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743,605
CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement
Schwartz 2013
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. marijuana legalization provides a salient example the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the political obstacles that would prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. [*633] The marijuana legalization issue provides a salient example. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous. As of 2008, there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities." n240 Thus, commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism. Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly.
2,875
<h4>CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, <u>forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. </u>[*633] The <u>marijuana legalization</u> issue <u>provides a salient example</u>. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But <u>the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous</u>. As of 2008, <u>there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level</u>. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "<u><strong><mark>only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities</u></strong></mark>." n240 Thus, <u><mark>commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states</u>. <u></mark>The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism</u>. <u>Such <mark>a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the</mark> significant <mark>political obstacles that would </mark>likely<mark> prevent Congress from taking such a step directly</u></mark>.</p>
null
1nc
2
430,416
19
17,112
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
565,260
N
Wake
2
Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,606
The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.</h4>
null
1nc
2
431,098
1
17,110
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
565,262
N
Wake
5
NYU Itliong-Zhan
McCleary
Fed CP (2NR) AG Politics (2NR Cede the Political DA T - USFG
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,607
C. The affirmative interpretation is bad for debate. Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash, and the affirmative unlimits. They permit a huge number of policies that are all the possible specification of less than nearly all sales , and all of the permutations of all those possible specifications
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4><strong>C. The affirmative interpretation is bad for debate. Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash, and the affirmative unlimits. They permit a huge number of policies that are all the possible specification of less than nearly all sales , and all of the permutations of all those possible specifications</h4></strong>
null
1nc
4
431,099
1
17,109
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
565,261
N
Wake
3
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
Watson
AG Politics (2NR) Narrow Ruling CP (2NR) Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR) T - nearly all Test Case Fiat
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,608
Capitalism solves disease
Norberg 3
Norberg 3 – Fellow at Timbro and CATO [Johan Norberg, In Defense of Global Capitalism, pg. 186]
One common objection to the market economy is that it causes people and enterprises to produce for profit, not for needs This means pharmaceutical companies devoting huge resources to research and medicines to do with obesity, baldness, and depression, things that westerners can afford to worry about and pay for, whereas only a fraction is devoted to attempting to cure tropical diseases The unfairness exists, but capitalism is not to blame for it Without capitalism and the lure of profit, we shouldn't imagine that everyone would have obtained cures for their illnesses In fact, far fewer would do so than is now the case. If wealthy people in the West demand help for their problems, their resources can be used to research and eventually solve those problems which are not necessarily trivial to the people afflicted with them. Capitalism gives companies economic incentives to help us by developing medicines and vaccines. That westerners spend money this way does not make things worse for anyone. This is not money that would otherwise have gone to researching tropical diseases—the pharmaceutical companies simply would not have had these resources otherwise as free trade and the market economy promote greater prosperity in poorer countries, their needs and desires will play a larger role in dictating the purposes of research and production
One objection to the market economy is that it causes enterprises to produce for profit, not needs capitalism is not to blame for it. Without capitalism and the lure of profit, we shouldn't imagine that everyone would have obtained cures for their illnesses far fewer would do so people in the West resources can be used to research and solve those problems Capitalism gives companies economic incentives to develop medicines This is not money that would otherwise have gone to researching tropical diseases
One common objection to the market economy is that it causes people and enterprises to produce for profit, not for needs. This means, for example, pharmaceutical companies devoting huge resources to research and medicines to do with obesity, baldness, and depression, things that westerners can afford to worry about and pay for, whereas only a fraction is devoted to attempting to cure tropical diseases afflicting the poorest of the world's inhabitants, such as malaria and tuberculosis. This criticism is understandable. The unfairness exists, but capitalism is not to blame for it. Without capitalism and the lure of profit, we shouldn't imagine that everyone would have obtained cures for their illnesses. In fact, far fewer would do so than is now the case. If wealthy people in the West demand help for their problems, their resources can be used to research and eventually solve those problems, which are not necessarily trivial to the people afflicted with them. Capitalism gives companies economic incentives to help us by developing medicines and vaccines. That westerners spend money this way does not make things worse for anyone. This is not money that would otherwise have gone to researching tropical diseases—the pharmaceutical companies simply would not have had these resources otherwise. And, as free trade and the market economy promote greater prosperity in poorer countries, their needs and desires will play a larger role in dictating the purposes of research and production.
1,499
<h4><strong>Capitalism solves disease </h4><p>Norberg 3 </strong>– Fellow at Timbro and CATO<strong> <u></strong>[Johan Norberg, In Defense of Global Capitalism, pg. 186]</p><p><mark>One</mark> common <mark>objection to the market economy is that it causes</mark> people and <mark>enterprises to produce for profit, not</mark> for <mark>needs</u></mark>. <u>This means</u>, for example, <u>pharmaceutical companies devoting huge resources to research and medicines to do with obesity, baldness, and depression, things that westerners can afford to worry about and pay for, whereas only a fraction is devoted to attempting to cure tropical diseases</u> afflicting the poorest of the world's inhabitants, such as malaria and tuberculosis. This criticism is understandable. <u>The unfairness exists, but <mark>capitalism is not to blame for it</u>. <u>Without capitalism and the lure of profit, we shouldn't imagine that everyone would have obtained cures for their illnesses</u></mark>. <u>In fact, <mark>far fewer would do so</mark> than is now the case. If wealthy <mark>people in the West</mark> demand help for their problems, their <mark>resources can be used to research and</mark> eventually <mark>solve those problems</u></mark>, <u>which are not necessarily trivial to the people afflicted with them. <mark>Capitalism gives companies economic incentives to </mark>help us by <mark>develop</mark>ing <mark>medicines</mark> and vaccines. That westerners spend money this way does not make things worse for anyone. <mark>This is not money that would otherwise have gone to researching tropical diseases</mark>—the pharmaceutical companies simply would not have had these resources otherwise</u>. And, <u>as free trade and the market economy promote greater prosperity in poorer countries, their needs and desires will play a larger role in dictating the purposes of research and production</u>.</p>
null
1nc
Case
431,101
34
17,111
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
565,271
N
Texas
5
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
Garrett
Framework (2NR) cap good
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,609
State immigration regulations kill the economy- uncertainty and inability to operate across state lines—turns innovation
Fitz 10
Fitz 10 (Marshall, Director of Immigration Policy at the Center for American Progress, Arizona Calls the Question, June, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/06/candelaria_column.html)
The need for uniformity in immigration policy is undeniable Businesses operating in multiple states suffer significant economic uncertainty and inefficiency when each state can impose different rules and regulations governing hiring practices. And requiring U.S. citizens traveling throughout the country to carry different documents in different states raises obvious practical concerns This movement to enact state and local immigration laws and regulations threatens legal uniformity and social cohesion
The need for uniformity in immigration policy is undeniabl . Businesses operating in multiple states suffer significant economic uncertainty and inefficiency when each state can impose different rules governing hiring requiring U.S. citizens to carry different documents in different states raises obvious practical concerns
The need for uniformity in immigration policy is undeniable. Congress’s power to establish the nation’s immigration policy was enshrined in the Constitution because of the critical foreign policy implications that it triggers. But there are equally significant practical implications in modern America. Businesses operating in multiple states suffer significant economic uncertainty and inefficiency when each state can impose different rules and regulations governing hiring practices. And requiring U.S. citizens traveling throughout the country to carry different documents in different states raises obvious practical concerns and constitutional questions. This movement to enact state and local immigration laws and regulations threatens legal uniformity and social cohesion. It is time to put the brakes on this movement once and for all, and the administration’s brief in Candelaria is an important first step.
918
<h4><strong>State immigration regulations kill the economy- uncertainty and inability to operate across state lines—turns innovation </h4><p>Fitz 10</strong> (Marshall, Director of Immigration Policy at the Center for American Progress, Arizona Calls the Question, June, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/06/candelaria_column.html)</p><p><u><strong><mark>The need for uniformity in immigration policy is undeniabl</mark>e</u></strong>. Congress’s power to establish the nation’s immigration policy was enshrined in the Constitution because of the critical foreign policy implications that it triggers. But there are equally significant practical implications in modern America<mark>. <u><strong>Businesses operating in multiple states suffer significant economic uncertainty and inefficiency when each state can impose different rules</mark> and regulations <mark>governing hiring</mark> practices. And <mark>requiring U.S. citizens</mark> traveling throughout the country <mark>to carry different documents in different states raises obvious practical concerns</u></strong></mark> and constitutional questions. <u><strong>This movement to enact state and local immigration laws and regulations threatens legal uniformity and social cohesion</u></strong>. It is time to put the brakes on this movement once and for all, and the administration’s brief in Candelaria is an important first step.</p>
1nr
null
Econ
42,129
155
17,108
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
565,269
N
Texas
2
Northwestern Esman-McCue
Moss
Fed CP (2NR) TPA T - Legalize State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,610
Sanctions destroy the deal and cause war- emboldens hardliners, undermines international support for the US
Davenport 1/15
Davenport 1/15/2015 (Kelsey, Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association, Congress Should Support Negotiations, Not New Iran Sanctions, http://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2015-01-15/Congress-Should-Support-Negotiations-Not-New-Iran-Sanctions)
The United States has an historic opportunity to limit Iran’s nuclear program, block its pathways to the bomb, and guard against a covert nuclear weapons program Congressional action on sanctions at this time, however, threatens the significant progress made over the past year by the United States, its allies, and Iran toward a comprehensive nuclear deal new sanctions threaten to derail negotiations, push Iran away from the negotiating table, and erode international support for the sanctions regime new sanctions violate the first-phase deal a bill might place new and unrealistic requirements on the comprehensive agreement that the parties are currently negotiating new sanctions while talks are ongoing risks shattering the carefully built international coalition If Washington passes sanctions now, the United States would be blamed for any breakdown of the talks, and other countries may resume trade with Iran. That would dramatically reduce U.S. leverage and the prospects for a diplomatic solution. sanctions will be seen as an act of bad faith in Iran and a sign that the U.S. negotiating team will not be able to deliver what it promises Iranians may not believe that Congress won’t change the goal posts again sanctions will give the hardliners in Iran considerable ammunition to assert that the United States is not following through on its commitments in the Joint Plan of Action and will not negotiate a comprehensive agreement in good faith. This could narrow the space Rouhani has to negotiate sanctions could also cause Iran to pull out lead negotiator Zarif said that a "deal is dead" if the United States imposes more sanctions If the United States violates the interim agreement and talks fail, Iran is likely to also move down the path of escalation The only way to block Iran’s pathways to the bomb, limit its nuclear activities, and put in place sufficiently intrusive monitoring to promptly detect a dash to the bomb is through a comprehensive nuclear deal. A return to the pre-interim agreement status quo of Iran’s steadily increasing nuclear capabilities with less international monitoring threatens U.S. and international security
United States has an historic opportunity to limit Iran’s nuclear program Congressional action on sanctions threatens the significant progress push Iran away from the negotiating table, and erode international support anctions give the hardliners in Iran unition to assert that the United States is not following through Rouhani has to negotiate lead negotiator Zarif said that a "deal is dead" if the United States imposes more sanctio
The United States has an historic opportunity to limit Iran’s nuclear program, block its pathways to the bomb, and guard against a covert nuclear weapons program. Congressional action on sanctions at this time, however, threatens the significant progress made over the past year by the United States, its allies, and Iran toward a comprehensive nuclear deal. Moving forward on new sanctions legislation against Iran threatens to derail negotiations, push Iran away from the negotiating table, and erode international support for the sanctions regime currently in place. Contrary to the claims of sanctions proponents, any new nuclear-related sanctions legislation on Iran at this time would violate the terms of the first-phase deal that the United States and its P5+1 negotiating partners (China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom) committed to in the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action. In addition, a bill might place new and unrealistic requirements on the comprehensive agreement that the parties are currently negotiating. Efforts by the U.S. Congress to move the goalposts for the final phase negotiations beyond the parameters already established by the P5+1 would undermine prospects for a final phase agreement. A comprehensive nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran is the only effective way to limit Iran's nuclear program and ensure that it is entirely peaceful. Rather than sabotaging the progress made to date and undermining the prospects for a more far-reaching final phase deal, the Congress should allow the P5+1 negotiators the time and support necessary to negotiate an effective diplomatic solution. Sanctions Violate the Interim Deal Several members of Congress are drafting new sanctions legislation. If approved, these sanctions would directly violate the United States commitment to "refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions" under the November 24, 2013 interim agreement The most imminent sanctions bill will be considered before the Senate Banking Committee on Jan. 20 and marked-up later in the week. Its primary authors, Sens. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) and Mark Kirk (R-Ill.), introduced a sanctions bill in December 2013, S. 1881, which, if passed, would have derailed the talks and the progress generated under the interim deal--which has halted the most worrisome aspects of Iran’s nuclear program and rolled back key elements. Proponents of additional sanctions at this time claim that these measures will not go into effect until negotiations breakdown and that the possibility of additional sanctions pressure will keep Iran at the negotiating table. However, passing new sanctions while talks are ongoing risks shattering the carefully built international coalition pressuring Iran to remain at the negotiating table. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power said on Jan. 12 that the administration opposes new sanctions at this time, noting that "if we pull the trigger on new nuclear-related sanctions now, we will go from isolating Iran to potentially isolating ourselves." If Washington passes sanctions now, the United States would be blamed for any breakdown of the talks, and other countries may resume trade with Iran. That would dramatically reduce U.S. leverage and the prospects for a diplomatic solution. Even if sanctions were designed not go into effect immediately, and are “triggered” by an event such as the breakdown of talks, they would directly contradict the terms of the Joint Plan of Action. Triggered sanctions that depend on a “breakdown” also would require a subjective determination of what constitutes a breakdown in the talks. Elizabeth Rosenberg, a former senior advisor the U.S. Department of Treasury, said at an Arms Control Association-Carnegie event on Dec. 3 that triggered sanctions send the wrong message to Iran. Rosenberg, now at the Center for a New American Security, said that sanctions at this time “... will be seen as an act of bad faith in Iran on the part of the U.S. and a sign that the U.S. negotiating team will not be able to deliver what it promises and that it won’t be able to successfully coordinate with Congress.” Rosenberg also said that “Iranians may not believe that Congress won’t change the goal posts again” when it comes time to lift sanctions when Iran takes particular actions in the event of a comprehensive agreement. More Pressure Will Not Help Some members of Congress, however, mistakenly believe that additional economic pressure at this time will push Iran to make further concessions at the negotiating table. Kirk said on Jan. 4, “now is the time to put pressure on Iran especially with oil prices so low. We are uniquely advantaged at this time to shut down this nuclear program.” This reasoning is illogical and incorrect for several reasons. From a negotiating perspective, moving forward on any sanctions bill will give the hardliners in Iran considerable ammunition to assert that the United States is not following through on its commitments in the Joint Plan of Action and will not negotiate a comprehensive agreement in good faith. This could narrow the space that Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has to negotiate a final deal even further. New sanctions could also cause Iran to pull out of the negotiations. Iran made clear last year that it would interpret such a move as a violation of the Joint Plan of Action. Iran's Foreign Minister and lead negotiator Mohammad Javad Zarif said that a "deal is dead" if the United States imposes more sanctions, even if they do not go into effect during the negotiations. However, for some members of Congress, the purpose of passing new sanctions is to end negotiations. Sen.Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) said on Jan. 13 “the end of these negotiations isn't an unintended consequence of congressional action. It is very much an intended consequence, a feature, not a bug, so to speak." Rejecting a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran before it is reached is irresponsible and dangerous. If the United States violates the interim agreement and talks fail, Iran is likely to also move down the path of escalation. In December 2013, after Menendez and Kirk released the text of their sanctions bill, S. 1881, Iran drafted a law that would require Tehran to increase its uranium enrichment to 60 percent. One Iranian lawmaker said it was in response to “America’s hostile act.” While short of the 90 percent required for weapons-grade uranium, 60 percent puts Iran considerably closer than the five percent cap Tehran agreed to under the interim agreement. The only way to block Iran’s pathways to the bomb, limit its nuclear activities, and put in place sufficiently intrusive monitoring to promptly detect a dash to the bomb is through a comprehensive nuclear deal. A return to the pre-interim agreement status quo of Iran’s steadily increasing nuclear capabilities with less international monitoring threatens U.S. and international security.
6,936
<h4><strong>Sanctions destroy the deal and cause war- emboldens hardliners, undermines international support for the US</h4><p>Davenport 1/15</strong>/2015 (Kelsey, Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association, Congress Should Support Negotiations, Not New Iran Sanctions, http://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2015-01-15/Congress-Should-Support-Negotiations-Not-New-Iran-Sanctions)</p><p><u>The <mark>United States has an historic opportunity to limit Iran’s nuclear program</mark>, block its pathways to the bomb, and guard against a covert nuclear weapons program</u>. <u><mark>Congressional action on sanctions</mark> at this time, however, <mark>threatens the significant progress</mark> made over the past year by the United States, its allies, and Iran toward a comprehensive nuclear deal</u>. Moving forward on <u>new sanctions</u> legislation against Iran <u>threaten</u>s <u>to derail negotiations, <mark>push Iran away from the negotiating table, and erode international support</mark> for the sanctions regime</u> currently in place. Contrary to the claims of sanctions proponents, any <u>new</u> nuclear-related <u>sanctions</u> legislation on Iran at this time would <u>violate</u> <u>the</u> terms of the <u>first-phase deal</u> that the United States and its P5+1 negotiating partners (China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom) committed to in the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action. In addition, <u>a bill might place new and unrealistic requirements on the comprehensive agreement that the parties are currently negotiating</u>. Efforts by the U.S. Congress to move the goalposts for the final phase negotiations beyond the parameters already established by the P5+1 would undermine prospects for a final phase agreement. A comprehensive nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran is the only effective way to limit Iran's nuclear program and ensure that it is entirely peaceful. Rather than sabotaging the progress made to date and undermining the prospects for a more far-reaching final phase deal, the Congress should allow the P5+1 negotiators the time and support necessary to negotiate an effective diplomatic solution. Sanctions Violate the Interim Deal Several members of Congress are drafting new sanctions legislation. If approved, these sanctions would directly violate the United States commitment to "refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions" under the November 24, 2013 interim agreement The most imminent sanctions bill will be considered before the Senate Banking Committee on Jan. 20 and marked-up later in the week. Its primary authors, Sens. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) and Mark Kirk (R-Ill.), introduced a sanctions bill in December 2013, S. 1881, which, if passed, would have derailed the talks and the progress generated under the interim deal--which has halted the most worrisome aspects of Iran’s nuclear program and rolled back key elements. Proponents of additional sanctions at this time claim that these measures will not go into effect until negotiations breakdown and that the possibility of additional sanctions pressure will keep Iran at the negotiating table. However, passing <u>new sanctions while talks are ongoing risks shattering the carefully built international coalition</u> pressuring Iran to remain at the negotiating table. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power said on Jan. 12 that the administration opposes new sanctions at this time, noting that "if we pull the trigger on new nuclear-related sanctions now, we will go from isolating Iran to potentially isolating ourselves." <u>If Washington passes sanctions now, the United States would be blamed for any breakdown of the talks, and other countries may resume trade with Iran. That would dramatically reduce U.S. leverage and the prospects for a diplomatic solution. </u>Even if sanctions were designed not go into effect immediately, and are “triggered” by an event such as the breakdown of talks, they would directly contradict the terms of the Joint Plan of Action. Triggered sanctions that depend on a “breakdown” also would require a subjective determination of what constitutes a breakdown in the talks. Elizabeth Rosenberg, a former senior advisor the U.S. Department of Treasury, said at an Arms Control Association-Carnegie event on Dec. 3 that triggered sanctions send the wrong message to Iran. Rosenberg, now at the Center for a New American Security, said that <u>sanctions</u> at this time “... <u>will be seen as an act of bad faith in Iran</u> on the part of the U.S. <u>and a sign that the U.S. negotiating team will not be able to deliver what it promises</u> and that it won’t be able to successfully coordinate with Congress.” Rosenberg also said that “<u>Iranians may not believe that Congress won’t change the goal posts again</u>” when it comes time to lift sanctions when Iran takes particular actions in the event of a comprehensive agreement. More Pressure Will Not Help Some members of Congress, however, mistakenly believe that additional economic pressure at this time will push Iran to make further concessions at the negotiating table. Kirk said on Jan. 4, “now is the time to put pressure on Iran especially with oil prices so low. We are uniquely advantaged at this time to shut down this nuclear program.” This reasoning is illogical and incorrect for several reasons. From a negotiating perspective, moving forward on any <u>s<mark>anctions</u></mark> bill <u>will <mark>give the hardliners in Iran</mark> considerable amm<mark>unition to assert that the United States is not following through</mark> on its commitments in the Joint Plan of Action</u> <u>and will not negotiate a comprehensive agreement in good faith.</u> <u>This could narrow the space</u> that Iranian President Hassan <u><mark>Rouhani</u> <u>has to negotiate</u></mark> a final deal even further. New <u>sanctions could also cause Iran to pull out</u> of the negotiations. Iran made clear last year that it would interpret such a move as a violation of the Joint Plan of Action. Iran's Foreign Minister and <u><strong><mark>lead negotiator</u></strong></mark> Mohammad Javad <u><strong><mark>Zarif said that a "deal is dead" if the United States imposes more sanctio</mark>ns</u></strong>, even if they do not go into effect during the negotiations. However, for some members of Congress, the purpose of passing new sanctions is to end negotiations. Sen.Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) said on Jan. 13 “the end of these negotiations isn't an unintended consequence of congressional action. It is very much an intended consequence, a feature, not a bug, so to speak." Rejecting a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran before it is reached is irresponsible and dangerous. <u>If the United States violates the interim agreement and talks fail, Iran is likely to also <strong>move down the path of escalation</u></strong>. In December 2013, after Menendez and Kirk released the text of their sanctions bill, S. 1881, Iran drafted a law that would require Tehran to increase its uranium enrichment to 60 percent. One Iranian lawmaker said it was in response to “America’s hostile act.” While short of the 90 percent required for weapons-grade uranium, 60 percent puts Iran considerably closer than the five percent cap Tehran agreed to under the interim agreement. <u>The only way to block Iran’s pathways to the bomb, limit its nuclear activities, and put in place sufficiently intrusive monitoring to promptly detect a dash to the bomb is through a comprehensive nuclear deal. A return to the pre-interim agreement status quo of Iran’s steadily increasing nuclear capabilities with less international monitoring <strong>threatens</strong> U.S. and <strong>international security</u>. </p></strong>
1nr
Sanctions fail
UQ
431,103
3
17,106
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
565,267
N
Navy
8
Navy Mueller-Roach
Benedict
Fed CP (2NR) Politics - Iran DA (2NR) T - nearly all Treaties DA
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,611
Organ sales would be the most effective way to solve the transplant shortage
Study by Becker and Elias 14
Study by Becker and Elias 14 Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina. Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth
Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. Paying for organs would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.
Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths The most effective change would be to provide compensation we recommend a market for organs. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap sufficient payment would increase the supply by a large percentage, without increasing the total cost very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney Iran permits the sale by living donors waiting times have been eliminated Since the number uld be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply o there would no longer be any significant waiting time deaths due to long waits for a transplant would disappear the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortag isn't consistent with supply of other parts of the body for medical use.
Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change, we believe, would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap. In particular, sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. Paying for organs would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.
10,692
<h4><strong>Organ sales would be the most effective way to solve the transplant shortage</h4><p>Study by Becker and Elias 14 </strong>Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina.<strong> </strong>Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs</p><p><u>http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth</p><p><mark>Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths</mark>, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. <mark>The most effective change</u></mark>, we believe, <u><mark>would be to provide</mark> <mark>compensation</mark> to people who give their organs—that is, <mark>we recommend</mark> establishing <mark>a market for organs.</mark> </u>Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. <u><mark>Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap</u></mark>. In particular, <u><mark>sufficient</mark> <mark>payment</mark> to kidney donors <mark>would increase the supply</mark> of kidneys <mark>by a large percentage,</mark> <mark>without</mark> greatly <mark>increasing the total cost</mark> of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. </u>These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. <u>Our conclusion is that a <mark>very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney</mark>.</u> That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but <u><mark>Iran permits the sale</mark> of kidneys <mark>by living donors</mark>.</u> Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that <u><mark>waiting times</mark> to get kidneys <mark>have</mark> <mark>been</mark> largely <mark>eliminated</u></mark>. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. <u><mark>Since the number</mark> of kidneys available at a reasonable price wo<mark>uld be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply o</mark>f kidneys, <mark>there would no longer be any significant waiting time </mark>to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and <mark>deaths due to long waits for a transplant</mark> <mark>would</mark> essentially <mark>disappear</mark>. </u>Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But <u><mark>the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortag</mark>e of organs <mark>isn't consistent with</mark> what we know about the <mark>supply of other parts of the body for medical use.</u></mark> For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. <u>Paying for organs </u>would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it <u>would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.</p><p></u> </p>
null
null
Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives
430,254
24
17,114
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
565,248
A
Wake
4
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
Voss
null
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,612
The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism
Schwartz 2013
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is
The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief held by key justices that constitutional law must accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states the anti-commandeering doctrine is not y entrenched; the vote of just one conservative justices could limit the anti-commandeering doctrine, to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA a loophole would make it even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment designed to regulate would-be consumers , if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is.
B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough and clear enough to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it, in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" under Reno. Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data. Put another way, while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions. Rather the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way, if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is. I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.
