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743,805	Current bio-defense sufficientOrent 9 (Wendy, Ph.D. in anthropology from the … the World's Most Dangerous Disease 7/1“The bioterror bugaboo.” Los Angeles Times. http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/17/opinion/oe-orent17)	, according to an Army War College report, by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.	After the anthrax letter attacks of October 2001, the Bush administration pledged $57 billion to keep the nation safe from bioterror. Since then, the government has created a vast network of laboratories and institutions to track down and block every remotely conceivable form of bioterror threat. The Obama administration seems committed to continuing the biodefense push, having just appointed a zealous bioterror researcher as undersecretary of science and technology in the Department of Homeland Security. But is the threat really as great as we've been led to believe? Last summer, the FBI concluded that the anthrax letters that killed five Americans came not from abroad but from an American laboratory, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. Meanwhile, the Russian bioweapons program was officially shut down in 1992, and it's unlikely that anything remaining of it could pose much of a threat. Iraq, it has turned out, had no active program. And Al Qaeda's rudimentary explorations were interrupted, according to an Army War College report, by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.	null	null	Disease impact inevitable—no reason why has to originate in the US—other coutnries trigger—byrne ev is not speicifc	115	<h4>Current bio-defense sufficientOrent 9 (Wendy, Ph.D. in anthropology from the … the World's Most Dangerous Disease 7/1“The bioterror bugaboo.” Los Angeles<u> Times. http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/17/opinion/oe-orent17)</h4><p>After the anthrax letter attacks of</u> October 20<u>01</u>, the Bush administration pledged $57 billion to keep the nation safe from bioterror. Since then, <u><mark>the government has created a vast network</mark> of laboratories and institutions <mark>to</mark> track down and <mark>block every</mark> remotely <mark>conceivable form of bioterror threat.</mark> The <mark>Obama</mark> administration seems <mark>committed to</mark> continuing the <mark>biodefense</mark> push,</u> having just appointed a zealous bioterror researcher as undersecretary of science and technology in the Department of Homeland Security. But is the threat really as great as we've been led to believe? Last summer, the FBI concluded that the anthrax letters that killed five Americans came not from abroad but from an American laboratory, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. Meanwhile, <u><mark>the Russian bioweapons program was officially shut down</mark> in</u> <u>1992, and it's unlikely that anything remaining of it could pose much of a threat. Iraq,</u> it has turned out, <u>had no active program. And <mark>Al Qaeda's</mark> rudimentary <mark>explorations were interrupted</u><strong></mark>, according to an Army War College report, by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. </p><p></strong> <strong>Disease impact inevitable—no reason why has to originate in the US—other coutnries trigger—byrne ev is not speicifc </p></strong>	null	1nc	Public Health	431,181	1	17,115	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	565,263	N	Wake	8	Georgia Boyce-Feinberg	Markoff	AG politics fed cp (2nr) treaties da (2nr) ban marihuana cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,806	Text: The fifty states should, through the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Law, amend the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act to require routine recovery of cadaveric organs in the event of brain death, allowing limited religious opt-out.	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>Text: The fifty states should, through the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Law, amend the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act to require routine recovery of cadaveric organs in the event of brain death, allowing limited religious opt-out. </h4>	1NC	null	1nc – CP	431,180	1	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,807	Sparks global trade – prevents backsliding to protectionism	Economist 2-22- 14	Economist 2-22- 14 [The Economist 2-22, “How to make the world $600 billion poorer,” 2/22/14 (Print Edition), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21596934-barack-obamas-unwillingness-fight-free-trade-expensive-mistake-how-make-world]	free trade If not championed by leaders will constantly be eroded by narrow economic nationalism If he cannot drag Democrats back to their senses the world will lose its best opportunity in two decades for a burst of liberalisation It will be a signal that America is giving up its role as defender of an open global economy Obama launched into ambitious new deals with large Pacific economies and the European Union breathing new life into global trade talks Diplomats credit the White House’s new resolve for helping to bring stubborn parties to the table Progress suddenly seemed possible in other areas, such as liberalising trade in services and information technology, and reducing barriers to the exchange of “environmental goods and services which would make it cheaper to curb carbon emissions Congress must approve trade agreements. Previous presidents had the advantage of “fast-track Without it No country would engage in serious talks with America some optimists claim that Congress will return after the mid-terms ready to back fast-track Tactically even a short delay could prove fatal to both deals Europe’s leaders will now doubt America’s commitment, given how feebly Mr Obama has fought for fast-track The greatest risk of all is that the political momentum in America having swung against free trade, will be hard to reverse There is nothing inevitable about globalisation Governments have put up barriers before with disastrous consequences during the 1930s and could do so again So it is alarming when America, the mainstay of an open global economy, gives off isolationist signals America cannot turn inward	free trade. If not championed will constantly be eroded by narrow economic nationalism the world will lose its best opportunity in two decades for a burst of liberalisation. It will signal America is giving up its role as defender of an open global economy Obama launched new deals breathing new life into global trade talks. Progress seemed possible Congress must approve trade agreements fast-track Without it, No country would engage in serious talks even a short delay could prove fatal Europe’s leaders will doubt America’s commitment The greatest risk is that the political momentum will be hard to reverse There is nothing inevitable about globalisation. America cannot turn inward	IN JULY 2008 Barack Obama, then a candidate for the presidency, declared before an adoring crowd in Berlin that “true partnership and true progress [require] constant work and sustained sacrifice.” So it is with free trade. If not championed by leaders who understand its broad benefits, it will constantly be eroded by narrow economic nationalism. Mr Obama now appears to be surrendering to protectionists within his own party. If he cannot drag Democrats back to their senses, the world will lose its best opportunity in two decades for a burst of liberalisation. It will also be a signal that America is giving up its role as defender of an open global economy in the same way that Mr Obama has retreated in foreign policy. ¶ Mr Obama did little to promote free trade during his first term, but has seemed bolder in his second. He launched America into ambitious new deals with large Pacific economies and the European Union, breathing new life into global trade talks. Momentum built up; the “constant work and sacrifice” paid dividends. Members of the World Trade Organisation agreed on a package of trade reforms in December—the first truly multilateral deal in the organisation’s 20-year history. Diplomats credit the White House’s new resolve for helping to bring stubborn parties to the table. Progress suddenly seemed possible in other areas, such as liberalising trade in services and information technology, and reducing barriers to the exchange of “environmental goods and services”, which would make it cheaper to curb carbon emissions.¶ First, shoot yourself in the foot. Then repeat…¶ The hitch is that Congress must approve trade agreements. Previous presidents had the advantage of “fast-track” trade promotion authority, which let them present deals to Congress for a simple yes or no vote. Without it, lawmakers can wreck carefully negotiated deals with toxic amendments. No country would engage in serious talks with America under such circumstances. Fast-track is therefore essential—and elusive. Congress last granted it in 2002; it expired in 2007. The Obama administration blithely asserted that Congress would renew it, but many lawmakers, primarily Democrats, have signed letters opposing it. Harry Reid, the Senate majority leader, has all but ruled out a vote this year. And on February 14th Joe Biden, the vice-president, told a gathering of Democratic leaders that he understood their opposition. The White House appears to have given up with scarcely a fight. A fast-track vote before November’s mid-term elections seems unlikely (see article). ¶ Why panic about this? Tactically, it could just be another piece of Washington politicking: some optimists claim that Congress will return after the mid-terms ready to back fast-track, providing Mr Obama allows some boilerplate language in the bill chiding China for allegedly manipulating its currency. Others wonder whether the trade deals are really so vital. Indeed, the idea that they will not do much to help the economy is one excuse for Democrats undermining their president. ¶ In fact, the deals on the table are big. Reasonable estimates say that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) could boost the world’s annual output by $600 billion—equivalent to adding another Saudi Arabia. Some $200 billion of that would accrue to America. And the actual gains could be even larger. The agreements would clear the way for freer trade in services, which account for most of rich countries’ GDP but only a small share of trade. Opening up trade in services could help reduce the cost of everything from shipping to banking, education and health care. Exposing professional occupations to the same global competition that factory workers have faced for decades could even strike a blow against the income inequality that Mr Obama so often decries. ¶ Tactically, even a short delay could prove fatal to both deals. Pacific negotiations have been extended while America and Japan hammer out compromises on agriculture. Why should Japanese politicians risk infuriating their farmers when any agreement can be torn up on Capitol Hill? The deal with the EU was meant to be done swiftly—perhaps in as little as two years—to keep politics from mucking it up. Europe’s leaders will now doubt America’s commitment, given how feebly Mr Obama has fought for fast-track. Trade sceptics, such as French farmers, are drooling. Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor, who is already furious about American spying, may decide that a trade deal is not worth battling for. ¶ The greatest risk of all is that the political momentum in America, having swung against free trade, will be hard to reverse. Some Tea Party Republicans oppose fast-track because they are loth to grant Mr Obama the authority to do anything. Democrats, keen to brand themselves as the anti-inequality party, may find economic nationalism an easy sell on the campaign stump: and, once pledged to that cause in November, candidates will not vote for the opposite in Congress. ¶ And for this Mr Obama deserves some blame. He is far more ardent in bemoaning inequality than in explaining why an American retreat from the world would be the wrong way to address it. He seldom mentions, for example, that cheap imports help the poor by cutting their shopping bills, and so reduce inequality of consumption. ¶ It’s not a zero-sum world¶ There is nothing inevitable about globalisation. Governments have put up barriers before—with disastrous consequences during the 1930s—and could do so again. So it is alarming when America, the mainstay of an open global economy, gives off isolationist signals. Only recently Congress childishly refused to honour an agreed-upon increase in America’s financial commitment to the International Monetary Fund. The Federal Reserve is pushing forward with new banking regulations that could penalise foreign banks and further Balkanise global finance (see article). Mr Obama continues to delay approval of a critical oil pipeline from Canada, and is slow to grant permits to export American natural gas.¶ “America cannot turn inward,” the Obama of 2008 said in Berlin. The Obama of 2014 is now responding: “Yes we can.”	6,237	<h4>Sparks global trade – prevents backsliding to protectionism</h4><p><strong>Economist 2-22- 14</strong> [The Economist 2-22, “How to make the world $600 billion poorer,” 2/22/14 (Print Edition), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21596934-barack-obamas-unwillingness-fight-free-trade-expensive-mistake-how-make-world]</p><p>IN JULY 2008 Barack Obama, then a candidate for the presidency, declared before an adoring crowd in Berlin that “true partnership and true progress [require] constant work and sustained sacrifice.” So it is with <u><mark>free trade</u>. <u>If not championed</mark> by leaders</u> who understand its broad benefits, it <u><mark>will</u> <u>constantly be eroded by narrow economic nationalism</u></mark>. Mr Obama now appears to be surrendering to protectionists within his own party. <u>If he cannot</u> <u>drag Democrats back to their senses</u>, <u><mark>the world will lose its best opportunity in two decades for a burst of liberalisation</u>. <u>It will</u></mark> also <u>be a <mark>signal</mark> that</u> <u><mark>America is giving up its role as defender of an open global economy</u></mark> in the same way that Mr Obama has retreated in foreign policy. ¶ Mr <u><mark>Obama</u></mark> did little to promote free trade during his first term, but has seemed bolder in his second. He <u><mark>launched</u></mark> America <u>into ambitious <mark>new deals</mark> with large Pacific economies and the European Union</u>, <u><mark>breathing new life into global trade talks</u>.</mark> Momentum built up; the “constant work and sacrifice” paid dividends. Members of the World Trade Organisation agreed on a package of trade reforms in December—the first truly multilateral deal in the organisation’s 20-year history. <u>Diplomats</u><mark> <u></mark>credit the White House’s new resolve</u> <u>for helping to bring stubborn parties to the table</u>. <u><mark>Progress</mark> suddenly <mark>seemed possible</mark> in other areas, such as liberalising trade in services and information technology, and</u> <u>reducing barriers to the exchange of “environmental goods and services</u>”, <u>which</u> <u>would make it cheaper to curb carbon emissions</u>.¶ First, shoot yourself in the foot. Then repeat…¶ The hitch is that <u><mark>Congress must approve trade agreements</mark>. Previous presidents had the advantage of “<mark>fast-track</u></mark>” trade promotion authority, which let them present deals to Congress for a simple yes or no vote. <u><mark>Without it</u>,</mark> lawmakers can wreck carefully negotiated deals with toxic amendments. <u><mark>No country would engage in</mark> <mark>serious talks</mark> with America</u> under such circumstances. Fast-track is therefore essential—and elusive. Congress last granted it in 2002; it expired in 2007. The Obama administration blithely asserted that Congress would renew it, but many lawmakers, primarily Democrats, have signed letters opposing it. Harry Reid, the Senate majority leader, has all but ruled out a vote this year. And on February 14th Joe Biden, the vice-president, told a gathering of Democratic leaders that he understood their opposition. The White House appears to have given up with scarcely a fight. A fast-track vote before November’s mid-term elections seems unlikely (see article). ¶ Why panic about this? Tactically, it could just be another piece of Washington politicking: <u>some optimists claim that Congress will return after the mid-terms ready to back fast-track</u>, providing Mr Obama allows some boilerplate language in the bill chiding China for allegedly manipulating its currency. Others wonder whether the trade deals are really so vital. Indeed, the idea that they will not do much to help the economy is one excuse for Democrats undermining their president. ¶ In fact, the deals on the table are big. Reasonable estimates say that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) could boost the world’s annual output by $600 billion—equivalent to adding another Saudi Arabia. Some $200 billion of that would accrue to America. And the actual gains could be even larger. The agreements would clear the way for freer trade in services, which account for most of rich countries’ GDP but only a small share of trade. Opening up trade in services could help reduce the cost of everything from shipping to banking, education and health care. Exposing professional occupations to the same global competition that factory workers have faced for decades could even strike a blow against the income inequality that Mr Obama so often decries. ¶ <u>Tactically</u>, <u><mark>even a short delay could prove fatal</mark> to both deals</u>. Pacific negotiations have been extended while America and Japan hammer out compromises on agriculture. Why should Japanese politicians risk infuriating their farmers when any agreement can be torn up on Capitol Hill? The deal with the EU was meant to be done swiftly—perhaps in as little as two years—to keep politics from mucking it up. <u><mark>Europe’s leaders will</mark> now <mark>doubt America’s commitment</mark>,</u> <u>given how feebly Mr Obama has fought for fast-track</u>. Trade sceptics, such as French farmers, are drooling. Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor, who is already furious about American spying, may decide that a trade deal is not worth battling for. ¶ <u><mark>The greatest risk</mark> of all <mark>is that</u> <u>the political momentum</mark> in America</u>, <u>having swung against free trade,</u> <u><mark>will be hard to reverse</u></mark>. Some Tea Party Republicans oppose fast-track because they are loth to grant Mr Obama the authority to do anything. Democrats, keen to brand themselves as the anti-inequality party, may find economic nationalism an easy sell on the campaign stump: and, once pledged to that cause in November, candidates will not vote for the opposite in Congress. ¶ And for this Mr Obama deserves some blame. He is far more ardent in bemoaning inequality than in explaining why an American retreat from the world would be the wrong way to address it. He seldom mentions, for example, that cheap imports help the poor by cutting their shopping bills, and so reduce inequality of consumption. ¶ It’s not a zero-sum world¶ <u><mark>There is nothing inevitable about globalisation</u>.</mark> <u>Governments have put up barriers before</u>—<u>with</u> <u>disastrous consequences during the 1930s</u>—<u>and could do so again</u>. <u>So it is alarming when America, the mainstay of an open global economy, gives off isolationist signals</u>. Only recently Congress childishly refused to honour an agreed-upon increase in America’s financial commitment to the International Monetary Fund. The Federal Reserve is pushing forward with new banking regulations that could penalise foreign banks and further Balkanise global finance (see article). Mr Obama continues to delay approval of a critical oil pipeline from Canada, and is slow to grant permits to export American natural gas.¶ “<u><mark>America cannot turn inward</u></mark>,” the Obama of 2008 said in Berlin. The Obama of 2014 is now responding: “Yes we can.”</p>	null	null	1nc – Midterms DA	213,145	101	17,120	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	565,421	N	Gsu	3	Wake Forest Clifford-Villa	Watson	vs Stem cells aff 1NC T "nearly all" midterms DA visas CP heg bad case 2NC heg bad case 1NR case T 2NR heg bad case	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,808	No extinction from disease	Posner 5	Posner 5—Senior Lecturer, U Chicago Law. Judge on the US Court of Appeals 7th Circuit. AB from Yale and LLB from Harvard. (Richard, Catastrophe, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-4150331/Catastrophe-the-dozen-most-significant.html)	Homo sapiens managed to survive every disease in 200,000 years none has come close to destroying the human race There is a biological reason Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly there is no danger that likelihood a natural pandemic would cause extinction is even less today than in the past	Homo sapiens survive every disease in 200,000 years Natural selection favors limited lethality; they are fitter because genes spread if the germs do not kill their hosts likelihood pandemic would cause extinction is less today	Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease.	1,146	<h4>No extinction from disease</h4><p><strong>Posner 5</strong>—Senior Lecturer, U Chicago Law. Judge on the US Court of Appeals 7th Circuit. AB from Yale and LLB from Harvard. (Richard, Catastrophe, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-4150331/Catastrophe-the-dozen-most-significant.html)</p><p>Yet the fact that <u><mark>Homo sapiens</u></mark> has <u>managed to <mark>survive every disease</u></mark> to assail it <u><mark>in</u></mark> the <u><mark>200,000 years</u></mark> or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but <u>none has come close to destroying the</u> entire <u>human race</u>. <u><strong>There is a biological reason</u></strong>. <u><mark>Natural selection favors</u></mark> <u>germs of</u> <u><mark>limited lethality</u>; <u>they are fitter</mark> in an evolutionary sense <mark>because </mark>their <mark>genes </mark>are more likely to be <mark>spread if the germs do not kill their hosts </mark>too quickly</u>. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet <u>there is no danger that</u> AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The <u><mark>likelihood</u></mark> of <u>a natural <mark>pandemic</u></mark> that <u><mark>would</mark> <mark>cause</u></mark> the <u><mark>extinction</u></mark> of the human race <u><mark>is</u></mark> probably <u>even <mark>less today</mark> than in the past</u> (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. </p>	null	1nc	Public Health	64,791	356	17,115	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	565,263	N	Wake	8	Georgia Boyce-Feinberg	Markoff	AG politics fed cp (2nr) treaties da (2nr) ban marihuana cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,809	Flips the aff & extinction	PANZNER 08 Faculty – New York Institute of Finance. Specializes in Global Capital Markets. MA Columbia	PANZNER 08 Faculty – New York Institute of Finance. Specializes in Global Capital Markets. MA Columbia [Michael J. Panzner, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, Revised and Updated Edition [Paperback], p. 137-138]	Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross—border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity be acquired from less-than-friendly nations, whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to fullscale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part. may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation" between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.	Smoot-Hawley triggered a series of tit-for-tat responses helped turn a downturn into a prolonged global disaster The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring confrontations over shared sources will become more commonplace. tensions will give rise to fullscale military encounters economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts terrorist groups will boost attacks to a whole new level China will assume an increasingly belligerent posture Iran may embark on overt colonization Israel may draw allies into conflicts Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons the beginnings of a new world war.	Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross—border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity be acquired from less-than-friendly nations, whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to fullscale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part. may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation" between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.	4,549	<h4>Flips the aff & extinction</h4><p><strong>PANZNER 08 Faculty – New York Institute of Finance. Specializes in Global Capital Markets. MA Columbia</strong> [Michael J. Panzner, Financial<u> Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, Revised and Updated Edition [Paperback], p. 137-138]</p><p>Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious <mark>Smoot-Hawley</mark> bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it <mark>triggered a series of tit-for-tat</mark> economic <mark>responses</mark>, which many commentators believe <mark>helped turn a</mark> serious economic <mark>downturn into a prolonged</mark> and devastating <mark>global disaster</mark>. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross—border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. <mark>The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring</mark> about ever more heated arguments and dangerous <mark>confrontations over shared sources</mark> of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity be acquired from less-than-friendly nations, whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources <mark>will become more commonplace. </mark>Around the world, such <mark>tensions will give rise to fullscale military encounters</mark>, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, <mark>economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts</mark> that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, <mark>terrorist groups will</mark> likely <mark>boost</mark> the frequency and scale of their horrifying <mark>attacks</mark>, bringing the threat of random violence <mark>to a whole new level</mark>. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. <mark>China will</mark> likely <mark>assume an increasingly belligerent posture</mark> toward Taiwan, while <mark>Iran may embark on overt colonization</mark> of its neighbors in the Mideast. <mark>Israel</mark>, for its part. <mark>may</mark> look to <mark>draw</mark> a dwindling list of <mark>allies</mark> from around the world <mark>into</mark> a growing number of <mark>conflicts</mark>. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation" between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. <mark>Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons</mark> will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as <mark>the beginnings of a new world war.</mark> </p></u>	null	null	1nc – Midterms DA	39,217	627	17,120	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	565,421	N	Gsu	3	Wake Forest Clifford-Villa	Watson	vs Stem cells aff 1NC T "nearly all" midterms DA visas CP heg bad case 2NC heg bad case 1NR case T 2NR heg bad case	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,810	Solves supply better and avoids exploitation DA	Spital, 7 -	Spital, 7 - Department of Medicine, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New York, New York (Aaron, “Routine Recovery of Cadaveric Organs for Transplantation: Consistent, Fair, and Life-Saving” CJASN March 2007 vol. 2 no. 2 300-303, doi: 10.2215/CJN.03260906)	our organ procurement system fails to meet our needs. Recognition of this failure has led to proposals for legalization of organ sales But before reaching for a new approach, we need to ask first, “What is wrong with our current cadaveric organ procurement system?” the major problem is its absolute requirement for consent we propose that the requirement for consent for cadaveric organ recovery be eliminated and that whenever a person dies with transplantable organs, these be recovered routinely Under such a program, recovery of transplantable organs should approach 100%. Routine recovery would be much simpler and cheaper to implement than proposals designed to stimulate consent because there would be no need for donor registries no need for stringent governmental regulation, no need to consider paying for organs, and no need for permanent public education campaigns routine posthumous organ recovery is more equitable than are systems that require consent. All people would be potential contributors, and all would be potential beneficiaries And concern about exploitation of the poor, as sometimes arises during discussions of organ sales, is not an issue here	failure has led to proposals for legalization of organ sales But we need to ask first, “What is wrong with our current cadaveric system?” the major problem is consent we propose that the requirement be eliminated recovery of transplantable organs should approach 100%. Routine recovery would be much simpler and cheaper than proposals to stimulate consent because there would be no need for registries no need to consider paying for organs, and no need for education campaigns routine posthumous recovery is more equitable all would be potential beneficiaries And concern about exploitation is not an issue here	Transplant candidates and the people who care for them know only too well that there is a severe shortage of acceptable organs. As a result, in the United States alone, approximately 19 people on the transplant waiting list die every day (1). Compounding this tragedy is the fact that many potentially life-saving cadaverica organs are not procured (2). Clearly, our organ procurement system fails to meet our needs. Recognition of this failure has led to several radical proposals designed to increase the number of organs that are recovered for transplantation, including legalization of organ sales (3) and offering priority status to people who agree to posthumous organ recovery (4). But before reaching for a new approach, we need to ask first, “What is wrong with our current cadaveric organ procurement system?” The Need for Consent: Widely Accepted but Sometimes Deadly We believe that the major problem with our present cadaveric organ procurement system is its absolute requirement for consent. As such, the system’s success depends on altruism and voluntarism. Unfortunately, this approach has proved to be inefficient. Despite tremendous efforts to increase public commitment to posthumous organ donation, exemplified most recently by the US Department of Health and Human Services sponsored Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative (5), many families who are asked for permission to recover organs from a recently deceased relative still say no (2). The result is a tragic syllogism: nonconsent leads to nonprocurement of potentially life-saving organs, and nonprocurement limits the number of people who could have been saved through transplantation; therefore, nonconsent results in loss of life. In an attempt to overcome this consent barrier while retaining personal control over the disposition of one’s body after death, several countries have enacted “opting-out” policies, sometimes referred to (erroneously, we believe) as presumed consent (6). Under these plans, cadaveric organs can be procured for transplantation unless the decedent—or her family after her death—had expressed an objection to organ recovery. Although there is evidence that this approach increases recovery rates, perhaps by changing the default from nondonation to donation (7,8), the recent Institute of Medicine (IOM) report on organ donation concluded that a presumed consent policy should not be adopted in the United States at this time (8). One of the most important concerns noted by the IOM committee is the results of a 2005 survey in which 30% of the respondents said that they would opt out under a presumed consent law. The IOM report also pointed out that in the United States there seems to be a lack of public support for this approach, that the organ donation rate in the United States currently exceeds that of many countries with presumed consent policies, and that in most of these countries the family of the decedent is still consulted (8). It should also be noted that even opting-out countries do not have enough organs to meet their needs, and for people who remain unaware of the plan, presumed consent becomes routine recovery in disguise. Given that some people do not want to donate, it is clear that whether we follow an opting-in or an opting-out approach, life-saving organs are and will continue to be lost because of refusals. In other words, the requirement for consent, whether explicit or presumed, is responsible for some deaths. But isn’t this the price that we must pay to show respect for people after they die? We believe that the answer is no. The view that consent is an absolute requirement for cadaveric organ recovery has long been accepted as self-evident, and few experts in the field have seen the need to justify it. We agree that the premortem wishes of the deceased regarding the postmortem disposition of his or her property should generally be respected. However, we believe that the obligation to honor these (or the family’s) wishes is prima facie, not absolute, and that it ceases to exist when the cost is unnecessary loss of human life, which is often precisely what happens when permission for organ recovery is denied. Therefore, given the current severe organ shortage and its implications for patients who are on the waiting list, we propose that the requirement for consent for cadaveric organ recovery be eliminated and that whenever a person dies with transplantable organs, these be recovered routinely (9–11). Consent for such recovery should be neither required nor sought. In our opinion, the practical and ethical arguments for this proposal are compelling. Routine Removal: Consistency with Other Socially Desirable but Intrusive Programs One of the major reasons for insisting on consent is to show respect for autonomy, a major principle of biomedical ethics. However, Beauchamp and Childress (12) pointed out that as important as this principle is, it “has only prima facie standing and can be overridden by competing moral considerations.” One such consideration occurs when society is so invested in attaining a certain goal that is designed to promote the public good that it mandates its citizens to behave in a manner that increases the probability of achieving that goal, even though many of them would prefer not to act in this way. Silver (13) pointed out the legitimacy of this approach in his discussion of an “organ draft”: “The sense behind the coercive power of democratic governments is to move society forward by public decree where individuals will not, by private volition, act in their own best interests.” Examples of such situations include a military draft during wartime, taxation, mandatory vaccination of children who attend public school, jury duty, and, perhaps most relevant to routine removal of cadaveric organs, mandatory autopsy when foul play is suspected. Although some people may not like the fact that they have no choice about these programs, the vast majority of us accept their existence as necessary to promote the common good. Routine removal of cadaveric organs would be consistent with this established approach, and it would save many lives at no more (and we believe much less) cost than these other mandated programs. Furthermore, had we been born into a world where cadaveric organ removal for transplantation were routine, it is likely that few if any people would question the policy, just as few of us question mandatory autopsy today. And while most of us will never need a transplant, nonrecipients would also benefit from the plan in the same way that people who never file a claim benefit from the security of having insurance. It should also be noted here that, as discussed below, a person’s autonomy is lost after death. Recovering Cadaveric Organs without Consent: Life-Saving and Fair Few would argue against the view that routine removal of usable cadaveric organs would save many lives. Under such a program, recovery of transplantable organs should approach 100%. It is unlikely that any program designed to increase consent rates could even come close. Although the expected high efficiency of routine recovery is its major raison d’être, it also has several other advantages. Routine recovery would be much simpler and cheaper to implement than proposals designed to stimulate consent because there would be no need for donor registries, no need to train requestors, no need for stringent governmental regulation, no need to consider paying for organs, and no need for permanent public education campaigns. The plan would eliminate the added stress that is experienced by some families and staff who are forced to confront the often emotionally wrenching question of consent for recovery. Delays in the removal of transplantable organs, which sometimes occur while awaiting the family’s decision and which can jeopardize organ quality, would also be eliminated. A final advantage of routine posthumous organ recovery is that it is more equitable than are systems that require consent. All people would be potential contributors, and all would be potential beneficiaries. No longer could one say, “Thank you,” when offered an organ but say, “No,” when asked to give one; such “free riders” would be eliminated. And concern about exploitation of the poor, as sometimes arises during discussions of organ sales, is not an issue here.	8,364	<h4>Solves supply better and avoids exploitation DA</h4><p><strong>Spital, 7 - </strong>Department of Medicine, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New York, New York (Aaron, “Routine Recovery of Cadaveric Organs for Transplantation: Consistent, Fair, and Life-Saving” CJASN March 2007 vol. 2 no. 2 300-303, doi: 10.2215/CJN.03260906)</p><p>Transplant candidates and the people who care for them know only too well that there is a severe shortage of acceptable organs. As a result, in the United States alone, approximately 19 people on the transplant waiting list die every day (1). Compounding this tragedy is the fact that many potentially life-saving cadaverica organs are not procured (2). Clearly, <u>our organ procurement system fails to meet our needs. Recognition of this <mark>failure has led to</u></mark> several radical <u><mark>proposals</u></mark> designed to increase the number of organs that are recovered <u><mark>for</u></mark> transplantation, including <u><strong><mark>legalization of organ sales</u></strong></mark> (3) and offering priority status to people who agree to posthumous organ recovery (4). <u><mark>But </mark>before reaching for a new approach, <mark>we need to ask first, “What is wrong with our current cadaveric</mark> organ procurement <mark>system?”</p><p></u></mark>The Need for Consent: Widely Accepted but Sometimes Deadly</p><p>We believe that <u><mark>the major problem</u></mark> with our present cadaveric organ procurement system <u><mark>is</mark> its absolute requirement for <mark>consent</u></mark>. As such, the system’s success depends on altruism and voluntarism. Unfortunately, this approach has proved to be inefficient. Despite tremendous efforts to increase public commitment to posthumous organ donation, exemplified most recently by the US Department of Health and Human Services sponsored Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative (5), many families who are asked for permission to recover organs from a recently deceased relative still say no (2). The result is a tragic syllogism: nonconsent leads to nonprocurement of potentially life-saving organs, and nonprocurement limits the number of people who could have been saved through transplantation; therefore, nonconsent results in loss of life.</p><p>In an attempt to overcome this consent barrier while retaining personal control over the disposition of one’s body after death, several countries have enacted “opting-out” policies, sometimes referred to (erroneously, we believe) as presumed consent (6). Under these plans, cadaveric organs can be procured for transplantation unless the decedent—or her family after her death—had expressed an objection to organ recovery. Although there is evidence that this approach increases recovery rates, perhaps by changing the default from nondonation to donation (7,8), the recent Institute of Medicine (IOM) report on organ donation concluded that a presumed consent policy should not be adopted in the United States at this time (8). One of the most important concerns noted by the IOM committee is the results of a 2005 survey in which 30% of the respondents said that they would opt out under a presumed consent law. The IOM report also pointed out that in the United States there seems to be a lack of public support for this approach, that the organ donation rate in the United States currently exceeds that of many countries with presumed consent policies, and that in most of these countries the family of the decedent is still consulted (8). It should also be noted that even opting-out countries do not have enough organs to meet their needs, and for people who remain unaware of the plan, presumed consent becomes routine recovery in disguise.</p><p>Given that some people do not want to donate, it is clear that whether we follow an opting-in or an opting-out approach, life-saving organs are and will continue to be lost because of refusals. In other words, the requirement for consent, whether explicit or presumed, is responsible for some deaths. But isn’t this the price that we must pay to show respect for people after they die? We believe that the answer is no.</p><p>The view that consent is an absolute requirement for cadaveric organ recovery has long been accepted as self-evident, and few experts in the field have seen the need to justify it. We agree that the premortem wishes of the deceased regarding the postmortem disposition of his or her property should generally be respected. However, we believe that the obligation to honor these (or the family’s) wishes is prima facie, not absolute, and that it ceases to exist when the cost is unnecessary loss of human life, which is often precisely what happens when permission for organ recovery is denied. Therefore, given the current severe organ shortage and its implications for patients who are on the waiting list, <u><mark>we propose that the requirement</mark> for consent for cadaveric organ recovery <mark>be eliminated</mark> and that whenever a person dies with transplantable organs, these be recovered routinely</u> (9–11). Consent for such recovery should be neither required nor sought. In our opinion, the practical and ethical arguments for this proposal are compelling.</p><p>Routine Removal: Consistency with Other Socially Desirable but Intrusive Programs</p><p>One of the major reasons for insisting on consent is to show respect for autonomy, a major principle of biomedical ethics. However, Beauchamp and Childress (12) pointed out that as important as this principle is, it “has only prima facie standing and can be overridden by competing moral considerations.” One such consideration occurs when society is so invested in attaining a certain goal that is designed to promote the public good that it mandates its citizens to behave in a manner that increases the probability of achieving that goal, even though many of them would prefer not to act in this way. Silver (13) pointed out the legitimacy of this approach in his discussion of an “organ draft”: “The sense behind the coercive power of democratic governments is to move society forward by public decree where individuals will not, by private volition, act in their own best interests.” Examples of such situations include a military draft during wartime, taxation, mandatory vaccination of children who attend public school, jury duty, and, perhaps most relevant to routine removal of cadaveric organs, mandatory autopsy when foul play is suspected. Although some people may not like the fact that they have no choice about these programs, the vast majority of us accept their existence as necessary to promote the common good. Routine removal of cadaveric organs would be consistent with this established approach, and it would save many lives at no more (and we believe much less) cost than these other mandated programs. Furthermore, had we been born into a world where cadaveric organ removal for transplantation were routine, it is likely that few if any people would question the policy, just as few of us question mandatory autopsy today. And while most of us will never need a transplant, nonrecipients would also benefit from the plan in the same way that people who never file a claim benefit from the security of having insurance. It should also be noted here that, as discussed below, a person’s autonomy is lost after death.</p><p>Recovering Cadaveric Organs without Consent: Life-Saving and Fair</p><p>Few would argue against the view that routine removal of usable cadaveric organs would save many lives. <u>Under such a program, <mark>recovery of transplantable organs <strong>should approach 100%.</u></strong></mark> It is unlikely that any program designed to increase consent rates could even come close. Although the expected high efficiency of routine recovery is its major raison d’être, it also has several other advantages. <u><mark>Routine recovery would be much simpler and cheaper</mark> to implement <mark>than proposals</mark> designed <mark>to stimulate consent because there would be <strong>no need for </mark>donor <mark>registries</u></strong></mark>, no need to train requestors, <u>no need for stringent governmental regulation, <strong><mark>no need to consider paying for organs</strong>, and no need for</mark> permanent public <mark>education campaigns</u></mark>. The plan would eliminate the added stress that is experienced by some families and staff who are forced to confront the often emotionally wrenching question of consent for recovery. Delays in the removal of transplantable organs, which sometimes occur while awaiting the family’s decision and which can jeopardize organ quality, would also be eliminated.</p><p>A final advantage of <u><mark>routine posthumous</mark> organ <mark>recovery is</u></mark> that it is <u><mark>more equitable</mark> than are systems that require consent. All people would be potential contributors, and <mark>all would be potential beneficiaries</u></mark>. No longer could one say, “Thank you,” when offered an organ but say, “No,” when asked to give one; such “free riders” would be eliminated. <u><mark>And <strong>concern about exploitation</strong></mark> of the poor, as sometimes arises during discussions of organ sales, <mark>is <strong>not an issue here</u></strong></mark>.</p>	1NC	null	1nc – CP	431,182	10	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,811	Double bidn either a) credibilyt is resilient because of military and economic power	Walt 11	Walt 11 (Stephen, Professor of International Relations – Harvard University, “Does the U.S. still need to reassure its allies?” Foreign Policy, 12-5, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/05/us_credibility_is_not_our_problem, GDI File)	A perennial preoccupation of U.S. diplomacy has been the perceived need to reassure allies of our reliability U.S. leaders worried that any loss of credibility might cause dominoes to fall, lead key allies to "bandwagon" with the Soviet Union The possibility that key allies would abandon us was almost always exaggerated but U.S. leaders remain overly sensitive to the possibility the United States isn't going anywhere I've never really understood why USS.S. leaders were so worried about the credibility of our commitments to others given our remarkably secure geopolitical position, whether U.S. pledges are credible is first and foremost a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help We should take allies' hints about realignment or neutrality they have every incentive to make us worry about it but in most cases little incentive to actually do it	leaders worried that loss of cred might cause dominoes to fall The possibility that key allies would abandon us was almost always exaggerated the United States isn't going anywhere." ( secure geopolitical position, allies hints about realignment but in most cases little incentive to actually do it.	A perennial preoccupation of U.S. diplomacy has been the perceived need to reassure allies of our reliability. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. leaders worried that any loss of credibility might cause dominoes to fall, lead key allies to "bandwagon" with the Soviet Union, or result in some form of "Finlandization." Such concerns justified fighting so-called "credibility wars" (including Vietnam), where the main concern was not the direct stakes of the contest but rather the need to retain a reputation for resolve and capability. Similar fears also led the United States to deploy thousands of nuclear weapons in Europe, as a supposed counter to Soviet missiles targeted against our NATO allies. The possibility that key allies would abandon us was almost always exaggerated, but U.S. leaders remain overly sensitive to the possibility. So Vice President Joe Biden has been out on the road this past week, telling various U.S. allies that "the United States isn't going anywhere." (He wasn't suggesting we're stuck in a rut, of course, but saying that the imminent withdrawal from Iraq doesn't mean a retreat to isolationism or anything like that.) There's nothing really wrong with offering up this sort of comforting rhetoric, but I've never really understood why USS.S. leaders were so worried about the credibility of our commitments to others. For starters, given our remarkably secure geopolitical position, whether U.S. pledges are credible is first and foremost a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help. We should therefore take our allies' occasional hints about realignment or neutrality with some skepticism; they have every incentive to try to make us worry about it, but in most cases little incentive to actually do it.	1,745	<h4>Double bidn either a) credibilyt is resilient because of military and economic power</h4><p><strong>Walt 11</strong> (Stephen, Professor of International Relations – Harvard University, “Does the U.S. still need to reassure its allies?” Foreign Policy, 12-5, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/05/us_credibility_is_not_our_problem, GDI File)</p><p><u>A perennial preoccupation of U.S. diplomacy has been the perceived need to reassure allies of our reliability</u>. Throughout the Cold War, <u>U.S. <mark>leaders worried that</mark> any <mark>loss of cred</mark>ibility <mark>might cause dominoes to fall</mark>, lead key allies to "bandwagon" with the Soviet Union</u>, or result in some form of "Finlandization." Such concerns justified fighting so-called "credibility wars" (including Vietnam), where the main concern was not the direct stakes of the contest but rather the need to retain a reputation for resolve and capability. Similar fears also led the United States to deploy thousands of nuclear weapons in Europe, as a supposed counter to Soviet missiles targeted against our NATO allies. <u><mark>The possibility that key allies would abandon us was <strong>almost always exaggerated</u></strong></mark>, <u>but U.S. leaders remain overly sensitive to the possibility</u>. So Vice President Joe Biden has been out on the road this past week, telling various U.S. allies that "<u><mark>the United States isn't going anywhere</u>." (</mark>He wasn't suggesting we're stuck in a rut, of course, but saying that the imminent withdrawal from Iraq doesn't mean a retreat to isolationism or anything like that.) There's nothing really wrong with offering up this sort of comforting rhetoric, but <u>I've never really understood why USS.S. leaders were so worried about the credibility of our commitments to others</u>. For starters, <u>given our remarkably <mark>secure geopolitical position,</mark> whether U.S. pledges are credible is <strong>first and foremost</strong> a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help</u>. <u>We should</u> therefore <u>take</u> our <u><mark>allies</mark>'</u> occasional <u><mark>hints about realignment</mark> or neutrality</u> with some skepticism; <u>they have every incentive to</u> try to <u>make us worry about it</u>, <u><mark>but in most cases little incentive to actually do it</u>.</p></mark>	null	1nc	2	66,267	33	17,115	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	565,263	N	Wake	8	Georgia Boyce-Feinberg	Markoff	AG politics fed cp (2nr) treaties da (2nr) ban marihuana cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,812	The United States judiciary should establish a property right in the body. The United States should not legalize organ sales	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>The United States judiciary should establish a property right in the body. The United States should not legalize organ sales</h4>	1NC	null	1nc – CP	431,183	1	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,813	Nearly all means ALL with one or two exceptions.	Rodgers and Cooper, 06 –	Rodgers and Cooper, 06 – professor of counseling at Strathclyde University (Brian and Mick, “Proposed Scoring Scheme for Qualitative Thematic Analysis”, www.strath.ac.uk/Departments/counsunit/docs/art_QTA.doc)	The intention is to use ‘plain English’ terms to describe the frequency of occurrence. For example around half’ is used to describe 50% ‘nearly all’ is used to describe 100% minus one or two	The intention is to use ‘plain English’ terms to describe the frequency of occurrence. For example around half’ is used to describe 50% nearly all’ is used to describe 100% minus one or two	Drawing on the work of psychotherapy researchers Robert Elliott, Clara Hill and colleagues, the following scheme has been proposed for the write up of qualitative thematic analysis when describing the ‘weighting’ of codes or categories (i.e. the number of interviews that the code/category appeared in). The intention is to use ‘plain English’ terms to describe the frequency of occurrence. For example the term ‘around half’ is used to describe 50% plus or minus one interview, and ‘nearly all’ is used to describe 100% minus one or two interviews.	549	<h4>Nearly all means ALL with one or two exceptions.</h4><p><strong>Rodgers and Cooper, 06 – </strong>professor of counseling at Strathclyde University (Brian and Mick, “Proposed Scoring Scheme for Qualitative Thematic Analysis”, www.strath.ac.uk/Departments/counsunit/docs/art_QTA.doc)</p><p>Drawing on the work of psychotherapy researchers Robert Elliott, Clara Hill and colleagues, the following scheme has been proposed for the write up of qualitative thematic analysis when describing the ‘weighting’ of codes or categories (i.e. the number of interviews that the code/category appeared in). <u><mark>The intention is to use ‘plain English’ terms to describe the frequency of occurrence. For example</u></mark> the term ‘<u><mark>around half’ is used to describe 50%</u></mark> plus or minus one interview, and <u>‘<mark>nearly all’ is used to describe 100% minus one or two</mark> </u>interviews.</p>	null	null	1nc – T	429,521	122	17,120	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	565,421	N	Gsu	3	Wake Forest Clifford-Villa	Watson	vs Stem cells aff 1NC T "nearly all" midterms DA visas CP heg bad case 2NC heg bad case 1NR case T 2NR heg bad case	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,814	Or b) Aff’s necessary but not sufficient – cyberwarefare, treaties, drones, and human rights are all alt causes to credibility	Greenwald 12	Glen Greenwald 12, 1/25, http://www.salon.com/2012/06/25/collapsing_u_s_credibility/	Op-Eds warn of the precipitous decline of American cred on human rights and peace ushered in by Obama The first is from Columbia Professor Glenny, who explains the significance of cyberwarfare by introducing Stuxnet America has severely undermined its moral and political credibility Obama opposes any treaties to regulate all of this America’s maiden use of this new form of warfare “could enable other countries to justify their own attacks Jimmy Carter describes the record of , the current President Revelations that top officials are targeting people to be assassinated abroad including American citizens are disturbing proof of how far our nation’s violation of human rights has extended Recent legislation has made legal the president’s right to detain a person indefinitely on suspicion of affiliation with terrorist organizations vague power that can be abused This law violates freedom of expression These policies clearly affect American foreign policy Top intelligence officials, affirm that the great escalation in drone attacks has turned aggrieved families toward terrorist organizations America’s violation of international human rights abets our enemies and alienates our friends when it comes to the human rights violations they can actually do something about they are largely silent	Op-Eds warn of the precipitous decline of American credi cyberwarfare America has severely undermined its credibility Obama opposes any treaties to regulate America’s maiden use of this new form of warfare “could enable other countries, to justify their own attacks the great escalation in drone attacks has turned aggrieved families toward terrorist organizations, America’s violation of international human rights abets our enemies and alienates our friend	Two Op-Eds in The New York Times this morning both warn of the precipitous decline of American credibility on matters of human rights and peace ushered in by the Obama presidency. Taken together, they explain much of why I’ve been writing what I’ve been writing over the last three years. The first is from Columbia Professor and cyber expert Misha Glenny, who explains the significance of the first ever deployment of cyberwarfare — by the U.S. (first under Bush and accelerated under Obama), along with Israel, against Iran: THE decision by the United States and Israel to develop and then deploy the Stuxnet computer worm against an Iranian nuclear facility late in George W. Bush’s presidency marked a significant and dangerous turning point in the gradual militarization of the Internet. Washington has begun to cross the Rubicon. If it continues, contemporary warfare will change fundamentally as we move into hazardous and uncharted territory. It is one thing to write viruses and lock them away safely for future use should circumstances dictate it. It is quite another to deploy them in peacetime. Stuxnet has effectively fired the starting gun in a new arms race that is very likely to lead to the spread of similar and still more powerful offensive cyberweaponry across the Internet. Unlike nuclear or chemical weapons, however, countries are developing cyberweapons outside any regulatory framework. . . . Stuxnet was originally deployed with the specific aim of infecting the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in Iran. This required sneaking a memory stick into the plant to introduce the virus to its private and secure “offline” network. But despite Natanz’s isolation, Stuxnet somehow escaped into the cyberwild, eventually affecting hundreds of thousands of systems worldwide. This is one of the frightening dangers of an uncontrolled arms race in cyberspace; once released, virus developers generally lose control of their inventions, which will inevitably seek out and attack the networks of innocent parties. Moreover, all countries that possess an offensive cyber capability will be tempted to use it now that the first shot has been fired. . . . The United States has long been a commendable leader in combating the spread of malicious computer code, known as malware, that pranksters, criminals, intelligence services and terrorist organizations have been using to further their own ends. But by introducing such pernicious viruses as Stuxnet and Flame, America has severely undermined its moral and political credibility. He also explains that the Obama administration opposes any treaties to regulate all of this in part because it “might undermine its presumed superiority in the field of cyberweaponry and robotics,” and because it claims Russia and China (but not, of course, the U.S.) would attempt to exploit such treaties to control the Internet. In case anyone thinks he’s being melodramatic in his warnings, the original New York Times article by David Sanger that confirmed U.S. responsibility for the cyber attack included this passage: “Mr. Obama, according to participants in the many Situation Room meetings on Olympic Games, was acutely aware that with every attack he was pushing the United States into new territory, much as his predecessors had with the first use of atomic weapons in the 1940s, of intercontinental missiles in the 1950s and of drones in the past decade.” It also explained that America’s maiden use of this new form of warfare “could enable other countries, terrorists or hackers to justify their own attacks.” The second is from former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, an actually meritorious Nobel Peace Prize winner, who describes the record of his fellow Nobel laureate, the current President, in an Op-Ed entitled “A Cruel and Unusual Record“: Revelations that top officials are targeting people to be assassinated abroad, including American citizens, are only the most recent, disturbing proof of how far our nation’s violation of human rights has extended. This development began after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and has been sanctioned and escalated by bipartisan executive and legislative actions, without dissent from the general public. As a result, our country can no longer speak with moral authority on these critical issues. . . . . It is disturbing that, instead of strengthening these principles, our government’s counterterrorism policies are now clearly violating at least 10 of the [Declaration on Human Rights'] 30 articles, including the prohibition against “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Recent legislation has made legal the president’s right to detain a person indefinitely on suspicion of affiliation with terrorist organizations or “associated forces,” a broad, vague power that can be abused without meaningful oversight from the courts or Congress (the law is currently being blocked by a federal judge). This law violates the right to freedom of expression and to be presumed innocent until proved guilty, two other rights enshrined in the declaration. In addition to American citizens’ being targeted for assassination or indefinite detention, recent laws have canceled the restraints in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to allow unprecedented violations of our rights to privacy through warrantless wiretapping and government mining of our electronic communications. . . . Despite an arbitrary rule that any man killed by drones is declared an enemy terrorist, the death of nearby innocent women and children is accepted as inevitable. After more than 30 airstrikes on civilian homes this year in Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai has demanded that such attacks end, but the practice continues in areas of Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen that are not in any war zone. We don’t know how many hundreds of innocent civilians have been killed in these attacks, each one approved by the highest authorities in Washington. This would have been unthinkable in previous times. These policies clearly affect American foreign policy. Top intelligence and military officials, as well as rights defenders in targeted areas, affirm that the great escalation in drone attacks has turned aggrieved families toward terrorist organizations, aroused civilian populations against us and permitted repressive governments to cite such actions to justify their own despotic behavior. . . . At a time when popular revolutions are sweeping the globe, the United States should be strengthening, not weakening, basic rules of law and principles of justice enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But instead of making the world safer, America’s violation of international human rights abets our enemies and alienates our friends. One can reasonably object to Carter’s Op-Ed on the ground that it romanticizes a non-existent American past (systematic human rights abuses are hardly a new development in the post-9/11 world), but what cannot be reasonably disputed is the trend he denounces. Note that the most egregious examples he cites — assassinating U.S. citizens without due process, civilian-killing drone attacks, the indefinite detention provisions of the NDAA — had some genesis under Bush but are hallmarks of Obama policy (his other example, the rapid erosion of constraints on government domestic surveillance, took place under both, with the full support of Obama). It’s a remarkably scathing denunciation of the record of his own political party and its current leader. Many American pundits and foreign policy experts love to depict themselves as crusaders for human rights, but it almost always takes the form of condemning other governments, never their own. There’s no end to self-styled U.S. human rights moralizers who will oh-so-bravely (and inconsequentially) write one screed after the next about the oppressive acts of Syria, or Russia, or China, or Iran (the targets of their wrath are not just foreign governments, but usually ones serving the role as Current Enemy of the U.S. Government). But when it comes to the human rights violations they can actually do something about — the ones committed (or enabled) by their own government: the government for which they vote and to which they pay taxes and over which they are supposed to act as adversarial watchdogs — they are largely silent. They prefer the cheap, easy, self-satisfying and pointless sermons (look over there at how terrible that foreign country is) to the much harder and more purposeful opposition to their own government’s abuses (American commentators who devote substantial attention to the human rights abuses of other nations but the bulk of their time on their own government’s are commendable rarities). As Noam Chomsky perfectly explained when asked why he focuses more of his time and energy on the human rights abuses of the U.S. and its allies than other countries: My own concern is primarily the terror and violence carried out by my own state, for two reasons. For one thing, because it happens to be the larger component of international violence. But also for a much more important reason than that; namely, I can do something about it. So even if the U.S. was responsible for 2 percent of the violence in the world instead of the majority of it, it would be that 2 percent I would be primarily responsible for. And that is a simple ethical judgment. That is, the ethical value of one’s actions depends on their anticipated and predictable consequences. It is very easy to denounce the atrocities of someone else. That has about as much ethical value as denouncing atrocities that took place in the 18th century. Condemning the abusive acts of other countries while ignoring or sanctioning those of one’s own government is indeed easy. It’s cost-free. It’s inconsequential. It’s career-advancing (using purported human rights concerns to bash America’s Enemies converts one into an eager, useful instrument of U.S. policy and a perpetuator of D.C. orthodoxy). And, most of all, it’s self-affirming (those people over there are really bad, but not us, and by railing against them I show what a good and concerned person I am). That’s precisely why the prime dogma in U.S. political and media discourse on foreign policy is that serious human rights violations (along with Terrorism) are something that non-Westerners do, not the West (and certainly not the U.S.). What these two Op-Eds today demonstrate is that not only is this false, but the U.S. continues to be a key pioneer in these abuses. It’s easy to distinguish American pundits and experts with a genuine commitment to human rights from those who feign concern by the extent to which they work against their own government’s conduct.	10,734	<h4>Or b) Aff’s necessary but not sufficient – cyberwarefare, treaties, drones, and human rights are all alt causes to credibility </h4><p>Glen <strong>Greenwald 12</strong>, 1/25, http://www.salon.com/2012/06/25/collapsing_u_s_credibility/</p><p>Two <u><mark>Op-Eds</u></mark> in The New York Times this morning both <u><mark>warn of the precipitous decline of American cred</u>i</mark>bility <u>on</u> matters of <u>human rights and peace ushered in by</u> the <u>Obama</u> presidency. Taken together, they explain much of why I’ve been writing what I’ve been writing over the last three years. <u>The first is from Columbia Professor</u> and cyber expert Misha <u>Glenny, who explains the significance of</u> the first ever deployment of <u><mark>cyberwarfare</u></mark> — by the U.S. (first under Bush and accelerated under Obama), along with Israel, against Iran: THE decision by the United States and Israel to develop and then deploy the Stuxnet computer worm against an Iranian nuclear facility late in George W. Bush’s presidency marked a significant and dangerous turning point in the gradual militarization of the Internet. Washington has begun to cross the Rubicon. If it continues, contemporary warfare will change fundamentally as we move into hazardous and uncharted territory. It is one thing to write viruses and lock them away safely for future use should circumstances dictate it. It is quite another to deploy them in peacetime. Stuxnet has effectively fired the starting gun in a new arms race that is very likely to lead to the spread of similar and still more powerful offensive cyberweaponry across the Internet. Unlike nuclear or chemical weapons, however, countries are developing cyberweapons outside any regulatory framework. . . . Stuxnet was originally deployed with the specific aim of infecting the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in Iran. This required sneaking a memory stick into the plant to introduce the virus to its private and secure “offline” network. But despite Natanz’s isolation, Stuxnet somehow escaped into the cyberwild, eventually affecting hundreds of thousands of systems worldwide. This is one of the frightening dangers of an uncontrolled arms race in cyberspace; once released, virus developers generally lose control of their inventions, which will inevitably seek out and attack the networks of innocent parties. Moreover, all countries that possess an offensive cyber capability will be tempted to use it now that the first shot has been fired. . . . The United States has long been a commendable leader in combating the spread of malicious computer code, known as malware, that pranksters, criminals, intelligence services and terrorist organizations have been using to further their own ends. But <u>by introducing</u> such pernicious viruses as <u>Stuxnet </u>and Flame, <u><strong><mark>America has severely undermined its</mark> moral and political <mark>credibility</u></strong></mark>. He also explains that the <u><mark>Obama</u></mark> administration <u><mark>opposes any treaties to regulate</mark> all of this</u> in part because it “might undermine its presumed superiority in the field of cyberweaponry and robotics,” and because it claims Russia and China (but not, of course, the U.S.) would attempt to exploit such treaties to control the Internet. In case anyone thinks he’s being melodramatic in his warnings, the original New York Times article by David Sanger that confirmed U.S. responsibility for the cyber attack included this passage: “Mr. Obama, according to participants in the many Situation Room meetings on Olympic Games, was acutely aware that with every attack he was pushing the United States into new territory, much as his predecessors had with the first use of atomic weapons in the 1940s, of intercontinental missiles in the 1950s and of drones in the past decade.” It also explained that <u><mark>America’s maiden use of this new form of warfare “could enable other countries</u>,</mark> terrorists or hackers <u><mark>to justify their own attacks</u></mark>.” The second is from former U.S. President <u>Jimmy Carter</u>, an actually meritorious Nobel Peace Prize winner, who <u>describes the record of</u> his fellow Nobel laureate<u>, the current President</u>, in an Op-Ed entitled “A Cruel and Unusual Record“: <u>Revelations that top officials are targeting people to be assassinated abroad</u>, <u>including American citizens</u>, <u>are</u> only the most recent, <u>disturbing proof of how far our nation’s violation of human rights has extended</u>. This development began after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and has been sanctioned and escalated by bipartisan executive and legislative actions, without dissent from the general public. As a result, our country can no longer speak with moral authority on these critical issues. . . . . It is disturbing that, instead of strengthening these principles, our government’s counterterrorism policies are now clearly violating at least 10 of the [Declaration on Human Rights'] 30 articles, including the prohibition against “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” <u>Recent legislation has made legal the president’s right to detain a person indefinitely on suspicion of affiliation with terrorist organizations</u> or “associated forces,” a broad, <u>vague power that can be abused</u> without meaningful oversight from the courts or Congress (the law is currently being blocked by a federal judge). <u>This law violates</u> the right to <u>freedom of expression</u> and to be presumed innocent until proved guilty, two other rights enshrined in the declaration. In addition to American citizens’ being targeted for assassination or indefinite detention, recent laws have canceled the restraints in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to allow unprecedented violations of our rights to privacy through warrantless wiretapping and government mining of our electronic communications. . . . Despite an arbitrary rule that any man killed by drones is declared an enemy terrorist, the death of nearby innocent women and children is accepted as inevitable. After more than 30 airstrikes on civilian homes this year in Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai has demanded that such attacks end, but the practice continues in areas of Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen that are not in any war zone. We don’t know how many hundreds of innocent civilians have been killed in these attacks, each one approved by the highest authorities in Washington. This would have been unthinkable in previous times. <u><strong>These policies clearly affect American foreign policy</u></strong>. <u>Top intelligence</u> and military <u>officials,</u> as well as rights defenders in targeted areas, <u>affirm that <mark>the great escalation in drone attacks has turned aggrieved families toward terrorist organizations</u>,</mark> aroused civilian populations against us and permitted repressive governments to cite such actions to justify their own despotic behavior. . . . At a time when popular revolutions are sweeping the globe, the United States should be strengthening, not weakening, basic rules of law and principles of justice enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But instead of making the world safer, <u><mark>America’s violation of international human rights abets our enemies and alienates our friend</mark>s</u>. One can reasonably object to Carter’s Op-Ed on the ground that it romanticizes a non-existent American past (systematic human rights abuses are hardly a new development in the post-9/11 world), but what cannot be reasonably disputed is the trend he denounces. Note that the most egregious examples he cites — assassinating U.S. citizens without due process, civilian-killing drone attacks, the indefinite detention provisions of the NDAA — had some genesis under Bush but are hallmarks of Obama policy (his other example, the rapid erosion of constraints on government domestic surveillance, took place under both, with the full support of Obama). It’s a remarkably scathing denunciation of the record of his own political party and its current leader. Many American pundits and foreign policy experts love to depict themselves as crusaders for human rights, but it almost always takes the form of condemning other governments, never their own. There’s no end to self-styled U.S. human rights moralizers who will oh-so-bravely (and inconsequentially) write one screed after the next about the oppressive acts of Syria, or Russia, or China, or Iran (the targets of their wrath are not just foreign governments, but usually ones serving the role as Current Enemy of the U.S. Government). But <u>when it comes to the human rights violations they can actually do something about</u> — the ones committed (or enabled) by their own government: the government for which they vote and to which they pay taxes and over which they are supposed to act as adversarial watchdogs — <u>they are largely silent</u>. They prefer the cheap, easy, self-satisfying and pointless sermons (look over there at how terrible that foreign country is) to the much harder and more purposeful opposition to their own government’s abuses (American commentators who devote substantial attention to the human rights abuses of other nations but the bulk of their time on their own government’s<strong> are commendable rarities). As Noam Chomsky perfectly explained when asked why he focuses more of his time and energy on the human rights abuses of the U.S. and its allies than other countries: My own concern is primarily the terror and violence carried out by my own state, for two reasons. For one thing, because it happens to be the larger component of international violence. But also for a much more important reason than that; namely, I can do something about it. So even if the U.S. was responsible for 2 percent of the violence in the world instead of the majority of it, it would be that 2 percent I would be primarily responsible for. And that is a simple ethical judgment. That is, the ethical value of one’s actions depends on their anticipated and predictable consequences. It is very easy to denounce the atrocities of someone else. That has about as much ethical value as denouncing atrocities that took place in the 18th century. Condemning the abusive acts of other countries while ignoring or sanctioning those of one’s own government is indeed easy. It’s cost-free. It’s inconsequential. It’s career-advancing (using purported human rights concerns to bash America’s Enemies converts one into an eager, useful instrument of U.S. policy and a perpetuator of D.C. orthodoxy). And, most of all, it’s self-affirming (those people over there are really bad, but not us, and by railing against them I show what a good and concerned person I am). That’s precisely why the prime dogma in U.S. political and media discourse on foreign policy is that serious human rights violations (along with Terrorism) are something that non-Westerners do, not the West (and certainly not the U.S.). What these two Op-Eds today demonstrate is that not only is this false, but the U.S. continues to be a key pioneer in these abuses. It’s easy to distinguish American pundits and experts with a genuine commitment to human rights from those who feign concern by the extent to which they work against their own government’s conduct.</p></strong>	null	1nc	2	280,249	2	17,115	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	565,263	N	Wake	8	Georgia Boyce-Feinberg	Markoff	AG politics fed cp (2nr) treaties da (2nr) ban marihuana cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,815	AND – legalization is removing ALL criminal penalties against – including sub-areas	De MARNEFFE 12 Professor of Philosophy, School of Historical, Philosophical, and Religious Studies - Arizona State University	De MARNEFFE 12 Professor of Philosophy, School of Historical, Philosophical, and Religious Studies - Arizona State University [Peter de Marneffe, Vice Laws and Self-Sovereignty, Criminal Law and Philosophy, 18 May 2012]	drugs are criminalized when there are criminal penalties Drugs are legalized when there are no criminal penalties for manufacturing, selling, or possessing Drugs are not legalized when there are criminal penalties for manufacturing or possessing prostitution is criminalized when there are criminal penalties Prostitution is legalized when there are no criminal penalties for operating a business and no penalties for acting as a paid agent for sexual services and no penalties for purchasing these services Prostitution is not legalized when the government imposes penalties for operating a business, or for working or for paying Because in Sweden there are criminal penalties for the purchase but not for the sale the sale of sex is not legalized	drugs are criminalized when there are criminal penalties Drugs are legalized when there are no criminal penalties for manufacturing, selling, or possessing prostitution is criminalized when there are criminal penalties	I will say that drugs are criminalized when there are criminal penalties for using drugs or for possessing small quantities of them. Drugs are decriminalized, then, when there are no criminal penalties for using drugs or for possessing small quantities of them. Drugs are legalized when there are no criminal penalties for manufacturing, selling, or possessing large quantities of drugs. Drugs are not legalized when there are criminal penalties for manufacturing, selling, or possessing large quantities of drugs. Observe that during National Prohibition there were criminal penalties for the manufacture, sale and transportation of alcohol, but not for drinking or possessing alcohol. So although National Prohibition was a form of drug nonlegalization, it was not a form drug criminalization. Likewise I will say that prostitution is criminalized when there are criminal penalties for the sale of sexual services. Prostitution is decriminalized when there are no criminal penalties for the sale of sexual services. Prostitution is legalized when there are no criminal penalties for operating a sex business, such as a brothel or escort service, and no criminal penalties for acting as a paid agent for sexual services, and no penalties for purchasing these services from anyone above the age of sexual consent and legal employment. Prostitution is not legalized when the government imposes criminal penalties for operating a sex business, or for working as a paid agent for sex work, or for paying someone above the age of sexual consent and legal employment for sex.1 Footnote: 1 Because in Sweden there are criminal penalties for the purchase of sex, but not for the sale of sex, one might say that although the sale of sex is decriminalized in Sweden, it is not legalized.	1,778	<h4>AND – legalization is removing ALL criminal penalties against – including sub-areas</h4><p><strong>De MARNEFFE 12 Professor of Philosophy, School of Historical, Philosophical, and Religious Studies - Arizona State University</strong> [Peter de Marneffe, Vice Laws and Self-Sovereignty, Criminal Law and Philosophy, 18 May 2012]</p><p>I will say that <u><mark>drugs are criminalized when there are criminal penalties</u></mark> for using drugs or for possessing small quantities of them. Drugs are decriminalized, then, when there are no criminal penalties for using drugs or for possessing small quantities of them. <u><mark>Drugs are legalized when there are no criminal penalties</u> <u>for <strong>manufacturing, selling, or possessing</u></strong></mark> large quantities of drugs. <u>Drugs are not legalized when there are criminal penalties</u> <u>for manufacturing</u>, selling, <u>or possessing</u> large quantities of drugs. Observe that during National Prohibition there were criminal penalties for the manufacture, sale and transportation of alcohol, but not for drinking or possessing alcohol. So although National Prohibition was a form of drug nonlegalization, it was not a form drug criminalization.</p><p>Likewise I will say that <u><mark>prostitution is criminalized when there are criminal penalties</u></mark> for the sale of sexual services. Prostitution is decriminalized when there are no criminal penalties for the sale of sexual services. <u>Prostitution is legalized when there are <strong>no criminal penalties </strong>for operating a</u> sex <u>business</u>, such as a brothel or escort service, <u>and no</u> criminal <u>penalties for acting as a paid agent for sexual services</u>, <u>and no penalties for purchasing these services</u> from anyone above the age of sexual consent and legal employment. <u>Prostitution is <strong>not legalized</u></strong> <u>when the government imposes</u> criminal <u>penalties for</u> <u>operating a</u> sex <u>business, or for working</u> as a paid agent for sex work, <u>or for paying</u> someone above the age of sexual consent and legal employment for sex.1</p><p>Footnote:</p><p>1 <u>Because in Sweden there are criminal penalties for the purchase</u> of sex, <u>but not for the sale</u> of sex, one might say that although <u>the sale of sex is</u> decriminalized in Sweden, it is <u><strong>not legalized</u></strong>.</p>	null	null	1nc – T	431,184	7	17,120	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	565,421	N	Gsu	3	Wake Forest Clifford-Villa	Watson	vs Stem cells aff 1NC T "nearly all" midterms DA visas CP heg bad case 2NC heg bad case 1NR case T 2NR heg bad case	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,816	Distinguishing solves their courts advantage – doesn’t legalize	LAMOND 04 University Lecturer in Legal Philosophy and the Felix Frankfurter Fellow in Law, Balliol College	LAMOND 04 University Lecturer in Legal Philosophy and the Felix Frankfurter Fellow in Law, Balliol College [Grant Lamond, , “Precedent as Decision” Draft for Analytical Legal Philosophy Conference, April, http://www.law.nyu.edu/newscalendars/2003_2004/legalphilosophy/lamond.pdf#search=%22overrule%20distinguish%20Llewellyn%20precedent%20thirteen%20list%22]	Distinguishing is the practice whereby later courts cite some difference between the facts of the precedent case and the facts of the later case to explain why they are not following the precedent. A later case may be a straightforward case but the later court may decline to reach the result on the basis that there is some feature in the later case, not present in the earlier case, which provides a good reason not to reach the result distinguishing	Distinguishing is the practice whereby courts cite some difference between the facts of the precedent case and later case to explain why they are not following the precedent. A later case may be a straightforward case but the court may decline to reach the result on the basis that there is some feature which provides a good reason not to reach the result	From this perspective it is easy to see why distinguishing has been thought to be the most difficult feature of the common law doctrine of precedent to reconcile with the conventional view of rationes as rules.13 Distinguishing is the practice whereby later courts cite some difference between the facts of the precedent case and the facts of the later case to explain why they are not following the precedent. A later case may clearly fall within the scope of the earlier ratio, i.e. it may be a straightforward case of {J, K, L}, but the later court may decline to reach the result C on the basis that there is some feature in the later case, not present in the earlier case, which provides a good reason not to reach the result C. For example when a former member of a violent criminal organisation sought to rely on the defence of duress to a criminal charge under English law, it was held that the defence was not available because the defendant had voluntarily exposed himself to the risk of such threats, despite the earlier formulations of the defence mentioning no such restriction on the availability of the defence.14 The existence of distinguishing raises two problems for the conventional view of precedent. The first is whether it is compatible with the idea that rationes are rules (in the robust way akin to statutes). The second is whether there is a satisfactory rationale for the practice from a rule-based perspective.	1,438	<h4>Distinguishing solves their courts advantage – doesn’t legalize</h4><p><strong>LAMOND 04 University Lecturer in Legal Philosophy and the Felix Frankfurter Fellow in Law, Balliol College</strong> [Grant Lamond, , “Precedent as Decision” Draft for Analytical Legal Philosophy Conference, April, http://www.law.nyu.edu/newscalendars/2003_2004/legalphilosophy/lamond.pdf#search=%22overrule%20distinguish%20Llewellyn%20precedent%20thirteen%20list%22]</p><p>From this perspective it is easy to see why <strong>distinguish</strong>ing has been thought to be the most difficult feature of the common law doctrine of precedent to reconcile with the conventional view of rationes as rules.13 <u><mark>Distinguishing is the practice whereby</mark> later <mark>courts cite some difference between the facts of the precedent case and</mark> the facts of the <mark>later case to explain why they are not following the precedent. A later case may</u></mark> clearly fall within the scope of the earlier ratio, i.e. it may <u><mark>be a straightforward case</u></mark> of {J, K, L}, <u><mark>but the</mark> later <mark>court may decline to reach the result</u></mark> C <u><mark>on the basis that there is some feature</mark> in the later case, not present in the earlier case, <mark>which provides a good reason not to reach the result</u></mark> C. For example when a former member of a violent criminal organisation sought to rely on the defence of duress to a criminal charge under English law, it was held that the defence was not available because the defendant had voluntarily exposed himself to the risk of such threats, despite the earlier formulations of the defence mentioning no such restriction on the availability of the defence.14 The existence of <u>distinguishing</u> raises two problems for the conventional view of precedent. The first is whether it is compatible with the idea that rationes are rules (in the robust way akin to statutes). The second is whether there is a satisfactory rationale for the practice from a rule-based perspective. </p>	1NC	null	1nc – CP	406,103	10	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,817	ISIS strategy fails inevitably --- the bill won’t solve	Weiner and Abay 11/5/14	Weiner and Abay 11/5/14 --- former spokesman for the White House National Drug Policy Office and the House Government Operations Committee AND senior international policy analyst for Robert Weiner Associates and Solutions for Change. (Robert and Joseph, “The myth of ‘training’ to fight ISIS”, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/nov/5/weiner-abay-the-myth-of-training-to-fight-isis/)//trepka	Now that we are “at war with ISIS,” Congress passed a resolution to allow the Pentagon to “train and equip” Syrian “moderate” rebel forces “Training” is a myth U.S. troops are devoted and committed to their mission after nine weeks of basic training, Yet we have been training in Afghanistan and Iraq for 13 years and spent more than $2 trillion on the wars. The issue is not training; it’s loyalty. According to Army Chief of Staff only two brigades out of 23 in Afghanistan are “combat ready They are unteachable, untrustable and untrainable When mortars were coming in, Afghan soldiers would be on the roof on their cellphones saying where to aim the “Iraqi army has turned and fled when Mosul and other major cities were attacked From 2012 to 2014, more than one in 10 U.S. deaths were attributed to Afghan Security Forces Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds, as well as local tribal divisions, have agendas based on centuries of conflict. We do not know who the “good” or “moderate” opposition really is regardless of “vetting.” The other big flaw in U.S. strategy is neglect of the illicit narcotics economy that funds terrorists throughout the Middle East. For the third consecutive year” in Afghanistan, “which has the world’s largest opium poppy cultivation, cultivation increased.” 50 percent of Afghan opiates are trafficked via Iran who hid bin Laden. The administration has refused to acknowledge the myth of “training” and the rise of the narco-state Following the same failed policy in Syria as we’ve carried out in Afghanistan and Iraq will only drag us deeper into Middle East conflicts caused by volatile and fractured ethnic and religious feuds.	Training” is a myth The issue is loyalty the “Iraqi army turned and fled when major cities were attacked.” Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds, as well as local tribal divisions, have agendas based on centuries of conflict. We do not know who the moderate” opposition really is The U.S. strategy neglect the illicit narcotics economy that funds terrorists For the third year cultivation increased Following the same failed policy as w carried out in Afghanistan and Iraq will only drag us into conflicts caused by ethnic and religious feuds	With Congress set to reconvene for the lame-duck session on Nov. 14, support for the Obama administration’s anti-ISIS strategy will be up. Now that we are “at war with ISIS,” Congress passed a resolution to allow the Pentagon to “train and equip” Syrian “moderate” rebel forces. At the White House, the United Nations, and in speeches to the nation, President Obama has emphasized “training” of Syrian, Afghanistan and Iraqi troops to “degrade and destroy” ISIS, also called the Islamic State, as well as al Qaeda, Khorasan and other terrorist groups. “Training” is a myth. U.S. troops are devoted and committed to their mission after nine weeks of basic training, or “boot camp.” Our men and women in uniform are ready to fight to the death as soon as they take the field. Yet we have been training in Afghanistan and Iraq for 13 years and spent more than $2 trillion on the wars. The issue is not training; it’s loyalty. According to Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno, as of late last year, only two brigades out of 23 in Afghanistan are “combat ready.” One U.S. trainer in Afghanistan told us, “They are unteachable, untrustable and untrainable. They can kill you at any time.” He added that they pretend they are loyal and then they are talking with their Taliban friends. He said, “When mortars were coming in, Afghan soldiers would be on the roof on their cellphones saying where to aim, “To the left, to the left.” Afghan and Iraqi soldiers have run from al Qaeda, the Taliban and advances of the Islamic State. NBC’s Andrea Mitchell stated that the “Iraqi army has turned and fled when Mosul and other major cities were attacked.” Even before ISIS attacked Mosul, 300 troops were deserting daily. From 2012 to 2014, more than one in 10 U.S. deaths were attributed to Afghan Security Forces, according to the Pentagon. On Sept. 22, three Afghan troops disappeared from a training site in the United States and were captured escaping to Canada. Afghan President Hamid Karzai slammed the United States in his farewell speech on Sept. 23, asserting that Afghan citizens “are the sacrificial lambs and victims,” and that the U.S. “failed to match its words with actions.” He refused to sign a Status of Forces Agreement allowing U.S. troops to stay because we insisted on “immunity” when the CIA and U.S. military murdered and tortured. The State Department reported as far back as 2006 that 75 percent of Iraqis would “feel safer if the U.S. and other foreign forces left.” Yet, on Sept. 30, we signed an agreement with new Afghan leaders to keep 10,000 troops in Afghanistan. The U.S. media have nearly ignored this development. Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds, as well as local tribal divisions, have agendas based on centuries of conflict. We do not know who the “good” or “moderate” opposition really is regardless of “vetting.” The family spokesman for beheaded journalist Steven Botloff, as well as Botloff’s mother, said on CNN that one of the Syrian “moderate” groups had sold Sotloff to the Islamic State for $50,000. ISIS then beheaded him. She said the “policymakers” are “ignoring” these facts. In a tape released to Al Jazeera in 2004, Osama bin Laden said it was “easy to provoke and bait this administration. All we have to do is to send two mujahedeen to the furthest point east to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al Qaeda, to make generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic and political losses without their achieving anything of note.” We have fallen for the trap set by ISIS. The other big flaw in U.S. strategy is neglect of the illicit narcotics economy that funds terrorists throughout the Middle East. On Sept. 15, the Presidential Determination on Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries stated: “For the third consecutive year” in Afghanistan, “which has the world’s largest opium poppy cultivation, cultivation increased.” Afghanistan has become a narco-state — the No. 1 world opium and heroin producer. Ninety percent of the world’s opium is produced there. According to the U.N., “50 percent of Afghan opiates are trafficked via Iran” — a nuclear nemesis — with roughly “35 percent via Pakistan”— our “ally” — whose bad guys hid bin Laden. The administration needs a “Plan Afghanistan” similar to Plan Colombia, which reduced terrorist attacks by 79 percent in that nation, the No. 1 coca-producing country in the world, by reducing coca cultivation. According to the president’s report, Afghanistan’s opium is grown in “less than 3 percent of farmable land; nearly 10 times more is devoted to wheat production.” The U.S. should be supporting the non-drug economy. The administration has refused to acknowledge the myth of “training” and the rise of the narco-state. Democratic Rep. John Conyers Jr. of Michigan, chairman of the Out of Iraq and Afghanistan Caucus, told us that the answer to fighting the Islamic State and terrorism is “international cooperation,” especially “from the region.” On that, the administration agrees and needs to make it happen in more than words. Following the same failed policy in Syria as we’ve carried out in Afghanistan and Iraq will only drag us deeper into Middle East conflicts caused by volatile and fractured ethnic and religious feuds.	5,238	<h4>ISIS strategy <u>fails inevitably </u>--- the bill won’t solve</h4><p><strong>Weiner and Abay 11/5/14 </strong>--- former spokesman for the White House National Drug Policy Office and the House Government Operations Committee AND senior international policy analyst for Robert Weiner Associates and Solutions for Change. (Robert and Joseph, “The myth of ‘training’ to fight ISIS”, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/nov/5/weiner-abay-the-myth-of-training-to-fight-isis/<u>)//trepka</p><p></u>With Congress set to reconvene for the lame-duck session on Nov. 14, support for the Obama administration’s anti-ISIS strategy will be up. <u>Now that we are “at war with ISIS,” Congress passed a resolution to allow the Pentagon to “train and equip” Syrian “moderate” rebel forces</u>. At the White House, the United Nations, and in speeches to the nation, President Obama has emphasized “training” of Syrian, Afghanistan and Iraqi troops to “degrade and destroy” ISIS, also called the Islamic State, as well as al Qaeda, Khorasan and other terrorist groups. <u>“<mark>Training” is a <strong>myth</u></strong></mark>. <u>U.S. troops are devoted and committed to their mission after nine weeks of basic training,</u> or “boot camp.” Our men and women in uniform are ready to fight to the death as soon as they take the field. <u>Yet we have been training in Afghanistan and Iraq for 13 years and spent more than $2 trillion on the wars. <mark>The issue is</mark> not training; it’s <strong><mark>loyalty</strong></mark>. According to Army Chief of Staff</u> Gen. Ray Odierno, as of late last year, <u>only two brigades out of 23 in Afghanistan are “combat ready</u>.” One U.S. trainer in Afghanistan told us, “<u>They are <strong>unteachable</strong>, <strong>untrustable</strong> and <strong>untrainable</u></strong>. They can kill you at any time.” He added that they pretend they are loyal and then they are talking with their Taliban friends. He said, “<u>When mortars were coming in, Afghan soldiers would be on the roof on their <strong>cellphones</strong> saying <strong>where to aim</u></strong>, “To the left, to the left.” Afghan and Iraqi soldiers have run from al Qaeda, the Taliban and advances of the Islamic State. NBC’s Andrea Mitchell stated that <u><mark>the “Iraqi army</mark> has <strong><mark>turned and fled </strong>when </mark>Mosul and other <mark>major cities were attacked</u>.”</mark> Even before ISIS attacked Mosul, 300 troops were deserting daily. <u>From 2012 to 2014, more than one in 10 U.S. deaths were attributed to <strong>Afghan Security Forces</u></strong>, according to the Pentagon. On Sept. 22, three Afghan troops disappeared from a training site in the United States and were captured escaping to Canada. Afghan President Hamid Karzai slammed the United States in his farewell speech on Sept. 23, asserting that Afghan citizens “are the sacrificial lambs and victims,” and that the U.S. “failed to match its words with actions.” He refused to sign a Status of Forces Agreement allowing U.S. troops to stay because we insisted on “immunity” when the CIA and U.S. military murdered and tortured. The State Department reported as far back as 2006 that 75 percent of Iraqis would “feel safer if the U.S. and other foreign forces left.” Yet, on Sept. 30, we signed an agreement with new Afghan leaders to keep 10,000 troops in Afghanistan. The U.S. media have nearly ignored this development. <u><mark>Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds, as well as local tribal divisions, have agendas based on <strong>centuries of conflict</strong>. We do not know who the</mark> “<strong>good</strong>” or “<strong><mark>moderate</strong>” opposition really is</mark> regardless of “vetting.”</u> The family spokesman for beheaded journalist Steven Botloff, as well as Botloff’s mother, said on CNN that one of the Syrian “moderate” groups had sold Sotloff to the Islamic State for $50,000. ISIS then beheaded him. She said the “policymakers” are “ignoring” these facts. In a tape released to Al Jazeera in 2004, Osama bin Laden said it was “easy to provoke and bait this administration. All we have to do is to send two mujahedeen to the furthest point east to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al Qaeda, to make generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic and political losses without their achieving anything of note.” We have fallen for the trap set by ISIS. <u><mark>The</mark> other big flaw in <mark>U.S. strategy</mark> is <mark>neglect</mark> of <mark>the <strong>illicit narcotics economy</strong> that <strong>funds terrorists</u></strong></mark> <u>throughout the Middle East.</u> On Sept. 15, the Presidential Determination on Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries stated: “<u><mark>For the third</mark> consecutive <mark>year</mark>” in Afghanistan, “which has the world’s largest opium poppy cultivation, <strong><mark>cultivation increased</strong></mark>.” </u>Afghanistan has become a narco-state — the No. 1 world opium and heroin producer. Ninety percent of the world’s opium is produced there. According to the U.N., “<u>50 percent of Afghan opiates are trafficked <strong>via Iran</u></strong>” — a nuclear nemesis — with roughly “35 percent via Pakistan”— our “ally” — <u>who</u>se bad guys <u><strong>hid bin Laden. </u></strong>The administration needs a “Plan Afghanistan” similar to Plan Colombia, which reduced terrorist attacks by 79 percent in that nation, the No. 1 coca-producing country in the world, by reducing coca cultivation. According to the president’s report, Afghanistan’s opium is grown in “less than 3 percent of farmable land; nearly 10 times more is devoted to wheat production.” The U.S. should be supporting the non-drug economy. <u>The administration has refused to acknowledge the myth of “training” and the rise of the narco-state</u>. Democratic Rep. John Conyers Jr. of Michigan, chairman of the Out of Iraq and Afghanistan Caucus, told us that the answer to fighting the Islamic State and terrorism is “international cooperation,” especially “from the region.” On that, the administration agrees and needs to make it happen in more than words. <u><mark>Following the same failed policy</mark> in Syria <mark>as w</mark>e’ve <mark>carried out in <strong>Afghanistan</strong> and <strong>Iraq</strong> will only drag us</mark> <strong>deeper</strong> <mark>into</mark> Middle East <mark>conflicts caused by</mark> volatile and fractured <strong><mark>ethnic</strong> and <strong>religious feuds</strong></mark>.</p></u>	null	1nc	2	431,186	1	17,115	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	565,263	N	Wake	8	Georgia Boyce-Feinberg	Markoff	AG politics fed cp (2nr) treaties da (2nr) ban marihuana cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,818	Topical affs must remove penalties on close to 100% of the area – the Aff only legalizes organs created through stem cells which kills neg ground and creates unpredictable aff advantages	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>Topical affs must remove penalties on close to 100% of the area – the Aff only legalizes organs created through stem cells which kills neg ground and creates unpredictable aff advantages</h4>	null	null	1nc – T	431,185	1	17,120	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	565,421	N	Gsu	3	Wake Forest Clifford-Villa	Watson	vs Stem cells aff 1NC T "nearly all" midterms DA visas CP heg bad case 2NC heg bad case 1NR case T 2NR heg bad case	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,819	New developments sure up grid stability	Kemp 12	Kemp 12 -- Reuters market analyst (John, 4/5/12, "COLUMN-Phasors and blackouts on the U.S. power grid: John Kemp," http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/column-smart-grid-idUSL6E8F59W120120405)	solution to grid instability is in fact a collaboration between the federal government and industry to improve grid monitoring and control by using modern communications technology. More than 500 phasor monitoring units have so far been installed across the transmission network to take precise measurements of frequency, voltage and other aspects of power quality on the grid up to 30 times per second Units are synchronised using GPS to enable users to build up a comprehensive real-time picture of how power is flowing across the grid systems being developed under NASPI provide a much finer level of detail that will reveal congestion and disturbances on individual transmission lines and particular zones so that grid managers can act quickly to restore balance or isolate failures	solution to grid instability is a collaboration between the federal government and industry to improve grid monitoring and control More than 500 phasor monitoring units have been installed across transmission to take precise measurements of frequency, voltage to 30 times per second Units are synchronised using GPS systems will reveal congestion and disturbances so that grid managers can act quickly to restore balance or isolate failures	The hoped-for solution to grid instability is something called the North American SynchroPhasor Initiative (NASPI), which sounds like something out of Star Trek but is in fact a collaboration between the federal government and industry to improve grid monitoring and control by using modern communications technology. More than 500 phasor monitoring units have so far been installed across the transmission network to take precise measurements of frequency, voltage and other aspects of power quality on the grid up to 30 times per second (compared with once every four seconds using conventional technology). Units are synchronised using GPS to enable users to build up a comprehensive real-time picture of how power is flowing across the grid (www.naspi.org/Home.aspx and). It is a scaled-up version of the monitoring system developed by the University of Tennessee's Power Information Technology Laboratory using inexpensive frequency monitors that plug into ordinary wall sockets. Tennessee's FNET project provides highly aggregated data to the public via its website. The systems being developed under NASPI provide a much finer level of detail that will reveal congestion and disturbances on individual transmission lines and particular zones so that grid managers can act quickly to restore balance or isolate failures ()	1,328	<h4>New developments sure up grid stability</h4><p><strong>Kemp 12</strong> -- Reuters market analyst (John, 4/5/12, "COLUMN-Phasors and blackouts on the U.S. power grid: John Kemp," http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/column-smart-grid-idUSL6E8F59W120120405)</p><p>The hoped-for <u><mark>solution to grid instability</u></mark> is something called the North American SynchroPhasor Initiative (NASPI), which sounds like something out of Star Trek but <u><mark>is</mark> in fact <mark>a collaboration between the federal government and industry to improve grid monitoring and control</mark> by using modern communications technology. <strong><mark>More than 500 phasor monitoring units</strong> have</mark> so far <mark>been installed across</mark> the <mark>transmission</mark> network <mark>to take <strong>precise measurements</strong> of frequency, voltage</mark> and other aspects of power quality on the grid up <mark>to <strong>30 times per second</u></strong></mark> (compared with once every four seconds using conventional technology). <u><mark>Units are synchronised using GPS</mark> to enable users to build up a comprehensive real-time picture of how power is flowing across the grid</u> (www.naspi.org/Home.aspx and). It is a scaled-up version of the monitoring system developed by the University of Tennessee's Power Information Technology Laboratory using inexpensive frequency monitors that plug into ordinary wall sockets. Tennessee's FNET project provides highly aggregated data to the public via its website. The <u><mark>systems</mark> being developed under NASPI provide a much finer level of detail that <mark>will reveal congestion and disturbances</mark> on individual transmission lines and particular zones <mark>so that grid managers can <strong>act quickly</strong> to <strong>restore balance</strong> or <strong>isolate failures</u></strong></mark> ()</p>	1NC	null	1nc – Illicit Markets	229,398	24	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,820	Their ev’s all hype --- ISIS has no capabilities and their impact’s empirically denied by al Qaeda	NBC 9/12/14	NBC 9/12/14 (“Petraeus: Don't Overestimate ISIS in Iraq”, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/petraeus-dont-overestimate-isis-iraq-n202011)//trepka	ISIS should not be overestimated and has “nowhere near” the strength of al Qaeda in Iraq at the height of the war in that country that ISIS in Syria is “far more complex.” it has nowhere near the roots, the numbers and the structure that al Qaeda in Iraq and the associated Sunni insurgents had when we launched the surge” in 2007.	ISIS has “nowhere near” the strength of al Qaeda in Iraq at the height ISIS is more complex it has nowhere near the roots numbers and structure al Qaeda had in 2007.	Gen. David Petraeus says ISIS should not be overestimated and has “nowhere near” the strength of al Qaeda in Iraq at the height of the war in that country. Petraeus, the former top American commander in Iraq and Afghanistan, told a crowd in Denver on Thursday that President Barack Obama made a compelling case for destroying ISIS militants. He said that the battle will probably outlast Obama’s administration, according to NBC affiliate KUSA. He also said that ISIS in Syria is “far more complex.” But in Iraq, the general said, ISIS “should not be overestimated in many respects — it has nowhere near the roots, the numbers and the structure that al Qaeda in Iraq and the associated Sunni insurgents had when we launched the surge” in 2007.	743	<h4>Their ev’s all <u>hype</u> --- ISIS has <u>no capabilities</u> and their impact’s <u>empirically denied</u> by <u>al Qaeda</h4><p></u><strong>NBC 9/12/14 </strong>(“Petraeus: Don't Overestimate ISIS in Iraq”, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/petraeus-dont-overestimate-isis-iraq-n202011<u>)//trepka</p><p></u>Gen. David Petraeus says <u><mark>ISIS</mark> should not be overestimated and <mark>has “<strong>nowhere near</strong>” the</u> <u>strength of al Qaeda in Iraq at the <strong>height</strong> </mark>of the war in that country</u>. Petraeus, the former top American commander in Iraq and Afghanistan, told a crowd in Denver on Thursday that President Barack Obama made a compelling case for destroying ISIS militants. He said that the battle will probably outlast Obama’s administration, according to NBC affiliate KUSA. He also said <u>that <mark>ISIS</mark> in Syria <mark>is</mark> “<strong>far <mark>more complex</mark>.” </u></strong>But in Iraq, the general said, ISIS “should not be overestimated in many respects — <u><mark>it has nowhere near the <strong>roots</strong></mark>, the <strong><mark>numbers</strong> and</mark> the <strong><mark>structure</strong></mark> that <mark>al Qaeda </mark>in Iraq and the associated Sunni insurgents <mark>had</mark> when we launched the surge” <mark>in 2007.</p></u></mark>	null	1nc	2	118,656	6	17,115	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	565,263	N	Wake	8	Georgia Boyce-Feinberg	Markoff	AG politics fed cp (2nr) treaties da (2nr) ban marihuana cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,821	VOTE NEG – allowing small changes crushes predictable limits – lets the aff only effect a few states, a few people, a few types of each area – it becomes unwieldy – while denying neg ground.	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>VOTE NEG – allowing small changes crushes predictable limits – lets the aff only effect a few states, a few people, a few types of each area – it becomes unwieldy – while denying neg ground.</h4>	null	null	1nc – T	431,187	1	17,120	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	565,421	N	Gsu	3	Wake Forest Clifford-Villa	Watson	vs Stem cells aff 1NC T "nearly all" midterms DA visas CP heg bad case 2NC heg bad case 1NR case T 2NR heg bad case	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,822	Anti-trafficking norms are effective now – organ bans are key	Capron 14	Capron 14 - University Professor and Scott H. Bice Chair in Healthcare Law, Policy, and Ethics, University of Southern California (Alexander, “SIX DECADES OF ORGAN DONATION AND THE CHALLENGES THAT SHIFTING THE UNITED STATES TO A MARKET SYSTEM WOULD CREATE AROUND THE WORLD” LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:25)	Global Efforts to Strengthen Legal Norms India was one of fifty countries that undertook to reform practices following the WHO’s Guiding Principles countries adopted laws to institute the anticommercial system a number of countries—including several that were centers for organ sales, such as Pakistan the Philippines, and Israel have adopted laws and regulations These changes have been strongly supported by other intergovernmental bodies all of which have addressed the phenomena of organ trafficking The Declaration of Istanbul has been endorsed by more than 120 medical organizations and governmental agencies Realizing that the declaration would not be self-implementing, its creators formed the Declaration of Istanbul Custodian Group DICG to encourage adherence to its principles and proposals The DICG have produced some notable results by calling on government officials to adopt and enforce prohibitions the DICG’s direct interventions to change professional practices have been even more successful academic recognition has been withheld from physicians who have carried out transplants with organs from executed prisoners medical journals have announced that they expect adherence to the Declaration of Istanbul by their authors	Global Efforts to Strengthen Norms fifty countries undertook reform following the Guiding Principles countries adopted laws to institute the anticommercial system Pakistan the Philippines, and Israel adopted regulations intergovernmental bodies addressed organ trafficking45 The D o I has been endorsed by more than 120 organizations and government agencies The DICG have produced notable results calling on officials to enforce prohibitions direct interventions have been successful	B. Global Efforts to Strengthen Ethical and Legal Norms India was one of about fifty countries that undertook to reform their practices following the approval of WHO’s original Guiding Principles. These countries adopted laws in the early 1990s to institute the anticommercial system recommended by WHO. Similarly, a number of countries—including several that were centers for organ sales, such as Pakistan and the Philippines, and other countries, such as Israel, that had sent large numbers of “transplant tourists” abroad to receive vended kidneys40—have adopted laws and regulations in the past few years that aim to put the 2010 WHO Guiding Principles into effect.41 These changes have been strongly supported by other intergovernmental bodies such as the United Nations,42 the Council of Europe,43 and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime,44 all of which have addressed the phenomena of organ trafficking45 and of people being trafficked for the removal of the organs.46 Equally significant in driving ethical and legal reforms have been the advocacy efforts of leaders in transplantation medicine. For example, the Transplantation Society (TTS) and the International Society of Nephrology organized a global summit on organ trafficking and transplant tourism in Istanbul in late April 2008, where a statement of professional opposition to organ markets, the Declaration of Istanbul, was adopted.47 The Declaration of Istanbul has since been endorsed by more than 120 medical organizations and governmental agencies.48 Realizing that the declaration would not be self-implementing, its creators formed the Declaration of Istanbul Custodian Group (DICG) in 2010 to encourage adherence to its principles and proposals.49 The DICG and TTS have produced some notable results by calling on government officials to adopt and enforce prohibitions, and by making clear to them the harm done to the standing of medical professionals who work in locales where organ sales are widespread.50 Furthermore, the DICG’s direct interventions to change professional practices have been even more successful.51 For instance, academic recognition has been withheld from physicians who have carried out transplants with organs from executed prisoners by barring the physicians’ abstracts from inclusion in international medical congresses.52 Many medical journals have announced that they expect adherence to the Declaration of Istanbul by their authors, just as they have long insisted that research conducted with human beings must adhere to the Declaration of Helsinki, first promulgated by the World Medical Association in 1964.53 In at least one instance, several articles were retracted from an academic journal when it was discovered that the work discussed involved living donors who had been paid to supply a kidney.54	2,808	<h4>Anti-trafficking norms are effective now – organ bans are key </h4><p><strong>Capron 14</strong> - University Professor and Scott H. Bice Chair in Healthcare Law, Policy, and Ethics, University of Southern California (Alexander, “SIX DECADES OF ORGAN DONATION AND THE CHALLENGES THAT SHIFTING THE UNITED STATES TO A MARKET SYSTEM WOULD CREATE AROUND THE WORLD” LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:25)</p><p>B. <u><strong><mark>Global Efforts to Strengthen</u></strong> </mark>Ethical and <u><strong>Legal <mark>Norms</p><p></strong></mark>India was one of</u> about <u><mark>fifty countries </mark>that <mark>undertook </mark>to <mark>reform</u> </mark>their <u>practices <mark>following the</u> </mark>approval of <u>WHO’s</u> original <u><mark>Guiding Principles</u></mark>. These <u><strong><mark>countries adopted laws</u></strong> </mark>in the early 1990s <u><strong><mark>to institute the anticommercial system</u></strong> </mark>recommended by WHO. Similarly, <u>a number of countries—including several that were centers for organ sales, such as <mark>Pakistan</u> </mark>and <u><mark>the Philippines, and</u> </mark>other countries, such as <u><mark>Israel</u></mark>, that had sent large numbers of “transplant tourists” abroad to receive vended kidneys40—<u><strong>have <mark>adopted </mark>laws and <mark>regulations</u></strong> </mark>in the past few years that aim to put the 2010 WHO Guiding Principles into effect.41 <u>These changes have been strongly supported by other <mark>intergovernmental bodies</u> </mark>such as the United Nations,42 the Council of Europe,43 and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime,44 <u>all of which have <mark>addressed </mark>the phenomena of <mark>organ trafficking</u>45 </mark>and of people being trafficked for the removal of the organs.46</p><p>Equally significant in driving ethical and legal reforms have been the advocacy efforts of leaders in transplantation medicine. For example, the Transplantation Society (TTS) and the International Society of Nephrology organized a global summit on organ trafficking and transplant tourism in Istanbul in late April 2008, where a statement of professional opposition to organ markets, the Declaration of Istanbul, was adopted.47 <u><strong><mark>The D</mark>eclaration <mark>o</mark>f <mark>I</mark>stanbul <mark>has</u></strong> </mark>since <u><strong><mark>been endorsed by more than 120 </mark>medical <mark>organizations and government</mark>al <mark>agencies</u></strong></mark>.48 <u>Realizing that the declaration would not be self-implementing, its creators formed the Declaration of Istanbul Custodian Group</u> (<u>DICG</u>) in 2010 <u><strong>to encourage adherence to its principles and proposals</u></strong>.49 <u><strong><mark>The DICG</u></strong> </mark>and TTS <u><strong><mark>have produced </mark>some <mark>notable results </mark>by <mark>calling on </mark>government <mark>officials to </mark>adopt and <mark>enforce prohibitions</u></strong></mark>, and by making clear to them the harm done to the standing of medical professionals who work in locales where organ sales are widespread.50 Furthermore, <u>the DICG’s <mark>direct interventions </mark>to change professional practices <strong><mark>have been </mark>even more <mark>successful</u></strong></mark>.51 For instance, <u>academic recognition has been withheld from physicians who have carried out transplants with organs from executed prisoners</u> by barring the physicians’ abstracts from inclusion in international medical congresses.52 Many <u>medical journals have announced that they expect adherence to the Declaration of Istanbul by their authors</u>, just as they have long insisted that research conducted with human beings must adhere to the Declaration of Helsinki, first promulgated by the World Medical Association in 1964.53 In at least one instance, several articles were retracted from an academic journal when it was discovered that the work discussed involved living donors who had been paid to supply a kidney.54</p>	1NC	null	1nc – Illicit Markets	431,188	13	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,823	Zero military response	Wilson 3-25	Wilson 3-25 [Scott Wilson and Will Englund (Washington Post); “Obama calls Russia a ‘regional power,’ warns of more sanctions if it expands military moves”; March 25, 2014; http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ousted-by-g-8-russia-says-it-will-remain-at-the-table-of-larger-g20/2014/03/25/2f70284a-b404-11e3-b899-20667de76985_story.html]	Obama acknowledged that Putin’s annexation of Crimea would be difficult to reverse, as Russia’s government announced plans to significantly increase forces on the Black Sea peninsula and create new ways to minimize the effect of sanctions Concluding a summit on nuclear security, Obama warned that broader Russian military intervention in neighboring countries would trigger further economic sanctions pointedly called Russia a “regional power” acting out of political isolation and economic uncertainty. Obama dismissed criticism that a perception of U.S. retreat abroad had prompted Putin to seize Crimea But Obama made clear that Western nations are not contemplating a military response, There’s no expectation that they will be dislodged by force we can bring to bear are the legal arguments, the diplomatic arguments, the political pressure, the economic sanctions that are already in place, to try to make sure that there’s a cost	Obama made clear that Western nations are not contemplating a military response what we can bring to bear are legal arguments diplomatic pressure economic sanctions to make sure there’s a cost	THE HAGUE — President Obama acknowledged Tuesday that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea would be difficult to reverse, as Russia’s government announced plans to significantly increase forces on the Black Sea peninsula and create new ways to minimize the effect of Western economic sanctions.¶ Concluding a summit here on nuclear security, Obama warned that broader Russian military intervention in neighboring countries would trigger further economic sanctions that would disrupt the global economy but hit Russia the hardest. He pointedly called Russia a “regional power” acting out of political isolation and economic uncertainty.¶ Obama dismissed criticism that a perception of U.S. retreat abroad had prompted Putin to seize the Crimea region this month, an act the United States and Europe have said was a violation of Ukrainian and international law. But Obama made clear that Western nations are not contemplating a military response, unless Putin pushes into NATO member nations on Russia’s western border.¶ “There’s no expectation that they will be dislodged by force,” Obama said in a news conference with Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, who hosted the Nuclear Security Summit. “And so what we can bring to bear are the legal arguments, the diplomatic arguments, the political pressure, the economic sanctions that are already in place, to try to make sure that there’s a cost to that process.”	1,427	<h4>Zero military response</h4><p><strong>Wilson 3-25</strong> [Scott Wilson and Will Englund (Washington Post); “Obama calls Russia a ‘regional power,’ warns of more sanctions if it expands military moves”; March 25, 2014; http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ousted-by-g-8-russia-says-it-will-remain-at-the-table-of-larger-g20/2014/03/25/2f70284a-b404-11e3-b899-20667de76985_story.html]</p><p>THE HAGUE — President <u>Obama acknowledged</u> Tuesday <u>that</u> Russian President Vladimir <u>Putin’s annexation of Crimea would be difficult to reverse, as Russia’s government announced plans to significantly increase forces on the Black Sea peninsula and create new ways to minimize the effect of</u> Western economic <u>sanctions</u>.¶ <u>Concluding a summit</u> here <u>on nuclear security, Obama warned that broader Russian military intervention in neighboring countries would trigger further economic sanctions </u>that would disrupt the global economy but hit Russia the hardest. He <u>pointedly called Russia a “regional power” acting out of political isolation and economic uncertainty.</u>¶<u> Obama dismissed criticism that a perception of U.S. retreat abroad had prompted Putin to seize</u> the <u>Crimea</u> region this month, an act the United States and Europe have said was a violation of Ukrainian and international law. <u><strong>But <mark>Obama made clear that Western nations are not contemplating a military response</mark>,</u></strong> unless Putin pushes into NATO member nations on Russia’s western border.¶ “<u><strong>There’s no expectation that they will be dislodged by force</u></strong>,” Obama said in a news conference with Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, who hosted the Nuclear Security Summit. “And so <mark>what <u><strong>we can bring to bear are</mark> the <mark>legal arguments</mark>, the <mark>diplomatic</mark> arguments, the political <mark>pressure</mark>, the <mark>economic sanctions</mark> that are already in place, <mark>to</mark> try to <mark>make sure</mark> that <mark>there’s a cost</u></mark> to that process.”</p></strong>	null	1nc	2	431,189	2	17,115	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	565,263	N	Wake	8	Georgia Boyce-Feinberg	Markoff	AG politics fed cp (2nr) treaties da (2nr) ban marihuana cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	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743,824	No impact – can’t use science as leverage	Marlow 12	Marlow 12 (Jeffrey, Graduate Student in Geological and Planetary Sciences – California Institute of Technology, “The Promise and Pitfalls of Science Diplomacy,” Wired, 12-11, http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/12/the-promise-and-pitfalls-of-science-diplomacy/)	This notion of science as a diplomatic tool is a constructive brand of international relations The philosophy is noble, but its a bit vague A recent assessment noted the challenge of following through on initiatives predicated on the personal credibility and contacts of the individual envoys Leveraging the networks of world-renowned scientists within the framework of a coherent policy of international relations is difficult particularly when funding is uncertain The trust of international partners requires a predictable political and financial environment	science as a diplomatic tool is noble, but vague A recent assessment noted the challenge of following through on initiatives predicated on the credibility and contacts of the individual envoys. Leveraging the networks of world-renowned scientists within the framework of a coherent policy of international relations is difficult, particularly when funding is uncertain. The trust of international partners requires a predictable political and financial environment.	This notion of science as a diplomatic tool – its use as an entry point to a recalcitrant society that simultaneously breaks down politically steeped preconceptions and offers tangible benefits – is a promising mode of development and a constructive brand of international relations. The Obama Administration understands the value of science diplomacy; last month, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the expansion of the Science Envoy program, appointing Barbara Schaal of Washington University in St. Louis, Bernard Amadei of the University of Colorado, and Susan Hockfield of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to the position. These prominent scientists represent the third class of envoys – the program began in 2009 and has sponsored visits to nearly 20 countries. The philosophy behind the envoy program is noble, but its current directive is a bit vague. As noted in the State Department’s official release, “the science envoys travel in their capacity as private citizens and advise the White House, the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. scientific community about the insights they gain from their travels and interactions.” A recent assessment of the program by envoy Elias Zerhouni noted the challenge of following through on initiatives predicated on the personal credibility and contacts of the individual envoys. Leveraging the networks of world-renowned scientists within the framework of a coherent policy of international relations is difficult, particularly when funding for longer-term projects is uncertain. The trust of international partners requires a predictable political and financial environment.	1,645	<h4>No impact – can’t use science as leverage</h4><p><strong>Marlow 12</strong> (Jeffrey, Graduate Student in Geological and Planetary Sciences – California Institute of Technology, “The Promise and Pitfalls of Science Diplomacy,” Wired, 12-11, http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/12/the-promise-and-pitfalls-of-science-diplomacy/)</p><p><u>This notion of <mark>science as a diplomatic tool</u></mark> – its use as an entry point to a recalcitrant society that simultaneously breaks down politically steeped preconceptions and offers tangible benefits – <u>is a</u> promising mode of development and a <u>constructive brand of international relations</u>. The Obama Administration understands the value of science diplomacy; last month, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the expansion of the Science Envoy program, appointing Barbara Schaal of Washington University in St. Louis, Bernard Amadei of the University of Colorado, and Susan Hockfield of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to the position. These prominent scientists represent the third class of envoys – the program began in 2009 and has sponsored visits to nearly 20 countries. <u>The philosophy</u> behind the envoy program <u><mark>is noble, but</mark> its</u> current directive is <u>a bit <mark>vague</u></mark>. As noted in the State Department’s official release, “the science envoys travel in their capacity as private citizens and advise the White House, the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. scientific community about the insights they gain from their travels and interactions.” <u><mark>A recent assessment</u></mark> of the program by envoy Elias Zerhouni <u><mark>noted the <strong>challenge</strong> of following through on initiatives predicated on the</mark> personal <mark>credibility and contacts of the individual envoys</u>. <u><strong>Leveraging the networks of world-renowned scientists within the framework of a coherent policy of international relations is difficult</u></strong>, <u>particularly when funding</u></mark> for longer-term projects <u><mark>is uncertain</u>. <u>The trust of international partners requires a predictable political and financial environment</u>.</p></mark>	null	null	1nc – Science Diplomacy	145,195	43	17,120	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	565,421	N	Gsu	3	Wake Forest Clifford-Villa	Watson	vs Stem cells aff 1NC T "nearly all" midterms DA visas CP heg bad case 2NC heg bad case 1NR case T 2NR heg bad case	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	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743,825	Plan destroys norms – US key to send a signal	Capron 14	Capron 14 - University Professor and Scott H. Bice Chair in Healthcare Law, Policy, and Ethics, University of Southern California (Alexander, “SIX DECADES OF ORGAN DONATION AND THE CHALLENGES THAT SHIFTING THE UNITED STATES TO A MARKET SYSTEM WOULD CREATE AROUND THE WORLD” LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:25)	National patterns of organ donation can be expected to be less diverse as countries move away from their former roles as buyers or sellers progress toward a world in which all countries where organ transplants are performed rely on donors, rather than paying living donors and the families has been halting, and the outcome is far from assured the changes that have occurred have been heavily influenced by the WHO and the Declaration of Istanbul, which rest on the consistent practice of noncommercial organ donation in the United States The hands-on advocacy has reinforced the efforts of local medical leaders to reform national laws and practices. But if systems that have so long embodied the ideal of voluntary, altruistic solidarity were to move to a “regulated market” with financial inducements for donation, the progress achieved in countries that have only recently come into line would reverse course in short order. The proponents of paying for organs in those countries would seize upon the change of policy in the West and say, “Clearly, no principle is offended by the sale and purchase of organs, for these enlightened countries allow it; and if these countries, which are rich and medically well equipped, find payment necessary to generate an adequate supply of organs, how can we succeed in any way other than by following their example?”	countries move away from their roles as buyers or sellers progress has been halting, and the outcome is far from assured the changes that have occurred have been heavily influenced by the WHO and the D o I which rest on the consistent practice of noncommercial organ donation in the United States The hands-on advocacy has reinforced the efforts to reform laws and practices But if systems that have embodied the ideal of altruistic solidarity move to a market the progress achieved in countries would reverse in short order proponents of paying for organs would seize upon the change of policy in the West and say, “Clearly, no principle is offended by sale for enlightened countries allow it we succeed by following their example	BENEFITS, COSTS, AND INTERCONNECTIONS National patterns of organ donation can be expected to be less diverse in the future, thanks to changes of the sort detailed above, as countries move away from their former roles as buyers or sellers in what has been called “the global traffic in human organs.”102 But progress toward a world in which all countries where organ transplants are performed103 rely on deceased and living-related donors, rather than paying living donors and the families of cadaver donors, has been halting, and the outcome is far from assured. To a large extent, the changes that have occurred have been heavily influenced by the WHO Guiding Principles and the Declaration of Istanbul, which, in turn, rest on the consistent practice of noncommercial organ donation in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe for more than four decades. The hands-on advocacy of WHO and DICG leaders has conveyed this vision to the responsible authorities in countries that have previously relied on paid organ vendors, and it has reinforced the efforts of local medical leaders to reform national laws and practices. But if systems that have so long embodied the ideal of voluntary, altruistic solidarity as their basis for organ donation and that have thereby attained the highest rates of donation were to move to a “regulated market” with financial inducements for donation, the progress achieved in countries that have only recently come into line with, or that have been moving in the direction of, the WHO Guiding Principles and the Declaration of Istanbul would reverse course in short order. The proponents of paying for organs in those countries— whether they be surgeons and brokers who stand to profit from transplant tourists or those who believe it is necessary to offer material expressions of gratitude in order to build a functioning organ-transplant system104—would seize upon the change of policy in the West and say, “Clearly, no principle is offended by the sale and purchase of organs, for these enlightened countries allow it; and if these countries, which are rich and medically well equipped, find payment necessary to generate an adequate supply of organs, how can we succeed in any way other than by following their example?”	2,260	<h4>Plan destroys norms – US key to send a signal </h4><p><strong>Capron 14</strong> - University Professor and Scott H. Bice Chair in Healthcare Law, Policy, and Ethics, University of Southern California (Alexander, “SIX DECADES OF ORGAN DONATION AND THE CHALLENGES THAT SHIFTING THE UNITED STATES TO A MARKET SYSTEM WOULD CREATE AROUND THE WORLD” LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:25)</p><p>BENEFITS, COSTS, AND INTERCONNECTIONS</p><p><u>National patterns of organ donation can be expected to be less diverse</u> in the future, thanks to changes of the sort detailed above, <u>as <mark>countries move away from their </mark>former <mark>roles as buyers or sellers</u> </mark>in what has been called “the global traffic in human organs.”102 But <u><mark>progress </mark>toward a world in which all countries where organ transplants are performed</u>103 <u>rely on</u> deceased and living-related <u>donors, rather than paying living donors and the families</u> of cadaver donors, <u><mark>has been halting, and <strong>the outcome is far from assured</u></strong></mark>. To a large extent, <u><mark>the changes that have occurred have been heavily influenced by the <strong>WHO</u></strong> </mark>Guiding Principles <u><strong><mark>and the D</mark>eclaration <mark>o</mark>f <mark>I</mark>stanbul, <mark>which</u></strong></mark>, in turn, <u><strong><mark>rest on the consistent practice of noncommercial organ donation in the United States</u></strong></mark>, Canada, and Western Europe for more than four decades. <u><mark>The hands-on advocacy</u> </mark>of WHO and DICG leaders has conveyed this vision to the responsible authorities in countries that have previously relied on paid organ vendors, and it <u><mark>has reinforced the efforts </mark>of local medical leaders <mark>to reform </mark>national <mark>laws and practices<strong></mark>.</p><p><mark>But if systems that have </mark>so long <mark>embodied the ideal of </mark>voluntary, <mark>altruistic solidarity</u></strong> </mark>as their basis for organ donation and that have thereby attained the highest rates of donation <u><strong>were to <mark>move to a </mark>“regulated <mark>market</mark>” with financial inducements for donation, <mark>the progress achieved in countries </mark>that have only recently come into line</u></strong> with, or that have been moving in the direction of, the WHO Guiding Principles and the Declaration of Istanbul <u><strong><mark>would reverse </mark>course <mark>in short order</strong></mark>. The <mark>proponents of paying for organs </mark>in those countries</u>— whether they be surgeons and brokers who stand to profit from transplant tourists or those who believe it is necessary to offer material expressions of gratitude in order to build a functioning organ-transplant system104—<u><mark>would seize upon the change of policy in the West and say, <strong>“Clearly, no principle is offended by </mark>the <mark>sale </mark>and purchase of organs, <mark>for </mark>these <mark>enlightened countries allow it</strong></mark>; and if these countries, which are rich and medically well equipped, find payment necessary to generate an adequate supply of organs, <strong>how can <mark>we succeed </mark>in any way other than <mark>by following their example</mark>?”</p></u></strong>	1NC	null	1nc – Illicit Markets	431,190	5	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,826	That won’t change – its Obama’s doctrine	Hirsh 3/20	Hirsh 3/20 [Michael Hirsh (Chief correspondent, National Journal); “In Ukraine as in Syria, the 'Obama Doctrine' Rules: No Military Aid: The president won't arm Ukraine or use U.S. forces despite Russian troop deployment.”; March 20, 2014; http://www.nationaljournal.com/white-house/in-ukraine-as-in-syria-the-obama-doctrine-rules-no-military-aid-20140320]	Obama said they are not considering arming the Ukrainian military even as they raised alarms about the deployment of Russian forces along that country's southern and eastern borders. It amounted to another iteration of a pattern observed in the two-year debate over Syria's civil war, an emerging "Obama doctrine" in which the only pressure tools contemplated in a crisis are nonlethal aid and economic sanctions. Nobody wants the outcome here to be a full-bore military conflict between Ukraine and Russia said a senior administration official although the president was "deeply concerned by the positioning of Russian forces in southern and eastern Ukraine At the same time the administration announced more sanctions the administration was "working actively to prepare additional sanctions." the U S has problems of its own Obama suffered a significant setback during the mid-term elections The Republican Party won the House the Obama administration has lost much of its room for maneuver and it faces an uphill battle getting Senate approval for key appointments and international treaties In turn international perceptions of the strength of Obama as president have diminished making it easier to ignore US entreaties and for others to take advantage of perceived American weakness Many question whether the prospects for American leadership have been fatally challenged and whether they can ever be repaired	Obama said they are not considering arming the Ukrainian military another iteration of an emerging "Obama doctrine" in which the only tools contemplated are nonlethal aid and economic sanctions Nobody wants a full-bore military conflict Obama suffered a significant setback during the mid-term elections the administration lost room for maneuver and faces an uphill battle getting key appointments and treaties In turn, international perceptions of the strength of Obama as president have diminished making it easier to take advantage of perceived American weakness Many question whether American leadership have been fatally challenged and whether they can ever be repaired	Obama administration officials said Thursday that they are not considering arming the Ukrainian military, ¶ even as they raised alarms about the deployment of Russian forces along that country's southern and eastern borders. It amounted to another iteration of a pattern observed in the two-year debate over Syria's civil war, an emerging "Obama doctrine" in which the only pressure tools contemplated in a crisis are nonlethal aid and economic sanctions.¶ "Nobody wants the outcome here to be a full-bore military conflict between Ukraine and Russia," said a senior administration official in a conference call with reporters, although he earlier indicated the president was "deeply concerned by the positioning of Russian forces in southern and eastern Ukraine."¶ At the same time the administration announced more sanctions against Russian officials, as well as a "crony bank" called Bank Rossiya, Russia's 17th largest, which is controlled by Yuri Kovalchuk, whom the Treasury Department calls the "personal banker" to Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior officials. One U.S. official promised that the administration was "working actively to prepare additional sanctions." 2. Republican House means international perception of Obama weakness is inevitable---they can’t overcome it Jones 11, Erik, Professor of European Studies, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center, April 2011, “European Security, Transatlantic Relations, and the Challenge to US Global Leadership,” in European Security and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, ed. Jones and Alcaro, online: http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/iairp_01.pdf Europe is not a rival to the United States and yet it is not obviously a supportive influence either. Meanwhile, the United States has problems of its own. The Obama administration suffered a significant setback during the mid-term elections held in November 2010. The Republican Party won control over the House of Representatives and it was able to reduce the Democratic majority in Senate. As a consequence, the Obama administration has lost much of its room for maneuver in domestic policy and it faces an uphill battle getting Senate approval for key appointments and international treaties (it managed to have the US-Russia New START treaty on the reduction of nuclear warheads approved by the Senate in the final days of the lame-duck session, though). In turn, international perceptions of the strength of Obama as president have diminished, making it easier for some to ignore US entreaties or blandishments and for others to take advantage of perceived American weakness or preoccupation at home. Many question whether the prospects for American leadership have been fatally challenged and some even wonder whether they can ever be repaired.5	2,811	<h4>That won’t change – its Obama’s doctrine</h4><p><strong>Hirsh 3/20</strong> [Michael Hirsh (Chief correspondent, National Journal); “In Ukraine as in Syria, the 'Obama Doctrine' Rules: No Military Aid: The president won't arm Ukraine or use U.S. forces despite Russian troop deployment.”; March 20, 2014; http://www.nationaljournal.com/white-house/in-ukraine-as-in-syria-the-obama-doctrine-rules-no-military-aid-20140320]</p><p><u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark> administration officials <u><strong><mark>said</u></strong></mark> Thursday that <u><strong><mark>they are not considering arming the Ukrainian military</u></strong></mark>, ¶ <u>even as they raised alarms about the deployment of Russian forces along that country's southern and eastern borders. It amounted to <mark>another iteration of</mark> a <strong>pattern</strong> observed in the two-year debate over Syria's civil war, <strong><mark>an emerging "Obama doctrine" in which the only</mark> pressure <mark>tools</mark> <mark>contemplated</mark> in a crisis <mark>are nonlethal aid and economic sanctions</mark>.