse at each stage of the entire process. Intriguing is a tentative explanation provided by the KLPD team for the failure to signal coercion and force; any potential observer may be cross-pressured by conflicting interests and turn a blind eye (idem, 104-10). Prostitutes want the coercion to end but will not report from fear of deportation; clients might want to help but also want to have sex; club owners and managers’ overriding concern is turnover, and they profit from low labor costs despite the risk of contravening regulations; social workers hesitate reporting, possibly jeopardizing their contact with the victim; local authorities work under pressure and want to avoid fuss; police, faced by performance measurement, are tempted to take up cases which are less time consuming and easier to prove; the public prosecutor worries whether the witnesses will turn up or the case holds in court and may abstain from prosecuting. The KLPD report stressed that legalization had not ended abuse in the prostitution sector. Monitoring and regulation were no guarantee that women do not work under threat of coercion. According to the preface, ‘the criminal investigation exudes threat, violence, fear and dependency. It is an illusion that a clean normal sector has emerged’ (idem, 8). The evidence emerging from the Sneep case clashed with ‘the dominant image of an almost cleansed prostitution branch’ (idem, 10), an image the researchers ascribed to earlier police reports but also to the work of the WODC teams. The KLPD report had two important effects. Firstly, it questioned the distinction between the licensed and non-licensed sector, one supposedly clean and the other criminal. Secondly, it also overturned the distinction between the emancipated prostitute from the EU and the sorry victims from non-EU countries, as most of the trafficked women turned out to be EU citizens, notably from the Netherlands and Germany. The report received widespread publicity; later one of the KLPD team further fuelled public and parliamentary debate by publishing a book about his experiences in investigating forced prostitution (Werson 2012). Another recent publication by two journalists, although extending its scope to forced labor in general, draws extensively on the KLPD reports and comes out in favour of better implementation of existing regulation as well as supporting the higher age of consent for prostitution and controlling the escort services (Roessingh and Ramesar 2011). Although there is no recent public opinion poll on attitudes towards prostitution and its regulation, the recurring media attention to all the reports, books, articles, events and incidents have in all likelihood led to a shift in public opinion about the regulation of prostitution in the 2000s.
| 4,212 |
<h4>Regulation doesn’t solve - incentives to ignore trafficking at all levels</h4><p><strong>Outshoorn ’12 </strong>[Joyce Outshoorn, Institute of Political Science, University of Leiden “Policy Change in Prostitution in the Netherlands: from Legalization to Strict Control” Sexuality Research and Social Policy 19 June 2012]</p><p>The strongest indictment of the situation came in 2008 when the investigative unit of the national police published a report on human trafficking during a widely publicized case of three Turkish traffickers who ran a major prostitution network in three cities, including Amsterdam (KLPD 2008) (Originally known as the Sneep case, it is now usually called the ‘Saban B.’ case after its prime mover). At least 78 women can be regarded as the victims of the gang (idem, 11). Notable was that the majority came from the Netherlands and Germany; the others were generally from EU countries such as Ireland, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. The investigation reported many instances of severe violence against the women, including forced tattooing, coerced cosmetic surgery and even cases of forced abortion. <u>The <mark>traffickers</mark> had <mark>operated quite openly in the licensed sector for several years</mark>,</u> leading the researchers to investigate how this could have happened. To analyze this question, the researchers examined the entire process from the first signals of forced prostitution, for instance by a prostitute in a contact with a social welfare or health care worker or a client, to local authority granting licenses and residence permits to workers, the police who take up a signal of trafficking and report to their superiors, and finally the public prosecution and the courts. The report shows how there are barriers to signaling abuse at each stage of the entire process. Intriguing is a tentative explanation provided by the KLPD team for the failure to signal coercion and force; any potential observer may be cross-pressured by conflicting interests and turn a blind eye (idem, 104-10). <u><mark>Prostitutes want the coercion to end but will not report from fear of deportation</mark>; <mark>clients</mark> might <mark>want to help but also</mark> <mark>want to have sex</mark>; club owners and <mark>managers’ overriding concern is turnover</mark>, <mark>and they profit from low labor costs</mark> despite the risk of contravening regulations; <mark>social workers hesitate</mark> reporting, possibly <mark>jeopardizing their contact with the victim</mark>; loc<mark>al authorities work under pressure and want to avoid fuss;</mark> <mark>police</mark>, faced by performance measurement, <mark>are tempted to take up cases which are less time consuming and easier to prove</mark>; <mark>the public prosecutor worries whether the witnesses will turn up or the case holds in court</mark> and may abstain from prosecuting.</u> The KLPD report stressed that legalization had not ended abuse in the prostitution sector. Monitoring and regulation were no guarantee that women do not work under threat of coercion. According to the preface, ‘the criminal investigation exudes threat, violence, fear and dependency. It is an illusion that a clean normal sector has emerged’ (idem, 8). The evidence emerging from the Sneep case clashed with ‘the dominant image of an almost cleansed prostitution branch’ (idem, 10), an image the researchers ascribed to earlier police reports but also to the work of the WODC teams. <u><mark>The KLPD report</u></mark> had two important effects. Firstly, it <u>questioned the distinction between the licensed and non-licensed sector</u>, one supposedly clean and the other criminal. Secondly, <u>it also <mark>overturned the distinction between the emancipated prostitute from the EU and the sorry victims</mark> from non-EU countries, <mark>as most</mark> of the <mark>trafficked women</mark> <mark>turned out to be EU citizens,</mark> notably <mark>from the Netherlands and Germany</u></mark>. The report received widespread publicity; later one of the KLPD team further fuelled public and parliamentary debate by publishing a book about his experiences in investigating forced prostitution (Werson 2012). Another recent publication by two journalists, although extending its scope to forced labor in general, draws extensively on the KLPD reports and comes out in favour of better implementation of existing regulation as well as supporting the higher age of consent for prostitution and controlling the escort services (Roessingh and Ramesar 2011). Although there is no recent public opinion poll on attitudes towards prostitution and its regulation, the recurring media attention to all the reports, books, articles, events and incidents have in all likelihood led to a shift in public opinion about the regulation of prostitution in the 2000s.</p>
| null |
2NC
|
Trafficking
| 430,333 | 1 | 17,057 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,292 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Washington Elizondo-Micovic
|
Stone
|
1AC - Prostitution
1NC - Trafficking Adv CP Decrim CP Politics Case
2NC - CPs Case
1NR - Politics
2NR - Adv CP Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,643 |
The United States should legalize non-physician assisted suicide for inmates on death row. The United States should provide authorization and training for non-physician officials to assist in inmates’ suicide.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States should legalize non-physician assisted suicide for inmates on death row. The United States should provide authorization and training for non-physician officials to assist in inmates’ suicide.</h4>
| null | null |
CP
| 430,331 | 1 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
7
|
Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
|
1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,644 |
The United States Federal Government should amend the National Organ Transplant Act to permit regulated sale of human organs. A government agency should be established to purchase organs, paying cash or vouchers at an adjusted market-clearing price. Organs should be placed in the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Federal Government should amend the National Organ Transplant Act to permit regulated sale of human organs. A government agency should be established to purchase organs, paying cash or vouchers at an adjusted market-clearing price. Organs should be placed in the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network</h4>
| null | null |
Plan
| 430,332 | 1 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,645 |
Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash and for debate to occur. Without limits, there can't be a rigorous testing of ideas. Advocacy and decision skills are minimized – this turns the case
|
Morson 4
|
Morson 4 - Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331
|
teachers, find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, our rebelliousness speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture. the language of academic educators sounds with all the overtones of authority We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be as oppressive and overbearing, many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance unless one is very careful. the skills of refuting an oppressive power are not openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue Hitler’s self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel Milosevic Communisit totalitarianism the Gulag, were constructed by rebels the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology seized power unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue . If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth rebels of the next generation may proceed in ongoing intolerance
|
teachers find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority We are prone to think of ourselves fighting oppression it takes work to realize we may be as oppressive maximal rebellion against authority produces greater intolerance the skills of refuting oppressive power are not openness, self-skepticism, or dialogue Hitler’s self-consciousness was precisely the rebel Milosevic Communisit totalitarianism, the Gulag, were constructed by rebels oppression comes from rebellious psychology unless they cultivated dialogue If ideological becoming is a struggle in which one has achieved truth rebels may proceed in ongoing intolerance
|
Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communisit totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance.
| 4,005 |
<h4>Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash and for debate to occur. Without limits, there can't be a rigorous testing of ideas. Advocacy and decision skills are minimized – this turns the case</h4><p><strong>Morson 4</strong> - Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331</p><p>Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As<u> <mark>teachers</mark>, </u>we<u> <mark>find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority</mark>,</u> however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because <u>our rebelliousness</u> against society at large <u>speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.</u>We speak <u>the language</u> and thoughts <u>of academic educators</u>, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, <u>sounds with all the overtones of authority </u>to our students. <u><mark>We are</mark> so <mark>prone to think of ourselves</mark> as <mark>fighting oppression</u></mark> <u>that <mark>it takes</mark> some <mark>work to realize</mark> that <strong><mark>we</mark> ourselves</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>may be</u></strong> </mark>felt <u><strong><mark>as oppressive</strong> </mark>and overbearing,</u> and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that <u>many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors.</u> There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. <u>There is something in the nature of <mark>maximal rebellion against authority</mark> that <mark>produces</mark> ever <mark>greater intolerance</u></mark>, <u>unless one is very careful.</u> For <u><strong><mark>the skills</strong> of</u></mark> fighting or <u><mark>refuting</mark> an <mark>oppressive power are not</u></mark> those of <u><mark>openness, self-skepticism, or</mark> real <mark>dialogue</u></mark>. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading <u><mark>Hitler’s</u></mark> Mein Kampf and discovering that his <u><mark>self-consciousness was precisely</mark> that of <mark>the rebel</u></mark> speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan <u><mark>Milosevic</mark> </u>exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that <u><mark>Communisit totalitarianism</u>, <u>the Gulag,</u></mark> and the unprecedented censorship <u><mark>were constructed by rebels</u></mark> who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that <u>the worst <mark>oppression comes from</mark> those who, with the <mark>rebellious psychology</u></mark> of “the insulted and humiliated,” have <u>seized power</u> – <u><mark>unless they</mark> have somehow <mark>cultivated</mark> the value of <mark>dialogue</u></mark>, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority<u>. <mark>If</mark> one’s <mark>ideological becoming is</mark> understood as <mark>a struggle in which one has</mark> at last <mark>achieved</mark> the <mark>truth</u></mark>, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and <u><mark>rebels</mark> of the next generation <mark>may proceed</u></mark> in much the same way, <u><mark>in </u></mark>an<u> <mark>ongoing</mark> </u>spiral of <u><mark>intolerance</u></mark>.</p>
| null | null |
1NC
| 97,086 | 146 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,646 |
Prostitutes won’t seek help
|
Day ’12
|
Day ’12 [Kristina Day “Addressing the Sex Trafficking Crisis: How Prostitution Laws Can Help” Creighton International and Comparative Law Journal Volume 2 p. 149-172 2012]
|
a jurisdiction that decriminalizes prostitution exacerbates the sex trafficking crisis by obstructing law enforcement’s ability to identify pimps and trafficking victims the availability of such shelters and support services will not motivate victims to get help for First, many trafficking victims do not consider themselves a victim of human trafficking Second, pimps manipulate their victims to keep them from seeking help Third, police, not shelter operators, are the only agents able to identify trafficking victims and to effectively separate the victims from the enslaving control of their traffickers
|
a jurisdiction that decriminalizes prostitution exacerbates sex trafficking by obstructing law enforcement’s ability to identify pimps and trafficking victims the availability of shelters will not motivate victims to get help many trafficking victims do not consider themselves a victim econd, pimps manipulate their victims to keep them from seeking help Third, police not shelter operators are the only agents able to identify victims and effectively separate the victims from their traffickers
|
1. Decriminalizing Acts of Prostitution Increases the Demand for Sex and Impedes on Law Enforcement’s Ability to Identify Trafficking Victims and The Traffickers Policies on prostitution in Western countries are changing rapidly.115 Over the past ten years, decriminalizing and legalizing prostitution have been the most popular solutions to combat sex trafficking.116 Many people concerned about sex trafficking victims and their need for protection understandably question whether criminalizing such victims under prostitution laws is appropriate or necessary.117 This comes out of concern for sex trafficking victims and their need for protection, not criminalization.118 However, a jurisdiction that decriminalizes prostitution exacerbates the sex trafficking crisis by obstructing law enforcement’s ability to identify pimps and trafficking victims, effectively remove the trafficking victim from the situation, and to successfully prosecute the pimps.119 Those in support of decriminalizing prostitution tend to believe that prosecuting trafficked girls is unnecessary if shelters and rehabilitation facilities are made available to them.120 However, the availability of such shelters and support services will not motivate trafficking victims, especially those who are minors, to get help for three reasons.121 First, many trafficking victims do not consider themselves a victim of human trafficking.122 Second, pimps manipulate their victims to keep them from seeking help and beat the victims into submission if they otherwise fail to obey.123 Third, police, not shelter operators, are the only agents able to identify trafficking victims and to effectively separate the victims from the enslaving control of their traffickers.124 Even if upon arrest, law enforcement diverted trafficking victims directly into a rehabilitation center, there is nothing to encourage the trafficking victim to stay unless criminal charges are pending.125 Simply making shelters and rehabilitation facilities available will not effectively keep trafficking victims from the psychological and physical clutches of their pimps.126 Thus, police jurisdiction over victims through criminal prostitution laws is the only effective, recognized means to rescue trafficking victims.127 Decriminalization does not help these victims because it creates ideal conditions for pimps and traffickers, as it prevents the police from arresting them and keeps women and children enslaved.128
| 2,463 |
<h4>Prostitutes won’t seek help</h4><p><strong>Day ’12 </strong>[Kristina Day “Addressing the Sex Trafficking Crisis: How Prostitution Laws Can Help” Creighton International and Comparative Law Journal Volume 2 p. 149-172 2012]</p><p>1. Decriminalizing Acts of Prostitution Increases the Demand for Sex and Impedes on Law Enforcement’s Ability to Identify Trafficking Victims and The Traffickers Policies on prostitution in Western countries are changing rapidly.115 Over the past ten years, decriminalizing and legalizing prostitution have been the most popular solutions to combat sex trafficking.116 Many people concerned about sex trafficking victims and their need for protection understandably question whether criminalizing such victims under prostitution laws is appropriate or necessary.117 This comes out of concern for sex trafficking victims and their need for protection, not criminalization.118 However, <u><mark>a jurisdiction that decriminalizes prostitution exacerbates</mark> the <mark>sex trafficking </mark>crisis <mark>by obstructing law enforcement’s ability to identify pimps and trafficking victims</u></mark>, effectively remove the trafficking victim from the situation, and to successfully prosecute the pimps.119 Those in support of decriminalizing prostitution tend to believe that prosecuting trafficked girls is unnecessary if shelters and rehabilitation facilities are made available to them.120 However, <u><mark>the availability of</mark> such <mark>shelters</mark> and support services <mark>will not motivate</u></mark> trafficking <u><mark>victims</u></mark>, especially those who are minors, <u><mark>to get help</mark> for</u> three reasons.121 <u>First, <mark>many trafficking victims do not consider themselves a victim</mark> of human trafficking</u>.122 <u>S<mark>econd, pimps manipulate their victims to keep them from seeking help</u></mark> and beat the victims into submission if they otherwise fail to obey.123 <u><mark>Third, police</mark>, <mark>not shelter operators</mark>, <mark>are the only agents able to identify</mark> trafficking <mark>victims</mark> <mark>and</mark> to <mark>effectively separate the victims from</mark> the enslaving control of <mark>their traffickers</u></mark>.124 Even if upon arrest, law enforcement diverted trafficking victims directly into a rehabilitation center, there is nothing to encourage the trafficking victim to stay unless criminal charges are pending.125 Simply making shelters and rehabilitation facilities available will not effectively keep trafficking victims from the psychological and physical clutches of their pimps.126 Thus, police jurisdiction over victims through criminal prostitution laws is the only effective, recognized means to rescue trafficking victims.127 Decriminalization does not help these victims because it creates ideal conditions for pimps and traffickers, as it prevents the police from arresting them and keeps women and children enslaved.128</p>
| null |
2NC
|
Trafficking
| 430,334 | 1 | 17,057 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,292 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Washington Elizondo-Micovic
|
Stone
|
1AC - Prostitution
1NC - Trafficking Adv CP Decrim CP Politics Case
2NC - CPs Case
1NR - Politics
2NR - Adv CP Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,647 |
CP PICs out of “physician assisted” part of plan---solves the case while avoiding our net-benefits.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>CP PICs out of “physician assisted” part of plan---solves the case while avoiding our net-benefits.</h4>
| null | null |
CP
| 430,335 | 1 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
7
|
Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
|
1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,648 |
Sufficient research-based preparation and debates focused on detailed points of disagreement are crucial to transforming political culture
|
Gutting 13
|
Gutting (professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame) 13
|
our political “debates” seldom deserve the name
we seldom see a direct and sustained confrontation of rival positions through the dialectic of assertion, critique, response and counter-critique. partisans typically remain safe in their ideological worlds, convincing themselves that they hold to obvious truths, while their opponents must be either knaves or fools — with no need to think through the strengths of their rivals’ positions or the weaknesses of their own.
Is there any way to make genuine debates — sustained back-and-forth exchanges part of our political culture
A first condition is that the debates be focused on specific points of major disagreement Not, “How can we improve our economy?” but “Will tax cuts for the wealthy or stimulus spending on infrastructure do more to improve our economy?” This will prevent vague statements of principle that don’t address the real issues at stake
debate should not be merely extemporaneous where too much will depend on quick-thinking and an engaging manner We want remarks to be carefully prepared and open to considered responses.
|
we seldom see a direct and sustained confrontation of rival positions through the dialectic of critique, response partisans typically remain safe in their ideological worlds while their opponents must be fools with no need to think through the strengths of their rivals’ positions
to make genuine debates part of our political culture
A first condition is that the debates be focused on specific points of major disagreement. Not, “How can we improve our economy?” but “Will tax cuts for the wealthy or stimulus on infrastructure do more to improve our economy?” This will prevent vague statements of principle that don’t address the real issues
We want remarks to be carefully prepared and open to considered responses
|
(Gary, Feb 19, A Great Debate, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/a-great-debate/?emc=eta1)
This is the year of what should be a decisive debate on our country’s spending and debt. But our political “debates” seldom deserve the name. For the most part representatives of the rival parties exchange one-liners: “The rich can afford to pay more” is met by “Tax increases kill jobs.” Slightly more sophisticated discussions may cite historical precedents: “There were higher tax rates during the post-war boom” versus “Reagan’s tax cuts increased revenues.”
Such volleys still don’t even amount to arguments: they don’t put forward generally accepted premises that support a conclusion. Full-scale speeches by politicians are seldom much more than collections of such slogans and factoids, hung on a string of platitudes. Despite the name, candidates’ pre-election debates are exercises in looking authoritative, imposing their talking points on the questions, avoiding gaffes, and embarrassing their opponents with “zingers” (the historic paradigm: “There you go again.”).
There is a high level of political discussion in the editorials and op-eds of national newspapers and magazines as well as on a number of blogs, with positions often carefully formulated and supported with argument and evidence. But even here we seldom see a direct and sustained confrontation of rival positions through the dialectic of assertion, critique, response and counter-critique.Such exchanges occur frequently in our law courts (for example, oral arguments before the Supreme Court) and in discussions of scientific papers. But they are not a significant part of our deliberations about public policy. As a result, partisans typically remain safe in their ideological worlds, convincing themselves that they hold to obvious truths, while their opponents must be either knaves or fools — with no need to think through the strengths of their rivals’ positions or the weaknesses of their own.
Is there any way to make genuine debates — sustained back-and-forth exchanges, meeting high intellectual standards but still widely accessible — part of our political culture? (I leave to historians the question of whether there are historical precedents— like the Webster-Hayne or Lincoln-Douglas debates.) Can we put our politicians in a situation where they cannot ignore challenges, where they must genuinely engage with one another in responsible discussion and not just repeat talking points?
A first condition is that the debates be focused on specific points of major disagreement. Not, “How can we improve our economy?” but “Will tax cuts for the wealthy or stimulus spending on infrastructure do more to improve our economy?” This will prevent vague statements of principle that don’t address the real issues at stake.
Another issue is the medium of the debate. Written discussions, in print or online could be easily arranged, but personal encounters are more vivid and will better engage public attention. They should not, however, be merely extemporaneous events, where too much will depend on quick-thinking and an engaging manner. We want remarks to be carefully prepared and open to considered responses.
| 3,206 |
<h4>Sufficient research-based preparation and debates focused on detailed points of disagreement are crucial to transforming political culture</h4><p><strong>Gutting</strong> (professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame) <strong>13</p><p></strong>(Gary, Feb 19, A Great Debate, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/a-great-debate/?emc=eta1)</p><p>This is the year of what should be a decisive debate on our country’s spending and debt. But <u>our political “debates” seldom deserve the name</u>. For the most part representatives of the rival parties exchange one-liners: “The rich can afford to pay more” is met by “Tax increases kill jobs.” Slightly more sophisticated discussions may cite historical precedents: “There were higher tax rates during the post-war boom” versus “Reagan’s tax cuts increased revenues.”</p><p>Such volleys still don’t even amount to arguments: they don’t put forward generally accepted premises that support a conclusion. Full-scale speeches by politicians are seldom much more than collections of such slogans and factoids, hung on a string of platitudes. Despite the name, candidates’ pre-election debates are exercises in looking authoritative, imposing their talking points on the questions, avoiding gaffes, and embarrassing their opponents with “zingers” (the historic paradigm: “There you go again.”).</p><p>There is a high level of political discussion in the editorials and op-eds of national newspapers and magazines as well as on a number of blogs, with positions often carefully formulated and supported with argument and evidence. But even here <u><mark>we seldom see a direct and sustained confrontation of rival positions through the dialectic of</mark> assertion, <mark>critique, response</mark> and counter-critique.</u>Such exchanges occur frequently in our law courts (for example, oral arguments before the Supreme Court) and in discussions of scientific papers. But they are not a significant part of our deliberations about public policy. As a result, <u><mark>partisans typically remain safe in their ideological worlds</mark>, convincing themselves that they hold to obvious truths, <mark>while their opponents must be</mark> either knaves or <mark>fools</mark> — <mark>with no need to think through the strengths of their rivals’ positions</mark> or the weaknesses of their own.</p><p>Is there any way <mark>to make genuine debates</mark> — sustained back-and-forth exchanges</u>, meeting high intellectual standards but still widely accessible — <u><mark>part of our political culture</u></mark>? (I leave to historians the question of whether there are historical precedents— like the Webster-Hayne or Lincoln-Douglas debates.) Can we put our politicians in a situation where they cannot ignore challenges, where they must genuinely engage with one another in responsible discussion and not just repeat talking points?</p><p><u><mark>A first condition is that the debates be <strong>focused on specific points of major disagreement</u></strong>. <u>Not, “How can we improve our economy?” but “Will tax cuts for the wealthy or stimulus</mark> spending <mark>on infrastructure do more to improve our economy?”</u> <u>This will prevent vague statements of principle that don’t address the real issues</mark> at stake</u>.</p><p>Another issue is the medium of the <u>debate</u>. Written discussions, in print or online could be easily arranged, but personal encounters are more vivid and will better engage public attention. They <u>should not</u>, however, <u>be merely extemporaneous</u> events, <u>where too much will depend on quick-thinking</u> <u>and an engaging manner</u>. <u><mark>We want <strong>remarks to be carefully prepared and open to considered responses</strong></mark>.</p></u>
| null | null |
1NC
| 122,847 | 48 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,649 |
A program with a government intermediary is viable means for "organ sales"
|
Wilkinson 11
|
Wilkinson 11 Stephen Wilkinson, Professor of Bioethics, Lancaster University (UK) 10-17-11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Sale of Human Organs" http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/
|
The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual sells to another But there are other possibilities too One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris who suggest that a market in human organs should have a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria. Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
|
One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris who suggest that a market in human organs should have a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
|
1. Different Kinds of Organ Sale System The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual (who needs or wants money) sells his or her kidney to another (who needs a kidney). But there are other possibilities too. One (in countries where the prior consent of the deceased is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay people living now for rights over their body after death. Another (in countries where the consent of relatives is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay relatives for transplant rights over their recently deceased loved ones' bodies. Since the kidney is the most commonly transplanted organ and since the ethics literature on organ sale is mainly about kidney sale from live donors, that is the practice on which this entry will focus. ‘Organ sale’ as the term is used here does not include the sale of body products (a category which includes blood, eggs, hair, and sperm) since this is different in some important respects. For example, the risk of permanent harm is generally much less in the case of blood and hair donation; while, the donation of eggs and sperm raises additional issues relating to the creation and parenting of additional future people. That said, many of the fundamental issues are similar and the very same concerns about (for example) exploitation and consent arise in both cases. An important preliminary point is that almost all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say: It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market. While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade: … far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required, but most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that: At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care. One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris (1994; 2003) who suggest that a market in human organs should have the following features: It is limited to a particular geopolitical area, such as a state or the European Union, with only citizens or residents of that area being allowed to sell or to receive organs. There is a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria. Direct sales are banned. Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
| 3,355 |
<h4>A program with a government intermediary is viable means for "organ sales"</h4><p><strong>Wilkinson 11</strong> Stephen Wilkinson, Professor of Bioethics, Lancaster University (UK) 10-17-11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Sale of Human Organs" <u>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/</p><p></u>1. Different Kinds of Organ Sale System <u>The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual</u> (who needs or wants money) <u>sells </u>his or her kidney <u>to another</u> (who needs a kidney). <u>But there are other possibilities too</u>. One (in countries where the prior consent of the deceased is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay people living now for rights over their body after death. Another (in countries where the consent of relatives is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay relatives for transplant rights over their recently deceased loved ones' bodies. Since the kidney is the most commonly transplanted organ and since the ethics literature on organ sale is mainly about kidney sale from live donors, that is the practice on which this entry will focus. ‘Organ sale’ as the term is used here does not include the sale of body products (a category which includes blood, eggs, hair, and sperm) since this is different in some important respects. For example, the risk of permanent harm is generally much less in the case of blood and hair donation; while, the donation of eggs and sperm raises additional issues relating to the creation and parenting of additional future people. That said, many of the fundamental issues are similar and the very same concerns about (for example) exploitation and consent arise in both cases. An important preliminary point is that almost all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say: It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market. While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade: … far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required, but most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that: At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care. <u><mark>One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris</u></mark> (1994; 2003) <u><mark>who suggest that a market in human organs should have</mark> </u>the following features: It is limited to a particular geopolitical area, such as a state or the European Union, with only citizens or residents of that area being allowed to sell or to receive organs. There is <u><mark>a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria</mark>. </u>Direct sales are banned. <u><mark>Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.</p></u></mark>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 429,540 | 21 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,650 |
Specifically, their “health” and “safety” regulations in the Kuo evidence are weak pretexts for expansive regulations of sex workers’ lives- leads to race and class hierarchies and replicates the problems of criminalization
|
Scoular 10,
|
Scoular 10, Jane, Professor of Law at University of Strathclyde, March 2010, “What's Law Got To Do With it? How and Why Law Matters in the Regulation of Sex Work,” Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 37, No. 1, Wiley Online, Accessed 9/10/14
|
Significant legislative change in the West resonates throughout the social body, appearing to threaten to disrupt associated norms. The threat of this social rupture provokes considerable anxieties on the part of certain groups, who seek to control the social order in order to preserve hegemonic forms of power relations. issues of problematic consumption prostitution) and dangerous identities have been convenient targets' for moral regulation. Prostitution appears throughout history as `a dense signifier around which a variety of social anxieties' can be expressed. moral panics around syphilis, venereal disease, and `white slavery trade' expressed wider cultural anxieties the Contagious Diseases Acts constructed the prostitute as morally and physically dangerous and vulnerable, justifying intensive ral, social, and legal regulation the public's health appeared to be secured, helping to consolidate a particular image of the nation state as healthy and enlightened, which facilitated its colonial expansion. This parallels with the present and the recent flurry of legislative activity in prostitution laws. This modern `unholy' alliance has coalesced around a crusade to combat `modern sexual slavery', the trafficked bodies of sex workers provide a useful metaphor for violated state boundaries and act as a trope for a more general politics of security the same forces have been the impetus behind efforts to legalize voluntary sex work in the Netherlands.
|
Significant legislative change in the West resonates appearing to threaten to disrupt norms. this social rupture provokes anxieties on the part of certain groups, who seek to control the social to preserve hegemonic power relations. prostitution) and dangerous identities have been convenient targets' for regulation. moral panics around disease expressed wider cultural anxieties the Contagious Diseases Acts constructed the prostitute as morally and physically vulnerable, justifying intensive ral, social, and legal regulation the public's health appeared to be secured, helping to consolidate a image of the nation state as healthy and enlightened which facilitated its colonial expansion. This parallels with present prostitution laws. the trafficked bodies of sex workers provide a useful metaphor for violated state boundaries the same forces have been the impetus behind efforts to legalize voluntary sex work
|
EXPLORING THE PARALLELS IN ABOLITIONIST AND REGULATORY APROACHES TO SEX WORK IN THE CONTEXT OF NEO-LIBERALISM The history of prostitution control shows that major reform is episodic and related to wider social transformations, to shifts in economy, culture, and `nation states'.8 Significant legislative change in the West has, for example, accompanied the period of transition from feudalism to industrialization and from that period to present-day late capitalism. Such rapid change resonates throughout the social body, appearing to threaten to disrupt the perceived social fabric and its associated norms. The threat and experience of this social rupture provokes considerable anxieties on the part of certain groups, who seek to control the social order in order to preserve hegemonic forms of power relations.9 During such periods of flux, issues of problematic consumption (alcohol, gambling, and prostitution) and dangerous identities have been convenient and familiar `targets' for programmes and campaigns of moral regulation.10 Prostitution, which combines both of these elements, thus appears throughout history as `a dense signifier around which a variety of social anxieties' can be expressed.11 Thus, during the intense social and economic transformation which characterized the Victorian era, moral panics around syphilis, venereal disease, and an imagined `white slavery trade'12 expressed wider cultural anxieties over the overlapping processes of urbanization, immigration, and women's shifting roles. Encouraged by a broad coalition of feminists and religious groups who had made saving fallen women their mission, the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1864, 1866, and 1869 constructed the prostitute as morally and physically dangerous and vulnerable, justifying the intensive moral, social, and legal regulation of many unmarried working-class women.13 In so doing, the public's individual moral and social health appeared to be secured, helping to consolidate a particular image of the nation state as healthy and enlightened, all of which facilitated its colonial expansion. As Burton notes, the spectre of sexual slavery employed in campaigns and reforms at this time operated to conceal their facilitation of a wider colonialist project.14 This parallels with the present late-modern period and the dynamics of globalization which provide much of the impetus behind the recent flurry of legislative activity in international prostitution laws. Here the major shifts and increased fluidity in the movement of people, capital, and commodities brought about by globalization and late-capitalist restructuring, alongside a burgeoning sex industry, have incited a similar broad coalition of the religious right, moral puritans, and radical feminists around an abolitionist mission.15 This modern `unholy' alliance has coalesced around a crusade to combat what it regards as `modern sexual slavery', a term applied variously to the `trafficking' of women and girls for purposes of prostitution and to commercial sex more generally. `Saving fallen women' has returned to the policy frame, yet while there is continuity with the earlier nineteenth-century campaigns, its reappearance relates to a new global economic and political context and invokes new forms of governance.16 Once again, the trafficked bodies of sex workers provide a useful metaphor for violated state boundaries and act as a trope for a more general politics of security:17 the putative re-emergence of the `white slave trade' triggered multiple initiatives intended to protect the sovereign spaces of the European Union as much as the sovereign bodies of women.18 The form these multiple initiatives have taken is contingent upon different political traditions and arrangements, meaning that the same forces (that is, globalization) have been the impetus behind what are often cast as opposing regulatory frameworks, the most notable being efforts to criminalize men in Sweden and to legalize voluntary sex work in the Netherlands.19
2
| 4,019 |
<h4>Specifically, their “health” and “safety” regulations in the Kuo evidence are weak pretexts for expansive regulations of sex workers’ lives- leads to race and class hierarchies and replicates the problems of criminalization</h4><p><strong>Scoular 10, </strong>Jane, Professor of Law at University of Strathclyde, March 2010, “What's Law Got To Do With it? How and Why Law Matters in the Regulation of Sex Work,” Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 37, No. 1, Wiley Online, Accessed 9/10/14</p><p>EXPLORING THE PARALLELS IN ABOLITIONIST AND REGULATORY APROACHES TO SEX WORK IN THE CONTEXT OF NEO-LIBERALISM The history of prostitution control shows that major reform is episodic and related to wider social transformations, to shifts in economy, culture, and `nation states'.8 <u><mark>Significant legislative change in the West</u></mark> has, for example, accompanied the period of transition from feudalism to industrialization and from that period to present-day late capitalism. Such rapid change <u><mark>resonates</mark> throughout the social body, <mark>appearing to threaten to disrupt</u></mark> the perceived social fabric and its <u>associated <mark>norms.</u> <u></mark>The threat</u> and experience <u>of <mark>this social rupture provokes</mark> considerable <mark>anxieties on the part of certain groups, who seek to control the social</mark> order in order <mark>to preserve hegemonic</mark> forms of <mark>power relations.</u></mark>9 During such periods of flux, <u>issues of problematic consumption</u> (alcohol, gambling, and <u><mark>prostitution) and dangerous identities have been convenient</mark> </u>and familiar `<u><mark>targets' for</u></mark> programmes and campaigns of <u>moral <mark>regulation.</u></mark>10 <u>Prostitution</u>, which combines both of these elements, thus <u>appears throughout history as `a dense signifier around which a variety of social anxieties' can be expressed.</u>11 Thus, during the intense social and economic transformation which characterized the Victorian era, <u><mark>moral panics around</mark> syphilis, venereal <mark>disease</mark>, and</u> an imagined <u>`white slavery trade'</u>12 <u><mark>expressed wider cultural anxieties</u></mark> over the overlapping processes of urbanization, immigration, and women's shifting roles. Encouraged by a broad coalition of feminists and religious groups who had made saving fallen women their mission, <u><mark>the Contagious Diseases Acts</u></mark> of 1864, 1866, and 1869 <u><mark>constructed the prostitute as morally and physically </mark>dangerous and <mark>vulnerable, justifying</u></mark> the <u><mark>intensive</u></mark> mo<u><strong><mark>ral, social, and legal regulation</u></strong></mark> of many unmarried working-class women.13 In so doing, <u><mark>the public's</u></mark> individual moral and social <u><mark>health appeared to be secured, helping to consolidate a</mark> particular <mark>image of the nation state as healthy and enlightened</mark>,</u> all of <u><mark>which facilitated its colonial expansion.</u></mark> As Burton notes, the spectre of sexual slavery employed in campaigns and reforms at this time operated to conceal their facilitation of a wider colonialist project.14 <u><mark>This parallels with</mark> the <mark>present</u></mark> late-modern period <u>and</u> the dynamics of globalization which provide much of the impetus behind <u>the recent flurry of legislative activity in</u> international <u><mark>prostitution laws.</u></mark> Here the major shifts and increased fluidity in the movement of people, capital, and commodities brought about by globalization and late-capitalist restructuring, alongside a burgeoning sex industry, have incited a similar broad coalition of the religious right, moral puritans, and radical feminists around an abolitionist mission.15 <u>This modern `unholy' alliance has coalesced around a crusade to combat</u> what it regards as <u>`modern sexual slavery',</u> a term applied variously to the `trafficking' of women and girls for purposes of prostitution and to commercial sex more generally. `Saving fallen women' has returned to the policy frame, yet while there is continuity with the earlier nineteenth-century campaigns, its reappearance relates to a new global economic and political context and invokes new forms of governance.16 Once again, <u><mark>the trafficked bodies of sex workers provide a useful metaphor for violated state boundaries</mark> and act as a trope for a more general politics of security</u>:17 the putative re-emergence of the `white slave trade' triggered multiple initiatives intended to protect the sovereign spaces of the European Union as much as the sovereign bodies of women.18<u> </u>The form these multiple initiatives have taken is contingent upon different political traditions and arrangements, meaning that <u><mark>the</u> <u>same forces</u></mark> (that is, globalization) <u><mark>have been the impetus behind</u></mark> what are often cast as opposing regulatory frameworks, the most notable being <u><mark>efforts to</u></mark> criminalize men in Sweden and to <u><mark>legalize</mark> <mark>voluntary sex work</mark> in the Netherlands.</u>19</p><p><strong>2</p></strong>
| null |
2NC
|
Decrim
| 430,336 | 3 | 17,057 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,292 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Washington Elizondo-Micovic
|
Stone
|
1AC - Prostitution
1NC - Trafficking Adv CP Decrim CP Politics Case
2NC - CPs Case
1NR - Politics
2NR - Adv CP Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
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Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
741,651 |
Three points of clarification
|
1. Ground is not the issue
|
1. Ground is not the issue
There is always some ground. The point is whether the negative can be reasonably prepared on those issues, and that requires limits. The absence of specific evidence prevents rigorous testing.
| null | null |
2. Abuse is a bad standard
Limits are an evaluative standard for definitions. So, it's what you justify, not what you do. Additionally, we think there is abuse, but that abuse is a bad standard because it's too subjective and it discourages research (doing less reseach makes abuse more likely)
3. We don't think debate is role playing policy makers
You're you and I'm me, and we are discussing what policy should be.
| 420 |
<h4><strong>Three points of clarification</h4><p>1. Ground is not the issue</p><p>There is always some ground. The point is whether the negative can be reasonably prepared on those issues, and that requires limits. The absence of specific evidence prevents rigorous testing.</p><p>2. Abuse is a bad standard</p><p>Limits are an evaluative standard for definitions. So, it's what you justify, not what you do. Additionally, we think there is abuse, but that abuse is a bad standard because it's too subjective and it discourages research (doing less reseach makes abuse more likely)</p><p>3. We don't think debate is role playing policy makers</p><p>You're you and I'm me, and we are discussing what policy should be.</p></strong>
| null | null |
1NC
| 430,337 | 1 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
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AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
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Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,652 |
This would maximize organ sales
|
Erin and Harris 3
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Erin and Harris 3 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester J Med Ethics 2003; 29 :141 Janet Radcliffe Richards on our modest proposal
http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/138.full.pdf+html
|
We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts.
|
We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts
|
Thus when Radcliffe Richards says: “Of course there is something undesirable about a one way international traffic from poor to rich; but that is not enough to settle the all things considered question of whether it should be allowed” she is again right. It is not enough to settle that question. Our paper was not trying to settle that question. 2 We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts. In our paper we note that:“In 1994, we made a proposal in which we outlined possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically, and in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme” and this is the proposal that we repeat in abbreviated form. The claim we make, which it seems Radcliffe Richards judges tobe too strong, is that our proposal outlines “possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically”; but note that there is a qualification to this claim, namely that if the first part of our claim is true it is so because it defends organ sales “in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme”. It may be that organ sales could be defended (possibly by Janet Radcliffe Richards and for that matter by the present authors) in a way that does not minimise such dangers. But that is not what we were trying to do in our paper.
| 1,450 |
<h4>This <strong>would maximize organ sales</h4><p>Erin and Harris 3 </strong>Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester J Med Ethics 2003; 29 :141<strong> </strong>Janet Radcliffe Richards on our modest<strong> </strong>proposal</p><p>http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/138.full.pdf+html</p><p>Thus when Radcliffe Richards says: “Of course there is something undesirable about a one way international traffic from poor to rich; but that is not enough to settle the all things considered question of whether it should be allowed” she is again right. It is not enough to settle that question. Our paper was not trying to settle that question. 2 <u><mark>We have proposed a scheme that would <strong>maximise organ sales</strong> by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts</mark>.</u> In our paper we note that:“In 1994, we made a proposal in which we outlined possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically, and in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme” and this is the proposal that we repeat in abbreviated form. The claim we make, which it seems Radcliffe Richards judges tobe too strong, is that our proposal outlines “possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically”; but note that there is a qualification to this claim, namely that if the first part of our claim is true it is so because it defends organ sales “in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme”. It may be that organ sales could be defended (possibly by Janet Radcliffe Richards and for that matter by the present authors) in a way that does not minimise such dangers. But that is not what we were trying to do in our paper.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 430,338 | 11 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,653 |
Suicide isn’t a medical problem---legalizing suicide but removing the physician and medical profession as a whole from the picture is key
|
Szasz 99
|
Thomas S. Szasz 99, psychiatrist, Fellow of the American Psychiatric Association, member of the American Psychoanalytic Association, professor of psychiatry at the State University of New York, and professor emeritus of psychiatry at the SUNY Upstate Medical University in Syracuse, “Suicide as a Moral Issue”, July 1999, published by The Foundation for Economic Education, The Freeman, 49: 41-42
|
*edited for gender
"Suicide is an event that is a part of human nature every person must confront it for himself anew, and every age must come to its own terms with it."
--Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832)
dying voluntarily is a choice intrinsic to human existence. It is our ultimate, fatal freedom. That is not how the right-thinking person today sees voluntary death: [s]he believes that no one in his right mind kills himself, that suicide is a mental health problem. Behind that belief lies a transparent evasion: relying on physicians to prevent suicide as well as to provide suicide -- and thus avoid the subject of suicide -- is an evasion of personal responsibility fatal to freedom.
the time is ripe to rethink our attitude toward suicide and its relation to the medical profession, accept suicide comfortably, and speak about it calmly we must demedicalize and destigmatize voluntary death and accept it as a behavior that has always been and will always be a part of the human condition Wanting to die cannot be a bona fide medical treatment; and it can never justify deprivation of liberty.
advances in medical technology have transformed how we die machines, transplanted organs, and immunosuppressive drugs have created choices not only about whether to live or die but also about when and how to die.
procreating voluntarily is a personal decision dying voluntarily is also a personal decision The state and the medical profession no longer interfere with birth control. They ought to stop interfering with death control.
As a society, we can choose to let people die on their own terms or force them to die on terms decreed by the dominant ethic suicide is logically anterior to physician-assisted suicide.
Over time, social attitudes toward many behaviors have changed. Suicide began as a sin, became a crime, then became a mental illness, and now some people propose transferring it into the category called "treatment," provided the cure is under the control of doctors.
Is killing oneself a voluntary act or the product of mental illness? Should physicians be permitted to use force to prevent suicide? Should they be authorized to prescribe a lethal dose of a drug for the purpose of suicide? Personal careers, professional identities, multi-billion dollar industries, legal doctrines, judicial procedures, and the life and liberty of every American hangs on how we answer these questions. Answering such questions requires no specialized knowledge of medicine or law. It requires only a willingness to open our eyes and look life -- and death -- in the eye. Evading that challenge is tantamount to denying that we are just as responsible for how we die as we are for how we live.
The person who kills [her]self sees suicide as a solution For the person who kills [her]self suicide is an action Psychiatrists maintain that suicide is the result of a disease Set against this mind set, the view that, a priori, suicide has nothing to do with illness or medicine risks being dismissed akin to asserting that cancer has nothing to do with illness or medicine.
The evidence that suicide is not a medical matter is all around us suicide is plainly not legal if it were, it would be illegal to use force to prevent suicide Instead, coercive suicide prevention is considered a life-saving treatment and helping a person kill [her]self is a felony.