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<h4>The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes <u><mark>The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization</u></mark>. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. <u>Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases</u>. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. <u><strong><mark>We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong </u></mark>enough and clear enough<u></strong><mark> <strong>to overcome a strong belief</strong></mark> possibly <mark>held <strong>by key justices that constitutional law must </mark>somehow <mark>accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states</mark>.</u></strong> Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, <u><mark>the <strong>anti-commandeering doctrine is not</strong> </mark>exactl<mark>y <strong>entrenched</strong>; the vote of just one </mark>of the five <mark>conservative justices could </mark>produce a decision qualifying or <mark>limit</mark>ing<mark> the anti-commandeering doctrine,</mark> if not entirely scrapping it</u>, <u>in order <mark>to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA</u></mark>. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? <u>Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno</u>. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, <u>such <mark>a loophole would make it </mark>easier to characterize the CSA - <mark>even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering"</u></mark> under Reno. <u><mark>Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, </mark>and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custod<mark>y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment </mark>ultimately<mark> designed to regulate would-be consumers</mark> of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data</u>. Put another way, <u>while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities</u>. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. <u>The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions</u>. Rather <u>the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine</u>. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way<mark>, <u><strong>if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is</u></strong>.</mark> I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.</p>
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18
17,112
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
565,260
N
Wake
2
Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
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cx
college
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743,613
D. T is a voter because it is necessary for good clash and debate
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<h4><strong>D. T is a voter because it is necessary for good clash and debate</h4></strong>
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1nc
4
431,102
1
17,109
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
565,261
N
Wake
3
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
Watson
AG Politics (2NR) Narrow Ruling CP (2NR) Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR) T - nearly all Test Case Fiat
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
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college
2
743,614
CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement
Schwartz 2013
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. marijuana legalization provides a salient example the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the political obstacles that would prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. [*633] The marijuana legalization issue provides a salient example. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous. As of 2008, there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities." n240 Thus, commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism. Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly.
2,875
<h4>CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, <u>forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. </u>[*633] The <u>marijuana legalization</u> issue <u>provides a salient example</u>. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But <u>the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous</u>. As of 2008, <u>there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level</u>. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "<u><strong><mark>only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities</u></strong></mark>." n240 Thus, <u><mark>commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states</u>. <u></mark>The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism</u>. <u>Such <mark>a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the</mark> significant <mark>political obstacles that would </mark>likely<mark> prevent Congress from taking such a step directly</u></mark>.</p>
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17,110
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
565,262
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5
NYU Itliong-Zhan
McCleary
Fed CP (2NR) AG Politics (2NR Cede the Political DA T - USFG
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743,615
Extinction
Yu 9
Yu 9 - (5/22/09, Victoria, Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Science Writer, “Human Extinction: The Uncertainty of Our Fate,” http://dujs.dartmouth.edu/spring-2009/human-extinction-the-uncertainty-of-our-fate)
A pandemic will kill off all humans. Perhaps the best-known case was the bubonic plague that killed up to one third of the European population in the mid-14th century While vaccines have been developed for the plague and some other infectious diseases, new viral strains are constantly emerging a process that maintains the possibility of a pandemic-facilitated human extinction. Some surveyed students mentioned AIDS as a potential mainly due to HIV’s rapid and constant evolution two factors account for the virus’s abnormally high mutation rate: 1. HIV’s use of reverse transcriptase, which does not have a proof-reading mechanism, and 2. the lack of an error-correction mechanism in HIV DNA polymerase (8). However, for more easily transmitted viruses such as influenza, the evolution of new strains could prove far more consequential. The simultaneous occurrence of antigenic drift and antigenic shift in the influenza virus could produce a new version of influenza for which scientists may not immediately find a cure. Since influenza can spread quickly, this lag time could potentially lead to a “global influenza pandemic,” according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention The most recent scare of this variety came in 1918 when bird flu managed to kill over 50 million people Perhaps even more frightening is the fact that only 25 mutations were required to convert the original viral strain — which could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain
A pandemic will kill off all humans the bubonic plague killed to one third of the population new viral strains are constantly emerging — a process that maintains the possibility of a pandemic-facilitated human extinction for more easily transmitted viruses such as influenza, the evolution of new strains could prove far more consequential simultaneous occurrence of antigenic drift and antigenic shift could produce a new version for which scientists may not immediately find a cure this lag time could lead to a “global influenza pandemic bird flu managed to kill over 50 million people only 25 mutations were required
A pandemic will kill off all humans. In the past, humans have indeed fallen victim to viruses. Perhaps the best-known case was the bubonic plague that killed up to one third of the European population in the mid-14th century (7). While vaccines have been developed for the plague and some other infectious diseases, new viral strains are constantly emerging — a process that maintains the possibility of a pandemic-facilitated human extinction. Some surveyed students mentioned AIDS as a potential pandemic-causing virus. It is true that scientists have been unable thus far to find a sustainable cure for AIDS, mainly due to HIV’s rapid and constant evolution. Specifically, two factors account for the virus’s abnormally high mutation rate: 1. HIV’s use of reverse transcriptase, which does not have a proof-reading mechanism, and 2. the lack of an error-correction mechanism in HIV DNA polymerase (8). Luckily, though, there are certain characteristics of HIV that make it a poor candidate for a large-scale global infection: HIV can lie dormant in the human body for years without manifesting itself, and AIDS itself does not kill directly, but rather through the weakening of the immune system. However, for more easily transmitted viruses such as influenza, the evolution of new strains could prove far more consequential. The simultaneous occurrence of antigenic drift (point mutations that lead to new strains) and antigenic shift (the inter-species transfer of disease) in the influenza virus could produce a new version of influenza for which scientists may not immediately find a cure. Since influenza can spread quickly, this lag time could potentially lead to a “global influenza pandemic,” according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (9). The most recent scare of this variety came in 1918 when bird flu managed to kill over 50 million people around the world in what is sometimes referred to as the Spanish flu pandemic. Perhaps even more frightening is the fact that only 25 mutations were required to convert the original viral strain — which could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain (10).
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<h4>Extinction </h4><p><strong>Yu 9</strong> - (5/22/09, Victoria, Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Science Writer, “Human Extinction: The Uncertainty of Our Fate,” http://dujs.dartmouth.edu/spring-2009/human-extinction-the-uncertainty-of-our-fate)</p><p><u><mark>A pandemic will kill off all humans</mark>.</u> In the past, humans have indeed fallen victim to viruses. <u>Perhaps the best-known case was <mark>the bubonic plague</mark> that <mark>killed</mark> up<mark> to one third of the</mark> European <mark>population</mark> in the mid-14th century</u> (7). <u>While vaccines have been developed for the plague and some other infectious diseases, <mark>new viral strains are constantly emerging</u> — <u>a process that maintains the possibility of a pandemic-facilitated human extinction</mark>.</u> <u>Some surveyed students mentioned AIDS as a potential </u>pandemic-causing virus. It is true that scientists have been unable thus far to find a sustainable cure for AIDS, <u>mainly due to HIV’s rapid and constant evolution</u>. Specifically, <u>two factors account for the virus’s abnormally high mutation rate: 1. HIV’s use of reverse transcriptase, which does not have a proof-reading mechanism, and 2. the lack of an error-correction mechanism in HIV DNA polymerase (8).</u> Luckily, though, there are certain characteristics of HIV that make it a poor candidate for a large-scale global infection: HIV can lie dormant in the human body for years without manifesting itself, and AIDS itself does not kill directly, but rather through the weakening of the immune system. <u>However, <mark>for more easily transmitted viruses such as influenza, the evolution of new strains could prove far more consequential</mark>. The <mark>simultaneous occurrence of antigenic drift</u></mark> (point mutations that lead to new strains) <u><mark>and antigenic shift</u></mark> (the inter-species transfer of disease) <u>in the influenza virus <mark>could produce a new version</mark> of influenza <mark>for which scientists may not immediately find a cure</mark>. Since influenza can spread quickly, <mark>this lag time could</mark> potentially <mark>lead to a “global influenza pandemic</mark>,” according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</u> (9). <u>The most recent scare of this variety came in 1918 when <mark>bird flu managed to kill over 50 million people</u></mark> around the world in what is sometimes referred to as the Spanish flu pandemic. <u>Perhaps even more frightening is the fact that <mark>only 25 mutations were required</mark> to convert the original viral strain — which could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain</u> (10). </p>
null
1nc
Case
95,194
133
17,111
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
565,271
N
Texas
5
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
Garrett
Framework (2NR) cap good
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,616
Swamps their internal link- criticism of SB 1070 alters the agenda of international human rights institutions
null
Steinberg 2010 (James B., Deputy Secretary of State, former Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Deputy National Security Adviser on the staff of the National Security Council, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, affidavit filed in US v. Arizona, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Case 2:10-cv-01413-NVW Document 6-1 Filed 07/06/10, http://www.scribd.com/doc/33977183/U-S-v-Arizona-Exh-1-to-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Affidavit-of-James-Steinberg)
S.B. 1070 prompted harsh criticism in human rights forums demonstrating the negative consequences that a state can have on U.S. foreign policy The law has diminished our credibility in advocating for human rights compliance abroad by others U.N bodies criticized S.B. 1070 six UN human rights experts issued a joint statement specifically addressing the Arizona law: A disturbing pattern of legislative activity hostile to ethnic minorities and immigrant expressed concern about the law's compatibility with international human rights treaties to which the United States is a party the UN Human Rights Council criticized laws that criminalize irregular migration and discriminatory practices in the enforcement of immigration laws, and several states explicitly singled out S.B. 1070 for criticism in their plenary remarks
null
B. Impact on Regional and Multilateral Relationships 45. The Arizona legislature's adoption of S.B. 1070 also prompted harsh criticism of the law in human rights forums, demonstrating in practical terms the negative consequences that unilateral action by a single U.S. state can have on U.S. foreign policy interests. The law has diminished our credibility in advocating for human rights compliance abroad by others, and if allowed to go into effect, will continue to do so. 46.A number of U.N. and regional intergovernmental organizations and bodies, including those whose mandates explicitly include the promotion of human rights, have criticized S.B. 1070. For example, on May 10, 2010, six UN human rights experts (the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, the Independent Expert in the Field of Cultural Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, and the Independent Expert on Minority Issues) issued a joint statement specifically addressing the Arizona law: A disturbing pattern of legislative activity hostile to ethnic minorities and immigrants has been established with the adoption of an immigration law [in Arizona] that may allow for police action targeting individuals on the basis of their perceived ethnic origin.... In Arizona, persons who appear to be of Mexican, Latin American, or indigenous origin are especially at risk of being targeted under the law. The UN independent experts stressed that "legal experts differ on the potential effects of recent amendments to the immigration law that relate to the conditions for the official detention of suspected illegal aliens," and expressed concern about the "vague standards and sweeping language of Arizona's immigration law, which raise serious doubts about the law's compatibility with relevant international human rights treaties to which the United States is a party." 47.Additionally, in June 2010, at the 14th session of the UN Human Rights Council, the membership body within the United Nations system charged with promoting human rights and addressing situations of human rights violations, many countries criticized laws that criminalize irregular migration and discriminatory practices in the enforcement of immigration laws, and several states explicitly singled out S.B. 1070 for criticism in their plenary remarks.
2,546
<h4><strong>Swamps their internal link- criticism of SB 1070 alters the agenda of international human rights institutions</h4><p><u></strong>Steinberg 2010</u> (James B., Deputy Secretary of State, former Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Deputy National Security Adviser on the staff of the National Security Council, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, affidavit filed in US v. Arizona, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Case 2:10-cv-01413-NVW Document 6-1 Filed 07/06/10, http://www.scribd.com/doc/33977183/U-S-v-Arizona-Exh-1-to-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Affidavit-of-James-Steinberg)</p><p>B. Impact on Regional and Multilateral Relationships 45. The Arizona legislature's adoption of <u><strong>S.B. 1070</u></strong> also <u><strong>prompted harsh criticism</u></strong> of the law <u><strong>in human rights forums</u></strong>, <u><strong>demonstrating</u></strong> in practical terms <u><strong>the negative consequences that</u></strong> unilateral action by <u><strong>a</u></strong> single U.S. <u><strong>state can have on U.S. foreign policy</u></strong> interests. <u><strong>The law has diminished our credibility in advocating for human rights compliance abroad by others</u></strong>, and if allowed to go into effect, will continue to do so. 46.A number of <u><strong>U.N</u></strong>. and regional intergovernmental organizations and <u><strong>bodies</u></strong>, including those whose mandates explicitly include the promotion of human rights, have <u><strong>criticized S.B. 1070</u></strong>. For example, on May 10, 2010, <u><strong>six UN human rights experts</u></strong> (the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, the Independent Expert in the Field of Cultural Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, and the Independent Expert on Minority Issues) <u><strong>issued a joint statement specifically addressing the Arizona law: A disturbing pattern of legislative activity hostile to ethnic minorities and immigrant</u></strong>s has been established with the adoption of an immigration law [in Arizona] that may allow for police action targeting individuals on the basis of their perceived ethnic origin.... In Arizona, persons who appear to be of Mexican, Latin American, or indigenous origin are especially at risk of being targeted under the law. The UN independent experts stressed that "legal experts differ on the potential effects of recent amendments to the immigration law that relate to the conditions for the official detention of suspected illegal aliens," and <u><strong>expressed concern about the</u></strong> "vague standards and sweeping language of Arizona's immigration law, which raise serious doubts about the <u><strong>law's compatibility with</u></strong> relevant <u><strong>international human rights treaties to which the United States is a party</u></strong>." 47.Additionally, in June 2010, at the 14th session of <u><strong>the UN Human Rights Council</u></strong>, the membership body within the United Nations system charged with promoting human rights and addressing situations of human rights violations, many countries <u><strong>criticized laws that criminalize irregular migration and discriminatory practices in the enforcement of immigration laws, and several states explicitly singled out S.B. 1070 for criticism in their plenary remarks</u>.</p></strong>
1nr
null
Turns ILaqw
431,104
1
17,108
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
565,269
N
Texas
2
Northwestern Esman-McCue
Moss
Fed CP (2NR) TPA T - Legalize State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,617
The deal will succeed now- new sanctions are the only thing that can cause collapse- independently violates the JPOA which causes war with Iran
Goldenberg 12/18
Goldenberg 12/18/2014 (Ilan, senior fellow and director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for New American Security. He previously served as the Iran Team Chief at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as a Senior Professional Staff Member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, No need for new sanctions on Iran, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/227466-no-need-for-new-sanctions-on-iran)
new sanctions would reduce the probability of a positive outcome. new sanctions at this moment are likely to lead to less flexibility from the Iranian negotiators One of the major challenges in the current negotiations is that the Iranians do not believe that even in the event of a deal the United States Congress will ever lift sanctions New sanctions now would only reconfirm worst suspicions New sanctions endanger a very tenuous but positive status quo The JPOA freeze bought the United States and its allies time, as the Iranians have made no substantive progress on their nuclear program New sanctions would be a violation of the JPOA and could cause Iran to unfreeze its program increasing the likelihood of an impending confrontation. New sanctions give Iran a way out of the negotiations in which it can blame the United States for failure and dramatically weaken the sanctions regime in the aftermath of a collapse. If Congress were to pass new legislation, Iran could walk away from the table and put the onus the United States it is unclear how implementors of the international sanctions regime – most notably China – would respond particularly if they believe that the collapse of the talks was due to Congressional sanctions sanctions are not necessary at the moment as the oil market is already doing the work of increasing pressure These trends are already creating real anxiety in Tehran and are much more likely to have the desired effect on the psychology and calculus of Iran’s leaders than a new piece of Congressional legislation New sanctions reduce the chances of an agreement, endanger the delicate but positive status quo, and give the Iranians an excuse to walk away
new sanctions now would be poorly timed and reduce the probability of a positive outcome likely to lead to less flexibility . New sanctions could also endanger a very tenuous but positive status quo. New sanctions would be a violation of the JPOA and could cause Iran to unfreeze its program increasing the likelihood of an impending confrontation. Iran a way out of the negotiations in which it can blame the U New sanctions reduce the chances of an agreement, endanger the delicate but positive status quo, and give the Iranians an excuse
As the 113th Congress wraps up and the new Congress prepares for the start of 2015 it is evident that one of the central early debates on foreign policy will revolve around new sanctions on Iran. The sanctions regime imposed by Congress and implemented by the Obama administration played a significant role in bringing Iran to the table and getting an agreement on the interim Joint Plan of Action (JPOA). However, new sanctions now would be poorly timed and reduce the probability of a positive outcome. First, new sanctions at this moment are likely to lead to less flexibility from the Iranian negotiators. Sanctions are a useful stick to bring a party to the table, but to be used effectively they must be a stick that can be credibly lifted. One of the major challenges in the current negotiations is that the Iranians do not believe that even in the event of a deal the United States Congress will ever lift sanctions. This is particularly true of the ultimate decisionmaker in Tehran –Supreme Leader Ali Khameini – who is a notoriously suspicious of the United States. New sanctions now would only reconfirm his worst suspicions. New sanctions could also endanger a very tenuous but positive status quo. The JPOA, which was signed in November of 2013, is not an ideal document that should be seen as the long-term solution. However, it did successfully freeze Iran’s enrichment program for the first time since 2005 in exchange for only very limited sanctions relief. This freeze has bought the United States and its allies time, as the Iranians have made no substantive progress on their nuclear program in the last 12 months while even rolling back some elements – most notably by making their stock of 20% enriched uranium into a product that is more difficult to enrich further. New sanctions would be a violation of the JPOA and could cause Iran to unfreeze its program increasing the likelihood of an impending confrontation. New sanctions could also inadvertently give Iran a way out of the negotiations in which it can blame the United States for failure and dramatically weaken the sanctions regime in the aftermath of a collapse. If Congress were to pass new legislation, Iran could walk away from the table and put the onus the United States for not keeping its word and violating the interim agreement. In such a scenario, it is unclear how some of the key implementors of the international sanctions regime – most notably China – would respond, particularly if they believe that the collapse of the talks was due to Congressional sanctions. The Chinese might choose to continue to abide by sanctions on Iran since they ultimately care more about access to the U.S. economy than Iran’s. Or they might choose to call the American bluff, restart trade with Iran and assume that the United States would not dare sanction China and cause grave damage to its own economy in the process. Finally, sanctions are not necessary at the moment as the oil market is already doing the work of increasing pressure. Prices have dropped from a high of $120 over the summer to below $60. This will have dramatic implications for the Iranian economy. Bread prices have risen 30 percent in recent weeks. And President Rouhani recently introduced an austerity budget for the next year pegging the Iranian budget to $70 oil even though Iran needs a much higher price to sustain its fiscal viability in the long run. These trends are already creating real anxiety in Tehran and are much more likely to have the desired effect on the psychology and calculus of Iran’s leaders than a new piece of Congressional legislation that would not even go into effect unless the negotiations failed. And the beauty of this type of pressure is that it cannot be seen as an act of bad faith on America’s part. Ultimately, if a deal cannot be struck by the middle of this year it might be time to revaluate and consider other options. But for the moment sanctions are unlikely to improve the chances of an agreement. Lower oil prices are already increasing the pressure on Iran. New sanctions are more likely to reduce the chances of an agreement, endanger the delicate but positive status quo, and give the Iranians an excuse to walk away while taking the high ground and blaming the United States.
4,281
<h4><strong>The deal will succeed now- new sanctions are the only thing that can cause collapse- independently violates the JPOA which causes war with Iran</h4><p>Goldenberg 12/18</strong>/2014 (Ilan, senior fellow and director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for New American Security. He previously served as the Iran Team Chief at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as a Senior Professional Staff Member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, No need for new sanctions on Iran, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/227466-no-need-for-new-sanctions-on-iran)</p><p>As the 113th Congress wraps up and the new Congress prepares for the start of 2015 it is evident that one of the central early debates on foreign policy will revolve around new sanctions on Iran. The sanctions regime imposed by Congress and implemented by the Obama administration played a significant role in bringing Iran to the table and getting an agreement on the interim Joint Plan of Action (JPOA). However, <u><mark>new sanctions</u> now <u>would</u> be poorly timed and <u>reduce the probability of a positive outcome</mark>. </u>First, <u>new sanctions at this moment are <mark>likely to lead to less flexibility </mark>from the Iranian negotiators</u>. Sanctions are a useful stick to bring a party to the table, but to be used effectively they must be a stick that can be credibly lifted. <u>One of the major challenges in the current negotiations is that the Iranians do not believe that even in the event of a deal the United States Congress will ever lift sanctions</u>. This is particularly true of the ultimate decisionmaker in Tehran –Supreme Leader Ali Khameini – who is a notoriously suspicious of the United States. <u>New sanctions now would only reconfirm</u> his <u>worst suspicions</u><mark>. <u><strong>New sanctions</u></strong> could also <u><strong>endanger a very tenuous but positive status quo</u></strong>. <u></mark>The JPOA</u>, which was signed in November of 2013, is not an ideal document that should be seen as the long-term solution. However, it did successfully freeze Iran’s enrichment program for the first time since 2005 in exchange for only very limited sanctions relief. This <u>freeze</u> has <u>bought the United States and its allies time, as the Iranians have made no substantive progress on their nuclear program</u> in the last 12 months while even rolling back some elements – most notably by making their stock of 20% enriched uranium into a product that is more difficult to enrich further. <u><mark>New sanctions would be a violation of the JPOA and could cause Iran to unfreeze its program <strong>increasing the likelihood of an impending confrontation</strong>.</mark> New sanctions</u> could also inadvertently <u>give <mark>Iran a way out of the negotiations</u> <u>in which it can blame the U</mark>nited States for failure and dramatically weaken the sanctions regime in the aftermath of a collapse.</u> <u>If Congress were to pass new legislation, Iran could walk away from the table and put the onus the United States</u> for not keeping its word and violating the interim agreement. In such a scenario, <u>it is unclear how</u> some of the key <u>implementors of the international sanctions regime – most notably China – would respond</u>, <u>particularly if they believe that the collapse of the talks was due to Congressional sanctions</u>. The Chinese might choose to continue to abide by sanctions on Iran since they ultimately care more about access to the U.S. economy than Iran’s. Or they might choose to call the American bluff, restart trade with Iran and assume that the United States would not dare sanction China and cause grave damage to its own economy in the process. Finally, <u>sanctions are not necessary at the moment as the oil market is already doing the work of increasing pressure</u>. Prices have dropped from a high of $120 over the summer to below $60. This will have dramatic implications for the Iranian economy. Bread prices have risen 30 percent in recent weeks. And President Rouhani recently introduced an austerity budget for the next year pegging the Iranian budget to $70 oil even though Iran needs a much higher price to sustain its fiscal viability in the long run. <u>These trends are already <strong>creating real anxiety in Tehran</strong> and are much more likely to have the desired effect on the psychology and calculus of Iran’s leaders than a new piece of Congressional legislation</u> that would not even go into effect unless the negotiations failed. And the beauty of this type of pressure is that it cannot be seen as an act of bad faith on America’s part. Ultimately, if a deal cannot be struck by the middle of this year it might be time to revaluate and consider other options. But for the moment sanctions are unlikely to improve the chances of an agreement. Lower oil prices are already increasing the pressure on Iran. <u><mark>New sanctions</u></mark> are more likely to <u><mark>reduce the chances of an agreement, endanger the delicate but positive status quo, and give the Iranians an excuse</mark> to walk away </u>while taking the high ground and blaming the United States. </p>
1nr
Sanctions fail
UQ
431,030
2
17,106
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
565,267
N
Navy
8
Navy Mueller-Roach
Benedict
Fed CP (2NR) Politics - Iran DA (2NR) T - nearly all Treaties DA
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,618
The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market
Hughes 9
Hughes 9 J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.
U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid
A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. banning organ sales. illegality of the trade is insufficient to discourage many faced with the possibility of dying on an waiting list transplant tourism" has become its own industry S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, under don't ask, don't tell" policy The lack of regulated organ marketplace in the U.S resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world .S. policy have produced immoral and unethical consequences
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351 Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global black market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales. n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid. n92
2,620
<h4>The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market</h4><p><strong>Hughes 9</strong> J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.</p><p>Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351</p><p>Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models</p><p><u>U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. <mark>A</mark> <mark>thriving global</u></mark> black <u><mark>market in human organs has resulted from U.S.</mark> policy <mark>banning organ sales</u>.</mark> n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 <u>The <mark>illegality of the</mark> organ <mark>trade is insufficient to</mark> <mark>discourage many </mark>of those <mark>faced with the possibility of dying on an</mark> organ <mark>waiting list</mark>, and "<mark>transplant tourism" has become its own industry</mark>.</u> n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 <u>U.<mark>S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too,</mark> often <mark>under</mark> hospitals' "<mark>don't ask, don't tell" policy</mark> regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related</u>. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 <u><mark>The lack of</mark> a <mark>regulated organ marketplace in the U.S</mark>. has <mark>resulted in</mark> <mark>exploitation of the poor throughout the world</mark>.</u> n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 <u>In short, U<mark>.S. policy</mark> and its ban on organ sales <mark>have produced</mark> some of the same <mark>immoral and unethical consequences</mark> the ban was designed to avoid</u>. n92</p>
null
null
Contention 2 is illegal markets
430,256
14
17,114
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
565,248
A
Wake
4
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
Voss
null
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,619
Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations
Taylor 2013
Taylor 2013 (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)
without congressional action and given Obama’s opposition to legalizing marijuana the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with states The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives broad discretion to do so including legally binding contractual agreements. Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do should not require much boldness Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise prosecutorial discretion to ensure that Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong deterrent to unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently in contrast to the uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to marijuana with the invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen too much chaos
Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,
The good news is that even without a congressional action, and even given President Obama’s opposition to legalizing recreational or medical marijuana, the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana states and the District of Columbia. The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives him broad discretion to do so, through means including legally binding contractual agreements. This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do (cooperate with the states) should not require much boldness. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. Written contractual agreements should, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise his prosecutorial discretion to ensure that his Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General (or a high-level designee) personally finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently—again, in marked contrast to the chaos and uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to medical marijuana. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, with the above-mentioned invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse. At the very last, they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen, of late, all too much chaos.