</u></strong>¶<u><strong> </u></strong>"<u><strong><mark>Nobody wants</mark> the outcome here to be <mark>a full-bore military conflict</mark> between Ukraine and Russia</u></strong>," <u>said a senior administration official</u> in a conference call with reporters, <u>although</u> he earlier indicated <u>the president was "deeply concerned by the positioning of Russian forces in southern and eastern Ukraine</u>."¶ <u><strong>At the same time the administration announced more sanctions</u></strong> against Russian officials, as well as a "crony bank" called Bank Rossiya, Russia's 17th largest, which is controlled by Yuri Kovalchuk, whom the Treasury Department calls the "personal banker" to Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior officials. One U.S. official promised that <u><strong>the administration was "working actively to prepare additional sanctions."</p><p></u>2. Republican House means international perception of Obama weakness is inevitable---they can’t overcome it </p><p>Jones 11</strong>, Erik, Professor of European Studies, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center, April 2011, “European Security, Transatlantic Relations, and the Challenge to US Global Leadership,” in European Security and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, ed. Jones and Alcaro, online: http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/iairp_01.pdf</p><p>Europe is not a rival to the United States and yet it is not obviously a supportive influence either. Meanwhile, <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>has problems of its own</u>. The <u><mark>Obama</u></mark> administration <u><mark>suffered a</u> <u><strong>significant setback</u></strong> <u>during the mid-term elections</u></mark> held in November 2010. <u>The Republican Party won</u> control over <u>the House</u> of Representatives and it was able to reduce the Democratic majority in Senate. As a consequence, <u><mark>the</mark> Obama <mark>administration</mark> has</u> <u><strong><mark>lost</mark> much of its <mark>room for maneuver</u></strong></mark> in domestic policy <u><mark>and</mark> it <mark>faces an uphill battle getting</mark> Senate approval for</u> <u><strong><mark>key appointments and</mark> international <mark>treaties</u></strong></mark> (it managed to have the US-Russia New START treaty on the reduction of nuclear warheads approved by the Senate in the final days of the lame-duck session, though). <u><mark>In turn</u>, <u><strong>international perceptions of the strength of Obama as president</u></strong> <u>have diminished</u></mark>, <u><mark>making it easier</u></mark> for some <u>to</u> <u><strong>ignore US entreaties</u></strong> or blandishments <u>and for others <mark>to</u> <u><strong>take advantage of perceived American weakness</u></strong></mark> or preoccupation at home. <u><mark>Many question whether</mark> the prospects for <mark>American leadership have been</u> <u><strong>fatally challenged</u></strong> <u>and</u></mark> some even wonder <u><strong><mark>whether they can ever be repaired</u></strong></mark>.5</p>	null	1nc	2	302,106	2	17,115	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	565,263	N	Wake	8	Georgia Boyce-Feinberg	Markoff	AG politics fed cp (2nr) treaties da (2nr) ban marihuana cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,827	National security trump science diplomacy – makes international agreements impossible	Dickson 10	Dickson 10 (David, Director – SciDev.Net, “Science Diplomacy: Easier Said than Done,” SciDev.Net Blog, 6-24, http://scidevnet.wordpress.com/2010/06/24/science-diplomacy-easier-said-than-done/)	Others pointed to the broader issue of an apparent conflict between the supposed goal of science to promote international interests and the goal of diplomacy, namely to advance the national interests of the country that the diplomat is serving Reaching agreement on where that balance should lie is a major challenge Achieving that balance will be even harder Already it is clear from this meeting that science diplomacy is easier said than done	Others pointed to the issue of an apparent conflict between the goal of science to promote international interests, and the goal of diplomacy, to advance the national interests of the country that the diplomat is serving. Reaching agreement on where that balance should lie is a major challenge	Others pointed to the broader issue of an apparent conflict between the supposed goal of science to promote international interests, and the goal of diplomacy, namely to advance the national interests of the country that the diplomat is serving. There has been much talk of the need to find a way of achieving a balance between these two tendencies. Reaching agreement on where that balance should lie is a major challenge. Achieving that balance will be even harder. Already it is clear from this meeting that science diplomacy is easier said than done.	556	<h4>National security trump science diplomacy – makes international agreements impossible</h4><p><strong>Dickson 10</strong> (David, Director – SciDev.Net, “Science Diplomacy: Easier Said than Done,” SciDev.Net Blog, 6-24, http://scidevnet.wordpress.com/2010/06/24/science-diplomacy-easier-said-than-done/)</p><p><u><mark>Others pointed to the</mark> broader <mark>issue of an apparent conflict between the</mark> supposed <mark>goal of science to promote international interests</u>, <u>and the goal of diplomacy,</mark> namely <mark>to advance the national interests of the country that the diplomat is serving</u>.</mark> There has been much talk of the need to find a way of achieving a balance between these two tendencies. <u><strong><mark>Reaching agreement on where that balance should lie is a major challenge</u></strong></mark>. <u>Achieving that balance will be even harder</u>. <u>Already it is clear from this meeting that science diplomacy is easier said than done</u>.</p>	null	null	1nc – Science Diplomacy	145,198	24	17,120	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	565,421	N	Gsu	3	Wake Forest Clifford-Villa	Watson	vs Stem cells aff 1NC T "nearly all" midterms DA visas CP heg bad case 2NC heg bad case 1NR case T 2NR heg bad case	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,828	Anti-market norm spills-over – causes sex and labor trafficking	Caplan, 14	Caplan, 14 – NYU bioethics division head and professor [Arthur, Ph.D. in the history and philosophy of science from Columbia, Drs. William F and Virginia Connolly Mitty Professor and head of the Division of Bioethics at New York University Langone Medical Center in New York City, "Reply to Cherry," Contemporary Debates in Bioethics, google books, 70-71, accessed 8-18-14]	other nations will emulate our decision to permit markets. Those will have less choice and will simply be forced into kidney sales. When a market opens in the United States, it opens in far less lawful and far more impoverished parts of the globe our ability to combat trafficking for sex and slave labor depends on the moral position that incentives are wrong, it forced from many in other parts of the world	other nations emulate our decision to permit markets. Those will have less choice and will be forced into kidney sales. When a market opens in the United States, it opens in less lawful parts of the globe our ability to combat trafficking for sex and labor depends on the moral position that incentives are wrong	Even worse, many Annas will live in other nations who will emulate our decision to permit markets. Those Annas will have even less potential for choice and will simply be coerced, bullied, threatened, or forced into kidney sales. When a market opens in the United States, it also opens in far less lawful and far more impoverished parts of the globe. Since our ability to combat trafficking for organs, sex, baby sales, and indentured slave labor depends on the moral position that incentives in these domains are wrong, it is a bitter price to pay to allow a few Annas in the US to sell what will be forced from many, many more in other parts of the world.	657	<h4>Anti-market norm spills-over – causes sex and labor trafficking </h4><p><strong>Caplan, 14</strong> – NYU bioethics division head and professor [Arthur, Ph.D. in the history and philosophy of science from Columbia, Drs. William F and Virginia Connolly Mitty Professor and head of the Division of Bioethics at New York University Langone Medical Center in New York City, "Reply to Cherry," Contemporary Debates in Bioethics, google books, 70-71, accessed 8-18-14]</p><p>Even worse, many Annas will live in <u><mark>other nations</u> </mark>who <u>will <strong><mark>emulate our decision to permit markets</strong>. Those</u> </mark>Annas <u><mark>will have</u> </mark>even <u><mark>less</u> </mark>potential for <u><mark>choice and will </mark>simply <mark>be</u> </mark>coerced, bullied, threatened, or <u><strong><mark>forced </strong>into kidney sales<strong>. When a market opens in the United States, it</u></strong> </mark>also <u><strong><mark>opens in </mark>far <mark>less lawful </mark>and far more impoverished <mark>parts of the globe</u></strong></mark>. Since <u><strong><mark>our ability to combat trafficking for</u></strong> </mark>organs, <u><strong><mark>sex</u></strong></mark>, baby sales, <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong> </mark>indentured <u><strong>slave <mark>labor depends on the moral position that incentives</u></strong> </mark>in these domains <u><strong><mark>are wrong</strong></mark>, it</u> is a bitter price to pay to allow a few Annas in the US to sell what will be <u>forced from many</u>, many more <u>in other parts of the world</u>.</p>	1NC	null	1nc – Illicit Markets	431,191	9	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,829	Federalism model solves Ukraine war	Sasse and Hughes 2014	Sasse and Hughes 2014 (Gwendolyn Sasse and James Hughes 3-19-2014; Professorial Fellow, Nuffield College & University Reader in Comparative Politics at Oxford and London School of Economics political scientist “Building a federal Ukraine?” Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/19/building-a-federal-ukraine/)	The idea of a remaking of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction. Yatsenyuk reached out to Russophones announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution Senior U.S. administration officials have encouraged the Ukrainian leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines. Until recently the federal idea was an anathema The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state Overall, Ukraine’s elites have been moderate in their approach to state- and nation-building. Ukraine now needs to reestablish regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a hitherto informal mechanism. a state-wide comprehensive federalization or decentralization of more powers to all regions We could expect greater powers to include self-government reform process could be achieved by either a constitutional convention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. These steps would generate a democratic process of debate, dialogue and engagement, and hopefully reunite Ukrainian society. There would be international monitoring and advice This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the United States and the E.U. are not short of is experts on , federalism implementation depends critically on leadership The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected. In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict The Ukraine crisis offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of autonomy and federalism to peacefully manage conflict and enhance state stability federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward in Ukraine	U.S. officials have encouraged leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines Ukraine’s elites have been moderate Ukraine now needs regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a mechanism decentralization could be achieved by con con These steps would generate engagement, and reunite Ukrainian society. There would be international monitoring and advice. This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the U S are not short of is experts on federalism implementation depends critically on leadership Ukraine offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of federalism to peacefully manage conflict	The idea of a remaking of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction. On March 18, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk reached out to Russophones in the eastern and southern regions, announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution.” Senior U.S. administration officials have encouraged the Ukrainian leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines. On March 17, the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed the establishment of an international “support group” to manage the crisis. The list of items that Russia wants to be the basis for negotiation in Ukraine includes a new federal structure for Ukraine and the recognition of Russian as a second language. Until recently the federal idea was an anathema among the greater part of Ukraine’s political elite. As a constitutional form it was largely rejected in the 1990s, partly as a negative reaction to the experience of Soviet federalism, and partly from fear of its centrifugal potential for splitting the country along ethnolinguistic fault lines. The negative view of federalism as a destabilizing constitutional order in ethnically divided places was one that was not only perceived by elites as a lived experience in former communist federations, such as the Soviet Union successor states Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, but was also prevalent among scholars studying the collapse of communism. Federalism, or “ethnofederalism” as it was usually termed by political scientists, came to be seen as part of the problem of “mismanaging” ethnically diverse countries, not part of the solution. The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. Prospects for federalism in Ukraine The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state. The ideas of decentralization and federalism have undulated in the Ukrainian political discourse since the early 1990s. At first these ideas were an agenda of the western regions. Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil and the ‘national-democratic’ forces he represented promoted federalism as a means to protect the cultural distinctiveness of Western Ukraine. From the mid-to late 1990s, after independence, calls for autonomy or federalism came from the mainly Russophone south-east and Crimea, in particular in crisis situations like the Orange Revolution or the recent protests. Overall, Ukraine’s elites have been moderate in their approach to state- and nation-building. The first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, did not impose the state language on the southeast or Crimea as envisaged by the Ukrainian language law. The cautious approach continued after the 1994 presidential elections, which saw the “eastern” candidate Leonid Kuchma defeat Kravchuk. Although Kuchma ran on an election platform of more power to the regions and the recognition of the Russian language as an official language, he actually did not deliver on this agenda during his two terms in office between 1994 and 2004. The implicit consensus on balancing regional interests helped to preserve political stability during Ukraine’s transition, while also slowing economic reforms and adjustment. It was also evident in the ambivalent foreign policy approaches toward Russia and the European Union/ NATO. Ukraine now needs to reestablish this important regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a hitherto informal mechanism. There are two scenarios: First, there could be an asymmetric decentralization (that is, different agreements with different regions of the country). The new government in Kiev could engage in bilateral negotiations with individual regions in the south-east. Given the long-standing inability of Ukrainian elites to agree on the reform of center-regional relations as whole, a selective divide and rule strategy offers the advantages of fragmenting the “Russophone” bloc, and the potential for making deals on a case-by-case basis. Such a process would inevitably be largely non-transparent. This asymmetric federal approach, as with Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s approach to ethnic republics in Russia in the mid-1990s, might generate some short-term stability but it would also antagonize other regions and would be vulnerable to unraveling. Second, there could be a state-wide process of constitutional reform with the aim of either a comprehensive federalization, or decentralization of more powers to all regions. We could expect greater powers to include self-government in culture (including language and education), economic management, taxation, and policing. The election (rather than the presidential appointment) of regional governors is an important aspect of reform. This could be part of a synchronization of regional elections, including for governors, with early parliamentary elections. This reform process could be achieved by either a constitutional convention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. These steps would generate a democratic process of debate, dialogue and engagement, and hopefully reunite Ukrainian society. There would almost certainly be international monitoring and advice. This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the United States and the E.U. are not short of is legal experts on autonomy, federalism and minority rights. The implementation of constitutional reform depends critically on political will and leadership, and it would have to be championed by the new president to be elected in May. Constitutional reform will be on the agenda in any event, as Ukraine currently finds itself between constitutions (2004 and 2010) – and neither of these constitutions was clearly defined. Regional oligarchs will also have to be part of this process. Just how they are to be managed in the new Ukraine will be one of the greatest challenges facing the political elites. A properly functioning constitutional court that is insulated better against political interference is crucial for decentralization or federalization to be lasting. Opponents of federalization will no doubt raise the dangers of state disintegration and secession that might flow from such a constitutional reform process, especially given the Crimea example and the ongoing unrest in the southeast. The fact that Russia has indicated that greater autonomy is its own preferred outcome for Ukraine means, however, that there is now potential for substantive negotiations to move forward – assuming that Russia can switch off the Russian nationalist mobilization that it has so far been promoting. Reassessing the turn against “ethnofederalism” There was a turn against ethnofederalism in the 1990s that is ripe for a reassessment. Prior to the collapse of communism, there was a dominant paradigm that federalism as “self rule and shared rule” has positive “win-win” effects on promoting stable politics, and indeed, that it was the constitutional order (following the U.S. example) that was most conducive to democracy. Federalism was also seen as an essential constitutional design for the “politics of accommodation” in “deeply divided” or “plural” societies. From the early 1990s this paradigm was shaken by critiques which argued that federalism and autonomy more generally were highly destabilizing in ethnically divided states where the federal administrative architecture and boundaries were drawn to reflect ethnic divisions. The three socialist ethnofederations (USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) were used as cases to demonstrate this thesis. The argument is that the mode of socialist federalism, which while it was intrinsically a “sham” in terms of power distribution given that real power resided in communist parties, was flawed because of its “ethnic” structure leading to a mismanagement of nationalism. Consequently, a major cause of the collapse was the fact that the previously disempowered federal architecture became a platform for ethnonational mobilization. Socialist-era federal structures were essentially “subversive institutions”. The negative thesis was developed further in perspectives on the “frozen conflicts” to include even the prospect of autonomy and decentralization. In the Caucasus region, autonomy was seen as “a root cause of conflict” and a driver for secession. The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected. In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict. The Russian Federation is partially divided into ethnic units, and only Chechnya posed a serious threat to its territorial integrity. If one analyzes the case of Tatarstan and other ethnic republics of the Russian Federation the fact is that the asymmetric federalism and autonomy in key areas relating to self-rule, culture and, to some extent, economic power, was sufficient to quash secessionist demands and maintain state stability. That stability has persisted even when Putin recentralized powers from the ethnic republics to create his “power vertical” (see this recent Monkey Cage post). A similar argument holds with regard to conflict-prevention in Crimea in the 1990s (see the recent Monkey Cage post). The Ukraine crisis offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of autonomy and federalism to peacefully manage conflict and enhance state stability. It is of note that the federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward not just in Ukraine but in other places of conflict in the post-communist space, and beyond (for example, Iraq, Syria, and Libya).	9,859	<h4><strong>Federalism model solves Ukraine war </h4><p>Sasse and Hughes 2014</strong> (Gwendolyn Sasse and James Hughes 3-19-2014; Professorial Fellow, Nuffield College & University Reader in Comparative Politics at Oxford and London School of Economics political scientist “Building a federal Ukraine?” Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/19/building-a-federal-ukraine/)</p><p><u>The idea of a <strong>remaking</strong> of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction.</u> On March 18, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy <u>Yatsenyuk</u> <u>reached out to Russophones</u> in the eastern and southern regions, <u>announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution</u>.” <u>Senior <mark>U.S.</mark> administration <mark>officials have <strong>encouraged</strong></mark> the Ukrainian <mark>leadership to consider constitutional reform <strong>along federal lines</mark>. </u></strong>On March 17, the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed the establishment of an international “support group” to manage the crisis. The list of items that Russia wants to be the basis for negotiation in Ukraine includes a new federal structure for Ukraine and the recognition of Russian as a second language. <u>Until recently the federal idea was an anathema</u> among the greater part of Ukraine’s political elite. As a constitutional form it was largely rejected in the 1990s, partly as a negative reaction to the experience of Soviet federalism, and partly from fear of its centrifugal potential for splitting the country along ethnolinguistic fault lines. The negative view of federalism as a destabilizing constitutional order in ethnically divided places was one that was not only perceived by elites as a lived experience in former communist federations, such as the Soviet Union successor states Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, but was also prevalent among scholars studying the collapse of communism. Federalism, or “ethnofederalism” as it was usually termed by political scientists, came to be seen as part of the problem of “mismanaging” ethnically diverse countries, not part of the solution. <u>The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that <strong>now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism</strong>, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. </u>Prospects for federalism in Ukraine <u>The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state</u>. The ideas of decentralization and federalism have undulated in the Ukrainian political discourse since the early 1990s. At first these ideas were an agenda of the western regions. Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil and the ‘national-democratic’ forces he represented promoted federalism as a means to protect the cultural distinctiveness of Western Ukraine. From the mid-to late 1990s, after independence, calls for autonomy or federalism came from the mainly Russophone south-east and Crimea, in particular in crisis situations like the Orange Revolution or the recent protests. <u>Overall, <mark>Ukraine’s elites have been moderate</mark> in their approach to state- and nation-building. </u>The first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, did not impose the state language on the southeast or Crimea as envisaged by the Ukrainian language law. The cautious approach continued after the 1994 presidential elections, which saw the “eastern” candidate Leonid Kuchma defeat Kravchuk. Although Kuchma ran on an election platform of more power to the regions and the recognition of the Russian language as an official language, he actually did not deliver on this agenda during his two terms in office between 1994 and 2004. The implicit consensus on balancing regional interests helped to preserve political stability during Ukraine’s transition, while also slowing economic reforms and adjustment. It was also evident in the ambivalent foreign policy approaches toward Russia and the European Union/ NATO. <u><mark>Ukraine now needs</mark> to reestablish</u> this important <u><mark>regional balance</u> <u>and has the opportunity to <strong>formalize a </mark>hitherto informal <mark>mechanism</strong></mark>. </u>There are two scenarios: First, there could be an asymmetric decentralization (that is, different agreements with different regions of the country). The new government in Kiev could engage in bilateral negotiations with individual regions in the south-east. Given the long-standing inability of Ukrainian elites to agree on the reform of center-regional relations as whole, a selective divide and rule strategy offers the advantages of fragmenting the “Russophone” bloc, and the potential for making deals on a case-by-case basis. Such a process would inevitably be largely non-transparent. This asymmetric federal approach, as with Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s approach to ethnic republics in Russia in the mid-1990s, might generate some short-term stability but it would also antagonize other regions and would be vulnerable to unraveling. Second, there could be <u>a state-wide</u> process of constitutional reform with the aim of either a <u>comprehensive federalization</u>, <u>or <mark>decentralization</mark> of more powers to all regions</u>. <u>We could expect greater powers to include self-government</u> in culture (including language and education), economic management, taxation, and policing. The election (rather than the presidential appointment) of regional governors is an important aspect of reform. This could be part of a synchronization of regional elections, including for governors, with early parliamentary elections. This <u>reform process <mark>could be achieved by </mark>either a <mark>con</mark>stitutional <mark>con</mark>vention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. <mark>These steps would generate </mark>a democratic process of debate, dialogue and <mark>engagement, and</mark> hopefully <strong><mark>reunite Ukrainian society. There would</strong></mark> </u>almost certainly<u><strong><mark> be</strong> <strong>international monitoring and advice</u></strong>. <u>This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates and the E.U. <mark>are <strong>not short of is</strong></mark> </u>legal<u> <strong><mark>experts on</strong></mark> </u>autonomy<u>, <strong><mark>federalism</strong></mark> </u>and minority rights. The<u> <mark>implementation</mark> </u>of constitutional reform<u> <mark>depends critically on</mark> </u>political will and <u><mark>leadership</u></mark>, and it would have to be championed by the new president to be elected in May. Constitutional reform will be on the agenda in any event, as Ukraine currently finds itself between constitutions (2004 and 2010) – and neither of these constitutions was clearly defined. Regional oligarchs will also have to be part of this process. Just how they are to be managed in the new Ukraine will be one of the greatest challenges facing the political elites. A properly functioning constitutional court that is insulated better against political interference is crucial for decentralization or federalization to be lasting. Opponents of federalization will no doubt raise the dangers of state disintegration and secession that might flow from such a constitutional reform process, especially given the Crimea example and the ongoing unrest in the southeast. The fact that Russia has indicated that greater autonomy is its own preferred outcome for Ukraine means, however, that there is now potential for substantive negotiations to move forward – assuming that Russia can switch off the Russian nationalist mobilization that it has so far been promoting. Reassessing the turn against “ethnofederalism” There was a turn against ethnofederalism in the 1990s that is ripe for a reassessment. Prior to the collapse of communism, there was a dominant paradigm that federalism as “self rule and shared rule” has positive “win-win” effects on promoting stable politics, and indeed, that it was the constitutional order (following the U.S. example) that was most conducive to democracy. Federalism was also seen as an essential constitutional design for the “politics of accommodation” in “deeply divided” or “plural” societies. From the early 1990s this paradigm was shaken by critiques which argued that federalism and autonomy more generally were highly destabilizing in ethnically divided states where the federal administrative architecture and boundaries were drawn to reflect ethnic divisions. The three socialist ethnofederations (USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) were used as cases to demonstrate this thesis. The argument is that the mode of socialist federalism, which while it was intrinsically a “sham” in terms of power distribution given that real power resided in communist parties, was flawed because of its “ethnic” structure leading to a mismanagement of nationalism. Consequently, a major cause of the collapse was the fact that the previously disempowered federal architecture became a platform for ethnonational mobilization. Socialist-era federal structures were essentially “subversive institutions”. The negative thesis was developed further in perspectives on the “frozen conflicts” to include even the prospect of autonomy and decentralization. In the Caucasus region, autonomy was seen as “a root cause of conflict” and a driver for secession. <u>The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected.</u> <u>In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict</u>. The Russian Federation is partially divided into ethnic units, and only Chechnya posed a serious threat to its territorial integrity. If one analyzes the case of Tatarstan and other ethnic republics of the Russian Federation the fact is that the asymmetric federalism and autonomy in key areas relating to self-rule, culture and, to some extent, economic power, was sufficient to quash secessionist demands and maintain state stability. That stability has persisted even when Putin recentralized powers from the ethnic republics to create his “power vertical” (see this recent Monkey Cage post). A similar argument holds with regard to conflict-prevention in Crimea in the 1990s (see the recent Monkey Cage post). <u>The <mark>Ukraine</mark> crisis <mark>offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of</mark> autonomy and <mark>federalism to <strong>peacefully manage conflict</mark> </strong>and <strong>enhance state stability</u></strong>. It is of note that the <u>federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward</u> not just <u>in Ukraine</u> but in other places of conflict in the post-communist space, and beyond (for example, Iraq, Syria, and Libya).</p>	null	2nc	2	242,776	13	17,115	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	565,263	N	Wake	8	Georgia Boyce-Feinberg	Markoff	AG politics fed cp (2nr) treaties da (2nr) ban marihuana cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,830	Decline doesn’t cause war	Fettweis 11	Fettweis 11—Professor of Poli Sci @ Tulane University [Christopher J. Fettweis, “The Superpower as Superhero: Hubris in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Paper prepared for presentation at the 2011 meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, Seattle, WA, September 2011, pg. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1902154]	The most important pathological belief generated by hubris places the U S at the center of peace This belief is a variant of the “hegemonic stability theory,” It overestimates the capability of the U S to maintain stability No state can impose peace on determined belligerents The U.S. military can only police the system if the other members generally cooperate if other states the U S simply cannot force peace upon an unwilling ninety-five percent. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental.¶ the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be preventing them from doing so.71 Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we believe them to be. The ego-centric bias suggests that while it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. if U.S. security guarantees were the cause of the restraint then those countries would be demonstrating an amount of trust without precedent in history it is hard to think of When any capable members of an alliance virtually disarmed and allowed another member to protect their interests It seems more logical to suggest that the other members of NATO and Japan just do not share the same perception of threat that the U S does. If there was danger out there the grand strategies of the allies would be quite different in order for hegemonic stability logic to be an adequate explanation for restrained behavior, allied states must trust the hegemon can interpret correctly and consistently allies do not feel that the U S consistently demonstrates strategic wisdom hey often seem confused and unable to explain why we so often find it necessary to search of monsters to destroy. believers in hegemonic stability are rarely able to cite evidence to support their claims the empirical data we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and stability During the 90s the U S cut back on defense fairly substantially The world grew more peaceful while the U S cut its forces No defense establishments were enhanced no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred , this era of global peace proves to be inherently stable because normative evolution is typically unidirectional, then no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spending the only evidence regarding the relationship between U.S. power and international stability suggests that the two are unrelated the world can operate quite effectively without a global police Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone It requires a good deal of hubris for any actor to consider itself indispensable to world peace	the U S cannot force peace upon an unwilling ninety-five percent Stability may be coincidental the U S has not been eager to enforce rules. Even genocide has not been enough to inspire action most of the world is free to fight without U.S. involvement Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present ego-centric bias suggests they are certainly overestimating their importance if U.S. guarantees were the cause of restraint those countries would be demonstrating trust without precedent other members do not share the same perception of threat If there was danger the strategies of allies would be different in order for hegemonic stability logic to be adequate explanation allied states must trust the hegemon allies do not feel the U S demonstrates strategic wisdom the empirical data suggests there is little connection between U.S. activism and stability. During the 1990s The world grew more peaceful while the U S cut its forces peace proves to be inherently stable because normative evolution is typically unidirectional	The final and in some ways most important pathological belief generated by hubris places the United States at the center of the current era of relative peace. “All that stands between civility and genocide, order and mayhem,” explain Kaplan and Kristol, “is American power.”68 This belief is a variant of what is known as the “hegemonic stability theory,” which proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules.69 Although it was first developed to describe economic behavior, the theory has been applied more broadly, to explain the current proliferation of peace. At the height of Pax Romana between roughly 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring an unprecedented level of peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana in which no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could bring humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world, economic turmoil that could ripple throughout global financial markets. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to doubt that U.S hegemony is the primary cause of the current stability.¶ First, the hegemonic-stability argument shows the classic symptom of hubris: It overestimates the capability of the United States, in this case to maintain global stability. No state, no matter how strong, can impose peace on determined belligerents. The U.S. military may be the most imposing in the history of the world, but it can only police the system if the other members generally cooperate. Self-policing must occur, in other words; if other states had not decided on their own that their interests are best served by peace, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could keep them from fighting. The five percent of the world’s population that lives in the United States simply cannot force peace upon an unwilling ninety-five percent. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental.¶ In order for U.S. hegemony to be the explanation for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be preventing them from doing so.71 Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention, yet few choose to do so.¶ Second, it is worthwhile to repeat one of the most basic observations about misperception in international politics, one that is magnified by hubris: Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we believe them to be. The ego-centric bias suggests that while it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. At the very least, the United States is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is.¶ Third, if U.S. security guarantees were the primary cause of the restraint shown by the other great and potentially great powers, then those countries would be demonstrating an amount of trust in the intentions, judgment and wisdom of another that would be without precedent in international history. If the states of Europe and the Pacific Rim detected a good deal of danger in the system, relying entirely on the generosity and sagacity (or, perhaps the naiveté and gullibility) of Washington would be the height of strategic irresponsibility. Indeed it is hard to think of a similar choice: When have any capable members of an alliance virtually disarmed and allowed another member to protect their interests? It seems more logical to suggest that the other members of NATO and Japan just do not share the same perception of threat that the United States does. If there was danger out there, as so many in the U.S. national security community insist, then the grand strategies of the allies would be quite different. Even during the Cold War, U.S. allies were not always convinced that they could rely on U.S. security commitments. Extended deterrence was never entirely comforting; few Europeans could be sure that United States would indeed sacrifice New York for Hamburg. In the absence of the unifying Soviet threat, their trust in U.S. commitments for their defense would presumably be lower—if in fact that commitment was at all necessary outside of the most pessimistic works of fiction.¶ Furthermore, in order for hegemonic stability logic to be an adequate explanation for restrained behavior, allied states must not only be fully convinced of the intentions and capability of the hegemon to protect their interests; they must also trust that the hegemon can interpret those interests correctly and consistently. As discussed above, the allies do not feel that the United States consistently demonstrates the highest level of strategic wisdom. In fact, they often seem to look with confused eyes upon our behavior, and are unable to explain why we so often find it necessary to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. They will participate at times in our adventures, but minimally and reluctantly.¶ Finally, while believers in hegemonic stability as the primary explanation for the long peace have articulated a logic that some find compelling, they are rarely able to cite much evidence to support their claims. In fact, the limited empirical data we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on defense fairly substantially, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 that it did in 1990, which was a twenty-five percent reduction.72 To defense hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace,” argued Kristol and Kagan.”73 If global stability were unrelated to U.S. hegemony, however, one would not have expected an increase in conflict and violence.¶ The verdict from the last two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces.74 No state believed that its security was endangered by a less-capable U.S. military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No defense establishments were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred after the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped that spending back up. The two phenomena are unrelated.¶ These figures will not be enough to convince skeptics. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability, and one could also presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not be expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered.¶ However, two points deserve to be made. First, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, it would remain the case that stability can be maintained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if, as many suspect, this era of global peace proves to be inherently stable because normative evolution is typically unidirectional, then no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spending.75 Abandoning the mission to stabilize the world would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation.¶ Second, it is also worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then surely hegemonists would note that their expectations had been justified. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the relationship between U.S. power and international stability suggests that the two are unrelated. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.¶ It requires a good deal of hubris for any actor to consider itself indispensable to world peace. Far from collapsing into a whirlwind of chaos, the chances are high that the world would look much like it does now if the United States were to cease regarding itself as God’s gladiator on earth. The people of the United States would be a lot better off as well.	10,977	<h4>Decline doesn’t cause war</h4><p><strong>Fettweis 11</strong>—Professor of Poli Sci @ Tulane University [Christopher J. Fettweis, “The Superpower as Superhero: Hubris in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Paper prepared for presentation at the 2011 meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, Seattle, WA, September 2011, pg. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1902154]</p><p><u>The</u> final and in some ways <u>most important pathological belief generated by hubris places the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>at the center of </u>the current era of relative<u> peace</u>. “All that stands between civility and genocide, order and mayhem,” explain Kaplan and Kristol, “is American power.”68 <u>This belief is a variant of </u>what is known as <u>the “hegemonic stability theory,”</u> which proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules.69 Although it was first developed to describe economic behavior, the theory has been applied more broadly, to explain the current proliferation of peace. At the height of Pax Romana between roughly 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring an unprecedented level of peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana in which no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could bring humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world, economic turmoil that could ripple throughout global financial markets. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to doubt that U.S hegemony is the primary cause of the current stability.¶ First, the hegemonic-stability argument shows the classic symptom of hubris: <u>It</u> <u>overestimates the capability of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, in this case <u>to maintain</u> global<u> stability</u>. <u>No state</u>, no matter how strong,<u> can impose peace on determined belligerents</u>. <u><strong>The U.S. military</u></strong> may be the most imposing in the history of the world, but it <u><strong>can only police the system if the other members</strong> generally <strong>cooperate</u></strong>. Self-policing must occur, in other words; <u>if other states</u> had not decided on their own that their interests are best served by peace, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could keep them from fighting. The five percent of the world’s population that lives in <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u>simply <mark>cannot force peace upon an unwilling ninety-five percent</mark>. <mark>Stability </mark>and unipolarity <mark>may be </mark>simply <mark>coincidental</mark>.¶ </u>In order for U.S. hegemony to be the explanation for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, <u><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>has not been</mark> especially <mark>eager to enforce</mark> any particular <mark>rules</u>. <u>Even</mark> rather incontrovertible evidence of <mark>genocide has not been enough to inspire action</u></mark>. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. <u>Since <mark>most of the world </mark>today <mark>is free to fight without U.S. involvement</mark>, something else must be preventing them from doing so.71 <strong><mark>Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present</u></strong></mark>. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention, yet few choose to do so.¶ Second, it is worthwhile to repeat one of the most basic observations about misperception in international politics, one that is magnified by hubris: <u>Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we believe them to be. The <strong><mark>ego-centric bias</strong> suggests </mark>that while it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, <mark>they are </mark>almost <mark>certainly overestimating their </mark>own <mark>importance</mark>.</u> At the very least, the United States is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is.¶ Third, <u><mark>if U.S. </mark>security <mark>guarantees were the</u></mark> primary <u><mark>cause of </mark>the <mark>restraint</mark> </u>shown by the other great and potentially great powers, <u>then <mark>those countries would be demonstrating</mark> an amount of <strong><mark>trust</u></strong></mark> in the intentions, judgment and wisdom of another that would be <u><strong><mark>without precedent </mark>in</u></strong> international <u><strong>history</u></strong>. If the states of Europe and the Pacific Rim detected a good deal of danger in the system, relying entirely on the generosity and sagacity (or, perhaps the naiveté and gullibility) of Washington would be the height of strategic irresponsibility. Indeed <u>it is hard to think of</u> a similar choice: <u>When</u> have <u>any capable members of an alliance virtually disarmed and allowed another member to protect their interests</u>? <u>It seems more logical to suggest that</u> <u>the <mark>other members</mark> of NATO and Japan just <strong><mark>do not share the same perception of threat</strong> </mark>that the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>does. <mark>If there was danger</mark> out there</u>, as so many in the U.S. national security community insist, then <u><mark>the</mark> grand <mark>strategies of </mark>the <mark>allies would be</mark> quite <mark>different</u></mark>. Even during the Cold War, U.S. allies were not always convinced that they could rely on U.S. security commitments. Extended deterrence was never entirely comforting; few Europeans could be sure that United States would indeed sacrifice New York for Hamburg. In the absence of the unifying Soviet threat, their trust in U.S. commitments for their defense would presumably be lower—if in fact that commitment was at all necessary outside of the most pessimistic works of fiction.¶ Furthermore, <u><mark>in order for hegemonic stability logic to be </mark>an <mark>adequate explanation</mark> for restrained behavior, <mark>allied states</mark> </u>must not only be fully convinced of the intentions and capability of the hegemon to protect their interests; they <u><mark>must</u></mark> also <u><mark>trust</u></mark> that <u><mark>the hegemon</mark> can interpret</u> those interests <u>correctly and consistently</u>. As discussed above, the <u><mark>allies do not feel</mark> that <mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u>consistently <mark>demonstrates</u></mark> the highest level of <u><mark>strategic wisdom</u></mark>. In fact, t<u>hey often seem</u> to look with <u>confused</u> eyes upon our behavior, <u>and</u> are <u>unable to explain why we so often find it necessary to</u> go abroad in <u>search of monsters to destroy.</u> They will participate at times in our adventures, but minimally and reluctantly.¶ Finally, while <u>believers in hegemonic stability</u> as the primary explanation for the long peace have articulated a logic that some find compelling, they <u>are rarely able to cite</u> much<u> evidence to support their claims</u>. In fact, <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> limited <u><strong><mark>empirical data</strong></mark> we have <mark>suggests</mark> that <mark>there is little connection between</mark> the relative level of <mark>U.S. activism and</u></mark> international <u><mark>stability</u>. <u>During the</u> 19<u>90s</u></mark>, <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>cut back on defense fairly substantially</u>, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 that it did in 1990, which was a twenty-five percent reduction.72 To defense hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace,” argued Kristol and Kagan.”73 If global stability were unrelated to U.S. hegemony, however, one would not have expected an increase in conflict and violence.¶ The verdict from the last two decades is fairly plain: <u><mark>The world grew more peaceful while the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>cut its forces</u></mark>.74 No state believed that its security was endangered by a less-capable U.S. military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. <u><strong>No defense establishments were enhanced</u></strong> to address power vacuums;<u> <strong>no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred</u></strong> after the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped that spending back up. The two phenomena are unrelated.¶ These figures will not be enough to convince skeptics. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability, and one could also presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not be expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered.¶ However, two points deserve to be made. First, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, it would remain the case that stability can be maintained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if, as many suspect<u>, this era of global <mark>peace proves to be inherently stable because normative evolution is typically <strong>unidirectional</strong></mark>, then no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spending</u>.75 Abandoning the mission to stabilize the world would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation.¶ Second, it is also worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then surely hegemonists would note that their expectations had been justified. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, <u>the only evidence</u> we have <u>regarding the relationship between U.S. power and international stability suggests that <strong>the two are unrelated</u></strong>. Evidently the rest of<u> the world can operate quite effectively without</u> the presence of <u>a global police</u>man. <u>Those who think otherwise base their view on <strong>faith alone</u></strong>.¶ <u>It requires a good deal of hubris for any actor to consider itself indispensable to world peace</u>. Far from collapsing into a whirlwind of chaos, the chances are high that the world would look much like it does now if the United States were to cease regarding itself as God’s gladiator on earth. The people of the United States would be a lot better off as well.</p>	null	null	1nc – Science Diplomacy	159,993	33	17,120	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	565,421	N	Gsu	3	Wake Forest Clifford-Villa	Watson	vs Stem cells aff 1NC T "nearly all" midterms DA visas CP heg bad case 2NC heg bad case 1NR case T 2NR heg bad case	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,831	Sales for research are legal now	Korobkin 07	Korobkin 07, Russell Korobkin, Richard C. Maxwell Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law. "Buying and selling human tissues for stem cell research." Ariz. L. Rev. 49 (2007): 45.	The primary law relating to the sale of human tissues is NOTA NOTA’s reach is limited to organs “for use in human transplantation.”13 This language indicates that researchers may buy and donors may sell covered organs for research purposes without running afoul of the statute The UAGA prohibits the purchase or sale of body parts for use in transplantation or therapy but notably omits research purposes from this prohibition this statute also appears inapplicable to transactions of the type that might be relevant for obtaining raw materials for research neither of these statutes with national scope apply, under any conditions which are likely to be needed for research federal law criminalizes the sale of HIV-positive gametes which seems, by implication, to recognize the validity of purchases	null	The primary federal law relating to the purchase or sale of human tissues is the National Organ Transplant Act (“NOTA”). Enacted in 1984, NOTA specifically prohibits—on pain of fine or imprisonment—the buying or selling of human organs, which it defines to include the kidneys, liver, heart, lungs, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof, and any other human organ (or any subpart thereof, including that derived from a fetus).11 The inclusion in the statute’s scope of any “subpart” of any listed organ suggests that even a single skin cell, which conceivably could be used in therapeutic cloning, would fall under the prohibition on sales, however its scope does not encompass renewable tissues, including blood or sperm.12 More importantly, NOTA’s reach is limited, on its face, to organs “for use in human transplantation.”13 This language indicates that researchers may buy and donors may sell covered organs for research purposes without running afoul of the statute.14 The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (“UAGA”) is a state law, but its adoption in all 50 states15 gives it national scope. The UAGA provides that individuals may donate their entire bodies or “body parts” for transplantation, therapy, research, or education.16 The Act prohibits the purchase or sale of body parts for use in transplantation or therapy but notably omits research purposes from this prohibition.17 In addition, the sale prohibition applies only “if removal of the part is to occur after the death of the decedent” and so does not cover inter vivos transactions.18 For both reasons, this statute also appears inapplicable to transactions of the type that might be relevant for obtaining raw materials for use in stem cell research. Furthermore, neither of these statutes with national scope appears to apply, under any conditions, to gametes, which—especially ova—are likely to be needed in large numbers for stem cell research if the practice of therapeutic cloning becomes widespread. In fact, a federal law criminalizes the donation or sale of HIV-positive gametes,19 which seems, by implication, to recognize the validity of purchases involving uninfected gametes.	2,188	<h4>Sales for research are legal now</h4><p><strong>Korobkin 07</strong>, Russell Korobkin, Richard C. Maxwell Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law. "Buying and selling human tissues for stem cell research." Ariz. L. Rev. 49 (2007): 45. </p><p><u>The primary</u> federal <u>law relating to the</u> purchase or <u>sale of human tissues is</u> the National Organ Transplant Act (“<u>NOTA</u>”). Enacted in 1984, NOTA specifically prohibits—on pain of fine or imprisonment—the buying or selling of human organs, which it defines to include the kidneys, liver, heart, lungs, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof, and any other human organ (or any subpart thereof, including that derived from a fetus).11 The inclusion in the statute’s scope of any “subpart” of any listed organ suggests that even a single skin cell, which conceivably could be used in therapeutic cloning, would fall under the prohibition on sales, however its scope does not encompass renewable tissues, including blood or sperm.12 More importantly, <u><strong>NOTA’s reach is limited</u></strong>, on its face, <u><strong>to organs “for use in human transplantation.”13 This language indicates that researchers may buy and donors may sell covered organs for research purposes without running afoul of the statute</u></strong>.14</p><p>The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (“UAGA”) is a state law, but its adoption in all 50 states15 gives it national scope. <u>The UAGA</u> provides that individuals may donate their entire bodies or “body parts” for transplantation, therapy, research, or education.16 The Act <u>prohibits the purchase or sale of body parts for use in transplantation or therapy but <strong>notably omits research purposes from this prohibition</u></strong>.17 In addition, the sale prohibition applies only “if removal of the part is to occur after the death of the decedent” and so does not cover inter vivos transactions.18 For both reasons, <u>this statute also appears inapplicable to transactions of the type that might be relevant for obtaining raw materials for</u> use in stem cell <u>research</u>.</p><p>Furthermore, <u>neither of these statutes with national scope</u> appears to <u>apply, under any conditions</u>, to gametes, <u>which</u>—especially ova—<u>are likely to be needed</u> in large numbers <u>for</u> stem cell <u>research</u> if the practice of therapeutic cloning becomes widespread. In fact, a <u><strong>federal law criminalizes the</u></strong> donation or <u><strong>sale of HIV-positive gametes</u></strong>,19 <u><strong>which seems, by implication, to recognize the validity of purchases</u></strong> involving uninfected gametes.</p>	1NC	null	1nc – Property Rights	431,192	5	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,832	“Local buy-in” is a DA to the plan- Tax law 280E would force businesses to reorganize as 501-c-4s which have to focus on social welfare activities – the aff takes out this tax law and causes backlash from local governments which hurts the industry- 501c4 structure gets them on board- ONLY the CP solves	Leff 2014	Leff 2014 (Ben, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523, lexis)	current law permits marijuana sellers to avoid the impact of § 280E by operating as tax-exempt social welfare organizations federal tax law creates a strong incentive for marijuana sellers to do just that the incentive created in such a strange manner is good policy The use of federal tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is superior policy because it encourages "multi-jurisdictional" federalism. a dualist model state and national is too limited it is important to recognize that localities have conflicts with states conflicts between states that have liberalized marijuana laws and localities seeking to restrict or prohibit marijuana sales have become common in assessing the merits of any particular approach that the federal government could take it makes sense to take into account local stakeholders nonprofit social welfare organizations are more likely than for-profit operations to advance the interests of localities The IRS could make clear that this "minimum standards of acceptable conduct" standard is based on local standards it would be using federal law to intervene in marijuana policy, but only when state laws and local laws were in harmony the tax law would incentivize marijuana sales in communities that permitted such sales, and dis-incentivize such sales in communities that objected to them This could mitigate inter-jurisdictional conflict	current law permits marijuana sellers to avoid the impact of § 280E by operating as tax-exempt social welfare organizations. federal tax law creates a strong incentive for marijuana sellers to do just that. The use of federal tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is superior policy because it encourages "multi-jurisdictional" federalism a dualist model state and t national is too limited it is important to recognize that localitie ave conflicts with states, conflicts between states that have liberalized marijuana laws and localities seeking to restrict or prohibit marijuana sales have become common it makes sense to take into account local stakeholders nonprofit social welfare organizations are more likely than for-profit operations to advance the interests of localities the tax law would incentivize marijuana sales in communities that permitted such sales, and dis-incentivize such sales in communities that objected to them. This could mitigate inter-jurisdictional conflict	The previous Part argues that current law plausibly permits marijuana sellers to avoid the impact of § 280E by operating as tax-exempt social welfare organizations. If that is true, federal tax law creates a strong incentive for marijuana sellers to do just that. This incentive may well be no more than a historical oddity: an unintended consequence of the confluence of the creation of a type of tax-exempt organization that is unaffected by the public policy doctrine and the placement in the tax code [564] of a penalty for selling marijuana. But it is possible that the incentive created in such a strange manner is good policy. This Part explores that question: Does a tax incentive encouraging marijuana selling by social welfare organizations solve certain federalism issues better than other federal laws addressing the marijuana issue? The conflict between state and federal laws governing the marijuana industry presents a stark example of inter-jurisdictional conflict. The federal government has criminalized all sale and use of marijuana; a number of states have legalized marijuana for medical purposes; and, as of this year, Washington and Colorado have legalized marijuana for any purpose. This conflict creates a potentially extreme federalism problem. n188 Robert Mikos describes a "war" between the federal government and some states over marijuana policy. n189 The most predictable outcome of the war would be a victory for the federal government, given that the Constitution permits the federal government to preempt state law when acting within its authority, and the Supreme Court has held that regulating marijuana is within the federal government's authority. n190 However, Mikos argues that "the states - and not the federal government - have already won the war over medical marijuana," n191 largely because states have continued to legalize marijuana and public opinion is strongly behind them. n192 If the President wanted to use force to fight the war, he could direct the Department of Justice to criminally prosecute marijuana users or sellers to the full extent of federal law, presumably resulting in significant prison sentences for people who are behaving in ways sanctioned by their state governments. While there are practical constraints on the federal government's ability to prosecute marijuana sellers, n193 it [565] presumably could deter a lot of individual actors if it vigorously enforced the criminal law. Instead, the President appears to have tactically retreated from this inter-jurisdictional conflict, at least with respect to criminal enforcement of federal drug laws against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n194 As discussed above, the IRS has not participated in this retreat, and its current policy appears to be vigorous enforcement of § 280E against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. I argue that § 280E enforcement, coupled with recognition of tax-exempt status for properly operated marijuana sellers, provides the federal government with a superior resolution to its "war" with the states. Using tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is better policy than either returning to a policy of enforcing criminal penalties against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers or a policy of benign neglect of state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n195 The use of federal tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is superior policy because it encourages "multi-jurisdictional" federalism. Multiple scholars of federalism have pointed out that a dualist model of federalism, in which the goal is to allocate authority between or balance the interests of only two parties - a state government and the national government - is too limited. n196 Instead, it is important to recognize that localities may have inter-jurisdictional conflicts with their states, and the principles of federalism may apply with equal force to these sub-national, inter-jurisdictional conflicts, even if localities are not truly sovereign. n197 In the marijuana context, conflicts between states that have liberalized marijuana laws and localities seeking to restrict or prohibit marijuana sales have become common. n198 Therefore, in assessing the merits [*566] of any particular approach that the federal government could take to the question of how to influence national marijuana policy, it makes sense to take into account not just policy made at state level, but the interests of local stakeholders in each locality as well. How could this "multi-jurisdictional" federalism be advanced by an IRS policy of channeling marijuana sellers into nonprofit social welfare organizations? First, as discussed above, nonprofit social welfare organizations are more likely than for-profit operations to advance the interests of localities because of their commitment to social welfare purposes. To qualify as a social welfare organization, an organization would have to provide job training and employment opportunities for hard-to-employ members of the community. Providing these jobs has the potential to reduce the negative effects of illegal drug markets and thereby positively impact the neighborhood in which the organization operates. But perhaps as importantly, while I have argued that an intention to violate federal law should not prevent an organization from qualifying for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4), I have also argued that an intention to violate state or local laws should. Remember, the one piece of guidance from the IRS on the relationship between illegal activities and § 501(c)(4) status involved an organization whose intention was to violate local laws and ordinances by engaging in civil disobedience. The IRS argued that an organization that intended to disrupt the peace of a community could not advance the social welfare of that community because it intended to engage in activities that "violate the minimum standards of acceptable conduct necessary to the preservation of an orderly society." n199 The IRS could make clear that this "minimum standards of acceptable conduct" standard is based on local standards, and could thereby refuse to recognize the tax-exempt status of a social welfare organization that intended to sell marijuana contrary to local law. If that was the IRS's standard then it would be using federal law to intervene in marijuana policy, but only when state laws and local laws were in harmony. In effect, the tax law would incentivize marijuana sales in communities that permitted such sales, and dis-incentivize such sales in communities that objected to them. This type of "multi-jurisdictional" approach to a key federalism issue could mitigate inter-jurisdictional conflict, and would arm localities in their struggle for control over marijuana policy.	6,802	<h4><strong>“Local buy-in” is a DA to the plan- Tax law 280E would force businesses to reorganize as 501-c-4s which have to focus on social welfare activities – the aff takes out this tax law and causes backlash from local governments which hurts the industry- 501c4 structure gets them on board- ONLY the CP solves</h4><p>Leff 2014</strong> (Ben, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523, lexis)</p><p>The previous Part argues that <u><mark>current law</u></mark> plausibly <u><mark>permits</u> <u>marijuana sellers to avoid the impact of § 280E</u> <u>by operating as tax-exempt social welfare organizations</u>. </mark>If that is true, <u><strong><mark>federal tax law creates a strong incentive for marijuana sellers to do just that</u></strong>.</mark> This incentive may well be no more than a historical oddity: an unintended consequence of the confluence of the creation of a type of tax-exempt organization that is unaffected by the public policy doctrine and the placement in the tax code [564] of a penalty for selling marijuana. But it is possible that <u>the incentive created in such a strange manner <strong>is good policy</u></strong>. This Part explores that question: Does a tax incentive encouraging marijuana selling by social welfare organizations solve certain federalism issues better than other federal laws addressing the marijuana issue? The conflict between state and federal laws governing the marijuana industry presents a stark example of inter-jurisdictional conflict. The federal government has criminalized all sale and use of marijuana; a number of states have legalized marijuana for medical purposes; and, as of this year, Washington and Colorado have legalized marijuana for any purpose. This conflict creates a potentially extreme federalism problem. n188 Robert Mikos describes a "war" between the federal government and some states over marijuana policy. n189 The most predictable outcome of the war would be a victory for the federal government, given that the Constitution permits the federal government to preempt state law when acting within its authority, and the Supreme Court has held that regulating marijuana is within the federal government's authority. n190 However, Mikos argues that "the states - and not the federal government - have already won the war over medical marijuana," n191 largely because states have continued to legalize marijuana and public opinion is strongly behind them. n192 If the President wanted to use force to fight the war, he could direct the Department of Justice to criminally prosecute marijuana users or sellers to the full extent of federal law, presumably resulting in significant prison sentences for people who are behaving in ways sanctioned by their state governments. While there are practical constraints on the federal government's ability to prosecute marijuana sellers, n193 it [565] presumably could deter a lot of individual actors if it vigorously enforced the criminal law. Instead, the President appears to have tactically retreated from this inter-jurisdictional conflict, at least with respect to criminal enforcement of federal drug laws against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n194 As discussed above, the IRS has not participated in this retreat, and its current policy appears to be vigorous enforcement of § 280E against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. I argue that § 280E enforcement, coupled with recognition of tax-exempt status for properly operated marijuana sellers, provides the federal government with a superior resolution to its "war" with the states. Using tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is better policy than either returning to a policy of enforcing criminal penalties against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers or a policy of benign neglect of state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n195 <u><mark>The use of federal tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is superior policy because it <strong>encourages "multi-jurisdictional" federalism</mark>. </u></strong>Multiple scholars of federalism have pointed out that <u><mark>a dualist model</u></mark> of federalism, in which the goal is to allocate authority between or balance the interests of only two parties - a <u><mark>state</u></mark> government <u><mark>and</u> t</mark>he <u><mark>national</u> </mark>government - <u><mark>is too limited</u></mark>. n196 Instead, <u><mark>it is important to recognize that localitie</mark>s</u> may <u>h<mark>ave</u></mark> inter-jurisdictional <u><mark>conflicts</u> <u>with</u></mark> their <u><mark>states</u>,</mark> and the principles of federalism may apply with equal force to these sub-national, inter-jurisdictional conflicts, even if localities are not truly sovereign. n197 In the marijuana context, <u><strong><mark>conflicts between states that have liberalized marijuana laws and localities seeking to restrict or prohibit marijuana sales have become common</u></strong></mark>. n198 Therefore, <u>in assessing the merits</u> [*566] <u>of any particular approach that the federal government could take</u> to the question of how to influence national marijuana policy, <u><mark>it makes sense to take into account</u></mark> not just policy made at state level, but the interests of <u><mark>local stakeholders</u></mark> in each locality as well. How could this "multi-jurisdictional" federalism be advanced by an IRS policy of channeling marijuana sellers into nonprofit social welfare organizations? First, as discussed above, <u><mark>nonprofit social welfare organizations are more likely than for-profit operations to advance the interests of localities</u></mark> because of their commitment to social welfare purposes. To qualify as a social welfare organization, an organization would have to provide job training and employment opportunities for hard-to-employ members of the community. Providing these jobs has the potential to reduce the negative effects of illegal drug markets and thereby positively impact the neighborhood in which the organization operates. But perhaps as importantly, while I have argued that an intention to violate federal law should not prevent an organization from qualifying for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4), I have also argued that an intention to violate state or local laws should. Remember, the one piece of guidance from the IRS on the relationship between illegal activities and § 501(c)(4) status involved an organization whose intention was to violate local laws and ordinances by engaging in civil disobedience. The IRS argued that an organization that intended to disrupt the peace of a community could not advance the social welfare of that community because it intended to engage in activities that "violate the minimum standards of acceptable conduct necessary to the preservation of an orderly society." n199 <u>The IRS could make clear that this "minimum standards of acceptable conduct" standard is <strong>based on local standards</u></strong>, and could thereby refuse to recognize the tax-exempt status of a social welfare organization that intended to sell marijuana contrary to local law. If that was the IRS's standard then <u>it would be using federal law to intervene in marijuana policy, but only when state laws and local laws were in harmony</u>. In effect, <u><mark>the tax law would incentivize marijuana sales in communities that permitted such sales, and dis-incentivize such sales in communities that objected to them</u>. <u><strong>This</u></strong></mark> type of "multi-jurisdictional" approach to a key federalism issue <u><strong><mark>could mitigate inter-jurisdictional conflict</u></mark>, and would arm localities in their struggle for control over marijuana policy.</p></strong>	null	2nc	2NC Local DA	430,932	5	17,115	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	565,263	N	Wake	8	Georgia Boyce-Feinberg	Markoff	AG politics fed cp (2nr) treaties da (2nr) ban marihuana cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,833	Heg can’t deter conflict	Monteiro 11	Monteiro 11—Professor of Political Science at Yale University [Nuno P. Monteiro, “Why we (keep) fighting,” Foreign Policy, December 29, 2011, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/29/why_we_keep_fighting]	The last two decades, less than ten percent of U.S. history, account for more than 25 percent of the nation's total wartime. Between the defeat of Napoleon and the Soviet demise, great powers were involved in wars on average one every six years. Since it became the sole superpower, the U S has been at war for more than half the time, wars in Kuwait Kosovo Afghanistan and Iraq all resulted from other states not complying with U.S. demands When threatened with U.S. military action, Milosevic did not fold the Taliban did not give in nor did Hussein roll over America's enemies feel vulnerable even if they comply with Washington's demands. They know that the U S has the wherewithal to take them down if it so decides, so they are unlikely to accept any U.S. demands to abandon a nuclear program that would leave them in a position of even greater weakness This explains U.S. involvement in so many "hot" wars the U S is seen as an aggressive behemoth. we are told, it must restrain itself But even if it does all this, as long as U.S. power remains unmatched, Washington will continue to face difficulties having its way without resorting to war. This should come as no surprise. It follows from the unparalleled power of the United States.	The last two decades account for more than 25 percent of the nation's total wartime. Kuwait Kosovo Afghanistan and Iraq all resulted from other states not complying with U.S. demands When threatened with U.S. military action, Milosevic did not fold, the Taliban did not give in, nor did Hussein roll over America's enemies feel vulnerable even if they comply with Washington's demands they are unlikely to accept any U.S. demands that would leave them in a position of greater weakness the U S is seen as aggressive we are told, it must restrain itself But even if it does as long as U.S. power remains unmatched, Washington will continue to face difficulties having its way without resorting to war It follows from the unparalleled power of the United States.	Many seem to think so. Writing in the New York Times a week ago, Joshua Goldstein and Steven Pinker argued that "war really is going out of style." In what concerns the United States, however, nothing could be further from the truth. The last two decades, less than ten percent of U.S. history, account for more than 25 percent of the nation's total wartime. Between the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 and the Soviet demise, great powers were involved in wars on average one every six years. Since it became the sole superpower, the United States has been at war for more than half the time, or twelve out of twenty two years. These wars in Kuwait (1991), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001-present), and Iraq (2003-11) all resulted from other states not complying with U.S. demands. When threatened with U.S. military action, Slobodan Milosevic did not fold, the Taliban did not give in, nor did Saddam Hussein roll over. In contrast, the Soviet Union always took U.S. threats seriously. Despite its tremendous might, it refrained from taking West Berlin and withdrew its missiles from Cuba. Why were U.S. threats heeded by the Soviet bear but now disregarded by secondary powers? Two explanations are commonly offered. The first is that the United States is militarily overextended. The second is that while the Soviets were evil but rational, today's enemies are irrational. Both these views are wrong. The war in Afghanistan does not prevent the United States from badly damaging any non-nuclear state that defies it while suffering relatively little itself. And the U.S.'s new enemies are no less rational than its old ones. If U.S. threats were able to deter shoe-slamming "we will bury you" Khrushchev and his hundreds of intercontinental nuclear missiles, why is the United States unable to stop North Korea and its handful of rudimentary warheads -- not to mention Iran, which has none? Because threats are not the problem. Backed by the mightiest military in history, U.S. threats are eminently credible. In fact, the absence of another great power capable of deterring Washington gives the U.S. a free hand abroad. As Saddam's foreign minister Tariq Aziz lamented after Iraq's humiliating defeat in the Gulf War, "We don't have a patron anymore. If we still had the Soviets as our patron,none of this would have happened." The problem lies elsewhere. During the Cold War, mutually assured destruction kept the peace. The prospect of an unprovoked U.S. attack, which would ultimately lead to the U.S.'s own destruction, was unthinkable. But now that the Soviet Union is gone, America's enemies feel vulnerable even if they comply with Washington's demands. They know that the United States has the wherewithal to take them down if it so decides, so they are unlikely to accept any U.S. demands (to abandon a nuclear program, for example) that would leave them in a position of even greater weakness. This is what explains U.S. involvement in so many "hot" wars since the Cold War ended. As the world's sole superpower, the United States is often seen as an aggressive behemoth. To make its threats effective, we are told, it must restrain itself through a less aggressive military posture, a commitment to multilateral action, or even a pledge to eschew regime change. But even if it does all this, as long as U.S. power remains unmatched, Washington will continue to face difficulties having its way without resorting to war. This should come as no surprise. It follows from the unparalleled power of the United States.	3,524	<h4>Heg can’t deter conflict</h4><p><strong>Monteiro 11</strong>—Professor of Political Science at Yale University [Nuno P. Monteiro, “Why we (keep) fighting,” <u>Foreign Policy</u>, December 29, 2011, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/29/why_we_keep_fighting]</p><p>Many seem to think so. Writing in the New York Times a week ago, Joshua Goldstein and Steven Pinker argued that "war really is going out of style." In what concerns the United States, however, nothing could be further from the truth. <u><mark>The last two decades</mark>, less than ten percent of U.S. history, <mark>account for more than 25 percent of the nation's total wartime.</mark> Between the defeat of Napoleon</u> in 1815 <u>and the Soviet demise, great powers were involved in wars on average one every six years. Since</u> <u>it became the sole superpower, the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>has been at war for more than half the time,</u> or twelve out of twenty two years.</p><p>These <u>wars in <mark>Kuwait</u></mark> (1991), <u><mark>Kosovo</u></mark> (1999), <u><mark>Afghanistan</u></mark> (2001-present), <u><mark>and Iraq</u></mark> (2003-11) <u><mark>all resulted from other states <strong>not complying with U.S. demands</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>When threatened with U.S. military action,</u> </mark>Slobodan <u><strong><mark>Milosevic</strong> did not fold</u>, <u>the <strong>Taliban</strong> did not give in</u>, <u>nor did</u></mark> Saddam <u><strong><mark>Hussein</strong> roll over</u></mark>. In contrast, the Soviet Union always took U.S. threats seriously. Despite its tremendous might, it refrained from taking West Berlin and withdrew its missiles from Cuba.</p><p>Why were U.S. threats heeded by the Soviet bear but now disregarded by secondary powers? Two explanations are commonly offered. The first is that the United States is militarily overextended. The second is that while the Soviets were evil but rational, today's enemies are irrational. Both these views are wrong. The war in Afghanistan does not prevent the United States from badly damaging any non-nuclear state that defies it while suffering relatively little itself. And the U.S.'s new enemies are no less rational than its old ones. If U.S. threats were able to deter shoe-slamming "we will bury you" Khrushchev and his hundreds of intercontinental nuclear missiles, why is the United States unable to stop North Korea and its handful of rudimentary warheads -- not to mention Iran, which has none?</p><p>Because threats are not the problem. Backed by the mightiest military in history, U.S. threats are eminently credible. In fact, the absence of another great power capable of deterring Washington gives the U.S. a free hand abroad. As Saddam's foreign minister Tariq Aziz lamented after Iraq's humiliating defeat in the Gulf War, "We don't have a patron anymore. If we still had the Soviets as our patron,none of this would have happened."</p><p>The problem lies elsewhere. During the Cold War, mutually assured destruction kept the peace. The prospect of an unprovoked U.S. attack, which would ultimately lead to the U.S.'s own destruction, was unthinkable. But now that the Soviet Union is gone, <u><mark>America's enemies feel vulnerable even if they comply with Washington's demands</mark>. They know that the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>has the wherewithal to take them down if it so decides, so <mark>they are unlikely to accept any U.S. demands</u></mark> (<u>to abandon a nuclear program</u>, for example) <u><mark>that would <strong>leave them in a position of</mark> even <mark>greater weakness</u></strong></mark>. <u>This</u> is what <u>explains U.S. involvement in so many "hot" wars</u> since the Cold War ended.</p><p>As the world's sole superpower, <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>is</u></mark> often <u><mark>seen as</mark> an <mark>aggressive</mark> behemoth.</u> To make its threats effective, <u><mark>we are told, it must restrain itself</u></mark> through a less aggressive military posture, a commitment to multilateral action, or even a pledge to eschew regime change. <u><mark>But even if it does</mark> all this, <mark>as long as U.S. power remains unmatched, Washington will continue to face difficulties having its way without resorting to war</mark>. This should come as no surprise. <mark>It follows from the unparalleled power of the United States.</p></u></mark>	null	null	1nc – Science Diplomacy	243,615	5	17,120	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	565,421	N	Gsu	3	Wake Forest Clifford-Villa	Watson	vs Stem cells aff 1NC T "nearly all" midterms DA visas CP heg bad case 2NC heg bad case 1NR case T 2NR heg bad case	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,834	Judges won’t create a strong precedent for property rights—proves the aff fails or the counterplan is sufficient to solve	GOODWIN ‘6	Michele GOODWIN, Professor of Law and Director of the Health Law Institute at DePaul University College of Law, ‘6 [“Formalism and the Legal Status of Body Parts,” The University of Chicago Legal Forum, 2006 U Chi Legal F 317, Lexis]	entrenched formalism in a rapidly expanding biotechnological era will stymie meaningful development of common law jurisprudence on the ownership, dispensation, and remedies involving body parts. Without judicial adaptation to an evolving society in which litigation involves body parts, plaintiffs will never prevail absent a finding that deems the body as "property," plaintiffs will be barred from recovery Formalistic rule making or the lack thereof conflicts with reasoned, evolved decisionmaking. It fails to acknowledge and respond to the shifting of culture, society, and biotechnology judges do not believe it is their role to change the law to respond to biotechnology. They would argue that it is the legislature's role to introduce new meaning to the law; the courts simply sort out the statutory "mishmash." In strictly adhering to formalism, judges ignore the independence of the bench and its secondary function, which is to sort out the mishmash. Obsequious loyalty to doctrine necessarily inures heightened blindness to external factors, and in the face of biotechnological harms to plaintiffs, may undermine the perception of the judiciary as an independent, fair, competent arm of the government the refusal to tamper with almost biblically derived notions of the body by introducing new values, recognizing alternative paradigms and hermeneutics, suffocates the law while the law of body parts could be a robust representation of nuanced thinking on a very complex issue, instead it appears weak, ragged, and arbitrary	entrenched formalism will stymie meaningful development of common law on the ownership, dispensation, and remedies involving body parts. Without judicial adaptation to an evolving society in which litigation involves body parts, plaintiffs will never prevail Formalistic rule making conflicts with evolved decisionmaking. It fails to respond to shifting biotech judges do not believe it is their role to change the law to respond to biotech They would argue it is the legislature's role to introduce new meaning to the law; the courts simply sort out the mishmash Obsequious loyalty to doctrine inures heightened blindness to external factors, and in the face of biotech harms to plaintiffs, may undermine the perception of the judiciary as competent the refusal to tamper with biblically derived notions of the body by introducing new values, recognizing alternative paradigms suffocates the law law of body parts appears weak, ragged, and arbitrary	The models discussed in Part I demonstrate that entrenched formalism in a rapidly expanding biotechnological era will stymie meaningful development of common law jurisprudence on the ownership, dispensation, and remedies involving body parts. Without judicial adaptation to an evolving society in which litigation involves body parts, plaintiffs will never prevail. n125 A common element of the three very different scenarios presented in the above models is that absent a finding that deems the body as "property," plaintiffs will be barred from recovery--even in the more disturbing cases that involve the most egregious breaches of medical trust and ethics. Formalistic rule making (or the lack thereof ), conflicts with reasoned, evolved decisionmaking. It fails to acknowledge and respond to the shifting of culture, society, and biotechnology. n126 Such rule making, "to put it baldly," according to the Honorable Mary Schroeder, is to devise "pontifical formulas which relieve courts of the burden of reasoned decisionmaking." n127 The law too must evolve to address the nuanced byproducts of biotechnology. Legislative and judicial indifference to the ways in which biotechnology interferes with individual liberties, however, poses several serious problems. 1. Illusory negative rights. For example, presumed consent legislation tramples individual autonomy while purportedly designed to promote health and safety. However, that worthy goal is defeated through surreptitious tissue harvesting exclusively from unsafe victims, including those whose deaths resulted from homicides, poisonings, and other catastrophic means. n128 Failure to collect social history [347] data increases the likelihood that insalubrious tissues will enter the marketplace and harm those whom the statutes are designed to protect. n129 The opt-out provision, as discussed earlier, is more illusory than real. n130 The fact that there isn't a national or state registry, except in Iowa, where one can opt-out of tissue donation is a significant barrier. States that enacted presumed consent laws failed to take secondary measures to give full meaning to an individual or her family's choice to decline extraction. Their failure to do so unquestionably contributes to legal and social backlash against presumed consent policies. n131 Thus, without a more serious effort to capture assent or dissent, the opt-out provision is meaningless. Even in some instances when families refused to donate, state actors successfully claimed immunity for the "accidental" taking of tissues used for a legitimate state purpose. n132 Why then, has formalism dominated judicial response to nonconsensual tissue taking and the collateral outgrowths of biotechnology (in other words, Model C)? [348] 2. Episodic or collective. Judges tend to view biotechnology cases involving body parts episodically and not collectively. n133 Viewed narrowly, Mr. Moore seems to be one lone individual--a single plaintiff--with an isolated case. His disease is rare and the defendants are located in Los Angeles--their reach falls short of all other Moore-like patients at California's borders. It appears the instance will not be repeated and the means justify the utilitarian ends; Moore pays the emotional costs for a private industry gaining competitive strength and furthering scientific understanding and possibly engineering treatment options for a broader class of individuals affected by leukemia. Here the California justices are responding to a nationalist principle, an American advantage. Were the company that collaborated with Dr. Golde a foreign corporation, they may well have reached a different conclusion. Thus, the case is not simply about the random expansion of biotechnology, but specifically American technology. n134 3. Formalism entrenched. Formalists necessarily ignore exogenous sources, instead choosing to concentrate on adhering to traditional norms, n135 lest they be viewed as unmindful of their role, radical or even judi [*349] cially activist. In essence, judges do not believe it is their role to change the law to respond to biotechnology. They would argue that it is the legislature's role to introduce new meaning to the law; the courts simply sort out the statutory "mishmash." n136 Judge Guido Calabresi suggests that the formalist approach "does not contemplate the introduction of new or modified values into the scheme as part of their role." n137 Thus the court's function to hear the new biotechnology cases with an objective ear is usurped not by judicial indifference to plaintiffs, but rather a defense "of the values it finds embedded in the system." n138 In strictly adhering to formalism, judges ignore the independence of the bench and its secondary function, which is to sort out the mishmash. Obsequious loyalty to doctrine necessarily inures heightened blindness to external factors, and in the face of biotechnological harms to plaintiffs, may undermine the perception of the judiciary as an independent, fair, competent arm of the government. Although Calabresi suggests that today's formalists "take a bow to exogenous values," Models A-C (and there are many more) do not support that conclusion. Rather, the refusal to tamper with almost biblically derived notions of the body by introducing new values, recognizing alternative paradigms and hermeneutics, suffocates the law. Thus, while the law of body parts could be a robust representation of nuanced thinking on a very complex issue, instead it appears weak, ragged, and arbitrary.	5,554	<h4>Judges won’t create a strong precedent for property rights—proves the aff fails or the counterplan is sufficient to solve</h4><p>Michele <strong>GOODWIN</strong>, Professor of Law and Director of the Health Law Institute at DePaul University College of Law, <strong>‘6</strong> [“Formalism and the Legal Status of Body Parts,” The University of Chicago Legal Forum, 2006 U Chi Legal F 317, Lexis]</p><p>The models discussed in Part I demonstrate that <u><mark>entrenched formalism</mark> in a rapidly expanding biotechnological era <mark>will <strong>stymie meaningful development</strong> of common law</mark> jurisprudence <mark>on the ownership, dispensation, and remedies involving body parts. Without judicial adaptation to an evolving society in which litigation involves body parts, <strong>plaintiffs will never prevail</u></strong></mark>. n125 A common element of the three very different scenarios presented in the above models is that <u>absent a finding that deems the body as "property," plaintiffs will be barred from recovery</u>--even in the more disturbing cases that involve the most egregious breaches of medical trust and ethics. <u><mark>Formalistic rule making</u></mark> (<u>or the lack thereof</u> ), <u><mark>conflicts with</mark> reasoned, <mark>evolved decisionmaking. It fails to</mark> acknowledge and <mark>respond to</mark> the <mark>shifting</mark> of culture, society, and <mark>biotech</mark>nology</u>. n126 Such rule making, "to put it baldly," according to the Honorable Mary Schroeder, is to devise "pontifical formulas which relieve courts of the burden of reasoned decisionmaking." n127</p><p>The law too must evolve to address the nuanced byproducts of biotechnology. Legislative and judicial indifference to the ways in which biotechnology interferes with individual liberties, however, poses several serious problems.</p><p>1. Illusory negative rights.</p><p>For example, presumed consent legislation tramples individual autonomy while purportedly designed to promote health and safety. However, that worthy goal is defeated through surreptitious tissue harvesting exclusively from unsafe victims, including those whose deaths resulted from homicides, poisonings, and other catastrophic means. n128 Failure to collect social history [347] data increases the likelihood that insalubrious tissues will enter the marketplace and harm those whom the statutes are designed to protect. n129 The opt-out provision, as discussed earlier, is more illusory than real. n130 The fact that there isn't a national or state registry, except in Iowa, where one can opt-out of tissue donation is a significant barrier.</p><p>States that enacted presumed consent laws failed to take secondary measures to give full meaning to an individual or her family's choice to decline extraction. Their failure to do so unquestionably contributes to legal and social backlash against presumed consent policies. n131 Thus, without a more serious effort to capture assent or dissent, the opt-out provision is meaningless. Even in some instances when families refused to donate, state actors successfully claimed immunity for the "accidental" taking of tissues used for a legitimate state purpose. n132 Why then, has formalism dominated judicial response to nonconsensual tissue taking and the collateral outgrowths of biotechnology (in other words, Model C)? [348] </p><p>2. Episodic or collective.</p><p>Judges tend to view biotechnology cases involving body parts episodically and not collectively. n133 Viewed narrowly, Mr. Moore seems to be one lone individual--a single plaintiff--with an isolated case. His disease is rare and the defendants are located in Los Angeles--their reach falls short of all other Moore-like patients at California's borders. It appears the instance will not be repeated and the means justify the utilitarian ends; Moore pays the emotional costs for a private industry gaining competitive strength and furthering scientific understanding and possibly engineering treatment options for a broader class of individuals affected by leukemia. Here the California justices are responding to a nationalist principle, an American advantage. Were the company that collaborated with Dr. Golde a foreign corporation, they may well have reached a different conclusion. Thus, the case is not simply about the random expansion of biotechnology, but specifically American technology. n134</p><p>3. Formalism entrenched.</p><p>Formalists necessarily ignore exogenous sources, instead choosing to concentrate on adhering to traditional norms, n135 lest they be viewed as unmindful of their role, radical or even judi [*349] cially activist. In essence, <u><mark>judges do not believe it is their role to change the law to respond to biotech</mark>nology. <mark>They would argue</mark> that <mark>it is the legislature's role to introduce new meaning to the law; the courts simply sort out the</mark> statutory "<mark>mishmash</mark>."</u> n136 Judge Guido Calabresi suggests that the formalist approach "does not contemplate the introduction of new or modified values into the scheme as part of their role." n137 Thus the court's function to hear the new biotechnology cases with an objective ear is usurped not by judicial indifference to plaintiffs, but rather a defense "of the values it finds embedded in the system." n138 <u>In strictly adhering to formalism, judges ignore the independence of the bench and its secondary function, which is to sort out the mishmash. <mark>Obsequious loyalty to doctrine</mark> necessarily <mark>inures heightened blindness to external factors, and in the face of biotech</mark>nological <mark>harms to plaintiffs, may <strong>undermine the perception of the judiciary as</mark> an independent, fair, <mark>competent</mark> arm of the government</u></strong>.</p><p>Although Calabresi suggests that today's formalists "take a bow to exogenous values," Models A-C (and there are many more) do not support that conclusion. Rather, <u><mark>the refusal to tamper with</mark> almost <strong><mark>biblically derived notions of the body</strong> by introducing new values, recognizing alternative paradigms</mark> and hermeneutics, <strong><mark>suffocates the law</u></strong></mark>. Thus, <u>while the <mark>law of body parts</mark> could be a robust representation of nuanced thinking on a very complex issue, instead it <mark>appears weak, ragged, and arbitrary</u></mark>.</p>	1NC	null	1nc – Property Rights	431,194	2	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,835	State-local conflict results in outright marijuana bans- turns the case	Kamin 2012	Kamin 2012 (Sam, Professor and Director, Constitutional Rights and Remedies Program, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law, THE ROAD TO LEGITIMIZING MARIJUANA: WHAT BENEFIT AT WHAT COST?: Medical Marijuana in Colorado and the Future of Marijuana Regulation in the United States, 43 McGeorge L. Rev. 147, lexis)	In addition to conflict between state and federal law there is conflict between state and local governments. there is often tension between state and municipal governments over whether and to what extent the drug may be regulated In Colorado municipalities and counties are free to enact zoning restrictions on the sale of marijuana - including complete bans - and a number of local bodies have recently chosen to ban it outright there will likely be many places where marijuana cannot lawfully be manufactured or purchased. it is not surprising that different jurisdictions within the same state would have such disparate views we might be concerned that localism will allow municipalities to subvert state-wide policy The literature is quite diverse concerning units of analysis, theories, research methods, and data this paper offers some general critiques most of the studies at the systemic level of analysis are either difficult to substantiate empirically or are theoretically imprecise concerning mechanisms and processes most of the studies that focus on foreign policy moods lack a well-developed conception of 'mood' most of these studies from both perspectives are unspecific about the duration of growth and its effects on Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad Fordham DeRouen and Gowa find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Leeds and Davis conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani and Russett and Oneal These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. the consensus among influential thinkers was that the economic crisis would unleash a wave of geopolitical plagues. Xenophobic outbursts, civil wars, collapsing currencies, protectionism, international conflicts, and street riots were only some of the dire consequences expected by the experts. It didn't happen the scary predictions failed to materialize Violent political turmoil will become more common. It didn't. Electorates did punish governments for the economic hard times. But this was mostly in Europe and mostly peaceful and democratic A crisis of this magnitude is bound to increase political [conflict] No, it turns out: They aren't burnout transmission constraints many infections burn themselves out because they kill too quickly or they don’t have a way to get from person to person they don’t have an efficient means of transmission fundamental epidemiology A fundamental epidemiology that the spread of an infectious disease is a function of the density of both susceptible and infectious hosts. If infectious agents are supportable by the host species of conservation interest, the impact of a pathogen on a declining population is likely to decrease as the host population declines. A pathogen will spread when , it is able to transmit to a susceptible host before an infected host dies or eliminates the infection If the parasite affects the reproduction or mortality of its host the parasite reduce the density of susceptible hosts to a level at which the rate of parasite increase is no longer positive. there is a host threshold density below which a parasite cannot invade the chance that a susceptible host will become infected is proportional to the density of infected hosts a host specific pathogen cannot drive its host to extinction )//gingE There's nothing like a good plague to get journalists and pundits in a frenzy pandemics it's all too often exaggerated. In the last few years, the world has experienced two such pandemics, H5N1) and H1N1 Both fell far short of the apocalyptic vision of a new Black Death Out of a global population of more than 6 billion people, 8,768 are estimated to have died from swine flu, 306 from avian flu. it was not just the BBC ominously informing us that "the deadly swine flu … cannot be contained. the good done by mobilizing people to address the problem must be weighed against the danger of apocalypse fatigue on the part of a public subjected to endless Chicken Little scares. many of these differences are essential to the survival and progress of the human race. People have different vulnerabilities and resistances to a variety of diseases. That is why one disease is unlikely to wipe out the human species, even in one place Yellow Fever, Black Goddess I am confident that no terrible disease will appear that slaughters us by the billion. The reason is that we can now respond very quickly to such a visible enemy. Any disease that spreads like wildfire will have to go so through the air or water and there are many steps we can take right away to prevent such a spread After bracing ourselves for a global pandemic, we've suffered something more like the usual seasonal influenza Senior officials prophesied that millions could be infected by the disease. But as of last week, the WHO had confirmed only 4,800 cases Why did the predictions of a pandemic turn out to be so exaggerated? there is a broader mistake in the way we look at the world. we can rarely anticipate the human response to that crisis. Take swine flu. The virus had crucial characteristicsthat led researchers to worry that it could spread far and fast But it did not go unchecked. In fact, swine flu was met by an extremely vigorous response at its epicenter, Mexico. The Mexican government reacted quickly and massively, quarantining the infected population, testing others, providing medication to those who needed it. The noted expert on this subject, They basically paralyzed their own economy. They've suffered billions of dollars in financial losses still being tallied up, and thereby really brought transmission to a halt." Every time one of these viruses is detected, writers and officials bring up the Spanish influenza epidemic of 1918 But the world we live in today looks nothing like 1918. Public health-care systems are far better Even Mexico, a developing country, has a first-rate public-health system In reaching these landmarks in the containment of SARS, the most severely affected countries and areas have identified and rapidly corrected long-standing weaknesses in their health systems in ways that will mean permanent improvements for the management of all diseases systems of data collection and reporting, and new patterns of openly communicating to the public will hold the world in good stead when the next new disease emerges and the next influenza pandemic breaks out. Mueller 10 Politicians preach . This was dramatic risk inflation , terrorist groups have exhibited only limited desire and progress armed theft of fissile material is unlikely chase would be immediate terrorists have to transport it over unfamiliar terrain Once outside terrorists would need a well-equipped machine shop and skilled scientists technical requirements verge on the unfeasible Adopting bias in the terrorists’ favor the cumulative odds drop to one in three billion They are unlikely to be sold a bomb The terrorist group might steal a “loose nuke none exist. bombs have devices that destroy the bomb if tampered with. codes are required if a state were to collapse weapons remain under heavy guard al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond the Internet	there is often a tension between state and municipal governments over whether and to what extent the drug may be regulated In Colorado a number of local bodies have recently chosen to ban it outright. there will likely be many places where marijuana cannot lawfully be manufactured or purchased it is not surprising that different jurisdictions within the same state would have such disparate views we might be concerned that localism will allow municipalities to subvert state-wide policy this paper offers some general critiques most of the studies are difficult to substantiate empirically or theoretically imprecise most of these studies are unspecific about the duration of growth The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature Fordham DeRouen and Gowa find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force Leeds and Davis conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangan and Russett and Oneal the consensus was that economic crisis would unleash geopolitical plagues. wars, collapsing currencies, protectionism It didn't happen scary predictions failed to materialize A crisis of this magnitude is bound to increase political [conflict No, it turns out: They aren't. infections burn themselves out because they kill too quickly or don’t have an efficient means of transmission. fundamental epidemiology the chance that a host will become infected is proportional to the density of infected hosts pathogen cannot drive its host to extinction pandemics often exaggerated. In the last few years, the world experienced H5N1) and H1N1 Out of a global population 8,768 died from swine flu 306 from avian flu BBC ominously informing us the deadly swine flu … cannot be contained People have different vulnerabilities and resistances to a variety of diseases one disease is unlikely to wipe out the species, even in one place no terrible disease will slaughters us we can now respond very quickly Any will go so through air or water and there are steps we can take to prevent spread Why did predictions turn out to be so exaggerated? we rarely anticipate the human response to crisis swine flu was met by vigorous response at its epicenter The Mexican government reacted quickly and massively, quarantining the infected population the world looks nothing like 1918 health-care systems are far better In reaching these landmarks in the containment of SARS, the most severely affected countries and areas have corrected weaknesses in their health systems systems of data collection and reporting, and new patterns o communicating to the public will hold the world in good stead when the next new disease emerges Politicians preach This was dramatic risk inflation terrorist groups have exhibited only limited desire and progress armed theft of fissile material is unlikely chase would be immediate terrorists have to transport it over unfamiliar terrain Once outside terrorists would need a well-equipped machine shop and skilled scientists technical requirements verge on the unfeasible Adopting bias in the terrorists’ favor the cumulative odds drop to one in three billion They are unlikely to be sold a bomb The terrorist group might steal a “loose nuke none exist bombs have devices that destroy the bomb if tampered with. codes are required if a state were to collapse weapons remain under heavy guard al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond the Internet.	V. The State-Local Junction In addition to the ambiguity and conflict between state laws (some of which purport to legalize marijuana) and the federal law (which continues to criminalize it), there is another level of intergovernmental conflict in the area of marijuana regulation and reform - the interplay between state and local governments. Even in those states that have legalized marijuana for medical purposes, there is often a tension between state and municipal governments over whether and to what extent the drug may be regulated at the local level. In Colorado, for example, municipalities and counties are free to enact zoning restrictions on the sale of marijuana - including complete bans - and a number of local bodies have recently chosen to ban it outright. n67 Even though the Colorado Constitution prohibits the conviction of those using marijuana for medical purposes, there will likely be many places in the state where marijuana cannot lawfully be manufactured or purchased. In California, which has delegated much of the regulation of marijuana from the state to the local level, the counties of San Diego and San Bernardino sued the state in 2006 to enjoin it from requiring them to participate in the state-mandated medical marijuana program. n68 The counties argued that the CSA [163] preempted the state law requiring them to facilitate the applications of those seeking to register as marijuana patients under the state's medicinal marijuana provisions. The counties asked to be excused from their state obligations, arguing that participation in the state regulatory regime would make them complicit in the medical marijuana patients and care-givers' in violations of the federal law. The counties - like the sheriffs in Willis v. Winters - thus presented a non-trivial argument that they were incapable of complying with both state and federal law; the state obligated them to facilitate the very drug transactions that federal law expressly prohibits them from facilitating. n69 Although the counties lost their suit, the San Diego NORML case illustrates that, even in those states that have voted to make medical marijuana legally available, support for such policies is hardly uniform. Just as there are pockets of support and resistance to federal policy among the several states, similarly counties and towns can be expected to support state policy with varying levels of enthusiasm. For example, a number of municipalities in medical marijuana states have embraced the new industry as a boon to tax coffers. Most famously, the City of Oakland, California, has sought to establish itself as the Amsterdam of the United States. Facing fading industry and disappearing tax dollars, the city voted in 2010 to permit large-scale marijuana production, pledging to become the "Silicon Valley of Marijuana." n70 Of course, it is not surprising that different jurisdictions within the same state would have such disparate views of medical marijuana. But it raises disconcerting questions about the ability of a city or county to opt out of a state-wide policy. The traditional understanding of the state-local dynamic is one of master and servant. n71 Generally considered the mere creations and instrumentalities of the state, local governments were seen as having essentially no power to contest state authority: Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to them. For the purpose of executing these powers properly and efficiently they usually are given the power to [164] acquire, hold, and manage personal and real property. The number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state. Neither their charters, nor any law conferring governmental powers, or vesting in them property to be used for governmental purposes, or authorizing them to hold or manage such property, or exempting them from taxation upon it, constitutes a contract with the state within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States. n72 This is certainly the view underlying the California court's decision in San Diego NORML. The court held that, "as a general rule, a local governmental entity "charged with the ministerial duty of enforcing a statute ... generally does not have the authority, in the absence of a judicial determination of unconstitutionality, to refuse to enforce the statute on the basis of the [entity's] view that it is unconstitutional.'" n73 This traditional view has come under criticism in recent years, largely from legal academics. n74 These authors argue that the principle of federalism - with its embrace of a variety of approaches and views - should include support for a diversity of opinions within states as well as between them. n75 In other words, the [*165] things that we like about "Our Federalism" apply with equal or perhaps greater power to state-local (and sub-local) federalism. n76 If the states are laboratories of ideas, then surely the even more diverse collection of local entities can produce even greater innovation and insights. This argument for a "localist" parallel to federalism makes a strong case for giving the municipalities the right to contest state policies, including the choice of a state to permit marijuana for medical purposes. However, just as segregation and interposition are the dark side of the argument for state power vis-a-vis the federal government, so localism creates the opportunity for localities to subvert the will of the voters of a particular state. We would look askance, for example, at a municipality that barred churches, bookstores, or abortion clinics outright. If we mean what we say about there being a state right to use marijuana, why should we permit localities to defeat state policy through zoning and regulating marijuana businesses out of their jurisdictions? Just as we worry that the rhetoric of states' rights will allow states to undermine important federal principles, so we might be concerned that localism will allow municipalities to subvert state-wide policy. ( ) Prefer our study – others are not empirical, lack coherent definitions, and don’t specify duration of growth Boehmer 10 (Charles, professor of political science at the University of Texas – El Paso and Ph.D. in Political Science from Pennsylvania State University, “Economic Growth and Violent International Conflict: 1875-1999,” Defence and Peace Economics, June, Vol. 21, Issue 3, pg. 249-268) The literature cited above is quite diverse concerning units of analysis, theories, research methods, and data. One study such as this cannot re-examine all the potential hypotheses therein. However, this paper offers some general critiques across the literature. First, most of the studies at the systemic level of analysis are either difficult to substantiate empirically, such as providing evidence that long cycles are actually 'cycles' endogenous to the global economy and not simply statistical random walks (Beck, 1991), or are theoretically imprecise concerning mechanisms and processes. Some work in this area lacks agency, linking periodicities of economic cycles to individual states. Second, most of the studies that focus on foreign policy moods lack a well-developed conception of 'mood'. How could we best identify such a variable and does it extend equally to leaders and those in society? Third, most of these studies from both perspectives are unspecific about the duration of growth and its effects on conflict. Shorter-term growth rates are often undifferentiated from longer-term economic development. Some studies simply use one-year lags of economic growth while others measure growth over several years using moving averages, whereas others focus on long waves or cycles of more than a decade. There are important theoretical distinctions in such choices. ( ) Consensus of experts concur – no war. TIR 10 Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia (Tir Jaroslav, The Journal of Politics, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, 2010, Volume 72: 413-425, Hopkins) Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a, 1998b), DeRouen (1995), and Gowa (1998) find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, Leeds and Davis (1997) conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani (2005) and Russett and Oneal (2001) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s (2002) revision of Gowa’s (1998) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake (2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett (1990)—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy). ( ) More evidence – impacts are empirically denied. Naim ‘10 Moises Naim – Editor in Chief of Foreign Policy Magazine Foreign Policy Online \| JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/it_didnt_happen?page=full d.a. 7-15-10 Just a few months ago, the consensus among influential thinkers was that the economic crisis would unleash a wave of geopolitical plagues. Xenophobic outbursts, civil wars, collapsing currencies, protectionism, international conflicts, and street riots were only some of the dire consequences expected by the experts. It didn't happen. Although the crash did cause severe economic damage and widespread human suffering, and though the world did change in important ways for the worse -- the International Monetary Fund, for example, estimates that the global economy's new and permanent trajectory is a 10 percent lower rate of GDP growth than before the crisis -- the scary predictions for the most part failed to materialize. Sadly, the same experts who failed to foresee the economic crisis were also blindsided by the speed of the recovery. More than a year into the crisis, we now know just how off they were. From telling us about the imminent collapse of the international financial system to prophecies of a 10-year recession, here are six of the most common predictions about the crisis that have been proven wrong: The international financial system will collapse. It didn't. As Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac crashed, as Citigroup and many other pillars of the financial system teetered on the brink, and as stock markets everywhere entered into free fall, the wise men predicted a total system meltdown. The economy has "fallen off a cliff," warned investment guru Warren Buffett. Fellow financial wizard George Soros agreed, noting the world economy was on "life support," calling the turbulence more severe than during the Great Depression, and comparing the situation to the demise of the Soviet Union. The natural corollary of such doomsday scenarios was the possibility that depositors would lose access to the funds in their bank accounts. From there to visions of martial law imposed to control street protests and the looting of bank offices was just an easy step for thousands of Internet-fueled conspiracy theorists. Even today, the financial system is still frail, banks are still failing, credit is scarce, and risks abound. But the financial system is working, and the perception that it is too unsafe to use or that it can suddenly crash out of existence has largely dissipated. The economic crisis will last for at least two years and maybe even a decade. It didn't. By fall of 2009, the economies of the United States, Europe, and Japan had begun to grow again, and many of the largest developing economies, such as China, India, and Brazil, were growing at an even faster pace. This was surely a far cry from the doom-laden -- and widely echoed -- prophecies of economist Nouriel Roubini. In late 2008 he warned that radical governmental actions at best would prevent "what will now be an ugly and nasty two-year recession and financial crisis from turning into a systemic meltdown and a decade-long economic depression." Roubini was far from the only pessimist. "The danger," warned Harvard University's Kenneth Rogoff, another distinguished economist, in the fall of 2008, "is that instead of having a few bad years, we'll have another lost decade." It turned out that radical policy reactions were far more effective than anyone had expected in shortening the life of the recession. The U.S. dollar will crash. It didn't. Instead, the American currency's value increased 20 percent between July 2008 and March 2009, at the height of the crisis. At first, investors from around the world sought refuge in the U.S. dollar. Then, as the U.S. government bailed out troubled companies and stimulated the economy with aggressive public spending, the U.S. fiscal deficit skyrocketed and anxieties about a dollar devaluation mounted. By the second half of 2009, the U.S. currency had lost value. But devaluation has not turned out to be the catastrophic crash predicted by the pessimists. Rather, as Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf noted, "The dollar's correction is not just natural; it is helpful. It will lower the risk of deflation in the U.S. and facilitate the correction of the global 'imbalances' that helped cause the crisis." Protectionism will surge. It didn't. Trade flows did drop dramatically in late 2008 and early 2009, but they started to grow again in the second half of 2009 as economies recovered. Pascal Lamy, director-general of the World Trade Organization, had warned that the global financial crisis was bound to lead to surges in protectionism as governments sought to blame foreigners for their problems. "That is exactly what happened in the 1930s when [protectionism] was the virus that spread the crisis all over the place," he said in October 2008, echoing a widely held sentiment among trade experts. And it is true that many governments dabbled in protectionism, including not only the U.S. Congress's much-derided "Buy American" provision, but also measures such as increased tariffs or import restrictions imposed in 17 of the G-20 countries. Yet one year later, a report from the European Union concluded that "a widespread and systemic escalation of protectionism has been prevented." The protectionist temptation is always there, and a meaningful increase in trade barriers cannot be ruled out. But it has not happened yet. The crisis in rich countries will drag down developing ones. It didn't. As the economies of America and Europe screeched to a halt during the nightmarish first quarter of 2009, China's economy accelerated, part of a broader trend in which emerging markets fared better through the crisis than the world's most advanced economies. As the rich countries entered a deep recession and the woes of the U.S. financial market affected banking systems everywhere, the idea that emerging economies could "decouple" from the advanced ones was widely mocked. But decouple they did. Some emerging economies relied on their domestic markets, others on exports to other growing countries (China, for example, displaced the United States last year as Brazil's top export market). Still others had ample foreign reserves, low exposure to toxic financial assets, or, like Chile, had taken measures in anticipation of an eventual global slowdown. Not all developing countries managed to escape the worst of the crisis -- and many, such as Mexico and Iran, were deeply hurt -- but many others managed to avoid the fate of the advanced economies. Violent political turmoil will become more common. It didn't. Electorates did punish governments for the economic hard times. But this was mostly in Europe and mostly peaceful and democratic. "There will be blood," prophesied Harvard historian Niall Ferguson last spring. "A crisis of this magnitude is bound to increase political [conflict] ... It is bound to destabilize some countries. It will cause civil wars to break out that have been dormant. It will topple governments that were moderate and bring in governments that are extreme. These things are pretty predictable." No, it turns out: They aren't. burnout and transmission constraints Morse, 04 (Stephen, PhD, director of the Center for Public Health Preparedness May 2004, “Emerging and Reemerging Infectious Diseases: A Global Problem,” http://www.actionbioscience.org/newfrontiers/morse.html, Hensel) Morse: A pandemic is a very big epidemic. It requires a number of things. There are many infections that get introduced from time to time in the human population and, like Ebola, burn themselves out because they kill too quickly or they don’t have a way to get from person to person. They are a terrible tragedy, but also, in a sense, it is a lucky thing that they don’t have an efficient means of transmission. fundamental epidemiology concludes neg Gerber 5 (Leah R. Gerber, PhD. Associate Professor of Ecology, Evolution, and Environmental Sciences, Ecological Society of America, "Exposing Extinction Risk Analysis to Pathogens: Is Disease Just Another Form of Density Dependence?" August 2005, Jstor) The density of it population is an important parameter for both PVA and host-pathogen theory. A fundamental principle of epidemiology is that the spread of an infectious disease through a population is a function of the density of both susceptible and infectious hosts. If infectious agents are supportable by the host species of conservation interest, the impact of a pathogen on a declining population is likely to decrease as the host population declines. A pathogen will spread when, on average, it is able to transmit to a susceptible host before an infected host dies or eliminates the infection (Kermack and McKendrick 1927, Anderson and May l99l). If the parasite affects the reproduction or mortality of its host, or the host is able to mount an immune response, the parasite population may eventually reduce the density of susceptible hosts to a level at which the rate of parasite increase is no longer positive. Most epidemiological models indicate that there is a host threshold density (or local population size) below which a parasite cannot invade, suggesting that rare or depleted species should be less subject to host-specific disease. This has implications for small, yet increasing, populations. For example, although endangered species at low density may be less susceptible to a disease outbreak, recovery to higher densities places them at increasing risk of future disease-related decline (e.g., southern sea otters; Gerber ct al. 2004). In the absence of stochastic factors (such as those modeled in PVA), and given the usual assumption of disease models that the chance that a susceptible host will become infected is proportional to the density of infected hosts (the mass action assumption) a host specific pathogen cannot drive its host to extinction (McCallum and Dobson 1995). Hype Lind, 11 - Policy Director of the Economic Growth Program at the New America Foundation (Michael, March/April 2011, “So Long, Chicken Little,” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/so_long_chicken_little?page=0,5)//gingE There's nothing like a good plague to get journalists and pundits in a frenzy. Although the threat of global pandemics is real, it's all too often exaggerated. In the last few years, the world has experienced two such pandemics, the avian flu (H5N1) and swine flu (H1N1). Both fell far short of the apocalyptic vision of a new Black Death cutting huge swaths of mortality with its remorseless scythe. Out of a global population of more than 6 billion people, 8,768 are estimated to have died from swine flu, 306 from avian flu.¶ And yet it was not just the BBC ominously informing us that "the deadly swine flu … cannot be contained." Like warnings about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the good done by mobilizing people to address the problem must be weighed against the danger of apocalypse fatigue on the part of a public subjected to endless Chicken Little scares. Genetics Sowell, 1 – Fellow at Hoover Institution (Thomas, March 5, Jewish World Review, “The Dangers of “Equality”, http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell030501.asp)//gingE A sense of smell is just one of innumerable things that can differ greatly from one person to the next. Moreover, many of these differences are essential to the survival and progress of the human race.¶ People have different vulnerabilities and resistances to a variety of diseases. That is why one disease is unlikely to wipe out the human species, even in one place. An epidemic that sweeps through an area may leave some people dying like flies while others remain as healthy as horses. Intervening actors Wills 96 (Christopher, Professor of Biology at the University of California Yellow Fever, Black Goddess) I am confident that no terrible disease will appear that slaughters us by the billion. The reason is that we can now respond very quickly to such a visible enemy. Any disease that spreads like wildfire will have to go so through the air or water and there are many steps we can take right away to prevent such a spread. If the people of fourteenth-century Europe had known what we know now, they could have halted the black death in short order. Empirics and quarantines Zakaria 9—Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, “The Capitalist Manifesto: Greed Is Good,” 13 June 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/201935) Note—Laurie Garrett=science and health writer, winner of the Pulitzer, Polk, and Peabody Prize It certainly looks like another example of crying wolf. After bracing ourselves for a global pandemic, we've suffered something more like the usual seasonal influenza. Three weeks ago the World Health Organization declared a health emergency, warning countries to "prepare for a pandemic" and said that the only question was the extent of worldwide damage. Senior officials prophesied that millions could be infected by the disease. But as of last week, the WHO had confirmed only 4,800 cases of swine flu, with 61 people having died of it. Obviously, these low numbers are a pleasant surprise, but it does make one wonder, what did we get wrong? Why did the predictions of a pandemic turn out to be so exaggerated? Some people blame an overheated media, but it would have been difficult to ignore major international health organizations and governments when they were warning of catastrophe. I think there is a broader mistake in the way we look at the world. Once we see a problem, we can describe it in great detail, extrapolating all its possible consequences. But we can rarely anticipate the human response to that crisis. Take swine flu. The virus had crucial characteristicsthat led researchers to worry that it could spread far and fast. They described—and the media reported—what would happen if it went unchecked. But it did not go unchecked. In fact, swine flu was met by an extremely vigorous response at its epicenter, Mexico. The Mexican government reacted quickly and massively, quarantining the infected population, testing others, providing medication to those who needed it. The noted expert on this subject, Laurie Garrett, says, "We should all stand up and scream, 'Gracias, Mexico!' because the Mexican people and the Mexican government have sacrificed on a level that I'm not sure as Americans we would be prepared to do in the exact same circumstances. They shut down their schools. They shut down businesses, restaurants, churches, sporting events. They basically paralyzed their own economy. They've suffered billions of dollars in financial losses still being tallied up, and thereby really brought transmission to a halt." Every time one of these viruses is detected, writers and officials bring up the Spanish influenza epidemic of 1918 in which millions of people died. Indeed, during the last pandemic scare, in 2005, President George W. Bush claimed that he had been reading a history of the Spanish flu to help him understand how to respond. But the world we live in today looks nothing like 1918. Public health-care systems are far better and more widespread than anything that existed during the First World War. Even Mexico, a developing country, has a first-rate public-health system—far better than anything Britain or France had in the early 20th century. Lessons from the SARS outbreak have already improved worldwide public health–this will limit future outbreaks of any disease ENSOM 2003 (Jim, Globalcontinuity.com, June 20 http://www.globalcontinuity.com/article/articleview/94/1/30/) In reaching these landmarks in the containment of SARS, the most severely affected countries and areas have identified and rapidly corrected long-standing weaknesses in their health systems in ways that will mean permanent improvements for the management of all diseases. In addition, systems of data collection and reporting, and new patterns of openly and frankly communicating information to the public will hold the world in good stead when the next new disease emerges and the next influenza pandemic breaks out. No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant Mueller 10 (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html) Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.	47,536	<h4><strong>State-local conflict results in outright marijuana bans- turns the case</h4><p>Kamin 2012</strong> (Sam, Professor and Director, Constitutional Rights and Remedies Program, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law, THE ROAD TO LEGITIMIZING MARIJUANA: WHAT BENEFIT AT WHAT COST?: Medical Marijuana in Colorado and the Future of Marijuana Regulation in the United States, 43 McGeorge L. Rev. 147, lexis)</p><p>V. The State-Local Junction <u>In addition to</u> the ambiguity and <u>conflict between state</u> laws (some of which purport to legalize marijuana) <u>and</u> the <u>federal law</u> (which continues to criminalize it), <u>there is</u> another level of intergovernmental <u>conflict </u>in the area of marijuana regulation and reform - the interplay <u>between state and local governments.</u> Even in those states that have legalized marijuana for medical purposes, <u><mark>there is often</u> a <u>tension between state and municipal governments over whether and to what extent the drug may be regulated</u></mark> at the local level. <u><mark>In Colorado</u></mark>, for example, <u>municipalities and counties are free to enact zoning restrictions on the sale of marijuana - including complete bans - and <strong><mark>a number of local bodies have recently chosen to ban it outright</u></strong>.</mark> n67 Even though the Colorado Constitution prohibits the conviction of those using marijuana for medical purposes, <u><strong><mark>there will likely be many places</u></strong></mark> in the state <u><strong><mark>where marijuana cannot lawfully be manufactured or purchased</mark>. </u></strong>In California, which has delegated much of the regulation of marijuana from the state to the local level, the counties of San Diego and San Bernardino sued the state in 2006 to enjoin it from requiring them to participate in the state-mandated medical marijuana program. n68 The counties argued that the CSA [163] preempted the state law requiring them to facilitate the applications of those seeking to register as marijuana patients under the state's medicinal marijuana provisions. The counties asked to be excused from their state obligations, arguing that participation in the state regulatory regime would make them complicit in the medical marijuana patients and care-givers' in violations of the federal law. The counties - like the sheriffs in Willis v. Winters - thus presented a non-trivial argument that they were incapable of complying with both state and federal law; the state obligated them to facilitate the very drug transactions that federal law expressly prohibits them from facilitating. n69 Although the counties lost their suit, the San Diego NORML case illustrates that, even in those states that have voted to make medical marijuana legally available, support for such policies is hardly uniform. Just as there are pockets of support and resistance to federal policy among the several states, similarly counties and towns can be expected to support state policy with varying levels of enthusiasm. For example, a number of municipalities in medical marijuana states have embraced the new industry as a boon to tax coffers. Most famously, the City of Oakland, California, has sought to establish itself as the Amsterdam of the United States. Facing fading industry and disappearing tax dollars, the city voted in 2010 to permit large-scale marijuana production, pledging to become the "Silicon Valley of Marijuana." n70 Of course, <u><mark>it is not surprising that different jurisdictions within the same state would have such disparate views</mark> </u>of medical marijuana. But it raises disconcerting questions about the ability of a city or county to opt out of a state-wide policy. The traditional understanding of the state-local dynamic is one of master and servant. n71 Generally considered the mere creations and instrumentalities of the state, local governments were seen as having essentially no power to contest state authority: Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to them. For the purpose of executing these powers properly and efficiently they usually are given the power to [164] acquire, hold, and manage personal and real property. The number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state. Neither their charters, nor any law conferring governmental powers, or vesting in them property to be used for governmental purposes, or authorizing them to hold or manage such property, or exempting them from taxation upon it, constitutes a contract with the state within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States. n72 This is certainly the view underlying the California court's decision in San Diego NORML. The court held that, "as a general rule, a local governmental entity "charged with the ministerial duty of enforcing a statute ... generally does not have the authority, in the absence of a judicial determination of unconstitutionality, to refuse to enforce the statute on the basis of the [entity's] view that it is unconstitutional.'" n73 This traditional view has come under criticism in recent years, largely from legal academics. n74 These authors argue that the principle of federalism - with its embrace of a variety of approaches and views - should include support for a diversity of opinions within states as well as between them. n75 In other words, the [*165] things that we like about "Our Federalism" apply with equal or perhaps greater power to state-local (and sub-local) federalism. n76 If the states are laboratories of ideas, then surely the even more diverse collection of local entities can produce even greater innovation and insights. This argument for a "localist" parallel to federalism makes a strong case for giving the municipalities the right to contest state policies, including the choice of a state to permit marijuana for medical purposes. However, just as segregation and interposition are the dark side of the argument for state power vis-a-vis the federal government, so localism creates the opportunity for localities to subvert the will of the voters of a particular state. We would look askance, for example, at a municipality that barred churches, bookstores, or abortion clinics outright. If we mean what we say about there being a state right to use marijuana, why should we permit localities to defeat state policy through zoning and regulating marijuana businesses out of their jurisdictions? Just as we worry that the rhetoric of states' rights will allow states to undermine important federal principles, so <u><mark>we might be concerned that localism will <strong>allow municipalities to subvert state-wide policy</u></mark>.</p><p> ( ) Prefer our study – others are not empirical, lack coherent definitions, and don’t specify duration of growth</p><p>Boehmer 10</strong> (Charles, professor of political science at the University of Texas – El Paso and Ph.D. in Political Science from Pennsylvania State University, “Economic Growth and Violent International Conflict: 1875-1999,” Defence and Peace Economics, June, Vol. 21, Issue 3, pg. 249-268)</p><p><u>The literature </u>cited above <u>is quite diverse concerning units of analysis, theories, research methods, and data</u>. One study such as this cannot re-examine all the potential hypotheses therein. However, <u><mark>this paper offers some general critiques</u></mark> across the literature. First, <u><mark>most of the studies</mark> at the systemic level of analysis <mark>are</mark> either <mark>difficult to substantiate empirically</u></mark>, such as providing evidence that long cycles are actually 'cycles' endogenous to the global economy and not simply statistical random walks (Beck, 1991), <u><mark>or</u></mark> <u>are <mark>theoretically imprecise</mark> concerning mechanisms and processes</u>. Some work in this area lacks agency, linking periodicities of economic cycles to individual states. Second, <u>most of the studies that focus on foreign policy moods lack a well-developed conception of 'mood'</u>. How could we best identify such a variable and does it extend equally to leaders and those in society? Third, <u><mark>most of these studies</mark> from both perspectives <mark>are unspecific about the duration of growth</mark> and its effects on</u><strong> conflict. Shorter-term growth rates are often undifferentiated from longer-term economic development. Some studies simply use one-year lags of economic growth while others measure growth over several years using moving averages, whereas others focus on long waves or cycles of more than a decade. There are important theoretical distinctions in such choices. </p><p>( ) Consensus of experts concur – no war.</p><p>TIR 10 </strong>Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia </p><p>(Tir Jaroslav, The Journal of Politics, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, 2010, Volume 72: 413-425, Hopkins)</p><p><u>Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. <mark>The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature</u></mark>. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, note that <u>the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad</u>. Similarly, <u><mark>Fordham</u></mark> (1998a, 1998b),<u> <mark>DeRouen</u></mark> (1995), <u><mark>and Gowa</u></mark> (1998) <u><mark>find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force</mark>.</u> Furthermore, <u><mark>Leeds and Davis</u></mark> (1997) <u><mark>conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangan</mark>i</u> (2005) <u><mark>and Russett and Oneal</u></mark> (2001) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s (2002) revision of Gowa’s (1998) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake (2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett (1990)—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. <u>These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise.</u><strong> Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy).</p><p>( ) More evidence – impacts are empirically denied.</p><p>Naim ‘10<u></strong> </u>Moises<u> </u>Naim – Editor in Chief of Foreign Policy Magazine Foreign Policy Online \| JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010<strong> </strong>http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/it_didnt_happen?page=full d.a.<strong> 7-15-10</p><p></strong>Just a few months ago, <u><mark>the consensus</mark> among influential thinkers <mark>was that</mark> the <mark>economic crisis would unleash</mark> a wave of <mark>geopolitical plagues.