For a long time, suicide was the business of the Church and the priest. Now it is the business of the State and the doctor
|
Suicide is an event that is a part of human nature
dying voluntarily is a choice intrinsic to human existence It is our ultimate fatal freedom relying on physicians to provide suicide is an evasion of personal responsibility fatal to freedom
the time is ripe to rethink our attitude toward suicide and its relation to the medical profession we must demedicalize voluntary death
procreating is a personal decision dying is also The state and the medical profession ought to stop interfering with death control
Over time social attitudes change
For the person who kills [her]self suicide is an action Psychiatrists maintain suicide is the result of a disease Set against this mind set, the view that suicide has nothing to do with medicine risks being dismissed
The evidence that suicide is not a medical matter is all around us suicide is plainly not legal if it were, it would be illegal to use force to prevent suicide Instead coercive suicide prevention is considered life-saving and helping a person kill [her]self is a felony
|
*edited for gender
"Suicide is an event that is a part of human nature. However much may have been said and done about it in the past, every person must confront it for himself anew, and every age must come to its own terms with it."
--Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832)
Behind Goethe's simple statement lies a profound truth: dying voluntarily is a choice intrinsic to human existence. It is our ultimate, fatal freedom. That is not how the right-thinking person today sees voluntary death: [s]he believes that no one in his right mind kills himself, that suicide is a mental health problem. Behind that belief lies a transparent evasion: relying on physicians to prevent suicide as well as to provide suicide -- and thus avoid the subject of suicide -- is an evasion of personal responsibility fatal to freedom.
Not long ago the right-thinking person believed that masturbation, oral sex, homosexuality, and other "unnatural acts" were medical problems whose solution was delegated to doctors. It took us a surprisingly long time to take these behaviors back from physicians, accept them comfortably, and speak about them calmly. Perhaps the time is ripe to rethink our attitude toward suicide and its relation to the medical profession, accept suicide comfortably, and speak about it calmly. To accomplish this, we must demedicalize and destigmatize voluntary death and accept it as a behavior that has always been and will always be a part of the human condition. Wanting to die or killing oneself is sometimes blameworthy, sometimes praiseworthy, and sometimes neither; it is not a disease; it cannot be a bona fide medical treatment; and it can never justify deprivation of liberty.
Increasing life expectancy, advances in medical technology, and radical changes in the regulation of drug use and the economics of health care have transformed how we die. Formerly, most people died at home. Today, most people die in a hospital. Formerly, patients who could not breathe or whose kidneys or livers or hearts failed to function died. Now, they can be kept alive by machines, transplanted organs, and immunosuppressive drugs. These developments have created choices not only about whether to live or die but also about when and how to die.
Birth and death are unique phenomena. Absent celibacy or infertility, practicing birth control -- that is, procreating voluntarily -- is a personal decision. Absent accidental or sudden death, practicing death control -- that is, dying voluntarily -- is also a personal decision. The state and the medical profession no longer interfere with birth control. They ought to stop interfering with death control.
Practicing birth control and practicing death control as well as abstaining from these practices have far-reaching consequences, for both the individual and others. Birth control is important for the young, death control, for the old. The young are often entrapped by abstaining from birth control, the old, by abstaining from death control.
As individuals, we can choose to die actively or passively, practicing death control or dying of disease or old age. As a society, we can choose to let people die on their own terms or force them to die on terms decreed by the dominant ethic. Camus maintained that suicide is the only "truly serious philosophical problem." It would be more accurate to say that suicide is our foremost moral and political problem, logically anterior to such closely related problems as the right to reject treatment or the right to physician-assisted suicide.
Faced with a particular personal conduct, we can approve, facilitate, and reward it; disapprove, hinder, and penalize it; or accept, tolerate, and ignore it. Over time, social attitudes toward many behaviors have changed. Suicide began as a sin, became a crime, then became a mental illness, and now some people propose transferring it into the category called "treatment," provided the cure is under the control of doctors.
Is killing oneself a voluntary act or the product of mental illness? Should physicians be permitted to use force to prevent suicide? Should they be authorized to prescribe a lethal dose of a drug for the purpose of suicide? Personal careers, professional identities, multi-billion dollar industries, legal doctrines, judicial procedures, and the life and liberty of every American hangs on how we answer these questions. Answering such questions requires no specialized knowledge of medicine or law. It requires only a willingness to open our eyes and look life -- and death -- in the eye. Evading that challenge is tantamount to denying that we are just as responsible for how we die as we are for how we live.
The person who kills [her]self sees suicide as a solution. If the observer views it as problem, he precludes understanding the suicide just as surely as he would preclude understanding a Japanese speaker if [s]he assumed that he is hearing garbled English. For the person who kills [her]self or plans to kill [her]self, suicide is, eo ipso, an action. Psychiatrists, however, maintain that suicide is a happening, the result of a disease: as coronary arteriosclerosis causes myocardial infarction, so clinical depression causes suicide. Set against this mind set, the view that, a priori, suicide has nothing to do with illness or medicine, which is my view, risks being dismissed as an act of intellectual know-nothingness, akin to asserting that cancer has nothing to do with illness or medicine.
The evidence that suicide is not a medical matter is all around us. We are proud that suicide is no longer a crime, yet it is plainly not legal; if it were, it would be illegal to use force to prevent suicide and it would be legal to help a person kill himself. Instead, coercive suicide prevention is considered a life-saving treatment and helping a person kill [her]self is (in most jurisdictions) a felony.
Supporters and opponents of policies concerning troubling social issues -- such as slavery, pornography, abortion -- have always invoked a sacred authority or creed to justify the policies they favored. Formerly, God, the Bible, the Church; now, the Constitution, Law, Medicine. It is an unpersuasive tactic: too many deplorable social policies have been justified by appeals to Scriptural, Constitutional, and Medical sanctions.
The question of who should control when and how we die is one of the most troubling issues we face today. The debate is in full swing. Once again, the participants invoke the authority of the Bible, the Constitution, and Medicine to cast the decisive ballot in favor of their particular program. It is a spineless gambit: persons who promote particular social policies do so because they believe that their policies are superior to the policies of their adversaries. Accordingly, they ought to defend their position on the grounds of their own moral vision, instead of trying to disarm opponents by appealing to a sanctified authority.
For a long time, suicide was the business of the Church and the priest. Now it is the business of the State and the doctor. Eventually we will make it our own business, regardless of what the Bible or the Constitution or Medicine supposedly tells us about it.
| 7,212 |
<h4>Suicide isn’t a medical problem---legalizing suicide but removing the physician and medical profession <u>as a whole</u> from the picture is key</h4><p>Thomas S. <strong>Szasz 99</strong>, psychiatrist, Fellow of the American Psychiatric Association, member of the American Psychoanalytic Association, professor of psychiatry at the State University of New York, and professor emeritus of psychiatry at the SUNY Upstate Medical University in Syracuse, “Suicide as a Moral Issue”, July 1999, published by The Foundation for Economic Education, The Freeman, 49: 41-42</p><p><u>*edited for gender</p><p>"<mark>Suicide is an event that is a part of human nature</u></mark>. However much may have been said and done about it in the past, <u>every person must confront it for himself anew, and every age must come to its own terms with it." </p><p><strong>--Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) </p><p></u></strong>Behind Goethe's simple statement lies a profound truth: <u><mark>dying voluntarily is a choice intrinsic to human existence</mark>. <mark>It is our ultimate</mark>, <mark>fatal freedom</mark>. That is not how the right-thinking person today sees voluntary death: [s]he believes that no one in his right mind kills himself, that suicide is a mental health problem. Behind that belief lies a transparent evasion: <strong><mark>relying on physicians</strong></mark> to prevent suicide as well as <strong><mark>to provide suicide</strong></mark> -- and thus avoid the subject of suicide -- <strong><mark>is an evasion of personal responsibility fatal to freedom</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>Not long ago the right-thinking person believed that masturbation, oral sex, homosexuality, and other "unnatural acts" were medical problems whose solution was delegated to doctors. It took us a surprisingly long time to take these behaviors back from physicians, accept them comfortably, and speak about them calmly. Perhaps <u><strong><mark>the time is ripe to rethink our attitude toward suicide and its relation to the medical profession</mark>, accept suicide comfortably, and speak about it calmly</u></strong>. To accomplish this, <u><mark>we must <strong>demedicalize</strong></mark> and destigmatize <mark>voluntary death</mark> and accept it as a behavior that has always been and will always be a part of the human condition</u>. <u>Wanting to die</u> or killing oneself is sometimes blameworthy, sometimes praiseworthy, and sometimes neither; it is not a disease; it <u>cannot be a bona fide medical treatment; and it can never justify deprivation of liberty. </p><p></u>Increasing life expectancy, <u>advances in medical technology</u>, and radical changes in the regulation of drug use and the economics of health care <u>have transformed how we die</u>. Formerly, most people died at home. Today, most people die in a hospital. Formerly, patients who could not breathe or whose kidneys or livers or hearts failed to function died. Now, they can be kept alive by <u>machines, transplanted organs, and immunosuppressive drugs</u>. These developments <u><strong>have created choices not only about whether to live or die but also about when and how to die. </p><p></u></strong>Birth and death are unique phenomena. Absent celibacy or infertility, practicing birth control -- that is, <u><mark>procreating</mark> voluntarily</u> -- <u><mark>is a personal decision</u></mark>. Absent accidental or sudden death, practicing death control -- that is, <u><mark>dying</mark> voluntarily</u> -- <u><mark>is also</mark> a personal decision</u>. <u><mark>The state and the medical profession</mark> no longer interfere with birth control. <strong>They <mark>ought to stop interfering with death control</mark>. </p><p></u></strong>Practicing birth control and practicing death control as well as abstaining from these practices have far-reaching consequences, for both the individual and others. Birth control is important for the young, death control, for the old. The young are often entrapped by abstaining from birth control, the old, by abstaining from death control. </p><p>As individuals, we can choose to die actively or passively, practicing death control or dying of disease or old age. <u>As a society, we can choose to let people die on their own terms or force them to die on terms decreed by the dominant ethic</u>. Camus maintained that suicide is the only "truly serious philosophical problem." It would be more accurate to say that <u>suicide is</u> our foremost moral and political problem, <u>logically anterior to</u> such closely related problems as the right to reject treatment or the right to <u>physician-assisted suicide. </p><p></u>Faced with a particular personal conduct, we can approve, facilitate, and reward it; disapprove, hinder, and penalize it; or accept, tolerate, and ignore it. <u><mark>Over time</mark>, <mark>social attitudes</mark> toward many behaviors have <mark>change</mark>d. Suicide began as a sin, became a crime, then became a mental illness, and now some people propose transferring it into the category called "treatment," provided the cure is under the control of doctors. </p><p>Is killing oneself a voluntary act or the product of mental illness? Should physicians be permitted to use force to prevent suicide? Should they be authorized to prescribe a lethal dose of a drug for the purpose of suicide? Personal careers, professional identities, multi-billion dollar industries, legal doctrines, judicial procedures, and the life and liberty of every American hangs on how we answer these questions. Answering such questions requires no specialized knowledge of medicine or law. It requires only a willingness to open our eyes and look life -- and death -- in the eye. Evading that challenge is tantamount to denying that we are just as responsible for how we die as we are for how we live. </p><p>The person who kills [her]self sees suicide as a solution</u>. If the observer views it as problem, he precludes understanding the suicide just as surely as he would preclude understanding a Japanese speaker if [s]he assumed that he is hearing garbled English. <u><mark>For the person who kills [her]self</u></mark> or plans to kill [her]self, <u><mark>suicide is</u></mark>, eo ipso, <u><mark>an action</u></mark>. <u><mark>Psychiatrists</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>maintain</mark> that <mark>suicide is</mark> </u>a happening, <u><mark>the result of a disease</u></mark>: as coronary arteriosclerosis causes myocardial infarction, so clinical depression causes suicide. <u><mark>Set against this mind set, the view that</mark>, a priori, <mark>suicide has <strong>nothing to do with</strong></mark> illness or <strong><mark>medicine</u></strong></mark>, which is my view, <u><mark>risks being dismissed</u></mark> as an act of intellectual know-nothingness, <u>akin to asserting that cancer has nothing to do with illness or medicine. </p><p><strong><mark>The evidence that suicide is not a medical matter is all around us</u></strong></mark>. We are proud that <u><mark>suicide</u></mark> is no longer a crime, yet it <u><strong><mark>is plainly not legal</u></strong></mark>; <u><mark>if it were, it would be illegal to use force to prevent suicide</u></mark> and it would be legal to help a person kill himself. <u><mark>Instead</mark>, <mark>coercive suicide prevention is considered</mark> a <mark>life-saving</mark> treatment <mark>and helping a person kill [her]self is</u></mark> (in most jurisdictions) <u><mark>a felony</mark>. </p><p></u>Supporters and opponents of policies concerning troubling social issues -- such as slavery, pornography, abortion -- have always invoked a sacred authority or creed to justify the policies they favored. Formerly, God, the Bible, the Church; now, the Constitution, Law, Medicine. It is an unpersuasive tactic: too many deplorable social policies have been justified by appeals to Scriptural, Constitutional, and Medical sanctions. </p><p>The question of who should control when and how we die is one of the most troubling issues we face today. The debate is in full swing. Once again, the participants invoke the authority of the Bible, the Constitution, and Medicine to cast the decisive ballot in favor of their particular program. It is a spineless gambit: persons who promote particular social policies do so because they believe that their policies are superior to the policies of their adversaries. Accordingly, they ought to defend their position on the grounds of their own moral vision, instead of trying to disarm opponents by appealing to a sanctified authority. </p><p><u>For a long time, suicide was the business of the Church and the priest. Now it is the business of the State and the doctor</u><strong>. Eventually we will make it our own business, regardless of what the Bible or the Constitution or Medicine supposedly tells us about it.</p></strong>
| null | null |
CP
| 430,340 | 11 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
7
|
Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
|
1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,654 |
Turn – legalization increases STI contraction because of the two-tier system
|
Bindel & Kelly 03
|
Bindel & Kelly 03 (Julie Bindel and Liz Kelly, Child and Woman Abuse Studies Unit, London Metropolitan University, 2003, “A Critical Examination of Responses to Prostitution in Four Countries: Victoria, Australia; Ireland; the Netherlands; and Sweden”, http://nordicbaltic-assistwomen.net/IMG/pdf/Study_in_4_countries_Kelly_Bindel.pdf)
|
Since changes to laws regulating the sex industry there have been increasing anecdotal reports that prostitution has become a more dangerous occupation
the increased controls of the legal sector in Australia had pushed many women into the illegal sector where there was an increased risk of HIV infection
Women take appropriate steps to avoid unsafe sexual practices
The majority went frequently for sexual health checks; and
There were still no reports of prostitutes with HIV
In Victoria between there has been a 91per cent increase in number of women presenting with HIV infections ithin the general increase of 56 per cent
|
changes to laws regulating the sex industry have been increasing reports that prostitution has become a more dangerous occupation
the increased controls of the legal sector pushed many women into the illegal sector there was an increased risk of HIV infection,
there has been a 91per cent increase in number of women presenting with HIV infections the general increase of 56 per cent
|
Since changes to laws regulating the sex industry in Queensland in 1992, there have been increasing anecdotal reports that prostitution has become a more dangerous occupation (Banach, 1999).
In 1991 the PCV argued that the increased controls of the legal sector in Australia had pushed many women into the illegal sector, where there was an increased risk of HIV infection, and limited access to the PCV and peer support (Dobinson 1991: 118).
In 1994, PCV found that:
• Women take appropriate steps to avoid unsafe sexual practices
• The majority went frequently for sexual health checks; and
• There were still no reports of prostitutes with HIV. But:
• 63 per cent of women worried about contracting an STD through prostitution; and 23 per cent had had an STD while involved in prostitution (Pyett, Haste & Snow 1994: pp 2, 4, 21, 22);
In Victoria between 2000 and 2002 there has been a 91per cent increase in number of women presenting with HIV infections, within the general increase of 56 per cent (Altman 2002). A study in Melbourne, Victoria, found that 40 per cent of customers had used prostituted women without wearing condoms (Louie, 1998).
| 1,163 |
<h4><strong>Turn – legalization increases STI contraction because of the two-tier system </h4><p>Bindel & Kelly 03</strong> (Julie Bindel and Liz Kelly, Child and Woman Abuse Studies Unit, London Metropolitan University, 2003, “A Critical Examination of Responses to Prostitution in Four Countries: Victoria, Australia; Ireland; the Netherlands; and Sweden”, http://nordicbaltic-assistwomen.net/IMG/pdf/Study_in_4_countries_Kelly_Bindel.pdf)</p><p><u><strong>Since<mark> changes to laws regulating the sex industry</u></strong></mark> in Queensland in 1992, <u><strong>there <mark>have been increasing </mark>anecdotal <mark>reports</mark> <mark>that prostitution has become a more dangerous occupation</mark> </u></strong>(Banach, 1999). </p><p>In 1991 the PCV argued that <u><strong><mark>the increased controls of the legal sector</mark> in Australia had <mark>pushed many women into the illegal sector</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>where <mark>there was an increased risk of HIV infection</u></strong>,</mark> and limited access to the PCV and peer support (Dobinson 1991: 118). </p><p>In 1994, PCV found that: </p><p>• <u><strong>Women take appropriate steps to avoid unsafe sexual practices</u></strong> </p><p>• <u><strong>The majority went frequently for sexual health checks; and</u></strong> </p><p>• <u><strong>There were still no reports of prostitutes with HIV</u></strong>. But: </p><p>• 63 per cent of women worried about contracting an STD through prostitution; and 23 per cent had had an STD while involved in prostitution (Pyett, Haste & Snow 1994: pp 2, 4, 21, 22); </p><p><u><strong>In Victoria between</u></strong> 2000 and 2002 <u><strong><mark>there has been a 91per cent increase in number of women presenting with HIV infections</u></strong></mark>, w<u><strong>ithin <mark>the general increase of 56 per cent</u></strong></mark> (Altman 2002). A study in Melbourne, Victoria, found that 40 per cent of customers had used prostituted women without wearing condoms (Louie, 1998). </p>
| null |
2NC
|
Decrim
| 430,341 | 2 | 17,057 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,292 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Washington Elizondo-Micovic
|
Stone
|
1AC - Prostitution
1NC - Trafficking Adv CP Decrim CP Politics Case
2NC - CPs Case
1NR - Politics
2NR - Adv CP Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,655 |
Text: John and I legalize workless non-physician assisted suicide
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Text: John and I legalize workless non-physician assisted suicide</h4>
| null | null |
1NC
| 430,339 | 1 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,656 |
Trust in doctors is high but can’t be taken for granted
|
Riner, 14
|
Riner, 14 – MD, emergency physician
[Myles, MedPage, 2-15-14, www.kevinmd.com/blog/2014/02/patients-lost-trust-doctors.html, accessed 8-24-14]
|
didn’t a Gallup poll recently reveal trust in doctors moved to an all-time high of 70% over the last ten years? That’s true. we still have the trust of our patients it is incumbent on physicians to recognize they need to earn this trust, and not take it for granted; to watchdog their profession and those who practice it; to monitor themselves to guard against the insidious intrusion of the business of medicine on the practice of medicine. this is no easy task.
|
didn’t a Gallup poll recently reveal trust in doctors moved to an all-time high of 70% over the last ten years? That’s true we still have the trust of our patients it is incumbent on physicians to recognize they need to earn this trust, not take it for granted to watchdog their profession to guard against the insidious intrusion of the business of medicine on the practice of medicine this is no easy task.
|
But didn’t a Gallup poll recently reveal that trust in doctors moved to an all-time high of 70% over the last ten years? That’s true. Perhaps all of this hand wringing I just went through is based on an incorrect assumption: we still have the trust of our patients (especially compared to the public’s trust in lawyers, stockbrokers, and members of Congress). Great. I hope this poll is accurate: but members of Congress are at the bottom of the poll at 7%, and yet they all keep getting re-elected. Perhaps those polled were thinking “I love my doctor, but I’m not sure about those other guys.” Regardless, I think it is incumbent on physicians to recognize they need to earn this trust, and not take it for granted; to watchdog their profession and those who practice it; to monitor themselves and how incentives impact their behavior and their care; to promote respect from the public and the media; and to guard against the insidious intrusion of the business of medicine on the practice of medicine. As someone who advocates actively for fair payment for physician services; I can assure you this is no easy task.
| 1,125 |
<h4><strong>Trust in doctors is high but can’t be taken for granted</h4><p>Riner, 14</strong> – MD, emergency physician </p><p>[Myles, MedPage<u><strong>, 2-15-14, www.kevinmd.com/blog/2014/02/patients-lost-trust-doctors.html, accessed 8-24-14]</p><p></u></strong>But <u><strong><mark>didn’t a Gallup poll recently reveal</u></strong> </mark>that <u><strong><mark>trust in doctors moved to an all-time high of 70% over the last ten years? That’s true</mark>.</u></strong> Perhaps all of this hand wringing I just went through is based on an incorrect assumption: <u><strong><mark>we still have the trust of our patients</u></strong></mark> (especially compared to the public’s trust in lawyers, stockbrokers, and members of Congress). Great. I hope this poll is accurate: but members of Congress are at the bottom of the poll at 7%, and yet they all keep getting re-elected. Perhaps those polled were thinking “I love my doctor, but I’m not sure about those other guys.” Regardless, I think <u><strong><mark>it is incumbent on physicians to recognize they need to earn this trust, </mark>and <mark>not take it for granted</mark>; <mark>to watchdog their profession</mark> and those who practice it; to monitor themselves </u></strong>and how incentives impact their behavior and their care; to promote respect from the public and the media; and <u><strong><mark>to guard against the insidious intrusion of the business of medicine on the practice of medicine</mark>.</u></strong> As someone who advocates actively for fair payment for physician services; I can assure you <u><strong><mark>this is no easy task.</p></u></strong></mark>
| null | null |
CP
| 200,956 | 9 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
7
|
Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
|
1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,657 |
government purchaser avoids exploitation
|
Erin and Harris 3
|
Erin and Harris 3 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs
http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full
|
While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
|
we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. . The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
|
While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. A market in organs from living donors is one such option. The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
| 461 |
<h4>government purchaser avoids exploitation</h4><p><strong>Erin and Harris 3</strong> Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, <strong> </strong>J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs</p><p><u>http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full</p><p>While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, <mark>we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall.</mark> </u>A market in organs from living donors is one such option<mark>.<u> The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.</p></u></mark>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 430,342 | 13 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,658 |
Negotiators will reach a deal now- the letter didn’t destroy the process
|
CNN 3/17
|
CNN 3/17/2015 (U.S. sees progress in Iran nuclear talks as deadline nears, http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/17/politics/iran-nuclear-talks-progress/)
|
World powers and Iran have made progress in closing gaps preventing a deal on Tehran's nuclear program but issues remain The sides met in Switzerland for grueling diplomatic negotiations that are gathering speed We have definitely made progress" on technical issues talks involved enrichment, reactors, fissile materials production and how all these factor into breakout times, among other topics If the parties are successful in hammering out a framework agreement this month, they will then have until July 1 to finalize all the details State Department Spokeswoman Psaki described the discussions as "solid, substantive and difficult, but constructive Despite controversy stoked when senators sent a letter to Iran's leaders analysts believe that the talks will go on even if the end-of-March deadline slips. these negotiations are not about a letter They're about the issues at hand
| null |
World powers and Iran have made progress in closing some of the remaining gaps preventing a deal on Tehran's nuclear program, according to U.S. senior administration officials, but they warned Tuesday that difficult issues remain. The sides met in in Lausanne, Switzerland, for a third day of grueling diplomatic negotiations that are gathering speed as an end-of-March deadline for a framework deal looms. "We have definitely made progress" on technical issues — as opposed to other problem areas, such as sanctions — a U.S. official said. "There's no way around it." But the official added that "we still have some tough, tough issues to address." Tuesday's talks involved enrichment, reactors, fissile materials production and how all these factor into breakout times, among other topics, according to a senior administration official. The negotiators also discussed transparency and verification, the official said. If the parties are successful in hammering out a framework agreement this month, they will then have until July 1 to finalize all the details. State Department Spokeswoman Jen Psaki described the discussions as "solid, substantive and difficult, but constructive." She added, "We expect that will remain the case as we continue to try to close the gaps." But time may be running out for a deal in which six world powers would lift sanctions that have throttled Iran's economy in return for assurances that Tehran will continue to stay a year or so away from developing a nuclear bomb. The White House puts the chances of an agreement at only 50-50. Disputes still rage over the scale of nuclear infrastructure Iran will be allowed to keep, the pace of sanctions relief and the extent of nuclear site inspections. Despite the controversy stoked last week in Washington when 47 GOP senators sent a letter to Iran's leaders warning that the future of a deal was not guaranteed without congressional support, many analysts believe that the talks will go on even if the end-of-March deadline slips. Psaki called the letter "a distraction, and certainly a time suck," noting that the Iranians brought up concerns about its contents on the first day of this round of talks. "We continue to believe that these negotiations are not about a letter that was ill-informed or ill-advised. They're about the issues at hand," Psaki said.
Prefer our evidence because it post dates,
Additionally a draft agreement leaked, that would have Iran reduce its centrifuges, proves negotioations are making progress
| 2,510 |
<h4>Negotiators will reach a deal now- the letter didn’t destroy the process</h4><p><strong>CNN 3/17</strong>/2015 (U.S. sees progress in Iran nuclear talks as deadline nears, http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/17/politics/iran-nuclear-talks-progress/)</p><p><u><strong>World powers and Iran have made progress in closing</u></strong> some of the remaining <u><strong>gaps preventing a deal on Tehran's nuclear program</u></strong>, according to U.S. senior administration officials, <u>but</u> they warned Tuesday that difficult <u>issues remain</u>. <u>The sides met in</u> in Lausanne, <u>Switzerland</u>, <u>for</u> a third day of <u>grueling diplomatic negotiations that are <strong>gathering speed</u></strong> as an end-of-March deadline for a framework deal looms. "<u>We have definitely made progress" on technical issues </u>— as opposed to other problem areas, such as sanctions — a U.S. official said. "There's no way around it." But the official added that "we still have some tough, tough issues to address." Tuesday's <u>talks involved enrichment, reactors, fissile materials production and how all these factor into breakout times, among other topics</u>, according to a senior administration official. The negotiators also discussed transparency and verification, the official said. <u>If the parties are successful in hammering out a framework agreement this month, they will then have until July 1 to finalize all the details</u>. <u>State Department Spokeswoman</u> Jen <u>Psaki described the discussions as "solid, substantive and difficult, but constructive</u>." She added, "We expect that will remain the case as we continue to try to close the gaps." But time may be running out for a deal in which six world powers would lift sanctions that have throttled Iran's economy in return for assurances that Tehran will continue to stay a year or so away from developing a nuclear bomb. The White House puts the chances of an agreement at only 50-50. Disputes still rage over the scale of nuclear infrastructure Iran will be allowed to keep, the pace of sanctions relief and the extent of nuclear site inspections. <u>Despite</u> the <u>controversy</u> <u>stoked</u> last week in Washington <u>when</u> 47 GOP <u>senators sent a letter to Iran's leaders</u> warning that the future of a deal was not guaranteed without congressional support, many <u><strong>analysts believe that the talks will go on</u></strong> <u>even if the end-of-March deadline slips.</u> Psaki called the letter "a distraction, and certainly a time suck," noting that the Iranians brought up concerns about its contents on the first day of this round of talks. "We continue to believe that <u>these negotiations are not about a letter</u> that was ill-informed or ill-advised. <u>They're about the issues at hand</u>," Psaki said.</p><p>Prefer our evidence because it post dates,</p><p>Additionally a draft agreement leaked, that would have Iran reduce its centrifuges, proves negotioations are making progress </p>
| null |
1NR
|
Decrim
| 430,343 | 1 | 17,057 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,292 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Washington Elizondo-Micovic
|
Stone
|
1AC - Prostitution
1NC - Trafficking Adv CP Decrim CP Politics Case
2NC - CPs Case
1NR - Politics
2NR - Adv CP Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,659 |
PAS destroys trust
|
Watkins 5
|
Watkins 5 (Peter, Euthanasia – the erosion of trust? Clin Med March/April 2005 5:93-94; doi:10.7861/clinmedicine.5-2-93)
|
the majority of surveys suggest that most people are opposed to the introduction of euthanasia The dominant theme of this correspondence highlighted the inevitable loss of trust which would follow empowerment of doctors to offer euthanasia to patients ‘suffering unbearably’ in an established terminal illness trust between doctor and patient is needed to give those suffering from terminal illness compassionate care, to share the concerns of these most vulnerable patients, and bring them new hope and meaning at this time. Euthanasia, on the other hand, promotes an attitude of avoiding and not confronting issues of dependence and suffering around the time of death. If doctors are perceived as potential harbingers of death, this delicate relationship with their patients, and with society at large, is permanently altered. Fear, after all, is the opposite of trust. Trust, once lost, cannot easily be regained. Several correspondents have observed that experience in Holland suggests that at least some patients with serious diseases or disabilities fear their doctors who may regularly offer euthanasia. Trust in doctors, at least in these cases, has been destroyed teams could easily become dysfunctional and hospice work, in particular, could be fatally damaged by this legislation Legislation ignores these issues to its cost
|
people are opposed to the introduction of euthanasia the inevitable loss of trust which would follow empowerment of doctors to offer euthanasia to patients ‘suffering unbearably’ in an between doctor and patient is needed to give those suffering from terminal illness compassionate care, and bring them new hope and meaning at this time. Euthanasia promotes an attitude of avoiding and not confronting issues of dependence If doctors are perceived as potential harbingers of death, this delicate relationship with their patients, and society is permanently altered. Fear is the opposite of trust.
|
Trust is the key element which underpins every relationship, whether in marriage or friendship, between manager and employee, or between colleagues in business. Trust is also a crucial part of the relationship between professional people and those who seek their advice, and is thus essential to the success of medical consultations between doctors and patients.1 Baroness O’Neill and others have spoken eloquently regarding the damage to relationships caused by a general decline in trust in the independent judgement of professionals.2–4 The arguments for and against the introduction of euthanasia on both moral and practical grounds have been extensively presented in Clinical Medicine.5 The division of opinion both in society in general and among physicians in particular resulted in this College’s stance of ‘studied neutrality’, acknowledging that opinions are divided but not implying either indifference or support for the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2004. Yet the majority of surveys (with all their limitations) suggest that most people are opposed to the introduction of euthanasia, and this is reflected in the letters received by several officers of this College, almost all of which indicated vigorous opposition to euthanasia. The dominant theme of this correspondence highlighted the inevitable loss of trust which would follow empowerment of doctors to offer euthanasia to patients ‘suffering unbearably’ in an established terminal illness. This aspect of the euthanasia debate has not hitherto been addressed. Perhaps more than at any other time, trust between doctor and patient is needed to give those suffering from terminal illness compassionate care, to share the concerns of these most vulnerable patients, and bring them new hope and meaning at this time. Euthanasia, on the other hand, promotes an attitude of avoiding and not confronting issues of dependence and suffering around the time of death. If doctors are perceived as potential harbingers of death, this delicate relationship with their patients, and with society at large, is permanently altered. Fear, after all, is the opposite of trust. Trust, once lost, cannot easily be regained. Several correspondents have observed that experience in Holland suggests that at least some patients with serious diseases or disabilities fear their doctors who may regularly offer euthanasia. Trust in doctors, at least in these cases, has been destroyed. Correspondents also observe the likely erosion of trust between doctors, and between doctors and nurses and other members of the medical team, some of whom will inevitably be divided on the application of euthanasia. Such teams could easily become dysfunctional and hospice work, in particular, could be fatally damaged by this legislation. There is unanimity regarding the need for universal access to palliative care services. It is nevertheless accepted that even with the best care there may be occasional failure to alleviate suffering. Yet such individual cases provide a poor basis for a radical change in the law which would have universal application, not least because the recognition of the legal right of an individual to assisted dying would entail giving others the responsibility of killing. In the words of Archbishop Rowan Williams, The right to be spared avoidable pain is beyond debate – as is the right to say yes or no to certain treatments…. But once that has mutated into the right to expect assistance in dying, the responsibility of others is involved, as is the whole question of what society is saying about life and its possible meanings. Legislation ignores these issues to its cost.6
| 3,659 |
<h4><strong>PAS destroys trust </h4><p>Watkins 5</strong> (Peter, Euthanasia – the erosion of trust? Clin Med March/April 2005 5:93-94; doi:10.7861/clinmedicine.5-2-93) </p><p>Trust is the key element which underpins every relationship, whether in marriage or friendship, between manager and employee, or between colleagues in business. Trust is also a crucial part of the relationship between professional people and those who seek their advice, and is thus essential to the success of medical consultations between doctors and patients.1 Baroness O’Neill and others have spoken eloquently regarding the damage to relationships caused by a general decline in trust in the independent judgement of professionals.2–4 The arguments for and against the introduction of euthanasia on both moral and practical grounds have been extensively presented in Clinical Medicine.5 The division of opinion both in society in general and among physicians in particular resulted in this College’s stance of ‘studied neutrality’, acknowledging that opinions are divided but not implying either indifference or support for the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2004. Yet <u>the majority of surveys</u> (with all their limitations) <u>suggest that most <mark>people are opposed to the introduction of euthanasia</u></mark>, and this is reflected in the letters received by several officers of this College, almost all of which indicated vigorous opposition to euthanasia. <u>The dominant theme of this correspondence highlighted <mark>the inevitable loss of trust which would follow empowerment of doctors to offer euthanasia to patients ‘suffering unbearably’ in an</mark> established terminal illness</u>. This aspect of the euthanasia debate has not hitherto been addressed. Perhaps more than at any other time, <u>trust <mark>between doctor and patient is needed to give those suffering from terminal illness compassionate care,</mark> to share the concerns of these most vulnerable patients, <mark>and bring them new hope and meaning at this time.</mark> <mark>Euthanasia</mark>, on the other hand, <mark>promotes an attitude of avoiding and not confronting issues of dependence</mark> and suffering around the time of death. <mark>If doctors are perceived as potential harbingers of death, this delicate relationship with their patients, and</mark> with <mark>society</mark> at large, <mark>is permanently altered.</u> <u>Fear</mark>, after all, <mark>is the opposite of trust.</mark> Trust, once lost, cannot easily be regained. Several correspondents have observed that experience in Holland suggests that at least some patients with serious diseases or disabilities fear their doctors who may regularly offer euthanasia. Trust in doctors, at least in these cases, has been destroyed</u>. Correspondents also observe the likely erosion of trust between doctors, and between doctors and nurses and other members of the medical team, some of whom will inevitably be divided on the application of euthanasia. Such <u>teams could easily become dysfunctional and hospice work, in particular, could be fatally damaged by this legislation</u>. There is unanimity regarding the need for universal access to palliative care services. It is nevertheless accepted that even with the best care there may be occasional failure to alleviate suffering. Yet such individual cases provide a poor basis for a radical change in the law which would have universal application, not least because the recognition of the legal right of an individual to assisted dying would entail giving others the responsibility of killing. In the words of Archbishop Rowan Williams, The right to be spared avoidable pain is beyond debate – as is the right to say yes or no to certain treatments…. But once that has mutated into the right to expect assistance in dying, the responsibility of others is involved, as is the whole question of what society is saying about life and its possible meanings. <u>Legislation ignores these issues to its cost</u>.6</p>
| null | null |
CP
| 430,344 | 1 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
7
|
Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
|
1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,660 |
Physician-assisted suicide places the intimate act of suicide under medical elites – the demand for validation means they can’t solve
|
Salem 99
|
Salem 99 Tania Salem, “Physician-Assisted Suicide: Promoting Autonomy—Or Medicalizing Suicide?” Hastings Center Report, 29: 30–36. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/3528193/full
|
no doubt emphasis on inner individuals prevails in contemporary arguments for physician-assisted suicide Influences from the outside are seen as pernicious in subverting the main goal: the “pure” or “true” choice reached from within self-centered ethics rests on a nonrelational conception of personhood
there is a paradox underlying physician-assisted suicide It is conceived of as an intimate, existential act and indeed a response to modern medicine, but at the same time it is a request for the complicity of physicians and society
What seems unusual in the debate about aid in dying is the request for public endorsement and legitimization of the act of suicide Whereas in suicide the individual “drops out” of the social order, in the context of physician-assisted suicide the individual “drops into” a system that recognizes and must even authorize this particular choice displacing suicide from the private arena to bring it under medicine's stewardship means surrendering suicide to the (medical) “establishment
decision to die by suicide is treated precisely as if it were a set of clinical problems to be solved medically the “private self-determining” decision to commit suicide is translated into a clinical event
it cannot be seen as an act that solely expresses the ideal of individual autonomy as long as it entails assistance it implies a mutual decision and even more importantly assisted suicide presupposes that medicine has passed judgment on the act of suicide physician-assisted suicide entails an increase of medical power over death and social morality
|
emphasis on inner individuals prevails in contemporary arguments for p a s Influences from the outside are seen as pernicious in subverting the pure choice self-centered ethics rests on a nonrelational conception of personhood
there is a paradox underlying physician-assisted suicide it is a request for the complicity of physicians (and society
Whereas in suicide the individual “drops out” of the social order, in the context of physician-assisted suicide the individual “drops into” a system that recognizes and must even authorize this particular choice displacing suicide from the private arena to bring it under medicine's stewardship means surrendering suicide to the (medical) “establishment
the “private self-determining” decision to commit suicide is translated into a clinical event
it cannot be seen as an act that solely expresses the ideal of individual autonomy as long as it entails assistance even more importantly assisted suicide presupposes that medicine has passed judgment on the act of suicide physician-assisted suicide entails an increase of medical power over death and social morality
|
There is no doubt that the emphasis on inner individuals prevails in contemporary arguments for physician-assisted suicide. Influences from the outside, whether subtle or blatant, are seen as pernicious in subverting the main goal: the “pure” or “true” choice reached from within that at bottom takes account of the interests of the decisionmaker. This self-centered ethics rests on a nonrelational conception of personhood.
The second—and closely related—pillar of this discourse is the insistence that individuals be radically free to exercise their singularities and idiosyncrasies. In pluralistic societies, it is asserted, “there is far from any agreement, or near-agreement, about how one can establish as canonical a particular normative view of life.”13 Because personal styles, experiences, and beliefs are radically irreducible, it is impossible to suppose a priori that individual choices will coincide; each must find his or her own way of facing dying and death.14
Yet there is a paradox underlying physician-assisted suicide. It is conceived of as an intimate, existential act and indeed a response to modern medicine, but at the same time it is a request for the complicity of physicians (and society). In contemporary Western societies the decision to take death into one's own hands has been construed as an act that is not simply personal, private, and solitary, but contrary to social norms and expectations. From a societal perspective, the individual who commits or attempts suicide is in this sense an outsider.
What seems unusual in the debate about aid in dying is the request for public endorsement and legitimization of the act of suicide. Whereas in suicide the individual “drops out” of the social order, in the context of physician-assisted suicide the individual “drops into” a system that recognizes and must even authorize this particular (ostensibly private) choice. In other words, displacing suicide from the private arena to bring it under medicine's stewardship means surrendering suicide to the (medical) “establishment.”
The decision to die by suicide is treated precisely as if it were a set of clinical problems to be solved medically— the “private,” “intimate,” “self-determining” decision to commit suicide is translated into a clinical event.
Precisely because assisted suicide requires the connivance of others (direct from doctors, indirect from society), it cannot be seen as an act that solely expresses the ideal of individual autonomy. On the contrary, as long as it entails assistance it implies a mutual decision. Additionally, and even more importantly, more than a mutual decision, assisted suicide presupposes that medicine has passed judgment on the act of suicide. In sum, physician-assisted suicide both introduces tensions in the principle of personal autonomy and entails an increase of medical power over death and social morality.
| 2,892 |
<h4>Physician-assisted suicide places the intimate act of suicide under medical elites – the demand for validation means they can’t solve </h4><p><strong>Salem 99</strong> Tania Salem, “Physician-Assisted Suicide: Promoting Autonomy—Or Medicalizing Suicide?” Hastings Center Report, 29: 30–36. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/3528193/full</p><p>There is <u>no doubt</u> that the <u><mark>emphasis on inner individuals prevails in contemporary arguments for p</mark>hysician-<mark>a</mark>ssisted <mark>s</mark>uicide</u>. <u><mark>Influences from the outside</u></mark>, whether subtle or blatant, <u><mark>are seen as pernicious in subverting the</mark> main goal: the “<mark>pure</mark>” or “true” <mark>choice</mark> reached from within</u> that at bottom takes account of the interests of the decisionmaker. This <u><mark>self-centered ethics rests on a nonrelational conception of personhood</u></mark>.</p><p>The second—and closely related—pillar of this discourse is the insistence that individuals be radically free to exercise their singularities and idiosyncrasies. In pluralistic societies, it is asserted, “there is far from any agreement, or near-agreement, about how one can establish as canonical a particular normative view of life.”13 Because personal styles, experiences, and beliefs are radically irreducible, it is impossible to suppose a priori that individual choices will coincide; each must find his or her own way of facing dying and death.14</p><p>Yet <u><mark>there is a paradox underlying physician-assisted suicide</u></mark>. <u>It is conceived of as an intimate, existential act and indeed a response to modern medicine, but at the same time <mark>it is a request for the complicity of physicians</u> (<u>and society</u></mark>). In contemporary Western societies the decision to take death into one's own hands has been construed as an act that is not simply personal, private, and solitary, but contrary to social norms and expectations. From a societal perspective, the individual who commits or attempts suicide is in this sense an outsider.</p><p><u>What seems unusual in the debate about aid in dying is the request for public endorsement and legitimization of the act of suicide</u>. <u><mark>Whereas in suicide the individual “drops out” of the social order, in the context of physician-assisted suicide the individual “drops into” a system that recognizes and must even authorize this particular</u></mark> (ostensibly private) <u><mark>choice</u></mark>. In other words, <u><mark>displacing suicide from the private arena to bring it under medicine's stewardship means surrendering suicide to the (medical) “establishment</u></mark>.”</p><p>The <u>decision to die by suicide is treated precisely as if it were a set of clinical problems to be solved medically</u>— <u><mark>the “private</u></mark>,” “intimate,” “<u><mark>self-determining” decision to commit suicide is translated into a clinical event</u></mark>.</p><p>Precisely because assisted suicide requires the connivance of others (direct from doctors, indirect from society), <u><mark>it cannot be seen as an act that solely expresses the ideal of individual autonomy</u></mark>. On the contrary, <u><mark>as long as it entails assistance</mark> it implies a mutual decision</u>. Additionally, <u>and <mark>even more importantly</u></mark>, more than a mutual decision, <u><mark>assisted suicide presupposes that medicine has passed judgment on the act of suicide</u></mark>. In sum, <u><mark>physician-assisted suicide</u></mark> both introduces tensions in the principle of personal autonomy and <u><mark>entails an increase of medical power over death and social morality</u></mark>.</p>
| null | null |
1NC
| 430,345 | 3 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
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Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,661 |
Inequality in ability to purchase is avoided with central purchasing
|
Radcliffe-Richards et al 98
|
Radcliffe-Richards et al 98 J. Radcliffe-Richards, Department of Philosophy, the Open University, Milton Keynes et al J; Daar, A S; Guttmann, R D; Hoffenberg, R; Kennedy, I; Lock, M; Sells, R A;
|
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/pub/users/webfac/held/157_VIII.pdf
Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor. all purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution [12]
|
Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor. all purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution.
|
Tilney, N The Lancet Volume 351(9120) 27 June 1998 pp 1950-1952 The case for allowing kidney sales
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/pub/users/webfac/held/157_VIII.pdf
Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor. This argument, however, is irrelevant to the issue of organ selling as such. If organ selling is wrong for this reason, so are all benefits available to the rich, including all private medicine, and, for that matter, all public provision of medicine in rich countries (including transplantation of donated organs) that is unavailable in poor ones. Furthermore, all purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution. [12]
| 727 |
<h4>Inequality in ability to purchase is avoided with central purchasing</h4><p><strong>Radcliffe-Richards et al 98</strong> J. Radcliffe-Richards, Department of Philosophy, the Open University, Milton Keynes et al J; Daar, A S; Guttmann, R D; Hoffenberg, R; Kennedy, I; Lock, M; Sells, R A;</p><p>Tilney, N The Lancet Volume 351(9120) 27 June 1998 pp 1950-1952 The case for allowing kidney sales</p><p><u>http://elsa.berkeley.edu/pub/users/webfac/held/157_VIII.pdf</p><p><mark>Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor.</mark> </u>This argument, however, is irrelevant to the issue of organ selling as such. If organ selling is wrong for this reason, so are all benefits available to the rich, including all private medicine, and, for that matter, all public provision of medicine in rich countries (including transplantation of donated organs) that is unavailable in poor ones. Furthermore, <u><mark>all purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution</u>.<u></mark> [12]</p><p> </p></u>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 430,346 | 7 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,662 |
Iran will succeed – they’re just being smart – be suspect of their evidence
|
Dubowitz and Fixler 1-15
|
Dubowitz and Fixler 1-15 Mark Dubowitz, lecturer and senior research fellow at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto; Annie Fixler, policy analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance; January 2015, “The Case for Deadline Triggered Sanctions on Iran,” FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES, http://www.eshraf.ir/wp-content/uploads/www.eshraf.ir-FDD-Necessity_of_Sanctions.pdf
|
The Iranian threat to walk away from the negotiations is counter-historical. Iran has remained at the negotiation table for over a decade
Iran has successfully used negotiations to transform the debate from one of “Can Iran have a nuclear program?” to “How much of a nuclear program can Iran have?”
| null |
The Iranian threat to walk away from the negotiations is counter-historical. Despite multiple rounds of sanctions, Iran has remained at the negotiation table for over a decade, using talks to legitimize its nuclear weapons program and to avoid a full U.S.-led financial and trade embargo.