5,417
<h4>Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations</h4><p><strong>Taylor 2013</strong> (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)</p><p>The good news is that even <u>without</u> a <u>congressional action</u>, <u>and</u> even <u>given</u> President <u>Obama’s</u> <u>opposition to legalizing</u> recreational or medical <u>marijuana</u>, <u>the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with</u> Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana <u>states</u> and the District of Columbia. <u>The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives</u> him <u>broad discretion to do so</u>, through means <u>including legally binding contractual agreements.</u> This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). <u>Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do</u> (cooperate with the states) <u>should not require much boldness</u>. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. <u><mark>Written contractual agreements should</u></mark>, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, <u><mark>provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate</u></mark> licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; <u><mark>and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate </mark>in targeting those who grow and distribute <mark>marijuana without state licenses</u>. <u>This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to </mark>control trafficking, abuse, and diversion <mark>than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes</u>. <u>Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General </mark>to exercise</u> his <u>prosecutorial discretion to ensure that</u> his <u>Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General</u> (or a high-level designee) personally <u>finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law</u> and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But <u><strong><mark>the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong</u></strong> political <u><strong>deterrent to</u></strong> such an <u><strong>unwarranted enforcement action</u></strong></mark>. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, <u><mark>the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,</mark> by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently</u>—again, <u>in</u> marked <u>contrast to the</u> chaos and <u>uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to</u> medical <u>marijuana</u>. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, <u>with the</u> above-mentioned <u>invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states</u>, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, <u>the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse</u>. At the very last, <u>they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen</u>, of late, all <u>too much chaos</u>.</p>
null
1nc
2
56,721
34
17,112
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
565,260
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Wake
2
Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
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college
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743,620
The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism
Schwartz 2013
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is
The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief held by key justices that constitutional law must accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states the anti-commandeering doctrine is not y entrenched; the vote of just one conservative justices could limit the anti-commandeering doctrine, to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA a loophole would make it even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment designed to regulate would-be consumers , if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is.
B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough and clear enough to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it, in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" under Reno. Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data. Put another way, while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions. Rather the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way, if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is. I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.
8,598
<h4>The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes <u><mark>The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization</u></mark>. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. <u>Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases</u>. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. <u><strong><mark>We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong </u></mark>enough and clear enough<u></strong><mark> <strong>to overcome a strong belief</strong></mark> possibly <mark>held <strong>by key justices that constitutional law must </mark>somehow <mark>accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states</mark>.</u></strong> Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, <u><mark>the <strong>anti-commandeering doctrine is not</strong> </mark>exactl<mark>y <strong>entrenched</strong>; the vote of just one </mark>of the five <mark>conservative justices could </mark>produce a decision qualifying or <mark>limit</mark>ing<mark> the anti-commandeering doctrine,</mark> if not entirely scrapping it</u>, <u>in order <mark>to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA</u></mark>. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? <u>Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno</u>. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, <u>such <mark>a loophole would make it </mark>easier to characterize the CSA - <mark>even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering"</u></mark> under Reno. <u><mark>Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, </mark>and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custod<mark>y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment </mark>ultimately<mark> designed to regulate would-be consumers</mark> of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data</u>. Put another way, <u>while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities</u>. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. <u>The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions</u>. Rather <u>the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine</u>. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way<mark>, <u><strong>if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is</u></strong>.</mark> I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.</p>
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2
430,417
18
17,110
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
565,262
N
Wake
5
NYU Itliong-Zhan
McCleary
Fed CP (2NR) AG Politics (2NR Cede the Political DA T - USFG
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
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<h4>M</h4>
null
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Case
431,105
1
17,111
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
565,271
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Texas
5
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
Garrett
Framework (2NR) cap good
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
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college
2
743,622
Squo solves organs-constant innovation in bioprinting means it will be capable in less than a decade
*momentum/new tech answers solvency deficits
*momentum/new tech answers solvency deficits
Bio-artificial and 3D-printed organs are critical for overcoming this challenge. Bio-artificial organs are the products of tissue engineering. Scientists explain that tissue engineering uses the concepts and tools of biotechnology, molecular and cell biology, material science and engineering Between March 2004 and July 2007, the research team at Wake Forest University led by Dr Atala built artificial urethras for five boys using the patients' own cells. Tests measuring urine flow and tube diameter confirmed that the engineered tissue remained functional throughout the six-year follow-up period Anthony Atala also reported the successful transplantation of laboratory-grown urinary bladders into beagles in 1999. Less than 10 years later the same procedure was repeated in humans suffering from end-stage bladder disease Although the task is indeed challenging, scientists continue to make advances – Doris Taylor created a beating rat heart the University of Michigan David Humes created a cell-phone-size artificial kidney that has passed tests on sheep The bioprinting trend is being driven by three factors - more sophisticated printers, refined CAD software and advances in regenerative medicine. Scientists are becoming increasingly interested in the field Diego-based company Organovo successfully prints small pieces of blood vessel or liver tissue. Although the mini-livers are half a millimetre deep and 4 millimetres across, they can perform most functions of the real organ executive and scientific director of the Cardiovascular Innovation Institute (US), suggests that scientists will be able to print fully functional hearts from a patient’s own cells within 10 years. First steps have already been made Given the progress to date, further advances in bioprinting might even enable bionic organs – body parts that restore and extend human ability
Bio-artificial organs are the products of tissue engineering. Scientists explain that tissue engineering uses the concepts and tools of biotechnology, molecular and cell biology, material science and engineering Although the task is indeed challenging, scientists continue to make advances David Humes created a cell-phone-size artificial kidney that has passed tests on sheep The bioprinting trend is being driven by three factors - more sophisticated printers, refined CAD software and advances in regenerative medicine. Scientists are becoming increasingly interested in the field executive and scientific director of the Cardiovascular Innovation Institute (US), suggests that scientists will be able to print fully functional hearts from a patient’s own cells within 10 years. First steps have already been made
DAEF 14 (An online platform launched by the Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology of the European Commission to facilitate a broad reflection on future European policies, “Advances in bio-artificial and 3D-printed organs” [http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/futurium/en/content/advances-bio-artificial-and-3d-printed-organs) Organs such as kidneys, livers and lungs have always been in high demand by patients with severe illnesses. In 2008, 56 000 people were waiting for a suitable organ within the European Union. The demand exceeds the number of available organs in Member States and is increasing faster than organ donation rates. Bio-artificial and 3D-printed organs are critical for overcoming this challenge.¶ Advances in bio-artificial organs¶ Bio-artificial organs are the products of tissue engineering. Scientists explain that tissue engineering uses the concepts and tools of biotechnology, molecular and cell biology, material science and engineering to understand the structure-function relationships in mammalian tissues and to develop biological substitutes for the repair or replacement of tissue or organ functions (Bioartificial Organs as Outcomes of Tissue Engineering).¶ The generation of bio-artificial organs takes part in 3 steps:¶ Obtaining the patient’s autologous cells with the help of biopsy procedure, isolating the cells from the tissue biopsy and increasing their number in the cell culture (outside the human).¶ Transferring the cells onto a carrier structure (matrix) which is usually generated from animal tissue or from synthetic components. In the lab cells sprout on the matrix, dissolve it and replace it by private proteins.¶ After reaching a level of maturation in the laboratory, the bio-artificial tissue is transplanted as replacement tissue into the patient.¶ Dr Anthony Atala, director of the Institute for Regenerative Medicine at the Wake Forest Baptist Medical Center in North Carolina (US) breaks tissue engineering into four levels of complexity:¶ Flat structures that are made up of just one type of cells are the simplest to engineer. Skin is an example.¶ Tubes like blood vessels and urethras which have two types of cells and act as a conduit.¶ Hollow non-tubular organs like the bladder and the stomach. These have more complex structures and functions.¶ Solid organs like the kidney, hearth and liver are the most complex to engineer because they have many different cell types and also require blood supply.¶ German researchers are already mass producing swatches of real human skin. As of 2009, the price per unit was 34 Euros. The skin produced by Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft is exactly like the skin on human bodies – made up of different cell types whereas skin manufactured previously used to be one thin layer made up of only one type of cell.¶ Between March 2004 and July 2007, the research team at Wake Forest University led by Dr Atala built artificial urethras for five boys using the patients' own cells. Tests measuring urine flow and tube diameter confirmed that the engineered tissue remained functional throughout the six-year follow-up period. Scientists say that bio-artificial urethras can be used successfully in patients and could be an alternative to the current treatment, which has a high failure rate.¶ Anthony Atala also reported the successful transplantation of laboratory-grown urinary bladders into beagles in 1999. Less than 10 years later the same procedure was repeated in humans suffering from end-stage bladder disease - functional bioartificial bladders were successfully implanted into patients.¶ Growing solid organs in the lab is however is much more complex. Organs like kidneys, lungs or hearts requires putting a number of different cell types into the right positions and simultaneously growing complete networks of blood vessels to keep them alive. Although the task is indeed challenging, scientists continue to make advances – Doris Taylor created a beating rat heart at the Texas Heart Institute in Houston. At the University of Michigan David Humes created a cell-phone-size artificial kidney that has passed tests on sheep.¶ Some scientists believe that implanting bio-artificial solid organs into humans is achievable, other remain more sceptical.¶ Advances in 3D-printed organs¶ The bioprinting trend is being driven by three factors - more sophisticated printers, refined CAD software and advances in regenerative medicine. Scientists are becoming increasingly interested in the field – from 2008 to 2011, the number of scientific papers referencing bioprinting almost tripled.¶ Bio 3D printers function in the same way as traditional 3D printers – tissue is printed layer by layer. Once a layer of cells is laid down by the printer, a layer of hydrogel that operates as a scaffold material follows and the process repeats. When the cells fuse, the hydrogel is removed to create material made entirely of human cells. The material is then moved to a bioreactor where the tissue continues to grow into its final form.¶ 3D printing has already been used to create personalised prosthetics, human bones and human tissue. For example, LayerWise, a Belgian metal parts manufacturer successfully printed a jaw bone in 2012. The artificial jaw was implanted into a 83-year old patient. San Diego-based company Organovo successfully prints small pieces of blood vessel or liver tissue. Although the mini-livers are half a millimetre deep and 4 millimetres across, they can perform most functions of the real organ. The ultimate goal of Organovo is to create human-sized structures suitable for transplantation.¶ Currently, the biggest challenge in 3D bioprinting is producing larger branched networks of blood vessels to nourish complex organs. Stuart William, executive and scientific director of the Cardiovascular Innovation Institute (US), suggests that scientists will be able to print fully functional hearts from a patient’s own cells within 10 years. First steps have already been made – in the first half of 2013 researchers printed and implanted a portion of a heart and blood vessels in mice.¶ Given the progress to date, further advances in bioprinting might even enable bionic organs – body parts that restore and extend human ability. Scientists at Princeton University have conducted experiments aiming to integrate electronics into bioprinting. Earlier in 2013 they created an ear that receives a wide range of frequencies using a coiled antenna printed with silver nanoparticles. The artificial ear can pick up frequencies beyond the range of normal human hearing.¶ Bio-artificial and 3D-printed organs can not only alleviate the shortage of donor organs. Artificially created organs can also be used to test the impact of new drugs, thus eliminating the need to test new drugs on humans. 3D models of organs could also be used for educational and research purposes.
6,916
<h4>Squo solves organs-constant innovation in bioprinting means it will be capable in less than a decade</h4><p><u><strong>*momentum/new tech answers solvency deficits </p><p></u>DAEF 14<u> </u></strong>(An online platform launched by the Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology of the European Commission to facilitate a broad reflection on future European policies, “Advances in bio-artificial and 3D-printed organs” [http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/futurium/en/content/advances-bio-artificial-and-3d-printed-organs)</p><p>Organs such as kidneys, livers and lungs have always been in high demand by patients with severe illnesses. In 2008, 56 000 people were waiting for a suitable organ within the European Union. The demand exceeds the number of available organs in Member States and is increasing faster than organ donation rates. <u>Bio-artificial and 3D-printed organs are critical for overcoming this challenge.</u>¶ Advances in bio-artificial organs¶ <u><mark>Bio-artificial organs are the products of tissue engineering. Scientists explain that tissue engineering uses the concepts and tools of biotechnology, molecular and cell biology, material science and engineering</mark> </u>to understand the structure-function relationships in mammalian tissues and to develop biological substitutes for the repair or replacement of tissue or organ functions (Bioartificial Organs as Outcomes of Tissue Engineering).¶ The generation of bio-artificial organs takes part in 3 steps:¶ Obtaining the patient’s autologous cells with the help of biopsy procedure, isolating the cells from the tissue biopsy and increasing their number in the cell culture (outside the human).¶ Transferring the cells onto a carrier structure (matrix) which is usually generated from animal tissue or from synthetic components. In the lab cells sprout on the matrix, dissolve it and replace it by private proteins.¶ After reaching a level of maturation in the laboratory, the bio-artificial tissue is transplanted as replacement tissue into the patient.¶ Dr Anthony Atala, director of the Institute for Regenerative Medicine at the Wake Forest Baptist Medical Center in North Carolina (US) breaks tissue engineering into four levels of complexity:¶ Flat structures that are made up of just one type of cells are the simplest to engineer. Skin is an example.¶ Tubes like blood vessels and urethras which have two types of cells and act as a conduit.¶ Hollow non-tubular organs like the bladder and the stomach. These have more complex structures and functions.¶ Solid organs like the kidney, hearth and liver are the most complex to engineer because they have many different cell types and also require blood supply.¶ German researchers are already mass producing swatches of real human skin. As of 2009, the price per unit was 34 Euros. The skin produced by Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft is exactly like the skin on human bodies – made up of different cell types whereas skin manufactured previously used to be one thin layer made up of only one type of cell.¶ <u>Between March 2004 and July 2007, the research team at Wake Forest University led by Dr Atala built artificial urethras for five boys using the patients' own cells. Tests measuring urine flow and tube diameter confirmed that the engineered tissue remained functional throughout the six-year follow-up period</u>. Scientists say that bio-artificial urethras can be used successfully in patients and could be an alternative to the current treatment, which has a high failure rate.¶ <u>Anthony Atala also reported the successful transplantation of laboratory-grown urinary bladders into beagles in 1999. Less than 10 years later the same procedure was repeated in humans suffering from end-stage bladder disease</u> - functional bioartificial bladders were successfully implanted into patients.¶ Growing solid organs in the lab is however is much more complex. Organs like kidneys, lungs or hearts requires putting a number of different cell types into the right positions and simultaneously growing complete networks of blood vessels to keep them alive. <u><mark>Although the task is indeed challenging, scientists continue to make advances</mark> – Doris Taylor created a beating rat heart</u> at the Texas Heart Institute in Houston. At <u>the University of Michigan <mark>David Humes created a cell-phone-size artificial kidney that has passed tests on sheep</u></mark>.¶ Some scientists believe that implanting bio-artificial solid organs into humans is achievable, other remain more sceptical.¶ Advances in 3D-printed organs¶ <u><mark>The bioprinting trend is being driven by three factors - more sophisticated printers, refined CAD software and advances in regenerative medicine. Scientists are becoming increasingly interested in the field</u></mark> – from 2008 to 2011, the number of scientific papers referencing bioprinting almost tripled.¶ Bio 3D printers function in the same way as traditional 3D printers – tissue is printed layer by layer. Once a layer of cells is laid down by the printer, a layer of hydrogel that operates as a scaffold material follows and the process repeats. When the cells fuse, the hydrogel is removed to create material made entirely of human cells. The material is then moved to a bioreactor where the tissue continues to grow into its final form.¶ 3D printing has already been used to create personalised prosthetics, human bones and human tissue. For example, LayerWise, a Belgian metal parts manufacturer successfully printed a jaw bone in 2012. The artificial jaw was implanted into a 83-year old patient. San <u>Diego-based company Organovo successfully prints small pieces of blood vessel or liver tissue. Although the mini-livers are half a millimetre deep and 4 millimetres across, they can perform most functions of the real organ</u>. The ultimate goal of Organovo is to create human-sized structures suitable for transplantation.¶ Currently, the biggest challenge in 3D bioprinting is producing larger branched networks of blood vessels to nourish complex organs. Stuart William, <u><mark>executive and scientific director of the Cardiovascular Innovation Institute (US), suggests that scientists will be able to print fully functional hearts from a patient’s own cells within 10 years. First steps have already been made</u></mark> – in the first half of 2013 researchers printed and implanted a portion of a heart and blood vessels in mice.¶ <u>Given the progress to date, further advances in bioprinting might even enable bionic organs – body parts that restore and extend human ability</u>. Scientists at Princeton University have conducted experiments aiming to integrate electronics into bioprinting. Earlier in 2013 they created an ear that receives a wide range of frequencies using a coiled antenna printed with silver nanoparticles. The artificial ear can pick up frequencies beyond the range of normal human hearing.¶ Bio-artificial and 3D-printed organs can not only alleviate the shortage of donor organs. Artificially created organs can also be used to test the impact of new drugs, thus eliminating the need to test new drugs on humans. 3D models of organs could also be used for educational and research purposes.</p>
null
1nc
adv 1
430,443
11
17,109
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
565,261
N
Wake
3
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
Watson
AG Politics (2NR) Narrow Ruling CP (2NR) Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR) T - nearly all Test Case Fiat
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,623
Means you can’t solve case—not perceived as credible
null
HUYEN PHAM, 2004, Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia;, THE INHERENT FLAWS IN THE INHERENT AUTHORITY POSITION: WHY INVITING LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION, http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/lawreview/downloads/314/Pham_Porter.pdf
local authorities make immigration policy when they enforce immigration laws, then other countries may rightly feel more uncertainty about how their nationals will be treated under that policy than they would under a unitary federal policy. This heightened uncertainty could have spillover effects on U.S. relations with these countries And if each state or local author- ity can enforce immigration laws as a sovereign, then a country that disagrees with the treatment of its nationals in a particular instance may not have a consistent or effective way to protest that treat- ment
local authorities make immigration policy when they enforce immigration laws, then other countries may rightly feel more uncertainty about how their nationals will be treated This heightened uncertainty could have spillover effects on U.S. relations with these countries if each state can enforce as a sovereign, then a country that disagrees may not have a consistent way to protest
If, as argued above, local authorities make immigration policy when they enforce immigration laws, then other countries may rightly feel more uncertainty about how their nationals will be treated under that policy than they would under a unitary federal policy. This heightened uncertainty could have spillover effects on U.S. relations with these countries. And if each state or local author- ity can enforce immigration laws as a sovereign, then a country that disagrees with the treatment of its nationals in a particular instance may not have a consistent or effective way to protest that treat- ment.162 Because nonuniform enforcement affects immigration policy and foreign policy, it is as constitutionally problematic as nonuniform immigration laws.
756
<h4><strong>Means you can’t solve case—not perceived as credible </h4><p></strong>HUYEN <u>PHAM</u>, <u>2004</u>, Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia;, THE INHERENT FLAWS IN THE INHERENT AUTHORITY POSITION: WHY INVITING LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION, http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/lawreview/downloads/314/Pham_Porter.pdf</p><p>If, as argued above, <u><strong><mark>local authorities make immigration policy when they enforce immigration laws, then other countries may rightly feel more uncertainty about how their nationals will be treated</mark> under that policy than they would under a unitary federal policy.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>This heightened uncertainty could have spillover effects on U.S. relations with these countries</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>And <mark>if each state</mark> or local author- ity <mark>can enforce</mark> immigration laws <mark>as a sovereign, then a country that disagrees</mark> with the treatment of its nationals in a particular instance <mark>may not have a consistent</mark> or effective <mark>way to protest</mark> that treat- ment</u></strong>.162 Because nonuniform enforcement affects immigration policy and foreign policy, it is as constitutionally problematic as nonuniform immigration laws.</p>
1nr
null
Turns ILaqw
431,106
1
17,108
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
565,269
N
Texas
2
Northwestern Esman-McCue
Moss
Fed CP (2NR) TPA T - Legalize State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,624
Yes strikes- and they escalate- prefer recent ev
Guardian 1/1
Guardian 1/1/2015 (Middle East, 2015: further standoffs, tripwires and catastrophes; The jihadist threat of Isis and ongoing Syria disaster will pile pressure on western leaders. Then there's Iran, Turkey, Israel-Palestine and north Africa, lexis)
The Middle East in 2015 features several dangerous tripwires that could tip the region into sudden chaos The most obvious is the standoff over Iran's suspect nuclear programme, which Israel regards as an existential threat. Opinions differ whether a deal can be reached. If it is, Iran could come in from the cold If not the possibility that Israel, led by Netanyahu, will take matters into its own hands and launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is very real
Middle East in 2015 features several dangerous tripwires that could tip the region into sudden chaos. The most obvious is Iran's nuclear programme, which Israel regards as an existential threat a deal can be reached. If not, the possibility that Israel, led by Binyamin Netanyahu, will take matters into its own hands and launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is very real
The Middle East in 2015 features several other dangerous tripwires that could tip the region into sudden chaos. The most obvious is the standoff over Iran's suspect nuclear programme, which Israel regards as an existential threat. Long-running talks again ended without agreement in November. A new deadline of July, 2015 has been set. Opinions differ whether a deal can be reached. If it is, Iran could come in from the cold for the first time since 1979. If not, the possibility that Israel, led by prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu, will take matters into its own hands and launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is very real indeed.
656
<h4><strong>Yes strikes- and they escalate- prefer recent ev</h4><p>Guardian 1/1</strong>/2015 (Middle East, 2015: further standoffs, tripwires and catastrophes; The jihadist threat of Isis and ongoing Syria disaster will pile pressure on western leaders. Then there's Iran, Turkey, Israel-Palestine and north Africa, lexis)</p><p><u>The <mark>Middle East in 2015 features several</u></mark> other <u><mark>dangerous tripwires that could tip the region</mark> <mark>into sudden chaos</u>. <u>The most obvious is</mark> the standoff over <mark>Iran's</mark> suspect <mark>nuclear programme, which Israel regards as an existential threat</mark>.</u> Long-running talks again ended without agreement in November. A new deadline of July, 2015 has been set. <u>Opinions differ whether <mark>a deal can be reached.</mark> If it is, Iran could come in from the cold </u>for the first time since 1979. <u><mark>If not</u>, <u>the possibility that Israel, led by</u></mark> prime minister <mark>Binyamin <u>Netanyahu, will take matters into its own hands and launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is <strong>very real</u></strong></mark> indeed.</p><p> </p>
1nr
Strikes
At: no impact
430,495
6
17,106
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
565,267
N
Navy
8
Navy Mueller-Roach
Benedict
Fed CP (2NR) Politics - Iran DA (2NR) T - nearly all Treaties DA
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,625
And that market is expanding—desperation and profit ensures expansion and exploitation
Samadi 2012
Samadi 2012 – Vice Chairman of the Department of Urology and Chief of Robotics and Minimally Invasive Surgery at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine (David, May 30, 2012, “Consequences of the rise in illegal organ trafficking,” Fox News, http://www.foxnews.com/health/2012/05/30/consequences-rise-in-illegal-organ-trafficking/,)
the WHO released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. Unfortunately the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives with patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs In the majority of situations, those selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations In countries like Pakistan, China or India a person can sell a kidney for $5,000 while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit Prior reports demonstrated that the recipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower statistics might underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable
WHO) released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market , in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives, hose selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations. ipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally. the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower
Earlier this week, the World Health Organization (WHO) released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market. According to the paper, in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. Organ transplantation is a necessary treatment for many individuals whose organs have failed and has been in practice in the United States since the 1950s. In the U.S. organ donations are regulated by an independent non-for-profit organization, United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). Organs are given to those whose need is the greatest, regardless of wealth or position. Unfortunately, the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply. As of March 2012 over 113,115 patients are currently waiting for an organ to become available. An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation, and the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives, with patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney. According to the WHO report, 76 percent of organs sold were kidneys, reflecting the growing demand secondary to complications of high blood pressure and diabetes. There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs. In the majority of situations, those selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations. In countries like Pakistan, China or India, a person can sell a kidney for $5,000, while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit. Prior reports have also demonstrated that the recipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally. A recent meta-analysis involving 39 original publications revealed that those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV. Furthermore the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower. These statistics might even underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias; those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies. Additionally, given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams. In 2010, a former psychiatrist was sentenced to more than 15 years in prison for offering false promises of organ transplants in the Philippines, while taking over $400,000 dollars from patients. Over five patients actually travelled to the Philippines only to find out that there was no organ awaiting them. One of these patients died in the Philippines. Regretfully, the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable
2,662
<h4>And that market is <u>expanding</u>—desperation and profit ensures expansion and exploitation</h4><p><strong>Samadi 2012</strong> – Vice Chairman of the Department of Urology and Chief of Robotics and Minimally Invasive Surgery at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine (David, May 30, 2012, “Consequences of the rise in illegal organ trafficking,” Fox News, http://www.foxnews.com/health/2012/05/30/consequences-rise-in-illegal-organ-trafficking/,)</p><p>Earlier this week, <u>the</u> World Health Organization (<u><mark>WHO</u>) <u>released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market</u></mark>. According to the paper<mark>, <u>in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour.</mark> </u>Organ transplantation is a necessary treatment for many individuals whose organs have failed and has been in practice in the United States since the 1950s. In the U.S. organ donations are regulated by an independent non-for-profit organization, United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). Organs are given to those whose need is the greatest, regardless of wealth or position. <u>Unfortunately</u>, <u>the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply</u>. As of March 2012 over 113,115 patients are currently waiting for an organ to become available. <u><mark>An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation</u></mark>, and <u><mark>the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives</u>,</mark> <u>with</u> <u>patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney</u>. According to the WHO report, 76 percent of organs sold were kidneys, reflecting the growing demand secondary to complications of high blood pressure and diabetes. <u>There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs</u>. <u>In the majority of situations, t<mark>hose selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations</u>.</mark> <u>In countries like Pakistan, China or India</u>, <u>a person can sell a kidney for $5,000</u>, <u>while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit</u>. <u>Prior reports</u> have also <u>demonstrated that the rec<mark>ipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally</u>.</mark> A recent meta-analysis involving 39 original publications revealed that <u>those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV</u>. Furthermore <u><mark>the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower</u></mark>. These <u>statistics</u> <u>might</u> even <u>underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias</u>; <u>those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies</u>. Additionally, <u>given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams</u>. In 2010, a former psychiatrist was sentenced to more than 15 years in prison for offering false promises of organ transplants in the Philippines, while taking over $400,000 dollars from patients. Over five patients actually travelled to the Philippines only to find out that there was no organ awaiting them. One of these patients died in the Philippines. Regretfully, <u>the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable</u> </p>
null
null
Contention 2 is illegal markets
267,351
8
17,114
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
565,248
A
Wake
4
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
Voss
null
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,626
Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics
American Banker 2014
American Banker 7/18/2014 (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)
The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry The legislation has yet to pass in the Senate Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system
The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark. "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry,"
The House of Representatives gave a thumbs-up Wednesday to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system. The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark. "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry," Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. The legislation, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, has yet to pass in the Senate. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.