</mark> Xenophobic outbursts, civil <mark>wars, collapsing currencies, protectionism</mark>, international conflicts, and street riots were only some of the dire consequences expected by the experts. <mark>It didn't happen</u></mark>. Although the crash did cause severe economic damage and widespread human suffering, and though the world did change in important ways for the worse -- the International Monetary Fund, for example, estimates that the global economy's new and permanent trajectory is a 10 percent lower rate of GDP growth than before the crisis -- <u>the <mark>scary predictions</u></mark> for the most part <u><strong><mark>failed to materialize</u></strong></mark>. Sadly, the same experts who failed to foresee the economic crisis were also blindsided by the speed of the recovery. More than a year into the crisis, we now know just how off they were. From telling us about the imminent collapse of the international financial system to prophecies of a 10-year recession, here are six of the most common predictions about the crisis that have been proven wrong: The international financial system will collapse. It didn't. As Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac crashed, as Citigroup and many other pillars of the financial system teetered on the brink, and as stock markets everywhere entered into free fall, the wise men predicted a total system meltdown. The economy has "fallen off a cliff," warned investment guru Warren Buffett. Fellow financial wizard George Soros agreed, noting the world economy was on "life support," calling the turbulence more severe than during the Great Depression, and comparing the situation to the demise of the Soviet Union. The natural corollary of such doomsday scenarios was the possibility that depositors would lose access to the funds in their bank accounts. From there to visions of martial law imposed to control street protests and the looting of bank offices was just an easy step for thousands of Internet-fueled conspiracy theorists. Even today, the financial system is still frail, banks are still failing, credit is scarce, and risks abound. But the financial system is working, and the perception that it is too unsafe to use or that it can suddenly crash out of existence has largely dissipated. The economic crisis will last for at least two years and maybe even a decade. It didn't. By fall of 2009, the economies of the United States, Europe, and Japan had begun to grow again, and many of the largest developing economies, such as China, India, and Brazil, were growing at an even faster pace. This was surely a far cry from the doom-laden -- and widely echoed -- prophecies of economist Nouriel Roubini. In late 2008 he warned that radical governmental actions at best would prevent "what will now be an ugly and nasty two-year recession and financial crisis from turning into a systemic meltdown and a decade-long economic depression." Roubini was far from the only pessimist. "The danger," warned Harvard University's Kenneth Rogoff, another distinguished economist, in the fall of 2008, "is that instead of having a few bad years, we'll have another lost decade." It turned out that radical policy reactions were far more effective than anyone had expected in shortening the life of the recession. The U.S. dollar will crash. It didn't. Instead, the American currency's value increased 20 percent between July 2008 and March 2009, at the height of the crisis. At first, investors from around the world sought refuge in the U.S. dollar. Then, as the U.S. government bailed out troubled companies and stimulated the economy with aggressive public spending, the U.S. fiscal deficit skyrocketed and anxieties about a dollar devaluation mounted. By the second half of 2009, the U.S. currency had lost value. But devaluation has not turned out to be the catastrophic crash predicted by the pessimists. Rather, as Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf noted, "The dollar's correction is not just natural; it is helpful. It will lower the risk of deflation in the U.S. and facilitate the correction of the global 'imbalances' that helped cause the crisis." Protectionism will surge. It didn't. Trade flows did drop dramatically in late 2008 and early 2009, but they started to grow again in the second half of 2009 as economies recovered. Pascal Lamy, director-general of the World Trade Organization, had warned that the global financial crisis was bound to lead to surges in protectionism as governments sought to blame foreigners for their problems. "That is exactly what happened in the 1930s when [protectionism] was the virus that spread the crisis all over the place," he said in October 2008, echoing a widely held sentiment among trade experts. And it is true that many governments dabbled in protectionism, including not only the U.S. Congress's much-derided "Buy American" provision, but also measures such as increased tariffs or import restrictions imposed in 17 of the G-20 countries. Yet one year later, a report from the European Union concluded that "a widespread and systemic escalation of protectionism has been prevented." The protectionist temptation is always there, and a meaningful increase in trade barriers cannot be ruled out. But it has not happened yet. The crisis in rich countries will drag down developing ones. It didn't. As the economies of America and Europe screeched to a halt during the nightmarish first quarter of 2009, China's economy accelerated, part of a broader trend in which emerging markets fared better through the crisis than the world's most advanced economies. As the rich countries entered a deep recession and the woes of the U.S. financial market affected banking systems everywhere, the idea that emerging economies could "decouple" from the advanced ones was widely mocked. But decouple they did. Some emerging economies relied on their domestic markets, others on exports to other growing countries (China, for example, displaced the United States last year as Brazil's top export market). Still others had ample foreign reserves, low exposure to toxic financial assets, or, like Chile, had taken measures in anticipation of an eventual global slowdown. Not all developing countries managed to escape the worst of the crisis -- and many, such as Mexico and Iran, were deeply hurt -- but many others managed to avoid the fate of the advanced economies. <u>Violent political turmoil will become more common. It didn't. Electorates did punish governments for the economic hard times. But this was mostly in Europe and mostly peaceful and democratic</u>. "There will be blood," prophesied Harvard historian Niall Ferguson last spring. "<u><mark>A crisis of this magnitude is bound to increase political [conflict</mark>] </u>... It is bound to destabilize some countries. It will cause civil wars to break out that have been dormant. It will topple governments that were moderate and bring in governments that are extreme. These things are pretty predictable." <u><strong><mark>No, it turns out: They aren't</u>.</mark> </p><p><u>burnout</u> and <u>transmission constraints</p><p></u>Morse, 04 </strong>(Stephen, PhD, director of the Center for Public Health Preparedness May 2004, “Emerging and Reemerging Infectious Diseases: A Global Problem,” http://www.actionbioscience.org/newfrontiers/morse.html, Hensel)</p><p>Morse: A pandemic is a very big epidemic. It requires a number of things. There are <u>many <mark>infections</u></mark> that get introduced from time to time in the human population and, like Ebola, <u><mark>burn themselves out because they kill too quickly or </mark>they <mark>don’t </mark>have a way to get from person to person</u>. They are a terrible tragedy, but also, in a sense, it is a lucky thing that <u>they don’t <mark>have an efficient means of transmission</u>.<strong></mark> </p><p><u>fundamental epidemiology</u></strong> <strong>concludes neg</p><p>Gerber 5 </strong>(Leah R. Gerber, PhD. Associate Professor of Ecology, Evolution, and Environmental Sciences, Ecological Society of America, "Exposing Extinction Risk Analysis to Pathogens: Is Disease Just Another Form of Density Dependence?" August 2005, Jstor)<strong> </p><p></strong>The density of it population is an important parameter for both PVA and host-pathogen theory. <u>A <strong><mark>fundamental </u></strong></mark>principle of<u><strong><mark> epidemiology</strong> </u></mark>is<u> that the spread of an infectious disease </u>through a population<u> is a function of the density of both susceptible and infectious hosts. If infectious agents are supportable by the host species of conservation interest, the impact of a pathogen on a declining population is likely to decrease as the host population declines. A pathogen will spread when</u>, on average<u>, it is able to transmit to a susceptible host before an infected host dies or eliminates the infection</u> (Kermack and McKendrick 1927, Anderson and May l99l). <u>If the parasite affects the reproduction or mortality of its host</u>, or the host is able to mount an immune response, <u>the parasite </u>population may eventually <u>reduce the density of susceptible hosts to a level at which the rate of parasite increase is no longer positive.</u> Most epidemiological models indicate that <u>there is a host threshold density </u>(or local population size) <u>below which a parasite cannot invade</u>, suggesting that rare or depleted species should be less subject to host-specific disease. This has implications for small, yet increasing, populations. For example, although endangered species at low density may be less susceptible to a disease outbreak, recovery to higher densities places them at increasing risk of future disease-related decline (e.g., southern sea otters; Gerber ct al. 2004). In the absence of stochastic factors (such as those modeled in PVA), and given the usual assumption of disease models that <u><mark>the chance that a </mark>susceptible <mark>host will become infected is <strong>proportional</strong> to the density of infected hosts</u></mark> (the mass action assumption) <u>a host specific <mark>pathogen <strong>cannot drive its host to extinction</u></mark> (McCallum and Dobson 1995). </p><p>Hype</p><p>Lind, 11</strong> - Policy Director of the Economic Growth Program at the New America Foundation<strong> </strong>(Michael, March/April 2011, “So Long, Chicken Little,” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/so_long_chicken_little?page=0,5<u>)//gingE</p><p>There's nothing like a good <strong>plague</strong> to get <strong>journalists</strong> and <strong>pundits</strong> in a frenzy</u>. Although the threat of global <u><mark>pandemics</u></mark> is real, <u>it's all too <strong><mark>often exaggerated</strong>. In the last few years, the world</mark> has <mark>experienced</mark> two such pandemics,</u> the avian flu (<u><mark>H5N1) and</u></mark> swine flu (<u><mark>H1N1</u></mark>). <u>Both fell far short of the apocalyptic vision of a new Black Death</u> cutting huge swaths of mortality with its remorseless scythe. <u><mark>Out of a global population</mark> of more than 6 billion people, <strong><mark>8,768</strong></mark> are estimated to have <mark>died from swine flu</mark>, <strong><mark>306 </strong>from avian flu</mark>.</u>¶ And yet <u>it was not just the <mark>BBC ominously informing us</mark> that "<strong><mark>the deadly swine flu … cannot be contained</strong></mark>.</u>" Like warnings about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, <u><strong>the good done by mobilizing people to address the problem must be weighed against the danger of apocalypse fatigue on the part of a public subjected to endless Chicken Little scares.</p><p></u>Genetics</p><p>Sowell, 1</strong> – Fellow at Hoover Institution (Thomas, March 5, Jewish World Review, “The Dangers of “Equality”, http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell030501.asp)//gingE</p><p>A sense of smell is just one of innumerable things that can differ greatly from one person to the next. Moreover, <u>many of these differences are essential to the survival and progress of the human race.</u>¶<u> <mark>People have <strong>different vulnerabilities and resistances</strong> to a variety of diseases</mark>. That is why <mark>one disease is <strong>unlikely</strong> to wipe out the </mark>human <mark>species, <strong>even in one place</u></mark>. An epidemic that sweeps through an area may leave some people dying like flies while others remain as healthy as horses.</p><p>Intervening actors</p><p>Wills 96 </strong>(Christopher, Professor of Biology at the University of California <u>Yellow Fever, Black Goddess</u>)</p><p><u>I am confident that <mark>no terrible disease will </mark>appear that <mark>slaughters us </mark>by the billion. The reason is that <mark>we can now respond very quickly </mark>to such a visible enemy. <mark>Any </mark>disease that spreads like wildfire<mark> will</mark> have to <mark>go so through </mark>the <mark>air or water and there are </mark>many <mark>steps we can take</mark> right away <mark>to prevent </mark>such a <mark>spread</u></mark>. If the people of fourteenth-century Europe had known what we know now, they could have halted the black death<strong> in short order.</p><p>Empirics and quarantines</p><p>Zakaria 9—</strong>Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, “The Capitalist Manifesto: Greed Is Good,” 13 June 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/201935)</p><p>Note—Laurie Garrett=science and health writer, winner of the Pulitzer, Polk, and Peabody Prize</p><p>It certainly looks like another example of crying wolf. <u>After bracing ourselves for a global pandemic, we've suffered something more like the usual seasonal influenza</u>. Three weeks ago the World Health Organization declared a health emergency, warning countries to "prepare for a pandemic" and said that the only question was the extent of worldwide damage. <u>Senior officials prophesied that millions could be infected by the disease. But as of last week, the WHO had confirmed only 4,800 cases</u> of swine flu, with 61 people having died of it. Obviously, these low numbers are a pleasant surprise, but it does make one wonder, what did we get wrong? <u><mark>Why did</mark> the <mark>predictions</mark> of a pandemic <mark>turn out to be so exaggerated?</u></mark> Some people blame an overheated media, but it would have been difficult to ignore major international health organizations and governments when they were warning of catastrophe. I think <u>there is a broader mistake in the way we look at the world.</u> Once we see a problem, we can describe it in great detail, extrapolating all its possible consequences. But <u><strong><mark>we</strong></mark> can <strong><mark>rarely anticipate</strong> the <strong>human response</strong> to</mark> that <mark>crisis</mark>. Take swine flu. The virus had crucial characteristicsthat led researchers to worry that it could spread far and fast</u>. They described—and the media reported—what would happen if it went unchecked. <u>But it did not go unchecked. In fact, <mark>swine flu was met by</mark> an extremely <strong><mark>vigorous</strong> response at its epicenter</mark>, Mexico. <mark>The Mexican government reacted quickly and massively, quarantining the infected population</mark>, testing others, providing medication to those who needed it. The noted expert on this subject,</u> Laurie Garrett, says, "We should all stand up and scream, 'Gracias, Mexico!' because the Mexican people and the Mexican government have sacrificed on a level that I'm not sure as Americans we would be prepared to do in the exact same circumstances. They shut down their schools. They shut down businesses, restaurants, churches, sporting events. <u>They basically paralyzed their own economy. They've suffered billions of dollars in financial losses still being tallied up, and thereby really brought transmission to a halt." Every time one of these viruses is detected, writers and officials bring up the Spanish influenza epidemic of 1918</u> in which millions of people died. Indeed, during the last pandemic scare, in 2005, President George W. Bush claimed that he had been reading a history of the Spanish flu to help him understand how to respond. <u>But <mark>the world</mark> we live in today <mark>looks <strong>nothing</strong> like 1918</mark>. Public <mark>health-care systems are far better</mark> </u>and more widespread than anything that existed during the First World War. <u>Even Mexico, a developing country, has a first-rate public-health system</u><strong>—far better than anything Britain or France had in the early 20th century. </p><p>Lessons from the SARS outbreak have already improved worldwide public health–this will limit future outbreaks of any disease</p><p>ENSOM 2003 </strong>(Jim, Globalcontinuity.com, June 20 http://www.globalcontinuity.com/article/articleview/94/1/30/)</p><p><u><mark>In reaching these landmarks in the containment of SARS, the most severely affected countries and areas have</mark> identified and rapidly <mark>corrected</mark> long-standing <mark>weaknesses in their health systems</mark> in ways that will mean permanent improvements for the management of all diseases</u>. In addition, <u><mark>systems of data collection and reporting, and new patterns o</mark>f openly</u> and frankly <u><mark>communicating</u></mark> information <u><mark>to the public will hold the world in good stead when the next new disease emerges<strong></mark> and the next influenza pandemic breaks out.</p><p></u>No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant</p><p><u>Mueller 10</u></strong> (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)</p><p><u><mark>Politicians</mark> </u>of all stripes<u> <mark>preach</mark> </u>to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York<u>. <mark>This</u> <u>was</mark> </u>an early expression of a pattern of<u> <mark>dramatic risk inflation</u></mark> that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions<u>, <mark>terrorist groups</u></mark> seem to <u><mark>have exhibited only limited desire and</mark> </u>even less<u> <mark>progress</mark> </u>in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright <u><mark>armed theft of fissile material is</u></mark> exceedingly<u><mark> unlikely</mark> </u>not only because of the resistance of guards, but because <u><mark>chase would be immediate</u></mark>. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If<u> <mark>terrorists</mark> </u>were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material,<u> </u>they would then probably <u><mark>have to transport it</u></mark> a long distance<u><mark> over unfamiliar terrain</u></mark> and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. <u><mark>Once outside</mark> </u>the country with their precious booty, <u><mark>terrorists would need</mark> </u>to set up<u> <mark>a </u></mark>large and<u><mark> well-equipped machine shop</mark> </u>to manufacture a bomb<u> <mark>and</mark> </u>then to populate it with a very select team of highly<u><mark> skilled scientists</u></mark>, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the <u><mark>technical requirements</u></mark> in several fields <u><mark>verge on the unfeasible</u></mark>. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. <u><mark>Adopting</mark> </u>probability estimates that purposely and heavily<u> <mark>bias </u></mark>the case <u><mark>in the terrorists’ favor</u></mark>—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, <u><mark>the cumulative odds</mark> </u>that they will be able to pull off the deed <u><mark>drop to one in</mark> </u>well over<u> <mark>three billion</u></mark>. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. <u><mark>They are unlikely to be</mark> </u>given or<u> <mark>sold a bomb</u></mark> by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. <u><mark>The terrorist group might</u></mark> also seek to <u><mark>steal</mark> </u>or illicitly purchase<u> <mark>a “loose nuke</u></mark>“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that <u><strong><mark>none exist</strong></mark>. </u>All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished <u><mark>bombs have</mark> </u>been out-fitted with <u><mark>devices that</u></mark> trigger a non-nuclear explosion that <u><mark>destroy</u></mark>s <u><mark>the bomb if </u></mark>it is<u><mark> tampered with.</mark> </u>And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple<u><mark> codes are required</mark> </u>not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge <u><mark>if a </u></mark>nuclear<u><mark> state were to</mark> </u>utterly<u> <mark>collapse</u></mark>; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear<u> <mark>weapons </u></mark>would probably <u><mark>remain under heavy guard</u></mark> by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that <u><mark>al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond</mark> </u>searching<u> <mark>the Internet</u>.</mark> After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.</p>	null	2nc	2NC Local DA	47,970	226	17,115	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	565,263	N	Wake	8	Georgia Boyce-Feinberg	Markoff	AG politics fed cp (2nr) treaties da (2nr) ban marihuana cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,836	The United States should cease its public and diplomatic opposition to the initiation of WTO-authorized suspension of Antigua’s obligations towards the United States under the TRIPS Agreement, and encourage Antigua to proceed with such suspension so long as legally authorized. The United States should not retaliate against Antigua for such suspension. The fifty states and sub-federal territories should legalize nearly all online gambling in the United States and institute uniform regulatory systems for online gambling, clarifying that prediction markets are legally permitted.	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4><strong>The United States should cease its public and diplomatic opposition to the initiation of WTO-authorized suspension of Antigua’s obligations towards the United States under the TRIPS Agreement, and encourage Antigua to proceed with such suspension so long as legally authorized. The United States should not retaliate against Antigua for such suspension. The fifty states and sub-federal territories should legalize nearly all online gambling in the United States and institute uniform regulatory systems for online gambling, clarifying that prediction markets are legally permitted. </h4></strong>	null	null	1	431,193	1	17,113	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	565,270	N	Texas	4	Georgetown Erpenbach-Krishnan	Arnett	DHS politics (2NR) cross retal cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,837	legal	AMERICAN TRANSPLANT FOUNDATION 15	AMERICAN TRANSPLANT FOUNDATION 15 non-profit organization that strives to eliminate our country's shortage of human transplant organs [FACTS & MYTHS, http://www.americantransplantfoundation.org/about-transplant/facts-and-myths/]	More than 6,000 living donations occur each year. One in four donors is not biologically related to the recipient. The buying and selling of human organs is not allowed for transplants in America, but it is allowed for research purposes.	null	Facts: Did You Know? More than 123,000 people in the United States are currently on the waiting list for a lifesaving organ transplant. Another name is added to the national transplant waiting list every 12 minutes. On average, 21 people die every day from the lack of available organs for transplant. Seven percent of people on the waiting list—more than 6,500 each year—die before they are able to receive a transplant. One deceased donor can save up to eight lives through organ donation and can save and enhance more than 100 lives through the lifesaving and healing gift of tissue donation. Organ recipients are selected based primarily on medical need, location and compatibility. Over 617,000 transplants have occurred in the U.S. since 1988. Organs that can be donated after death are the heart, liver, kidneys, lungs, pancreas and small intestines. Tissues include corneas, skin, veins, heart valves, tendons, ligaments and bones. The cornea is the most commonly transplanted tissue. More than 40,000 corneal transplants take place each year in the United States. A healthy person can become a ‘living donor’ by donating a kidney, or a part of the liver, lung, intestine, blood or bone marrow. More than 6,000 living donations occur each year. One in four donors is not biologically related to the recipient. The buying and selling of human organs is not allowed for transplants in America, but it is allowed for research purposes. In most countries, it is illegal to buy and sell human organs for transplants, but international black markets for organs are growing in response to the increased demand around the world. Learn more about Transplant Tourism.	1,665	<h4>legal</h4><p><strong>AMERICAN TRANSPLANT FOUNDATION 15</strong> non-profit organization that strives to eliminate our country's shortage of human transplant organs [FACTS & MYTHS, http://www.americantransplantfoundation.org/about-transplant/facts-and-myths/]</p><p>Facts: Did You Know?</p><p>More than 123,000 people in the United States are currently on the waiting list for a lifesaving organ transplant.</p><p>Another name is added to the national transplant waiting list every 12 minutes.</p><p>On average, 21 people die every day from the lack of available organs for transplant.</p><p>Seven percent of people on the waiting list—more than 6,500 each year—die before they are able to receive a transplant.</p><p>One deceased donor can save up to eight lives through organ donation and can save and enhance more than 100 lives through the lifesaving and healing gift of tissue donation.</p><p>Organ recipients are selected based primarily on medical need, location and compatibility.</p><p>Over 617,000 transplants have occurred in the U.S. since 1988.</p><p>Organs that can be donated after death are the heart, liver, kidneys, lungs, pancreas and small intestines. Tissues include corneas, skin, veins, heart valves, tendons, ligaments and bones.</p><p>The cornea is the most commonly transplanted tissue. More than 40,000 corneal transplants take place each year in the United States.</p><p>A healthy person can become a ‘living donor’ by donating a kidney, or a part of the liver, lung, intestine, blood or bone marrow.</p><p><u>More than 6,000 living donations occur each year. One in four donors is not biologically related to the recipient.</p><p>The buying and selling of human organs is not allowed for transplants in America, but it is allowed for research purposes.</p><p></u>In most countries, it is illegal to buy and sell human organs for transplants, but international black markets for organs are growing in response to the increased demand around the world. Learn more about Transplant Tourism.</p>	1NC	null	1nc – Property Rights	431,195	2	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,838	Collapsing the drug control treaties causes mass disease spread- abrogation cuts off key medicine trade—independtly also turns econ and cred	Bewley-Taylor et al 2014	Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)	Withdrawing from the UN drug control conventions completely is likely to trigger strong condemnations and may have serious political, economic and reputational repercussions For countries receiving development aid or benefitting from preferential trade agreements, sanctions would be unavoidable Adherence to all three drug control conventions has been made an explicit condition in agreements countries want to keep parts of the international drug-control regime intact not least its control system for production, trade and availability of drugs for medicinal purposes Many countries, however, are already suffering inadequate availability of essential medicines, and exiting the treaty system administering their production and trade would only complicate those problems the Conventions provide the INCB the possibility to impose “remedial measures” in terms of restricting or banning trade in medicines controlled under those treaties to countries if “the Board has objective reasons to believe that the aims of this Convention are being seriously endangered such measures would have immediate and severe humanitarian consequences	Withdrawing from the UN drug control conventions completely is likely to trigger even stronger condemnations and may have serious political, economic and reputational repercussions For countries receiving development aid or benefitting from preferential trade agreements, sanctions would be unavoidable ountries want to keep parts of the international drug-control regime intact, not least its control system for production, trade and availability of drugs for medicinal purposes Many countries are already suffering inadequate availability of essential medicines, and exiting the treaty system administering their production and trade would only complicate those problems Conventions provide the INCB the possibility to impose “remedial measures” in terms of restricting or banning trade in medicines such measures would have immediate and severe humanitarian consequences	Withdrawing from the UN drug control conventions completely is likely to trigger even stronger condemnations than seen in the case of Bolivia, and may have serious political, economic and reputational repercussions.37 For countries receiving development aid or benefitting from preferential trade agreements, sanctions from the U.S. and the European Union would probably be unavoidable. Adherence to all three drug control conventions has been made an explicit condition in several other agreements, not only in the sphere of trade and development but it is also a sine qua non for accession to the European Union, for example. Very few countries would be able to confront such pressures alone. Also, most countries now struggling to abide by all its strictures and considering options for change want to keep significant parts of the international drug-control regime intact, not least its control system for production, trade and availability of drugs for medicinal purposes. Denunciation would not automatically exclude access to controlled drugs for licit purposes, since (as an exception in international law) the drug control conventions impose obligations even on non-parties to adhere to the system of estimated requirements and monitoring rules for international trade of controlled drugs for medical and scientific purposes. Many countries, however, are already suffering inadequate availability of essential medicines, and exiting the treaty system administering their production and trade would only complicate those problems. Moreover, the 1961 and 1971 Conventions provide the INCB the possibility to impose “remedial measures” in terms of restricting or banning trade in medicines controlled under those treaties to countries if “the Board has objective reasons to believe that the aims of this Convention are being seriously endangered by reason of the failure of any Party, country or territory to carry out the provisions of this Convention”.38 While the procedure under that treaty article has only been activated by the INCB a few times, and is operative now in the case of Afghanistan, actual sanctions have never been applied. It would be extremely controversial as such measures would have immediate and severe humanitarian consequences and violate the human right to health, for which the Board would not want to be responsible.	2,352	<h4><strong>Collapsing the drug control treaties causes mass disease spread- abrogation cuts off key medicine trade—independtly also turns econ and cred </h4><p>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)</p><p><u><mark>Withdrawing from the UN drug control conventions completely is likely to trigger</u> even <u>strong</u>er <u>condemnations</u></mark> than seen in the case of Bolivia, <u><strong><mark>and may have serious political, economic and reputational repercussions</u></strong></mark>.37 <u><mark>For countries receiving development aid or benefitting from preferential trade agreements, sanctions</u></mark> from the U.S. and the European Union <u><mark>would</u></mark> probably <u><mark>be</u> <u>unavoidable</u></mark>. <u>Adherence to all three drug control conventions has been made an explicit condition in</u> several other <u>agreements</u>, not only in the sphere of trade and development but it is also a sine qua non for accession to the European Union, for example. Very few countries would be able to confront such pressures alone. Also, most <u>c<mark>ountries</u></mark> now struggling to abide by all its strictures and considering options for change <u><mark>want to keep</u></mark> significant <u><mark>parts of the international drug-control regime intact</u>, <u>not least its control system for production, trade and availability of drugs for medicinal purposes</u></mark>. Denunciation would not automatically exclude access to controlled drugs for licit purposes, since (as an exception in international law) the drug control conventions impose obligations even on non-parties to adhere to the system of estimated requirements and monitoring rules for international trade of controlled drugs for medical and scientific purposes. <u><mark>Many countries</mark>, however, <mark>are already suffering inadequate availability of <strong>essential medicines</strong>, and exiting the treaty system administering their production and trade would only complicate those problems</u></mark>. Moreover, <u>the</u> 1961 and 1971 <u><mark>Conventions provide the INCB the possibility to impose “remedial measures” in terms of restricting or banning trade in medicines</mark> controlled under those treaties to countries if “the Board has objective reasons to believe that the aims of this Convention are being seriously endangered </u>by reason of the failure of any Party, country or territory to carry out the provisions of this Convention”.38 While the procedure under that treaty article has only been activated by the INCB a few times, and is operative now in the case of Afghanistan, actual sanctions have never been applied. It would be extremely controversial as <u><strong><mark>such measures would have immediate and severe humanitarian consequences</u></mark> and violate the human right to health, for which the Board would not want to be responsible.</p></strong>	null	1nr	2NC Local DA	430,464	8	17,115	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	565,263	N	Wake	8	Georgia Boyce-Feinberg	Markoff	AG politics fed cp (2nr) treaties da (2nr) ban marihuana cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,839	Retrenchment solves	MacDonald & Parent 11	MacDonald & Parent 11—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]	Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States Contrary to predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the U S should be able to retrench in the coming decades the U S is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations the empirical record supports these conclusions periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the AngloAmerican transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the U S can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes	Based on the historical record the U S should retrench the U S is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to allies, and decrease commitments retrenchment need not signal weakness Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability they are no longer the target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons can play a role in alliance formation they should eliminate burdens without exposing vulnerabilities the record supports these conclusions periods of transition do not appear more conflict prone the AngloAmerican transition and was resolved without confrontation retrenchment need not undermine commitments or unleash security dilemmas By shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the U S can strengthen its commitments while accommodating China When policymakers perceive a stable heg power-maximisation becomes the goal because of the ‘lust for power’ and disappearance of security constraints When policymakers perceive a declining heg policymakers change their hierarchic view policymakers worry about security Offshore balancing and multilateralism become options to maximise security the US becomes willing to pay the ‘lock-in’ price of multilateral institutions to constrain other states Multilateral institutions became Clinton’s weapon to open Asia the ‘new economy’ revived confidence The selective engagement policy was expanded by Bush to hegemonic dominion The ‘lust for power’ drove US to pursue pre-emption strategy’ and proactive missile defence When heg is stable no one can stop US expansion early implementation of multilateralism may facilitate the soft-landing of declining hege What is most to be feared is weak global regulations given WMDs As tech united by IT, cognitive science, nanotech and robotics advance synergistically in unmonitored lab we may be blindsided by future developments At the base of our concerns are proclivities for short-term thinking tied to national interests we need new global regulation effective global governance alone can adequately respond to destructive current global problems, and prevent new ones our dilemma is that multilateral institutions are not likely to be strengthened because great powers seek superiority great powers will leave global survival	Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two. 91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America’s superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, “[N]o amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia.” 92 Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the AngloAmerican transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. 94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two. 95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness. 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul. 97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict. 98 Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order. 99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory. 100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes. 101 Decline causes multilateralism and a soft landing He 10—Professor of Political Science at Utah State University [Kai He (Postdoctoral fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program at Princeton University (2009–2010) and a Bradley fellow of the Lynda and Harry Bradley Foundation (2009–2010), “The hegemon’s choice between power and security: explaining US policy toward Asia after the Cold War,” Review of International Studies (2010), 36, pg. 1121–1143] When US policymakers perceive a rising or a stable hegemony, the anarchic nature of the international system is no longer valid in the mind of US policymakers because the preponderant power makes the US immune from military threats. In the self-perceived, hierarchic international system with the US on the top, power-maximisation becomes the strategic goal of the US in part because of the ‘lust for power’ driven by human nature and in part because of the disappearance of the security constraints imposed by anarchy. Therefore, selective engagement and hegemonic dominion become two possible strategies for the US to maximise its power in the world. The larger the power gap between the US and others, the more likely selective engagement expands to hegemonic dominion. When US policymakers perceive a declining hegemony in that the power gap between the hegemon and others is narrowed rather than widened, US policymakers begin to change their hierarchic view of the international system. The rapid decline of relative power causes US policymakers to worry about security imposed by anarchy even though the US may remain the most powerful state in the system during the process of decline. Offshore balancing and multilateralism, therefore, become two possible policy options for the US to maximise its security under anarchy. The possible budget constraints during US decline may lead to military withdrawals from overseas bases. In addition, the US becomes more willing to pay the initial ‘lock-in’ price of multilateral institutions in order to constrain other states’ behaviour for its own security. US foreign policy towards Asia preliminarily supports the power-perception hegemonic model. When President George H. W. Bush came to power, the US faced ‘dual deficits’ even though the US won the Cold War and became the hegemon by default in the early 1990s. The domestic economic difficulty imposed a declining, or at least uncertain, hegemony to the Bush administration. Consequently, Bush had to withdraw troops from Asia and conducted a reluctant offshore balancing strategy in the early 1990s. Although the US still claimed to keep its commitments to Asian allies, the US words with the sword became unreliable at best. During President Clinton’s first tenure, how to revive US economy became the first priority of the administration. The perception of a declining hegemon did not totally fade until the middle of the 1990s when the US economy gradually came out of the recession. Multilateral institutions, especially APEC, became Clinton’s diplomatic weapon to open Asia’s market and boost US economy. In addition, the US also endorsed the ARF initiated by the ASEAN states in order to retain its eroding political and military influence after the strategic retreats in the early 1990s. However, the US ‘new economy’ based on information technology and computers revived policymakers’ confidence in US hegemony after the Asian miracle was terminated by the 1997 economic crisis. The second part of the 1990s witnessed a rising US hegemony and the George W. Bush administration reached the apex of US power by any measure in the early 21st century. Therefore, since Clinton’s second tenure in the White House, US foreign policy in general and towards Asia in particular has become more assertive and power-driven in nature. Besides reconfirming its traditional military alliances in Asia, the US deepened its military engagement in the region through extensive security cooperation with other Asian states. The selective engagement policy of the US in the late 1990s was substantially expanded by the Bush administration to hegemonic dominion after 9/11. The unrivalled hegemony relieved US of concerns over security threats from any other states in the international system. The ‘lust for power’ without constraints from anarchy drove US policymakers to pursue a hegemonic dominion policy in the world. The ‘pre-emption strategy’ and proactive missile defence programs reflected the power-maximising nature of the hegemonic dominion strategy during the George W. Bush administration. What will the US do in the future? The power-perception hegemonic model suggests that the US cannot escape the fate of other great powers in history. When US hegemony is still rising or at a stable stage, no one can stop US expansion for more power. When its economy can no longer afford its power-oriented strategy, the US will face the same strategic burden of ‘imperial overstretch’ that Great Britain suffered in the 19th century. However, the power-perception hegemonic model also argues that US foreign policy depends on how US policymakers perceive the rise and fall of US hegemony. If historical learning can help US policymakers cultivate a prudent perception regarding US hegemony, the early implementation of offshore balancing and multilateralism may facilitate the soft-landing of declining US hegemony. More importantly, the real danger is whether the US can make a right choice between power and security when US hegemony begins to decline. If US policymakers cannot learn from history but insist on seeking more power instead of security even though US hegemony is in decline, the likelihood of hegemonic war will increase. However, if US policymakers choose security over power when US hegemony is in decline, offshore balancing and multilateralism can help the US maximise security in the future anarchic, multipolar world. Pg. 1141-1143 Extinction Masciulli 11—Professor of Political Science @ St Thomas University [Joseph Masciulli, “The Governance Challenge for Global Political and Technoscientific Leaders in an Era of Globalization and Globalizing Technologies,” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society February 2011 vol. 31 no. 1 pg. 3-5] What is most to be feared is enhanced global disorder resulting from the combination of weak global regulations; the unforeseen destructive consequences of converging technologies and economic globalization; military competition among the great powers; and the prevalent biases of short-term thinking held by most leaders and elites. But no practical person would wish that such a disorder scenario come true, given all the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) available now or which will surely become available in the foreseeable future. As converging technologies united by IT, cognitive science, nanotechnology, and robotics advance synergistically in monitored and unmonitored laboratories, we may be blindsided by these future developments brought about by technoscientists with a variety of good or destructive or mercenary motives. The current laudable but problematic openness about publishing scientific results on the Internet would contribute greatly to such negative outcomes. To be sure, if the global disorder-emergency scenario occurred because of postmodern terrorism or rogue states using biological, chemical, or nuclear WMDs, or a regional war with nuclear weapons in the Middle East or South Asia, there might well be a positive result for global governance. Such a global emergency might unite the global great and major powers in the conviction that a global concert was necessary for their survival and planetary survival as well. In such a global great power concert, basic rules of economic, security, and legal order would be uncompromisingly enforced both globally and in the particular regions where they held hegemonic status. That concert scenario, however, is flawed by the limited legitimacy of its structure based on the members having the greatest hard and soft power on planet Earth. At the base of our concerns, I would argue, are human proclivities for narrow, short-term thinking tied to individual self-interest or corporate and national interests in decision making. For globalization, though propelled by technologies of various kinds, “remains an essentially human phenomenon . . . and the main drivers for the establishment and uses of disseminative systems are hardy perennials: profit, convenience, greed, relative advantage, curiosity, demonstrations of prowess, ideological fervor, malign destructiveness.” These human drives and capacities will not disappear. Their “manifestations now extend considerably beyond more familiarly empowered governmental, technoscientific and corporate actors to include even individuals: terrorists, computer hackers and rogue market traders” (Whitman, 2005, p. 104). In this dangerous world, if people are to have their human dignity recognized and enjoy their human rights, above all, to life, security, a healthy environment, and freedom, we need new forms of comprehensive global regulation and control. Such effective global leadership and governance with robust enforcement powers alone can adequately respond to destructive current global problems, and prevent new ones. However, successful human adaptation and innovation to our current complex environment through the social construction of effective global governance will be a daunting collective task for global political and technoscientific leaders and citizens. For our global society is caught in “the whirlpool of an accelerating process of modernization” that has for the most part “been left to its own devices” (Habermas, 2001, p. 112). We need to progress in human adaptation to and innovation for our complex and problematical global social and natural planetary environments through global governance. I suggest we need to begin by ending the prevalent biases of short-termism in thinking and acting and the false values attached to the narrow self-interest of individuals, corporations, and states. I agree with Stephen Hawking that the long-term future of the human race must be in space. It will be difficult enough to avoid disaster on planet Earth in the next hundred years, let alone the next thousand, or million. . . . There have been a number of times in the past when its survival has been a question of touch and go. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 was one of these. The frequency of such occasions is likely to increase in the future. We shall need great care and judgment to negotiate them all successfully. But I’m an optimist. If we can avoid disaster for the next two centuries, our species should be safe, as we spread into space. . . . But we are entering an increasingly dangerous period of our history. Our population and our use of the finite resources of planet Earth, are growing exponentially, along with our technical ability to change the environment for good or ill. But our genetic code still carries the selfish and aggressive instincts that were of survival advantage in the past. . . . Our only chance of long term survival is not to remain inward looking on planet Earth, but to spread out into space. We have made remarkable progress in the last hundred years. But if we want to continue beyond the next hundred years, our future is in space.” (Hawking, 2010) Nonetheless, to reinvent humanity pluralistically in outer space and beyond will require securing our one and only global society and planet Earth through effective global governance in the foreseeable future. And our dilemma is that the enforcement powers of multilateral institutions are not likely to be strengthened because of the competition for greater (relative, not absolute) hard and soft power by the great and major powers. They seek their national or alliance superiority, or at least, parity, for the sake of their state’s survival and security now. Unless the global disorder-emergency scenario was to occur soon—God forbid—the great powers will most likely, recklessly and tragically, leave global survival and security to their longer term agendas. Pg. 4-5	18,331	<h4>Retrenchment solves</h4><p><strong>MacDonald & Parent 11</strong>—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” <u>International Security</u>, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]</p><p><u>Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States</u>. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two. 91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America’s superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, “[N]o amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia.” 92</p><p><u>Contrary to</u> these <u>predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism</u>. <u><mark>Based on the historical</mark> track <mark>record</mark> of great powers facing acute relative decline, <mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>should</mark> be able to <mark>retrench</mark> in the coming decades</u>. In the next few years, <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to</mark> its <mark>allies, and</mark> work to <mark>decrease</mark> costly international <mark>commitments</u></mark>. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. <u>Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that <mark>retrenchment need not signal weakness</mark>. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers</u>.</p><p><u>Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline</u>. We counter that <u>there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument</u>. Theoretically, <u>hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. <mark>Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability</mark>, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them</u>. Further, <u><mark>they are no longer the</mark> top <mark>target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons</mark> may be influential because they <mark>can play a</mark> pivotal <mark>role in alliance formation</u></mark>. In addition, <u>hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; <mark>they should</mark> be able to more readily identify and <mark>eliminate</mark> extraneous <mark>burdens without exposing vulnerabilities</mark> or exciting domestic populations</u>.</p><p>We believe <u><mark>the</mark> empirical <mark>record supports these conclusions</u></mark>. In particular, <u><mark>periods of</mark> hegemonic <mark>transition do not appear more conflict prone</mark> than those of acute decline</u>. <u>The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was <mark>the AngloAmerican transition</mark>, which took place around 1872 <mark>and was resolved without</mark> armed <mark>confrontation</u></mark>. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. 94</p><p>Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two. 95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness. 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul. 97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict. 98 Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order. 99 <u>A policy of gradual <mark>retrenchment need not undermine</mark> the credibility of U.S. alliance <mark>commitments or unleash </mark>destabilizing regional <mark>security dilemmas</u></mark>. Indeed, <u>even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory</u>. 100 <u><mark>By</mark> incrementally <mark>shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions,</mark> <mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>can strengthen</mark> the credibility of <mark>its</mark> core <mark>commitments while accommodating</mark> the interests of a rising <mark>China</mark>. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes</u>. 101</p><p>Decline causes multilateralism and a soft landing</p><p>He 10—Professor of Political Science at Utah State University [Kai He (Postdoctoral fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program at Princeton University (2009–2010) and a Bradley fellow of the Lynda and Harry Bradley Foundation (2009–2010), “The hegemon’s choice between power and security: explaining US policy toward Asia after the Cold War,” Review of International Studies (2010), 36, pg. 1121–1143]</p><p><mark>When</mark> US <mark>policymakers perceive a</mark> rising or a <mark>stable heg</mark>emony, the anarchic nature of the international system is no longer valid in the mind of US policymakers because the preponderant power makes the US immune from military threats. In the self-perceived, hierarchic international system with the US on the top, <mark>power-maximisation becomes the</mark> strategic <mark>goal</mark> of the US in part <mark>because of the ‘lust for power’</mark> driven by human nature <mark>and</mark> in part because of the <mark>disappearance of</mark> the <mark>security constraints</mark> imposed by anarchy. Therefore, selective engagement and hegemonic dominion become two possible strategies for the US to maximise its power in the world. The larger the power gap between the US and others, the more likely selective engagement expands to hegemonic dominion. <mark>When</mark> US <mark>policymakers perceive a declining heg</mark>emony in that the power gap between the hegemon and others is narrowed rather than widened, US <mark>policymakers</mark> begin to <mark>change their hierarchic view</mark> of the international system. The rapid decline of relative power causes US <mark>policymakers</mark> to <mark>worry about security</mark> imposed by anarchy even though the US may remain the most powerful state in the system during the process of decline. <mark>Offshore balancing and multilateralism</mark>, therefore, <mark>become</mark> two possible policy <mark>options</mark> for the US <mark>to maximise</mark> its <mark>security</mark> under anarchy. The possible budget constraints during US decline may lead to military withdrawals from overseas bases. In addition, <mark>the US becomes</mark> more <mark>willing to pay the</mark> initial <mark>‘lock-in’ price of multilateral institutions</mark> in order <mark>to constrain other states</mark>’ behaviour for its own security.</p><p>US foreign policy towards Asia preliminarily supports the power-perception hegemonic model. When President George H. W. Bush came to power, the US faced ‘dual deficits’ even though the US won the Cold War and became the hegemon by default in the early 1990s. The domestic economic difficulty imposed a declining, or at least uncertain, hegemony to the Bush administration. Consequently, Bush had to withdraw troops from Asia and conducted a reluctant offshore balancing strategy in the early 1990s. Although the US still claimed to keep its commitments to Asian allies, the US words with the sword became unreliable at best.</p><p>During President Clinton’s first tenure, how to revive US economy became the first priority of the administration. The perception of a declining hegemon did not totally fade until the middle of the 1990s when the US economy gradually came out of the recession. <mark>Multilateral institutions</mark>, especially APEC, <mark>became Clinton’s</mark> diplomatic <mark>weapon to open Asia</mark>’s market and boost US economy. In addition, the US also endorsed the ARF initiated by the ASEAN states in order to retain its eroding political and military influence after the strategic retreats in the early 1990s.</p><p>However, <mark>the </mark>US <mark>‘new economy’</mark> based on information technology and computers <mark>revived </mark>policymakers’ <mark>confidence </mark>in US hegemony after the Asian miracle was terminated by the 1997 economic crisis. The second part of the 1990s witnessed a rising US hegemony and the George W. Bush administration reached the apex of US power by any measure in the early 21st century. Therefore, since Clinton’s second tenure in the White House, US foreign policy in general and towards Asia in particular has become more assertive and power-driven in nature. Besides reconfirming its traditional military alliances in Asia, the US deepened its military engagement in the region through extensive security cooperation with other Asian states.</p><p><mark>The selective engagement policy</mark> of the US in the late 1990s <mark>was</mark> substantially <mark>expanded by</mark> the <mark>Bush</mark> administration <mark>to hegemonic dominion</mark> after 9/11. The unrivalled hegemony relieved US of concerns over security threats from any other states in the international system. <mark>The ‘lust for power’</mark> without constraints from anarchy <mark>drove US</mark> policymakers <mark>to pursue</mark> a hegemonic dominion policy in the world. The ‘<mark>pre-emption strategy’ and</mark> <mark>proactive missile defence</mark> programs reflected the power-maximising nature of the hegemonic dominion strategy during the George W. Bush administration.</p><p>What will the US do in the future? The power-perception hegemonic model suggests that the US cannot escape the fate of other great powers in history. <mark>When</mark> US <mark>heg</mark>emony <mark>is</mark> still rising or at a <mark>stable</mark> stage, <mark>no one can stop US expansion</mark> for more power. When its economy can no longer afford its power-oriented strategy, the US will face the same strategic burden of ‘imperial overstretch’ that Great Britain suffered in the 19th century. However, the power-perception hegemonic model also argues that US foreign policy depends on how US policymakers perceive the rise and fall of US hegemony.</p><p>If historical learning can help US policymakers cultivate a prudent perception regarding US hegemony, the <mark>early implementation of</mark> offshore balancing and <mark>multilateralism may facilitate the soft-landing of declining</mark> US <mark>hege</mark>mony. More importantly, the real danger is whether the US can make a right choice between power and security when US hegemony begins to decline. If US policymakers cannot learn from history but insist on seeking more power instead of security even though US hegemony is in decline, the likelihood of hegemonic war will increase. However, if US policymakers choose security over power when US hegemony is in decline, offshore balancing and multilateralism can help the US maximise security in the future anarchic, multipolar world. Pg. 1141-1143</p><p>Extinction</p><p>Masciulli 11—Professor of Political Science @ St Thomas University [Joseph Masciulli, “The Governance Challenge for Global Political and Technoscientific Leaders in an Era of Globalization and Globalizing Technologies,” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society February 2011 vol. 31 no. 1 pg. 3-5]</p><p><mark>What is most to be feared is</mark> enhanced global disorder resulting from the combination of <mark>weak global regulations</mark>; the unforeseen destructive consequences of converging technologies and economic globalization; military competition among the great powers; and the prevalent biases of short-term thinking held by most leaders and elites. But no practical person would wish that such a disorder scenario come true, <mark>given</mark> all the weapons of mass destruction (<mark>WMDs</mark>) available now or which will surely become available in the foreseeable future. <mark>As</mark> converging <mark>tech</mark>nologies <mark>united by IT, cognitive science,</mark> <mark>nanotech</mark>nology, <mark>and robotics</mark> <mark>advance synergistically in</mark> monitored and <mark>unmonitored lab</mark>oratories, <mark>we may be blindsided by</mark> these <mark>future developments</mark> brought about by technoscientists with a variety of good or destructive or mercenary motives. The current laudable but problematic openness about publishing scientific results on the Internet would contribute greatly to such negative outcomes.</p><p>To be sure, if the global disorder-emergency scenario occurred because of postmodern terrorism or rogue states using biological, chemical, or nuclear WMDs, or a regional war with nuclear weapons in the Middle East or South Asia, there might well be a positive result for global governance. Such a global emergency might unite the global great and major powers in the conviction that a global concert was necessary for their survival and planetary survival as well. In such a global great power concert, basic rules of economic, security, and legal order would be uncompromisingly enforced both globally and in the particular regions where they held hegemonic status. That concert scenario, however, is flawed by the limited legitimacy of its structure based on the members having the greatest hard and soft power on planet Earth.</p><p><mark>At the base of our concerns</mark>, I would argue, <mark>are</mark> human <mark>proclivities for</mark> narrow, <mark>short-term thinking tied to</mark> individual self-interest or corporate and <mark>national interests</mark> in decision making. For globalization, though propelled by technologies of various kinds, “remains an essentially human phenomenon . . . and the main drivers for the establishment and uses of disseminative systems are hardy perennials: profit, convenience, greed, relative advantage, curiosity, demonstrations of prowess, ideological fervor, malign destructiveness.” These human drives and capacities will not disappear. Their “manifestations now extend considerably beyond more familiarly empowered governmental, technoscientific and corporate actors to include even individuals: terrorists, computer hackers and rogue market traders” (Whitman, 2005, p. 104).</p><p>In this dangerous world, if people are to have their human dignity recognized and enjoy their human rights, above all, to life, security, a healthy environment, and freedom, <mark>we need new</mark> forms of comprehensive <mark>global regulation</mark> and control. Such <mark>effective global</mark> leadership and <mark>governance</mark> with robust enforcement powers <mark>alone can adequately respond to destructive current global problems, and prevent new ones</mark>. However, successful human adaptation and innovation to our current complex environment through the social construction of effective global governance will be a daunting collective task for global political and technoscientific leaders and citizens. For our global society is caught in “the whirlpool of an accelerating process of modernization” that has for the most part “been left to its own devices” (Habermas, 2001, p. 112). We need to progress in human adaptation to and innovation for our complex and problematical global social and natural planetary environments through global governance. I suggest we need to begin by ending the prevalent biases of short-termism in thinking and acting and the false values attached to the narrow self-interest of individuals, corporations, and states.</p><p>I agree with Stephen Hawking that the long-term future of the human race must be in space. It will be difficult enough to avoid disaster on planet Earth in the next hundred years, let alone the next thousand, or million. . . . There have been a number of times in the past when its survival has been a question of touch and go. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 was one of these. The frequency of such occasions is likely to increase in the future. We shall need great care and judgment to negotiate them all successfully. But I’m an optimist. If we can avoid disaster for the next two centuries, our species should be safe, as we spread into space. . . . But we are entering an increasingly dangerous period of our history. Our population and our use of the finite resources of planet Earth, are growing exponentially, along with our technical ability to change the environment for good or ill. But our genetic code still carries the selfish and aggressive instincts that were of survival advantage in the past. . . . Our only chance of long term survival is not to remain inward looking on planet Earth, but to spread out into space. We have made remarkable progress in the last hundred years. But if we want to continue beyond the next hundred years, our future is in space.” (Hawking, 2010)</p><p>Nonetheless, to reinvent humanity pluralistically in outer space and beyond will require securing our one and only global society and planet Earth through effective global governance in the foreseeable future. And <mark>our dilemma is that</mark> the enforcement powers of <mark>multilateral institutions are not likely to be strengthened because</mark> of the competition for greater (relative, not absolute) hard and soft power by the <mark>great</mark> and major <mark>powers</mark>. They <mark>seek</mark> their national or alliance <mark>superiority</mark>, or at least, parity, for the sake of their state’s survival and security now. Unless the global disorder-emergency scenario was to occur soon—God forbid—the <mark>great powers will</mark> most likely, recklessly and tragically, <mark>leave global survival</mark> and security to their longer term agendas. Pg. 4-5</p>	null	null	1nc – Science Diplomacy	97,185	113	17,120	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	565,421	N	Gsu	3	Wake Forest Clifford-Villa	Watson	vs Stem cells aff 1NC T "nearly all" midterms DA visas CP heg bad case 2NC heg bad case 1NR case T 2NR heg bad case	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,840	Legalization implies changing the law	EMCCDA 01	EMCCDA 01 European monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction,	Recent developments in legal approaches to drug use” November 2001 http://eldd.emcdda.org/databases/eldd_comparative_analyses.cfm Concept and Definition of Decriminalisation Decriminalisation takes away the status of criminal law from those acts to which it is applied certain acts no longer constitute criminal offences With regard to drugs, it is usually used to refer to demand acts of acquisition, possession and consumption. it still is illegal to use, possess, acquire or in certain cases import drugs, but those acts are no longer criminal offences. sanctions can still be applied In contrast, legalisation is the process of bringing within the control of the law a specified activity that was previously illegal and prohibited or strictly regulated the term is most commonly applied to acts of supply; production, manufacture or sale for non-medical use Legalisation would mean that such activities, and use and possession, would be regulated by states’ norms any form of legalisation would be contrary to the current UN conventions.	Decriminalisation takes away the status of criminal law sanctions can still be applied In contrast, legalisation is the process of bringing within the control of the law a specified activity that was previously illegal Legalisation would mean that such activities, and use and possession, would be regulated	“Decriminalisation in Europe?: Recent developments in legal approaches to drug use” November 2001 http://eldd.emcdda.org/databases/eldd_comparative_analyses.cfm Concept and Definition of Decriminalisation Decriminalisation. Decriminalisation takes away the status of criminal law from those acts to which it is applied. This means that certain acts no longer constitute criminal offences. With regard to drugs, it is usually used to refer to demand; acts of acquisition, possession and consumption. Following decriminalisation, it still is illegal to use, possess, acquire or in certain cases import drugs, but those acts are no longer criminal offences. However, administrative sanctions can still be applied; these can be a fine, suspension of the driving or firearms licence, or just a warning. In contrast, legalisation is the process of bringing within the control of the law a specified activity that was previously illegal and prohibited or strictly regulated. Related to drugs, the term is most commonly applied to acts of supply; production, manufacture or sale for non-medical use. Legalisation would mean that such activities, and use and possession, would be regulated by states’ norms, in the same way that it is legal to use alcohol and tobacco. There can still exist some administrative controls and regulations, which might even be supported by criminal sanctions (e.g. when juveniles or road traffic are concerned). From a legal point of view, any form of legalisation would be contrary to the current UN conventions.	1,534	<h4><strong>Legalization implies changing the law</h4><p>EMCCDA 01 </strong> European monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction, </p><p>“Decriminalisation in Europe?:<u> Recent developments in legal approaches to drug use” November 2001 http://eldd.emcdda.org/databases/eldd_comparative_analyses.cfm</p><p>Concept and Definition of Decriminalisation</u> Decriminalisation. <u><mark>Decriminalisation takes away the status of criminal law </mark>from those acts to which it is applied</u>. This means that <u>certain acts no longer constitute criminal offences</u>. <u>With regard to drugs, it is usually used to refer to demand</u>; <u>acts of acquisition, possession and consumption.</u> Following decriminalisation, <u>it still is illegal to use, possess, acquire or in certain cases import drugs, but those acts are no longer criminal offences.</u> However, administrative <u><mark>sanctions can still be applied</u></mark>; these can be a fine, suspension of the driving or firearms licence, or just a warning. <u><mark>In contrast, legalisation is the process of bringing within the control of the law a specified activity that was previously illegal</mark> and prohibited or strictly regulated</u>. Related to drugs, <u>the term is most commonly applied to acts of supply; production, manufacture or sale for non-medical use</u>. <u><mark>Legalisation would mean that such activities, and use and possession, would be regulated </mark>by states’ norms</u>, in the same way that it is legal to use alcohol and tobacco. There can still exist some administrative controls and regulations, which might even be supported by criminal sanctions (e.g. when juveniles or road traffic are concerned). From a legal point of view, <u>any form of legalisation would be contrary to the current UN conventions.</p></u>	1nc vs WGA	null	1nc – T	431,121	18	17,118	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	565,420	N	Gsu	1	West Georgia Muhammad-Gaius	Deming	1NC T occidentalism K law good K impact turns 2NC Space colonization impact turn 1NR T 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,841	GM development is inevitable—	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>GM development is inevitable—</h4>	null	null	1nc – Biotech	431,196	1	17,120	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	565,421	N	Gsu	3	Wake Forest Clifford-Villa	Watson	vs Stem cells aff 1NC T "nearly all" midterms DA visas CP heg bad case 2NC heg bad case 1NR case T 2NR heg bad case	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,842	The CP drops U.S. opposition to cross-retaliation by Antigua---that legitimizes cross-retal and boosts trade credibility, separate from the issue of compliance	Danish 13	Danish 13, Fourth Year, B.A. LL.B.(H) National University of Advanced Legal Studies, India, October 2013, “WTO Dispute Resolution and Cross Retaliation under Trips: Is it Sanctioned Piracy of Intellectual Property? A Case Study of the US - Gambling (Antigua) Case,” Westminster Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, http://www.westminsterlawreview.org/wlr16.php As of June 2013, Antigua had not initiated any proceedings aimed at profiting from suspension of the intellectual property obligations owed to the US. However, many reports seem to suggest that it may soon set up a website for the sale of American intellectual property, if the negotiations deadlock is not broken.44	Antigua is still engaged in the use of pressure tactics in the hope of getting the US to comply with the rulings whenever Antigua has shown signs of putting its ruling into action, the Americans have responded with threats, claiming intellectual property piracy and violation of international trade laws The Antiguan action has been authorised by the DSB after all the procedures laid down in the DSU were followed to the letter the way in which Antigua has proceeded against the US has conformed to all the standards expected of a country using an international trade dispute redressal forum Yet there have been aspersions on Antiguan conduct by American authorities the levelling of such allegations constitutes a severe breach of trust in WTO procedures Irrespective of its non compliance with the WTO rulings the despicable way in which the US has besmirched Antiguan reputation to cast it as a promulgator of intellectual property piracy has raised questions on the legality of cross retaliation under TRIPs	Antigua is still engaged in pressure tactics in the hope of getting the US to comply whenever Antigua has shown signs of putting its ruling into action, the Americans have responded with threats, The Antiguan action has been authorised by the DSB after procedures were followed to the letter the way Antigua has proceeded conformed to all standards of international trade dispute redressal there have been aspersions on Antiguan conduct by American authorities levelling such allegations constitutes a severe breach of trust in WTO procedures Irrespective of its non compliance with the rulings the despicable way the US has besmirched Antiguan reputation has raised questions on the legality of cross retaliation under TRIPs	In the decade that has passed since the initiation of this case, there has not been any significant shift in the American position regarding its obligations under the GATS. Antigua is still engaged in the use of pressure tactics in the hope of getting the US to comply with the rulings. However, whenever Antigua has shown signs of putting its ruling into action, the Americans have responded with threats, claiming intellectual property piracy and violation of international trade laws. The Antiguan action has been authorised by the DSB after all the procedures laid down in the DSU were followed to the letter without any breach in its legality. Further, the way in which Antigua has proceeded against the US has conformed to all the standards expected of a country using an international trade dispute redressal forum. Yet there have been aspersions on Antiguan conduct by American authorities. Notwithstanding extant jurisprudence, the levelling of such allegations constitutes a severe breach of trust in WTO procedures. Irrespective of its non compliance with the WTO rulings and disregard of the threat of cross retaliation, the despicable way in which the US has besmirched Antiguan reputation to cast it as a promulgator of intellectual property piracy has also raised questions on the legality of cross retaliation under TRIPs.	1,338	<h4><strong>The CP drops U.S. opposition to cross-retaliation by Antigua---that <u>legitimizes</u> cross-retal and boosts trade credibility, <u>separate</u> from the issue of compliance </h4><p>Danish 13</strong>, Fourth Year, B.A. LL.B.(H) National University of Advanced Legal Studies, India, October 2013, “WTO Dispute Resolution and Cross Retaliation under Trips: Is it Sanctioned Piracy of Intellectual Property? A Case Study of the US - Gambling (Antigua) Case,” Westminster Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, http://www.westminsterlawreview.org/wlr16.php</p><p>As of June 2013, <u><strong><mark>Antigua had not initiated</mark> any proceedings aimed at profiting from <mark>suspension of</mark> the <mark>i</mark>ntellectual <mark>p</mark>roperty obligations</u></strong> owed to the US. <u><strong><mark>However, many reports</u></strong></mark> seem to <u><strong><mark>suggest</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>it may soon set up</mark> a website for the <mark>sale of American</mark> <mark>i</mark>ntellectual <mark>p</mark>roperty, if the negotiations deadlock is not broken</u></strong>.44</p><p>In the decade that has passed since the initiation of this case, there has not been any significant shift in the American position regarding its obligations under the GATS. <u><strong><mark>Antigua is still engaged in</mark> the use of <mark>pressure tactics in the hope of getting the US to comply</mark> with the rulings</u></strong>. However, <u><strong><mark>whenever Antigua has shown signs of putting its ruling into action,</u></strong> <u><strong>the Americans have responded with threats,</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>claiming intellectual property piracy and violation of international trade laws</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The Antiguan action has been authorised by the DSB</mark> <mark>after</mark> all the <mark>procedures</mark> laid down in the DSU <mark>were followed to the letter</u></strong></mark> without any breach in its legality. Further, <u><strong><mark>the way</mark> in which <mark>Antigua has proceeded</mark> against the US has <mark>conformed to all</mark> the <mark>standards</mark> expected <mark>of</mark> a country using an <mark>international trade dispute redressal</mark> forum</u></strong>. <u><strong>Yet <mark>there have been aspersions on Antiguan conduct by American authorities</u></strong></mark>. Notwithstanding extant jurisprudence, <u><strong>the <mark>levelling</mark> of <mark>such allegations constitutes a severe breach of trust in WTO procedures</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Irrespective of its non compliance with the</mark> WTO <mark>rulings</u></strong></mark> and disregard of the threat of cross retaliation, <u><strong><mark>the despicable way</mark> in which <mark>the US has besmirched Antiguan reputation</mark> to cast it as a promulgator of intellectual property piracy <mark>has</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>raised questions on the legality of cross retaliation under TRIPs</u></mark>.</p></strong>	null	null	1	429,653	13	17,113	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	565,270	N	Texas	4	Georgetown Erpenbach-Krishnan	Arnett	DHS politics (2NR) cross retal cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,843	They’re conflating the shortage which is an annual rate with the size of the waiting list---we provide enough organs to create an annual surplus which in turn reduces the waitlist over time	Kaserman 2	David Kaserman 2, PhD in Econ from the University of Florida, “Markets for Organs: Myths and Misconceptions,” 18 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 567 (2002), http://scholarship.law.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1222&context=jchlp	For over three decades, there has been a severe and chronic shortage of cadaveric human organs suitable for transplantation this shortage of organs is not attributable to an inadequate supply of potential organ donors. While estimates of the actual number of deaths that occur each year under circumstances that would allow for removal and transplantation of cadaver organs vary widely, all such estimates reveal a substantial pool of potential organ donors who, for a variety of reasons, fail to supply the needed organs these conservatively suggests organ donations could at least double, given the existing number of potential donors the present shortage is the quantity demanded minus the quantity supplied the quantities are flows, not stocks. units of the product per some interval of time participants in these debates often have explicitly or implicitly confused the number of patients on transplant waiting lists, which is a stock, with the concept of a shortage, which is a flow.8 The size of the waiting lists represents the accumulation of the excess demands of all preceding periods, adjusted for the attrition observed waiting lists greatly exaggerate the magnitude of the actual organ shortage on an annual basis the waiting list for kidneys stood at 42,364 patients in 1998 However, the actual annual shortage of kidneys the actual shortage was only 4,128 or just over 2,000 donors FOOTNOTE articles appear to confuse waiting lists with shortages. That confusion appears to lead authors to conclude mistakenly that the potential supply of cadaveric donors is insufficient to eliminate the organ shortage at any conceivable collection rate END FOOTNOTE if 4,128 additional kidneys had been supplied in 1997, the waiting list would have remained stable given the backlog annual surplus reduce that list Once the backlog is eliminated by surpluses a simple clearing of the annual demand for kidneys will be sufficient to prevent future backlogs if one mistakenly views the shortage as being equal to the waiting list, one might then conclude (incorrectly) xxxthat resolution of the shortage is not feasible	there has been a shortage of cadaveric organs for transplantation this is not attributable to inadequate potential donors estimates of the number of deaths that would allow transplantation all reveal a substantial pool these conservatively suggest donations could at least double debates have confused the number on waiting lists, which is a stock, with the shortage, which is a flow observed waiting lists greatly exaggerate the actual shortage on an annual basis in 1998 the actual shortage was only 2,000 donors articles confuse waiting lists with shortages. That confusion lead authors to conclude mistakenly that the potential supply of cadaveric donors is insufficient to eliminate the shortage at any collection rate if 4,128 additional kidneys had been supplied the waiting list would have remained stable given the backlog annual surplus reduce that list if one mistakenly views the shortage as equal to the waiting list, one might conclude (incorrectly) xxxthat resolution of the shortage is not feasible	For over three decades, there has been a severe and chronic shortage of cadaveric human organs suitable for transplantation. The ongoing shortage of kidneys, hearts, livers, lungs, and other solid organs has significantly hampered the ability of physicians to bring improved life-saving transplant technology to patients suffering from a variety of debilitating and often fatal diseases. As a result, thousands of individuals die each year because of the failure to obtain a suitable organ in time.' Thousands more are forced to undergo dialysis and other unpleasant but life-sustaining treatments while waiting for an organ (or death, whichever comes first).¶ It is noteworthy that this shortage of transplantable organs is not attributable to an inadequate supply of potential organ donors. While estimates of the actual number of deaths that occur each year under circumstances that would allow for removal and transplantation of cadaver organs vary widely, all such estimates reveal a substantial pool of potential organ donors who, for a variety of reasons, fail to supply the needed organs.2 A review of these estimates conservatively suggests that organ donations could at least double, given the existing number of potential donors.¶ The failure of the current procurement system to collect a larger portion of the cadaveric organs that are potentially available has spawned an extensive literature proffering a variety of proposals to alter the existing system in various fundamental and not-so-fundamental ways. Among these proposals, perhaps the most promising is a lifting of the legal ban on cadaveric organ purchases and sales that is contained in the 1984 National Organ Transplant Act, which would allow markets to form and organ prices to rise to their equilibrium, market-clearing levels.3¶ To an economist, this proposal provides an obvious and straightforward approach to resolving the organ or any other shortage. To many of the commentators on medical policy issues who are contributing to the literature in this area, however, the organ market proposal is highly suspect and has been challenged on both ethical and economic grounds.4 Significantly, most, if not all, of these challenges appear to be founded upon rather blatant misconceptions involving some very fundamental economic issues.5¶ While errors involving economic concepts may be inevitable in a literature that has been dominated by non-economists, correction of such errors is nonetheless necessary if policy discussions and ultimate decisions are to be founded upon accurate information. The somewhat limited purpose of this paper is to identify and correct some of the more prominent economic misconceptions involving the organ market proposal that currently plague the literature in the hope that the resulting increased clarity will help to elevate the level of the ongoing debate. While I certainly do not intend or expect this discussion to transform readers into economists, the clarifications offered in this article should improve the overall understanding of the organ market proposal and how it can work to resolve this tragic shortage.¶ II. MISCONCEPTION 1: DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF THE SHORTAGE ¶ Perhaps the most fundamental misconception surrounding discussions of the organ shortage involves the very definition of the term "shortage," and the corresponding measurement of the magnitude of that shortage. Specifically, several authors writing in this area have mistakenly interpreted the number of patients on a transplant waiting list as a direct measure of the size of the shortage of a particular organ. Such a view fails to recognize the crucial distinction between stocks and flows that is routinely emphasized in economic analysis. Economists define a shortage as a condition in which the quantity of a product demanded exceeds the quantity supplied at the existing price! To appreciate what this definition implies for the organ shortage, two fundamental aspects of the concepts of supply and demand must first be understood.¶ First, both of these concepts refer to schedules relating the quantities bought and sold to various prices paid and received. That is, the term "demand" means a schedule, which may be expressed in the form of a table, graph, or equation that shows the quantities that will be purchased at all possible prices. A specific quantity, at some point along that schedule, is then referred to as the "quantity demanded" at the specified price. Similarly, "supply" is a schedule that indicates the quantities that will be placed on the market for sale at all possible prices. "Quantity supplied" refers to a single point along that schedule. Thus, the present shortage of transplantable organs is equal to the quantity demanded minus the quantity supplied at the current price of organs. Under the existing U.S. organ procurement policy, that price is zero.¶ Second, and extremely important for the discussion here, the quantities referred to in the definitions of both supply and demand are flows, not stocks. In other words, these quantities are expressed as some number of units of the product per some interval of time. To say that the quantity demanded or supplied of product X is 100 units at a price of $10 per unit is meaningless unless we specify the time period over which these 100 units will be purchased or sold.Obviously, the demand and supply of a product will vary substantially depending upon the time interval over which they are defined.¶ This second point is crucial to understand, as it has been the source of considerable confusion in debates about the organ shortage and alternative policies formulated to resolve it. Specifically, participants in these debates often have explicitly or implicitly confused the number of patients on transplant waiting lists, which is a stock, with the concept of a shortage, which is a flow.8 The size of the waiting lists for transplantable organs represents the accumulation of the excess demands (shortages) of all preceding periods, adjusted for the attrition that occurs from patients dying during the specified time interval. As such, observed waiting lists greatly exaggerate the magnitude of the actual organ shortage on an annual (or any other time period) basis.¶ To illustrate this important distinction, data from the United Network for Organs Sharing (UNOS) indicates that the waiting list for kidneys stood at 42,364 patients in 1998.9 However, the actual annual shortage of kidneys is not equal to this number. Rather, the shortage is approximated by the increase in the number of people on the waiting list over the preceding year's figure. It is that number-the annual change in the waiting list-that indicates the amount by which the quantity demanded in 1997 exceeded the quantity supplied in that year. With UNOS reporting 38,236 people on this list in 1997, the actual shortage in that year was only 4,128 (42,364 minus 38,236) kidneys, or just over 2,000 donors, if there is no adjustment for attrition due to deaths of patients on the list.'0 Note that this number is less than ten percent of the number of patients on the waiting list."¶ FOOTNOTE¶ 8. See Evans et al., supra note 2, at 239; Randall, supra note 6, at 1223; Siminoff & Leonard, supra note 4, at 20. All of these articles appear to confuse waiting lists with shortages. That confusion, in turn, appears to lead these authors to conclude mistakenly that the potential supply of cadaveric donors is insufficient to eliminate the organ shortage at any conceivable collection rate (i.e., at any rate up to 100%).¶ END FOOTNOTE ¶ Obviously, if 4,128 additional kidneys had been supplied in 1997, the waiting list would have remained stable at 38,236. That is, the backlog would not have grown. Further, if 42,364 kidneys had been supplied in 1998, the entire waiting list that had built up over all prior years of shortages could have been eliminated completely in a single year. Then, if that number of kidneys continued to be supplied in subsequent years, an extremely large surplus would materialize immediately. Of course, given the backlog of patients on the waiting list, an annual surplus is highly desirable for some period into the future in order to reduce that list over 12 time. Once the backlog is eliminated by this series of surpluses, however, a simple clearing of the annual demand for kidneys will be sufficient to prevent future backlogs from developing.¶ Clarification of this issue is important, because it directly affects the perceived ability of any policy change to eliminate the shortage under the constraint provided by the existing pool of potential organ donors. Specifically, if one mistakenly views the shortage as being equal to the waiting list, one might then conclude (incorrectly) xxxthat complete resolution of the shortage is not feasible under any policy option. 3 In addition, overestimation of the shortage by reference to the waiting list would lead to a gross overestimate of the price that would be required to equilibrate the market.1 4 Such an overestimate, in turn, would cause an underestimation of the cost effectiveness of the organ market proposal. As a result, unbiased evaluation of that proposal requires a correct definition and measurement of the shortage as a flow rather than a stock.	9,316	<h4>They’re conflating the <u>shortage</u> which is an annual <u>rate</u> with the <u>size of the waiting list</u>---we provide enough organs to create an <u>annual surplus</u> which in turn reduces the waitlist over time</h4><p>David <strong>Kaserman 2</strong>, PhD in Econ from the University of Florida, “Markets for Organs: Myths and Misconceptions,” 18 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 567 (2002), http://scholarship.law.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1222&context=jchlp</p><p><u>For over three decades, <mark>there has been a</mark> severe and chronic <mark>shortage of <strong>cadaveric</strong></mark> human <strong><mark>organs</strong></mark> suitable <mark>for transplantation</u></mark>. The ongoing shortage of kidneys, hearts, livers, lungs, and other solid organs has significantly hampered the ability of physicians to bring improved life-saving transplant technology to patients suffering from a variety of debilitating and often fatal diseases. As a result, thousands of individuals die each year because of the failure to obtain a suitable organ in time.' Thousands more are forced to undergo dialysis and other unpleasant but life-sustaining treatments while waiting for an organ (or death, whichever comes first).¶ It is noteworthy that <u><mark>this</mark> shortage of</u> transplantable <u>organs <strong><mark>is not attributable</strong> to</mark> an <mark>inadequate</mark> supply of <strong><mark>potential</strong></mark> organ <mark>donors</mark>. While <mark>estimates of the</mark> actual <mark>number of deaths that</mark> occur each year under circumstances that <mark>would allow</mark> for removal and <mark>transplantation </mark>of cadaver organs vary widely, <strong><mark>all</strong></mark> such estimates <mark>reveal a <strong>substantial pool</strong></mark> of potential organ donors who, for a variety of reasons, fail to supply the needed organs</u>.2 A review of <u><mark>these</u></mark> estimates <u><strong><mark>conservatively</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>suggest</mark>s</u> that <u>organ <mark>donations <strong>could at least double</strong></mark>, given the existing number of potential donors</u>.¶ The failure of the current procurement system to collect a larger portion of the cadaveric organs that are potentially available has spawned an extensive literature proffering a variety of proposals to alter the existing system in various fundamental and not-so-fundamental ways. Among these proposals, perhaps the most promising is a lifting of the legal ban on cadaveric organ purchases and sales that is contained in the 1984 National Organ Transplant Act, which would allow markets to form and organ prices to rise to their equilibrium, market-clearing levels.3¶ To an economist, this proposal provides an obvious and straightforward approach to resolving the organ or any other shortage. To many of the commentators on medical policy issues who are contributing to the literature in this area, however, the organ market proposal is highly suspect and has been challenged on both ethical and economic grounds.4 Significantly, most, if not all, of these challenges appear to be founded upon rather blatant misconceptions involving some very fundamental economic issues.5¶ While errors involving economic concepts may be inevitable in a literature that has been dominated by non-economists, correction of such errors is nonetheless necessary if policy discussions and ultimate decisions are to be founded upon accurate information. The somewhat limited purpose of this paper is to identify and correct some of the more prominent economic misconceptions involving the organ market proposal that currently plague the literature in the hope that the resulting increased clarity will help to elevate the level of the ongoing debate. While I certainly do not intend or expect this discussion to transform readers into economists, the clarifications offered in this article should improve the overall understanding of the organ market proposal and how it can work to resolve this tragic shortage.¶ II. MISCONCEPTION 1: DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF THE SHORTAGE ¶ Perhaps the most fundamental misconception surrounding discussions of the organ shortage involves the very definition of the term "shortage," and the corresponding measurement of the magnitude of that shortage. Specifically, several authors writing in this area have mistakenly interpreted the number of patients on a transplant waiting list as a direct measure of the size of the shortage of a particular organ. Such a view fails to recognize the crucial distinction between stocks and flows that is routinely emphasized in economic analysis. Economists define a shortage as a condition in which the quantity of a product demanded exceeds the quantity supplied at the existing price! To appreciate what this definition implies for the organ shortage, two fundamental aspects of the concepts of supply and demand must first be understood.¶ First, both of these concepts refer to schedules relating the quantities bought and sold to various prices paid and received. That is, the term "demand" means a schedule, which may be expressed in the form of a table, graph, or equation that shows the quantities that will be purchased at all possible prices. A specific quantity, at some point along that schedule, is then referred to as the "quantity demanded" at the specified price. Similarly, "supply" is a schedule that indicates the quantities that will be placed on the market for sale at all possible prices. "Quantity supplied" refers to a single point along that schedule. Thus, <u>the present shortage</u> of transplantable organs <u>is</u> equal to <u>the quantity demanded minus the quantity supplied</u> at the current price of organs. Under the existing U.S. organ procurement policy, that price is zero.¶ Second, and extremely important for the discussion here, <u>the quantities</u> referred to in the definitions of both supply and demand <u><strong>are flows, not stocks.</u></strong> In other words, these quantities are expressed as some number of <u>units of the product <strong>per some interval of time</u></strong>. To say that the quantity demanded or supplied of product X is 100 units at a price of $10 per unit is meaningless unless we specify the time period over which these 100 units will be purchased or sold.Obviously, the demand and supply of a product will vary substantially depending upon the time interval over which they are defined.¶ This second point is crucial to understand, as it has been the source of considerable confusion in debates about the organ shortage and alternative policies formulated to resolve it. Specifically, <u>participants in these <mark>debates</mark> often <mark>have</mark> explicitly or implicitly <strong><mark>confused</strong> the number </mark>of patients <mark>on</mark> transplant <mark>waiting lists, which is a stock, with the</mark> concept of a <strong><mark>shortage</strong>, which is a flow</mark>.8 The size of the waiting lists</u> for transplantable organs <u>represents the accumulation of the excess demands</u> (shortages) <u>of all preceding periods, adjusted for the attrition</u> that occurs from patients dying during the specified time interval. As such, <u><mark>observed waiting lists <strong>greatly exaggerate</strong> the</mark> magnitude of the <mark>actual</mark> organ <mark>shortage on an annual</u></mark> (or any other time period) <u><mark>basis</u></mark>.¶ To illustrate this important distinction, data from the United Network for Organs Sharing (UNOS) indicates that <u>the waiting list for kidneys stood at 42,364 patients <mark>in 1998</u></mark>.9 <u>However, the actual annual shortage of kidneys</u> is not equal to this number. Rather, the shortage is approximated by the increase in the number of people on the waiting list over the preceding year's figure. It is that number-the annual change in the waiting list-that indicates the amount by which the quantity demanded in 1997 exceeded the quantity supplied in that year. With UNOS reporting 38,236 people on this list in 1997, <u><mark>the actual shortage</u></mark> in that year <u><strong><mark>was only</mark> 4,128</u></strong> (42,364 minus 38,236) kidneys, <u>or <strong>just over <mark>2,000 donors</u></strong></mark>, if there is no adjustment for attrition due to deaths of patients on the list.'0 Note that this number is less than ten percent of the number of patients on the waiting list."¶ <u><strong>FOOTNOTE</u></strong>¶<u><strong> </u></strong>8. See Evans et al., supra note 2, at 239; Randall, supra note 6, at 1223; Siminoff & Leonard, supra note 4, at 20. All of these <u><mark>articles</mark> <strong>appear to <mark>confuse waiting lists with shortages.</u></strong> <u><strong>That confusion</u></strong></mark>, in turn, <u>appears to <mark>lead</u></mark> these <u><mark>authors to conclude <strong>mistakenly</strong> that the potential supply of cadaveric donors is <strong>insufficient</strong> to <strong>eliminate the </mark>organ <mark>shortage</strong> <strong>at any </mark>conceivable <mark>collection rate</u></strong></mark> (i.e., at any rate up to 100%).¶ <u><strong>END FOOTNOTE</u></strong> ¶ Obviously, <u><mark>if 4,128 additional kidneys had been supplied</mark> in 1997, <strong><mark>the waiting list would have remained stable</u></strong></mark> at 38,236. That is, the backlog would not have grown. Further, if 42,364 kidneys had been supplied in 1998, the entire waiting list that had built up over all prior years of shortages could have been eliminated completely in a single year. Then, if that number of kidneys continued to be supplied in subsequent years, an extremely large surplus would materialize immediately. Of course, <u><mark>given the backlog</u></mark> of patients on the waiting list, an <u><mark>annual surplus</u></mark> is highly desirable for some period into the future in order to <u><mark>reduce that list</u></mark> over 12 time. <u>Once the backlog is eliminated by</u> this series of <u>surpluses</u>, however, <u><strong>a simple clearing</u></strong> <u>of the annual demand for kidneys will be <strong>sufficient to prevent future backlogs</u></strong> from developing.¶ Clarification of this issue is important, because it directly affects the perceived ability of any policy change to eliminate the shortage under the constraint provided by the existing pool of potential organ donors. Specifically, <u><mark>if one <strong>mistakenly</strong></mark> <mark>views the shortage as</mark> being <mark>equal to the waiting list, one might</mark> then <mark>conclude (<strong>incorrectly</strong>) xxxthat</u></mark> complete <u><mark>resolution of the shortage <strong>is not feasible</u></strong></mark> under any policy option. 3 In addition, overestimation of the shortage by reference to the waiting list would lead to a gross overestimate of the price that would be required to equilibrate the market.1 4 Such an overestimate, in turn, would cause an underestimation of the cost effectiveness of the organ market proposal. As a result, unbiased evaluation of that proposal requires a correct definition and measurement of the shortage as a flow rather than a stock.</p>	2NC	CP – conscription	2nc solvency	431,197	5	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,844	There is pressure on the treaty system in the squo- but the SUCCESSFUL push will be for FLEXIBILITY not ABANDONMENT- this is the key distinction between the plan and the disad	Youngers 2014	Youngers 2014 (Colletta, Senior Fellow with WOLA, the Washington Office on Latin America, an associate with the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), and a member of the research team, Colectivo de Estudios Drogas y Derecho (CEDD), based in Aguascalientes, Mexico, A Turning Point for Drug Policy, NACLA Report on the Americas47.2 (Summer 2014): 21-27, proquest)	SINCE NIXON DECLARED THE WAR on Drugs the U.S. used its muscle to dictate policies throughout the region the tables have turned as Latin American countries have emerged as a driving force Numerous factors have contributed to the waning influence of Washington on this The surge in left-leaning governments The growing economic influence of Brazil, the economic recession in the United States, and the decline of U.S. foreign assistance have all contributed to this trend reformist leanings on drug policy do not break down on ideological grounds with Guatemala's right-wing president joining left-wing presidents in Uruguay and Ecuador to advocate for an end to prohibitionist drug policies Washington is suffering from a credibility problem Even as the United States continues to advocate a "tough on drugs" approach overseas, at home state after state is relaxing marijuana laws The irony is not lost on Latin American officials the head of the incoming Mexican government's transition team said, "Obviously, we can't handle a product that is illegal in Mexico, trying to stop its transfer to the United States, when in the United States, at least part of the United States, it has a different status Not surprisingly, a vigorous debate on cannabis policy is now underway in Mexico. the most significant factor driving the debate in Latin America is the growing sentiment that it is their own people and governments that are paying the price for policies primarily designed to curb drug use in consumer countries like the United States THE APRIL 2012 CARTAGENA SUMMIT MARKED A historic turning point For the first time, most of the region's presidents met in private with one item on the agenda: the analysis of drug policy and the exploration of alternatives In stark contrast to the "one size fits all" approach long advocated by Washington the report asks that countries be granted the flexibility to experiment with policies appropriate to their reality Despite arduous negotiations the final declaration calls for a multi-layered consultation process including a special session of the OAS General Assembly in 2014 devoted to drug policy, ensuring that the issue stays at the top of the hemispheric agenda. the "Vienna consensus" on a uniform approach to drug control has been shattered for the first time a group of key Latin American countries worked together to promote a reform-oriented agenda the Mexican delegation in Vienna embraced a leadership role, bringing together Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Uruguay in pushing a joint strategy for open and transparent discussion at the 2016 UNGASS what was achieved was "a Latin American profile in the search for alternative strategies to the 'war on drugs' The resolution eventually adopted on the UNGASS included much of the language that these five countries insisted on-no small feat given the formidable opposition by countries such as Russia and Canada Latin American officials supporting the drug policy status quo did not publicly oppose their colleagues' efforts on the UNGASS resolution And the final declaration by the group of Latin American and Caribbean countries underscored the need to take into account the specific circumstances of each of them This has emerged as the one point of regional consensus: the need for tolerance in allowing countries to forge a different path	Washington is suffering from a credibility problem. Even as the United States continues to advocate a "tough on drugs" approach overseas, at home state after state is relaxing marijuana laws markets. The irony is not lost on Latin American officials; CARTAGENA SUMMIT MARKED A historic turning point. For the first time region's presidents met in private : the analysis of drug policy and the exploration of alternatives In stark contrast to the "one size fits all" approach long advocated by Washington, the report asks that countries be granted the flexibility to experiment with policies appropriate to their reality Despite arduous negotiations the final declaration calls for a multi-layered consultation process devoted to drug policy, ensuring that the issue stays at the top of the hemispheric agenda the "Vienna consensus" on a uniform approach to drug control has been shattered, for the first time a group of key Latin American countries worked together to promote a reform-oriented agenda the Mexican delegation in Vienna embraced a leadership role, bringing together Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Uruguay in pushing a joint strategy for open and transparent discussion at the 2016 UNGASS what was achieved was "a Latin American profile in the search for alternative strategies the 'war on drugs' The resolution eventually adopted on the UNGASS included much of the language that these five countries insisted on-no small feat given the formidable opposition by countries such as Russia and Canad emerged as the one point of regional consensus: the need for tolerance in allowing countries to forge a different path.	SINCE PRESIDENT NIXON FIRST DECLARED THE WAR on Drugs over 40 years ago, the U.S. government has used its political and economic muscle to dictate policies throughout the region. Now the tables have turned as Latin American countries have emerged as a driving force. Numerous factors have contributed to the waning influence of Washington on this and other policies. The surge in left-leaning governments in countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia has challenged Washington's historic patterns of unilateralism and interventionism. The growing economic influence of Brazil, the economic recession in the United States, and the decline of U.S. foreign assistance have all contributed to this trend. Interestingly, the reformist leanings on drug policy do not break down on ideological grounds, with Guatemala's right-wing president joining left-wing presidents in Uruguay and Ecuador to advocate for an end to prohibitionist drug policies, while left-wing governments in Venezuela and Nicaragua strongly support the status quo. Washington is suffering from a credibility problem. Even as the United States continues to advocate a "tough on drugs" approach overseas, at home state after state is relaxing marijuana laws. To date, 21 states and the District of Colombia have decriminalized it, 20 states have adopted medical marijuana laws (these states often overlap with those that have decriminalized), and two states-Washington and Colorado-are in the process of implementing legal, regulated cannabis markets. The irony is not lost on Latin American officials; for example, after the November 2012 U.S. elections when voters in Washington and Colorado approved the legalization initiatives (indeed, in Colorado marijuana got more votes than President Obama), the head of the incoming Mexican government's transition team, Luis Videgaray, said, "Obviously, we can't handle a product that is illegal in Mexico, trying to stop its transfer to the United States, when in the United States, at least part of the United States, it has a different status." Not surprisingly, a vigorous debate on cannabis policy is now underway in Mexico. Perhaps the most significant factor driving the debate in Latin America is the growing sentiment that it is their own people and governments that are paying the price for policies primarily designed to curb drug use in consumer countries like the United States, and that have made no dent in the drug trade or consumption. On the contrary, organized crime has spread, fueling violence, extortion, corruption, and the erosion of democratic institutions. As Argentinian sociologist Juan Gabriel Tokatlian points out, "the old balloon effect...is being superseded by a kind of Zeppelin effect by which transnational organizationsbasically intertwining local narcowarlords, national drug barons and global money laundering tycoonsare reaching a point of generating a pax mafiosa in certain urban and rural areas." Shifts in trafficking have led to the proliferation of routes and increased local consumption. As the U.S. appetite for cocaine has abated (and other drugs such as illegal prescription painkillers have become more popular), use in Europe and parts of Asia has risen, generating new transportation routes from the Andean region-particularly Peru and Bolivia-through Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, often via West Africa. While still well below that of the United States, drug consumption in Latin America is steadily on the rise. In particular, use of paco, an addictive form of cocaine paste, has surged in those countries. Meanwhile, approximately 80% of the Colombian cocaine still headed for U.S. city streets now transits through Central American countries that have little capacity to resist the drug trade's corrupting influence. As Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina notes, "We have seen that prohibitionism and the war against drugs have not given the results hoped for. Quite the opposite. The cartels have grown in strength, the flow of arms towards Central America from the north has grown and deaths in our country have grown." THE APRIL 2012 CARTAGENA SUMMIT MARKED A historic turning point. For the first time, most of the region's presidents met in private with one item on the agenda: the analysis of drug policy and the exploration of alternatives. Reports circulated that the United States would only agree if a study was done under the auspices of the OAS, where it has considerable influence over the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) as Washington traditionally names its director and provides a significant chunk of its budget. But skepticism about what the OAS would produce (shared by this author) has proven wrong. The vast OAS report, "The Drug Problem in the Americas," and a "scenario planning" exercise were released in May 2013. Numerous points are groundbreaking for an initiative by a multilateral organization. For example, the study recognizes the harm caused by present policies and calls for drug use to be treated as a public health issue (that is not to criminalize and incarcerate users). In stark contrast to the "one size fits all" approach long advocated by Washington, the report asks that countries be granted the flexibility to experiment with policies appropriate to their reality. Significantly, it allows for the possibility that such flexibility could result in changes to domestic and international laws, opening the door for discussion of international convention reform, a topic long considered taboo. Also one of the four possible scenarios, Pathways, is based on the premise that prohibitionist policies cause too much harm, and that regulatory frameworks should be explored, beginning with cannabis. For the first time, in June 2013, drug policy was the thematic focus of the OAS General Assembly (GA) meeting, which brings together the region's foreign ministers. Despite arduous negotiations-which revealed the extent of disagreement among countries on specific reforms-the final declaration calls for a multi-layered consultation process including a special session of the OAS General Assembly in 2014 devoted to drug policy, ensuring that the issue stays at the top of the hemispheric agenda. Whether or not the meeting will have any impact on UNGASS preparations remains to be seen, as countries such as Peru, Panama, and Nicaragua, among others, remain staunchly wedded to present policies, and the region's powerhouse, Brazil, has taken a back seat, neither supporting nor opposing reforms. Such divisions were also evident at the March 2014 CND. This year's meeting included a high-level segment where intensive and conflictive negotiations revealed the deep schisms between those countries supporting reforms and those opposing any change at all. While some European and Latin American countries emerged as important advocates for reform-oriented language, countries such as China, Pakistan, and Russia argued fiercely in support of the status quo. In the end, agreement could not be reached on a myriad of issues, resulting in a meaningless declaration. The exercise clearly showed, however, that the "Vienna consensus" on a uniform approach to drug control has been shattered, leaving in its place polarization and near stagnation, given that the CND operates by consensus. Yet a significant change emerged: for the first time a group of key Latin American countries worked together to promote a reform-oriented agenda. Though Mexican President Peña Nieto has taken a cautious approach, the Mexican delegation in Vienna embraced a leadership role, bringing together Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Uruguay in pushing a joint strategy for open and transparent discussion at the 2016 UNGASS. As the Uruguayan OAS Ambassador, Milton Romani Gerner, noted in an interview, what was achieved was "a Latin American profile in the search for alternative strategies to overcome the 'war on drugs' approach." The resolution eventually adopted on the UNGASS included much of the language that these five countries insisted on-no small feat given the formidable opposition by countries such as Russia and Canada. Interestingly, Latin American officials supporting the drug policy status quo did not publicly oppose their colleagues' efforts on the UNGASS resolution (perhaps because there was plenty of opposition from other countries). And the final declaration by the group of Latin American and Caribbean countries (GRULAC), underscored the need to take into account the specific circumstances of each of them. This has emerged as the one point of regional consensus: the need for tolerance in allowing countries to forge a different path.	8,683	<h4><strong>There is pressure on the treaty system in the squo- but the SUCCESSFUL push will be for FLEXIBILITY not <u>ABANDONMENT</u>- this is the key distinction between the plan and the disad </h4><p>Youngers 2014</strong> (Colletta, Senior Fellow with WOLA, the Washington Office on Latin America, an associate with the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), and a member of the research team, Colectivo de Estudios Drogas y Derecho (CEDD), based in Aguascalientes, Mexico, A Turning Point for Drug Policy, NACLA Report on the Americas47.2 (Summer 2014): 21-27, proquest<mark>)</p><p><u></mark>SINCE</u> PRESIDENT <u>NIXON</u> FIRST <u>DECLARED</u> <u>THE WAR on Drugs</u> over 40 years ago, <u>the U.S.</u> government has <u>used its</u> political and economic <u>muscle to dictate policies throughout the region</u>. Now <u>the tables have turned as Latin American countries have emerged as a driving force</u>. <u>Numerous factors have contributed to the waning influence of Washington on this</u> and other policies. <u>The surge in left-leaning governments</u> in countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia has challenged Washington's historic patterns of unilateralism and interventionism. <u>The growing economic influence of Brazil, the economic recession in the United States, and the decline of U.S. foreign assistance have all contributed to this trend</u>. Interestingly, the <u><strong>reformist leanings on drug policy do not break down on ideological grounds</u></strong>, <u>with Guatemala's right-wing president joining left-wing presidents in Uruguay and Ecuador</u> <u>to advocate for an end to prohibitionist drug policies</u>, while left-wing governments in Venezuela and Nicaragua strongly support the status quo. <u><strong><mark>Washington is suffering from a credibility problem</u></strong>. <u>Even as the United States continues to advocate a "tough on drugs" approach overseas, at home state after state is relaxing marijuana laws</u></mark>. To date, 21 states and the District of Colombia have decriminalized it, 20 states have adopted medical marijuana laws (these states often overlap with those that have decriminalized), and two states-Washington and Colorado-are in the process of implementing legal, regulated cannabis <mark>markets. <u>The irony is not lost on Latin American officials</u>;</mark> for example, after the November 2012 U.S. elections when voters in Washington and Colorado approved the legalization initiatives (indeed, in Colorado marijuana got more votes than President Obama), <u>the head of the incoming Mexican government's transition team</u>, Luis Videgaray, <u>said, "Obviously, we can't handle a product that is illegal in Mexico, trying to stop its transfer to the United States, when in the United States, at least part of the United States, it has a different status</u>." <u>Not surprisingly, a vigorous debate on cannabis policy is now underway in Mexico. </u>Perhaps <u>the most significant factor driving the debate in Latin America is the growing sentiment that it is their own people and governments that are paying the price for policies primarily designed to curb drug use in consumer countries like the United States</u>, and that have made no dent in the drug trade or consumption. On the contrary, organized crime has spread, fueling violence, extortion, corruption, and the erosion of democratic institutions. As Argentinian sociologist Juan Gabriel Tokatlian points out, "the old balloon effect...is being superseded by a kind of Zeppelin effect by which transnational organizationsbasically intertwining local narcowarlords, national drug barons and global money laundering tycoonsare reaching a point of generating a pax mafiosa in certain urban and rural areas." Shifts in trafficking have led to the proliferation of routes and increased local consumption. As the U.S. appetite for cocaine has abated (and other drugs such as illegal prescription painkillers have become more popular), use in Europe and parts of Asia has risen, generating new transportation routes from the Andean region-particularly Peru and Bolivia-through Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, often via West Africa. While still well below that of the United States, drug consumption in Latin America is steadily on the rise. In particular, use of paco, an addictive form of cocaine paste, has surged in those countries. Meanwhile, approximately 80% of the Colombian cocaine still headed for U.S. city streets now transits through Central American countries that have little capacity to resist the drug trade's corrupting influence. As Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina notes, "We have seen that prohibitionism and the war against drugs have not given the results hoped for. Quite the opposite. The cartels have grown in strength, the flow of arms towards Central America from the north has grown and deaths in our country have grown." <u>THE APRIL 2012 <mark>CARTAGENA SUMMIT MARKED A historic turning point</u>. <u>For the first time</mark>, most of the <mark>region's presidents met in private </mark>with one item on the agenda<mark>: the analysis of drug policy and the exploration of alternatives</u></mark>. Reports circulated that the United States would only agree if a study was done under the auspices of the OAS, where it has considerable influence over the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) as Washington traditionally names its director and provides a significant chunk of its budget. But skepticism about what the OAS would produce (shared by this author) has proven wrong. The vast OAS report, "The Drug Problem in the Americas," and a "scenario planning" exercise were released in May 2013. Numerous points are groundbreaking for an initiative by a multilateral organization. For example, the study recognizes the harm caused by present policies and calls for drug use to be treated as a public health issue (that is not to criminalize and incarcerate users). <u><strong><mark>In stark contrast to the "one size fits all" approach long advocated by Washington</u></strong>, <u><strong>the report asks that countries be granted the flexibility to experiment</strong> with policies appropriate to their reality</u></mark>. Significantly, it allows for the possibility that such flexibility could result in changes to domestic and international laws, opening the door for discussion of international convention reform, a topic long considered taboo. Also one of the four possible scenarios, Pathways, is based on the premise that prohibitionist policies cause too much harm, and that regulatory frameworks should be explored, beginning with cannabis. For the first time, in June 2013, drug policy was the thematic focus of the OAS General Assembly (GA) meeting, which brings together the region's foreign ministers. <u><mark>Despite arduous negotiations</u></mark>-which revealed the extent of disagreement among countries on specific reforms-<u><mark>the final declaration calls for a multi-layered consultation process </mark>including a special session of the OAS General Assembly in 2014 <mark>devoted to drug policy, ensuring that the issue stays at the top of the hemispheric agenda</mark>. </u>Whether or not the meeting will have any impact on UNGASS preparations remains to be seen, as countries such as Peru, Panama, and Nicaragua, among others, remain staunchly wedded to present policies, and the region's powerhouse, Brazil, has taken a back seat, neither supporting nor opposing reforms. Such divisions were also evident at the March 2014 CND. This year's meeting included a high-level segment where intensive and conflictive negotiations revealed the deep schisms between those countries supporting reforms and those opposing any change at all. While some European and Latin American countries emerged as important advocates for reform-oriented language, countries such as China, Pakistan, and Russia argued fiercely in support of the status quo. In the end, agreement could not be reached on a myriad of issues, resulting in a meaningless declaration. The exercise clearly showed, however, that <u><mark>the "Vienna consensus" on a uniform approach to drug control has been shattered</u>,</mark> leaving in its place polarization and near stagnation, given that the CND operates by consensus. Yet a significant change emerged: <u><strong><mark>for the first time a group of key Latin American countries worked together to promote a reform-oriented agenda</u></strong></mark>. Though Mexican President Peña Nieto has taken a cautious approach, <u><mark>the Mexican delegation in Vienna embraced a leadership role, bringing together Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Uruguay in pushing a joint strategy for open and transparent discussion at the 2016 UNGASS</u></mark>. As the Uruguayan OAS Ambassador, Milton Romani Gerner, noted in an interview, <u><mark>what was achieved was "a Latin American profile in the search for alternative strategies</mark> to</u> overcome <u><mark>the 'war on drugs'</u></mark> approach." <u><mark>The resolution eventually adopted on the UNGASS included much of the language that these five countries insisted on-no small feat given the formidable opposition by countries such as Russia and Canad</mark>a</u>. Interestingly, <u>Latin American officials supporting the drug policy status quo did not publicly oppose their colleagues' efforts on the UNGASS resolution</u> (perhaps because there was plenty of opposition from other countries). <u>And the final declaration by the group of Latin American and Caribbean countries</u> (GRULAC), <u>underscored the need to take into account the specific circumstances of each of them</u>. <u>This has <mark>emerged as the one point of regional consensus: the need for tolerance in allowing countries to forge a different path</u><strong>.</p></strong></mark>	null	1nr	2NC Local DA	430,470	17	17,115	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	565,263	N	Wake	8	Georgia Boyce-Feinberg	Markoff	AG politics fed cp (2nr) treaties da (2nr) ban marihuana cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,845	Modest predictability of the resolution is worth potential substantive tradeoff. Topicality creates space for relevant debate.	MASSARO 89	Toni M. MASSARO, Professor of Law, University of Florida, 89 [August, 1989, “Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?” Michigan Law Review, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099, Lexis]	despite their acknowledgment that some ordering and rules are necessary, empathy proponents tend to approach the rule-of-law model as a villain. our actual decisional "rules" rarely mandate a particular (unempathetic) response. Most of our rules are fairly open-ended. "Relevance," undue hardship to name only a few represent a weaker, but still constraining sense of the rule-of-law model. Most rules are guidelines that establish spheres of relevant conversation, not mathematical formulas We are taught to distinguish different "stories," to arrive at "law" through experience with many stories, and to revise that law as future experience requires. our rules often are fluid standards that offer substantial room for varying interpretations We value some procedural regularity because it lends stasis and structure Even within our most intimate relationships, we both establish "rules," and expect the other party to follow them. Breach of these unspoken agreements can destroy the relationship and hurt us deeply, regardless of the wisdom or "substantive fairness" of a particular rule. Our agreements create expectations, and their consistent application fulfills the expectations modest predictability that this sort of "formalism" provides may encourage human relationships	our actual decisional "rules" rarely mandate a particular (unempathetic) response. Most of our rules are fairly open-ended. "Relevance," undue hardship represent a constraining sense of the rule-of-law model. our rules often are fluid standards that offer substantial room for varying interpretations We value some procedural regularity because it lends stasis and structure Even within our most intimate relationships, we both establish "rules," and expect the other party to follow them Our agreements create expectations, and their consistent application fulfills the expectations modest predictability this sort of "formalism" provides may encourage human relationships	Yet despite their acknowledgment that some ordering and rules are necessary, empathy proponents tend to approach the rule-of-law model as a villain. Moreover, they are hardly alone in their deep skepticism about the rule-of-law model. Most modern legal theorists question the value of procedural regularity when it denies substantive justice.52 Some even question the whole notion of justifying a legal decision by appealing to a rule of law, versus justifying the decision by reference to the facts of the case and the judges' own reason and expe-rience.53 I do not intend to enter this important jurisprudential de-bate, except to the limited extent that the "empathy" writings have suggested that the rule-of-law chills judges' empathic reactions. In this regard, I have several observations. My first thought is that the rule-of-law model is only a model. If the term means absolute separation of legal decision and "politics," then it surely is both unrealistic and undesirable.54 But our actual statutory and decisional "rules" rarely mandate a particular (unempathetic) response. Most of our rules are fairly open-ended. "Relevance," "the best interests of the child," "undue hardship," "negligence," or "freedom of speech" - to name only a few legal concepts - hardly admit of precise definition or consistent, predictable application. Rather, they represent a weaker, but still constraining sense of the rule-of-law model. Most rules are guidelines that establish spheres of relevant conversation, not mathematical formulas. Moreover, legal training in a common law system emphasizes the indeterminate nature of rules and the significance of even subtle variations in facts. Our legal tradition stresses an inductive method of discovering legal principles. We are taught to distinguish different "stories," to arrive at "law" through experience with many stories, and to revise that law as future experience requires. Much of the effort of most first-year law professors is, I believe, devoted to debunking popular lay myths about "law" as clean-cut answers, and to illuminate law as a dynamic body of policy determinations constrained by certain guiding principles.55 As a practical matter, therefore, our rules often are ambiguous and fluid standards that offer substantial room for varying interpretations. The interpreter, usually a judge, may consult several sources to aid in decisionmaking. One important source necessarily will be the judge's own experiences -including the experiences that seem to determine a person's empathic capacity. In fact, much ink has been spilled to illuminate that our stated "rules" often do not dictate or explain our legal results. Some writers even have argued that a rule of law may be, at times, nothing more than a post hoc rationalization or attempted legitimization of results that may be better explained by extralegal (including, but not necessarily limited to, emotional) responses to the facts, the litigants, or the litigants' lawyers,56 all of which may go un-stated. The opportunity for contextual and empathic decisionmaking therefore already is very much a part of our adjudicatory law, despite our commitment to the rule-of-law ideal. Even when law is clear and relatively inflexible, however, it is not necessarily "unempathetic." The assumed antagonism of legality and empathy is belied by our experience in rape cases, to take one important example. In the past, judges construed the general, open-ended standard of "relevance" to include evidence about the alleged victim's prior sexual conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involved the defendant.57 The solution to this "empathy gap" was legislative action to make the law more specific - more formalized. Rape shield statutes were enacted that controlled judicial discretion and specifically defined relevance to exclude the prior sexual history of the woman, except in limited, justifiable situations.58 In this case, one can make a persuasive argument not only that the rule-of-law model does explain these later rulings, but also that obedience to that model resulted in a triumph for the human voice of the rape survivor. Without the rule, some judges likely would have continued to respond to other inclinations, and admit this testimony about rape survivors. The example thus shows that radical rule skepticism is inconsistent with at least some evidence of actual judicial behavior. It also suggests that the principle of legality is potentially most critical for people who are least understood by the decisionmakers - in this example, women - and hence most vulnerable to unempathetic ad hoc rulings. A final observation is that the principle of legality reflects a deeply ingrained, perhaps inescapable, cultural instinct. We value some procedural regularity - "law for law's sake" - because it lends stasis and structure to our often chaotic lives. Even within our most intimate relationships, we both establish "rules," and expect the other party to follow them.59 Breach of these unspoken agreements can destroy the relationship and hurt us deeply, regardless of the wisdom or "substantive fairness" of a particular rule. Our agreements create expectations, and their consistent application fulfills the expectations. The modest predictability that this sort of "formalism" provides actually may encourage human relationships.60	5,367	<h4>Modest predictability of the resolution is worth potential substantive tradeoff. Topicality creates space for relevant debate.</h4><p>Toni M. <strong>MASSARO</strong>, Professor of Law, University of Florida, <strong>89</strong> [August, 1989, “Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?” Michigan Law Review, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099, Lexis]</p><p>Yet <u>despite their acknowledgment that some ordering and rules are necessary, empathy proponents tend to approach the rule-of-law model as a villain.</u> Moreover, they are hardly alone in their deep skepticism about the rule-of-law model. Most modern legal theorists question the value of procedural regularity when it denies substantive justice.52 Some even question the whole notion of justifying a legal decision by appealing to a rule of law, versus justifying the decision by reference to the facts of the case and the judges' own reason and expe-rience.53 I do not intend to enter this important jurisprudential de-bate, except to the limited extent that the "empathy" writings have suggested that the rule-of-law chills judges' empathic reactions. In this regard, I have several observations.</p><p>My first thought is that the rule-of-law model is only a model. If the term means absolute separation of legal decision and "politics," then it surely is both unrealistic and undesirable.54 But <u><mark>our actual</u></mark> statutory and <u><mark>decisional "rules" rarely mandate a particular (unempathetic) response. Most of our rules are fairly open-ended. "Relevance,"</u></mark> "the best interests of the child," "<u><mark>undue hardship</u></mark>," "negligence," or "freedom of speech" - <u>to name only a few</u> legal concepts - hardly admit of precise definition or consistent, predictable application. Rather, they <u><mark>represent a</mark> weaker, but still <mark>constraining sense of the rule-of-law model. </mark>Most rules are guidelines that establish spheres of relevant conversation, not mathematical formulas</u>.</p><p>Moreover, legal training in a common law system emphasizes the indeterminate nature of rules and the significance of even subtle variations in facts. Our legal tradition stresses an inductive method of discovering legal principles. <u>We are taught to distinguish different "stories," to arrive at "law" through experience with many stories, and to revise that law as future experience requires.</u> Much of the effort of most first-year law professors is, I believe, devoted to debunking popular lay myths about "law" as clean-cut answers, and to illuminate law as a dynamic body of policy determinations constrained by certain guiding principles.55</p><p>As a practical matter, therefore, <u><mark>our rules often are</u> </mark>ambiguous and <u><mark>fluid standards that offer <strong>substantial room for varying interpretations</u></strong></mark>. The interpreter, usually a judge, may consult several sources to aid in decisionmaking. One important source necessarily will be the judge's own experiences -including the experiences that seem to determine a person's empathic capacity. In fact, much ink has been spilled to illuminate that our stated "rules" often do not dictate or explain our legal results. Some writers even have argued that a rule of law may be, at times, nothing more than a post hoc rationalization or attempted legitimization of results that may be better explained by extralegal (including, but not necessarily limited to, emotional) responses to the facts, the litigants, or the litigants' lawyers,56 all of which may go un-stated. The opportunity for contextual and empathic decisionmaking therefore already is very much a part of our adjudicatory law, despite our commitment to the rule-of-law ideal.</p><p>Even when law is clear and relatively inflexible, however, it is not necessarily "unempathetic." The assumed antagonism of legality and empathy is belied by our experience in rape cases, to take one important example. In the past, judges construed the general, open-ended standard of "relevance" to include evidence about the alleged victim's prior sexual conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involved the defendant.57 The solution to this "empathy gap" was legislative action to make the law more specific - more formalized. Rape shield statutes were enacted that controlled judicial discretion and specifically defined relevance to exclude the prior sexual history of the woman, except in limited, justifiable situations.58 In this case, one can make a persuasive argument not only that the rule-of-law model does explain these later rulings, but also that obedience to that model resulted in a triumph for the human voice of the rape survivor. Without the rule, some judges likely would have continued to respond to other inclinations, and admit this testimony about rape survivors. The example thus shows that radical rule skepticism is inconsistent with at least some evidence of actual judicial behavior. It also suggests that the principle of legality is potentially most critical for people who are least understood by the decisionmakers - in this example, women - and hence most vulnerable to unempathetic ad hoc rulings.</p><p>A final observation is that the principle of legality reflects a deeply ingrained, perhaps inescapable, cultural instinct. <u><strong><mark>We value some procedural regularity</u></strong></mark> - "law for law's sake" - <u><mark>because it lends <strong>stasis and structure</u></strong></mark> to our often chaotic lives. <u><mark>Even within our most intimate relationships, we both establish "rules," and expect the other party to follow them</mark>.</u>59 <u>Breach of these unspoken agreements can destroy the relationship and hurt us deeply, <strong>regardless of the wisdom or "substantive fairness"</strong> of a particular rule. <mark>Our agreements create <strong>expectations</strong>, and their consistent application fulfills the expectations</u></mark>. The <u><strong><mark>modest predictability</strong> </mark>that <mark>this sort of "formalism" provides</u></mark> actually <u><mark>may encourage human relationships</u></mark>.60 </p>	1nc vs WGA	null	Proceduralism	31,202	125	17,118	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	565,420	N	Gsu	1	West Georgia Muhammad-Gaius	Deming	1NC T occidentalism K law good K impact turns 2NC Space colonization impact turn 1NR T 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,846	The plan forecloses cross-retaliation---it’s legally linked to noncompliance on the federal horse-racing law	Rosenzweig 14	Adam H. Rosenzweig 14, Professor of Law, Washington University in Saint Louis, 2014, “Conceptualizing a New Institutional Framework for International Taxation: An Antigua Gambling Model for the International Tax Regime,” Washington University Journal of Law & Policy, 44 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 79	In July 2013 Antigua announced the formation of a committee to direct "the government's plan to build the framework necessary to suspend selected US intellectual property rights Antigua declared its intent to begin selling copyrighted songs, movies, and other material directly to U.S. consumers without paying royalties the WTO permitted Antigua to retaliate under TRIPS). This is referred to as "cross-retaliation as the aggrieved member state is permitted to retaliate under one agreement for a violation of a different agreement under the purview of the WTO Antigua could perfectly legally, sell U.S. copyrighted material in the U S In response the U S was provided the opportunity to repeal the ban and comply with the WTO ruling The U S declined Antigua sought permission to retaliate against the U S for failing to comply the D S B took into account the holding of the Appellate Body by limiting the right of Antigua to retaliate only to those lost profits attributable to horse racing, and not to all online gambling although Antigua requested the ability to cross-retaliate in an amount up to $ 3 billion per year the WTO limited the Antigua retaliation to approximately $ 21 million per year Antigua Gambling represented the first time the WTO ruled in favor of a specific form of cross-retaliation Despite continued attempts at bilateral negotiations it appears as if Antigua will pursue its options to begin suspending obligations to protect U.S. intellectual property rights under TRIPS	Antigua announced the government's plan to suspend US i p r Antigua declared intent to sell copyrighted material the WTO permitted Antigua to retaliate under TRIPS "cross-retaliation Antigua could, perfectly legally, sell U.S. copyrighted material In response, the U S was provided the opportunity to repeal the ban and comply with the WTO The declined the D S B limit the right of Antigua to retaliate only to lost profits attributable to horse racing not to all online gambling the WTO limited retaliation to $ 21 million per year it appears Antigua will pursue its options to begin suspending U.S. i p r under TRIPS	In July of 2013, the government of Antigua and Barbuda announced the formation of a committee to direct "the government's plan to build the framework necessary to suspend selected US intellectual property rights ... ." n4 In other words, Antigua and Barbuda declared its intent to begin selling copyrighted songs, movies, and other material directly to U.S. consumers without paying royalties. n5 What made this different from any college student ripping their favorite songs off of BitTorrent or Pirate Bay was that these sales were to be completely legal. How could that be? Antigua and Barbuda is the smallest member country of the WTO and for years hosted popular online gambling sites directed primarily at U.S. gamblers. In 2006, the United States enacted the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA), n6 making it illegal to offer online gambling in the United States. In response, Antigua and Barbuda brought a claim in the WTO that the United States was impermissibly restraining international trade in services in violation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). After several rounds of hearings and appeals, Antigua and Barbuda won the case. The typical remedy for a violation of GATS is permission for the aggrieved country to retaliate by enacting restraints or tariffs on services from the other country. Unfortunately, this remedy would not be very effective between the United States and Antigua and Barbuda. Why? For the simple reason that there is virtually no trade in services between the United States and Antigua and Barbuda. So even if Antigua and Barbuda could impose retaliatory tariffs of 1000 percent on services provided by the United States in Antigua and Barbuda, it would prove near meaningless. In response, the WTO permitted Antigua and Barbuda [82] to retaliate not under GATS but under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). This is referred to as "cross-retaliation," as the aggrieved member state is permitted to retaliate under one agreement for a violation of a different agreement under the purview of the WTO. n7 In other words, Antigua and Barbuda could, perfectly legally, sell U.S. copyrighted material in the United States. In response, the United States was provided the opportunity to repeal the ban and comply with the WTO ruling. The United States declined, citing the ability under the WTO for member states to enact legislation for public morality. Instead, it appealed the decision to the Appellate Body of the WTO. The Appellate Body agreed in part with the United States that it did have a legitimate interest under GATS in furthering public morals. The problem was that the United States permitted inter-state gambling on horse racing through so-called "off-track betting" locations. n8 Thus, at a minimum, the United States was discriminating against offshore gambling websites with respect to horse racing. Accordingly, the Appellate Body held that the public morals exception did not justify discrimination against offshore gambling with respect to horse racing. n9 The United States requested reasonable time to comply with this decision, but eventually Antigua sought permission to retaliate against the United States for failing to comply. At this remedy stage, the Dispute Settlement Body took into account the holding of the Appellate Body by limiting the right of Antigua to retaliate only to those lost profits attributable to horse racing, and not to all online gambling, such as poker and other card games. n10 Thus, although [83] Antigua requested the ability to cross-retaliate in an amount up to $ 3 billion per year, the WTO limited the Antigua retaliation to approximately $ 21 million per year. n11 Even at this relatively small annual amount, Antigua Gambling represented the first time the WTO ruled in favor of a specific form of cross-retaliation. Prior to Antigua Gambling, the mere threat of cross-retaliation had proven sufficient to result in a negotiated compromise between the countries. n12 But in Antigua Gambling, the United States decided that the offending law was sufficiently important to its public policy as to be worth incurring the cost from cross-retaliation. Despite continued attempts at bilateral negotiations to avoid the implementation of the cross-retaliation, it appears as if Antigua and Barbuda will pursue its options to begin suspending obligations to protect U.S. intellectual property rights under TRIPS. n13	4,488	<h4><strong>The plan <u>forecloses</u> cross-retaliation---it’s legally linked to noncompliance on the <u>federal horse-racing</u> law</h4><p></strong>Adam H. <strong>Rosenzweig 14</strong>, Professor of Law, Washington University in Saint Louis, 2014, “Conceptualizing a New Institutional Framework for International Taxation: An Antigua Gambling Model for the International Tax Regime,” Washington University Journal of Law & Policy, 44 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 79</p><p><u><strong>In July</u></strong> of <u><strong>2013</u></strong>, the government of <u><strong><mark>Antigua</u></strong></mark> and Barbuda <u><strong><mark>announced</mark> the formation of a committee to direct "<mark>the government's plan to</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>build the framework necessary to <mark>suspend</mark> selected <mark>US i</mark>ntellectual <mark>p</mark>roperty <mark>r</mark>ights</u></strong> ... ." n4 In other words, <u><strong><mark>Antigua</u></strong></mark> and Barbuda <u><strong><mark>declared</mark> its <mark>intent to</mark> begin <mark>sell</mark>ing <mark>copyrighted</mark> songs, movies, and other <mark>material</mark> directly to U.S. consumers without paying royalties</u></strong>. n5 What made this different from any college student ripping their favorite songs off of BitTorrent or Pirate Bay was that these sales were to be completely legal. How could that be?