Iran has successfully used the JPOA period and previous negotiations to transform the debate from one of “Can Iran have a nuclear program?” to “How much of a nuclear program can Iran have?” While it is possible that Iranian negotiators might walk away temporarily from the talks, the history of the Iran talks suggests that they won’t, and if they do, they are likely to return.
| 667 |
<h4>Iran will succeed – they’re just being smart – be suspect of their evidence</h4><p><u><strong>Dubowitz and Fixler 1-15</u></strong> Mark Dubowitz, lecturer and senior research fellow at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto; Annie Fixler, policy analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance; January 2015, “The Case for Deadline Triggered Sanctions on Iran,” FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES, http://www.eshraf.ir/wp-content/uploads/www.eshraf.ir-FDD-Necessity_of_Sanctions.pdf</p><p><u><strong>The Iranian threat to walk away from the negotiations is counter-historical.</u></strong> Despite multiple rounds of sanctions, <u><strong>Iran has remained at the negotiation table for over a decade</u></strong>, using talks to legitimize its nuclear weapons program and to avoid a full U.S.-led financial and trade embargo.</p><p><u><strong>Iran has successfully used</u></strong> the JPOA period and previous <u><strong>negotiations to transform the debate from one of “Can Iran have a nuclear program?” to “How much of a nuclear program can Iran have?”</u></strong> While it is possible that Iranian negotiators might walk away temporarily from the talks, the history of the Iran talks suggests that they won’t, and if they do, they are likely to return.</p>
| null |
1NR
|
AT: Iran Says No
| 430,347 | 1 | 17,057 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,292 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Washington Elizondo-Micovic
|
Stone
|
1AC - Prostitution
1NC - Trafficking Adv CP Decrim CP Politics Case
2NC - CPs Case
1NR - Politics
2NR - Adv CP Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
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Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
741,663 |
Loss of trust makes pandemics inevitable – people won’t do what doctors recommend.
|
Prati 2011
|
Prati 2011 Gabriele, Department of Education, University of Bologna, Compliance with recommendations for pandemic influenza H1N1 2009: the role of trust and personal beliefs Health Educ. Res. (2011) 26 (5): 761-769.
|
Results showed that trust were related to all recommended behaviors. The results for trust are in line with SARS and H1N1 2009. However, this study showed that participants who complied with recommended behaviors had higher trust regardless of what they did concerning this risk there have been participants who perceived that the media had exaggerated the risks and that health ministry is not doing a good job of dealing with this risk, still they complied with recommended behaviors because of their trust in media and health ministry These results may suggest that it is important to build trust and commitment in advance of a pandemic outbreak This is especially true during emerging health threats when people may be concerned about sensationalism and may feel distrust toward the government This limited evidence calls for renewed strategies that will significantly increase stated compliance with the official recommendations in a timely and massive scale the results of the present study indicate that trust is an essential element of the communication strategy people do not infer trustworthiness from direct evidence rather from value-bearing narratives Thus, social trust depends on salient value similarity, in other words, the shared sense between the institution and the public of what are the important goals Whereas several models of health behavior recognized as key determinants of protective or preventative behavior cognitive factors this study provides further evidence for the role of emotions
|
Results show trust were related to all recommended behaviors participants who complied with recommended behaviors had higher trus regardless of what they did participants compli with recommended behaviors because their trust in health ministry. These results suggest it is important to build trust in advance of a pandemic outbreak people do not infer trustworthiness from direct evidence rather from value-bearing narratives social trust depends on salient value similarity the shared sense between the institution and the public of important goals
|
Results showed that media trust and trust in the Ministry of Health were related to all recommended behaviors. The results for trust are in line with Tang and Wong's study [8] concerning SARS and Rubin et al. study [4] concerning pandemic influenza H1N1 2009. However, this study showed that participants who complied with recommended behaviors had higher trust in media and health ministry regardless of what they did concerning this risk. In other words, there have been participants who perceived that the media had exaggerated the risks and that health ministry is not doing a good job of dealing with this risk, still they complied with recommended behaviors because of their trust in media and health ministry. These results may suggest that it is important to build trust and commitment in advance of a pandemic outbreak. This is especially true during emerging health threats when people may be concerned about sensationalism and may feel distrust toward the government [23]. In contrast with a previous study [4], we found an effect of the Topo Gigio campaign, however, this effect was limited in line with another study of evaluation of a cold/flu self-care public education campaign [19, 24]. This limited evidence calls for renewed strategies that will significantly increase stated compliance with the official recommendations in a timely and massive scale. It should be noted that a recently published study showed that exposure to media reporting or advertising coverage was associated with recommended behaviors through the mediation of perceived knowledge about swine flu and perceived efficacy of hygiene strategies [25]. While these results suggest that media campaign may have an influence on stated compliance with the official recommendations, the results of the present study indicate that trust is an essential element of the communication strategy. According to Earle and Cvetkovitch's perspective, social trust may be increased by telling stories expressing salient values that are similar to the receivers [26, 27]. More specifically, according to this perspective, people do not infer trustworthiness from direct evidence rather from value-bearing narratives. Thus, social trust depends on salient value similarity, in other words, the shared sense between the institution and the public of what are the important goals and/or processes that should be followed in a specific situation. Affective reaction to risks such as worry was found to be as important in predicting recommended behaviors as cognitive dimensions of risk perception. Whereas several models of health behavior recognized as key determinants of protective or preventative behavior cognitive factors (e.g. risk perception) [14, 15], this study provides further evidence for the role of emotions [4, 8, 11, 15–17]. In line with the literature [4, 15], we found that people who believed that there is currently a high risk of catching influenza (likelihood of infection), that it is possible to control their risk of catching this illness (control) and that did not think that the media had exaggerated the risks of catching influenza tended to comply with recommended behaviors. These findings endorse the policy of providing the public with clear consistent information, which report the risks, focuses on the practical things that people can do to reduce their risk and emphasizes the efficacy of recommended behaviors. A challenge for public health authorities is to deliver a communication aimed at increasing the perceived likelihood of infection without exaggerating the risk.
| 3,576 |
<h4>Loss of trust makes pandemics inevitable – people won’t do what doctors recommend.</h4><p><strong>Prati 2011 </strong>Gabriele, Department of Education, University of Bologna, Compliance with recommendations for pandemic influenza H1N1 2009: the role of trust and personal beliefs Health Educ. Res. (2011) 26 (5): 761-769.</p><p><u><mark>Results show</mark>ed that</u> media trust and <u><mark>trust</u></mark> in the Ministry of Health <u><mark>were related to all recommended behaviors</mark>. The results for trust are in line with</u> Tang and Wong's study [8] concerning <u>SARS and</u> Rubin et al. study [4] concerning pandemic influenza <u>H1N1 2009. However, this study showed that <mark>participants who complied with recommended</mark> <mark>behaviors had higher trus</mark>t</u> in media and health ministry <u><mark>regardless of what they did</mark> concerning this risk</u>. In other words, <u>there have been <mark>participants</mark> who perceived that the media had exaggerated the risks and that health ministry is not doing a good job of dealing with this risk, still they <mark>compli</mark>ed <mark>with</mark> <mark>recommended behaviors because</mark> of <mark>their trust in</mark> media and <mark>health ministry</u>. <u><strong>These results</mark> may <mark>suggest</mark> that <mark>it is important to build trust</mark> and commitment <mark>in advance of a pandemic outbreak</u></strong></mark>. <u>This is especially true during emerging health threats when people may be concerned about sensationalism and may feel distrust toward the government</u> [23]. In contrast with a previous study [4], we found an effect of the Topo Gigio campaign, however, this effect was limited in line with another study of evaluation of a cold/flu self-care public education campaign [19, 24]. <u>This limited evidence calls for renewed strategies that will significantly increase stated compliance with the official recommendations in a timely and massive scale</u>. It should be noted that a recently published study showed that exposure to media reporting or advertising coverage was associated with recommended behaviors through the mediation of perceived knowledge about swine flu and perceived efficacy of hygiene strategies [25]. While these results suggest that media campaign may have an influence on stated compliance with the official recommendations, <u>the results of the present study indicate that trust is an essential element of the communication strategy</u>. According to Earle and Cvetkovitch's perspective, social trust may be increased by telling stories expressing salient values that are similar to the receivers [26, 27]. More specifically, according to this perspective, <u><strong><mark>people do not infer trustworthiness from direct evidence rather from</mark> <mark>value-bearing narratives</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Thus, <mark>social trust depends on salient value similarity</mark>, in other words, <mark>the</mark> <mark>shared sense between the institution and the public of</mark> what are the <mark>important goals</u></strong></mark> and/or processes that should be followed in a specific situation. Affective reaction to risks such as worry was found to be as important in predicting recommended behaviors as cognitive dimensions of risk perception. <u>Whereas several models of health behavior recognized as key determinants of protective or preventative behavior cognitive factors</u> (e.g. risk perception) [14, 15], <u>this study provides further evidence for the role of emotions</u> [4, 8, 11, 15–17]. In line with the literature [4, 15], we found that people who believed that there is currently a high risk of catching influenza (likelihood of infection), that it is possible to control their risk of catching this illness (control) and that did not think that the media had exaggerated the risks of catching influenza tended to comply with recommended behaviors. These findings endorse the policy of providing the public with clear consistent information, which report the risks, focuses on the practical things that people can do to reduce their risk and emphasizes the efficacy of recommended behaviors. A challenge for public health authorities is to deliver a communication aimed at increasing the perceived likelihood of infection without exaggerating the risk. </p>
| null | null |
CP
| 430,348 | 17 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
7
|
Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
|
1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,664 |
Review of literature concludes that sales will increase supply
|
Beard et al 13
|
Beard et al 13 T. Randolph "Randy" Beard, Professor of Economics at Auburn University.; Rigmar Osterkamp, Fellow at the School for Political Studies at University of Munich.; And David L. Kaserman, Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.2013 The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses
|
On balance, a fair-minded reading of the evidence suggests that compensation for donors, if done correctly and sensibly, would increase, probably substantially, the number of organs available for transplant. In the cases of both deceased donors (and their families) and living donors, available evidence confirms the observation that people respond to incentives.
|
On balance a fair reading of the evidence suggests that compensation for donors would increase substantially the number of organs available for transplant both deceased donors (and their families) and living donors respond to incentives
|
On balance, a fair-minded reading of the evidence suggests that compensation for donors, if done correctly and sensibly, would increase, probably substantially, the number of organs available for transplant. In the cases of both deceased donors (and their families) and living donors, available evidence confirms the observation that people respond to incentives.
| 363 |
<h4>Review of literature concludes that sales will increase supply</h4><p><strong>Beard et al 13</strong> T. Randolph "Randy" Beard, Professor of Economics at Auburn University.; Rigmar Osterkamp, Fellow at the School for Political Studies at University of Munich.; And David L. Kaserman, Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.2013 The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses</p><p><u><mark>On balance</mark>, <mark>a fair</mark>-minded <mark>reading of</mark> <mark>the evidence suggests that compensation for donors</mark>, if done correctly and sensibly, <mark>would increase</mark>, probably <mark>substantially</mark>, <mark>the number of organs available for transplant</mark>. In the cases of <mark>both deceased donors (and their families) and living donors</mark>, available evidence confirms the observation that people <mark>respond to incentives</mark>.</p></u>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 430,350 | 6 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,665 |
Medicalization controls their impacts – if they don’t solve it they don’t solve any part of the aff
|
Elden 2
|
Stuart Elden, politics at University of Warwick, 2/29/2002 “The War of Races and the Constitution of the State: Foucault's «Il faut défendre la société» and the Politics of Calculation,” Boundary,http://boundary2.dukejournals.org/content/29/1/125.full.pdf
| null |
Racism as biologizing, as tied to a state, takes shape where the procedures of intervention ‘‘at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life, received justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood Because certain groups in society are conceived of in medical terms, society is no longer in need of being defended from the outsider but from the insider: the abnormal in behavior, species, or race What is novel is not the mentality of power but the technology of power hen coupled with the mechanisms of mathematics and medicine in bio-power, this can be conceived of in entirely different ways. Bio-power is able to establish, between my life and the death of the other, a relation that is not warlike or confrontational but biological abnormal individuals can be eliminated the death of the other, of the bad, inferior race or the degenerate or abnormal, makes life purer This holds for indirect death—the exposure to death—as much as for direct killing The theme of the political enemy is extrapolated biologically war is no longer simply a way of securing one race by eliminating the other but of regenerating that race In Nazism Eugenics and medical/mathematical techniques are coupled with the fantasy of blood and the ideal of the purity of the race the old sovereign power of killing traversed the entire society
|
The reverse side is the power to allow death. State racism is a recoding of the old mechanisms of blood through the new procedures of regulation. Racism, as biologizing, as tied to a state, takes shape where the procedures of intervention ‘‘at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life, received their color and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race’’ (VS, 197; WK, 149).37 For example, the old anti-Semitism based on religion is reused under the new rubric of state racism. The integrity and purity of the race is threatened, and the state apparatuses are introduced against the race that has infiltrated and introduced noxious elements into the body. The Jews are characterized as the race present in the middle of all races (FDS, 76).38 The use of medical language is important. Because certain groups in society are conceived of in medical terms, society is no longer in need of being defended from the outsider but from the insider: the abnormal in behavior, species, or race. What is novel is not the mentality of power but the technology of power (FDS, 230). The recoding of old problems is made possible through new techniques.2 A break or cut (coupure) is fundamental to racism: a division or incision between those who must live and those who must die. The ‘‘biological continuum of the human species’’ is fragmented by the apparition of races, which are seen as distinguished, hierarchized, qualified as good or inferior, and so forth. The species is subdivided into subgroups that are thought of as races. In a sense, then, just as the continuum of geometry becomes divisible in Descartes,39 the human continuum is divided, that is, made calculable and orderable, two centuries later. As Anderson has persuasively argued, to suggest that racism has its roots in nationalism is a mistake. He suggests that ‘‘the dreams of racism actually have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation: above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to ‘blue’ or ‘white’ blood and breeding among aristocracies.’’40 As Stoler has noted, for Foucault, it is the other way around: ‘‘A discourse of class derives from an earlier discourse of races.’’41 But it is a more subtle distinction than that. What Foucault suggests is that discourses of class have their roots in the war of races, but so, too, does modern racism; what is different is the biological spin put on the concepts.42 But as well as emphasizing the biological, modern racism puts this another way: to survive, to live, one must be prepared to massacre one’s enemies, a relation of war. As a relation of war, this is no different from the earlier war of races that Foucault has spent so much of the course explaining. But when coupled with the mechanisms of mathematics and medicine in bio-power, this can be conceived of in entirely different ways. Bio-power is able to establish, between my life and the death of the other, a relation that is not warlike or confrontational but biological: ‘‘The more inferior species tend to disappear, the more abnormal individuals can be eliminated, the less the species will be degenerated, the more I— not as an individual but as a species—will live, will be strong, will be vigorous, will be able to proliferate.’’ The death of the other does not just make me safer personally, but the death of the other, of the bad, inferior race or the degenerate or abnormal, makes life in general healthier and purer (FDS, 227–28). ‘‘The existence in question is no longer of sovereignty, juridical; but that of the population, biological. If genocide is truly the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a return today of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population’’ (VS, 180; WK, 136). ‘‘If the power of normalization wishes to exercise the ancient sovereign right of killing, it must pass through racism. And if, inversely, a sovereign power, that is to say a power with the right of life and death, wishes to function with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it must also pass through racism’’ (FDS, 228). This holds for indirect death—the exposure to death—as much as for direct killing. While not Darwinism, this biological sense of power is based on evolutionism and enables a thinking of colonial relations, the necessity of wars, criminality, phenomena of madness and mental illness, class divisions, and so forth. The link to colonialism is central: This form of modern state racism develops first with colonial genocide. The theme of the political enemy is extrapolated biologically. But what is important in the shift at the end of the nineteenth century is that war is no longer simply a way of securing one race by eliminating the other but of regenerating that race (FDS, 228–30). As Foucault puts it in La volonté de savoir: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of all; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity. Massacres have become vital [vitaux— understood in a dual sense, both as essential and biological]. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. (VS, 180; WK, 136) The shift Foucault thinks is interesting is what might be called a shift from sanguinity to sexuality: sanguinity, in that it had an instrumental role (the shedding of blood) and a symbolic role (purity of blood, differences of blood); sexuality, when mechanisms of power are directed to the body, to life. The theme of race is present in both, but in a different form (VS, 194; WK, 147). We have moved from ‘‘a symbolics of blood to an analytics of sexuality. Clearly, nothing was more on the side of the law, death, transgression, the symbolic, and sovereignty than blood; just as sexuality was on the side of the norm, knowledge, life, meaning, the disciplines and regulations’’ (VS, 195; WK, 148). In Nazism, the two are combined. Eugenics and medical/mathematical techniques are coupled with the fantasy of blood and the ideal of the purity of the race. Foucault notes that there was immediate control of procreation and genetics in the Nazi regime, and that regulation, security, and assurance were imposed over the disciplined, ordered society; but at the same time, the old sovereign power of killing traversed the entire society. This was not simply confined to the state, nor simply to the SA or the SS, but ultimately to everyone, as, through denunciation, everyone could have this power over their neighbor (FDS, 231).
| 6,840 |
<h4>Medicalization controls their impacts – if they don’t solve it they don’t solve any part of the aff</h4><p>Stuart <strong>Elden</strong>, politics at University of Warwick, 2/29/200<strong>2</strong> “The War of Races and the Constitution of the State: Foucault's «Il faut défendre la société» and the Politics of Calculation,” Boundary,http://boundary2.dukejournals.org/content/29/1/125.full.pdf </p><p><strong>The reverse side is the power to allow death. State racism is a recoding of the old mechanisms of blood through the new procedures of regulation. <mark>Racism</mark>, <mark>as biologizing, as tied to a state, takes shape where the procedures of intervention ‘‘at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life,</mark> <mark>received</mark> their color and their <mark>justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood</mark> and ensuring the triumph of the race’’ (VS, 197; WK, 149).37 For example, the old anti-Semitism based on religion is reused under the new rubric of state racism. The integrity and purity of the race is threatened, and the state apparatuses are introduced against the race that has infiltrated and introduced noxious elements into the body. The Jews are characterized as the race present in the middle of all races (FDS, 76).38 The use of medical language is important. <mark>Because certain groups in society are conceived of in medical terms, society is no longer in need of being defended from the outsider but from the insider: the abnormal in behavior, species, or race</mark>. <mark>What is novel is not the mentality of power but the technology of power</mark> (FDS, 230). The recoding of old problems is made possible through new techniques.2 A break or cut (coupure) is fundamental to racism: a division or incision between those who must live and those who must die. The ‘‘biological continuum of the human species’’ is fragmented by the apparition of races, which are seen as distinguished, hierarchized, qualified as good or inferior, and so forth. The species is subdivided into subgroups that are thought of as races. In a sense, then, just as the continuum of geometry becomes divisible in Descartes,39 the human continuum is divided, that is, made calculable and orderable, two centuries later. As Anderson has persuasively argued, to suggest that racism has its roots in nationalism is a mistake. He suggests that ‘‘the dreams of racism actually have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation: above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to ‘blue’ or ‘white’ blood and breeding among aristocracies.’’40 As Stoler has noted, for Foucault, it is the other way around: ‘‘A discourse of class derives from an earlier discourse of races.’’41 But it is a more subtle distinction than that. What Foucault suggests is that discourses of class have their roots in the war of races, but so, too, does modern racism; what is different is the biological spin put on the concepts.42 But as well as emphasizing the biological, modern racism puts this another way: to survive, to live, one must be prepared to massacre one’s enemies, a relation of war. As a relation of war, this is no different from the earlier war of races that Foucault has spent so much of the course explaining. But w<mark>hen coupled with the mechanisms of mathematics and medicine in bio-power, this can be conceived of in entirely different ways. Bio-power is able to establish, between my life and the death of the other, a relation that is not warlike or confrontational but biological</mark>: ‘‘The more inferior species tend to disappear, the more <mark>abnormal individuals can be eliminated</mark>, the less the species will be degenerated, the more I— not as an individual but as a species—will live, will be strong, will be vigorous, will be able to proliferate.’’ The death of the other does not just make me safer personally, but <mark>the death of the other, of the bad, inferior race or the degenerate or abnormal, makes life</mark> in general healthier and <mark>purer</mark> (FDS, 227–28). ‘‘The existence in question is no longer of sovereignty, juridical; but that of the population, biological. If genocide is truly the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a return today of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population’’ (VS, 180; WK, 136). ‘‘If the power of normalization wishes to exercise the ancient sovereign right of killing, it must pass through racism. And if, inversely, a sovereign power, that is to say a power with the right of life and death, wishes to function with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it must also pass through racism’’ (FDS, 228). <mark>This holds for indirect death—the exposure to death—as much as for direct killing</mark>. While not Darwinism, this biological sense of power is based on evolutionism and enables a thinking of colonial relations, the necessity of wars, criminality, phenomena of madness and mental illness, class divisions, and so forth. The link to colonialism is central: This form of modern state racism develops first with colonial genocide. <mark>The theme of the political enemy is extrapolated biologically</mark>. But what is important in the shift at the end of the nineteenth century is that <mark>war is no longer simply a way of securing one race by eliminating the other but of regenerating that race</mark> (FDS, 228–30). As Foucault puts it in La volonté de savoir: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of all; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity. Massacres have become vital [vitaux— understood in a dual sense, both as essential and biological]. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. (VS, 180; WK, 136) The shift Foucault thinks is interesting is what might be called a shift from sanguinity to sexuality: sanguinity, in that it had an instrumental role (the shedding of blood) and a symbolic role (purity of blood, differences of blood); sexuality, when mechanisms of power are directed to the body, to life. The theme of race is present in both, but in a different form (VS, 194; WK, 147). We have moved from ‘‘a symbolics of blood to an analytics of sexuality. Clearly, nothing was more on the side of the law, death, transgression, the symbolic, and sovereignty than blood; just as sexuality was on the side of the norm, knowledge, life, meaning, the disciplines and regulations’’ (VS, 195; WK, 148). <mark>In Nazism</mark>, the two are combined. <mark>Eugenics and medical/mathematical techniques are coupled with the fantasy of blood and the ideal of the purity of the race</mark>. Foucault notes that there was immediate control of procreation and genetics in the Nazi regime, and that regulation, security, and assurance were imposed over the disciplined, ordered society; but at the same time, <mark>the old sovereign power of killing traversed the entire society</strong></mark>. This was not simply confined to the state, nor simply to the SA or the SS, but ultimately to everyone, as, through denunciation, everyone could have this power over their neighbor (FDS, 231).</p>
| null | null |
1NC
| 55,906 | 45 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,666 |
Cal Gov Brown is pushing renewable energy agenda, his PC is key to get it done
|
Lifsher 3/1
|
Lifsher 3/1 (Marc, LA Times, California Legislature Hits a Lull, 3/1/15, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-capitol-business-beat-20150302-story.html)
|
Brown is spending most of his time in his office working on the agenda he set in his state of the state speech in January. The governor wants more renewable energy projects Brown is no flashy politician The Capitol's quiet atmosphere perhaps is the result of Brown's philosophic style of governing The governor sets the tone in Sacramento, not the Legislature," said Bill Whalen, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University Brown, he said, "spends a lot of his time off the radar screen and underground, which is not to say that he's not doing his job." the public and voters don't feel threatened by any huge crisis, Democratic political strategist Darry Sragow said he senses a change in voter attitudes. Many are worried about big-picture issues, such as drought, climate change, education and jobs, and less about "nanny" bills that appeal to certain causes or constituent groups, he said. "You can't push some magic button and make something happen right away," he said. "They are big, complex issues and have to play out over time."
|
Brown spending most of his time in his office working on the agenda he set in his state of the state speech in January. The governor wants more renewable energy projects Brown is no flashy politician. The Capitol's quiet atmosphere perhaps is the result of Brown's philosophic style of governin The governor sets the tone in Sacramento, not the Legislature," said Bill Whalen, a research fellow at Stanford spends a lot of his time off the radar screen and underground, which is not to say that he's not doing his job Democratic political strategist Darry Sragow said he senses a change in voter attitudes. Many are worried about climate change You can't push some magic button and make something happen right away," he said. "They are big, complex issues and have to play out over time."
|
Lawmakers including scores of freshmen are still proposing plenty of bills — 2,297 as of Friday's deadline for new legislation. But the usually camera-hungry politicians are holding fewer news conferences to tout proposals such as protecting consumer privacy and banning chewing tobacco at baseball games. And Gov. Jerry Brown, who was handily reelected to a fourth and final term, is spending most of his time in his office working on the agenda he set in his state of the state speech in January. The governor wants more renewable energy projects… Brown is no flashy politician. He has little taste for the Hollywood-style media events favored by his action-hero predecessor, Arnold Schwarzenegger. Veteran state politics watchers say they're dumbfounded by the Sacramento slo-mo. The lack of electricity in the air around the Capitol is "eerie," says Barbara O'Connor, a professor emeritus of political science and communications at Cal State Sacramento. O'Connor said she was amazed last week at the few people she saw at a restaurant popular with legislators and lobbyists. The stillness, she said, "could be good or could be bad, nobody knows. But it's not normal." The Capitol's quiet atmosphere perhaps is the result of Brown's philosophic style of governing and a certain contemplativeness that borrows from his time at a Jesuit seminary and his studies of Zen Buddhism in Japan in later years. "The governor sets the tone in Sacramento, not the Legislature," said Bill Whalen, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and a speech writer for Gov. Pete Wilson in the early 1990s. Brown, he said, "spends a lot of his time off the radar screen and underground, which is not to say that he's not doing his job." What's more, California now has a small budget surplus, Whalen pointed out, resulting in fewer noisy protests from teachers, nurses and other groups complaining about slashed spending. The upshot is the public and voters don't feel threatened by any huge crisis, he said. "They don't feel like a sword of Damocles is hanging over them." Democratic political strategist Darry Sragow said he senses a change in voter attitudes. Many are worried about big-picture issues, such as drought, climate change, education and jobs, and less about "nanny" bills that appeal to certain causes or constituent groups, he said. "You can't push some magic button and make something happen right away," he said. "They are big, complex issues and have to play out over time."
| 2,502 |
<h4><strong>Cal Gov Brown is pushing renewable energy agenda, his PC is key to get it done</h4><p>Lifsher 3/1 </strong>(Marc, LA Times, California Legislature Hits a Lull, 3/1/15, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-capitol-business-beat-20150302-story.html<u>)</p><p></u>Lawmakers including scores of freshmen are still proposing plenty of bills <strong>— 2</strong>,297 as of Friday's deadline for new legislation. But the usually camera-hungry politicians are holding fewer news conferences to tout proposals such as protecting consumer privacy and banning chewing tobacco at baseball games. And Gov. Jerry <u><mark>Brown</u></mark>, who was handily reelected to a fourth and final term, <u>is <mark>spending most of his time in his office working on the agenda he set in his state of the state speech in January. The governor wants more renewable energy projects</u></mark>… <u><mark>Brown is no flashy politician</u>.</mark> He has little taste for the Hollywood-style media events favored by his action-hero predecessor, Arnold Schwarzenegger. Veteran state politics watchers say they're dumbfounded by the Sacramento slo-mo. The lack of electricity in the air around the Capitol is "eerie," says Barbara O'Connor, a professor emeritus of political science and communications at Cal State Sacramento. O'Connor said she was amazed last week at the few people she saw at a restaurant popular with legislators and lobbyists. The stillness, she said, "could be good or could be bad, nobody knows. But it's not normal." <u><mark>The Capitol's quiet atmosphere perhaps is the result of Brown's philosophic style of governin</mark>g</u> and a certain contemplativeness that borrows from his time at a Jesuit seminary and his studies of Zen Buddhism in Japan in later years. "<u><mark>The governor sets the tone in Sacramento, not the Legislature," said Bill Whalen, a research fellow</mark> at the Hoover Institution <mark>at Stanford</mark> University</u> and a speech writer for Gov. Pete Wilson in the early 1990s. <u>Brown, he said, "<mark>spends a lot of his time off the radar screen and underground, which is not to say that he's not doing his job</mark>." </u>What's more, California now has a small budget surplus, Whalen pointed out, resulting in fewer noisy protests from teachers, nurses and other groups complaining about slashed spending. The upshot is <u>the public and voters don't feel threatened by any huge crisis,</u> he said. "They don't feel like a sword of Damocles is hanging over them.<strong>"</strong> <u><mark>Democratic political strategist Darry Sragow said he senses a change in voter attitudes.</mark> <mark>Many are worried about</mark> big-picture issues, such as drought, <mark>climate change</mark>, education and jobs, and less about "nanny" bills that appeal to certain causes or constituent groups, he said. "<strong><mark>You can't push some magic button and make something happen right away," he said. "They are big, complex issues and have to play out over time."</p></u></strong></mark>
| null | null |
Politics
| 430,349 | 1 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
7
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Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
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1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
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AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,667 |
And their recentering of individual autonomy prevents an analysis of medicine as a system of power relations – turns case even if they’re right about the act of PAS
|
Salem 99
|
Salem 99 Tania Salem, “Physician-Assisted Suicide: Promoting Autonomy—Or Medicalizing Suicide?” Hastings Center Report, 29: 30–36. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/3528193/full
|
There is a certain consensus that institutionalization of death has extended physicians’ role in regulating death
In the wake of the “right to die” movement doctors share end-of-life decisions and choices with patients and families 70 percent of deaths in the hospital occur after a decision has been made to withhold treatment
one of the most dramatic aspects of medicine's extended power over contemporary sensibilities has been precisely medicine's ability to mold our conceptions about dying medicalization of death, is so deeply embedded in our culture that it goes unnoticed The sway of medicine should not be understood as a Machiavellian strategy devised by doctors physicians themselves are under medicine's power and not always aware of their critical role in the cultural construction of death and dying
the paradox dissolves, when we recognize it as a facet of how thoroughly public conscience is imbued with medical ideology
Physician-assisted suicide is widely but incorrectly represented as a further step in the demedicalization of death begun by the patients’ rights and right to die movements. It ultimately extends the power of physicians in regulating death, now under the guise of “assisting” suicide
|
institutionalization of death has extended physicians’ role in regulating death
doctors share end-of-life decisions and choices with patients and families
one of the most dramatic aspects of medicine's extended power over contemporary sensibilities has been precisely medicine's ability to mold our conceptions about dyin medicalization of death, is so deeply embedded in our culture that it goes unnoticed The sway of medicine should not be understood as a Machiavellian strategy devised by doctors physicians themselves are under medicine's power and not always aware of their critical role in the cultural construction of death and dying
Physician-assisted suicide is widely but incorrectly represented as a further step in the demedicalization of death begun by the patients’ rights movements It ultimately extends the power of physicians in regulating death, now under the guise of “assisting” suicide
|
There is a certain consensus that the institutionalization of death, its transference from the community to the hospital setting and its medicalization, has extended physicians’ role in regulating death. Today some 80 percent of deaths in the United States take place in health care facilities, while as recently as fifty years ago only a small minority of people died in hospitals or long-term care facilities.
In the wake of the “right to die” movement, today in theory—and to some extent in actual practice—doctors share end-of-life decisions and choices with patients and families. In this sense, all contrive to consolidate “managed death” as the predominant way of dying in the United States. Indeed, the American Hospital Association reported that about 70 percent of deaths in the hospital occur after a decision has been made to withhold treatment.30
Despite the space ceded to patients’ autonomous choices, one of the most dramatic aspects of medicine's extended power over contemporary sensibilities has been precisely medicine's ability to mold our conceptions about dying. This intangible aspect of medicine's power, such a crucial facet of the medicalization of death, is so deeply embedded in our culture that it goes unnoticed. The sway of medicine should not be understood as a Machiavellian strategy devised by doctors to dominate various domains of contemporary life; physicians themselves are under medicine's power and not always aware of their critical role in the cultural construction of death and dying.
There is a paradox in our attitude toward modern medicine: on the one hand, we criticize and wish to counterbalance medicine's power through the enhancement of the patient's autonomy, and on the other, we open up the doors for physicians in the domain of suicide. Yet from another perspective the paradox dissolves, when we recognize it as a facet of how thoroughly public conscience is imbued with medical ideology.
Physician-assisted suicide is widely but incorrectly represented as a further step in the demedicalization of death begun by the patients’ rights and right to die movements. It ultimately extends the power of physicians in regulating death, now under the guise of “assisting” suicide.
| 2,230 |
<h4>And their recentering of individual autonomy prevents an analysis of medicine as a system of power relations – turns case even if they’re right about the act of PAS</h4><p><strong>Salem 99</strong> Tania Salem, “Physician-Assisted Suicide: Promoting Autonomy—Or Medicalizing Suicide?” Hastings Center Report, 29: 30–36. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/3528193/full</p><p><u>There is a certain consensus that</u> the <u><mark>institutionalization of death</u></mark>, its transference from the community to the hospital setting and its medicalization, <u><mark>has extended physicians’ role in regulating death</u></mark>. Today some 80 percent of deaths in the United States take place in health care facilities, while as recently as fifty years ago only a small minority of people died in hospitals or long-term care facilities.</p><p><u>In the wake of the “right to die” movement</u>, today in theory—and to some extent in actual practice—<u><mark>doctors share end-of-life decisions and choices with patients and families</u></mark>. In this sense, all contrive to consolidate “managed death” as the predominant way of dying in the United States. Indeed, the American Hospital Association reported that about <u>70 percent of deaths in the hospital occur after a decision has been made to withhold treatment</u>.30</p><p>Despite the space ceded to patients’ autonomous choices, <u><mark>one of the most dramatic aspects of medicine's extended power over contemporary sensibilities has been precisely medicine's ability to mold our conceptions about dyin</mark>g</u>. This intangible aspect of medicine's power, such a crucial facet of the <u><mark>medicalization of death, is so deeply embedded in our culture that it goes unnoticed</u></mark>. <u><mark>The sway of medicine should not be understood as a Machiavellian strategy devised by doctors</u></mark> to dominate various domains of contemporary life; <u><mark>physicians themselves are under medicine's power and not always aware of their critical role in the cultural construction of death and dying</u></mark>.</p><p>There is a paradox in our attitude toward modern medicine: on the one hand, we criticize and wish to counterbalance medicine's power through the enhancement of the patient's autonomy, and on the other, we open up the doors for physicians in the domain of suicide. Yet from another perspective <u>the paradox dissolves, when we recognize it as a facet of how thoroughly public conscience is imbued with medical ideology</u>.</p><p><u><mark>Physician-assisted suicide is widely but incorrectly represented as a further step in the demedicalization of death begun by the patients’ rights</mark> and right to die <mark>movements</mark>. <mark>It ultimately extends the power of physicians in regulating death, now under the guise of “assisting” suicide</u></mark>.</p>
| null | null |
1NC
| 430,351 | 7 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
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1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
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Dartmouth AvMa
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| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,668 |
The voluntary system is susceptible to influence by the rich
|
Epstein 14
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Epstein 14 Richard Epstein, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law New York University School of Law
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A objection is that the voluntary market will discriminate against the poor who do not have the means to pay. To this point, , right now rich people can influence the UNOS allocation process to work their way up the queue. Richer people have more contacts and more resources to spend on getting themselves on, if necessary, multiple queues. Worse still, there are all sorts of opportunities to divert cadaveric organs to favored recipients, as major transplant centers can keep harvested organs for their own patients by claiming that their condition renders them unfit to be transferred elsewhere. No system that allocates huge benefits for zero or below market price will be immune from influence,
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the voluntary market will discriminate against the poor who do not have the means to pay rich people can influence the UNOS allocation process to work their way up the queue cher people have more contacts and more resources to spend on getting themselves on multiple queues Worse there are all sorts of opportunities to divert cadaveric organs to favored recipients, transplant centers can keep harvested organs for their own patients by claiming that their condition renders them unfit to be transferred elsewhere No system that allocates huge benefits for below market price will be immune from influence
|
NYU Journal of Law and Liberty The Kidney Crisis
http://lawandlibertyblog.com/nyujll/2014/10/28/the-kidney-crisis
A second objection is that the voluntary market will discriminate against the poor who do not have the means to pay. To this point, two responses are in order. First, right now rich people can influence the UNOS allocation process to work their way up the queue. Richer people have more contacts and more resources to spend on getting themselves on, if necessary, multiple queues. Worse still, there are all sorts of opportunities to divert cadaveric organs to favored recipients, as major transplant centers can keep harvested organs for their own patients by claiming that their condition renders them unfit to be transferred elsewhere. No system that allocates huge benefits for zero or below market price will be immune from influence, whether we are talking about rent-controlled units in Manhattan or unassigned kidney organs, whose donor, often young and poor, receives not one cent from the successful transfer.
| 1,034 |
<h4>The voluntary system is susceptible to influence by the rich</h4><p><strong>Epstein 14</strong> Richard Epstein, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law New York University School of Law</p><p>NYU Journal of Law and Liberty The Kidney Crisis</p><p>http://lawandlibertyblog.com/nyujll/2014/10/28/the-kidney-crisis</p><p><u>A </u>second <u>objection is that <mark>the voluntary market will discriminate against the poor</mark> <mark>who do not have the means to pay</mark>. To this point, </u>two responses are in order. First<u>, right now <mark>rich people can influence the UNOS allocation process to work their way up the queue</mark>. Ri<mark>cher people have more contacts and more resources to spend on getting themselves on</mark>, if necessary, <mark>multiple queues</mark>. <mark>Worse</mark> still, <mark>there are all sorts of opportunities to divert cadaveric organs to favored recipients,</mark> as major <mark>transplant centers can keep harvested organs for their own patients by claiming that their condition renders them unfit to be transferred elsewhere</mark>. <mark>No system that allocates huge benefits for</mark> zero or <mark>below market price will be immune from influence</mark>, </u>whether we are talking about rent-controlled units in Manhattan or unassigned kidney organs, whose donor, often young and poor, receives not one cent from the successful transfer.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 430,352 | 2 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
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AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
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| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,669 |
PAS is a political lightning rod that saps Brown PC—social conservatives in both parties oppose it
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Sanburn 1-23
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Sanburn 1-23 Josh Sanburn, writer for TIME.com., “More States Considering Right-to-Die Laws After Brittany Maynard” Jan. 23, 2015 http://time.com/3678199/brittany-maynard-death-with-dignity-legislation-california/,
|
bill modeled after Oregon’s 1997 Death With Dignity law was most associated with Jack Kevorkian Wolk acknowledges that actually getting the bill passed, however, will be a “heavy lift.” The measure could find support among some Democrats and libertarian-leaning conservatives, who often favor letting individuals make their own end-of-life decisions. resistance will be strong from social conservatives in both parties. The Catholic Church, in particular, has long led the fight against similar measures around the nation. The church has already hired a lobbying firm from Sacramento to fight the bill The American Medical Association , could provide another obstacle will have a tough time passing both houses of the legislature. It’s also unclear whether Governor Jerry Brown would sign it if it reached his desk.
|
The bill was most associated with Jack Kevorkia Wolk acknowledges that actually getting the bill passed, however, will be a “heavy lift resistance will be strong from both parties. The Catholic Church, in particular, has long led the fight against similar measures around the nation. The church has already hired a lobbying firm from Sacramento to fight the bil The American Medical Association could provide another obstacle will have a tough time passing both houses of the legislature.
|
“The fact that Brittany Maynard was a Californian suffering from an incurable, irreversible illness who then had to leave the state to ease her suffering was simply appalling, simply unacceptable,” says California Senator Lois Wolk, who along with Senator Bill Monning, both Democrats, have co-authored a bill giving terminally ill patients with six months to live the ability to obtain life-ending medication. (MORE: See Which States Allow End-of-Life Treatment) The bill, which would require two independent physicians to determine that patients are mentally competent to make an end-of-life decision, is largely modeled after Oregon’s 1997 Death With Dignity law, which was the first state measure to allow terminal patients to end their lives. That law has become a template for other states considering similar legislation. According to the HYPERLINK "http://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Documents/year16.pdf" \t "_blank" Oregon Public Health Division, 1,173 people have had end-of-life medication prescribed to them as of 2013; 752 have actually chosen to ingest it. Only two other states have passed right-to-die legislation — Washington and Vermont — while judges in New Mexico and Montana have effectively legalized it by saying there is nothing barring doctors from prescribing life-ending medication. For years, the so-called right-to-die movement was most associated with Jack Kevorkian, the Michigan physician known as Dr. Death for participating in dozens of physician-assisted suicides, one of which led to a conviction of second-degree murder. Maynard offered a far more sympathetic face for the movement. A 29-year-old newlywed who was diagnosed with brain cancer on Jan. 1, 2014, Maynard used her story to advocate for so-called death-with-dignity laws while publicly discussing her symptoms and plans for her last few weeks. She died Nov. 1 after taking doctor-prescribed barbiturates. Since then, legislators from 14 states have either introduced or pledged to put forward right-to-die bills, according to Compassion & Choices, a national organization advocating death with dignity. The group says it conducted surveys showing that two-thirds of Californians support end-of-life legislation. “The case of Brittany Maynard has brought this into focus for many Californians,” Monning says. “There’s a changed public attitude and increased awareness, and we think the time is right for California.” (MORE: Death Is Not Only for the Dying) Wolk acknowledges that actually getting the bill passed, however, will be a “heavy lift.” The measure could find support among some Democrats and libertarian-leaning conservatives, who often favor letting individuals make their own end-of-life decisions. But resistance will be strong from social conservatives in both parties. The Catholic Church, in particular, has long led the fight against similar measures around the nation. The church has already hired a lobbying firm from Sacramento to fight the bill, according to the Los Angeles HYPERLINK "http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-california-bill-would-legalize-assisted-death-20150120-story.html" \t "_blank" Times. The American Medical Association, which believes that doctors shouldn’t be involved in life-ending treatment, could provide another obstacle. Wolk expects the bill will make it out of committee and reach the Senate floor, but will have a tough time passing both houses of the legislature. It’s also unclear whether Governor Jerry Brown would sign it if it reached his desk. The onetime Jesuit seminarian has not publicly addressed the issue, according to the HYPERLINK "http://www.mercurynews.com/health/ci_27357033/california-bill-would-allow-terminally-ill-end-life" \t "_blank" San Jose Mercury News.
| 3,807 |
<h4><strong>PAS is a political lightning rod that saps Brown PC—social conservatives in both parties oppose it</h4><p>Sanburn 1-23</strong> Josh Sanburn, writer for TIME.com., “More States Considering Right-to-Die Laws After Brittany Maynard” Jan. 23, 2015 http://time.com/3678199/brittany-maynard-death-with-dignity-legislation-california/,</p><p>“The fact that Brittany Maynard was a Californian suffering from an incurable, irreversible illness who then had to leave the state to ease her suffering was simply appalling, simply unacceptable,” says California Senator Lois Wolk, who along with Senator Bill Monning, both Democrats, have co-authored a bill giving terminally ill patients with six months to live the ability to obtain life-ending medication. (MORE: See Which States Allow End-of-Life Treatment) <mark>The <u>bill</u></mark>, which would require two independent physicians to determine that patients are mentally competent to make an end-of-life decision, is largely <u>modeled after Oregon’s 1997 Death With Dignity law</u>, which was the first state measure to allow terminal patients to end their lives. That law has become a template for other states considering similar legislation. According to the HYPERLINK "http://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Documents/year16.pdf" \t "_blank" Oregon Public Health Division, 1,173 people have had end-of-life medication prescribed to them as of 2013; 752 have actually chosen to ingest it. Only two other states have passed right-to-die legislation — Washington and Vermont — while judges in New Mexico and Montana have effectively legalized it by saying there is nothing barring doctors from prescribing life-ending medication. For years, the so-called right-to-die movement <u><mark>was most associated with Jack Kevorkia</mark>n</u>, the Michigan physician known as Dr. Death for participating in dozens of physician-assisted suicides, one of which led to a conviction of second-degree murder. Maynard offered a far more sympathetic face for the movement. A 29-year-old newlywed who was diagnosed with brain cancer on Jan. 1, 2014, Maynard used her story to advocate for so-called death-with-dignity laws while publicly discussing her symptoms and plans for her last few weeks. She died Nov. 1 after taking doctor-prescribed barbiturates. Since then, legislators from 14 states have either introduced or pledged to put forward right-to-die bills, according to Compassion & Choices, a national organization advocating death with dignity. The group says it conducted surveys showing that two-thirds of Californians support end-of-life legislation. “The case of Brittany Maynard has brought this into focus for many Californians,” Monning says. “There’s a changed public attitude and increased awareness, and we think the time is right for California.” (MORE: Death Is Not Only for the Dying) <u><mark>Wolk acknowledges that actually getting the bill passed, however, will be a “heavy lift</mark>.” The measure could find support among some Democrats and libertarian-leaning conservatives, who often favor letting individuals make their own end-of-life decisions.</u> But <u><mark>resistance will be strong from</mark> social conservatives in <mark>both parties. The Catholic Church, in particular, has long led the fight against similar measures around the nation. The church has already hired a lobbying firm from Sacramento to fight the bil</mark>l</u>, according to the Los Angeles HYPERLINK "http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-california-bill-would-legalize-assisted-death-20150120-story.html" \t "_blank" Times. <u><mark>The American Medical Association</u></mark>, which believes that doctors shouldn’t be involved in life-ending treatment<u>, <mark>could provide another obstacle</u></mark>. Wolk expects the bill will make it out of committee and reach the Senate floor, but <u><mark>will have a tough time passing both houses of the legislature.</mark> It’s also unclear whether Governor Jerry Brown would sign it if it reached his desk. </u>The onetime Jesuit seminarian has not publicly addressed the issue, according to the HYPERLINK "http://www.mercurynews.com/health/ci_27357033/california-bill-would-allow-terminally-ill-end-life" \t "_blank" San Jose Mercury News<strong>. </p></strong>
| null | null |
Politics
| 430,353 | 2 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
7
|
Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
|
1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,670 |
People who kill themselves aren’t thinking “wow this will totally show the elites that they can’t control me” – they’re probably experiencing extreme depression and isolation. The aff romanticizes the act of suicide which makes it impossible to help people.