1,984
<h4>Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics</h4><p><strong>American Banker</strong> 7/18/<strong>2014</strong> (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)</p><p><u><mark>The House</u></mark> of Representatives <u><mark>gave a thumbs-up</u></mark> Wednesday <u><mark>to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system</u></mark>. <u><mark>The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses.</mark> </u>It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, <u>the House vote <mark>marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream</u></mark>. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. <u><strong><mark>The House measure passed</strong> with the support of <strong>186 Democrats and 45 Republicans</u></strong>, <u>and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark</u>. "<u><strong>This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry</u></strong>,"</mark> Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. <u>The legislation</u>, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, <u>has yet to pass in the Senate</u>. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. <u>Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system</u>. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.</p>
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2
430,418
16
17,112
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
565,260
N
Wake
2
Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
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18,764
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2,014
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743,627
Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations
Taylor 2013
Taylor 2013 (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)
without congressional action and given Obama’s opposition to legalizing marijuana the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with states The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives broad discretion to do so including legally binding contractual agreements. Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do should not require much boldness Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise prosecutorial discretion to ensure that Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong deterrent to unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently in contrast to the uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to marijuana with the invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen too much chaos
Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,
The good news is that even without a congressional action, and even given President Obama’s opposition to legalizing recreational or medical marijuana, the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana states and the District of Columbia. The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives him broad discretion to do so, through means including legally binding contractual agreements. This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do (cooperate with the states) should not require much boldness. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. Written contractual agreements should, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise his prosecutorial discretion to ensure that his Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General (or a high-level designee) personally finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently—again, in marked contrast to the chaos and uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to medical marijuana. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, with the above-mentioned invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse. At the very last, they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen, of late, all too much chaos.
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<h4>Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations</h4><p><strong>Taylor 2013</strong> (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)</p><p>The good news is that even <u>without</u> a <u>congressional action</u>, <u>and</u> even <u>given</u> President <u>Obama’s</u> <u>opposition to legalizing</u> recreational or medical <u>marijuana</u>, <u>the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with</u> Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana <u>states</u> and the District of Columbia. <u>The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives</u> him <u>broad discretion to do so</u>, through means <u>including legally binding contractual agreements.</u> This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). <u>Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do</u> (cooperate with the states) <u>should not require much boldness</u>. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. <u><mark>Written contractual agreements should</u></mark>, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, <u><mark>provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate</u></mark> licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; <u><mark>and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate </mark>in targeting those who grow and distribute <mark>marijuana without state licenses</u>. <u>This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to </mark>control trafficking, abuse, and diversion <mark>than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes</u>. <u>Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General </mark>to exercise</u> his <u>prosecutorial discretion to ensure that</u> his <u>Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General</u> (or a high-level designee) personally <u>finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law</u> and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But <u><strong><mark>the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong</u></strong> political <u><strong>deterrent to</u></strong> such an <u><strong>unwarranted enforcement action</u></strong></mark>. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, <u><mark>the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,</mark> by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently</u>—again, <u>in</u> marked <u>contrast to the</u> chaos and <u>uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to</u> medical <u>marijuana</u>. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, <u>with the</u> above-mentioned <u>invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states</u>, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, <u>the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse</u>. At the very last, <u>they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen</u>, of late, all <u>too much chaos</u>.</p>
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56,721
34
17,110
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
565,262
N
Wake
5
NYU Itliong-Zhan
McCleary
Fed CP (2NR) AG Politics (2NR Cede the Political DA T - USFG
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2,014
cx
college
2
743,628
Barriers to xenotransplant
Sobota 4
Sobota 4 Margaret R. Sobota, J.D. Candidate (2005), Washington University School of Law. Washington University Law Quarterly Fall, 2004 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1225 NOTE: THE PRICE OF LIFE: $ 50,000 FOR AN EGG, WHY NOT $ 1,500 FOR A KIDNEY? AN ARGUMENT TO ESTABLISH A MARKET FOR ORGAN PROCUREMENT SIMILAR TO THE CURRENT MARKET FOR HUMAN EGG PROCUREMENT lexis
The major medical obstacle with xenotransplantation is organ rejection due to physiological differences between humans and animals Additionally, there are major ethical and moral issues associated with xenotransplantation
null
A third proposed reform to the current system of organ procurement is to increase the supply of transplantable organs through xenotransplantation (transplantation between species, generally from animals to humans). n78 The major medical obstacle with xenotransplantation is organ rejection due to physiological differences [*1236] between humans and animals. n79 Additionally, there are major ethical and moral issues associated with xenotransplantation which are beyond the scope of this Note. n80
500
<h4>Barriers to xenotransplant</h4><p><strong>Sobota 4</strong> Margaret R. Sobota, J.D. Candidate (2005), Washington University School of Law. Washington University Law Quarterly Fall, 2004 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1225 NOTE: THE PRICE OF LIFE: $ 50,000 FOR AN EGG, WHY NOT $ 1,500 FOR A KIDNEY? AN ARGUMENT TO ESTABLISH A MARKET FOR ORGAN PROCUREMENT SIMILAR TO THE CURRENT MARKET FOR HUMAN EGG PROCUREMENT lexis</p><p>A third proposed reform to the current system of organ procurement is to increase the supply of transplantable organs through xenotransplantation (transplantation between species, generally from animals to humans). n78 <u>The major medical obstacle with xenotransplantation is organ rejection due to physiological differences</u> [*1236] <u>between humans and animals</u>. n79 <u>Additionally, there are major ethical and moral issues associated with xenotransplantation</u> which are beyond the scope of this Note. n80</p>
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431,107
1
17,109
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
565,261
N
Wake
3
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
Watson
AG Politics (2NR) Narrow Ruling CP (2NR) Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR) T - nearly all Test Case Fiat
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
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743,629
The Altnerative leads to China Fill-in, kills the economy and causes mercantilism—causes transition wars, poverty and ecological destruction
POSEN, 9
POSEN, 9 - Deputy director and senior fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics (Adam, “Economic leadership beyond the crisis,” http://clients.squareeye.com/uploads/foresight/documents/PN%20USA_FINAL_LR_1.pdf)
US power and prestige, beyond the nation's military might, have been based largely on American relative economic size and success These facts enabled the US to promote economic openness and buy-in to a set of economic institutions, formal and informal, that resulted in increasing international economic integration this combination produced generally growing prosperity at home underpinned the idea that there were benefits to other countries of following the American model and playing by American rules With the collapse of Soviet communism in 1989, and the concomitant switch of important emerging economies, notably Brazil, China, India, and Mexico, to increasingly free-market capitalism, global integration on American terms through American leadership has been increasingly dominant for the last two decades The global financial system, including but not limited to US-based entities, has not yet been sustainably reformed. the crisis will accelerate at least temporarily two related long-term trends eroding the viability of the current international economic arrangements American global economic leadership has been eroded over the long-term by the rise of major emerging market economies, disrupted in the short-term by the nature and scope of the financial crisis, and partially discredited by the excessive reliance upon and overselling of US-led financial capitalism Is there an alternative economic model? the rise of the Rest over the West. That would be premature The empirical record is that economic recovery from financial crises is doable even by the poorest countries Even large fiscal debt burdens can be reined in over a few years where political will and institutions allow, and the US has historically fit in that category The Chinese model is in part mercantilism . That would erode globalisation, and lead to greater conflict adjustment of current international economic institutions is all that is required, rather than desperately defending economic globalisation itself The need for the US to avoid excessive domestic self-absorption is a real concern as well, given the combination of foreign policy fatigue from the Bush foreign policy agenda and economic insecurity from the financial crisis. Failure to act affirmatively to manage the situation, however, bears two significant and related risks: first, that China and perhaps some other rising economic powers will opportunistically divert countries in US-oriented integrated relationships to their economic sphere(s); second, that a leadership vacuum will arise in international financial affairs and in multilateral trade efforts, which will over time erode support for a globally integrated economy. Both of these risks if realised would diminish US foreign policy influence, make the economic system less resilient in response to future shocks reduce economic growth and thus the rate of reduction in global poverty, and conflict with other foreign policy goals like controlling climate change
US power based largely on relative success underpinned that there were benefits to following the American mode global integration has been increasingly dominant The Chinese model is mercantilism That would erode globalisation, and lead to greater conflict Failure to act bears risks: , that China will divert countries to their economic sphere , a leadership vacuum will arise these risks would diminish US foreign policy influence, make the economic system less resilient reduce growth and the rate of reduction in global poverty, and conflict with goals like controlling climate change
In the postwar period, US power and prestige, beyond the nation's military might, have been based largely on American relative economic size and success. These facts enabled the US to promote economic openness and buy-in to a set of economic institutions, formal and informal, that resulted in increasing international economic integration. With the exception of the immediate post-Bretton Woods oil-shock period (1974-85), this combination produced generally growing prosperity at home and abroad, and underpinned the idea that there were benefits to other countries of following the American model and playing by American rules. Initially this system was most influential and successful in those countries in tight military alliance with the US, such as Canada, West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. With the collapse of Soviet communism in 1989, and the concomitant switch of important emerging economies, notably Brazil, China, India, and Mexico, to increasingly free-market capitalism, global integration on American terms through American leadership has been increasingly dominant for the last two decades. The global financial crisis of 2008-09, however, represents a challenge to that world order. While overt financial panic has been averted, and most economic forecasts are for recovery to begin in the US and the major emerging markets well before end of 2009 (a belief I share), there remain significant risks for the US and its leadership. The global financial system, including but not limited to US-based entities, has not yet been sustainably reformed. In fact, financial stability will come under strain again when the current government financial guarantees and public ownership of financial firms and assets are unwound over the next couple of years. The growth rate of the US economy and the ability of the US government to finance responses to future crises, both military and economic, will be meaningfully curtailed for several years to come. Furthermore, the crisis will accelerate at least temporarily two related long-term trends eroding the viability of the current international economic arrangements. First, perhaps inevitably, the economic size and importance of China, India, Brazil, and other emerging markets (including oil-exporters like Russia) has been catching up with the US, and even more so with demographically and productivity challenged Europe and northeast Asia. Second, pressure has been building over the past fifteen years or so of these developing countries' economic rise to give their governments more voice and weight in international economic decision-making. Again, this implies a transfer of relative voting share from the US, but an even greater one from over-represented Western Europe. The near certainty that Brazil, China, and India, are to be less harmed in real economic terms by the current crisis than either the US or most other advanced economies will only emphasise their growing strength, and their ability to claim a role in leadership. The need for capital transfers from China and oil-exporters to fund deficits and bank recapitalisation throughout the West, not just in the US, increases these rising countries' leverage and legitimacy in international economic discussions. One aspect of this particular crisis is that American economic policymakers, both Democratic and Republican, became increasingly infatuated with financial services and innovation beginning in the mid-1990s. This reflected a number of factors, some ideological, some institutional, and some interest group driven. The key point here is that export of financial services and promotion of financial liberalisation on the US securitised model abroad came to dominate the US international economic policy agenda, and thus that of the IMF, the OECD, and the G8 as well. This came to be embodied by American multinational commercial and investment banks, in perception and in practice. That particular version of the American economic model has been widely discredited, because of the crisis' apparent origins in US lax regulation and over-consumption, as well as in excessive faith in American-style financial markets. Thus, American global economic leadership has been eroded over the long-term by the rise of major emerging market economies, disrupted in the short-term by the nature and scope of the financial crisis, and partially discredited by the excessive reliance upon and overselling of US-led financial capitalism. This crisis therefore presents the possibility of the US model for economic development being displaced, not only deservedly tarnished, and the US having limited resources in the near-term to try to respond to that challenge. Additionally, the US' traditional allies and co-capitalists in Western Europe and Northeast Asia have been at least as damaged economically by the crisis (though less damaged reputationally). Is there an alternative economic model? The preceding description would seem to confirm the rise of the Rest over the West. That would be premature. The empirical record is that economic recovery from financial crises, while painful, is doable even by the poorest countries, and in advanced countries rarely leads to significant political dislocation. Even large fiscal debt burdens can be reined in over a few years where political will and institutions allow, and the US has historically fit in that category. A few years of slower growth will be costly, but also may put the US back on a sustainable growth path in terms of savings versus consumption. Though the relative rise of the major emerging markets will be accelerated by the crisis, that acceleration will be insufficient to rapidly close the gap with the US in size, let alone in technology and well-being. None of those countries, except perhaps for China, can think in terms of rivaling the US in all the aspects of national power. These would include: a large, dynamic and open economy; favorable demographic dynamics; monetary stability and a currency with a global role; an ability to project hard power abroad; and an attractive economic model to export for wide emulation. This last point is key. In the area of alternative economic models, one cannot beat something with nothing - communism fell not just because of its internal contradictions, or the costly military build-up, but because capitalism presented a clearly superior alternative. The Chinese model is in part the American capitalist (albeit not high church financial liberalisation) model, and is in part mercantilism. There has been concern that some developing or small countries could take the lesson from China that building up lots of hard currency reserves through undervaluation and export orientation is smart. That would erode globalisation, and lead to greater conflict with and criticism of the US-led system. While in the abstract that is a concern, most emerging markets - and notably Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea - are not pursuing that extreme line. The recent victory of the incumbent Congress Party in India is one indication, and the statements about openness of Brazilian President Lula is another. Mexico's continued orientation towards NAFTA while seeking other investment flows (outside petroleum sector, admittedly) to and from abroad is a particularly brave example. Germany's and Japan's obvious crisis-prompted difficulties emerging from their very high export dependence, despite their being wealthy, serve as cautionary examples on the other side. So unlike in the1970s, the last time that the US economic performance and leadership were seriously compromised, we will not see leading developing economies like Brazil and India going down the import substitution or other self-destructive and uncooperative paths. If this assessment is correct, the policy challenge is to deal with relative US economic decline, but not outright hostility to the US model or displacement of the current international economic system. That is reassuring, for it leaves us in the realm of normal economic diplomacy, perhaps to be pursued more multilaterally and less high-handedly than the US has done over the past 20 years. It also suggests that adjustment of current international economic institutions is all that is required, rather than desperately defending economic globalisation itself. For all of that reassurance, however, the need to get buy-in from the rising new players to the current system is more pressing on the economic front than it ever has been before. Due to the crisis, the ability of the US and the other advanced industrial democracies to put up money and markets for rewards and side-payments to those new players is also more limited than it has been in the past, and will remain so for at least the next few years. The need for the US to avoid excessive domestic self-absorption is a real concern as well, given the combination of foreign policy fatigue from the Bush foreign policy agenda and economic insecurity from the financial crisis. Managing the post-crisis global economy Thus, the US faces a challenging but not truly threatening global economic situation as a result of the crisis and longer-term financial trends. Failure to act affirmatively to manage the situation, however, bears two significant and related risks: first, that China and perhaps some other rising economic powers will opportunistically divert countries in US-oriented integrated relationships to their economic sphere(s); second, that a leadership vacuum will arise in international financial affairs and in multilateral trade efforts, which will over time erode support for a globally integrated economy. Both of these risks if realised would diminish US foreign policy influence, make the economic system less resilient in response to future shocks (to every country's detriment), reduce economic growth and thus the rate of reduction in global poverty, and conflict with other foreign policy goals like controlling climate change or managing migration and demographic shifts. If the US is to rise to the challenge, it should concentrate on the following priority measures.
10,200
<h4>The Altnerative leads to China Fill-in, kills the economy and causes mercantilism—causes transition wars, poverty and ecological destruction</h4><p><strong>POSEN, 9</strong> - Deputy director and senior fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics (Adam, “Economic leadership beyond the crisis,” http://clients.squareeye.com/uploads/foresight/documents/PN%20USA_FINAL_LR_1.pdf)</p><p>In the postwar period, <u><mark>US power</mark> and prestige, beyond the nation's military might, have been <mark>based largely on </mark>American <mark>relative </mark>economic size and <mark>success</u></mark>. <u>These facts enabled the US to promote economic openness and buy-in to a set of economic institutions, formal and informal, that resulted in increasing international economic integration</u>. With the exception of the immediate post-Bretton Woods oil-shock period (1974-85), <u>this combination produced generally growing prosperity at home </u>and abroad, and<u> <mark>underpinned </mark>the idea <mark>that there were benefits to</mark> other countries of <mark>following the American mode</mark>l and playing by American rules</u>. Initially this system was most influential and successful in those countries in tight military alliance with the US, such as Canada, West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. <u>With the collapse of Soviet communism in 1989, and the concomitant switch of important emerging economies, notably Brazil, China, India, and Mexico, to increasingly free-market capitalism, <mark>global integration </mark>on American terms through American leadership <mark>has been increasingly dominant</mark> for the last two decades</u>. The global financial crisis of 2008-09, however, represents a challenge to that world order. While overt financial panic has been averted, and most economic forecasts are for recovery to begin in the US and the major emerging markets well before end of 2009 (a belief I share), there remain significant risks for the US and its leadership. <u>The global financial system, including but not limited to US-based entities, has not yet been sustainably reformed.</u> In fact, financial stability will come under strain again when the current government financial guarantees and public ownership of financial firms and assets are unwound over the next couple of years. The growth rate of the US economy and the ability of the US government to finance responses to future crises, both military and economic, will be meaningfully curtailed for several years to come. Furthermore, <u>the crisis will accelerate at least temporarily two related long-term trends eroding the viability of the current international economic arrangements</u>. First, perhaps inevitably, the economic size and importance of China, India, Brazil, and other emerging markets (including oil-exporters like Russia) has been catching up with the US, and even more so with demographically and productivity challenged Europe and northeast Asia. Second, pressure has been building over the past fifteen years or so of these developing countries' economic rise to give their governments more voice and weight in international economic decision-making. Again, this implies a transfer of relative voting share from the US, but an even greater one from over-represented Western Europe. The near certainty that Brazil, China, and India, are to be less harmed in real economic terms by the current crisis than either the US or most other advanced economies will only emphasise their growing strength, and their ability to claim a role in leadership. The need for capital transfers from China and oil-exporters to fund deficits and bank recapitalisation throughout the West, not just in the US, increases these rising countries' leverage and legitimacy in international economic discussions. One aspect of this particular crisis is that American economic policymakers, both Democratic and Republican, became increasingly infatuated with financial services and innovation beginning in the mid-1990s. This reflected a number of factors, some ideological, some institutional, and some interest group driven. The key point here is that export of financial services and promotion of financial liberalisation on the US securitised model abroad came to dominate the US international economic policy agenda, and thus that of the IMF, the OECD, and the G8 as well. This came to be embodied by American multinational commercial and investment banks, in perception and in practice. That particular version of the American economic model has been widely discredited, because of the crisis' apparent origins in US lax regulation and over-consumption, as well as in excessive faith in American-style financial markets. Thus, <u>American global economic leadership has been eroded over the long-term by the rise of major emerging market economies, disrupted in the short-term by the nature and scope of the financial crisis, and partially discredited by the excessive reliance upon and overselling of US-led financial capitalism</u>. This crisis therefore presents the possibility of the US model for economic development being displaced, not only deservedly tarnished, and the US having limited resources in the near-term to try to respond to that challenge. Additionally, the US' traditional allies and co-capitalists in Western Europe and Northeast Asia have been at least as damaged economically by the crisis (though less damaged reputationally). <u>Is there an alternative economic model?</u> The preceding description would seem to confirm <u>the rise of the Rest over the West. That would be premature</u>. <u>The empirical record is that economic recovery from financial crises</u>, while painful, <u>is doable even by the poorest countries</u>, and in advanced countries rarely leads to significant political dislocation. <u>Even large fiscal debt burdens can be reined in over a few years where political will and institutions allow, and the US has historically fit in that category</u>. A few years of slower growth will be costly, but also may put the US back on a sustainable growth path in terms of savings versus consumption. Though the relative rise of the major emerging markets will be accelerated by the crisis, that acceleration will be insufficient to rapidly close the gap with the US in size, let alone in technology and well-being. None of those countries, except perhaps for China, can think in terms of rivaling the US in all the aspects of national power. These would include: a large, dynamic and open economy; favorable demographic dynamics; monetary stability and a currency with a global role; an ability to project hard power abroad; and an attractive economic model to export for wide emulation. This last point is key. In the area of alternative economic models, one cannot beat something with nothing - communism fell not just because of its internal contradictions, or the costly military build-up, but because capitalism presented a clearly superior alternative. <u><mark>The Chinese model is </mark>in part</u> the American capitalist (albeit not high church financial liberalisation) model, and is in part <u><mark>mercantilism</u></mark>. There has been concern that some developing or small countries could take the lesson from China that building up lots of hard currency reserves through undervaluation and export orientation is smart<u>. <mark>That would erode globalisation, and lead to greater conflict</u></mark> with and criticism of the US-led system. While in the abstract that is a concern, most emerging markets - and notably Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea - are not pursuing that extreme line. The recent victory of the incumbent Congress Party in India is one indication, and the statements about openness of Brazilian President Lula is another. Mexico's continued orientation towards NAFTA while seeking other investment flows (outside petroleum sector, admittedly) to and from abroad is a particularly brave example. Germany's and Japan's obvious crisis-prompted difficulties emerging from their very high export dependence, despite their being wealthy, serve as cautionary examples on the other side. So unlike in the1970s, the last time that the US economic performance and leadership were seriously compromised, we will not see leading developing economies like Brazil and India going down the import substitution or other self-destructive and uncooperative paths. If this assessment is correct, the policy challenge is to deal with relative US economic decline, but not outright hostility to the US model or displacement of the current international economic system. That is reassuring, for it leaves us in the realm of normal economic diplomacy, perhaps to be pursued more multilaterally and less high-handedly than the US has done over the past 20 years. It also suggests that<u> adjustment of current international economic institutions is all that is required, rather than desperately defending economic globalisation itself</u>. For all of that reassurance, however, the need to get buy-in from the rising new players to the current system is more pressing on the economic front than it ever has been before. Due to the crisis, the ability of the US and the other advanced industrial democracies to put up money and markets for rewards and side-payments to those new players is also more limited than it has been in the past, and will remain so for at least the next few years. <u>The need for the US to avoid excessive domestic self-absorption is a real concern as well, given the combination of foreign policy fatigue from the Bush foreign policy agenda and economic insecurity from the financial crisis.</u> Managing the post-crisis global economy Thus, the US faces a challenging but not truly threatening global economic situation as a result of the crisis and longer-term financial trends. <u><mark>Failure to act</mark> affirmatively to manage the situation, however, <mark>bears</mark> two significant and related <mark>risks: </mark>first<mark>, that China</mark> and perhaps some other rising economic powers <mark>will</mark> opportunistically <mark>divert countries</mark> in US-oriented integrated relationships <mark>to their economic sphere</mark>(s); second<mark>, </mark>that <mark>a leadership vacuum will arise</mark> in international financial affairs and in multilateral trade efforts, which will over time erode support for a globally integrated economy. Both of <mark>these risks </mark>if realised <mark>would diminish US foreign policy influence, make the economic system less resilient</mark> in response to future shocks</u> (to every country's detriment), <u><mark>reduce</mark> economic <mark>growth and</mark> thus <mark>the rate of reduction in global poverty, and conflict with </mark>other foreign policy <mark>goals like controlling climate change</u></mark> or managing migration and demographic shifts. If the US is to rise to the challenge, it should concentrate on the following priority measures.</p>
null
1nc
Case
70,108
17
17,111
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
565,271
N
Texas
5
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
Garrett
Framework (2NR) cap good
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,630
States would be REALLY MEAN to immigrants- state control causes patchwork- links to all of our turns and takes out any solvency
Fitz 10
Fitz 10 (Marshall, Director of Immigration Policy at the Center for American Progress, Arizona Calls the Question, June, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/06/candelaria_column.html)
in Candelaria the United States argued that Arizona had overstepped its authority by establishing a parallel employer-sanctions law. He stated that the state law was explicitly preempted by federal law and that the underlying court decision should be reversed. This is an important signal and a critical first step in halting the growth of state and local immigration legislation the administration now has an opportunity to provide a more expansive articulation of its views on federal preemption of immigration regulation The United States has witnessed an unprecedented explosion of activity by state and local governments seeking to legislate in the immigration arena These state and local efforts have been counterproductive the Supreme Court could have embraced the 9th Circuit’s reasoning and ruling would have charted the country on a disastrous course back to the Articles of Confederation by endorsing the right of each state to establish its own immigration policies The administration argued that Arizona’s law imposing sanctions on employers that hire undocumented workers thwarts Congress’s careful balancing of interests in establishing a national employer sanctions regime. That line of argument can and should be extended to other state and local efforts to legislate in the immigration arena
the state law was preempted by federal law This is an important signal and a critical first step in halting the growth of state immigration legislation The United States has witnessed an unprecedented explosion of activity by state governments seeking to legislate in immigration the Supreme Court’s could embrace the 9th Circuit’s ruling would have charted the country on a disastrous course back to the Articles of Confederation by endorsing the right of each state to establish its own immigration policies Arizona’s law thwarts Congress’s balancing of interests That line of argument can and should be extended to other state efforts
The Obama administration recently waded in to the debate over whether states can legislate in the immigration arena in a brief filed with the Supreme Court. The case, U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, involves a challenge to an Arizona law passed in 2007 that requires employers to use a national electronic employment verification system called E-verify and establishes a state-level sanctions regime for employing undocumented workers. The 9th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the law, but the plaintiffs sought review of that decision with the Supreme Court, and the Court formally requested the administration’s views on the issues raised in the appeal. The acting solicitor general of the United States argued (correctly) that Arizona had overstepped its authority by establishing a parallel employer-sanctions law. He stated that the state law was explicitly preempted by federal law and that the underlying court decision should be reversed. This is an important signal and a critical first step in halting the growth of state and local immigration legislation. Given the current developments in Arizona and elsewhere in the country, the administration now has an opportunity, and a responsibility, to provide a more expansive articulation of its views on federal preemption of immigration regulation and enforcement by the states. Proliferation of laws and ordinances The United States has witnessed an unprecedented explosion of activity by state and local governments seeking to legislate in the immigration arena since the last congressional attempt at comprehensive federal immigration reform failed three years ago. These initiatives range from statewide employment restrictions, to municipal regulations prohibiting housing rentals based on immigration status, and requiring state and local police to enforce immigration laws. These efforts reflect a sense of lost control and legitimate anger with the federal government’s failure to do its job. They are also an expression of fear and frustration with rapidly changing demographics that bring local resourcing challenges and create cultural tensions. And individuals and organizations driving an anti-immigrant agenda are the ones stoking these fears and egging on or initiating state and local legislative efforts. These state and local efforts have been counterproductive, as is often the case when actions are the product of fear, anger, or frustration. They have divided communities, triggered costly litigation, and failed to solve the problems they were supposed to address. Perhaps the only constructive thing to come from them is the spotlight they have shined on the consequences of federal inaction. An excellent case in point is the recent legislation in Arizona, S.B.1070, which has caused a national uproar. It has alienated the fastest growing ethnic group in the state, precipitated a barrage of lawsuits requiring the state to hire a private legal defense firm, and will not begin to solve the challenges posed by illegal immigration into the state. Public opinion polling confirms that there is majority support for S.B. 1070 in the state. But it also shows there is much stronger opposition from Latinos, who make up 30 percent of Arizona’s population and view the measure as an offensive invitation to racial profiling. And there is significantly broader and deeper support among all Arizonans for a comprehensive federal solution rather than the divisive S.B. 1070. The law hasn’t even gone in to effect and it has already ignited racial tensions and invited a national backlash with significant economic consequences. Arizona’s law has captured the eye of the national media because of the emotional cauldron ignited by its extremism, but similar stories are unfolding in states and communities throughout the country. The divisiveness and growing pervasiveness of these counterproductive measures demands a federal response. The administration’s response to Candelaria: A small but important first step It is safe to assume that the administration would have preferred to address the federalism issues presented by this burgeoning state and local immigration movement by enacting federal comprehensive immigration reform. But with comprehensive immigration reform legislation stuck in neutral and the Supreme Court’s term expiring, a response to the Court on Candelaria became due. The administration had three basic choices: (1) it could have skirted the substantive questions and argued that the issues were not ripe for Court review, (2) it could have embraced the 9th Circuit’s reasoning and ruling, or (3) it could have done what it did and argue that the measure was preempted by federal immigration law. The first option would have been deeply unsatisfying to all parties because it would have left us in the dark about the administration’s view on immigration regulation by state and local governments. And that continued silence would have further emboldened other states to pursue similar measures. The second option would have charted the country on a disastrous course back to the Articles of Confederation by endorsing the right of each state to establish its own immigration policies. Such a course would eventually confront constitutional hurdles regardless of the administration’s legal views. After all, the central impetus behind the Constitutional convention and ultimate ratification of our founding document was the manifest need for national uniformity in such matters. The administration’s adoption of the third approach was plainly the correct move from both a policy and legal standpoint. The administration argued that Arizona’s law imposing sanctions on employers that hire undocumented workers thwarts Congress’s careful balancing of interests in establishing a national employer sanctions regime. That line of argument can and should be extended to other state and local efforts to legislate in the immigration arena.