</p><p>Antigua and Barbuda is the smallest member country of the WTO and for years hosted popular online gambling sites directed primarily at U.S. gamblers. In 2006, the United States enacted the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA), n6 making it illegal to offer online gambling in the United States. In response, Antigua and Barbuda brought a claim in the WTO that the United States was impermissibly restraining international trade in services in violation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). After several rounds of hearings and appeals, Antigua and Barbuda won the case. The typical remedy for a violation of GATS is permission for the aggrieved country to retaliate by enacting restraints or tariffs on services from the other country.</p><p>Unfortunately, this remedy would not be very effective between the United States and Antigua and Barbuda. Why? For the simple reason that there is virtually no trade in services between the United States and Antigua and Barbuda. So even if Antigua and Barbuda could impose retaliatory tariffs of 1000 percent on services provided by the United States in Antigua and Barbuda, it would prove near meaningless. In response, <u><strong><mark>the WTO permitted Antigua</u></strong></mark> and Barbuda [82] <u><strong><mark>to retaliate</u></strong></mark> not under GATS but <u><strong><mark>under</u></strong></mark> the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (<u><strong><mark>TRIPS</mark>). This is referred to as <mark>"cross-retaliation</u></strong></mark>," <u><strong>as the aggrieved member state is permitted to retaliate under one agreement for a violation of a different agreement under the purview of the WTO</u></strong>. n7 In other words, <u><strong><mark>Antigua</u></strong></mark> and Barbuda <u><strong><mark>could</u></strong>, <u><strong>perfectly legally, sell U.S. copyrighted material</mark> in the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates.</p><p><u><strong><mark>In response</u></strong>,</mark> <u><strong><mark>the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>was provided the opportunity to repeal the ban and comply with the WTO</mark> ruling</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong><mark>declined</u></strong></mark>, citing the ability under the WTO for member states to enact legislation for public morality. Instead, it appealed the decision to the Appellate Body of the WTO.</p><p>The Appellate Body agreed in part with the United States that it did have a legitimate interest under GATS in furthering public morals. The problem was that the United States permitted inter-state gambling on horse racing through so-called "off-track betting" locations. n8 Thus, at a minimum, the United States was discriminating against offshore gambling websites with respect to horse racing. Accordingly, the Appellate Body held that the public morals exception did not justify discrimination against offshore gambling with respect to horse racing. n9</p><p>The United States requested reasonable time to comply with this decision, but eventually <u><strong>Antigua sought permission to retaliate against the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>for failing to comply</u></strong>. At this remedy stage, <u><strong><mark>the D</u></strong></mark>ispute <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>ettlement <u><strong><mark>B</u></strong></mark>ody <u><strong>took into account the holding of the Appellate Body by <mark>limit</mark>ing <mark>the right of Antigua to retaliate only to</mark> those <mark>lost profits</u></strong> <u><strong>attributable to horse racing</mark>, and <mark>not to all online gambling</u></strong></mark>, such as poker and other card games. n10 Thus, <u><strong>although</u></strong> [83] <u><strong>Antigua requested the ability to cross-retaliate in an amount up to $ 3 billion per year</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>the WTO limited</mark> the Antigua <mark>retaliation to</mark> approximately <mark>$ 21 million per year</u></strong></mark>. n11</p><p>Even at this relatively small annual amount, <u><strong>Antigua Gambling represented the first time the WTO ruled in favor of a specific form of cross-retaliation</u></strong>. Prior to Antigua Gambling, the mere threat of cross-retaliation had proven sufficient to result in a negotiated compromise between the countries. n12 But in Antigua Gambling, the United States decided that the offending law was sufficiently important to its public policy as to be worth incurring the cost from cross-retaliation. <u><strong>Despite continued attempts at bilateral negotiations</u></strong> to avoid the implementation of the cross-retaliation, <u><strong><mark>it appears</mark> as if <mark>Antigua</u></strong></mark> and Barbuda <u><strong><mark>will pursue its options to begin suspending</mark> obligations to protect <mark>U.S.</mark> <mark>i</mark>ntellectual <mark>p</mark>roperty <mark>r</mark>ights <mark>under TRIPS</u></mark>. n13</p></strong>	null	null	1	430,376	8	17,113	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	565,270	N	Texas	4	Georgetown Erpenbach-Krishnan	Arnett	DHS politics (2NR) cross retal cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,847	A. Demand and climate change fears	New Scientist 08	New Scientist 08 (1/5, “New Generation of GM Crops Could Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions by More Than Grounding All the Aircraft in the World.” http://www.soyatech.com/news_story.php?id=6269)	The first generation of GM crops have traits, such as herbicide tolerance and resistance to insect pests, that benefit producers In Europe, the opposition has been enough to delay the introduction of GM crops climate change trump these concerns However such crops are greeted, there is no doubt they are coming. There is a growing realisation that climate change will be a serious challenge for farmers – and that could mean big profits for companies that can help them adapt The first of this new generation of GM crops will be varieties of maize that can survive periods of drought There is already a strong demand, as drought costs maize farmers $8 billion globally The first commercial varieties could become available soon after 2010 Drought-tolerant versions of other plants are not far behind.	GM crops have traits that benefit producers climate change trump concerns re is no doubt they are coming. There is a growing realisation that climate change will be a serious challenge for farmers – and that could mean big profits for companies that can help them adapt There is already a strong demand The first commercial varieties could become available soon after 2010. Drought-tolerant versions of other plants are not far behind.	For now, we are in a period of uneasy quiet. The first generation of GM crops have traits, such as herbicide tolerance and resistance to insect pests, that benefit producers. So far consumers have failed to see what's in it for them, while green activists have attacked GM agriculture, arguing among other things that it encourages farming practices that damage rural biodiversity. In Europe, the opposition has been enough to delay the introduction of GM crops to fields and GM foods to supermarket shelves. But will climate change trump these concerns? Could crops designed to maintain yields in a warming world, or even to curb greenhouse emissions, eventually overcome Europe's distaste for GM products? However such crops are greeted, there is no doubt they are coming. There is a growing realisation that climate change will be a serious challenge for farmers – and that could mean big profits for companies that can help them adapt. Over the past year, industry leader Monsanto of St Louis, Missouri, asked leading academics and its own scientists to consider how farming should adapt in the face of global warming. Their conclusion: in a changing and unstable climate, stresses that threaten crop yields, such as drought, may become more frequent and severe. "One of our main focuses right now is on helping plants adapt to environmental stress," says David Fischhoff, Monsanto's vice-president for technology strategy and development. The first of this new generation of GM crops will be varieties of maize that can survive periods of drought, or make do with less water during the growing season. There is already a strong demand, as drought costs maize farmers $3.4 billion a year in the US alone, and around $8 billion globally. Engineering plants to tolerate water shortage is more complicated than simply inserting a gene for herbicide resistance or an insecticidal protein. What works in one crop variety, and in one environment, may not work in another . Still, Monsanto and its rivals claim that they can already boost maize yields in dry conditions by around 10 per cent. The first commercial varieties could become available soon after 2010. Drought-tolerant versions of other plants are not far behind. "We're looking for ways to leverage what we find in maize into other crops," says Marc Albertsen of Pioneer Hi-Bred International in Johnston, Iowa.	2,371	<h4>A. Demand and climate change fears</h4><p><strong>New Scientist 08 </strong>(1/5, “New Generation of GM Crops Could Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions by More Than Grounding All the Aircraft in the World.” http://www.soyatech.com/news_story.php?id=6269)</p><p>For now, we are in a period of uneasy quiet. <u>The first generation of <mark>GM crops have traits</mark>, such as herbicide tolerance and resistance to insect pests, <mark>that benefit producers</u></mark>. So far consumers have failed to see what's in it for them, while green activists have attacked GM agriculture, arguing among other things that it encourages farming practices that damage rural biodiversity. <u>In Europe, the opposition has been enough to delay the introduction of GM crops</u> to fields and GM foods to supermarket shelves. But will <u><mark>climate change trump</mark> these <mark>concerns</u></mark>? Could crops designed to maintain yields in a warming world, or even to curb greenhouse emissions, eventually overcome Europe's distaste for GM products? <u>However such crops are greeted, the<mark>re is no doubt they are coming. There is a growing realisation that climate change will be a serious challenge for farmers – and that could mean big profits for companies that can help them adapt</u></mark>. Over the past year, industry leader Monsanto of St Louis, Missouri, asked leading academics and its own scientists to consider how farming should adapt in the face of global warming. Their conclusion: in a changing and unstable climate, stresses that threaten crop yields, such as drought, may become more frequent and severe. "One of our main focuses right now is on helping plants adapt to environmental stress," says David Fischhoff, Monsanto's vice-president for technology strategy and development. <u>The first of this new generation of GM crops will be varieties of maize that can survive periods of drought</u>, or make do with less water during the growing season. <u><mark>There is already a strong demand</mark>, as drought costs maize farmers</u> $3.4 billion a year in the US alone, and around <u>$8 billion globally</u>. Engineering plants to tolerate water shortage is more complicated than simply inserting a gene for herbicide resistance or an insecticidal protein. What works in one crop variety, and in one environment, may not work in another . Still, Monsanto and its rivals claim that they can already boost maize yields in dry conditions by around 10 per cent. <u><mark>The first commercial varieties could become available soon after 2010</u>. <u>Drought-tolerant versions of other plants are not far behind.</u></mark> "We're looking for ways to leverage what we find in maize into other crops," says Marc Albertsen of Pioneer Hi-Bred International in Johnston, Iowa. </p>	null	null	1nc – Biotech	431,198	1	17,120	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	565,421	N	Gsu	3	Wake Forest Clifford-Villa	Watson	vs Stem cells aff 1NC T "nearly all" midterms DA visas CP heg bad case 2NC heg bad case 1NR case T 2NR heg bad case	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,848	Since deceased donors are dead, they can give both of their kidneys and a host of other organs---the actual potential supply is 40 thousand kidneys a year and 20 thousand each for other organs	Silver 88	Theodore Silver 88, J.D., M.D., Assistant Professor of Law at Touro College and the Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, “The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a Proposed Model Organ Draft Act,” 68 B. U. L. Rev. 681 (1988), http://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1181&context=scholarlyworks	most cadaveric organs are not suitable for transplant Transplantable organs must come from brain-dead patients whose breathing and cardiac activity have been artificially maintained Medical wisdom dictates that donors must be young and free from disease impinging on the organ to be salvaged it appears that two percent of the one million patients who die annually in United States hospitals satisfy these criteria then the potential supply of single kidneys is approximately 40,000. The potential supply of hearts, livers, and lung pairs is approximately 20,000. This estimate is consistent with that of the Task Force on Organ Transplantation which suggests that the potential pool of organ donors is between 17,000 and 26,000 annually	most cadaveric organs are not suitable Transplantable organs must come from brain-dead patients donors must be young and free from disease two percent of the one million patients who die annually in U S hospitals satisfy these criteria then the potential supply of single kidneys is 40,000. The potential supply of hearts, livers, and lung pairs is 20,000. This estimate is consistent with the Task Force on Organ Transplantation which suggests the potential pool of donors is 26,000 annually	25 Although approximately two million people die annually in the United States, most of their cadaveric organs are not suitable for transplant. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1986, (table 81) (1986). Transplantable organs must come primarily from brain-dead patients whose breathing and cardiac activity have been artificially maintained. When the heart stops and respiration ceases, oxygen deprivation quickly renders organs unsuitable for transplantation. Telephone conversation with Dr. James Cerilli, Direc-tor of Transplantation, University of Rochester School of Medicine (Jan. 1989). Because organs must come from brain-dead bodies whose respiration and circulation have been artificially maintained after death, donors must, first of all, die in hospitals. About one-half of Americans do so. Bart, Macon, Whittier, Baldwin & Blount, Cadaveric Kidneys For Transplantation: A Paradox of Shortage in the Face of Plenty, 31 TRANSPLANTATION 379-81 (1982) (indicating that 60% of people who die in the United States die in hospitals); Cooper, supra note 10, at 417 (noting that in a study in Washington state, nearly half of the recorded deaths occurred in hospitals). Medical wisdom also dictates that donors must be relatively young and free from disease impinging on the organ to be salvaged. Though estimates vary, it appears that about two percent of the approximately one million patients who die annually in United States hospitals satisfy these criteria. See, e.g., Mertz, The Organ Procurement Problem: Many Causes, No Easy Solution, 254 J. A.M.A. 3258 (1985); Russel & Cosimi, Transplantation, 301 N. ENG. J. MED. 470-79 (1979); Cooper, supra note 10, at 416-20 (estimating the potential kidney donors in Washington as 0.0032% of the population per year); Bart, Prevalence ofCadaveric Kidneysjbr Transplantation, in AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF TISSUE BANKS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1977 ANNUAL MEETING 124-30 (K. Sell, V. Pewy & M. Vincent eds. 1977). If two percent of one million cadavers are suitable donors, then the potential supply of single kidneys, a paired organ, is approximately 40,000. The potential supply of hearts, livers, and lung pairs is approximately 20,000. This estimate is consistent with that of the Task Force on Organ Transplantation which suggests that the potential pool of organ donors is between 17,000 and 26,000 annually, although they recommend further study. TASK FORCE 1986 REPORT, supra note 7, at 35.	2,492	<h4>Since deceased donors are <u>dead</u>, they can give <u>both</u> of their kidneys and a <u>host</u> of other organs---the <u>actual</u> potential supply is 40 thousand kidneys a year and 20 thousand each for other organs</h4><p>Theodore <strong>Silver 88</strong>, J.D., M.D., Assistant Professor of Law at Touro College and the Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, “The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a Proposed Model Organ Draft Act,” 68 B. U. L. Rev. 681 (1988), http://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1181&context=scholarlyworks</p><p>25 Although approximately two million people die annually in the United States, <u><mark>most</u></mark> of their <u><mark>cadaveric organs are not suitable </mark>for transplant</u>. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1986, (table 81) (1986). <u><mark>Transplantable organs must come</u></mark> primarily <u><mark>from brain-dead patients</mark> whose breathing and cardiac activity have been artificially maintained</u>. When the heart stops and respiration ceases, oxygen deprivation quickly renders organs unsuitable for transplantation. Telephone conversation with Dr. James Cerilli, Direc-tor of Transplantation, University of Rochester School of Medicine (Jan. 1989). Because organs must come from brain-dead bodies whose respiration and circulation have been artificially maintained after death, donors must, first of all, die in hospitals. About one-half of Americans do so. Bart, Macon, Whittier, Baldwin & Blount, Cadaveric Kidneys For Transplantation: A Paradox of Shortage in the Face of Plenty, 31 TRANSPLANTATION 379-81 (1982) (indicating that 60% of people who die in the United States die in hospitals); Cooper, supra note 10, at 417 (noting that in a study in Washington state, nearly half of the recorded deaths occurred in hospitals). <u>Medical wisdom</u> also <u>dictates that <mark>donors must be</u></mark> relatively <u><mark>young and free from disease</mark> impinging on the organ to be salvaged</u>. Though estimates vary, <u>it appears that</u> about <u><strong><mark>two percent</u></strong> <u>of the</u></mark> approximately <u><strong><mark>one million patients</u></strong> <u>who die annually in</mark> <strong><mark>U</strong></mark>nited <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>tates <mark>hospitals <strong>satisfy these criteria</u></strong></mark>. See, e.g., Mertz, The Organ Procurement Problem: Many Causes, No Easy Solution, 254 J. A.M.A. 3258 (1985); Russel & Cosimi, Transplantation, 301 N. ENG. J. MED. 470-79 (1979); Cooper, supra note 10, at 416-20 (estimating the potential kidney donors in Washington as 0.0032% of the population per year); Bart, Prevalence ofCadaveric Kidneysjbr Transplantation, in AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF TISSUE BANKS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1977 ANNUAL MEETING 124-30 (K. Sell, V. Pewy & M. Vincent eds. 1977). If two percent of one million cadavers are suitable donors, <u><mark>then the potential supply of <strong>single kidneys</u></strong></mark>, a paired organ, <u><mark>is</mark> approximately <strong><mark>40,000</strong>. The potential supply of hearts, livers, and lung pairs is</mark> approximately <strong><mark>20,000</strong>. This estimate is <strong>consistent with</mark> that of <mark>the Task Force on Organ Transplantation</u></strong> <u>which suggests</mark> that <mark>the potential pool of</mark> organ <strong><mark>donors</strong> is <strong></mark>between 17,000 and <mark>26,000 annually</u></strong></mark>, although they recommend further study. TASK FORCE 1986 REPORT, supra note 7, at 35.</p>	2NC	CP – conscription	2nc solvency	431,199	3	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,849	That push will be accepted and is key to 2016 reform	Oakford 2014	Oakford 2014 (Samuel, writer for VICE News, Global Drug Policy Is Still Deadly and Ineffective, https://news.vice.com/article/global-drug-policy-is-still-deadly-and-ineffective)	Russia's meddling in Ukraine has forced them to temporarily set aside their prohibitionist grandstanding, and could open a window as the UN General Assembly prepares to meet in 2016 for a special session on drug policy. as more countries test their legal limits, a critical mass could lead to a General Assembly resolution redefining their meaning and intent. We are proposing a flexible interpretation of the conventions," Uruguay's Ambassador told We have an interpretation to the side of liberty and rights	Russia's meddling in Ukraine could open a window as the UN General Assembly prepares to meet in 2016 for a special session on drug policy as more countries test their legal limits, a critical mass could lead to a General Assembly resolution redefining their meaning and intent. "We are proposing a flexible interpretation of the conventions	But Russia's meddling in Ukraine has forced them to temporarily set aside their prohibitionist grandstanding, and could open a window as the UN General Assembly prepares to meet in 2016 for a special session on drug policy. There's little hope or wish of overhauling the conventions. But as more countries test their legal limits, a critical mass could lead to a General Assembly resolution redefining their meaning and intent. "We are proposing a flexible interpretation of the conventions," Milton Romani Gerner, Uruguay's Ambassador to the Organization of American States and the country's former Secretary General for Drugs, told VICE News. "There are countries that interpret the conventions by imposing the death penalty and there are countries in Vienna that defend its use on minors involved with drugs. We have an interpretation to the other side, to the side of liberty and rights."	892	<h4><strong>That push will be accepted and is key to 2016 reform</h4><p>Oakford 2014</strong> (Samuel, writer for VICE News, Global Drug Policy Is Still Deadly and Ineffective, https://news.vice.com/article/global-drug-policy-is-still-deadly-and-ineffective)</p><p>But <u><mark>Russia's meddling in Ukraine</mark> has forced them to temporarily set aside their prohibitionist grandstanding, and <mark>could open a window as the UN General Assembly prepares to meet in 2016 for a special session on drug policy</mark>. </u>There's little hope or wish of overhauling the conventions. But <u><mark>as more countries test their legal limits, <strong>a critical mass could lead to a General Assembly resolution redefining their meaning and intent. </u></strong>"<u>We are proposing a flexible interpretation of the conventions</mark>,"</u> Milton Romani Gerner, <u>Uruguay's</u> <u>Ambassador</u> to the Organization of American States and the country's former Secretary General for Drugs, <u>told</u> VICE News. "There are countries that interpret the conventions by imposing the death penalty and there are countries in Vienna that defend its use on minors involved with drugs. <u>We have an interpretation</u> to the other side, <u>to the side of liberty and rights</u>."</p>	null	1nr	2NC Local DA	430,783	8	17,115	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	565,263	N	Wake	8	Georgia Boyce-Feinberg	Markoff	AG politics fed cp (2nr) treaties da (2nr) ban marihuana cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,850	State legalization solves the case---DOJ guidance legitimizes it	Rose 12	I. Nelson Rose 12, Professor of Law, Whittier Law School; Visiting Professor, University of Macau; and Rebecca Bolin, Resident Fellow, Yale Law School, December 2012, “Article: Game On for Internet Gambling: With Federal Approval, States Line Up to Place Their Bets,” Connecticut Law Review, 45 Conn. L. Rev. 653	With a legal memorandum the Obama Administration reversed an aggressive, decades-old DOJ") position and opened the door for states to legalize almost every form of Internet gambling without interference from federal laws OLC announced the major federal anti-gambling statute, the Wire Act applies only to bets on sports events and races By issuing a clear interpretation of previously vague and inconsistent federal gambling laws, the Executive Branch turned oversight of Internet gambling operations over to states Internet gambling, is soon to be legalized by the states The debate about Internet gambling has now been pushed to cash-strapped state authorities, allowing them to make their own decisions. This major change in federal law will advance the current wave of legalized gambling which already encompasses all but two states Internet gambling has the potential to spread pervasively with state cooperation. State legislators are desperate to raise revenue without raising taxes Gambling is seen as a painless tax, so states are seriously and quickly expanding to online gambling. They can now do so with the DOJ's blessing for every form of gambling except sports betting	Obama reversed an aggressive DOJ") position and opened the door for states to legalize almost every form of Internet gambling without interference OLC announced the Wire Act applies only to sports By issuing clear interpretation of inconsistent gambling laws, the Executive turned oversight of Internet gambling over to states This major change will advance the wave of legalized gambling Internet gambling has the potential to spread pervasively with state cooperation states are seriously and quickly expanding	Two days before Christmas in 2011, President Obama gave an unexpected gift to the states. n1 With a thirteen-page legal memorandum ("Memorandum"), the Obama Administration reversed an aggressive, decades-old Department of Justice ("DOJ") position and opened the door for states to legalize almost every form of Internet gambling without interference from federal laws. n2 Through the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC"), the Obama Administration announced that the major federal anti-gambling statute, the Wire Act, n3 now applies only to bets on sports events and races. By issuing a clear interpretation of previously vague and inconsistent federal gambling laws, the Executive Branch maneuvered what Congress could not: it turned oversight of Internet gambling operations over to states. The impacts of land-based casino gambling are long debated, n4 but Internet gaming is a recently developed industry. Opponents have compared online gambling to crack cocaine, n5 but it has also been described [656] as inevitable and unstoppable. n6 Americans have made Internet bets in the hundreds of millions of dollars to the benefit of offshore illegal and gray market operations. n7 President Obama's Christmas Memorandum was a gift to states worth billions of dollars in new tax revenue and thousands of new jobs. After this thirteen-page reversal, expect a quick departure to uncharted territory for the United States: legal Internet gambling. Part II of this Article explains the complicated, interlocked set of federal gaming laws at issue. These laws are critical to federal enforcement of state gambling laws and to federal involvement in states' decisions about what forms of gambling they might want to regulate. The law addressed in the Memorandum, the Wire Act, was the most important weapon the DOJ used to prevent states from authorizing Internet gambling, but it is not the only federal barrier to state-authorized gambling. Part III discusses the tension among these federal laws, which at times undermine and contradict one another. With no legislative solution in sight, the Memorandum offers a clean solution and interprets the law to eliminate most, though not all, of the problems. Part IV explores the explosion of Internet gambling, which is soon to be legalized by the states. The debate about Internet gambling has now been pushed to cash-strapped state authorities, allowing them to make their own decisions. This major change in federal law will advance the current wave of legalized gambling, which already encompasses all but two states. Internet gambling has the potential to spread pervasively with state cooperation. State legislators and governors are desperate to find ways to raise revenue without raising taxes. Gambling is seen as a painless tax, so states are seriously and quickly expanding to online gambling. They can [657] now do so with the DOJ's blessing for every form of gambling except sports betting.	2,948	<h4><u><strong>State legalization</u> solves the case---DOJ guidance legitimizes it </h4><p></strong>I. Nelson <strong>Rose 12</strong>, Professor of Law, Whittier Law School; Visiting Professor, University of Macau; and Rebecca Bolin, Resident Fellow, Yale Law School, December 2012, “Article: Game On for Internet Gambling: With Federal Approval, States Line Up to Place Their Bets,” Connecticut Law Review, 45 Conn. L. Rev. 653</p><p>Two days before Christmas in 2011, President Obama gave an unexpected gift to the states. n1 <u><strong>With a</u></strong> thirteen-page <u><strong>legal memorandum</u></strong> ("Memorandum"), <u><strong>the <mark>Obama</mark> Administration</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>reversed</u></strong> <u><strong>an aggressive</mark>, decades-old</u></strong> Department of Justice ("<u><strong><mark>DOJ") position and</u></strong> <u><strong>opened the door for states to legalize almost every form of Internet gambling</u></strong> <u><strong>without interference</mark> from federal laws</u></strong>. n2 Through the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel ("<u><strong><mark>OLC</u></strong></mark>"), the Obama Administration <u><strong><mark>announced</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong>the major federal anti-gambling statute, <mark>the Wire Act</u></strong></mark>, n3 now <u><strong><mark>applies only to</mark> bets on <mark>sports</mark> events and races</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>By issuing</mark> a <mark>clear interpretation of</mark> previously vague and <mark>inconsistent</mark> federal <mark>gambling laws, the Executive</mark> Branch</u></strong> maneuvered what Congress could not: it <u><strong><mark>turned oversight of Internet gambling</mark> operations <mark>over to states</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>The impacts of land-based casino gambling are long debated, n4 but Internet gaming is a recently developed industry. Opponents have compared online gambling to crack cocaine, n5 but it has also been described [656] as inevitable and unstoppable. n6 Americans have made Internet bets in the hundreds of millions of dollars to the benefit of offshore illegal and gray market operations. n7 President Obama's Christmas Memorandum was a gift to states worth billions of dollars in new tax revenue and thousands of new jobs. After this thirteen-page reversal, expect a quick departure to uncharted territory for the United States: legal Internet gambling.</p><p>Part II of this Article explains the complicated, interlocked set of federal gaming laws at issue. These laws are critical to federal enforcement of state gambling laws and to federal involvement in states' decisions about what forms of gambling they might want to regulate. The law addressed in the Memorandum, the Wire Act, was the most important weapon the DOJ used to prevent states from authorizing Internet gambling, but it is not the only federal barrier to state-authorized gambling.</p><p>Part III discusses the tension among these federal laws, which at times undermine and contradict one another. With no legislative solution in sight, the Memorandum offers a clean solution and interprets the law to eliminate most, though not all, of the problems.</p><p>Part IV explores the explosion of <u><strong>Internet gambling,</u></strong> which <u><strong>is soon to be legalized by the states</u></strong>. <u><strong>The debate about Internet gambling has now been pushed to cash-strapped state authorities, allowing them to make their own decisions. <mark>This</u></strong> <u><strong>major change</mark> in federal law</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>will advance the</mark> current <mark>wave of legalized gambling</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>which already encompasses all but two states</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Internet gambling has the potential to</u></strong> <u><strong>spread pervasively</u></strong> <u><strong>with state cooperation</mark>. State legislators</u></strong> and governors <u><strong>are</u></strong> <u><strong>desperate</u></strong> <u><strong>to</u></strong> find ways to <u><strong>raise revenue without raising taxes</u></strong>. <u><strong>Gambling is seen as a painless tax, so <mark>states are</u></strong> <u><strong>seriously and quickly expanding</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to online gambling. They can</u></strong> [657] <u><strong>now do so with the DOJ's blessing for every form of gambling except sports betting</u>.</p></strong>	null	null	1	430,377	7	17,113	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	565,270	N	Texas	4	Georgetown Erpenbach-Krishnan	Arnett	DHS politics (2NR) cross retal cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,851	B. Increase in public acceptance	Canberra Times 08	Canberra Times 6/11/08 (“Memo to Unbelievers: GM Crops Safe And Sound.” http://www.truthabouttrade.org/content/view/11854/54/)	a slow increase in public acceptance of GM foods will continue as GM crops are approved as next generation GM varieties such as drought-resistant wheat, frost- resistant horticultural crops, allergen-free rye grass and others with manifest benefits come through the regulatory process and time will do the job	increase in public acceptance of GM foods will continue as GM crops are approved as next generation GM varieties with manifest benefits come through the regulatory process. time will do the job	This continues a slow increase in public acceptance of GM foods, a trend that will continue as long as credible health or environmental problems do not arise and as more obviously advantageous GM crops are approved. Sir Gus Nossal, whose review led to the Victorian Government's decisions to approve GM canola plantings, told a National Press Club audience last week that it was "genuinely bad luck" that canola was our first GM food test case. Although GM canolas deliver environmental benefits because weedkillers they resist are biodegradable unlike triazine- based herbicides used with some conventionally bred varieties he said this kind of benefit did not cut through for the average consumer. He foresees that this will change as next generation GM varieties such as drought-resistant wheat, frost- resistant horticultural crops, allergen-free rye grass and others with manifest benefits come through the regulatory process. Meantime, Sir Gus counselled the use of "sweet reason" when it came to dealing with outdated GM fears and criticisms. He recalled that Mothers Against Genetic Engineering appeared before his inquiry. "You listen and you study what it is that they're trying to tell you and you reach your conclusions and then you come back and say, 'Well, I've heard you, I don't agree with you, here are the reasons, and time will do the job I think'," he said.	1,377	<h4>B. Increase in public acceptance</h4><p><strong>Canberra Times </strong>6/11/<strong>08 </strong>(“Memo to Unbelievers: GM Crops Safe And Sound.” http://www.truthabouttrade.org/content/view/11854/54/)</p><p>This continues <u>a slow <mark>increase in public acceptance of GM foods</u></mark>, a trend that <u><mark>will continue as</u></mark> long as credible health or environmental problems do not arise and as more obviously advantageous <u><mark>GM crops are approved</u></mark>. Sir Gus Nossal, whose review led to the Victorian Government's decisions to approve GM canola plantings, told a National Press Club audience last week that it was "genuinely bad luck" that canola was our first GM food test case. Although GM canolas deliver environmental benefits because weedkillers they resist are biodegradable unlike triazine- based herbicides used with some conventionally bred varieties he said this kind of benefit did not cut through for the average consumer. He foresees that this will change <u><mark>as next generation GM varieties</mark> such as drought-resistant wheat, frost- resistant horticultural crops, allergen-free rye grass and others <mark>with manifest benefits come through the regulatory process</u>.</mark> Meantime, Sir Gus counselled the use of "sweet reason" when it came to dealing with outdated GM fears and criticisms. He recalled that Mothers Against Genetic Engineering appeared before his inquiry. "You listen and you study what it is that they're trying to tell you and you reach your conclusions and then you come back and say, 'Well, I've heard you, I don't agree with you, here are the reasons, <u>and <mark>time will do the job</u></mark> I think'," he said.</p>	null	null	1nc – Biotech	431,200	1	17,120	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	565,421	N	Gsu	3	Wake Forest Clifford-Villa	Watson	vs Stem cells aff 1NC T "nearly all" midterms DA visas CP heg bad case 2NC heg bad case 1NR case T 2NR heg bad case	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,852	Challenging oppression needs to be dialogic. Alternative creates new authoritarianism.	Morson 4	Morson 4—Northwestern prof (Greg, Bakhtinian Perspectives on Language, Literacy, and Learning, 317-23)	learning as a dialogic process is not merely a transmission of knowledge, but an activity in which selves acquire new capacities for development Everyone has heard that apartheid is bad, that the environment needs preserving In our academic subculture, we are persuaded of the rightness of equality inclusion and affirmative action, These are our authoritative voices, and we may accept either because they are simply not to be questioned or because we have sought out intelligent opponents who have questioned them and have thought about, if not ultimately accepted their answers Thinking of ourselves as oppositional, we often forget that we, too, have our own authoritative discourse and must remember that, in a world of difference authority may not extend to those unlike us. The testable authoritative voice In a society that is relatively open to diverse values, that minimal, but still significant, function of an authoritative voice is the most important one. It demands not adherence but attention. And such a voice is likely to survive far longer than an authoritarian voice whose rejection is necessarily its destruction we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all and that jargon sounds with all the overtones of authority We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes work to realize that we may be felt as overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree The Theme of the Rebel many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors Ivan the Terrible saw himself as someone who had been oppressed as the great rebel against authority There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful they were rebelling victims Milosevic exploited the appeal Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power Rebels make the worst tyrants because their word borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance. By contrast if rebellion against an authoritative word is truly dialogic, that is unlikely to happen, or to be subject to self-check Dialogue is a process of real testing, and one of the characteristics of a genuine test is that the result is not guaranteed	learning is not merely a transmission of knowledge, but an activity in which selves acquire new capacities Everyone has heard apartheid is bad the environment needs preserving These are authoritative voices we may accept either because they are not questioned or because we have sought out intelligent opponents who have questioned them Thinking of ourselves as oppositional forget The testable authoritative voice we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice We are so prone to think of ourselves fighting oppression it takes work to realize we may be felt as overbearing that our own voice may provoke the same reactions we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree great rebels of history were the same people as the great oppressors maximal rebellion against authority produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is careful Rebels make the worst tyrants their word borrowed something from the authoritative word it opposed, and exaggerated it aura of righteous authority if rebellion against an authoritative word is truly dialogic, that is unlikely to happen Dialogue is real testing the result is not guaranteed	Sarah Freedman and Arnetha Ball describe learning as a dialogic process. It is not merely a transmission of knowledge, but an activity in which whole selves are formed and acquire new capacities for development. We live in a world of enormous cultural diversity, and the various languages and points of view—ideologies in Bakhtin’s sense—of students have become a fact that cannot be ignored. Teachers need to enter into a dialogue with those points of view and to help students do the same. For difference may best be understood not as an obstacle but as an opportunity. The range of “authoritative” and “innerly persuasive discourses” in our classrooms appears to be growing along with our cultural diversity. Freedman and Ball observe: “This rich and complex ‘contact zone’ inside the classroom yields plentiful opportunity for students to decide what will be internally persuasive for them, and consequently for them to develop their ideologies. This diversity presents both challenges and opportunities as teachers seek to guide their students on this developmental journey” (pp. 8– 9, this volume). The journey they have in mind does not so much lead to a particular goal as establish an ever-enriching process of learning. Freedman and Ball’s approach grows out of Bakhtin’s key concepts, especially one that has been largely neglected in research on him: “ideological becoming” (see Chapter 1, this volume). The implications of the essays in this volume therefore extend well beyond educational theory and practice to the humanities and social sciences generally. How does a thinking person– and we are all thinking people—develop? What happens when ideas, embodied in specific people with particular voices, come into dialogic contact? What factors guide the creation of a point of view on the world? The specific problematic of pedagogy serves as a lens to make the broader implications of such questions clearer. [End Page 317] Authority and testing How does a person develop a point of view on the world, a set of attitudes for interpreting and evaluating it ? How systematic is that point of view? Is our fundamental take on the world a philosophy with implicit doctrines or is it more like a set of inclinations and a way of probing? Perhaps it is not one, but a collection of ways of probing, a panoply of skills and habits, which a person tries out one after another the way in which one may, in performing a physical task, reach for one tool after another? What does our point of view have to do with our sense of ourselves, whether as individuals or as members of groups? What role does formal education play in acquiring and shaping it? What happens when contrary evidence confronts us or when the radical uncertainty of the world impinges on us? Whatever that “point of view” is, how does it change over time ? In any given culture or subculture, there tends to be what Bakhtin would call an “authoritative” perspective. However, the role of that perspective is not necessarily authoritarian. Despite Bakhtin’s experience as a Soviet citizen, where the right perspective on just about all publicly identified perspectives was held to be already known and certain, he was well aware that outside that circle of presumed certainty life was still governed by opinion. It is not just that rival ideologies—Christian, liberal, and many others—were still present; beyond that, each individual’s experiences led to half-formed but strongly held beliefs that enjoyed no formal expression. Totalitarianism was surely an aspiration of the Soviet and other such regimes, but it could never realize its ideal of uniformity–“the new Soviet man” who was all of a piece—for some of the same reasons it could not make a centrally planned economy work. There is always too much contingent, unexpected, particular, local, and idiosyncratic, with a historical or personal background that does not fit. Bakhtin may be viewed as the great philosopher of all that does not fit. He saw the world as irreducibly messy, unsystematizable, and contingent, and he regarded it as all the better for that. For life to have meaning, it must possess what he called “surprisingness.” If individual people are to act morally, they cannot displace their responsibility onto some systematic ideology, whether Marxist, Christian, or any other. What I do now is not reducible to any ethical, political, or metaphysical system; and I—each “I”– must take responsibility for his or her acts at this moment. As Bakhtin liked to say, there is “no alibi.” Authoritative words in their fully expressed form purport to offer an alibi. They say, like Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor: we speak the truth and you need not question, only obey, for your conscience to be at rest. Yet, every authoritative word is spoken or heard in a milieu of difference. It may try to insulate itself from dialogue with reverential tones, a special script, and all the other signs of the authority fused to it, but at the margins 319 dialogue waits with a challenge: you may be right, but you have to convince me. Once the authoritative word responds to that challenge, it ceases to be fully authoritative. To be sure, it may still command considerable deference by virtue of its past, its moral aura, and its omnipresence. But it has ceased to be free from dialogue and its authority has changed from unquestioned to dialogically tested. Every educator crosses this line when he or she gives reasons for a truth. My daughter once had a math teacher who, when asked why a certain procedure was used to solve an equation, would reply, “because some old, dead guy said so.” Of course, no answer could be further from the spirit of mathematics, where logic counts for everything and authority for nothing. Nobody proves the Pythagorean theorem by saying Pythagoras said so. Compare this reply with actually showing the logic of a procedure so the student understands the “why.” In that case, one immediately admits that there must be a good reason for proceeding in a certain way, and that it needs to be shown. The procedure does not end up as less sure because of this questioning; quite the contrary. Rather, questioning is seen as intrinsic to mathematics itself, which enjoys its authority precisely because it has survived such questioning. Even in fields that do not admit of mathematical proof, an authoritative word does not necessarily lose all authority when questioning enters into it. We can give no mathematically sure reason why democracy is preferable to dictatorship or market economies are generally more productive than command economies. But we can give reasons, which admit the possibilities of challenges we had not foreseen and may have to think about. Education and all inquiry are fundamentally different when the need for reasons is acknowledged and when questioning becomes part of the process of learning. Truth becomes dialogically tested and forever testable. In short, authoritative words may or may not be authoritarian. In the Soviet Union, authoritarian words were the norm and questioning was seen as suspect. One no more questioned Marxism-Leninism than one questioned the law of gravity (a common comparison, suggesting that each was equally sure). What the Party said was right because it was the outcome of sure historical laws guaranteeing the correctness of its rulings. Education reflected this spirit. Bakhtin’s embrace of dialogue, then, challenged not so much the economic or historical theories the regime propounded, but its very concept of truth and the language of truth it embraced. Dialogue by its very nature invites questioning, thrives on it, demands it. It follows from Bakhtin’s argument that nonauthoritarian authoritative words are not necessarily weaker than authoritarian ones. After all, one may believe something all the more because one has questioned it, provided that defenders have been willing to answer and have been more or less cogent in their defense. They need not answer all objections perfectly—we are often convinced with qualifications, with a “just in case,” with “loopholes.” 320 However, they must demonstrate that the authority is based on generally sound reasons. Morever, for many, enormous persuasive power lies in the very fact that the authoritative belief is so widely held. Everyone speaks it, even if with ironizing quotation marks. An authoritative word of this nonauthoritarian kind functions not as a voice speaking the Truth, but as a voice speaking the one point of view that must be attended to. It may be contested, rejected, or modified, the way in which church dogmas are modified over time by believers, but it cannot be ignored. Think of Huck Finn (discussed by Mark Dressman, this volume). Even when he cannot bring himself to turn in Jim as a runaway slave, he accepts the authority of the social voice telling him that such an action would be right. He does not question that voice, just realizes he will not follow it and will do “wrong.” Much of the moral complexity of this book lies in Huck’s self-questioning, as he does what we believe to be right but what he thinks of as wrong; and if we read this book sensitively, we may ask ourselves how much of our own behavior is Huckish in this respect. Perhaps our failure to live up to our ideals bespeaks our intuition without overt expression that there is something wrong with those ideals. What Huck demonstrates is that there may be a wisdom, even a belief system, in behavior itself: we always know more than we know, and our moral sensitivity may be different from, and wiser than, our professed beliefs. our own authoritative words The basic power of an authoritative voice comes from its status as the one that everyone hears. Everyone has heard that democracy is good and apartheid is bad, that the environment needs preserving, that church must not be merged with state; and people who spend their lives in an academic environment may add many more to the list. In our academic subculture, we are, almost all of us, persuaded of the rightness of greater economic equality, of plans for inclusion and affirmative action, of abortion rights, of peace, of greater efforts to reach out to all the people in the world in all their amazing diversity. These are our authoritative voices, and, too, we may accept either because they are simply not to be questioned or because we have sought out intelligent opponents who have questioned them and have thought about, if not ultimately accepted, their answers. Again, educators know the moment when a student from a background different from ours questions one of our beliefs and we experience the temptation to reply like that math teacher. Thinking of ourselves as oppositional, we often forget that we, too, have our own authoritative discourse and must work to remember that, in a world of difference, authority may not extend to those unlike us. The testable authoritative voice: we hear it always, and though some may disagree with it, they cannot ignore it. Its nonauthoritarian power is based 321 above all on its ubiquity. In a society that is relatively open to diverse values, that minimal, but still significant, function of an authoritative voice is the most important one. It demands not adherence but attention. And such a voice is likely to survive far longer than an authoritarian voice whose rejection is necessarily its destruction. We have all these accounts of Soviet dissidents—say, Solzhenitsyn—who tell their story as a “narrative of rethinking” (to use Christian Knoeller’s phrase): they once believed in Communist ideology, but events caused them to raise some questions that by their nature could not be publicly voiced, and that silence itself proved most telling. You can hear silence if it follows a pistol shot. If silence does not succeed in ending private questioning, the word that silence defends is decisively weakened. The story of Soviet dissidents is typically one in which, at some point, questioning moved from a private, furtive activity accompanied by guilt to the opposite extreme, a clear rejection in which the authoritative voice lost all hold altogether. Vulnerability accompanies too much power. But in more open societies, and in healthier kinds of individual development, an authoritative voice of the whole society, or of a particular community (like our own academic community), still sounds, still speaks to us in our minds. In fact, we commonly see that people who have questioned and rejected an authoritative voice find that it survives within them as a possible alternative, like the minority opinion in a court decision. When they are older, they discover that experience has vindicated some part of what they had summarily rejected. Perhaps the authoritative voice had more to it than we thought when young? Now that we are teachers, perhaps we see some of the reasons for practices we objected to? Can we, then, combine in a new practice both the practices of our teachers and the new insights we have had? When we do, a flexible authoritative word emerges, one that has become to a great extent an innerly persuasive one. By a lengthy process, the word has, with many changes, become our own, and our own word has in the process acquired the intonations of authority. In much the same way, we react to the advice of our parents. At some point it may seem dated, no more than what an earlier generation unfortunately thought, or we may greet it with the sign of regret that our parents have forgotten what they experienced when our age. However, the dialogue goes on. At a later point, we may say, you know, there was wisdom in what our parents said, only why did they express it so badly? If only I had known! We may even come to the point where we express some modified form of parental wisdom in a convincing voice. We translate it into our own idiolect, confident that we will not make the mistakes of our parents when we talk to our children. Then our children listen, and find our own idiolect, to which we have devoted such painful ideological and verbal work, hopelessly dated, and the process may start again. It is always a difficult moment when we realize that our own voice is now the authority, especially because we have made it different, persuasive in its 322 own terms, not like our parents’ voice. When we reflect on how our children see us, we may even realize that our parents’ authoritative words may not have been the product of blind acceptance, but the result of a process much like our own. They may have done the same thing we did—question, reject, adapt, arrive at a new version—and that rigid voice of authority we heard from them was partly in our own ears. Can we somehow convey to our students our own words so they do not sound so rigid? We all think we can. But so did our parents (and other authorities). Dialogue, Laughter, And Surprise Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture. We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. 323 For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal—otherwise so inexplicable—was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power—unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance. By contrast, if one’s rebellion against an authoritative word is truly dialogic, that is unlikely to happen, or to be subject to more of a self-check if it does. Then one questions one’s own certainties and invites skepticism, lest one become what one has opposed. One may even step back and laugh at oneself. Laughter at oneself invites the perspective of the other. Laughter is implicitly pluralist. Instead of looking at one’s opponents as the unconditionally wrong, one imagines how one sounds to them. Regarding earlier authorities, one thinks: that voice of authority, it is not my voice, but perhaps it has something to say, however wrongly put. It comes from a specific experience, which I must understand. I will correct it, but to do that I must measure it, test it, against my own experience. Dialogue is a process of real testing, and one of the characteristics of a genuine test is that the result is not guaranteed. It may turn out that sometimes the voice of earlier authority turns out to be right on some point. Well, we will incorporate that much into our own “innerly persuasive voice.” Once one has done this, once one has allowed one’s own evolving convictions to be tested by experience and by other convictions, then one may allow the dialogue to continue.	20,189	<h4>Challenging oppression needs to be dialogic. Alternative creates new authoritarianism.</h4><p><strong>Morson 4</strong>—Northwestern prof (Greg, Bakhtinian Perspectives on Language, Literacy, and Learning, 317-23)</p><p>Sarah Freedman and Arnetha Ball describe <u><mark>learning</mark> as a dialogic process</u>. It <u><mark>is not merely a</u> <u><strong>transmission of knowledge</strong>, but an activity in which</u></mark> whole <u><mark>selves</u></mark> are formed and <u><mark>acquire new capacities</mark> for development</u>. We live in a world of enormous cultural diversity, and the various languages and points of view—ideologies in Bakhtin’s sense—of students have become a fact that cannot be ignored. Teachers need to enter into a dialogue with those points of view and to help students do the same. For difference may best be understood not as an obstacle but as an opportunity.</p><p>The range of “authoritative” and “innerly persuasive discourses” in our classrooms appears to be growing along with our cultural diversity. Freedman and Ball observe: “This rich and complex ‘contact zone’ inside the classroom yields plentiful opportunity for students to decide what will be internally persuasive for them, and consequently for them to develop their ideologies. This diversity presents both challenges and opportunities as teachers seek to guide their students on this developmental journey” (pp. 8– 9, this volume). The journey they have in mind does not so much lead to a particular goal as establish an ever-enriching process of learning.</p><p>Freedman and Ball’s approach grows out of Bakhtin’s key concepts, especially one that has been largely neglected in research on him: “ideological becoming” (see Chapter 1, this volume). The implications of the essays in this volume therefore extend well beyond educational theory and practice to the humanities and social sciences generally. How does a thinking person– and we are all thinking people—develop? What happens when ideas, embodied in specific people with particular voices, come into dialogic contact? What factors guide the creation of a point of view on the world? The specific problematic of pedagogy serves as a lens to make the broader implications of such questions clearer. [End Page 317]</p><p>Authority and testing How does a person develop a point of view on the world, a set of attitudes for interpreting and evaluating it ? How systematic is that point of view? Is our fundamental take on the world a philosophy with implicit doctrines or is it more like a set of inclinations and a way of probing? Perhaps it is not one, but a collection of ways of probing, a panoply of skills and habits, which a person tries out one after another the way in which one may, in performing a physical task, reach for one tool after another? What does our point of view have to do with our sense of ourselves, whether as individuals or as members of groups? What role does formal education play in acquiring and shaping it? What happens when contrary evidence confronts us or when the radical uncertainty of the world impinges on us? Whatever that “point of view” is, how does it change over time ? In any given culture or subculture, there tends to be what Bakhtin would call an “authoritative” perspective. However, the role of that perspective is not necessarily authoritarian. Despite Bakhtin’s experience as a Soviet citizen, where the right perspective on just about all publicly identified perspectives was held to be already known and certain, he was well aware that outside that circle of presumed certainty life was still governed by opinion. It is not just that rival ideologies—Christian, liberal, and many others—were still present; beyond that, each individual’s experiences led to half-formed but strongly held beliefs that enjoyed no formal expression. Totalitarianism was surely an aspiration of the Soviet and other such regimes, but it could never realize its ideal of uniformity–“the new Soviet man” who was all of a piece—for some of the same reasons it could not make a centrally planned economy work. There is always too much contingent, unexpected, particular, local, and idiosyncratic, with a historical or personal background that does not fit. Bakhtin may be viewed as the great philosopher of all that does not fit. He saw the world as irreducibly messy, unsystematizable, and contingent, and he regarded it as all the better for that. For life to have meaning, it must possess what he called “surprisingness.” If individual people are to act morally, they cannot displace their responsibility onto some systematic ideology, whether Marxist, Christian, or any other. What I do now is not reducible to any ethical, political, or metaphysical system; and I—each “I”– must take responsibility for his or her acts at this moment. As Bakhtin liked to say, there is “no alibi.” Authoritative words in their fully expressed form purport to offer an alibi. They say, like Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor: we speak the truth and you need not question, only obey, for your conscience to be at rest. Yet, every authoritative word is spoken or heard in a milieu of difference. It may try to insulate itself from dialogue with reverential tones, a special script, and all the other signs of the authority fused to it, but at the margins 319 dialogue waits with a challenge: you may be right, but you have to convince me. Once the authoritative word responds to that challenge, it ceases to be fully authoritative. To be sure, it may still command considerable deference by virtue of its past, its moral aura, and its omnipresence. But it has ceased to be free from dialogue and its authority has changed from unquestioned to dialogically tested. Every educator crosses this line when he or she gives reasons for a truth. My daughter once had a math teacher who, when asked why a certain procedure was used to solve an equation, would reply, “because some old, dead guy said so.” Of course, no answer could be further from the spirit of mathematics, where logic counts for everything and authority for nothing. Nobody proves the Pythagorean theorem by saying Pythagoras said so. Compare this reply with actually showing the logic of a procedure so the student understands the “why.” In that case, one immediately admits that there must be a good reason for proceeding in a certain way, and that it needs to be shown. The procedure does not end up as less sure because of this questioning; quite the contrary. Rather, questioning is seen as intrinsic to mathematics itself, which enjoys its authority precisely because it has survived such questioning. Even in fields that do not admit of mathematical proof, an authoritative word does not necessarily lose all authority when questioning enters into it. We can give no mathematically sure reason why democracy is preferable to dictatorship or market economies are generally more productive than command economies. But we can give reasons, which admit the possibilities of challenges we had not foreseen and may have to think about. Education and all inquiry are fundamentally different when the need for reasons is acknowledged and when questioning becomes part of the process of learning. Truth becomes dialogically tested and forever testable. In short, authoritative words may or may not be authoritarian. In the Soviet Union, authoritarian words were the norm and questioning was seen as suspect. One no more questioned Marxism-Leninism than one questioned the law of gravity (a common comparison, suggesting that each was equally sure). What the Party said was right because it was the outcome of sure historical laws guaranteeing the correctness of its rulings. Education reflected this spirit. Bakhtin’s embrace of dialogue, then, challenged not so much the economic or historical theories the regime propounded, but its very concept of truth and the language of truth it embraced. Dialogue by its very nature invites questioning, thrives on it, demands it. It follows from Bakhtin’s argument that nonauthoritarian authoritative words are not necessarily weaker than authoritarian ones. After all, one may believe something all the more because one has questioned it, provided that defenders have been willing to answer and have been more or less cogent in their defense. They need not answer all objections perfectly—we are often convinced with qualifications, with a “just in case,” with “loopholes.” 320 However, they must demonstrate that the authority is based on generally sound reasons. Morever, for many, enormous persuasive power lies in the very fact that the authoritative belief is so widely held. Everyone speaks it, even if with ironizing quotation marks. An authoritative word of this nonauthoritarian kind functions not as a voice speaking the Truth, but as a voice speaking the one point of view that must be attended to. It may be contested, rejected, or modified, the way in which church dogmas are modified over time by believers, but it cannot be ignored. Think of Huck Finn (discussed by Mark Dressman, this volume). Even when he cannot bring himself to turn in Jim as a runaway slave, he accepts the authority of the social voice telling him that such an action would be right. He does not question that voice, just realizes he will not follow it and will do “wrong.” Much of the moral complexity of this book lies in Huck’s self-questioning, as he does what we believe to be right but what he thinks of as wrong; and if we read this book sensitively, we may ask ourselves how much of our own behavior is Huckish in this respect. Perhaps our failure to live up to our ideals bespeaks our intuition without overt expression that there is something wrong with those ideals. What Huck demonstrates is that there may be a wisdom, even a belief system, in behavior itself: we always know more than we know, and our moral sensitivity may be different from, and wiser than, our professed beliefs. our own authoritative words The basic power of an authoritative voice comes from its status as the one that everyone hears. <u><mark>Everyone has heard</mark> that</u> democracy is good and <u><mark>apartheid is bad</mark>, that <mark>the environment needs preserving</u></mark>, that church must not be merged with state; and people who spend their lives in an academic environment may add many more to the list. <u>In our academic subculture, we are</u>, almost all of us, <u>persuaded of the rightness of </u>greater economic <u>equality</u>, of plans for <u>inclusion and affirmative action,</u> of abortion rights, of peace, of greater efforts to reach out to all the people in the world in all their amazing diversity. <u><mark>These are</mark> our <mark>authoritative voices</mark>, and</u>, too, <u><strong><mark>we may accept either because they are</mark> simply <mark>not</mark> to be <mark>questioned or because we have sought out intelligent opponents who have questioned them</mark> and have thought about</strong>, if not ultimately accepted</u>, <u><strong>their answers</u></strong>. Again, educators know the moment when a student from a background different from ours questions one of our beliefs and we experience the temptation to reply like that math teacher. <u><mark>Thinking of ourselves as oppositional</mark>, <strong>we often <mark>forget</mark> that we, too, have our own authoritative discourse</strong> and must</u> work to <u>remember that, in a world of difference</u>, <u>authority may not extend to those unlike us. <strong><mark>The testable authoritative voice</u></strong></mark>: we hear it always, and though some may disagree with it, they cannot ignore it. Its nonauthoritarian power is based 321 above all on its ubiquity. <u>In a society that is relatively open to diverse values, that minimal, but still significant, function of an authoritative voice is the most important one. It demands not adherence but attention. And such a voice is likely to survive far longer than an authoritarian voice whose rejection is necessarily its destruction</u>. We have all these accounts of Soviet dissidents—say, Solzhenitsyn—who tell their story as a “narrative of rethinking” (to use Christian Knoeller’s phrase): they once believed in Communist ideology, but events caused them to raise some questions that by their nature could not be publicly voiced, and that silence itself proved most telling. You can hear silence if it follows a pistol shot. If silence does not succeed in ending private questioning, the word that silence defends is decisively weakened. The story of Soviet dissidents is typically one in which, at some point, questioning moved from a private, furtive activity accompanied by guilt to the opposite extreme, a clear rejection in which the authoritative voice lost all hold altogether. Vulnerability accompanies too much power. But in more open societies, and in healthier kinds of individual development, an authoritative voice of the whole society, or of a particular community (like our own academic community), still sounds, still speaks to us in our minds. In fact, we commonly see that people who have questioned and rejected an authoritative voice find that it survives within them as a possible alternative, like the minority opinion in a court decision. When they are older, they discover that experience has vindicated some part of what they had summarily rejected. Perhaps the authoritative voice had more to it than we thought when young? Now that we are teachers, perhaps we see some of the reasons for practices we objected to? Can we, then, combine in a new practice both the practices of our teachers and the new insights we have had? When we do, a flexible authoritative word emerges, one that has become to a great extent an innerly persuasive one. By a lengthy process, the word has, with many changes, become our own, and our own word has in the process acquired the intonations of authority. In much the same way, we react to the advice of our parents. At some point it may seem dated, no more than what an earlier generation unfortunately thought, or we may greet it with the sign of regret that our parents have forgotten what they experienced when our age. However, the dialogue goes on. At a later point, we may say, you know, there was wisdom in what our parents said, only why did they express it so badly? If only I had known! We may even come to the point where we express some modified form of parental wisdom in a convincing voice. We translate it into our own idiolect, confident that we will not make the mistakes of our parents when we talk to our children. Then our children listen, and find our own idiolect, to which we have devoted such painful ideological and verbal work, hopelessly dated, and the process may start again. It is always a difficult moment when we realize that our own voice is now the authority, especially because we have made it different, persuasive in its 322 own terms, not like our parents’ voice. When we reflect on how our children see us, we may even realize that our parents’ authoritative words may not have been the product of blind acceptance, but the result of a process much like our own. They may have done the same thing we did—question, reject, adapt, arrive at a new version—and that rigid voice of authority we heard from them was partly in our own ears. Can we somehow convey to our students our own words so they do not sound so rigid? We all think we can. But so did our parents (and other authorities). Dialogue, Laughter, And Surprise Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much <u><mark>we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice</mark>, because our</u> <u>rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture</u>. <u>We</u> <u>speak the</u> <u>language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all</u>,<u> and that jargon</u>, inaudible to us, <u>sounds with all the overtones of authority</u> to our students. <u><strong><mark>We are so prone to think of ourselves</mark> as <mark>fighting oppression</mark> that <mark>it takes</u></strong></mark> some <u><strong><mark>work to realize</mark> that <mark>we</u></strong></mark> ourselves <u><strong><mark>may be felt as</u></strong></mark> oppressive and<u><strong> <mark>overbearing</mark>, and <mark>that our own voice may provoke the same reactions</mark> that <mark>we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree</u></strong></mark>. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “<u>The Theme of the Rebel</u>” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that <u><strong>many of the <mark>great rebels of history were the</mark> very <mark>same people as the great oppressors</u></strong></mark>. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar <u>Ivan the Terrible</u>’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan <u>saw himself as someone who had been oppressed</u> by noblemen as a child and pictured himself <u>as the great rebel against</u> traditional <u>authority</u> when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. <u>There is something in the nature of <mark>maximal <strong>rebellion against authority</mark> that <mark>produces ever greater intolerance</strong>, unless one is</mark> very <mark>careful</u></mark>. 323 For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal—otherwise so inexplicable—was to the German sense that <u>they were rebelling victims</u>. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan <u>Milosevic exploited</u> much <u>the</u> same <u>appeal</u>. Bakhtin surely knew that <u>Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power</u>. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power—unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. <u><mark>Rebels</u></mark> often <u><mark>make the worst tyrants</mark> because <mark>their word</u></mark>, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has <u><mark>borrowed something</mark> crucial <mark>from the authoritative word it opposed, and</u></mark> perhaps <u><mark>exaggerated it</mark>: <strong>the <mark>aura of righteous authority</strong></mark>. If</u> one’s <u>ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance. By contrast</u>,<u> <mark>if</u></mark> one’s <u><strong><mark>rebellion against an authoritative word is truly dialogic</strong>, that is unlikely to happen</mark>, or to be subject to</u> more of a <u>self-check</u> if it does. Then one questions one’s own certainties and invites skepticism, lest one become what one has opposed. One may even step back and laugh at oneself. Laughter at oneself invites the perspective of the other. Laughter is implicitly pluralist. Instead of looking at one’s opponents as the unconditionally wrong, one imagines how one sounds to them. Regarding earlier authorities, one thinks: that voice of authority, it is not my voice, but perhaps it has something to say, however wrongly put. It comes from a specific experience, which I must understand. I will correct it, but to do that I must measure it, test it, against my own experience. <u><strong><mark>Dialogue is</mark> a process of <mark>real testing</strong></mark>, and one of the characteristics of a genuine test is that <strong><mark>the result is not guaranteed</u></strong></mark>. It may turn out that sometimes the voice of earlier authority turns out to be right on some point. Well, we will incorporate that much into our own “innerly persuasive voice.” Once one has done this, once one has allowed one’s own evolving convictions to be tested by experience and by other convictions, then one may allow the dialogue to continue. </p>	1nc vs WGA	null	Proceduralism	97,086	146	17,118	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	565,420	N	Gsu	1	West Georgia Muhammad-Gaius	Deming	1NC T occidentalism K law good K impact turns 2NC Space colonization impact turn 1NR T 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,853	More than enough can come from cadavers – live donation is unnecessary	Carney, 7	Carney, 7 - Scott Carney is an investigative journalist based in Chennai, India (“The Case for Mandatory Organ Donation” Wired, 5/8, http://archive.wired.com/medtech/health/news/2007/05/india_transplants_donorpolicy	Increasing the supply of cadaver organs is an obvious solution, but volunteer programs have not produced enough organs harvesting from cadavers should be a routine procedure just like autopsies in murder investigations. Routine recovery would be much simpler and cheaper to implement than proposals designed to stimulate consent because there would be no need for stringent government regulation, no need to consider paying for organs it could be the only solution that works. The shortage of donors isn't based on a shortage of brain-dead people in hospitals, but on the shortage of people whose organs never find their way to a viable patient Fewer than two out of 10 families opt to donate organs Routine organ donations would dramatically increase the supply of donor organs it would be possible to set up a system to transport donation-worthy organs anywhere in the world.	harvesting should be a routine procedure like autopsies Routine recovery would be much simpler and cheaper than proposals to stimulate consent because there would be no need to consider paying it could be the only solution that works. The shortage isn't based on a shortage of brain-dead people in hospitals, but people whose organs never find their way Fewer than two out of 10 opt Routine donations would dramatically increase the supply it would be possible to transport worthy organs anywhere in the world	Increasing the supply of cadaver organs is an obvious solution, but volunteer programs have not produced enough organs to make a difference. Now some leading ethicists and doctors are re-examining the principle of informed consent in government organ-donor programs, arguing that harvesting from cadavers should be a routine procedure just like autopsies in murder investigations. "Routine recovery would be much simpler and cheaper to implement than proposals designed to stimulate consent because there would be no need for donor registries, no need to train requestors, no need for stringent government regulation, no need to consider paying for organs, and no need for permanent public education campaigns," wrote Aaron Spital, a clinical professor at Mount Sinai School of Medicine, and James Stacey Taylor, an assistant professor of philosophy at the College of New Jersey, in a controversial article published this year by the American Society of Nephrology. This approach faces obvious and enormous obstacles, challenging as it does widely and deeply held beliefs about the sanctity of the body, even in death. But it could be the only solution that works. Roughly half a million people around the world suffer from kidney failure and many are willing to pay any price for a donor organ. They have two options: wait on impossibly long donation lists or pay someone for a live donor transplant. The United Network for Organ Sharing, which runs the current system of cadaver donation in the United States, maintains lists of brain-dead patients around the country and actively tries to match up prospective donors. At present there are more than 90,000 people waiting for kidneys but only about 14,000 donors enter the system each year. The shortage of donors isn't based on a shortage of brain-dead people in hospitals, but on the shortage of people whose organs -- even after they have opted into a convoluted and difficult organ-donation program -- never find their way to a viable patient. A 2005 Gallup poll revealed that more than half the population of the United States was willing to donate organs after death, but inefficiencies in the current system mean that even willing donors often end up not donating because families raise objections or there is a question about consent. Fewer than two out of 10 families opt to donate organs of relatives after death. Hospitals often are unwilling to share organs from donors on their rolls and waste organs while waiting to set up their own in-house transplants. Often, perfectly good transplant organs get lost in a bureaucratic shuffle. Routine organ donations would dramatically increase the supply of donor organs; with a little effort it would be possible to set up a system to transport donation-worthy organs anywhere in the world.	2,797	<h4>More than enough can come from cadavers – live donation is unnecessary</h4><p><strong>Carney, 7</strong> - Scott Carney is an investigative journalist based in Chennai, India (“The Case for Mandatory Organ Donation” Wired, 5/8,</p><p>http://archive.wired.com/medtech/health/news/2007/05/india_transplants_donorpolicy</p><p><u>Increasing the supply of cadaver organs is an obvious solution, but volunteer programs have not produced enough organs</u> to make a difference. Now some leading ethicists and doctors are re-examining the principle of informed consent in government organ-donor programs, arguing that <u><mark>harvesting</mark> from cadavers <mark>should be a routine procedure</mark> just <mark>like autopsies</mark> in murder investigations.</p><p></u>"<u><mark>Routine recovery would be much simpler and cheaper</mark> to implement <mark>than proposals</mark> designed <mark>to stimulate consent because there would be</u></mark> no need for donor registries, no need to train requestors, <u>no need for stringent government regulation, <strong><mark>no need to consider paying</mark> for organs</u></strong>, and no need for permanent public education campaigns," wrote Aaron Spital, a clinical professor at Mount Sinai School of Medicine, and James Stacey Taylor, an assistant professor of philosophy at the College of New Jersey, in a controversial article published this year by the American Society of Nephrology.</p><p>This approach faces obvious and enormous obstacles, challenging as it does widely and deeply held beliefs about the sanctity of the body, even in death. But <u><strong><mark>it could be the only solution that works.</p><p></u></strong></mark>Roughly half a million people around the world suffer from kidney failure and many are willing to pay any price for a donor organ. They have two options: wait on impossibly long donation lists or pay someone for a live donor transplant.</p><p>The United Network for Organ Sharing, which runs the current system of cadaver donation in the United States, maintains lists of brain-dead patients around the country and actively tries to match up prospective donors. At present there are more than 90,000 people waiting for kidneys but only about 14,000 donors enter the system each year.</p><p><u><mark>The shortage</mark> of donors <strong><mark>isn't based on a shortage of brain-dead people in hospitals</strong>, but</mark> on the shortage of <mark>people whose organs</u></mark> -- even after they have opted into a convoluted and difficult organ-donation program -- <u><mark>never find their way</mark> to a viable patient</u>. A 2005 Gallup poll revealed that more than half the population of the United States was willing to donate organs after death, but inefficiencies in the current system mean that even willing donors often end up not donating because families raise objections or there is a question about consent.</p><p><u><mark>Fewer than two out of 10</mark> families <mark>opt </mark>to donate organs</u> of relatives after death. Hospitals often are unwilling to share organs from donors on their rolls and waste organs while waiting to set up their own in-house transplants. Often, perfectly good transplant organs get lost in a bureaucratic shuffle.</p><p><u><mark>Routine</mark> organ <mark>donations would dramatically increase the supply</mark> of donor organs</u>; with a little effort <u><mark>it would be possible to </mark>set up a system to <mark>transport</mark> donation-<mark>worthy organs <strong>anywhere in the world</mark>.</p></u></strong>	2NC	CP – conscription	2nc solvency	431,201	4	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,854	Regulations aren’t allowed- distribution and cultivation must be prohibited by federal law	Bewley-Taylor et al 2014	Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)	treaty articles about the optional character of prohibition are often misinterpreted by cannabis-reform advocates arguing that they allow licit cultivation if requirements for governmental control are met the object and purpose of the conventions limits the non-prohibition option exclusively to medical and scientific purposes. in the case of cannabis, as per its inclusion in Schedule IV, the Single Convention clearly recommends that it should be limited to small amounts for research only Legal regulation of the cannabis market cannot be justified within the existing limits of latitude of the UN drug control treaty regime	treaty articles about the optional character of prohibition are often misinterpreted the object and purpose of the conventions limits the non-prohibition option exclusively to medical and scientific purposes Legal regulation of the cannabis market cannot be justified within the existing limits of the UN drug control treaty regime	These treaty articles about the optional character of prohibition, leaving open options for licit cannabis cultivation, are often misinterpreted by cannabis-reform advocates, arguing that they also allow for licit cultivation for non-medical purposes if the strict requirements for governmental control are met. They argue that if a party does not “render the prohibition of the cultivation [...] the most suitable measure [...] for protecting the public health and welfare,” that party is not required to prohibit it and thus can allow cannabis cultivation under state control. However, the object and purpose of the conventions limits the non-prohibition option exclusively to medical and scientific purposes. And in the case of cannabis, as per its inclusion in Schedule IV, the Single Convention clearly recommends that it should be limited to small amounts for research only. Legal regulation of the cannabis market for recreational purposes, therefore, cannot be justified within the existing limits of latitude of the UN drug control treaty regime. It is within this context that we must view recent policy shifts in two U.S. states and in Uruguay.	1,155	<h4><strong>Regulations aren’t allowed- distribution and cultivation must be prohibited by federal law</h4><p>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)</p><p>These <u><mark>treaty articles about the optional character of prohibition</u></mark>, leaving open options for licit cannabis cultivation, <u><mark>are often misinterpreted</mark> by cannabis-reform advocates</u>, <u>arguing that they</u> also <u>allow</u> for <u>licit cultivation</u> for non-medical purposes <u>if</u> the strict <u>requirements for governmental control are met</u>. They argue that if a party does not “render the prohibition of the cultivation [...] the most suitable measure [...] for protecting the public health and welfare,” that party is not required to prohibit it and thus can allow cannabis cultivation under state control. However, <u><mark>the object and purpose of the conventions limits the non-prohibition option exclusively to medical and scientific purposes</mark>.</u> And <u>in the case of cannabis, as per its inclusion in Schedule IV, the Single Convention clearly recommends that it should be limited to small amounts for research only</u>. <u><mark>Legal regulation of the cannabis market</u></mark> for recreational purposes, therefore, <u><strong><mark>cannot be justified</strong> within the existing limits</mark> of latitude <mark>of the UN drug control treaty regime</u><strong></mark>. It is within this context that we must view recent policy shifts in two U.S. states and in Uruguay.</p></strong>	null	1nr	2NC Local DA	430,954	16	17,115	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	565,263	N	Wake	8	Georgia Boyce-Feinberg	Markoff	AG politics fed cp (2nr) treaties da (2nr) ban marihuana cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,855	The 1AC’s glorification of “indigenous knowledge” opposes “western” thought. This creates a power dynamic that always holds “indigenous” above “western”	Gordon and Krech 12	Gordon and Krech 12 [David M. Gordon is an associate professor of history at Bowdoin College. He is author of Nachituti’s Gift: Economy, Society, and Environment in Central Africa and numerous articles on African social, cultural, and environmental history.] [Shepard Krech III is a professor emeritus of anthropology at Brown University and a research associate in the Department of Anthropology, National Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institution. A trustee of the National Humanities Center, he is the author or editor of many essays and books, including The Ecological Indian and The Encyclopedia of World Environmental History, edited with John McNeill and Carolyn Merchant.] Indigenous Knowledge and the Environment “Indigenous knowledge ” excites and infuriates. One of its leading academic proponents and critics, Michael Dove, argues that its conceptual space has evolved from “innovative tool to hackneyed dichotomy.”1 Historians and anthropologists are uncomfortable at its mention—increasingly so, we sense, at the very moment that others press its birth as a discipline. After all, is not the notion of an impenetrable body of knowledge that belongs to an unchanging group of indigenes a romantic projection of our modern imaginations into the past? As newcomers—transients and immigrants—arrive in any particular place, some conquering, some settling, some exchanging genes and culture, and so on, with people already present, might not the notion of “indigenous” lack historical nuance? At the same time, however, indigenous knowledge holds political appeal and moral valence. It offers an alternative to a Western teleology of civilization (or development), even if the notion is a creation of the encounter between the West and the rest. It offers an alternative to the power-knowledge nexus of Western thought, and yet it introduces its own modalities of power. It unsettles stable categories of knowledge and fields of human agency, such as science and religion, and then tends to confirm the very same epistemological oppositions. This conceptual and political slipperiness is what makes “indigenous knowledge” such an academic apostasy, so essential and so interesting to study.	Rather than claiming that indigenous knowledge stands in some kind of exterior relationship to Western conquest, colonialism, and science, we argue that the emergence of modern indigenous knowledges was intimately related to conquest and colonial rule attaching “indigenous” to “knowledge” often was, and often continues to be, a strategy entwined with acts of domination and resistance we regard indigenous knowledges as maneuvers that challenge the imposition of power and make claims to power we reveal modern indigenous knowledges as palimpsests We are not the first to notice the conceptual and political inconsistencies of indigenous knowledge Arun Agrawal pointed to the oppositions that scholars and activists invoke between “Western science” and indigenous knowledge tendencies to try to “preserve” indigenous knowledges ex situ have not confronted the political and economic processes that marginalize people termed “indigenous.” Others, including Dove Ellen, and Sillitoe followed with significant contributions to the debate	attaching “indigenous” to “knowledge” often continues to be, a strategy entwined with acts of domination Agrawal pointed to the oppositions that scholars and activists invoke between “Western science” and indigenous knowledge	This book investigates the historical constructions, the political uses, and the epistemological nuances of indigenous knowledges. Rather than claiming that indigenous knowledge stands in some kind of exterior relationship to Western conquest, colonialism, and science, we argue that the emergence of modern indigenous knowledges was intimately related to conquest and colonial rule. This is not to claim that people who are now termed indigenous—or who term themselves indigenous—did not have knowledge prior to contact with Europeans. Quite the opposite: the chapters in this volume detail such precolonial forms of knowledge. But they also show that during times of conquest and colonization, by Europeans and by others, attaching “indigenous” to “knowledge” often was, and often continues to be, a strategy entwined with acts of domination and resistance. Rather than an established body of knowledge that can be owned, written, and transmitted unchanged over time, we regard indigenous knowledges as claims, as strategic maneuvers that challenge the imposition of power and make claims to power. Most of all, we reveal modern indigenous knowledges as palimpsests upon which, if we look carefully and ask the right questions, we can detect the signs of past conflicts that scraped out notions of indigeneity. We are not the first to notice the conceptual and political inconsistencies of indigenous knowledge. In a seminal article that appeared just as indigenous knowledge became the catchphrase of environmental and developmental policy-makers and activists, Arun Agrawal pointed to the fallacious oppositions that scholars and activists invoke between “Western science” and indigenous knowledge. Agrawal argued that the tendencies to try to “preserve” indigenous knowledges ex situ have not confronted the political and economic processes that marginalize people termed “indigenous.” 2 Others, including Dove, Roy Ellen, and Paul Sillitoe, have followed Agrawal with significant contributions to the debate that we join in this collection.3	2,047	<h4><strong>The 1AC’s glorification of “indigenous knowledge” opposes “western” thought. This creates a power dynamic that always holds “indigenous” above “western” </h4><p>Gordon and Krech 12</strong> [David M. Gordon is an associate professor of history at Bowdoin College. He is author of Nachituti’s Gift: Economy, Society, and Environment in Central Africa and numerous articles on African social, cultural, and environmental history.] [Shepard Krech III is a professor emeritus of anthropology at Brown University and a research associate in the Department of Anthropology, National Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institution. A trustee of the National Humanities Center, he is the author or editor of many essays and books, including The Ecological Indian and The Encyclopedia of World Environmental History, edited with John McNeill and Carolyn Merchant.] Indigenous Knowledge and the Environment </p><p>“<u><mark>Indigenous knowledge</u> </mark>” excites and infuriates. One of its leading academic proponents and critics, Michael Dove, argues that its conceptual space has evolved from “innovative tool to hackneyed dichotomy.”1 Historians and anthropologists are uncomfortable at its mention—increasingly so, we sense, at the very moment that others press its birth as a discipline. After all, is not the notion of an impenetrable body of knowledge that belongs to an unchanging group of indigenes a romantic projection of our modern imaginations into the past? As newcomers—transients and immigrants—arrive in any particular place, some conquering, some settling, some exchanging genes and culture, and so on, with people already present, might not the notion of “indigenous” lack historical nuance? At the same time, however, indigenous knowledge holds political appeal and moral valence. It offers an alternative to a Western teleology of civilization (or development), even if the notion is a creation of the encounter between the West and the rest. It <u><mark>offers an alternative to </mark>the power-knowledge nexus of <mark>Western thought, and yet <strong>it introduces its own modalities of power</strong>. It </mark>unsettles stable categories of knowledge</u> and fields of human agency, such as science and religion, <u>and then <strong><mark>tends to confirm the </mark>very <mark>same epistemological oppositions</strong></mark>. This</u> conceptual and political <u>slipperiness</u> is what <u>makes “indigenous knowledge”</u> such <u>an academic apostasy</u>, so essential and so interesting to study.</p><p>This book investigates the historical constructions, the political uses, and the epistemological nuances of indigenous knowledges. <u>Rather than claiming that indigenous knowledge stands in some kind of exterior relationship to Western conquest, colonialism, and science, we argue that the emergence of modern indigenous knowledges was intimately related to conquest and colonial rule</u>. This is not to claim that people who are now termed indigenous—or who term themselves indigenous—did not have knowledge prior to contact with Europeans. Quite the opposite: the chapters in this volume detail such precolonial forms of knowledge. But they also show that during times of conquest and colonization, by Europeans and by others, <u><mark>attaching “indigenous” to “knowledge” often </mark>was, and often <mark>continues to be, <strong>a strategy entwined with acts of domination</strong> </mark>and resistance</u>. Rather than an established body of knowledge that can be owned, written, and transmitted unchanged over time, <u>we regard indigenous knowledges</u> as claims, <u>as</u> strategic <u>maneuvers that challenge the imposition of power and make claims to power</u>. Most of all, <u>we reveal modern indigenous knowledges as palimpsests</u> upon which, if we look carefully and ask the right questions, we can detect the signs of past conflicts that scraped out notions of indigeneity.</p><p><u>We are not the first to notice the conceptual and political inconsistencies of indigenous knowledge</u>. In a seminal article that appeared just as indigenous knowledge became the catchphrase of environmental and developmental policy-makers and activists, <u>Arun <mark>Agrawal pointed to the</u> </mark>fallacious <u><mark>oppositions that scholars and activists invoke between “Western science” and indigenous knowledge</u></mark>. Agrawal argued that the <u>tendencies to try to “preserve” indigenous knowledges ex situ have not confronted the political and economic processes that marginalize people termed “indigenous.”</u> 2 <u>Others, including Dove</u>, Roy <u>Ellen, and</u> Paul <u>Sillitoe</u>, have <u>followed</u> Agrawal <u>with significant contributions to the debate</u> that we join in this collection.3</p>	1nc vs WGA	null	1nc – Native K	431,202	3	17,118	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	565,420	N	Gsu	1	West Georgia Muhammad-Gaius	Deming	1NC T occidentalism K law good K impact turns 2NC Space colonization impact turn 1NR T 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,856	C. Industry growth – 12% a year and growing.	Financial Times 08	Financial Times 08 (2/13, “GM crop use to double by 2015, study predicts.” Salamander Davoudi. Proquest.)	Agricultural use of genetically modified crops across the world has increased almost 70-fold in the past 10 years, breaking the 100m- hectare mark, and is set to double by 2015 GM crops were last year planted on 114m hectares worldwide by more than 12m farmers, a 12 per cent increase The global market for GM seeds and traits is growing at 12 per cent a year as farmers look to boost yields that almost 100m farmers will plant 200m hectares of such crops in 45 countries by 2015. "There will be a doubling of the number of countries involved, a doubling of the number of hectares and the number of farmers involved will rise almost 10-fold At a time when you have soaring commodity prices and sky- rocketing energy prices, you want a technology that will increase the supply side and bring down the cost of production and this is what you have countries that could adopt GM crops in the next one or two years include Vietnam, Egypt and Burkina Faso	use of genetically modified crops across the world has increased almost 70-fold and is set to double by 2015 The global market for GM seeds and traits is growing at 12 per cent a year There will be a doubling of the number of countries involved, a doubling of the number of hectares and the number of farmers involved will rise almost 10-fold when you have soaring commodity prices and sky- rocketing energy prices, you want a technology that will increase the supply side and bring down the cost of production	Agricultural use of genetically modified crops across the world has increased almost 70-fold in the past 10 years, breaking the 100m- hectare mark, and is set to double by 2015, according to a study released today. The International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Application, a non-profit organisation, estimates that GM crops were last year planted on 114m hectares (282m acres) worldwide by more than 12m farmers, a 12 per cent increase on the previous year. "About 70 per cent of the world's poor are associated with agriculture and about 50 per cent of these people are subsistence farmers," said Clive James, chairman and founder of ISAAA. "Increasing the income of small and resource-poor farmers contributes to the poverty alleviation of a large majority of the world's poorest people." The global market for GM seeds and traits - the GM portion of the technology added to seed - is growing at 12 per cent a year as farmers look to boost yields. Biotechnology has been proven to improve yields per hectare in some crops mainly by offering protection from insect damage and disease. The US and Argentina have given over the most land for growing GM crops, with 57.7m and 19m hectares respectively. India this year overtook China to become the fifth largest producer in the world. The ISAAA, which has been criticised by environmental groups for bias towards biotechnology companies, predicts that almost 100m farmers will plant 200m hectares of such crops in 45 countries by 2015. "There will be a doubling of the number of countries involved, a doubling of the number of hectares and the number of farmers involved will rise almost 10-fold, " said Mr James. "At a time when you have soaring commodity prices and sky- rocketing energy prices, you want a technology that will increase the supply side and bring down the cost of production and this is what you have in this technology." Twenty three countries at present plant GM crops, with a further 29 allowing imports for food or animal feed. According to the report, countries that could adopt GM crops in the next one or two years include Vietnam, Egypt and Burkina Faso.	2,145	<h4>C. Industry growth – 12% a year and growing.</h4><p><strong>Financial Times 08 </strong>(2/13, “GM crop use to double by 2015, study predicts.” Salamander Davoudi. Proquest.)</p><p><u>Agricultural <mark>use of genetically modified crops across the world has increased almost 70-fold</mark> in the past 10 years, breaking the 100m- hectare mark, <mark>and is set to double by 2015</u></mark>, according to a study released today. The International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Application, a non-profit organisation, estimates that <u>GM crops were last year planted on 114m hectares</u> (282m acres) <u>worldwide by more than 12m farmers, a 12 per cent increase</u> on the previous year. "About 70 per cent of the world's poor are associated with agriculture and about 50 per cent of these people are subsistence farmers," said Clive James, chairman and founder of ISAAA. "Increasing the income of small and resource-poor farmers contributes to the poverty alleviation of a large majority of the world's poorest people." <u><mark>The global market for GM seeds and traits</u></mark> - the GM portion of the technology added to seed - <u><mark>is growing at 12 per cent a year</mark> as farmers look to boost yields</u>. Biotechnology has been proven to improve yields per hectare in some crops mainly by offering protection from insect damage and disease. The US and Argentina have given over the most land for growing GM crops, with 57.7m and 19m hectares respectively. India this year overtook China to become the fifth largest producer in the world. The ISAAA, which has been criticised by environmental groups for bias towards biotechnology companies, predicts <u>that almost 100m farmers will plant 200m hectares of such crops in 45 countries by 2015. "<mark>There will be a doubling of the number of countries involved, a doubling of the number of hectares and the number of farmers involved will rise almost 10-fold</u></mark>, " said Mr James. "<u>At a time <mark>when you have soaring commodity prices and sky- rocketing energy prices, you want a technology that will increase the supply side and bring down the cost of production</mark> and this is what you have</u> in this technology." Twenty three countries at present plant GM crops, with a further 29 allowing imports for food or animal feed. According to the report, <u>countries that could adopt GM crops in the next one or two years include Vietnam, Egypt and Burkina Faso</u>. </p>	null	null	1nc – Biotech	431,203	1	17,120	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	565,421	N	Gsu	3	Wake Forest Clifford-Villa	Watson	vs Stem cells aff 1NC T "nearly all" midterms DA visas CP heg bad case 2NC heg bad case 1NR case T 2NR heg bad case	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,857	But, state legalization doesn’t preclude cross-retaliation---avoids our net-benefits	Rose 12	I. Nelson Rose 12, Professor of Law, Whittier Law School; Visiting Professor, University of Macau; and Rebecca Bolin, Resident Fellow, Yale Law School, December 2012, “Article: Game On for Internet Gambling: With Federal Approval, States Line Up to Place Their Bets,” Connecticut Law Review, 45 Conn. L. Rev. 653	the DOJ Memorandum does nothing to clarify the problem created by Antigua's successful challenge of American federal law at the WTO The WTO held the U.S. was discriminating against Antigua's Internet racebooks because Congress enacted the IHA, but there was no comparable International Horseracing Act In practice, there is actually quite a bit of betting across national borders But these bets technically do violate the Wire Act, and do not fall under the IHA, which has detailed definitions of what constitutes a "state" for interstate horseracing The DOJ's declaration that the Wire Act is limited to sports and races does nothing to solve the problems created by the WTO decision since that was based on the Wire Act prohibiting Antigua's racebooks from taking online bets from America	the DOJ Memorandum does nothing to clarify the problem created by Antigua's challenge of American federal law at the WTO. The WTO held the U.S. was discriminating against Antigua's racebooks because Congress enacted the IHA but there was no International Horseracing Act The DOJ's declaration that the Wire Act is limited to sports and races does nothing to solve the problems created by the WTO decision since that was based on the Wire Act prohibiting Antigua from taking bets from America	One of the ironies of the DOJ Memorandum is that it does nothing to clarify the problem created by Antigua's successful challenge of American federal law at the WTO. The WTO held that the U.S. was discriminating against Antigua's Internet racebooks because Congress enacted the IHA, but there was no comparable International Horseracing Act. In practice, there is actually quite a bit of betting across national borders, including Americans betting on races in Canada and Hong Kong, and Canadians and Mexicans betting on races in the U.S. But these bets technically do violate the Wire Act, and do not fall under the IHA, which has detailed definitions [*686] of what constitutes a "state" for interstate horseracing. n223 The DOJ's declaration that the Wire Act is limited to cross-border betting on sports and races does nothing to solve the problems created by the WTO decision, since that was based on the Wire Act prohibiting Antigua's racebooks from taking online bets from America. It should also be noted that the WTO stated, in dicta, that even U.S. state laws violate America's GATS commitment to accept legal gambling from other countries that signed that treaty. n224 President Bush unilaterally abrogated that treaty commitment, but it is not clear whether he had the power to change the treaties of the United States without Senate approval.	1,357	<h4><u><strong>But</u>, state legalization <u>doesn’t preclude cross-retaliation</u>---avoids our net-benefits</h4><p></strong>I. Nelson <strong>Rose 12</strong>, Professor of Law, Whittier Law School; Visiting Professor, University of Macau; and Rebecca Bolin, Resident Fellow, Yale Law School, December 2012, “Article: Game On for Internet Gambling: With Federal Approval, States Line Up to Place Their Bets,” Connecticut Law Review, 45 Conn. L. Rev. 653</p><p>One of the ironies of <u><strong><mark>the DOJ Memorandum</u></strong></mark> is that it <u><strong><mark>does nothing</u></strong> <u><strong>to clarify the problem created by Antigua's</mark> successful <mark>challenge of American federal law at the WTO</u></strong>. <u><strong>The WTO held</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>the U.S. was discriminating against Antigua's</mark> Internet <mark>racebooks because Congress enacted the IHA</mark>,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>but there was</u></strong> <u><strong>no</mark> comparable <mark>International Horseracing Act</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>In practice, there is actually quite a bit of betting across national borders</u></strong>, including Americans betting on races in Canada and Hong Kong, and Canadians and Mexicans betting on races in the U.S. <u><strong>But these bets technically do violate the Wire Act, and do not fall under the IHA, which has detailed definitions</u></strong> [*686] <u><strong>of what constitutes a "state" for interstate horseracing</u></strong>. n223 <u><strong><mark>The DOJ's declaration that the Wire Act is limited to</u></strong></mark> cross-border betting on <u><strong><mark>sports and races does nothing to solve the problems created by the WTO decision</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>since that was based on the Wire Act</mark> <mark>prohibiting Antigua</mark>'s racebooks <mark>from taking</mark> online <mark>bets from America</u></mark>. It should also be noted that the WTO stated, in dicta, that even U.S. state laws violate America's GATS commitment to accept legal gambling from other countries that signed that treaty. n224 President Bush unilaterally abrogated that treaty commitment, but it is not clear whether he had the power to change the treaties of the United States without Senate approval.</p></strong>	null	null	1	431,204	5	17,113	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	565,270	N	Texas	4	Georgetown Erpenbach-Krishnan	Arnett	DHS politics (2NR) cross retal cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,858	Establishes the same precedent – every lawyer votes neg	LAMOND 14 University Lecturer in Legal Philosophy and the Felix Frankfurter Fellow in Law, Balliol College	LAMOND 14 University Lecturer in Legal Philosophy and the Felix Frankfurter Fellow in Law, Balliol College [Grant Lamond, "Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), First published Tue Jun 20, 2006, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/legal-reas-prec/>.] 2.1.2 The practice of distinguishing	An integral part of precedents is the practice of distinguishing Distinguishing involves a precedent not being followed even though the facts fall within the scope The effect of distinguishing is that the later court is free not to follow a precedent that, prima facie, applies to it Hence a later court must either follow or distinguish a binding precedent when a case is distinguished it is not often thought that the law was one thing until the later decision of a court, and now another thing The law will be regarded as subject to various distinctions learning that cases are ‘distinguishable’ is a staple part of common law education, and no common lawyer would be competent who did not appreciate that the law was not to be identified simply with the ratio of an earlier decision.	An integral part of precedents is the practice of distinguishing Distinguishing involves a precedent not being followed The effect is that the later court is free not to follow a precedent The law will be regarded as learning that cases are ‘distinguishable’ is a staple no lawyer would be competent who did not appreciate that the law was not to be identified simply with the ratio of an earlier decision	An integral part of legal reasoning using precedents is the practice of distinguishing. Distinguishing involves a precedent not being followed even though the facts of the later case fall within the scope of the ratio of the earlier case. As the later case falls within the scope of the earlier ratio (i.e., within the scope of the rule), one might expect that the decision in the later case must be the same (unless the court has the power to overrule the earlier case and decides to do so). In legal reasoning using precedents, however, the later court is free not to follow the earlier case by pointing to some difference in the facts between the two cases, even though those facts do not feature in the ratio of the earlier case. Take the trust example: in a later case the recipient of trust property may not have paid for the property, but may have relied on the receipt in entering into another arrangement (e.g. in using the property as security for a loan). The later court may hold that the recipient is entitled to retain the property and justify its decision by ruling that where (i) the defendant has received trust property (ii) in breach of trust and (iii) has not paid for the property, but has (vii) relied upon the receipt to disadvantageously alter her position, then the defendant is entitled to retain the property. (This result would still leave the beneficiary with a claim against the trustee for the value of the property.) The effect of distinguishing, then, is that the later court is free not to follow a precedent that, prima facie, applies to it, by making a ruling which is narrower than that made in the precedent case. The only formal constraints on the later court are that: (1) in formulating the ratio of the later case, the factors in the ratio of the earlier case (i.e., (i)–(iii)) must be retained, and (2) the ruling in the later case must be such that it would still support the result reached in the precedent case. In short, the ruling in the second case must not be inconsistent with the result in the precedent case, but the court is otherwise free to make a ruling narrower than that in the precedent. Hence the more accurate statements of the doctrine of precedent are to the effect that a later court must either follow or distinguish a binding precedent—a disjunctive obligation. At a formal level the practice of distinguishing can be reconciled with the view that rationes are rules by arguing that later courts have the power to modify the rule in the earlier case. An analogy can be drawn to the power to overrule earlier decisions: just as judges can overrule earlier cases, they can also modify earlier law, thereby paralleling the power of legislators to either repeal or amend the law. The analogy, however, is very imperfect. There are two difficulties: (a) Common Lawyers do not conceptualise overruling and distinguishing in this parallel way, and (b) the rationale for a power with this particular scope is unclear. On the first point, Common Lawyers ordinarily think of precedents as constituting the law up and until they are overruled. Once overruled the later decision is (normally) given retroactive effect, so the law is changed for the past as well as the future. But when a case is distinguished it is not often thought that the law was one thing until the later decision of a court, and now another thing. The law will be regarded prior to the later decision as already subject to various distinctions not mentioned by the earlier court. Indeed part of the skill of a good common lawyer is grasping the law as not stated by the earlier court: learning that cases are ‘distinguishable’ is a staple part of common law education, and no common lawyer would be competent who did not appreciate that the law was not to be identified simply with the ratio of an earlier decision. Common lawyers do not, then, conceptualise distinguishing along lines analogous to overruling.	3,938	<h4>Establishes the same precedent – every lawyer votes neg</h4><p><strong>LAMOND 14 University Lecturer in Legal Philosophy and the Felix Frankfurter Fellow in Law, Balliol College</strong> [Grant Lamond, "Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), First published Tue Jun 20, 2006, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/legal-reas-prec/>.]</p><p>2.1.2 The practice of distinguishing</p><p><u><mark>An integral part of</u></mark> legal reasoning using <u><mark>precedents is the practice of distinguishing</u></mark>. <u><mark>Distinguishing involves a precedent not being followed</u></mark> <u>even though the facts</u> of the later case <u>fall within the scope</u> of the ratio of the earlier case. As the later case falls within the scope of the earlier ratio (i.e., within the scope of the rule), one might expect that the decision in the later case must be the same (unless the court has the power to overrule the earlier case and decides to do so). In legal reasoning using precedents, however, the later court is free not to follow the earlier case by pointing to some difference in the facts between the two cases, even though those facts do not feature in the ratio of the earlier case.</p><p>Take the trust example: in a later case the recipient of trust property may not have paid for the property, but may have relied on the receipt in entering into another arrangement (e.g. in using the property as security for a loan). The later court may hold that the recipient is entitled to retain the property and justify its decision by ruling that where (i) the defendant has received trust property (ii) in breach of trust and (iii) has not paid for the property, but has (vii) relied upon the receipt to disadvantageously alter her position, then the defendant is entitled to retain the property. (This result would still leave the beneficiary with a claim against the trustee for the value of the property.)</p><p><u><mark>The effect</mark> of distinguishing</u>, then, <u><mark>is that the later court is free not to follow a precedent</mark> that, prima facie, applies to it</u>, by making a ruling which is narrower than that made in the precedent case. The only formal constraints on the later court are that: (1) in formulating the ratio of the later case, the factors in the ratio of the earlier case (i.e., (i)–(iii)) must be retained, and (2) the ruling in the later case must be such that it would still support the result reached in the precedent case. In short, the ruling in the second case must not be inconsistent with the result in the precedent case, but the court is otherwise free to make a ruling narrower than that in the precedent. <u>Hence</u> the more accurate statements of the doctrine of precedent are to the effect that <u>a later court must either follow or distinguish a binding precedent</u>—a disjunctive obligation.</p><p>At a formal level the practice of distinguishing can be reconciled with the view that rationes are rules by arguing that later courts have the power to modify the rule in the earlier case. An analogy can be drawn to the power to overrule earlier decisions: just as judges can overrule earlier cases, they can also modify earlier law, thereby paralleling the power of legislators to either repeal or amend the law. The analogy, however, is very imperfect. There are two difficulties: (a) Common Lawyers do not conceptualise overruling and distinguishing in this parallel way, and (b) the rationale for a power with this particular scope is unclear.</p><p>On the first point, Common Lawyers ordinarily think of precedents as constituting the law up and until they are overruled. Once overruled the later decision is (normally) given retroactive effect, so the law is changed for the past as well as the future. But <u>when a case is distinguished it is not often thought that the law was one thing until the later decision of a court, and now another thing</u>. <u><mark>The law will be regarded</u></mark> prior to the later decision <u><mark>as</u></mark> already <u>subject to various distinctions </u>not mentioned by the earlier court. Indeed part of the skill of a good common lawyer is grasping the law as not stated by the earlier court: <u><strong><mark>learning that cases are ‘distinguishable’ is a staple</strong></mark> part of common law education, and <mark>no</mark> common <mark>lawyer would be competent who did not appreciate that the law was not to be identified</mark> <mark>simply with the ratio of an earlier decision</mark>.</u> Common lawyers do not, then, conceptualise distinguishing along lines analogous to overruling.</p>	2NC	CP – distinguish	2nc solvency	431,206	2	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,859	Link- Rico says federal legalization violates the 1961 treaty	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4><strong>Link- Rico says federal legalization violates the 1961 treaty</h4></strong>	null	1nr	2NC Local DA	431,205	1	17,115	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	565,263	N	Wake	8	Georgia Boyce-Feinberg	Markoff	AG politics fed cp (2nr) treaties da (2nr) ban marihuana cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,860	This creates a notion of a superior “indigenous people” that should reorder the world, creating a new set of elites	Gordon and Krech 12	Gordon and Krech 12 [David M. Gordon is an associate professor of history at Bowdoin College. He is author of Nachituti’s Gift: Economy, Society, and Environment in Central Africa and numerous articles on African social, cultural, and environmental history.] [Shepard Krech III is a professor emeritus of anthropology at Brown University and a research associate in the Department of Anthropology, National Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institution. A trustee of the National Humanities Center, he is the author or editor of many essays and books, including The Ecological Indian and The Encyclopedia of World Environmental History, edited with John McNeill and Carolyn Merchant.] Indigenous Knowledge and the Environment Despite the instrumental, moral, and ideological qualities of indigeneity, some still insist on viewing it in biological terms. Early twentiethcentury racial theories remain inscribed in theories of indigenous belonging. This biological—or “blood”—understanding of indigeneity emerges from legal formulations that insist on proof of belonging. Blood seems to offer such convincing proof. In addition, outside of institutional, state, and legal arrangements, blood kinship models still inspire models of wider corporate group membership. For these reasons, even while this volume—along with a range of scholarship—emphasizes the historical model of the indigenous belonging, the biological blood model of indigenous belonging prevails in quotidian, and even some academic understandings. The notion of “indigenous people” may even “provide ideological ammunition to those who would reorder the world according to blood and soil,” as André Béteille points out.19 Yet, as analyses in this volume and elsewhere make clear, lurking beneath the surface of blood is always power: power, exercised by the state or by the people of indigenous status themselves, to determine that indigeneity depends on descent from an ancestor on a particular historical list; on descent from a man but not a woman or a woman but not a man; on descent from a person free but not from one enslaved; on comportment; on culture—the vexed tradition; on membership in a group of a certain size; or on myriad other historical and cultural factors.	In its emphasis on an unchanging body of knowledge and in its opposition to modernity, indigenous knowledges share a conceptual relationship with “tradition.” while tradition disguises itself as unchanging, it is dynamic and invented according to political and ideological exigencies. tradition is often conservative, involving cultural artifacts that legitimize established elites The idea of indigenous knowledge has comparable qualities (indeed, indigenous knowledge is often referred to as “traditional knowledge,” Indigenous knowledges conceal their dynamism Indigenous knowledges invoke their conceptual power by claims of timelessness, even while their ability to respond to contemporary articulations of power demands flexibility. Like tradition, indigenous knowledges have hidden and often repressed histories. indigenous) knowledge is unevenly produced, unevenly shared, and unevenly distributed.	In its emphasis on opposition to modernity, indigenous knowledges share a conceptual relationship with “tradition.” tradition is dynamic and invented according to political and ideological exigencies tradition involv cultural artifacts that legitimize established elites The idea of indigenous knowledge has comparable qualities (indeed, indigenous knowledge is often referred to as “traditional knowledge Indigenous knowledges conceal their dynamism indigenous) knowledge is unevenly produced shared, and distributed	In its emphasis on an unchanging body of knowledge and in its opposition to modernity, indigenous knowledges share a conceptual relationship with “tradition.” Like “tradition,” “indigenous” implies something ancient, even primordial. In their influential work The Invention of Tradition, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger argue that while tradition disguises itself as unchanging, it is dynamic and invented according to political and ideological exigencies.20 In their view, tradition is often conservative, involving cultural artifacts that legitimize established elites—thus the need for historians to lay bare its invention. Tradition is also typically modern in its nostalgia for a lost past. The idea of indigenous knowledge has comparable qualities (indeed, indigenous knowledge is often referred to as “traditional environmental knowledge,” or TEK). Indigenous knowledges conceal their dynamism under the appearance of a timeless body of knowledge. They share a nostalgia for a culturally particular form of knowledge and an imagined past, which makes them an adept tool to resist ostensibly scientific and universal discourses. (Unlike “traditions,” however, indigenous knowledges are often thought to be a tool of the disempowered and dispossessed, rather than of the elite.) Indigenous knowledges invoke their conceptual power by claims of timelessness, even while their ability to respond to contemporary articulations of power demands flexibility. Like tradition, indigenous knowledges have hidden and often repressed histories. Over time, cultural (including indigenous) knowledge is unevenly produced, unevenly shared, and unevenly distributed. And society is rarely, if ever, insular, tightly bounded, and exclusionary. It rarely remains homogeneous in its membership and composition. What this means is obvious: No assumption should be made that indigenous knowledges are closed to external influence or history, that they do not incorporate or reflect originally nonindigenous conception or perception, or that what one or several people might think or perceive is held universally in that society.	2,115	<h4><strong>This creates a notion of a superior “indigenous people” that should reorder the world, creating a new set of elites </h4><p>Gordon and Krech 12</strong> [David M. Gordon is an associate professor of history at Bowdoin College. He is author of Nachituti’s Gift: Economy, Society, and Environment in Central Africa and numerous articles on African social, cultural, and environmental history.] [Shepard Krech III is a professor emeritus of anthropology at Brown University and a research associate in the Department of Anthropology, National Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institution. A trustee of the National Humanities Center, he is the author or editor of many essays and books, including The Ecological Indian and The Encyclopedia of World Environmental History, edited with John McNeill and Carolyn Merchant.] Indigenous Knowledge and the Environment </p><p>Despite the instrumental, moral, and ideological qualities of indigeneity, <u>some</u> still <u>insist on viewing it in biological terms. Early</u> twentiethcentury <u>racial theories remain inscribed in theories of indigenous belonging</u>. This biological—or “blood”—understanding of indigeneity emerges from legal formulations that insist on proof of belonging. Blood seems to offer such convincing proof. In addition, outside of institutional, state, and legal arrangements, <u>blood kinship models still inspire models of wider corporate group membership</u>. For these reasons, even while this volume—along with a range of scholarship—emphasizes the historical model of the indigenous belonging, the biological blood model of indigenous belonging prevails in quotidian, and even some academic understandings. <u><mark>The notion of “indigenous people” may </mark>even <mark>“<strong>provide ideological ammunition to those who would reorder the world according to blood and soil</strong>,”</u> </mark>as André Béteille points out.19 Yet, as analyses in this volume and elsewhere make clear, <u><strong><mark>lurking beneath the surface of blood is always power</strong></mark>: power, <mark>exercised by the state or by the people of indigenous status themselves, to determine that indigeneity depends on</u> </mark>descent from an ancestor on a particular historical list; on descent from a man but not a woman or a woman but not a man; on descent from a person free but not from one enslaved; on comportment; on culture—the vexed tradition; on <u><mark>membership in a group</u> <u></mark>of a certain size; or on myriad other historical and cultural factors.</p><p><mark>In its emphasis on </mark>an unchanging body of knowledge and in its <mark>opposition to modernity, indigenous knowledges share a conceptual relationship with “tradition.”</u> </mark>Like “tradition,” “indigenous” implies something ancient, even primordial. In their influential work The Invention of Tradition, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger argue that <u>while <mark>tradition </mark>disguises itself as unchanging, it <mark>is dynamic and invented according to political and ideological exigencies</mark>.</u>20 In their view, <u><strong><mark>tradition </mark>is often conservative, <mark>involv</mark>ing <mark>cultural artifacts that legitimize established elites</u></strong></mark>—thus the need for historians to lay bare its invention. Tradition is also typically modern in its nostalgia for a lost past. <u><mark>The idea of indigenous knowledge has comparable qualities (indeed, indigenous knowledge is often referred to as “traditional</u> </mark>environmental <u><mark>knowledge</mark>,”</u> or TEK). <u><strong><mark>Indigenous knowledges conceal their dynamism</u></strong> </mark>under the appearance of a timeless body of knowledge. They share a nostalgia for a culturally particular form of knowledge and an imagined past, which makes them an adept tool to resist ostensibly scientific and universal discourses. (Unlike “traditions,” however, indigenous knowledges are often thought to be a tool of the disempowered and dispossessed, rather than of the elite.) <u>Indigenous knowledges invoke their conceptual power by claims of timelessness, even while their ability to respond to contemporary articulations of power demands flexibility. Like tradition, indigenous knowledges have hidden and often repressed histories.</p><p></u>Over time, cultural (including <u><mark>indigenous) knowledge is unevenly produced</mark>, unevenly <mark>shared, and </mark>unevenly <mark>distributed</mark>.</u> And society is rarely, if ever, insular, tightly bounded, and exclusionary. It rarely remains homogeneous in its membership and composition. What this means is obvious: No assumption should be made that indigenous knowledges are closed to external influence or history, that they do not incorporate or reflect originally nonindigenous conception or perception, or that what one or several people might think or perceive is held universally in that society.</p>	1nc vs WGA	null	1nc – Native K	431,207	3	17,118	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	565,420	N	Gsu	1	West Georgia Muhammad-Gaius	Deming	1NC T occidentalism K law good K impact turns 2NC Space colonization impact turn 1NR T 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,861	Antiguan cross-retaliation triggers monitoring systems for TRIPS compliance---that massively boosts overall enforcement of all IP laws---it’s unique because there’s no political will for LDCs to cooperate in enforcement now	Hamann 9	Georgia Hamann 9, J.D. 2009, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009, “NOTE: REPLACING SLINGSHOTS WITH SWORDS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANTIGUA-GAMBLING 22.6 PANEL REPORT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 993	Monitoring and enforcement systems are untested territory because Ecuador settled instead of suspending TRIPS Ecuador's proposed mechanism is an indication that viable options exist reference to the EC-Bananas III arbitration by the Anitigua-Gambling arbitrators hints that the WTO would require a similar system for developing countries in subsequent arbitration that actually implements the TRIPS suspension remedy Forcing developing countries seeking retaliation under TRIPS to demonstrate effective monitoring and enforcement of the authorized IP suspensions could lead to more effective monitoring and enforcement of regular TRIPS protections Whereas the incentives to develop systems to enforce TRIPS protections are currently relatively low authorization of the TRIPS suspension remedy increases those incentives The U.S., would watch for signs that the retaliating country lost control of the remedy The developing country would have an incentive to avoid expensive and exhausting disputes over the scope of retaliation the developing country would develop "the political will to curb "piracy the developing country would also correct "institutional weaknesses by developing effective means of monitoring pirates and protecting information Other developed countries would have an interest in ensuring that the suspensions did not affect their protected material Increased interest in maintaining protection would increase the pressure on the developing state to increase TRIPS enforcement across the board and would lead to assistance in creating enforcement regimes Such assistance would go far to increase TRIPS compliance	Monitoring and enforcement are untested because Ecuador settled instead of suspending TRIPS Ecuador's mechanism is an indication viable options exist the WTO would require a similar system for developing countries in subsequent arbitration that implements TRIPS suspension Forcing developing countries to demonstrate effective monitoring and enforcement of the authorized suspensions could lead to more effective monitoring and enforcement of regular TRIPS protections Whereas incentives to develop systems to enforce TRIPS are currently low authorization of TRIPS suspension remedy increases those incentives. The U.S., would watch for signs the retaliating country lost control of the remedy The developing country would have an incentive to avoid disputes over the scope of retaliation the developing country would develop political will to curb "piracy correct "institutional weaknesses by developing effective means of monitoring and protecting information developed countries would have an interest in ensuring suspensions did not affect their material Increased interest would increase pressure on the developing state to increase TRIPS enforcement across the board and would lead to assistance creating enforcement regimes. assistance would go far to increase TRIPS compliance	Monitoring and enforcement systems are, unfortunately, untested territory because Ecuador settled instead of suspending TRIPS. n232 However, Ecuador's proposed mechanism is an indication that viable options exist. n233 In EC-Bananas III, the decision noted "with approval" n234 that Ecuador had proposed to implement a coherent and likely effective structure for monitoring and calculating the value of continued violations, in addition to the "actual impact" of initial violations. n235 If it were to suspend TRIPS, Ecuador intended to establish a licensing system whereby companies or individuals who wanted to produce materials with an EC copyright would instead apply for a license from the Ecuadorian government. n236 The licensing system would "[limit] the suspension of concessions in terms of quantity, value, and time." n237 The government would use a specified ""related right value' of a new ... sound recording," with the value [1026] calculated by an international institution. n238 The EC-Bananas III decision further explained, The Ecuadorian government would reserve its right to revoke these licenses at any time... . A certain proportion of this value would represent the performer's share and another, larger part would represent the producer's share. If the level of suspension thus calculated were to risk reaching (together with authorized suspension in other sectors and/or under other agreements, if any) the level of nullification and impairment suffered by Ecuador, the authorization scheme would be stopped. Ecuador believes that the chances that this would happen are very close to nil. n239 Although Antigua proposed no such structure and merely sought the right to suspend TRIPS, n240 the specific reference n241 to the EC-Bananas III arbitration by the Anitigua-Gambling arbitrators n242 hints that the WTO would require a similar system for developing countries in subsequent arbitration that actually implements the TRIPS suspension remedy. Forcing developing countries seeking retaliation under TRIPS to demonstrate effective monitoring and enforcement of the authorized IP suspensions could also lead to more effective monitoring and enforcement of regular TRIPS protections. Weak TRIPS enforcement in developing countries is primarily attributed to "institutional weaknesses and the lack of resources," as well as a lack of "the political will to curb "piracy.'" n243 Whereas the incentives to develop systems to enforce TRIPS protections are currently relatively low, n244 authorization of the TRIPS suspension remedy increases those incentives. The U.S., or any similarly situated developed country, would watch for signs that the retaliating country lost control of the remedy. The developing country would have an incentive to avoid expensive and exhausting disputes over the scope of retaliation and attempts by the developing economy to maximize the value of suspensions - that is, the [1027] developing country would develop "the political will to curb "piracy.'" n245 In addition to this newfound will, the developing country would also correct "institutional weaknesses" by developing effective means of monitoring pirates and protecting information. n246 Other developed countries, though not directly entangled in the dispute, would nevertheless have an interest in ensuring that the suspensions did not affect their protected material. n247 Increased interest in maintaining protection would increase the pressure on the developing state to increase TRIPS enforcement across the board and perhaps would lead to assistance in creating enforcement regimes. Such assistance would go far to increase TRIPS compliance. n248	3,672	<h4><strong>Antiguan cross-retaliation triggers <u>monitoring systems</u> for TRIPS compliance---that <u>massively boosts</u> overall <u>enforcement</u> of <u>all</u> IP laws---it’s unique because there’s <u>no political will</u> for LDCs to cooperate in enforcement now </h4><p></strong>Georgia <strong>Hamann 9</strong>, J.D. 2009, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009, “NOTE: REPLACING SLINGSHOTS WITH SWORDS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANTIGUA-GAMBLING 22.6 PANEL REPORT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 993 </p><p><u><strong><mark>Monitoring and enforcement</mark> systems <mark>are</u></strong></mark>, unfortunately, <u><strong><mark>untested</mark> territory <mark>because Ecuador settled instead of suspending TRIPS</u></strong></mark>. n232 However, <u><strong><mark>Ecuador's</mark> proposed <mark>mechanism is an indication</mark> that</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>viable options exist</u></strong></mark>. n233 In EC-Bananas III, the decision noted "with approval" n234 that Ecuador had proposed to implement a coherent and likely effective structure for monitoring and calculating the value of continued violations, in addition to the "actual impact" of initial violations. n235 If it were to suspend TRIPS, Ecuador intended to establish a licensing system whereby companies or individuals who wanted to produce materials with an EC copyright would instead apply for a license from the Ecuadorian government. n236 The licensing system would "[limit] the suspension of concessions in terms of quantity, value, and time." n237 The government would use a specified ""related right value' of a new ... sound recording," with the value [1026] calculated by an international institution. n238 The EC-Bananas III decision further explained, </p><p>The Ecuadorian government would reserve its right to revoke these licenses at any time... . A certain proportion of this value would represent the performer's share and another, larger part would represent the producer's share. If the level of suspension thus calculated were to risk reaching (together with authorized suspension in other sectors and/or under other agreements, if any) the level of nullification and impairment suffered by Ecuador, the authorization scheme would be stopped. Ecuador believes that the chances that this would happen are very close to nil. n239</p><p>Although Antigua proposed no such structure and merely sought the right to suspend TRIPS, n240 the specific <u><strong>reference</u></strong> n241 <u><strong>to the EC-Bananas III arbitration by the Anitigua-Gambling arbitrators</u></strong> n242 <u><strong>hints that <mark>the WTO would</u></strong> <u><strong>require a similar system for developing countries in subsequent arbitration that</mark> actually <mark>implements</mark> the <mark>TRIPS suspension</mark> remedy</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Forcing developing countries</mark> seeking retaliation under TRIPS <mark>to demonstrate effective monitoring and enforcement of the authorized</mark> IP <mark>suspensions could</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>lead to more effective monitoring and enforcement of regular TRIPS protections</u></strong></mark>. Weak TRIPS enforcement in developing countries is primarily attributed to "institutional weaknesses and the lack of resources," as well as a lack of "the political will to curb "piracy.'" n243</p><p><u><strong><mark>Whereas</mark> the</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>incentives to develop systems to enforce TRIPS</mark> protections <mark>are currently</mark> relatively <mark>low</u></strong></mark>, n244 <u><strong><mark>authorization of</mark> the <mark>TRIPS suspension remedy</u></strong> <u><strong>increases those incentives</u></strong>. <u><strong>The U.S.,</u></strong></mark> or any similarly situated developed country, <u><strong><mark>would watch for signs</mark> that <mark>the retaliating country lost control of the remedy</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The developing country would have an incentive to avoid</mark> expensive and exhausting <mark>disputes over the scope of retaliation</u></strong></mark> and attempts by the developing economy to maximize the value of suspensions - that is, <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> [1027] <u><strong><mark>developing country would</u></strong> <u><strong>develop</mark> "the <mark>political will to curb "piracy</u></strong></mark>.'" n245 In addition to this newfound will, <u><strong>the developing country would also</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>correct "institutional weaknesses</u></strong></mark>" <u><strong><mark>by developing effective means of monitoring</mark> pirates <mark>and protecting information</u></strong></mark>. n246</p><p><u><strong>Other <mark>developed countries</u></strong></mark>, though not directly entangled in the dispute, <u><strong><mark>would</u></strong></mark> nevertheless <u><strong><mark>have an interest in ensuring</mark> that the <mark>suspensions did not affect their</mark> protected <mark>material</u></strong></mark>. n247 <u><strong><mark>Increased interest</mark> in maintaining protection <mark>would</u></strong> <u><strong>increase</mark> the <mark>pressure on the developing state to</u></strong> <u><strong>increase TRIPS enforcement across the board</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong></mark> perhaps <u><strong><mark>would lead to</u></strong> <u><strong>assistance</mark> in <mark>creating enforcement regimes</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>Such <mark>assistance would</u></strong> <u><strong>go far to increase TRIPS compliance</u></mark>. n248</p></strong>	null	null	1	430,379	9	17,113	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	565,270	N	Texas	4	Georgetown Erpenbach-Krishnan	Arnett	DHS politics (2NR) cross retal cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,862	Long timeframe and adaptation solves	Mendelsohn 9	Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf	The debate about climate change give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society These statements are alarmist and misleading society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences science and economics is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences severe impacts require a century (or two of no mitigation predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks	debate give the impression that climate change is an immediate threat to society These statements are alarmist and misleading immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences science and economics is clear that emissions over the next decades will lead to mild consequences severe impacts require a century of no mitigation predicted impacts assume there will be no adaptation many of these ” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not apparent that immediate policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks	The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006). These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.	1,935	<h4>Long timeframe and adaptation solves</h4><p>Robert O. <strong>Mendelsohn 9</strong>, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf</p><p><u>The</u> heart of the <u><mark>debate</mark> about climate change</u> comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that <u><mark>give the impression that</mark> human-induced <mark>climate change is an immediate threat to society</u></mark> (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006).