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Stoneman 5
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Stoneman 5 Scott, “Suicide and Biopower: Foucault, Derrida, and Deconstruction,” Fall, http://www.scribd.com/doc/230752001/774-Long-Paper-Stoneman-Foucault-Derrida-and-Suicide#scribd
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what are the implications for framing suicide as a kind of resistance Foucault’s concern with suicide is allegoric a peculiarly methodological tool used to explain a certain theory by reducing it to a specific, emblematic scenario He is invested in what discursively is yielded up by preserving the singularity of suicide as an event that exceeds the regulative purview of biopower it is imperative that the consequential shortcomings of treating this matter “allegorically” (the likely deliberate disavowal of the bleakness and misery of real suicides be resolved if a meaningful and engaged consideration of suicide is to be formed there are situations in which suicide not only authorizes, but demands precisely the kind of coercive surveillance and brute interruption characteristic of the operations of biopower Foucault’s theory of the suicidal astonishment needs some nuance
|
what are the implications for framing suicide as a kind of resistance concern with suicide is allegoric a peculiarly methodological tool used to explain a certain theory by reducing it to a specific emblematic scenario it is imperative that the consequential shortcomings of treating this matter “allegorically the likely deliberate disavowal of the bleakness and misery of real suicides) be resolved if a meaningful and engaged consideration of suicide is to be formed there are situations in which suicide not only authorizes, but demands precisely the kind of coercive surveillance and brute interruption characteristic of the operations of biopower, theory of the suicidal astonishment needs some nuance
|
This equivocal passage from Foucault explodes the possibilities for theorizing suicide. But what, I wonder, are Foucault’s specific motivations for entering this particular dialectic —what productive “distortions” or epistemic agitations do his observations provide to the discourse on selbstmord, or “self-murder”? What use does Foucault make of caching these two critical sentences in Volume 1 of The History of Sexuality within a broader formulation of bio-power (a thing which, as we will see, is at once productive of and threatened by suicidality)? More precisely to the point: what are the implications for framing suicide as a kind of resistance vis-à-vis a technology of power that, in Foucault’s account, grows out of the seventeenth century? I contend that Foucault’s concern with suicide is allegoric. This is not to trivialize or understate the complexity of his diffuse consideration of the subject. What I mean here by allegoric is the sense that Walter Benjamin gives the term: a peculiarly methodological tool or turn used to explain a certain theory by reducing it to a specific, emblematic scenario. Foucault is interested in the intersticiality and peripherality which suicide embodies: a thing which operates “at the borders and in the interstices of power that was exercised over life” (HS 139). He is invested, moreover, in what discursively is yielded up by preserving the singularity of suicide as an event that, precisely because of its singularity, exceeds the regulative purview of biopower. But it is imperative that the consequential shortcomings of treating this matter “allegorically” (the likely deliberate disavowal of the bleakness and misery of real suicides) be resolved if a meaningful and engaged consideration of suicide is to be formed. This move, it seems, can only be accomplished by means of a complicity with “sociological analysis” in considering the question of how and under what pretenses to intervene in suicide. Indeed, if we accept Michael J. Cholbi’s provocative and convincing claim that there are situations in which suicide not only authorizes, but demands precisely the kind of coercive surveillance and brute interruption characteristic of the operations of biopower, we are forced also to acknowledge that Foucault’s theory of the suicidal astonishment needs some nuance. Additionally, in order to consider the broader question of the relationship between sovereignty and suicide I will look to an interview conducted by Elisabeth Roudinesco with Jacques Derrida, in which Derrida provides the possibility of thinking the death penalty as an event of disciplinary suicidalization. Derrida’s brief theorization—one might even call it an intimation—of the ways in which execution is made autodestruction, of the manner in which being condemned to death is discursively reformed into an event of taking one’s own life, is one which idiomatically exceeds the critical capacity of available theories and taxonomies of suicide, and will provide the primary means through which to consider a Derridean re-reading of biopolitics.
| 3,081 |
<h4>People who kill themselves aren’t thinking “wow this will totally show the elites that they can’t control me” – they’re probably experiencing extreme depression and isolation. The aff romanticizes the act of suicide which makes it impossible to help people.</h4><p><strong>Stoneman 5</strong> Scott, “Suicide and Biopower: Foucault, Derrida, and Deconstruction,” Fall, http://www.scribd.com/doc/230752001/774-Long-Paper-Stoneman-Foucault-Derrida-and-Suicide#scribd</p><p>This equivocal passage from Foucault explodes the possibilities for theorizing suicide. But what, I wonder, are Foucault’s specific motivations for entering this particular dialectic —what productive “distortions” or epistemic agitations do his observations provide to the discourse on selbstmord, or “self-murder”? What use does Foucault make of caching these two critical sentences in Volume 1 of The History of Sexuality within a broader formulation of bio-power (a thing which, as we will see, is at once productive of and threatened by suicidality)? More precisely to the point: <u><mark>what are the implications for framing suicide as a kind of resistance</u></mark> vis-à-vis a technology of power that, in Foucault’s account, grows out of the seventeenth century? I contend that <u>Foucault’s <mark>concern with suicide is allegoric</u></mark>. This is not to trivialize or understate the complexity of his diffuse consideration of the subject. What I mean here by allegoric is the sense that Walter Benjamin gives the term: <u><mark>a peculiarly methodological tool</u></mark> or turn <u><mark>used to explain a certain theory by reducing it to a specific</mark>, <mark>emblematic scenario</u></mark>. Foucault is interested in the intersticiality and peripherality which suicide embodies: a thing which operates “at the borders and in the interstices of power that was exercised over life” (HS 139). <u>He is invested</u>, moreover, <u>in what discursively is yielded up by preserving the singularity of suicide as an event that</u>, precisely because of its singularity, <u>exceeds the regulative purview of biopower</u>. But <u><mark>it is imperative that</mark> <mark>the consequential shortcomings of treating this matter “allegorically</mark>”</u> <u>(<mark>the likely deliberate disavowal of the bleakness and misery of real suicides</u>) <u>be resolved if a meaningful and engaged consideration of suicide is to be formed</u></mark>. This move, it seems, can only be accomplished by means of a complicity with “sociological analysis” in considering the question of how and under what pretenses to intervene in suicide. Indeed, if we accept Michael J. Cholbi’s provocative and convincing claim that <u><mark>there are situations in which suicide not only authorizes, but demands precisely the kind of coercive surveillance and brute interruption characteristic of the operations of biopower</u>,</mark> we are forced also to acknowledge that <u>Foucault’s <mark>theory of the suicidal astonishment needs some nuance</u></mark>. Additionally, in order to consider the broader question of the relationship between sovereignty and suicide I will look to an interview conducted by Elisabeth Roudinesco with Jacques Derrida, in which Derrida provides the possibility of thinking the death penalty as an event of disciplinary suicidalization. Derrida’s brief theorization—one might even call it an intimation—of the ways in which execution is made autodestruction, of the manner in which being condemned to death is discursively reformed into an event of taking one’s own life, is one which idiomatically exceeds the critical capacity of available theories and taxonomies of suicide, and will provide the primary means through which to consider a Derridean re-reading of biopolitics.</p>
| null | null |
1NC
| 430,354 | 8 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,671 |
Coercion is greater with voluntary donations
|
Epstein 14
|
Epstein 14 Richard Epstein, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law New York University School of Law
|
http://lawandlibertyblog.com/nyujll/2014/10/28/the-kidney-crisis
One standard objection is that individuals could be “coerced” into selling their organs. But this argument is exactly backwards. To find coercion, look no further than the family situation where one member is an organ match for a sibling or a child, but has serious qualms about taking the risk in question. Now money or in-kind benefits cannot be offered to offset that risk. So the full array of nonstop family pressures can be imposed in order to get the reluctant relative to change his or her mind. But in an open market, the potential of thousands of unrelated donors makes it both impossible and unnecessary to bring subtle pressures to bear on these strangers. Coercion is not an inherent consequence of voluntary exchanges. Rather, it is a far greater risk when only uncompensated transfers can be allowed.
|
standard objection is that individuals could be “coerced” into selling their organs this argument is backwards To find coercion, look no further than the family situation where one member is an organ match for a sibling or a child, but has serious qualms about taking the risk in question the full array of nonstop pressures can be imposed in order to get the reluctant relative to change his or her mind an open market makes it impossible and unnecessary to bring subtle pressures to bear on strangers Coercion is a far greater risk when only uncompensated transfers can be allowed
|
NYU Journal of Law and Liberty The Kidney Crisis
http://lawandlibertyblog.com/nyujll/2014/10/28/the-kidney-crisis
So why not take the plunge? One standard objection is that individuals could be “coerced” into selling their organs. But this argument is exactly backwards. To find coercion, look no further than the family situation where one member is an organ match for a sibling or a child, but has serious qualms about taking the risk in question. Now money or in-kind benefits cannot be offered to offset that risk. So the full array of nonstop family pressures can be imposed in order to get the reluctant relative to change his or her mind. But in an open market, the potential of thousands of unrelated donors makes it both impossible and unnecessary to bring subtle pressures to bear on these strangers. Coercion is not an inherent consequence of voluntary exchanges. Rather, it is a far greater risk when only uncompensated transfers can be allowed.
| 958 |
<h4>Coercion is greater with voluntary donations</h4><p><strong>Epstein 14</strong> Richard Epstein, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law New York University School of Law</p><p>NYU Journal of Law and Liberty The Kidney Crisis</p><p><u>http://lawandlibertyblog.com/nyujll/2014/10/28/the-kidney-crisis</p><p></u>So why not take the plunge? <u>One <mark>standard objection is that individuals could be “coerced” into selling their organs</mark>. But <mark>this argument is</mark> exactly <mark>backwards</mark>. <mark>To find coercion, look no further than the family situation where one member is an organ match for a sibling or a child, but has serious qualms about taking the risk in question</mark>. Now money or in-kind benefits cannot be offered to offset that risk. So <mark>the full array of nonstop</mark> family <mark>pressures can be imposed in order to get the reluctant relative to change his or her mind</mark>. But in <mark>an open market</mark>, the potential of thousands of unrelated donors <mark>makes it</mark> both <mark>impossible and unnecessary to bring subtle pressures to bear on</mark> these <mark>strangers</mark>. <mark>Coercion</mark> is not an inherent consequence of voluntary exchanges. Rather, it <mark>is a far greater risk when only uncompensated transfers can be allowed</mark>.</p></u>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 430,355 | 1 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,672 |
Brown’s proposals are modeled and drive global climate solutions
|
Pope 1/13
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Carl Pope, 1/13/2015. Former executive director and chairman, Sierra Club. “Flood Tide for the Climate Movement,” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carl-pope/flood-tide-for-the-climate-movement_b_6446832.html.
|
Brown committed the world's seventh largest economy to the world's boldest clean energy goals yet: going from 25% to 50% renewable electricity by 2030 and cutting oil consumption by 50% Brown's goals are bold, ambitious and exciting they cannot be dismissed as impossible --- California has already reached 25% renewable electricity California - and the world -- are starting from almost scratch in seeking fuel diversity in the transportation sector- oil powers more than 90% of the world's transport Ramping up to a 50% reduction in petroleum use by 2030 will require a massive replacement of the state's existing vehicle fleets, engine technologies, transportation infrastructure and fuel networks But if California can realize this vision, the odds that the rest of the world moves beyond oil dependency go up staggeringly Now that clean energy technologies have moved to a scale that anyone whose eyes are open can see that we don't necessarily need fossil fuels for much longer, leaders like Brown can offer programs that both capture the popular imagination and confront the scale of the energy revolution we need And as these technologies get bigger, they get cheaper - unlike coal and oil for whom demand growth means ever higher and higher costs
|
Brown committed the world's seventh largest economy to the world's boldest clean energy goals yet: going to 50% renewable electricity and cutting oil consumption by 50% if California can realize this vision, the odds that the rest of the world moves beyond oil dependency go up staggeringly leaders can offer programs that confront the scale of the energy revolution we need. as these technologies get bigger, they get cheaper
|
Two days later, here in Sacramento, California Governor Jerry Brown committed the world's seventh largest economy to the world's boldest clean energy goals yet: going from 25% to 50% renewable electricity by 2030, and -- stunningly in the state which birthed the freeway culture -- cutting oil consumption by 50% by the same date. So shocked was the oil industry that all they commented was that they would work with the governor for "solutions that will sustain today's energy and economic realities while protecting both our environment and future energy needs." (Don't hold your breath.) Brown's and Modi's electricity goals are bold, ambitious and exciting. They will be attacked as expensive and unwise. But they cannot be dismissed as impossible --- California has already reached 25% renewable electricity, India is producing the world's cheapest solar power, and other countries like Portugal and Denmark have demonstrated that renewable electricity is ready to carry more than half of their power load. California's oil target is breathtaking. It is what is needed - the latest report on the how much oil we can afford to burn and stay on a 2 degree pathway says that a third of existing global oil reserves must remain underground, including all of such unconventional sources as the deep oceans, the Arctic and tar sands. It is consistent with goals articulated by climate advocates and organizations. But California - and the world -- are starting from almost scratch in seeking fuel diversity in the transportation sector- oil powers more than 90% of the world's transport. Both India and the US have enacted tough fuel efficiency standards to reduce petroleum waste. But California State's low-carbon fuel standard and ZEV mandates are only beginning to kick in, and transportation fuels have just been placed under the state's AB32 cap. (Oregon joined California a few days after Brown's speech putting in place requirements the fuels sold in the state have 10% less carbon by 2020.) Ramping up to a 50% reduction in petroleum use by 2030 will require a massive replacement of the state's existing vehicle fleets, engine technologies, transportation infrastructure and fuel networks. But if California can realize this vision, the odds that the rest of the world moves beyond oil dependency go up staggeringly. Big oil gets this. Houston, Wichita, Calgary and Riyadh have no doubt seen dozens of meetings in the last week about how to crush Brown's vision before the public realizes just how practical it is. "Mission Impossible" will be the war-cry. "They're going to take your car away" the Koch Brother ads and sound bites will babble. "Renewable power isn't reliable" the coal companies will croak. The reality is they are losing. Their campaign strategy - which worked for decades - was to mire the public debate down in climate science and risk, and thereby keep action on climate solutions at the "too small to really matter" scale. But they got greedy, and allowed the price of oil and coal to steadily soar. That opened up a market for clean energy that wasn't based on climate protection, although climate security is its most important benefit. No, Tesla and Solar City - and their Indian counterparts -- are powered by the fact that they offered better energy products with cheaper fuels. Renewable energy investment demonstrated this again in 2014. Even as coal, oil and natural gas prices fell, global investment in renewable energy jumped by 16%, and with steadily dropping costs for renewable energy, the volume of new clean energy increased by more than 25%. Now that clean energy technologies have moved to a scale that anyone whose eyes are open can see that we don't necessarily need fossil fuels for much longer, leaders like Modi and Brown - and others around the world - can offer programs that both capture the popular imagination and confront the scale of the energy revolution we need. And as these technologies get bigger, they get cheaper - unlike coal and oil for whom demand growth means ever higher and higher costs.
| 4,062 |
<h4><strong>Brown’s proposals are modeled and drive global climate solutions </h4><p></strong>Carl <strong>Pope</strong>, <strong>1/13</strong>/2015. Former executive director and chairman, Sierra Club. “Flood Tide for the Climate Movement,” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carl-pope/flood-tide-for-the-climate-movement_b_6446832.html.</p><p>Two days later, here in Sacramento, California Governor Jerry <u><mark>Brown committed the world's seventh largest economy to the world's boldest clean energy goals yet: going</mark> from 25% <mark>to 50% renewable electricity</mark> by 2030</u>, <u><mark>and</u></mark> -- stunningly in the state which birthed the freeway culture -- <u><mark>cutting oil consumption by 50%</u></mark> by the same date. So shocked was the oil industry that all they commented was that they would work with the governor for "solutions that will sustain today's energy and economic realities while protecting both our environment and future energy needs." (Don't hold your breath.) <u>Brown's</u> and Modi's electricity <u>goals are bold, ambitious and exciting</u>. They will be attacked as expensive and unwise. But <u>they cannot be dismissed as impossible --- California has already reached 25% renewable electricity</u>, India is producing the world's cheapest solar power, and other countries like Portugal and Denmark have demonstrated that renewable electricity is ready to carry more than half of their power load. California's oil target is breathtaking. It is what is needed - the latest report on the how much oil we can afford to burn and stay on a 2 degree pathway says that a third of existing global oil reserves must remain underground, including all of such unconventional sources as the deep oceans, the Arctic and tar sands. It is consistent with goals articulated by climate advocates and organizations. But <u>California - <strong>and the world</strong> -- are starting from almost scratch in seeking fuel diversity in the transportation sector- oil powers more than 90% of the world's transport</u>. Both India and the US have enacted tough fuel efficiency standards to reduce petroleum waste. But California State's low-carbon fuel standard and ZEV mandates are only beginning to kick in, and transportation fuels have just been placed under the state's AB32 cap. (Oregon joined California a few days after Brown's speech putting in place requirements the fuels sold in the state have 10% less carbon by 2020.) <u>Ramping up to a 50% reduction in petroleum use by 2030 will require a massive replacement of the state's existing vehicle fleets, engine technologies, transportation infrastructure and fuel networks</u>. <u>But <mark>if California can realize this vision, the odds that the rest of the world moves beyond oil dependency<strong> go up staggeringly</u></strong></mark>. Big oil gets this. Houston, Wichita, Calgary and Riyadh have no doubt seen dozens of meetings in the last week about how to crush Brown's vision before the public realizes just how practical it is. "Mission Impossible" will be the war-cry. "They're going to take your car away" the Koch Brother ads and sound bites will babble. "Renewable power isn't reliable" the coal companies will croak. The reality is they are losing. Their campaign strategy - which worked for decades - was to mire the public debate down in climate science and risk, and thereby keep action on climate solutions at the "too small to really matter" scale. But they got greedy, and allowed the price of oil and coal to steadily soar. That opened up a market for clean energy that wasn't based on climate protection, although climate security is its most important benefit. No, Tesla and Solar City - and their Indian counterparts -- are powered by the fact that they offered better energy products with cheaper fuels. Renewable energy investment demonstrated this again in 2014. Even as coal, oil and natural gas prices fell, global investment in renewable energy jumped by 16%, and with steadily dropping costs for renewable energy, the volume of new clean energy increased by more than 25%. <u>Now that clean energy technologies have moved to a scale that anyone whose eyes are open can see that we don't necessarily need fossil fuels for much longer, <mark>leaders</mark> like</u> Modi and <u>Brown</u> - and others around the world - <u><mark>can offer programs that</mark> both capture the popular imagination and <mark>confront the scale of the energy revolution we need</u>.</mark> <u>And <mark>as these technologies get bigger, they get cheaper</mark> - unlike coal and oil for whom demand growth means ever higher and higher costs</u><strong>.</p></strong>
| null | null |
Politics
| 430,357 | 13 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
7
|
Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
|
1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,673 |
Suicide is not a generalizable act – it is never just a question of the individual and its motivations vary wildly – reject their totalization
|
Osborne 6
|
Osborne 6 Thomas Osborne, Department of Sociology, University of Bristol, “‘Fascinated dispossession’: suicide and the aesthetics of freedom,” Economy and Society Volume 34, Issue 2, 2005, 8/16/2006
|
to associate suicide with resistance is to misunderstand the kind of action it embodies aesthetic model of suicide in its ideal-typical form embodies the idea of suicide as pure agency there can be no such thing, not only because of Blanchot's view that suicide is always mixed and double but also because suicide is hardly ever a matter for a single agent but entraps many others in its web and, on the other hand, because of the difficulty of escaping the realm of bio-politics, even from within the aesthetic view of suicide itself what sort of a space would suicide 'retreats' possibly occupy other than a bio-political one
What count are not our theories but our practices and the experiences in which they are embedded invocation of the Stoic and other ideas of a beautiful death presupposes not some general view of suicide that would apply at all times but a precise - historical - understanding of the particular context of particular practices in connection with the ethics of one's life and the event of one's death Taken as a regulative ideal the idea of aesthetic suicide the existential suicide understood as an exercise of freedom has its uses taken more or less normatively as a moral panacea it risks exposing us to a kind of moral romanticism, a compromised utopia Suicide cannot unproblematically be the object of an uncompromised affirmation At the heart lurks not only agency but passivity Suicide cannot be the object of a finite moral or other kind of knowledge It is always ambiguous, always problematic it cannot be legislated away by a politics of affirmation or an aesthetic of freedom - perhaps it cannot be the object of a verdict but only of our continued and probably futile attempts at understanding case by case according to a concerned and open-minded empiricism
|
aesthetic model of suicide embodies pure agency there can be no such thing, not only because suicide is always mixed and double but also because suicide is hardly ever a matter for a single agent but entraps many others and because of the difficulty of escaping the realm of bio-politics even from within the aesthetic view what sort of a space would suicide 'retreats' possibly occupy other than a bio-political one
What count are not our theories but the experiences in which they are embedded ideas of a beautiful death presuppose not some general view of suicide that would apply at all times but a particular context taken more or less normatively as a moral panacea it risks exposing us to a kind of moral romanticism, a compromised utopia Suicide cannot unproblematically be the object of an uncompromised affirmation Suicide cannot be the object of a finite moral or other kind of knowledge it cannot be legislated away by a politics of affirmation or an aesthetic of freedom - perhaps it cannot be the object of a verdict but only of our continued and probably futile attempts at understanding case by case
|
More than anything, to associate suicide with resistance is to misunderstand the kind of action it embodies. We do not actually need to take any particular moral stance to see that this is so. The aesthetic model of suicide, at least in its ideal-typical form, embodies the idea of suicide as pure agency. And yet there can be no such thing, not only because of Blanchot's view that suicide is always mixed and double, both agency and passivity, but also, on the one hand, because suicide is hardly ever a matter for a single agent but entraps many others - passively, one might say - in its web (one cannot evade the moral dimension so easily) and, on the other hand, because of the difficulty of escaping the realm of bio-politics, even from within the aesthetic view of suicide itself. This latter point is not meant as a critique of Foucault (cf. Foucault 1994b). His position came in the context of some speculative remarks only. But we would need to ask, for instance, what sort of a space would the suicide 'retreats' that he invokes possibly occupy other than one which would itself be a bio-political one? The answer would have to come by way of the positing of some sort of cultural 'experience' appropriate to such an institutional form, an experience to be created perhaps but one which at the moment does not pre-exist its speculative invocation - and no doubt Foucault's remarks were meant only to invoke the possibility of such an experience, not to presume its actuality.
The lesson is no doubt an empirical even an empiricist one. What count are not our theories but our practices and the experiences in which they are embedded. No one knew this better than Foucault himself of course. His invocation of the Stoic and other ideas of a beautiful death presupposes not some general view of suicide that would apply at all times and at all periods but a precise - historical - understanding of the particular context of particular practices in connection with the ethics of one's life and the event of one's death (Foucault 2001). Taken as a regulative ideal, no doubt the idea of aesthetic suicide and its family relations - the suicide of free decision, the existential suicide understood as an exercise of freedom - has its uses, not least in combating the kind of moral dismissal of suicide that has been the norm throughout so much of history, as is so well described in the historical sections of The Savage God. But taken more or less normatively as a moral panacea it risks exposing us to a kind of moral romanticism, a compromised utopia. Indeed, More's Utopia is often credited with being one of the first works in the West to advocate suicide. But More's suicide retreats were in fact not crucibles of freedom but places of passive euthanasia. Suicide cannot unproblematically be the object of an uncompromised affirmation. At the heart even of the generalized vision of aesthetic suicide, then, lurks not only agency but also passivity, the web of dependence. Suicide cannot be the object of a finite moral or other kind of knowledge. It is always ambiguous, always problematic, and certainly always double; it cannot be legislated away by a politics of affirmation or an aesthetic of freedom - perhaps it cannot be the object of a verdict but only of our continued and probably futile attempts at understanding case by case according, perhaps, to a concerned and open-minded empiricism.
| 3,413 |
<h4>Suicide is not a generalizable act – it is never just a question of the individual and its motivations vary wildly – reject their totalization</h4><p><strong>Osborne 6</strong> Thomas Osborne, Department of Sociology, University of Bristol, “‘Fascinated dispossession’: suicide and the aesthetics of freedom,” Economy and Society Volume 34, Issue 2, 2005, 8/16/2006</p><p>More than anything, <u>to associate suicide with resistance is to misunderstand the kind of action it embodies</u>. We do not actually need to take any particular moral stance to see that this is so. The <u><mark>aesthetic model of suicide</u></mark>, at least <u>in its ideal-typical form</u>, <u><mark>embodies</mark> the idea of suicide as <mark>pure agency</u></mark>. And yet <u><mark>there can be no such thing, not only because</mark> of Blanchot's view that <mark>suicide is always mixed and double</u></mark>, both agency and passivity, <u><mark>but</u> <u>also</u></mark>, on the one hand, <u><mark>because</mark> <mark>suicide is hardly ever a matter for a single agent but entraps many others</u></mark> - passively, one might say - <u>in its web</u> (one cannot evade the moral dimension so easily) <u><mark>and</mark>, on the other hand, <mark>because of the difficulty of escaping the realm of bio-politics</mark>, <mark>even from within the aesthetic view</mark> of suicide itself</u>. This latter point is not meant as a critique of Foucault (cf. Foucault 1994b). His position came in the context of some speculative remarks only. But we would need to ask, for instance, <u><mark>what sort of a space would</u></mark> the <u><mark>suicide 'retreats'</mark> </u>that he invokes<u> <mark>possibly occupy other than</mark> </u>one which would itself be<u> <mark>a bio-political one</u></mark>? The answer would have to come by way of the positing of some sort of cultural 'experience' appropriate to such an institutional form, an experience to be created perhaps but one which at the moment does not pre-exist its speculative invocation - and no doubt Foucault's remarks were meant only to invoke the possibility of such an experience, not to presume its actuality.</p><p>The lesson is no doubt an empirical even an empiricist one. <u><mark>What count are not our theories but</mark> our practices and <mark>the experiences in which they are embedded</u></mark>. No one knew this better than Foucault himself of course. His <u>invocation of the Stoic and other <mark>ideas of a beautiful death presuppose</mark>s <mark>not some general view of suicide that would apply at all times</u></mark> and at all periods <u><mark>but a</mark> precise - historical - understanding of the <mark>particular context</mark> of particular practices</u> <u>in connection with the ethics of one's life and the event of one's death</u> (Foucault 2001). <u>Taken as a regulative ideal</u>, no doubt <u>the idea of aesthetic suicide</u> and its family relations - the suicide of free decision, <u>the existential suicide understood as an exercise of freedom</u> - <u>has its uses</u>, not least in combating the kind of moral dismissal of suicide that has been the norm throughout so much of history, as is so well described in the historical sections of The Savage God. But <u><mark>taken more or less normatively as a moral panacea it risks exposing us to a kind of moral romanticism, a compromised utopia</u></mark>. Indeed, More's Utopia is often credited with being one of the first works in the West to advocate suicide. But More's suicide retreats were in fact not crucibles of freedom but places of passive euthanasia. <u><mark>Suicide cannot unproblematically be the object of an uncompromised affirmation</u></mark>. <u>At the heart</u> even of the generalized vision of aesthetic suicide, then, <u>lurks not only agency but</u> also <u>passivity</u>, the web of dependence. <u><mark>Suicide cannot be the object of a finite moral or other kind of knowledge</u></mark>. <u>It is always ambiguous, always problematic</u>, and certainly always double; <u><mark>it cannot be legislated away by a politics of affirmation or an aesthetic of freedom - perhaps it cannot be the object of a verdict but only of our continued and probably futile attempts at understanding case by case</mark> according</u>, perhaps, <u>to a concerned and open-minded empiricism</u><strong>.</p></strong>
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1NC
| 430,356 | 3 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
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AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
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Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,674 |
Great power war is obsolete – globalization, nuclear deterrence, and the cooperative liberal order ensure no conflict
|
Ikenberry and Deudney 9
|
Ikenberry and Deudney 9 (Daniel – Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, and G. John – professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, Jan/Feb, “The Myth of the Autocratic Revival,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Issue 1, p. 8)
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the picture of an international system marked by conflict and competition is an exaggeration and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces , the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are globalization institutions and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides constraints and opportunities that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. great-power expansion has become obsolete. nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. in the twenty-first century the status quo is much more difficult to overturn. Simple comparisons between China and the U S with regard to aggregate economic size and capability do not reflect the fact that the United States does not stand alone but rather is the head of a coalition of liberal capitalist states whose aggregate assets far exceed those of China revisionist states notably China and Russia are stakeholders in an ensemble of global institutions that make up the status quo, not least the UN Security Council (in which they have permanent seats and veto power Many other global institutions are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice only by buying into the institutions The pathway to modernity is not outside and against the status quo but rather inside the liberal international order. The viability of regimes hinges on their ability to sustain economic growth which is crucially dependent on international trade Not only have these states joined the world economy, but their people have increasingly joined the world community citizens of autocratic states are participating in transnational networks. the values of "us versus them" become difficult to generate and sustain. These social and diplomatic processes and developments suggest that there are strong tendencies toward normalization operating here China Europe, India, Japan, the United States Iran and Russia share a common interest in security . The declining utility of war and emerging environmental interdependencies undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability the conditions of the twenty-first century point to the renewed value of international integration and cooperation
|
the picture of an international system marked by conflict and competition is an exaggeration and ignores powerful countervailing factors the most striking features are globalization institutions and interdependence The overall structure provides constraints that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. great-power expansion has become obsolete nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the powers possessing nuclear weapons The prospect of losses has instilled level of restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts trade, investment, and production across international borders raises the costs of war revisionist states, are stakeholders in an ensemble of global institutions that make up the status quo institution are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice only by buying into the institutions their people have increasingly joined the world community the values of us versus them" become difficult to generate China Europe, India, Japan Iran and Russia share a common interest in security The declining utility of and emerging environmental interdependencies undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability the conditions of the twenty-first century point to the renewed value of cooperation.
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It is in combination with these factors that the regime divergence between autocracies and democracies will become increasingly dangerous. If all the states in the world were democracies, there would still be competition, but a world riven by a democratic-autocratic divergence promises to be even more conflictual. There are even signs of the emergence of an "autocrats international" in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, made up of China, Russia, and the poorer and weaker Central Asian dictatorships. Overall, the autocratic revivalists paint the picture of an international system marked by rising levels of conflict and competition, a picture quite unlike the "end of history" vision of growing convergence and cooperation. This bleak outlook is based on an exaggeration of recent developments and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces. Indeed, contrary to what trhe revivalists describe, the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are the intensification of economic globalization, thickening institutions, and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure of the international system today is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century. Compared to older orders, the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides a set of constraints and opportunities — of pushes and pulls — that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which war as a path to conflict resolution and great-power expansion has become largely obsolete. Most important, nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war from a routine feature of international politics into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces, warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts. Furthermore, the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international. Taken together, these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge. The autocratic revival thesis neglects other key features of the international system as well. In the nineteenth century, rising states faced an international environment in which they could reasonably expect to translate their growing clout into geopolitical changes that would benefit themselves. But in the twenty-first century, the status quo is much more difficult to overturn. Simple comparisons between China and the United States with regard to aggregate economic size and capability do not reflect the fact that the United States does not stand alone but rather is the head of a coalition of liberal capitalist states in Europe and East Asia whose aggregate assets far exceed those of China or even of a coalition of autocratic states. Moreover, potentially revisionist autocratic states, most notably China and Russia, are already substantial players and stakeholders in an ensemble of global institutions that make up the status quo, not least the UN Security Council (in which they have permanent seats and veto power). Many other global institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice only by buying into the institutions. The pathway to modernity for rising states is not outside and against the status quo but rather inside and through the flexible and accommodating institutions of the liberal international order. The fact that these autocracies are capitalist has profound implications for the nature of their international interests that point toward integration and accommodation in the future. The domestic viability of these regimes hinges on their ability to sustain high economic growth rates, which in turn is crucially dependent on international trade and investment; today's autocracies may be illiberal, but they remain fundamentally dependent on a liberal international capitalist system. It is not surprising that China made major domestic changes in order to join the WTO or that Russia is seeking to do so now. The dependence of autocratic capitalist states on foreign trade and investment means that they have a fundamental interest in maintaining an open, rulebased economic system. (Although these autocratic states do pursue bilateral trade and investment deals, particularly in energy and raw materials, this does not obviate their more basic dependence on and commitment to the WTO order.) In the case of China, because of its extensive dependence on industrial exports, the WTO may act as a vital bulwark against protectionist tendencies in importing states. Given their position in this system, which so serves their interests, the autocratic states are unlikely to become champions of an alternative global or regional economic order, let alone spoilers intent on seriously damaging the existing one. The prospects for revisionist behavior on the part of the capitalist autocracies are further reduced by the large and growing social networks across international borders. Not only have these states joined the world economy, but their people — particularly upwardly mobile and educated elites — have increasingly joined the world community. In large and growing numbers, citizens of autocratic capitalist states are participating in a sprawling array of transnational educational, business, and avocational networks. As individuals are socialized into the values and orientations of these networks, stark: "us versus them" cleavages become more difficult to generate and sustain. As the Harvard political scientist Alastair Iain Johnston has argued, China's ruling elite has also been socialized, as its foreign policy establishment has internalized the norms and practices of the international diplomatic community. China, far from cultivating causes for territorial dispute with its neighbors, has instead sought to resolve numerous historically inherited border conflicts, acting like a satisfied status quo state. These social and diplomatic processes and developments suggest that there are strong tendencies toward normalization operating here. Finally, there is an emerging set of global problems stemming from industrialism and economic globalization that will create common interests across states regardless of regime type. Autocratic China is as dependent on imported oil as are democratic Europe, India, Japan, and the United States, suggesting an alignment of interests against petroleum-exporting autocracies, such as Iran and Russia. These states share a common interest in price stability and supply security that could form the basis for a revitalization of the International Energy Agency, the consumer association created during the oil turmoil of the 1970s. The emergence of global warming and climate change as significant problems also suggests possibilities for alignments and cooperative ventures cutting across the autocratic-democratic divide. Like the United States, China is not only a major contributor to greenhouse gas accumulation but also likely to be a major victim of climate-induced desertification and coastal flooding. Its rapid industrialization and consequent pollution means that China, like other developed countries, will increasingly need to import technologies and innovative solutions for environmental management. Resource scarcity and environmental deterioration pose global threats that no state will be able to solve alone, thus placing a further premium on political integration and cooperative institution building. Analogies between the nineteenth century and the twenty-first are based on a severe mischaracterization of the actual conditions of the new era. The declining utility of war, the thickening of international transactions and institutions, and emerging resource and environmental interdependencies together undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability based on autocratic-democratic rivalry and autocratic revisionism. In fact, the conditions of the twenty-first century point to the renewed value of international integration and cooperation.