5,958
<h4><strong>States would be REALLY MEAN to immigrants- state control causes patchwork- links to all of our turns and takes out any solvency</h4><p>Fitz 10</strong> (Marshall, Director of Immigration Policy at the Center for American Progress, Arizona Calls the Question, June, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/06/candelaria_column.html)</p><p>The Obama administration recently waded <u><strong>in</u></strong> to the debate over whether states can legislate in the immigration arena in a brief filed with the Supreme Court. The case, U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. <u><strong>Candelaria</u></strong>, involves a challenge to an Arizona law passed in 2007 that requires employers to use a national electronic employment verification system called E-verify and establishes a state-level sanctions regime for employing undocumented workers. The 9th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the law, but the plaintiffs sought review of that decision with the Supreme Court, and the Court formally requested the administration’s views on the issues raised in the appeal. The acting solicitor general of <u><strong>the United States argued</u></strong> (correctly) <u><strong>that Arizona had overstepped its authority by establishing a parallel employer-sanctions law. He stated that <mark>the state law was</mark> explicitly <mark>preempted by federal law</mark> and that the underlying court decision should be reversed. <mark>This is an </strong>important signal<strong> and a critical first step in halting the growth of state</mark> and local <mark>immigration legislation</u></strong></mark>. Given the current developments in Arizona and elsewhere in the country, <u><strong>the administration now has an opportunity</u></strong>, and a responsibility, <u><strong>to provide a more expansive articulation of its views on federal preemption of immigration regulation</u></strong> and enforcement by the states. Proliferation of laws and ordinances <u><strong><mark>The United States has witnessed an </strong>unprecedented explosion<strong> of activity by state</mark> and local <mark>governments seeking to legislate in</mark> the <mark>immigration</mark> arena</u></strong> since the last congressional attempt at comprehensive federal immigration reform failed three years ago. These initiatives range from statewide employment restrictions, to municipal regulations prohibiting housing rentals based on immigration status, and requiring state and local police to enforce immigration laws. These efforts reflect a sense of lost control and legitimate anger with the federal government’s failure to do its job. They are also an expression of fear and frustration with rapidly changing demographics that bring local resourcing challenges and create cultural tensions. And individuals and organizations driving an anti-immigrant agenda are the ones stoking these fears and egging on or initiating state and local legislative efforts. <u><strong>These state and local efforts have been counterproductive</u></strong>, as is often the case when actions are the product of fear, anger, or frustration. They have divided communities, triggered costly litigation, and failed to solve the problems they were supposed to address. Perhaps the only constructive thing to come from them is the spotlight they have shined on the consequences of federal inaction. An excellent case in point is the recent legislation in Arizona, S.B.1070, which has caused a national uproar. It has alienated the fastest growing ethnic group in the state, precipitated a barrage of lawsuits requiring the state to hire a private legal defense firm, and will not begin to solve the challenges posed by illegal immigration into the state. Public opinion polling confirms that there is majority support for S.B. 1070 in the state. But it also shows there is much stronger opposition from Latinos, who make up 30 percent of Arizona’s population and view the measure as an offensive invitation to racial profiling. And there is significantly broader and deeper support among all Arizonans for a comprehensive federal solution rather than the divisive S.B. 1070. The law hasn’t even gone in to effect and it has already ignited racial tensions and invited a national backlash with significant economic consequences. Arizona’s law has captured the eye of the national media because of the emotional cauldron ignited by its extremism, but similar stories are unfolding in states and communities throughout the country. The divisiveness and growing pervasiveness of these counterproductive measures demands a federal response. The administration’s response to Candelaria: A small but important first step It is safe to assume that the administration would have preferred to address the federalism issues presented by this burgeoning state and local immigration movement by enacting federal comprehensive immigration reform. But with comprehensive immigration reform legislation stuck in neutral and <u><strong><mark>the Supreme Court</u></strong>’s</mark> term expiring, a response to the Court on Candelaria became due. The administration had three basic choices: (1) it could have skirted the substantive questions and argued that the issues were not ripe for Court review, (2) it <u><strong><mark>could</mark> have <mark>embrace</mark>d <mark>the 9th Circuit’s</mark> reasoning and <mark>ruling</u></strong></mark>, or (3) it could have done what it did and argue that the measure was preempted by federal immigration law. The first option would have been deeply unsatisfying to all parties because it would have left us in the dark about the administration’s view on immigration regulation by state and local governments. And that continued silence would have further emboldened other states to pursue similar measures. The second option <u><strong><mark>would have charted the country on a </strong>disastrous course back to the Articles of Confederation<strong> by endorsing the right of each state to establish its own immigration policies</u></strong></mark>. Such a course would eventually confront constitutional hurdles regardless of the administration’s legal views. After all, the central impetus behind the Constitutional convention and ultimate ratification of our founding document was the manifest need for national uniformity in such matters. The administration’s adoption of the third approach was plainly the correct move from both a policy and legal standpoint. <u><strong>The administration argued that <mark>Arizona’s law</mark> imposing sanctions on employers that hire undocumented workers <mark>thwarts Congress’s</mark> careful <mark>balancing of interests</mark> in establishing a national employer sanctions regime. <mark>That line of argument can and should be extended to other state</mark> and local <mark>efforts</mark> to legislate in the immigration arena</u>.</p></strong>
1nr
null
At: NBD
430,926
2
17,108
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
565,269
N
Texas
2
Northwestern Esman-McCue
Moss
Fed CP (2NR) TPA T - Legalize State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,631
Economically desperate people are coerced into selling their organs in the hope of bettering their situation. As a result of the actions of unscrupulous organ brokers and inadequate medical care, they are actually made worse off.
Jaycox 12
Jaycox 12 Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College, Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:
Moazam found almost all organ vendors were in significant debt at the time they sold their kidneys Although vendors were promised by brokers 160,000 rupees the amount received was 103,000 rupees a majority were either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady majority expressed regret because they were not freed from their debts sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority (17) of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them: In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.
2,479
<h4>Economically desperate people are coerced into selling their organs in the hope of bettering their situation. As a result of the actions of unscrupulous organ brokers and inadequate medical care, they are actually made worse off.</h4><p><strong>Jaycox 12</strong> Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,</p><p>Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION</p><p>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf</p><p><u>Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat <mark>Moazam</mark> offers the results of a recent study </u>in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 <u>He <mark>found</mark> that <mark>almost all </mark>of these <mark>organ vendors were in significant debt</mark> to wealthy landlords <mark>at the time they sold their kidneys</mark>;</u> the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. <u><mark>Although</mark> the <mark>vendors were promised by</mark> third-party <mark>brokers </mark>an average price of <mark>160,000 rupees</mark> per kidney, <mark>the amount</mark> actually <mark>received</mark> by the vendors <mark>was</mark> an average of <mark>103,000 rupees</mark>. As a result, <mark>a majority</mark> </u>(17) <u>of them <mark>were</mark> ‘<mark>either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’</mark> </u>at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, <u>a majority of the <mark>vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady</mark> as a result of their nephrectomies, and a <mark>majority</mark> also <mark>expressed regret</mark> or shame for their decision <mark>because they were not freed from their debts</mark> and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act.</u> When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and<u> </u>ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,<u><strong>Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the <mark>sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:</strong></mark> </u>In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.</p>
null
null
Contention 2 is illegal markets
430,255
14
17,114
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
565,248
A
Wake
4
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
Voss
null
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,632
Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)
All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection
The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection
All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.
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<h4>Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)</p><p><u><strong>All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity</u></strong>, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> <mark>strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses</u></strong></mark> to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, <u><strong><mark>while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option</mark> to consider in various parts of the world</u></strong>, the <u><strong><mark>reputational</u></strong></mark> (and possibly economic) <u><strong><mark>costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond</u></strong></mark> some form of <u><strong><mark>soft defection</u></mark>.</p></strong>
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Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
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Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics
American Banker 2014
American Banker 7/18/2014 (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)
The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry The legislation has yet to pass in the Senate Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system
The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, , would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, . "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry,"
The House of Representatives gave a thumbs-up Wednesday to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system. The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark. "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry," Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. The legislation, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, has yet to pass in the Senate. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.
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<h4>Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics</h4><p><strong>American Banker</strong> 7/18/<strong>2014</strong> (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)</p><p><u><mark>The House</u></mark> of Representatives <u><mark>gave a thumbs-up</u></mark> Wednesday <u><mark>to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system</u></mark>. <u><mark>The legislation, </mark>which passed by a 231-192 margin<mark>, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks </mark>and credit unions <mark>for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses.</mark> </u>It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, <u>the House vote <mark>marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream</u></mark>. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. <u><strong><mark>The House measure passed</strong> with the support of <strong>186 Democrats and 45 Republicans</u></strong>, <u></mark>and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark</u><mark>. "<u><strong>This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry</u></strong>,"</mark> Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. <u>The legislation</u>, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, <u>has yet to pass in the Senate</u>. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. <u>Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system</u>. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.</p>
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
565,262
N
Wake
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NYU Itliong-Zhan
McCleary
Fed CP (2NR) AG Politics (2NR Cede the Political DA T - USFG
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Policy making focus is key—the only way to learn about how to institute change is through analysis of real life political problems and solutions—hip hop narratives do nothing
McWhorter 08
McWhorter 08-PhD in Linguistics @ Stanford University, Associate Professor of Linguistics @ UC-Berkeley, lecturer @ Columbia University, M.A. in American Studies @ NYU, Fellow @ the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, Contributing Editor @ the Manhattan Institutes City Journal, author of several books on Hip Hop in American Culture [John, All About the Beat, June 2008, Pg. 42-44, DavidK]
We can do better than that kind of politics. Being oppositional feels good and makes for good rhymes spit over great beats. But black people's lives are improving in ways that have nothing do with sticking up their middle fingers. They are overcoming in the real America, the only America they will ever know. The hip-hop ethos cannot even see any of this, because it is all about that upturned middle finger. The beat is better over here. Hip-hop doesn't care. people making big claims about the potential for hip-hop to affect politics or create a revolution have mysteriously little interest in political change as it actually happens Rehashing that too many black men are in prison, they know nothing about nationwide efforts to reintegrate ex- cons into society. Whipping up applause knocking Republicans, they couldn't cite a single bill making its way through Congress related to the black condition They are not political junkies at all. The politics that they intend when referring to its relationship to hip-hop is actually the personal kind: to them, politics is an attitude. Attitude alone will do nothing for that ex-con. Efforts that help that ex-con are sustained in ongoing fashion quite separately from anything going on in the rap arena or stemming from it. if we are really interested in moving forward hip-hop does not merit serious interest. Hip-hop's style, , is ill-conceived to create substance for black people or anyone else.
Being oppositional feels good and makes for good rhymes spit over great beats. Bu black people's lives are improving in ways that have nothing do with sticking up their middle fingers. They are overcoming in the real Ameri hip-hop ethos cannot even see any of this, because it is all about that upturned middle finger. people making big claims about the potential for hip-hop to affect politics or create a revolution have mysteriously little interest i Rehashing that too many black men are in prison, they know nothing about nationwide efforts to reintegrate ex- cons they couldn't cite a single bill related to the black condition politics that they intend when referring to its relationship to hip-hop is actually the personal kind . Attitude alone will do nothing for that ex-con , Hip-hop's style, is ill-conceived to create substance for black people or anyone else.
We can do better than that kind of politics. There is an old joke in which someone is looking within the light cast by a streetlight for a dollar bill they dropped. Someone asks why they are looking there when they dropped the dollar bill a block away, and they say "the light's better here." The politics of hip-hop is exactly like this. Being oppositional feels good and makes for good rhymes spit over great beats. But meanwhile, black people's lives are improving in ways that have nothing do with sticking up their middle fingers. They are overcoming in the real America, the only America they will ever know. The hip-hop ethos, ever assailing the suits, cannot even see any of this, because it is all about that upturned middle finger. The beat is better over here. But what about the great things going on where there is no beat? Hip-hop, quite simply, doesn't care. Why would it? It's music. Too often for it to be an accident, I have found that people making big claims about the potential for hip-hop to affect politics or create a revolution have mysteriously little interest in politics as traditionally understood, or political change as it actually happens, as opposed to via dramatic revolutionary uprisings. Rehashing that too many black men are in prison, they know nothing about nationwide efforts to reintegrate ex- cons into society. Whipping up applause knocking Republicans, they couldn't cite a single bill making its way through Congress related to the black condition (and there are always some). They are not, really, political junkies at all. The politics that they intend when referring to its relationship to hip-hop is actually the personal kind: to them, politics is an attitude. Attitude alone will do nothing for that ex-con. Efforts that help that ex-con are sustained in ongoing fashion quite separately from anything going on in the rap arena or stemming from it. This means that if we are really interested in moving forward, then in relation to that task, hip-hop does not merit serious interest. Hip-hop is a style, in rhythm, dress code, carriage, and attitude. But there is style and there is substance. Hip-hop's style, however much it makes the neck snap, is ill-conceived to create substance for black people or anyone else.
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<h4>Policy making focus <strong>is key—the only way to learn about how to institute change is through analysis of real life political problems and solutions—hip hop narratives do nothing </h4><p>McWhorter 08</strong>-PhD in Linguistics @ Stanford University, Associate Professor of Linguistics @ UC-Berkeley, lecturer @ Columbia University, M.A. in American Studies @ NYU, Fellow @ the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, Contributing Editor @ the Manhattan Institutes City Journal, author of several books on Hip Hop in American Culture [John, <u>All About the Beat</u>, June 2008, Pg. 42-44<u>, DavidK]</p><p>We can do better than that kind of politics.</u> There is an old joke in which someone is looking within the light cast by a streetlight for a dollar bill they dropped. Someone asks why they are looking there when they dropped the dollar bill a block away, and they say "the light's better here." The politics of hip-hop is exactly like this. <u><mark>Being oppositional feels good and makes for good rhymes spit over great beats. Bu</mark>t</u> meanwhile, <u><mark>black people's lives are improving in ways that have nothing do with sticking up their middle fingers.</mark> <mark>They are overcoming in the real Ameri</mark>ca, the only America they will ever know. The <mark>hip-hop ethos</u></mark>, ever assailing the suits, <u><mark>cannot even see any of this, because it is all about that upturned middle finger.</mark> The beat is better over here. </u>But what about the great things going on where there is no beat? <u>Hip-hop</u>, quite simply, <u>doesn't care.</u> Why would it? It's music. Too often for it to be an accident, I have found that <u><mark>people making big claims about the potential for hip-hop to affect politics or create a revolution have mysteriously little interest i</mark>n</u> politics as traditionally understood, or <u>political change as it actually happens</u>, as opposed to via dramatic revolutionary uprisings. <u><mark>Rehashing that too many black men are in prison, they know nothing about nationwide efforts to reintegrate ex- cons</mark> into society. Whipping up applause knocking Republicans, <mark>they couldn't cite a single bill</mark> making its way through Congress <mark>related to the black condition</u></mark> (and there are always some). <u>They are not</u>, really, <u>political junkies at all. The <mark>politics that they intend when referring to its relationship to hip-hop is actually the personal kind</mark>: to them, politics is an attitude<mark>. Attitude alone will do nothing for that ex-con</mark>. Efforts that help that ex-con are sustained in ongoing fashion quite separately from anything going on in the rap arena or stemming from it. </u>This means that <u>if we are really interested in moving forward</u>, then in relation to that task<mark>, <u></mark>hip-hop does not merit serious interest.</u> Hip-hop is a style, in rhythm, dress code, carriage, and attitude. But there is style and there is substance. <u><mark>Hip-hop's style,</u> </mark>however much it makes the neck snap<u>, <mark>is ill-conceived to create substance for black people or anyone else.</p></u></mark>
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
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Binghamton Herrera-Smith
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Cadaver donations will never be enough—means still research
Satel 12
Satel 12 Sally L. Satel, a physician, is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute 4 May 7, 2012 Bloomberg View Facebook’s Organ Donation Success Needs Follow-Up http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-05-07/facebook-s-organ-donation-success-needs-follow-up
Even if every American agreed to be an organ donor, there still wouldn’t be enough kidneys for transplantation. I specify kidneys because people with renal failure represent about 80 percent of those on the national organ waiting list. Last year, roughly 91,000 people needed a renal transplant, but only one fifth of them received one. Of the roughly 2 million Americans who die annually, it has been estimated that only 10,500 to 13,000 possess organs healthy enough for transplanting. So, if every eligible person donated his organs at death, surgeons might be able to double the number of transplant surgeries. (Last year, 7,433 deceased donors yielded an average of 1.5 kidneys each, for a total of 11,043 operations Homo sapiens managed to survive every disease in 200,000 years none has come close to destroying the human race There is a biological reason Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly there is no danger that likelihood a natural pandemic would cause extinction is even less today than in the past There is a new era in human and veterinary public health as a continual increase in “emerging diseases” is¶ routinely reported in the scientific and lay press Most of these infections seem to be clinically mild or inapparent zoonotic disease LCMV The virus is often considered a problem in hamsters,¶ but can occur in a wide variety of rodents. Although it can affect humans, cases are seen infrequently. Bats are being incriminated as carriers and possible reservoirs of several viral diseases No documented cases of these infections have been seen in material presented for diagnosis Given the recent recognition of many of the reported conditions The biology of these¶ infections is not well understood, but anecdotal reports and data suggest they may not be highly infectious, much of the increase is due to¶ more animals being seen rather than new diseases. John Oxford expect an animal-originated pandemic within the next five year Such a contagion may originate in backwater of Asia or Africa, and be contracted by one person from a wild animal or domestic beast, By the time the first victim has succumbed to this illness, they will have spread it b Thanks to our hyper-connected world, this doomsday virus will already begun crossing the globe by air, rail, road and sea before even the best brains in medicine have begun to chisel at its genetic secrets. it will have cut the world’s population (John, “The Armageddon virus: Why experts fear a disease that leaps from animals to humans could devastate mankind in the next five years,” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2217774/The-Armageddon-virus-Why-experts-fear-disease-leaps-animals-humans-devastate-mankind-years.html) new microbe is named Bas-Congo virus to a family of viruses known as rhabdoviruses the virus was passed to insect bites There are plenty of other viral candidates You can, catch leprosy from armadillos Horses can transmit the Hendra virus, which can cause lethal respiratory and neurological disease in people.