</p><p><u><mark>These statements are</u></mark> largely <u><strong><mark>alarmist and misleading</u></strong></mark>. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, <u>society’s <mark>immediate behavior has an</u> <u><strong>extremely low probability</u></strong> <u>of leading to</u> <u><strong>catastrophic consequences</u></strong></mark>. The <u><mark>science and economics</u></mark> of climate change <u><mark>is</mark> quite <mark>clear that emissions over the next</mark> few <mark>decades will lead to</mark> only</u> <u><strong><mark>mild consequences</u></strong></mark>. The <u><strong><mark>severe impacts</u></strong></mark> predicted by alarmists <u><strong><mark>require a century</mark> (or two</u></strong> in the case of Stern 2006) <u><strong><mark>of no mitigation</u></strong></mark>. Many of the <u><mark>predicted impacts assume there will be no</mark> or little <mark>adaptation</u></mark>. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of <u>the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and <mark>many of these</u></mark> “<u>potential<mark>” impacts</u> <u><strong>will never occur because people will adapt</u></strong>. <u>It is not</mark> at all <mark>apparent that immediate</mark> and dramatic <mark>policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks</u></mark>. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.</p>	null	null	1nc – Biotech	45,412	381	17,120	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	565,421	N	Gsu	3	Wake Forest Clifford-Villa	Watson	vs Stem cells aff 1NC T "nearly all" midterms DA visas CP heg bad case 2NC heg bad case 1NR case T 2NR heg bad case	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,863	Upholds the precedent	LAMOND 14 University Lecturer in Legal Philosophy and the Felix Frankfurter Fellow in Law, Balliol College	LAMOND 14 University Lecturer in Legal Philosophy and the Felix Frankfurter Fellow in Law, Balliol College [Grant Lamond, "Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/legal-reas-prec/>.] The main challenge for this account of precedent lies in explaining when a later court is bound to follow a precedent which it regards as having been incorrectly decided. In the case of the trust property, the later court may think the precedent court mistaken to have concluded that the recipient must return the property to the beneficiary. May a later court avoid the result of the precedent by pointing to any general factual difference between the cases (e.g. this is real property rather than personal property, this is an implied rather than an express trust), and distinguish the precedent by stating a narrower ratio? After all, the balance of reasons never supported the precedent in the first place, so shouldn't it be confined to the narrowest possible statement of its facts? In which case precedents seem to have very little binding force indeed.	the basic common law requirement in stare decisis is to treat earlier cases as correctly decided A case may be distinguished, but only if that distinction does not imply that the precedent was wrongly decided the court may distinguish (citing that differences with the original case), since that does not imply that precedent was mistaken	the basic common law requirement in stare decisis is to treat earlier cases as correctly decided A case may be distinguished only if that distinction does not imply that the precedent was wrongly decided the court may distinguish (citing differences with the original case), since that does not imply that precedent was mistaken	One obvious possibility for avoiding this problem would be to ask how the precedent court would have assessed the facts in later case. But although this would be satisfactory in theory (if sometimes difficult in practice), it again does not reflect legal practice. Courts sometimes approach the question in this way, but often they do not, and there is no legal requirement that they do so. A better response is this: the basic common law requirement in stare decisis is to treat earlier cases as correctly decided. A case may be distinguished, but only if that distinction does not imply that the precedent was wrongly decided. So in the later case the court must decide whether the factual difference (real versus personal property, implied versus express trust) provides a better justification against the earlier decision than the facts of that case on their own. If it does, then the court may distinguish (citing that differences with the original case), since that does not imply that precedent was mistaken. If not—because real property or implied trusts raise no special considerations in this context—then the precedent must be followed. This approach, of course, assumes that it is possible to make these sorts of comparative judgements (for arguments that this is not generally possible see Alexander 1989, 34–7).	1,325	<h4>Upholds the precedent</h4><p><strong>LAMOND 14 University Lecturer in Legal Philosophy and the Felix Frankfurter Fellow in Law, Balliol College</strong> [Grant Lamond, "Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/legal-reas-prec/>.]</p><p>The main challenge for this account of precedent lies in explaining when a later court is bound to follow a precedent which it regards as having been incorrectly decided. In the case of the trust property, the later court may think the precedent court mistaken to have concluded that the recipient must return the property to the beneficiary. <u>May a later court avoid the result of the precedent by pointing to any general factual difference between the cases</u> (e.g. this is real property rather than personal property, this is an implied rather than an express trust), <u>and distinguish the precedent by stating a narrower ratio? </u>After all, the balance of reasons never supported the precedent in the first place, so shouldn't it be confined to the narrowest possible statement of its facts? In which case precedents seem to have very little binding force indeed.</p><p>One obvious possibility for avoiding this problem would be to ask how the precedent court would have assessed the facts in later case. But although this would be satisfactory in theory (if sometimes difficult in practice), it again does not reflect legal practice. Courts sometimes approach the question in this way, but often they do not, and there is no legal requirement that they do so. A better response is this: <u><mark>the basic common law requirement in stare decisis is to treat earlier cases as correctly decided</u></mark>. <u><mark>A case may be distinguished</mark>, but <mark>only if <strong>that distinction</strong> <strong>does not imply that the precedent was wrongly decided</u></strong></mark>. So in the later case the court must decide whether the factual difference (real versus personal property, implied versus express trust) provides a better justification against the earlier decision than the facts of that case on their own. If it does, then <u><mark>the court may distinguish (citing</mark> that <mark>differences with the original case), since that does not imply that precedent was mistaken</u></mark>. If not—because real property or implied trusts raise no special considerations in this context—then the precedent must be followed. This approach, of course, assumes that it is possible to make these sorts of comparative judgements (for arguments that this is not generally possible see Alexander 1989, 34–7).</p>	2NC	CP – distinguish	2nc solvency	135,184	3	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,864	Legalization in advance of treaty revision causes treaty withdrawal – only the CP maintains compliance	Donohue et al 2010	Donohue et al 2010 (C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford, John, “Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy” http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12096)	Another complication for legalization is international law the Single Convention binds all UN member nations to maintain prohibition of drugs, including cannabis specifically While the Single Convention requires that countries maintain prohibition it does not require a punitive regime reforms working within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require either a country’s withdrawal or revision due to the Single Convention even countries with more liberal narcotics policies lack full- fledged drug legalization in the Netherlands the importation and commercial production of cannabis remains illegal	the Single Convention binds nations to prohibition including cannabis specifically While the Convention requires prohibition it does not require a punitive regime reforms within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require withdrawal even countries with more liberal narcotics policies lack full- fledged legalization in the Netherlands importation and commercial production remains illegal	International Law. Another complication for legalization is international law. While many researchers attempt to make international comparisons in studying drugs, one area of drug control policy that receives scant attention is the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 which binds all UN member nations to maintain prohibition of drugs, including cannabis specifically (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 61). While the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs requires that countries maintain prohibition of manufacture, sales, and import, it does not require a punitive regime of the type currently found in the United States. Article 36 of the Single Convention, “Penal Provision,” specifically allows for treatment programs to either enhance or serve as a substitute for punishment.81 The Economist reports that countries like the Netherlands are able to allow for some innovation in controlling marijuana use through the convention’s commentary, which states that its goal is “improvement of the efficacy of national criminal justice systems in the field of drug trafficking” (“A Toker’s Guide” 2009). Thus, reforms working within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require either a country’s withdrawal from the treaty or revision thereof. Perhaps partly due to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, even countries with more liberal narcotics policies than the United States lack full- fledged drug legalization and at most allow for depenalization of marijuana and/ or widespread needle exchange programs. As discussed above, in the Netherlands, a country long known for its tolerance of marijuana smoking, the importation and commercial production of cannabis remains illegal (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 64). When considering its own drug reform, Portugal declined to adopt outright legalization likely in part because of its treaty obligations under the 1961 Single Convention (Cato Institute 2009).	1,974	<h4><strong>Legalization <u>in advance</u> of treaty revision causes <u>treaty withdrawal</u> – only the CP maintains compliance</h4><p>Donohue et al 2010 </strong> (C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford, John, “Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy” http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12096)</p><p>International Law. <u>Another complication for legalization is international law</u>. While many researchers attempt to make international comparisons in studying drugs, one area of drug control policy that receives scant attention is <u><mark>the</u></mark> United Nations <u><mark>Single Convention</u></mark> on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 which <u><mark>binds</mark> all UN member <mark>nations to</mark> maintain <mark>prohibition</mark> of drugs, <mark>including cannabis specifically</u></mark> (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 61). <u><mark>While the</mark> Single <mark>Convention</u></mark> on Narcotic Drugs <u><strong><mark>requires</mark> that countries maintain <mark>prohibition</mark> </u></strong>of manufacture, sales, and import, <u><strong><mark>it does not require a punitive regime</u></strong></mark> of the type currently found in the United States. Article 36 of the Single Convention, “Penal Provision,” specifically allows for treatment programs to either enhance or serve as a substitute for punishment.81 The Economist reports that countries like the Netherlands are able to allow for some innovation in controlling marijuana use through the convention’s commentary, which states that its goal is “improvement of the efficacy of national criminal justice systems in the field of drug trafficking” (“A Toker’s Guide” 2009). Thus, <u><mark>reforms</mark> working <strong><mark>within the framework of the existing treaty</strong> are possible, though <strong>full- scale legalization</strong> would require</mark> either a country’s <strong><mark>withdrawal</strong></mark> </u>from the treaty<u> <strong>or revision</strong> </u>thereof. Perhaps partly <u>due to the Single Convention </u>on Narcotic Drugs, <u><mark>even countries with more liberal narcotics policies</u></mark> than the United States <u><mark>lack <strong>full- fledged</mark> drug <mark>legalization</u></strong></mark> and at most allow for depenalization of marijuana and/ or widespread needle exchange programs. As discussed above, <u><mark>in the Netherlands</u></mark>, a country long known for its tolerance of marijuana smoking, <u>the <mark>importation and commercial production</mark> of cannabis <strong><mark>remains illegal</u></strong></mark> (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 64). When considering its own drug reform, Portugal declined to adopt outright legalization likely in part because of its treaty obligations under the 1961 Single Convention (Cato Institute 2009).</p>	null	1nr	2NC Local DA	430,457	62	17,115	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	565,263	N	Wake	8	Georgia Boyce-Feinberg	Markoff	AG politics fed cp (2nr) treaties da (2nr) ban marihuana cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,865	That creates widespread Occidentalist violence	Baber 02	Baber 02 Zaheer BABER Sociology @ Saskatchewan ‘2 The European Legacy 7 (6) p. 748-749	One of the intellectual responses to the situation has been the project of “indigenization,” an attempt to exorcise the remnants of the Eurocentric elements from academic discourse Shiva categorically rejects “Western” categories, science and knowledge with the objective of constructing a friendlier, decidedly non-strategic essentialist model derived from “non-Western” worldviews, because, as she puts it, “most non-Western cultures have been based on the democracy of all life.” The attractions of replacing presumably Eurocentric discourses and institutions are all too evident the move to indigenize the social sciences must not end up being a form of “nativism” or “occidentalism In seeking to contest the dominance of Eurocentric ideas in the social sciences, some have unwittingly reinforced the paternalistic Orientalism that they claim to be contesting. proponents of this project known as “indigenization and “alternative discourses” have succeeded in unintentionally inflicting heavy doses of conceptual violence on the very idea of social science and knowledge Said frequently saddled with the responsibility of contributing to the construction of such unreflexive nativism, has been highly critical of this gesture	One of the intellectual responses to the situation has been the project of “indigenization,” an attempt to categorically reject “Western” categories, the move to indigenize the sciences must not end up being a form of “nativism” or “occidentalism In seeking to contest the dominance of Eurocentric ideas some have reinforced the paternalistic Orientalism that they claim to be contesting proponents of this project known as alternative discourses” have succeeded in inflicting heavy doses of violence	Despite the highly mediated nature of the diverse networks of intellectual influences, there is no doubt that residues of the European legacy of colonial conquest and rule continue to influence certain dominant strands of social scientific discourses. One of the intellectual responses to the situation has been the project of “indigenization,” an attempt to exorcise the remnants of the Eurocentric elements of the European legacy from academic discourse. The task at hand for scholars associated with this project is to provide a corrective to what is perceived to be the valorization of the experience of “Western” societies as the yardstick for measuring “Other” societies and cultures. At the extreme end of the spectrum is the Indian scholar Claude Alvares, who yearns for a radically anti-modern era that would be in tune with “our own distinctive eastern traditions.” In a recent book, Science, Development and Violence: the Revolt Against Modernity, Alvares makes the dramatic announcement that he has cut off connections with all institutions.6 Presumably, with the exception of Oxford University Press (his publisher), all institutions are compromised products of Eurocentric modernity. The degree of commitment of other intellectuals to the project of indigenization is variable, depending on the issues at hand. Vandana Shiva, for example, whose contribution to the critical literature on biotechnology, patents and development has been insightful and important, unnecessarily conjures up visions of a kinder and gentler science based on a highly romanticized “feminine principle.” Determined not to make any concessions to heterogeneity, ambivalence, contradictory formations or even a nod to the Spivakian “strategic use of positive essentialism,” Shiva categorically rejects “Western” categories, science and knowledge with the objective of constructing a friendlier, decidedly non-strategic essentialist model derived from “non-Western” worldviews, because, as she puts it, “most non-Western cultures have been based on the democracy of all life.”7 The attractions of replacing presumably Eurocentric discourses and institutions are all also all too evident in anthropologist T. N. Madan’s confident dismissal of the state policy of secularism in India. He has no doubts about the fact that in the Indian context, the policy of secularism exhibits “moral arrogance” since it constitutes an “alien cultural ideology … a gift of Christianity … an impossible credo of life … the dream of a minority (secularists) which wants to shape the majority in its own image.”8 Not to be outdone, Ashis Nandy who in some of his earlier writings has steered away from Manichean dichotomies, ratchets up the temperature of the polemical game by quite a few degrees. As he puts it, secularism is quite obviously a “Western concept … introduced into Indian public life to subvert and discredit” Indian society. The policy of secularism for him constitutes the archetypical Eurocentric project if ever there was one, peddled by individuals who are obviously “intellectually crippled and morally  awed … senile … seduced and brainwashed … anaemic” and who have “taken over the white man’s burden in this part of the world.”9 However, not all intellectual encounters with the legacy of Europe in postcolonial societies and theories inevitably traverse the path that leads to a categorical rejection of “alien” epistemologies and knowledge. Nor do all proponents of what has come to be known as the “indigenization” project seek concepts that are sui generis, untainted, and unalloyed by non-indigenous influences. A nuanced variation on the indigenization theme is the promotion of a universalism based on intellectual titration that would replace parochialism masquerading as universalism.10 As formulated by Alatas, the driving force behind this movement is the “idea that social scientific theories, concepts, and methodologies can be derived from the histories and cultures of the various non-Western civilizations” with the ultimate objective of explaining and interpreting “the whole world from various non-Western vantage points.”11 Arguing that the “culture-specific situation of a society determines, at least in part, the concepts, theories and methodologies that arise from tackling specifically indigenous problems,” the ultimate objective of the movement is the construction of “systematized bodies of knowledge … that are based on the indigenous cultures in the same way that Western social science is based on Western historical experiences and cultural practices.”12 While Alatas has been careful to emphasize that as he conceives of it, the move to indigenize the social sciences should not and must not end up being a form of “nativism” or “occidentalism and orientalism in reverse,” not all scholars have been as cautious as him. In seeking to contest the dominance of Eurocentric ideas in the social sciences, some scholars have ironically and perhaps unwittingly reinforced the very paternalistic Orientalism that they claim to be contesting. In more ways than one, some proponents of this project variously known as “indigenization,” “ethno-sociology” and “alternative discourses” have succeeded in unintentionally inflicting heavy doses of conceptual violence on the very idea of social science and knowledge. Little wonder that Edward Said, who is frequently saddled with the responsibility of contributing to the construction of such unreflexive nativism, has been highly critical of this gesture.13 The claims of two scholars gone native with a vengeance are discussed below in some detail, but these two do not by any means exhaust the laundry list.	5,673	<h4>That creates widespread Occidentalist<strong> violence </h4><p>Baber 02 </strong>Zaheer BABER Sociology @ Saskatchewan ‘2 The European Legacy 7 (6) p. 748-749</p><p>Despite the highly mediated nature of the diverse networks of intellectual influences, there is no doubt that residues of the European legacy of colonial conquest and rule continue to influence certain dominant strands of social scientific discourses. <u><mark>One of the intellectual responses to the situation has been the project of “<strong>indigenization</strong>,” an attempt to </mark>exorcise the remnants of the Eurocentric elements</u> of the European legacy <u>from academic discourse</u>. The task at hand for scholars associated with this project is to provide a corrective to what is perceived to be the valorization of the experience of “Western” societies as the yardstick for measuring “Other” societies and cultures. At the extreme end of the spectrum is the Indian scholar Claude Alvares, who yearns for a radically anti-modern era that would be in tune with “our own distinctive eastern traditions.” In a recent book, Science, Development and Violence: the Revolt Against Modernity, Alvares makes the dramatic announcement that he has cut off connections with all institutions.6 Presumably, with the exception of Oxford University Press (his publisher), all institutions are compromised products of Eurocentric modernity. The degree of commitment of other intellectuals to the project of indigenization is variable, depending on the issues at hand. Vandana Shiva, for example, whose contribution to the critical literature on biotechnology, patents and development has been insightful and important, unnecessarily conjures up visions of a kinder and gentler science based on a highly romanticized “feminine principle.” Determined not to make any concessions to heterogeneity, ambivalence, contradictory formations or even a nod to the Spivakian “strategic use of positive essentialism,”<u> Shiva <mark>categorically reject</mark>s <mark>“Western” categories,</mark> science and knowledge with the objective of constructing a friendlier, decidedly non-strategic essentialist model derived from “non-Western” worldviews, because, as she puts it, “most non-Western cultures have been based on the democracy of all life.”</u>7 <u>The attractions of replacing presumably Eurocentric discourses and institutions are all </u>also all <u>too evident</u> in anthropologist T. N. Madan’s confident dismissal of the state policy of secularism in India. He has no doubts about the fact that in the Indian context, the policy of secularism exhibits “moral arrogance” since it constitutes an “alien cultural ideology … a gift of Christianity … an impossible credo of life … the dream of a minority (secularists) which wants to shape the majority in its own image.”8 Not to be outdone, Ashis Nandy who in some of his earlier writings has steered away from Manichean dichotomies, ratchets up the temperature of the polemical game by quite a few degrees. As he puts it, secularism is quite obviously a “Western concept … introduced into Indian public life to subvert and discredit” Indian society. The policy of secularism for him constitutes the archetypical Eurocentric project if ever there was one, peddled by individuals who are obviously “intellectually crippled and morally  awed … senile … seduced and brainwashed … anaemic” and who have “taken over the white man’s burden in this part of the world.”9 However, not all intellectual encounters with the legacy of Europe in postcolonial societies and theories inevitably traverse the path that leads to a categorical rejection of “alien” epistemologies and knowledge. Nor do all proponents of what has come to be known as the “indigenization” project seek concepts that are sui generis, untainted, and unalloyed by non-indigenous influences. A nuanced variation on the indigenization theme is the promotion of a universalism based on intellectual titration that would replace parochialism masquerading as universalism.10 As formulated by Alatas, the driving force behind this movement is the “idea that social scientific theories, concepts, and methodologies can be derived from the histories and cultures of the various non-Western civilizations” with the ultimate objective of explaining and interpreting “the whole world from various non-Western vantage points.”11 Arguing that the “culture-specific situation of a society determines, at least in part, the concepts, theories and methodologies that arise from tackling specifically indigenous problems,” the ultimate objective of the movement is the construction of “systematized bodies of knowledge … that are based on the indigenous cultures in the same way that Western social science is based on Western historical experiences and cultural practices.”12 While Alatas has been careful to emphasize that as he conceives of it, <u><mark>the move to indigenize the </mark>social <mark>sciences</u> </mark>should not and <u><mark>must not end up being a form of “nativism” or “occidentalism</u> </mark>and orientalism in reverse,” not all scholars have been as cautious as him. <u><mark>In seeking to contest the dominance of Eurocentric ideas </mark>in the social sciences, <mark>some</u> </mark>scholars <u><mark>have</u> </mark>ironically and perhaps <u>unwittingly <mark>reinforced the</u> </mark>very <u><mark>paternalistic Orientalism that they claim to be contesting</mark>.</u> In more ways than one, some <u><mark>proponents of this project </u></mark>variously <u><mark>known as </mark>“indigenization</u>,” “ethno-sociology” <u>and “<mark>alternative discourses” have succeeded in </mark>unintentionally <mark>inflicting heavy doses of </mark>conceptual</u><strong> <u></strong><mark>violence </mark>on the very idea of social science and knowledge</u>. Little wonder that Edward <u>Said</u>, who is <u>frequently saddled with the responsibility of contributing to the construction of such unreflexive nativism, has been highly critical of this gesture</u>.13 The claims of two scholars gone native with a vengeance are discussed below in some detail, but these two do not by any means exhaust the laundry list.</p>	1nc vs WGA	null	1nc – Native K	431,208	4	17,118	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	565,420	N	Gsu	1	West Georgia Muhammad-Gaius	Deming	1NC T occidentalism K law good K impact turns 2NC Space colonization impact turn 1NR T 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,866	Strengthening global IP protection is key to U.S. growth and competitiveness	Pham 10	Nam D. Pham 10, Managing Partner of NDP Consulting Group, formerly Vice President at Scudder Kemper Investments in Boston, where he was responsible for research, asset allocations, and currency hedging for Scudder’s global and international bond funds; formerly Chief Economist of the Asia Region for Standard & Poor’s DRI in Boston; an economist at the World Bank in Washington D.C.; and a consultant to both the Department of Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission, April 2010, “The Impact of Innovation and the Role of Intellectual Property Rights on U.S. Productivity, Competitiveness, Jobs, Wages, and Exports,” http://infojustice.org/download/gcongress/dii/pham%20article.pdf	the creation of i p is the key factor in sustaining economic growth i p enhances U.S. productivity and strengthens global competitiveness IP-intensive industries enjoy higher productivity and greater competitiveness While the U.S. job market remains weak IP-intensive industries are creating jobs To strengthen the U.S. economic position in global markets U.S. policymakers will need to support policies to encourage innovation With the growing importance of knowledge as a driving force for economic expansion worldwide protection of i p rights has attracted greater attention and concern piracy of products are rising exponentially and are costing the global economy hundreds of billions The challenge is developing the policy instruments and frameworks to better protect intellectual property rights Policies that enhance law enforcement’s ability to prosecute IP theft are essential for promoting further innovation protection of i p rights will require the effective strengthening of national policies as well as the international coordination of effective policies U.S. policy action to further encourage IP creation while protecting IP rights will be critical in helping the U S retain its global competitive edge in innovation This is essential for ensuring sustained U.S. economic growth	creation of i p is the key factor in sustaining growth and strengthens global competitiveness To strengthen the U.S. position in global markets policymakers need to encourage innovation protection of i p has attracted greater concern piracy are rising exponentially Policies that enhance ability to prosecute IP theft are essential for promoting innovation protection will require effective national policies, as well as international coordination U.S. policy protecting IP will be critical in helping the U S retain its global competitive edge	We conclude that the creation of intellectual property is the key factor in sustaining economic growth and achieving high living standards, a finding that is consistent with the current literature. Evidence from the United States for the 2000s confirms that intellectual property enhances U.S. productivity, in terms of revenue and value added, and strengthens global competitiveness, as reflected in higher exports. IP-intensive industries, measured by R&D expenditure as such expenditures are direct inputs for innovation and are the most widely used measures for intellectual property, enjoy higher productivity and greater competitiveness than non-IP intensive industries. While the U.S. job market remains weak, with the unemployment rate stuck at historical highs, IP-intensive industries are creating jobs for scientists and engineers, as well as for low-skilled production workers. In addition to R&D expenditure, IP-intensive industries show more capital expenditure per employee. In this way, IP-intensive industries exert positive effects on other tradable industries (machinery and equipment), as well as on non-tradable industries (buildings and other structures). From a global perspective, innovations in developed countries also have positive effects on factor productivity in developing countries. To strengthen the U.S. economic position in global markets, U.S. policymakers will need to support policies to encourage innovation. While R&D expenditures by the United States account for 33 percent of global R&D spending--far exceeding the spending of all other countries--seven other countries report R&D-intensity levels (R&D as a percent of GDP) above the U.S. level.77 This suggests the need for the United States to further increase its R&D spending to maintain its advantage in the coming years. Since industry is the largest source of R&D funding (67 percent) as well as the largest R&D spender (72 percent), such valuable policy incentives as R&D tax credits will continue to encourage applied research and development. U.S. policymakers would also do well in supporting the recent proposals to the Congress of the National Science Board; the Board recommended additional federal funding for basic research, more intellectual interchanges between industry and academia, and new databases to track the impact of the globalization of manufacturing and services on the U.S. economy.78 With the growing importance of knowledge as a driving force for innovation and economic expansion worldwide, the protection of intellectual property rights has attracted greater attention and concern. The counterfeiting and piracy of products are rising exponentially and are costing the global economy hundreds of billions of dollars a year in lost revenues and thousands of jobs. The challenge for policymakers is therefore to continue encouraging investment in R&D and human capital in order to promote innovation while at the same time developing the policy instruments and frameworks to better protect intellectual property rights. Policies that enhance law enforcement’s ability to detect, investigate, and prosecute IP theft are essential for better protecting intellectual property rights and thereby promoting further innovation. The protection of intellectual property rights will require the effective strengthening of national policies, as well as the international coordination of effective policies and frameworks in such forums as the World Trade Organization. The United States has demonstrated a commitment to protecting intellectual property rights. The Congress in 2008 passed, and President Bush signed into law, the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act (ProIP Act) that increased both civil and criminal penalties for trademark and copyright infringement. Consequently, the Senate in December 2009 confirmed Victoria Espinel as the first IP enforcement coordinator to oversee the nation’s enforcement of intellectual property laws and to protect U.S. intellectual property abroad. And the U.S. House of Representatives recently passed the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2009 to protect intellectual property online.79 As for cross-border IP theft, this can be addressed by re-authorizing the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Reauthorization Act to enhance the IP enforcement capabilities of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and to press for internationally coordinated rules in relevant global forums. U.S. policy action to further encourage IP creation while protecting IP rights will be critical in helping the United States retain its global competitive edge in innovation. This, in turn, is essential for ensuring sustained U.S. economic growth and job creation in the coming years.	4,759	<h4><u><strong>Strengthening global IP protection</u> is key to U.S. growth and competitiveness </h4><p></strong>Nam D. <strong>Pham 10</strong>, Managing Partner of NDP Consulting Group, formerly Vice President at Scudder Kemper Investments in Boston, where he was responsible for research, asset allocations, and currency hedging for Scudder’s global and international bond funds; formerly Chief Economist of the Asia Region for Standard & Poor’s DRI in Boston; an economist at the World Bank in Washington D.C.; and a consultant to both the Department of Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission, April 2010, “The Impact of Innovation and the Role of Intellectual Property Rights on U.S. Productivity, Competitiveness, Jobs, Wages, and Exports,” http://infojustice.org/download/gcongress/dii/pham%20article.pdf</p><p>We conclude that <u><strong>the <mark>creation of</u></strong> <u><strong>i</u></strong></mark>ntellectual <u><strong><mark>p</u></strong></mark>roperty <u><strong><mark>is the</u></strong> <u><strong>key factor in sustaining</mark> economic <mark>growth</u></strong></mark> and achieving high living standards, a finding that is consistent with the current literature. Evidence from the United States for the 2000s confirms that <u><strong>i</u></strong>ntellectual <u><strong>p</u></strong>roperty <u><strong>enhances U.S. productivity</u></strong>, in terms of revenue and value added, <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong> <u><strong>strengthens global competitiveness</u></strong></mark>, as reflected in higher exports. </p><p><u><strong>IP-intensive industries</u></strong>, measured by R&D expenditure as such expenditures are direct inputs for innovation and are the most widely used measures for intellectual property, <u><strong>enjoy higher productivity and greater competitiveness</u></strong> than non-IP intensive industries. <u><strong>While the U.S. job market remains weak</u></strong>, with the unemployment rate stuck at historical highs, <u><strong>IP-intensive industries are creating jobs</u></strong> for scientists and engineers, as well as for low-skilled production workers. In addition to R&D expenditure, IP-intensive industries show more capital expenditure per employee. In this way, IP-intensive industries exert positive effects on other tradable industries (machinery and equipment), as well as on non-tradable industries (buildings and other structures). From a global perspective, innovations in developed countries also have positive effects on factor productivity in developing countries. </p><p><u><strong><mark>To strengthen the U.S.</mark> economic <mark>position in global markets</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>U.S. <mark>policymakers</mark> will <mark>need to</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>support policies to <mark>encourage innovation</u></strong></mark>. While R&D expenditures by the United States account for 33 percent of global R&D spending--far exceeding the spending of all other countries--seven other countries report R&D-intensity levels (R&D as a percent of GDP) above the U.S. level.77 This suggests the need for the United States to further increase its R&D spending to maintain its advantage in the coming years.</p><p>Since industry is the largest source of R&D funding (67 percent) as well as the largest R&D spender (72 percent), such valuable policy incentives as R&D tax credits will continue to encourage applied research and development. U.S. policymakers would also do well in supporting the recent proposals to the Congress of the National Science Board; the Board recommended additional federal funding for basic research, more intellectual interchanges between industry and academia, and new databases to track the impact of the globalization of manufacturing and services on the U.S. economy.78</p><p><u><strong>With the growing importance of knowledge as a driving force for</u></strong> innovation and <u><strong>economic expansion worldwide</u></strong>, the <u><strong><mark>protection of i</u></strong></mark>ntellectual <u><strong><mark>p</u></strong></mark>roperty <u><strong>rights</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>has attracted greater</mark> attention and <mark>concern</u></strong></mark>. The counterfeiting and <u><strong><mark>piracy</mark> of products <mark>are rising exponentially</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and are costing the global economy hundreds of billions</u></strong> of dollars a year in lost revenues and thousands of jobs. <u><strong>The challenge</u></strong> for policymakers <u><strong>is</u></strong> therefore to continue encouraging investment in R&D and human capital in order to promote innovation while at the same time <u><strong>developing the policy instruments and frameworks to</u></strong> <u><strong>better protect intellectual property rights</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Policies that enhance</mark> law enforcement’s <mark>ability to</u></strong></mark> detect, investigate, and <u><strong><mark>prosecute IP theft are essential for</u></strong></mark> better protecting intellectual property rights and thereby <u><strong><mark>promoting</mark> further <mark>innovation</u></strong></mark>. The <u><strong><mark>protection</mark> of i</u></strong>ntellectual <u><strong>p</u></strong>roperty <u><strong>rights <mark>will</u></strong> <u><strong>require</mark> the <mark>effective</mark> strengthening of <mark>national policies</u></strong>, <u><strong>as well as</mark> the <mark>international coordination</mark> of effective policies</u></strong> and frameworks in such forums as the World Trade Organization.</p><p>The United States has demonstrated a commitment to protecting intellectual property rights. The Congress in 2008 passed, and President Bush signed into law, the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act (ProIP Act) that increased both civil and criminal penalties for trademark and copyright infringement. Consequently, the Senate in December 2009 confirmed Victoria Espinel as the first IP enforcement coordinator to oversee the nation’s enforcement of intellectual property laws and to protect U.S. intellectual property abroad. And the U.S. House of Representatives recently passed the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2009 to protect intellectual property online.79 As for cross-border IP theft, this can be addressed by re-authorizing the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Reauthorization Act to enhance the IP enforcement capabilities of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and to press for internationally coordinated rules in relevant global forums. </p><p><u><strong><mark>U.S. policy</mark> action to further encourage IP creation while <mark>protecting IP</mark> rights <mark>will be</u></strong> <u><strong>critical in helping the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>retain its global competitive edge</mark> in innovation</u></strong>. <u><strong>This</u></strong>, in turn, <u><strong>is essential for ensuring sustained U.S. economic growth</u> and job creation in the coming years.</p></strong>	null	null	1	430,381	10	17,113	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	565,270	N	Texas	4	Georgetown Erpenbach-Krishnan	Arnett	DHS politics (2NR) cross retal cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,867	-- No extinction – diseases favor limited lethality and medicine will check	Posner 4	Posner 4 (Richard, Judge – US Court of Appeals, Catastrophe: Risk and Response, p. 22-24)	Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease in the 200,000 years of its existence There have been Black Death, smallpox, and AIDS none has come close to destroying the entire human race There is a biological reason Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality The likelihood of a pandemic that would cause extinction is even less today than in the past despite wider contacts The reason is improvements in medical science	Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality The likelihood of pandemic that would cause extinction is even less today than the past The reason is improvements in medical science.	Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time.	1,366	<h4>-- No extinction – diseases favor limited lethality and medicine will check</h4><p><strong>Posner 4</strong> (Richard, Judge – US Court of Appeals, Catastrophe: Risk and Response, p. 22-24)</p><p>Yet the fact that <u><mark>Homo sapiens has managed to survive</u> <u><strong>every disease</u></strong> </mark>to assail it <u>in the 200,000 years</u> or so <u>of its existence</u> is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. <u>There have been</u> enormously destructive plagues, such as the <u>Black Death, smallpox, and</u> now <u>AIDS</u>, but <u><strong><mark>none has come close</u></strong> <u>to destroying the entire human race</u>. <u>There is a biological reason</u>. <u>Natural selection favors germs of</u> <u><strong>limited lethality</u></strong></mark>; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. <u><mark>The</mark> <mark>likelihood</mark> <mark>of</mark> a</u> natural <u><mark>pandemic that would cause</u> </mark>the <u><mark>extinction</u></mark> of the human race <u><mark>is</u></mark> probably <u><strong><mark>even less today</u></strong> <u>than</u></mark> <u>in <mark>the past</u> </mark>(except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), <u>despite wider</u> human <u>contacts</u> that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. <u><mark>The</u> <u>reason is improvements in medical science</u>. </mark>But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time.</p>	null	null	1nc – Biotech	64,791	356	17,120	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	565,421	N	Gsu	3	Wake Forest Clifford-Villa	Watson	vs Stem cells aff 1NC T "nearly all" midterms DA visas CP heg bad case 2NC heg bad case 1NR case T 2NR heg bad case	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,868	Their 1AC evidence is all about tissues:	WAGNER 2014	WAGNER 2014	? A recognition that human tissues are “personal property” is entirely separate from the question of who owns the property ]cc property rights stimulate biomedical research in many ways promise of compensation encourages research participation by individuals who might otherwise decline to behave altruistically while others profit, and, what is more, who face the inconvenience, medical risks, loss of privacy, and possibility of genetic discrimination inherent in such participation promise of profits also fosters self-checking by individuals who will initiate significant research by informing biomedical researchers of the value and uniqueness of their tissue. , the possibility of a liability action creates even greater incentive for researchers to provide informed consent this model's recognition of research participants' right to bargain with researchers will help to ensure that the tissue ends up in the hands of the highest bidder, who, it is hoped, will put the tissue to its most valuable use Any other approach threatens to lead to a decrease in public support of such research, emphasis will focus on whether a person should be entitled to own tissues removed from h is/her own body ding organs for medical treatment and research purposes	? A recognition that human tissues are “personal property” is entirely separate from the question of who owns the property promise of profits also fosters self-checking by individuals who will initiate significant research by informing biomedical researchers of the value and uniqueness of their tissue emphasis will focus on whether a person should be entitled to own tissues removed from h is/her own body	“Jennifer K. Wagner, J.D., Ph.D., is a solo-practicing attorney in State College, PA and a research associate at the University of Pennsylvania’s Center for the Integration of Genetic Healthcare Technologies.” http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2014/06/11/property-rights-and-the-human-body/ Recognition of personal property rights in human bodies (in whole or in part) makes many legal scholars, bioethicists, and biotech industry people (among others) uncomfortable. But should that necessarily be the case? There are many aspects of property law principles that are intriguing when considered in the context of biomedical research. Would recognition of personal property rights in one’s own biospecimens make it conceptually less challenging for an individual to make contributions to research or medicine – either by donating, selling, or even licensing materials to researchers? Would it help researchers better manage risks by allowing them to set liquidated damages or pay premiums for permission to use biospecimens for particular purposes? Other principles might be less desirable. For example, if property interests were recognized in tissues, could tissues be taken by government agencies (e.g. the NIH or NSF) as government condemnation through powers of eminent domain? How would public and private necessities apply to biospecimens, potentially enabling emergency or limited uses of the property without the owner’s prior consent? Would recognition of property rights allow us to apply concepts of concurrent ownership (e.g., joint owners) or future interests to genetic information in certain contexts? (e.g., having joint EMRs that allow BRCA1/2 risk information to be visible across records for sisters or records of mothers and daughters)? Would the promotion of such transfers through recognition of novel or existing property principles serve as an equalizer and mediate the harms of body part and human trafficking for medical and research purposes or, conversely, would it further disenfranchise, marginalize, and exploit those same populations whose members suffered (and continue to suffer) from slavery and the treatment of human beings as chattel? A recognition that human tissues are “personal property” is entirely separate from the question of who owns the property. Facts similar to those in the Canadian case involving the Estate of Ms. Piljak may very well lead U.S. courts to reach similar conclusions and continue to follow Moore precedent. It may cause us to revisit fundamental questions in biomedical research settings (e.g., what is medical waste and what are the meaningful differences between an informed consent document and a contract). Yet this acknowledgement as a preliminary matter that the biospecimens are personal property does provide us flexibility to move forward and focus on important questions regarding the corresponding rights and obligations that that classification entails (e.g., possession, title, and ability to transfer) and discuss pressing policy issues (such as whether limitations should be imposed as act, actor, subject, or purpose constraints). I welcome a renewed property discussion in the area of biomedical research. A property designation on biospecimens need not imply that donors have legal interests that survive the completed transfer of biospecimens and entitle them to claim a share in IP-based profits down the road. Moreover, a bill of sale to transfer rights in specific biospecimens would be refreshingly clear and final (and of interest to only a subset of the human population willing to take the risks associated with such a transaction) and could be permitted without undermining human research participant protections. It is vital, however, that in addressing whether and how we might apply property principles to biospecimens, we stay committed to human rights and, accordingly, remain focused on ensuring the equality and dignity of all human beings. Gitter 4 – Donna M. Assistant Professor of Legal and Ethical Studies, Fordham University Schools of Business; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., Cornell University. [“Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human Research Participants' Property Rights in Their Biological Material,” Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 61 \| Issue 1 Article 5, 1/1]cc A property rights/liability model promises to stimulate biomedical research in many ways. First, the promise of compensation encourages research participation by individuals who might otherwise decline to behave altruistically while others profit, and, what is more, who face the inconvenience, medical risks, loss of privacy, and possibility of genetic discrimination inherent in such participation.377 Second, the promise of profits also fosters self-checking by individuals who will initiate significant research by informing biomedical researchers of the value and uniqueness of their tissue.3 7 ' Third, the possibility of a liability action creates even greater incentive for researchers to provide informed consent, 79 especially because the monetary damages will prove great enough to serve a deterrent effect.3a 0 Fourth, this model's recognition of research participants' right to bargain with researchers will help to ensure that the tissue ends up in the hands of the highest bidder, who, it is hoped, will put the tissue to its most valuable use.3 "' Fifth, and just as important, notions of equity militate that research participants, who supply useful scientific raw materials, 382 and encounter risks through their participation,8 3 are entitled to compensation, in light of researchers' own pecuniary gain. Any other approach threatens to lead to a decrease in public support of such research,38 4 lest the public perceive that researchers obtain scientific inputs from them for free and then charge them for the commercial outputs. Rodger 12 http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_2_No_12_Special_Issue_June_2012/11.pdf SO, Tsz Ngai Roger DBA, Juris Doctor City University of Hong Kon g School of Law T at Chee Ave. Kowloon Tong Hong Kong TSUI, Fung Ling Sara Solicitor of t he High Court of Hong Kong SAR Teaching Fellow C ity University of Hong Kong School of Law Tat Chee Ave. Kowloon Tong Hong Kong “Property Rights in Human Tissue – A Review of t he Current Status of Hong Kong Law in Relation t o Human Body Parts”pg. 80 In doing so it will often take into consideration principles of morality, economic consideration, justice, and floodgate effect, etc. and frame its decisions under the label of policy considera tion. 95 In this part the authors will critique the prevalent policy considerations on the issue whether there should be general property in human body parts. Particular emphasis will focus on whether a person should be entitled to own tissues removed from h is/her own body. 3.1 Morality Human dignity It has been asserted that permitting people to enjoy right to income and right to capital over their severed body tissues might be viewed as permission to commoditisation of human body. This may challenge traditi onal social values on human bodies and denigrate dignity upon life persons and dead bodies. 96 Also, this also triggers resentment linking to metaphor of the human slavery in the early, uncivilised history of mankind. While this concern is legitimate to a certain extent, there is also counter arguments that a property regime would actually enhance respect over living human beings and the dead. For instance, it would promotes better record - keeping and best practice since res earchers will be under a duty to exercise good control over donated body parts in accordance with the law and the conditions from the providers, and dismay such as preserved human bodies being negligently dumped to landfill will be greatly reduced. 97 Prohi bition over sale of body organs and in vitro embryos can still be achieved via legislation while enjoying the associated protection available from the property regime. 98 3.2 Economic analysis Effect on medical research and treatment It is postulated that granting people‟s rights to capital and income might be a disincentive to altruistic donation of body tissue . 99 Sale of body tissues would then increase the costs of medical researches which are considered detrimental to the society at large. The authors would consider this as a myth by considering the analogy of voluntary social service (e.g. cleaning the beaches) versus paid service (i.e. paid cleaning workers). Based on conventional wisdom, one would expect that the net economic effect of providing mon etary reward to people‟s service (cleaning) actually increase the total supply of cleaning workforce. By the same token ofargument, rewarding the providers of human tissues would in theory increase the supply of the much needed organs and tissues, as evid enced from the existence of the black - market for such things. 100 Floodgate Effect Floodgate effect is a common policy reason adopted by a court to deny a person‟s claim despite sound justifications. Allowing the recognition of property over one‟s tissue samples may, theoretically, create a floodgate of possible litigations since there are numerous scenarios where one person may interfere with another person‟s right to possess his/her tissue samples, irrespective of any meaningful use, e.g. hair removed in a saloon. I would regard such concern as overly pessimistic, as the law has already been prepared to deal with such challenge such as by treating the owner as abandoning his/her property right over the removed hair. 101 Enhance Legal Certainty Adopting a property regime will clarify the legal relationship between a provider and recipient researcher (donee) by defining what rights and the term and conditions have been transferred. Any violation of suc h rights or conditions will entitle the sufferer to bring a legal action for the necessary remedy. This will promote and regulate the transferability of tissues samples, in a market - like setting, and will arguably enhance the supply of human tissues inclu ding organs for medical treatment and research purposes	10,142	<h4><strong>Their 1AC evidence is all about tissues:</h4><p>WAGNER 2014 </p><p></strong>“Jennifer K. Wagner, J.D., Ph.D., is a solo-practicing attorney in State College, PA and a research associate at the University of Pennsylvania’s Center for the Integration of Genetic Healthcare Technologies.” http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2014/06/11/property-rights-and-the-human-body/</p><p>Recognition of personal property rights in human bodies (in whole or in part) makes many legal <strong>scholars</strong>, bioethicists, and biotech industry people (among others) uncomfortable. But should that necessarily be the case? There are many aspects of property law principles that are intriguing when considered in the context of biomedical research. Would recognition of personal property rights in one’s own biospecimens make it conceptually less challenging for an individual to make contributions to research or medicine – either by donating, selling, or even licensing materials to researchers? Would it help researchers better manage risks by allowing them to set liquidated damages or pay premiums for permission to use biospecimens for particular purposes? Other principles might be less desirable. For example, if property interests were recognized in tissues, could tissues be taken by government agencies (e.g. the NIH or NSF) as government condemnation through powers of eminent domain? How would public and private necessities apply to biospecimens, potentially enabling emergency or limited uses of the property without the owner’s prior consent? Would recognition of property rights allow us to apply concepts of concurrent ownership (e.g., joint owners) or future interests to genetic information in certain contexts? (e.g., having joint EMRs that allow BRCA1/2 risk information to be visible across records for sisters or records of mothers and daughters)? Would the promotion of such transfers through recognition of novel or existing property principles serve as an equalizer and mediate the harms of body part and human trafficking for medical and research purposes or, conversely, would it further disenfranchise, marginalize, and exploit those same populations whose members suffered (and continue to suffer) from slavery and the treatment of human beings as chattel<u><mark>? A recognition that human tissues are “personal property” is entirely separate from the question of who owns the property</u></mark>. Facts similar to those in the Canadian case involving the Estate of Ms. Piljak may very well lead U.S. courts to reach similar conclusions and continue to follow Moore precedent. It may cause us to revisit fundamental questions in biomedical research settings (e.g., what is medical waste and what are the meaningful differences between an informed consent document and a contract). Yet this acknowledgement as a preliminary matter that the biospecimens are personal property does provide us flexibility to move forward and focus on important questions regarding the corresponding rights and obligations that that classification entails (e.g., possession, title, and ability to transfer) and discuss pressing policy issues (such as whether limitations should be imposed as act, actor, subject, or purpose constraints). I welcome a renewed property discussion in the area of biomedical research. A property designation on biospecimens need not imply that donors have legal interests that survive the completed transfer of biospecimens and entitle them to claim a share in IP-based profits down the road. Moreover, a bill of sale to transfer rights in specific biospecimens would be refreshingly clear and final (and of interest to only a subset of the human population willing to take the risks associated with such a transaction) and could be permitted without undermining human research participant protections. It is vital, however, that in addressing whether and how we might apply property principles to biospecimens, we stay committed to human rights and, accordingly, remain focused on ensuring the equality and dignity of all human beings.</p><p><strong>Gitter 4</strong> – Donna M. Assistant Professor of Legal and Ethical Studies, Fordham University Schools of Business; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., Cornell University.</p><p>[“Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human Research Participants' Property Rights in Their Biological Material,” Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 61 \| Issue 1 Article 5, 1/1<u>]cc</p><p></u>A <u>property rights</u>/liability model promises to <u>stimulate biomedical research in many ways</u>. First, the <u>promise of compensation encourages research participation by individuals who might otherwise decline to behave altruistically while others profit, and, what is more, who face the inconvenience, medical risks, loss of privacy, and possibility of genetic discrimination inherent in such participation</u>.377 Second, the <u><mark>promise of profits also fosters self-checking by individuals who will initiate significant research by informing biomedical researchers of the value and uniqueness of their tissue</mark>.</u>3 7 ' Third<u>, the possibility of a liability action creates even greater incentive for researchers to provide informed consent</u>, 79 especially because the monetary damages will prove great enough to serve a deterrent effect.3a 0 Fourth, <u>this model's recognition of research participants' right to bargain with researchers will help to ensure that the tissue ends up in the hands of the highest bidder, who, it is hoped, will put the tissue to its most valuable use</u>.3 "' Fifth, and just as important, notions of equity militate that research participants, who supply useful scientific raw materials, 382 and encounter risks through their participation,8 3 are entitled to compensation, in light of researchers' own pecuniary gain. <u>Any other approach threatens to lead to a decrease in public support of such research,</u>38 4 <strong>lest the public perceive that researchers obtain scientific inputs from them for free and then charge them for the commercial outputs.</p><p>Rodger 12</p><p></strong>http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_2_No_12_Special_Issue_June_2012/11.pdf</p><p>SO, Tsz Ngai Roger DBA, Juris Doctor City University of Hong Kon g School of Law T at Chee Ave. Kowloon Tong Hong Kong TSUI, Fung Ling Sara Solicitor of t he High Court of Hong Kong SAR Teaching Fellow C ity University of Hong Kong School of Law Tat Chee Ave. Kowloon Tong Hong Kong “Property Rights in Human Tissue – A Review of t he Current Status of Hong Kong Law in Relation t o Human Body Parts”pg. 80</p><p>In doing so it will often take into consideration principles of morality, economic consideration, justice, and floodgate effect, etc. and frame its decisions under the label of policy considera tion. 95 In this part the authors will critique the prevalent policy considerations on the issue whether there should be general property in human body parts. Particular <u><strong><mark>emphasis will focus on whether a person should be entitled to own tissues removed from h is/her own body</u></strong></mark>. 3.1 Morality Human dignity It has been asserted that permitting people to enjoy right to income and right to capital over their severed body tissues might be viewed as permission to commoditisation of human body. This may challenge traditi onal social values on human bodies and denigrate dignity upon life persons and dead bodies. 96 Also, this also triggers resentment linking to metaphor of the human slavery in the early, uncivilised history of mankind. While this concern is legitimate to a certain extent, there is also counter arguments that a property regime would actually enhance respect over living human beings and the dead. For instance, it would promotes better record - keeping and best practice since res earchers will be under a duty to exercise good control over donated body parts in accordance with the law and the conditions from the providers, and dismay such as preserved human bodies being negligently dumped to landfill will be greatly reduced. 97 Prohi bition over sale of body organs and in vitro embryos can still be achieved via legislation while enjoying the associated protection available from the property regime. 98 3.2 Economic analysis Effect on medical research and treatment It is postulated that granting people‟s rights to capital and income might be a disincentive to altruistic donation of body tissue . 99 Sale of body tissues would then increase the costs of medical researches which are considered detrimental to the society at large. The authors would consider this as a myth by considering the analogy of voluntary social service (e.g. cleaning the beaches) versus paid service (i.e. paid cleaning workers). Based on conventional wisdom, one would expect that the net economic effect of providing mon etary reward to people‟s service (cleaning) actually increase the total supply of cleaning workforce. By the same token ofargument, rewarding the providers of human tissues would in theory increase the supply of the much needed organs and tissues, as evid enced from the existence of the black - market for such things. 100 Floodgate Effect Floodgate effect is a common policy reason adopted by a court to deny a person‟s claim despite sound justifications. Allowing the recognition of property over one‟s tissue samples may, theoretically, create a floodgate of possible litigations since there are numerous scenarios where one person may interfere with another person‟s right to possess his/her tissue samples, irrespective of any meaningful use, e.g. hair removed in a saloon. I would regard such concern as overly pessimistic, as the law has already been prepared to deal with such challenge such as by treating the owner as abandoning his/her property right over the removed hair. 101 Enhance Legal Certainty Adopting a property regime will clarify the legal relationship between a provider and recipient researcher (donee) by defining what rights and the term and conditions have been transferred. Any violation of suc h rights or conditions will entitle the sufferer to bring a legal action for the necessary remedy. This will promote and regulate the transferability of tissues samples, in a market - like setting, and will arguably enhance the supply of human tissues inclu<u> ding organs for medical treatment and research purposes</p></u>	2NC	CP – distinguish	A2 organs key	431,209	3	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,869	Link magnifier- Now is a key time for the global treaty- the US approach will determine whether the system falls apart (in non-CP 1NC)	Bewley-Taylor et al 2014	Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf) Decades of doubts, soft defections, legal hypocrisy and policy experimentation have now reached the point where de jure legal regulation of the whole cannabis market is gaining political acceptability, even if it violates certain outdated elements of the UN conventions. Tensions between countries seeking more flexibility and the UN drug control system and its specialized agencies, as well as with countries strongly in favour of defending the status quo, are likely to further increase. This seems inevitable because the trend towards cannabis regulation appears irreversible and is rapidly gaining more support across the Americas, as well as among many local authorities in Europe that have to face the difficulties and consequences of implementing current control mechanisms. In the untidy conflict of procedural and political constraints on treaty reforms versus the movement towards a modernized more flexible global drug control regime, the system will likely go through a period of legally dubious interpretations and questionable if not at times hypocritical justifications for national reforms. And the situation is unlikely to change until a tipping point is reached and a group of like-minded countries is ready to engage in the challenge to reconcile the multiple and increasing legal inconsistencies and disputes. The question appearing on the international policy agenda is now no longer whether or not there is a need to reassess and modernize the UN drug control system, but rather when and how. The question is if a mechanism can be found soon enough to deal with the growing tensions and to transform the current system in an orderly fashion into one more adaptable to local concerns and priorities, and one that is more compatible with basic scientific norms and UN standards of today. If not, a critical mass of dissenters will soon feel forced to opt out of the current system’s strictures, and, using any of the available reservation, modification or denunciation options, use or create a legal mechanism or interpretation to pursue the drug policy reforms they are convinced will most protect the health and safety of their people.	federal withdrawal Sometimes the U S has sought to make significant adjustments to multilateral frameworks or even quit them other times, the U S has pressed on within the treaty despite consequential breaches But in those instances the U S s’ compliance failures have come despite some hard striving by the federal government The State Department tries mightily to make state law enforcement officers aware of obligations under the Vienna Convention In this case, though, no external factors federalism or a contrary ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court have frustrated a strong push by the executive branch to vindicate the drug treaties The Cole Memo nevertheless establishes at least some friction with a treaty obligation, this strategy is without precedent in U.S. treaty practice The U S should approach it carefully and deliberatively, given the country’s outsized interest in reciprocal performance of treaty obligations That depends on being able to credibly call out other nations for treaty failings something which depends on strictly performing our own obligations, or at least making a good show of trying hard to do so before coming up short the U S can sustain the status quo in the short term But today’s model likely won’t hold up year in and year out	Sometimes the U S has sought adjustments to multilateral frameworks or even quit them compliance failures have come despite hard striving by the federal government State tries mightily to make law enforcement aware of Vienna In this case no external factors have frustrated a strong push by the executive to vindicate the drug treaties this strategy is without precedent in U.S. treaty practice. The U S should approach it carefully given the outsized interest in reciprocal performance of treaty obligations. That depends on being able to credibly call out other nations for treaty failings which depends on strictly performing our own obligations the U S can sustain the status quo in the short term	Disticntion is federal withdrawal that’s key—star this card Wells C. Bennett 10-15, Fellow in National Security Law at the Brookings Institution; and John Walsh, Senior Associate at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), focused on drug policy reforms that protect human rights, public health and public safety, 10/15/14, “Marijuana Legalization is an Opportunity to Modernize International Drug Treaties,” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/10/15%20marijuana%20legalization%20modernize%20drug%20treaties%20bennett%20walsh/cepmmjlegalizationv4.pdf This is not to suggest that compliance challenges or complexity should always trigger a call to reshape the United States’ treaty commitments. Practice and prudence both support a more nuanced, case-specific approach than that. Sometimes the United States has sought to make significant adjustments to multilateral frameworks or even quit them; other times, the United States has weighed costs and benefits, and pressed on within the treaty despite consequential breaches—in situations much more obvious (and less open to reasonable contention) than that regarding marijuana. But in those instances, the United States’ compliance failures often have come despite some hard striving by the federal government. The State Department, to name one well known example, tries mightily to make state law enforcement officers aware of the United States’ obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations—notwithstanding some repeated and well-known violations of that treaty by the likes of Texas, Virginia, and Arizona.42 In this case, though, no external factors—federalism, say, or a contrary ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court—have frustrated a strong push by the executive branch to vindicate the drug treaties; the decision not to assert federal supremacy was in fact taken unilaterally by the Obama administration. Given the circumstances, we believe it was the correct decision. The Cole Memo nevertheless establishes at least some friction with a treaty obligation, by holding back on CSA enforcement, so as to accommodate state-level regulation of marijuana. Again, the reasons why are entirely understandable: given the incipient nature of the changes to which the Cole Memo was reacting, the United States essentially opted to take a wait-and-see approach as to how problematic the treaty questions might become. So far as we are aware, this strategy is without precedent in U.S. treaty practice. The United States should approach it carefully and deliberatively, given the country’s outsized interest in reciprocal performance of treaty obligations. That depends in part on being able to credibly call out other nations for treaty failings—something which in turn depends on strictly performing our own obligations, or at least making a good show of trying hard to do so before coming up short. Again, we think the United States can sustain the status quo in the short term. But today’s model likely won’t hold up year in and year out, for the reasons we describe above. The government therefore ought to start thinking about some of the fundamental treaty reforms that its public statements seemingly have downplayed. Better to have weighed such options early on, should existing policy’s downsides start to overtake its upsides—as we predict they could.	3,353	<h4><strong>Link magnifier- Now is a key time for the global treaty- the US approach will determine whether the system falls apart </strong>(in non-CP 1NC)</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)</p><p>Decades of <u><mark>doubt</mark>s</u>, soft <u><mark>defections</u></mark>, legal hypocrisy <u><mark>and</u> p</mark>olicy <u><mark>experimentation</u> <u>have</u></mark> now <u><mark>reached</u> <u>the point where</mark> de jure legal regulation <mark>of the whole cannabis market is gaining political acceptability, even if it violates</u></mark> certain outdated elements of <u><mark>the</u> </mark>UN <u>c<mark>onventions</u></mark>. <u><mark>Tensions</u> <u>between countries seeking more flexibility and the UN drug control system</u></mark> and its specialized agencies, as well as with countries strongly in favour of defending the status quo, <u>are likely to further increase.</u> This seems inevitable because <u><mark>the trend towards cannabis regulation</mark> appears irreversible and <mark>is rapidly gaining</u></mark> more <u>support</u> across the Americas, as well as among many local authorities in Europe that have to face the difficulties and consequences of implementing current control mechanisms. <u>In the untidy conflict of procedural and political constraints on treaty reforms versus the movement towards a modernized more flexible global drug control regime, <mark>the system will likely go through a period of legally dubious interpretations</u></mark> and questionable if not at times hypocritical justifications for national reforms. And <u><mark>the situation is unlikely to change until a tipping point is reached and a group of like-minded countries is ready to engage</mark> in the challenge to reconcile the multiple and increasing legal inconsistencies and disputes</u>. The question appearing on the international policy agenda is now no longer whether or not there is a need to reassess and modernize the UN drug control system, but rather when and how. <u><mark>The question is if a mechanism can be found soon enough to deal with the growing tensions and to transform the current system in an orderly fashion into one more adaptable to <strong>local concerns and priorities</u></strong></mark>, and one that is more compatible with basic scientific norms and UN standards of today. <u><strong><mark>If not, a critical mass of dissenters will soon feel forced to opt out of the current system’s strictures</u></mark>, and, using any of the available reservation, modification or denunciation options, use or create a legal mechanism or interpretation to pursue the drug policy reforms they are convinced will most protect the health and safety of their people.</p><p>Disticntion is <u>federal withdrawal</u> that’s key—star this card </p><p></strong>Wells C. <strong>Bennett 10-15</strong>, Fellow in National Security Law at the Brookings Institution; and John Walsh, Senior Associate at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), focused on drug policy reforms that protect human rights, public health and public safety, 10/15/14, “Marijuana Legalization is an Opportunity to Modernize International Drug Treaties,” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/10/15%20marijuana%20legalization%20modernize%20drug%20treaties%20bennett%20walsh/cepmmjlegalizationv4.pdf</p><p>This is not to suggest that compliance challenges or complexity should always trigger a call to reshape the United States’ treaty commitments. Practice and prudence both support a more nuanced, case-specific approach than that. <u><mark>Sometimes the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>has sought</mark> to make significant <mark>adjustments to multilateral frameworks or</u> <u>even quit them</u></mark>; <u>other times, the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>has</u> weighed costs and benefits, and <u>pressed on within the treaty despite consequential breaches</u>—in situations much more obvious (and less open to reasonable contention) than that regarding marijuana.</p><p><u>But in those instances</u>, <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tate<u>s’ <mark>compliance failures</u></mark> often <u><mark>have come despite</mark> some <mark>hard striving by <strong>the federal government</u></strong></mark>. <u>The <mark>State</mark> Department</u>, to name one well known example, <u><mark>tries mightily to make</mark> state <mark>law enforcement</mark> officers <mark>aware of</u></mark> the United States’ <u>obligations under the <mark>Vienna</mark> Convention</u> on Consular Relations—notwithstanding some repeated and well-known violations of that treaty by the likes of Texas, Virginia, and Arizona.42</p><p><u><mark>In this case</mark>, though, <mark>no external factors</u></mark>—<u>federalism</u>, say, <u>or a contrary ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court</u>—<u><mark>have frustrated a strong push by the executive</mark> branch <mark>to vindicate the drug treaties</u></mark>; the decision not to assert federal supremacy was in fact taken unilaterally by the Obama administration. Given the circumstances, we believe it was the correct decision. <u>The Cole Memo nevertheless establishes at least some friction with a treaty obligation,</u> by holding back on CSA enforcement, so as to accommodate state-level regulation of marijuana. Again, the reasons why are entirely understandable: given the incipient nature of the changes to which the Cole Memo was reacting, the United States essentially opted to take a wait-and-see approach as to how problematic the treaty questions might become.</p><p>So far as we are aware, <u><strong><mark>this strategy is without precedent in U.S. treaty practice</u></strong>. <u>The U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>should approach it carefully</mark> and deliberatively,</u> <u><mark>given the</mark> country’s <mark>outsized interest in reciprocal performance of treaty obligations</u>. <u>That depends</u></mark> in part <u><mark>on being able to</u> <u>credibly call out other nations for treaty failings</u></mark>—<u>something <mark>which</u></mark> in turn <u><mark>depends on strictly performing our own obligations</mark>, or</u> <u>at least making a good show of trying hard to do so before coming up short</u>.</p><p>Again, we think <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>can sustain the status quo in the short term</u></mark>. <u>But today’s model likely won’t hold up year in and year out</u><strong>, for the reasons we describe above. The government therefore ought to start thinking about some of the fundamental treaty reforms that its public statements seemingly have downplayed. Better to have weighed such options early on, should existing policy’s downsides start to overtake its upsides—as we predict they could.</p></strong>	null	1nr	2NC Local DA	432,971	78	17,115	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	565,263	N	Wake	8	Georgia Boyce-Feinberg	Markoff	AG politics fed cp (2nr) treaties da (2nr) ban marihuana cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,870	This Occidentalist view turns the case – flips the power binary and allows the destruction of humanity	Buruma and Margalit 04	Buruma and Margalit 04 Ian Buruma is a Dutch writer and academic. Much of his work focuses on the culture of Asia, particularly that of China and 20th-century Japan and Avishai Margalit, is an Israeli George F. Kennan Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, and Professor Emeritus in Philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem “Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies” P. 10-11	The view of the West in Occidentalism is like the worst aspects of its counterpart, Orientalism, which strips its human targets of their humanity Orientalist prejudices made non-Western people seem less than fully adult human beings; they had the minds of children, and could thus be treated as lesser breads. Occidentalism is at least as reductive; its bigotry simply turns the Orientalist view upside down. To diminish an entire society or a civilization to a mass of soulless, decadent, money-grubbing, rootless, faithless, unfeeling parasites is a form of intellectual destruction when the idea of others as less than human gathers revolutionary force, it leads to the destruction of human beings.	The view of the West in Occidentalism strips human targets of their humanity Orientalist prejudices made non-Western people seem less than fully adult human beings; they could thus be treated as lesser breads. Occidentalism is as reductive; its bigotry turns the Orientalist view upside down. To diminish an entire civilization to soulless parasites is a form of intellectual destruction when the idea of others as less than human gathers force, it leads to the destruction of human beings	There are, of course, perfectly valid reasons to be critical of many elements that go into the venomous brew we call Occidentalism. Not all the critiques of the Enlightenment lead to intolerance or dangerous irrationalism. The belief in universal progress, driven by business and industry, is certainly open to criticism. Blind faith in the market is a self-serving and often damaging dogma. American society us far from ideal, and U.S. policies are often disastrous. Western colonialism has much to answer for. And the revolt of the logical against claims of the global can be legitimate, even necessary. But criticism of the West, harsh as it may be, is not the issue here. The view of the West in Occidentalism is like the worst aspects of its counterpart, Orientalism, which strips its human targets of their humanity. Some Orientalist prejudices made non-Western people seem less than fully adult human beings; they had the minds of children, and could thus be treated as lesser breads. Occidentalism is at least as reductive; its bigotry simply turns the Orientalist view upside down. To diminish an entire society or a civilization to a mass of soulless, decadent, money-grubbing, rootless, faithless, unfeeling parasites is a form of intellectual destruction. Once again, if this were merely a matter of distaste or prejudice, it would not be of great interest. Prejudices are part of the human condition. But when the idea of others as less than human gathers revolutionary force, it leads to the destruction of human beings.	1,534	<h4>This Occidentalist view turns the case – flips the power binary and allows the destruction of humanity </h4><p><strong>Buruma and Margalit 04 </strong>Ian Buruma is a Dutch writer and academic. Much of his work focuses on the culture of Asia, particularly that of China and 20th-century Japan and Avishai Margalit, is an Israeli George F. Kennan Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, and Professor Emeritus in Philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem “Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies” P. 10-11</p><p>There are, of course, perfectly valid reasons to be critical of many elements that go into the venomous brew we call Occidentalism. Not all the critiques of the Enlightenment lead to intolerance or dangerous irrationalism. The belief in universal progress, driven by business and industry, is certainly open to criticism. Blind faith in the market is a self-serving and often damaging dogma. American society us far from ideal, and U.S. policies are often disastrous. Western colonialism has much to answer for. And the revolt of the logical against claims of the global can be legitimate, even necessary. But criticism of the West, harsh as it may be, is not the issue here. <u><mark>The view of the West in Occidentalism </mark>is like the worst aspects of its counterpart, Orientalism, <strong>which <mark>strips </mark>its <mark>human targets of their humanity</u></strong></mark>. Some <u><mark>Orientalist prejudices made non-Western people seem less than fully adult human beings; they </mark>had the minds of children, and <mark>could thus be treated as lesser breads. Occidentalism is<strong> </strong></mark>at least <mark>as reductive; its bigotry</mark> simply <mark>turns the Orientalist view upside down. To diminish an entire</mark> society or a <mark>civilization to </mark>a mass of <mark>soulless</mark>, decadent, money-grubbing, rootless, faithless, unfeeling <mark>parasites is a form of intellectual destruction</u></mark>. Once again, if this were merely a matter of distaste or prejudice, it would not be of great interest. Prejudices are part of the human condition. But <u><mark>when the idea of others as less than human gathers </mark>revolutionary <mark>force, <strong>it leads to the destruction of human beings</strong></mark>.</u> </p>	1nc vs WGA	null	1nc – Native K	431,210	3	17,118	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	565,420	N	Gsu	1	West Georgia Muhammad-Gaius	Deming	1NC T occidentalism K law good K impact turns 2NC Space colonization impact turn 1NR T 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,871	Competitiveness key to heg and preventing great power war---also turns trade	Colby 14	Elbridge Colby 14, the Robert M. Gates fellow at the Center for a New American Security; and Paul Lettow, was senior director for strategic planning on the U.S. National Security Council staff from 2007 to 2009, 7/3/14, “Have We Hit Peak America?,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/03/have_we_hit_peak_america	foreign-policy experts believe retaining American primacy is a matter of will -- of how America chooses to exert its power But will is unavailing without strength. If the U S wants the international system to continue to reflect its interests and values a system in which the global commons are protected, trade is broad-based and extensive, and armed conflicts among great nations are curtailed it needs to sustain not just resolve, but relative power. That will require acknowledging that global power and wealth are shifting at an unprecedented pace Preserving America's international position will require it to restore its economic vitality the U S still enjoys greater freedom to determine its future than any other major power because many of its problems are within its ability to address. But renewal must begin with analyzing America's competitive position and understanding the gravity of the situation Americans face.	will is unavailing without strength. If the U S wants the system to reflect its interests in which trade is broad-based armed conflicts among great nations are curtailed it needs to sustain relative power global power and wealth are shifting Preserving America's position will require economic vitality its problems are within its ability to address renewal must begin with America's competitive position	Many foreign-policy experts seem to believe that retaining American primacy is largely a matter of will -- of how America chooses to exert its power abroad. Even President Obama, more often accused of being a prophet of decline than a booster of America's future, recently asserted that the United States "has rarely been stronger relative to the rest of the world." The question, he continued, is "not whether America will lead, but how we will lead." But will is unavailing without strength. If the United States wants the international system to continue to reflect its interests and values -- a system, for example, in which the global commons are protected, trade is broad-based and extensive, and armed conflicts among great nations are curtailed -- it needs to sustain not just resolve, but relative power. That, in turn, will require acknowledging the uncomfortable truth that global power and wealth are shifting at an unprecedented pace, with profound implications. Moreover, many of the challenges America faces are exacerbated by vulnerabilities that are largely self-created, chief among them fiscal policy. Much more quickly and comprehensively than is understood, those vulnerabilities are reducing America's freedom of action and its ability to influence others. Preserving America's international position will require it to restore its economic vitality and make policy choices now that pay dividends for decades to come. America has to prioritize and to act. Fortunately, the United States still enjoys greater freedom to determine its future than any other major power, in part because many of its problems are within its ability to address. But this process of renewal must begin with analyzing America's competitive position and understanding the gravity of the situation Americans face.	1,809	<h4><strong>Competitiveness key to heg and preventing great power war---also turns trade </h4><p></strong>Elbridge <strong>Colby 14</strong>, the Robert M. Gates fellow at the Center for a New American Security; and Paul Lettow, was senior director for strategic planning on the U.S. National Security Council staff from 2007 to 2009, 7/3/14, “Have We Hit Peak America?,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/03/have_we_hit_peak_america</p><p>Many <u><strong>foreign-policy experts</u></strong> seem to <u><strong>believe</u></strong> that <u><strong>retaining American primacy is</u></strong> largely <u><strong>a matter of will -- of how America chooses to exert its power</u></strong> abroad. Even President Obama, more often accused of being a prophet of decline than a booster of America's future, recently asserted that the United States "has rarely been stronger relative to the rest of the world." The question, he continued, is "not whether America will lead, but how we will lead."</p><p><u><strong>But <mark>will is unavailing without strength. If the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>wants the</mark> international <mark>system to</mark> continue to <mark>reflect its interests</mark> and values</u></strong> -- <u><strong>a system</u></strong>, for example, <u><strong><mark>in which</mark> the global commons are protected, <mark>trade is broad-based</mark> and extensive, and</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>armed conflicts among great nations are curtailed</u></strong></mark> -- <u><strong><mark>it needs to sustain</mark> not just resolve, but <mark>relative power</mark>. That</u></strong>, in turn, <u><strong>will require acknowledging</u></strong> the uncomfortable truth <u><strong>that</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>global power and wealth are shifting</mark> at an unprecedented pace</u></strong>, with profound implications. Moreover, many of the challenges America faces are exacerbated by vulnerabilities that are largely self-created, chief among them fiscal policy. Much more quickly and comprehensively than is understood, those vulnerabilities are reducing America's freedom of action and its ability to influence others.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Preserving America's</mark> international <mark>position will</u></strong> <u><strong>require</mark> it to restore its <mark>economic vitality</u></strong></mark> and make policy choices now that pay dividends for decades to come. America has to prioritize and to act. Fortunately, <u><strong>the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>still enjoys greater freedom to determine its future than any other major power</u></strong>, in part <u><strong>because many of <mark>its problems are within its ability to address</mark>. But</u></strong> this process of <u><strong><mark>renewal must begin with</mark> analyzing</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>America's competitive position</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and understanding the gravity of the situation Americans face.</p></u></strong>	null	null	1	32,227	195	17,113	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	565,270	N	Texas	4	Georgetown Erpenbach-Krishnan	Arnett	DHS politics (2NR) cross retal cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,872	-- Food wars are a myth – there’s zero empirical evidence	Salehyan 7	Salehyan 7 (Idean, Professor of Political Science – University of North Texas, “The New Myth About Climate Change”, Foreign Policy, Summer, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3922)	aside from anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity lead to conflict several studies have shown an abundance of resources is more likely to contribute to conflict 5 million in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for years. But Malawi has yet to experience war Similarly, the tsunami in 2004 ed to severe shortages of food Yet the tsunami did not lead to resource wars Clearly there is much more to conflict than resource scarcity	there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity lead to conflict studies show an abundance of resources is more likely to contribute to conflict 5 million in Malawi have food shortages But has yet to experience war there is much more to conflict than resource scarcity	First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters.	1,555	<h4>-- Food wars are a myth – there’s zero empirical evidence</h4><p><strong>Salehyan 7</strong> (Idean, Professor of Political Science – University of North Texas, “The New Myth About Climate Change”, Foreign Policy, Summer, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3922)</p><p>First, <u>aside from</u> a few <u>anecdotes, <mark>there is</u> <u><strong>little systematic empirical evidence</u></strong> <u>that resource scarcity</u> </mark>and changing environmental conditions <u><mark>lead to conflict</u></mark>. In fact, <u>several <mark>studies</mark> have <mark>show</mark>n</u> that <u><mark>an abundance of</u> </mark>natural <u><mark>resources is more likely to contribute to conflict</u></mark>. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. </p><p>Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that <u><mark>5 million</u> </mark>people <u><mark>in</mark> <mark>Malawi have</mark> been experiencing</u> <u>chronic <mark>food shortages </mark>for</u> several <u>years. <mark>But</u></mark> famine-wracked <u>Malawi <mark>has yet to experience</u></mark> a major civil <u><mark>war</u></mark>. <u>Similarly, the</u> Asian <u>tsunami in 2004</u> killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and l<u>ed to severe shortages of</u> shelter, <u>food</u>, clean water, and electricity. <u>Yet the tsunami</u>, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, <u>did not lead to</u> an outbreak of <u>resource wars</u>. <u>Clearly</u> then, <u><mark>there is much more to</u> </mark>armed <u><mark>conflict than resource scarcity</u> </mark>and natural disasters. </p>	null	null	1nc – Biotech	813,803	226	17,120	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	565,421	N	Gsu	3	Wake Forest Clifford-Villa	Watson	vs Stem cells aff 1NC T "nearly all" midterms DA visas CP heg bad case 2NC heg bad case 1NR case T 2NR heg bad case	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round3.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,873	International pressure solves now – that’s key	Capron 14	Capron 14 - University Professor and Scott H. Bice Chair in Healthcare Law, Policy, and Ethics, University of Southern California (Alexander, “SIX DECADES OF ORGAN DONATION AND THE CHALLENGES THAT SHIFTING THE UNITED STATES TO A MARKET SYSTEM WOULD CREATE AROUND THE WORLD” LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:25)	Recent Changes in Response to Global Norms governments must adopt and enforce bans on organ purchases and transplant tourism gains have been achieved proponents of organ-trade prohibitions have successfully used global standards in their transformative efforts. This is illustrated by the experiences of Pakistan Prominent transplant surgeons among the DICG leadership came to Pakistan to convince government officials that organ sales were a matter of international concern Esrat concludes, “For government officials, the desire to conform to widely held international norms and redeem the national reputation served as a motivation for action.” When the law was contested in a federal court the existence of the international standards weighed heavily enough that the court rejected the challenge When programs continued to carry out commercial transplants colleagues reported these violations to the authorities and prosecutions were brought against the surgeons and hospitals The current situation in the Philippines resembles that in Pakistan international pressure on the government intensified a ministerial directive barred foreign recipients from getting kidneys from Filipino living donors the Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking followed the international trend and used the organ trafficking provisions of the Philippines’ Anti-Human Trafficking Law as the basis for supplemental regulations outlawing all organ purchases Colombia is indicative of the progress across Latin America The Document of Aguascalientes has provided legal and ethical as well as technical guidance for countries across that region as they have created or strengthened their own systems for organ donation, allocation, and transplantation that aim to meet the transplant needs of the domestic population and achieve “self-sufficiency” impressive examples are in the Middle East. Israel’s enactment in 2008 of legislation halting insurance coverage for commercial transplants that violate local laws ended its reliance on Turkey, South Africa, China, and the Philippines, among other countries Arab countries have taken steps to treat patients at home rather than sending them abroad	governments must enforce bans on organ purchases gains have been achieved proponents of organ-trade prohibitions have successfully used global standards in their efforts. This is illustrated by Pakistan the DICG came to Pakistan to convince government officials that organ sales were a matter of international concern For government officials, the desire to conform to widely held international norms and redeem the national reputation served as a motivation for action When the law was contested in a federal court the existence of the international standards weighed heavily enough that the court rejected the challenge colleagues reported violations and prosecutions were brought The Philippines resembles Pakistan international pressure intensified the Philippines’ outlawing organ purchases Colombia is indicative of the progress across Latin America The Document of Aguascalientes has provided legal and technical guidance for countries across that region impressive examples are in the Middle East. Israel’s ended its reliance on other countries Arab countries have taken steps to treat patients at home rather than sending them abroad	C. Recent National Changes in Response to Global Normsx Bringing about thoroughgoing changes in transplant practices requires more than academic and professional sanctions; governments must also adopt and enforce bans on organ purchases and transplant tourism. The latter has proven particularly difficult, not the least because of the built-in opposition of the people who have profited from catering to transplant tourists. Accordingly, the hard-won gains in this regard that have been achieved in the past five years are all the more remarkable. Some local proponents of organ-trade prohibitions have successfully used global standards in their transformative efforts. This is illustrated by the experiences of Pakistan where the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Ordinance was adopted by presidential decree in 2007 before becoming a parliamentary act in 2010.55 Before the ordinance, an estimated 1500 patients from other countries—principally in the Middle East—as well as about 500 wealthy Pakistanis received vended kidneys each year, mainly in private hospitals and clinics in Lahore and other Punjab cities.56 The efforts to bring that practice to an end were lead by the professionals associated with the Sindh Institute of Urology and Transplantation (SIUT), a medical center in Karachi that provides donation-driven kidney dialysis and transplantation to all patients without charge. SIUT supplied the “moral entrepreneurs: groups and individuals in civil society who are committed to the elimination of trade they consider harmful and repugnant,”57 who mobilized public opposition to commercial organ donation. They urged the government to adopt the new law. Descriptions written by SIUT physicians of the socioeconomic realities of the organ trade58 and of the resulting hazards to both donors and recipients59 led to critical reporting of the practice in newspapers and on television.60 The media coverage took specific aim at the role of the government, whose failed poverty-alleviation programs left individuals no choice but to sell their kidneys, and whose failure to enact a transplant law and later to enforce it allowed the organ trade to thrive. It was also noted that reports of Pakistan’s “flourishing kidney market” had appeared in the international press, tarnishing the country’s reputation.61 The owners of the private hospitals who profited greatly from transplant commercialism and who had strong connections to high-level officials mounted fierce opposition to the transplant bill and sought to water down its prohibitions on unrelated living donation.62 On the other side, SIUT’s founder and director, Professor Adib Rizvi, used his strong connections with international medical groups, particularly his membership in the DICG, to counteract these powerful opponents.63 Prominent transplant surgeons among the DICG leadership came to Pakistan to convince government officials that organ sales were a matter of international concern and needed to be curbed to rehabilitate the reputation of Pakistani physicians.64 As Professor Asif Esrat concludes, “For government officials, the desire to conform to widely held international norms and redeem the national reputation served as a motivation for action.”65 When the law was contested in a federal Shariat court as an interference with the Islamic duty to save life, the existence of the international standards, as embodied in the WHO Guiding Principles (which Pakistan had joined in endorsing at the World Health Assembly), weighed heavily enough that the court rejected the challenge.66 When several transplant programs continued to carry out commercial transplants, including on patients from abroad, Dr. Rizvi and his colleagues reported these violations to the authorities and prosecutions were brought against the surgeons and hospitals that had attempted to profit by breaking the law.67 The current situation in the Philippines resembles that in Pakistan in some ways but differs in significant respects. The country has been a well-known locale for organ purchases for the past several decades; indeed, it was one of the first places where the anthropologists of Organs Watch, an independent research and medical-human-rights project at the University of California, Berkeley, began their examination of the “new body trade” in which “the circulation of kidneys follows established routes of capital from South to North, from East to West, from poorer to more affluent bodies, from black and brown bodies to white ones, and from female to male or from poor, low status men to more affluent men.”68 Although Internet sites have made the Philippines another important locus for the global organ trade, the initial pattern of using vended kidneys there differed from what had occurred in Pakistan because the recipients were mainly wealthy Filipinos, not foreigners. 358 of the 468 kidney transplants recorded in 2003 by the Renal Disease Control Program of the Department of Health in the Philippines involved domestic patients (though the possibility of incomplete reporting by private hospitals cannot be totally discounted).69 It was thus not surprising that elite groups at that time supported a proposal under consideration by the government to institutionalize paid kidney donation as well as to formally accept transplantation for foreign patients.70 As appealing as this idea may have seemed to someone viewing it “from a private hospital room in Quezon City,” it was much less so for human-rights advocates trying to protect potential organ sellers in “a sewage-infested banguay (slum) in Manila.”71 These advocates used the attention that the World Health Organization was bringing to the issue at that time to halt the movement toward legalizing compensation. Over the following five years, international pressure on the government intensified, not only from intergovernmental and medical bodies72 but from the Catholic hierarchy, particularly in light of press coverage about unscrupulous organ brokers trolling in the slums for donors to meet the ever-increasing demand for kidneys coming from Manila’s transplant tourists.73 On April 30, 2008, a ministerial directive barred foreign recipients from getting kidneys from Filipino living donors.74 The next year, the Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking followed the international trend and used the organ trafficking provisions of the Philippines’ Anti-Human Trafficking Law as the basis for supplemental regulations outlawing all organ purchases, as well as other means of trafficking persons for organ removal, including the use of force, fraud, and taking advantage of vulnerability.75 The fragility of these legal changes in the face of the determined opposition is indicated by the next swing of the Filipino organ-policy pendulum. When Benigno Aquino III assumed office as President in June 2010, he nominated as secretary of health Dr. Enrique T. Ona, a transplant surgeon who had previously expressed his opposition to the ban on organ sales.76 The nomination was held up, however, when Ona announced his intention to allow organ donors to be compensated by a $3200 “gratuity package”77 and joined several American regulated-market advocates in sponsoring an international forum on “Incentives for Donation” in Manila that November.78 He was confirmed as health minister, however, after providing assurances that he would not institute financial “gratuities,” but he did sign the proposal for incentives that emerged from the international forum.79 In effect, the pendulum has swung back, as the number of foreign transplant recipients, which had risen to 531 by 2007 before the ban, fell to two by 2011, even as a threefold increase occurred in deceaseddonor transplants for Filipinos.80 Movement in the opposite direction remains possible, however, as organ purchases by wealthy Filipinos have not completely disappeared, with brokers helping potential kidney recipients persuade review committees to allow as “emotionally related” donations what are in fact commercial transactions.81 Another variation on the theme of transplant tourism has taken place in Colombia, which “was a major provider of deceased-donor organs for wealthy foreigners” during the first decade of this century,82 mainly for liver transplantation.83 With strong international and regional backing, local medical leaders succeeded in redirecting organs to recipients from Colombia and neighboring countries. The annual rate of transplantation to foreigners, which stood at 200 in 2005 (16.5% of the national total), was reduced to 10 by 2011 (0.9% of the total, down from 1.45% the prior year).84 The situation in Colombia is indicative of the progress that has been made across Latin America with the adoption by the Ibero-American Council of a set of principles and objectives in a regional parallel to the Declaration of Istanbul, the Document of Aguascalientes, 85 which was encouraged through a strong alliance with the Spanish transplant program. The Document of Aguascalientes has provided legal and ethical as well as technical guidance for countries across that region as they have created or strengthened their own systems for organ donation, allocation, and transplantation that seek the support of the public and medical professionals and that aim to meet the transplant needs of the domestic population and achieve “self-sufficiency” nationally or through regional cooperation.86 Over the past five years, the most impressive examples of countries that have responded to stronger global norms regarding the opposite side of “self-sufficiency”—namely, not sending transplant tourists abroad as the means to meet domestic demand for organs—are in the Middle East. Israel’s enactment in 2008 of legislation halting insurance coverage for commercial transplants that violate local laws ended its reliance on Turkey, South Africa, China, and the Philippines, among other countries, as sites where Israeli patients could go to obtain vended kidneys.87 The law also stimulated the development of a robust system of deceased and living-related donation, which has been widely praised.88 A number of Arab countries have taken steps—thus far less sweeping in scope or impact than the Israeli program but still effective—to treat patients at home rather than sending them abroad. The evolution of policy in Qatar provides a vivid example of the competing forces at work: expediency, selfinterest, generosity, and concern about adhering to international norms. The local provider of transplant services, the Hamad Medical Corporation (HMC), has concluded that it needs to go beyond the existing Qatari program for honoring donors if it is to achieve self-sufficiency in organ transplantation.89 Consequently, the HMC increased outreach within the expatriate community in Qatar (more than 85% of residents) to ensure that they too have access to transplantation services.90 Additionally, the HMC has substantially increased deceased donation by publicizing that “brain death” is acceptable under Islam91 and by having prominent persons, such as members of the royal family, not only recognize the generosity of living donors and the families of deceased donors but also enroll in the organ-donor registry.92	11,257	<h4>International pressure solves now – that’s key </h4><p><strong>Capron 14</strong> - University Professor and Scott H. Bice Chair in Healthcare Law, Policy, and Ethics, University of Southern California (Alexander, “SIX DECADES OF ORGAN DONATION AND THE CHALLENGES THAT SHIFTING THE UNITED STATES TO A MARKET SYSTEM WOULD CREATE AROUND THE WORLD” LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:25)</p><p>C. <u><strong>Recent</u></strong> National <u><strong>Changes in Response to Global Norms</u></strong>x</p><p>Bringing about thoroughgoing changes in transplant practices requires more than academic and professional sanctions; <u><strong><mark>governments must</u></strong> </mark>also <u><strong>adopt and <mark>enforce bans on organ purchases</strong> </mark>and transplant tourism</u>. The latter has proven particularly difficult, not the least because of the built-in opposition of the people who have profited from catering to transplant tourists. Accordingly, the hard-won <u><strong><mark>gains</u></strong> </mark>in this regard that <u><strong><mark>have been achieved</u></strong> </mark>in the past five years are all the more remarkable.</p><p>Some local <u><mark>proponents of organ-trade prohibitions have successfully used global standards in their </mark>transformative <mark>efforts. This is illustrated by </mark>the experiences of <mark>Pakistan</u> </mark>where the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Ordinance was adopted by presidential decree in 2007 before becoming a parliamentary act in 2010.55 Before the ordinance, an estimated 1500 patients from other countries—principally in the Middle East—as well as about 500 wealthy Pakistanis received vended kidneys each year, mainly in private hospitals and clinics in Lahore and other Punjab cities.56 The efforts to bring that practice to an end were lead by the professionals associated with the Sindh Institute of Urology and Transplantation (SIUT), a medical center in Karachi that provides donation-driven kidney dialysis and transplantation to all patients without charge. SIUT supplied the “moral entrepreneurs: groups and individuals in civil society who are committed to the elimination of trade they consider harmful and repugnant,”57 who mobilized public opposition to commercial organ donation. They urged the government to adopt the new law. Descriptions written by SIUT physicians of the socioeconomic realities of the organ trade58 and of the resulting hazards to both donors and recipients59 led to critical reporting of the practice in newspapers and on television.60 </p><p>The media coverage took specific aim at the role of the government, whose failed poverty-alleviation programs left individuals no choice but to sell their kidneys, and whose failure to enact a transplant law and later to enforce it allowed the organ trade to thrive. It was also noted that reports of Pakistan’s “flourishing kidney market” had appeared in the international press, tarnishing the country’s reputation.61</p><p>The owners of the private hospitals who profited greatly from transplant commercialism and who had strong connections to high-level officials mounted fierce opposition to the transplant bill and sought to water down its prohibitions on unrelated living donation.62 On the other side, SIUT’s founder and director, Professor Adib Rizvi, used his strong connections with international medical groups, particularly his membership in the DICG, to counteract these powerful opponents.63 <u>Prominent transplant surgeons among <mark>the DICG </mark>leadership <mark>came to Pakistan to convince government officials that <strong>organ sales were a matter of international concern</u></strong> </mark>and needed to be curbed to rehabilitate the reputation of Pakistani physicians.64 As Professor Asif <u>Esrat concludes, “<mark>For government officials, <strong>the desire to conform to widely held international norms</strong> and redeem the national reputation served as a <strong>motivation for action</strong></mark>.”</u>65 <u><strong><mark>When the law was contested in a federal</u></strong> </mark>Shariat <u><strong><mark>court</u></strong> </mark>as an interference with the Islamic duty to save life,<strong> <u><mark>the existence of the international standards</u></strong></mark>, as embodied in the WHO Guiding Principles (which Pakistan had joined in endorsing at the World Health Assembly), <u><strong><mark>weighed heavily enough that the court rejected the challenge</u></strong></mark>.66 <u>When</u> several transplant <u>programs continued to carry out commercial transplants</u>, including on patients from abroad, Dr. Rizvi and his <u><strong><mark>colleagues reported </mark>these <mark>violations </mark>to the authorities <mark>and prosecutions were brought </mark>against the surgeons and hospitals</u></strong> that had attempted to profit by breaking the law.67</p><p><u><mark>The </mark>current situation in the <mark>Philippines resembles </mark>that in <mark>Pakistan</u> </mark>in some ways but differs in significant respects. The country has been a well-known locale for organ purchases for the past several decades; indeed, it was one of the first places where the anthropologists of Organs Watch, an independent research and medical-human-rights project at the University of California, Berkeley, began their examination of the “new body trade” in which “the circulation of kidneys follows established routes of capital from South to North, from East to West, from poorer to more affluent bodies, from black and brown bodies to white ones, and from female to male or from poor, low status men to more affluent men.”68</p><p>Although Internet sites have made the Philippines another important locus for the global organ trade, the initial pattern of using vended kidneys there differed from what had occurred in Pakistan because the recipients were mainly wealthy Filipinos, not foreigners. 358 of the 468 kidney transplants recorded in 2003 by the Renal Disease Control Program of the Department of Health in the Philippines involved domestic patients (though the possibility of incomplete reporting by private hospitals cannot be totally discounted).69 It was thus not surprising that elite groups at that time supported a proposal under consideration by the government to institutionalize paid kidney donation as well as to formally accept transplantation for foreign patients.70 As appealing as this idea may have seemed to someone viewing it “from a private hospital room in Quezon City,” it was much less so for human-rights advocates trying to protect potential organ sellers in “a sewage-infested banguay (slum) in Manila.”71 These advocates used the attention that the World Health Organization was bringing to the issue at that time to halt the movement toward legalizing compensation.</p><p>Over the following five years, <u><strong><mark>international pressure </mark>on the government <mark>intensified</u></strong></mark>, not only from intergovernmental and medical bodies72 but from the Catholic hierarchy, particularly in light of press coverage about unscrupulous organ brokers trolling in the slums for donors to meet the ever-increasing demand for kidneys coming from Manila’s transplant tourists.73 On April 30, 2008, <u>a ministerial directive barred foreign recipients from getting kidneys from Filipino living donors</u>.74 The next year, <u>the Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking followed the international trend and used the organ trafficking provisions of <mark>the Philippines’ </mark>Anti-Human Trafficking Law as the basis for supplemental regulations <strong><mark>outlawing </mark>all <mark>organ purchases</u></strong></mark>, as well as other means of trafficking persons for organ removal, including the use of force, fraud, and taking advantage of vulnerability.75</p><p>The fragility of these legal changes in the face of the determined opposition is indicated by the next swing of the Filipino organ-policy pendulum. When Benigno Aquino III assumed office as President in June 2010, he nominated as secretary of health Dr. Enrique T. Ona, a transplant surgeon who had previously expressed his opposition to the ban on organ sales.76 The nomination was held up, however, when Ona announced his intention to allow organ donors to be compensated by a $3200 “gratuity package”77 and joined several American regulated-market advocates in sponsoring an international forum on “Incentives for Donation” in Manila that November.78 He was confirmed as health minister, however, after providing assurances that he would not institute financial “gratuities,” but he did sign the proposal for incentives that emerged from the international forum.79 In effect, the pendulum has swung back, as the number of foreign transplant recipients, which had risen to 531 by 2007 before the ban, fell to two by 2011, even as a threefold increase occurred in deceaseddonor transplants for Filipinos.80 Movement in the opposite direction remains possible, however, as organ purchases by wealthy Filipinos have not completely disappeared, with brokers helping potential kidney recipients persuade review committees to allow as “emotionally related” donations what are in fact commercial transactions.81</p><p>Another variation on the theme of transplant tourism has taken place in Colombia, which “was a major provider of deceased-donor organs for wealthy foreigners” during the first decade of this century,82 mainly for liver transplantation.83 With strong international and regional backing, local medical leaders succeeded in redirecting organs to recipients from Colombia and neighboring countries. The annual rate of transplantation to foreigners, which stood at 200 in 2005 (16.5% of the national total), was reduced to 10 by 2011 (0.9% of the total, down from 1.45% the prior year).84</p><p>The situation in <u><mark>Colombia is indicative of the <strong>progress</u></strong> </mark>that has been made <u><strong><mark>across Latin America</u></strong> </mark>with the adoption by the Ibero-American Council of a set of principles and objectives in a regional parallel to the Declaration of Istanbul, the Document of Aguascalientes, 85 which was encouraged through a strong alliance with the Spanish transplant program. <u><mark>The Document of Aguascalientes has provided legal and </mark>ethical as well as <mark>technical guidance for countries across that region </mark>as they have created or strengthened their own systems for organ donation, allocation, and transplantation that</u> seek the support of the public and medical professionals and that <u>aim to meet the transplant needs of the domestic population and achieve “self-sufficiency”</u> nationally or through regional cooperation.86</p><p>Over the past five years, the most <u><mark>impressive examples</u> </mark>of countries that have responded to stronger global norms regarding the opposite side of “self-sufficiency”—namely, not sending transplant tourists abroad as the means to meet domestic demand for organs—<u><mark>are in the Middle East. Israel’s </mark>enactment in 2008 of legislation halting insurance coverage for commercial transplants that violate local laws <mark>ended its reliance on </mark>Turkey, South Africa, China, and the Philippines, among <mark>other countries</u></mark>, as sites where Israeli patients could go to obtain vended kidneys.87 The law also stimulated the development of a robust system of deceased and living-related donation, which has been widely praised.88</p><p>A number of <u><mark>Arab countries have taken steps</u></mark>—thus far less sweeping in scope or impact than the Israeli program but still effective—<u><mark>to treat patients at home rather than sending them abroad</u></mark>. The evolution of policy in Qatar provides a vivid example of the competing forces at work: expediency, selfinterest, generosity, and concern about adhering to international norms. The local provider of transplant services, the Hamad Medical Corporation (HMC), has concluded that it needs to go beyond the existing Qatari program for honoring donors if it is to achieve self-sufficiency in organ transplantation.89 Consequently, the HMC increased outreach within the expatriate community in Qatar (more than 85% of residents) to ensure that they too have access to transplantation services.90 Additionally, the HMC has substantially increased deceased donation by publicizing that “brain death” is acceptable under Islam91 and by having prominent persons, such as members of the royal family, not only recognize the generosity of living donors and the families of deceased donors but also enroll in the organ-donor registry.92</p>	2NC	Case - trafficking	2nc uniqueness	431,188	13	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,874	Framing--U.S. foreign policy is effectively implementing multilateral cooperation and upholding global rules now—only risk the aff makes worse	Cohen 14	Michael A. Cohen 14, former speechwriter in the State Department, fellow at the Century Foundation, 7/9/14, “Obama’s Understated Foreign Policy Gains,” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/opinion/obamas-understated-foreign-policy-gains.html?_r=0	It’s been a pretty good couple of weeks for American foreign policy the last of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile was destroyed Putin asked his Parliament to rescind the permission that it had given him to send troops into Ukraine there is still cautious optimism that a nuclear deal with Iran is within reach these relied on diplomacy they hold important lessons for how American power can be most effectively deployed given the choice between American bombing or giving up his chemical weapons Assad chose the latter pundits declared Putin had “won” in Crimea But Russia has paid a serious price In trying to operate outside the global system Putin found that resistance to international norms came at an unacceptable cost What did work in these three situations was patient diplomatic effort of building a global consensus global consensus against chemical and nuclear proliferation, backed by international treaties, served as the foundation for American diplomacy toward Iran and Syria What the U S can do is set modest and realistic goals upholding global norms and rules and seeking achievable diplomatic outcomes the results with Syria, Russia and Iran remind that when American foreign policy is led by painstaking diplomacy, seeks multilateral consensus and acts with an understanding of its own limitations it can produce positive results	It’s been good for American foreign policy Syria’s chemical stockpile was destroyed Putin asked Parliament to rescind permission a deal with Iran is within reach these relied on diplomacy they hold lessons for how American power can be effectively deployed In trying to operate outside the system Putin found resistance to international norms came at a cost What did work was diplomatic effort of building global consensus backed by international treaties the U S can set goals: upholding global norms and rules when American foreign policy seeks multilateral consensus it can produce positive results	It’s been a pretty good couple of weeks for American foreign policy. No, seriously. On June 23, the last of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile was loaded onto a Danish freighter to be destroyed. The following day, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia asked his Parliament to rescind the permission that it had given him to send troops into Ukraine. Meanwhile, there is still cautious optimism that a nuclear deal with Iran is within reach. What do these have in common? They were achieved without a single American bomb being dropped and they relied on a combination of diplomacy, economic sanctions and the coercive threat of military force. As policy makers and pundits remain focused on Iraq and the perennial but distracting discussion about the use of force, these modest but significant achievements have, perhaps predictably, been ignored. Yet they hold important lessons for how American power can be most effectively deployed today. [Marked here] Nine months ago, President Obama eschewed military means to punish Syria for its use of chemical weapons and instead negotiated an agreement to remove them. Critics like Senator John McCain blasted it as a “loser” deal that would never work. By refusing to back up a stated “red line” with military force, Mr. Obama had supposedly weakened American credibility. In Damascus, however, the threat of military engagement by the United States was taken more seriously. And when given the choice between American bombing or giving up his chemical weapons, President Bashar al-Assad of Syria chose the latter. Four months ago, some pundits confidently declared that Mr. Putin had “won” in Crimea and would ignore a Western response of toothless sanctions. But Russia has paid a serious price for its actions in Ukraine: diplomatic isolation and an economic downturn spurred by capital outflows, declining foreign investment and international opprobrium. Mr. Putin’s recent effort to tamp down tensions appears to be a response, in part, to the threat of further sanctions. In trying to operate outside the global system, Mr. Putin found that resistance to international norms came at an unacceptable cost. While it is far too early to declare success on the nuclear talks in Vienna, that the United States and Iran are sitting down at the negotiating table is a historic diplomatic achievement. When Mr. Obama spoke during the 2008 election campaign of his willingness to talk with Iran’s leaders, it led to criticisms that he was naïve about global politics. But his efforts as president to extend an olive branch, even as Iran continued to pursue its nuclear ambitions, enabled America to build support for the multilateral economic sanctions that helped make the current negotiations possible. While one should be careful in drawing expansive judgments from disparate examples like these, there are noteworthy commonalities. The most obvious is that military force is not as effective as its proponents would have Americans believe. Had the United States bombed Syria or hit Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, it would almost certainly not have been as successful as the nonmilitary approaches used. Yet, at the outset of practically every international crisis, to bomb or not to bomb becomes the entire focus of debate. That false choice disregards the many other tools at America’s disposal. It doesn’t mean that force should never be considered, but that it should be the option of last resort. Force is a blunt instrument that produces unpredictable outcomes (for evidence, look no further than Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya). What did work in these three situations was the patient diplomatic effort of building a global consensus. The success of international sanctions against Iran and Russia respectively relied on the support of both allies and rivals. Acting alone, the United States would never have achieved the same results. It wasn’t just Americans who were outraged by the seizure of Crimea — so, too, were nations that had few interests in the region. The reason is simple: When countries invade their neighbors with impunity, it puts every country at risk. A similar global consensus against chemical and nuclear proliferation, backed by international treaties, also served as the foundation for American diplomacy toward Iran and Syria. Critics will fairly argue that these outcomes hardly justify great celebration. Mr. Assad has relinquished his chemical weapons, but the bloody civil war in Syria continues. Mr. Putin has backed off in eastern Ukraine, but he’s keeping Crimea. Iran may agree to a nuclear deal, but it will remain a destabilizing power with the potential to upgrade its nuclear capacity. This speaks to the limitations of American power. The United States cannot stop every conflict or change every nefarious regime. Any foreign policy predicated on such ambitions will consistently fail. What the United States can do is set modest and realistic goals: upholding global norms and rules, limiting conflicts and seeking achievable diplomatic outcomes. With China flexing its muscles in the Far East, these lessons are more important than ever. But they are not transferable to every international crisis. Sanctions don’t mean much, for example, to radical nonstate actors like the jihadists of the Islamic State. And unilateral pressure from the United States cannot, for example, bring about the political reforms in Iraq that are needed to stabilize the country. Sometimes, America has no good answer for disruptive events like these. All too often, though, our foreign policy debates are defined by simplistic ideas: that force is a problem-solver, that America can go its own way and that mere application of American leadership brings positive results. But the results with Syria, Russia and Iran remind us that when American foreign policy is led by painstaking diplomacy, seeks multilateral consensus and acts with an understanding of its own limitations, it can produce positive results. More often than not, boring is better.	6,019	<h4><strong>Framing--U.S. foreign policy is <u>effectively implementing</u> multilateral cooperation and <u>upholding global rules</u> now—only risk the aff makes worse </h4><p></strong>Michael A. <strong>Cohen 14</strong>, former speechwriter in the State Department, fellow at the Century Foundation, 7/9/14, “Obama’s Understated Foreign Policy Gains,” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/opinion/obamas-understated-foreign-policy-gains.html?_r=0</p><p><u><mark>It’s been</mark> a pretty <mark>good</mark> couple of weeks <mark>for American foreign policy</u></mark>. No, seriously.</p><p>On June 23, <u>the last of <mark>Syria’s chemical</mark> weapons <mark>stockpile was</u></mark> loaded onto a Danish freighter to be <u><mark>destroyed</u></mark>. The following day, President Vladimir V. <u><mark>Putin</u></mark> of Russia <u><mark>asked</mark> his <mark>Parliament to rescind</mark> the <mark>permission</mark> that it had given him to send troops into Ukraine</u>. Meanwhile, <u>there is still cautious optimism that <mark>a</mark> nuclear <mark>deal with Iran is within reach</u></mark>.</p><p>What do <u><mark>these</u></mark> have in common? They were achieved without a single American bomb being dropped and they <u><mark>relied on</u></mark> a combination of <u><mark>diplomacy</u></mark>, economic sanctions and the coercive threat of military force. As policy makers and pundits remain focused on Iraq and the perennial but distracting discussion about the use of force, these modest but significant achievements have, perhaps predictably, been ignored. Yet <u><mark>they hold</mark> important <mark>lessons for how American power can be</mark> most <mark>effectively deployed</u></mark> today.</p><p>[Marked here]</p><p>Nine months ago, President Obama eschewed military means to punish Syria for its use of chemical weapons and instead negotiated an agreement to remove them. Critics like Senator John McCain blasted it as a “loser” deal that would never work. By refusing to back up a stated “red line” with military force, Mr. Obama had supposedly weakened American credibility.</p><p>In Damascus, however, the threat of military engagement by the United States was taken more seriously. And when <u>given the choice between American bombing or giving up his chemical weapons</u>, President Bashar al-<u>Assad</u> of Syria <u>chose the latter</u>.</p><p>Four months ago, some <u>pundits</u> confidently <u>declared</u> that Mr. <u>Putin had “won” in Crimea</u> and would ignore a Western response of toothless sanctions. <u>But Russia has paid a serious price</u> for its actions in Ukraine: diplomatic isolation and an economic downturn spurred by capital outflows, declining foreign investment and international opprobrium.</p><p>Mr. Putin’s recent effort to tamp down tensions appears to be a response, in part, to the threat of further sanctions. <u><mark>In trying to operate outside the</mark> global <mark>system</u></mark>, Mr. <u><mark>Putin found</mark> that</u> <u><mark>resistance to international norms</u> <u>came at a</mark>n unacceptable <mark>cost</u></mark>.</p><p>While it is far too early to declare success on the nuclear talks in Vienna, that the United States and Iran are sitting down at the negotiating table is a historic diplomatic achievement. When Mr. Obama spoke during the 2008 election campaign of his willingness to talk with Iran’s leaders, it led to criticisms that he was naïve about global politics. But his efforts as president to extend an olive branch, even as Iran continued to pursue its nuclear ambitions, enabled America to build support for the multilateral economic sanctions that helped make the current negotiations possible.</p><p>While one should be careful in drawing expansive judgments from disparate examples like these, there are noteworthy commonalities. The most obvious is that military force is not as effective as its proponents would have Americans believe. Had the United States bombed Syria or hit Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, it would almost certainly not have been as successful as the nonmilitary approaches used.</p><p>Yet, at the outset of practically every international crisis, to bomb or not to bomb becomes the entire focus of debate. That false choice disregards the many other tools at America’s disposal. It doesn’t mean that force should never be considered, but that it should be the option of last resort. Force is a blunt instrument that produces unpredictable outcomes (for evidence, look no further than Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya).</p><p><u><mark>What did work</mark> in these three situations <mark>was</u></mark> the <u>patient <mark>diplomatic effort of building</mark> a <mark>global consensus</u></mark>. The success of international sanctions against Iran and Russia respectively relied on the support of both allies and rivals. Acting alone, the United States would never have achieved the same results.</p><p>It wasn’t just Americans who were outraged by the seizure of Crimea — so, too, were nations that had few interests in the region. The reason is simple: When countries invade their neighbors with impunity, it puts every country at risk. A similar <u>global consensus against chemical and nuclear proliferation, <mark>backed by international treaties</mark>,</u> also <u>served as the foundation for American diplomacy toward Iran and Syria</u>.</p><p>Critics will fairly argue that these outcomes hardly justify great celebration. Mr. Assad has relinquished his chemical weapons, but the bloody civil war in Syria continues. Mr. Putin has backed off in eastern Ukraine, but he’s keeping Crimea. Iran may agree to a nuclear deal, but it will remain a destabilizing power with the potential to upgrade its nuclear capacity.</p><p>This speaks to the limitations of American power. The United States cannot stop every conflict or change every nefarious regime. Any foreign policy predicated on such ambitions will consistently fail. </p><p><u>What <mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>can</mark> do is <mark>set</mark> modest and realistic <mark>goals</u>: <u>upholding global norms and rules</u></mark>, limiting conflicts <u>and seeking achievable diplomatic outcomes</u>. With China flexing its muscles in the Far East, these lessons are more important than ever.</p><p>But they are not transferable to every international crisis. Sanctions don’t mean much, for example, to radical nonstate actors like the jihadists of the Islamic State. And unilateral pressure from the United States cannot, for example, bring about the political reforms in Iraq that are needed to stabilize the country. Sometimes, America has no good answer for disruptive events like these. </p><p>All too often, though, our foreign policy debates are defined by simplistic ideas: that force is a problem-solver, that America can go its own way and that mere application of American leadership brings positive results. But <u>the results with Syria, Russia and Iran remind</u> us <u>that</u> <u><mark>when American foreign policy</mark> is led by painstaking diplomacy, <mark>seeks multilateral consensus</u></mark> <u>and acts with an understanding of its own limitations</u>, <u><mark>it can produce positive results</u></mark>. More often than not, boring is better.</p>	null	1nr	2NC Local DA	431,211	14	17,115	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	565,263	N	Wake	8	Georgia Boyce-Feinberg	Markoff	AG politics fed cp (2nr) treaties da (2nr) ban marihuana cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round8.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,875	Independently, the elimination of Western Knowledge should also be a concern – losing any type of knowledge decreases the chance of survival	Agrawal 95 .	Agrawal 95 Arun Agrawal, “Dismantling the Divide Between Indigenous and Scientific Knowledge” Development and Change Vol. 26 (1995), 413439. Institute of Social Studies 1995. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Rd, Oxford OX4 lJF, UK.	inconsistencies mark the assertions from the neo- indigenistas the argument goes disappearance constitutes an enormous loss to humanity since they possess the potential to remedy many of the problems that have emasculated development strategies during the past five decades. Greater efforts must, therefore, be made to save, document and apply indigenous strategies of survival But neo-indigenistas remain committed to the same kind of dichotomous classification that dominated the world view of the modernization theorists Both groups of theorists seek to create two categories of knowledge - western and indigenous This attempt is bound to fail because different indigenous and western knowledges possess specific histories, particular burdens from the past, and distinctive patterns of change. any one world is always a radical heterogeneity which radiates out in a tissue of differences that undoes the initial identity’	the argument goes disappearance constitutes an enormous loss to humanity since they possess the potential to remedy problems that have emasculated development strategies Greater efforts must be made to save strategies of survival But neo-indigenistas remain committed to the same dichotomous classification that dominated the world view of the modernization theorists Both groups create two categories of knowledge - western and indigenous This is bound to fail because different indigenous and western knowledges possess specific histories and distinctive change any one world is a radical heterogeneity	A number of inconsistencies and problems mark the assertions from the neo- indigenistas. Their case seems superficially persuasive. Indigenous knowledge and peoples, the argument goes, are disappearing all over the world as a direct result of the pressures of modernization. Their disappearance, in turn, constitutes an enormous loss to humanity since they possess the potential to remedy many of the problems that have emasculated development strategies during the past five decades. Greater efforts must, therefore, be made to save, document and apply indigenous strategies of survival. But neo-indigenistas remain committed to the same kind of dichotomous classification that dominated the world view of the modernization theorists,* in spite of their seeming opposition to the idea that indigenous institutions and knowledge are obstacles to the march by the Angel of Progress. Both groups of theorists seek to create two categories of knowledge - western and indigenous - relying on the possibility that a finite and small number of characteristics can define the elements contained within the categories. This attempt is bound to fail because different indigenous and western knowledges possess specific histories, particular burdens from the past, and distinctive patterns of change. Colin MacCabe (1988: xvii) puts it: ‘any one world is always, also, a radical heterogeneity which radiates out in a tissue of differences that undoes the initial identity’.	1,463	<h4>Independently, the elimination of Western Knowledge should also be a concern – losing any type of knowledge decreases the chance of survival </h4><p><strong>Agrawal 95</strong> Arun Agrawal, “Dismantling the Divide Between Indigenous and Scientific Knowledge” Development and Change Vol. 26 (1995), 413439. Institute of Social Studies 1995. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Rd, Oxford OX4 lJF, UK<strong>. </p><p></strong>A number of <u>inconsistencies</u> and problems <u>mark the assertions from the neo- indigenistas</u>. Their case seems superficially persuasive. Indigenous knowledge and peoples, <u><mark>the argument goes</u></mark>, are disappearing all over the world as a direct result of the pressures of modernization. Their <u><mark>disappearance</u></mark>, in turn, <u><mark>constitutes an enormous loss to humanity since they possess the potential to remedy </mark>many of the <mark>problems that have emasculated development strategies </mark>during the past five decades. <strong><mark>Greater efforts must</mark>, therefore, <mark>be made to save</mark>, document and apply indigenous <mark>strategies of survival</u></mark>. </p><p><u><mark>But neo-indigenistas remain committed to the same </mark>kind of <mark>dichotomous classification that dominated the world view of the modernization theorists</u></strong></mark>,* in spite of their seeming opposition to the idea that indigenous institutions and knowledge are obstacles to the march by the Angel of Progress. <u><mark>Both groups </mark>of theorists seek to <mark>create two categories of knowledge - western and indigenous</u> </mark>- relying on the possibility that a finite and small number of characteristics can define the elements contained within the categories. <u><mark>This </mark>attempt <mark>is bound to fail because different indigenous and western knowledges possess specific histories</mark>, particular burdens from the past, <mark>and distinctive </mark>patterns of <mark>change</mark>.