| 9,298 |
<h4><strong>Great power war is obsolete – globalization, nuclear deterrence, and the cooperative liberal order ensure no conflict </h4><p>Ikenberry and Deudney 9 </strong>(Daniel – Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, and G. John – professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, Jan/Feb, “The Myth of the Autocratic Revival,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Issue 1, p. 8)</p><p>It is in combination with these factors that the regime divergence between autocracies and democracies will become increasingly dangerous. If all the states in the world were democracies, there would still be competition, but a world riven by a democratic-autocratic divergence promises to be even more conflictual. There are even signs of the emergence of an "autocrats international" in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, made up of China, Russia, and the poorer and weaker Central Asian dictatorships. Overall, the autocratic revivalists paint <u><mark>the picture of an international system marked by</u></mark> rising levels of <u><mark>conflict and competition</u></mark>, a picture quite unlike the "end of history" vision of growing convergence and cooperation. This bleak outlook <u><mark>is</u></mark> based on <u><strong><mark>an exaggeration</u></strong></mark> of recent developments <u><mark>and ignores powerful <strong>countervailing factors</mark> and forces</u></strong>. Indeed, contrary to what trhe revivalists describe<u>, <mark>the most striking features</mark> of the contemporary international landscape <mark>are</u></mark> the intensification of economic <u><strong><mark>globalization</u></strong></mark>, thickening <u><strong><mark>institutions</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><strong>shared problems of <mark>interdependence</strong></mark>. <mark>The</u> <u>overall structure</u></mark> of the international system today <u>is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century</u>. Compared to older orders,<u> the contemporary liberal-centered international order <mark>provides</u></mark> a set of <u><mark>constraints</mark> and opportunities</u> — of pushes and pulls — <u><mark>that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving.</u></mark> Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which war as a path to conflict resolution and <u><mark>great-power expansion has become</u></mark> largely <u><strong><mark>obsolete</strong></mark>.</u> Most important, <u><strong><mark>nuclear weapons</u></strong> <u>have transformed great-power war</mark> </u>from a routine feature of international politics <u><mark>into an exercise in <strong>national suicide.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>With all of the</mark> great <mark>powers possessing nuclear weapons</mark> and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces</u>, warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. <u><mark>The prospect of</mark> such great <mark>losses has instilled</mark> in the great powers a <mark>level <strong>of</mark> caution and <mark>restraint</strong> that <strong>effectively precludes major revisionist efforts</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, <u>the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory</u> inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the<u> density of <mark>trade, investment, and production</mark> networks <mark>across international borders <strong>raises</mark> even more <mark>the costs of war</strong></mark>. </u>A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international. Taken together, these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge. The autocratic revival thesis neglects other key features of the international system as well. In the nineteenth century, rising states faced an international environment in which they could reasonably expect to translate their growing clout into geopolitical changes that would benefit themselves. But <u>in the twenty-first century</u>, <u>the status quo is much more difficult to overturn. Simple comparisons between China and the</u> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>with regard to aggregate economic size and capability do not reflect the fact that the United States does not stand alone but rather is the head of a coalition of liberal capitalist states</u> in Europe and East Asia <u>whose aggregate assets far exceed those of China</u> or even of a coalition of autocratic states. Moreover, potentially <u><mark>revisionist</u></mark> autocratic <u><mark>states</u>,</mark> most <u>notably China and Russia</u>, <u><mark>are</u></mark> already substantial players and <u><strong><mark>stakeholders</strong> in</u></mark> <u><mark>an</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>ensemble of global institutions</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>that make up the status quo</mark>, not least the UN Security Council (in which they have permanent seats and veto power</u>). <u>Many other global <mark>institution</mark>s</u>, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, <u><mark>are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice <strong>only by buying into the institutions</u></strong></mark>. <u>The pathway to modernity</u> for rising states <u>is not outside and against the status quo but rather inside</u> and through the flexible and accommodating institutions of <u>the liberal international order.</u> The fact that these autocracies are capitalist has profound implications for the nature of their international interests that point toward integration and accommodation in the future. <u>The </u>domestic <u>viability of</u> these <u>regimes hinges on their ability to sustain</u> high <u>economic growth</u> rates, <u>which</u> in turn <u>is crucially dependent on international trade</u> and investment; today's autocracies may be illiberal, but they remain fundamentally dependent on a liberal international capitalist system. It is not surprising that China made major domestic changes in order to join the WTO or that Russia is seeking to do so now. The dependence of autocratic capitalist states on foreign trade and investment means that they have a fundamental interest in maintaining an open, rulebased economic system. (Although these autocratic states do pursue bilateral trade and investment deals, particularly in energy and raw materials, this does not obviate their more basic dependence on and commitment to the WTO order.) In the case of China, because of its extensive dependence on industrial exports, the WTO may act as a vital bulwark against protectionist tendencies in importing states. Given their position in this system, which so serves their interests, the autocratic states are unlikely to become champions of an alternative global or regional economic order, let alone spoilers intent on seriously damaging the existing one. The prospects for revisionist behavior on the part of the capitalist autocracies are further reduced by the large and growing social networks across international borders. <u>Not only have these states joined the world economy, but <mark>their people</u></mark> — particularly upwardly mobile and educated elites — <u><mark>have increasingly joined the world community</u></mark>. In large and growing numbers, <u>citizens of autocratic</u> capitalist <u>states are participating in</u> a sprawling array of <u>transnational </u>educational, business, and avocational <u>networks.</u> As individuals are socialized into <u><mark>the values</u></mark> and orientations <u><mark>of</u></mark> these networks, stark: <u>"<mark>us versus them"</u></mark> cleavages <u><mark>become</u></mark> more <u><strong><mark>difficult to generate</mark> and sustain</strong>.</u> As the Harvard political scientist Alastair Iain Johnston has argued, China's ruling elite has also been socialized, as its foreign policy establishment has internalized the norms and practices of the international diplomatic community. China, far from cultivating causes for territorial dispute with its neighbors, has instead sought to resolve numerous historically inherited border conflicts, acting like a satisfied status quo state. <u>These social and diplomatic processes and developments suggest that there are strong tendencies toward normalization operating here</u>. Finally, there is an emerging set of global problems stemming from industrialism and economic globalization that will create common interests across states regardless of regime type. Autocratic <u><strong><mark>China</u></strong></mark> is as dependent on imported oil as are democratic <u><strong><mark>Europe</strong>, <strong>India</strong>, <strong>Japan</strong></mark>,</u> and <u>the United States</u>, suggesting an alignment of interests against petroleum-exporting autocracies, such as <u><strong><mark>Iran</strong> and <strong>Russia</u></strong></mark>. These states <u><strong><mark>share a common interest</strong> in</u></mark> price stability and supply <u><mark>security</u></mark> that could form the basis for a revitalization of the International Energy Agency, the consumer association created during the oil turmoil of the 1970s. The emergence of global warming and climate change as significant problems also suggests possibilities for alignments and cooperative ventures cutting across the autocratic-democratic divide. Like the United States, China is not only a major contributor to greenhouse gas accumulation but also likely to be a major victim of climate-induced desertification and coastal flooding. Its rapid industrialization and consequent pollution means that China, like other developed countries, will increasingly need to import technologies and innovative solutions for environmental management. Resource scarcity and environmental deterioration pose global threats that no state will be able to solve alone, thus placing a further premium on political integration and cooperative institution building<u>.</u> Analogies between the nineteenth century and the twenty-first are based on a severe mischaracterization of the actual conditions of the new era. <u><strong><mark>The declining utility of</mark> war</u></strong>, the thickening of international transactions and institutions, <u><mark>and emerging</u></mark> resource and <u><mark>environmental interdependencies</u></mark> together <u><strong><mark>undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability</u></strong></mark> based on autocratic-democratic rivalry and autocratic revisionism. In fact, <u><mark>the conditions of the twenty-first century <strong>point to the renewed value</strong> of</mark> international integration and <mark>cooperation</u>.</p></mark>
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Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 18,192 | 80 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
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Hurricanedebates2015
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1
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West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
741,675 |
Warming is real, human caused, and causes extinction—acting now key
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Mccoy 14
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Mccoy 14 (Dr. David McCoy et al., MD, Centre for International Health and Development, University College London, “Climate Change and Human Survival,” BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL v. 348, 4—2—14, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.g2510)
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the IPCC’s new report should leave no doubt about the scale and immediacy of the threat to human survival, it is “virtually certain that human influence has warmed the climate system and it is “extremely likely that more than half of the increase in temperature is anthropogenic Its report outlines the threats of warming: increased scarcity of food and water; extreme weather rise in sea level loss of biodiversity areas becoming uninhabitable; and mass migration, conflict and violence. the well being of all nations [is] at risk climate change is “the greatest threat to human health Further changes will depend on how much we continue to heat the planet Business as usual” will increase carbon dioxide concentrations The IPCC warns of “tipping points which, if crossed, could lead to a catastrophic collapse of interlinked human and natural systems there is now a “real chance of abrupt, unpredictable and potentially irreversible changes with highly damaging impacts
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the IPCC’s new report should leave no doubt about the scale and immediacy of the threat to human survival, it is “virtually certain that human influence has warmed the climate and is “extremely likely that more than half of the increase in temperature is anthropogenic Its report outlines the threats of warming: increased scarcity of food and water; extreme weather rise in sea level; loss of biodiversity; areas becoming uninhabitable; and mass migration, conflict and violence. climate change is “the greatest threat to human health Further changes will depend on how much we continue to heat the planet Business as usual” will increase carbon concentrations The IPCC warns of “tipping points which, if crossed, could lead to a catastrophic collapse of human and natural systems there is now a “real chance of abrupt, unpredictable and potentially irreversible changes with highly damaging impacts
|
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has just published its report on the impacts of global warming. Building on its recent update of the physical science of global warming [1], the IPCC’s new report should leave the world in no doubt about the scale and immediacy of the threat to human survival, health, and well-being. The IPCC has already concluded that it is “virtually certain that human influence has warmed the global climate system” and that it is “extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010” is anthropogenic [1]. Its new report outlines the future threats of further global warming: increased scarcity of food and fresh water; extreme weather events; rise in sea level; loss of biodiversity; areas becoming uninhabitable; and mass human migration, conflict and violence. Leaked drafts talk of hundreds of millions displaced in a little over 80 years. This month, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) added its voice: “the well being of people of all nations [is] at risk.” [2] Such comments reaffirm the conclusions of the Lancet/UCL Commission: that climate change is “the greatest threat to human health of the 21st century.” [3] The changes seen so far—massive arctic ice loss and extreme weather events, for example—have resulted from an estimated average temperature rise of 0.89°C since 1901. Further changes will depend on how much we continue to heat the planet. The release of just another 275 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide would probably commit us to a temperature rise of at least 2°C—an amount that could be emitted in less than eight years. [4] “Business as usual” will increase carbon dioxide concentrations from the current level of 400 parts per million (ppm), which is a 40% increase from 280 ppm 150 years ago, to 936 ppm by 2100, with a 50:50 chance that this will deliver global mean temperature rises of more than 4°C. It is now widely understood that such a rise is “incompatible with an organised global community.” [5]. The IPCC warns of “tipping points” in the Earth’s system, which, if crossed, could lead to a catastrophic collapse of interlinked human and natural systems. The AAAS concludes that there is now a “real chance of abrupt, unpredictable and potentially irreversible changes with highly damaging impacts on people around the globe.” [2] And this week a report from the World Meteorological Office (WMO) confirmed that extreme weather events are accelerating. WMO secretary general Michel Jarraud said, “There is no standstill in global warming . . . The laws of physics are non-negotiable.” [6]
| 2,661 |
<h4><strong>Warming is real, human caused, and causes extinction—<u>acting now</u> key</h4><p>Mccoy 14 </strong>(Dr. David McCoy et al., MD, Centre for International Health and Development, University College London, “Climate Change and Human Survival,” BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL v. 348, 4—2—14, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.g2510)</p><p>The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has just published its report on the impacts of global warming. Building on its recent update of the physical science of global warming [1], <u><mark>the IPCC’s new report should leave</u></mark> the world in <u><strong><mark>no doubt</strong> about the <strong>scale</strong> and <strong>immediacy</strong> of the threat to <strong>human survival</strong>,</u></mark> health, and well-being. The IPCC has already concluded that <u><mark>it is “<strong>virtually certain</strong> that human influence has warmed the</u></mark> global <u><mark>climate</mark> system</u>” <u><mark>and</u></mark> that <u>it <mark>is “<strong>extremely likely</strong> that more than half of the</u></mark> observed <u><mark>increase in</u></mark> global average surface <u><mark>temperature</u></mark> from 1951 to 2010” <u><mark>is anthropogenic</u></mark> [1]. <u><mark>Its</u></mark> new <u><mark>report outlines the</u></mark> future <u><mark>threats of</mark> </u>further global <u><mark>warming: increased scarcity of food and</mark> </u>fresh <u><mark>water; extreme weather</u></mark> events; <u><mark>rise in sea level</u>; <u>loss of biodiversity</u>; <u>areas becoming <strong>uninhabitable;</strong> and mass</u></mark> human <u><mark>migration, conflict and violence.</u></mark> Leaked drafts talk of hundreds of millions displaced in a little over 80 years. This month, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) added its voice: “<u>the well being of</u> people of <u>all nations [is] at risk</u>.” [2] Such comments reaffirm the conclusions of the Lancet/UCL Commission: that <u><mark>climate change is “the <strong>greatest threat</strong> to human health</u></mark> of the 21st century.” [3] The changes seen so far—massive arctic ice loss and extreme weather events, for example—have resulted from an estimated average temperature rise of 0.89°C since 1901. <u><mark>Further changes will depend on how much we continue to heat the planet</u></mark>. The release of just another 275 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide would probably commit us to a temperature rise of at least 2°C—an amount that could be emitted in less than eight years. [4] “<u><strong><mark>Business as usual</strong>” will increase carbon</mark> dioxide <mark>concentrations</u></mark> from the current level of 400 parts per million (ppm), which is a 40% increase from 280 ppm 150 years ago, to 936 ppm by 2100, with a 50:50 chance that this will deliver global mean temperature rises of more than 4°C. It is now widely understood that such a rise is “incompatible with an organised global community.” [5]. <u><mark>The IPCC warns of “<strong>tipping points</u></strong></mark>” in the Earth’s system, <u><mark>which, if crossed, could lead to a <strong>catastrophic collapse</strong> of</mark> interlinked <mark>human and natural systems</u></mark>. The AAAS concludes that <u><mark>there is now a “real chance of <strong>abrupt,</strong> <strong>unpredictable</strong> and potentially <strong>irreversible</strong> changes with <strong>highly damaging</strong> impacts</u></mark> on people around the globe.” [2] And this week a report from the World Meteorological Office (WMO) confirmed that extreme weather events are accelerating. WMO secretary general Michel Jarraud said, “There is no standstill in global warming . . . The laws of physics are non-negotiable.” [6] </p>
| null | null |
Politics
| 47,595 | 469 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
7
|
Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
|
1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,676 |
Turns case – they reinforce biopower – their resistance is a pyrrhic victory if it necessitates the destruction of the subject
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Stoneman 5
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Stoneman 5 Scott, “Suicide and Biopower: Foucault, Derrida, and Deconstruction,” Fall, http://www.scribd.com/doc/230752001/774-Long-Paper-Stoneman-Foucault-Derrida-and-Suicide#scribd
|
Blanchot is concerned about the “illogical optimism” that seems to characterize contemporary critical interventions on suicide While it may retain the power of an exceptional affirmation the annihilation of the autos- is most often a practical response to abject suffering the suicidal subject who claims a sovereignty over the body and a constituent power to effect death, effects a death which is not his own the person whose actions announce, “I withdraw from the world, I will act no longer” paradoxically affirms a kind of heteronomy under biopower by negating the future possibility of any autonomous action The self-willed destruction of the autonomy of the suicidal other affirms for these philosophers, a certain invaluable immanentism But if it is a defeat of or affront to biopower, suicide is a profoundly pyrrhic victory Foucault’s advocated right to self-murder much too expediently displaces concern for the ways in which killing oneself not only takes place as the effect of being broke, broken or berated but as the discernible consequence, the endgame, as it were, of certain strategies that characterize biopower as a regime of power/knowledge? The institutionalization of the suicidal astonishment in the only half-facetious manner in which Foucault describes it attests to the extent to which discussion of suicidality in recognizing the institutional force of biopower to produce suicide, must resist the lure of allegoricizing autodestruction
|
illogical optimism seems to characterize contemporary critical interventions “I withdraw from the world paradoxically affirms a kind of heteronomy under biopower by negating the future possibility of any autonomous action The self-willed destruction of the suicidal other affirms, for these philosophers, a certain invaluable immanentism But suicide is a profoundly pyrrhic victory right to self-murder much too expediently displaces concern for the ways in which killing onesel takes place as the effect of being broke, broken or berated, but as the discernible endgame of biopower discussion of suicidality must resist the lure of allegoricizing autodestruction
|
There would be no sense here of speaking to Blanchot’s consideration of suicide were it not one that, as I said earlier, qualifies the un-dialectical thinking in Foucault on the subject. Blanchot is concerned about the “illogical optimism” that seems to characterize contemporary critical interventions on, as well as literary representations of suicide (102). While it may retain, as he puts it, “the power of an exceptional affirmation” (103), there is the valuable residual sense in Blanchot that the annihilation of the autos- is most often a practical response to abject suffering. In this sense, the suicidal subject who claims a sovereignty over the body and a constituent power to effect death, effects a death which is not his own. It is on the question of the autonomous negation of the autonomy of the autos- that Blanchot seems to open to the forms of interruptive and invasive paternalism propounded in Cholbi. This is the principal site of self-difference in Blanchot, for whom the person whose actions announce, “I withdraw from the world, I will act no longer” paradoxically affirms a kind of heteronomy under biopower by negating the future possibility of any autonomous action (Blanchot 102). The self-willed destruction of the autonomy of the suicidal other may signal a “desire to begin, to find the beginning again in the end, to inaugurate in that ending a meaning,” it may, if it affirms, for these philosophers, a certain invaluable immanentism, necessitate forms of intervention (Blanchot 103). But if it is a defeat of or affront to biopower, suicide is a profoundly pyrrhic victory. Indeed, how robust an alternative is Foucault’s advocated right to self-murder if his concern with suicide much too expediently displaces an important concern for the ways in which killing oneself not only or simply takes place as the effect of being broke, broken or berated, but as the discernible consequence, the endgame, as it were, of certain strategies that characterize biopower as a regime of power/knowledge? The institutionalization of the suicidal astonishment in the only half-facetious manner in which Foucault describes it to Bono, while it may strike us as “merely” a joke, in my reading attests to the extent to which Foucault is vulnerable to a reading of his discussion of suicidality that, in recognizing the institutional force of biopower to produce suicide, must resist the lure of allegoricizing autodestruction.
| 2,446 |
<h4><strong>Turns case – they reinforce biopower</strong> – their resistance is a pyrrhic victory if it necessitates the destruction of the subject </h4><p><strong>Stoneman 5</strong> Scott, “Suicide and Biopower: Foucault, Derrida, and Deconstruction,” Fall, http://www.scribd.com/doc/230752001/774-Long-Paper-Stoneman-Foucault-Derrida-and-Suicide#scribd</p><p>There would be no sense here of speaking to Blanchot’s consideration of suicide were it not one that, as I said earlier, qualifies the un-dialectical thinking in Foucault on the subject. <u>Blanchot is concerned about the “<mark>illogical optimism</mark>” that <mark>seems to characterize contemporary critical interventions</mark> on</u>, as well as literary representations of <u>suicide</u> (102). <u>While it may retain</u>, as he puts it, “<u>the power of an exceptional affirmation</u>” (103), there is the valuable residual sense in Blanchot that <u>the annihilation of the autos- is most often a practical response to abject suffering</u>. In this sense, <u>the suicidal subject who claims a sovereignty over the body and a constituent power to effect death, effects a death which is not his own</u>. It is on the question of the autonomous negation of the autonomy of the autos- that Blanchot seems to open to the forms of interruptive and invasive paternalism propounded in Cholbi. This is the principal site of self-difference in Blanchot, for whom <u>the person whose actions announce, <mark>“I withdraw from the world</mark>, I will act no longer” <mark>paradoxically affirms a kind of heteronomy under biopower by negating the future possibility of any autonomous action</u></mark> (Blanchot 102). <u><mark>The self-willed destruction of the</mark> autonomy of the <mark>suicidal other</u></mark> may signal a “desire to begin, to find the beginning again in the end, to inaugurate in that ending a meaning,” it may, if it <u><mark>affirms</u>, <u>for these philosophers, a certain invaluable immanentism</u></mark>, necessitate forms of intervention (Blanchot 103). <u><mark>But</mark> if it is a defeat of or affront to biopower, <mark>suicide is a profoundly</u> <u>pyrrhic</u> <u>victory</u></mark>. Indeed, how robust an alternative is <u>Foucault’s advocated <mark>right to self-murder</u></mark> if his concern with suicide <u><mark>much too expediently displaces</u></mark> an important <u><mark>concern for the ways in which killing onesel</mark>f</u> <u>not only</u> or simply<u> <mark>takes place as the effect of being broke, broken or berated</u>, <u>but as the discernible </mark>consequence, the <mark>endgame</mark>, as it were, <mark>of</mark> certain strategies that characterize <mark>biopower</mark> as a regime of power/knowledge?</u> <u>The institutionalization of the suicidal astonishment in the only half-facetious manner in which Foucault describes it</u> to Bono, while it may strike us as “merely” a joke, in my reading <u>attests to the extent</u> <u>to which</u> Foucault is vulnerable to a reading of his <u><mark>discussion of suicidality</u></mark> that, <u>in recognizing the institutional force of biopower to produce suicide, <mark>must resist the lure of allegoricizing autodestruction</u></mark>.</p>
| null | null |
1NC
| 430,358 | 1 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,677 |
Nuclear deterrence checks – all states are rational
|
Tepperman 9
|
Tepperman 9 (John - journalist based in New York Cuty, Why obama should learn to love the bomb, Newsweek, 9/7, p.lexis)
|
A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side--and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and m a d is so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring leaders all came to the same safe conclusion the Cuban missile crisis both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations Ganguly found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962
|
A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not make the world more dangerous nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945 there's never been a nuclear war between two states all states are rational Their leaders tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate Nuclear weapons mak the costs of war obvious and unacceptable Even the craziest tin-pot dictator accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" The iron logic of deterrence and m a d led to nuclear peace nuclear powers have avoided direct combat, and they always will. There have been near misses, but a close look is fundamentally reassuring leaders all came to the same safe conclusion The record shows nuclear enemies slide toward war, then pull back The best example is India and Pakistan Getting weapons didn't lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. the two sides have never fought another war, despite provocations
|
A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why--and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way--you need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side--and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button--and everybody knows it--the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring--because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time." The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it.
| 5,323 |
<h4>Nuclear deterrence checks – all states are rational </h4><p><strong>Tepperman 9</strong> (John - journalist based in New York Cuty, Why obama should learn to love the bomb, Newsweek, 9/7, p.lexis)</p><p><u><strong><mark>A growing and compelling body of research</strong> suggests that nuclear weapons may not</mark>, in fact, <mark>make the world more dangerous</u></mark>, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, <u><mark>nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945</mark>. Second, <mark>there's never been a nuclear</mark>, or even a nonnuclear, <mark>war between two states </mark>that possess them</u>. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why--and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way--you need to start by recognizing that <u><mark>all states are <strong>rational</mark> on some basic level</strong>. <mark>Their leaders</mark> may be <strong>stupid</strong>, <strong>petty</strong>, <strong>venal</strong>, <strong>even evil</strong>, but they <mark>tend to do things only when they're <strong>pretty sure they can get away with them</strong></mark>. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. <strong><mark>Not even Hitler or Saddam</strong> waged wars they didn't think they could win</mark>. The problem historically has been that <mark>leaders often make the <strong>wrong gamble and underestimate</strong></mark> the other side--and millions of innocents pay the price. <mark>Nuclear weapons</mark> change all that by <mark>mak</mark>ing <mark>the costs of war <strong>obvious</strong></mark>, inevitable, <strong><mark>and unacceptable</u></strong></mark>. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button--and everybody knows it--the basic math shifts. <u><mark>Even the <strong>craziest tin-pot dictator</strong></mark> is forced to <mark>accept that war with a nuclear state is <strong>unwinnable</strong></mark> and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, <mark>"<strong>Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything</strong>?"</mark> Why indeed? <mark>The iron logic of deterrence and <strong>m</u></strong></mark>utually <u><strong><mark>a</u></strong></mark>ssured <u><strong><mark>d</u></strong></mark>estruction <u>is so compelling, it's <mark>led to</mark> what's known as the <strong><mark>nuclear peace</u></strong></mark>: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, <u>the <mark>nuclear powers have</mark> scrupulously <strong><mark>avoided direct combat</strong>, and</mark> there's very good reason to think <strong><mark>they always will</strong>. There have been</mark> some <mark>near misses, but</u> <u>a close look</mark> at these cases <strong><mark>is fundamentally reassuring</u></strong></mark>--because in each instance, very different <u><strong><mark>leaders all came to the same safe conclusion</u></strong></mark>. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: <u>the Cuban missile crisis</u>. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But <u>both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have <strong>meant curtains</u></strong> for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time." <u><mark>The record</mark> since then <mark>shows</mark> the same pattern repeating: <mark>nuclear</mark>-armed <mark>enemies slide toward war, <strong>then pull back</strong></mark>, always for the same reasons. <mark>The best</mark> recent <mark>example is India and Pakistan</u></mark>, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. <u><mark>Getting</mark> their hands on <mark>weapons</mark> of mass destruction <mark>didn't</mark> do anything to <mark>lessen their animosity. But it did <strong>dramatically mellow their behavior</strong>.</mark> Since acquiring atomic weapons, <mark>the two sides have never fought another war, <strong>despite</mark> severe <mark>provocations</u></strong></mark> (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit <u>Ganguly</u>, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has <u>found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962</u>. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 18,360 | 140 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
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Hurricanedebates2015
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1
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West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
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Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,678 |
Their affirimation of suicide for death row inmates is rooted in a false Understanding of Free Choice—The Very Endorsement of Such a Concept Underestimates the Ideological Power of the World Itself, Making Resistance Impossible and Proving They Can’t Solve
| null |
Slavoj Zizek, “Against enlightened administration,” June 19, 2005 (http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/2169/thanks_but_wel_do_it_ourselves/)
|
Amish communities routinely practice the institution of rumspringa At 17, their children (who until then have been subjected to strict family discipline) are set free and allowed, solicited even, to go out and experience the ways of the “American” world around them. They drive cars, listen to pop music, watch TV and get involved in drinking, drugs and wild sex. After a couple of years, they are expected to decide: Will they become members of the Amish community, or leave it and turn into ordinary American citizens? Far from allowing the youngsters a truly free choice—that is, giving them a chance to decide based on the full knowledge and experience of both sides of the choice—such a solution is a fake choice if there ever was one. After long years of discipline and fantasizing about the illicit pleasures of the outside world, when the adolescent Amish are thrown into this world unprepared, they cannot but indulge in extremely transgressive behavior, And since they have never had the chance to develop any self-regulation in such a life, the wholly new and permissive situation inexorably backlashes, generating unbearable anxiety. Thus, it is a safe bet that, after a couple of years, they will return to the seclusion of their community. Indeed, 90 percent of the children do exactly that.
This is a perfect example of the difficulties that accompany the idea of a “free choice.” While Amish adolescents are formally given a free choice, the conditions they find themselves in while choosing make the choice “unfree.” In order for them to have a truly free choice, they would have to be properly informed of and educated about all their options. However, the only way to do this would be to extract them from the Amish community, which would effectively render them American.
This deadlock also illustrates the problems with the standard liberal attitude toward Muslim women who wear veils: They can do it if it is their free choice and not an option imposed on them by their husbands or family. However, the moment women wear a veil as the result of their free choice the meaning of wearing a veil changes completely. For liberals, it is no longer a sign of their belonging to the Muslim community, but an expression of their idiosyncratic individuality
|
Amish communities practice rumspringa their children are set free and allowed to go out and experience the ways of the “American” world around them fter a couple of years, they are expected to decide: Will they become members of the Amish community, or leave it a that is, giving them a chance to decide based on the full knowledge and experience of both sides of the choice—such a solution is a fake choice if there ever was one. After long years of discipline and fantasizing about the illicit And since they have never had the chance to develop any self-regulation in such a life, the wholly new and permissive situation inexorably backlashes, generating unbearable anxiety.
This is a perfect example of the difficulties that accompany the idea of a “free choice.” While Amish adolescents are formally given a free choice, the conditions they find themselves in while choosing make the choice “unfree.”
|
Amish communities routinely practice the institution of rumspringa (from the German herumspringen, to jump around). At 17, their children (who until then have been subjected to strict family discipline) are set free and allowed, solicited even, to go out and experience the ways of the “American” world around them. They drive cars, listen to pop music, watch TV and get involved in drinking, drugs and wild sex. After a couple of years, they are expected to decide: Will they become members of the Amish community, or leave it and turn into ordinary American citizens? Far from allowing the youngsters a truly free choice—that is, giving them a chance to decide based on the full knowledge and experience of both sides of the choice—such a solution is a fake choice if there ever was one. After long years of discipline and fantasizing about the illicit pleasures of the outside world, when the adolescent Amish are thrown into this world unprepared, they cannot but indulge in extremely transgressive behavior, gorging themselves fully on a life of sex, drugs and drinking. And since they have never had the chance to develop any self-regulation in such a life, the wholly new and permissive situation inexorably backlashes, generating unbearable anxiety. Thus, it is a safe bet that, after a couple of years, they will return to the seclusion of their community. Indeed, 90 percent of the children do exactly that.
This is a perfect example of the difficulties that accompany the idea of a “free choice.” While Amish adolescents are formally given a free choice, the conditions they find themselves in while choosing make the choice “unfree.” In order for them to have a truly free choice, they would have to be properly informed of and educated about all their options. However, the only way to do this would be to extract them from the Amish community, which would effectively render them American.
This deadlock also illustrates the problems with the standard liberal attitude toward Muslim women who wear veils: They can do it if it is their free choice and not an option imposed on them by their husbands or family. However, the moment women wear a veil as the result of their free choice (say, in order to realize their own spirituality), the meaning of wearing a veil changes completely. For liberals, it is no longer a sign of their belonging to the Muslim community, but an expression of their idiosyncratic individuality. The difference is the same as the one between a Chinese farmer eating Chinese food because his village has done so from time immemorial and a citizen of a Western megalopolis deciding to go and have dinner at a local Chinese restaurant.
| 2,671 |
<h4>Their affirimation of suicide for death row inmates is rooted in a false Understanding of Free Choice—The Very Endorsement of Such a Concept Underestimates the Ideological Power of the World Itself, Making Resistance Impossible and Proving They Can’t Solve</h4><p>Slavoj Zizek, “Against enlightened administration,” June 19, 2005 (http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/2169/thanks_but_wel_do_it_ourselves/)</p><p><u><mark>Amish communities</mark> routinely <mark>practice</mark> the institution of <mark>rumspringa</u></mark> (from the German herumspringen, to jump around). <u>At 17, <mark>their children</mark> (who until then have been subjected to strict family discipline) <mark>are set free and allowed</mark>, solicited even, <mark>to go out and experience the ways of the “American” world around them</mark>. They drive cars, listen to pop music, watch TV and get involved in drinking, drugs and wild sex. A<mark>fter a couple of years, they are expected to decide: Will they become members of the Amish community, or leave it a</mark>nd turn into ordinary American citizens?</u> <u>Far from allowing the youngsters a truly free choice—<mark>that is, giving them a chance to decide based on the full knowledge and experience of both sides of the choice—such a solution is a fake choice if there ever was one. After long years of discipline and fantasizing about the illicit</mark> pleasures of the outside world, when the adolescent Amish are thrown into this world unprepared, they cannot but indulge in extremely transgressive behavior,</u> gorging themselves fully on a life of sex, drugs and drinking. <u><mark>And since they have never had the chance to develop any self-regulation in such a life, the wholly new and permissive situation inexorably backlashes, generating unbearable</mark> <mark>anxiety.</mark> Thus, it is a safe bet that, after a couple of years, they will return to the seclusion of their community. Indeed, 90 percent of the children do exactly that.</p><p><mark>This is a perfect example of the difficulties that accompany the idea of a “free choice.” While Amish adolescents are formally given a free choice, the conditions they find themselves in while choosing make the choice “unfree.”</mark> In order for them to have a truly free choice, they would have to be properly informed of and educated about all their options. However, the only way to do this would be to extract them from the Amish community, which would effectively render them American.</p><p>This deadlock also illustrates the problems with the standard liberal attitude toward Muslim women who wear veils: They can do it if it is their free choice and not an option imposed on them by their husbands or family. However, the moment women wear a veil as the result of their free choice </u>(say, in order to realize their own spirituality), <u>the meaning of wearing a veil changes completely. For liberals, it is no longer a sign of their belonging to the Muslim community, but an expression of their idiosyncratic individuality</u>. The difference is the same as the one between a Chinese farmer eating Chinese food because his village has done so from time immemorial and a citizen of a Western megalopolis deciding to go and have dinner at a local Chinese restaurant.</p>
| null | null |
Zizek
| 430,359 | 1 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
7
|
Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
|
1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,679 |
case
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>case</h4>
| null |
2AC
|
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 430,360 | 1 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,680 |
Affirm suicide as a possible aesthetic beyond the strictures of medical expertise – we should allow suicide but not allegoricize or moralize it
|
Osborne 6
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Osborne 6 Thomas Osborne, Department of Sociology, University of Bristol, “‘Fascinated dispossession’: suicide and the aesthetics of freedom,” Economy and Society Volume 34, Issue 2, 2005, 8/16/2006
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The aesthetic suicide, paradoxically enough, resists the forces that would freeze up life This is, again, to refer to a sense in which we might describe such suicide as being 'beyond' knowledge or morality suicide became both a problem and a privileged object for bio-power suicide was a phenomenon amenable to being counted; it was a key instrument of bio-political regulation there was also something like an ethical privilege afforded by this attention as a kind of resistance to bio-power
Yet Foucault did perhaps find himself drawn to advocacy of something akin to an aesthetic approach The aesthetic attitude more generally was, for him, itself a form of resistance to bio-power the artistic life came to be something of a challenge to the regime of bio-political regulation he commented there is no more beautiful form of conduct than suicide It would be a case of working on one's suicide for all of one's life
Aestheticism does not presuppose extreme drama or spectacle Foucault's vision amounts to an alternative to the bio-political regulation of life and death itself he envisages suicide 'retreats' where people could go in order to choose their own death removed from the strictures of either determinate moral codes or medicalized expertise
|
The aesthetic suicide resists the forces that would freeze up life e might describe suicide as being 'beyond' knowledge or morality suicide was a phenomenon amenable to being counted; it was a key instrument of bio-political regulation there was also something like an ethical privilege afforded by this attention as a kind of resistance to bio-power
The aesthetic attitude came to be challenge to bio-political regulation
Aestheticism does not presuppose extreme spectacle Foucault's vision amounts to an alternative suicide removed from the strictures of either determinate moral codes or medicalized expertise
|
Perhaps, too, in being acts of power such suicides, albeit here drawn from literary sources, are acts of resistance. The aesthetic suicide, paradoxically enough, resists the forces that would freeze up life. This is, again, to refer to a sense in which we might describe such suicide as being 'beyond' knowledge or morality. And take, again, some of Michel Foucault's own reflections on this matter, not in so far as Foucault straightforwardly endorsed such a view but in that he himself posited suicide - historically speaking - as a category of resistance to the modern state administration of life in systems of welfare, medicine and the regulation of population, to what he called bio-power. In fact, in the nineteenth century suicide became both a problem and a privileged object for such bio-power. In part this was due to the fact that suicide was a phenomenon amenable to being counted; it was a key instrument of bio-political regulation (Hacking 1990: 64-72, 170-3). Yet, as Foucault, argues, there was also something like an ethical or subjective privilege afforded by this attention to suicide; as a kind of resistance and provocation to bio-power. 'This determination to die, strange and yet so persistent and constant in its manifestations, and consequently so difficult to explain as being due to particular circumstances or individual accidents, was one of the first astonishments of a society in which political power had assigned itself the task of administering life' (Foucault 1979: 138-9).
Yet, in seeing suicide as a form of resistance to bio-power, Foucault did perhaps find himself drawn to advocacy of something akin to an aesthetic approach to the act of suicide as one suited to the circumstances of the present age. The aesthetic attitude more generally was, for him, itself a form of resistance to bio-power, at least originally so: in so far as the artistic life, beginning with romanticism, came to be something of a challenge to the regime of bio-political regulation, and in so far as the 'life of the artist' emerged as a critique of the egoism of bourgeois culture and thus a challenge no doubt to the idea of the administration of life itself (Foucault 1994a: 629-30). Indeed, in Foucault's own terms, there is a sense in which suicide itself is integrally tied to the idea of art. In a late interview he commented in a somewhat retro-Stoic vein: 'I am committed to a veritable cultural combat to remind people that there is no more beautiful form of conduct which, as a result, merits reflection with such great attention, than suicide. It would be a case of working on one's suicide for all of one's life' (Foucault 1994b: 256; cf. Hadot 1995: 93-101).
Foucault, it should be noted, is by no means restricting himself here to such high-profile suicides as that of the Mishima variety. Aestheticism does not presuppose such extreme forms of drama or spectacle. Foucault's vision - if it can be called that - amounts to an alternative to the bio-political regulation of life and death itself. Thus he envisages here suicide 'retreats' where people could go in order to choose their own death, indeed a beautiful death, a freely chosen active euthanasia, one removed from the strictures of either determinate moral codes or medicalized expertise (Foucault 1994b: 256-7). In these comments it is as if suicide has taken on a kind of exemplary ethical status as an index of modern reflexive agency itself. For writers such as Foucault, the will to commit suicide is, in its aesthetic intensity, perhaps something of an index of our capacity for freedom itself.
| 3,593 |
<h4>Affirm suicide as a possible aesthetic beyond the strictures of medical expertise – we should allow suicide but not allegoricize or moralize it</h4><p><strong>Osborne 6</strong> Thomas Osborne, Department of Sociology, University of Bristol, “‘Fascinated dispossession’: suicide and the aesthetics of freedom,” Economy and Society Volume 34, Issue 2, 2005, 8/16/2006</p><p>Perhaps, too, in being acts of power such suicides, albeit here drawn from literary sources, are acts of resistance. <u><mark>The aesthetic suicide</mark>, paradoxically enough, <mark>resists the forces that would freeze up life</u></mark>. <u>This is, again, to refer to a sense in which w<mark>e might describe</mark> such <mark>suicide as being 'beyond' knowledge or morality</u></mark>. And take, again, some of Michel Foucault's own reflections on this matter, not in so far as Foucault straightforwardly endorsed such a view but in that he himself posited suicide - historically speaking - as a category of resistance to the modern state administration of life in systems of welfare, medicine and the regulation of population, to what he called bio-power. In fact, in the nineteenth century <u>suicide became both a problem and a privileged object for</u> such <u>bio-power</u>. In part this was due to the fact that <u><mark>suicide was a phenomenon amenable to being counted; it was a key instrument of bio-political regulation</u></mark> (Hacking 1990: 64-72, 170-3). Yet, as Foucault, argues, <u><mark>there was also something like an ethical</u></mark> or subjective <u><mark>privilege afforded by this attention</u></mark> to suicide; <u><mark>as a kind of resistance</u></mark> and provocation <u><mark>to bio-power</u></mark>. 'This determination to die, strange and yet so persistent and constant in its manifestations, and consequently so difficult to explain as being due to particular circumstances or individual accidents, was one of the first astonishments of a society in which political power had assigned itself the task of administering life' (Foucault 1979: 138-9).</p><p><u>Yet</u>, in seeing suicide as a form of resistance to bio-power, <u>Foucault</u> <u>did perhaps find himself drawn to advocacy of something akin to an aesthetic approach</u> to the act of suicide as one suited to the circumstances of the present age. <u><mark>The aesthetic attitude</mark> more generally was, for him, itself a form of resistance to bio-power</u>, at least originally so: in so far as <u>the artistic life</u>, beginning with romanticism, <u><mark>came to be</mark> something of a <mark>challenge to</mark> the regime of <mark>bio-political regulation</u></mark>, and in so far as the 'life of the artist' emerged as a critique of the egoism of bourgeois culture and thus a challenge no doubt to the idea of the administration of life itself (Foucault 1994a: 629-30). Indeed, in Foucault's own terms, there is a sense in which suicide itself is integrally tied to the idea of art. In a late interview <u>he commented</u> in a somewhat retro-Stoic vein: 'I am committed to a veritable cultural combat to remind people that <u>there is no more beautiful form of conduct</u> which, as a result, merits reflection with such great attention, <u>than suicide</u>. <u>It would be a case of working on one's suicide for all of one's life</u>' (Foucault 1994b: 256; cf. Hadot 1995: 93-101).</p><p>Foucault, it should be noted, is by no means restricting himself here to such high-profile suicides as that of the Mishima variety. <u><mark>Aestheticism does not presuppose</u></mark> such <u><mark>extreme</u></mark> forms of <u>drama or <mark>spectacle</u></mark>. <u><mark>Foucault's vision</u></mark> - if it can be called that - <u><mark>amounts to an alternative</mark> to the bio-political regulation of life and death itself</u>. Thus <u>he envisages</u> here <u><mark>suicide</mark> 'retreats' where people could go in order to choose their own death</u>, indeed a beautiful death, a freely chosen active euthanasia, one <u><strong><mark>removed from the strictures of either determinate moral codes or medicalized expertise</u></strong></mark> (Foucault 1994b: 256-7). In these comments it is as if suicide has taken on a kind of exemplary ethical status as an index of modern reflexive agency itself. For writers such as Foucault, the will to commit suicide is, in its aesthetic intensity, perhaps something of an index of our capacity for freedom itself.</p>
| null | null |
1NC
| 430,361 | 1 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
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Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,681 |
Liberal anti-racism inevitably disintegrates in response to perceived crisis because of its tie to fantasy politics and the waythat ignores the source of its criticism in enjoyment ***
|
Stavrakakis '99
|
Stavrakakis '99 [Yannis, No, love isn't all you need, Lacan and the Political, NYC: Routledge, 1999, 109-10//uwyo-ajl]
|
the effects of the normative idealist or Enlightenment-style critique of racism are severely limited because , it 'has remained more naïve than the consciousness it wanted to expose' ). In its rationality it has exhausted itself what is at stake here is not rational argumentation but the organization and administration of enjoyment: The impotence of the attitude of traditional Enlightenment is best exemplified by the anti-racist who, at the level of rational argumentation, produces a series of convincing reasons against the racist Other, but is nonetheless clearly fascinated by the object of his critique – and consequently, defense disintegrates in the moment of real crisis the question of how to gain the minimum distance from the fantasmatic frame that organises our enjoyment is crucial not only for the concept of the psychoanalytic cure and its conclusion: today, in our era of renewed racist tensions, of universalised anti-Semitism, it is perhaps the foremost political question' why is the politics of today a politics of aporia? in the ethical sphere, the fantasmatic ideal of harmony is still dominant. Accepting this ultimate impossibility seems to be the only way out of this troubling state.
|
Enlightenment-style critique of racism are limited because , it 'has remained more naïve than the consciousness it wanted to expose' what is at stake here is not rational argumentation but the organization and administration of enjoyment: the anti-racist produces a series of convincing reasons against the racist Other, but is nonetheless clearly fascinated by the object of his critique – and consequently, all defense disintegrates in the moment of real crisis the question of how to gain the minimum distance from the fantasmatic frame that organises our enjoyment , is crucial not only for the concept of the psychoanalytic cure it is perhaps the foremost political question' why is the politics of today a politics of aporia , in the ethical sphere, the fantasmatic ideal of harmony is still dominant.
|
What is at stake in the Lacanian conception of fantasy is, as we have already pointed out, enjoyment (jouissance). If the effects of the normative idealist or Enlightenment-style critique of racism are severely limited, if this critique is not enough (Lipowatz, 1995a: 213), this is because, to use one of Sloterdijk's formulations, it 'has remained more naïve than the consciousness it wanted to expose' (Sloterdijk, 1988: 3). In its rationality it has exhausted itself. In other words, it didn't take into account that what is at stake here is not rational argumentation but the organization and administration of enjoyment: The impotence of the attitude of traditional Enlightenment is best exemplified by the anti-racist who, at the level of rational argumentation, produces a series of convincing reasons against the racist Other, but is nonetheless clearly fascinated by the object of his critique – and consequently, all his defense disintegrates in the moment of real crisis (when 'the fatherland is in danger' for example). (Sloterdijk, 1988: 3) Thus, the question of la traversee du fantasme, that is to say 'of how to gain the minimum distance from the fantasmatic frame that organises our enjoyment, of how to suspend its efficiency, is crucial not only for the concept of the psychoanalytic cure and its conclusion: today, in our era of renewed racist tensions, of universalised anti-Semitism, it is perhaps the foremost political question' (Zizek, 1996a: 117-18). In light of this, traversing the fantasy of utopian thought seems to be one of the most important political tasks of our age. The current crisis of utopia is not cause for concern but for celebration. But then why is the politics of today a politics of aporia? There can be only one plausible explanation: just because, in the ethical sphere, the fantasmatic ideal of harmony is still dominant. If we are situated today in a terrain of aporia and frustration it is because we still fantasise something that is increasingly revealed as impossible and catastrophic. Accepting this ultimate impossibility seems to be the only way out of this troubling state.
| 2,133 |
<h4>Liberal anti-racism inevitably disintegrates in response to perceived crisis because of its tie to fantasy politics and the waythat ignores the source of its criticism in enjoyment ***</h4><p><u><strong>Stavrakakis '99</u></strong> [Yannis, No, love isn't all you need, Lacan and the Political, NYC: Routledge, 1999, 109-10//uwyo-ajl]</p><p>What is at stake in the Lacanian conception of fantasy is, as we have already pointed out, enjoyment (jouissance). If <u><strong>the effects of the normative idealist or <mark>Enlightenment-style critique of racism are</mark> severely <mark>limited</u></strong></mark>, if this critique is not enough (Lipowatz, 1995a: 213), this is <u><strong><mark>because</u></strong></mark>, to use one of Sloterdijk's formulations<u><strong><mark>, it 'has remained more naïve than the consciousness it wanted to expose'</u></strong></mark> (Sloterdijk, 1988: 3<u><strong>). In its rationality it has exhausted itself</u></strong>. In other words, it didn't take into account that<u> <strong><mark>what is at stake here is not rational argumentation but the organization and administration of enjoyment:</mark> The impotence of the attitude of traditional Enlightenment is best exemplified by <mark>the anti-racist</mark> who, at the level of rational argumentation, <mark>produces a series of convincing reasons against the racist Other, but is nonetheless clearly fascinated by the object of his critique – and consequently, </u></strong>all</mark> his <u><strong><mark>defense disintegrates in the moment of real crisis</strong></mark> </u>(when 'the fatherland is in danger' for example). (Sloterdijk, 1988: 3) Thus, <u><strong><mark>the question of</u></strong></mark> la traversee du fantasme, that is to say 'of <u><strong><mark>how to gain the minimum distance from the fantasmatic frame that organises our enjoyment</u></strong></mark>, of how to suspend its efficiency<mark>,<u> <strong>is crucial not only for the concept of the psychoanalytic cure</mark> and its conclusion: today, in our era of renewed racist tensions, of universalised anti-Semitism, <mark>it is perhaps the foremost political question'</mark> </u></strong>(Zizek, 1996a: 117-18). In light of this, traversing the fantasy of utopian thought seems to be one of the most important political tasks of our age. The current crisis of utopia is not cause for concern but for celebration. But then <u><strong><mark>why is the politics of today a politics of aporia</mark>?</u></strong> There can be only one plausible explanation: just because<mark>,<u><strong> in the ethical sphere, the fantasmatic ideal of harmony is still dominant.</mark> </u></strong>If we are situated today in a terrain of aporia and frustration it is because we still fantasise something that is increasingly revealed as impossible and catastrophic. <u><strong>Accepting this ultimate impossibility seems to be the only way out of this troubling state. </p></u></strong>
| null | null |
Zizek
| 94,261 | 4 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
7
|
Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
|
1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,682 |
PAS opens the door to physicians killing without the patients consent—Dutch studies prove.
|
Hendin et al 97
|
Hendin et al 97
Herbert Hendin, MD (AFSP), Chris Rutenfrans, PhD (Dept. of Justice, The Hague), Zbigniew Zylicz, MD (Hospice Rosenhuyvel), “Lessons From the Dutch”, Journal of the American Medical Association, June 4, 1997-Vol 277, No. 21. , http://www.life.org.nz/euthanasia/abouteuthanasia/history-euthanasia10/ //jchen
|
Death Without Consent
The most alarming concern, to arise from the Dutch studies, has been the documentation of cases in which patients, who have not given their consent, have their lives ended by physicians. The 1990 study revealed that in 0.8% of the deaths, more than 1000 cases in the Netherlands each year, physicians admitted they had actively caused death without the explicit consent of the patient.
while pointing to the decline, concede that differences in the way this particular information was obtained, make its significance uncertain. In both studies, however, about a quarter of physicians stated that they had "terminated the lives of patients without an explicit request" from the patient to do so and a third more of the physicians could conceive of doing so.