Even if every American agreed to be an organ donor, there still wouldn’t be enough kidneys for transplantation people with renal failure represent 80 percent roughly 91,000 people only one fifth of them received one. Of the 2 million only 10,500 possess organs healthy for transplantin Homo sapiens survive every disease in 200,000 years Natural selection favors limited lethality; they are fitter because genes spread if the germs do not kill their hosts likelihood pandemic would cause extinction is less today Most of these infections seem to be clinically mild or inapparent zoonotic disease Given the recent recognition of many of the reported conditions The biology of these¶ infections is not well understood, but anecdotal reports and data suggest they may not be highly infectious, much of the increase is due to¶ more animals being seen rather than new diseases Oxford expect an animal-originated pandemic within the next five years, Such a contagion may originate in Asia or Africa be contracted by one person the time the first victim has succumbed illness, they will have spread it by this doomsday virus will already begun crossing the globe before even the best brains in medicine have begun to chisel at its genetic secrets. it will have cut the world’s population
Organ-donation groups are rightly thrilled with Facebook’s initiative. Yet it’s important to keep the larger picture in mind. Even if every American agreed to be an organ donor, there still wouldn’t be enough kidneys for transplantation. I specify kidneys because people with renal failure represent about 80 percent of those on the national organ waiting list. Last year, roughly 91,000 people needed a renal transplant, but only one fifth of them received one. Transplant Math Now look more closely at the donor math: Of the roughly 2 million Americans who die annually, it has been estimated that only 10,500 to 13,000 possess organs healthy enough for transplanting. So, if every eligible person donated his organs at death, surgeons might be able to double the number of transplant surgeries. (Last year, 7,433 deceased donors yielded an average of 1.5 kidneys each, for a total of 11,043 operations; the rest were done with organs supplied by living relatives and friends.) No extinction from disease Posner 5—Senior Lecturer, U Chicago Law. Judge on the US Court of Appeals 7th Circuit. AB from Yale and LLB from Harvard. (Richard, Catastrophe, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-4150331/Catastrophe-the-dozen-most-significant.html) Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. No impact to zoonotic diseases – hype and doesn’t cause extinction – not infectious enough Schmidt et al 6 (Emerging Diseases–Hype or Reality¶ Robert E. Schmidt, DVM, PhD, Dipl ACVP, and Drury R. Reavill, DVM, Dipl ABVP (Avian),¶ Dipl ACVP http://www.aemv.org/documents/2006_aemv_proceedings_7.pdf 2006) //trepka There is a new era in human and veterinary public health as a continual increase in “emerging diseases” is¶ routinely reported in the scientific and lay press. This presentation will mention some of the conditions considered¶ “emerging diseases” in small mammals, and compare/contrast the reports with a few of those conditions that¶ seem to be increasingly seen in a diagnostic pathology practice that specializes in “exotic” animals.¶ The question that should be answered is: What is an “emerging” disease? According to Lederberg, “‘Emergence¶ is in fact regression, a return to the standard that prevailed universally in the previous century.”1 For instance,¶ common microbes like Staphylococcus aureus, which used to be easily treatable by penicillin, have evolved to¶ be antibiotic-resistant.¶ In addition, exposure to infectious diseases that pass from animals to humans is accelerating because of the¶ modernization of our society. Humans are encroaching upon the environment and coming into contact with¶ microbes, which can jump from animals, sometimes with fatal consequences. The factors responsible for new¶ diseases are varied but probably have a synergistic action.¶ Most of these conditions have only been recognized in the last several years, and it is not clear if they are truly¶ emergent, just more readily recognized. An example would be rodent Helicobacter. This paper will briefly¶ discuss a few of the reported diseases in rodents, rabbits, and bats, as well as the actual types of conditions seen¶ in a specialty diagnostic practice.62 Association of Avian Veterinarians¶ Rodents¶ In rodents, the following diseases have been identified, primarily by the laboratory animal community, as “emerging.”¶ 1. Helicobacter infections of mice, rats, and hamsters.¶ 2. Beta hemolytic Streptococcus infections of mice.¶ 3. Staphylococcus aureus infections of athymic (nude) mice.¶ 4. Corynebacterium bovis (Hyperkeratosis-associated coryneform or HAC) infections of athymic (nude)¶ mice.¶ 5. Atypical parvovirus infections (MPV and RPV) of mice and rats.¶ 6. Atypical reovirus and paramyxovirus (parainfluenza) virus infections of guinea pigs.¶ 7. Atypical mouse hepatitis virus (MHV) infections of mice.¶ 8. Atypical mouse rotavirus (EDIM) infections of mice.¶ 9. Rat respiratory virus (RRV) infections of rats.¶ Most of these infections seem to be clinically mild or inapparent. Many have not been associated with lesions or¶ physiologic changes, and several may only be recognized by seroconversion.2 These statements are based on¶ experience with laboratory rodents, which often is different than what is happening with pet rodents.¶ Based on submissions to our diagnostic service, there appears to be an increase in the number of cases of central¶ nervous system disease in rodents. Explanations for this include expansion of the pet rodent base, greater awareness¶ by owner,s and more concern for the possibility of a zoonotic disease, particularly lymphocytic choriomeningitis.¶ Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (LCMV) is a rodent-borne virus belonging to the family Arenaviridae, genus¶ Arenavirus, which causes a wide spectrum of human disease. The virus is often considered a problem in hamsters,¶ but can occur in a wide variety of rodents. Although it can affect humans, cases are seen infrequently.¶ We have seen sporadic cases of presumed viral encephalitis in chinchillas and a woodchuck and encephalomalacia¶ of undetermined cause in a guinea pig. The largest number of cases, however, is of purulent meningoencephalitis¶ due to bacteria. In these cases the organisms have been seen and/or cultured. This condition has been diagnosed¶ in mice, rats, gerbils, hamsters, and guinea pigs. In addition cases of probable toxoplasma-induced encephalitis¶ have been seen in rats and a prairie dog.¶ Rabbits¶ In rabbits, “emerging” diseases include rabbit hemorrhagic disease due to Calicivirus. It has been increasingly¶ reported since being found in China in1984. The disease has an unusually high death rate and hemorrhage.¶ In addition, Borellia burgdorferi has been documented in rabbit ticks. Rabbits developed a rash similar to2006 Proceedings 63¶ the typical Lyme disease rash as well as the same type of immune response generated after being bitten by¶ ticks infected with B burgdorferi.¶ We have seen occasional cases of hemorrhagic disease but have not documented Lyme disease in pet rabbits.¶ We have seen an increasing number of cases of renal disease in pet rabbits, however. The primary condition is¶ interstitial nephritis with lymphocytes and plasma cells, or occasionally heterophils. There may be fibrosis and¶ mineralization. Tubular casts are occasionally present. In some animals, there is variable glomerulitis and glomerular¶ sclerosis. A few cases are associated with a bacterial infection, but in most the cause is not apparent. Because¶ the lesion is morphologically similar to renal lesions caused by Encephalitozoon, this protozoa is a primary¶ etiologic candidate. This is true even though organisms are not seen. These organisms can be difficult to demonstrate,¶ and they may not be present even though there is an ongoing immune-mediated inflammatory response.¶ Bats¶ Bats are being incriminated as carriers and possible reservoirs of several viral diseases, including Hendra and¶ Nipah viruses, as well as lyssavirus.3 Some bats have also been considered possible carriers of the coronavirus¶ that causes SARS, although there is some controversy concerning this assumption.¶ No documented cases of these infections have been seen in material presented for diagnosis. In most cases, the¶ cause of the conditions submitted is not determined, but bacterial disease, probable nutritional/metabolic disorders,¶ and neoplasia are seen. Organs most commonly involved include the lung, liver, and urinary tract (kidney and¶ urinary bladder). Morphologically, both inflammatory and noninflammatory lesions are seen.¶ Discussion¶ Given the recent arrival, or at least, recent recognition of many of the reported conditions, particularly in¶ rodents, there is minimal literature to give guidance as to their biology or importance. The biology of these¶ infections is not well understood, but anecdotal reports and data suggest they may not be highly infectious,¶ particularly the rodent diseases.¶ In the case of the conditions seen by our diagnostic service, it is probable that much of the increase is due to¶ more animals being seen by veterinarians rather than newly emergent diseases. Double bind—1ac Lyon evidence says ebola—means either a) no extinction or b) impact inevitable HUGE threshold for solvency—just once person infected from zoonotic means it’s game over—also come from WATERS of Asia and Africa THEIR AUTHOR Naish 12 – citing a leading British virologist, professor of John Oxford (John, “The Armageddon virus: Why experts fear a disease that leaps from animals to humans could devastate mankind in the next five years,” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2217774/The-Armageddon-virus-Why-experts-fear-disease-leaps-animals-humans-devastate-mankind-years.html) One leading British virologist, Professor John Oxford at Queen Mary Hospital, University of London, and a world authority on epidemics, warns that we must expect an animal-originated pandemic to hit the world within the next five years, with potentially cataclysmic effects on the human race. Such a contagion, he believes, will be a new strain of super-flu, a highly infectious virus that may originate in some far-flung backwater of Asia or Africa, and be contracted by one person from a wild animal or domestic beast, such as a chicken or pig. By the time the first victim has succumbed to this unknown, unsuspected new illness, they will have spread it by coughs and sneezes to family, friends, and all those gathered anxiously around them. Thanks to our crowded, hyper-connected world, this doomsday virus will already have begun crossing the globe by air, rail, road and sea before even the best brains in medicine have begun to chisel at its genetic secrets. Before it even has a name, it will have started to cut its lethal swathe through the world’s population. alt causes to zoonotic disease and no impact THEIR AUTHOR Naish 12 – citing a leading British virologist, professor of John Oxford (John, “The Armageddon virus: Why experts fear a disease that leaps from animals to humans could devastate mankind in the next five years,” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2217774/The-Armageddon-virus-Why-experts-fear-disease-leaps-animals-humans-devastate-mankind-years.html) The new microbe is named Bas-Congo virus (BASV), after the province where its three victims lived. It belongs to a family of viruses known as rhabdoviruses, which includes rabies. A report in the journal PLoS Pathogens says the virus probably originated in local wildlife and was passed to humans through insect bites or some other as-yet unidentified means. There are plenty of other new viral candidates waiting in the wings, guts, breath and blood of animals around us. You can, for example, catch leprosy from armadillos, which carry the virus in their shells and are responsible for a third of leprosy cases in the U.S. Horses can transmit the Hendra virus, which can cause lethal respiratory and neurological disease in people.
12,072
<h4>Cadaver donations will never be enough—means still research </h4><p><strong>Satel 12</strong> Sally L. Satel, a physician, is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute</p><p>4 May 7, 2012 Bloomberg View Facebook’s Organ Donation Success Needs Follow-Up <u>http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-05-07/facebook-s-organ-donation-success-needs-follow-up</p><p></u>Organ-donation groups are rightly thrilled with Facebook’s initiative. Yet it’s important to keep the larger picture in mind. <u><mark>Even if every American agreed to be an organ donor, there still wouldn’t be enough kidneys for transplantation</mark>.</p><p>I specify kidneys because <mark>people with renal failure represent</mark> about <mark>80 percent</mark> of those on the national organ waiting list. Last year, <mark>roughly 91,000 people</mark> needed a renal transplant, but <mark>only one fifth of them received one.</p><p></u></mark>Transplant Math</p><p>Now look more closely at the donor math: <u><mark>Of the</mark> roughly <mark>2 million</mark> Americans who die annually, it has been estimated that <mark>only 10,500</mark> to 13,000 <mark>possess organs healthy</mark> enough <mark>for transplantin</mark>g. So, if every eligible person donated his organs at death, surgeons might be able to double the number of transplant surgeries. (Last year, 7,433 deceased donors yielded an average of 1.5 kidneys each, for a total of 11,043 operations</u><strong>; the rest were done with organs supplied by living relatives and friends.)</p><p>No extinction from disease</p><p>Posner 5</strong>—Senior Lecturer, U Chicago Law. Judge on the US Court of Appeals 7th Circuit. AB from Yale and LLB from Harvard. (Richard, Catastrophe, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-4150331/Catastrophe-the-dozen-most-significant.html)</p><p>Yet the fact that <u><mark>Homo sapiens</u></mark> has <u>managed to <mark>survive every disease</u></mark> to assail it <u><mark>in</u></mark> the <u><mark>200,000 years</u></mark> or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but <u>none has come close to destroying the</u> entire <u>human race</u>. <u><strong>There is a biological reason</u></strong>. <u><mark>Natural selection favors</u></mark> <u>germs of</u> <u><mark>limited lethality</u>; <u>they are fitter</mark> in an evolutionary sense <mark>because </mark>their <mark>genes </mark>are more likely to be <mark>spread if the germs do not kill their hosts </mark>too quickly</u>. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet <u>there is no danger that</u> AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The <u><mark>likelihood</u></mark> of <u>a natural <mark>pandemic</u></mark> that <u><mark>would</mark> <mark>cause</u></mark> the <u><mark>extinction</u></mark> of the human race <u><mark>is</u></mark> probably <u>even <mark>less today</mark> than in the past</u><strong> (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. </p><p>No impact to zoonotic diseases – hype and doesn’t cause extinction – not infectious enough</p><p>Schmidt et al 6 </strong>(Emerging Diseases–Hype or Reality¶ Robert E. Schmidt, DVM, PhD, Dipl ACVP, and Drury R. Reavill, DVM, Dipl ABVP (Avian),¶ Dipl ACVP http://www.aemv.org/documents/2006_aemv_proceedings_7.pdf 2006) //trepka</p><p><u>There is a new era in human and veterinary public health as a continual increase in “emerging diseases” is¶ routinely reported in the scientific and lay press</u>. This presentation will mention some of the conditions considered¶ “emerging diseases” in small mammals, and compare/contrast the reports with a few of those conditions that¶ seem to be increasingly seen in a diagnostic pathology practice that specializes in “exotic” animals.¶ The question that should be answered is: What is an “emerging” disease? According to Lederberg, “‘Emergence¶ is in fact regression, a return to the standard that prevailed universally in the previous century.”1 For instance,¶ common microbes like Staphylococcus aureus, which used to be easily treatable by penicillin, have evolved to¶ be antibiotic-resistant.¶ In addition, exposure to infectious diseases that pass from animals to humans is accelerating because of the¶ modernization of our society. Humans are encroaching upon the environment and coming into contact with¶ microbes, which can jump from animals, sometimes with fatal consequences. The factors responsible for new¶ diseases are varied but probably have a synergistic action.¶ Most of these conditions have only been recognized in the last several years, and it is not clear if they are truly¶ emergent, just more readily recognized. An example would be rodent Helicobacter. This paper will briefly¶ discuss a few of the reported diseases in rodents, rabbits, and bats, as well as the actual types of conditions seen¶ in a specialty diagnostic practice.62 Association of Avian Veterinarians¶ Rodents¶ In rodents, the following diseases have been identified, primarily by the laboratory animal community, as “emerging.”¶ 1. Helicobacter infections of mice, rats, and hamsters.¶ 2. Beta hemolytic Streptococcus infections of mice.¶ 3. Staphylococcus aureus infections of athymic (nude) mice.¶ 4. Corynebacterium bovis (Hyperkeratosis-associated coryneform or HAC) infections of athymic (nude)¶ mice.¶ 5. Atypical parvovirus infections (MPV and RPV) of mice and rats.¶ 6. Atypical reovirus and paramyxovirus (parainfluenza) virus infections of guinea pigs.¶ 7. Atypical mouse hepatitis virus (MHV) infections of mice.¶ 8. Atypical mouse rotavirus (EDIM) infections of mice.¶ 9. Rat respiratory virus (RRV) infections of rats.¶ <u><mark>Most of these infections seem to be <strong>clinically mild or inapparent</u></strong></mark>. Many have not been associated with lesions or¶ physiologic changes, and several may only be recognized by seroconversion.2 These statements are based on¶ experience with laboratory rodents, which often is different than what is happening with pet rodents.¶ Based on submissions to our diagnostic service, there appears to be an increase in the number of cases of central¶ nervous system disease in rodents. Explanations for this include expansion of the pet rodent base, greater awareness¶ by owner,s and more concern for the possibility of a<u> <mark>zoonotic disease</u></mark>, particularly lymphocytic choriomeningitis.¶ Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (<u>LCMV</u>) is a rodent-borne virus belonging to the family Arenaviridae, genus¶ Arenavirus, which causes a wide spectrum of human disease. <u>The virus is often considered a problem in hamsters,¶ but can occur in a wide variety of rodents. Although it can affect humans, cases are seen infrequently.</u>¶ We have seen sporadic cases of presumed viral encephalitis in chinchillas and a woodchuck and encephalomalacia¶ of undetermined cause in a guinea pig. The largest number of cases, however, is of purulent meningoencephalitis¶ due to bacteria. In these cases the organisms have been seen and/or cultured. This condition has been diagnosed¶ in mice, rats, gerbils, hamsters, and guinea pigs. In addition cases of probable toxoplasma-induced encephalitis¶ have been seen in rats and a prairie dog.¶ Rabbits¶ In rabbits, “emerging” diseases include rabbit hemorrhagic disease due to Calicivirus. It has been increasingly¶ reported since being found in China in1984. The disease has an unusually high death rate and hemorrhage.¶ In addition, Borellia burgdorferi has been documented in rabbit ticks. Rabbits developed a rash similar to2006 Proceedings 63¶ the typical Lyme disease rash as well as the same type of immune response generated after being bitten by¶ ticks infected with B burgdorferi.¶ We have seen occasional cases of hemorrhagic disease but have not documented Lyme disease in pet rabbits.¶ We have seen an increasing number of cases of renal disease in pet rabbits, however. The primary condition is¶ interstitial nephritis with lymphocytes and plasma cells, or occasionally heterophils. There may be fibrosis and¶ mineralization. Tubular casts are occasionally present. In some animals, there is variable glomerulitis and glomerular¶ sclerosis. A few cases are associated with a bacterial infection, but in most the cause is not apparent. Because¶ the lesion is morphologically similar to renal lesions caused by Encephalitozoon, this protozoa is a primary¶ etiologic candidate. This is true even though organisms are not seen. These organisms can be difficult to demonstrate,¶ and they may not be present even though there is an ongoing immune-mediated inflammatory response.¶ Bats¶ <u>Bats are being incriminated as carriers and possible reservoirs of several viral diseases</u>, including Hendra and¶ Nipah viruses, as well as lyssavirus.3 Some bats have also been considered possible carriers of the coronavirus¶ that causes SARS, although there is some controversy concerning this assumption.¶ <u>No documented cases of these infections have been seen in material presented for diagnosis</u>. In most cases, the¶ cause of the conditions submitted is not determined, but bacterial disease, probable nutritional/metabolic disorders,¶ and neoplasia are seen. Organs most commonly involved include the lung, liver, and urinary tract (kidney and¶ urinary bladder). Morphologically, both inflammatory and noninflammatory lesions are seen.¶ Discussion¶ <u><mark>Given the recent</u></mark> arrival, or at least, recent <u><mark>recognition of many of the reported conditions</u></mark>, particularly in¶ rodents, there is minimal literature to give guidance as to their biology or importance. <u><mark>The biology of these¶ infections is not well understood, but anecdotal reports and data suggest they <strong>may not be highly infectious,</u></mark>¶<u> </u></strong>particularly the rodent diseases.¶ In the case of the conditions seen by our diagnostic service, it is probable that <u><mark>much of the increase is due to¶ more animals being seen </u></mark>by veterinarians<u> <mark>rather than new</u></mark>ly emergent <u><mark>diseases</mark>.</u><strong> </p><p>Double bind—1ac Lyon evidence says ebola—means either a) no extinction or b) impact inevitable </p><p>HUGE threshold for solvency—just once person infected from zoonotic means it’s game over—also come from WATERS of Asia and Africa </p><p>THEIR AUTHOR Naish 12</strong> – citing a leading British virologist, professor of John Oxford</p><p><strong>(John, “The Armageddon virus: Why experts fear a disease that leaps from animals to humans could devastate mankind in the next five years,” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2217774/The-Armageddon-virus-Why-experts-fear-disease-leaps-animals-humans-devastate-mankind-years.html)</p><p></strong>One leading British virologist, Professor <u>John <mark>Oxford</u></mark> at Queen Mary Hospital, University of London, and a world authority on epidemics, warns that we must <u><mark>expect an animal-originated pandemic</u></mark> to hit the world <u><mark>within the next five year</u>s,</mark> with potentially cataclysmic effects on the human race. <u><mark>Such a contagion</u></mark>, he believes, will be a new strain of super-flu, a highly infectious virus that <u><mark>may originate in</u></mark> some far-flung <u>backwater of <mark>Asia or Africa</mark>,</u> <u>and <mark>be contracted by one person</mark> from a wild animal or domestic beast,</u> such as a chicken or pig. <u>By <mark>the time the first victim has succumbed</mark> to this</u> unknown, unsuspected new <u><mark>illness, they will have spread it b</u>y</mark> coughs and sneezes to family, friends, and all those gathered anxiously around them. <u>Thanks to our </u>crowded, <u>hyper-connected world, <mark>this</u> <u>doomsday virus will already</u></mark> have <u><mark>begun crossing the globe</mark> by air, rail, road and sea <mark>before even the best brains in medicine have begun to chisel at its genetic secrets.</u></mark> Before it even has a name, <u><mark>it will have</u></mark> started to <u><mark>cut</u></mark> its lethal swathe through <u><mark>the world’s population</u><strong></mark>.</p><p>alt causes to zoonotic disease and no impact</p><p>THEIR AUTHOR Naish 12</strong> – citing a leading British virologist, professor of John Oxford</p><p><u>(John, “The Armageddon virus: Why experts fear a disease that leaps from animals to humans could devastate mankind in the next five years,” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2217774/The-Armageddon-virus-Why-experts-fear-disease-leaps-animals-humans-devastate-mankind-years.html)</p><p></u>The <u>new microbe is named Bas-Congo virus</u> (BASV), after the province where its three victims lived. It belongs <u>to a family of viruses known as rhabdoviruses</u>, which includes rabies. A report in the journal PLoS Pathogens says <u>the virus</u> probably originated in local wildlife and <u>was passed to</u> humans through <u>insect bites</u> or some other as-yet unidentified means. <u>There are plenty of other </u>new <u>viral candidates</u> waiting in the wings, guts, breath and blood of animals around us. <u>You can,</u> for example, <u>catch leprosy from armadillos</u>, which carry the virus in their shells and are responsible for a third of leprosy cases in the U.S. <u>Horses can transmit the Hendra virus, which can cause lethal respiratory and neurological disease in people.</p></u>
null
1nc
adv 1
64,791
356
17,109
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
565,261
N
Wake
3
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
Watson
AG Politics (2NR) Narrow Ruling CP (2NR) Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR) T - nearly all Test Case Fiat
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,636
For many, the coercion is more violent
Bowden 13
Bowden 13 Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis
Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades Imagine living in a poor country As you walk peacefully you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live , there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem.
Organ trafficking depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given Your body is then dumped you are extremely lucky if you live. on of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking
[*452] Introduction Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades. n1 Imagine living in a poor country, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. As you walk peacefully to your home at the end of the day, you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live. Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [*453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However, there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10
1,529
<h4>For many, the coercion is more violent</h4><p><strong>Bowden 13</strong> Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis</p><p> [*452] Introduction <u><mark>Organ trafficking</mark> has been <mark>depriving innocent people of their</mark> <mark>fundamental right to life</mark> for decades</u>. n1 <u>Imagine living in a poor country</u>, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. <u>As you walk peacefully</u> to your home at the end of the day, <u><mark>you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck</mark>. </u>n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as <u><mark>a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney</u></mark>. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, <u><mark>no anesthesia is administered and no medication</mark> <mark>is given</mark> to prevent infection</u>. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. <u><mark>Your body is then dumped</mark> on a side street, and <mark>you are extremely lucky if you live</u>.</mark> Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [*453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However<u>, there are reported accounts suggesting that abducti<mark>on of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking</mark>.</u> n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 <u>Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. </u>n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10</p><p><strong> </p></strong>
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Contention 2 is illegal markets
430,258
14
17,114
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
565,248
A
Wake
4
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
Voss
null
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
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Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,637
Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention
Rico 2014 Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)
Rico 2014 (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)
marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, marijuana legalization still violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
936
<h4>Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention</h4><p><strong>Rico 2014</strong> (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?,<u><strong> Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)</p><p></u></strong>It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, <u><strong>marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic</u></strong>. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, <u><strong><mark>marijuana legalization</u></strong></mark> still <u><strong><mark>violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs</mark>.</p></u></strong>
null
1nc
4
430,420
24
17,112
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
565,260
N
Wake
2
Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
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18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,638
NOTA does not apply to stem cells
Pollack 11
Pollack 11 ANDREW POLLACK December 2, 2011 The New York Times Court Says Some Donors Of Stem Cells Can Be Paid SECTION: Section B; Column 0; Business/Financial Desk; Pg. 5 lexis
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said that a federal law prohibiting payment for donated organs did not apply to stem cells extracted from circulating blood. ''The statute does not prohibit compensation for donations of blood and the substances in it, which include peripheral blood stem cells,'' Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld wrote
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said that a federal law prohibiting payment for donated organs did not apply to stem cells extracted from circulating blood. ''The statute does not prohibit compensation for donations of blood and the substances in it, which include peripheral blood stem cells,'' Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld wrote for a unanimous three-judge panel.
373
<h4><strong>NOTA does not apply to stem cells</h4><p>Pollack 11<u></strong> ANDREW POLLACK December 2, 2011 The New York Times Court Says Some Donors Of Stem Cells Can Be Paid SECTION: Section B; Column 0; Business/Financial Desk; Pg. 5 lexis</p><p>The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said that a federal law prohibiting payment for donated organs did not apply to stem cells extracted from circulating blood. </p><p>''The statute does not prohibit compensation for donations of blood and the substances in it, which include peripheral blood stem cells,'' Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld wrote</u><strong> for a unanimous three-judge panel.</p></strong>
null
1nc
adv 2
430,525
2
17,109
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
565,261
N
Wake
3
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
Watson
AG Politics (2NR) Narrow Ruling CP (2NR) Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR) T - nearly all Test Case Fiat
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,454
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ya.....
Pi.....
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18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
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null
1,004
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2,014
cx
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2
743,639
University students engaging in macro-political discussions are preventing the Right’s ascendancy—The AFF’s retreat from policy implementation chokes off effective solutions ensuring their advocacy is anti-political
Gitlin 5
Gitlin 5 (Todd formerly served as professor of sociology and director of the mass communications program at the University of California, Berkeley, and then a professor of culture, journalism and sociology at New York University. He is now a professor of journalism and sociology and chair of the Ph.D. program in Communications at Columbia University. He was a long-time political activist( from the Left). From the Book: The Intellectuals and the Flag – 200 – available via CIAO Books – date accessed 9/25/10 – http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/book/git01/git01_04.pdf)
Weak thinking on the left is glaring but this is hardly to say that the right has been more impressive The reason But my focus here is for the right’s ascendancy: the left’s intellectual disarmament. Some of Left and liberal analyses and proposals do emerge from universities but circulation is choked off The right’s apparatus is not the only reason why the left has suffered defeat The left’s intellectual stockpile has been badly depleted When the left has thought big, it has been clearer about isms to oppose mainly racism than about policies to further it has preferred the denunciatory mode All this is to say that the left has been imprisoned in the closed world of outside politics the academic left has nourished what has come to be called “theory” The turn” turns out to be its own prison house, equipped with funhouse mirrors but no exit. You see steadfast avoidance of tough questions Politically, it is useless. It amounts to secession from the world where people live
the right’s ascendancy: the left’s intellectual disarmament liberal proposals emerge from universities but circulation is choked off left’s intellectual stockpile has depleted the left has thought big, it has been about isms to oppose than policies the left has been imprisoned outside politics Politically, it is useless
Weak thinking on the American left is especially glaring after September 11, 2001, as I’ll argue in part III, but this is hardly to say that the right has been more impressive at making the world comprehensible. For decades the right has cultivated its own types of blindness and more than that: having risen to political power, it has been in a position to make blindness the law of the land. The neoconservatives’ foreign policy is largely hubris under a veneer of ideals. The antigovernment dogma of deregulation, privatization, and tax cuts exacerbates economic and social troubles. A culture war against modernity—against secularism, feminism, and racial justice—flies in the face of the West’s distinctive contribution to the history of civilization, namely, the rise of individual rights and reason. To elaborate on these claims is the work of other books. The reasons for the right-wing ascendancy are many, among them—as I argued in letter 7 of Letters to a Young Activist (2003)—the organizational discipline that the right cherishes and the left, at least until recently, tends to abhor. The left’s institutions, in particular, unions, are weak. But my focus here is another reason for the right’s ascendancy: the left’s intellectual disarmament. Some of the deficiency is institutional. Despite efforts to come from behind after the 2000 election, there remain decades’ worth of shortfall in the left’s cultural apparatus. In action-minded think tanks, talk radio and cable television, didactic newspapers, subsidies for writers, and so on, the right has held most of the high cards.1 Left and liberal analyses and proposals do emerge from universities and research centers, but their circulation is usually choked off for lack of focus, imagination, and steady access to mass media—except in the cheapened forms of punditry and agitprop. The right’s masterful apparatus for purveying its messages and organizing for power is not the only reason why the left has suffered defeat after defeat in national politics since the 1960s. The left’s intellectual stockpile has been badly depleted, and new ideas are more heralded than delivered. When the left has thought big, it has been clearer about isms to oppose—mainly imperialism and racism—than about values and policies to further. At that, it has often preferred the denunciatory mode to the analytical, mustering full-throated opposition rather than full-brained exploration. While it is probably true that many more reform ideas are dreamt of than succeed in circulating through the brain-dead media, the liberal-left conveys little sense of a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. While the right has rather successfully tarred liberals with the brush of “tax-and-spend,” those thus tarred have often been unsure whether to reply “It’s not so” or “It is so, we’re proud to say.” A fair generalization is that the left’s expertise has been constricted in scope, showing little taste for principle and little capacity to imagine a reconstituted nation. It has been conflicted and unsteady about values. It has tended to disdain any design for foreign policy other than “U.S. out,” which is no substitute for a foreign policy—and inconsistent to boot when you consider that the left wants the United States to intervene, for example, to push Israel to end its occupation of the West Bank. All this is to say that the left has been imprisoned in the closed world of outsider politics. Instead of a vigorous quest for testable propositions that could actually culminate in reform, the academic left in particular has nourished what has come to be called “theory”: a body of writing (one can scarcely say its content consists of propositions) that is, in the main, distracting, vague, self-referential, and wrong-headed. “Theory” is chiefly about itself: “thought to the second power,” as Fredric Jameson defined dialectical thinking in an early, dazzling American exemplar of the new theoretical style.2 Even when “theory” tries to reconnect from language and mind to the larger social world, language remains the preoccupation. Michel Foucault became a rock star of theory in the United States precisely because he demoted knowledge to a reflex of power, merely the denominator of the couplet “power/knowledge,” yet his preoccupation was with the knowledge side, not actual social structures. His famous illustration of the power of “theory” was built on Jeremy Bentham’s design of an ideal prison, the Panopticon—a model never built.3 The “linguistic turn” in the social sciences turns out to be its own prison house, equipped with funhouse mirrors but no exit. When convenient, “theory” lays claim to objective truth, but in fact the chief criterion by which it ascended in status was aesthetic, not empirical. Flair matters more than explanatory power. At crucial junctures “theory” consists of flourishes, intellectual performance pieces: things are said to be so because the theorist says so, and even if they are not, isn’t it interesting to pretend? But the problem with “theory” goes beyond opaque writing—an often dazzling concoction of jargon, illogic, and preening. If you overcome bedazzlement at the audacity and glamour of theory and penetrate the obscurity, you find circularity and self-justification, often enough (and self-contradictorily) larded with populist sentimentality about “the people” or “forces of resistance.” You see steadfast avoidance of tough questions. Despite the selective use of the still-prestigious rhetoric of science, the world of “theory” makes only tangential contact with the social reality that it disdains. Politically, it is useless. It amounts to secession from the world where most people live.