</u> Colin MacCabe (1988: xvii) puts it: ‘<u><mark>any one world is </mark>always</u>, also, <u><mark>a radical heterogeneity </mark>which radiates out in a tissue of differences that undoes the initial identity’</u>. </p>	1nc vs WGA	null	1nc – Native K	431,213	1	17,118	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	565,420	N	Gsu	1	West Georgia Muhammad-Gaius	Deming	1NC T occidentalism K law good K impact turns 2NC Space colonization impact turn 1NR T 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,876	Successful Antiguan cross-retaliation sets a precedent that spills over to make the global tax collection regime successful---causes buy-in from LDCs	Rosenzweig 14	Adam H. Rosenzweig 14, Professor of Law, Washington University in Saint Louis, 2014, “Conceptualizing a New Institutional Framework for International Taxation: An Antigua Gambling Model for the International Tax Regime,” Washington University Journal of Law & Policy, 44 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 79	An Antigua Gambling Model for International Tax What lessons can be drawn from these two stories? In the tax context disparate incentives between some developed and developing countries have led to a breakdown in the international order In trade we observe a dispute between the wealthiest and poorest member nations being resolved pursuant to the terms of the WTO treaties and within the institutional framework of the WTO Could the lessons from the WTO be incorporated into the BEPS project to solve this problem? in building a new institutional framework, the international tax regime can learn from the recent experiences of the WTO in overcoming this impasse by balancing the interests of both developed and developing nations what would an international tax regime look like that would incorporate the lessons of Antigua Gambling? the current BEPS project focuses on a set of consistent international norms Without some mechanism to incorporate smaller countries that might have disparate incentives, this may not prove effective to the WTO cross-retaliation mechanism the dispute settlement understanding of the WTO provides any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements There are two crucial aspects to cross-retaliation that would need to be amended to fit within the international tax context the WTO is a dispute resolution body. there would need to be established some permanent dispute resolution body for international tax it is not difficult in theory and has been covered in other places so this Essay will assume that away Second, the retaliation in the WTO is intended to increase sales or profits for private actors in the complaining party country at the expense of competitors in the offending country In the tax context the remedy would have to result in revenue for the government of the complaining country In the specific context of BEPS it might be possible to establish commonly accepted worldwide norms the primary hurdle to applying a WTO model to international tax - the lack of common norms - would be overcome A WTO-type regime would remain difficult to translate into international tax because as between asymmetric countries with little or no trade there is no direct retaliation possible This is where an Antigua Gambling type model comes into play	An Antigua Gambling Model for International Tax In tax disparate incentives between developed and developing countries led to a breakdown in the international order In trade we observe a dispute being resolved pursuant to WTO treaties the international tax regime can learn from experiences of the WTO the current project focuses on norms Without some mechanism to incorporate smaller countries this may not prove effective WTO cross-retaliation provides any party may request authorization to suspend obligations under covered agreements two crucial aspects to cross-retaliation would need to be amended within the international tax context there would need to be some dispute resolution body it is not difficult retaliation in the WTO is intended to increase profits for private actors In tax the remedy would have to result in revenue for the government In the context of BEPS it might be possible to establish accepted worldwide norms the primary hurdle to applying a WTO model the lack of common norms - would be overcome. A WTO-type regime would remain difficult to translate into international tax because there is no direct retaliation possible This is where an Antigua Gambling model comes into play	III. An Antigua Gambling Model for International Tax What lessons can be drawn from these two stories? In the tax context, it appears disparate incentives between some developed and developing countries have led to a breakdown in the international order. In the trade context, we observe a dispute between arguably the wealthiest and poorest member nations being resolved pursuant to the terms of the WTO treaties and within the institutional framework of the WTO. Why has the WTO framework been so successful when the international tax framework seems not to have been? Could the lessons from the WTO be incorporated into the BEPS project to solve this problem? The primary reason this disconnect arises is that the WTO institutional framework takes into account the disparate incentives of the developed and developing member nations in a manner that the international tax regime does not. Instead, the international tax regime continues to try to adopt a harmonized worldwide regime, which could be thought of as a one-size-fits-all approach. But if certain developing and developed countries cannot even agree on the normative starting point for the international tax regime, how can they agree on policing transfer pricing? Even worse, as noted above, only one country needs to defect from the regime for the entire system to unravel. Thus, the international tax system seems at an impasse. The primary thesis of this Essay is that, in building a new institutional framework, the international tax regime can learn from the recent experiences of the WTO in overcoming this impasse by balancing the interests of both developed and developing nations. So what would an international tax regime look like that would incorporate the lessons of Antigua Gambling? The clearest answer would be to build a dispute settlement mechanism into the BEPS project that permits a form of cross-retaliation such as that used in the WTO. In other words, the current BEPS project focuses on building a set of consistent international norms on transfer pricing and dividing the tax base of multinational corporations among countries. Without [91] some mechanism to incorporate smaller countries that might have disparate incentives, however, this may not prove effective. The WTO cross-retaliation model could provide one such mechanism. Turning to the WTO cross-retaliation mechanism in particular, in relevant part, Article 22 of the dispute settlement understanding of the WTO provides: 2. If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into compliance ... such Member shall ... enter into negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation. If no satisfactory compensation has been agreed within 20 days after the date of expiry of the reasonable period of time, any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements. 3. In considering what concessions or other obligations to suspend, the complaining party shall apply the following principles and procedures: (a) the general principle is that the complaining party should first seek to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which the panel or Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment; (b) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s), it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations in other sectors under the same agreement; (c) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to other sectors under the same agreement, and that the circumstances are serious enough, it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations under another covered agreement; [92] (d) in applying the above principles, that party shall take into account: (i) the trade in the sector or under the agreement under which the panel or Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment, and the importance of such trade to that party; (ii) the broader economic elements related to the nullification or impairment and the broader economic consequences of the suspension of concessions or other obligations; n29 There are two crucial aspects to cross-retaliation in the WTO context that would need to be amended to fit within the international tax context. First, the WTO is a dispute resolution body. Thus, there would need to be established some permanent dispute resolution body for international tax. While this may be difficult in practice, it is not difficult in theory and has been covered in other places, so this Essay will assume that away. Second, the retaliation in the WTO is intended to increase sales or profits for private actors in the complaining party country at the expense of competitors in the offending country, potentially leading to political pressure to repeal the offending law. n30 In the tax context, however, the remedy would have to result in revenue for the government of the complaining country. It is for these two reasons that the WTO mechanism has typically been deemed insufficient for international tax. n31 First, and primarily, as between countries that have not entered into tax treaties, there are no common norms to be violated. Thus, unlike in the WTO, there cannot be dispute resolution as to an underlying norm that does not [*93] exist, making the WTO model inapplicable to most international tax disputes. n32 In the specific context of BEPS, however, it might be possible to establish commonly accepted worldwide norms. In such a case, the primary hurdle to applying a WTO model to international tax - the lack of common norms - would be overcome. A WTO-type regime would remain difficult to translate into international tax, however, because as between asymmetric countries with little or no trade, there is no direct retaliation possible in the tax context. This is where an Antigua Gambling type model comes into play.	6,277	<h4><strong>Successful Antiguan cross-retaliation sets a precedent that spills over to make the <u>global tax collection regime</u> successful---causes <u>buy-in from LDCs </h4><p></u></strong>Adam H. <strong>Rosenzweig 14</strong>, Professor of Law, Washington University in Saint Louis, 2014, “Conceptualizing a New Institutional Framework for International Taxation: An Antigua Gambling Model for the International Tax Regime,” Washington University Journal of Law & Policy, 44 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 79</p><p>III. <u><strong><mark>An Antigua Gambling Model for International Tax</u></strong></mark> </p><p><u><strong>What lessons can be drawn from these two stories?</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>In</mark> the <mark>tax</mark> context</u></strong>, it appears <u><strong><mark>disparate incentives between</mark> some <mark>developed and developing countries</mark> have <mark>led to a</mark> <mark>breakdown in the international order</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>In</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>trade</u></strong></mark> context, <u><strong><mark>we observe a dispute</mark> between</u></strong> arguably <u><strong>the wealthiest and poorest member nations <mark>being</u></strong> <u><strong>resolved pursuant to</mark> the terms of the <mark>WTO treaties</mark> and within the institutional framework of the WTO</u></strong>. Why has the WTO framework been so successful when the international tax framework seems not to have been? <u><strong>Could the</u></strong> <u><strong>lessons from the WTO be incorporated into the BEPS project to solve this problem?</p><p></u></strong>The primary reason this disconnect arises is that the WTO institutional framework takes into account the disparate incentives of the developed and developing member nations in a manner that the international tax regime does not. Instead, the international tax regime continues to try to adopt a harmonized worldwide regime, which could be thought of as a one-size-fits-all approach. But if certain developing and developed countries cannot even agree on the normative starting point for the international tax regime, how can they agree on policing transfer pricing? Even worse, as noted above, only one country needs to defect from the regime for the entire system to unravel. Thus, the international tax system seems at an impasse. The primary thesis of this Essay is that, <u><strong>in building a new institutional framework, <mark>the international tax regime can</u></strong> <u><strong>learn from</mark> the recent <mark>experiences of the WTO</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>in overcoming this impasse by balancing the interests of both developed and developing nations</u></strong>.</p><p>So <u><strong>what would an international tax regime look like that would incorporate the lessons of Antigua Gambling?</u></strong> The clearest answer would be to build a dispute settlement mechanism into the BEPS project that permits a form of cross-retaliation such as that used in the WTO. In other words, <u><strong><mark>the current </mark>BEPS <mark>project focuses on</u></strong></mark> building <u><strong>a set of consistent international <mark>norms</u></strong></mark> on transfer pricing and dividing the tax base of multinational corporations among countries. <u><strong><mark>Without</u></strong></mark> [91] <u><strong><mark>some mechanism to incorporate smaller countries</mark> that might have disparate incentives,</u></strong> however, <u><strong><mark>this may not prove effective</u></strong></mark>. The WTO cross-retaliation model could provide one such mechanism.</p><p>Turning <u><strong>to the</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>WTO cross-retaliation </mark>mechanism</u></strong> in particular, in relevant part, Article 22 of <u><strong>the dispute settlement understanding of the WTO <mark>provides</u></strong></mark>: </p><p>2. If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into compliance ... such Member shall ... enter into negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation. If no satisfactory compensation has been agreed within 20 days after the date of expiry of the reasonable period of time, <u><strong><mark>any party</mark> having invoked the dispute settlement procedures <mark>may request authorization</mark> from the DSB <mark>to suspend</mark> the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other <mark>obligations under</mark> the <mark>covered agreements</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>3. In considering what concessions or other obligations to suspend, the complaining party shall apply the following principles and procedures:</p><p>(a) the general principle is that the complaining party should first seek to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which the panel or Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment;</p><p>(b) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s), it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations in other sectors under the same agreement;</p><p>(c) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to other sectors under the same agreement, and that the circumstances are serious enough, it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations under another covered agreement;</p><p> [92] (d) in applying the above principles, that party shall take into account:</p><p>(i) the trade in the sector or under the agreement under which the panel or Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment, and the importance of such trade to that party;</p><p>(ii) the broader economic elements related to the nullification or impairment and the broader economic consequences of the suspension of concessions or other obligations; n29 </p><p><u><strong>There are</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>two crucial aspects to cross-retaliation</u></strong></mark> in the WTO context <u><strong>that <mark>would need to be amended</mark> to fit <mark>within the international tax context</u></strong></mark>. First, <u><strong>the WTO is a dispute resolution body.</u></strong> Thus, <u><strong><mark>there would need to be</mark> established <mark>some</mark> permanent <mark>dispute resolution body</mark> for international tax</u></strong>. While this may be difficult in practice, <u><strong><mark>it is not difficult</mark> in theory and has been covered in other places</u></strong>, <u><strong>so this Essay will assume that away</u></strong>. <u><strong>Second, the <mark>retaliation in the WTO is intended to increase</mark> sales or <mark>profits for private actors</mark> in the complaining party country at the expense of competitors in the offending country</u></strong>, potentially leading to political pressure to repeal the offending law. n30 <u><strong><mark>In</mark> the <mark>tax</mark> context</u></strong>, however, <u><strong><mark>the remedy would have to result in revenue for the government</mark> of the complaining country</u></strong>.</p><p>It is for these two reasons that the WTO mechanism has typically been deemed insufficient for international tax. n31 First, and primarily, as between countries that have not entered into tax treaties, there are no common norms to be violated. Thus, unlike in the WTO, there cannot be dispute resolution as to an underlying norm that does not [*93] exist, making the WTO model inapplicable to most international tax disputes. n32</p><p><u><strong><mark>In the</mark> specific <mark>context of BEPS</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>it might be possible to</u></strong> <u><strong>establish</mark> commonly <mark>accepted worldwide norms</u></strong></mark>. In such a case, <u><strong><mark>the primary hurdle to applying a WTO model</mark> to international tax - <mark>the lack of common norms - would be overcome</u></strong>. <u><strong>A WTO-type regime would remain difficult to translate into international tax</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>because</mark> as between asymmetric countries with little or no trade</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>there is no direct retaliation possible</u></strong></mark> in the tax context. <u><strong><mark>This is where an Antigua Gambling</mark> type <mark>model comes into play</u></mark>.</p></strong>	null	null	1	430,385	6	17,113	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	565,270	N	Texas	4	Georgetown Erpenbach-Krishnan	Arnett	DHS politics (2NR) cross retal cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,877	The DOI has substantially decreased organ trafficking	Danovitch et al, 13	Danovitch et al, 13 - David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA, Los Angeles, CA (Gabriel, “Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism: The Role of Global Professional Ethical Standards—The 2008 Declaration of Istanbul” Transplantation. 2013 Jun 15;95(11):1306-12. doi: 10.1097/TP.0b013e318295ee7d.	Since the publication of the DoI, organ trafficking and transplant tourism have been inhibited, as has organ commercialism. Success in combating organ trafficking has been aided by the implementation of the protocol by the United Nations as part of its effort to halt transnational organized crime the World Health Assembly WHA) adopted a resolution encouraging the creation of systems of unpaid donation of organs from deceased and living donors and endorsing the updated WHO Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ Transplantation These steps by the WHA have encouraged countries to cooperate with one another and the DICG in ending all forms of organ commercialism major changes in policies and practices have occurred in countries that had previously been centers of organ trafficking and transplant tourism in Pakistani cities illegal transplants has fallen the Indian government amended the Transplantation of Human Organs Act a private hospital–public hospital partnership promoting deceased-donor transplantation has effectively eliminated commercialization in a manner that can serve as a model for other regions of South Asia and developing countries Progressive changes in China will have significant implications for countries from which a substantial number of transplant recipients have traveled in recent years to China The reporting of Egyptian transplant data to a new registry under the auspices of the Middle Eastern Society of Transplantation may provide a much-needed source of transparency The presidents of every Latin American Society of Nephrology have endorsed the DoI Brazil became the first country to include specific reference to the DoI in its national regulations regarding transplanting organs	Since the DoI, organ trafficking and transplant tourism have been inhibited, as has organ commercialism. Success has been aided by the implementation of the protocol by the U N the WHA) adopted a resolution encouraging the creation of systems of unpaid donation These steps have encouraged countries to cooperate in ending organ commercialism major changes in practices have occurred in countries that had previously been centers of organ trafficking and tourism the Indian government amended the Transplantation Act a private hospital has effectively eliminated commercialization in a manner that can serve as a model for other regions Progressive changes will have significant implications for countries from which a substantial number of transplant recipients have traveled to China The reporting of Egyptian transplant data to a new registry may provide a much-needed source of transparency The presidents of every Society of Nephrology have endorsed the DoI Brazil became the first country to include specific reference to the DoI in its national regulations	Since the publication of the DoI, organ trafficking and transplant tourism, which have their greatest effect in developing countries, have been inhibited, as has the broader phenomenon of organ commercialism. Success in combating organ trafficking has been aided by the implementation of the protocol issued in 2000 by the United Nations as part of its effort to halt transnational organized crime, the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, in which the “removal of organs” is recognized as a key purpose of human trafficking (14). In 2009, the Council of Europe and the United Nations jointly produced a study on organ trafficking and trafficking in human beings for the purpose of the removal of organs that concluded that specially adapted means should be used to combat each, including emphasizing voluntary donation and the absence of financial gain from the human body or its parts (15). In the UK, the Nuffield Council of Bioethics report on organ donation, to which the DICG contributed, concluded that altruism should continue to play a central role in ethical thinking about donation (16). In 2011, Spain made special mention of the DoI when modifying its Penal Code to provide sanctions for trafficking in organs or people for the purpose of the removal of organs (17). Further, in 2012, the Coalition for Organ Failure Solutions urged the U.S. Congress to incorporate human trafficking for organ removal under the rubric of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18). Such a measure need not interfere with a related practice, defined by the DoI as “travel for transplant,” such as occurs when a living related donor resides in a different country than his or her planned recipient or a recipient–donor pair have to cross a border to access transplantation expertise that is not available in their own community (7). Finally, in May 2010, the World Health Assembly (WHA) adopted a resolution encouraging the creation of systems of unpaid donation of organs from deceased and living donors and endorsing the updated WHO Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ Transplantation, which restate the 1991 principles and add two aimed at vigilance and safety in transplantation and at ensuring transparency in organ procurement and allocation. These steps by the WHA have encouraged countries to cooperate with one another and the DICG in ending all forms of organ commercialism (19). This alignment of activities is assisted by the status of TTS as a nongovernmental organization in official relations with the WHO. WINDS OF CHANGE In the past 5 years, major changes in policies and practices have occurred in countries that had previously been centers of organ trafficking and transplant tourism. Six of these former “hotspots” merit special mention because of the dramatic changes in policies and practices that have occurred—and are continuing—in each. Pakistan Over the past four decades, transplant programs in a number of Pakistani cities have performed many thousands of commercial transplants for foreigners using kidneys from the poor from villages throughout the country. In 2010, leaders of the Sind Institute of Urology and Transplantation in Karachi, backed by the DICG, led a successful effort for a new law criminalizing organ sales. The number of illegal transplants has since fallen, but constant vigilance must be exercised to prevent its resumption by the surgeons and hospitals that stand to profit. The DICG members have identified several illicit programs, which have been closed and prosecuted (20). India India was identified as a common destination for commercial transplants and transplant tourism in 1980s and 1990s. The Indian Parliament outlawed commercial transplants and recognized the concept of brain death through the 1994 Transplantation of Human Organs Act (21). The number of such transplants fell after the enactment of this law, although there remained widely publicized cases of its abuse. The law, however, allowed unrelated transplants motivated by love and affection provided these were cleared by a statutory “Authorization Committee” set up by the states. This committee itself provided an avenue for abuse (22). In 2008, after the adoption of the DoI and the revised WHO Guiding Principles, the Indian government amended the Transplantation of Human Organs Act (21). The role and functioning of the authorization committees has been better defined, tests to ascertain relationship were prescribed, greater caution was suggested to prevent exploitation of females, a mandatory requirement for all foreign nationals to obtain clearance from the Authorization Committee and embassies of their home countries has been introduced, and the penal provisions stiffened. At the same time, the Government has put into place a mechanism to promote deceased donations. In the state of Tamil Nadu with a population of more than 70 million, a private hospital–public hospital partnership promoting deceased-donor transplantation has effectively eliminated commercialization in a manner that can serve as a model for other regions of South Asia and developing countries (23). China Chinese organ transplant activities have global implications. For the last decade or more, Chinese hospitals, aided by Internet advertising, have been major destinations for wealthy or well-insured transplant tourists from around the world. The conversion of the body of an executed prisoner into cash through sale of its organs and the exploitation of living kidney donors for foreign patients not only engenders profound ethical concerns but also comes at the expense of the needs of the Chinese population. The DoI specifically addresses the unacceptable nature of the Chinese practice of “donation by execution.” The DICG, the TTS (24), and other nongovernmental organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have taken an unequivocal stance against this practice while promoting ethically acceptable alternatives (25). As urged by the DICG, several academic journals have placed barriers to the publication of data that involve executed prisoners, societies of transplant professionals have prevented the presentation at their meetings of clinical research involving executed prisoners, and pharmaceutical companies have limited clinical trials in China for the same reason. The firm stance by the DICG and other international groups, as well as the policies promoted by the WHO, are having notable effects. High-ranking Chinese government officials have themselves brought attention to the lack of acceptance by the international community of the practice of using organs from executed prisoners and of the corruption and commercialization that characterize living and deceased donation in China (26). Authorities have closed dozens of transplant programs, which violated new rules that severely limit transplant tourism. In the next cycle of reauthorization, Chinese transplant programs will be required to have in place alternative programs to the use of organs from executed prisoners (27). Progressive changes in China will have significant implications for countries from which a substantial number of transplant recipients have traveled in recent years to China to purchase organs. Nonethnic Chinese have been known to use assumed names and identities presumably to bypass the Chinese law that officially criminalizes such activities. The Philippines Fueled by poverty in the slums of Manila and an extensive network of organ brokers, the Philippines was a well-known destination for transplant tourists during the past decade; even programs that provided transplants for domestic patients relied on the profits from transplanting foreign patients. A presidential directive, issued on April 30, 2008, at the start of the Istanbul Summit, established a ban on foreign recipients receiving kidneys from Filipino living donors. Supplemental rules and regulations for the implementation of the organ trafficking provision of the Anti-Human Trafficking Law went into effect in June 2009 (28). The annual number of foreign transplant recipients fell from 531 in 2007 to 2 in 2011, and the number of deceased-donor transplants has increased threefold in the same period (29). Egypt Since the 1980s, Egypt has been the main locale for organ trafficking and transplant tourism in the Middle East (2). In February 2010, representatives of the WHO and the DICG obtained commitments from Egyptian transplant leaders and policymakers to end these practices; this culminated in the passage of the landmark Law on Human Organ Transplantation, which prohibits and penalizes organ trafficking and permits deceased donation in accord with the WHO Guiding Principles and the DoI (30). Unfortunately, political changes have shifted the focus, and most centers appear to be undertaking commercial organ transplants, including the use of trafficked donors, despite the 2010 law (31, 32). The reporting of Egyptian transplant data to a new registry under the auspices of the Middle Eastern Society of Transplantation may provide a much-needed source of transparency. Colombia and Latin America In the first decade of the 21st century, Colombia was a major provider of deceased-donor organs for wealthy foreigners. A concerted effort by the government to stop this practice and direct organs to citizens of Colombia and neighboring countries, through regional governmental agreements, led to a fall in transplants to noncitizens from 16.5% of the total (200 transplants) in 2005 to 1.37% (16 transplants) in 2010 (33). The presidents of every Latin American Society of Nephrology have endorsed the DoI (11), and the Society of Transplantation of Latin America and Caribbean (STALYC), during the first Latin American Forum in Ethics and Transplantation adopted the “Document of Aguascalientes”, which closely parallels the DoI (34). In February 2012, Brazil became the first country to include specific reference to the DoI in its national regulations regarding transplanting organs into nonresidents (35).	10,122	<h4>The DOI has substantially decreased organ trafficking </h4><p><strong>Danovitch et al, 13</strong> - David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA, Los Angeles, CA (Gabriel, “Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism: The Role of Global Professional Ethical Standards—The 2008 Declaration of Istanbul” Transplantation. 2013 Jun 15;95(11):1306-12. doi: 10.1097/TP.0b013e318295ee7d.</p><p><u><mark>Since the</mark> publication of the <mark>DoI, organ trafficking and transplant tourism</u></mark>, which have their greatest effect in developing countries, <u><mark>have</mark> <mark>been inhibited, as has</u></mark> the broader phenomenon of <u><mark>organ commercialism. Success</mark> in combating organ trafficking <mark>has been aided by the</mark> <mark>implementation of the protocol</u></mark> issued in 2000 <u><mark>by the U</mark>nited <mark>N</mark>ations as part of its effort to halt transnational organized crime</u>, the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, in which the “removal of organs” is recognized as a key purpose of human trafficking (14). In 2009, the Council of Europe and the United Nations jointly produced a study on organ trafficking and trafficking in human beings for the purpose of the removal of organs that concluded that specially adapted means should be used to combat each, including emphasizing voluntary donation and the absence of financial gain from the human body or its parts (15). In the UK, the Nuffield Council of Bioethics report on organ donation, to which the DICG contributed, concluded that altruism should continue to play a central role in ethical thinking about donation (16). In 2011, Spain made special mention of the DoI when modifying its Penal Code to provide sanctions for trafficking in organs or people for the purpose of the removal of organs (17). Further, in 2012, the Coalition for Organ Failure Solutions urged the U.S. Congress to incorporate human trafficking for organ removal under the rubric of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18). Such a measure need not interfere with a related practice, defined by the DoI as “travel for transplant,” such as occurs when a living related donor resides in a different country than his or her planned recipient or a recipient–donor pair have to cross a border to access transplantation expertise that is not available in their own community (7). Finally, in May 2010, <u><mark>the</mark> World Health Assembly</u> (<u><mark>WHA) adopted a resolution encouraging the creation of systems of</mark> <mark>unpaid donation</mark> of organs from deceased and living donors and endorsing the updated WHO Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ Transplantation</u>, which restate the 1991 principles and add two aimed at vigilance and safety in transplantation and at ensuring transparency in organ procurement and allocation. <u><mark>These steps</mark> by the WHA <mark>have encouraged countries to cooperate</mark> with one another and the DICG <mark>in ending</mark> all forms of <mark>organ commercialism</u></mark> (19). This alignment of activities is assisted by the status of TTS as a nongovernmental organization in official relations with the WHO.</p><p>WINDS OF CHANGE</p><p>In the past 5 years, <u><strong><mark>major changes</strong> in </mark>policies and <mark>practices have occurred in countries that had <strong>previously been centers</strong> of organ</mark> <mark>trafficking and</mark> transplant <mark>tourism</u></mark>. Six of these former “hotspots” merit special mention because of the dramatic changes in policies and practices that have occurred—and are continuing—in each.</p><p>Pakistan</p><p>Over the past four decades, transplant programs <u>in</u> a number of <u>Pakistani cities</u> have performed many thousands of commercial transplants for foreigners using kidneys from the poor from villages throughout the country. In 2010, leaders of the Sind Institute of Urology and Transplantation in Karachi, backed by the DICG, led a successful effort for a new law criminalizing organ sales. The number of <u>illegal transplants has</u> since <u>fallen</u>, but constant vigilance must be exercised to prevent its resumption by the surgeons and hospitals that stand to profit. The DICG members have identified several illicit programs, which have been closed and prosecuted (20).</p><p>India</p><p>India was identified as a common destination for commercial transplants and transplant tourism in 1980s and 1990s. The Indian Parliament outlawed commercial transplants and recognized the concept of brain death through the 1994 Transplantation of Human Organs Act (21). The number of such transplants fell after the enactment of this law, although there remained widely publicized cases of its abuse. The law, however, allowed unrelated transplants motivated by love and affection provided these were cleared by a statutory “Authorization Committee” set up by the states. This committee itself provided an avenue for abuse (22).</p><p>In 2008, after the adoption of the DoI and the revised WHO Guiding Principles, <u><mark>the Indian government amended the Transplantation</mark> of Human Organs <mark>Act</u></mark> (21). The role and functioning of the authorization committees has been better defined, tests to ascertain relationship were prescribed, greater caution was suggested to prevent exploitation of females, a mandatory requirement for all foreign nationals to obtain clearance from the Authorization Committee and embassies of their home countries has been introduced, and the penal provisions stiffened. At the same time, the Government has put into place a mechanism to promote deceased donations. In the state of Tamil Nadu with a population of more than 70 million, <u><mark>a private hospital</mark>–public hospital partnership promoting deceased-donor transplantation <mark>has</mark> <mark>effectively eliminated commercialization in a manner that can <strong>serve as a model for other regions</strong> </mark>of South Asia and developing countries</u> (23).</p><p>China</p><p>Chinese organ transplant activities have global implications. For the last decade or more, Chinese hospitals, aided by Internet advertising, have been major destinations for wealthy or well-insured transplant tourists from around the world. The conversion of the body of an executed prisoner into cash through sale of its organs and the exploitation of living kidney donors for foreign patients not only engenders profound ethical concerns but also comes at the expense of the needs of the Chinese population.</p><p>The DoI specifically addresses the unacceptable nature of the Chinese practice of “donation by execution.” The DICG, the TTS (24), and other nongovernmental organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have taken an unequivocal stance against this practice while promoting ethically acceptable alternatives (25). As urged by the DICG, several academic journals have placed barriers to the publication of data that involve executed prisoners, societies of transplant professionals have prevented the presentation at their meetings of clinical research involving executed prisoners, and pharmaceutical companies have limited clinical trials in China for the same reason. The firm stance by the DICG and other international groups, as well as the policies promoted by the WHO, are having notable effects. High-ranking Chinese government officials have themselves brought attention to the lack of acceptance by the international community of the practice of using organs from executed prisoners and of the corruption and commercialization that characterize living and deceased donation in China (26). Authorities have closed dozens of transplant programs, which violated new rules that severely limit transplant tourism. In the next cycle of reauthorization, Chinese transplant programs will be required to have in place alternative programs to the use of organs from executed prisoners (27). <u><mark>Progressive changes</mark> in China <mark>will have significant implications for</mark> <mark>countries from which a substantial number of transplant recipients have traveled</mark> in recent years <mark>to China</u></mark> to purchase organs. Nonethnic Chinese have been known to use assumed names and identities presumably to bypass the Chinese law that officially criminalizes such activities.</p><p>The Philippines</p><p>Fueled by poverty in the slums of Manila and an extensive network of organ brokers, the Philippines was a well-known destination for transplant tourists during the past decade; even programs that provided transplants for domestic patients relied on the profits from transplanting foreign patients. A presidential directive, issued on April 30, 2008, at the start of the Istanbul Summit, established a ban on foreign recipients receiving kidneys from Filipino living donors. Supplemental rules and regulations for the implementation of the organ trafficking provision of the Anti-Human Trafficking Law went into effect in June 2009 (28). The annual number of foreign transplant recipients fell from 531 in 2007 to 2 in 2011, and the number of deceased-donor transplants has increased threefold in the same period (29).</p><p>Egypt</p><p>Since the 1980s, Egypt has been the main locale for organ trafficking and transplant tourism in the Middle East (2). In February 2010, representatives of the WHO and the DICG obtained commitments from Egyptian transplant leaders and policymakers to end these practices; this culminated in the passage of the landmark Law on Human Organ Transplantation, which prohibits and penalizes organ trafficking and permits deceased donation in accord with the WHO Guiding Principles and the DoI (30). Unfortunately, political changes have shifted the focus, and most centers appear to be undertaking commercial organ transplants, including the use of trafficked donors, despite the 2010 law (31, 32). <u><mark>The reporting of Egyptian transplant data to a new registry</mark> under the auspices of the Middle Eastern Society of Transplantation <mark>may provide a much-needed source of transparency</u></mark>.</p><p>Colombia and Latin America</p><p>In the first decade of the 21st century, Colombia was a major provider of deceased-donor organs for wealthy foreigners. A concerted effort by the government to stop this practice and direct organs to citizens of Colombia and neighboring countries, through regional governmental agreements, led to a fall in transplants to noncitizens from 16.5% of the total (200 transplants) in 2005 to 1.37% (16 transplants) in 2010 (33). <u><mark>The presidents of every</mark> Latin American <mark>Society of Nephrology have endorsed the DoI</u></mark> (11), and the Society of Transplantation of Latin America and Caribbean (STALYC), during the first Latin American Forum in Ethics and Transplantation adopted the “Document of Aguascalientes”, which closely parallels the DoI (34). In February 2012, <u><mark>Brazil became the first country to include</mark> <mark>specific reference to the DoI in its national regulations</mark> regarding transplanting organs </u>into nonresidents (35).</p>	2NC	Case - trafficking	2nc uniqueness	431,214	3	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,878	We should not abandon the category of universal humanity. Anti-slavery abolition and its intersections with critiques of gendered citizenship drew on universal humanity as a source of solidarity.	GILROY ‘9	Paul GILROY Anthony Giddens Prf. of Social Theory @ London School of Economics ‘9 Race and the Right to be Human p. 6-11	At times, the movement against slavery was extended into a comprehensive assault on racial hierarchy which invoked an idea of universal humanity as well as inalienable rights That alternative provides my point of departure It was articulated in distinctive accents which were neither bourgeois nor liberal the idea of universal humanity its origins, its hierarchies and varying moral and juridical dispositions—were connected to struggles over race, slavery, colonial and imperial rule This agonistic enterprise necessitates a different genealogy for human rights than is conventional It begins with the history of conquest and European expansion and the debates over how colonies and slave plantation systems were to be administered , it must incorporate the contending voices of Las Casas and Sepulveda Focusing on that combination of progress and catastrophe through a postcolonial lens They valorized forms of humanity that were not amenable to colour-coded hierarchy and, in complicating approaches to human sameness, they refused the full, obvious force of natural differences even when they were articulated together with sex and gender These struggles shaped philosophical perspectives on the fragile universals that had come into focus initially on the insurgent edges of colonial contact zones where the violence of racialized statecraft was repudiated and cosmopolitan varieties of care took shape unexpectedly across the boundaries of culture, civilization, language and technology One early critique of the humanitarian language and tacit racialization of the enlightenment ideal had been delivered by the militant abolitionist David Walker in his 1830 commentary on the US constitution Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World, but in particular, and very expressly, to those of the United States of America His famous text supplies a useful symbolic, starting point for generating the new genealogy we require Walker made the problem of black humanity and related issues of rights—political and human—intrinsic to his insubordinate conception of world citizenship. His plea that blacks be recognized as belonging to “the human family” was combined with a view of their natural rights as being wrongfully confiscated in the condition of slavery which could, as a result of their exclusion, be justifiably overthrown Frederick Douglass particularly in his extraordinary 1852 speech on the meaning of the 4th of July to the slave spoke directly to the US in the name of its polluted national citizenship Must I undertake to prove that the slave is a man? That point is conceded already. Nobody doubts it. The slave-holders themselves acknowledge it in the enactment of laws for their government They acknowledge it when they punish disobedience on the part of the slave rimké had articulated the concept of human rights in her 1836 Appeal To The Christian Women of The South man is never vested with . . . dominion over his fellow man; he was never told that any of the human species were put under his feet; it was only all things, and man, who was created in the image of his Maker, never can properly be termed a thing, though the laws of Slave States do call him ‘a chattel personal Her insight was framed by a deep engagement with the problem of a gendered alienation from the humanity of “species being “The investigation of the rights of the slave has led me to better understanding of our own. I have found the Anti-slavery cause to be the high school of morals in our land—the school in which human rights are more fully investigated and better understood and taught The foregrounding of race is a fundamental and distinguishing feature as is the suggestion that reflecting upon the thwarted rights of slaves promotes a richer understanding of the rightslessness known by women. Here, slavery was not only a political metaphor. A different kind of connection was being proposed: whoever we are, we can learn about our own situation from studying the suffering of others which instructively resembles it. This approach makes the disinterest in abolitionism shown by today’s liberal chroniclers of human rights struggles all the more perplexing The long battle to appropriate the language and political morality of human rights re-worked the assumptions which had led to articulating the unthinkable prospects of black citizenship and black humanity The liberatory recognition solicited by those inquiries was pitched against the corrosive power of racial categories and mediated by the cosmopolitan power of human shame. It asked that the social divisions signified by phenotypical difference be set aside in favour of a more substantive human commonality	At times, the movement against slavery was extended into a comprehensive assault on racial hierarchy which invoked an idea of universal humanity as well as inalienable rights1 That alternative provides my point of departure It was articulated in distinctive accents which were neither bourgeois nor liberal the idea of universal humanity were connected to struggles over race, slavery, colonial and imperial rule This agonistic enterprise necessitates a different genealogy for human rights than is conventional. It begins with conquest and European expansion and debates over colonies Focusing on combination of progress and catastrophe through a postcolonial lens Frederick Douglass spoke directly to the US in the name of its polluted national citizenship. The slave-holders themselves acknowledge it in the enactment of laws for their government. They acknowledge it when they punish disobedience on the part of the slave. Her insight d by a deep engagement with the problem of a gendered alienation from the humanity of “species being”: “ I found the Anti-slavery cause to be the high school of morals in our land—the school in which human rights are more fully investigated and better understood and taught, The foregrounding of race is, a fundamental and distinguishing feature as is the suggestion that reflecting upon the thwarted rights of slaves promotes a richer understanding of the rightslessness known by women slavery was not only a political metaphor. A different kind of connection was being proposed: whoever we are, we can learn about our own situation from studying the suffering of others which instructively resembles it. led to articulating the unthinkable prospects of black citizenship and black humanity	At times, the movement against slavery was extended into a comprehensive assault on racial hierarchy which invoked an idea of universal humanity (by no means always religious in origin) as well as an idea of inalienable rights1. That alternative provides my point of departure this evening. It was articulated in distinctive accents which were neither bourgeois nor liberal. It requires us to follow a detour through colonial history which has come under revisionist pressure as a result of recent attempts to revive imperial relations. That dubious development has made it imperative to place the west’s avowal of modern, liberal, humanistic and humanitarian ideas in the context of the formative encounter with native peoples whose moral personality and humanity had long been placed in doubt. The approach I favour requires seeing not just how all-conquering liberal sensibilities evolved unevenly into considerations of human rights but how a range of disputes over and around the idea of universal humanity—its origins, its hierarchies and varying moral and juridical dispositions—were connected to struggles over race, slavery, colonial and imperial rule, and how they in turn produced positions which would later be narrated and claimed as liberal. This agonistic enterprise necessitates a different genealogy for human rights than is conventional. It begins with the history of conquest and European expansion and must be able to encompass the evolving debates over how colonies and slave plantation systems were to be administered4. At its most basic, it must incorporate the contending voices of Las Casas and Sepulveda. It should be able to analyze the contrapuntality of a text like Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan with the introduction of England’s Navigation Acts and illuminate the relationship between John Locke’s insightful advocacy on behalf of an emergent bourgeoisie and his commitment to the colonial improvers’ doctrine of the vacuum domicilium. This counter-narrative would certainly include the Treaty of Utrecht and the Assiento. It could terminate uneasily in the contemporary debates about torture and rendition or in discussion about the institutionalisation of rightslessness which floods into my mind each time I navigate the halls of the Schiphol complex. Focusing on that combination of progress and catastrophe through a postcolonial lens yields a view of what would become the liberal tradition moving on from its seventeenth century origins in a style of thought that was partly formed by and readily adapted to colonial conditions5. This helps to explain how an obstinate attachment to raciology recurs. Struggles against racial hierarchy have contributed directly and consistently to challenging conceptions of the human. They valorized forms of humanity that were not amenable to colour-coded hierarchy and, in complicating approaches to human sameness, they refused the full, obvious force of natural differences even when they were articulated together with sex and gender. These struggles shaped philosophical perspectives on the fragile universals that had come into focus initially on the insurgent edges of colonial contact zones where the violence of racialized statecraft was repudiated and cosmopolitan varieties of care took shape unexpectedly across the boundaries of culture, civilization, language and technology6. One early critique of the humanitarian language and tacit racialization of the enlightenment ideal had been delivered by the militant abolitionist David Walker in his 1830 commentary on the US constitution: Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World, but in particular, and very expressly, to those of the United States of America. His famous text supplies a useful symbolic, starting point for generating the new genealogy we require. Erecting secular demands over the foundation of a revolutionary, Pauline Christianity, Walker made the problem of black humanity and related issues of rights—political and human—intrinsic to his insubordinate conception of world citizenship. His plea that blacks be recognized as belonging to “the human family” was combined with a view of their natural rights as being wrongfully confiscated in the condition of slavery which could, as a result of their exclusion, be justifiably overthrown7. His address was primarily offered to the coloured citizens of the world but the tactical reduction of that universalist argument to the parochial problem of joining the US as full citizens soon followed. The consequences of that change of scale can be readily seen in the humanistic abolitionism that followed. Frederick Douglass—particularly in his extraordinary 1852 speech on the meaning of the 4th of July to the slave8, spoke directly to the US in the name of its polluted national citizenship. His indictment of slavery was a cosmopolitan one in which the eloquent facts of plantation life were judged, just as Walker had suggested they should be, through global comparisons. They were compared with all the abuse to be found in “the monarchies and despotisms of the Old World (and in) South America”. Douglass concluded that “for revolting barbarity and shameless hypocrisy, America reigns without a rival”. He continued, again echoing Walker: “Must I undertake to prove that the slave is a man? That point is conceded already. Nobody doubts it. The slave-holders themselves acknowledge it in the enactment of laws for their government. They acknowledge it when they punish disobedience on the part of the slave. . . . . . How should I look to-day, in the presence of Americans, dividing, and subdividing a discourse, to show that men have a natural right to freedom? speaking of it relatively and positively, negatively and affirmatively. To do so, would be to make myself ridiculous, and to offer an insult to your understanding.”9 In demanding equality based on natural rights and exploring the relationship of debased citizenship and tainted law to racialized life, Douglass was drawing upon the thinking of an earlier cohort of abolitionist writers. Many of them had, like Walker and other anti-slavery radicals, practiced a chiliastic Christianity that built upon St. Paul with incendiary consequences which could not be limited by the heading of anti-slavery. Consider the way in which Angelina Grimké had articulated the concept of human rights in her 1836 Appeal To The Christian Women of The South: . . . man is never vested with . . . dominion over his fellow man; he was never told that any of the human species were put under his feet; it was only all things, and man, who was created in the image of his Maker, never can properly be termed a thing, though the laws of Slave States do call him ‘a chattel personal;’ Man then, I assert never was put under the feet of man, by that first charter of human rights which was given by God, to the Fathers of the Antediluvian and Postdiluvian worlds, therefore this doctrine of equality is based on the Bible10. Grimké elaborated upon this inspired refusal of the reduction of people to things in a memorable (1838) letter to her friend Catherine Beecher (the older sister of Harriet Beecher Stowe). There, she connected the notion of divinely instituted human rights to a growing sense of what it would mean for women to acquire political rights. Her insight was framed by a deep engagement with the problem of a gendered alienation from the humanity of “species being”: “The investigation of the rights of the slave has led me to better understanding of our own. I have found the Anti-slavery cause to be the high school of morals in our land—the school in which human rights are more fully investigated and better understood and taught, than in any other. Here a great fundamental principle is uplifted and illuminated, and from this central light rays innumerable stream all around. Human beings have rights, because they are moral beings: the rights of all men grown out of their moral nature, they have essentially the same rights. ”11 It is not easy to assimilate this variety of critical reflection to the political traditions inherited by modern liberalism from revolutionary France. The foregrounding of race is, for example, a fundamental and distinguishing feature as is the suggestion that reflecting upon the thwarted rights of slaves promotes a richer understanding of the rightslessness known by women. Here, slavery was not only a political metaphor. A different kind of connection was being proposed: whoever we are, we can learn about our own situation from studying the suffering of others which instructively resembles it. This approach makes the disinterest in abolitionism shown by today’s liberal chroniclers of human rights struggles all the more perplexing. The long battle to appropriate the language and political morality of human rights re-worked the assumptions which had led to articulating the unthinkable prospects of black citizenship and black humanity in the form of the ancient rhetorical questions immortalized in Wedgewood’s porcelain: “Am I not a Man and a brother?” “Am I not a Woman and a sister?”. The liberatory recognition solicited by those inquiries was pitched against the corrosive power of racial categories and mediated by the cosmopolitan power of human shame. It asked that the social divisions signified by phenotypical difference be set aside in favour of a more substantive human commonality. It promised an alternative conception of kinship that could deliver a world purged of injustice in general and racial hierarchy in particular.	9,547	<h4>We should not abandon the category of universal humanity. Anti-slavery abolition and its intersections with critiques of gendered citizenship drew on universal humanity as a source of solidarity. </h4><p>Paul <u><strong>GILROY</u></strong> Anthony Giddens Prf. of Social Theory @ London School of Economics <u><strong>‘9</u></strong> Race and the Right to be Human p. 6-11</p><p><u><mark>At times, the movement against slavery was extended into a comprehensive assault on racial hierarchy which invoked an idea of <strong>universal humanity</u></strong></mark> (by no means always religious in origin) <u><mark>as well as</u></mark> an idea of <u><mark>inalienable rights</u>1</mark>. <u><mark>That alternative provides my point of departure</u></mark> this evening. <u><mark>It was articulated in distinctive accents which were <strong>neither bourgeois nor liberal</u></strong></mark>. It requires us to follow a detour through colonial history which has come under revisionist pressure as a result of recent attempts to revive imperial relations. That dubious development has made it imperative to place the west’s avowal of modern, liberal, humanistic and humanitarian ideas in the context of the formative encounter with native peoples whose moral personality and humanity had long been placed in doubt. The approach I favour requires seeing not just how all-conquering liberal sensibilities evolved unevenly into considerations of human rights but how a range of disputes over and around <u><mark>the idea of universal humanity</u></mark>—<u>its origins, its hierarchies and varying moral and juridical dispositions—<mark>were connected to struggles</mark> <mark>over race, slavery, colonial and imperial rule</u></mark>, and how they in turn produced positions which would later be narrated and claimed as liberal. <u><mark>This agonistic enterprise necessitates a</mark> <strong><mark>different genealogy</strong> for human rights than is conventional</u>. <u>It begins with</mark> the history of <mark>conquest and European expansion</u> <u>and</u></mark> must be able to encompass <u>the</u> evolving <u><mark>debates</mark> <mark>over</mark> how <mark>colonies</mark> and slave plantation systems were to be administered</u>4. At its most basic<u>, it must incorporate the contending voices of Las Casas and Sepulveda</u>. It should be able to analyze the contrapuntality of a text like Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan with the introduction of England’s Navigation Acts and illuminate the relationship between John Locke’s insightful advocacy on behalf of an emergent bourgeoisie and his commitment to the colonial improvers’ doctrine of the vacuum domicilium. This counter-narrative would certainly include the Treaty of Utrecht and the Assiento. It could terminate uneasily in the contemporary debates about torture and rendition or in discussion about the institutionalisation of rightslessness which floods into my mind each time I navigate the halls of the Schiphol complex. <u><mark>Focusing on</mark> that <strong><mark>combination of progress and catastrophe</strong> through a postcolonial lens</mark> </u>yields a view of what would become the liberal tradition moving on from its seventeenth century origins in a style of thought that was partly formed by and readily adapted to colonial conditions5. This helps to explain how an obstinate attachment to raciology recurs. Struggles against racial hierarchy have contributed directly and consistently to challenging conceptions of the human. <u>They valorized forms of humanity that were not amenable to colour-coded hierarchy and, in complicating approaches to human sameness, they refused the full, obvious force of natural differences even when they were articulated together with sex and gender</u>. <u>These struggles shaped philosophical perspectives on the fragile universals that had come into focus initially on the insurgent edges of colonial contact zones where the violence of racialized statecraft was repudiated and cosmopolitan varieties of care took shape unexpectedly across the boundaries of culture, civilization, language and technology</u>6. <u>One early critique of the humanitarian language and tacit racialization of the enlightenment ideal had been delivered by the militant abolitionist David Walker in his 1830 commentary on the US constitution</u>: <u>Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World, but in particular, and very expressly, to those of the United States of America</u>. <u>His famous text supplies a useful symbolic, starting point for generating the new genealogy we require</u>. Erecting secular demands over the foundation of a revolutionary, Pauline Christianity, <u>Walker made the problem of black humanity and related issues of rights—political and human—intrinsic to his insubordinate conception of world citizenship. His plea that blacks be recognized as belonging to “the human family” was combined with a view of their natural rights as being wrongfully confiscated in the condition of slavery which could, as a result of their exclusion, be justifiably overthrown</u>7. His address was primarily offered to the coloured citizens of the world but the tactical reduction of that universalist argument to the parochial problem of joining the US as full citizens soon followed. The consequences of that change of scale can be readily seen in the humanistic abolitionism that followed. <u><mark>Frederick Douglass</u></mark>—<u>particularly in his extraordinary 1852 speech on the meaning of the 4th of July to the slave</u>8, <u><mark>spoke directly to the US <strong>in the name of its polluted national citizenship</u></strong>.</mark> His indictment of slavery was a cosmopolitan one in which the eloquent facts of plantation life were judged, just as Walker had suggested they should be, through global comparisons. They were compared with all the abuse to be found in “the monarchies and despotisms of the Old World (and in) South America”. Douglass concluded that “for revolting barbarity and shameless hypocrisy, America reigns without a rival”. He<u> </u>continued, again echoing Walker: “<u>Must I undertake to prove that the slave is a man? That point is conceded already. Nobody doubts it. <mark>The slave-holders themselves acknowledge it in the enactment of laws for their government</u>. <u>They acknowledge it when they punish disobedience on the part of the slave</u>.</mark> . . . . . How should I look to-day, in the presence of Americans, dividing, and subdividing a discourse, to show that men have a natural right to freedom? speaking of it relatively and positively, negatively and affirmatively. To do so, would be to make myself ridiculous, and to offer an insult to your understanding.”9 In demanding equality based on natural rights and exploring the relationship of debased citizenship and tainted law to racialized life, Douglass was drawing upon the thinking of an earlier cohort of abolitionist writers. Many of them had, like Walker and other anti-slavery radicals, practiced a chiliastic Christianity that built upon St. Paul with incendiary consequences which could not be limited by the heading of anti-slavery. Consider the way in which Angelina G<u>rimké had articulated the concept of human rights in her 1836 Appeal To The Christian Women of The South</u>: . . . <u>man is never vested with . . . dominion over his fellow man; he was never told that any of the human species were put under his feet;</u> <u>it was only all things, and man, who was created in the image of his Maker, never can properly be termed a thing, though the laws of Slave States do call him ‘a chattel personal</u>;’ Man then, I assert never was put under the feet of man, by that first charter of human rights which was given by God, to the Fathers of the Antediluvian and Postdiluvian worlds, therefore this doctrine of equality is based on the Bible10. Grimké elaborated upon this inspired refusal of the reduction of people to things in a memorable (1838) letter to her friend Catherine Beecher (the older sister of Harriet Beecher Stowe). There, she connected the notion of divinely instituted human rights to a growing sense of what it would mean for women to acquire political rights. <u><mark>Her insight</mark> was frame<mark>d by a deep engagement with the problem of a gendered alienation from the humanity of “species being</u>”: <u>“</mark>The investigation of the rights of the slave has led me to better understanding of our own. <mark>I</mark> have <mark>found</mark> <mark>the Anti-slavery cause to be the high school of morals in our land—the school in which human rights are more fully investigated and better understood and taught</u>,</mark> than in any other. Here a great fundamental principle is uplifted and illuminated, and from this central light rays innumerable stream all around. Human beings have rights, because they are moral beings: the rights of all men grown out of their moral nature, they have essentially the same rights. ”11 It is not easy to assimilate this variety of critical reflection to the political traditions inherited by modern liberalism from revolutionary France. <u><mark>The foregrounding of race is</u>,</mark> for example, <u><mark>a fundamental and distinguishing feature as is the suggestion that reflecting upon the thwarted rights of slaves promotes a richer understanding of the rightslessness known by women</mark>.</u> <u>Here, <mark>slavery was not only a political metaphor.</u> <u>A different kind of connection was being proposed: whoever we are, <strong>we can learn about our own situation from studying the suffering of others which instructively resembles it.</u></strong> <u></mark>This approach makes the disinterest in abolitionism shown by today’s liberal chroniclers of human rights struggles all the more perplexing</u>. <u>The long battle to appropriate the language and political morality of human rights re-worked the assumptions which had <mark>led to <strong>articulating the unthinkable prospects of black</strong> <strong>citizenship and black humanity</u></mark> in</strong> the form of the ancient rhetorical questions immortalized in Wedgewood’s porcelain: “Am I not a Man and a brother?” “Am I not a Woman and a sister?”. <u>The liberatory recognition solicited by those inquiries was pitched against the corrosive power of racial categories and mediated by the cosmopolitan power of human shame. It asked that the social divisions signified by phenotypical difference be set aside in favour of a more substantive human commonality</u>. It promised an alternative conception of kinship that could deliver a world purged of injustice in general and racial hierarchy in particular.</p>	1NC	null	humanism	424,085	13	17,121	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round5.docx	565,427	N	D6seceda	5	Wake Forest Athanasopoulos-Ning	Galloway	1NC T humanism good K case 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round5.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,879	Our alternative: Recognize that the epistemology diversity and density of native communities. Epistemological investigation should emphasize density not absolute difference because Western epistemes assist everyday struggles against resource exploitation.	Andersen 09	Andersen 09 Chris ANDERSEN Michif (Métis) from western Canada. He is an associate professor in the Faculty of Native Studies @ Alberta ‘9 “critical indigenous studies From Difference to Density” Cultural Studies Review 15 (2) p.95-96	let me offer some thoughts on where my removal of difference a central pillar of Native studies leaves us with respect to fashioning a discipline Champagne spends much of his analytical time arguing that Western concepts are of only limited use to Indigenous studies because they fail to account for the distinctive needs, aspirations and epistemologies of Indigenous communities. He thus positions Native studies (a position familiar to Native studies practitioners) as a dog on the leash for Indigenous communities and nations or especially) if Indigenous studies is a dog on the leash for Indigenous communities and nations, why does this necessarily require an entirely new set of theoretical or methodological precepts that differ from those of mainstream disciplines many of us have been involved in situations in which an Indigenous community has approached our department to ask for research assistance for mundane issues about collecting data on telephone or internet use in their community; proper application of census documents to produce the robust statistical profiles through which they interface with government funder water purity samples to make determinations of water safety; or even archival documents to assist them in legal battles over hunting, fishing and other resource extraction questions. Although the disciplines of sociology, biological sciences, history or anthropology could and have undertaken this assistance, so can many existing Indigenous studies departments It seems inherently strange to call for a theoretical and methodological orientation which possessed none of this capability His model presupposes the difference of Indigenous communities and in doing so slams the shutters closed on forms of expertise which might nonetheless prove of central concern to the communities although not fully captured by terms like race, ethnicity or class, such terms nonetheless assist greatly in reflecting upon the relationships between our communities and the various nation-states, and not only because they possess symbolic power in dominant society most prominent critique of Indigenous studies—that a ‘cacophony’ of theoretical and methodological tools will ‘doom’ it to institutional marginality is usually emphasised as a disciplinary strengt in dealing with the totalizing systems that we know as Native cultures, each view from traditional disciplines is limited and partial, NAS must draw together the various disciplines and their methods in order to achieve something approaching a complete picture of Natives, their cultures and experiences By beginning with the assumption that Indigenous communities are epistemologically dense (rather than just different appeal for interdisciplinarity becomes vital. Indeed, failure to account, interdisciplinarily, for this density elevates the danger of producing a naive, substantialist and ultimately parochial Indigenous studies	where removal of difference leaves us with respect to fashioning a discipline why does this require an entirely new set of theoretical or methodological precepts that differ from mainstream disciplines many of us have been involved in situations in which an Indigenous community has approached our department to ask for assistance for mundane issues about collecting data internet census documents water purity samples archival documents resource extraction questions It seems inherently strange to call for a theoretical and methodological orientation which possessed none of this capability model presupposes the difference of Indigenous communities and in doing so slams the shutters closed on forms of expertise which might prove of central concern to the communities such terms assist greatly in reflecting upon the relationships between our communities and the various nation-states, and not only because they possess symbolic power in dominant society By beginning with the assumption that Indigenous communities are epistemologically dense (rather than just different appeal for interdisciplinarity becomes vital failure to account, interdisciplinarily elevates the danger of producing a naive, substantialist and parochial studies	By way of conclusion, let me offer some thoughts on where my removal of difference—a central pillar of Champagne’s Native studies—leaves us with respect to fashioning a discipline which can honour our past complexity while accounting for its contemporary and future manifestations.68 Champagne spends much of his analytical time arguing that Western concepts and disciplines are of only limited use to Indigenous studies because they fail to account for the distinctive needs, aspirations and epistemologies of Indigenous communities. A proper Indigenous studies discipline must thus produce: points of view and conceptualizations drawing on the everyday strategies and conceptions of American Indian communities that require mainstream academics and policy makers to rethink and extend the views of indigenous groups, as a means to include their views and socio-cultural actions outside the use of class, ethnicity, race, and even nationality. Native American Studies, and more generally indigenous studies, calls for conceptualizations and strategies that encompass issues, rights, and strategies of political, cultural, and territorial survival.69 He thus positions Native studies (a position familiar to Native studies practitioners) as a dog on the leash for Indigenous communities and nations. Such a position offers little in the way of analysis about the complexity of academic/community relations but it certainly feels good to say. He doesn’t appear to realise the extent to which analysing such a relationship necessarily requires sliding into disciplinary territory long claimed by other disciplines. If his point is that as Indigenous studies practitioners we need to claim this territory as our own, I am in full agreement. My point is merely that staking such a claim requires none of the epistemological baggage he wants to pack for the journey, and indeed raises troubling issues that require us to carefully unpack what he proposes to bring. Two of these are worth unpacking here. First, the community/academic relationship which appears to anchor Champagne’s formulation is problematic in that it ignores the ways that whiteness in the academy shapes the boundaries of its knowledge production in ways which do not necessarily subscribe to the regimes under which community knowledges are produced: Moreton-Robinson contends quite rightly that such representations ‘may not reflect the same knowledges about authenticity that are created and deployed within and by Indigenous communities and as such they may not be acceptable’.70 In ignoring this complexity, how on earth is Champagne to deal with the conflicts that inevitably arise? It does little good to acquiesce to one discourse or the other (though more often than not academic representations are given the nod), nor can we pretend that such differences are always reconcilable. These conflicts arise in situations pertaining to fundamentally irreconcilable positions on precisely the relationships between humans and nature (as Champagne points to) but they can also arise in more mundane situations, such as how to provide honorariums for elders involved in research projects in ways which don’t claw back from their monthly social assistance cheques. Second, even (or especially) if Indigenous studies is a dog on the leash for Indigenous communities and nations, why does this necessarily require an entirely new set of theoretical or methodological precepts that differ from those of mainstream disciplines? I agree with the broad strokes of Champagne’s argument about constructing a specific niche for ourselves in the academic, as do many other Native studies practitioners. But many of us have been involved in situations in which an Indigenous community has approached our department to ask for research assistance for mundane issues about collecting data on telephone or internet use in their community; proper application of census documents to produce the robust statistical profiles through which they interface with government funders; water purity samples to make determinations of water safety; or even archival documents to assist them in legal battles over hunting, fishing and other resource extraction questions. Although the disciplines of sociology, biological sciences, history or anthropology could and have undertaken this assistance, so can many existing Indigenous studies departments. It seems inherently strange to call for a theoretical and methodological orientation—and thus, according to Champagne, a discipline—which possessed none of this capability. His model presupposes the difference of Indigenous communities and in doing so slams the shutters closed on forms of expertise which might nonetheless prove of central concern to the communities. Champagne contends that ‘the issues confronting indigenous peoples are not reducible to race, class, ethnicity or other common analytical dimensions in use within mainstream disciplines’.71 The problem, from an epistemological standpoint, is that no issues of any peoples can be reduced to these factors. Concepts—all concepts—are by definition schematic and as such are laughably simplistic in the face of the enormous complexity of human life. This complexity requires us to acknowledge that Indigenous communities are—and have been for centuries—more than the ‘holistic, institutionally nondifferentiated’ entities in which ‘knowledge is inherently integrated with community, culture, and political and economic relations’72 painted by Champagne. Thus, although not fully captured by terms like race, ethnicity or class, such terms nonetheless assist greatly in reflecting upon the relationships between our communities and the various nation-states, and not only because they possess symbolic power in dominant society. The real irony of Champagne’s model of Indigenous studies is that his choices of analytical focus require none of the theoretical or methodological prescriptions he begs of them. For example, his most prominent critique of Indigenous studies—that a ‘cacophony’ of theoretical and methodological tools will ‘doom’ it to institutional marginality73—is usually emphasised as a disciplinary strength. Thus, Indigenous studies scholar Jace Weaver writes that: in dealing with the totalizing systems that we know as Native cultures, each view from traditional disciplines is limited and partial, NAS must draw together the various disciplines and their methods in order to achieve something approaching a complete picture of Natives, their cultures and experiences.74 This isn’t an issue for Champagne, apparently, since his positioning of Indigenous communities strips them of any of the epistemological complexity that would require us to intrude on others’ disciplinary turf. He sees this as his model’s strength but in fact it becomes its Achilles heel. By beginning with the assumption that Indigenous communities are epistemologically dense (rather than just different), however, Weaver’s appeal for interdisciplinarity becomes vital. Indeed, failure to account, interdisciplinarily, for this density elevates the danger of producing a naive, substantialist and ultimately parochial Indigenous studies.	7,186	<h4>Our alternative: Recognize that the epistemology diversity and density of native communities. Epistemological investigation should emphasize density not absolute difference because Western epistemes assist everyday struggles against resource exploitation. </h4><p><strong>Andersen 09 </strong>Chris ANDERSEN Michif (Métis) from western Canada. He is an associate professor in the Faculty of Native Studies @ Alberta ‘9 “critical indigenous studies From Difference to Density” Cultural Studies Review 15 (2) p.95-96</p><p>By way of conclusion, <u>let me offer some thoughts on <mark>where</mark> my <mark>removal of difference</u></mark>—<u>a central pillar</u> <u>of</u> Champagne’s <u>Native studies</u>—<u><mark>leaves</u> <u>us with respect to fashioning a discipline</u></mark> which can honour our past complexity while accounting for its contemporary and future manifestations.68 <u>Champagne spends much of his analytical time arguing that Western concepts</u> and disciplines <u>are of only limited use to</u> <u>Indigenous studies because they fail to account for the distinctive needs, aspirations and epistemologies of Indigenous communities.</u> A proper Indigenous studies discipline must thus produce: points of view and conceptualizations drawing on the everyday strategies and conceptions of American Indian communities that require mainstream academics and policy makers to rethink and extend the views of indigenous groups, as a means to include their views and socio-cultural actions outside the use of class, ethnicity, race, and even nationality. Native American Studies, and more generally indigenous studies, calls for conceptualizations and strategies that encompass issues, rights, and strategies of political, cultural, and territorial survival.69 <u>He thus positions Native studies (a position familiar to Native studies practitioners) as a dog on the leash for Indigenous communities and nations</u>. Such a position offers little in the way of analysis about the complexity of academic/community relations but it certainly feels good to say. He doesn’t appear to realise the extent to which analysing such a relationship necessarily requires sliding into disciplinary territory long claimed by other disciplines. If his point is that as Indigenous studies practitioners we need to claim this territory as our own, I am in full agreement. My point is merely that staking such a claim requires none of the epistemological baggage he wants to pack for the journey, and indeed raises troubling issues that require us to carefully unpack what he proposes to bring. Two of these are worth unpacking here. First, the community/academic relationship which appears to anchor Champagne’s formulation is problematic in that it ignores the ways that whiteness in the academy shapes the boundaries of its knowledge production in ways which do not necessarily subscribe to the regimes under which community knowledges are produced: Moreton-Robinson contends quite rightly that such representations ‘may not reflect the same knowledges about authenticity that are created and deployed within and by Indigenous communities and as such they may not be acceptable’.70 In ignoring this complexity, how on earth is Champagne to deal with the conflicts that inevitably arise? It does little good to acquiesce to one discourse or the other (though more often than not academic representations are given the nod), nor can we pretend that such differences are always reconcilable. These conflicts arise in situations pertaining to fundamentally irreconcilable positions on precisely the relationships between humans and nature (as Champagne points to) but they can also arise in more mundane situations, such as how to provide honorariums for elders involved in research projects in ways which don’t claw back from their monthly social assistance cheques. Second, even (<u>or especially) if Indigenous studies is a dog on the leash for Indigenous communities and nations, <mark>why does this</mark> necessarily <mark>require an entirely new set of theoretical or methodological precepts that differ from</mark> those of <mark>mainstream disciplines</u></mark>? I agree with the broad strokes of Champagne’s argument about constructing a specific niche for ourselves in the academic, as do many other Native studies practitioners. But <u><mark>many of us have been involved in situations in which an Indigenous community has approached our department to ask for</mark> research <mark>assistance for mundane issues about collecting data</mark> on telephone or <mark>internet</mark> use in their community; proper application of <mark>census documents</mark> to produce the robust statistical profiles through which they interface with government funder</u>s; <u><mark>water purity samples</mark> to make determinations of water safety; or even <mark>archival documents</mark> to assist them in legal battles over hunting, fishing and other <mark>resource extraction questions</mark>.</u> <u>Although the disciplines of sociology, biological sciences, history or anthropology could and have undertaken this assistance, so can many existing Indigenous studies departments</u>. <u><mark>It</u> <u>seems inherently strange to call for a theoretical and methodological orientation</u></mark>—and thus, according to Champagne, a discipline—<u><mark>which possessed none of this capability</u></mark>. <u>His <mark>model presupposes the difference of Indigenous communities and in doing so slams the shutters closed on <strong>forms of expertise</strong> which might</mark> nonetheless <mark>prove of <strong>central concern to the communities</u></strong></mark>. Champagne contends that ‘the issues confronting indigenous peoples are not reducible to race, class, ethnicity or other common analytical dimensions in use within mainstream disciplines’.71 The problem, from an epistemological standpoint, is that no issues of any peoples can be reduced to these factors. Concepts—all concepts—are by definition schematic and as such are laughably simplistic in the face of the enormous complexity of human life. This complexity requires us to acknowledge that Indigenous communities are—and have been for centuries—more than the ‘holistic, institutionally nondifferentiated’ entities in which ‘knowledge is inherently integrated with community, culture, and political and economic relations’72 painted by Champagne. Thus, <u>although not fully captured by terms like race, ethnicity or class, <mark>such terms</mark> nonetheless <mark>assist greatly in reflecting upon the relationships between our communities and the various nation-states, and <strong>not only because they possess symbolic power</strong> in dominant society</u></mark>. The real irony of Champagne’s model of Indigenous studies is that his choices of analytical focus require none of the theoretical or methodological prescriptions he begs of them. For example, his <u>most prominent critique of Indigenous studies—that a ‘cacophony’ of theoretical and methodological tools will ‘doom’ it to institutional marginality</u>73—<u>is usually emphasised as a disciplinary strengt</u>h. Thus, Indigenous studies scholar Jace Weaver writes that: <u>in dealing with the totalizing systems that we know as Native cultures, each view from traditional disciplines is limited and partial, NAS must draw together the various disciplines and their methods in order to achieve something approaching a complete picture of Natives, their cultures and experiences</u>.74 This isn’t an issue for Champagne, apparently, since his positioning of Indigenous communities strips them of any of the epistemological complexity that would require us to intrude on others’ disciplinary turf. He sees this as his model’s strength but in fact it becomes its Achilles heel. <u><mark>By beginning with the assumption that Indigenous communities are <strong>epistemologically dense</strong> (rather than just different</u></mark>), however, Weaver’s <u><mark>appeal for interdisciplinarity becomes</mark> <mark>vital</mark>. Indeed, <mark>failure to account, interdisciplinarily</mark>, for this density <mark>elevates the danger of producing a naive, substantialist and</mark> ultimately <mark>parochial</mark> Indigenous <mark>studies</u></mark>.</p>	1nc vs WGA	null	1nc – Native K	99,115	32	17,118	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	565,420	N	Gsu	1	West Georgia Muhammad-Gaius	Deming	1NC T occidentalism K law good K impact turns 2NC Space colonization impact turn 1NR T 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,880	Harmonized tax regime’s key to prevent global tax avoidance by MNCs---unchecked avoidance crushes developing world tax revenue	Biron 14	Carey L. Biron 14, Inter Press Service, 6/26/14, “IMF Issues “Revolutionary” Warning on Corporate Tax Avoidance,” http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/06/imf-issues-revolutionary-warning-on-corporate-tax-avoidance/	the IMF issued an unusually stark warning over the lack of harmonised global tax policies these gaps are allowing for widespread tax gaming by corporations with particularly negative impacts for developing countries The paper is the result of a new focus on tax-dodging among the G20 The sums involved can be large, not just relative to corporate tax but relative to all tax revenue these effects are systematically more important for developing countries Corporate tax rates have plummeted in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, rich and middle-income countries have begun actively discussing how to maximise their tax revenues, with a focus on ending corporate accounting gimmickry Rich companies could be stashing away as much as 20 trillion dollars overseas in order to escape national taxation Developed countries need more income and are mad because not everyone is paying their taxes that anger is also translating into public pressure People who pay their taxes even during a difficult recession are even madder than the governments tax competition between countries has been significantly exacerbated as multinational companies have increasingly learned how to legally “move” their operations for tax benefit a key issue in assessing any international tax arrangement is how it divides the rights to tax between source and residence countries The allocation of rights is especially important for low-income countries the impact of these spillover effects on corporate tax bases are “significant and sizable especially for low-income countries The IMF analysis raises worrying concerns about the impact of tax rules and practices in rich countries on the ability of poor countries to raise their own revenues We see a clear message to … major capital-exporting countries to review their tax rules and make sure they are not harming the ability of poor countries to raise the revenues they need for their development	IMF issued a warning over lack of harmonised global tax policies gaps are allowing widespread tax gaming by corporations with negative impacts for developing countries sums involved can be large relative to revenue companies could be stashing 20 trillion to escape taxation key in any international tax arrangement is how it divides the rights to tax between source and residence countries allocation of rights is especially important for low-income countries We see a message to major capital-exporting countries to review their tax rules and make sure they are not harming the ability of poor countries to raise revenues for development	The staff at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has issued an unusually stark warning over the lack of harmonised global tax policies, pointing out that these gaps are allowing for widespread tax gaming by corporations with particularly negative impacts for developing countries. Anti-poverty advocates are lauding a new staff paper from the fund released Wednesday. Its findings not only coincide with civil society calls for major taxation reforms at the national and international levels, but also repeatedly push back against longstanding tax-related dogma, including that offered by the Washington-based IMF itself. “This is, frankly, a revolutionary paper,” Jo Marie Griesgraber, the executive director of the New Rules for Global Finance Coalition, a Washington-based international network, told IPS. “It looks very carefully at many aspects of tax planning, and each time says that this has very negative impact on developing countries … Ultimately, it says that traditional tax theory is essentially uninformed by empirical knowledge.” The paper is the result of a new focus on tax-dodging among the Group of 20 (G20) industrialised countries, which directed the fund to undertake related research. The findings are particularly notable in their sustained focus on the impacts on developing countries. “Our technical assistance work in developing countries frequently encounters large revenue losses through gaps and weaknesses in the international tax regime,” Michael Keen, deputy director of the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, said in a statement. “The sums involved for them can be large, not just relative to corporate tax but relative to all tax revenue: 10-15 percent in some cases. The paper reports new evidence that these effects are in fact systematically more important for developing countries.” Corporate tax rates in all countries have plummeted in recent decades, the paper notes. Low-income countries have seen these rates degrade from near 50 percent in 1980 to under 30 percent last year. Others have seen similar plunges, with high-income countries seeing corporate taxation fall from around 40 percent three decades ago to little more than 20 percent today. Such trends have been tracked for years. Yet in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, rich and middle-income countries have begun actively discussing how to maximise their tax revenues, with a focus on ending corporate accounting gimmickry. Rich companies and individuals could be stashing away as much as 20 trillion dollars overseas in order to escape national taxation, according to some estimates. “Developed countries today need more income and are mad because not everyone is paying their taxes,” Griesgraber says. “And that anger is also translating into public pressure. People who pay their taxes even during a difficult recession are even madder than the governments.” “Meaningless” designations According to the IMF data, developing countries should perhaps be the most incensed by the impacts of today’s global taxation hodgepodge. The paper offers new findings on the ramifications of what the fund terms “spillover effects” – the ways in which one country’s tax rules impact on another country, which can also be thought of in terms of tax competition between countries. This phenomenon has been significantly exacerbated as multinational companies have increasingly learned how to legally “move” their operations – largely on paper – for tax benefit. Such companies appear to be based in countries with low taxes, despite doing most of their work in another country that, in turn, is unable to place levies on the company’s full earnings. “Current international tax arrangements rest on concepts of companies’ ‘residence’ and the ‘source’ of their income, both of which globalization has made increasingly fragile (some would say meaningless),” the paper states. “At its core, a key issue in assessing any international tax arrangement is how it divides the rights to tax between source and residence countries … The allocation of rights is especially important for low-income countries, however, as flows are for them commonly very asymmetric – they are essentially ‘source’ countries.” The fund staff found that the impact of these spillover effects on corporate tax bases are “significant and sizable” but are “especially pronounced for low-income countries”. Compared to rich countries, the paper notes, “the base spillovers from others’ tax rates are two to three times larger” in developing countries, and “statistically more significant”. Particularly problematic has been the extractives industry, though the fund also calls out telecommunications companies. The paper recounts IMF experiences in multiple countries where corporate tax trickery has eaten up much of a project’s revenue, such as a “gold mining sector in which USD 100 billion has been invested over the last decade, but which is almost entirely debt financed”. The fund ultimately goes so far as to suggest that countries should be extremely careful about signing any bilateral tax treaty, urging developing country governments instead to signal openness to investment by other means. Through such agreements, countries can sign away their right to levy full tax rates and give an upper hand to foreign corporations. “The IMF analysis raises some very worrying concerns about the impact of tax rules and practices in rich countries on the ability of poor countries to raise their own revenues,” Diarmid O’Sullivan, a tax justice policy advisor with ActionAid, a watchdog group, said Wednesday. “We see a clear message to … major capital-exporting countries to review their tax rules and make sure they are not harming the ability of poor countries to raise the revenues they need for their development.”	5,793	<h4><strong>Harmonized tax regime’s key to prevent global tax avoidance by MNCs---unchecked avoidance crushes developing world tax revenue </h4><p></strong>Carey L. <strong>Biron 14</strong>, Inter Press Service, 6/26/14, “IMF Issues “Revolutionary” Warning on Corporate Tax Avoidance,” http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/06/imf-issues-revolutionary-warning-on-corporate-tax-avoidance/</p><p>The staff at <u><strong>the</u></strong> International Monetary Fund (<u><strong><mark>IMF</u></strong></mark>) has <u><strong><mark>issued a</mark>n</u></strong> <u><strong>unusually stark <mark>warning over</mark> the</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>lack of harmonised global tax policies</u></strong></mark>, pointing out that <u><strong>these <mark>gaps are allowing</mark> for <mark>widespread tax gaming by corporations with</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>particularly <mark>negative impacts for developing countries</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Anti-poverty advocates are lauding a new staff paper from the fund released Wednesday. Its findings not only coincide with civil society calls for major taxation reforms at the national and international levels, but also repeatedly push back against longstanding tax-related dogma, including that offered by the Washington-based IMF itself.</p><p>“This is, frankly, a revolutionary paper,” Jo Marie Griesgraber, the executive director of the New Rules for Global Finance Coalition, a Washington-based international network, told IPS. </p><p>“It looks very carefully at many aspects of tax planning, and each time says that this has very negative impact on developing countries … Ultimately, it says that traditional tax theory is essentially uninformed by empirical knowledge.” </p><p><u><strong>The paper is the result of a</u></strong> <u><strong>new focus on tax-dodging</u></strong> <u><strong>among the</u></strong> Group of 20 (<u><strong>G20</u></strong>) industrialised countries, which directed the fund to undertake related research. The findings are particularly notable in their sustained focus on the impacts on developing countries. </p><p>“Our technical assistance work in developing countries frequently encounters large revenue losses through gaps and weaknesses in the international tax regime,” Michael Keen, deputy director of the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, said in a statement. </p><p>“<u><strong>The <mark>sums involved</u></strong></mark> for them <u><strong><mark>can be large</mark>, not just relative to corporate tax but <mark>relative to </mark>all tax <mark>revenue</u></strong></mark>: 10-15 percent in some cases. The paper reports new evidence that <u><strong>these effects are</u></strong> in fact <u><strong>systematically more important for developing countries</u></strong>.” </p><p><u><strong>Corporate tax rates</u></strong> in all countries <u><strong>have</u></strong> <u><strong>plummeted</u></strong> in recent decades, the paper notes. </p><p>Low-income countries have seen these rates degrade from near 50 percent in 1980 to under 30 percent last year. Others have seen similar plunges, with high-income countries seeing corporate taxation fall from around 40 percent three decades ago to little more than 20 percent today. </p><p>Such trends have been tracked for years. Yet <u><strong>in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, rich and middle-income countries have begun actively discussing how to maximise their tax revenues, with a focus on ending corporate accounting gimmickry</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong>Rich <mark>companies</u></strong></mark> and individuals <u><strong><mark>could be stashing</mark> away</u></strong> <u><strong>as much as <mark>20 trillion</mark> dollars overseas</u></strong> <u><strong>in order <mark>to escape</mark> national <mark>taxation</u></strong></mark>, according to some estimates. </p><p>“<u><strong>Developed countries</u></strong> today <u><strong>need more income and are mad because not everyone is paying their taxes</u></strong>,” Griesgraber says. </p><p>“And <u><strong>that anger is also translating into public pressure</u></strong>. <u><strong>People who pay their taxes even during a difficult recession are</u></strong> <u><strong>even madder than the governments</u></strong>.” </p><p>“Meaningless” designations</p><p>According to the IMF data, developing countries should perhaps be the most incensed by the impacts of today’s global taxation hodgepodge. The paper offers new findings on the ramifications of what the fund terms “spillover effects” – the ways in which one country’s tax rules impact on another country, which can also be thought of in terms of <u><strong>tax competition between countries</u></strong>. </p><p>This phenomenon <u><strong>has been significantly exacerbated as multinational companies have increasingly learned how to legally “move” their operations</u></strong> – largely on paper – <u><strong>for tax benefit</u></strong>. Such companies appear to be based in countries with low taxes, despite doing most of their work in another country that, in turn, is unable to place levies on the company’s full earnings. </p><p>“Current international tax arrangements rest on concepts of companies’ ‘residence’ and the ‘source’ of their income, both of which globalization has made increasingly fragile (some would say meaningless),” the paper states. </p><p>“At its core, <u><strong>a <mark>key</mark> issue <mark>in</mark> assessing <mark>any international tax arrangement is how it divides the rights to tax between source and residence countries</u></strong></mark> … <u><strong>The <mark>allocation of rights is especially important for low-income countries</u></strong></mark>, however, as flows are for them commonly very asymmetric – they are essentially ‘source’ countries.” </p><p>The fund staff found that <u><strong>the impact of these spillover effects on corporate tax bases are</u></strong> <u><strong>“significant and sizable</u></strong>” but are “<u><strong>especially</u></strong> pronounced <u><strong>for low-income countries</u></strong>”. Compared to rich countries, the paper notes, “the base spillovers from others’ tax rates are two to three times larger” in developing countries, and “statistically more significant”.</p><p>Particularly problematic has been the extractives industry, though the fund also calls out telecommunications companies. The paper recounts IMF experiences in multiple countries where corporate tax trickery has eaten up much of a project’s revenue, such as a “gold mining sector in which USD 100 billion has been invested over the last decade, but which is almost entirely debt financed”. </p><p>The fund ultimately goes so far as to suggest that countries should be extremely careful about signing any bilateral tax treaty, urging developing country governments instead to signal openness to investment by other means. Through such agreements, countries can sign away their right to levy full tax rates and give an upper hand to foreign corporations. </p><p>“<u><strong>The IMF analysis raises</u></strong> some very <u><strong>worrying concerns about the</u></strong> <u><strong>impact of tax rules and practices in rich countries on the</u></strong> <u><strong>ability of poor countries to raise their own revenues</u></strong>,” Diarmid O’Sullivan, a tax justice policy advisor with ActionAid, a watchdog group, said Wednesday.</p><p>“<u><strong><mark>We see a</mark> clear <mark>message to</mark> … <mark>major capital-exporting countries to review their tax rules and make sure they are not</u></strong> <u><strong>harming the ability of poor countries to raise</mark> the <mark>revenues</mark> they need <mark>for</mark> their <mark>development</u></mark>.”</p></strong>	null	null	1	430,387	6	17,113	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	565,270	N	Texas	4	Georgetown Erpenbach-Krishnan	Arnett	DHS politics (2NR) cross retal cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,881	Major progress is being made, but the plan destroys it	Danovitch and Al-Mousawi 12	Danovitch and Al-Mousawi 12 (Gabriel M., Medical Director of Kidney Transplant Program – David Geffen School of Medicine (UCLA), & Mustafa, President – Middle East Society for Organ Transplantation and Vice President – Kuwait Transplant Society, “The Declaration of Istanbul—Early Impact and Future Potential”, Nature Reviews Nephrology 8, June, 358-361)	Financial incentives for donation are not consistent with the principles of the Declaration a trial of incentives could not be regulated in the current international environment.11 The Declaration in action A brochure has been developed to educate patients and explicitly warns prospective organ transplant recipients about the ethical and practical problems of transplant tourism DICG emissaries have been appointed in more than 40 countries to help uncover organ trafficking Individual violations are brought to the attention of the Patient Affairs Task Force cases are reported to national health authorities and action will be taken against transplant centers and medical professionals engaged in these practices. Legislative change post Declaration A call has been made for government accountability achieving this goal requires a favorable legislative framework. In this regard, the complementary goals of the Declaration and the WHO Guiding Principles are invaluable. we are closer now than we have previously been to an international consensus that these practices are unacceptable. Substantial progress has been made through government action and progressive legislation in countries previously designated hotspots for organ trafficking in the Philippines, the implementation of regulations were followed by a dramatic fall in transplant tourism to this country In Colombia, engagement by the government led to a dramatic reduction in transplant tourism Pakistan, India, Egypt and Russia have all passed progressive laws on organ trafficking Progress has also been made in countries that were the source of transplant tourists. In Israel a new law on organ transplantation prohibits patients travel abroad criminalizes organ transplant brokering, and provides for full reimbursement of legitimate expenses associated with organ donation there has been a dramatic fall in the number of patients who travel abroad to purchase organs Singapore has also passed laws that prohibit payment for living donation but permit reimbursement of legitimate expenses. In Qatar, the Doha Donation Accord established in 2009 sets a framework for the promotion of both living and deceased donation to address the needs of the local population reducing the need for patients to travel abroad for an organ Japan passed legislation in 2009 that potentially enables patients awaiting a transplant to be treated in their home country rather than having to go abroad The Malaysian Health Minister announced new legislxxxation stating that the government will stop providing medications to patients who have commercial transplantations performed abroad This was designed to discourage Malaysians from going abroad	Financial incentives are not consistent with the Declaration incentives could not be regulated in the current international environment The Declaration has developed to educate patients and warns about ethical and practical problems of transplant tourism DICG emissaries have been appointed in more than 40 countries to uncover organ trafficking violations are brought to the Task Force action will be taken against transplant centers and medical professionals engaged in these practices A call has been made for government accountability achieving this requires a favorable legislative framework the Declaration and the WHO Guiding Principles are invaluable we are closer to an international consensus Substantial progress has been made through legislation the Philippines Colombia Pakistan, India, Egypt and Russia have all passed progressive laws on organ trafficking Progress has also been made in Israel there has been a dramatic fall in the number of patients who travel abroad to purchase organs Singapore has also passed laws that prohibit payment for living donation but permit reimbursement of legitimate expenses Qatar set a framework for reducing travel abroad for an organ Japan passed legislation Malaysia will stop providing medications to patients who have commercial transplantations performed abroad	A critique of the Declaration from a criminological perspective documents the Declaration's progressive effect, but calls for a clearer differentiation between transplant commercialism and organ trafficking.10 The critique includes support for a regulated trial of incentives (presumably financial) to increase organ donation. Financial incentives for donation (as opposed to the removal of financial disincentives) are not consistent with the principles of the Declaration and in a detailed response to the critique the authors argued that a trial of incentives could not be regulated in the current international environment.11 The Declaration in action The DICG, through its Patient Affairs Task Force, directly examines the clinical implementation of the Declaration and particularly focuses on identifying, reporting and preventing specific instances of transplant tourism and organ trafficking. A freely available brochure has been developed to educate patients who might consider the option of obtaining an organ through these methods, and explicitly warns prospective organ transplant recipients about the ethical and practical problems of transplant tourism.12 DICG emissaries have been appointed in more than 40 countries to help uncover instances of organ trafficking and transplant tourism. Individual violations are brought to the attention of the Patient Affairs Task Force through the work of these emissaries, news media and personal contacts. Following the removal of patient-identifying details, cases are reported to national health authorities and relevant professional organizations with the expectation that suitable action will be taken against transplant centers and medical professionals engaged in these practices. Legislative change post Declaration A clarion call has been made for government accountability to achieve national and regional self-sufficiency in organ donation and transplantation.13 Promotion of such self-sufficiency is at the core of any attempt to resolve the problem of organ donor shortages and to prevent organ trafficking and transplant tourism; however, achieving this goal requires a favorable legislative framework. In this regard, the complementary goals of the Declaration and the WHO Guiding Principles are invaluable. Development of a critical pathway to evaluate the national potential for deceased donation was endorsed by the 3rd WHO Global Consultation on Organ Donation and Transplantation held in Madrid, Spain, in 2010.14 The purpose of this pathway is to facilitate deceased donation according to international norms, particularly in countries where deceased donation is currently absent or rudimentary. Specific initiatives are underway in South-Eastern Europe and Asia to attain these goals. Although organ trafficking and transplant tourism have by no means ceased to occur, we are closer now than we have previously been to an international consensus that these practices are unacceptable. Substantial progress has been made through government action and progressive legislation in some of the countries previously designated by the WHO as hotspots for organ trafficking. For example, in the Philippines, the implementation of regulations that prohibit living donors from the local population to provide organs for transplantation to non-Filipinos were followed by a dramatic fall in transplant tourism to this country.15 In Colombia, engagement by the government to ensure that organs from deceased donors reach the country's own citizens who are in need, rather than wealthy foreigners, has also led to a dramatic reduction in transplant tourism within the country.16 Furthermore, Pakistan, India, Egypt and Russia have all passed progressive laws on organ trafficking. Progress has also been made in countries that were previously the source of transplant tourists. In Israel a new law on organ transplantation prohibits health insurance companies from reimbursing the medical expenses of patients who travel abroad to receive transplants, criminalizes organ transplant brokering, and provides for full reimbursement of legitimate expenses associated with organ donation.17 Since passage of this law there has been a dramatic fall in the number of patients who travel abroad to purchase organs and a gratifying increase in living donation in Israel itself.18 Singapore has also passed laws that prohibit payment for living donation but permit reimbursement of legitimate expenses. In Qatar, the Doha Donation Accord established in 2009 sets a critical precedent for the Gulf region, providing a framework for the promotion of both living and deceased donation to address the needs of the local population (including foreign workers), thereby reducing the need for patients to travel abroad for an organ.19 Japan, which has lacked effective transplant programs involving deceased donation, passed legislation in 2009 that potentially enables patients awaiting a transplant to be treated in their home country rather than having to go abroad.20 In Malaysia, more than 60% of the 1,500 kidney transplantations from 2000 to 2010 were performed in China. The Malaysian Health Minister, quoting the WHO Guiding Principles,9 officially announced new legislxxxation (which took effect in January 2012) stating that the government will stop providing free immunosuppressant medications to patients who have commercial transplantations performed abroad.21 This initiative was designed to discourage Malaysians from going abroad for commercial transplants as part of transplant tourism.	5,548	<h4>Major progress is being made, but the plan destroys it </h4><p><strong>Danovitch and Al-Mousawi 12</strong> (Gabriel M., Medical Director of Kidney Transplant Program – David Geffen School of Medicine (UCLA), & Mustafa, President – Middle East Society for Organ Transplantation and Vice President – Kuwait Transplant Society, “The Declaration of Istanbul—Early Impact and Future Potential”, Nature Reviews Nephrology 8, June, 358-361)</p><p>A critique of the Declaration from a criminological perspective documents the Declaration's progressive effect, but calls for a clearer differentiation between transplant commercialism and organ trafficking.10 The critique includes support for a regulated trial of incentives (presumably financial) to increase organ donation. <u><strong><mark>Financial incentives </mark>for donation</u></strong> (as opposed to the removal of financial disincentives) <u><strong><mark>are not consistent with the </mark>principles of the <mark>Declaration</u></strong> </mark>and in a detailed response to the critique the authors argued that <u>a trial of <mark>incentives <strong>could not be regulated in the current international environment</mark>.11</p><p><mark>The Declaration </mark>in action</p><p></u></strong>The DICG, through its Patient Affairs Task Force, directly examines the clinical implementation of the Declaration and particularly focuses on identifying, reporting and preventing specific instances of transplant tourism and organ trafficking. <u>A</u> freely available <u>brochure <mark>has </mark>been <mark>developed to educate patients</u> </mark>who might consider the option of obtaining an organ through these methods, <u><mark>and </mark>explicitly <mark>warns </mark>prospective organ transplant recipients <mark>about </mark>the <mark>ethical and practical problems of transplant tourism</u></mark>.12</p><p><u><mark>DICG emissaries have been appointed in <strong>more than 40 countries to </mark>help <mark>uncover</u></strong> </mark>instances of <u><strong><mark>organ trafficking</u></strong> </mark>and transplant tourism. <u>Individual <mark>violations are brought to the </mark>attention of the Patient Affairs <mark>Task Force</u> </mark>through the work of these emissaries, news media and personal contacts. Following the removal of patient-identifying details, <u>cases are reported to national health authorities and</u> relevant professional organizations with the expectation that suitable <u><strong><mark>action will be taken against transplant centers and medical professionals engaged in these practices</mark>.</p><p>Legislative change post Declaration</p><p></strong><mark>A</u> </mark>clarion <u><mark>call has been made for government accountability</u> </mark>to achieve national and regional self-sufficiency in organ donation and transplantation.13 Promotion of such self-sufficiency is at the core of any attempt to resolve the problem of organ donor shortages and to prevent organ trafficking and transplant tourism; however, <u><strong><mark>achieving this </mark>goal <mark>requires a favorable legislative framework</mark>. In this regard, <mark>the </mark>complementary goals of the <mark>Declaration and the WHO Guiding Principles are invaluable</mark>.</u></strong> Development of a critical pathway to evaluate the national potential for deceased donation was endorsed by the 3rd WHO Global Consultation on Organ Donation and Transplantation held in Madrid, Spain, in 2010.14 The purpose of this pathway is to facilitate deceased donation according to international norms, particularly in countries where deceased donation is currently absent or rudimentary. Specific initiatives are underway in South-Eastern Europe and Asia to attain these goals.</p><p>Although organ trafficking and transplant tourism have by no means ceased to occur, <u><mark>we are closer </mark>now than we have previously been <mark>to an <strong>international consensus </mark>that these practices are unacceptable. <mark>Substantial progress has been made</strong> through </mark>government action and progressive <mark>legislation </mark>in</u> some of the <u>countries previously designated</u> by the WHO as <u>hotspots for organ trafficking</u>. For example, <u><strong>in <mark>the Philippines</mark>, the implementation of regulations</u></strong> that prohibit living donors from the local population to provide organs for transplantation to non-Filipinos <u><strong>were followed by a dramatic fall in transplant tourism to this country</u></strong>.15 <u><strong>In <mark>Colombia</mark>, engagement by the government</u></strong> to ensure that organs from deceased donors reach the country's own citizens who are in need, rather than wealthy foreigners, has also <u><strong>led to a dramatic reduction in transplant tourism</u></strong> within the country.16 Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>Pakistan, India, Egypt and Russia have all passed progressive laws on organ trafficking</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u><mark>Progress has also been made in </mark>countries that were</u> previously <u>the source of transplant tourists. In <mark>Israel </mark>a new law on organ transplantation prohibits</u> health insurance companies from reimbursing the medical expenses of <u>patients</u> who <u>travel abroad</u> to receive transplants, <u>criminalizes organ transplant brokering, and provides for full reimbursement of legitimate expenses associated with organ donation</u>.17 Since passage of this law <u><strong><mark>there has been a dramatic fall in the number of patients who travel abroad to purchase organs</u></strong> </mark>and a gratifying increase in living donation in Israel itself.18 <u><mark>Singapore has also passed laws that prohibit payment for living donation but permit reimbursement of legitimate expenses</mark>. In <mark>Qatar</mark>, the Doha Donation Accord established in 2009 <mark>set</mark>s</u> a critical precedent for the Gulf region, providing <u><mark>a framework for</mark> the promotion of both living and deceased donation to address the needs of the local population</u> (including foreign workers), thereby <u><mark>reducing </mark>the need for patients to <mark>travel abroad for an organ</u></mark>.19 <u><mark>Japan</u></mark>, which has lacked effective transplant programs involving deceased donation, <u><mark>passed legislation </mark>in 2009 that potentially enables patients awaiting a transplant to be treated in their home country rather than having to go abroad</u>.20 In Malaysia, more than 60% of the 1,500 kidney transplantations from 2000 to 2010 were performed in China. <u>The <mark>Malaysia</mark>n Health Minister</u>, quoting the WHO Guiding Principles,9 officially <u>announced new legislxxxation</u> (which took effect in January 2012) <u>stating that the government <mark>will stop providing</u> </mark>free immunosuppressant <u><mark>medications to patients who have commercial transplantations performed abroad</u></mark>.21 <u>This</u> initiative <u>was designed to discourage Malaysians from going abroad</u> for commercial transplants as part of transplant tourism.</p>	2NC	Case - trafficking	2nc uniqueness	431,216	4	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,882	We will always be haunted by the memory of the law. A clean break with it is impossible.	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>We will always be haunted by the memory of the law. A clean break with it is impossible.</h4>	1nc vs WGA	null	1nc – Law K	431,215	1	17,118	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	565,420	N	Gsu	1	West Georgia Muhammad-Gaius	Deming	1NC T occidentalism K law good K impact turns 2NC Space colonization impact turn 1NR T 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,883	Developing world public revenue’s key to reduce North-South disparity	McHale 5	John McHale 5, Professor of Economics and a faculty research fellow at the Queen's School of Business, Queen's University, Canada, February 2005, “Taxation and Skilled Indian Migration to the United States: Revisiting the Bhagwati Tax,” http://web.business.queensu.ca/faculty/jmchale/research3/Taxation%20and%20Skilled%20Migration%20to%20the%20Uniited%20States%20%20Revisiting%20the%20Bhagwati%20Tax.pdf	poor countries face large investment gaps that trap them in poverty and a significant part of the needed investment must come through the public sector Fiscal resources are needed to fund badly needed investments in education, health care, environmental protection and infrastructure Although increased aid and debt relief are an important parts of the solution, there is increasing interest in fiscal transfers to poor countries	poor countries face large investment gaps that trap them in poverty a significant part of needed investment must come through the public sector Fiscal resources are needed to fund investments in education, health care, environmental protection and infrastructure Although aid are important there is increasing interest in fiscal transfers to poor countries	Second, there is a renewed appreciation that poor countries face large investment gaps that trap them in poverty, and that a significant part of the needed investment must come through the public sector (United Nations Millennium Project, 2005). Fiscal resources are needed to fund badly needed investments in education, health care, environmental protection and infrastructure. Although increased aid and debt relief are an important parts of the solution, there is increasing interest in “innovative” mechanisms for making fiscal transfers to poor countries to help make up inevitable shortfalls (see, for example, the papers collected in Atkinson, 2004). This could be a sign that innovative, emigration-related fiscal instruments would get a more sympathetic hearing now than they did three decades ago.	807	<h4><strong>Developing world public revenue’s key to reduce North-South disparity </h4><p></strong>John <strong>McHale 5</strong>, Professor of Economics and a faculty research fellow at the Queen's School of Business, Queen's University, Canada, February 2005, “Taxation and Skilled Indian Migration to the United States: Revisiting the Bhagwati Tax,” http://web.business.queensu.ca/faculty/jmchale/research3/Taxation%20and%20Skilled%20Migration%20to%20the%20Uniited%20States%20%20Revisiting%20the%20Bhagwati%20Tax.pdf</p><p>Second, there is a renewed appreciation that <u><strong><mark>poor countries face</u></strong> <u><strong>large investment gaps that trap them in poverty</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>and</u></strong> that <u><strong><mark>a significant part of</mark> the <mark>needed investment</u></strong> <u><strong>must come through the public sector</u></strong></mark> (United Nations Millennium Project, 2005). <u><strong><mark>Fiscal resources are needed to fund</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>badly needed <mark>investments</u></strong> <u><strong>in education, health care, environmental protection and infrastructure</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Although</mark> increased <mark>aid</mark> and debt relief <mark>are</mark> an <mark>important</mark> parts of the solution, <mark>there is increasing interest in</u></strong></mark> “innovative” mechanisms for making <u><strong><mark>fiscal transfers to poor countries</u></mark> to help make up inevitable shortfalls (see, for example, the papers collected in Atkinson, 2004). This could be a sign that innovative, emigration-related fiscal instruments would get a more sympathetic hearing now than they did three decades ago.</p></strong>	null	null	1	430,388	6	17,113	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	565,270	N	Texas	4	Georgetown Erpenbach-Krishnan	Arnett	DHS politics (2NR) cross retal cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,884	Racial progress has occurred though legal change and more in the area of drug laws is still possible---reject pessimism because it ignores specific reforms that achieved lasting reductions in racial inequality	Omi 13,	Michael Omi 13, and Howard Winant, Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias, Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 36, Issue 6, p. 961-973, 2013 Special Issue: Symposium - Rethinking Racial Formation Theory	white racist rule in the USA appears unalterable and permanent They dismiss important rearrangements and reforms as merely ‘a distraction from more ingrained structural oppressions that define US society’ we disagree The USA is in many respects a racial democracy, capable of being influenced towards more or less inclusive policies It would be easy to conclude that white racial dominance has been continuous and unchanging throughout US history But such a perspective misses the dramatic twists and turns in racial politics that have occurred since the Second World War and the civil rights era. claim that we overly inflate the significance of the changes wrought by the civil rights movement and overlook serious reversals of racial justice and persistence of huge racial inequalities’ We do not While the right wing was able to ‘rearticulate’ race and racism issues to roll back some of the gains of the civil rights movement there are limits to what the right could achieve in the post-civil rights political landscape the present prospects for racial justice are demoralizing But we do not think that is the whole story. US racial conditions have changed Some of the major reforms of the 1960s have proved irreversible; they have set powerful democratic forces in motion desegregation of the armed forces the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act Loving v. Virginia that declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional The US racial regime has been transformed in significant ways important if partial victories shifted the racial state and transformed the significance of race in everyday life. And further victories can take place both on the broad terrain of the state and across civil society the most important accomplishment of the anti-racist movement of the 1960s was race-based movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially defined ‘others’ and the democratization of structurally racist societies, but also the recognition and validation by both the state and civil society of racially-defined experience and identity. These demands broadened and deepened democracy itself. They facilitated democratic gains in the USA by the black movement By no means do we think that the post-war movement upsurge was an unmitigated success even the need to develop the highly contradictory ideology of ‘colourblindness’, reveal the transformative character use of racial categories can be imprecise. This is not their problem alone; anyone writing about race needs to frame terms with care and precision, and we undoubtedly get fuzzy too from time to time. The absence of a careful approach leads to ‘racial lumping’ and essentialisms This imprecision is heightened in polemic. In the essay the term ‘whites’ refers to all whites, white elites, ‘dominant white actors’ and very exceptionally, anti-racist whites it is important not to frame race in a bipolar manner. The black/white paradigm made more sense in the past than it does in the twenty-first century. The racial make-up of the nation has now changed dramatically We still want to acknowledge that blacks have been catching hell and have borne the brunt of the racist reaction of the past several decades. For example, we agree with critique of the reactionary politics of incarceration How is it to be understood? beyond denunciation of the ferocious white racism that is operating here, deeper political implications are worth considering the upsurge over recent decades in incarceration rates aims at restricting the increasing impact of voters of colour in a demographically shifting electorate for all the horrors and injustices that the ‘new Jim Crow’ represents, incarceration, profiling and similar practices remain political issues. These practices and policies are not ineluctable and unalterable dimensions of the US racial regime. There have been previous waves of reform in these areas. They can be transformed again by mass mobilization, electoral shifts and so on. In other words, resistance is not futile. Women of colour are also targeted, especially by violence, discrimination and assaults on their reproductive rights racial conflict, both within the state and in everyday life, is a fundamentally political process the ongoing political realities of race provide extensive evidence that people of colour in the USA are not so powerless, and that whites are not so omnipotent there have been enormous increases in racial inequality in recent years. But movement-based anti-racist opposition continues, and sometimes scores victories. Challenges to white racism continue both within the state and in civil society Movements may experience setbacks, the reforms for which they fought may be revealed as inadequate but racial subjectivity both within the individual psyche and the body politic, abides. Resistance is not futile.x	white racist rule in the US appears permanent They dismiss important reforms as merely ‘a distraction from oppressions that define US society’ we disagree. that white racial dominance has been unchanging throughout history misses twists in racial politics since civil rights We do not While the right was able to roll back some gains there are limits to what the right could achieve racial conditions have changed Some reforms proved irreversible; they set powerful forces in motion desegregation of armed forces Voting Rights Act Immigration and Naturalization Act Loving v. Virginia important if partial victories shifted the racial state further victories can take place both on the state and across civil society most important accomplishment of the 60s was movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially defined ‘others’ and democratization of structurally racist societies, but also recognition by both the state and civil society of racially-defined identity even the need to develop contradictory ideology of ‘colourblindness’, reveal the transformative character we agree with critique of incarceration How is it to be understood? beyond racism deeper political implications are worth considering for all the horrors ‘new Jim Crow’ represents, incarceration, profiling and similar practices remain political issues not ineluctable dimensions of the US racial regime. There have been previous waves of reform They can be transformed again resistance is not futile racial conflict is fundamentally political political realities of race provide extensive evidence people of colour are not powerless there have been enormous increases in racial inequality Movements may experience setbacks but racial subjectivity within the psyche and body politic, abides	In Feagin and Elias's account, white racist rule in the USA appears unalterable and permanent. There is little sense that the ‘white racial frame’ evoked by systemic racism theory changes in significant ways over historical time. They dismiss important rearrangements and reforms as merely ‘a distraction from more ingrained structural oppressions and deep lying inequalities that continue to define US society’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21). Feagin and Elias use a concept they call ‘surface flexibility’ to argue that white elites frame racial realities in ways that suggest change, but are merely engineered to reinforce the underlying structure of racial oppression. Feagin and Elias say the phrase ‘racial democracy’ is an oxymoron – a word defined in the dictionary as a figure of speech that combines contradictory terms. If they mean the USA is a contradictory and incomplete democracy in respect to race and racism issues, we agree. If they mean that people of colour have no democratic rights or political power in the USA, we disagree. The USA is a racially despotic country in many ways, but in our view it is also in many respects a racial democracy, capable of being influenced towards more or less inclusive and redistributive economic policies, social policies, or for that matter, imperial policies. What is distinctive about our own epoch in the USA (post-Second World War to the present) with respect to race and racism? ¶ Over the past decades there has been a steady drumbeat of efforts to contain and neutralize civil rights, to restrict racial democracy, and to maintain or even increase racial inequality. Racial disparities in different institutional sites – employment, health, education – persist and in many cases have increased. Indeed, the post-2008 period has seen a dramatic increase in racial inequality. The subprime home mortgage crisis, for example, was a major racial event. Black and brown people were disproportionately affected by predatory lending practices; many lost their homes as a result; race-based wealth disparities widened tremendously. It would be easy to conclude, as Feagin and Elias do, that white racial dominance has been continuous and unchanging throughout US history. But such a perspective misses the dramatic twists and turns in racial politics that have occurred since the Second World War and the civil rights era.¶ Feagin and Elias claim that we overly inflate the significance of the changes wrought by the civil rights movement, and that we ‘overlook the serious reversals of racial justice and persistence of huge racial inequalities’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21) that followed in its wake. We do not. In Racial Formation we wrote about ‘racial reaction’ in a chapter of that name, and elsewhere in the book as well. Feagin and Elias devote little attention to our arguments there; perhaps because they are in substantial agreement with us. While we argue that the right wing was able to ‘rearticulate’ race and racism issues to roll back some of the gains of the civil rights movement, we also believe that there are limits to what the right could achieve in the post-civil rights political landscape.¶ So we agree that the present prospects for racial justice are demoralizing at best. But we do not think that is the whole story. US racial conditions have changed over the post-Second World War period, in ways that Feagin and Elias tend to downplay or neglect. Some of the major reforms of the 1960s have proved irreversible; they have set powerful democratic forces in motion. These racial (trans)formations were the results of unprecedented political mobilizations, led by the black movement, but not confined to blacks alone. Consider the desegregation of the armed forces, as well as key civil rights movement victories of the 1960s: the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act (Hart- Celler), as well as important court decisions like Loving v. Virginia that declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional. While we have the greatest respect for the late Derrick Bell, we do not believe that his ‘interest convergence hypothesis’ effectively explains all these developments. How does Lyndon Johnson's famous (and possibly apocryphal) lament upon signing the Civil Rights Act on 2 July 1964 – ‘We have lost the South for a generation’ – count as ‘convergence’?¶ The US racial regime has been transformed in significant ways. As Antonio Gramsci argues, hegemony proceeds through the incorporation of opposition (Gramsci 1971, p. 182). The civil rights reforms can be seen as a classic example of this process; here the US racial regime – under movement pressure – was exercising its hegemony. But Gramsci insists that such reforms – which he calls ‘passive revolutions’ – cannot be merely symbolic if they are to be effective: oppositions must win real gains in the process. Once again, we are in the realm of politics, not absolute rule.¶ So yes, we think there were important if partial victories that shifted the racial state and transformed the significance of race in everyday life. And yes, we think that further victories can take place both on the broad terrain of the state and on the more immediate level of social interaction: in daily interaction, in the human psyche and across civil society. Indeed we have argued that in many ways the most important accomplishment of the anti-racist movement of the 1960s in the USA was the politicization of the social. In the USA and indeed around the globe, race-based movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially defined ‘others’ and the democratization of structurally racist societies, but also the recognition and validation by both the state and civil society of racially-defined experience and identity. These demands broadened and deepened democracy itself. They facilitated not only the democratic gains made in the USA by the black movement and its allies, but also the political advances towards equality, social justice and inclusion accomplished by other ‘new social movements’: second-wave feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-war movements among others.¶ By no means do we think that the post-war movement upsurge was an unmitigated success. Far from it: all the new social movements were subject to the same ‘rearticulation’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. xii) that produced the racial ideology of ‘colourblindness’ and its variants; indeed all these movements confronted their mirror images in the mobilizations that arose from the political right to counter them. Yet even their incorporation and containment, even their confrontations with the various ‘backlash’ phenomena of the past few decades, even the need to develop the highly contradictory ideology of ‘colourblindness’, reveal the transformative character of the ‘politicization of the social’. While it is not possible here to explore so extensive a subject, it is worth noting that it was the long-delayed eruption of racial subjectivity and self-awareness into the mainstream political arena that set off this transformation, shaping both the democratic and anti-democratic social movements that are evident in US politics today.¶ What are the political implications of contemporary racial trends?¶ Feagin and Elias's use of racial categories can be imprecise. This is not their problem alone; anyone writing about race and racism needs to frame terms with care and precision, and we undoubtedly get fuzzy too from time to time. The absence of a careful approach leads to ‘racial lumping’ and essentialisms of various kinds. This imprecision is heightened in polemic. In the Feagin and Elias essay the term ‘whites’ at times refers to all whites, white elites, ‘dominant white actors’ and very exceptionally, anti-racist whites, a category in which we presume they would place themselves. Although the terms ‘black’, ‘African American’ and ‘Latino’ appear, the term ‘people of colour’ is emphasized, often in direct substitution for black reference points.¶ In the USA today it is important not to frame race in a bipolar manner. The black/white paradigm made more sense in the past than it does in the twenty-first century. The racial make-up of the nation has now changed dramatically. Since the passage of the Immigration Reform Act of 1965, the USA has become more ‘coloured’. A ‘majority–minority’ national demographic shift is well underway. Predicted to arrive by the mid-twenty-first century, the numerical eclipse of the white population is already in evidence locally and regionally. In California, for example, non-Hispanic whites constitute only 39.7 per cent of the state's population. While the decline in the white population cannot be correlated with any decline of white racial dominance, the dawning and deepening of racial multipolarity calls into question a sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit black/white racial framework that is evident in Feagin and Elias's essay. Shifting racial demographics and identities also raise general questions of race and racism in new ways that the ‘systemic racism’ approach is not prepared to explain.3¶ Class questions and issues of panethnicizing trends, for example, call into question what we mean by race, racial identity and race consciousness. No racially defined group is even remotely uniform; groups that we so glibly refer to as Asian American or Latino are particularly heterogeneous. Some have achieved or exceeded socio-economic parity with whites, while others are subject to what we might call ‘engineered poverty’ in sweatshops, dirty and dangerous labour settings, or prisons. Tensions within panethnicized racial groups are notably present, and conflicts between racially defined groups (‘black/brown’ conflict, for example) are evident in both urban and rural settings. A substantial current of social scientific analysis now argues that Asians and Latinos are the ‘new white ethnics’, able to ‘work toward whiteness’4 at least in part, and that the black/white bipolarity retains its distinct and foundational qualities as the mainstay of US racism (Alba and Nee 2005; Perlmann 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Waters, Ueda and Marrow 2007).¶ We question that argument in light of the massive demographic shifts taking place in the USA. Globalization, climate change and above all neoliberalism on a global scale, all drive migration. The country's economic capacity to absorb enormous numbers of immigrants, low-wage workers and their families (including a new, globally based and very female, servant class) without generating the sort of established subaltern groups we associate with the terms race and racism, may be more limited than it was when the ‘whitening’ of Europeans took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In other words this argument's key precedent, the absorption of white immigrants ‘of a different color’ (Jacobson 1998), may no longer apply. Indeed, we might think of the assimilationist model itself as a general theory of immigrant incorporation that was based on a historically specific case study – one that might not hold for, or be replicated by, subsequent big waves of immigration. Feagin and Elias's systemic racism model, while offering numerous important insights, does not inform concrete analysis of these issues.¶ It is important going forward to understand how groups are differentially racialized and relatively positioned in the US racial hierarchy: once again racism must be seen as a shifting racial project. This has important consequences, not only with respect to emerging patterns of inequality, but also in regard to the degree of power available to different racial actors to define, shape or contest the existing racial landscape. Attention to such matters is largely absent in Feagin and Elias's account. In their view racially identified groups are located in strict reference to the dominant ‘white racial frame’, hammered into place, so to speak. As a consequence, they fail to examine how racially subordinate groups interact and influence each others’ boundaries, conditions and practices. Because they offer so little specific analysis of Asian American, Latino or Native American racial issues, the reader finds her/himself once again in the land (real or imaginary, depending on your racial politics) of bipolar US racial dynamics, in which whites and blacks play the leading roles, and other racially identified groups – as well as those ambiguously identified, such as Middle Eastern and South Asian Americans (MEASA) – play at best supporting roles, and are sometimes cast as extras or left out of the picture entirely.¶ We still want to acknowledge that blacks have been catching hell and have borne the brunt of the racist reaction of the past several decades. For example, we agree with Feagin and Elias's critique of the reactionary politics of incarceration in the USA. The ‘new Jim Crow’ (Alexander 2012) or even the ‘new slavery’ that the present system practises is something that was just in its beginning stages when we were writing Racial Formation. It is now recognized as a national and indeed global scandal. How is it to be understood? Of course there are substantial debates on this topic, notably about the nature of the ‘prison-industrial complex’ (Davis 2003, p. 3) and the social and cultural effects of mass incarceration along racial lines. But beyond Feagin and Elias's denunciation of the ferocious white racism that is operating here, deeper political implications are worth considering. As Alexander (2012), Mauer (2006), Manza and Uggen (2008) and movement groups like Critical Resistance and the Ella Baker Center argue, the upsurge over recent decades in incarceration rates for black (and brown) men expresses the fear-based, law-and-order appeals that have shaped US racial politics since the rise of Nixonland (Perlstein 2008) and the ‘Southern strategy’. Perhaps even more central, racial repression aims at restricting the increasing impact of voters of colour in a demographically shifting electorate.¶ There is a lot more to say about this, but for the present two key points stand out: first, it is not an area where Feagin and Elias and we have any sharp disagreement, and second, for all the horrors and injustices that the ‘new Jim Crow’ represents, incarceration, profiling and similar practices remain political issues. These practices and policies are not ineluctable and unalterable dimensions of the US racial regime. There have been previous waves of reform in these areas. They can be transformed again by mass mobilization, electoral shifts and so on. In other words, resistance is not futile.¶ Speaking of electoral shifts and the formal political arena, how should President Barack Obama be politically situated in this discussion? How do Feagin and Elias explain Obama? Quite amazingly, his name does not appear in their essay. Is he a mere token, an ‘oreo’, a shill for Wall Street? Or does Obama represent a new development in US politics, a black leader of a mass, multiracial party that for sheer demographic reasons alone might eventually triumph over the white people's party, the Republicans? If the President is neither the white man's token nor Neo, the One,5 then once again we are in the world of politics: neither the near-total white despotism depicted by Feagin and Elias, nor a racially inclusive democracy.¶ President Obama continues to enjoy widespread black support, although it is clear that he has not protected blacks against their greatest cumulative loss of wealth in history. He has not explicitly criticized the glaring racial bias in the US carceral system. He has not intervened in conflicts over workers’ rights – particularly in the public sector where many blacks and other people of colour are concentrated. He has not intervened to halt or slow foreclosures, except in ways that were largely symbolic. Workers and lower-middle-class people were the hardest hit by the great recession and the subprime home mortgage crisis, with black families faring worst, and Latinos close behind (Rugh and Massey 2010); Obama has not defended them. Many writers have explained Obama's centrism and unwillingness to raise the issue of race as functions of white racism (Sugrue 2010).