The use of the word "explicit" is somewhat inaccurate since, in 48% of these cases, there was no request of any kind, (3[pp.1704]) and in the others, there were mainly references to patients’ earlier statements of not wanting to suffer (l[pp.5l]).
International attention had centered on the 1350 cases, 1% of all Dutch deaths in 1990, in which physicians gave pain medication with the explicit intention of ending the patient's life
As reported by the physicians, in the 1995 study, in more than 80% of these cases (1537 deaths), no request for death was made by the patient
and involuntary (if the patient was competent) euthanasia, they will see this as a striking increase in the number of cases terminated without request and a refutation of the investigators’ claim that there has been perhaps a slight decrease in the number of such cases.
totals all the deaths that resulted from euthanasia, assisted suicide, ending the life of a patient without consent, and giving opioids with the explicit intention of ending life, the estimated number of deaths, caused by active intervention by physicians, has increased from 4813 (3.7% of all deaths) in 1990 to 6368 (4.7% of all deaths) Based on data from the questionnaire study, this is an increase of 27% in cases in which physicians actively intervened to cause death (the interview study documents a 20% increase).
The Dutch investigators minimize the significance of the number of deaths without consent by explaining that the patients were incompeten We are not told what percentage of those patients' who were given pain medication intended to end their lives without discussing it with them, were competent, but analysis of the data for opioid administration indicates that it is likely to be at least 20%.
More than 4000 additional competent patients were given pain medication in amounts likely to end their lives by physicians who did not discuss the decision with them, but whose primary intention was not to end their lives
Whether the intention was to end life, or whether death was simply likely, physicians usually gave as the reason for not discussing the decisions with the patients, that they had previously had some discussion of the subject with them (3[pp.1704]).
Yet, it seems incomprehensible that a physician would terminate or put at risk the life of a competent patient on the basis of a previous discussion without checking what the patient currently felt.
Dutch patient with disseminated breast cancer, who had said she did not want euthanasia, had her life ended because in the physician’s words, "It could have taken another week before she died. I just needed this bed"
|
The most alarming concern, to arise from the Dutch studies, has been the documentation of cases in which patients, who have not given their consent, have their lives ended by physicians. in 0.8% of the deaths, more than 1000 cases in the Netherlands each year, physicians admitted they had actively caused death without the consent of the patient.
about a quarter of physicians stated that they had "terminated the lives of patients without an explicit request
in 48% of these cases, there was no request of any kind
in more than 80% of these cases (1537 deaths), no request for death was made by the patient
Based on data from the questionnaire study, this is an increase of 27% in cases in which physicians actively intervened to cause death
More than 4000 additional competent patients were given pain medication in amounts likely to end their lives by physicians who did not discuss the decision with them
Dutch patient with disseminated breast cancer, who had said she did not want euthanasia, had her life ended because in the physician’s words, "It could have taken another week before she died. I just needed this bed
|
Moreover, almost 20% of the physicians’ most recent un-reported cases involved ending of a life without the patient's consent (4[pp.1708]). Such cases, both the 1990 and 1995 studies revealed, were virtually never reported (l[pp.65],4[pl7lO]).
Death Without Consent
The most alarming concern, to arise from the Dutch studies, has been the documentation of cases in which patients, who have not given their consent, have their lives ended by physicians. The 1990 study revealed that in 0.8% of the deaths, more than 1000 cases in the Netherlands each year, physicians admitted they had actively caused death without the explicit consent of the patient.
The 1995 figure is 0.7% (fewer than 1000 cases), but the researchers, while pointing to the decline, concede that differences in the way this particular information was obtained, make its significance uncertain. In both studies, however, about a quarter of physicians stated that they had "terminated the lives of patients without an explicit request" from the patient to do so and a third more of the physicians could conceive of doing so.
The use of the word "explicit" is somewhat inaccurate since, in 48% of these cases, there was no request of any kind, (3[pp.1704]) and in the others, there were mainly references to patients’ earlier statements of not wanting to suffer (l[pp.5l]).
The 1990 study documented, and the 1995 study confirms, that cases classified, as "termination of the patient without explicit request", were a fraction of the nonvoluntary and involuntary euthanasia cases. International attention had centered on the 1350 cases, 1% of all Dutch deaths in 1990, in which physicians gave pain medication with the explicit intention of ending the patient's life (1[pp.73],12[pp.270]) The investigators minimized the number of patients put to death who had not requested it, by not including these 1350 patients, in that category.
By 1995, there had been an increase in the number of deaths in which physicians gave pain medication, with the explicit intention of ending the patient's life, from 1350 cases (1% of all Dutch deaths) to 1896 (1.4% of all Dutch deaths)(3[p1700]). These are comparisons that the Dutch investigators do not make (see Table).
As reported by the physicians, in the 1995 study, in more than 80% of these cases (1537 deaths), no request for death was made by the patient (3[pp.1704]).
Since researchers around the world have treated these deaths as nonvoluntary and involuntary (if the patient was competent) euthanasia, they will see this as a striking increase in the number of cases terminated without request and a refutation of the investigators’ claim that there has been perhaps a slight decrease in the number of such cases.
If one totals all the deaths that resulted from euthanasia, assisted suicide, ending the life of a patient without consent, and giving opioids with the explicit intention of ending life, the estimated number of deaths, caused by active intervention by physicians, has increased from 4813 (3.7% of all deaths) in 1990 to 6368 (4.7% of all deaths) in 1995 (Table). Based on data from the questionnaire study, this is an increase of 27% in cases in which physicians actively intervened to cause death (the interview study documents a 20% increase).
The Dutch investigators minimize the significance of the number of deaths without consent by explaining that the patients were incompetent (3[pp.1702]). But in the 1995 study, 21% of the individuals classified as "patients whose lives were ended without explicit request" were competent: in the 1990 study, 37% were competent [l (pp.l704)] We are not told what percentage of those patients' who were given pain medication intended to end their lives without discussing it with them, were competent, but analysis of the data for opioid administration indicates that it is likely to be at least 20%.
More than 4000 additional competent patients were given pain medication in amounts likely to end their lives by physicians who did not discuss the decision with them, but whose primary intention was not to end their lives (l[pp.75],3[pp.l700,l704]).
Whether the intention was to end life, or whether death was simply likely, physicians usually gave as the reason for not discussing the decisions with the patients, that they had previously had some discussion of the subject with them (3[pp.1704]).
Yet, it seems incomprehensible that a physician would terminate or put at risk the life of a competent patient on the basis of a previous discussion without checking what the patient currently felt.
An illustration given by the attorney for the Dutch Voluntary Euthanasia Society of why it was often necessary for physicians to end the lives of competent patients without their consent, was the case of a nun whose physician ended her life a few days before she would have died because she was in excruciating pain but her religious convictions did not permit her to ask for death (8[pp.97]).
In another case, a Dutch patient with disseminated breast cancer, who had said she did not want euthanasia, had her life ended because in the physician’s words, "It could have taken another week before she died. I just needed this bed" (13).
| 5,206 |
<h4><strong>PAS opens the door to physicians killing without the patients consent—Dutch studies prove.</h4><p>Hendin et al 97</p><p></strong>Herbert Hendin, MD (AFSP), Chris Rutenfrans, PhD (Dept. of Justice, The Hague), Zbigniew Zylicz, MD (Hospice Rosenhuyvel), “Lessons From the Dutch”, Journal of the American Medical Association, June 4, 1997-Vol 277, No. 21. , http://www.life.org.nz/euthanasia/abouteuthanasia/history-euthanasia10/ //jchen</p><p>Moreover, almost 20% of the physicians’ most recent un-reported cases involved ending of a life without the patient's consent (4[pp.1708]). Such cases, both the 1990 and 1995 studies revealed, were virtually never reported (l[pp.65],4[pl7lO]).</p><p><u>Death Without Consent</p><p><mark>The most alarming concern, to arise from the Dutch studies, has been the documentation of cases in which patients, who have not given their consent, have their lives ended by physicians.</mark> The 1990 study revealed that <mark>in 0.8% of the deaths, more than 1000 cases in the Netherlands each year, physicians admitted they had actively caused death without the </mark>explicit <mark>consent of the patient.</mark> </p><p></u>The 1995 figure is 0.7% (fewer than 1000 cases), but the researchers, <u>while pointing to the decline, concede that differences in the way this particular information was obtained, make its significance uncertain. In both studies, however, <mark>about a quarter of physicians stated that they had "terminated the lives of patients without an explicit request</mark>" from the patient to do so and a third more of the physicians could conceive of doing so. </p><p>The use of the word "explicit" is somewhat inaccurate since, <mark>in 48% of these cases, there was no request of any kind</mark>, (3[pp.1704]) and in the others, there were mainly references to patients’ earlier statements of not wanting to suffer (l[pp.5l]). </p><p></u>The 1990 study documented, and the 1995 study confirms, that cases classified, as "termination of the patient without explicit request", were a fraction of the nonvoluntary and involuntary euthanasia cases. <u>International attention had centered on the 1350 cases, 1% of all Dutch deaths in 1990, in which physicians gave pain medication with the explicit intention of ending the patient's life</u> (1[pp.73],12[pp.270]) The investigators minimized the number of patients put to death who had not requested it, by not including these 1350 patients, in that category. </p><p>By 1995, there had been an increase in the number of deaths in which physicians gave pain medication, with the explicit intention of ending the patient's life, from 1350 cases (1% of all Dutch deaths) to 1896 (1.4% of all Dutch deaths)(3[p1700]). These are comparisons that the Dutch investigators do not make (see Table). </p><p><u>As reported by the physicians, in the 1995 study, <mark>in more than 80% of these cases (1537 deaths), no request for death was made by the patient</u></mark> (3[pp.1704]). </p><p>Since researchers around the world have treated these deaths as nonvoluntary<u> and involuntary (if the patient was competent) euthanasia, they will see this as a striking increase in the number of cases terminated without request and a refutation of the investigators’ claim that there has been perhaps a slight decrease in the number of such cases. </p><p></u>If one <u>totals all the deaths that resulted from euthanasia, assisted suicide, ending the life of a patient without consent, and giving opioids with the explicit intention of ending life, the estimated number of deaths, caused by active intervention by physicians, has increased from 4813 (3.7% of all deaths) in 1990 to 6368 (4.7% of all deaths)</u> in 1995 (Table). <u><mark>Based on data from the questionnaire study, this is an increase of 27% in cases in which physicians actively intervened to cause death</mark> (the interview study documents a 20% increase). </p><p>The Dutch investigators minimize the significance of the number of deaths without consent by explaining that the patients were incompeten</u>t (3[pp.1702]). But in the 1995 study, 21% of the individuals classified as "patients whose lives were ended without explicit request" were competent: in the 1990 study, 37% were competent [l (pp.l704)] <u>We are not told what percentage of those patients' who were given pain medication intended to end their lives without discussing it with them, were competent, but analysis of the data for opioid administration indicates that it is likely to be at least 20%.</p><p><mark>More than 4000 additional competent patients were given pain medication in amounts likely to end their lives by physicians who did not discuss the decision with them</mark>, but whose primary intention was not to end their lives</u> (l[pp.75],3[pp.l700,l704]). </p><p><u>Whether the intention was to end life, or whether death was simply likely, physicians usually gave as the reason for not discussing the decisions with the patients, that they had previously had some discussion of the subject with them (3[pp.1704]). </p><p>Yet, it seems incomprehensible that a physician would terminate or put at risk the life of a competent patient on the basis of a previous discussion without checking what the patient currently felt. </p><p></u>An illustration given by the attorney for the Dutch Voluntary Euthanasia Society of why it was often necessary for physicians to end the lives of competent patients without their consent, was the case of a nun whose physician ended her life a few days before she would have died because she was in excruciating pain but her religious convictions did not permit her to ask for death (8[pp.97]). </p><p>In another case, a <u><mark>Dutch patient with disseminated breast cancer, who had said she did not want euthanasia, had her life ended because in the physician’s words, "It could have taken another week before she died. I just needed this bed</mark>"</u> (13).</p>
| null | null |
Case
| 430,363 | 2 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
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Stone
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1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,683 |
Shortage is not contrived – transplants keep many alive as the deaths from shortage prove
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Beard et al 13 Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses
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Beard et al 13 T. Randolph "Randy" Beard, Professor of Economics at Auburn University.; Rigmar Osterkamp, Fellow at the School for Political Studies at University of Munich.; And David L. Kaserman, Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.2013 The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses
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Some critics regard the entire idea of an organ shortage as a contrivance of modern medical practice. Yet, even if abundant numbers of good organs were available for free, transplantation would remain an expensive procedure in absolute terms, so it will likely never be the case that transplants will be generally done on very thin grounds the general consensus is that those on waiting lists are, in virtually all cases, persons who would, in fact, benefit from a transplant in a meaningful and substantial way.
, on reasonable medical grounds, transplantation is the best therapy, and sometimes the only good therapy, for a variety of serious conditions,
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Scheper-Hughcs regard the idea of an organ shortage as a contrivance of modern medical practice even if abundant numbers of good organs were available for free, transplantation would remain an expensive procedure in absolute terms, so it will likely never be the case that transplants will be generally done on very thin grounds the general consensus is that those on waiting lists are, in virtually all cases, persons who would, in fact, benefit from a transplant in a meaningful and substantial way.
on reasonable medical grounds, transplantation is the best therapy, and sometimes the only good therapy, for a variety of serious conditions,
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Some critics of modern medicine and its orientation toward extending life beyond "natural" limits, such as Nancy Scheper-Hughcs (2004), regard the entire idea of an organ shortage as a contrivance of modern medical practice. It is not the purpose of this work to address such claims. For our purposes, a shortage exists if there is an increase in the waiting list, appropriately adjusted for deaths, sickness, and the like. Thus, by necessity, we will ignore most speculation concerning the numbers of persons who, on strictly medical grounds of some sort, might benefit from a transplant. This latter number will always exceed the active waiting lists, perhaps by a large margin. Some opponents of market-based reforms in organ procurement have claimed that any increase in available organs will only trigger a flood of additional registrations, as physicians begin listing their patients under weaker and weaker criteria.Yet, even if abundant numbers of good organs were available for free, transplantation would remain an expensive procedure in absolute terms, so it will likely never be the case that transplants will be generally done on very thin grounds. In most or all industrialized countries, the general consensus is that those on waiting lists are, in virtually all cases, persons who would, in fact, benefit from a transplant in a meaningful and substantial way.
Thus, it seems quite fair to say that a global organ shortage does indeed exist. Although our conceptualization of this shortage means that we will pay too much attention to economically advanced countries, it must be empha¬sized that many middle- and lower-income nations would have shortages, as we define them, had they the resources.That is, on reasonable medical grounds, transplantation is the best therapy, and sometimes the only good therapy, for a variety of serious conditions, and these conditions are, unfortunately, prevalent throughout much of the world.
Topicality
| 1,955 |
<h4>Shortage is not contrived – transplants keep many alive as the deaths from shortage prove</h4><p><strong>Beard et al 13</strong> T. Randolph "Randy" Beard, Professor of Economics at Auburn University.; Rigmar Osterkamp, Fellow at the School for Political Studies at University of Munich.; And David L. Kaserman, Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.2013 The Global Organ Shortage: <u><strong>Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses</p><p>Some critics</u></strong> of modern medicine and its orientation toward extending life beyond "natural" limits, such as Nancy <mark>Scheper-Hughcs</mark> (2004), <u><strong><mark>regard</mark> <mark>the</mark> entire <mark>idea of an organ shortage as a contrivance of modern medical practice</mark>.</u></strong> It is not the purpose of this work to address such claims. For our purposes, a shortage exists if there is an increase in the waiting list, appropriately adjusted for deaths, sickness, and the like. Thus, by necessity, we will ignore most speculation concerning the numbers of persons who, on strictly medical grounds of some sort, might benefit from a transplant. This latter number will always exceed the active waiting lists, perhaps by a large margin. Some opponents of market-based reforms in organ procurement have claimed that any increase in available organs will only trigger a flood of additional registrations, as physicians begin listing their patients under weaker and weaker criteria.<u><strong>Yet, <mark>even if abundant numbers of good organs were available for free, transplantation would remain an expensive procedure in absolute terms, so</mark> <mark>it will likely never be the case that transplants will be generally done on very thin grounds</u></strong></mark>. In most or all industrialized countries, <u><strong><mark>the general consensus is that those on waiting lists are, in virtually all cases, persons who would, in fact, benefit from a transplant in a meaningful and substantial way.</p><p></u></strong></mark>Thus, it seems quite fair to say that a global organ shortage does indeed exist. Although our conceptualization of this shortage means that we will pay too much attention to economically advanced countries, it must be empha¬sized that many middle- and lower-income nations would have shortages, as we define them, had they the resources.That is<u><strong>, <mark>on reasonable medical grounds, transplantation is the best therapy, and sometimes the only good therapy, for a variety of serious conditions,</u></strong></mark> and these conditions are, unfortunately, prevalent throughout much of the world.</p><p>Topicality</p>
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2AC
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Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 430,362 | 1 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
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Hurricanedebates2015
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1
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West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
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Rumbaugh
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1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
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Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
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| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
741,684 |
The Affirmative’s Logic Assigns to the Other Something We Cannot Access or Understand, Something in Them “More than Themselves”—This is the Basis for Racism and Hatred, a Structure That Inevitably Results in the Violence Of Annihlation and Holocaust
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Zizek '95 “Ideology between Fiction and Fantasy,” 16 Cardozo Law Review 1511, 1995, LN]
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Zizek '95 [Slavoj , “Ideology between Fiction and Fantasy,” 16 Cardozo Law Review 1511, 1995, LN]
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: the outbreak of "real" violence is conditioned by a symbolic deadlock. Real violence is a kind of acting out that emerges when the symbolic fiction that guarantees the life of a community is in danger. . The best way to elaborate this crucial difference is to approach the problem from the other end: what is the target of the outbursts of violence? What are we aiming at, what do we endeavor to annihilate when we exterminate Jews or beat up foreigners in our cities? The first answer that offers itself again involves symbolic fiction: is not, beyond direct physical pain and personal humiliation the ultimate aim of the rapes in the Bosnian war, for example, to undermine the fiction (the symbolic narrative) that guarantees the coherence of the Muslim community? Is not a consequence of extreme violence also that "the story the community has been telling itself about itself no longer makes sense" This destruction of the enemy's symbolic universe, this "culturocide," however, is in itself not sufficient to explain an outburst of ethnic violence - its ultimate cause (in the sense of driving force) is to be sought at a somewhat deeper level. What does our "intolerance" towards foreigners feed on? What is it that irritates us about them and disturbs our psychic balance? Already at the level of a simple phenomenological description, the crucial characteristic of this cause is that it cannot be pinpointed to some clearly defined observable property: although we usually can enumerate a series of features that annoy us with "them these features function as indicators of a more radical strangeness. Foreigners may look and act like us, but there is some unfathomable je ne sais quoi, something "in them more than themselves" that makes them "not quite human" Our relationship to this unfathomable traumatic element that "bothers us" in the Other is structured in fantasies .). Jacques Lacan baptized this paradoxical uncanny object that stands for what in the perceived positive, empirical object necessarily eludes my gaze and as such serves as the driving force of my desiring it, objet petit a, the object-cause of desire; n9 another name for it is plus-de-jouir, the "surplus-enjoyment" that designates the excess over the satisfaction brought about by the positive, empirical properties of the object. At its most radical level, violence is precisely an endeavor to strike a blow at this unbearable surplus-enjoyment contained in the Other. Since hatred is thus not limited to the "actual properties" of its object but targets its real kernel, objet a, what is "in the object more than itself," the object of hatred is stricto sensu indestructible: the more we destroy the object in reality, the more powerful its sublime kernel rises in front of us. This paradox has already [*1519] emerged apropos of the Jews in Nazi Germany: the more they were ruthlessly exterminated, the more horrifying were the dimensions acquired by the remainder...
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Real violence emerges when the symbolic fiction that guarantees the life of a community is in danger The best way to elaborate this crucial difference is to approach the problem from the other end: what is the target of the outbursts of violence? the crucial characteristic is that it cannot be pinpointed to some clearly defined observable property: these features function as indicators of a more radical strangeness something "in them more than themselves" that makes them "not quite human" Our relationship to this unfathomable traumatic element that "bothers us" in the Other is structured in fantasies empirical object necessarily eludes my gaze and as such serves as the driving force of my desiring it, violence is precisely an endeavor to strike a blow at this unbearable surplus-enjoyment contained in the Other. Since hatred is thus not limited to the "actual properties" of its object what is "in the object more than itself, the more we destroy the object in reality, the more powerful its sublime kernel rises in front of us
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Our argument can be briefly summarized as follows: the outbreak of "real" violence is conditioned by a symbolic deadlock. Real violence is a kind of acting out that emerges when the symbolic fiction that guarantees the life of a community is in danger. There is, however, a feature with regard to which the example of the Amazon gold diggers differs from the first two: in the first two examples, the disturbed fiction was a publicly unacknowledged, shadowy, obscene agency (Kafka's Court, the sailors' obscene initiation rituals), whereas in the Amazon gold-digger community the disturbance affected the symbolic fiction that determines the very structure of public authority. The best way to elaborate this crucial difference is to approach the problem from the other end: what is the target of the outbursts of violence? What are we aiming at, what do we endeavor to annihilate when we exterminate Jews or beat up foreigners in our cities? The first answer that offers itself again involves symbolic fiction: is not, beyond direct physical pain and personal humiliation, [*1518] the ultimate aim of the rapes in the Bosnian war, for example, to undermine the fiction (the symbolic narrative) that guarantees the coherence of the Muslim community? Is not a consequence of extreme violence also that "the story the community has been telling itself about itself no longer makes sense" (to paraphrase Richard Rorty n8 )? This destruction of the enemy's symbolic universe, this "culturocide," however, is in itself not sufficient to explain an outburst of ethnic violence - its ultimate cause (in the sense of driving force) is to be sought at a somewhat deeper level. What does our "intolerance" towards foreigners feed on? What is it that irritates us about them and disturbs our psychic balance? Already at the level of a simple phenomenological description, the crucial characteristic of this cause is that it cannot be pinpointed to some clearly defined observable property: although we usually can enumerate a series of features that annoy us with "them" (the way they laugh too loudly, the bad smell of their food, etc.), these features function as indicators of a more radical strangeness. Foreigners may look and act like us, but there is some unfathomable je ne sais quoi, something "in them more than themselves" that makes them "not quite human" ("aliens" in the precise sense this term acquired in the science fiction films of the fifties). Our relationship to this unfathomable traumatic element that "bothers us" in the Other is structured in fantasies (about the Other's political and/or sexual omnipotence, about "their" strange sexual practices, about their secret hypnotic powers, etc.). Jacques Lacan baptized this paradoxical uncanny object that stands for what in the perceived positive, empirical object necessarily eludes my gaze and as such serves as the driving force of my desiring it, objet petit a, the object-cause of desire; n9 another name for it is plus-de-jouir, the "surplus-enjoyment" that designates the excess over the satisfaction brought about by the positive, empirical properties of the object. At its most radical level, violence is precisely an endeavor to strike a blow at this unbearable surplus-enjoyment contained in the Other. Since hatred is thus not limited to the "actual properties" of its object but targets its real kernel, objet a, what is "in the object more than itself," the object of hatred is stricto sensu indestructible: the more we destroy the object in reality, the more powerful its sublime kernel rises in front of us. This paradox has already [*1519] emerged apropos of the Jews in Nazi Germany: the more they were ruthlessly exterminated, the more horrifying were the dimensions acquired by the remainder...
| 3,778 |
<h4>The Affirmative’s Logic Assigns to the Other Something We Cannot Access or Understand, Something in Them “More than Themselves”—This is the Basis for Racism and Hatred, a Structure That Inevitably Results in the Violence Of Annihlation and Holocaust</h4><p><u><strong>Zizek '95</u></strong> [Slavoj ,<u><strong> “Ideology between Fiction and Fantasy,” 16 Cardozo Law Review 1511, 1995, LN]</p><p></u></strong>Our argument can be briefly summarized as follows<u><strong>: the outbreak of "real" violence is conditioned by a symbolic deadlock. <mark>Real violence</mark> is a kind of acting out that <mark>emerges when the symbolic fiction that guarantees the life of a community is in danger</mark>.</u></strong> There is, however, a feature with regard to which the example of the Amazon gold diggers differs from the first two: in the first two examples, the disturbed fiction was a publicly unacknowledged, shadowy, obscene agency (Kafka's Court, the sailors' obscene initiation rituals), whereas in the Amazon gold-digger community the disturbance affected the symbolic fiction that determines the very structure of public authority<u><strong>. <mark>The best way to elaborate this crucial difference is to approach the problem from the other end: what is the target of the outbursts of violence?</mark> What are we aiming at, what do we endeavor to annihilate when we exterminate Jews or beat up foreigners in our cities? The first answer that offers itself again involves symbolic fiction: is not, beyond direct physical pain and personal humiliation</u></strong>, [*1518] <u><strong>the ultimate aim of the rapes in the Bosnian war, for example, to undermine the fiction (the symbolic narrative) that guarantees the coherence of the Muslim community? Is not a consequence of extreme violence also that "the story the community has been telling itself about itself no longer makes sense"</u></strong> (to paraphrase Richard Rorty n8 )? <u><strong>This destruction of the enemy's symbolic universe, this "culturocide," however, is in itself not sufficient to explain an outburst of ethnic violence - its ultimate cause (in the sense of driving force) is to be sought at a somewhat deeper level. What does our "intolerance" towards foreigners feed on? What is it that irritates us about them and disturbs our psychic balance? Already at the level of a simple phenomenological description, <mark>the crucial characteristic </mark>of this cause <mark>is that it cannot be pinpointed to some clearly defined observable property:</mark> although we usually can enumerate a series of features that annoy us with "them</u></strong>" (the way they laugh too loudly, the bad smell of their food, etc.), <u><strong><mark>these features function as indicators of a more radical strangeness</mark>. Foreigners may look and act like us, but there is some unfathomable je ne sais quoi, <mark>something "in them more than themselves" that makes them "not quite human"</strong></mark> </u>("aliens" in the precise sense this term acquired in the science fiction films of the fifties). <u><strong><mark>Our relationship to this unfathomable traumatic element that "bothers us" in the Other is structured in fantasies</u></strong></mark> (about the Other's political and/or sexual omnipotence, about "their" strange sexual practices, about their secret hypnotic powers, etc<u>.). <strong>Jacques Lacan baptized this paradoxical uncanny object that stands for what in the perceived positive, <mark>empirical object necessarily eludes my gaze and as such serves as the driving force of my desiring it,</mark> objet petit a, the object-cause of desire; n9 another name for it is plus-de-jouir, the "surplus-enjoyment" that designates the excess over the satisfaction brought about by the positive, empirical properties of the object. At its most radical level, <mark>violence is precisely an endeavor to strike a blow at this unbearable surplus-enjoyment contained in the Other. Since hatred is thus not limited to the "actual properties" of its object </mark>but targets its real kernel, objet a, <mark>what is "in the object more than itself,</mark>" the object of hatred is stricto sensu indestructible: <mark>the more we destroy the object in reality, the more powerful its sublime kernel rises in front of us</mark>. This paradox has already [*1519] emerged apropos of the Jews in Nazi Germany: the more they were ruthlessly exterminated, the more horrifying were the dimensions acquired by the remainder...</p></u></strong>
| null | null |
Zizek
| 430,364 | 1 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
7
|
Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
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1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
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AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
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Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
741,685 |
Legalization of PAS harms the most disadvantaged – elderly and disabled and crushes value to life and inevitably leads to a slippery slope
|
Lee 2013 )
|
Lee 2013 (Patrick Lee Ph.D., is the John N. and Jamie D. McAleer Professor of Bioethics and the director of the Institute of Bioethics at Franciscan University of Steubenville. The slippery slope of physician-assisted suicide http://www.legatusmagazine.org/the-slippery-slope-of-physician-assisted-suicide/ )
|
If a culture regards human life as inviolable, that fact protects all of us; if not, then the most vulnerable among us — especially the elderly and the disabled — are in danger. A culture that condones PAS views life as merely contingently valuable and so views the lives of many of the most vulnerable among us as mere burdens. rescinding the law against PAS would send the message that in many cases a person’s life is simply not worth living and, by implication, is merely a burden on his or her family. The sense of self-worth among the elderly, dying, and disabled would be profoundly harmed by legalizing physician-assisted suicide, and it would lead many to despair and request suicide out of undue deference to others. If the rationale for PAS is to respect autonomy, then why limit it to those who are terminally ill? Why privilege the autonomy of those who are terminally ill above those who are suffering chronically? Alternatively, if the rationale for PAS is that a person is in misery or has allegedly lost her dignity — if the law is based on the belief that for some people death is a benefit — then it will be impossible to deny this alleged benefit to other groups who lack decision-making capacity, for example, those who are unconscious, demented, or are children (as the Netherlands has been led to do with the open euthanasia of infants). Thus, PAS is a denial of the equal and inherent dignity of the elderly, the dying, and the disabled. Respect for human life and genuine compassion and care for all requires that PAS remain illegal.
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if not the most vulnerable among us the elderly and the disabled — are in danger culture that condones PAS views life as merely contingently valuable and so views the lives of many of the most vulnerable among us as mere burdens. rescinding the law against PAS would send the message that a person’s life is simply not worth living and is merely a burden on his or her family. The sense of self-worth among the elderly, dying, and disabled would be profoundly harmed by legalizing p a s if the rationale for PAS is that a person is in misery if the law is based on the belief that for some people death is a benefit — then it will be impossible to deny this alleged benefit to other groups who lack decision-making capacity PAS is a denial of the equal and inherent dignity of the elderly, the dying, and the disabled
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The protection of life is as an essential component of the public good. Especially important is how the culture as a whole — which is profoundly influenced by the law — regards human life. If a culture regards human life as inviolable, that fact protects all of us; if not, then the most vulnerable among us — especially the elderly and the disabled — are in danger. A culture that condones PAS views life as merely contingently valuable and so views the lives of many of the most vulnerable among us as mere burdens. Consider laws that prohibit physicians from amputating healthy limbs or performing female genital mutilation. Such laws exist precisely because we recognize that physicians should perform surgery only to provide a real medical (or cosmetic) benefit to the patient — or at least not significantly harm her. Rescinding such laws would send the message that these practices are not inherently harmful. In the same way, rescinding the law against PAS would send the message that in many cases a person’s life is simply not worth living and, by implication, is merely a burden on his or her family. The sense of self-worth among the elderly, dying, and disabled would be profoundly harmed by legalizing physician-assisted suicide, and it would lead many to despair and request suicide out of undue deference to others. A society cannot, then, be neutral with respect to the lives of these people: It will either protect their lives or it will help shape a culture that views them as better off dead. The logic of de-criminalizing PAS for the terminally ill who are suffering grievously would lead inexorably to allowing (and encouraging) other types of killing. If the rationale for PAS is to respect autonomy, then why limit it to those who are terminally ill? Why privilege the autonomy of those who are terminally ill above those who are suffering chronically? Alternatively, if the rationale for PAS is that a person is in misery or has allegedly lost her dignity — if the law is based on the belief that for some people death is a benefit — then it will be impossible to deny this alleged benefit to other groups who lack decision-making capacity, for example, those who are unconscious, demented, or are children (as the Netherlands has been led to do with the open euthanasia of infants). Thus, PAS is a denial of the equal and inherent dignity of the elderly, the dying, and the disabled. Respect for human life and genuine compassion and care for all requires that PAS remain illegal.
| 2,506 |
<h4>Legalization of PAS harms the most disadvantaged – elderly and disabled and crushes value to life and inevitably leads to a slippery slope</h4><p><strong>Lee 2013</strong> (Patrick Lee Ph.D., is the John N. and Jamie D. McAleer Professor of Bioethics and the director of the Institute of Bioethics at Franciscan University of Steubenville. The slippery slope of physician-assisted suicide http://www.legatusmagazine.org/the-slippery-slope-of-physician-assisted-suicide/ <u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>The protection of life is as an essential component of the public good. Especially important is how the culture as a whole — which is profoundly influenced by the law — regards human life. <u><strong>If a culture regards human life as inviolable, that fact protects all of us; <mark>if not</mark>, then <mark>the most vulnerable among us</mark> — especially <mark>the elderly and the disabled — are in danger</mark>. A <mark>culture that condones PAS views life as merely contingently valuable and so views the lives of many of the most vulnerable among us as mere burdens.</u></strong></mark> Consider laws that prohibit physicians from amputating healthy limbs or performing female genital mutilation. Such laws exist precisely because we recognize that physicians should perform surgery only to provide a real medical (or cosmetic) benefit to the patient — or at least not significantly harm her. Rescinding such laws would send the message that these practices are not inherently harmful. In the same way, <u><strong><mark>rescinding the law against PAS would send the message that</mark> in many cases <mark>a person’s life is simply not worth living and</mark>, by implication, <mark>is merely a burden on his or her family. The sense of self-worth among the elderly, dying, and disabled would be profoundly harmed by legalizing p</mark>hysician-<mark>a</mark>ssisted <mark>s</mark>uicide, and it would lead many to despair and request suicide out of undue deference to others.</u></strong> A society cannot, then, be neutral with respect to the lives of these people: It will either protect their lives or it will help shape a culture that views them as better off dead. The logic of de-criminalizing PAS for the terminally ill who are suffering grievously would lead inexorably to allowing (and encouraging) other types of killing. <u><strong>If the rationale for PAS is to respect autonomy, then why limit it to those who are terminally ill? Why privilege the autonomy of those who are terminally ill above those who are suffering chronically? Alternatively, <mark>if the rationale for PAS is that a person is in misery</mark> or has allegedly lost her dignity — <mark>if the law is based on the belief that for some people death is a benefit — then it will be impossible to deny this alleged benefit to other groups who lack decision-making capacity</mark>, for example, those who are unconscious, demented, or are children (as the Netherlands has been led to do with the open euthanasia of infants). Thus, <mark>PAS is a denial of the equal and inherent dignity of the elderly, the dying, and the disabled</mark>. Respect for human life and genuine compassion and care for all requires that PAS remain illegal.</p></u></strong>
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Case
| 430,365 | 11 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
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Cedanats
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3
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Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
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Stone
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1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
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AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
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Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
741,686 |
United States divides power between the states and federal government
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Columbia Encyclopedia '9
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Columbia Encyclopedia '9 http://education.yahoo.com/reference/encyclopedia/entry/US
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The government of the United States is that of a federal republic set up by the Constitution of the United States There is a division of powers between the federal government and the state governments. The federal government consists of three branches: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.
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government of the United States is that of a federal republic set up by the Constitution of the United States
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The government of the United States is that of a federal republic set up by the Constitution of the United States, adopted by the Constitutional Convention of 1787. There is a division of powers between the federal government and the state governments. The federal government consists of three branches: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. The executive power is vested in the President and, in the event of the President's incapacity, the Vice President. (For a chronological list of all the presidents and vice presidents of the United States, including their terms in office and political parties, see the table entitled Presidents of the United States.) The executive conducts the administrative business of the nation with the aid of a cabinet composed of the Attorney General and the Secretaries of the Departments of State; Treasury; Defense; Interior; Agriculture; Commerce; Labor; Health and Human Services; Education; Housing and Urban Development; Transportation; Energy; and Veterans' Affairs.
The Congress of the United States, the legislative branch, is bicameral and consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The judicial branch is formed by the federal courts and headed by the U.S. Supreme Court. The members of the Congress are elected by universal suffrage (see election) as are the members of the electoral college, which formally chooses the President and the Vice President
| 1,424 |
<h4>United States divides power between the states and federal government</h4><p><strong>Columbia Encyclopedia '9</strong> http://education.yahoo.com/reference/encyclopedia/entry/US</p><p><u><strong>The <mark>government of the United States is that of a federal republic set up by the Constitution of the United States</u></strong></mark>, adopted by the Constitutional Convention of 1787. <u><strong>There is a division of powers between the federal government and the state governments. The federal government consists of three branches: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.</u></strong> The executive power is vested in the President and, in the event of the President's incapacity, the Vice President. (For a chronological list of all the presidents and vice presidents of the United States, including their terms in office and political parties, see the table entitled Presidents of the United States.) The executive conducts the administrative business of the nation with the aid of a cabinet composed of the Attorney General and the Secretaries of the Departments of State; Treasury; Defense; Interior; Agriculture; Commerce; Labor; Health and Human Services; Education; Housing and Urban Development; Transportation; Energy; and Veterans' Affairs.</p><p>The Congress of the United States, the legislative branch, is bicameral and consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The judicial branch is formed by the federal courts and headed by the U.S. Supreme Court. The members of the Congress are elected by universal suffrage (see election) as are the members of the electoral college, which formally chooses the President and the Vice President</p>
| null |
2AC
|
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 72,319 | 30 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
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Hurricanedebates2015
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1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
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Rumbaugh
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1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
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AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
741,687 |
Our Alternative is To Reject the Idea Implicit in the Affirmative that One Must Identify Within the Boundaries of the System, Instead We Make the Impossible Choice of the Act, Which Recognizes the Lack Inherent In the False Choice of Our Subjectivity and Re-organizes the Co-ordinates of the World—Only this Impossibility Can Deal With The Fact that Within The Current Structure Revolution Will Never Occur
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Zizek 2000 ]
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Zizek 2000 [Slavoj, Rather Prolific Author, “Class Struggle or Postmodernism? Yes, please!” Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, New York City: Verso, 2000]
|
because of this internality of the Real to the Symbolic, it is possible to touch the Real through the Symbolic - that is the whole point of Lacan's notion of psychoanalytic treatment; this is what the Lacanian notion of' the psychoanalytic act is about - the act as a gesture which by definition touches the dimension of some impossible Real. This notion of the act must be conceived of against the background of the distinction between the mere endeavour to solve a variety of partial problems' within a given field and the more radical gesture of subverting the very structuring principle of this field. An act does not simply occur within the given horizon of what appears to be `possible' - it redefines the very contours of what is possible (an act accomplishes what, within the given symbolic universe, appears to he impossible', yet it changes its conditions so that it creates retroactively the conditions of its own possibility.:. So when we are reproached by an opponent for doing something unacceptable. an act occurs when we no longer defend ourselves by accepting the underlying premiss that we hitherto shared with the opponent; in contrast, we fully accept the reproach, changing the very terrain that made it unacceptable - an act occurs when our answer to the reproach is `Yes, that it is precisely what I am doingl' In Speed, when the hero (Keanu Reeves) is confronting the terrorist blackmailer partner who holds his partner at gunpoint, he shoots not the blackmailer , but his own partner in the leg - this apparently senseless act thomentarily shocks the blackmailer who lets go of the hostage and runs away...In Ransom, when the media tycoon (Mel Gibson) goes on television to answer the kidnappers request for two million dollars as a ransom for ins son, he surprises everyone by saying that he will oiler two million dollars to anyone who will give him any information about the kidnappers, and announces that he will pursue them to the end, with all his resources, if they do not release his son immediately This radical gesture stuns not only the kidnappers - immediately after accomplishing it, Gibson himself almost breaks down, aware of the risk he is courting~ And finally, the supreme case: when, in the flashback scene from The Usual Suspects, the mysterious Keyser Soeze (Kevin Stacey) returns home and finds his wife and small daughter held at gunpoint by the members of a rival mob, he resorts to the radical gesture of shooting his wife and daughter themselves dead - this act enables him mercilessly to pursue members of the rival gang, their families, parents, friends, killing them What these three gestures have in common is that, in a situation of the forced choice, the subject makes the `crazy', impossible choice of, in a way striking at himself at what is most precious to himself. This act, far from amounting to a case of impotent aggressivity turned on oneself, rather changes the co-ordinates of the situation in which the subject finds himself: by cutting himself loose from the precious object through whose possession the enemy kept him in check, the subject gains the space of free action. Is not such a radical gesture of `striking at oneself' constitutive of subjectivity as such?