5,715
<h4><strong>University students <u>engaging</u> in macro-political discussions are preventing the Right’s ascendancy—The AFF’s <u>retreat</u> from policy implementation <u>chokes off</u> effective solutions ensuring their advocacy is <u>anti-political</h4><p></u>Gitlin 5 </strong>(Todd formerly served as professor of sociology and director of the mass communications program at the University of California, Berkeley, and then a professor of culture, journalism and sociology at New York University. He is now a professor of journalism and sociology and chair of the Ph.D. program in Communications at Columbia University. He was a long-time political activist( from the Left). From the Book: The Intellectuals and the Flag – 200 – available via CIAO Books – date accessed 9/25/10 – http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/book/git01/git01_04.pdf)</p><p><u><strong>Weak thinking on the</u></strong> American<u><strong> left is </u></strong>especially <u><strong>glaring </u></strong>after September 11, 2001, as I’ll argue in part III, <u><strong>but this is hardly to say that the right has been more impressive</u></strong> at making the world comprehensible. For decades the right has cultivated its own types of blindness and more than that: having risen to political power, it has been in a position to make blindness the law of the land. The neoconservatives’ foreign policy is largely hubris under a veneer of ideals. The antigovernment dogma of deregulation, privatization, and tax cuts exacerbates economic and social troubles. A culture war against modernity—against secularism, feminism, and racial justice—flies in the face of the West’s distinctive contribution to the history of civilization, namely, the rise of individual rights and reason. To elaborate on these claims is the work of other books. <u><strong>The reason</u></strong>s for the right-wing ascendancy are many, among them—as I argued in letter 7 of Letters to a Young Activist (2003)—the organizational discipline that the right cherishes and the left, at least until recently, tends to abhor. The left’s institutions, in particular, unions, are weak. <u><strong>But my focus here is </u></strong>another reason<u><strong> for <mark>the right’s ascendancy: the left’s intellectual disarmament</mark>. Some of </u></strong>the deficiency is institutional. Despite efforts to come from behind after the 2000 election, there remain decades’ worth of shortfall in the left’s cultural apparatus. In action-minded think tanks, talk radio and cable television, didactic newspapers, subsidies for writers, and so on, the right has held most of the high cards.1 <u><strong>Left and <mark>liberal</mark> analyses and <mark>proposals</mark> do <mark>emerge from universities</mark> </u></strong>and research centers, <u><strong><mark>but</mark> </u></strong>their<u><strong> <mark>circulation is</mark> </u></strong>usually<u><strong> <mark>choked off</mark> </u></strong>for lack of focus, imagination, and steady access to mass media—except in the cheapened forms of punditry and agitprop. <u><strong>The right’s</u></strong> masterful <u><strong>apparatus</u></strong> for purveying its messages and organizing for power <u><strong>is not the only reason why the left has suffered defeat</u></strong> after defeat in national politics since the 1960s. <u><strong>The <mark>left’s intellectual stockpile has</mark> been badly </strong><mark>depleted</u></mark>, and new ideas are more heralded than delivered. <u><strong>When <mark>the left has thought big, it has been </mark>clearer <mark>about isms to oppose</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>mainly</u></strong> imperialism and <u><strong>racism</u></strong>—<u><strong><mark>than</mark> about</u></strong> values and <u><strong><mark>policies</mark> to further</u></strong>. At that, <u><strong>it has</u></strong> often <u><strong>preferred the denunciatory mode </u></strong>to the analytical, mustering full-throated opposition rather than full-brained exploration. While it is probably true that many more reform ideas are dreamt of than succeed in circulating through the brain-dead media, the liberal-left conveys little sense of a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. While the right has rather successfully tarred liberals with the brush of “tax-and-spend,” those thus tarred have often been unsure whether to reply “It’s not so” or “It is so, we’re proud to say.” A fair generalization is that the left’s expertise has been constricted in scope, showing little taste for principle and little capacity to imagine a reconstituted nation. It has been conflicted and unsteady about values. It has tended to disdain any design for foreign policy other than “U.S. out,” which is no substitute for a foreign policy—and inconsistent to boot when you consider that the left wants the United States to intervene, for example, to push Israel to end its occupation of the West Bank. <u><strong>All this is to say that <mark>the left has been imprisoned</mark> in the closed world of <mark>outside</u></strong></mark>r <u><strong><mark>politics</u></strong></mark>. Instead of a vigorous quest for testable propositions that could actually culminate in reform, <u><strong>the academic left</u></strong> in particular <u><strong>has nourished what has come to be called “theory”</u></strong>: a body of writing (one can scarcely say its content consists of propositions) that is, in the main, distracting, vague, self-referential, and wrong-headed. “Theory” is chiefly about itself: “thought to the second power,” as Fredric Jameson defined dialectical thinking in an early, dazzling American exemplar of the new theoretical style.2 Even when “theory” tries to reconnect from language and mind to the larger social world, language remains the preoccupation. Michel Foucault became a rock star of theory in the United States precisely because he demoted knowledge to a reflex of power, merely the denominator of the couplet “power/knowledge,” yet his preoccupation was with the knowledge side, not actual social structures. His famous illustration of the power of “theory” was built on Jeremy Bentham’s design of an ideal prison, the Panopticon—a model never built.3 <u><strong>The</u></strong> “linguistic <u><strong>turn” </u></strong>in the social sciences<u><strong> turns out to be its own prison house, equipped with funhouse mirrors but no exit. </u></strong> When convenient, “theory” lays claim to objective truth, but in fact the chief criterion by which it ascended in status was aesthetic, not empirical. Flair matters more than explanatory power. At crucial junctures “theory” consists of flourishes, intellectual performance pieces: things are said to be so because the theorist says so, and even if they are not, isn’t it interesting to pretend? But the problem with “theory” goes beyond opaque writing—an often dazzling concoction of jargon, illogic, and preening. If you overcome bedazzlement at the audacity and glamour of theory and penetrate the obscurity, you find circularity and self-justification, often enough (and self-contradictorily) larded with populist sentimentality about “the people” or “forces of resistance.” <u><strong>You see steadfast avoidance of tough questions</u></strong>. Despite the selective use of the still-prestigious rhetoric of science, the world of “theory” makes only tangential contact with the social reality that it disdains. <u><strong><mark>Politically, it is useless</mark>. It amounts to secession from the world where </u></strong>most <u><strong>people live</u>. </p></strong>
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Focus on governmental change in drug policy is the best way to challenge structures of domination- allows the reclaiming of subjectivity for people that are “criminalized” and leads to change of social understanding of targeted populations
Sudbury 2008
Sudbury 2008 [Julia Sudbury is Metz Professor of Ethnic Studies at Mills College. She is a leading activist scholar in the prison abolitionist movement. She was a co-founder of Critical Resistance, a national abolitionist organization. “Rethinking Global Justice: Black Women Resist the Transnational Prison-Industrial Complex”, Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture, and Society, Volume 10, Issue 4]
Activists who pursue decarceration challenge stereotypical images of the “criminal” by making visible the human stories of prisoners, with the goal of demonstrating the inadequacy of incarceration as a response to the complex interaction of factors that produce harmful acts Decarceration usually involves targeting a specific prison population that the public sees as low-risk and arguing for an end to the use of imprisonment for this population. Decarcerative strategies often involve the promotion of alternatives to incarceration that are less expensive and more effective than prison and jail Drug law reform is a key area of decarcerative work Organizations and campaigns that promote drug law reform combines racial justice, economic, and public safety arguments by demonstrating that the laws have created a pipeline of prisoners of color FAMM dismantles popular representations of the war on drugs as a necessary protection against dangerous drug dealers and traffickers, demonstrating that most drug war prisoners are serving long sentences for low-level, non-violent drug-related activities In theorizing the intersections of racialized state violence and gendered interpersonal violence, FBW lays the groundwork for a broader abolitionist agenda that refutes the legitimacy of incarceration as a response to deep-rooted social inequalities based on interlocking systems of oppression By gradually shrinking the prison system, activists involved in decarcerative work hope to erode the public's reliance on the idea of imprisonment as a commonsense response to a wide range of social ills. the Prisoner Justice Action Committee formed the “81 Reasons” campaign, a multiracial collaboration of experienced anti-prison activists, youth and student organizers, in response to proposals to build a youth “superjail The campaign combined popular education on injustices in the juvenile system with an exercise in popular democracy that invited young people to decide themselves how they would spend the $81 million slated for the jail. Campaigners mobilized public concerns about spending cuts in other areas to create pressure on the provincial government to look into less expensive and less punitive alternatives to incarceration for youth. the campaign built a grassroots multiracial antiprison youth movement and raised public awareness of the social and economic costs of incarceration. Many anti-prison activists view campaigns for decarceration or moratorium as building blocks toward the ultimate goal of abolition. These practical actions promise short and medium-term successes that are essential markers on the road to long-term transformation. contemporary prison abolitionist movement in the U.S. and Canada dates to the 1970s, when political prisoners like Angela Y. Davis and Assata Shakur, in conjunction with other radical activists and scholars in the U.S., Canada, and Europe, began to call for the dismantling of prisons. These “common” prisoners challenged the state's legitimacy by declaring imprisonment a form of cruel and unusual punishment and confronting the brute force of state power activists drew deliberate links between the dismantling of prisons and the abolition of slavery. An abolitionist vision means that we must build models today that can represent how we want to live in the future It means developing practical strategies for taking small steps that move us toward making our dreams real and that lead the average person to believe that things really could be different It means living this vision in our daily lives. prison abolitionists are tasked with a dual burden: first, transforming people's consciousness so that they can believe that a world without prisons is possible, and second, taking practical steps to oppose the prison-industrial complex. Making abolition more than a utopian vision requires practical steps toward this long-term goal CR describes four steps that activists can get involved in shrinking the system creating alternatives, shifting public opinion and public policy
Activists who pursue decarceration challenge stereotypical images of the “criminal” Decarceration involves targeting a prison population and arguing for an end to imprisonment Drug law reform is a key area of decarcerative work Organizations that promote drug law reform combines racial justice economic, and public safety arguments by demonstrating that the laws have created a pipeline of prisoners of colo theorizing intersections of racialized state violence lays the groundwork for a abolitionist agenda that refutes legitimacy of incarceration activists involved in decarcerative erode the public's reliance on imprisonment the Prisoner Justice Action Committee formed a multiracial collaboration of activists, The campaign combined popular education on injustices with an exercise in popular democracy Campaigners mobilized public concerns to create pressure on the government , the campaign built a grassroots multiracial antiprison movement and raised public awareness activists view decarceration as building blocks toward abolition practical actions promise successes that are essential markers on the road to long-term transformation An abolitionist vision means that we must build models today that can represent how we want to live in the future. It means developing practical strategies for taking small steps that move us toward making our dreams real It means living this vision in our daily lives prison abolitionists are tasked with transforming people's consciousness so that they can believe that a world without prisons is possible, taking practical steps to oppose the prison-industrial complex. Making abolition more than a utopian vision requires practical steps toward this long-term goal
Chronic overcrowding has led to worsening conditions for prisoners. As a result of the unprecedented growth in sentenced populations, prison authorities have packed three or four prisoners into cells designed for two, and have taken over recreation rooms, gyms, and rooms designed for programming and turned them into cells, housing prisoners on bunk beds or on the floor. These new conditions have created challenges for activists, who have found themselves expending time and resources in pressuring prison authorities to provide every prisoner a bed, or to provide access to basic education programs. As prison populations continue to swell, anti-prison activists are faced with the limitations of reformist strategies. Gains temporarily won are swiftly undermined, new “women-centered” prison regimes are replaced with a focus on cost-efficiency and minimal programming and even changes enforced by legal cases like Shumate vs. Wilson are subject to backlash and resistance. 19 Of even greater concern is the well-documented tendency of prison regimes to co-opt reforms and respond to demands for changes in conditions by further expanding prison budgets. The vulnerability of prison reform efforts to cooption has led Angela Y. Davis to call for “non-reformist reforms,” reforms that do not lead to bigger and “better” prisons. 20 Despite the limited long-term impact of human rights advocacy and reforms, building bridges between prisoners, activists, and family members is an important step toward challenging the racialized dehumanization that undergirds the logic of incarceration. In this way, human rights advocacy carried out in solidarity with prisoner activists is an important component of a radical anti-prison agenda. Ultimately, however, anti-prison activists aim not to create more humane, culturally sensitive, women-centered prisons, but to dismantle prisons and enable formerly criminalized people to access services and resources outside the penal system. After three decades of prison expansion, more and more people are living with criminal convictions and histories of incarceration. In the U.S., nearly 650,000 people are released from state and federal prisons to the community each year. 21 Organizations of formerly incarcerated people focus on creating opportunities for former prisoners to survive after release, and on eliminating barriers to reentry, including extensive discrimination against former felons. The wide array of “post-incarceration sentences” that felons are subjected to has led activists to declare a “new civil rights movement.” 22 As a class, former prisoners can legally be disenfranchised and denied rights available to other citizens. While reentry has garnered official attention, with President Bush proposing a $300 million reentry initiative in his 2004 State of the Union address, anti-prison activists have critiqued this initiative for focusing on faith-based mentoring, job training, and housing without addressing the endemic discrimination against former prisoners or addressing the conditions in the communities which receive former prisoners, including racism, poverty, and gender violence. Organizations of ex-prisoners working to oppose discrimination against former prisoners and felons include All of Us Or None, the Nu Policy Leadership Group, Sister Outsider and the National Network for Women Prisoners in the U.S., and Justice 4 Women in Canada. All of Us Or None is described by members as “a national organizing initiative of prisoners, former prisoners and felons, to combat the many forms of discrimination that we face as the result of felony convictions.” 23 Founded by anti-imperialist and former political prisoner Linda Evans, and former prisoner and anti-prison activist Dorsey Nunn, and sponsored by the Northern California–based Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, All of Us Or None works to mobilize former prisoners nationwide and in Toronto, Canada. The organization's name, from a poem by Marxist playwright Bertold Brecht, invokes the need for solidarity across racial, class, and gender lines in creating a unified movement of former prisoners. Black women play a leading role in the organization, alongside other people of color. All of Us Or None focuses its lobbying and campaign work at city, county, and state levels, calling on local authorities to end discrimination based on felony convictions in public housing, benefits, and employment, to opt out of lifetime welfare and food stamp bans for felons, and to “ban the box” requiring disclosure of past convictions on applications for public employment. In addition, the organization calls for guaranteed housing, job training, drug and alcohol treatment, and public assistance for all newly released prisoners. 24 In the context of the war on drugs, many people with felony convictions also struggle with addictions. The recovery movement, which is made up of 12-step programs, treatment programs, community recovery centers, and indigenous healing programs run by and for people in recovery from addiction, offers an alternative response to problem drug use through programs focusing on spirituality, healing, and fellowship. However, the recovery movement's focus on individual transformation and accountability for past acts diverges from many anti-prison activists' focus on the harms done to criminalized communities by interlocking systems of dominance. As a result, anti-prison spaces seldom engage with the recovery movement, or tap the radical potential of its membership. Breaking with this trend, All of Us Or None has initiated a grassroots organizing effort to reach out to people in 12-step programs with felony convictions. This work is part of their wider organizing efforts that aim to mobilize former prisoners as agents of social change. Building on the strengths of identity politics, these organizations suggest that those who have experienced the prison-industrial complex first-hand may be best placed to provide leadership in dismantling it. As former prisoners have taken on a wide range of leadership positions across the movement, there has been a shift away from leadership by white middle-class progressives, and a move to promote the voices of those directly affected by the prison-industrial complex. Politicians who promote punitive “tough-on-crime” policies rely on racialized controlling images of “the criminal” to inspire fear and induce compliance among voters. Once dehumanized and depicted as dangerous and beyond rehabilitation, removing people from communities appears the only logical means of creating safety. Activists who pursue decarceration challenge stereotypical images of the “criminal” by making visible the human stories of prisoners, with the goal of demonstrating the inadequacy of incarceration as a response to the complex interaction of factors that produce harmful acts. Decarceration usually involves targeting a specific prison population that the public sees as low-risk and arguing for an end to the use of imprisonment for this population. Decarcerative strategies often involve the promotion of alternatives to incarceration that are less expensive and more effective than prison and jail. For example, Proposition 36, the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act, which passed in California in 2000 and allowed first- and second-time non-violent drug offenders charged with possession to receive substance abuse treatment instead of prison, channels approximately 35,000 people into treatment annually. 25 Drug law reform is a key area of decarcerative work. Organizations and campaigns that promote drug law reform include Drop the Rock, a coalition of youth, former prisoners, criminal justice reformers, artists, civil and labor leaders working to repeal New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws. The campaign combines racial justice, economic, and public safety arguments by demonstrating that the laws have created a pipeline of prisoners of color from New York City to newly built prisons in rural, mainly white areas represented Republican senators, resulting in a transfer of funding and electoral influence from communities of color to upstate rural communities. 26 Ultimately, the campaign calls for an end to mandatory minimum sentencing and the reinstatement of judges' sentencing discretion, a reduction in sentence lengths for drug-related offenses and the expansion of alternatives, including drug treatment, job training, and education. Former drug war prisoners play a leadership role in decarcerative efforts in the field of drug policy reform. Kemba Smith, an African–American woman who was sentenced to serve 24.5 years as a result of her relationship with an abusive partner who was involved in the drug industry, is one potent voice in opposition to the war on drugs. While she was incarcerated, Smith became an active advocate for herself and other victims of the war on drugs, securing interviews and feature articles in national media. Ultimately, Smith's case came to represent the failure of mandatory minimums, and in 2000, following a nation-wide campaign, she and fellow drug war prisoner Dorothy Gaines were granted clemency by outgoing President Clinton. After her release, Smith founded the Justice for People of Color Project (JPCP), which aims to empower young people of color to participate in drug policy reform and to promote a reallocation of public expenditures from incarceration to education. While women like Kemba Smith and Dorothy Gaines have become the human face of the drug war, prison invisibilizes and renders anonymous hundreds of thousands of drug war prisoners. The organization Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) challenges this process of erasure and dehumanization through its “Faces of FAMM” project. The project invites people in federal and state prisons serving mandatory minimum sentences to submit their cases to a database and provides online access to their stories and photographs. 27 The “Faces of FAMM” project highlights cases where sentencing injustices are particularly visible in order to galvanize public support for sentencing reform. At the same time, it dismantles popular representations of the war on drugs as a necessary protection against dangerous drug dealers and traffickers, demonstrating that most drug war prisoners are serving long sentences for low-level, non-violent drug-related activities or for being intimately connected to someone involved in these activities. Decarcerative work is not limited to drug law reform. Free Battered Women's (FBW) campaign for the release of incarcerated survivors is another example of decarcerative work. The organization supports women and transgender prisoners incarcerated for killing or assaulting an abuser in challenging their convictions by demonstrating that they acted in self-defense. Most recently, FBW secured the release of Flozelle Woodmore, an African–American woman serving a life sentence at CCWF for shooting her violent partner as an 18 year old. Released in August 2007, after five parole board recommendations for her release were rejected by Governors Davis and then Schwarzenegger, Woodmore's determined pursuit of justice made visible and ultimately challenged the racialized politics of gubernatorial parole releases. 28 While the number of women imprisoned for killing or assaulting an abuser is small—FBW submitted 34 petitions for clemency at its inception in 1991, and continues to fight 23 cases—FBW's campaign for the release of all incarcerated survivors challenges the mass incarceration of gender-oppressed prisoners on a far larger scale. FBW argues that experiences of intimate partner violence and abuse contribute to the criminalized activities that lead many women and transgender people into conflict with the law, including those imprisoned on drug or property charges, and calls for the release of all incarcerated survivors. Starting with a population generally viewed with sympathy—survivors of intimate partner violence—FBW generates a radical critique of both state and interpersonal violence, arguing that “the violence and control used by the state against people in prison mirrors the dynamics of battering that many incarcerated survivors have experienced in their intimate relationships and/or as children.” 29 In theorizing the intersections of racialized state violence and gendered interpersonal violence, FBW lays the groundwork for a broader abolitionist agenda that refutes the legitimacy of incarceration as a response to deep-rooted social inequalities based on interlocking systems of oppression. By gradually shrinking the prison system, Black women activists involved in decarcerative work hope to erode the public's reliance on the idea of imprisonment as a commonsense response to a wide range of social ills. At the other end of anti-expansionist work are activists who take a more confrontational approach. By starving correctional budgets of funds to continue building more prisons and jails, they hope to force politicians to embrace less expensive and more effective alternatives to incarceration. Prison moratorium organizing aims to stop construction of new prisons and jails. Unlike campaigns against prison privatization, which oppose prison-profiteering by private corporations, and seek to return imprisonment to the public sector, prison moratorium work opposes all new prison construction, public or private. In New York, the Brooklyn-based Prison Moratorium Project (PMP), co-founded by former prisoner Eddie Ellis and led by young women and gender non-conforming people of color, does this work through popular education and mass campaigns against prison expansion. Focusing on youth as a force for social change, New York's PMP uses compilations of progressive hip hop and rap artists to spread a critical analysis of the prison-industrial complex and its impact on people of color. PMP's strategies have been effective; for example, in 2002 the organization, as part of the Justice 4 Youth Coalition, succeeded in lobbying the New York Department of Juvenile Justice to redirect $53 million designated for expansion in Brooklyn and the Bronx. 30 PMP has also worked to make visible the connections between underfunding, policing of schools, and youth incarceration through their campaign “Stop the School-to-Prison Pipeline.” By demonstrating how zero tolerance policies and increased policing and use of surveillance technology in schools, combined with underfunded classrooms and overstretched teachers, has led to the criminalization of young people of color and the production of adult prisoners, PMP argues for a reprioritization of public spending from the criminal justice system to schools and alternatives to incarceration. 31 Moratorium work often involves campaigns to prevent the construction of a specific prison or jail. In Toronto, for example, the Prisoner Justice Action Committee formed the “81 Reasons” campaign, a multiracial collaboration of experienced anti-prison activists, youth and student organizers, in response to proposals to build a youth “superjail” in Brampton, a suburb of Toronto. 32 The campaign combined popular education on injustices in the juvenile system, including the disproportionate incarceration of Black and Aboriginal youth, with an exercise in popular democracy that invited young people to decide themselves how they would spend the $81 million slated for the jail. Campaigners mobilized public concerns about spending cuts in other areas, including health care and education, to create pressure on the provincial government to look into less expensive and less punitive alternatives to incarceration for youth. While this campaign did not ultimately prevent the construction of the youth jail, the size of the proposed facility was reduced. More importantly, the campaign built a grassroots multiracial antiprison youth movement and raised public awareness of the social and economic costs of incarceration. Moratorium campaigns face tough opposition from advocates who believe that building prisons stimulates economic development for struggling rural towns. Prisons are “sold” to rural towns that have suffered economic decline in the face of global competition, closures of local factories, and decline of small farms. In the context of economic stagnation, prisons are touted as providing stable, well-paying, unionized jobs, providing property and sales taxes and boosting real estate markets. The California Prison Moratorium Project has worked to challenge these assertions by documenting the actual economic, environmental, and social impact of prison construction in California's Central Valley prison towns. According to California PMP: We consider prisons to be a form of environmental injustice. They are normally built in economically depressed communities that eagerly anticipate economic prosperity. Like any toxic industry, prisons affect the quality of local schools, roads, water, air, land, and natural habitats. 33 California PMP opposes prison construction at a local level by building multiracial coalitions of local residents, farm workers, labor organizers, anti-prison activists, and former prisoners and their families to reject the visions of prison as a panacea for economic decline. 34 In the Californian context, where most new prisons are built in predominantly Latino/a communities and absorb land and water previously used for agriculture, PMP facilitates communication and solidarity between Latino/a farm worker communities, and urban Black and Latino/a prisoners in promoting alternative forms of economic development that do not rely on mass incarceration. Scholar-activist Ruth Wilson Gilmore's research on the political economy of prisons in California has been critical in providing evidence of the detrimental impact of prisons on local residents and the environment. 35 As an active member of CPMP, Gilmore's work is deeply rooted in anti-prison activism and in turn informs the work of other activists, demonstrating the important relationship between Black women's activist scholarship and the anti-prison movement. 36 Many anti-prison activists view campaigns for decarceration or moratorium as building blocks toward the ultimate goal of abolition. These practical actions promise short and medium-term successes that are essential markers on the road to long-term transformation. However, abolitionists believe that like slavery, the prison-industrial complex is a system of racialized state violence that cannot be “fixed.” The contemporary prison abolitionist movement in the U.S. and Canada dates to the 1970s, when political prisoners like Angela Y. Davis and Assata Shakur, in conjunction with other radical activists and scholars in the U.S., Canada, and Europe, began to call for the dismantling of prisons. 38 The explosion in political prisoners, fuelled by the FBI's Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) and targeting of Black liberation, American Indian and Puerto Rican independence movements in the U.S. and First Nations resistance in Canada as “threats” to national security, fed into an understanding of the role of the prison in perpetuating state repression against insurgent communities. 39 The new anti-prison politics were also shaped by a decade of prisoner litigation and radical prison uprisings, including the brutally crushed Attica Rebellion. These “common” prisoners, predominantly working-class people of color imprisoned for everyday acts of survival, challenged the state's legitimacy by declaring imprisonment a form of cruel and unusual punishment and confronting the brute force of state power. 40 By adopting the term “abolition” activists drew deliberate links between the dismantling of prisons and the abolition of slavery. Through historical excavations, the “new abolitionists” identified the abolition of prisons as the logical completion of the unfinished liberation marked by the 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution, which regulated, rather than ended, slavery. 41 Organizations that actively promote dialogue about what abolition means and how it can translate into concrete action include Critical Resistance (CR), New York's Prison Moratorium Project, Justice Now, California Coalition for Women Prisoners, Free Battered Women, and the Prison Activist Resource Center in the U.S. and the Prisoner Justice Action Committee (Toronto), the Prisoners' Justice Day Committee (Vancouver) and Joint Action in Canada. CR was founded in 1998 by a group of Bay Area activists including former political prisoner and scholar-activist Angela Y. Davis. Initially, CR focused on popular education and movement building, coordinating large conferences where diverse organizations could generate collective alternatives to the prison-industrial complex. Later work has included campaigns against prison construction in California's Central Valley and solidarity work with imprisoned Katrina survivors. CR describes abolition as: [A] political vision that seeks to eliminate the need for prisons, policing, and surveillance by creating sustainable alternatives to punishment and imprisonment … . An abolitionist vision means that we must build models today that can represent how we want to live in the future. It means developing practical strategies for taking small steps that move us toward making our dreams real and that lead the average person to believe that things really could be different. It means living this vision in our daily lives. 42 In this sense, prison abolitionists are tasked with a dual burden: first, transforming people's consciousness so that they can believe that a world without prisons is possible, and second, taking practical steps to oppose the prison-industrial complex. Making abolition more than a utopian vision requires practical steps toward this long-term goal. CR describes four steps that activists can get involved in: shrinking the system, creating alternatives, shifting public opinion and public policy, and building leadership among those directly impacted by the prison-industrial complex. 43 Since its inception in the San Francisco Bay Area, Critical Resistance has become a national organization with chapters in Baltimore, Chicago, Gainesville, Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York, Tampa/St. Petersburg, and Washington, D.C. As such, CR has played a critical role in re-invigorating abolitionist politics in the U.S. This work is rooted in the radical praxis of Black women and transgender activists.