¶ The black community – and other communities of colour as well – remains politically divided. While black folk have taken the hardest blows from the reactionary and racist regime that has mostly dominated US politics since Reagan (if not since Nixon), no united black movement has succeeded the deaths of Malcolm and Martin. Although there is always important political activity underway, a relatively large and fairly conservative black middle class, a ‘black bourgeoisie’ in Frazier's (1957) terms, has generally maintained its position since the end of the civil rights era. Largely based in the public sector, and including a generally centrist business class as well, this stratum has continued to play the role that Frazier – and before him, Charles S. Johnson. William Lloyd Warner, Alison Davis and other scholars – identified: vacillation between the white elite and the black masses. Roughly similar patterns operate in Latino communities as well, where the ‘working towards whiteness’ framework coexists with a substantial amount of exclusion and super-exploitation.¶ Alongside class issues in communities of colour, there are significant gender issues. The disappearance of blue-collar work, combined with the assault by the criminal justice system – chiefly profiling by the police (‘stop and frisk’) and imprisonment, have both unduly targeted and victimized black and brown men, especially youth. Women of colour are also targeted, especially by violence, discrimination and assaults on their reproductive rights (Harris-Perry 2011); profiling is everywhere (Glover 2009).¶ Here again we are in the realm of racial politics. Debate proceeds in the black community on Obama's credibilty, with Cornel West and Tavis Smiley leading the critics. But it seems safe to say that in North Philly, Inglewood or Atlanta's Lakewood section, the president remains highly popular. Latino support for Obama remains high as well. Feagin and Elias need to clarify their views on black and brown political judgement. Is it attuned to political realities or has it been captured by the white racial frame? Is Obama's election of no importance?¶ ***¶ In conclusion, do Feagin and Elias really believe that white power is so complete, so extensive, so ‘sutured’ (as Laclau and Mouffe might say) as they suggest here? Do they mean to suggest, in Borg-fashion, that ‘resistance is futile?’ This seems to be the underlying political logic of the ‘systemic racism’ approach, perhaps unintentionally so. Is white racism so ubiquitous that no meaningful political challenge can be mounted against it? Are black and brown folk (yellow and red people, and also others unclassifiable under the always- absurd colour categories) utterly supine, duped, abject, unable to exert any political pressure? Is such a view of race and racism even recognizable in the USA of 2012? And is that a responsible political position to be advocating? Is this what we want to teach our students of colour? Or our white students for that matter?¶ We suspect that if pressed, Feagin and Elias would concur with our judgement that racial conflict, both within (and against) the state and in everyday life, is a fundamentally political process. We think that they would also accept our claim that the ongoing political realities of race provide extensive evidence that people of colour in the USA are not so powerless, and that whites are not so omnipotent, as Feagin and Elias's analysis suggests them to be.¶ Racial formation theory allows us to see that there are contradictions in racial oppression. The racial formation approach reveals that white racism is unstable and constantly challenged, from the national and indeed global level down to the personal and intra-psychic conflicts that we all experience, no matter what our racial identity might be. While racism – largely white – continues to flourish, it is not monolithic. Yes, there have been enormous increases in racial inequality in recent years. But movement-based anti-racist opposition continues, and sometimes scores victories. Challenges to white racism continue both within the state and in civil society. Although largely and properly led by people of colour, anti-racist movements also incorporate whites such as Feagin and Elias themselves. Movements may experience setbacks, the reforms for which they fought may be revealed as inadequate, and indeed their leaders may be co-opted or even eliminated, but racial subjectivity and self-awareness, unresolved and conflictual both within the individual psyche and the body politic, abides. Resistance is not futile.x	20,865	<h4><u>Racial progress has occurred</u> though legal change and more in the area of drug laws is still possible---<u>reject pessimism</u> because it ignores specific reforms that achieved <u>lasting reductions</u> in racial inequality</h4><p>Michael<strong> Omi 13, </strong>and Howard Winant, Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin<u> and Elias, Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 36, Issue 6, p. 961-973, 2013 Special Issue: Symposium - Rethinking Racial Formation Theory</p><p></u>In Feagin and Elias's account, <u><mark>white racist rule in the US</mark>A <mark>appears</mark> unalterable and <mark>permanent</u></mark>. There is little sense that the ‘white racial frame’ evoked by systemic racism theory changes in significant ways over historical time. <u><mark>They dismiss <strong>important</strong></mark> rearrangements and <strong><mark>reforms</strong> as <strong>merely ‘a distraction</strong> from</mark> more ingrained structural <mark>oppressions</u></mark> and deep lying inequalities <u><mark>that</u></mark> continue to <u><strong><mark>define US society’</u></strong></mark> (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21). Feagin and Elias use a concept they call ‘surface flexibility’ to argue that white elites frame racial realities in ways that suggest change, but are merely engineered to reinforce the underlying structure of racial oppression. Feagin and Elias say the phrase ‘racial democracy’ is an oxymoron – a word defined in the dictionary as a figure of speech that combines contradictory terms. If they mean the USA is a contradictory and incomplete democracy in respect to race and racism issues, we agree. If they mean that people of colour have no democratic rights or political power in the USA, <u><strong><mark>we disagree</u></strong>. <u></mark>The USA</u> is a racially despotic country in many ways, but in our view it <u>is</u> also <u>in many respects a racial democracy, <strong>capable of being influenced</strong> towards <strong>more or less inclusive</u></strong> and redistributive economic <u><strong>policies</u></strong>, social policies, or for that matter, imperial policies. What is distinctive about our own epoch in the USA (post-Second World War to the present) with respect to race and racism? ¶ Over the past decades there has been a steady drumbeat of efforts to contain and neutralize civil rights, to restrict racial democracy, and to maintain or even increase racial inequality. Racial disparities in different institutional sites – employment, health, education – persist and in many cases have increased. Indeed, the post-2008 period has seen a dramatic increase in racial inequality. The subprime home mortgage crisis, for example, was a major racial event. Black and brown people were disproportionately affected by predatory lending practices; many lost their homes as a result; race-based wealth disparities widened tremendously. <u>It would be easy to conclude</u>, as Feagin and Elias do, <u><mark>that <strong>white racial dominance has been</mark> continuous and <mark>unchanging throughout </mark>US <mark>history</u></strong></mark>. <u>But such a perspective <strong><mark>misses</strong></mark> the <strong>dramatic <mark>twists</strong></mark> and turns <mark>in racial politics</mark> that have occurred <mark>since </mark>the Second World War and the <mark>civil rights </mark>era.</u>¶ Feagin and Elias <u>claim that we overly inflate the significance of the changes wrought by the civil rights movement</u>, <u>and</u> that we ‘<u>overlook</u> the <u>serious reversals of racial justice and persistence of huge racial inequalities’</u> (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21) that followed in its wake. <u><strong><mark>We do not</u></strong></mark>. In Racial Formation we wrote about ‘racial reaction’ in a chapter of that name, and elsewhere in the book as well. Feagin and Elias devote little attention to our arguments there; perhaps because they are in substantial agreement with us. <u><mark>While</u></mark> we argue that <u><mark>the right</mark> wing <mark>was able to</mark> ‘rearticulate’ race and racism issues to <mark>roll back some</mark> of the <mark>gains</mark> of the civil rights movement</u>, we also believe that <u><strong><mark>there are limits to what the right could achieve</u></strong></mark> <u>in the post-civil rights political landscape</u>.¶ So we agree that <u>the present prospects for racial justice are demoralizing</u> at best. <u>But we do not think that is the whole story. <strong>US <mark>racial conditions have changed</u></strong></mark> over the post-Second World War period, in ways that Feagin and Elias tend to downplay or neglect. <u><mark>Some</mark> of the major <mark>reforms</mark> of the 1960s have <strong><mark>proved irreversible</strong>; they</mark> have <mark>set <strong>powerful </mark>democratic <mark>forces in motion</u></strong></mark>. These racial (trans)formations were the results of unprecedented political mobilizations, led by the black movement, but not confined to blacks alone. Consider the <u><mark>desegregation of </mark>the <mark>armed forces</u></mark>, as well as key civil rights movement victories of the 1960s: <u>the <mark>Voting Rights Act</mark>, the <mark>Immigration and Naturalization Act</u></mark> (Hart- Celler), as well as important court decisions like <u><mark>Loving v. Virginia</u></mark> <u>that declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional</u>. While we have the greatest respect for the late Derrick Bell, we do not believe that his ‘interest convergence hypothesis’ effectively explains all these developments. How does Lyndon Johnson's famous (and possibly apocryphal) lament upon signing the Civil Rights Act on 2 July 1964 – ‘We have lost the South for a generation’ – count as ‘convergence’?¶ <u>The US racial regime <strong>has been transformed in significant ways</u></strong>. As Antonio Gramsci argues, hegemony proceeds through the incorporation of opposition (Gramsci 1971, p. 182). The civil rights reforms can be seen as a classic example of this process; here the US racial regime – under movement pressure – was exercising its hegemony. But Gramsci insists that such reforms – which he calls ‘passive revolutions’ – cannot be merely symbolic if they are to be effective: oppositions must win real gains in the process. Once again, we are in the realm of politics, not absolute rule.¶ So yes, we think there were <u><mark>important <strong>if partial</strong> victories</u></mark> that <u><mark>shifted the racial state</mark> and transformed the significance of race in everyday life. And</u> yes, we think that <u><mark>further victories can take place <strong>both</strong> on </mark>the broad terrain of <mark>the state and</u></mark> on the more immediate level of social interaction: in daily interaction, in the human psyche and <u><strong><mark>across civil society</u></strong></mark>. Indeed we have argued that in many ways <u>the <mark>most important accomplishment of</mark> the anti-racist movement of <mark>the</mark> 19<mark>60s</u></mark> in the USA <u><mark>was</u></mark> the politicization of the social. In the USA and indeed around the globe, <u>race-based <mark>movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially defined ‘others’ and</mark> the <mark>democratization of structurally racist societies, but also</mark> the <strong><mark>recognition </mark>and validation</strong> <mark>by <strong>both the state and civil society</strong> of racially-defined </mark>experience and <mark>identity</mark>. These demands <strong>broadened and deepened democracy</strong> itself. They facilitated</u> not only the <u><strong>democratic gains</u></strong> made <u>in the USA by the black movement</u> and its allies, but also the political advances towards equality, social justice and inclusion accomplished by other ‘new social movements’: second-wave feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-war movements among others.¶ <u><strong>By no means</u></strong> <u>do we think that the post-war movement upsurge was an unmitigated success</u>. Far from it: all the new social movements were subject to the same ‘rearticulation’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. xii) that produced the racial ideology of ‘colourblindness’ and its variants; indeed all these movements confronted their mirror images in the mobilizations that arose from the political right to counter them. Yet even their incorporation and containment, even their confrontations with the various ‘backlash’ phenomena of the past few decades, <u><mark>even the need to develop </mark>the highly <mark>contradictory ideology of ‘colourblindness’, <strong>reveal the transformative character</u></strong></mark> of the ‘politicization of the social’. While it is not possible here to explore so extensive a subject, it is worth noting that it was the long-delayed eruption of racial subjectivity and self-awareness into the mainstream political arena that set off this transformation, shaping both the democratic and anti-democratic social movements that are evident in US politics today.¶ What are the political implications of contemporary racial trends?¶ Feagin and Elias's <u>use of racial categories can be imprecise. This is not their problem alone; anyone writing about race</u> and racism <u>needs to frame terms with care and precision, and we undoubtedly get fuzzy too from time to time. The absence of a careful approach leads to ‘<strong>racial lumping’</strong> and essentialisms</u> of various kinds. <u><strong>This imprecision is heightened in polemic</strong>. In the</u> Feagin and Elias <u>essay the term ‘whites’</u> at times <u>refers to all whites, white elites, ‘dominant white actors’ and very exceptionally, anti-racist whites</u>, a category in which we presume they would place themselves. Although the terms ‘black’, ‘African American’ and ‘Latino’ appear, the term ‘people of colour’ is emphasized, often in direct substitution for black reference points.¶ In the USA today <u><strong>it is important not to frame race in a bipolar manner</strong>. The black/white paradigm made more sense in the past than it does in the twenty-first century. The racial make-up of the nation has now changed dramatically</u>. Since the passage of the Immigration Reform Act of 1965, the USA has become more ‘coloured’. A ‘majority–minority’ national demographic shift is well underway. Predicted to arrive by the mid-twenty-first century, the numerical eclipse of the white population is already in evidence locally and regionally. In California, for example, non-Hispanic whites constitute only 39.7 per cent of the state's population. While the decline in the white population cannot be correlated with any decline of white racial dominance, the dawning and deepening of racial multipolarity calls into question a sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit black/white racial framework that is evident in Feagin and Elias's essay. Shifting racial demographics and identities also raise general questions of race and racism in new ways that the ‘systemic racism’ approach is not prepared to explain.3¶ Class questions and issues of panethnicizing trends, for example, call into question what we mean by race, racial identity and race consciousness. No racially defined group is even remotely uniform; groups that we so glibly refer to as Asian American or Latino are particularly heterogeneous. Some have achieved or exceeded socio-economic parity with whites, while others are subject to what we might call ‘engineered poverty’ in sweatshops, dirty and dangerous labour settings, or prisons. Tensions within panethnicized racial groups are notably present, and conflicts between racially defined groups (‘black/brown’ conflict, for example) are evident in both urban and rural settings. A substantial current of social scientific analysis now argues that Asians and Latinos are the ‘new white ethnics’, able to ‘work toward whiteness’4 at least in part, and that the black/white bipolarity retains its distinct and foundational qualities as the mainstay of US racism (Alba and Nee 2005; Perlmann 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Waters, Ueda and Marrow 2007).¶ We question that argument in light of the massive demographic shifts taking place in the USA. Globalization, climate change and above all neoliberalism on a global scale, all drive migration. The country's economic capacity to absorb enormous numbers of immigrants, low-wage workers and their families (including a new, globally based and very female, servant class) without generating the sort of established subaltern groups we associate with the terms race and racism, may be more limited than it was when the ‘whitening’ of Europeans took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In other words this argument's key precedent, the absorption of white immigrants ‘of a different color’ (Jacobson 1998), may no longer apply. Indeed, we might think of the assimilationist model itself as a general theory of immigrant incorporation that was based on a historically specific case study – one that might not hold for, or be replicated by, subsequent big waves of immigration. Feagin and Elias's systemic racism model, while offering numerous important insights, does not inform concrete analysis of these issues.¶ It is important going forward to understand how groups are differentially racialized and relatively positioned in the US racial hierarchy: once again racism must be seen as a shifting racial project. This has important consequences, not only with respect to emerging patterns of inequality, but also in regard to the degree of power available to different racial actors to define, shape or contest the existing racial landscape. Attention to such matters is largely absent in Feagin and Elias's account. In their view racially identified groups are located in strict reference to the dominant ‘white racial frame’, hammered into place, so to speak. As a consequence, they fail to examine how racially subordinate groups interact and influence each others’ boundaries, conditions and practices. Because they offer so little specific analysis of Asian American, Latino or Native American racial issues, the reader finds her/himself once again in the land (real or imaginary, depending on your racial politics) of bipolar US racial dynamics, in which whites and blacks play the leading roles, and other racially identified groups – as well as those ambiguously identified, such as Middle Eastern and South Asian Americans (MEASA) – play at best supporting roles, and are sometimes cast as extras or left out of the picture entirely.¶ <u><strong>We</strong> still want to <strong>acknowledge</strong> that blacks have been catching hell and have borne the brunt of the racist reaction of the past several decades. For example, <strong><mark>we agree</strong> with</u></mark> Feagin and Elias's <u><mark>critique of</mark> the reactionary politics of <mark>incarceration</u></mark> in the USA. The ‘new Jim Crow’ (Alexander 2012) or even the ‘new slavery’ that the present system practises is something that was just in its beginning stages when we were writing Racial Formation. It is now recognized as a national and indeed global scandal. <u><strong><mark>How is it to be understood?</mark> </u></strong>Of course there are substantial debates on this topic, notably about the nature of the ‘prison-industrial complex’ (Davis 2003, p. 3) and the social and cultural effects of mass incarceration along racial lines. But <u><mark>beyond</u></mark> Feagin and Elias's <u>denunciation of the ferocious white <mark>racism</mark> that is operating here, <strong><mark>deeper political implications</strong> are worth considering</u></mark>. As Alexander (2012), Mauer (2006), Manza and Uggen (2008) and movement groups like Critical Resistance and the Ella Baker Center argue, <u>the upsurge over recent decades in incarceration rates</u> for black (and brown) men expresses the fear-based, law-and-order appeals that have shaped US racial politics since the rise of Nixonland (Perlstein 2008) and the ‘Southern strategy’. Perhaps even more central, racial repression <u>aims at restricting the <strong>increasing impact of voters of colour</strong> in a demographically shifting electorate</u>.¶ There is a lot more to say about this, but for the present two key points stand out: first, it is not an area where Feagin and Elias and we have any sharp disagreement, and second, <u><mark>for all the horrors</mark> and injustices that the <mark>‘new Jim Crow’ represents, incarceration, profiling and similar practices <strong>remain political issues</strong></mark>. <strong>These</strong> practices and <strong>policies</strong> <strong>are <mark>not ineluctable </mark>and unalterable <mark>dimensions of the US racial regime</strong>. There have been previous waves of reform</mark> in these areas. <strong><mark>They can be transformed again</strong> </mark>by mass mobilization, electoral shifts and so on. In other words, <strong><mark>resistance is not futile</strong></mark>.</u>¶<u> </u>Speaking of electoral shifts and the formal political arena, how should President Barack Obama be politically situated in this discussion? How do Feagin and Elias explain Obama? Quite amazingly, his name does not appear in their essay. Is he a mere token, an ‘oreo’, a shill for Wall Street? Or does Obama represent a new development in US politics, a black leader of a mass, multiracial party that for sheer demographic reasons alone might eventually triumph over the white people's party, the Republicans? If the President is neither the white man's token nor Neo, the One,5 then once again we are in the world of politics: neither the near-total white despotism depicted by Feagin and Elias, nor a racially inclusive democracy.¶ President Obama continues to enjoy widespread black support, although it is clear that he has not protected blacks against their greatest cumulative loss of wealth in history. He has not explicitly criticized the glaring racial bias in the US carceral system. He has not intervened in conflicts over workers’ rights – particularly in the public sector where many blacks and other people of colour are concentrated. He has not intervened to halt or slow foreclosures, except in ways that were largely symbolic. Workers and lower-middle-class people were the hardest hit by the great recession and the subprime home mortgage crisis, with black families faring worst, and Latinos close behind (Rugh and Massey 2010); Obama has not defended them. Many writers have explained Obama's centrism and unwillingness to raise the issue of race as functions of white racism (Sugrue 2010).¶ The black community – and other communities of colour as well – remains politically divided. While black folk have taken the hardest blows from the reactionary and racist regime that has mostly dominated US politics since Reagan (if not since Nixon), no united black movement has succeeded the deaths of Malcolm and Martin. Although there is always important political activity underway, a relatively large and fairly conservative black middle class, a ‘black bourgeoisie’ in Frazier's (1957) terms, has generally maintained its position since the end of the civil rights era. Largely based in the public sector, and including a generally centrist business class as well, this stratum has continued to play the role that Frazier – and before him, Charles S. Johnson. William Lloyd Warner, Alison Davis and other scholars – identified: vacillation between the white elite and the black masses. Roughly similar patterns operate in Latino communities as well, where the ‘working towards whiteness’ framework coexists with a substantial amount of exclusion and super-exploitation.¶ Alongside class issues in communities of colour, there are significant gender issues. The disappearance of blue-collar work, combined with the assault by the criminal justice system – chiefly profiling by the police (‘stop and frisk’) and imprisonment, have both unduly targeted and victimized black and brown men, especially youth. <u>Women of colour are also targeted, especially by violence, discrimination and assaults on their reproductive rights</u> (Harris-Perry 2011); profiling is everywhere (Glover 2009).¶ Here again we are in the realm of racial politics. Debate proceeds in the black community on Obama's credibilty, with Cornel West and Tavis Smiley leading the critics. But it seems safe to say that in North Philly, Inglewood or Atlanta's Lakewood section, the president remains highly popular. Latino support for Obama remains high as well. Feagin and Elias need to clarify their views on black and brown political judgement. Is it attuned to political realities or has it been captured by the white racial frame? Is Obama's election of no importance?¶ ***¶ In conclusion, do Feagin and Elias really believe that white power is so complete, so extensive, so ‘sutured’ (as Laclau and Mouffe might say) as they suggest here? Do they mean to suggest, in Borg-fashion, that ‘resistance is futile?’ This seems to be the underlying political logic of the ‘systemic racism’ approach, perhaps unintentionally so. Is white racism so ubiquitous that no meaningful political challenge can be mounted against it? Are black and brown folk (yellow and red people, and also others unclassifiable under the always- absurd colour categories) utterly supine, duped, abject, unable to exert any political pressure? Is such a view of race and racism even recognizable in the USA of 2012? And is that a responsible political position to be advocating? Is this what we want to teach our students of colour? Or our white students for that matter?¶ We suspect that if pressed, Feagin and Elias would concur with our judgement that <u><mark>racial conflict</mark>, both within</u> (and against) <u>the state and in everyday life, <mark>is</mark> a <strong><mark>fundamentally political</strong></mark> process</u>. We think that they would also accept our claim that <u>the ongoing <strong><mark>political realities of race</strong> provide <strong>extensive evidence</strong> </mark>that <mark>people of colour</mark> in the USA <mark>are not</mark> so <strong><mark>powerless</strong></mark>, and that whites are not so omnipotent</u>, as Feagin and Elias's analysis suggests them to be.¶ Racial formation theory allows us to see that there are contradictions in racial oppression. The racial formation approach reveals that white racism is unstable and constantly challenged, from the national and indeed global level down to the personal and intra-psychic conflicts that we all experience, no matter what our racial identity might be. While racism – largely white – continues to flourish, it is not monolithic. Yes, <u><mark>there have been enormous increases in racial inequality</mark> in recent years. But movement-based anti-racist opposition continues, and sometimes scores victories. <strong>Challenges to white racism continue both within the state and in civil society</u></strong>. Although largely and properly led by people of colour, anti-racist movements also incorporate whites such as Feagin and Elias themselves. <u><mark>Movements may experience setbacks</mark>, the reforms for which they fought may be revealed as inadequate</u>, and indeed their leaders may be co-opted or even eliminated, <u><mark>but <strong>racial subjectivity</u></strong></mark> and self-awareness, unresolved and conflictual <u>both <mark>within the</mark> individual <mark>psyche and </mark>the <mark>body politic, <strong>abides</strong></mark>. Resistance is not futile.x</p></u>	1NC	null	humanism	40,320	654	17,121	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round5.docx	565,427	N	D6seceda	5	Wake Forest Athanasopoulos-Ning	Galloway	1NC T humanism good K case 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round5.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	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743,885	Bunch of research projects	Pennisi 12/12/14	Pennisi 12/12/14 (elizabeth, News Science Magazine, Smithsonian jumps into biodiversity genomics with new institute, http://news.sciencemag.org/biology/2014/12/smithsonian-jumps-biodiversity-genomics-new-institute)	On the heels of two vast analyses of the genomes of both birds and insects , the Smithsonian has announced that it will launch a virtual biodiversity genomics institute to accelerate efforts to capture and catalog all the DNA from Earth’s flora and fauna The Smithsonian is already devoting $10 million a year toward genomics research the Smithsonian hopes to “mobilize [its] internal troops to do even more the Smithsonian will take a lead in coordinating biodiversity genomics worldwide The Smithsonian is one of the very few institutions around the world that are able to do this , the Smithsonian already has quite a diverse collection : hundreds of thousands of museum specimens and thousands of blood samples in 30 special freezers, part of an initiative to freeze 50% of the diversity of life in the next 5 years. global leadership the Smithsonian is recognized for tha There are parallel projects to sequence thousands of insects	On the heels of two vast analyses of the genomes of both birds and insects has announced that it will launch a virtual biodiversity genomics institute to accelerate efforts to capture and catalog all the DNA from Earth’s flora and fauna The Smithsonian is already devoting $10 million a year toward genomics research the Smithsonian hopes to “mobilize [its] internal troops to do even more the Smithsonian will take a lead in coordinating biodiversity genomics worldwide The Smithsonian is one of the very few institutions around the world that are able to do this the Smithsonian already ha quite a diverse collection global leadership the Smithsonian is recognized for tha There are parallel projects to sequence thousands of insects	On the heels of two vast analyses of the genomes of both birds and insects , the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C., has announced that it will launch a virtual biodiversity genomics institute to accelerate efforts to capture and catalog all the DNA from Earth’s flora and fauna. The Smithsonian is already devoting $10 million a year toward genomics research in evolutionary, diversity, conservation, and ecological studies. By formally tying all those efforts together, the Smithsonian hopes to “mobilize [its] internal troops”—about 100 scientists—to do even more, says John Kress , the Smithsonian’s interim under secretary for science. At the same time, he hopes the Smithsonian will take a lead in coordinating biodiversity genomics worldwide. Toward that goal, he hopes to raise $100 million over the next 10 years. “The Smithsonian is one of the very few institutions around the world that are able to do this,” says Erich Jarvis , a neurobiologist at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina, who coordinated the sequencing of the genomes of 48 bird species. For one, the Smithsonian already has quite a diverse collection : hundreds of thousands of museum specimens and thousands of blood samples in 30 special freezers, part of an initiative to freeze 50% of the diversity of life in the next 5 years. For another, the name carries clout. “You need some global leadership, and the Smithsonian is recognized for that,” Jarvis says. It has already partnered with Oak Ridge National Laboratory to develop the bioinformatics power to support the genomics efforts. The Smithsonian won’t be the first or even the biggest player in biodiversity genomics. Since 2006, Paul Hebert and his Biodiversity Institute of Ontario at the University of Guelph in Canada has been combing the world and cataloging short stretches of DNA called DNA barcodes. The China National Genebank is also carrying out a comprehensive collection of DNA from plants, animals, and microbes for sequencing and study. Indeed, the Smithsonian until now has lagged behind a little, says Stephen O’Brien , a geneticist at St. Petersburg State University in Russia, who has been coordinating a global effort to sequence 10,000 vertebrates . There are parallel projects to sequence thousands of insects , marine invertebrates , and plants . He doesn’t think there needs to be a coordinating institution for all these efforts.	2,411	<h4><strong>Bunch of research projects</h4><p>Pennisi 12/12/14 </strong>(elizabeth, News Science Magazine, Smithsonian jumps into biodiversity genomics with new institute, http://news.sciencemag.org/biology/2014/12/smithsonian-jumps-biodiversity-genomics-new-institute)</p><p><u><mark>On the heels of two vast analyses of the genomes of both birds and insects</u></mark> <u>, the Smithsonian</u> Institution in Washington, D.C., <u><strong><mark>has announced that it will launch a virtual biodiversity genomics institute to accelerate efforts to capture and catalog all the DNA from Earth’s flora and fauna</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u><strong><mark>The Smithsonian is already devoting $10 million a year toward genomics research</u></strong></mark> in evolutionary, diversity, conservation, and ecological studies. By formally tying all those efforts together, <u><mark>the Smithsonian hopes to “mobilize [its] internal troops</u></mark>”—about 100 scientists—<u><strong><mark>to do even more</u></strong></mark>, says John Kress , the Smithsonian’s interim under secretary for science. At the same time, he hopes <u><strong><mark>the Smithsonian will take a lead in coordinating biodiversity genomics worldwide</u></strong></mark>. Toward that goal, he hopes to raise $100 million over the next 10 years.</p><p>“<u><strong><mark>The Smithsonian is one of the very few institutions around the world that are able to do this</u></strong></mark>,” says Erich Jarvis , a neurobiologist at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina, who coordinated the sequencing of the genomes of 48 bird species. For one<u>, <mark>the Smithsonian already ha</mark>s <strong><mark>quite a diverse collection</strong></mark> : hundreds of thousands of museum specimens and thousands of blood samples in 30 special freezers, part of an initiative to freeze 50% of the diversity of life in the next 5 years.</u> For another, the name carries clout. “You need some <u><mark>global leadership</u></mark>, and <u><mark>the Smithsonian is recognized for tha</u></mark>t,” Jarvis says. It has already partnered with Oak Ridge National Laboratory to develop the bioinformatics power to support the genomics efforts.</p><p>The Smithsonian won’t be the first or even the biggest player in biodiversity genomics. Since 2006, Paul Hebert and his Biodiversity Institute of Ontario at the University of Guelph in Canada has been combing the world and cataloging short stretches of DNA called DNA barcodes. The China National Genebank is also carrying out a comprehensive collection of DNA from plants, animals, and microbes for sequencing and study. Indeed, the Smithsonian until now has lagged behind a little, says Stephen O’Brien , a geneticist at St. Petersburg State University in Russia, who has been coordinating a global effort to sequence 10,000 vertebrates . <u><mark>There are parallel projects to sequence thousands of insects</u></mark> , marine invertebrates , and plants . He doesn’t think there needs to be a coordinating institution for all these efforts.</p>	2NC	Case – property rights	Biotech high	431,217	2	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,886	Our alternative – affirm intimate opacity. We may not share a grammar of experience, but we can start with our common experience of mutual incomprehensibility as the basis for a multi-racial republic.	PRATT ’10	Lloyd PRATT English @ Oxford ’10 “Human beyond Understanding: Frederick Douglass's New Liberal Individual” Novel 43:1 p. 47-48	Douglass rejects the slave narrative's traditional rhetoric of full disclosure. When he describes the physical violence done to enslaved African Americans, Douglass often stops short of a full revelation of these atrocities He deflects his reader's attention at the last moment, dropping the curtain just as a violent scene reaches its climax He captions these moments as significantly incomplete this rhetorical opacity anticipates Du Bois's description of life behind the veil these captioned spots form links to the romances of Melville Whitman these seemingly incommensurate forms are different articulations of a single rhetorical stance that contests the protocols of bourgeois liberalism racialism and civic republicanism This self-consciously marks its own opacity while at the same time engaging its reader with the intimacy of direct address With forms and procedures," this literature defines a public formed around repeated figurations of a limit to the cognitive availability of experiences other than one's own Douglass refuses to render either his own life experience or that of others transparent to his readers, while simultaneously addressing his readers as though they were standing near him in close quarters a stance of intimate opacity . Its untransparent mode of address belies the view that all humans share consistent and easily communicated experiences and needs it rejects civic republicanism's universal man This avoids the lures of racialism by denying Jacksonian populism's claim that race- based differences are the only form of particularity that matter a primary experience of mutual alterity defines each human's relationship to all other humans these should not be mistaken for generic liberal individualists They value and seek to articulate a new liberal individual that hinges on the presence and acknowledgment of strangers they diverge from the norms of individualism do not seek to communicate a universal human experience or even one that is proprietarily a single person's own They instead engage forms of rhetorical address that announce an insurmountable boundary of experience separating each of us from all the rest of conscious practice of drawing boundaries attempt to articulate a modern subject constituted through the acknowledgment of what Hannah Arendt describes as the "condition of plurality "[p]lurality is the condition of human action by which she means political engagement because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live an anti-universalist universalism in which to be like all others is to be equally distinctive. A strong sense that this condition of plurality forbids a democracy based on a republicanism that envisions the mutual availability of each citizen's experience democracy's warrant is a state of lack: a lack of access to the experiences and knowledges properly belonging to others As in My Bondage and My Freedom, moreover, these authors take literature to be a site for articulating that condition of lack Their rhetorical practice signals our mutual alterity while at the same time affirming this alterity as the only legitimate basis for political life seek to found a democratic multiracial public constituted at the moment each of its members encounters the opacity of all its other members and accepts that opacity itself as an enabling constraint on democracy	Douglass stops short of a full revelation of atrocities He captions these moments as significantly incomplete This marks its own opacity while at the same time engaging its reader with the intimacy of direct address. this literature defines a public formed around repeated figurations of a limit to the cognitive availability of experiences other than one's own Douglass refuses to render his own life experience or that of others transparent to his readers, while addressing readers as though they were standing near him a stance of intimate opacity. untransparent mode of address belies the view that all humans share consistent and easily communicated experiences and needs it rejects civic republicanism's universal man. This avoids the lures of racialism by denying Jacksonian populism's claim that race- based differences are the only form of particularity that matter. a primary experience of mutual alterity defines each human's relationship to all other humans these should not be mistaken for generic liberal individualists. They value and seek to articulate a new liberal individual that hinges on the presence and acknowledgment of strangers They instead engage forms of rhetorical address that announce an insurmountable boundary of experience separating each of us from all the rest of us "[p]lurality is the condition of human action by which she means political engagement because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live democracy's warrant is a state of lack Their rhetorical practice signals our mutual alterity while at the same time affirming this alterity as the only legitimate basis for political life seek to found a democratic multiracial public constituted at the moment each of its members encounters the opacity of all its other members and accepts that opacity itself as an enabling constraint on democracy.	Nineteenth-century readers familiar with the slave narrative's formal conventions would have expected Frederick Douglass's second autobiography. My Bondage and My Freedom (1855), to offer a detailed account of the clear and simple facts of Douglass's enslavement, escape, and life as a free man. Although the book's title encourages that expectation, Douglass nevertheless rejects the slave narrative's traditional rhetoric of full disclosure. When he describes the physical violence done to enslaved African Americans, for instance, Douglass often stops short of a full revelation of these atrocities. He deflects his reader's attention at the last moment, dropping the curtain just as a violent scene reaches its climax. Douglass also calls attention to the factual deficiencies in his writing. He not only withholds that which his readers would know. He also captions these moments as significantly incomplete. For Robert Stepto, this rhetorical opacity anticipates W. E. B. Du Bois's description of life behind the veil, and it marks the first glimmers of what William Andrews calls the "novelization of voice" in African American writing. I propose that these deliberately captioned blind spots mark the emergence of a considered rhetorical form that links Douglass's autobiography to the romances of Herman Melville, the poetry of Walt Whitman, and several other instances of midnineteenth- century Anglophone and Francophone American and African American writing. I also suggest that these seemingly incommensurate forms of writing are actually different articulations of a single rhetorical stance that contests the protocols of bourgeois liberalism, of racialism, and of civic republicanism. This literature repeatedly and self-consciously marks its own opacity while at the same time engaging its reader with the intimacy of direct address. Michael Warner has suggested that "[m]uch of the art of writing . . . lies in the practical knowledge that there are always many different ways of addressing a public, that each decision of form, style, and procedure carries hazards and costs in the kind of public it can define" (14). With its "forms, styles, and procedures," this literature in effect defines a public formed around repeated figurations of a limit to the cognitive availability of experiences other than one's own. In My Bondage and My Freedom, Douglass refuses to render either his own life experience or that of others transparent to his readers, while simultaneously addressing his readers as though they were standing near him in close quarters. The best-known American writers of this period adopt a similar stance of intimate opacity. This literature's intimate opacity represents an effort to counter first, I would argue, the anachronistic civic republicanism favored by white abolitionists such as William Lloyd Garrison. Its untransparent mode of address belies the view that all humans share consistent and easily communicated experiences and needs. In this regard, it rejects civic republicanism's universal man. This mode of address also avoids the lures of racialism by denying Jacksonian populism's claim that race- based differences are the only form of particularity that matter. Instead, this literature asserts that a primary experience of mutual alterity defines each human's relationship to all other humans. Despite this seeming emphasis on individual experience, however, these writers should not be mistaken for generic liberal individualists. They value and seek to articulate a new liberal individual that hinges on the presence and acknowledgment of strangers, and in this respect they diverge radically from the norms of individualism being articulated elsewhere. These authors do not seek to communicate a universal human experience, an essential racial one, or even one that is proprietarily a single person's own. They instead engage forms of rhetorical address that announce an insurmountable boundary of experience separating each of us from all the rest of us. With this "conscious practice of drawing boundaries," as Ellen Rooney might describe it (128), they attempt to articulate a modern subject constituted through the acknowledgment of what Hannah Arendt describes as the "condition of plurality." In The Human Condition, Arendt proposes that "[p]lurality is the condition of human action," by which she means political engagement, "because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live" (8). Here Arendt proposes an anti-universalist universalism in which to be like all others is to be equally distinctive. A strong sense that this condition of plurality forbids a democracy based on a republicanism that envisions the mutual availability of each citizen's experience to all other citizens informs the writing of Douglass and his peers. In ways that have not been fully acknowledged, the formal structures and thematic preoccupations of midcentury American writing in fact indicate a broadening conviction among these authors that notating an underlying condition of plurality that unites human beings is the best argument for democracy. For these authors, I am suggesting, democracy's warrant is a state of lack: a lack of access to the experiences and knowledges properly belonging to others. As in My Bondage and My Freedom, moreover, these authors take literature to be a site for articulating that condition of lack. Their rhetorical practice signals our mutual alterity while at the same time affirming this alterity as the only legitimate basis for political life. They seek to found a democratic multiracial public constituted at the moment each of its members encounters the opacity of all its other members and accepts that opacity itself as an enabling constraint on democracy. In this regard, these writers responded to the widespread race-based exclusions that defined nineteenthcentury America's best-known sites of civic republicanism—including its lyceums, athenaeums, libraries, and lecture halls—with highlighted refusals and exclusions of their own, albeit rhetorical ones.	6,139	<h4>Our alternative – affirm intimate opacity. We may not share a grammar of experience, but we can start with our common experience of mutual incomprehensibility as the basis for a multi-racial republic. </h4><p>Lloyd <u><strong>PRATT</u></strong> English @ Oxford <u><strong>’10</u></strong> “Human beyond Understanding: Frederick Douglass's New Liberal Individual” Novel 43:1 p. 47-48</p><p>Nineteenth-century readers familiar with the slave narrative's formal conventions would have expected Frederick Douglass's second autobiography. My Bondage and My Freedom (1855), to offer a detailed account of the clear and simple facts of Douglass's enslavement, escape, and life as a free man. Although the book's title encourages that expectation, <u>Douglass</u> nevertheless <u>rejects the slave narrative's traditional</u> <u>rhetoric of full disclosure. When he describes the physical violence done to enslaved African Americans,</u> for instance, <u><mark>Douglass</mark> often <mark>stops short of a full revelation of</mark> these <mark>atrocities</u></mark>. <u>He deflects his reader's attention at the last moment, dropping the curtain just as a violent scene reaches its climax</u>. Douglass also calls attention to the factual deficiencies in his writing. He not only withholds that which his readers would know. <u><mark>He</u></mark> also <u><strong><mark>captions</strong> these moments as <strong>significantly</strong> <strong>incomplete</u></strong></mark>. For Robert Stepto, <u>this rhetorical opacity anticipates</u> W. E. B. <u>Du Bois's description of life behind the veil</u>, and it marks the first glimmers of what William Andrews calls the "novelization of voice" in African American writing. I propose that <u>these</u> deliberately <u>captioned</u> blind <u>spots</u> mark the emergence of a considered rhetorical <u>form</u> that <u>links</u> Douglass's autobiography <u>to the romances of </u>Herman <u>Melville</u>, the poetry of Walt <u>Whitman</u>, and several other instances of midnineteenth- century Anglophone and Francophone American and African American writing. I also suggest that <u>these seemingly incommensurate forms </u>of writing <u>are</u> actually <u>different</u> <u>articulations of a single rhetorical stance that contests the protocols of bourgeois liberalism</u>, of <u>racialism</u>, <u>and</u> of <u>civic republicanism</u>. <u><mark>This</u></mark> literature repeatedly and <u><strong>self-consciously <mark>marks</strong> its own <strong>opacity</strong> while at the same time engaging its reader with the <strong>intimacy</strong> of <strong>direct address</u></strong>.</mark> Michael Warner has suggested that "[m]uch of the art of writing . . . lies in the practical knowledge that there are always many different ways of addressing a public, that each decision of form, style, and procedure carries hazards and costs in the kind of public it can define" (14). <u>With</u> its "<u>forms</u>, styles, <u>and procedures,"</u> <u><mark>this literature</u></mark> in effect <u><mark>defines a public formed around <strong>repeated figurations</strong> of a <strong>limit</strong> to the <strong>cognitive availability</strong> of experiences <strong>other than one's own</u></strong></mark>. In My Bondage and My Freedom, <u><mark>Douglass</u> <u>refuses to render</mark> either <mark>his own life experience or that of others transparent to his readers, while</mark> simultaneously <mark>addressing</mark> his <mark>readers as though they were standing near him</mark> in close quarters</u>. The best-known American writers of this period adopt<u> <mark>a</u></mark> similar <u><mark>stance of <strong>intimate opacity</u></strong>.</p><p></mark>This literature's intimate opacity represents an effort to counter first, I would argue, the anachronistic civic republicanism favored by white abolitionists such as William Lloyd Garrison<u>. Its <mark>untransparent mode of address belies the view that all humans share consistent and easily communicated experiences and needs</u></mark>. In this regard, <u><mark>it rejects civic republicanism's universal man</u>. <u>This</u></mark> mode of address also <u><mark>avoids the lures of racialism by <strong>denying</strong> Jacksonian <strong>populism's</strong> claim that <strong>race- based differences</strong> are the o<strong>nly form of particularity that matter</u>.</strong></mark> Instead, this literature asserts that <u><mark>a primary experience of <strong>mutual alterity</strong> defines each human's relationship to all other humans</u></mark>. Despite this seeming emphasis on individual experience, however, <u><mark>these</u></mark> writers <u><mark>should not be mistaken for <strong>generic</strong> liberal individualists</u>. <u>They value and seek to articulate a new liberal individual that hinges on the presence and acknowledgment of <strong>strangers</u></strong></mark>, and in this respect <u>they</u> <u>diverge</u> radically <u>from</u> <u>the norms of individualism</u> being articulated elsewhere. These authors <u>do not seek to communicate a universal human experience</u>, an essential racial one, <u>or even one that is proprietarily a single person's own</u>. <u><mark>They instead engage forms of rhetorical address that <strong>announce</strong> an <strong>insurmountable boundary</strong> of experience separating each of us from all the rest of</u> us</mark>. With this "<u>conscious practice of drawing boundaries</u>," as Ellen Rooney might describe it (128), they <u>attempt to articulate a modern subject constituted through the acknowledgment of what Hannah Arendt describes as the "<strong>condition of plurality</u></strong>." In The Human Condition, Arendt proposes that <u><mark>"[p]lurality is the <strong>condition of human action</u></mark>,"</strong> <u><mark>by which she means political engagement</u></mark>, "<u><mark>because <strong>we are all the same</strong>, that is, human, in such a way that <strong>nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live</u></strong></mark>" (8). Here Arendt proposes <u>an anti-universalist universalism</u> <u>in which to be like all others is to be equally distinctive. A strong sense that this condition of plurality forbids a democracy based on a republicanism that envisions the mutual availability of each citizen's experience</u> to all other citizens informs the writing of Douglass and his peers.</p><p>In ways that have not been fully acknowledged, the formal structures and thematic preoccupations of midcentury American writing in fact indicate a broadening conviction among these authors that notating an underlying condition of plurality that unites human beings is the best argument for democracy. For these authors, I am suggesting, <u><strong><mark>democracy's warrant is a state of lack</mark>:</u></strong> <u>a lack of access to the experiences and knowledges properly belonging to others</u>. <u>As in My Bondage and My Freedom, moreover, these authors take literature to be a site for articulating that condition of lack</u>. <u><mark>Their rhetorical practice signals our mutual alterity while at the same time <strong>affirming</strong> this <strong>alterity</strong> as the only <strong>legitimate basis for political life</u></strong></mark>. They <u><mark>seek to found a <strong>democratic</strong> <strong>multiracial</strong> <strong>public</strong> <strong>constituted</strong> at the moment each of its members encounters the <strong>opacity</strong> of all its other members and accepts that opacity itself as an <strong>enabling constraint</strong> on democracy</u>.</mark> In this regard, these writers responded to the widespread race-based exclusions that defined nineteenthcentury America's best-known sites of civic republicanism—including its lyceums, athenaeums, libraries, and lecture halls—with highlighted refusals and exclusions of their own, albeit rhetorical ones.</p>	1NC	null	humanism	403,988	8	17,121	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round5.docx	565,427	N	D6seceda	5	Wake Forest Athanasopoulos-Ning	Galloway	1NC T humanism good K case 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round5.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,887	Nuclear war	Goldstein 10	Joshua S. Goldstein 10, Professor Emeritus, School of International Service, American University , 2010, “Changing World Order - Engaging the South,” online: http://wps.ablongman.com/long_goldstein_ir_7/35/8977/2298242.cw/index.html	global rebound operates from North to South Actions the North takes in the South come back to haunt the North later The problem of unintended consequences has been called “blowback extreme disparities of wealth and power between North and South create conflicts and resentments that can reach out of the South to punish the North To let a continent descend into despair may no longer be practical in the era of terrorism. Their fate may be the fate of the North that ignores them desperate states will be able to press their demands with w m d fanatics may destroy cities with nuclear weapons these issues may be less amenable to unilateral U.S. actions than are military responses to terrorism closer engagement of the global North with the South toward seriously addressing the South’s problems, would mark a shift	global rebound operates from North to South The problem of unintended consequences has been called “blowback disparities of wealth and power between North and South create conflicts and resentments that punish the North To let a continent despair may no longer be practical in the era of terrorism. Their fate may be the fate of the North states will press their demands with w m d fanatics destroy cities with nuclear weapons these issues may be less amenable to unilateral U.S. actions closer engagement of the North with the South toward seriously addressing problems would mark a shift	In the last chapter’s “Changing World Order” section, there was mention of how a smallpox epidemic launched from the global South and aimed at the global North would most likely return to do most damage in the South. This quality of global rebound operates from North to South as well. Actions the North takes in the South, such as arming Islamic extremists to fight Soviet occupiers in Afghanistan in the 1980s, come back to haunt the North later—as when Afghan-based Islamic extremists attacked the United States. The problem of unintended consequences of distant actions has been called “blowback.”* September 2001 demonstrated the increased interdependence of the global North and South. The extreme disparities of wealth and power between North and South create conflicts and resentments that can reach out of the South to punish the privileged citizens of the North who had been oblivious to the problems of poor countries. In the world order of the 1990s, disparities sharpened and prosperity cut unevenly with both winners and losers. The continent of Africa, along with zones of festering war and poverty in countries like Afghanistan, were losers in the 1990s. To let a continent or even a country descend into despair may no longer be practical in the era of terrorism. Their fate ultimately may be the fate of the North that ignores them. This is the century in which desperate African states will be able to press their demands with weapons of mass destruction, and in which fanatics may destroy cities with nuclear weapons. To combat terrorism may—though this is disputed—require addressing poverty, repression, and war throughout the poorest world regions. Furthermore, these issues may be less amenable to unilateral U.S. actions than are military responses to terrorism. Thus, the need to address “root causes” of terrorism may draw the United States into closer cooperation with the UN and other international institutions in the years to come. It is unclear how these relationships will play out in practice. But if in fact the new world order is moving toward closer engagement of the global North with the South, and toward seriously addressing the South’s problems, this move would mark a shift from the world order that was developing in the 1990s, with its sharpened disparities. Do you think that investing in development, democracy, and peace in the world’s poorest countries is an important principle that should govern world order in the era of terrorist attacks? If you think this is a good idea, should it extend globally or just to countries currently “breeding” terrorists? Can Argentina or Democratic Congo fall apart without upsetting the rest of the world? Could all of Latin America or all of Africa? Will the emerging world order bring together the North and South in new ways?	2,814	<h4><strong>Nuclear war </h4><p></strong>Joshua S. <strong>Goldstein 10</strong>, Professor Emeritus, School of International Service, American University , 2010, “Changing World Order - Engaging the South,” online: http://wps.ablongman.com/long_goldstein_ir_7/35/8977/2298242.cw/index.html</p><p>In the last chapter’s “Changing World Order” section, there was mention of how a smallpox epidemic launched from the global South and aimed at the global North would most likely return to do most damage in the South. This quality of <u><strong><mark>global rebound operates from North to South</u></strong></mark> as well. <u><strong>Actions the North takes in the South</u></strong>, such as arming Islamic extremists to fight Soviet occupiers in Afghanistan in the 1980s, <u><strong>come back to haunt the North later</u></strong>—as when Afghan-based Islamic extremists attacked the United States. <u><strong><mark>The problem of unintended consequences</u></strong></mark> of distant actions <u><strong><mark>has been called “blowback</u></strong></mark>.”*</p><p>September 2001 demonstrated the increased interdependence of the global North and South. The <u><strong>extreme <mark>disparities of wealth and power</u></strong> <u><strong>between North and South</u></strong> <u><strong>create conflicts and resentments</u></strong> <u><strong>that</mark> can reach out of the South to <mark>punish the</u></strong></mark> privileged citizens of the <u><strong><mark>North</u></strong></mark> who had been oblivious to the problems of poor countries. In the world order of the 1990s, disparities sharpened and prosperity cut unevenly with both winners and losers. The continent of Africa, along with zones of festering war and poverty in countries like Afghanistan, were losers in the 1990s.</p><p><u><strong><mark>To let a continent</u></strong></mark> or even a country <u><strong>descend into <mark>despair may no longer be practical in the era of terrorism.</u></strong> <u><strong>Their fate</u></strong></mark> ultimately <u><strong><mark>may be the fate of the North</mark> that ignores them</u></strong>. This is the century in which <u><strong>desperate</u></strong> African <u><strong><mark>states will</mark> be able to</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>press their demands with</u></strong> <u><strong>w</u></strong></mark>eapons of <u><strong><mark>m</u></strong></mark>ass <u><strong><mark>d</u></strong></mark>estruction, and in which <u><strong><mark>fanatics</mark> may</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>destroy cities with nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark>. To combat terrorism may—though this is disputed—require addressing poverty, repression, and war throughout the poorest world regions. Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>these issues may be</u></strong> <u><strong>less amenable to unilateral U.S. actions</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>than are military responses to terrorism</u></strong>. Thus, the need to address “root causes” of terrorism may draw the United States into closer cooperation with the UN and other international institutions in the years to come.</p><p>It is unclear how these relationships will play out in practice. But if in fact the new world order is moving toward <u><strong><mark>closer engagement of the</mark> global <mark>North with the South</u></strong></mark>, and <u><strong><mark>toward seriously addressing</mark> the South’s <mark>problems</mark>,</u></strong> this move <u><strong><mark>would mark a shift</u></strong></mark> from the world order that was developing in the 1990s, with its sharpened disparities. Do you think that investing in development, democracy, and peace in the world’s poorest countries is an important principle that should govern world order in the era of terrorist attacks? If you think this is a good idea, should it extend globally or just to countries currently “breeding” terrorists? Can Argentina or Democratic Congo fall apart without upsetting the rest of the world? Could all of Latin America or all of Africa? Will the emerging world order bring together the North and South in new ways?</p>	null	null	1	434,549	25	17,113	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	565,270	N	Texas	4	Georgetown Erpenbach-Krishnan	Arnett	DHS politics (2NR) cross retal cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,888	Google is on it – only costs 2500 total	Wolhsen 12/09/14	Wolhsen 12/09/14 (Marcus, Wired, “Google Opens Its Cloud to Crack the Genetic Code of Autism”, http://www.wired.com/2014/12/google-opens-cloud-crack-genetic-code-autism/)	Google has spent the past decade-and-a-half perfecting the science of recognizing patterns in the chaos of information on the web it’s applying that expertise to the human genome autism advocacy group Autism Speaks said it was partnering with Google to sequence the genomes of 10,000 people on the autism spectrum along with their family members. The project will make use of Google Genomics As sequencing the human genome becomes ever-faster and cheaper it can be done for about $2,500	has spent the past decade-and-a-half perfecting the science of recognizing patterns in the chaos of information on the web. it’s applying that expertise to the human genome autism advocacy group was partnering with Google to sequence the genomes of 10,000 people The project will make use of Google Genomics As sequencing the human genome becomes ever-faster and cheaper it can be done for about $2,500	Google has spent the past decade-and-a-half perfecting the science of recognizing patterns in the chaos of information on the web. Now it’s applying that expertise to searching for clues to the genetic causes of autism in the vast sea of data contained in the human genome. On Tuesday, autism advocacy group Autism Speaks said it was partnering with Google to sequence the genomes of 10,000 people on the autism spectrum along with their family members. Google will host and index the data for qualified researchers to sift as they hunt for variations in DNA that could hint at autism’s genetic origins. “We believe that the clues to understanding autism lie in that genome,” Rob Ring, Autism Speaks’ chief science officer, told WIRED. “We’d like to leverage the same kind of technology and approach to searching the internet every day to search into the genome for these missing answers.” The project will make use of Google Genomics , a tool launched by the company several months ago with little fanfare on Google’s Cloud Platform. As sequencing the human genome becomes ever-faster and cheaper—Ring says it can be done for about $2,500, compared to nearly $3 billion for the Human Genome Project —the volume of genetic data generated by researchers has grown astronomically. By allowing researchers to dump that data onto its servers, Google gets to show off and improve the capabilities of its cloud while providing a potentially important service.	1,453	<h4><strong>Google is on it – only costs 2500 total</h4><p>Wolhsen 12/09/14 </strong>(Marcus, Wired, “Google Opens Its Cloud to Crack the Genetic Code of Autism”, http://www.wired.com/2014/12/google-opens-cloud-crack-genetic-code-autism/)</p><p><u>Google <strong><mark>has spent the past decade-and-a-half</strong> perfecting the science of recognizing patterns in the chaos of information on the web</u>.</mark> Now <u><mark>it’s applying that expertise to</mark> </u>searching for clues to the genetic causes of autism in the vast sea of data contained in<u> <mark>the human genome</u></mark>.</p><p>On Tuesday, <u><mark>autism advocacy group</mark> Autism Speaks said it <strong><mark>was partnering with Google to sequence the genomes of 10,000 people</u></strong></mark> <u>on the autism spectrum along with their family members.</u> Google will host and index the data for qualified researchers to sift as they hunt for variations in DNA that could hint at autism’s genetic origins.</p><p>“We believe that the clues to understanding autism lie in that genome,” Rob Ring, Autism Speaks’ chief science officer, told WIRED. “We’d like to leverage the same kind of technology and approach to searching the internet every day to search into the genome for these missing answers.”</p><p><u><mark>The project will make use of Google Genomics</u></mark> , a tool launched by the company several months ago with little fanfare on Google’s Cloud Platform. <u><mark>As sequencing the human genome becomes ever-faster and cheaper</u></mark>—Ring says <u><strong><mark>it can be done for about $2,500</u></strong></mark>, compared to nearly $3 billion for the Human Genome Project —the volume of genetic data generated by researchers has grown astronomically. By allowing researchers to dump that data onto its servers, Google gets to show off and improve the capabilities of its cloud while providing a potentially important service.</p>	2NC	Case – property rights	Biotech high	431,218	2	17,117	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	565,425	N	D6seceda	1	Miami George-Silverman	Slattery	Organ sales aff 2NR politics distinguish grounds CP organ conscription CP	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,889	Abandoning the law leaves it to neoconservatives of the world. Building democratic law prevents sovereign violence.	PASSAVANT ’12	Paul PASSAVANT Poli Sci @ Hobart and William Smith Colleges ’12 “Democracy’s ruins, democracy’s archive” in Reading Modern Law: Critical Methodologies and Sovereign Formations eds. Buchanan et al p.	if one wants to give force to the requirements of justice then one must calculate, One cannot simply maintain the point of suspense Not if one wants to prevent the awful possibility of camps To leave matters at this suspended point is consistent with 's antijuridicism, pure receptivity would be vacuous and ultimately nothing The categories of ontology in themselves do not enable us to address the most pressing injustices in contemporary law and politics today, such as the revival of camps To embrace pure unthinkable possibilities for their own sake gives us no normative grounds on which to resist camps Absolute democracy exterior to sovereignty, is an impossibility A new beginning must borrow its terms. : the people of popular sovereignty do not invent the language of their self governance out of nothing. The beginning of democracy cannot be absolutely democratic. Never fully present, and defying origins, democracy reaches out to others in order to be. These others are past and future we must begin on some haunted grounds, using terms the meaning of which has, been previously determined by others, democratic beginnings are always less than democratic Because popular sovereignty is lacking at any moment, it requires a supplement. This is law Law is where we keep our commitments to democracy, reinstituting and re-sending these commitments in the moments of decision Democratic victories are always partial emaining vulnerable to the John Yoos of the world Yoo justifies the internment of Japanese Americans in concentration camps when created under the 'pressing public necessity' of a 'total' war he cites the repudiated, though never overruled Korematsu Every law is a sending and Justice Jackson, who was concerned that the validation of racial discrimination would lie around like a 'loaded weapon', to be picked up by a future tyrant claiming 'urgent need' Law Jackson realized has a 'generative power of its own', and every repetition of the principle of 'racial discrimination ould embed the principle more deeply in Americans' 'law and thinking' enabling its expansion to 'new purposes' Law is where we take a position on democracy Law is how we enact our commitment or responsibility to democracy and to justice, In this resistance to forgetting law is like an archive An archive is where social order is exercised a place of the question of who exercises legitimate hermeneutic authority who has the 'right to represent the law' We are constituted by democracy's archive, democracy's remainders By its echoes. Constitutional law in the U S bears the impression of confronting fascism in the internment of Japanese Americans, and the Supreme Court's infamous decision Korernatsu Aside from the fact that this legal decision found that courts must apply 'strict scrutiny' to racial classifications egal scholars do not view this legal opinion as 'good law'. The democratic narrative of Korernatsu, based on this archive, is shame and a sense of responsibility for overcoming the outcome of the case while maintaining the strongest presumption against invidious racial classifications Yoo's legal opinions attempt to eviscerate the narrative archiving the outcome of Korernatsu as wrong, and the principle of racial discrimination as wrong for a democratic society. The ideas that a president's word is law or that racial guilt is an acceptable premise for government must be excluded to keep democratic commitments or to send the possibility of a legacy hospitable for democracy an archive also constitutes resources to be drawn upon- at present, and for the future. When we take a position against the abusive exercise of tyrannical sovereign power, we invoke law The paradoxical co-implication of determination and responsiveness, necessary for popular sovereignty to be, is why democracy relies on law. If law is figured solely as vacuous then it is open to anything, even to Yoo So, an archive of democratic commitments a law dedicated to democracy- must also be constituted through exclusions if we seek faithfully to keep or to promise the prospect of democracy This legal archive is animated through a negative relation to tyrannies As we enumerate tyrannical mentalities and deeds, we will be engaged with the project of constituting an archive for democracy, a law to keep democracy for the future we are engaging in a practice of re-calling and re-sending democracy, faithful to its coming, labouring for its return when we engage in critique of camps we re-send our archived commitments against this tyrann the force of law may indeed generate the social bond what manner of 'being-with each other' shall we aspire to If our position is a democratic resistance to camps, then we will not be content to remain open to all potentialities Much as we must begin our labours among democracy's ruins, John Yoo has been hard at work already. Yoo's numerous legal memos written on behalf of the Bush administration Yoo is currently at work writing books, publishing law review articles, uploading SSRN papers, crafting op-eds, presenting congressional testimony, giving interviews, teaching law school courses, and responding to government reports questioning his faithfulness to the law He is an archivist as well, seeking to invent the legal archive that will have justified his earlier work. This is why we must persist in our faithful labours among democracy's ruins. Otherwise, democracy's archive will be put to a 'new use' and will be 'play[ed] with just as children play with disused objects' It will become dead letter in democracy's archive we find the legal principles equal protection, due process that are anathema to the camps We can find these commitments in democracy's archive, recall them, and extend these as a response to the tyrannies of today It is with-in democracy's archive where democracy undergoes a process of 'continual constitution' What is the fate of law and democracy after Yoo? Rather than a messianic aversion to law ur labours among democracy's ruins. points us to the persistence of law the possibility of democracy We cannot expect a messianic blow to replace, totally, a non-existent absolute sovereignty, Because of the impossibility of absolute democracy and absolute sovereignty, we must start where we are This is the urgency of law and of politics.	null	Here is where we can dramatically contrast Derrida's and Fitzpatrick's attention to law with Agamben's aversion to the concept of responsibility because of its relation to the juridical (Agamben 2002: 20ff.; Mills 2008: 102-4). If one is motivated by justice, if one wants to give force to the requirements of justice or make the powerful more just, then one must calculate, with a spirit of justice, what decision to make.9 One cannot simply maintain the point of suspense. Not if one wants to prevent the awful possibility of camps. Therefore, the experience of passivity, this openness to innumerable possibilities described by Agamben, is like the infinite responsiveness required by considerations of justice in the suspended moment prior to a legal decision. To leave matters at this suspended point is consistent with Agamben 's antijuridicism, since responsiveness is only one dimension of the law; pure receptivity would be vacuous and ultimately nothing. The demands of justice, however, mean that we must make a determination - one that admittedly will come too late. Consequently, to leave matters at a moment of passivity or receptivity, as Agamben does with his embrace of pure potentiality, is to do neither law nor the work ofjustice. The categories of ontology in themselves do not enable us to address the most pressing injustices in contemporary law and politics today, such as the revival of camps. To translate our terms of political theory into the terminology of ontology, as the new ontologists do, leads to significant confusions. To embrace pure, infinite, or unthinkable possibilities for their own sake gives us no normative grounds on which to resist camps. To contend that the opposite of sovereignty is contingency or potentiality does not suggest another force or capacity of greater normative value than sovereignty. Furthermore, if pure sovereignty is 'determinant', for example, then it cannot be described ontologically as 'absolute necessity'. Absolute democracy, exterior to sovereignty, is also an impossibility. 10 In contrast to Agamben, though, let us give credit to the achievements of the people in the centuries of struggle against the tyranny of absolute monarchy, and consider the quest for popular sovereignty. Democracy is already an articulated concept - an articulation of demos or people, and kratos (or kratein), which refers to having power, the force of law, rule, or to have or to be right (Derrida 2005: 22). That is, 'democracy' itself refers to popular sovereignty, a situation where people are sovereign, or where people govern themselves. In a democracy, people give themselves laws, and share power equally. By referring to popular sovereignty, I emphasize the normative element of democracy: it is right that the people should rule, the people have a right to rule. This is the rule or law of democracy. A new beginning is always both less and more than democratic. A new beginning must borrow its terms. Likewise for a democratic beginning: the people of popular sovereignty do not invent the language of their self governance out of nothing. Indeed, the possibility of democracy is given by language, and the many discourses of democracy, with meanings attributed to these words, rules of grammar, and discourses that the people did not give to themselves. The beginning of democracy cannot be absolutely democratic. When we begin - even a project of democracy - we begin from a place or a position already given to, or imposed upon, us (Derrida 2000, 2002b) . Our beginnings are always less than democratic as they have been legislated in advance of us. Additionally, because we must borrow our terms, the 'people' of popular sovereignty are always more than themselves. The 'people' of popular sovereignty share their power with others who preceded them. Furthermore, democratic acts are oriented to the future, to keeping democracy that is, they are oriented towards future incarnations of democratic subjects. Moreover, because democracy opens itself to others, the 'anyone' of democratic participation may include those who lack a commitment to democracy. Therefore, the 'people' of democracy are always more than themselves. There is never just democracy here. There is always democracy plus something else. The 'people' of popular sovereignty are also always less than themselves. Never fully present, and defying origins, democracy reaches out to others in order to be. These others are past and future. Because we must begin somewhere, on some haunted grounds, using terms the meaning of which has, to some extent, been previously determined by others, democratic beginnings are always less than democratic. Concrete democratic acts are necessary to fulfil promises or claims for democracy. But, like considerations regarding justice, there is always a limit to our knowledge, or a finite limit to our accounting of a problem, or our memory. In these ways, democracy is always lacking. There is never just democracy here. Because popular sovereignty is lacking at any moment, it requires a supplement. This is law. When we take a position - such as a position for democracy - we rely on law to recall the commitments necessarily implicated within this position. To bring our (democratic) selves back to ourselves. Law occupies the area of a-position, in between the determinate commitments necessary to making life more democratic or more just, and the infinitely responsive dimension of democracy, of justice; in between our democratic position and that to which we must respond if we are to maintain our democratic position. Like 'law', democracy's condition is always unresolved, calling for incessant decisions and judgements. Demacracy also persists through a relation of negativity - in condemning and addressing manners of tyranny. Democracy takes a position - comes from a position- as law 'comes from and returns to a position'. Law is where we keep our commitments to democracy, reinstituting and re-sending these commitments in the moments of decision, when, as always, our commitment to democracy seems to be dissipating and we must respond to a different challenge. Democracy must be open, but in this opening it risks becoming something other than democracy. Alternatively, democracy risks being trapped by past determinations in the face of new and different challenges - an enclosure that would render democracy less than democratic in its lack of responsiveness. Law resolves, for the time being, these paradoxical dimensions of popular sovereignty. 11 In sum, displacing inquiry from politics to the categories of ontology will not resolve pressing injustices. Moreover, both absolute sovereignty and absolute democracy are impossibilities. While sovereignty must take on certain democratic attributes to achieve extension- like sharing power through institutional assemblies and assemblages - democracy always begins in a place with terms in some way legislated for it by an other in advance. Both sovereignty and democracy must contain paradoxical, if not contradictory, attributes in order to be. And both rely on law for temporary and unstable resolution of these ambivalent tendencies. That which enables either the absolute sovereignty of a tyrant or a recording of a democratic success, however, makes these forms of power vulnerable to ruin. Tyranny requires the assistance of scriveners. Likewise, democratic struggles produce victories that can never be absolute as its plural institutional assemblages create opportunities for ruinous resistance to democracy's commitments. Democratic victories are always partial - succeeding in one place or another, while remaining vulnerable to the John Yoos of the world who remain embedded deep within the bureaucracies of the modern state or who remain in its assemblies. They will come with remainders and they will be lacking in some way. Camps, or democracy's ruins In his book The Powers of War and Peace, which finds that the president is not bound by international law, John Yoo, a member of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) between 2001 and 2003 in George W. Bush's administration, and the author of the infamous 'torture memo' of August 2002,justifies the internment of Japanese Americans in concentration camps during the Second World War by the US government (Yoo 2005). He does this in the context of illustrating a distinction he makes between 'total war', in which Congress augments executive war powers with a public declaration of the [actual existence of hostilities, and other wars that are conducted without such a public declaration by Congress. He finds internment camps to be constitutional when they are created under the 'pressing public necessity' of a 'total' war. Nevertheless, Yoo is typically ambiguous about whether the wholesale round-up of Americans or others would still be constitutional without such a congressional declaration. He says, 'one doubts' whether 'courts' would have allowed 'wholesale internment' of 'Panamanian Americans', 'Yugoslavs', or 'Iraqis Americans [sic]', in reference to recent conflicts conducted without the benefit of a congressional declaration of war, although he does not clearly rule out the possibility that courts might have upheld such actions. Moreover, his speculations are on the subject of court action; he does not clearly state whether he believes such an action to be properly constitutional even if he is clear that internment should be considered permissible when there is a congressional declaration of war (ibid.: 151, 333). To support this position he cites favourably in a singular endnote the repudiated, though never overruled, Supreme Court decision Korematsu v. United States (1944), which sustained Fred Korematsu's conviction for refusing to abide by the military's internment order applicable to 'all persons of Japanese ancestry', and remaining in a prohibited area: his hometown (Yoo 2005; Irons 1983) . During the 1940s the United States fought a war against the Nazis' camps. Today, however, the United States maintains a camp at a military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and another at the Baghram airbase in Afghanistan. 12 In these camps, hundreds of people have been subjected to executive detention, and many have been tortured (ICRC 2007). Every law is a sending, and this deeply worried a dissenter from the majority's opinion in Korematsu, Justice Jackson, who was concerned that the validation of racial discrimination would lie around like a 'loaded weapon', to be picked up by a future tyrant claiming 'urgent need'. Law, Jackson realized, has a 'generative power of its own', and every repetition of the principle of 'racial discrimination in criminal procedure' and the 'transplanting' of 'American citizens' would embed the principle more deeply in Americans' 'law and thinking', enabling its expansion to 'new purposes' (Korernatsu v. United States, with Justice Jackson dissenting at 246). These, as Jackson recognized, would be ruinous repetitions. Legal struggles, or democracy's archive Bow are we to resist the ruinous aspects of tyranny and keep faith with democracy? Messianic postmodernism would have us abandon law to oppose absolute and total sovereignty in the name of absolute democracy, for Hardt and Negri, or to experience pure potentiality, for Agamben . 1 have shown, however, that neither absolute sovereignty nor absolute democracy can exist as such. The perfect absence of democracy and its pure presence are both foreclosed by the force of necessary iteration, iteration that enables both democracy and tyrannical sovereignty to be, spectrally. Moreover, pure potentiality gives us no position from which to oppose the particularities of tyranny, such as camps. Drawing from Fitzpatrick, I have also indicated that law facilitates the resolution of (popular) sovereignty's - of democracy's - paradoxical dimensions for the time being: the determinate political position of democracy with democracy's openness and responsiveness, for example. Law subjects political power to sharing. It is where democracy is claimed, permitted, and promised. Even as law is always already 'ruined, in ruins, ruinous', law also provides for democracy being posited and preserved (Derrida 2002a: 273). Law is where sovereignty is divided or shared, and it is how we (re )send democracy (Derrida 2005: 34). It is where we enact our fidelity to democracy where we cut into history and take a position on democracy (Derrida 2002a: 289). Law is where we take a position on democracy. Law must come from a position, and there must be a position, or a place, to which law can then return. Law is how we enact our commitment or responsibility to democracy and to justice, the commitments and responsibilities we have made here to those impossibly necessary tasks. In this, law assists our memory and acts as a resistance to forgetting even as law's repetitions are generated by the fact that we have always already forgotten some of these commitments. We cannot keep such infinite responsibilities in mind at once. In this resistance to a forgetting that constantly tracks us, law is like an archive (Derrida 1995: 76, fn. 14). An archive is where archives, and archiving, take place (Derrida 1995: 2). There where a social order is exercised. Archive, deriving from the Greek arkhe, articulates a principle of beginning, a law according to which a practice was begun, a place of depositing, and the question of who exercises legitimate hermeneutic authority- who has the 'right to make or represent the law' (ibid.: 1-3). The notion of an archive implies a particular region of thought or place, as well as a law - no archiving without law (ibid.: 40). An archive both conserves and generates. It gathers in preparation for a future. It is a promise to others, to our legatees (ibid.: 36). On the one hand, when one interprets an object of an archive, one's interpretation becomes inscribed into the archive. The archive is a spectral corpus that never closes since the archivist produces more archive: the archive opens out to the future (ibid.: 67- 8). Yet, on the other hand, an archive must also exclude: 'No archive without outside' (ibid.: 11 , emphasis removed). The laws of an archive - principles of value and classification will regulate not only that which has been included and how it is to be included, but also that which should be excluded to conserve this trust, so we know how to go on in the future (ibid.: 40). Nevertheless, as Derrida points out, even that ':h.ich we exclude shapes our laws as its phantom continues to haunt us (Ibid .: 61). By thinking of law as where we take a position, for democracy, for example, and by thinking of law as an archival practice, we cross a conceptual argument with an ontological one. The conceptual argument that we share our powers, our law-making, with others indicates the impossibility of either the pure absence of democracy or democracy's pure presence. Therefore, even if law and politics do not have in essence a tendency towards democracy (which is implicated in the conceptual argument) , there remains an ineradicable democratic element. 13 Law as archive meets this conceptual argument with on tic and ontological principles. An archive takes place. It is deposited somewhere. There is no archive without substance: there is no archive without a trace (Derrida 1995: 26-7). Could the claim of popular sovereignty, could a democratic beginning or performative speech act, could the exercise of self-government, could politics take place where the people, there, decide to give themselves laws, and could this democratic sending or legacy disappear without a trace? Could the struggles against tyranny disappear, totally, without a trace? Would it be responsive or responsible to democracy or to justice to try to make these things disappear in order to constitute an absolutely new ontology? Such a beginning, like any beginning, would have to take place somewhere and therefore it would have to account for what had given place to such a beginning. This is the paradox of a democratic beginning: it is never equal to itself, it is never just democracy. It begins in ruins. This is where and how we begin, even if we want to begin democratically. But this is not all bad. Not if there is a resistance to forgetting these struggles against tyranny as we begin again. We are constituted by democracy's archive, by democracy's remainders. By its echoes. We are not totally foreign to democracy. Not now, and perhaps not ever. Our contemporary politics takes place within the echoes of languages (some even dead? Or would that be an impossibility?), making possible our constitution as political subjects and even as subjects capable of democracy in ways beyond or perhaps behind our ability to comprehend (Heller-Roazen 2005). Constitutional law in the United States bears the impression of confronting fascism nowhere more disturbingly than in the internment of Japanese Americans, and the Supreme Court's infamous decision Korernatsu v. United States upholding the conviction of Korematsu for violating the Order, which Yoo cites favourably. How has this case been archived previously? The dissenters in Korernalsu recognized at the time that the decision had fallen into the 'ugly abyss of racism' , that the ' legalization of racism' plays no justifiable part in a 'democratic way of life' (with Justice Murphy dissenting at 233, 242). One of the dissenters expressed concern regarding the decision's dangerous repetitive potential, as I have already mentioned. Peter Irons is the author of the definitive study of the law and politics around the internment of Japanese Americans. Discussing his sources, Irons notes that the decision faced immediate and scathing criticism in major law review articles published as early as 1945. Writing in 1983, Irons finds that in the 'years since the publication of these articles ... not a single legal scholar or writer has attempted a substantive defense of the Supreme Court opinions' (1983: 371). Aside from the fact that this legal decision found that courts must apply 'strict scrutiny' (a legal term of art meaning that the classification in question must be subjected to the most searching inquiry and that there is the greatest presumption against the constitutionality of the governmental policy at issue) to racial classifications, legal scholars do not view this legal opinion as 'good law'. The decision was made at a time when racial segregation was still allowed in the United States, but the Supreme Court found racial segregation to be unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Law students and others who study constitutional law are taught how the racial classification in Korernatsu cannot stand up to the most basic forms of equal protection analysis (because the classification is underinclusive by failing to include German or Italian Americans, and because it is also over-inclusive by including both loyal and disloyal Japanese Americans; all of this lets us see that the governmental policy is motivated less by security concerns and more by racism) .14 The conviction of Korematsu has been overturned because the government was found to have committed misconduct through the suppression of evidence and the inclusion of misinformation. And the United States has both apologized and paid reparations to those interned or their families (Sullivan and Gunther 2004: 668- 9, fn. 3). As matters of law and policy, everything about Korematsu, except the notion that there is the strongest presumption against racial classifications, has been repudiated and apologized for. The democratic narrative of Korernatsu, based on this archive, is shame and a sense of responsibility for overcoming the outcome of the case, while maintaining the strongest presumption against invidious racial classifications. The ruling was represented as a failure in the struggle against tyranny when it was issued, and in the manner it has been archived since. Yoo's legal opinions attempt to eviscerate the narrative archiving the outcome of Korernatsu as wrong, and the principle of racial discrimination as wrong for a democratic society. These, as Justice Jackson recognized, are ruinous iterations. The ideas that a president's word is law or that racial guilt is an acceptable premise for government must be excluded to keep democratic commitments or to send the possibility of a legacy hospitable for democracy. Any archive must have an outside. But an archive also constitutes resources to be drawn upon- at present, and for the future. Taking a position No wonder, then, that messianic postmodernists - those who wait for being alien to law - wind up invoking law either to denounce present injustices or to seek a better, more just, or indeed a more democratic and Jess tyrannical future. If these are our purposes - if we are taking a position against tyranny- then being passively open to infinite possibilities or potentialities will not actively further those commitments. This is why, when we have specific purposes or commitments to which we are faithful, such as taking a position for democracy, or when we critique a process of repetition sedimenting the tyranny of camps in order to open the space for their rejection , we invoke the law and draw from democracy's archive. Likewise, when Agamben seeks to preserve a community of the faithful who will think the 'relation of every instant to the Messiah', who will 'strain forward' towards salvation, he puts aside the antinomialism of Homo Sacer to embrace 'messian ic law', or the law of faith (2005b: 76-8, 95). There would be an infinite number of actions (not) to do if the faithful are to make messianic potential become active or operative, if they are to live exclusively in the joyful announcement ( euaggelion). To be sure, these infinite actions and inactions implicated in pistis (faith) would exceed any finite list of dos and don 'ts exemplified by the Mosaic law of the Ten Commandments, and messianic law, or nornos pisteos, refers to this excessive aspect. How can the faithful know or remember what is required of them at each moment to dwell within messianic law iflaw is not textualized? Agamben explains, ' [I]t is not a letter written in ink on tables of stone; rather, it is written with the breath of God on hearts of flesh'. It is 'not a writing but a form of life ... ''You are our letter"' (2005b: 122, quoting 2 Cor. 3:2, emphasis in original). This privileging of the spirit over the letter of the law attempts to make calculable, measured law identical to incalculable, immeasurable life by emphasizing the excessive aspect of law, and maintaining law's openness or responsiveness to the future. Through infinite openness, law and life are one, with no ruins or remainders. If, however, 'law' is not to be merely vacuous, infinitely open to anything and everything, hence no law at all, then we must not forget what it means to be faithful to the rnessiah. Appropriately, then, Agamben does not fully forgo textualizing law, citing St Paul 's recapitulation of the entirety of God's law with the formula 'Love your neighbor as yourself.' It helps to learn, to know, to remember what is required of the faithful, to recall the messianic. To this end, Agamben refers to law as a '"pedagogue" leading to the messiah' (2005b: 76, 120, citing Gal. 3:24, emphasis added). Law is an archive even for those faithful to the messianic. Similarly, in State of Exception Agamben critiques recent practices in the United States, such as the camps at Guant<inamo Bay and the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. He argues, 'At the very moment when it would like to give lessons in democracy to different traditions and cultures, the political culture of the West does not realize that it has entirely lost its canon' (2005a: 18). Here, Agamben denounces the United States, among others, for having lost its law. He condemns people in the United States for forgetting their law and losing their archive, their aide-memoire. Indeed, Agamben rightly denounces them - us - for it. His denunciation - accusing them, us - for forgetting our law pays homage, as Jean Baudrillard would have noted, to the law (1988: 173). His denunciation relies on recalling a law, an archive, and its presently forgotten, suppressed, or repressed democratic commitments. Thus, to the extent that messianic postmodernists are actually concerned with specific principles of justice, democracy, or even the messianic, as opposed to whatever, they contradict their postmodern antinomialism and invoke law. When we take a position against the abusive exercise of tyrannical sovereign power, as Agamben does, we invoke law. Coming from a position, law combines determinate political commitment with a responsiveness to future circumstances. This paradoxical, if not impossible, combination of determinacy with responsiveness required by popular sovereignty is 'resolved', as we can understand in light of Fitzpatrick's work, by law. The paradoxical co-implication of determination and responsiveness, necessary for popular sovereignty to be, is why democracy relies on law. The sense of pure whatever potentiality Agamben promotes corresponds with the dimension of law as infinite openness tending to vacuity. If law is figured solely as vacuous, then it is open to anything, even to Yoo. Law, however, comes from and returns to a position, and understanding law as democracy's archive is an attunement to the determinate place and commitments from which we begin, again. Any archival practice supplementing our memory of positive commitments to democracy, of re-calling our (democratic) selves to our selves, of re-calling society's commitment to democracy or principles of justice to society, must necessarily have an outside. So, an archive of democratic commitments- a law dedicated to democracy- must also be constituted through exclusions if we seek faithfully to keep or to promise the prospect of democracy. This legal archive is animated through a negative relation to tyrannies. As we enumerate tyrannical mentalities and deeds, we will be engaged, in part, with the project of constituting an archive for democracy, a law to keep democracy for the future. When we labour, in our fidelity to resisting tyranny, among democracy's ruins, we are engaging in a practice of re-calling and re-sending democracy, faithful to its coming, labouring for its return. Perhaps. Therefore, when we engage in critique of camps, and the way that some legal thought reintroduces this potentiality, we re-send our archived commitments against this tyranny as a faithful pledge to the future. In other words, the constituent force of law may indeed generate the 'very social bond of modernity, the means of our relation and being-with each other' (Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009: 85). But what manner of sociality, of 'being-with each other', shall we endure, share, or aspire to? What manner of being are we starting from, orienting towards, or have we vowed to keep for the time being? If our position is a democratic resistance to camps, then we will not be content to remain open to all potentialities, including camps- not when we have commitments to which we must remain faithful. Law as democracy's archive is our resistance to forgetting these commitments. An archive is a 'pledge' of the future (Derrida 1995: 18) . Likewise, law as democracy's archive is a pledge of and for the future, a future we have no certain grounds for knowing will keep this pledge, much as we have no certain grounds to count on just democracy ourselves, not as we begin again among democracy's ruins. There is, however, no democracy 'without an act offaith' (Derrida 2005: 48). Much as we must begin our labours among democracy's ruins, John Yoo has been hard at work already. Yoo's numerous legal memos written on behalf of the Bush administration, many of which remain secret as of this writing, constitute a warp. As geological layers evidence a protrusion, or another force repressed by layers of sediment, so too do these memos. Even their very numerousness serves to remind us of the doubts they are intended to cover over, the democratic doubt they are meant to contain. Yoo is also currently at work writing books, publishing law review articles, uploading SSRN (Social Science Research Network) papers, crafting op-eds, presenting congressional testimony, giving interviews, teaching law school courses, and responding to government reports questioning his faithfulness to the law. He is an archivist as well, seeking to invent the legal archive that will have justified his earlier work. This is why we must persist in our faithful labours among democracy's ruins. Otherwise, democracy's archive will be put to a 'new use' and will be 'play[ed] with just as children play with disused objects'. It will become like the dead letter Agamben's 'new attorney' reads bemusedly, but without attachment, 'leafing through "our old books"' (2005a: 63-4) . Conclusion In this chapter I have argued that recent postmodern aversions to law and sovereignty, such as the work of Agamben, which favours the coming of a new ontology - a messianic preoccupation with the absolute arrival of new being exterior to law or sovereignty- is not helpful in addressing present tyrannies and injustices. Fitzpatrick's work on sovereignty, emphasizing its tension between finite determination and extensive, encompassing responsiveness, indicates a more productive post-structuralism. Rather than a picture of absolute determination, Fitzpatrick shows how sovereignty must also be determinate. The impossibility of pure sovereignty elucidates the vulnerabilities popular sovereignty faces - the way that democracy is vulnerable to ruin. Any beginning, such as a democratic beginning, must commence on terms not of its own making. Therefore, the re is never just democracy here. Fitzpatrick's understanding of sovereignty, and the way that a fraught combination of d eterminacy and responsive ness takes place through law, allows us to comprehend, then, the dual impossibilities of absolute sovereignty and absolute democracy. Contemporary law and politics take place within the torsion of these impossibilities. Law, which is where popular sovereignty undergoes continual constitution , must come from a position, and it must also return to a position or a place. It is where we take a position on democracy, and it is where we archive democracy's ruins in resistance to the n ecessary finitude of our being forgetful human beings. If an archive is a pledge to the future, then considering law as democracy's archive means that it is with-in law that we recall principles of democracy and justice to ourselves, and send, again, this legacy to the future. In other words, we do not begin our struggles against the camps with a vacuous receptivity to pure potentiality that cannot take a position. We begin, again, in democracy's archive, with democratic remains. It is there that we find the legal principles that gave place to us, those of equal protection, due process, and that political leaders must take care that those laws are faithfully executed that are anathema to the camps. We can find these determinate commitments in democracy's archive, recall them, and extend these determinations faithfully as a response to the tyrannies of today, for the future. It is with-in democracy's archive where democracy undergoes a process of 'continual constitution'. What is the fate of law and democracy after Yoo? Rather than a messianic aversion to law or politics, Fitzpatrick's work points us in the direction of recommencing our labours among democracy's ruins. It points us to the persistence of law, the possibility of democracy, and the faithful labours necessary to resist tyranny. We cannot expect a messianic blow to replace, totally, a non-existent absolute sovereignty, without ruin or remainder. Because of the impossibility of absolute democracy and absolute sovereignty, we must start where we are, in the torsion of politics, labouring among democracy's ruins, reconstructing its archive, if we want better than Yoo gives us. Democracy is never just here. It is n ever just here. This is the urgency of law and of politics.	32,308	<h4>Abandoning the law leaves it to neoconservatives of the world. Building democratic law prevents sovereign violence.</h4><p>Paul <u><strong>PASSAVANT</u></strong> Poli Sci @ Hobart and William Smith Colleges <u><strong>’12</u></strong> “Democracy’s ruins, democracy’s archive” in Reading Modern Law: Critical Methodologies and Sovereign Formations eds. Buchanan et al p. </p><p>Here is where we can dramatically contrast Derrida's and Fitzpatrick's attention to law with Agamben's aversion to the concept of responsibility because of its relation to the juridical (Agamben 2002: 20ff.; Mills 2008: 102-4). If one is motivated by justice, <u>if one wants to give force to the requirements of justice</u> or make the powerful more just, <u>then one must calculate,</u> with a spirit of justice, what decision to make.9 <u>One cannot simply maintain the point of suspense</u>. <u>Not if one wants to prevent the awful possibility of camps</u>. Therefore, the experience of passivity, this openness to innumerable possibilities described by Agamben, is like the infinite responsiveness required by considerations of justice in the suspended moment prior to a legal decision. <u>To leave matters at this suspended point is consistent with </u>Agamben<u> 's antijuridicism, </u>since responsiveness is only one dimension of the law;<u> pure receptivity would be vacuous and ultimately nothing</u>. The demands of justice, however, mean that we must make a determination - one that admittedly will come too late. Consequently, to leave matters at a moment of passivity or receptivity, as Agamben does with his embrace of pure potentiality, is to do neither law nor the work ofjustice. <u>The categories of ontology in themselves do not enable us to address the most pressing injustices in contemporary law and politics today, such as the revival of camps</u><strong>.</strong> To translate our terms of political theory into the terminology of ontology, as the new ontologists do, leads to significant confusions. <u>To embrace pure</u>, infinite, or <u>unthinkable possibilities</u> <u>for their own sake gives us no normative grounds on which to resist camps</u>. To contend that the opposite of sovereignty is contingency or potentiality does not suggest another force or capacity of greater normative value than sovereignty. Furthermore, if pure sovereignty is 'determinant', for example, then it cannot be described ontologically as 'absolute necessity'. <u>Absolute democracy</u>, <u>exterior to sovereignty, is</u> also <u>an impossibility</u>. 10 In contrast to Agamben, though, let us give credit to the achievements of the people in the centuries of struggle against the tyranny of absolute monarchy, and consider the quest for popular sovereignty. Democracy is already an articulated concept - an articulation of demos or people, and kratos (or kratein), which refers to having power, the force of law, rule, or to have or to be right (Derrida 2005: 22). That is, 'democracy' itself refers to popular sovereignty, a situation where people are sovereign, or where people govern themselves. In a democracy, people give themselves laws, and share power equally. By referring to popular sovereignty, I emphasize the normative element of democracy: it is right that the people should rule, the people have a right to rule. This is the rule or law of democracy. A new beginning is always both less and more than democratic. <u>A new beginning must borrow its terms.</u> Likewise for a democratic beginning<u>: the people of popular sovereignty do not invent the language of their self governance out of nothing.</u> Indeed, the possibility of democracy is given by language, and the many discourses of democracy, with meanings attributed to these words, rules of grammar, and discourses that the people did not give to themselves. <u>The beginning of democracy cannot be absolutely democratic. </u>When we begin - even a project of democracy - we begin from a place or a position already given to, or imposed upon, us (Derrida 2000, 2002b) . Our beginnings are always less than democratic as they have been legislated in advance of us. Additionally, because we must borrow our terms, the 'people' of popular sovereignty are always more than themselves. The 'people' of popular sovereignty share their power with others who preceded them. Furthermore, democratic acts are oriented to the future, to keeping democracy that is, they are oriented towards future incarnations of democratic subjects. Moreover, because democracy opens itself to others, the 'anyone' of democratic participation may include those who lack a commitment to democracy. Therefore, the 'people' of democracy are always more than themselves. There is never just democracy here. There is always democracy plus something else. The 'people' of popular sovereignty are also always less than themselves. <u>Never fully present, and defying origins, democracy reaches out to others in order to be. These others are past and future</u>. Because <u>we must begin</u> somewhere, <u>on some haunted grounds, using terms the meaning of which has,</u> to some extent, <u>been previously determined by others, democratic beginnings are always less than democratic</u>. Concrete democratic acts are necessary to fulfil promises or claims for democracy. But, like considerations regarding justice, there is always a limit to our knowledge, or a finite limit to our accounting of a problem, or our memory. In these ways, democracy is always lacking. There is never just democracy here. <u>Because popular sovereignty is lacking at any moment, it requires a supplement. This is law</u>. When we take a position - such as a position for democracy - we rely on law to recall the commitments necessarily implicated within this position. To bring our (democratic) selves back to ourselves. Law occupies the area of a-position, in between the determinate commitments necessary to making life more democratic or more just, and the infinitely responsive dimension of democracy, of justice; in between our democratic position and that to which we must respond if we are to maintain our democratic position. Like 'law', democracy's condition is always unresolved, calling for incessant decisions and judgements. Demacracy also persists through a relation of negativity - in condemning and addressing manners of tyranny. Democracy takes a position - comes from a position- as law 'comes from and returns to a position'. <u>Law is where we keep our commitments to democracy, reinstituting and re-sending these commitments in the moments of decision</u>, when, as always, our commitment to democracy seems to be dissipating and we must respond to a different challenge. Democracy must be open, but in this opening it risks becoming something other than democracy. Alternatively, democracy risks being trapped by past determinations in the face of new and different challenges - an enclosure that would render democracy less than democratic in its lack of responsiveness. Law resolves, for the time being, these paradoxical dimensions of popular sovereignty. 11 In sum, displacing inquiry from politics to the categories of ontology will not resolve pressing injustices. Moreover, both absolute sovereignty and absolute democracy are impossibilities. While sovereignty must take on certain democratic attributes to achieve extension- like sharing power through institutional assemblies and assemblages - democracy always begins in a place with terms in some way legislated for it by an other in advance. Both sovereignty and democracy must contain paradoxical, if not contradictory, attributes in order to be. And both rely on law for temporary and unstable resolution of these ambivalent tendencies. That which enables either the absolute sovereignty of a tyrant or a recording of a democratic success, however, makes these forms of power vulnerable to ruin. Tyranny requires the assistance of scriveners. Likewise, democratic struggles produce victories that can never be absolute as its plural institutional assemblages create opportunities for ruinous resistance to democracy's commitments. <u>Democratic victories are always partial</u> - succeeding in one place or another, while r<u>emaining vulnerable to the John Yoos of the world</u> who remain embedded deep within the bureaucracies of the modern state or who remain in its assemblies. They will come with remainders and they will be lacking in some way. Camps, or democracy's ruins In his book The Powers of War and Peace, which finds that the president is not bound by international law, John <u>Yoo</u>, a member of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) between 2001 and 2003 in George W. Bush's administration, and the author of the infamous 'torture memo' of August 2002,<u>justifies the internment of Japanese Americans in concentration camps</u> during the Second World War by the US government (Yoo 2005). He does this in the context of illustrating a distinction he makes between 'total war', in which Congress augments executive war powers with a public declaration of the [actual existence of hostilities, and other wars that are conducted without such a public declaration by Congress. He finds internment camps to be constitutional <u>when</u> they are <u>created under the 'pressing public necessity' of a 'total' war</u>. Nevertheless, Yoo is typically ambiguous about whether the wholesale round-up of Americans or others would still be constitutional without such a congressional declaration. He says, 'one doubts' whether 'courts' would have allowed 'wholesale internment' of 'Panamanian Americans', 'Yugoslavs', or 'Iraqis Americans [sic]', in reference to recent conflicts conducted without the benefit of a congressional declaration of war, although he does not clearly rule out the possibility that courts might have upheld such actions. Moreover, his speculations are on the subject of court action; he does not clearly state whether he believes such an action to be properly constitutional even if he is clear that internment should be considered permissible when there is a congressional declaration of war (ibid.: 151, 333). To support this position <u>he cites</u> favourably in a singular endnote <u>the repudiated, though never overruled</u>, Supreme Court decision <u>Korematsu</u> v. United States (1944), which sustained Fred Korematsu's conviction for refusing to abide by the military's internment order applicable to 'all persons of Japanese ancestry', and remaining in a prohibited area: his hometown (Yoo 2005; Irons 1983) . During the 1940s the United States fought a war against the Nazis' camps. Today, however, the United States maintains a camp at a military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and another at the Baghram airbase in Afghanistan. 12 In these camps, hundreds of people have been subjected to executive detention, and many have been tortured (ICRC 2007). <u>Every law is a sending</u>, <u>and</u> this deeply worried a dissenter from the majority's opinion in Korematsu, <u>Justice Jackson, who was concerned that the validation of racial discrimination would lie around like a 'loaded weapon', to be picked up by a future tyrant claiming 'urgent need'</u>. <u>Law</u>, <u>Jackson realized</u>, <u>has a 'generative power of its own',</u> <u>and every repetition of the principle of 'racial discrimination</u> in criminal procedure' and the 'transplanting' of 'American citizens' w<u>ould embed the principle more deeply in Americans' 'law and thinking'</u>, <u>enabling its expansion to 'new purposes'</u> (Korernatsu v. United States, with Justice Jackson dissenting at 246). These, as Jackson recognized, would be ruinous repetitions. Legal struggles, or democracy's archive Bow are we to resist the ruinous aspects of tyranny and keep faith with democracy? Messianic postmodernism would have us abandon law to oppose absolute and total sovereignty in the name of absolute democracy, for Hardt and Negri, or to experience pure potentiality, for Agamben . 1 have shown, however, that neither absolute sovereignty nor absolute democracy can exist as such. The perfect absence of democracy and its pure presence are both foreclosed by the force of necessary iteration, iteration that enables both democracy and tyrannical sovereignty to be, spectrally. Moreover, pure potentiality gives us no position from which to oppose the particularities of tyranny, such as camps. Drawing from Fitzpatrick, I have also indicated that law facilitates the resolution of (popular) sovereignty's - of democracy's - paradoxical dimensions for the time being: the determinate political position of democracy with democracy's openness and responsiveness, for example. Law subjects political power to sharing. It is where democracy is claimed, permitted, and promised. Even as law is always already 'ruined, in ruins, ruinous', law also provides for democracy being posited and preserved (Derrida 2002a: 273). Law is where sovereignty is divided or shared, and it is how we (re )send democracy (Derrida 2005: 34). It is where we enact our fidelity to democracy where we cut into history and take a position on democracy (Derrida 2002a: 289). <u>Law is where we take a position on democracy</u>. Law must come from a position, and there must be a position, or a place, to which law can then return. <u>Law is how we enact our commitment or responsibility to democracy and to justice,</u> the commitments and responsibilities we have made here to those impossibly necessary tasks. In this, law assists our memory and acts as a resistance to forgetting even as law's repetitions are generated by the fact that we have always already forgotten some of these commitments. We cannot keep such infinite responsibilities in mind at once. <u>In this resistance to</u> a <u>forgetting</u> that constantly tracks us, <u>law is like an archive</u> (Derrida 1995: 76, fn. 14). <u>An archive is where</u> archives, and archiving, take place (Derrida 1995: 2). There where a <u>social order is exercised</u>. Archive, deriving from the Greek arkhe, articulates a principle of beginning, a law according to which a practice was begun, <u>a place of</u> depositing, and <u>the question of who exercises legitimate hermeneutic authority</u>- <u>who has the 'right to </u>make or <u>represent the law'</u> (ibid.: 1-3). The notion of an archive implies a particular region of thought or place, as well as a law - no archiving without law (ibid.: 40). An archive both conserves and generates. It gathers in preparation for a future. It is a promise to others, to our legatees (ibid.: 36). On the one hand, when one interprets an object of an archive, one's interpretation becomes inscribed into the archive. The archive is a spectral corpus that never closes since the archivist produces more archive: the archive opens out to the future (ibid.: 67- 8). Yet, on the other hand, an archive must also exclude: 'No archive without outside' (ibid.: 11 , emphasis removed). The laws of an archive - principles of value and classification will regulate not only that which has been included and how it is to be included, but also that which should be excluded to conserve this trust, so we know how to go on in the future (ibid.: 40). Nevertheless, as Derrida points out, even that ':h.ich we exclude shapes our laws as its phantom continues to haunt us (Ibid .: 61). By thinking of law as where we take a position, for democracy, for example, and by thinking of law as an archival practice, we cross a conceptual argument with an ontological one. The conceptual argument that we share our powers, our law-making, with others indicates the impossibility of either the pure absence of democracy or democracy's pure presence. Therefore, even if law and politics do not have in essence a tendency towards democracy (which is implicated in the conceptual argument) , there remains an ineradicable democratic element. 13 Law as archive meets this conceptual argument with on tic and ontological principles. An archive takes place. It is deposited somewhere. There is no archive without substance: there is no archive without a trace (Derrida 1995: 26-7). Could the claim of popular sovereignty, could a democratic beginning or performative speech act, could the exercise of self-government, could politics take place where the people, there, decide to give themselves laws, and could this democratic sending or legacy disappear without a trace? Could the struggles against tyranny disappear, totally, without a trace? Would it be responsive or responsible to democracy or to justice to try to make these things disappear in order to constitute an absolutely new ontology? Such a beginning, like any beginning, would have to take place somewhere and therefore it would have to account for what had given place to such a beginning. This is the paradox of a democratic beginning: it is never equal to itself, it is never just democracy. It begins in ruins. This is where and how we begin, even if we want to begin democratically. But this is not all bad. Not if there is a resistance to forgetting these struggles against tyranny as we begin again. <u>We are constituted by democracy's archive,</u> by <u>democracy's remainders</u>. <u>By its echoes. </u>We are not totally foreign to democracy. Not now, and perhaps not ever. Our contemporary politics takes place within the echoes of languages (some even dead? Or would that be an impossibility?), making possible our constitution as political subjects and even as subjects capable of democracy in ways beyond or perhaps behind our ability to comprehend (Heller-Roazen 2005). <u>Constitutional law in the</u> <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>bears the impression of confronting fascism </u>nowhere more disturbingly than<u> in the internment of Japanese Americans, and the Supreme Court's infamous decision Korernatsu</u> v. United States upholding the conviction of Korematsu for violating the Order, which Yoo cites favourably. How has this case been archived previously? The dissenters in Korernalsu recognized at the time that the decision had fallen into the 'ugly abyss of racism' , that the ' legalization of racism' plays no justifiable part in a 'democratic way of life' (with Justice Murphy dissenting at 233, 242). One of the dissenters expressed concern regarding the decision's dangerous repetitive potential, as I have already mentioned. Peter Irons is the author of the definitive study of the law and politics around the internment of Japanese Americans. Discussing his sources, Irons notes that the decision faced immediate and scathing criticism in major law review articles published as early as 1945. Writing in 1983, Irons finds that in the 'years since the publication of these articles ... not a single legal scholar or writer has attempted a substantive defense of the Supreme Court opinions' (1983: 371). <u>Aside from the fact that this legal decision found that courts must apply 'strict scrutiny'</u> (a legal term of art meaning that the classification in question must be subjected to the most searching inquiry and that there is the greatest presumption against the constitutionality of the governmental policy at issue) <u>to racial classifications</u>, l<u>egal scholars do not view this legal opinion as 'good law'. </u>The decision was made at a time when racial segregation was still allowed in the United States, but the Supreme Court found racial segregation to be unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Law students and others who study constitutional law are taught how the racial classification in Korernatsu cannot stand up to the most basic forms of equal protection analysis (because the classification is underinclusive by failing to include German or Italian Americans, and because it is also over-inclusive by including both loyal and disloyal Japanese Americans; all of this lets us see that the governmental policy is motivated less by security concerns and more by racism) .14 The conviction of Korematsu has been overturned because the government was found to have committed misconduct through the suppression of evidence and the inclusion of misinformation. And the United States has both apologized and paid reparations to those interned or their families (Sullivan and Gunther 2004: 668- 9, fn. 3). As matters of law and policy, everything about Korematsu, except the notion that there is the strongest presumption against racial classifications, has been repudiated and apologized for. <u>The democratic narrative of Korernatsu, based on this archive, is shame and a sense of responsibility for overcoming the outcome of the case</u>, <u>while</u> <u>maintaining the strongest presumption against invidious racial classifications</u>. The ruling was represented as a failure in the struggle against tyranny when it was issued, and in the manner it has been archived since. <u>Yoo's legal opinions attempt to eviscerate the narrative archiving the outcome of Korernatsu as wrong, and the principle of racial discrimination as wrong for a democratic society.</u> These, as Justice Jackson recognized, are ruinous iterations. <u>The ideas that a president's word is law or that racial guilt is an acceptable premise for government must be excluded to keep democratic commitments or to send the possibility of a legacy hospitable for democracy</u>. Any archive must have an outside. But <u>an archive also constitutes resources to be drawn upon- at present, and for the future. </p><p></u>Taking a position No wonder, then, that messianic postmodernists - those who wait for being alien to law - wind up invoking law either to denounce present injustices or to seek a better, more just, or indeed a more democratic and Jess tyrannical future. If these are our purposes - if we are taking a position against tyranny- then being passively open to infinite possibilities or potentialities will not actively further those commitments. This is why, when we have specific purposes or commitments to which we are faithful, such as taking a position for democracy, or when we critique a process of repetition sedimenting the tyranny of camps in order to open the space for their rejection , we invoke the law and draw from democracy's archive. Likewise, when Agamben seeks to preserve a community of the faithful who will think the 'relation of every instant to the Messiah', who will 'strain forward' towards salvation, he puts aside the antinomialism of Homo Sacer to embrace 'messian ic law', or the law of faith (2005b: 76-8, 95). There would be an infinite number of actions (not) to do if the faithful are to make messianic potential become active or operative, if they are to live exclusively in the joyful announcement ( euaggelion). To be sure, these infinite actions and inactions implicated in pistis (faith) would exceed any finite list of dos and don 'ts exemplified by the Mosaic law of the Ten Commandments, and messianic law, or nornos pisteos, refers to this excessive aspect. How can the faithful know or remember what is required of them at each moment to dwell within messianic law iflaw is not textualized? Agamben explains, ' [I]t is not a letter written in ink on tables of stone; rather, it is written with the breath of God on hearts of flesh'. It is 'not a writing but a form of life ... ''You are our letter"' (2005b: 122, quoting 2 Cor. 3:2, emphasis in original). This privileging of the spirit over the letter of the law attempts to make calculable, measured law identical to incalculable, immeasurable life by emphasizing the excessive aspect of law, and maintaining law's openness or responsiveness to the future. Through infinite openness, law and life are one, with no ruins or remainders. If, however, 'law' is not to be merely vacuous, infinitely open to anything and everything, hence no law at all, then we must not forget what it means to be faithful to the rnessiah. Appropriately, then, Agamben does not fully forgo textualizing law, citing St Paul 's recapitulation of the entirety of God's law with the formula 'Love your neighbor as yourself.' It helps to learn, to know, to remember what is required of the faithful, to recall the messianic. To this end, Agamben refers to law as a '"pedagogue" leading to the messiah' (2005b: 76, 120, citing Gal. 3:24, emphasis added). Law is an archive even for those faithful to the messianic. Similarly, in State of Exception Agamben critiques recent practices in the United States, such as the camps at Guant<inamo Bay and the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. He argues, 'At the very moment when it would like to give lessons in democracy to different traditions and cultures, the political culture of the West does not realize that it has entirely lost its canon' (2005a: 18). Here, Agamben denounces the United States, among others, for having lost its law. He condemns people in the United States for forgetting their law and losing their archive, their aide-memoire. Indeed, Agamben rightly denounces them - us - for it. His denunciation - accusing them, us - for forgetting our law pays homage, as Jean Baudrillard would have noted, to the law (1988: 173). His denunciation relies on recalling a law, an archive, and its presently forgotten, suppressed, or repressed democratic commitments. Thus, to the extent that messianic postmodernists are actually concerned with specific principles of justice, democracy, or even the messianic, as opposed to whatever, they contradict their postmodern antinomialism and invoke law. <u>When we take a position against the abusive exercise of tyrannical sovereign power,</u> as Agamben does, <u>we invoke law</u>. Coming from a position, law combines determinate political commitment with a responsiveness to future circumstances. This paradoxical, if not impossible, combination of determinacy with responsiveness required by popular sovereignty is 'resolved', as we can understand in light of Fitzpatrick's work, by law. <u>The paradoxical co-implication of determination and responsiveness, necessary for popular sovereignty to be, is why democracy relies on law.</u> The sense of pure whatever potentiality Agamben promotes corresponds with the dimension of law as infinite openness tending to vacuity. <u>If law is figured solely as vacuous</u>, <u>then it is open to anything, even to Yoo</u>. Law, however, comes from and returns to a position, and understanding law as democracy's archive is an attunement to the determinate place and commitments from which we begin, again. Any archival practice supplementing our memory of positive commitments to democracy, of re-calling our (democratic) selves to our selves, of re-calling society's commitment to democracy or principles of justice to society, must necessarily have an outside. <u>So, an archive of democratic commitments</u>- <u>a law dedicated to democracy- must also be constituted through exclusions if we seek faithfully to keep or to promise the prospect of democracy</u>. <u>This legal archive is animated through a negative relation to tyrannies</u>. <u>As we enumerate tyrannical mentalities and deeds,</u> <u>we will be engaged</u>, in part, <u>with the project of constituting an archive for democracy, a law to keep democracy for the future</u>. When we labour, in our fidelity to resisting tyranny, among democracy's ruins, <u>we are engaging in a practice of re-calling and re-sending democracy, faithful to its coming, labouring for its return</u>. Perhaps. Therefore, <u>when we engage in critique of camps</u><strong>,</strong> and the way that some legal thought reintroduces this potentiality, <u>we re-send our archived commitments against this tyrann</u>y as a faithful pledge to the future. In other words, <u>the</u> constituent <u>force of law may indeed generate the</u> 'very <u>social bond</u> of modernity, the means of our relation and being-with each other' (Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009: 85). But <u>what manner of</u> sociality, of <u>'being-with each other'</u>, <u>shall we </u>endure, share, or<u> aspire to</u>? What manner of being are we starting from, orienting towards, or have we vowed to keep for the time being? <u>If our position is a democratic resistance to camps, then we will not be content to remain open to all potentialities</u>, including camps- not when we have commitments to which we must remain faithful. Law as democracy's archive is our resistance to forgetting these commitments. An archive is a 'pledge' of the future (Derrida 1995: 18) . Likewise, law as democracy's archive is a pledge of and for the future, a future we have no certain grounds for knowing will keep this pledge, much as we have no certain grounds to count on just democracy ourselves, not as we begin again among democracy's ruins. There is, however, no democracy 'without an act offaith' (Derrida 2005: 48). <u>Much as we must begin our labours among democracy's ruins, John Yoo has been hard at work already. Yoo's numerous legal memos written on behalf of the Bush administration</u>, many of which remain secret as of this writing, constitute a warp. As geological layers evidence a protrusion, or another force repressed by layers of sediment, so too do these memos. Even their very numerousness serves to remind us of the doubts they are intended to cover over, the democratic doubt they are meant to contain. <u>Yoo is</u> also <u>currently at work writing books, publishing law review articles, uploading SSRN</u> (Social Science Research Network) <u>papers, crafting op-eds, presenting congressional testimony, giving interviews, teaching law school courses, and responding to government reports questioning his faithfulness to the law</u>. <u>He is an archivist as well, seeking to invent the legal archive that will have justified his earlier work. This is why we must persist in our faithful labours among democracy's ruins. Otherwise, democracy's archive will be put to a 'new use' and will be 'play[ed] with just as children play with disused objects'</u>. <u>It will become</u> like the <u>dead letter</u> Agamben's 'new attorney' reads bemusedly, but without attachment, 'leafing through "our old books"' (2005a: 63-4) . Conclusion In this chapter I have argued that recent postmodern aversions to law and sovereignty, such as the work of Agamben, which favours the coming of a new ontology - a messianic preoccupation with the absolute arrival of new being exterior to law or sovereignty- is not helpful in addressing present tyrannies and injustices. Fitzpatrick's work on sovereignty, emphasizing its tension between finite determination and extensive, encompassing responsiveness, indicates a more productive post-structuralism. Rather than a picture of absolute determination, Fitzpatrick shows how sovereignty must also be determinate. The impossibility of pure sovereignty elucidates the vulnerabilities popular sovereignty faces - the way that democracy is vulnerable to ruin. Any beginning, such as a democratic beginning, must commence on terms not of its own making. Therefore, the re is never just democracy here. Fitzpatrick's understanding of sovereignty, and the way that a fraught combination of d eterminacy and responsive ness takes place through law, allows us to comprehend, then, the dual impossibilities of absolute sovereignty and absolute democracy. Contemporary law and politics take place within the torsion of these impossibilities. Law, which is where popular sovereignty undergoes continual constitution , must come from a position, and it must also return to a position or a place. It is where we take a position on democracy, and it is where we archive democracy's ruins in resistance to the n ecessary finitude of our being forgetful human beings. If an archive is a pledge to the future, then considering law as democracy's archive means that it is with-in law that we recall principles of democracy and justice to ourselves, and send, again, this legacy to the future. In other words, we do not begin our struggles against the camps with a vacuous receptivity to pure potentiality that cannot take a position. We begin, again, <u>in democracy's archive</u>, with democratic remains. It is there that<u> we find the legal principles </u>that gave place to us, those of <u>equal protection, due process</u>, and that political leaders must take care that those laws are faithfully<u> </u>executed<u> that are anathema to the camps</u>. <u>We can find these </u>determinate<u> commitments in democracy's archive, recall them, and extend these </u>determinations<u> </u>faithfully<u> as a response to the tyrannies of today</u>, for the future. <u>It is with-in democracy's archive where democracy undergoes a process of 'continual constitution'</u>. <u>What is the fate of law and democracy after Yoo? Rather than a messianic aversion to law</u> or politics, Fitzpatrick's work points us in the direction of recommencing o<u>ur labours among democracy's ruins. </u>It <u>points us to the persistence of law</u>, <u>the possibility of democracy</u>, and the faithful labours necessary to resist tyranny. <u>We cannot expect a messianic blow to replace, totally, a non-existent absolute sovereignty, </u>without ruin or remainder. <u>Because of the impossibility of absolute democracy and absolute sovereignty, we must start where we are</u>, in the torsion of politics, labouring among democracy's ruins, reconstructing its archive, if we want better than Yoo gives us. Democracy is never just here. It is n ever just here. <u>This is the urgency of law and of politics.</p></u>	1nc vs WGA	null	1nc – Law K	9,218	41	17,118	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	565,420	N	Gsu	1	West Georgia Muhammad-Gaius	Deming	1NC T occidentalism K law good K impact turns 2NC Space colonization impact turn 1NR T 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,890	The aff doesn’t affirm a topical plan –	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>The aff<strong> doesn’t affirm a topical plan – </h4></strong>	1NC	null	T	431,219	1	17,121	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round5.docx	565,427	N	D6seceda	5	Wake Forest Athanasopoulos-Ning	Galloway	1NC T humanism good K case 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round5.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,891	Ceding civil rights archive ensures reactionary dominance of state and legal apparatus.	null	Eric YAMAMOTO Law @ Hawaii ‘3 “Reclaiming Civil Rights In Uncivil Times” 1 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 11 2003 p. 20-24	2. The Conservative Agenda But why is the twenty-year systematic, multifaceted conservative attack on civil rights being achieved with only belated publicly organized resistance? Why have some even become emboldened to say there's no longer any discrimination in America (with the exception of, as the Center for Individual Rights reportedly said recently, discrimination against males and whites). The dynamics are complex, including the state of the economy, who has legislative power, who serves as judges, who funds the think tanks, and who has media access. There is, however, a less visible dynamic I want to highlight. It's the topsy-turvy conservative civil rights agenda under the seemingly benign banner of the New Federalism. First, the conservative new federalism is "new" because the old conservatism was overtly racist, sexist, nativist and homophobic; it was explicitly anti-civil rights. "No coloreds allowed." The new conservatism is different. It deploys language of "equality," "colorblindness" and "responsibility." 57 It emphasizes "fairness to the individual" and, most important, "states' rights and immunities."58 It purports to embrace "civil rights."59 Surely worthy things. But although New Federalism in language, it's still old conservatism in substance. By focusing tightly on fairness to the individual, it wants us to ignore the reality that decisionmakers tend to treat people as members of groups. By deploying language of states' rights and immunities, it wants to shield states to allow aggressively discriminatory state actions. And by doing so, it wants us to ignore the still existing institutional barriers to advancement in jobs, education and housing. It wants us to blind ourselves to the reality faced by hate crime victims James Byrd,60 Joseph Ileto,61 Matthew Shepard 62 and others -your identity matters. By ignoring real continuing obstacles of race, gender, sexuality and immigrant status, the new conservatism says, "any problem, limitation or failure is your fault and your fault alone." You don't need the law's intervention to help you overcome long-standing group practices and institutionalized discrimination. Moreover, if you get any government help, that help constitutes unfair "preferences" in your favor, regardless of how tilted the playing field remains. Civil Rights Topsy-Turvy. Second, this New Federalism provides the substance, the ideology, for guiltlessly rolling back civil rights. Boiled down, it is quite comfortable with continuing inequality, a stratified society. It's okay for those struggling at the bottom to stay there-it's their fault. And this conservatism uses the language of individualism, responsibility and, yes, equality so as not to feel badly about it. Recall the infamous anti-affirmative action California "Civil Rights Initiative" with its harsh impact on African Americans and Latinos - conservatives cast it as an "equality" measure. Finally, this conservatism under the banner of New Federalism is insidious because it's the wolf in sheep's clothing. Its lofty "federalism" language, and media PR, tell us we're all heading safely toward the beautiful shore, while ignoring the wicked anticivil rights undertow dragging many out to sea.63 Post-September 11th government restrictions of civil liberties have heightened the danger to civil rights, but in a different way. In contrast with the covert exclusionary goals of the New Federalism, the post-September 11th undermining of civil liberties has been largely above board. "Outsiders" have been targeted 64 and restrictions of their civil liberties have been supported by mainstream America. 65 Yet all in the United States pay the price in the loss of cherished democratic values. Moreover, overt postSeptember 11th national security restrictions of civil liberties of noncitizens and citizens 66 have shocked out of complacency many who had been lulled into misbelieving that the New Federalism was really about fairness and personal responsibility. Some of the government's post-September 11th security measures were needed and appropriate. But the Bush Administration's misuse of the true horror of that day to implement a pre-existing and far-reaching conservative anti-civil rights agenda places in stark relief the significance of and threat to contemporary civil rights.67 C. Challenge This is why the struggle to "Reclaim Civil (and indeed, Human) Rights" in these uncivil times is so important. Because only collectively can we help organize our communities to meet pressing daily needs while simultaneously doing the intellectual, organizing and legal work essential to stemming the civil rights assault. This brings us to our third and final C: Challenge. There are no magic answers. But I do suggest that progressives can, and must, turn the Cautions into Actions. We are at the Civil Rights Crossroad. Among the possible action paths, let me briefly suggest five. The first action path begins right here. Whole-heartedly support and work with the frontline advocacy organizations mentioned earlier, and others. They must be inordinately strong. With our help, these groups fight our fights, give us hope, lift our spirits. Also, support the badly needed progressive civil rights think tanks like the Institute for Democracy that's scrutinized the powerful Federalist Society. They are hugely outnumbered and outfunded in comparison to the conservative think tanks. They give us in-depth research and fresh strategic thinking. The second action path is resistance. Get involved to resist the New Federalism and the orchestrated dismantling of civil rights. This means organizing with lawyers, advocacy groups, community organizations, students and media and then climbing into the trenches. It means fighting collectively on specific cases-with Martha Sandoval and for the constitutional liberties at stake in the Grutter affirmative action case 68 and the post-September 11th Hamdi and Padilla ("enemy combatants") cases and the Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media Group (First Amendment) cases. 