|
the act must be conceived of against the background of the distinction between the mere endeavour to solve a variety of partial problems' within a given field and the more radical gesture of subverting the very structuring principle of this field when we are reproached by an opponent for doing something unacceptable. an act occurs when we no longer defend ourselves by accepting the underlying premiss that we hitherto shared with the opponent; we fully accept the reproach, changing the very terrain that made it unacceptable In Speed, when (Keanu Reeves) is confronting the terrorist blackmailer partner who holds his partner at gunpoint, he shoots not the blackmailer , but his own partner in the leg - this apparently senseless act shocks the blackmailer who lets go of the hostage and runs away in a situation of the forced choice, the subject makes the impossible choice of striking at what is most precious to himself. This act changes the co-ordinates of the situation in which the subject finds himself: by cutting himself loose from the precious object through whose possession the enemy kept him in check, the subject gains the space of free action
|
Precisely because of this internality of the Real to the Symbolic, it is possible to touch the Real through the Symbolic - that is the whole point of Lacan's notion of psychoanalytic treatment; this is what the Lacanian notion of' the psychoanalytic act is about - the act as a gesture which by definition touches the dimension of some impossible Real. This notion of the act must be conceived of against the background of the distinction between the mere endeavour to solve a variety of partial problems' within a given field and the more radical gesture of subverting the very structuring principle of this field. An act does not simply occur within the given horizon of what appears to be `possible' - it redefines the very contours of what is possible (an act accomplishes what, within the given symbolic universe, appears to he impossible', yet it changes its conditions so that it creates retroactively the conditions of its own possibility.:. So when we are reproached by an opponent for doing something unacceptable. an act occurs when we no longer defend ourselves by accepting the underlying premiss that we hitherto shared with the opponent; in contrast, we fully accept the reproach, changing the very terrain that made it unacceptable - an act occurs when our answer to the reproach is `Yes, that it is precisely what I am doingl' in film, a modest, not quite appropriate recent example would be Kevin Kline's blurting out `I'm gay' instead of `Yes!' during the wedding ceremony in in and Out: openly admitting the truth that he is gay, and thus surprising not only us, the spectators, but even himself.51 In a series of recent (commercial) films, we find the same surprising radical gesture. In Speed, when the hero (Keanu Reeves) is confronting the terrorist blackmailer partner who holds his partner at gunpoint, he shoots not the blackmailer , but his own partner in the leg - this apparently senseless act thomentarily shocks the blackmailer who lets go of the hostage and runs away...In Ransom, when the media tycoon (Mel Gibson) goes on television to answer the kidnappers request for two million dollars as a ransom for ins son, he surprises everyone by saying that he will oiler two million dollars to anyone who will give him any information about the kidnappers, and announces that he will pursue them to the end, with all his resources, if they do not release his son immediately This radical gesture stuns not only the kidnappers - immediately after accomplishing it, Gibson himself almost breaks down, aware of the risk he is courting~ And finally, the supreme case: when, in the flashback scene from The Usual Suspects, the mysterious Keyser Soeze (Kevin Stacey) returns home and finds his wife and small daughter held at gunpoint by the members of a rival mob, he resorts to the radical gesture of shooting his wife and daughter themselves dead - this act enables him mercilessly to pursue members of the rival gang, their families, parents, friends, killing them What these three gestures have in common is that, in a situation of the forced choice, the subject makes the `crazy', impossible choice of, in a way striking at himself at what is most precious to himself. This act, far from amounting to a case of impotent aggressivity turned on oneself, rather changes the co-ordinates of the situation in which the subject finds himself: by cutting himself loose from the precious object through whose possession the enemy kept him in check, the subject gains the space of free action. Is not such a radical gesture of `striking at oneself' constitutive of subjectivity as such? Did not Lacan himself accornplish a similar act of `shooting at himself' when, in 1979, he dissolved the Ecole freudien de Paris, his agalma, his own organization, the very space of his collective life? Yet he was well aware that only such a `self-destructive' act could clear the terrain for a new beginning
| 3,930 |
<h4><strong>Our Alternative is To Reject the Idea Implicit in the Affirmative that One Must Identify Within the Boundaries of the System, Instead We Make the Impossible Choice of the Act, Which Recognizes the Lack Inherent In the False Choice of Our Subjectivity and Re-organizes the Co-ordinates of the World—Only this Impossibility Can Deal With The Fact that Within The Current Structure Revolution Will Never Occur</h4><p><u>Zizek 2000</u></strong> [Slavoj, Rather Prolific Author, “Class Struggle or Postmodernism? Yes, please!” Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, New York City: Verso, 2000<strong>]</p><p></strong>Precisely <u><strong>because of this internality of the Real to the Symbolic, it is possible to touch the Real through the Symbolic - that is the whole point of Lacan's notion of psychoanalytic treatment; this is what the Lacanian notion of' the psychoanalytic act is about - the act as a gesture which by definition touches the dimension of some impossible Real. This notion of <mark>the act must be conceived of against the background of the distinction between the mere endeavour to solve a variety of partial problems' within a given field and the more radical gesture of subverting the very structuring principle of this field</mark>. An act does not simply occur within the given horizon of what appears to be `possible' - it redefines the very contours of what is possible (an act accomplishes what, within the given symbolic universe, appears to he impossible', yet it changes its conditions so that it creates retroactively the conditions of its own possibility.:. So <mark>when we are reproached by an opponent for doing something unacceptable. an act occurs when we no longer defend ourselves by accepting the underlying premiss that we hitherto shared with the opponent;</mark> in contrast, <mark>we fully accept the reproach, changing the very terrain that made it unacceptable</mark> - an act occurs when our answer to the reproach is `Yes, that it is precisely what I am doingl</strong>'</u> in film, a modest, not quite appropriate recent example would be Kevin Kline's blurting out `I'm gay' instead of `Yes!' during the wedding ceremony in in and Out: openly admitting the truth that he is gay, and thus surprising not only us, the spectators, but even himself.51 In a series of recent (commercial) films, we find the same surprising radical gesture.<u> <strong><mark>In Speed, when</mark> the hero <mark>(Keanu Reeves) is confronting the terrorist blackmailer partner who holds his partner at gunpoint, he shoots not the blackmailer , but his own partner in the leg - this apparently senseless act</mark> thomentarily <mark>shocks the blackmailer who lets go of the hostage and runs away</mark>...In Ransom, when the media tycoon (Mel Gibson) goes on television to answer the kidnappers request for two million dollars as a ransom for ins son, he surprises everyone by saying that he will oiler two million dollars to anyone who will give him any information about the kidnappers, and announces that he will pursue them to the end, with all his resources, if they do not release his son immediately This radical gesture stuns not only the kidnappers - immediately after accomplishing it, Gibson himself almost breaks down, aware of the risk he is courting~ And finally, the supreme case: when, in the flashback scene from The Usual Suspects, the mysterious Keyser Soeze (Kevin Stacey) returns home and finds his wife and small daughter held at gunpoint by the members of a rival mob, he resorts to the radical gesture of shooting his wife and daughter themselves dead - this act enables him mercilessly to pursue members of the rival gang, their families, parents, friends, killing them What these three gestures have in common is that, <mark>in a situation of the forced choice, the subject makes the</mark> `crazy', <mark>impossible choice of</mark>, in a way <mark>striking</mark> at himself <mark>at what is most precious to himself. This act</mark>, far from amounting to a case of impotent aggressivity turned on oneself, rather <mark>changes the co-ordinates of the situation in which the subject finds himself: by cutting himself loose from the precious object through whose possession the enemy kept him in check, the subject gains the space of free action</mark>. Is not such a radical gesture of `striking at oneself' constitutive of subjectivity as such? </u></strong>Did not Lacan himself accornplish a similar act of `shooting at himself' when, in 1979, he dissolved the Ecole freudien de Paris, his agalma, his own organization, the very space of his collective life? Yet he was well aware that only such a `self-destructive' act could clear the terrain for a new beginning </p>
| null | null |
Zizek
| 430,366 | 1 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
7
|
Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
|
1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
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Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,688 |
United States is the states, DC, and territories and possessions
|
US Code
|
US Code http://freedom-school.com/code-defines-united-states.pdf
-CITE- 5 USC Sec. 5911 -EXPCITE- TITLE 5 PART III Subpart D CHAPTER 59
|
'United States' means the several States, the District of Columbia, and the territories and possessions of the United States including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico;
| null |
SUBCHAPTER II -HEAD- Sec. 5911. Quarters and facilities; employees in the United States -STATUTE- (a) For the purpose of this section - (4) 'United States' means the several States, the District of Columbia, and the territories and possessions of the United States including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico;
| 307 |
<h4>United States is the states, DC, and territories and possessions</h4><p><strong>US Code</strong> http://freedom-school.com/code-defines-united-states.pdf</p><p><u><strong>-CITE- 5 USC Sec. 5911 -EXPCITE- TITLE 5 PART III Subpart D CHAPTER 59</p><p></u></strong>SUBCHAPTER II -HEAD- Sec. 5911. Quarters and facilities; employees in the United States -STATUTE- (a) For the purpose of this section - (4) <u><strong>'United States' means the several States, the District of Columbia, and the territories and possessions of the United States including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico;</p></u></strong>
| null |
2AC
|
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 430,367 | 1 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
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AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
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Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,689 |
Right to die movements empirically justify larger use of ableist eugenics
|
Wright, 2K
|
Wright, 2K (Walter Wright - Associate Professor and Chair of Philosophy at Clark University, Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, Historical analogies, slippery slopes, and the question of euthanasia, EBSCO)
|
The gathering threads of the eugenics and “right-to- die” movements converged in Permitting the Destruction of Lives not Worth Living: Its Extent and Form by Binding Binding provides a careful legal analysis of a range of related cases, including assisting someone to com- mit suicide, not all lives are equal. Binding introduces the idea that “terminally ill or fatally wounded people” are in a new category. Binding’s arguments incorporate elements of the “right to die” movement as well as the eugenicist’s appeals to the preservation of social well-being ne could perhaps take these arguments as sensible, compas- sionate and progressive. They are surprisingly modern in tone can one abstract from the work’s historical effects? providing support for a limited practice of medical killing, Binding made such things discussible they provided intellectual cover for people who wished later to abuse the opportunity their work brought about a climate among German medical profes- sionals that permitted doctors to accept the idea of killing their patients. This climate could be claimed to have been a contributing cause for the vigorous advocacy by some German physicians of a policy of killing mentally retarded, physically handicapped, elderly people the German experience confirms the claim that even discuss- ing the idea that some lives might not be worth living helps to create the “unmitigated disaster Their influence in Germany effectively “pulled the peg” in the slope so that, when external social forces pushed the medi- cal cart, physicians were no longer able to arrest its slide
|
eugenics and “right-to- die” movements converge side. Binding provides a careful legal analysis of a range of related cases, including assisting someone to com- mit suicide not all lives are equal. Binding introduces the idea that “terminally ill or fatally wounded people” are in a new category one could perhaps take these arguments as sensible, compas- sionate and progressive. providing support for a limited practice of medical killing provided intellectual cover for people who wished later to abuse the opportunity their work brought about a climate that permitted doctors to accept the idea of killing their patients the German experience confirms the claim that even discuss- ing the idea that some lives might not be worth living helps to create the “unmitigated disaster Their influence in Germany pulled the peg” in the slope so that, when external social forces pushed the medi- cal cart, physicians were no longer able to arrest its slide.
|
The gathering threads of the eugenics and “right-to- die” movements converged in the influential 1920 publica- tion Die Freigabe der Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens: I hr Mass und Form (Permitting the Destruction of Lives not Worth Living: Its Extent and Form) by Karl Binding and Alfred Hoche.37 Binding was perhaps the most distinguished legal scholar of his time and Hoche was a physician and Professor at Freiburg. Their independent essays on the com- mon question appeared together. Most importantly, this little volume became a crucial avenue for disseminating the idea that some lives are not worth living. I will briefly review Binding's historically influential arguments leaving Hoche’s less germane discussion to the side. Binding provides a careful legal analysis of a range of related cases, including suicide, assisting someone to com- mit suicide, responding to a request from a terminally ill, hopeless, and suffering patient, killing a mentally ill person at the request of family members, and so on. He is very careful to make important distinctions, and he attempts to maintain clear boundaries around the specific cases of kill- ing he proposes to categorize as “not legally forbidden.” Thus, while he finds suicide “not legally forbidden,” assist- ing in a suicide is actually the killing of a third party and the consent of the victim does not remove legal liability from the assistant. However, not all lives are equal. Binding introduces the idea that “terminally ill or fatally wounded people” are in a new category. “Here there clearly appears the idea that such a life no longer merits strict legal protection.” These are, he thinks, “lives not worth living.” He distinguishes three cases. In the first group are “those irretrievably lost as a result of illness or injury, who, fully understanding their situation, possess and have somehow expressed their urgent wish for release.”M For Binding, killing such patients is “a duty of legal mercy.” Among other examples, he includes the fatally injured comrade on a battlefield or a mountain- eering expedition. The second group “consists of incur- able idiots."1’ These people have the will neither to live nor to die. In this case too Binding finds “no grounds— legally, socially, ethically, or religiously—for not permitting the killing of these people who are the fearsome counter image of true humanity, and who arouse horror in nearly everyone who meets them.”40 His restriction in this case is that the right of application should be limited to the family who have been caring for the handicapped patient, or to the guardian. The third group consists of mentally sound people who “through some event like a very severe, doubt- less fatal wound,” have become comatose. He docs not think that any blanket rule can cover this last group of cases, but then goes on to conclude with a general guideline: [OJnly those persons arc candidates for having their deaths permitted who are terminally ill and who, in addition to being beyond help, have either requested death or consented to dying, or else would have re- quested or consented, had they not fallen into uncon- sciousness at the critical time or if they had been able to achieve awareness of the situation.41 (Emphasis added.) All of this, Binding views within the constraint that “Every unforbidden killing of a third person must be expe- rienced as a release, at least by the victim; otherwise allow- ing it is self-evidently ruled out.”42 Having established his basic principle, Binding then goes on to propose a formal procedure with careful safeguards as a way to implement it without abuses.4* Binding’s arguments incorporate elements of the “right to die” movement as well as the eugenicist’s appeals to the preservation of social well-being. If one abstracts from this work’s historical results, ignores the occasionally crude cal- culations of social utility, and considers the rather careful protections that he includes against possible abuses, one could perhaps take these arguments as sensible, compas- sionate and progressive. They are surprisingly modern in tone, suggesting both Singer’s careful defense of permitting a limited practice of euthanasia, and recent guidelines in the Netherlands. But can one abstract from the work’s historical effects? This is the core of the slippery slope argument. Binding’s and Hoche’s views were extensively discussed by their con- temporaries and, although never officially accepted in the ^Xfeimar period, became widely influential among physicians. Participants in the T444 program used them explicitly to justify their actions.41 This connection is an instance of both a “precedent based” and a “causal” slippery slope. First, by providing support for a limited practice of medical killing, Binding and Hoche made such things discussible. In doing so, they provided intellectual cover for people who wished later to abuse the opportunity. Second, their work brought about a climate among German medical profes- sionals that permitted doctors to accept the idea of killing their patients. This climate could be claimed to have been a contributing cause for the vigorous advocacy by some German physicians of a policy of killing mentally retarded, physically handicapped, elderly people: the “useless eat- ers.” In that respect, Singer’s opponents might say, the German experience confirms the claim that even discuss- ing the idea that some lives might not be worth living helps to create the “unmitigated disaster.” Their argument also connects to the “peg” protecting our wagon from rolling down the hill. Their influence in Germany effectively “pulled the peg” in the slope (provided by the Hippocratic ethic), so that, when external social forces pushed the medi- cal cart, physicians were no longer able to arrest its slide.46
| 5,822 |
<h4>Right to die movements empirically justify larger use of ableist eugenics </h4><p><strong>Wright, 2K </strong>(Walter Wright - Associate Professor and Chair of Philosophy at Clark University, Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, Historical analogies, slippery slopes, and the question of euthanasia, EBSCO)</p><p><u>The gathering threads of the <mark>eugenics and “right-to- die” movements converge</mark>d<mark> </mark>in</u> the influential 1920 publica- tion Die Freigabe der Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens: I hr Mass und Form (<u>Permitting the Destruction of Lives not Worth Living: Its Extent and Form</u>) <u>by</u> Karl <u>Binding </u>and Alfred Hoche.37 Binding was perhaps the most distinguished legal scholar of his time and Hoche was a physician and Professor at Freiburg. Their independent essays on the com- mon question appeared together. Most importantly, this little volume became a crucial avenue for disseminating the idea that some lives are not worth living. I will briefly review Binding's historically influential arguments leaving Hoche’s less germane discussion to the <mark>side. <u>Binding provides a careful legal analysis of a range of related cases, including</u></mark> suicide, <u><mark>assisting someone to com- mit suicide</mark>, </u>responding to a request from a terminally ill, hopeless, and suffering patient, killing a mentally ill person at the request of family members, and so on. He is very careful to make important distinctions, and he attempts to maintain clear boundaries around the specific cases of kill- ing he proposes to categorize as “not legally forbidden.” Thus, while he finds suicide “not legally forbidden,” assist- ing in a suicide is actually the killing of a third party and the consent of the victim does not remove legal liability from the assistant. However, <u><mark>not all lives are equal. Binding introduces the idea that “terminally ill or fatally wounded people” are in a new category</mark>.</u> “Here there clearly appears the idea that such a life no longer merits strict legal protection.” These are, he thinks, “lives not worth living.” He distinguishes three cases. In the first group are “those irretrievably lost as a result of illness or injury, who, fully understanding their situation, possess and have somehow expressed their urgent wish for release.”M For Binding, killing such patients is “a duty of legal mercy.” Among other examples, he includes the fatally injured comrade on a battlefield or a mountain- eering expedition. The second group “consists of incur- able idiots."1’ These people have the will neither to live nor to die. In this case too Binding finds “no grounds— legally, socially, ethically, or religiously—for not permitting the killing of these people who are the fearsome counter image of true humanity, and who arouse horror in nearly everyone who meets them.”40 His restriction in this case is that the right of application should be limited to the family who have been caring for the handicapped patient, or to the guardian. The third group consists of mentally sound people who “through some event like a very severe, doubt- less fatal wound,” have become comatose. He docs not think that any blanket rule can cover this last group of cases, but then goes on to conclude with a general guideline: [OJnly those persons arc candidates for having their deaths permitted who are terminally ill and who, in addition to being beyond help, have either requested death or consented to dying, or else would have re- quested or consented, had they not fallen into uncon- sciousness at the critical time or if they had been able to achieve awareness of the situation.41 (Emphasis added.) All of this, Binding views within the constraint that “Every unforbidden killing of a third person must be expe- rienced as a release, at least by the victim; otherwise allow- ing it is self-evidently ruled out.”42 Having established his basic principle, Binding then goes on to propose a formal procedure with careful safeguards as a way to implement it without abuses.4* <u>Binding’s arguments incorporate elements of the “right to die” movement as well as the eugenicist’s appeals to the preservation of social well-being</u>. If one abstracts from this work’s historical results, ignores the occasionally crude cal- culations of social utility, and considers the rather careful protections that he includes against possible abuses, <mark>o<u>ne could perhaps take these arguments as sensible, compas- sionate and progressive.</mark> They are surprisingly modern in tone</u>, suggesting both Singer’s careful defense of permitting a limited practice of euthanasia, and recent guidelines in the Netherlands. But <u>can one abstract from the work’s historical effects? </u>This is the core of the slippery slope argument. Binding’s and Hoche’s views were extensively discussed by their con- temporaries and, although never officially accepted in the ^Xfeimar period, became widely influential among physicians. Participants in the T444 program used them explicitly to justify their actions.41 This connection is an instance of both a “precedent based” and a “causal” slippery slope. First, by <u><mark>providing support for a limited practice of medical killing</mark>, Binding</u> and Hoche <u>made such things discussible</u>. In doing so, <u>they <mark>provided intellectual cover for people who wished later to abuse the opportunity</u></mark>. Second, <u><mark>their work brought about a climate</mark> among German medical profes- sionals <mark>that permitted doctors to accept the idea of killing their patients</mark>. This climate could be claimed to have been a contributing cause for the vigorous advocacy by some German physicians of a policy of killing mentally retarded, physically handicapped, elderly people</u>: the “useless eat- ers.” In that respect, Singer’s opponents might say, <u><mark>the German experience confirms the claim that even discuss- ing the idea that some lives might not be worth living helps to create the “unmitigated disaster</u></mark>.” Their argument also connects to the “peg” protecting our wagon from rolling down the hill. <u><mark>Their influence in Germany</mark> effectively “<mark>pulled the peg” in the slope</u></mark> (provided by the Hippocratic ethic), <u><mark>so that, when external social forces pushed the medi- cal cart, <strong>physicians were no longer able to arrest its slide</u></strong>.<strong></mark>46</p></strong>
| null | null |
Case
| 430,105 | 12 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
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Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,690 |
Extinction outweighs everything else—there is no recovering from it (includes climate change)
|
Sandberg 08
|
Anders Sandberg et al., James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, "How Can We Reduce the Risk of Human Extinction?" BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 9-9-08, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction, accessed 5-2-10.
|
Such remote risks may seem academic in a world plagued by poverty, HIV, and climate change. But as intimidating as these problems are, they do not threaten human existence the stakes are one million times greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill "only" hundreds of millions of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential loss--including culture and science, the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise. There is a discontinuity between risks that threaten 10 percent or even 99 percent of humanity and those that threaten 100 percent. For disasters killing less than all humanity, there is a good chance that the species could recover. If we value future human generations, then reducing extinction risks should dominate our considerations. Fortunately,
| null |
Such remote risks may seem academic in a world plagued by immediate problems, such as global poverty, HIV, and climate change. But as intimidating as these problems are, they do not threaten human existence. In discussing the risk of nuclear winter, Carl Sagan emphasized the astronomical toll of human extinction: A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, the stakes are one million times greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill "only" hundreds of millions of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential loss--including culture and science, the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise. There is a discontinuity between risks that threaten 10 percent or even 99 percent of humanity and those that threaten 100 percent. For disasters killing less than all humanity, there is a good chance that the species could recover. If we value future human generations, then reducing extinction risks should dominate our considerations. Fortunately, most measures to reduce these risks also improve global security against a range of lesser catastrophes, and thus deserve support regardless of how much one worries about extinction.
| 1,650 |
<h4>Extinction outweighs everything else—there is no recovering from it (includes climate change)</h4><p>Anders <u><strong>Sandberg</u></strong> et al., James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, "How Can We Reduce the Risk of Human Extinction?" BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 9-9-<u><strong>08</u></strong>, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction, accessed 5-2-10.</p><p><u><strong>Such remote risks may seem academic in a world plagued by</u></strong> immediate problems, such as global <u><strong>poverty, HIV, and climate change. But as intimidating as these problems are, they do not threaten human existence</u></strong>. In discussing the risk of nuclear winter, Carl Sagan emphasized the astronomical toll of human extinction: A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion,<u><strong> the stakes are one million times greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill "only" hundreds of millions of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential loss--including culture and science, the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise. There is a discontinuity between risks that threaten 10 percent or even 99 percent of humanity and those that threaten 100 percent. For disasters killing less than all humanity, there is a good chance that the species could recover. If we value future human generations, then reducing extinction risks should dominate our considerations. Fortunately,</u></strong> most measures to reduce these risks also improve global security against a range of lesser catastrophes, and thus deserve support regardless of how much one worries about extinction.</p>
| null | null |
Case
| 21,354 | 917 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
7
|
Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
|
1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,691 |
Public Debate of organs is key and good—shifts attitudes
|
Smith 11 http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/sale-of-human-organs-should-be-legalised-say-surgeons-2176110.html
|
Smith 11 Lewis Smith 05 January 2011 The Independent Sale of human organs should be legalised, say surgeons http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/sale-of-human-organs-should-be-legalised-say-surgeons-2176110.html
|
Opponents agree there should be a public debate about the merits and flaws of a market in organs. "The British Transplantation Society opposes this view, however it is prepared to debate this issue as the theoretical and empirical literature evolve
Keith Rigg, the transplant surgeon and BTS president, said: "I'm happy to debate it. There are pros and cons
|
Opponents agree there should be a public debate about the merits and flaws of a market in organs debate this issue as the theoretical and empirical literature evolve
|
There remains stiff opposition to liberalising the market, not least from the British Transplantation Society (BTS). Opponents agree there should be a public debate about the merits and flaws of a market in organs. "The British Transplantation Society opposes this view, however it is prepared to debate this issue as the theoretical and empirical literature evolves," said a spokesman.
Keith Rigg, the transplant surgeon and BTS president, said: "I'm happy to debate it. There are pros and cons. I think the trouble is it would require a huge change in public opinion and legislation. One argument against a regulated market is if you are paying some people, what would be the impact on the existing deceased donor programme and living donor programme?"
| 754 |
<h4>Public Debate of organs is key and good—shifts <u>attitudes</u> </h4><p><strong>Smith 11</strong> Lewis Smith 05 January 2011 The Independent Sale of human organs should be legalised, say surgeons <u><strong>http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/sale-of-human-organs-should-be-legalised-say-surgeons-2176110.html</p><p></u></strong>There remains stiff opposition to liberalising the market, not least from the British Transplantation Society (BTS). <u><strong><mark>Opponents agree there should be a public debate</mark> <mark>about the merits and flaws of a market in organs</mark>. "The British Transplantation Society opposes this view, however it is prepared to <mark>debate this issue as the theoretical and empirical literature evolve</u></mark>s," said a spokesman.</p><p><u>Keith Rigg, the transplant surgeon and BTS president, said: "I'm happy to debate it. There are pros and cons</u></strong>. I think the trouble is it would require a huge change in public opinion and legislation. One argument against a regulated market is if you are paying some people, what would be the impact on the existing deceased donor programme and living donor programme?"</p>
| null |
2AC
|
FW
| 430,368 | 2 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
741,692 |
Ableism makes ongoing eugenics and extermination inevitable
|
Brown 11
|
Brown 11, Artist Initiative Grantee at Minnesota State Arts Board Senior Academic Adviser for the College of Education and Human Development at University of Minnesota Steering Committee at Education Abroad Network at University of Minnesota Volunteer Coordinator for Social Inclusion and Bullying Prevention at Marcy Open School see less Past 2012-2013 Buckman Fellow at Buckman Fellowship Travel and Study Grantee at Jerome Foundation Loft Mentor Series Award Winner for Poetry at The Loft Literary Center Institute on Community Integration Post-graduate Certificate Graduate Student at University of Minnesota University of Minnesota College of Education and Human Development/University Honors Program Liaison at University of Minnesota University Honors Program Academic Advisor at University of Minnesota University of Minnesota Learning Abroad Center/University Honors Program Liaison at University of Minnesota Foreign Lecturer--English Studies, Cultural Awareness, Humanities at Hokkaido University of Education Educational Technologies post-grad certificate program at University of British Columbia, Vancouver Adjunct Lecturer--Japanese Language at Wayne County Community College Adjunct Lecturer--English Composition at Wayne State University Foriegn Lecturer--English Studies, Creative Writing, English Literature at Sophia University--Tokyo, Japan ‘Screw normal’: Resisting the myth of normal by questioning media’s depiction of people with autism and their families, http://blog.lib.umn.edu/gara0030/iggds/Screw%20Normal_FINAL_Dosch%20Brown.pdf
|
The one societal need in our society that is often unacknowledged, silenced, and left unexamined is that humans have deep, visceral need to belong The media creates walls between its ideals and the people it views as Others when the media views people with autism as ‘abnormal mysteries’. We are being taught that differences occurring from autism are wrong, and too many families depicted in the media perpetuate this negative view of their own children. Michalko said the difference in his blindness must be grappled with inside his being in ―a space between nature and culture‖ and ―normal and abnormal it is within this confusing, unmarked space where he has had to build his own identity. By moving through the world with his ―body of blindness,‖ Michalko has projected himself into the ―social space society reacts to people who have disabilities who cannot live up to the mythical norms with ―help, ―pity, ―ridicule, ―unease,‖ and ―curiosity it results in an unequal power structure that creates treacherous terrain for all of us who have been Othered. mainstream Western society views all disabilities as abnormal, and it thus approaches people with disability as tragic people who live lives ―not worth living complexity, diversity, and range of differences of all human beings in this world are erased, denied, and ignored under a banner of ‗sameness‘ or ‗normalcy‘—and those who cannot or will not conform are silenced and lumped into the category of Other, and dealt with suspicion for not conforming to social construction of what is acceptable in appearance, behavior, and experience. Eugenics is still very much present in societal attitudes toward disability. Eugenics formalized ―the Normal, a cultural landscape outlined in order to support the hegemony of its inhabitants, a liberalist bourgeois class of white, able-bodied men By silencing those with perceived disabilities (or those with a particular perceived race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation, etc.) and deeming them as lesser than ‘normal‘ humans—society is able to continue to deny that ‘being normal‘ is actually a socially constructed myth those who committed the war crimes by killing or sterilizing people they had deemed of inferior intelligence in the Nazis T-4 project were consistently given less severe convictions and higher acquittal rates revealing as a society we devalue the lost lives of those considered too different from the mythical norm, which we will demonstrate later is a devaluation of human life very much alive in media depiction of autism. Society rarely has ears for the voices or rooms reserved for those with differences who think otherwise The media maintains this gaping silence as well. Society, either expects those deemed ―abnormal‖ will ―get through their differences by adapting to the dominant rules, so as to be less noticed, or it expects them to ―get out‖ by removing themselves from view, by being silent and isolated
|
The one societal need in our society that is often unacknowledged, silenced, and left unexamined is that humans have, deep, visceral need to belong The media creates walls between its ideals and the people it views as Others it results in an unequal power structure that creates treacherous terrain for all of us who have been Othered complexity, diversity, and range of differences of all human beings in this world are erased, denied, and ignored under a banner of ‗sameness‘ or ‗normalcy‘—and those who cannot or will not conform are silenced and lumped into the category of Other Eugenics formalized ―the Normal, a cultural landscape outlined in order to support the hegemony of its inhabitants, a liberalist bourgeois class of white, able-bodied men By silencing those with perceived disabilities (or those with a particular perceived race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation, and deeming them as lesser than ‘normal‘ humans—society is able to continue to deny that ‘being normal‘ is actually a socially constructed myth those who committed the war crimes by killing or sterilizing people ere consistently given less severe convictions and higher acquittal rates The media maintains this gaping silence as wel Society expects those deemed ―abnormal will get through their differences by adapting to the dominant rules by removing themselves from view, by being silent and isolated
|
The one societal need in our society that is often unacknowledged, silenced, and left unexamined is that humans have, as Michalko quoted Cornel West, the ―deep, visceral need to belong‖ (Michalko, 2002, p. 81) — all of us struggle with full acceptance of ourselves and our desire to be seen as acceptable or welcome in a society that loves to label people. The media creates walls between its ideals and the people it views as Others, such as when the media views people with autism as ‘abnormal mysteries’. We are being taught that differences occurring from autism are wrong, and sadly too many families depicted in the media perpetuate this negative view of their own children. When thinking of ‗normal‘ henceforth, let‘s consider what Michalko wrote about society and his blindness. He explained that, although society might have found ways technologically for him to participate (he is a professor), he is still seen as ‗strange‘ because he is blind. He said the difference in his blindness must be grappled with inside his being in ―a space between nature and culture‖ and ―normal and abnormal‖ (2002, p. 83), and it is within this confusing, unmarked space where he has had to build his own identity. By moving through the world with his ―body of blindness,‖ Michalko has projected himself into the ―social space,‖ just as my son must project his own self, by moving through the social space with his ‗mind of difference‘; thus, society reacts to people who have disabilities who cannot live up to the mythical norms with ―help, ―pity, ―ridicule, ―unease,‖ and ―curiosity‖ (2002, p. 88), and it results in an unequal power structure that creates treacherous terrain for all of us who have been Othered. Michalko (2002) noted that mainstream Western society views all disabilities as abnormal, and it thus approaches people with disability as tragic people who live lives ―not worth living‖; they are seen as the Other, as objects of pity, both ―vulnerable and fragile‖ (p.68). The complexity, diversity, and range of differences of all human beings in this world are erased, denied, and ignored under a banner of ‗sameness‘ or ‗normalcy‘—and those who cannot or will not conform are silenced and lumped into the category of Other, and dealt with suspicion for not conforming to social construction of what is acceptable in appearance, behavior, and experience. Eugenics, the academic Phil Smith (2008) has concluded, is still very much present in societal attitudes toward disability. Eugenics formalized ―the Normal, a cultural landscape outlined in order to support the hegemony of its inhabitants, a liberalist bourgeois class of white, able-bodied men‖ (P. Smith, p. 419). By silencing those with perceived disabilities (or those with a particular perceived race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation, etc.) and deeming them as lesser than ‘normal‘ humans—society is able to continue to deny that ‘being normal‘ is actually a socially constructed myth (Michalko, 2002, p. 69). Phil Smith further pointed out that not so long ago those who committed the war crimes by killing or sterilizing people they had deemed of inferior intelligence in the Nazis T-4 project were consistently given less severe convictions and higher acquittal rates (P. Smith, 2008, p. 421)—revealing, indeed, that as a society we devalue the lost lives of those considered too different from the mythical norm, which we will demonstrate later is a devaluation of human life very much alive in media depiction of autism. Society rarely has ears for the voices or rooms reserved for those with differences who think otherwise, and it rarely realizes that indeed people with differences also have value and critical roles to play in society. The media maintains this gaping silence as well. Society, Michalko has argued, either expects those deemed ―abnormal‖ will ―get through their differences by adapting to the dominant rules, so as to be less noticed, or it expects them to ―get out‖ by removing themselves from view, by being silent and isolated (Michalko, 2002, p. 75); and some experts, doctors, educators, and therapists make a sizable income from attempting to enforce these societal expectations on families.
| 4,204 |
<h4><strong>Ableism makes <u>ongoing eugenics and extermination inevitable</u> </h4><p>Brown 11</strong>, Artist Initiative Grantee at Minnesota State Arts Board Senior Academic Adviser for the College of Education and Human Development at University of Minnesota Steering Committee at Education Abroad Network at University of Minnesota Volunteer Coordinator for Social Inclusion and Bullying Prevention at Marcy Open School see less Past 2012-2013 Buckman Fellow at Buckman Fellowship Travel and Study Grantee at Jerome Foundation Loft Mentor Series Award Winner for Poetry at The Loft Literary Center Institute on Community Integration Post-graduate Certificate Graduate Student at University of Minnesota University of Minnesota College of Education and Human Development/University Honors Program Liaison at University of Minnesota University Honors Program Academic Advisor at University of Minnesota University of Minnesota Learning Abroad Center/University Honors Program Liaison at University of Minnesota Foreign Lecturer--English Studies, Cultural Awareness, Humanities at Hokkaido University of Education Educational Technologies post-grad certificate program at University of British Columbia, Vancouver Adjunct Lecturer--Japanese Language at Wayne County Community College Adjunct Lecturer--English Composition at Wayne State University Foriegn Lecturer--English Studies, Creative Writing, English Literature at Sophia University--Tokyo, Japan ‘Screw normal’: Resisting the myth of normal by questioning media’s depiction of people with autism and their families, http://blog.lib.umn.edu/gara0030/iggds/Screw%20Normal_FINAL_Dosch%20Brown.pdf</p><p><u><strong><mark>The one societal need in our society that is often unacknowledged, silenced, and left unexamined is that humans have</u></strong>,</mark> as Michalko quoted Cornel West, the ―<u><strong><mark>deep, visceral need to belong</u></strong></mark>‖ (Michalko, 2002, p. 81) — all of us struggle with full acceptance of ourselves and our desire to be seen as acceptable or welcome in a society that loves to label people. <u><strong><mark>The media creates walls between its ideals and the people it views as Others</u></strong></mark>, such as <u><strong>when the media views people with autism as ‘abnormal mysteries’. We are being taught that differences occurring from autism are wrong, and</u></strong> sadly <u><strong>too many families depicted in the media perpetuate this negative view of their own children. </u></strong>When thinking of ‗normal‘ henceforth, let‘s consider what <u><strong>Michalko</u></strong> wrote about society and his blindness. He explained that, although society might have found ways technologically for him to participate (he is a professor), he is still seen as ‗strange‘ because he is blind. He <u><strong>said the difference in his blindness must be grappled with inside his being in ―a space between nature and culture‖ and ―normal and abnormal</u></strong>‖ (2002, p. 83), and <u><strong>it is within this confusing, unmarked space where he has had to build his own identity. By moving through the world with his ―body of blindness,‖ Michalko has projected himself into the ―social space</u></strong>,‖ just as my son must project his own self, by moving through the social space with his ‗mind of difference‘; thus, <u><strong>society reacts to people who have disabilities who cannot live up to the mythical norms with ―help, ―pity, ―ridicule, ―unease,‖ and ―curiosity</u></strong>‖ (2002, p. 88), and <u><strong><mark>it results in an unequal power structure that creates treacherous terrain for all of us who have been Othered</mark>. </u></strong>Michalko (2002) noted that <u><strong>mainstream Western society views all disabilities as abnormal, and it thus approaches people with disability as tragic people who live lives ―not worth living</u></strong>‖; they are seen as the Other, as objects of pity, both ―vulnerable and fragile‖ (p.68). The <u><strong><mark>complexity, diversity, and range of differences of all human beings in this world are erased, denied, and ignored under a banner of ‗sameness‘ or ‗normalcy‘—and those who cannot or will not conform are silenced and lumped into the category of Other</mark>, and dealt with suspicion for not conforming to social construction of what is acceptable in appearance, behavior, and experience. Eugenics</u></strong>, the academic Phil Smith (2008) has concluded, <u><strong>is still very much present in societal attitudes toward disability. <mark>Eugenics formalized ―the Normal, a cultural landscape outlined in order to support the hegemony of its inhabitants, a liberalist bourgeois class of white, able-bodied men</u></strong></mark>‖ (P. Smith, p. 419). <u><strong><mark>By silencing those with perceived disabilities (or those with a particular perceived race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation,</mark> etc.) <mark>and deeming them as lesser than ‘normal‘ humans—society is able to continue to deny that ‘being normal‘ is actually a socially constructed myth</u></strong></mark> (Michalko, 2002, p. 69). Phil Smith further pointed out that not so long ago <u><strong><mark>those who committed the war crimes by killing or sterilizing people</mark> they had deemed of inferior intelligence in the Nazis T-4 project w<mark>ere consistently given less severe convictions and higher acquittal rates</u></strong></mark> (P. Smith, 2008, p. 421)—<u><strong>revealing</u></strong>, indeed, that <u><strong>as a society we devalue the lost lives of those considered too different from the mythical norm, which we will demonstrate later is a devaluation of human life very much alive in media depiction of autism. Society rarely has ears for the voices or rooms reserved for those with differences who think otherwise</u></strong>, and it rarely realizes that indeed people with differences also have value and critical roles to play in society.<u><strong> <mark>The media maintains this gaping silence as wel</mark>l. <mark>Society</mark>, </u></strong>Michalko has argued, <u><strong>either <mark>expects those deemed ―abnormal</mark>‖ <mark>will</mark> ―<mark>get through their differences by adapting to the dominant rules</mark>, so as to be less noticed, or it expects them to ―get out‖ <mark>by removing themselves from view, by being silent and isolated</u></strong></mark> (Michalko, 2002, p. 75); and some experts, doctors, educators, and therapists make a sizable income from attempting to enforce these societal expectations on families.</p>
| null | null |
Case
| 159,864 | 25 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
741,693 |
Have to weigh consequences
|
Issac 02
|
Jeffrey Issac (professor of political science at Indiana University) 2002 Dissent, Spring, ebsco
|
an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility it suffers three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil Moral absolutism undermines political effectiveness
| null |
As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
| 1,800 |
<h4>Have to weigh consequences</h4><p>Jeffrey <u><strong>Issac</u></strong> (professor of political science at Indiana University) 20<u><strong>02</u></strong> Dissent, Spring, ebsco</p><p> </p><p>As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, <u><strong>an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility</u></strong>. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but <u><strong>it suffers </u></strong>from <u><strong>three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends</u></strong>. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but <u><strong>if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience </u></strong>of their supporters;<u><strong> (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice</u></strong>. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; <u><strong>and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant</u></strong>. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, <u><strong>it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil</u></strong>. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways.<u><strong> Moral absolutism </u></strong>inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it <u><strong>undermines political effectiveness</u></strong>. </p>
| null | null |
Case
| 26,721 | 1,533 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
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Cedanats
|
7
|
Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
|
1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
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AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
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Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
741,694 |
The affirmative cannot be an affirmation of agency because death cancels the subject
|
Osborne 6
|
Osborne 6 Thomas Osborne, Department of Sociology, University of Bristol, “‘Fascinated dispossession’: suicide and the aesthetics of freedom,” Economy and Society Volume 34, Issue 2, 2005, 8/16/2006
|
the very image of suicide as a locus of free decision is something of a chimera a form of moral hubris or romanticism
there is a kind of essentially contested ambiguity about the act of suicide suicide can never really amount to an act of pure agency , in so far as it does amount to such a thing it simultaneously cancels itself out The performance of the event is a failure for the subject for the simple - almost banal - reason that if the suicide attempt is successful there is no longer any subject present action here is only the mask of a fascinated dispossession
However much suicide is an act of agency, that agency is conquered by death; and if it is not conquered by death it becomes an 'attempted suicide', a 'cry for help', hence not an act of constitutive agency at all but a failed act of will
It is precisely the paradoxical nature of suicide as an act of pure will that accounts for the magnetism of the question of suicide and the impossibility of closure in relation to such questions Suicide can seem at once the most voluntaristic and defiant of actions and the most passive and fatalistic and the same suicide can seem to be simultaneously both same action can seem to be both a voluntaristic act of will and a negative capitulation
|
the very image of suicide as free decision is something of a chimera a form of moral romanticism
suicide can never really amount to an act of pure agency in so far as it does it simultaneously cancels itself out The performance is a failure for the subject for the simple - almost banal - reason that if the suicide attempt is successful there is no longer any subject present action here is only the mask of a fascinated dispossession'
agency is conquered by death; and if it is not conquered by death it becomes an 'attempted suicide' a failed act of will
. It is precisely the paradoxical nature of suicide that accounts for the impossibility of closure in relation to such questions Suicide can seem at once the most voluntaristic and defiant of actions and the most passive and fatalistic and the same suicide can seem to be simultaneously both
|
But, the complexities of Foucault's own position aside, is the category of suicide actually capable of living up to the demands that are being made on it by the aesthetic conception? Can suicide really be deployed as a component of an aesthetic of freedom? What is at stake in such questions is really the status of the aesthetic view on existence itself. It could be argued, in fact, that the very image of suicide as a locus of free, aesthetic decision is something of a chimera, an instance of what could be described - when taken beyond the form of a regulative ideal - as a form of moral hubris or romanticism; even, indeed, an example of the phenomenon of willing what cannot be willed (Elster 1983; cf. Farber 1976).
This is because there is a kind of essentially contested ambiguity about the act of suicide. As a tradition of thought associated with Maurice Blanchot has argued, suicide can never really amount to an act of pure agency, that is, an act for the subject. Or, at least, in so far as it does amount to such a thing it simultaneously cancels itself out; there is an essential ambiguity to it. The performance of the event is a failure for the subject for the simple - almost banal - reason that if the suicide attempt is successful there is no longer any subject present. As Blanchot has it in The Space of Literature, death cannot be conquered by suicide precisely because death is the unknown: 'It is the passage from the certainty of an act that has been planned ... to something which disorients every project, remains foreign to all decisions' (Blanchot 1982 [1955]: 104). The attempt is futile: 'Thus in voluntary death it is still extreme passivity that we perceive - the fact that action here is only the mask of a fascinated dispossession' (ibid.: 102).
One thinks here of the question that Henry Miller wanted to ask of Mishima: 'how had death tasted? Was it truly the culmination of everything or did it still leave something to the imagination?' (Miller 1972: 38). The question is of course unanswerable. However much suicide is an act of agency, that agency is conquered by death; and if it is not conquered by death it becomes an 'attempted suicide', a 'cry for help', hence not an act of constitutive agency at all but a failed act of will (Stengel 1970). The willing of suicide as an act of will has self-defeating properties.
There is, in any case, an integral ambiguity at the core of the very idea of suicide when addressed in terms of absolute agency and free autonomy. But no doubt this is precisely why a person's suicide so typically opens onto a sort of contested inquest zone as to the extent and limits of their autonomy at the time of their death. It is precisely the paradoxical nature of suicide as an act of pure will that accounts for both the magnetism of the question of suicide in relation to questions of ethics and deliberations over causality and the impossibility of closure in relation to such questions and deliberations. Suicide can seem at once the most voluntaristic and defiant of actions and the most passive and fatalistic and the same suicide can seem to be simultaneously both. Perhaps this is only a function of the figure of the 'indeterminacy of the past' given prominence by Ian Hacking after G. E. M. Anscombe (Hacking 1997). If all action is action under a description, then clearly there can be a plurality of descriptions or interpretations of any single action. But suicide seems, so to speak, to polarize the alternatives of description. The same action can seem at once to be both a voluntaristic act of will and a negative capitulation, Blanchot's extreme passivity at the heart of voluntary, active death.
| 3,687 |
<h4>The affirmative cannot be an affirmation of agency because death cancels the subject</h4><p><strong>Osborne 6</strong> Thomas Osborne, Department of Sociology, University of Bristol, “‘Fascinated dispossession’: suicide and the aesthetics of freedom,” Economy and Society Volume 34, Issue 2, 2005, 8/16/2006</p><p>But, the complexities of Foucault's own position aside, is the category of suicide actually capable of living up to the demands that are being made on it by the aesthetic conception? Can suicide really be deployed as a component of an aesthetic of freedom? What is at stake in such questions is really the status of the aesthetic view on existence itself. It could be argued, in fact, that <u><mark>the very image of</mark> <mark>suicide as</mark> a locus of <mark>free</u></mark>, aesthetic <u><mark>decision is something of a chimera</u></mark>, an instance of what could be described - when taken beyond the form of a regulative ideal - as <u><mark>a form of moral</mark> hubris or <mark>romanticism</u></mark>; even, indeed, an example of the phenomenon of willing what cannot be willed (Elster 1983; cf. Farber 1976).</p><p>This is because <u>there is a kind of essentially contested ambiguity about the act of suicide</u>. As a tradition of thought associated with Maurice Blanchot has argued, <u><mark>suicide can never really amount to an act of pure agency</u></mark>, that is, an act for the subject. Or, at least<u>, <mark>in so far as it does</mark> amount to such a thing <mark>it simultaneously cancels itself out</u></mark>; there is an essential ambiguity to it. <u><mark>The performance</mark> of the event <mark>is a failure for the subject for the simple - almost banal - reason that if the suicide attempt is successful there is no longer any subject present</u></mark>. As Blanchot has it in The Space of Literature, death cannot be conquered by suicide precisely because death is the unknown: 'It is the passage from the certainty of an act that has been planned ... to something which disorients every project, remains foreign to all decisions' (Blanchot 1982 [1955]: 104). The attempt is futile: 'Thus in voluntary death it is still extreme passivity that we perceive - the fact that <u><mark>action here is only the mask of a fascinated dispossession</u>'</mark> (ibid.: 102).</p><p>One thinks here of the question that Henry Miller wanted to ask of Mishima: 'how had death tasted? Was it truly the culmination of everything or did it still leave something to the imagination?' (Miller 1972: 38). The question is of course unanswerable. <u>However much suicide is an act of agency, that <mark>agency is conquered by death; and if it is not conquered by death it becomes an 'attempted suicide'</mark>, a 'cry for help', hence not an act of constitutive agency at all but <mark>a failed act of will</u></mark> (Stengel 1970). The willing of suicide as an act of will has self-defeating properties.</p><p>There is, in any case, an integral ambiguity at the core of the very idea of suicide when addressed in terms of absolute agency and free autonomy. But no doubt this is precisely why a person's suicide so typically opens onto a sort of contested inquest zone as to the extent and limits of their autonomy at the time of their death<mark>. <u>It is precisely the paradoxical nature of suicide</mark> as an act of pure will <mark>that accounts for</u></mark> both <u>the magnetism of the question of suicide</u> in relation to questions of ethics and deliberations over causality <u>and <mark>the impossibility of closure in relation to such questions</u></mark> and deliberations. <u><mark>Suicide can seem at once the most voluntaristic and defiant of actions and the most passive and fatalistic and the same suicide can seem to be simultaneously both</u></mark>. Perhaps this is only a function of the figure of the 'indeterminacy of the past' given prominence by Ian Hacking after G. E. M. Anscombe (Hacking 1997). If all action is action under a description, then clearly there can be a plurality of descriptions or interpretations of any single action. But suicide seems, so to speak, to polarize the alternatives of description. The <u>same action can seem</u> at once <u>to be both a voluntaristic act of will and a negative capitulation</u>, Blanchot's extreme passivity at the heart of voluntary, active death.</p>
| null | null |
Case
| 430,369 | 3 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
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3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
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Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
741,695 |
Debate on effective implementation of organ policies is a moral responsibility
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Taub et al 3
|
Taub et al 3 Sara Taub, Andrew H. Maixner, Karine Morin, Robert M. Sade, For The Council On Ethical And Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association. "Cadaveric Organ Donation: Encouraging The Study Of Motivation." Transplantation Forum. Vol. 76, 748–751, No. 4, August 27, 2003. https://www.musc.edu/humanvalues/pdf/Cadaveric-organ-donation.pdf
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If policymakers, ethicists, or legislators prohibit the implementation of programs that could be shown to increase the number of available organs and reduce the number of deaths, then they must bear some moral responsibility for the patients who die from lack of an organ transplant. Therefore, a better informed debate is necessary, one that can occur only after the effectiveness of various incentive models has been measured.
|
If policymakers prohibit the implementation of programs that could be shown to increase the number of available organs and reduce the number of deaths they must bear some moral responsibility for the patients who die from lack of an organ transpla better informed debate is necessar one that can occur only after the effectiveness of various incentive models has been measured.