69 And it means fighting against damaging legislation -like the impending "Racial Privacy" Initiative. And very important, challenging judicial nominees hostile to civil rights. The outcome of these battles will affect our lives for years to come. The third path is forward-looking. Rebuild civil rights reconstruct the Second Reconstruction. Develop, test, legislate, litigate new ideas and approaches, not just defensive ones. For example, we need an all-out campaign to change the current federal law's restrictive definition of discrimination - to include subconsciously biased acts by decisionmakers and institutionalized forms of discrimination. We also need a persuasive theory of reparations that in part draws upon human rights principles and that shows larger society's strong interest in healing the deep wounds of injustice.70 And we need to make powerfully clear the connection of "civil rights" to the rights of women, immigrants, gays and lesbians and those with disabilities. In short, we need compelling theory, new doctrines and sober strategies to counteract the conservatives' New Federalism-to reclaim civil rights. On this note, we can support new groups like the dynamic Roll Back Coalition, started by the New York Lawyers for Public Interest, which now encompasses frontline lawyers, labor, clergy and women's groups. The fourth action path is where the personal meets the political. Reject the New Federalism and its anti-civil rights agenda that tells us that nothing more need be done, that things are fine as they are. And speak out (or write out -letters to the editor are often potent) when others say the New Federalism or blind support of ostensible national security is where we find justice. The fifth path is alliance-forging. Cross traditional boundaries to form new and deeper alliances - across boundaries of ethnicity, race, national origin, gender, sexuality, poverty and disability. Easy to say. Hard to do. How do progressives forge those alliances to reclaim civil rights? How do we widen the progressive umbrella while dealing with the internal tensions this generates? Indeed, these are the critical coalitional struggles of the moment.71	why is the twenty-year systematic, multifaceted conservative attack on civil rights being achieved with only belated publicly organized resistance new conservatism deploys language of colorblindness" and "responsibility." it's the wolf in sheep's clothing. Its lofty "federalism" language tell us we're all heading safely toward the beautiful shore the struggle to "Reclaim Civil Rights" in these uncivil times is so important only collectively can we help organize our communities to meet pressing daily needs while simultaneously doing the intellectual, organizing and legal work essential to stemming the civil rights assault resist the dismantling of civil rights means organizing with lawyers advocacy groups students , we need an all-out campaign to change the current federal law's restrictive definition of discrimination we need to make powerfully clear the connection of "civil rights" to the rights of women, immigrants, gays and lesbians and those with disabilities	2. The Conservative Agenda Under the Banner of New Federalism But why is the twenty-year systematic, multifaceted conservative attack on civil rights being achieved with only belated publicly organized resistance? Why have some even become emboldened to say there's no longer any discrimination in America (with the exception of, as the Center for Individual Rights reportedly said recently, discrimination against males and whites). The dynamics are complex, including the state of the economy, who has legislative power, who serves as judges, who funds the think tanks, and who has media access. There is, however, a less visible dynamic I want to highlight. It's the topsy-turvy conservative civil rights agenda under the seemingly benign banner of the New Federalism. First, the conservative new federalism is "new" because the old conservatism was overtly racist, sexist, nativist and homophobic; it was explicitly anti-civil rights. "No coloreds allowed." The new conservatism is different. It deploys language of "equality," "colorblindness" and "responsibility." 57 It emphasizes "fairness to the individual" and, most important, "states' rights and immunities."58 It purports to embrace "civil rights."59 Surely worthy things. But although New Federalism in language, it's still old conservatism in substance. By focusing tightly on fairness to the individual, it wants us to ignore the reality that decisionmakers tend to treat people as members of groups. By deploying language of states' rights and immunities, it wants to shield states to allow aggressively discriminatory state actions. And by doing so, it wants us to ignore the still existing institutional barriers to advancement in jobs, education and housing. It wants us to blind ourselves to the reality faced by hate crime victims James Byrd,60 Joseph Ileto,61 Matthew Shepard 62 and others -your identity matters. By ignoring real continuing obstacles of race, gender, sexuality and immigrant status, the new conservatism says, "any problem, limitation or failure is your fault and your fault alone." You don't need the law's intervention to help you overcome long-standing group practices and institutionalized discrimination. Moreover, if you get any government help, that help constitutes unfair "preferences" in your favor, regardless of how tilted the playing field remains. Civil Rights Topsy-Turvy. Second, this New Federalism provides the substance, the ideology, for guiltlessly rolling back civil rights. Boiled down, it is quite comfortable with continuing inequality, a stratified society. It's okay for those struggling at the bottom to stay there-it's their fault. And this conservatism uses the language of individualism, responsibility and, yes, equality so as not to feel badly about it. Recall the infamous anti-affirmative action California "Civil Rights Initiative" with its harsh impact on African Americans and Latinos - conservatives cast it as an "equality" measure. Finally, this conservatism under the banner of New Federalism is insidious because it's the wolf in sheep's clothing. Its lofty "federalism" language, and media PR, tell us we're all heading safely toward the beautiful shore, while ignoring the wicked anticivil rights undertow dragging many out to sea.63 Post-September 11th government restrictions of civil liberties have heightened the danger to civil rights, but in a different way. In contrast with the covert exclusionary goals of the New Federalism, the post-September 11th undermining of civil liberties has been largely above board. "Outsiders" have been targeted 64 and restrictions of their civil liberties have been supported by mainstream America. 65 Yet all in the United States pay the price in the loss of cherished democratic values. Moreover, overt postSeptember 11th national security restrictions of civil liberties of noncitizens and citizens 66 have shocked out of complacency many who had been lulled into misbelieving that the New Federalism was really about fairness and personal responsibility. Some of the government's post-September 11th security measures were needed and appropriate. But the Bush Administration's misuse of the true horror of that day to implement a pre-existing and far-reaching conservative anti-civil rights agenda places in stark relief the significance of and threat to contemporary civil rights.67 C. Challenge This is why the struggle to "Reclaim Civil (and indeed, Human) Rights" in these uncivil times is so important. Because only collectively can we help organize our communities to meet pressing daily needs while simultaneously doing the intellectual, organizing and legal work essential to stemming the civil rights assault. This brings us to our third and final C: Challenge. There are no magic answers. But I do suggest that progressives can, and must, turn the Cautions into Actions. We are at the Civil Rights Crossroad. Among the possible action paths, let me briefly suggest five. The first action path begins right here. Whole-heartedly support and work with the frontline advocacy organizations mentioned earlier, and others. They must be inordinately strong. With our help, these groups fight our fights, give us hope, lift our spirits. Also, support the badly needed progressive civil rights think tanks like the Institute for Democracy that's scrutinized the powerful Federalist Society. They are hugely outnumbered and outfunded in comparison to the conservative think tanks. They give us in-depth research and fresh strategic thinking. The second action path is resistance. Get involved to resist the New Federalism and the orchestrated dismantling of civil rights. This means organizing with lawyers, advocacy groups, community organizations, students and media and then climbing into the trenches. It means fighting collectively on specific cases-with Martha Sandoval and for the constitutional liberties at stake in the Grutter affirmative action case 68 and the post-September 11th Hamdi and Padilla ("enemy combatants") cases and the Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media Group (First Amendment) cases. 69 And it means fighting against damaging legislation -like the impending "Racial Privacy" Initiative. And very important, challenging judicial nominees hostile to civil rights. The outcome of these battles will affect our lives for years to come. The third path is forward-looking. Rebuild civil rights reconstruct the Second Reconstruction. Develop, test, legislate, litigate new ideas and approaches, not just defensive ones. For example, we need an all-out campaign to change the current federal law's restrictive definition of discrimination - to include subconsciously biased acts by decisionmakers and institutionalized forms of discrimination. We also need a persuasive theory of reparations that in part draws upon human rights principles and that shows larger society's strong interest in healing the deep wounds of injustice.70 And we need to make powerfully clear the connection of "civil rights" to the rights of women, immigrants, gays and lesbians and those with disabilities. In short, we need compelling theory, new doctrines and sober strategies to counteract the conservatives' New Federalism-to reclaim civil rights. On this note, we can support new groups like the dynamic Roll Back Coalition, started by the New York Lawyers for Public Interest, which now encompasses frontline lawyers, labor, clergy and women's groups. The fourth action path is where the personal meets the political. Reject the New Federalism and its anti-civil rights agenda that tells us that nothing more need be done, that things are fine as they are. And speak out (or write out -letters to the editor are often potent) when others say the New Federalism or blind support of ostensible national security is where we find justice. The fifth path is alliance-forging. Cross traditional boundaries to form new and deeper alliances - across boundaries of ethnicity, race, national origin, gender, sexuality, poverty and disability. Easy to say. Hard to do. How do progressives forge those alliances to reclaim civil rights? How do we widen the progressive umbrella while dealing with the internal tensions this generates? Indeed, these are the critical coalitional struggles of the moment.71	8,283	<h4><u>Ceding civil rights archive ensures reactionary dominance of state and legal apparatus.</h4><p>Eric YAMAMOTO Law @ Hawaii ‘3 “Reclaiming Civil Rights In Uncivil Times” 1 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 11 2003 p. 20-24</p><p>2. The Conservative Agenda </u><strong>Under the Banner of New Federalism<u></strong> But <mark>why is the twenty-year systematic, multifaceted conservative attack on civil rights being achieved with only belated publicly organized resistance</mark>? Why have some even become emboldened to say there's no longer any discrimination in America (with the exception of, as the Center for Individual Rights reportedly said recently, discrimination against males and whites). The dynamics are complex, including the state of the economy, who has legislative power, who serves as judges, who funds the think tanks, and who has media access. There is, however, a less visible dynamic I want to highlight. It's the topsy-turvy conservative civil rights agenda under the seemingly benign banner of the New Federalism. First, the conservative new federalism is "new" because the old conservatism was overtly racist, sexist, nativist and homophobic; it was explicitly anti-civil rights. "No coloreds allowed." The <mark>new conservatism</mark> is different. It <mark>deploys language of</mark> "equality," "<mark>colorblindness" and "responsibility."</mark> 57 It emphasizes "fairness to the individual" and, most important, "states' rights and immunities."58 It purports to embrace "civil rights."59 Surely worthy things. But although New Federalism in language, it's still old conservatism in substance. By focusing tightly on fairness to the individual, it wants us to ignore the reality that decisionmakers tend to treat people as members of groups. By deploying language of states' rights and immunities, it wants to shield states to allow aggressively discriminatory state actions. And by doing so, it wants us to ignore the still existing institutional barriers to advancement in jobs, education and housing. It wants us to blind ourselves to the reality faced by hate crime victims James Byrd,60 Joseph Ileto,61 Matthew Shepard 62 and others -your identity matters. By ignoring real continuing obstacles of race, gender, sexuality and immigrant status, the new conservatism says, "any problem, limitation or</u><strong> <u></strong>failure is your fault and your fault alone." You don't need the law's intervention to help you overcome long-standing group practices and institutionalized discrimination. Moreover, if you get any government help, that help constitutes unfair "preferences" in your favor, regardless of how tilted the playing field remains. Civil Rights Topsy-Turvy. Second, this New Federalism provides the substance, the ideology, for guiltlessly rolling back civil rights. Boiled down, it is quite comfortable with continuing inequality, a stratified society. It's okay for those struggling at the bottom to stay there-it's their fault. And this conservatism uses the language of individualism, responsibility and, yes, equality so as not to feel badly about it. Recall the infamous anti-affirmative action California "Civil Rights Initiative" with its harsh impact on African Americans and Latinos - conservatives cast it as an "equality" measure. Finally, this conservatism under the banner of New Federalism is insidious because <mark>it's the wolf in sheep's clothing. Its lofty "federalism" language</mark>, and media PR, <mark>tell us we're all heading safely toward the beautiful shore</mark>, while ignoring the wicked anticivil rights undertow dragging many out to sea.63 Post-September 11th government restrictions of civil liberties have heightened the danger to civil rights, but in a different way. In contrast with the covert exclusionary goals of the New Federalism, the post-September 11th undermining of civil liberties has been largely above board. "Outsiders" have been targeted 64 and restrictions of their civil liberties have been supported by mainstream America. 65 Yet all in the United States pay the price in the loss of cherished democratic values. Moreover, overt postSeptember 11th national security restrictions of civil liberties of noncitizens and citizens 66 have shocked out of complacency many who had been lulled into misbelieving that the New Federalism was really about fairness and personal responsibility. Some of the government's post-September 11th security measures were needed and appropriate. But the Bush Administration's misuse of the true horror of that day to implement a pre-existing and far-reaching conservative anti-civil rights agenda places in stark relief the significance of and threat to contemporary civil rights.67 C. Challenge This is why <mark>the struggle to "Reclaim Civil</mark> (and indeed, Human) <mark>Rights" in these uncivil times is so important</mark>. Because <mark>only collectively can we help organize our communities to meet pressing daily needs while simultaneously doing the intellectual, organizing and legal work essential to stemming the civil rights assault</mark>. This brings us to our third and final C: Challenge. There are no magic answers. But I do suggest that progressives can, and must, turn the Cautions into Actions. We are at the Civil Rights Crossroad. Among the possible action paths, let me briefly suggest five. The first action path begins right here. Whole-heartedly support and work with the frontline advocacy organizations mentioned earlier, and others. They must be inordinately strong. With our help, these groups fight our fights, give us hope, lift our spirits. Also, support the badly needed progressive civil rights think tanks like the Institute for Democracy that's scrutinized the powerful Federalist Society. They are hugely outnumbered and outfunded in comparison to the conservative think tanks. They give us in-depth research and fresh strategic thinking. The second action path is resistance. Get involved to <mark>resist</mark> the New Federalism and <mark>the</mark> orchestrated <mark>dismantling of civil rights</mark>. This <mark>means organizing with lawyers</mark>, <mark>advocacy groups</mark>, community organizations, <mark>students </mark>and media and then climbing into the trenches. It means fighting collectively on specific cases-with Martha Sandoval and for the constitutional liberties at stake in the Grutter affirmative action case 68 and the post-September 11th Hamdi and Padilla ("enemy combatants") cases and the Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media Group (First Amendment) cases. 69 And it means fighting against damaging legislation -like the impending "Racial Privacy" Initiative. And very important, challenging judicial nominees hostile to civil rights. The outcome of these battles will affect our lives for years to come. The third path is forward-looking. Rebuild civil rights reconstruct the Second Reconstruction. Develop, test, legislate, litigate new ideas and approaches, not just defensive ones. For example<mark>, we need an all-out campaign to change the current federal law's restrictive definition of discrimination</mark> - to include subconsciously biased acts by decisionmakers and institutionalized forms of discrimination. We also need a persuasive theory of reparations that in part draws upon human rights principles and that shows larger society's strong interest in healing the deep wounds of injustice.70 And <mark>we need to make powerfully clear the connection of "civil rights" to the rights of women, immigrants, gays and lesbians and those with disabilities</mark>. In short, we need compelling theory, new doctrines and sober strategies to counteract the conservatives' New Federalism-to reclaim civil rights. On this note, we can support new groups like the dynamic Roll Back Coalition, started by the New York Lawyers for Public Interest, which now encompasses frontline lawyers, labor, clergy and women's groups. The fourth action path is where the personal meets the political. Reject the New Federalism and its anti-civil rights agenda that tells us that nothing more need be done, that things are fine as they are. And speak out (or write out -letters to the editor are often potent) when others say the New Federalism or blind support of ostensible national security is where we find justice. The fifth path is alliance-forging. Cross traditional boundaries to form new and deeper alliances - across boundaries of ethnicity, race, national origin, gender, sexuality, poverty and disability. Easy to say. Hard to do. How do progressives forge those alliances to reclaim civil rights? How do we widen the progressive umbrella while dealing with the internal tensions this generates? Indeed, these are the critical coalitional struggles of the moment.71</p></u>	1nc vs WGA	null	1nc – Law K	431,222	1	17,118	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	565,420	N	Gsu	1	West Georgia Muhammad-Gaius	Deming	1NC T occidentalism K law good K impact turns 2NC Space colonization impact turn 1NR T 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,892	Obama will prevent a DHS shutdown by forcing Republicans to accept a clean funding bill- PC’s key	Milbank 2/3	Milbank 2/3/2015 (Dana, columnist with The Washington Post whose work is syndicated in 200 newspapers nationwide, Republicans might regret calling this play, lexis)	Obama had reason to be energetic, because this budget rollout was less about the 2016 blueprint than the current showdown with congressional Republicans who are threatening to cut off funding for the Department of Homeland Security if Obama doesn't abandon his immigration policies. Obama unquestionably occupied the high ground as well in his looming fight with Congress. Republicans will probably come to regret the showdown they forced with Obama Their argument - is unlikely to prevail in public opinion against Obama's claims Their uphill fight distracts from Republicans' budget arguments inconsistencies might get more of an airing if Obama weren't about to go eyeball-to-eyeball with congressional Republicans over homeland security	Obama had reason to be energetic because this budget rollout was less about the 2016 blueprint than the current showdown with congressional Republicans, who are threatening to cut off funding for the D H S Obama unquestionably occupied the high ground why Republicans will probably come to regret the showdown they forced with Obam Their argument is unlikely to prevail in public opinion against Obama's claim . Their uphill fight distracts from Republicans' budget argument	The perennially tardy President Obama appeared half an hour early for Monday's speech outlining his 2016 budget - a rare show of enthusiasm for the sacrificial ritual of sending his annual spending proposal to die on Capitol Hill. But Obama had reason to be energetic, because this budget rollout was less about the 2016 blueprint than the current showdown with congressional Republicans, who are threatening to cut off funding for the Department of Homeland Security at month's end if Obama doesn't abandon his immigration policies. The White House, emphasizing the point, staged the speech at a DHS campus in Northwest Washington, an old naval facility that occupies one of the highest perches in the city. From here, facing rows of men and women in the uniforms of the Coast Guard, Border Patrol, FEMA and other DHS agencies, Obama unquestionably occupied the high ground as well in his looming fight with Congress. "The work you do hangs in the balance," Obama said to those assembled, warning Republicans not to "jeopardize our national security over this disagreement" and mocking a claim by a Republican lawmaker that cutting off the department's funding is "not the end of the world." "It is the end of a paycheck for tens of thousands of front-line workers who'll continue to have to work without getting paid," he said. "Over 40,000 Border Patrol and customs agents, over 50,000 airport screeners, over 13,000 immigration officers, over 40,000 men and women in the Coast Guard." This is why Republicans will probably come to regret the showdown they forced with Obama by allowing DHS funding to expire at the end of this month while the rest of the government operates through September. Their argument - that they are happy to fund homeland security as long as it doesn't include funds to implement Obama's executive actions on immigration - is unlikely to prevail in public opinion against Obama's claims that Republicans "jeopardize our national security." This has echoes of 2002, when President George W. Bush clobbered Democrats by alleging that they were "not interested in the security of the American people," because of a dispute over union provisions in the creation of DHS. Their uphill fight over DHS funding also distracts from Republicans' budget arguments, where they are in a stronger position. Obama's 2016 proposal is a combination of the timid (he again does little to address the long-term problem with entitlements) and the symbolic (his proposed tax increases have little chance in the Republican Congress). In his speech Monday, Obama continued to make dubious claims to justify the new spending he proposes. "Since I took office, we have cut our deficits by about two-thirds," he said - but this is true only if you don't count the enormous deficit amassed in fiscal 2009 as part of Obama's presidency. "The budget I've sent to Congress today is fully paid for," he alleged - even though his budget has a $474 billion projected deficit in 2016 and would add about $5.7 trillion to the debt over a decade. "I will not accept a budget that severs the vital link between our national security and our economic security," he said - but a congressional budget resolution does not require a president's signature. Those inconsistencies might get more of an airing if Obama weren't about to go eyeball-to-eyeball with congressional Republicans over homeland security. When it comes to fighting terrorists, this president - or any president - brings better imagery to the fight than Congress can. The arsenal was on display Monday at DHS: the sharpshooters on roofs, helicopters overhead, multiple layers of vehicle barriers, explosive-sniffing dogs, magnetometers, X-ray machines and physical inspections, the sound system playing the Air Force Band's rendition of "The Stars and Stripes Forever" - and rows of men and women in uniform, many taking photos of the commander in chief. The 200 civil servants in an old gymnasium for Obama's speech refrained from applauding until the end. But by their presence they served as props for Obama as he made his dispute with Congress about them.	4,115	<h4>Obama will prevent a DHS shutdown by forcing Republicans to accept a clean funding bill- PC’s key</h4><p><strong>Milbank 2/3</strong>/2015 (Dana, columnist with The Washington Post whose work is syndicated in 200 newspapers nationwide, Republicans might regret calling this play, lexis)</p><p>The perennially tardy President Obama appeared half an hour early for Monday's speech outlining his 2016 budget - a rare show of enthusiasm for the sacrificial ritual of sending his annual spending proposal to die on Capitol Hill. But <u><mark>Obama had reason to be energetic</mark>, <mark>because this budget rollout was less about the 2016 blueprint than the <strong>current showdown with</strong> congressional <strong>Republicans</u></strong>, <u>who are threatening to cut off funding for the D</mark>epartment of <mark>H</mark>omeland <mark>S</mark>ecurity</u> at month's end <u>if Obama doesn't abandon his immigration policies. </u>The White House, emphasizing the point, staged the speech at a DHS campus in Northwest Washington, an old naval facility that occupies one of the highest perches in the city. From here, facing rows of men and women in the uniforms of the Coast Guard, Border Patrol, FEMA and other DHS agencies, <u><mark>Obama unquestionably occupied the high ground</mark> as well in his looming fight with Congress. </u>"The work you do hangs in the balance," Obama said to those assembled, warning Republicans not to "jeopardize our national security over this disagreement" and mocking a claim by a Republican lawmaker that cutting off the department's funding is "not the end of the world." "It is the end of a paycheck for tens of thousands of front-line workers who'll continue to have to work without getting paid," he said. "Over 40,000 Border Patrol and customs agents, over 50,000 airport screeners, over 13,000 immigration officers, over 40,000 men and women in the Coast Guard." This is <mark>why <u>Republicans will probably come to regret the showdown they forced with Obam</mark>a</u> by allowing DHS funding to expire at the end of this month while the rest of the government operates through September. <u><mark>Their argument</u></mark> - that they are happy to fund homeland security as long as it doesn't include funds to implement Obama's executive actions on immigration <u>- <mark>is unlikely to prevail in public opinion against Obama's claim</mark>s</u> that Republicans "jeopardize our national security." This has echoes of 2002, when President George W. Bush clobbered Democrats by alleging that they were "not interested in the security of the American people," because of a dispute over union provisions in the creation of DHS<mark>. <u><strong>Their uphill fight</u></strong></mark> over DHS funding also <u><mark>distracts from Republicans' budget argument</mark>s</u>, where they are in a stronger position. Obama's 2016 proposal is a combination of the timid (he again does little to address the long-term problem with entitlements) and the symbolic (his proposed tax increases have little chance in the Republican Congress). In his speech Monday, Obama continued to make dubious claims to justify the new spending he proposes. "Since I took office, we have cut our deficits by about two-thirds," he said - but this is true only if you don't count the enormous deficit amassed in fiscal 2009 as part of Obama's presidency. "The budget I've sent to Congress today is fully paid for," he alleged - even though his budget has a $474 billion projected deficit in 2016 and would add about $5.7 trillion to the debt over a decade. "I will not accept a budget that severs the vital link between our national security and our economic security," he said - but a congressional budget resolution does not require a president's signature. Those <u>inconsistencies might get more of an airing if Obama weren't about to go eyeball-to-eyeball with congressional Republicans over homeland security</u>. When it comes to fighting terrorists, this president - or any president - brings better imagery to the fight than Congress can. The arsenal was on display Monday at DHS: the sharpshooters on roofs, helicopters overhead, multiple layers of vehicle barriers, explosive-sniffing dogs, magnetometers, X-ray machines and physical inspections, the sound system playing the Air Force Band's rendition of "The Stars and Stripes Forever" - and rows of men and women in uniform, many taking photos of the commander in chief. The 200 civil servants in an old gymnasium for Obama's speech refrained from applauding until the end. But by their presence they served as props for Obama as he made his dispute with Congress about them.</p>	null	null	2	431,221	1	17,113	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	565,270	N	Texas	4	Georgetown Erpenbach-Krishnan	Arnett	DHS politics (2NR) cross retal cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,893	2. The social state	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>2. The social state</h4>	1nc vs WGA	null	1nc – Law K	431,220	1	17,118	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	565,420	N	Gsu	1	West Georgia Muhammad-Gaius	Deming	1NC T occidentalism K law good K impact turns 2NC Space colonization impact turn 1NR T 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,894	Legalization implies changing the law	EMCCDA 01	EMCCDA 01 European monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction,	Recent developments in legal approaches to drug use” November 2001 http://eldd.emcdda.org/databases/eldd_comparative_xanalyses.cfm Concept and Definition of Decriminalisation Decriminalisation takes away the status of criminal law from those acts to which it is applied certain acts no longer constitute criminal offences With regard to drugs, it is usually used to refer to demand acts of acquisition, possession and consumption. it still is illegal to use, possess, acquire or in certain cases import drugs, but those acts are no longer criminal offences. sanctions can still be applied In contrast, legalisation is the process of bringing within the control of the law a specified activity that was previously illegal and prohibited or strictly regulated the term is most commonly applied to acts of supply; production, manufacture or sale for non-medical use Legalisation would mean that such activities, and use and possession, would be regulated by states’ norms any form of legalisation would be contrary to the current UN conventions.	Decriminalisation takes away the status of criminal law sanctions can still be applied In contrast, legalisation is the process of bringing within the control of the law a specified activity that was previously illegal Legalisation would mean that such activities, and use and possession, would be regulated	“Decriminalisation in Europe?: Recent developments in legal approaches to drug use” November 2001 http://eldd.emcdda.org/databases/eldd_comparative_xanalyses.cfm Concept and Definition of Decriminalisation Decriminalisation. Decriminalisation takes away the status of criminal law from those acts to which it is applied. This means that certain acts no longer constitute criminal offences. With regard to drugs, it is usually used to refer to demand; acts of acquisition, possession and consumption. Following decriminalisation, it still is illegal to use, possess, acquire or in certain cases import drugs, but those acts are no longer criminal offences. However, administrative sanctions can still be applied; these can be a fine, suspension of the driving or firearms licence, or just a warning. In contrast, legalisation is the process of bringing within the control of the law a specified activity that was previously illegal and prohibited or strictly regulated. Related to drugs, the term is most commonly applied to acts of supply; production, manufacture or sale for non-medical use. Legalisation would mean that such activities, and use and possession, would be regulated by states’ norms, in the same way that it is legal to use alcohol and tobacco. There can still exist some administrative controls and regulations, which might even be supported by criminal sanctions (e.g. when juveniles or road traffic are concerned). From a legal point of view, any form of legalisation would be contrary to the current UN conventions.	1,535	<h4><strong>Legalization implies changing the law</h4><p>EMCCDA 01 </strong> European monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction, </p><p>“Decriminalisation in Europe?:<u> Recent developments in legal approaches to drug use” November 2001 http://eldd.emcdda.org/databases/eldd_comparative_xanalyses.cfm</p><p>Concept and Definition of Decriminalisation</u> Decriminalisation. <u><mark>Decriminalisation takes away the status of criminal law </mark>from those acts to which it is applied</u>. This means that <u>certain acts no longer constitute criminal offences</u>. <u>With regard to drugs, it is usually used to refer to demand</u>; <u>acts of acquisition, possession and consumption.</u> Following decriminalisation, <u>it still is illegal to use, possess, acquire or in certain cases import drugs, but those acts are no longer criminal offences.</u> However, administrative <u><mark>sanctions can still be applied</u></mark>; these can be a fine, suspension of the driving or firearms licence, or just a warning. <u><mark>In contrast, legalisation is the process of bringing within the control of the law a specified activity that was previously illegal</mark> and prohibited or strictly regulated</u>. Related to drugs, <u>the term is most commonly applied to acts of supply; production, manufacture or sale for non-medical use</u>. <u><mark>Legalisation would mean that such activities, and use and possession, would be regulated </mark>by states’ norms</u>, in the same way that it is legal to use alcohol and tobacco. There can still exist some administrative controls and regulations, which might even be supported by criminal sanctions (e.g. when juveniles or road traffic are concerned). From a legal point of view, <u>any form of legalisation would be contrary to the current UN conventions.</p></u>	1NC	null	T	431,121	18	17,121	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round5.docx	565,427	N	D6seceda	5	Wake Forest Athanasopoulos-Ning	Galloway	1NC T humanism good K case 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round5.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,895	They cause massive backlash	Jeffries 13 ; June 19, 2013; http://www.theverge.com/2013/6/19/4444738/online-gambling-haters-mellow-out-but-federal-law-still-hung-up-on-special-interests	Jeffries 13 Adrianne, reporter, The Verge; “Fierce opposition to online gambling fades, but don't bet on legalization” The Verge; June 19, 2013; http://www.theverge.com/2013/6/19/4444738/online-gambling-haters-mellow-out-but-federal-law-still-hung-up-on-special-interests	Advocates are not optimistic. There are many special interests such as casinos and tribes, which both want special rights that will allow them to cash in on online gambling, as well as a long list of less-obvious interests such as state lotteries and charities, which have carved out exceptions in federal gambling statutes. There are also family and Christian conservative groups that object on moral grounds. Even the NFL lobbied hard against internet gambling in the past. major push to pass federal legislation legalizing online poker failed last year, even though it earned the support of conservative groups. even with states putting pressure on the federal government, national legislation seems like a longshot I think this bill is a big underdog still — they always are," All these different stakeholders are trying to get the biggest slice of the pie possible, and some are willing to settle for no pie." there are still some groups that say online gambling is a gateway drug for money laundering and the corruption of minors There are some powerful opponents, such as casino mogul Sheldon Adelson, who some suspect is responsible for an anti-online gambling provision in the 2012 Republican party platform.	null	So will King’s bill finally put the issue to rest? Advocates are not optimistic. There are many special interests such as casinos and tribes, which both want special rights that will allow them to cash in on online gambling, as well as a long list of less-obvious interests such as state lotteries and charities, which have carved out exceptions in federal gambling statutes. There are also family and Christian conservative groups that object on moral grounds. Even the NFL lobbied hard against internet gambling in the past. The theory was that online gambling would pave the way for sports betting, which the league considers detrimental to the game (although it also fought for an exception for fantasy leagues). A major push to pass federal legislation legalizing online poker introduced by Sen. Harry Reid (D-NV) and Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ) failed last year, even though it earned the support of conservative groups. Sources familiar with the legalization efforts speculated that the bill became too heavily politicized due to the election. It was also criticized for being too weighted toward Nevada’s interests. Things are different this year, said Rich Muny, the vice president of player relations for the Poker Players Alliance, which has been one of the loudest voices in the debate over online gambling. "Cards are hitting the virtual felt right now in Nevada and they’re going to be hitting in New Jersey," he said. "What was a theoretical possibility before now is reality." But even with states putting pressure on the federal government, national legislation seems like a longshot. "I think this bill is a big underdog still — they always are," he said. "All these different stakeholders are trying to get the biggest slice of the pie possible, and some are willing to settle for no pie." The online gambling industry is estimated to grow to $1.5 billion in New Jersey alone in the next five years. It’s hard to say whether online gambling proponents outnumber opponents, or the other way around. Public opinion varies by state; 53 percent of voters in California approve, while 73 percent in Iowa do not. Beyond that, there are powerful interests on both sides. The revenue is attractive to states, and casinos such as Caesars are itching to get online. Furthermore, the knee-jerk moral opposition to online gambling is not as strong as it was in the past — although there are still some groups that say online gambling is a gateway drug for money laundering and the corruption of minors. There are some powerful opponents, such as casino mogul Sheldon Adelson, who some suspect is responsible for an anti-online gambling provision in the 2012 Republican party platform.	2,683	<h4>They cause massive backlash</h4><p><strong>Jeffries 13 </strong>Adrianne, reporter, The Verge; “Fierce opposition to online gambling fades, but don't bet on legalization” The Verge<u><strong>; June 19, 2013; http://www.theverge.com/2013/6/19/4444738/online-gambling-haters-mellow-out-but-federal-law-still-hung-up-on-special-interests</p><p></u></strong>So will King’s bill finally put the issue to rest? <u>Advocates are not optimistic. There are many special interests such as casinos and tribes, which both want special rights that will allow them to cash in on online gambling, as well as a long list of less-obvious interests such as state lotteries and charities, which have carved out exceptions in federal gambling statutes.</u> <u><strong>There are also family and Christian conservative groups that object on moral grounds.</u></strong> <u><strong>Even the NFL lobbied hard against internet gambling in the past.</u></strong> The theory was that online gambling would pave the way for sports betting, which the league considers detrimental to the game (although it also fought for an exception for fantasy leagues). A <u>major push to pass federal legislation legalizing online poker</u> introduced by Sen. Harry Reid (D-NV) and Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ) <u>failed last year, even though it earned the support of conservative groups. </u>Sources familiar with the legalization efforts speculated that the bill became too heavily politicized due to the election. It was also criticized for being too weighted toward Nevada’s interests. Things are different this year, said Rich Muny, the vice president of player relations for the Poker Players Alliance, which has been one of the loudest voices in the debate over online gambling. "Cards are hitting the virtual felt right now in Nevada and they’re going to be hitting in New Jersey," he said. "What was a theoretical possibility before now is reality." But <u>even with states putting pressure on the federal government, national legislation seems like a <strong>longshot</u></strong>. "<u>I think this bill is a big underdog still — they always are,"</u> he said. "<u><strong>All these different stakeholders are trying to get the biggest slice of the pie possible, and some are willing to settle for no pie."</u></strong> The online gambling industry is estimated to grow to $1.5 billion in New Jersey alone in the next five years. It’s hard to say whether online gambling proponents outnumber opponents, or the other way around. Public opinion varies by state; 53 percent of voters in California approve, while 73 percent in Iowa do not. Beyond that, there are powerful interests on both sides. The revenue is attractive to states, and casinos such as Caesars are itching to get online. Furthermore, the knee-jerk moral opposition to online gambling is not as strong as it was in the past — although <u><strong>there are still some groups that say online gambling is a gateway drug for money laundering and the corruption of minors</u></strong>. <u><strong>There are some powerful opponents, such as casino mogul Sheldon Adelson, who some suspect is responsible for an anti-online gambling provision in the 2012 Republican party platform.</p></u></strong>	null	null	2	430,508	7	17,113	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	565,270	N	Texas	4	Georgetown Erpenbach-Krishnan	Arnett	DHS politics (2NR) cross retal cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,896	GOP keeps the Senate – polls vote neg	SILVER 9 – 19 – 14 Election Guru	SILVER 9 – 19 – 14 Election Guru [Nate Silver, Senate Update: Democrats Add By Subtraction In Kansas, http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/senate-update-democrats-add-by-subtraction-in-kansas/]	the FiveThirtyEight forecast has Republicans with a 55 percent chance of winning the Senate, down from the Kansas ruling a couple of new polls on Friday were in line with our previous projections the forecast is similar to other systems, The Daily Kos Poll Explorer model uses polls only and gives Republicans a 54 percent chance The HuffPost Pollster model is polls only and puts the at 56 percent. The Washington Post’s Election Lab model has Republicans’ chances at 62 percent. The New York Times’ model has the GOP’s chances at 58 percent. Wang’s model is the outlier	FiveThirtyEight has Republicans with 55 percent new polls in line with previous projections The Daily Kos uses polls only and gives Republicans a 54 percent chance The HuffPost model is polls only” and puts 56 . The Washington Post has Republicans’ The New York Times 58 Wang’s model is the outlier	Overall, the FiveThirtyEight forecast has Republicans with a 55 percent chance of winning the Senate, down slightly from 57 percent before the Kansas ruling. (There were also a couple of new polls out on Friday, but they were in line with our previous projections in those states; the change in Kansas is what accounts for the slight boost to Democrats.) As has usually been the case, the FiveThirtyEight model’s forecast is similar to that of other systems, whether they use polls only or polls along with other factors: The Daily Kos Poll Explorer model, developed by Drew Linzer, uses polls only and gives Republicans a 54 percent chance of a Senate takeover. The HuffPost Pollster model is also “polls only” and puts the GOP’s chances at 56 percent. The Washington Post’s Election Lab model, which includes fundamentals, has Republicans’ chances at 62 percent. The New York Times’ “Leo” model, which uses polls and fundamentals, has the GOP’s chances at 58 percent. Sam Wang’s “Princeton Election Consortium” model is the outlier, suggesting Democrats would have a 93 percent chance of keeping the Senate in an election held today and a 70 percent chance in November. (I’ve raised a few questions about Wang’s methodology.)	1,227	<h4>GOP keeps the Senate – polls vote neg </h4><p><strong>SILVER 9 – 19 – 14 Election Guru</strong> [Nate Silver, Senate Update: Democrats Add By Subtraction In Kansas, http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/senate-update-democrats-add-by-subtraction-in-kansas/]</p><p>Overall, <u>the <mark>FiveThirtyEight</mark> forecast <mark>has Republicans with</mark> a <mark>55 percent </mark>chance of winning the Senate,</u> <u>down</u> slightly <u>from</u> 57 percent before <u>the Kansas ruling</u>. (There were also <u>a couple of <mark>new polls</mark> </u>out <u>on</u> <u>Friday</u>, but they <u>were</u> <u><mark>in line with</mark> our <mark>previous</mark> <mark>projections</u></mark> in those states; the change in Kansas is what accounts for the slight boost to Democrats.)</p><p>As has usually been the case, <u>the</u> FiveThirtyEight model’s <u>forecast is similar to</u> that of <u>other systems,</u> whether they use polls only or polls along with other factors:</p><p><u><mark>The Daily Kos</mark> Poll Explorer model</u>, developed by Drew Linzer, <u><strong><mark>uses polls only</u></strong> <u>and gives Republicans a 54 percent chance</mark> </u>of a Senate takeover.</p><p><u><mark>The HuffPost </mark>Pollster <mark>model is</u></mark> also “<u><strong><mark>polls only</u></strong>” <u>and puts </mark>the</u> GOP’s chances <u>at <mark>56</mark> percent<mark>.</p><p>The Washington Post</mark>’s Election Lab model</u>, which includes fundamentals, <u><mark>has Republicans’ </mark>chances at 62 percent.</p><p><mark>The New York Times</mark>’</u> “Leo” <u>model</u>, which uses polls and fundamentals, <u>has the GOP’s chances at <mark>58</mark> percent.</p><p></u>Sam <u><strong><mark>Wang’s</u></strong></mark> “Princeton Election Consortium” <u><strong><mark>model is the outlier</u></strong></mark>, suggesting Democrats would have a 93 percent chance of keeping the Senate in an election held today and a 70 percent chance in November. (I’ve raised a few questions about Wang’s methodology.)</p>	1NC	null	1nc – DA	431,171	8	17,122	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round6.docx	565,422	N	Gsu	6	Northwestern Esman-McCue	Hall	Aff Marijuana 1NC Contractual agreements CP employer liability DA Midterms case 2NR Contractual agreements CP employer liability DA	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round6.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,897	A plan text is key – provides a relatively stable locus for aff ground that creates a connection to topical generics	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>A plan text is key – provides a <u>relatively stable</u> locus for aff<u><strong> ground that creates a connection to topical generics</h4></u></strong>	1NC	null	T	431,223	1	17,121	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round5.docx	565,427	N	D6seceda	5	Wake Forest Athanasopoulos-Ning	Galloway	1NC T humanism good K case 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round5.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,898	The aff’s vision of pure autonomy from the state degrades social responsibility and public good.	Giroux 11	Giroux 11 – Global Television Network Chair in Communication Studies @ McMaster University [Dr. Henry A. Giroux (Former professor of Education @ Miami & Penn State University) “Neoliberalism and the death of the social state: remembering Walter Benjamin's Angel of History,” Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture Volume 17, Issue 4, 2011, pages 587-601	the storm brewing represent anti-progress a refusal to think about, invest in, or address the shared responsibilities visions of society that benefits citizens in general rather than a select few are now viewed as ‘a waste of time, since they are irrelevant to individual happiness the public has surrendered to atomizing morality and has replaced the call for communal responsibility with the call to further one's own interests The state – is viewed as an albatross Society has become hyper-individualized and stripped of any obligation to the other Individual[s are expected, pushed and pulled to seek and find individual solutions to socially created problems and implement those solutions individually using individual skills This ideology proclaims the counter productivity) of solidarity It derides communal responsibility a crowd of loners propelled by a contempt for any claim on the future in which the state has been reduced to wingless messengers trapped in their own biographies and individual experiences, cut off from any viable notion of society and its fundamental social solidarities the storm is fueled by an intense disdain for the social state A state is ‘social’ when it promotes the principle of communally endorsed, collective insurance against individual misfortune It is that principle that replac the ‘order of egoism’ bound to generate an atmosphere of mutual mistrust and suspicion, with the ‘order of equality’, inspiring confidence and solidarity It is the same principle which lifts members of society to the status of citizens The ‘winged messengers’ have been replaced by anti-public intellectuals and artists who now cater to the demands of the market and cheerlead neoliberal capitalism As the social state is eviscerated society increasingly becomes a machine for destroying the power of civic culture and civic life politics becomes a form of social death ) has called ‘the social question’ and what I have referred to as the punishing state. reliance upon a stripped-down notion of individual freedom and choice coupled with a strong emphasis on personal responsibility turns people away from those larger forces that nonetheless determine their varied daily experiences privatization, commodification, militarization, and deregulation that shape American society produce a range of crises and problems that extend far beyond the reach of the isolated and atomized individual Within this dystopian neoliberal economic order there is a cruel and deadly ideology in which the importance of the social responsibility, public goods, and public values is completely erased from a language derived from ideas based in marketing, commodification, and brand loyalty.	the storm brewing represent anti-progress, a refusal to think about, invest in, or address the shared responsibilities visions of ciety that benefits citizens in general rather than a select few are now viewed as ‘a waste of time, since they are irrelevant to individual happiness the public has surrendered to atomizing and has replaced the call for communal responsibility with the call to further one's own interests Individual[s] are expected, pushed and pulled to seek and find individual solutions to socially created problems and implement those solutions individually using individual skills a contempt for the state A state is ‘social’ when it promotes the principle of communally endorsed, collective insurance against individual misfortune As the state is eviscerated , society increasingly becomes a machine for destroying the power of civic culture and civic life politics becomes a form of social death privatization, commodification, militarization, and deregulation that shape American society produce a range of crises and problems that extend far beyond the reach of the isolated and atomized individual	The catastrophe that marks the current historical moment no longer wraps itself in the mantle of progress. On the contrary, the storm brewing in the United States and other parts of the globe represent a kind of anti-progress, a refusal to think about, invest in, or address the shared responsibilities that come with some vision of the future and ‘the good society’. Composing meaningful visions of the good society that benefits citizens in general rather than a select few are now viewed as ‘a waste of time, since they are irrelevant to individual happiness and a successful life’ (Bauman, 2008a, p. 88). Bounded by the narrow, private worlds that make up their everyday lives, the American public has surrendered to the atomizing consequences of a market-driven morality and society and has replaced the call for communal responsibility with the call to further one's own interests at all costs. The social and its most significant embodiment – the welfare state – is now viewed as an albatross around the neck of neoliberal notions of accumulation (as opposed to ‘progress’). Society has become hyper-individualized, trapped by the lure of material success and stripped of any obligation to the other. Zygmunt Bauman (2008a) argues that in such a society: Individual[s] men and women are now expected, pushed and pulled to seek and find individual solutions to socially created problems and implement those solutions individually using individual skills and resources. This ideology proclaims the futility (indeed, counter productivity) of solidarity: of joining forces and subordinating individual actions to a ‘common cause’. It derides the principle of communal responsibility for the well-being of its members, decrying it as a recipe for a debilitating ‘nanny state’, and warning against care for the other leading to an abhorrent and detestable ‘dependency’. (p. 88) Our contemporary Angel of History has been transformed into a ‘swarm of angels of biographies – a crowd of loners’ whose wings are stuck in a storm propelled by the hatred of democracy and a contempt for any claim on the future in which the state functions to offer even a modicum of social protection (Bauman, personal communication, 2 January 2011). And while Benjamin's Angel of History rightfully disputes the false claims of an order building progress, he has been replaced by a multitude of privatizing corporate beholden angles who cede any notion of society and collective vision – reduced to wingless messengers trapped in their own biographies and individual experiences, cut off from any viable notion of society and its fundamental social solidarities. At the same time, the storm that pins the wings of the contemporary angels of history is fueled by an intense disdain for the social state, which Bauman (2007a) describes in the following manner: A state is ‘social’ when it promotes the principle of communally endorsed, collective insurance against individual misfortune and its consequences. It is primarily that principle – declared, set in operation and trusted to be in working order – that recast the otherwise abstract idea of ‘society’ into the experience of felt and lived community through replacing the ‘order of egoism’ (to deploy John Dunn's terms), bound to generate an atmosphere of mutual mistrust and suspicion, with the ‘order of equality’, inspiring confidence and solidarity. It is the same principle which lifts members of society to the status of citizens, that is, makes them stakeholders in addition to being stockholders: beneficiaries, but also actors – the wardens as much as the wards of the ‘social benefits’ system, individuals with an acute interest in the common good understood as a network of shared institutions that can be trusted, and realistically expected, to guarantee the solidity and reliability of the state-issued ‘collective insurance policy’. (p. 140) We no longer live in an age in which history's ‘winged messengers’ bear witness to the suffering endured by millions and the conditions that allow such suffering to continue. Thinking about past and future has collapsed into a presentism in which the delete button, the utter normalization of a punishing inequality, and the atomizing pleasures of instant gratification come together to erase both any notion of historical consciousness and any vestige of social and moral responsibility owed as much to future generations as to the dead. The ‘winged messengers’ have been replaced by a less hallowed breed of anti-public intellectuals, academics, journalists, and artists who now cater to the demands of the market and further their careers by becoming cheerleaders for neoliberal capitalism. The legacy now left by too many intellectuals has more to do with establishing a corporate-friendly brand name than fighting economic and social injustices, translating private into public issues, or creating genuine public spheres that promote critical thought and collective action. Whatever ‘winged messengers’ do exist are either banished to the margins of the institutions that house them or excluded by the dominant media that have now become a mouthpiece for corporate culture and the new global rich. As history is erased and economics becomes the driving force for all aspects of political, cultural, and social life, those institutional and political forces that hold the reins of power now become the purveyors of social death, comfortably ensconced in a political imaginary that wreaks human misery on the planet as the rich and powerful reap huge financial gains for themselves. The principal players of casino capitalism live in the highly circumscribed time of short-term investments and financial gains and are more than willing to close their eyes to the carnage and suffering all around them while they are sucked into the black hole of the future. As the social state is eviscerated by an all-embracing market fundamentalism, society increasingly becomes a machine for destroying the power of civic culture and civic life, proliferating the ideologies and technologies of what is increasingly and unequivocally becoming a punishing state. And, quoting Achille Mbembe (2003), politics becomes a form of social death in which ‘the future is collapsed into the present’ (p. 37). Though helpless to control what he saw, Benjamin's Angel of History recognized that the past, present, and future were inextricably linked in a constellation of ideas, events, social practices, and relations of power that mutually inform each other. History offered no guarantees, and while it could often paralyze and punish, the potentially revolutionary ideal that gave it mythic status was organized around an understanding of social improvement that was partly connected to the unfinished business of human possibility and betterment. Of course, Benjamin rejected such a view. His Angel of History is caught up in a storm that paralyzed human agency while putting the myth of the inevitability of progress to rest. But storms pass, and hope as a condition for conceptualizing a future of sustainable progress can offer space and time for reflection, for developing modes of individual critique and collective agency capable of addressing and dismantling those sites of agony and wretchedness made visible in the after glow of historical consciousness. The problems confronting Americans today are very different from what Benjamin faced in the years before his suicide in 1940, but they share with the past a dangerous and threatening element of authoritarianism evident in the force and power of their ability to eliminate from public discussion what Tony Judt (2010) has called ‘the social question’ and what I have referred to as the punishing state. In an age when personal and political rights are undermined by the lack of economic rights, the utter reliance upon a stripped-down notion of individual freedom and choice coupled with a strong emphasis on personal responsibility turns people away from those larger forces that nonetheless determine (but not over determine) their varied daily experiences. Moreover, the ongoing privatization, commodification, militarization, and deregulation that now shape American society produce a range of crises and problems that extend far beyond the reach of the isolated and atomized individual. Within this dystopian neoliberal economic order, ‘the language of rights has changed: citizens have become “customers”; passengers and hospital patients have become “clients”; poverty has become criminalized and “extreme poverty” has become a “pathological condition” rather than a reflection of structural injustice – a “pathological dysfunction” of those who are poor, rather than the structural dysfunction of an economic system that generates and reproduces inequality’ (Bauman, 2010, p. 66). How else to explain increasing numbers of people being thrown in jail because they have failed to pay their debts? Or young people being booked and jailed because they violated a trivial rule such as breaking a school dress code? (See Edwards, 2010.) But there is more at work here than a society without social protections; there is also a cruel and deadly ideology of privatization and punishment in which the importance of the social responsibility, public goods, and public values is completely erased from a language derived from ideas based in marketing, commodification, and brand loyalty.	9,422	<h4>The aff’s vision of pure autonomy from the state degrades <u>social responsibility and public good</u>. </h4><p><strong><mark>Giroux 11</strong></mark> – Global Television Network Chair in Communication Studies @ McMaster University [Dr. Henry A. Giroux (Former professor of Education @ Miami & Penn State University) “Neoliberalism and the death of the social state: remembering Walter Benjamin's Angel of History,” <u>Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture</u> Volume 17, Issue 4, 2011, pages 587-601 </p><p>The catastrophe that marks the current historical moment no longer wraps itself in the mantle of progress. On the contrary, <u><mark>the storm brewing</u></mark> in the United States and other parts of the globe <u><mark>represent</u></mark> a kind of <u><strong><mark>anti-progress</u></strong>, <u>a refusal to think about, invest in, or address the <strong>shared responsibilities</strong></mark> </u>that come with some vision of the future and ‘the good society’. Composing meaningful <u><mark>visions of</u></mark> the good <u>so<mark>ciety that benefits citizens in general rather than a select few are now viewed as ‘a waste of time, since they are irrelevant to <strong>individual </strong>happiness</u></mark> and a successful life’ (Bauman, 2008a, p. 88). Bounded by the narrow, private worlds that make up their everyday lives, <u><mark>the</u></mark> American <u><mark>public has surrendered to</u></mark> the<u> <strong><mark>atomizing</u></strong></mark> consequences of a market-driven <u>morality</u> and society <u><mark>and has <strong>replaced the call for communal responsibility</strong> with the call to further one's own interests</u></mark> at all costs. <u>The</u> social and its most significant embodiment – the welfare <u>state – is</u> now <u>viewed as an albatross </u>around the neck of neoliberal notions of accumulation (as opposed to ‘progress’). <u>Society has become hyper-individualized</u>, trapped by the lure of material success <u>and stripped of any obligation to the other</u>. Zygmunt Bauman (2008a) argues that in such a society:</p><p><u><mark>Individual[s</u>] </mark>men and women <u><mark>are</u> </mark>now <u><mark>expected, pushed and pulled to seek and find individual solutions to socially created problems and implement those solutions individually using individual skills</u></mark> and resources. <u>This ideology proclaims the</u> futility (indeed, <u>counter productivity) of solidarity</u>: of joining forces and subordinating individual actions to a ‘common cause’. <u>It derides</u> the principle of <u>communal responsibility</u> for the well-being of its members, decrying it as a recipe for a debilitating ‘nanny state’, and warning against care for the other leading to an abhorrent and detestable ‘dependency’. (p. 88)</p><p>Our contemporary Angel of History has been transformed into a ‘swarm of angels of biographies – <u>a crowd of loners</u>’ whose wings are stuck in a storm <u>propelled by </u>the hatred of democracy and <u><strong><mark>a contempt for</mark> </strong>any claim on the future in which<strong> <mark>the state</strong></mark> </u>functions to offer even a modicum of social protection (Bauman, personal communication, 2 January 2011). And while Benjamin's Angel of History rightfully disputes the false claims of an order building progress, he <u>has been</u> replaced by a multitude of privatizing corporate beholden angles who cede any notion of society and collective vision – <u>reduced to wingless messengers <strong>trapped in their own biographies and individual experiences</strong>, cut off from any viable notion of society and its fundamental social solidarities</u>. At the same time, <u>the storm</u> that pins the wings of the contemporary angels of history <u>is fueled by an intense<strong> disdain for the </strong>social<strong> state</u></strong>, which Bauman (2007a) describes in the following manner:</p><p><u><mark>A state is ‘social’ when it promotes the principle of communally endorsed, <strong>collective insurance</strong> against individual misfortune</u></mark> and its consequences. <u>It is </u>primarily<u> that principle</u> – declared, set in operation and trusted to be in working order – <u>that </u>recast the otherwise abstract idea of ‘society’ into the experience of felt and lived community through <u>replac</u>ing <u>the ‘<strong>order of egoism’</u></strong> (to deploy John Dunn's terms), <u>bound to generate an atmosphere of mutual mistrust and suspicion, with the ‘<strong>order of equality’</strong>, inspiring confidence and solidarity</u>. <u>It is the same principle which lifts members of society to the status of citizens</u>, that is, makes them stakeholders in addition to being stockholders: beneficiaries, but also actors – the wardens as much as the wards of the ‘social benefits’ system, individuals with an acute interest in the common good understood as a network of shared institutions that can be trusted, and realistically expected, to guarantee the solidity and reliability of the state-issued ‘collective insurance policy’. (p. 140)</p><p>We no longer live in an age in which history's ‘winged messengers’ bear witness to the suffering endured by millions and the conditions that allow such suffering to continue. Thinking about past and future has collapsed into a presentism in which the delete button, the utter normalization of a punishing inequality, and the atomizing pleasures of instant gratification come together to erase both any notion of historical consciousness and any vestige of social and moral responsibility owed as much to future generations as to the dead. <u>The ‘winged messengers’ have been replaced by</u> a less hallowed breed of <u>anti-public intellectuals</u>, academics, journalists, <u>and artists who now cater to the demands of the market and</u> further their careers by becoming <u>cheerlead</u>ers for <u>neoliberal capitalism</u>. The legacy now left by too many intellectuals has more to do with establishing a corporate-friendly brand name than fighting economic and social injustices, translating private into public issues, or creating genuine public spheres that promote critical thought and collective action. Whatever ‘winged messengers’ do exist are either banished to the margins of the institutions that house them or excluded by the dominant media that have now become a mouthpiece for corporate culture and the new global rich.</p><p>As history is erased and economics becomes the driving force for all aspects of political, cultural, and social life, those institutional and political forces that hold the reins of power now become the purveyors of social death, comfortably ensconced in a political imaginary that wreaks human misery on the planet as the rich and powerful reap huge financial gains for themselves. The principal players of casino capitalism live in the highly circumscribed time of short-term investments and financial gains and are more than willing to close their eyes to the carnage and suffering all around them while they are sucked into the black hole of the future. <u><strong><mark>As the</strong> </mark>social <strong><mark>state is eviscerated</strong> </u></mark>by an all-embracing market fundamentalism<mark>,<u> society increasingly becomes a machine for destroying the power of civic culture and civic life</u></mark>, proliferating the ideologies and technologies of what is increasingly and unequivocally becoming a punishing state. And, quoting Achille Mbembe (2003), <u><mark>politics becomes a form of <strong>social death</u></strong></mark> in which ‘the future is collapsed into the present’ (p. 37).</p><p>Though helpless to control what he saw, Benjamin's Angel of History recognized that the past, present, and future were inextricably linked in a constellation of ideas, events, social practices, and relations of power that mutually inform each other. History offered no guarantees, and while it could often paralyze and punish, the potentially revolutionary ideal that gave it mythic status was organized around an understanding of social improvement that was partly connected to the unfinished business of human possibility and betterment. Of course, Benjamin rejected such a view. His Angel of History is caught up in a storm that paralyzed human agency while putting the myth of the inevitability of progress to rest. But storms pass, and hope as a condition for conceptualizing a future of sustainable progress can offer space and time for reflection, for developing modes of individual critique and collective agency capable of addressing and dismantling those sites of agony and wretchedness made visible in the after glow of historical consciousness. The problems confronting Americans today are very different from what Benjamin faced in the years before his suicide in 1940, but they share with the past a dangerous and threatening element of authoritarianism evident in the force and power of their ability to eliminate from public discussion what Tony Judt (2010<u>) has called ‘the social question’ and what I have referred to as the punishing state.</p><p></u>In an age when personal and political rights are undermined by the lack of economic rights, the utter <u>reliance upon a stripped-down notion of individual freedom and choice coupled with a strong emphasis on personal responsibility <strong>turns people away from those larger forces</strong> that nonetheless determine</u> (but not over determine) <u>their varied daily experiences</u>. Moreover, the ongoing <u><mark>privatization, commodification, militarization, and deregulation</mark> <mark>that</u></mark> now <u><mark>shape American society produce a range of crises and problems that extend far beyond the reach of the isolated and atomized individual</u></mark>. <u>Within this dystopian neoliberal economic order</u>, ‘the language of rights has changed: citizens have become “customers”; passengers and hospital patients have become “clients”; poverty has become criminalized and “extreme poverty” has become a “pathological condition” rather than a reflection of structural injustice – a “pathological dysfunction” of those who are poor, rather than the structural dysfunction of an economic system that generates and reproduces inequality’ (Bauman, 2010, p. 66). How else to explain increasing numbers of people being thrown in jail because they have failed to pay their debts? Or young people being booked and jailed because they violated a trivial rule such as breaking a school dress code? (See Edwards, 2010.) But there is more at work here than a society without social protections; <u>there is</u> also <u>a cruel and deadly ideology </u>of privatization and punishment <u>in which the importance of the social responsibility, public goods, and public values is <strong>completely erased</strong> from a language derived from ideas based in marketing, commodification, and brand loyalty.</p></u>	1nc vs WGA	null	1nc – Law K	431,224	1	17,118	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	565,420	N	Gsu	1	West Georgia Muhammad-Gaius	Deming	1NC T occidentalism K law good K impact turns 2NC Space colonization impact turn 1NR T 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,899	Shutdown destroys counterterror- can’t make long-term plans or respond effectively- independently de-funds the National Security Cutter	National Journal 1/5	National Journal 1/5/2015 (What a Homeland Security Shutdown Would Look Like, http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/what-a-homeland-security-shutdown-would-look-like-20150105)	budget confidence is "absolutely essential" to smoothly and effectively running an agency while many employees worked during that shutdown, several of the department's operations were curtailed. These included non-disaster grant programs as well as law-enforcement, civil-rights, and civil-liberties training staffing doesn't necessarily show the full picture. The government eases its contracting activities. Employee hiring, research efforts, and other projects can be stalled short-term funding deals create a chaotic and uncertain environment hurting the department even before funding can expire Any time you don't have a clear path of funding, you have to be careful you can't outspend what appropriations you have DHS comprises at least 16 agencies and offices, including the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Secret Service During that period of a CR, we cannot engage in new starts We've got some Homeland Security priorities that need to be funded now." For example, a presidential-election cycle is starting, but DHS can't hire more Secret Service agents. Funding for enhanced detention capabilities will be hindered investing in new border surveillance would be put on hold grants will go unfunded And the budget uncertainty could potentially delay the delivery of a National Security Cutter, which is the centerpiece of the Coast Guard's fleet withholding the purse strings puts DHS in a difficult position It's pretty difficult to plan long term when you don't exactly know how much you're going to have available and what strings might be tied to it	budget confidence is "absolutely essential" to smoothly and effectively running an agency during that shutdown operations were curtailed. These included non-disaster grant programs as well as law-enforcement, civil-rights, and civil-liberties training The government eases its contracting activities. Employee hiring, research efforts, and other projects can be stalled. short-term funding deals create a chaotic and uncertain environment, hurting the department even before funding can expir you can't outspend appropriation DHS comprises at least 16 agencies including the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, the F E M A and the Se S During that period we cannot engage in new starts some H Security priorities that need to be funded now. a presidential-election cycle is starting, but DHS can't hire more agents. Funding for enhanced detention capabilities will be hindered new border surveillance would be put on hold rants unfunded could potentially delay the delivery of a National Security Cutter, which is the centerpiece of the Coast Guard's fleet	Yet, budget confidence is "absolutely essential" to smoothly and effectively running an agency, said Stan Soloway, president and CEO of the Professional Services Council. The political optics, he said, let alone the real implications, of a shutdown are generally to be avoided—and this will likely create shutdown resistance within both parties. But that doesn't mean the option is completely off the table. "I think a lot of us were really surprised that it got to a shutdown [in 2013]," Soloway said. "It's really difficult to predict how this will play out." But it's a bit easier to predict what a shutdown would look like for DHS. During the October 2013 shutdown, nearly 200,000 of DHS's 231,000-plus civilian and military employees were likely exempted from emergency furloughs. That means more than 85 percent of DHS workers continued doing their jobs, according to a Congressional Research Service report on DHS's funding lapse. There are two main types of employees who still work: those whose jobs are paid for by fees and multiyear appropriations, and those who save lives or protect property. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services is busy readying the rules and guidelines for Obama's unilateral action, which provides work permits and deportation deferrals to millions of undocumented immigrants. But the agency is fee-funded, meaning that it doesn't need annual appropriations to continue operating. And during the most recent shutdown, about 97 percent of its employees were instructed to keep working, according to the department's September 2013 report, "Procedures Relating to a Federal Funding Hiatus." Those life- and property-saving functions include border-security programs and immigration enforcement and removal operations. They include air-passenger screening, maritime security, Secret Service protection, and more. But while many employees worked during that shutdown, several of the department's operations were curtailed. These included non-disaster grant programs as well as law-enforcement, civil-rights, and civil-liberties training, and more, according to the Congressional Research Service report. The staffing impacts of a shutdown are easy to measure, but staffing doesn't necessarily show the full picture. The government eases its contracting activities. Employee hiring, research efforts, and other projects can be stalled. And most employees go unpaid until the government is funded, the report states. While the DHS funding feud continues, short-term funding deals—called continuing resolutions—create a chaotic and uncertain environment, hurting the department even before funding can expire, Soloway says. "Any time you don't have a clear path of funding, you have to be careful," he said, "because you can't get out over your skis, you can't outspend what appropriations you have." DHS comprises at least 16 agencies and offices, including the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Secret Service. At a December House hearing, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson detailed the possible effects of funding DHS for only a few months. "During that period of a CR, we cannot engage in new starts," Johnson told the House Homeland Security Committee. "We've got some Homeland Security priorities that need to be funded now." For example, a presidential-election cycle is starting, but DHS can't hire more Secret Service agents. Funding for enhanced detention capabilities in Texas will be hindered, Johnson told the committee—at least until the department is funded through fiscal 2015. Additionally, investing in new border surveillance would be put on hold. DHS's non-disaster grants, which go to state and local municipalities, will go unfunded. And the budget uncertainty could potentially delay the delivery of a National Security Cutter, which is the centerpiece of the Coast Guard's fleet, according to a DHS official. Immigration isn't the department's only function, and withholding the purse strings puts DHS in a difficult position, Tom Ridge, a former Homeland Security secretary, told National Journal. "I would be very, very disappointed if I were secretary, and the Democrats did it to me," said Ridge, also a former Republican Pennsylvania governor. "It's pretty difficult to plan long term when you don't exactly know how much you're going to have available and what strings might be tied to it," he added. "My hope is that my Republican friends feel you made your point, get it out as soon as you get back. Give them the funding they need."	4,547	<h4>Shutdown destroys counterterror- can’t make long-term plans or respond effectively- independently de-funds the National Security Cutter</h4><p><strong>National Journal 1/5</strong>/2015 (What a Homeland Security Shutdown Would Look Like, http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/what-a-homeland-security-shutdown-would-look-like-20150105)</p><p>Yet, <u><strong><mark>budget confidence is "absolutely essential" to smoothly and effectively running an agency</u></strong></mark>, said Stan Soloway, president and CEO of the Professional Services Council. The political optics, he said, let alone the real implications, of a shutdown are generally to be avoided—and this will likely create shutdown resistance within both parties. But that doesn't mean the option is completely off the table. "I think a lot of us were really surprised that it got to a shutdown [in 2013]," Soloway said. "It's really difficult to predict how this will play out." But it's a bit easier to predict what a shutdown would look like for DHS. During the October 2013 shutdown, nearly 200,000 of DHS's 231,000-plus civilian and military employees were likely exempted from emergency furloughs. That means more than 85 percent of DHS workers continued doing their jobs, according to a Congressional Research Service report on DHS's funding lapse. There are two main types of employees who still work: those whose jobs are paid for by fees and multiyear appropriations, and those who save lives or protect property. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services is busy readying the rules and guidelines for Obama's unilateral action, which provides work permits and deportation deferrals to millions of undocumented immigrants. But the agency is fee-funded, meaning that it doesn't need annual appropriations to continue operating. And during the most recent shutdown, about 97 percent of its employees were instructed to keep working, according to the department's September 2013 report, "Procedures Relating to a Federal Funding Hiatus." Those life- and property-saving functions include border-security programs and immigration enforcement and removal operations. They include air-passenger screening, maritime security, Secret Service protection, and more. But <u>while many employees worked <mark>during that shutdown</mark>, several of the department's <mark>operations were curtailed. These included non-disaster grant programs as well as law-enforcement, civil-rights, and civil-liberties training</u></mark>, and more, according to the Congressional Research Service report. The staffing impacts of a shutdown are easy to measure, but <u>staffing doesn't necessarily show the full picture. <mark>The government eases its contracting activities. Employee hiring, research efforts, and other projects can be stalled</u>.</mark> And most employees go unpaid until the government is funded, the report states. While the DHS funding feud continues, <u><mark>short-term funding deals</u></mark>—called continuing resolutions—<u><strong><mark>create a chaotic and uncertain environment</u></strong>, <u>hurting the department even before funding can expir</mark>e</u>, Soloway says. "<u>Any time you don't have a clear path of funding, you have to be careful</u>," he said, "because you can't get out over your skis, <u><mark>you can't outspend </mark>what <mark>appropriation</mark>s you have</u>." <u><mark>DHS comprises at least 16 agencies</mark> and offices, <mark>including the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, the F</mark>ederal <mark>E</mark>mergency <mark>M</mark>anagement <mark>A</mark>gency, <mark>and the Se</mark>cret <mark>S</mark>ervice</u>. At a December House hearing, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson detailed the possible effects of funding DHS for only a few months. "<u><mark>During that period</mark> of a CR, <strong><mark>we cannot engage in new starts</u></strong></mark>," Johnson told the House Homeland Security Committee. "<u>We've got <mark>some H</mark>omeland <mark>Security priorities that need to be funded now.</mark>" For example, <mark>a presidential-election cycle is starting, but DHS can't hire more</mark> Secret Service <mark>agents. Funding for enhanced detention capabilities </u></mark>in Texas <u><mark>will be hindered</u></mark>, Johnson told the committee—at least until the department is funded through fiscal 2015. Additionally, <u>investing in <mark>new border surveillance would be put on hold</u></mark>. DHS's non-disaster <u>g<mark>rants</u></mark>, which go to state and local municipalities, <u>will go <mark>unfunded</u></mark>. <u>And the budget uncertainty <mark>could potentially delay the delivery of a National Security Cutter, which is <strong>the centerpiece of the Coast Guard's fleet</u></strong></mark>, according to a DHS official. Immigration isn't the department's only function, and <u>withholding the purse strings puts DHS in a difficult position</u>, Tom Ridge, a former Homeland Security secretary, told National Journal. "I would be very, very disappointed if I were secretary, and the Democrats did it to me," said Ridge, also a former Republican Pennsylvania governor. "<u>It's pretty difficult to plan long term when you don't exactly know how much you're going to have available and what strings might be tied to it</u>," he added. "My hope is that my Republican friends feel you made your point, get it out as soon as you get back. Give them the funding they need."</p>	null	null	2	431,225	1	17,113	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	565,270	N	Texas	4	Georgetown Erpenbach-Krishnan	Arnett	DHS politics (2NR) cross retal cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,900	They break the game:	1. Predictability—allowing the affirmative to dicuss anything tangentially related to the resolution without explicitly defending a topical action opens the floodgates—any important social or political issue can be a topical aff—the resolution exists to focus discussion	1. Predictability—allowing the affirmative to dicuss anything tangentially related to the resolution without explicitly defending a topical action opens the floodgates—any important social or political issue can be a topical aff—the resolution exists to focus discussion	2. Controversial Ground—	null	2. Controversial Ground—The resolution waxs selected precisely because its morally ambiguous and controversial—engaging this resolution is necessary to providing both sides with the ability to engage in a discussion and provides a stasis point for argument—sidestepping the resolution allows the affirmative to select the moral high ground and establish standards for evaluation that make the game impossible.x	411	<h4><strong>They break the game: </h4><p><u>1. Predictability—</u>allowing the affirmative to dicuss anything tangentially related to the resolution without explicitly defending a topical action opens the floodgates—any important social or political issue can be a topical aff—the resolution exists to focus discussion</p><p><u>2. Controversial Ground—</u>The resolution waxs selected precisely because its morally ambiguous and controversial—engaging this resolution is necessary to providing both sides with the ability to engage in a discussion and provides a stasis point for argument—sidestepping the resolution allows the affirmative to select the moral high ground and establish standards for evaluation that make the game impossible.x</p></strong>	1NC	null	T	431,123	2	17,121	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round5.docx	565,427	N	D6seceda	5	Wake Forest Athanasopoulos-Ning	Galloway	1NC T humanism good K case 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round5.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,901	Full legalization drives youth turn out and flips the election	Walker 14	Jon Walker 14, is the author of After Legalization: Understanding the future of marijuana policy, "Actually, Marijuana Legalization Might Improve Relative Youth Turnout," 5-7-2014, No Publication, http://justsaynow.firedoglake.com/2014/05/07/actually-marijuana-legalization-might-improve-relative-youth-turnout/, DOA: 8-17-2014, y2k	It appears that marijuana legalization may improve youth turnout Over at FiveThirtyEight Enten disputes conventional wisdom his argument suffers from two important flaws he looks at the CPS to determine the percent of the overall electorate in 2008 and 2012 that was 18-29 With the data set available from CPS this seems like the wrong information to look at if you want to know if marijuana might encourage young people to vote it brings too many variables into play that skew the results marijuana could cause an increase in the number of young voters but if some other unrelated factors brought out more older voters the percent of the electorate made up by young people would remain unchanged. A more direct way to look at the issue would be to compare only the change in number of young adults voting in marijuana legalization states to the behavior of young people in non-legalization states A better data point to look at in presidential-year elections would be the percentage of 18-24 year old citizens who voted in 2008 and 2012, comparing the legalization states to the national average. Enten inappropriately includes in data set initiatives that would make only modest reforms to drug policy We can look at prior years’ marijuana ballot measures For the 14 such ballot measures since 1998 the voting pool was made up of 0.2 percentage points fewer 18- to 29-year-olds compared to the prior similar election he includes in his table the 2000 California Proposition 36, “Probation While it was a positive improvement Prop. 36 was not exactly a sexy initiative and not clearly about marijuana legalization. it is hard to get people engaged over actions that are perceived to be half-measures full marijuana legalization creates popular excitement in a way all other changes don’t Even using Enten’s imperfect data choice we see that on average when full legalization is on the ballot, 18-29 year olds make up 0.5 percentage points more of the voting pool in close elections the Democratic party would be willing to spend millions on an outreach program if they thought it could increase the youth share of the electorate by 0.5 points. That can make a big difference Like with the three 2012 initiatives, youth turnout in California in 2010 performed better than the national average. Looking at the data from this perspective full legalization may have a positive effect legalization initiatives have the potential to drive youth turnout	Enten suffers important flaws. CPS the wrong information to look at it brings too many variables that skew results A better data point to look at in presidential-year elections would be the percentage of 18-24 year old citizens who voted in 2008 and 2012, comparing the legalization states to the national average Enten’s inappropriately includes in data set initiatives that would make only modest reforms to drug policy he includes Prop. 36 not clear marijuana legalization perceived to be half-measures full legalization creates popular excitement in a way all other changes don’t in close elections 0.5 points can make a big difference Looking at the data from this perspective, full legalization may have positive effect	It appears that marijuana legalization on the ballot may actually improve youth turnout. Over at FiveThirtyEight Harry Enten disputes this conventional wisdom, but I believe his argument suffers from two important flaws. First, he looks at the Current Population Survey (CPS) to determine the percent of the overall electorate in 2008 and 2012 that was 18-29: The Census Bureau found youth turnout rose by 0.2 points in Colorado, dropped by 0.9 points in Oregon, and dropped by 2.7 points in Washington from 2008 to 2012, an average 1.2-point drop across all three states. This drop is pretty much the same as the 1.5-point drop in young voters nationally, as measured by the CPS. With the data set available from CPS, this seems like the wrong information to look at if you want to know if marijuana might encourage young people to vote — it brings too many variables into play that skew the results. For example, marijuana could cause an increase in the total number of young voters but if some other unrelated factors also brought out more older voters, the percent of the electorate made up by young people would remain unchanged. A more direct way to look at the issue would be to compare only the change in number of young adults voting in marijuana legalization states to the behavior of young people in non-legalization states. A better data point to look at in presidential-year elections would be the percentage of 18-24 year old citizens who voted in 2008 and 2012, comparing the legalization states to the national average. 2008 % of 18-24 Citizens that Voted 2012 % of 18-24 Citizens that Voted Change Colorado 50.9 56.1 5.2 Oregon 52.7 51.1 -1.6 Washington 46.7 42.1 -4.6 National 48.5 41.2 -7.3 Thanks to the Obama campaign, youth political engagement was very high in 2008, but it really dropped off nationally in 2012. In this environment, Colorado was one of only a handful of states where according to the CPS the percent of 18-24 year olds voting actually went up in 2012, while Oregon and Washington saw much smaller decreases than the national average. (A note of causation there is a relatively large margin of error for these subset in the CPS data.) My second major issue with Enten’s analysis is that he inappropriately includes in his data set initiatives that would make only modest reforms to drug policy: We can also look at prior years’ recreational marijuana ballot measures, including those that sought to legalize, decriminalize or lessen the penalty for recreational marijuana. For the 14 such ballot measures since 1998, the voting pool was made up of 0.2 percentage points fewer 18- to 29-year-olds, according to the CPS, compared to the prior similar election (i.e. the prior midterm for midterm years and the prior presidential election for presidential election years). Looking only at the midterms, the 18-to-29 demographic rose 0.1 percentage points on average. For example, he includes in his table the 2000 California Proposition 36, “Probation and Treatment for Drug-Related Offenses.” While it was a positive improvement, Prop. 36 was not exactly a sexy initiative and not clearly about marijuana legalization. In general, it is hard to get people very engaged over actions that are perceived to be half-measures. I know from working in this space that full marijuana legalization creates real popular excitement in a way all other changes don’t. If you remove these non-legalization measures (like I have from his chart below) and look at only the initiatives that would actually legalize marijuana for adults, the results flip. Even using Enten’s imperfect data choice, we see that on average when full legalization is on the ballot, 18-29 year olds make up 0.5 percentage points more of the voting pool. Looking at only midterm elections the increase is 1.3 points. While that is not a huge numbers, I can almost guarantee that in close elections the Democratic party would be willing to spend millions on an outreach program if they thought it could increase the youth share of the electorate by 0.5 points. In addition, it could be argued you should only really look at four measures, California’s Prop 19 in 2010 and the three initiatives in 2012, because it was only starting in 2010 that several independent polls indicated legalization had a good chance of winning. That can make a big difference, since it is tough to get people excited about what is perceived as a lost cause. Like with the three 2012 initiatives, youth turnout in California in 2010 performed better than the national average. The percentage of young people who decided to vote in 2010 compared to 2006 was down nationally but up in California. While that makes for a very small sample size, it is four for four. Looking at the data from this perspective, full legalization on the ballot may actually have a modest, positive effect on youth turnout. Adding in some subjective analysis based on observing the campaigns, I would I suspect it is more the case that legalization initiatives have the potential to drive youth turnout, but merely getting it on the ballot is only part of it. There seems to be a need for a decently well-financed legalization campaign seriously focused on young outreach to get the maximum effect, which is what the Colorado campaign did. Given the large number of variables involved in an election and the small sample it might not be possible to definitively answer this question yet, but fortunately we will get some more data soon. We should likely seen around half a dozen full legalization initiatives on ballot in the next two election cycles.	5,602	<h4><u>Full</u> legalization drives youth turn out and flips the election</h4><p>Jon <strong>Walker 14</strong>, is the author of After Legalization: Understanding the future of marijuana policy, "Actually, Marijuana Legalization Might Improve Relative Youth Turnout," 5-7-2014, No Publication, http://justsaynow.firedoglake.com/2014/05/07/actually-marijuana-legalization-might-improve-relative-youth-turnout/, DOA: 8-17-2014, y2k </p><p><u>It appears that marijuana legalization</u> on the ballot <u>may</u> actually <u>improve youth turnout</u>. <u>Over at FiveThirtyEight</u> Harry <u><strong><mark>Enten</u></strong></mark> <u>disputes</u> this <u>conventional wisdom</u>, but I believe <u>his argument <mark>suffers </mark>from two <mark>important</u> <u>flaws</u>.</mark> First, <u>he looks at the</u> Current Population Survey (<u>CPS</u>) <u>to determine the percent of the overall electorate in 2008 and 2012 that was 18-29</u>: The Census Bureau found youth turnout rose by 0.2 points in Colorado, dropped by 0.9 points in Oregon, and dropped by 2.7 points in Washington from 2008 to 2012, an average 1.2-point drop across all three states. This drop is pretty much the same as the 1.5-point drop in young voters nationally, as measured by the CPS. <u>With the data set available from<mark> CPS</u></mark>, <u>this seems like <strong><mark>the wrong information to</mark> <mark>look at</u></strong></mark> <u>if you want to know if marijuana might encourage young people to vote</u> — <u><mark>it brings <strong>too many variables</u></strong> <u></mark>into play <mark>that skew</mark> the</u> <u><mark>results</u></mark>. For example, <u>marijuana could cause an increase in the</u> total <u>number of young voters but if some other unrelated factors</u> also <u>brought out more older voters</u>, <u>the percent of the electorate made up by young people would remain unchanged. <strong>A more direct way</u></strong> <u>to look at the issue would be to compare <strong>only the change in number of young adults voting</strong> in marijuana legalization states to the behavior of young people in non-legalization states</u>. <u><strong><mark>A better data</u></strong> <u>point</mark> <mark>to look at in presidential-year elections would be the percentage of 18-24 year old citizens who voted in 2008 and 2012, comparing the legalization states to the national average</mark>. </u>2008 % of 18-24 Citizens that Voted 2012 % of 18-24 Citizens that Voted Change Colorado 50.9 56.1 5.2 Oregon 52.7 51.1 -1.6 Washington 46.7 42.1 -4.6 National 48.5 41.2 -7.3 Thanks to the Obama campaign, youth political engagement was very high in 2008, but it really dropped off nationally in 2012. In this environment, Colorado was one of only a handful of states where according to the CPS the percent of 18-24 year olds voting actually went up in 2012, while Oregon and Washington saw much smaller decreases than the national average. (A note of causation there is a relatively large margin of error for these subset in the CPS data.) My second major issue with <u><mark>Enten</u>’s</mark> analysis is that he <u><mark>inappropriately includes in</u> </mark>his <u><mark>data set initiatives that would make only modest reforms to drug policy</u></mark>: <u>We can</u> also <u>look at prior years’</u> recreational <u>marijuana ballot measures</u>, including those that sought to legalize, decriminalize or lessen the penalty for recreational marijuana. <u>For the 14 such ballot measures since 1998</u>, <u>the</u> <u>voting pool was made up of 0.2 percentage points fewer 18- to 29-year-olds</u>, according to the CPS, <u>compared to the prior similar election</u> (i.e. the prior midterm for midterm years and the prior presidential election for presidential election years). Looking only at the midterms, the 18-to-29 demographic rose 0.1 percentage points on average. For example, <u><mark>he includes </mark>in his table the 2000 California Proposition 36, “Probation</u> and Treatment for Drug-Related Offenses.” <u>While it was a positive improvement</u>, <u><strong><mark>Prop. 36</mark> was not exactly a sexy initiative and <mark>not clear</mark>ly about <mark>marijuana legalization</mark>.</u></strong> In general, <u>it is hard to get people</u> very <u>engaged over actions that are <strong><mark>perceived to be half-measures</u></strong></mark>. I know from working in this space that <u><strong><mark>full</mark> marijuana <mark>legalization</u></strong> <u>creates</u></mark> real <u><mark>popular excitement in a way all <strong>other changes don’t</u></strong></mark>. If you remove these non-legalization measures (like I have from his chart below) and look at only the initiatives that would actually legalize marijuana for adults, the results flip. <u>Even using Enten’s imperfect data choice</u>, <u>we see that on average when full legalization is on the ballot,</u> <u>18-29 year olds make up 0.5 percentage points more of the voting pool</u>. Looking at only midterm elections the increase is 1.3 points. While that is not a huge numbers, I can almost guarantee that <u><strong><mark>in close elections</u></strong></mark> <u>the Democratic party would be willing to spend millions on an outreach program if they thought it could increase the youth share of the electorate <strong>by <mark>0.5 points</mark>.</strong> </u>In addition, it could be argued you should only really look at four measures, California’s Prop 19 in 2010 and the three initiatives in 2012, because it was only starting in 2010 that several independent polls indicated legalization had a good chance of winning. <u><strong>That <mark>can make a big difference</u></strong></mark>, since it is tough to get people excited about what is perceived as a lost cause. <u>Like with the three 2012 initiatives, youth turnout in California in 2010 performed better than the national average.</u> The percentage of young people who decided to vote in 2010 compared to 2006 was down nationally but up in California. While that makes for a very small sample size, it is four for four. <u><mark>Looking at the data from this perspective</u>, <u><strong>full legalization</u></strong> </mark>on the ballot <u><mark>may</u></mark> actually <u><mark>have </mark>a</u> modest, <u><strong><mark>positive effect</u></strong> </mark>on youth turnout. Adding in some subjective analysis based on observing the campaigns, I would I suspect it is more the case that <u>legalization initiatives have the potential to <strong>drive youth turnout</u></strong>, but merely getting it on the ballot is only part of it. There seems to be a need for a decently well-financed legalization campaign seriously focused on young outreach to get the maximum effect, which is what the Colorado campaign did. Given the large number of variables involved in an election and the small sample it might not be possible to definitively answer this question yet, but fortunately we will get some more data soon. We should likely seen around half a dozen full legalization initiatives on ballot in the next two election cycles.</p>	1NC	null	1nc – DA	431,226	19	17,122	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round6.docx	565,422	N	Gsu	6	Northwestern Esman-McCue	Hall	Aff Marijuana 1NC Contractual agreements CP employer liability DA Midterms case 2NR Contractual agreements CP employer liability DA	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round6.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,902	This politics of austerity results in a Hobbesian war of all against all. We must reimagine – not abandon – the state	Giroux 11	Giroux 11 – Global Television Network Chair in Communication Studies @ McMaster University [Dr. Henry A. Giroux (Former professor of Education @ Miami & Penn State University) “Neoliberalism and the death of the social state: remembering Walter Benjamin's Angel of History,” Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture Volume 17, Issue 4, 2011, pages 587-601	Even as inequality deepens and the ultra-rich wreak havoc on the globe The state is portrayed as a ‘nanny’ and those who partake in its services are represented as childish, lazy, and lacking any sense of individual responsibility ). We see the attack as part of the right-wing call for austerity The politics of austerity is not about rethinking priorities to benefit the public good it has become part of a discourse of shame, one that has little to do with using indignation to imagine a better world shame is used to wage a war on the poor rather than poverty, on young people rather than those economic and political forces that undermine their future, and on those considered other rather than on the underlying structures and ideologies of various forms of racism We need to to reimagine what it means to reconstruct a social state that invests in people rather than in the rich, mega corporations, the prison-industrial complex, and a permanent war economy We need to imagine how the state can be refigured in order to eliminate structural inequality, racism, and militarism Inequality, then, is not just unattractive in itself; it clearly corresponds to pathological social problems that we cannot hope to address unless we attend to their underlying cause. There is a reason why infant mortality, life expectancy, criminality, the prison population, mental illness, unemployment, obesity, malnutrition, teenage pregnancy, illegal drug use, economic insecurity, personal indebtedness and anxiety are so much more marked in the US and the UK than they are in continental Europe . . . Inequality is corrosive. It rots societies from within. The impact of material differences takes a while to show up: but in due course competition for status and goods increases; people feel a growing sense of superiority (or inferiority) based on their possessions; prejudice towards those on the lower ranks of the social ladder hardens; crime spikes and the pathologies of social disadvantage become ever more marked. The legacy of unregulated wealth creation is bitter indeed. If we are to imagine another type of society than the one we have, we will have to once again put the social question on the political agenda in order to understand how ‘ the pathologies of inequality and poverty _ crime, alcoholism, violence and mental illness _ have all multiplied commensurately’ , and how we address the symptoms of social dysfunction through a concerted effort to embrace communal freedom civic duties, and a vocabulary for translating private troubles into public issues The return of the social question necessitates invoking a public language The social question also demands that we make visible the forces of ‘ organized irresponsibility which functions to dissolve crucial social solidarities, undermine compassion, disparage mutual responsibility, and disband the bonds of social obligation itself But if we are to put the social question back on the agenda, we will first have to acknowledge the brutal and ruthless form of economic Darwinism that shreds the social fabric of the state, eviscerates the importance of the social question, and creates the conditions for a society resembling Thomas Hobbes’ war of all against all, a survival-of-the-fittest social order in which the flight from freedom and responsibility becomes the default mechanism for upholding a machinery of exploitation, cruelty, inequality, and militarism. the supportive culture for a viable democracy is incompatible with neoliberalism and crude consumerism individualistic ethic, and an aggressive battle to commodify everything The promise of democracy economic justice and social rights necessitates a new language of public purpose embedded in collective struggles willing to fight for a new kind of politics We don’ t need privatized utopias, but models of a democratic society and social state in which public values and democratic interests are expressed in a range of institutions We need a new army of critical and passionate winged messengers alert to the need for progressive social solidarities collective action, and a refusal to stare hopelessly at the rotting corpses and the walking dead that turn the promise of democracy into an advertisement for global destruction	We need to return to Benjamin’ s Angel of History in order to reimagine what it means to reconstruct a te that invests in people rather than in the rich, mega corporations, the prison-industrial complex, and a permanent war economy. We need to imagine how the state can be refigured in order to eliminate structural inequality, racism, and militarism. civic duties, and a vocabulary for translating private troubles into public issues brutal and ruthless form of economic Darwinism that shreds the social fabric of the state, eviscerates the importance of the social question, and creates the conditions for a society resembling Hobbes’ war of all against all, a survival-of-the-fittest social order in which the flight from freedom and responsibility becomes the default mechanism for upholding a machinery of exploitation, cruelty, inequality, and militarism. The promise of democracy economic justice and social rights necessitates a new language of public purpose embedded in collective struggles willing to fight for a new kind of politics We don’ t need privatized utopias, but models of a state in which public values and democratic interests are expressed in a range of institutions	Under the reign of the punishing state, those experiencing poverty are seen as the problem and become an easy target for mobilizing middle-class fears about not just the poor, the disabled, immigrants, and others who may depend on social services, but also the social services themselves and the policies that make them possible. Even as inequality deepens and the ultra-rich wreak havoc on the globe, the dominant media focus on so called welfare cheaters, while right-wing politicians go out of their way to associate poverty and dependency with a culture of crime and immorality. The social state is portrayed as a ‘nanny’ and those who partake in its services are represented as childish, lazy, and lacking any sense of individual responsibility. One example of this discourse can be found in a statement by former Republican presidential candidate Mike Huckabee who compared people with pre-existing health conditions to burned out houses. In this instance, Huckabee was criticizing Obama’ s health care plan, which requires insurance companies to cover people with pre-existing conditions (Pitt, 2010). We also see the attack on the poor and welfare policies being magnified as part of the right-wing call for austerity. Punitive sanctions against the poor combine with a kind of class and racial cleansing as right-wing politicians block legislation for schools to provide free meals to thousands of hungry children; eliminate public transportation systems; lay off thousands of civil servants; cancel school programs that benefit the poor; and ask parents to pay for school¶ supplies (Cooper, 2010; Krugman, 2010). The politics of austerity is not about¶ rethinking priorities to benefit the public good. Instead, it has become part of a discourse of shame, one that has little to do with using indignation to imagine a better world. On the contrary, shame is now used to wage a war on the poor rather¶ than poverty, on young people rather than those economic and political forces that undermine their future, and on those considered other rather than on the underlying structures and ideologies of various forms of state and individual racism. We need to return to Benjamin’ s Angel of History in order to reimagine what it means to reconstruct a social state that invests in people rather than in the rich, mega corporations, the prison-industrial complex, and a permanent war economy. We need to imagine how the state can be refigured along with the very nature of politics and economics in order to eliminate structural inequality, racism, and militarism. Once again, Americans must recognize that something is ‘ profoundly wrong with the way we live today’ and that the obsession with wealth, war, and violence is at odds with those democratic ideals often invoked in the name of freedom, justice, and equality (Judt, 2010, pp. 1_ 2). Just as we need a new language for talking about public values, shared responsibilities, and the common good, we also need a language for connecting the war at home with the war abroad. War is rarely about real defense or national honor, as the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate. Not only are these two wars draining the public treasury, they are also partly responsible for budget cuts at home that aim at balancing federal and state budgets on the backs of the poor, minority youth, working people, and the elderly. Robust war spending is matched by the massive cutting of school budgets at home. The United States spends $1.1 million per year to put a single soldier in Afghanistan, but refuses to bail out public schools, rescue universities that are suffering massive budget cuts, or reinvest in its crumbling national infrastructure. We offer paltry aid to support public libraries or to assist students who now absorb massive debts to finance their education, while potentially spending over $1.8 trillion to cover the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other operations associated with the war on terror (Congressional Research Service Report, 2010). Instead of using these funds for crucial domestic programs that could develop jobs, public works programs, health initiatives, housing, and education, the punishing state with its permanent war machine spreads death and destruction through the organization and production of violence. The punishing state not only locks up more people than any other country in the world, but also, as Tom Englehardt (2010) states, ‘ puts more money into the funding of war, our armed forces and the weaponry of war than the next 25 countries combined. We garrison the planet in a way no empire or nation in history has ever done’. With such a war mentality, economy, and values ruling the United States, we see daily the destruction of human lives and the exacerbation of massive inequalities that now permeate every aspect of American life (Bacevich, 2010; Johnson, 2006). War has become a poison that legitimates the corporate state, on the one hand, and works in tandem with the punishing state on the other. At the same time, it feeds an inequality that rots American society from within as it turns over matters of democratic governance and rule to corporate swindlers, military leaders, and right-wing ideologues (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009; Dollars & Sense & United for a Fair Economy, 2008). Tony Judt (2010) gets it right when he argues that: Inequality, then, is not just unattractive in itself; it clearly corresponds to pathological social problems that we cannot hope to address unless we attend to their underlying cause. There is a reason why infant mortality, life expectancy, criminality, the prison population, mental illness, unemployment, obesity, malnutrition, teenage pregnancy, illegal drug use, economic insecurity, personal indebtedness and anxiety are so much more marked in the US and the UK than they are in continental Europe . . . Inequality is corrosive. It rots societies from within. The impact of material differences takes a while to show up: but in due course competition for status and goods increases; people feel a growing sense of superiority (or inferiority) based on their possessions; prejudice towards those on the lower ranks of the social ladder hardens; crime spikes and the pathologies of social disadvantage become ever more marked. The legacy of unregulated wealth creation is bitter indeed. If we are to imagine another type of society than the one we have, we will have to once again put the social question on the political agenda in order to understand how ‘ the pathologies of inequality and poverty _ crime, alcoholism, violence and mental illness _ have all multiplied commensurately’ , and how we might take up the challenge of addressing the symptoms of social dysfunction through a concerted effort to embrace communal freedom, social investments, social rights, civic duties, and a vocabulary for translating private troubles into public issues (Judt, 2010, p. 175). The return of the social question necessitates invoking a public language and a new set of questions regarding ‘ What should be done to alleviate the suffering and¶ injustices to which the urban working masses [are] now exposed and how [is] the ruling elite of the day to be brought to see the need for change?’ (Judt, 2010, p. 174). The social question also demands that we make visible what C. Wright Mills (2008¶ [1944]) calls the forces of ‘ organized irresponsibility [that] prevail everywhere’ (p. 18), which functions to dissolve crucial social solidarities, undermine compassion, disparage mutual responsibility, and disband the bonds of social obligation itself (see also Terry, 1997). But if we are to put the social question back on the agenda, we will¶ first have to acknowledge, like Benjamin’ s Angel of History, the ‘ catastrophe that keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage’ (1968 [1950], p. 257). That catastrophe lies in a brutal and ruthless form of economic Darwinism that shreds the social fabric of the state, eviscerates the importance of the social question, and creates the conditions for a society resembling Thomas Hobbes’ war of all against all, a survival-of-the-fittest social order in which the flight from freedom and responsibility becomes the default mechanism for upholding a machinery of exploitation, cruelty, inequality, and militarism. Not only has the American public lost its ability, perhaps even its will, to talk about public values such as sharing, caring, and preserving, but it can no longer distinguish between a market-driven society and a democratic society. As Sheldon Wolin (2008) has insisted, the supportive culture for a viable democracy _ ‘ a complex of beliefs, values and practices that nurture equality, cooperation and freedom’ (pp. 260_ 261) _ is incompatible with the market-driven values of neoliberalism and their emphasis on a crude consumerism, over-the-top materialism, brutal competition, a culture of lying, a possessive individualistic ethic, and an aggressive battle to privatize, deregulate, and commodify everything. The promise of democracy and economic justice and social rights necessitates a new language of public purpose, rationality and formative culture embedded in democratic public values, collective struggles, and a social movement willing to fight for a new kind of politics, democracy and future. We don’ t need privatized utopias, but models of a democratic society and social state in which public values and democratic interests are expressed in a range of economic, political, and cultural institutions. We need a new army of critical and passionate winged messengers alert to the need for progressive social solidarities, social agency, collective action, and a refusal to stare hopelessly at the rotting corpses, gated communities, and the walking dead that turn the promise of democracy into an advertisement for global destruction. Pg. 597-599	9,863	<h4>This politics of austerity results in a <u>Hobbesian war</u> <u>of all against all</u>. We must reimagine – not abandon – the state </h4><p><strong>Giroux 11</strong> – Global Television Network Chair in Communication Studies @ McMaster University [Dr. Henry A. Giroux (Former professor of Education @ Miami & Penn State University) “Neoliberalism and the death of the social state: remembering Walter Benjamin's Angel of History,” <u>Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture</u> Volume 17, Issue 4, 2011, pages 587-601 </p><p>Under the reign of the punishing state, those experiencing poverty are seen as the problem and become an easy target for mobilizing middle-class fears about not just the poor, the disabled, immigrants, and others who may depend on social services, but also the social services themselves and the policies that make them possible. <u>Even as inequality deepens and the ultra-rich wreak havoc on the globe</u>, the dominant media focus on so called welfare cheaters, while right-wing politicians go out of their way to associate poverty and dependency with a culture of crime and immorality. <u>The</u> social <u>state is portrayed as a ‘nanny’ and those who partake in its services are represented as childish, lazy, and lacking any sense of individual responsibility</u>. One example of this discourse can be found in a statement by former Republican presidential candidate Mike Huckabee who compared people with pre-existing health conditions to burned out houses. In this instance, Huckabee was criticizing Obama’ s health care plan, which requires insurance companies to cover people with pre-existing conditions (Pitt, 2010<u>). We</u> also <u>see the attack</u> on the poor and welfare policies being magnified <u>as part of the right-wing call for <strong>austerity</u></strong>. Punitive sanctions against the poor combine with a kind of class and racial cleansing as right-wing politicians block legislation for schools to provide free meals to thousands of hungry children; eliminate public transportation systems; lay off thousands of civil servants; cancel school programs that benefit the poor; and ask parents to pay for school¶ supplies (Cooper, 2010; Krugman, 2010). <u>The <strong>politics of austerity</strong> is not about</u>¶<u> rethinking priorities to benefit the public good</u>. Instead, <u>it has become part of a discourse of shame, one that has little to do with using indignation to imagine a better world</u>. On the contrary, <u>shame is</u> now <u>used to wage a war on the poor rather</u>¶<u> than poverty, on young people rather than those economic and political forces that undermine their future, and on those considered other rather than on the underlying</u> <u>structures and ideologies of various forms of</u> state and individual <u>racism</u>.</p><p><u><mark>We need to</u> return to Benjamin’ s Angel of History in order <u>to <strong>reimagine</strong> what it means to <strong>reconstruct a</mark> </strong>social <strong>sta<mark>te</strong> that invests in people rather than in the rich, mega corporations, the prison-industrial complex, and a permanent war economy</u>. <u>We need to imagine how the state can be refigured</u></mark> along with the very nature of politics and economics <u><mark>in order to <strong>eliminate structural inequality, racism, and militarism</u></strong>.</mark> Once again, Americans must recognize that something is ‘ profoundly wrong with the way we live today’ and that the obsession with wealth, war, and violence is at odds with those democratic ideals often invoked in the name of freedom, justice, and equality (Judt, 2010, pp. 1_ 2).</p><p>Just as we need a new language for talking about public values, shared responsibilities, and the common good, we also need a language for connecting the war at home with the war abroad. War is rarely about real defense or national honor, as the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate. Not only are these two wars draining the public treasury, they are also partly responsible for budget cuts at home that aim at balancing federal and state budgets on the backs of the poor, minority youth, working people, and the elderly. Robust war spending is matched by the massive cutting of school budgets at home. The United States spends $1.1 million per year to put a single soldier in Afghanistan, but refuses to bail out public schools, rescue universities that are suffering massive budget cuts, or reinvest in its crumbling national infrastructure. We offer paltry aid to support public libraries or to assist students who now absorb massive debts to finance their education, while potentially spending over $1.8 trillion to cover the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other operations associated with the war on terror (Congressional Research Service Report, 2010). Instead of using these funds for crucial domestic programs that could develop jobs, public works programs, health initiatives, housing, and education, the punishing state with its permanent war machine spreads death and destruction through the organization and production of violence. The punishing state not only locks up more people than any other country in the world, but also, as Tom Englehardt (2010) states, ‘ puts more money into the funding of war, our armed forces and the weaponry of war than the next 25 countries combined. We garrison the planet in a way no empire or nation in history has ever done’. With such a war mentality, economy, and values ruling the United States, we see daily the destruction of human lives and the exacerbation of massive inequalities that now permeate every aspect of American life (Bacevich, 2010; Johnson, 2006). War has become a poison that legitimates the corporate state, on the one hand, and works in tandem with the punishing state on the other. At the same time, it feeds an inequality that rots American society from within as it turns over matters of democratic governance and rule to corporate swindlers, military leaders, and right-wing ideologues (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009; Dollars & Sense & United for a Fair Economy, 2008). Tony Judt (2010) gets it right when he argues that:</p><p><u><strong>Inequality, then, is not just unattractive in itself; it clearly corresponds to pathological social problems that we cannot hope to address unless we attend to their underlying cause. There is a reason why infant mortality, life expectancy, criminality, the prison population, mental illness, unemployment, obesity, malnutrition, teenage pregnancy, illegal drug use, economic insecurity, personal indebtedness and anxiety are so much more marked in the US and the UK than they are in continental Europe . . . Inequality is corrosive. It rots societies from within. The impact of material differences takes a while to show up: but in due course competition for status and goods increases; people feel a growing sense of superiority (or inferiority) based on their possessions; prejudice towards those on the lower ranks of the social ladder hardens; crime spikes and the pathologies of social disadvantage become ever more marked. The legacy of unregulated wealth creation is bitter indeed.</p><p></strong>If we are to imagine another type of society than the one we have, we will have to</u> <u>once again put the social question on the political agenda in order to understand how ‘ the pathologies of inequality and poverty _ crime, alcoholism, violence and mental illness _ have all multiplied commensurately’ , and how we</u> might take up the challenge of <u>address</u>ing <u>the symptoms of social dysfunction through a concerted effort to embrace <strong>communal freedom</u></strong>, social investments, social rights, <u><strong><mark>civic duties</strong>, and a vocabulary for <strong>translating private troubles into public issues</u></strong></mark> (Judt, 2010, p. 175). <u>The return of the social question necessitates invoking a public language</u> and a new set of questions regarding ‘ What should be done to alleviate the suffering and¶ injustices to which the urban working masses [are] now exposed and how [is] the ruling elite of the day to be brought to see the need for change?’ (Judt, 2010, p. 174). <u>The social question also demands that we make visible</u> what C. Wright Mills (2008¶ [1944]) calls <u>the forces of ‘ organized irresponsibility </u>[that] prevail everywhere’ (p. 18), <u>which functions to dissolve crucial social solidarities, undermine compassion, disparage mutual responsibility, and disband the bonds of social obligation itself</u> (see also Terry, 1997). <u>But if we are to put the social question back on the agenda, we will</u>¶<u> first have to acknowledge</u>, like Benjamin’ s Angel of History, <u>the</u> ‘ catastrophe that keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage’ (1968 [1950], p. 257). That catastrophe lies in a <u><mark>brutal and ruthless form of economic Darwinism that<strong> shreds the social fabric of the state</strong>, eviscerates the importance of the social question, and creates the conditions for a society resembling </mark>Thomas <strong><mark>Hobbes’ war of all against all</strong>, a survival-of-the-fittest social order in which the flight from freedom and responsibility becomes the default mechanism for upholding a <strong>machinery of exploitation, cruelty, inequality, and militarism.</p><p></u></strong></mark>Not only has the American public lost its ability, perhaps even its will, to talk about public values such as sharing, caring, and preserving, but it can no longer distinguish between a market-driven society and a democratic society. As Sheldon Wolin (2008) has insisted, <u>the supportive culture for a viable democracy</u> _ ‘ a complex of beliefs, values and practices that nurture equality, cooperation and freedom’ (pp. 260_ 261) _ <u>is incompatible with</u> the market-driven values of <u>neoliberalism and</u> their emphasis on a <u>crude consumerism</u>, over-the-top materialism, brutal competition, a culture of lying, a possessive <u>individualistic ethic, and an aggressive battle to</u> privatize, deregulate, and <u>commodify everything</u>.</p><p><u><mark>The promise of democracy</u></mark> and <u><mark>economic justice and social rights necessitates a new language of public purpose</u></mark>, rationality and formative culture <u><mark>embedded in</u></mark> democratic public values, <u><strong><mark>collective struggles</u></strong></mark>, and a social movement <u><mark>willing to fight for a <strong>new kind of politics</u></strong></mark>, democracy and future. <u><mark>We don’ t need privatized utopias, but <strong>models of a</mark> </strong>democratic society and social<strong> <mark>state</strong> in which public values and democratic interests are expressed in a range of</u></mark> economic, political, and cultural <u><mark>institutions</u></mark>. <u>We need a <strong>new army of critical and passionate </strong>winged<strong> messengers</strong> alert to the need for progressive social solidarities</u>, social agency, <u><strong>collective action</strong>, and a refusal to stare hopelessly at the rotting corpses</u>, gated communities, <u>and the walking dead that turn the promise of democracy into an advertisement for <strong>global destruction</u></strong>. Pg. 597-599</p>	1nc vs WGA	null	1nc – Law K	431,227	1	17,118	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	565,420	N	Gsu	1	West Georgia Muhammad-Gaius	Deming	1NC T occidentalism K law good K impact turns 2NC Space colonization impact turn 1NR T 2NR T	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round1.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,903	National Security Cutter is key to heg and deterrence	Papp 2014	Papp 2014 (RJ, Admiral of the US Coast Guard, Always Ready, 2013 PERFORMANCE HIGHLIGHTS 2015 BUDGET IN BRIEF, http://www.uscg.mil/budget/docs/2015_Budget_in_Brief.pdf)	the Coast Guard exercised critical prevention activities to help keep mariners and ports safe and secure They responded to the movement of illicit goods and people disasters, and other high priority national security needs They provided maritime governance the National Security Cutter replacing our forty-five year old high endurance cutters and provide vital response capability in the offshore environment HAMILTON’s fellow National Security Cutters are proving to be superlative examples of “useful sentinels of the law” to protect our Nation’s maritime borders and interests on the sea our voyage to a modernized offshore Coast Guard fleet will continue with the request for the production of the eighth National Security Cutte we look to the recapitalized fleet for future operations We will preserve our critical front-line operations in direct support of our Department of Homeland Security mission programs; prevent terrorism and enhance security secure and manage our borders, and strengthen national resilience	Coast Guard they exercised critical prevention activities to help keep our mariners and ports safe and secure. They responded to illicit goods and people disasters, and other high priority national ecurity needs. They provided the maritime governance National Security Cutter replacing our forty-five year old high endurance cutters and provide vital response capability in the offshore environment proving to be superlative examples of “useful sentinels of the law to protect our Nation’s maritime borders and interests we look to the recapitalized fleet for future operations We will preserve our critical front-line operations in direct support of our Department of Homeland Security mission programs; prevent terrorism and enhance security, secure and manage our borders, and strengthen national resilience	Despite the 2013 fiscally constrained environment, the men and women of the Coast Guard exhibited the honor, respect, and devotion to duty that has kept us America’s premier maritime responder for the last 223 years. Every day they exercised critical prevention activities to help keep our mariners and ports safe and secure. They braved uncertain waters and responded to the movement of illicit goods and people, man-made and natural disasters, and other high priority national safety, security and stewardship needs. They provided the maritime governance that our Nation demands to ensure safe, secure, and environmentally sound approaches to America’s shores. In 2013, the Coast Guard advanced down the trackline towards a recapitalized cutter fleet when we awarded the contract for the next six Fast Response Cutters – when we commission these cutters, we will have twenty-four of these outstanding platforms in service. We also christened the fourth National Security Cutter – Coast Guard Cutter HAMILTON. These new cutters are replacing our forty-five year old high endurance cutters and provide vital response capability in the offshore environment. HAMILTON’s fellow National Security Cutters, BERTHOLF, WAESCHE, and STRATTON are already proving to be superlative examples of “useful sentinels of the law” – the words Alexander Hamilton used in 1787 when he described an enduring need for ships to protect our Nation’s maritime borders and interests on the sea. In FY 2015, our voyage to a modernized offshore Coast Guard fleet will continue with the President’s Budget request for the production of the eighth National Security Cutter and continued work on the Offshore Patrol Cutter project. As prudent stewards of our resources, we will hold our course rebuilding Coast Guard assets in an affordable and responsible manner. On the horizon, we look to the recapitalized fleet for future operations and to provide our men and women the tools they need to continue the great work they do for our Nation. We will preserve our critical front-line operations in direct support of our Department of Homeland Security mission programs; prevent terrorism and enhance security, secure and manage our borders, and strengthen national resilience. We will make difficult decisions to scale activities, but will be there to answer the call for any maritime domain emergency, to protect America’s safety, and to add to our national security. Since our inception as the Revenue Cutter Service in 1790, the Coast Guard has stood the watch over America’s interests on the seas. We have protected those on the sea, the Nation from threats delivered by the sea, and the sea itself from environmental hazards. In the face of today’s challenging fiscal environment, the Coast Guard has been and will continue to be “Semper Paratus” – Always Ready.	2,836	<h4>National Security Cutter is key to heg and deterrence</h4><p><strong>Papp 2014</strong> (RJ, Admiral of the US Coast Guard, Always Ready, 2013 PERFORMANCE HIGHLIGHTS 2015 BUDGET IN BRIEF, http://www.uscg.mil/budget/docs/2015_Budget_in_Brief.pdf)</p><p>Despite the 2013 fiscally constrained environment, the men and women of <u>the <mark>Coast Guard</u></mark> exhibited the honor, respect, and devotion to duty that has kept us America’s premier maritime responder for the last 223 years. Every day <mark>they <u>exercised critical prevention activities to help keep</u> our <u>mariners and ports safe and secure</u>. <u>They</u></mark> braved uncertain waters and <u><mark>responded to</mark> the movement of <mark>illicit goods and people</u></mark>, man-made and natural <u><mark>disasters, and other high priority national </u></mark>safety, <u>s<mark>ecurity</u></mark> and stewardship <u><mark>needs</u>.</mark> <u><mark>They provided</u> the <u>maritime governance</u></mark> that our Nation demands to ensure safe, secure, and environmentally sound approaches to America’s shores. In 2013, the Coast Guard advanced down the trackline towards a recapitalized cutter fleet when we awarded the contract for the next six Fast Response Cutters – when we commission these cutters, we will have twenty-four of these outstanding platforms in service. We also christened <u>the</u> fourth <u><mark>National Security Cutter</u></mark> – Coast Guard Cutter HAMILTON. These new cutters are <u><mark>replacing our forty-five year old high endurance cutters and provide <strong>vital response capability</u></strong> <u>in the offshore environment</u></mark>. <u>HAMILTON’s fellow National Security Cutters</u>, BERTHOLF, WAESCHE, and STRATTON <u>are</u> already <u><mark>proving to be superlative examples of “useful sentinels of the law</mark>”</u> – the words Alexander Hamilton used in 1787 when he described an enduring need for ships <u><mark>to protect our Nation’s maritime borders and interests</mark> on the sea</u>. In FY 2015, <u>our voyage to a modernized offshore Coast Guard fleet will continue with the</u> President’s Budget <u>request for the production of the eighth National Security Cutte</u>r and continued work on the Offshore Patrol Cutter project. As prudent stewards of our resources, we will hold our course rebuilding Coast Guard assets in an affordable and responsible manner. On the horizon, <u><mark>we look to the recapitalized fleet for future operations</u></mark> and to provide our men and women the tools they need to continue the great work they do for our Nation. <u><mark>We will preserve our critical front-line operations in direct support of our Department of Homeland Security mission programs; prevent terrorism and enhance security</u>, <u>secure and manage our borders, and strengthen national resilience</u></mark>. We will make difficult decisions to scale activities, but will be there to answer the call for any maritime domain emergency, to protect America’s safety, and to add to our national security. Since our inception as the Revenue Cutter Service in 1790, the Coast Guard has stood the watch over America’s interests on the seas. We have protected those on the sea, the Nation from threats delivered by the sea, and the sea itself from environmental hazards. In the face of today’s challenging fiscal environment, the Coast Guard has been and will continue to be “Semper Paratus” – Always Ready.</p>	null	null	2	431,228	1	17,113	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	565,270	N	Texas	4	Georgetown Erpenbach-Krishnan	Arnett	DHS politics (2NR) cross retal cp	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
743,904	GOP gets TPA passed	JOSEPH 14 Nonprolif expert on the National Security Council, former White House national security staffer	JOSEPH 14 Nonprolif expert on the National Security Council, former White House national security staffer [Jofi Joseph, Why a GOP takeover of the US Senate will not cause political deadlock, http://globalriskinsights.com/2014/05/17/why-a-gop-takeover-of-the-us-senate-will-not-cause-political-deadlock/] Republican control of the Senate, which would make Senator Mitch McConnell the new Majority Leader, may have practical policy impacts, some of which will be of great interest to global investors.	oddsmakers are increasingly predicting the GOP) will assume majority control over the Senate Republicans need to flip six seats With analysts predicting Republicans are competitive in as many as ten Democratic-held seats a GOP takeover is increasingly likely Broadly speaking, a Republican takeover could break the policy deadlock once Republicans assume full control their leadership will come under greater pressure to demonstrate concrete results Obama will be focused on policy accomplishments his historical legacy These parallel sets of conditions will create incentives for both to devise compromises in pursuit of shared victories What might constitute common ground First look to trade for a breakthrough The White House has been stymied in its efforts to rejuvenate global free trade talks as Congress has refused fast track the TTIP with Europe and the TTP with Asia The primary source of Congressional opposition lies in the Senate Democratic caucus where Reid is unwilling to subject Members to tough votes that cross labor constituencies With a Senate under GOP control the prospects immediately brightens The Republican Party remains a strong supporter of free trade and would find common cause with the White House	a takeover could break deadlock Republicans leadership will come under pressure Obama will be focused on his legacy These conditions will create incentives for compromises The White House has been stymied in efforts to rejuvenate global free trade Congress has refused fast track The primary source of opposition lies in the Senate Democratic caucus, where Reid is unwilling to subject Members to tough votes With a Senate GOP the prospects immediately brighten	Although the U.S. midterm elections remain six months away, oddsmakers are increasingly predicting the Grand Old Party (GOP) will assume majority control over the Senate and thus put all of Congress under Republican control. Today, there are 53 Democratic Senators, along with two Independent members who caucus with the Democrats, giving Majority Leader Harry Reid a comfortable 55-45 margin of control. However, Republicans only need to flip six seats this November to retake the majority. With some analysts predicting that Republicans are competitive in as many as ten Democratic-held seats this fall, a GOP takeover is increasingly likely. Broadly speaking, a Republican takeover of the Senate could break the policy deadlock between the Obama Administration and Congress, which has defined the U.S. political system since 2011. Ironically, once Republicans assume full control of the Congress, their leadership will come under greater pressure to demonstrate concrete results – they will no longer be able to get by through simply blaming Reid and Obama. At the same time, as President Obama enters the lame duck stretch of his presidency, he and his senior staff will be increasingly focused on specific policy accomplishments that can add to his historical legacy. These parallel sets of conditions will create unique incentives for both sides to put aside some of their ideological rigidity and devise compromises in pursuit of shared victories. What might constitute some common ground for an Obama White House and a GOP-controlled Congress? First, look to international trade as a potential venue for a breakthrough. The White House has been stymied in its efforts to rejuvenate global free trade talks as Congress has refused White House requests to provide fast track authority for parallel sets of negotiations – the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) talks with the European Union and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) talks with Asian partners. The primary source of Congressional opposition lies in the Senate Democratic caucus, where Majority Leader Reid is unwilling to subject some of his more vulnerable Members to tough votes that cross labor constituencies. With a Senate under GOP control, the prospects for the granting of free-trade authority, and the likely boost that will provide to both sets of talks, immediately brightens. The Republican Party, especially its internationalist wing, remains a strong supporter of free trade and would find common cause with the White House there.	2,532	<h4>GOP gets TPA passed</h4><p><strong>JOSEPH 14 Nonprolif expert on the National Security Council, former White House national security staffer</strong> [Jofi Joseph, Why a GOP takeover of the US Senate will not cause political deadlock, http://globalriskinsights.com/2014/05/17/why-a-gop-takeover-of-the-us-senate-will-not-cause-political-deadlock/]</p><p><u>Republican control of the Senate</u>, which <u>would make</u> Senator Mitch <u>McConnell</u> the new Majority <u>Leader</u>, may have practical policy impacts, some of which will be of great interest to global investors.</p><p>Although the U.S. midterm elections remain six months away, <u>oddsmakers are increasingly predicting the</u> Grand Old Party (<u>GOP) will assume majority control over the Senate</u> and thus put all of Congress under Republican control.</p><p>Today, there are 53 Democratic Senators, along with two Independent members who caucus with the Democrats, giving Majority Leader Harry Reid a comfortable 55-45 margin of control. However, <u>Republicans</u> only <u>need to flip six seats</u> this November to retake the majority. <u>With</u> some <u>analysts</u> <u>predicting</u> that <u>Republicans are competitive in as many as ten Democratic-held seats</u> this fall, <u>a GOP takeover is increasingly likely</u>.</p><p><u>Broadly speaking, <mark>a</mark> Republican <mark>takeover</u></mark> of the Senate <u><mark>could break</mark> the policy <mark>deadlock</u></mark> between the Obama Administration and Congress, which has defined the U.S. political system since 2011. Ironically, <u>once <mark>Republicans</mark> assume full control</u> of the Congress, <u>their <mark>leadership will come under</mark> greater <mark>pressure </mark>to demonstrate concrete results </u>– they will no longer be able to get by through simply blaming Reid and Obama.</p><p>At the same time, as President <u><mark>Obama</u></mark> enters the lame duck stretch of his presidency, he and his senior staff <u><mark>will be</u></mark> increasingly <u><mark>focused on</u> </mark>specific <u>policy accomplishments</u> that can add to <u><mark>his</mark> historical <mark>legacy</u></mark>. <u><mark>These</mark> parallel sets of <mark>conditions</u></mark> <u><mark>will create</u></mark> unique <u><mark>incentives</mark> <mark>for</mark> both</u> sides <u>to</u> put aside some of their ideological rigidity and <u>devise <mark>compromises</u></mark> <u>in pursuit of shared victories</u>.</p><p><u>What might constitute</u> some <u>common ground</u> for an Obama White House and a GOP-controlled Congress?</p><p><u><strong>First</u></strong>, <u>look to</u> international <u>trade</u> as a potential venue <u>for a breakthrough</u>. <u><mark>The White House has been stymied in</mark> its <mark>efforts to rejuvenate</u></mark> <u><mark>global free trade</mark> talks</u> <u>as <mark>Congress has refused</u></mark> White House requests to provide <u><mark>fast track</u></mark> authority for parallel sets of negotiations – <u>the</u> Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (<u>TTIP</u>) talks <u>with</u> the <u>Europe</u>an Union <u>and the</u> Trans-Pacific Partnership (<u>TTP</u>) talks <u>with Asia</u>n partners.</p><p><u><mark>The primary source</mark> <mark>of</mark> Congressional <mark>opposition lies in the Senate Democratic caucus</u>, <u>where</u></mark> Majority Leader <u><mark>Reid is unwilling to subject</mark> </u>some of his more vulnerable<u> <mark>Members</u> <u>to tough votes</mark> that cross labor constituencies</u>. <u><mark>With a Senate</mark> under <mark>GOP</mark> control</u>, <u><mark>the prospects</u></mark> for the granting of free-trade authority, and the likely boost that will provide to both sets of talks, <u><mark>immediately brighten</mark>s</u>. <u>The Republican Party</u>, especially its internationalist wing, <u>remains a strong supporter of free trade and would find common cause with the White House</u> there.</p>	1NC	null	1nc – DA	231,131	57	17,122	./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round6.docx	565,422	N	Gsu	6	Northwestern Esman-McCue	Hall	Aff Marijuana 1NC Contractual agreements CP employer liability DA Midterms case 2NR Contractual agreements CP employer liability DA	ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-Gsu-Round6.docx	null	48,463	DeBo	Emory DeBo	null	Be.....	De.....	Ni.....	Bo.....	18,765	Emory	Emory	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2

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