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A thorough discussion of this matter also must include an examination of the costs of foregoing such studies. Currently, about 16 patients die each day waiting for an available organ (15). If policymakers, ethicists, or legislators prohibit the implementation of programs that could be shown to increase the number of available organs and reduce the number of deaths, then they must bear some moral responsibility for the patients who die from lack of an organ transplant. Therefore, a better informed debate is necessary, one that can occur only after the effectiveness of various incentive models has been measured.
| 617 |
<h4>Debate on effective implementation of organ policies is a moral responsibility</h4><p><strong>Taub et al 3</strong> Sara Taub, Andrew H. Maixner, Karine Morin, Robert M. Sade, For The Council On Ethical And Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association. "Cadaveric Organ Donation: Encouraging The Study Of Motivation." Transplantation Forum. Vol. 76, 748–751, No. 4, August 27, 2003. <u>https://www.musc.edu/humanvalues/pdf/Cadaveric-organ-donation.pdf</p><p></u>A thorough discussion of this matter also must include an examination of the costs of foregoing such studies. Currently, about 16 patients die each day waiting for an available organ (15). <u><strong><mark>If policymakers</mark>, ethicists, or legislators <mark>prohibit the implementation of programs that could be shown to increase the number of available organs and</mark> <mark>reduce the number of deaths</mark>, then <mark>they must bear some moral responsibility for the patients who die from lack of an organ transpla</mark>nt. Therefore, a <mark>better informed debate is necessar</mark>y, <mark>one that can occur only after the effectiveness of various incentive models has been measured.</p></u></strong></mark>
| null |
2AC
|
FW
| 430,266 | 7 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
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AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
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Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
741,696 |
They’re not gratuitous freedom – gut check Wilderson definitely doesn’t vote for this plan
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Wilderson 2007
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Frank B. Wilderson III 2007, Assistant Professor of African American Studies & Drama at UC Irvine, Warfare in the American Homeland-Policing and Prison in a Penal Democracy pg 22.
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the circulation of Blackness as metaphor and image at the most politically volatile and progressive moments in history (e.g., the French, English, and American revolutions) produces dreams of liberation which are more inessential to and more parasitic on the Black, and more emphatic in their guarantee of Black suffering, than any dream of human liberation in any era heretofore Black slavery is foundational to modern Humanism's ontics because "freedom" is the hub of Humanism's infinite conceptual trajectories. But these trajectories only appear to be infinite. They are finite in the sense that they are predicated on the idea of freedom from some contingency that can be named, or at least conceptualized The contingent rider could be freedom from patriarchy, freedom from economic exploitation, freedom from political tyranny (e.g., taxation without representation), freedom from heteronormativity, and so on political discourse recognizes freedom as a structuring ontologic and then it works to disavow this recognition by imagining freedom not through political ontology—where it rightfully began—but through political experience (and practice); whereupon it immediately loses its ontological foundations in allowing the notion of freedom to attain the ethical purity of its ontological status, one would have to lose one's Human coordinates and become Black. Which is to say one would have to die. For the Black, freedom is an ontological, rather than experiential, question There is no philosophically credible way to attach an experiential, a contingent, rider onto the notion of freedom when one considers the Black—such as freedom from gender or economic oppression, the kind of contingent riders rightfully placed on the non-Black when thinking freedom. the riders that one could place on Black freedom would be hyperbolic—though no less true—and ultimately untenable: freedom from the world, freedom from Humanity, freedom from everyone (including one's Black self) Given the reigning episteme, what are the chances of elaborating a comprehensive, much less translatable and communicable, political project out of the necessity of freedom as an absolute? Gratuitous freedom has never been a trajectory of Humanist thought, which is why the infinite trajectories of freedom that emanate from Humanism's hub are anything but infinite—for they have no line of flight leading to the Slave
|
the circulation of Blackness as metaphor and image at the most politically volatile and progressive moments in history produces dreams of liberation which are more inessential to and more parasitic on the Black, and more emphatic in their guarantee of Black suffering Black slavery is foundational to modern Humanism's ontics these trajectories are finite in the sense that they are predicated on the idea of freedom from some contingency that can be named, or at least conceptualized. The contingent rider could be freedom from patriarchy, freedom from economic exploitation, freedom from political tyranny freedom from heteronormativity, and so on , in allowing the notion of freedom to attain the ethical purity of its ontological status, one would have to lose one's Human coordinates and become Black. Which is to say one would have to die. For the Black, freedom is an ontological, rather than experiential, question. There is no philosophically credible way to attach an experiential, a contingent, rider onto the notion of freedom when one considers the Black the riders that one could place on Black freedom would be hyperbolic—though no less true—and ultimately untenable: freedom from the world, freedom from Humanity, freedom from everyone (including one's Black self ? Gratuitous freedom has never been a trajectory of Humanist thought, which is why the infinite trajectories of freedom that emanate from Humanism's hub are anything but infinite—for they have no line of flight leading to the Slave
|
Furthermore, the circulation of Blackness as metaphor and image at the most politically volatile and progressive moments in history (e.g., the French, English, and American revolutions) produces dreams of liberation which are more inessential to and more parasitic on the Black, and more emphatic in their guarantee of Black suffering, than any dream of human liberation in any era heretofore. Black slavery is foundational to modern Humanism's ontics because "freedom" is the hub of Humanism's infinite conceptual trajectories. But these trajectories only appear to be infinite. They are finite in the sense that they are predicated on the idea of freedom from some contingency that can be named, or at least conceptualized. The contingent rider could be freedom from patriarchy, freedom from economic exploitation, freedom from political tyranny (e.g., taxation without representation), freedom from heteronormativity, and so on. What I am suggesting is that first political discourse recognizes freedom as a structuring ontologic and then it works to disavow this recognition by imagining freedom not through political ontology—where it rightfully began—but through political experience (and practice); whereupon it immediately loses its ontological foundations. Why would anyone do this? Why would anyone start off with, quite literally, an earth-shattering ontologic and, in the process of meditating on it and acting through it, reduce it to an earth-reforming experience? Why do Humans take such pride in self-adjustment, in diminishing, rather than intensifying, the project of liberation (how did we get from 1968 to the present)? Because, I contend, in allowing the notion of freedom to attain the ethical purity of its ontological status, one would have to lose one's Human coordinates and become Black. Which is to say one would have to die. For the Black, freedom is an ontological, rather than experiential, question. There is no philosophically credible way to attach an experiential, a contingent, rider onto the notion of freedom when one considers the Black—such as freedom from gender or economic oppression, the kind of contingent riders rightfully placed on the non-Black when thinking freedom. Rather, the riders that one could place on Black freedom would be hyperbolic—though no less true—and ultimately untenable: freedom from the world, freedom from Humanity, freedom from everyone (including one's Black self). Given the reigning episteme, what are the chances of elaborating a comprehensive, much less translatable and communicable, political project out of the necessity of freedom as an absolute? Gratuitous freedom has never been a trajectory of Humanist thought, which is why the infinite trajectories of freedom that emanate from Humanism's hub are anything but infinite—for they have no line of flight leading to the Slave
| 2,858 |
<h4>They’re not gratuitous freedom – gut check Wilderson definitely doesn’t vote for this plan</h4><p>Frank B. <u><strong><mark>Wilderson</u></strong></mark> III <u><strong><mark>2007</u></strong></mark>, Assistant Professor of African American Studies & Drama at UC Irvine, Warfare in the American Homeland-Policing and Prison in a Penal Democracy pg 22.</p><p>Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>the circulation of Blackness as metaphor and image at the most politically volatile and progressive moments in history</mark> (e.g., the French, English, and American revolutions) <mark>produces dreams of liberation which are more inessential to and more parasitic on the Black, and more emphatic in their guarantee of Black suffering</mark>, than any dream of human liberation in any era heretofore</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Black slavery is foundational to modern Humanism's ontics </mark>because "freedom" is the hub of Humanism's infinite conceptual trajectories. But <mark>these trajectories </mark>only appear to be infinite. They <mark>are finite in the sense that they are predicated on the idea of freedom from some contingency that can be named, or at least conceptualized</u></strong>. <u><strong>The contingent rider could be freedom from patriarchy, freedom from economic exploitation, freedom from political tyranny</mark> (e.g., taxation without representation), <mark>freedom from heteronormativity, and so on</u></strong></mark>. What I am suggesting is that first <u><strong>political discourse recognizes freedom as a structuring ontologic and then it works to disavow this recognition by imagining freedom not through political ontology—where it rightfully began—but through political experience (and practice); whereupon it immediately loses its ontological foundations</u></strong>. Why would anyone do this? Why would anyone start off with, quite literally, an earth-shattering ontologic and, in the process of meditating on it and acting through it, reduce it to an earth-reforming experience? Why do Humans take such pride in self-adjustment, in diminishing, rather than intensifying, the project of liberation (how did we get from 1968 to the present)? Because, I contend<mark>,<u><strong> in allowing the notion of freedom to attain the ethical purity of its ontological status, one would have to lose one's Human coordinates and become Black. Which is to say one would have to die.</u></strong> <u><strong>For the Black, freedom is an ontological, rather than experiential, question</u></strong>. <u><strong>There is no philosophically credible way to attach an experiential, a contingent, rider onto the notion of freedom when one considers the Black</mark>—such as freedom from gender or economic oppression, the kind of contingent riders rightfully placed on the non-Black when thinking freedom.</u></strong> Rather, <u><strong><mark>the riders that one could place on Black freedom would be hyperbolic—though no less true—and ultimately untenable: freedom from the world, freedom from Humanity, freedom from everyone (including one's Black self</mark>)</u></strong>. <u><strong>Given the reigning episteme, what are the chances of elaborating a comprehensive, much less translatable and communicable, political project out of the necessity of freedom as an absolute<mark>? Gratuitous freedom has never been a trajectory of Humanist thought, which is why the infinite trajectories of freedom that emanate from Humanism's hub are anything but infinite—for they have no line of flight leading to the Slave</p></u></strong></mark>
| null | null |
Case
| 39,892 | 92 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
7
|
Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
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1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
741,697 |
Instances of actual benefit are extremely rare – mostly people would be pressured into it.
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NYDHS 11
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NYDHS 11
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assisted suicide and euthanasia are legalized, the autonomy of some patients would be extended while the autonomy of others would be compromised by the pressures to exercise these new options.
| null |
New York State Department of Health, Task Force, “When Death is Sought”, April 2011, “Chapter 6 - Crafting Public Policy on Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia”, https://www.health.ny.gov/regulations/task_force/reports_publications/when_death_is_sought/chap6.htm //jchen
Support for legalizing assisted suicide and euthanasia rests in part on the belief that individuals should have the right to assistance to end their lives at a time and in a manner they choose. None of the Task Force members believes that respect for autonomy dictates the legalization of assisted suicide and euthanasia. The moral claim to autonomy is weakened by both the overall risks of the practice and the extraordinary nature of the remedy sought. Moreover, if assisted suicide and euthanasia are legalized, the autonomy of some patients would be extended while the autonomy of others would be compromised by the pressures to exercise these new options. The legalization of assisted suicide and euthanasia is also urged on grounds of mercy and the alleviation of suffering. Some of the Task Force members believe that the practices offer clear benefits to certain patients who are dying or otherwise suffering greatly. They recognize that providing a quick, less prolonged death for some patients can be a compassionate act. These members, however, regard the number of cases when assisted suicide or euthanasia are medically and ethically appropriate as extremely rare. They do not believe that the benefits incurred for this small number of patients can justify a major shift in public policy or the serious risks that legalizing the practice would entail.
| 1,632 |
<h4><strong>Instances of actual benefit are extremely rare – mostly people would be pressured into it.</h4><p>NYDHS 11</p><p></strong>New York State Department of Health, Task Force, “When Death is Sought”, April 2011, “Chapter 6 - Crafting Public Policy on Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia”, https://www.health.ny.gov/regulations/task_force/reports_publications/when_death_is_sought/chap6.htm //jchen</p><p>Support for legalizing assisted suicide and euthanasia rests in part on the belief that individuals should have the right to assistance to end their lives at a time and in a manner they choose. None of the Task Force members believes that respect for autonomy dictates the legalization of assisted suicide and euthanasia. The moral claim to autonomy is weakened by both the overall risks of the practice and the extraordinary nature of the remedy sought. Moreover, if <u>assisted suicide and euthanasia are legalized, the autonomy of some patients would be extended while the autonomy of others would be compromised by the pressures to exercise these new options.</u> The legalization of assisted suicide and euthanasia is also urged on grounds of mercy and the alleviation of suffering. Some of the Task Force members believe that the practices offer clear benefits to certain patients who are dying or otherwise suffering greatly. They recognize that providing a quick, less prolonged death for some patients can be a compassionate act. These members, however, regard the number of cases when assisted suicide or euthanasia are medically and ethically appropriate as extremely rare. They do not believe that the benefits incurred for this small number of patients can justify a major shift in public policy or the serious risks that legalizing the practice would entail. </p>
| null |
2NC
|
Case
| 430,370 | 2 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
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Im.....
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Av.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,698 |
Policy focus key to combat racism---anti-blackness is not ontological
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Bouie 13
|
Jamelle Bouie 13, staff writer at The American Prospect, Making and Dismantling Racism, http://prospect.org/article/making-and-dismantling-racism
|
Coates has been exploring the intersection of race and public policy, with a focus on white supremacy as a driving force in political decisions This has led him to two conclusions: First, that anti-black racism as we understand it is a creation of explicit policy choices the decision to exclude, marginalize, and stigmatize Africans second, that it's possible to dismantle this prejudice using public policy there's nothing natural about the black/white divide that has defined American history White Europeans had contact with black Africans well before the trans-Atlantic slave trade without the emergence of an anti-black racism It took particular choices made by particular people to make black skin a stigma, By enslaving African indentured servants and allowing their white counterparts a chance for upward mobility, colonial landowners began the process that would make white supremacy the ideology of America. The position of slavery generated a stigma that then justified continued enslavement Slavery wasn't built to reflect racism as much as it was built in tandem with it later policy, further entrenched white supremacist attitudes If the prohibition against gay marriage helped create an anti-gay stigma, then lifting it—as we've seen over the last decade—has helped destroy it. There's no reason racism can't work the same way
|
anti-black racism is a creation of explicit policy choices it's possible to dismantle this prejudice using public policy there's nothing natural about the black/white divide that defined American history White Europeans had contact with black Africans before the slave trade without anti-black racism It took particular choices to make black a stigma enslaving African indentured servants and allowing their white counterparts a chance for upward mobility, colonial landowners began the process that would make white supremacy the ideology of America Slavery wasn't built to reflect racism as much as it was built in tandem with it
|
Over at The Atlantic, Ta-Nehisi Coates has been exploring the intersection of race and public policy, with a focus on white supremacy as a driving force in political decisions at all levels of government. This has led him to two conclusions: First, that anti-black racism as we understand it is a creation of explicit policy choices—the decision to exclude, marginalize, and stigmatize Africans and their descendants has as much to do with racial prejudice as does any intrinsic tribalism. And second, that it's possible to dismantle this prejudice using public policy. Here is Coates in his own words: Last night I had the luxury of sitting and talking with the brilliant historian Barbara Fields. One point she makes that very few Americans understand is that racism is a creation. You read Edmund Morgan’s work and actually see racism being inscribed in the law and the country changing as a result. If we accept that racism is a creation, then we must then accept that it can be destroyed. And if we accept that it can be destroyed, we must then accept that it can be destroyed by us and that it likely must be destroyed by methods kin to creation. Racism was created by policy. It will likely only be ultimately destroyed by policy. Over at his blog, Andrew Sullivan offers a reply: I don’t believe the law created racism any more than it can create lust or greed or envy or hatred. It can encourage or mitigate these profound aspects of human psychology – it can create racist structures as in the Jim Crow South or Greater Israel. But it can no more end these things that it can create them. A complementary strategy is finding ways for the targets of such hatred to become inured to them, to let the slurs sting less until they sting not at all. Not easy. But a more manageable goal than TNC’s utopianism. I can appreciate the point Sullivan is making, but I'm not sure it's relevant to Coates' argument. It is absolutely true that "Group loyalty is deep in our DNA," as Sullivan writes. And if you define racism as an overly aggressive form of group loyalty—basically just prejudice—then Sullivan is right to throw water on the idea that the law can "create racism any more than it can create lust or greed or envy or hatred." But Coates is making a more precise claim: That there's nothing natural about the black/white divide that has defined American history. White Europeans had contact with black Africans well before the trans-Atlantic slave trade without the emergence of an anti-black racism. It took particular choices made by particular people—in this case, plantation owners in colonial Virginia—to make black skin a stigma, to make the "one drop rule" a defining feature of American life for more than a hundred years. By enslaving African indentured servants and allowing their white counterparts a chance for upward mobility, colonial landowners began the process that would make white supremacy the ideology of America. The position of slavery generated a stigma that then justified continued enslavement—blacks are lowly, therefore we must keep them as slaves. Slavery (and later, Jim Crow) wasn't built to reflect racism as much as it was built in tandem with it. And later policy, in the late 19th and 20th centuries, further entrenched white supremacist attitudes. Block black people from owning homes, and they're forced to reside in crowded slums. Onlookers then use the reality of slums to deny homeownership to blacks, under the view that they're unfit for suburbs. In other words, create a prohibition preventing a marginalized group from engaging in socially sanctioned behavior—owning a home, getting married—and then blame them for the adverse consequences. Indeed, in arguing for gay marriage and responding to conservative critics, Sullivan has taken note of this exact dynamic. Here he is twelve years ago, in a column for The New Republic that builds on earlier ideas: Gay men--not because they're gay but because they are men in an all-male subculture--are almost certainly more sexually active with more partners than most straight men. (Straight men would be far more promiscuous, I think, if they could get away with it the way gay guys can.) Many gay men value this sexual freedom more than the stresses and strains of monogamous marriage (and I don't blame them). But this is not true of all gay men. Many actually yearn for social stability, for anchors for their relationships, for the family support and financial security that come with marriage. To deny this is surely to engage in the "soft bigotry of low expectations." They may be a minority at the moment. But with legal marriage, their numbers would surely grow. And they would function as emblems in gay culture of a sexual life linked to stability and love. [Emphasis added] What else is this but a variation on Coates' core argument, that society can create stigmas by using law to force particular kinds of behavior? Insofar as gay men were viewed as unusually promiscuous, it almost certainly had something to do with the fact that society refused to recognize their humanity and sanction their relationships. The absence of any institution to mediate love and desire encouraged behavior that led this same culture to say "these people are too degenerate to participate in this institution." If the prohibition against gay marriage helped create an anti-gay stigma, then lifting it—as we've seen over the last decade—has helped destroy it. There's no reason racism can't work the same way.
Prioritze material changes—only way to create skills for implementation
| 5,573 |
<h4>Policy focus key to combat racism---anti-blackness is not ontological </h4><p>Jamelle <strong>Bouie 13</strong>, staff writer at The American Prospect, Making and Dismantling Racism, http://prospect.org/article/making-and-dismantling-racism</p><p>Over at The Atlantic, Ta-Nehisi <u>Coates has been exploring the intersection of race and public policy, with a focus on white supremacy as a driving force in political decisions</u> at all levels of government. <u>This has led him to two conclusions: First, that <mark>anti-black racism</mark> as we understand it <mark>is a <strong>creation of explicit policy choices</u></mark>—<u>the decision to exclude, marginalize, and stigmatize Africans</u></strong> and their descendants has as much to do with racial prejudice as does any intrinsic tribalism. And <u>second, that <mark>it's possible to <strong>dismantle</mark> <mark>this prejudice using public policy</u></strong></mark>. Here is Coates in his own words: Last night I had the luxury of sitting and talking with the brilliant historian Barbara Fields. One point she makes that very few Americans understand is that racism is a creation. You read Edmund Morgan’s work and actually see racism being inscribed in the law and the country changing as a result. If we accept that racism is a creation, then we must then accept that it can be destroyed. And if we accept that it can be destroyed, we must then accept that it can be destroyed by us and that it likely must be destroyed by methods kin to creation. Racism was created by policy. It will likely only be ultimately destroyed by policy. Over at his blog, Andrew Sullivan offers a reply: I don’t believe the law created racism any more than it can create lust or greed or envy or hatred. It can encourage or mitigate these profound aspects of human psychology – it can create racist structures as in the Jim Crow South or Greater Israel. But it can no more end these things that it can create them. A complementary strategy is finding ways for the targets of such hatred to become inured to them, to let the slurs sting less until they sting not at all. Not easy. But a more manageable goal than TNC’s utopianism. I can appreciate the point Sullivan is making, but I'm not sure it's relevant to Coates' argument. It is absolutely true that "Group loyalty is deep in our DNA," as Sullivan writes. And if you define racism as an overly aggressive form of group loyalty—basically just prejudice—then Sullivan is right to throw water on the idea that the law can "create racism any more than it can create lust or greed or envy or hatred." But Coates is making a more precise claim: That <u><strong><mark>there's nothing natural about the black/white divide that </mark>has <mark>defined American history</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>White Europeans had contact with black Africans</mark> well <mark>before the</mark> trans-Atlantic <mark>slave trade <strong>without</mark> the emergence of an <mark>anti-black racism</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>It took particular choices</mark> made by particular people</u>—in this case, plantation owners in colonial Virginia—<u><strong><mark>to</u></strong> <u>make black</mark> skin <mark>a stigma</mark>, </u>to make the "one drop rule" a defining feature of American life for more than a hundred years. <u>By <mark>enslaving African indentured servants and allowing their white counterparts a chance for upward mobility, colonial landowners began the process that would <strong>make white supremacy the ideology of America</strong></mark>. The position of slavery generated a stigma that then justified continued enslavement</u>—blacks are lowly, therefore we must keep them as slaves. <u><mark>Slavery</mark> </u>(and later, Jim Crow) <u><strong><mark>wasn't built to reflect racism as much as it was built in tandem with it</u></strong></mark>. And <u>later policy,</u> in the late 19th and 20th centuries, <u>further entrenched white supremacist attitudes</u>. Block black people from owning homes, and they're forced to reside in crowded slums. Onlookers then use the reality of slums to deny homeownership to blacks, under the view that they're unfit for suburbs. In other words, create a prohibition preventing a marginalized group from engaging in socially sanctioned behavior—owning a home, getting married—and then blame them for the adverse consequences. Indeed, in arguing for gay marriage and responding to conservative critics, Sullivan has taken note of this exact dynamic. Here he is twelve years ago, in a column for The New Republic that builds on earlier ideas: Gay men--not because they're gay but because they are men in an all-male subculture--are almost certainly more sexually active with more partners than most straight men. (Straight men would be far more promiscuous, I think, if they could get away with it the way gay guys can.) Many gay men value this sexual freedom more than the stresses and strains of monogamous marriage (and I don't blame them). But this is not true of all gay men. Many actually yearn for social stability, for anchors for their relationships, for the family support and financial security that come with marriage. To deny this is surely to engage in the "soft bigotry of low expectations." They may be a minority at the moment. But with legal marriage, their numbers would surely grow. And they would function as emblems in gay culture of a sexual life linked to stability and love. [Emphasis added] What else is this but a variation on Coates' core argument, that society can create stigmas by using law to force particular kinds of behavior? Insofar as gay men were viewed as unusually promiscuous, it almost certainly had something to do with the fact that society refused to recognize their humanity and sanction their relationships. The absence of any institution to mediate love and desire encouraged behavior that led this same culture to say "these people are too degenerate to participate in this institution." <u>If the prohibition against gay marriage helped create an anti-gay stigma, then lifting it—as we've seen over the last decade—has helped destroy it. There's no reason racism can't work the same way</u><strong>. </p><p>Prioritze material changes—only way to create skills for implementation </p></strong>
| null |
2AC
|
FW
| 40,310 | 338 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,699 |
The United States should cease its public and diplomatic opposition to the initiation of WTO-authorized suspension of Antigua’s obligations towards the United States under the TRIPS Agreement, and encourage Antigua to proceed with such suspension so long as legally authorized. The United States should not retaliate against Antigua for such suspension. The fifty states and sub-federal territories should legalize nearly all online gambling in the United States and institute uniform regulatory systems for online gambling, clarifying that prediction markets are legally permitted.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States should cease its public and diplomatic opposition to the initiation of WTO-authorized suspension of Antigua’s obligations towards the United States under the TRIPS Agreement, and encourage Antigua to proceed with such suspension so long as legally authorized. The United States should not retaliate against Antigua for such suspension. The fifty states and sub-federal territories should legalize nearly all online gambling in the United States and institute uniform regulatory systems for online gambling, clarifying that prediction markets are legally permitted. </h4>
| null |
1NC
|
1NC
| 430,371 | 1 | 17,061 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx
| 565,291 |
N
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
2
|
Georgetown Louvis-McCoy
|
Hester
|
1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,700 |
Nearly all is 90% or more
|
NESD 14
|
NESD 14 Northwest Educational Service District 189 18-Feb-2014 (last modified) "Common Definitions"
| ERROR: type should be string, got "https://files.nwesd.org/website/TPEP/Student_Growth_Imp_Shoop/2.13.14/Common_Definititions.pdf\nALL OR NEARLY ALL means 90% or more." | null | ERROR: type should be string, got "https://files.nwesd.org/website/TPEP/Student_Growth_Imp_Shoop/2.13.14/Common_Definititions.pdf\n\"evidence of high growth for all or nearly all students\": HIGH means a year ot more. ALL OR NEARLY ALL means 90% or more." | 217 |
<h4>Nearly all is 90% or more</h4><p><strong>NESD 14</strong> Northwest Educational Service District 189 18-Feb-2014 (last modified) "Common Definitions"</p><p><u>https://files.nwesd.org/website/TPEP/Student_Growth_Imp_Shoop/2.13.14/Common_Definititions.pdf</p><p></u>"evidence of high growth for all or nearly all students": HIGH means a year ot more. <u>ALL OR NEARLY ALL means 90% or more.</p></u>
| null |
2NC
|
Case
| 430,372 | 1 | 17,060 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| 565,294 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
7
|
Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
|
Munday
|
1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
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Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,701 |
No real autonomy – too much pain/etc to be coherent
|
Levin 02
|
Levin 02
Mark Levin, constitutional lawyer and a nationally syndicated broadcaster, “PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: LEGALITY AND MORALITY”, 5/8/02, http://www.levinlaw.com/news/physician-assisted-suicide-legality-and-morality //jchen
| null |
main argument asserted in favor of assisted suicide is autonomy
I believe it would be very difficult for an elderly person suffering from a terminal illness with less than six months to live, suffering severe pain, facing loss of independence, experiencing potential family pressure, and a deterioration in physical and mental health to make an independent, autonomous decision the argument that individuals in this situation should have the fundamental right to control the timing and manner ignores that it is highly unlikely that individuals faced with such adversity could make an independent decision
|
The main argument asserted in favor of assisted suicide is that every competent person should have decision-making authority over his or her life. Every person should have the autonomy to decide the timing and manner of his death. Experiencing quality of life, avoiding severe pain and suffering, maintaining dignity, having a sense of control, and having others remember us as we wish to be remembered should be a fundamental liberty interest. Proponents of assisted suicide argue that this right to autonomy, especially at the end of life, is superior to any claim that life must be preserved. Moreover, the sacredness of life is dramatically diminished when an individual’s condition is terminal and death is imminent.
I do not dispute that the concept of a person’s autonomy over the timing and manner of his or her death is noteworthy and admirable. However, as discussed in detail later in this paper, I believe it would be very difficult for an elderly person suffering from a terminal illness with less than six months to live, suffering severe pain, facing loss of independence, experiencing potential family pressure, and a deterioration in physical and mental health to make an independent, autonomous decision. Thus, the argument that individuals in this situation should have the fundamental right to control the timing and manner of their death ignores the fact that it is highly unlikely that individuals faced with such adversity could make an independent decision under the circumstances
| 1,511 |
<h4>No real autonomy – too much pain/etc<strong> to be coherent</h4><p>Levin 02</p><p></strong>Mark Levin, constitutional lawyer and a nationally syndicated broadcaster, “PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: LEGALITY AND MORALITY”, 5/8/02, http://www.levinlaw.com/news/physician-assisted-suicide-legality-and-morality //jchen</p><p>The <mark>main argument asserted in favor of assisted suicide is</mark> that every competent person should have decision-making authority over his or her life. Every person should have the <mark>autonomy</mark> to decide the timing and manner of his death. Experiencing quality of life, avoiding severe pain and suffering, maintaining dignity, having a sense of control, and having others remember us as we wish to be remembered should be a fundamental liberty interest. Proponents of assisted suicide argue that this right to autonomy, especially at the end of life, is superior to any claim that life must be preserved. Moreover, the sacredness of life is dramatically diminished when an individual’s condition is terminal and death is imminent. </p><p>I do not dispute that the concept of a person’s autonomy over the timing and manner of his or her death is noteworthy and admirable. However, as discussed in detail later in this paper, <mark>I believe it would be very difficult for an elderly person suffering from a terminal illness with less than six months to live, suffering severe pain, facing loss of independence, experiencing potential family pressure, and a deterioration in physical and mental health to make an independent, autonomous decision</mark>. Thus, <mark>the argument that individuals in this situation should have the fundamental right to control the timing and manner</mark> of their death <mark>ignores</mark> the fact <mark>that it is highly unlikely that individuals faced with such adversity could make an independent decision</mark> under the circumstances</p>
| null |
2NC
|
Case
| 430,373 | 2 | 17,059 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| 565,293 |
N
|
Cedanats
|
3
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Stone
|
1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,702 |
Accusing authors of white supremacy makes discussion impossible
|
Hammersley 93
|
Hammersley, 93, Martyn, British Journal of Sociology, September 1993 “Research and anti-racism: the case of Peter foster and his critics”, 44.3, JSTOR
|
the implication is that reality is obscured from those with this background because of the effects of ideology. By contrast, it is suggested, the oppressed (black people) have privileged insight into the nature of society the validity of Foster's views can therefore be dismissed this position is no more satisfactory than relativism We must ask on what grounds we can decide that one group has superior insight into reality. This cannot be simply because they declare that they have this insight; otherwise everyone could make the same claim with the same legitimacy while we must recognise that people in different social locations may have divergent perspectives, giving them distinctive insights, it is not clear why we should believe the implausible claim that some people have privileged access to knowledge while others are blinded by ideology
|
the implication is reality is obscured from those with this background it is suggested, the black people) have privileged insight into the nature of society this position is no more satisfactory than relativism. We must ask on what grounds we can decide that one group has superior insight into reality otherwise everyone could make the same claim it is not clear why we should believe the implausible claim that some people have privileged access to knowledge while others are blinded by ideology
|
The second view I want to consider is sometimes associated with versions of the first, but must be kept separate because it involves a quite distinctive and incompatible element. I will refer to this as standpoint theory. Here people's experience and knowledge is treated as valid or invalid by dint of their membership in some social category.'7 Here again Foster's arguments may be dismissed because they reflect his background and experience as a white, middle class, male teacher. However, this time the implication is that reality is obscured from those with this background because of the effects of ideology. By contrast, it is suggested, the oppressed (black, female and/or working class people) have privileged insight into the nature of society. This argument produces a victory for one side, not the stalemate that seems to result from relativism; the validity of Foster's views can therefore be dismissed. But in other respects this position is no more satisfactory than relativism. We must ask on what grounds we can decide that one group has superior insight into reality. This cannot be simply because they declare that they have this insight; otherwise everyone could make the same claim with the same legitimacy (we would be back to relativism). This means that some other form of ultimate justification is involved, but what could this be? In the Marxist version of this argument the working class (or, in practice, the Communist Party) are the group with privileged insight into the nature of social reality, but it is Marx and Marxist theorists who confer this privilege on them by means of a dubious philosophy of history.l8 Something similar occurs in the case of feminist standpoint theory, where the feminist theorist ascribes privileged insight to women, or to feminists engaged in the struggle for women's emanci-pation.l9 However, while we must recognise that people in different social locations may have divergent perspectives, giving them distinctive insights, it is not clear why we should believe the implausible claim that some people have privileged access to knowledge while others are blinded by ideology.20
| 2,143 |
<h4>Accusing authors of white supremacy makes discussion impossible </h4><p><u><strong>Hammersley</u></strong>, <u><strong>93</u></strong>, Martyn, British Journal of Sociology, September 1993 “Research and anti-racism: the case of Peter foster and his critics”, 44.3, JSTOR </p><p>The second view I want to consider is sometimes associated with versions of the first, but must be kept separate because it involves a quite distinctive and incompatible element. I will refer to this as standpoint theory. Here people's experience and knowledge is treated as valid or invalid by dint of their membership in some social category.'7 Here again Foster's arguments may be dismissed because they reflect his background and experience as a white, middle class, male teacher. However, this time <u><mark>the implication is</mark> that <mark>reality is obscured from those with this background</mark> because of the effects of ideology. By contrast, <mark>it is suggested, the</mark> oppressed (<mark>black</u></mark>, female and/or working class <u><mark>people) have privileged insight into the nature of society</u></mark>. This argument produces a victory for one side, not the stalemate that seems to result from relativism; <u>the validity of Foster's views can therefore be dismissed</u>. But in other respects <u><mark>this position is no more satisfactory than relativism</u>. <u>We must ask on what grounds we can decide that one group has superior insight into reality</mark>. This cannot be simply because they declare that they have this insight; <mark>otherwise everyone could make the same claim</mark> with the same legitimacy</u> (we would be back to relativism). This means that some other form of ultimate justification is involved, but what could this be? In the Marxist version of this argument the working class (or, in practice, the Communist Party) are the group with privileged insight into the nature of social reality, but it is Marx and Marxist theorists who confer this privilege on them by means of a dubious philosophy of history.l8 Something similar occurs in the case of feminist standpoint theory, where the feminist theorist ascribes privileged insight to women, or to feminists engaged in the struggle for women's emanci-pation.l9 However, <u>while we must recognise that people in different social locations may have divergent perspectives, giving them distinctive insights, <mark>it is not clear why we should believe the implausible claim that some people have privileged access to knowledge while others are blinded by ideology</u></mark>.20 </p>
| null |
2AC
|
FW
| 298,145 | 7 | 17,058 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| 565,290 |
A
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
1
|
West Georgia Kelly-Zapata
|
Rumbaugh
|
1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,703 |
The CP drops U.S. opposition to cross-retaliation by Antigua---that legitimizes cross-retal and boosts trade credibility, separate from the issue of compliance
|
Danish 13
|
Danish 13, Fourth Year, B.A. LL.B.(H) National University of Advanced Legal Studies, India, October 2013, “WTO Dispute Resolution and Cross Retaliation under Trips: Is it Sanctioned Piracy of Intellectual Property? A Case Study of the US - Gambling (Antigua) Case,” Westminster Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, http://www.westminsterlawreview.org/wlr16.php
As of June 2013, Antigua had not initiated any proceedings aimed at profiting from suspension of the intellectual property obligations owed to the US. However, many reports seem to suggest that it may soon set up a website for the sale of American intellectual property, if the negotiations deadlock is not broken.44
|
Antigua is still engaged in the use of pressure tactics in the hope of getting the US to comply with the rulings whenever Antigua has shown signs of putting its ruling into action, the Americans have responded with threats, claiming intellectual property piracy and violation of international trade laws The Antiguan action has been authorised by the DSB after all the procedures laid down in the DSU were followed to the letter the way in which Antigua has proceeded against the US has conformed to all the standards expected of a country using an international trade dispute redressal forum Yet there have been aspersions on Antiguan conduct by American authorities the levelling of such allegations constitutes a severe breach of trust in WTO procedures Irrespective of its non compliance with the WTO rulings the despicable way in which the US has besmirched Antiguan reputation to cast it as a promulgator of intellectual property piracy has raised questions on the legality of cross retaliation under TRIPs
|
Antigua is still engaged in pressure tactics in the hope of getting the US to comply whenever Antigua has shown signs of putting its ruling into action, the Americans have responded with threats, The Antiguan action has been authorised by the DSB after procedures were followed to the letter the way Antigua has proceeded conformed to all standards of international trade dispute redressal there have been aspersions on Antiguan conduct by American authorities levelling such allegations constitutes a severe breach of trust in WTO procedures Irrespective of its non compliance with the rulings the despicable way the US has besmirched Antiguan reputation has raised questions on the legality of cross retaliation under TRIPs
|
In the decade that has passed since the initiation of this case, there has not been any significant shift in the American position regarding its obligations under the GATS. Antigua is still engaged in the use of pressure tactics in the hope of getting the US to comply with the rulings. However, whenever Antigua has shown signs of putting its ruling into action, the Americans have responded with threats, claiming intellectual property piracy and violation of international trade laws. The Antiguan action has been authorised by the DSB after all the procedures laid down in the DSU were followed to the letter without any breach in its legality. Further, the way in which Antigua has proceeded against the US has conformed to all the standards expected of a country using an international trade dispute redressal forum. Yet there have been aspersions on Antiguan conduct by American authorities. Notwithstanding extant jurisprudence, the levelling of such allegations constitutes a severe breach of trust in WTO procedures. Irrespective of its non compliance with the WTO rulings and disregard of the threat of cross retaliation, the despicable way in which the US has besmirched Antiguan reputation to cast it as a promulgator of intellectual property piracy has also raised questions on the legality of cross retaliation under TRIPs.
| 1,338 |
<h4>The CP drops U.S. opposition to cross-retaliation by Antigua---that <u>legitimizes</u> cross-retal and boosts trade credibility, <u>separate</u> from the issue of compliance </h4><p><strong>Danish 13</strong>, Fourth Year, B.A. LL.B.(H) National University of Advanced Legal Studies, India, October 2013, “WTO Dispute Resolution and Cross Retaliation under Trips: Is it Sanctioned Piracy of Intellectual Property? A Case Study of the US - Gambling (Antigua) Case,” Westminster Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, http://www.westminsterlawreview.org/wlr16.php</p><p>As of June 2013, <u><strong><mark>Antigua had not initiated</mark> any proceedings aimed at profiting from <mark>suspension of</mark> the <mark>i</mark>ntellectual <mark>p</mark>roperty obligations</u></strong> owed to the US. <u><strong><mark>However, many reports</u></strong></mark> seem to <u><strong><mark>suggest</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>it may soon set up</mark> a website for the <mark>sale of American</mark> <mark>i</mark>ntellectual <mark>p</mark>roperty, if the negotiations deadlock is not broken</u></strong>.44</p><p>In the decade that has passed since the initiation of this case, there has not been any significant shift in the American position regarding its obligations under the GATS. <u><strong><mark>Antigua is still engaged in</mark> the use of <mark>pressure tactics in the hope of getting the US to comply</mark> with the rulings</u></strong>. However, <u><strong><mark>whenever Antigua has shown signs of putting its ruling into action,</u></strong> <u><strong>the Americans have responded with threats,</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>claiming intellectual property piracy and violation of international trade laws</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The Antiguan action has been authorised by the DSB</mark> <mark>after</mark> all the <mark>procedures</mark> laid down in the DSU <mark>were followed to the letter</u></strong></mark> without any breach in its legality. Further, <u><strong><mark>the way</mark> in which <mark>Antigua has proceeded</mark> against the US has <mark>conformed to all</mark> the <mark>standards</mark> expected <mark>of</mark> a country using an <mark>international trade dispute redressal</mark> forum</u></strong>. <u><strong>Yet <mark>there have been aspersions on Antiguan conduct by American authorities</u></strong></mark>. Notwithstanding extant jurisprudence, <u><strong>the <mark>levelling</mark> of <mark>such allegations constitutes a severe breach of trust in WTO procedures</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Irrespective of its non compliance with the</mark> WTO <mark>rulings</u></strong></mark> and disregard of the threat of cross retaliation, <u><strong><mark>the despicable way</mark> in which <mark>the US has besmirched Antiguan reputation</mark> to cast it as a promulgator of intellectual property piracy <mark>has</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>raised questions on the legality of cross retaliation under TRIPs</u></strong></mark>.</p>
| null |
1NC
|
1NC
| 429,653 | 13 | 17,061 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx
| 565,291 |
N
|
Hurricanedebates2015
|
2
|
Georgetown Louvis-McCoy
|
Hester
|
1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx
| null | 48,458 |
AvMa
|
Dartmouth AvMa
| null |
Im.....
|
Av.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
741,704 |
Nearly all is atleast 90%
|
Gray 91
|
Gray 91 James U. Gray and Ronald N. MacGregor, University of British Columbia CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 16:1 (1991) A Cross-Canada Study of High School Art Teachers
|
nearly all means 90% or more
| null |
http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE16-1/CJE16-1-4Gray.pdf
Rather than present numerical data as tables, general descriptors are used, sometimes along with numbers. Thus,
nearly all means 90% or more of teachers interviewed; many means 70%–89%; half means 50%; some means 20%–49%; and a few means fewer than 20%.
| 326 |
<h4>Nearly all is atleast 90%</h4><p><strong>Gray 91</strong> James U. Gray and Ronald N. MacGregor, University of British Columbia CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 16:1 (1991) A Cross-Canada Study of High School Art Teachers</p><p>http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE16-1/CJE16-1-4Gray.pdf</p><p>Rather than present numerical data as tables, general descriptors are used, sometimes along with numbers. Thus,</p><p><u>nearly all means 90% or more</u><strong> of teachers interviewed; many means 70%–89%; half means 50%; some means 20%–49%; and a few means fewer than 20%. </p></strong>
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2NC
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Case
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
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Cedanats
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Fresno State Levin-Sicairos
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Munday
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1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx
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AvMa
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Dartmouth AvMa
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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cx
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college
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