22,526
<h4>Focus on governmental change in drug policy is the best way to challenge structures of domination- allows the reclaiming of subjectivity for people that are “criminalized” and leads to change of social<strong> understanding of targeted populations</h4><p>Sudbury 2008</strong> [Julia Sudbury is Metz Professor of Ethnic Studies at Mills College. She is a leading activist scholar in the prison abolitionist movement. She was a co-founder of Critical Resistance, a national abolitionist organization. “Rethinking Global Justice: Black Women Resist the Transnational Prison-Industrial Complex”, Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture, and Society, Volume 10, Issue 4]</p><p>Chronic overcrowding has led to worsening conditions for prisoners. As a result of the unprecedented growth in sentenced populations, prison authorities have packed three or four prisoners into cells designed for two, and have taken over recreation rooms, gyms, and rooms designed for programming and turned them into cells, housing prisoners on bunk beds or on the floor. These new conditions have created challenges for activists, who have found themselves expending time and resources in pressuring prison authorities to provide every prisoner a bed, or to provide access to basic education programs. As prison populations continue to swell, anti-prison activists are faced with the limitations of reformist strategies. Gains temporarily won are swiftly undermined, new “women-centered” prison regimes are replaced with a focus on cost-efficiency and minimal programming and even changes enforced by legal cases like Shumate vs. Wilson are subject to backlash and resistance. 19 Of even greater concern is the well-documented tendency of prison regimes to co-opt reforms and respond to demands for changes in conditions by further expanding prison budgets. The vulnerability of prison reform efforts to cooption has led Angela Y. Davis to call for “non-reformist reforms,” reforms that do not lead to bigger and “better” prisons. 20 Despite the limited long-term impact of human rights advocacy and reforms, building bridges between prisoners, activists, and family members is an important step toward challenging the racialized dehumanization that undergirds the logic of incarceration. In this way, human rights advocacy carried out in solidarity with prisoner activists is an important component of a radical anti-prison agenda. Ultimately, however, anti-prison activists aim not to create more humane, culturally sensitive, women-centered prisons, but to dismantle prisons and enable formerly criminalized people to access services and resources outside the penal system. After three decades of prison expansion, more and more people are living with criminal convictions and histories of incarceration. In the U.S., nearly 650,000 people are released from state and federal prisons to the community each year. 21 Organizations of formerly incarcerated people focus on creating opportunities for former prisoners to survive after release, and on eliminating barriers to reentry, including extensive discrimination against former felons. The wide array of “post-incarceration sentences” that felons are subjected to has led activists to declare a “new civil rights movement.” 22 As a class, former prisoners can legally be disenfranchised and denied rights available to other citizens. While reentry has garnered official attention, with President Bush proposing a $300 million reentry initiative in his 2004 State of the Union address, anti-prison activists have critiqued this initiative for focusing on faith-based mentoring, job training, and housing without addressing the endemic discrimination against former prisoners or addressing the conditions in the communities which receive former prisoners, including racism, poverty, and gender violence. Organizations of ex-prisoners working to oppose discrimination against former prisoners and felons include All of Us Or None, the Nu Policy Leadership Group, Sister Outsider and the National Network for Women Prisoners in the U.S., and Justice 4 Women in Canada. All of Us Or None is described by members as “a national organizing initiative of prisoners, former prisoners and felons, to combat the many forms of discrimination that we face as the result of felony convictions.” 23 Founded by anti-imperialist and former political prisoner Linda Evans, and former prisoner and anti-prison activist Dorsey Nunn, and sponsored by the Northern California–based Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, All of Us Or None works to mobilize former prisoners nationwide and in Toronto, Canada. The organization's name, from a poem by Marxist playwright Bertold Brecht, invokes the need for solidarity across racial, class, and gender lines in creating a unified movement of former prisoners. Black women play a leading role in the organization, alongside other people of color. All of Us Or None focuses its lobbying and campaign work at city, county, and state levels, calling on local authorities to end discrimination based on felony convictions in public housing, benefits, and employment, to opt out of lifetime welfare and food stamp bans for felons, and to “ban the box” requiring disclosure of past convictions on applications for public employment. In addition, the organization calls for guaranteed housing, job training, drug and alcohol treatment, and public assistance for all newly released prisoners. 24 In the context of the war on drugs, many people with felony convictions also struggle with addictions. The recovery movement, which is made up of 12-step programs, treatment programs, community recovery centers, and indigenous healing programs run by and for people in recovery from addiction, offers an alternative response to problem drug use through programs focusing on spirituality, healing, and fellowship. However, the recovery movement's focus on individual transformation and accountability for past acts diverges from many anti-prison activists' focus on the harms done to criminalized communities by interlocking systems of dominance. As a result, anti-prison spaces seldom engage with the recovery movement, or tap the radical potential of its membership. Breaking with this trend, All of Us Or None has initiated a grassroots organizing effort to reach out to people in 12-step programs with felony convictions. This work is part of their wider organizing efforts that aim to mobilize former prisoners as agents of social change. Building on the strengths of identity politics, these organizations suggest that those who have experienced the prison-industrial complex first-hand may be best placed to provide leadership in dismantling it. As former prisoners have taken on a wide range of leadership positions across the movement, there has been a shift away from leadership by white middle-class progressives, and a move to promote the voices of those directly affected by the prison-industrial complex. Politicians who promote punitive “tough-on-crime” policies rely on racialized controlling images of “the criminal” to inspire fear and induce compliance among voters. Once dehumanized and depicted as dangerous and beyond rehabilitation, removing people from communities appears the only logical means of creating safety. <u><mark>Activists who pursue decarceration challenge stereotypical images of the “criminal”</mark> by making visible the human stories of prisoners, with the goal of demonstrating <strong>the inadequacy of incarceration as a response to the complex interaction of factors</strong> that produce harmful acts</u>. <u><mark>Decarceration</mark> usually <mark>involves targeting a</mark> specific <mark>prison population </mark>that the public sees as low-risk <mark>and <strong>arguing for an end to </mark>the use of <mark>imprisonment</mark> for this population.</u></strong> <u>Decarcerative strategies often involve the promotion of alternatives to incarceration that are less expensive and more effective than prison and jail</u>. For example, Proposition 36, the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act, which passed in California in 2000 and allowed first- and second-time non-violent drug offenders charged with possession to receive substance abuse treatment instead of prison, channels approximately 35,000 people into treatment annually. 25 <u><strong><mark>Drug law reform is a key area of decarcerative work</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Organizations</mark> and campaigns <mark>that promote drug law reform</u></mark> include Drop the Rock, a coalition of youth, former prisoners, criminal justice reformers, artists, civil and labor leaders working to repeal New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws. The campaign <u><strong><mark>combines</mark> <mark>racial justice</mark>, <mark>economic, and public safety arguments by demonstrating that the laws have created a pipeline of prisoners of colo</mark>r</u></strong> from New York City to newly built prisons in rural, mainly white areas represented Republican senators, resulting in a transfer of funding and electoral influence from communities of color to upstate rural communities. 26 Ultimately, the campaign calls for an end to mandatory minimum sentencing and the reinstatement of judges' sentencing discretion, a reduction in sentence lengths for drug-related offenses and the expansion of alternatives, including drug treatment, job training, and education. Former drug war prisoners play a leadership role in decarcerative efforts in the field of drug policy reform. Kemba Smith, an African–American woman who was sentenced to serve 24.5 years as a result of her relationship with an abusive partner who was involved in the drug industry, is one potent voice in opposition to the war on drugs. While she was incarcerated, Smith became an active advocate for herself and other victims of the war on drugs, securing interviews and feature articles in national media. Ultimately, Smith's case came to represent the failure of mandatory minimums, and in 2000, following a nation-wide campaign, she and fellow drug war prisoner Dorothy Gaines were granted clemency by outgoing President Clinton. After her release, Smith founded the Justice for People of Color Project (JPCP), which aims to empower young people of color to participate in drug policy reform and to promote a reallocation of public expenditures from incarceration to education. While women like Kemba Smith and Dorothy Gaines have become the human face of the drug war, prison invisibilizes and renders anonymous hundreds of thousands of drug war prisoners. The organization Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) challenges this process of erasure and dehumanization through its “Faces of FAMM” project. The project invites people in federal and state prisons serving mandatory minimum sentences to submit their cases to a database and provides online access to their stories and photographs. 27 The “Faces of <u>FAMM</u>” project highlights cases where sentencing injustices are particularly visible in order to galvanize public support for sentencing reform. At the same time, it <u>dismantles popular representations of the war on drugs as a necessary protection against dangerous drug dealers and traffickers, demonstrating that most drug war prisoners are serving long sentences for low-level, non-violent drug-related activities</u> or for being intimately connected to someone involved in these activities. Decarcerative work is not limited to drug law reform. Free Battered Women's (FBW) campaign for the release of incarcerated survivors is another example of decarcerative work. The organization supports women and transgender prisoners incarcerated for killing or assaulting an abuser in challenging their convictions by demonstrating that they acted in self-defense. Most recently, FBW secured the release of Flozelle Woodmore, an African–American woman serving a life sentence at CCWF for shooting her violent partner as an 18 year old. Released in August 2007, after five parole board recommendations for her release were rejected by Governors Davis and then Schwarzenegger, Woodmore's determined pursuit of justice made visible and ultimately challenged the racialized politics of gubernatorial parole releases. 28 While the number of women imprisoned for killing or assaulting an abuser is small—FBW submitted 34 petitions for clemency at its inception in 1991, and continues to fight 23 cases—FBW's campaign for the release of all incarcerated survivors challenges the mass incarceration of gender-oppressed prisoners on a far larger scale. FBW argues that experiences of intimate partner violence and abuse contribute to the criminalized activities that lead many women and transgender people into conflict with the law, including those imprisoned on drug or property charges, and calls for the release of all incarcerated survivors. Starting with a population generally viewed with sympathy—survivors of intimate partner violence—FBW generates a radical critique of both state and interpersonal violence, arguing that “the violence and control used by the state against people in prison mirrors the dynamics of battering that many incarcerated survivors have experienced in their intimate relationships and/or as children.” 29 <u>In <mark>theorizing </mark>the <mark>intersections of racialized state violence </mark>and gendered interpersonal violence, FBW <strong><mark>lays the groundwork for a</mark> broader <mark>abolitionist agenda that refutes </mark>the <mark>legitimacy of incarceration</mark> as a response to deep-rooted social inequalities based on interlocking systems of oppression</u></strong>. <u><strong>By gradually shrinking the prison system,</u></strong> Black women <u><strong><mark>activists involved in decarcerative </mark>work hope to <mark>erode the public's reliance on </mark>the idea of <mark>imprisonment</mark> as a commonsense response to a wide range of social ills. </u></strong>At the other end of anti-expansionist work are activists who take a more confrontational approach. By starving correctional budgets of funds to continue building more prisons and jails, they hope to force politicians to embrace less expensive and more effective alternatives to incarceration. Prison moratorium organizing aims to stop construction of new prisons and jails. Unlike campaigns against prison privatization, which oppose prison-profiteering by private corporations, and seek to return imprisonment to the public sector, prison moratorium work opposes all new prison construction, public or private. In New York, the Brooklyn-based Prison Moratorium Project (PMP), co-founded by former prisoner Eddie Ellis and led by young women and gender non-conforming people of color, does this work through popular education and mass campaigns against prison expansion. Focusing on youth as a force for social change, New York's PMP uses compilations of progressive hip hop and rap artists to spread a critical analysis of the prison-industrial complex and its impact on people of color. PMP's strategies have been effective; for example, in 2002 the organization, as part of the Justice 4 Youth Coalition, succeeded in lobbying the New York Department of Juvenile Justice to redirect $53 million designated for expansion in Brooklyn and the Bronx. 30 PMP has also worked to make visible the connections between underfunding, policing of schools, and youth incarceration through their campaign “Stop the School-to-Prison Pipeline.” By demonstrating how zero tolerance policies and increased policing and use of surveillance technology in schools, combined with underfunded classrooms and overstretched teachers, has led to the criminalization of young people of color and the production of adult prisoners, PMP argues for a reprioritization of public spending from the criminal justice system to schools and alternatives to incarceration. 31 Moratorium work often involves campaigns to prevent the construction of a specific prison or jail. In Toronto, for example, <u><mark>the Prisoner Justice Action Committee formed </mark>the “81 Reasons” campaign, <mark>a multiracial collaboration of</mark> experienced anti-prison <mark>activists, <strong></mark>youth and student organizers</strong>, in response to proposals to build a youth “superjail</u>” in Brampton, a suburb of Toronto. 32 <u><mark>The campaign combined popular education on injustices</mark> in the juvenile system</u>, including the disproportionate incarceration of Black and Aboriginal youth, <u><mark>with an exercise in popular democracy</mark> that invited young people to decide themselves how they would spend the $81 million slated for the jail.</u> <u><strong><mark>Campaigners mobilized public concerns</strong></mark> about spending cuts in other areas</u>, including health care and education, <u><mark>to create pressure on the </mark>provincial <mark>government</mark> to look into less expensive and less punitive alternatives to incarceration for youth. </u>While this campaign did not ultimately prevent the construction of the youth jail, the size of the proposed facility was reduced. More importantly<mark>, <u>the campaign <strong>built a grassroots multiracial antiprison</mark> youth <mark>movement and raised public awareness</strong></mark> of the social and economic costs of incarceration. </u>Moratorium campaigns face tough opposition from advocates who believe that building prisons stimulates economic development for struggling rural towns. Prisons are “sold” to rural towns that have suffered economic decline in the face of global competition, closures of local factories, and decline of small farms. In the context of economic stagnation, prisons are touted as providing stable, well-paying, unionized jobs, providing property and sales taxes and boosting real estate markets. The California Prison Moratorium Project has worked to challenge these assertions by documenting the actual economic, environmental, and social impact of prison construction in California's Central Valley prison towns. According to California PMP: We consider prisons to be a form of environmental injustice. They are normally built in economically depressed communities that eagerly anticipate economic prosperity. Like any toxic industry, prisons affect the quality of local schools, roads, water, air, land, and natural habitats. 33 California PMP opposes prison construction at a local level by building multiracial coalitions of local residents, farm workers, labor organizers, anti-prison activists, and former prisoners and their families to reject the visions of prison as a panacea for economic decline. 34 In the Californian context, where most new prisons are built in predominantly Latino/a communities and absorb land and water previously used for agriculture, PMP facilitates communication and solidarity between Latino/a farm worker communities, and urban Black and Latino/a prisoners in promoting alternative forms of economic development that do not rely on mass incarceration. Scholar-activist Ruth Wilson Gilmore's research on the political economy of prisons in California has been critical in providing evidence of the detrimental impact of prisons on local residents and the environment. 35 As an active member of CPMP, Gilmore's work is deeply rooted in anti-prison activism and in turn informs the work of other activists, demonstrating the important relationship between Black women's activist scholarship and the anti-prison movement. 36 <u>Many anti-prison <mark>activists <strong>view </mark>campaigns for <mark>decarceration</mark> or moratorium <mark>as building blocks toward</mark> the ultimate goal of <mark>abolition</mark>.</u></strong> <u>These <mark>practical actions promise</mark> short and medium-term <mark>successes that <strong>are essential markers on the road to long-term transformation</mark>.</u></strong> However, abolitionists believe that like slavery, the prison-industrial complex is a system of racialized state violence that cannot be “fixed.” The <u>contemporary prison abolitionist movement in the U.S. and Canada dates to the 1970s, when political prisoners like Angela Y. Davis and Assata Shakur, in conjunction with other radical activists and scholars in the U.S., Canada, and Europe, began to call for the dismantling of prisons.</u> 38 The explosion in political prisoners, fuelled by the FBI's Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) and targeting of Black liberation, American Indian and Puerto Rican independence movements in the U.S. and First Nations resistance in Canada as “threats” to national security, fed into an understanding of the role of the prison in perpetuating state repression against insurgent communities. 39 The new anti-prison politics were also shaped by a decade of prisoner litigation and radical prison uprisings, including the brutally crushed Attica Rebellion. <u>These “common” prisoners</u>, predominantly working-class people of color imprisoned for everyday acts of survival, <u>challenged the state's legitimacy by declaring imprisonment a form of cruel and unusual punishment and confronting the brute force of state power</u>. 40 By adopting the term “abolition” <u>activists drew deliberate links between the dismantling of prisons and the abolition of slavery. </u>Through historical excavations, the “new abolitionists” identified the abolition of prisons as the logical completion of the unfinished liberation marked by the 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution, which regulated, rather than ended, slavery. 41 Organizations that actively promote dialogue about what abolition means and how it can translate into concrete action include Critical Resistance (CR), New York's Prison Moratorium Project, Justice Now, California Coalition for Women Prisoners, Free Battered Women, and the Prison Activist Resource Center in the U.S. and the Prisoner Justice Action Committee (Toronto), the Prisoners' Justice Day Committee (Vancouver) and Joint Action in Canada. CR was founded in 1998 by a group of Bay Area activists including former political prisoner and scholar-activist Angela Y. Davis. Initially, CR focused on popular education and movement building, coordinating large conferences where diverse organizations could generate collective alternatives to the prison-industrial complex. Later work has included campaigns against prison construction in California's Central Valley and solidarity work with imprisoned Katrina survivors. CR describes abolition as: [A] political vision that seeks to eliminate the need for prisons, policing, and surveillance by creating sustainable alternatives to punishment and imprisonment … . <u><mark>An abolitionist vision means that <strong>we must build models today that can represent how we want to live in the future</u></strong>. <u>It means <strong>developing practical strategies for taking small steps that move us toward making our dreams real </mark>and that lead the average person to believe that things really could be different</u></strong>. <u><mark>It means <strong>living this vision in our daily lives</strong></mark>.</u> 42 In this sense, <u><mark>prison abolitionists are tasked with</mark> a dual burden: first, <mark>transforming people's consciousness so that they can believe that a world without prisons is possible<strong>, </mark>and second, <mark>taking practical steps to oppose the prison-industrial complex.</u></strong> <u>Making abolition more than a utopian vision <strong>requires practical steps toward this long-term goal</u></strong></mark>. <u>CR describes four steps that activists can get involved in</u>: <u><strong>shrinking the system</u></strong>, <u><strong>creating alternatives, shifting public opinion and public policy</u></strong>, and building leadership among those directly impacted by the prison-industrial complex. 43 Since its inception in the San Francisco Bay Area, Critical Resistance has become a national organization with chapters in Baltimore, Chicago, Gainesville, Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York, Tampa/St. Petersburg, and Washington, D.C. As such, CR has played a critical role in re-invigorating abolitionist politics in the U.S. This work is rooted in the radical praxis of Black women and transgender activists.</p>
null
1nc
Case
45,050
89
17,111
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
565,271
N
Texas
5
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
Garrett
Framework (2NR) cap good
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,641
Victims of trafficking experience horrific forms of dehumanization- we must reject this violence
Crouse ’07
Crouse ’07 (Janice, PhD, Senior Fellow at the Beverly LaHaye Institute, the think tank for Concerned Women for America, “Sex Trafficking Victims: Disposable or Human”, July 12, 2007, http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=13418, [SG])
What 'happens' in these places does not 'stay' in these places. It is a stain on humanity. Every time a woman, a girl, a foreign migrant is treated as less than human, the loss of dignity for one is a loss of dignity for us all." "It's high time we treat pimps as exploiters rather than hip urban rebels. When a pimp insists his name or symbol be tattooed on his 'girls' he is branding them like cattle — dehumanizing them, treating them like property." "There is a growing refusal to accept enslavement as an inevitable product of poverty or human viciousness. Corruption is typically poverty's handmaiden in cases of human trafficking." We agree with Ambassador Lagon that trafficking in persons "shouldn't be regulated or merely mitigated; it must be abolished." The victims of this crime are among the "most degraded, most exploited, and most dehumanized people in the world." "Exploiters must be stigmatized, prosecuted, and squeezed out of existence." Those who treat people as commercial commodities — pimps, madams and johns — are slavers who buy and sell human beings as disposable goods for their brothels, factories or fields. Otherwise, such crimes undermine everyone's liberty and freedom; only corruption—free democratic processes create a society where peace and prosperity are possible for all citizens.
What 'happens' in these places does not 'stay' in these places. the loss of dignity for one is a loss of dignity for us all There is a growing refusal to accept enslavement as an inevitable product of poverty or human viciousness. C trafficking must be abolished The victims of this crime are among the "most degraded, most exploited, and most dehumanized people in the world Those who treat people as commercial commodities are slavers who buy and sell human beings as disposable goods such crimes undermine everyone's liberty and freedom;
We have all heard the catchy song lyrics about "what happens in Mexico" staying in Mexico or the advertisements about "what happens in Vegas" staying in Vegas. Ambassador Lagon addressed that fallacy. "What 'happens' in these places does not 'stay' in these places. It is a stain on humanity. Every time a woman, a girl, a foreign migrant is treated as less than human, the loss of dignity for one is a loss of dignity for us all." It was gratifying to hear the ambassador directly address the problems of American popular culture in glamorizing the "ho" and "pimp." He said, "It's high time we treat pimps as exploiters rather than hip urban rebels. When a pimp insists his name or symbol be tattooed on his 'girls' he is branding them like cattle — dehumanizing them, treating them like property." There are those who would argue that human trafficking is the inevitable outcome of poverty and that some poverty—stricken people choose willingly to be involved. But, as Ambassador Lagon pointed out, "There is a growing refusal to accept enslavement as an inevitable product of poverty or human viciousness. Corruption is typically poverty's handmaiden in cases of human trafficking." CWA is pleased to be among those that Ambassador Lagon called an "indomitable force." We and other evangelical Christians are at the forefront of this battle as modern—day abolitionists who work for the human rights of women and for the dignity of all of God's people. We agree with Ambassador Lagon that trafficking in persons "shouldn't be regulated or merely mitigated; it must be abolished." The victims of this crime are among the "most degraded, most exploited, and most dehumanized people in the world." We join the ambassador in declaring, "Exploiters must be stigmatized, prosecuted, and squeezed out of existence." Those who treat people as commercial commodities — pimps, madams and johns — are slavers who buy and sell human beings as disposable goods for their brothels, factories or fields. We must work for good laws and good law enforcement that will treat human trafficking as a criminal offense that will be investigated and the perpetrators prosecuted, convicted and punished to the fullest extent of the law. Otherwise, such crimes undermine everyone's liberty and freedom; only corruption—free democratic processes create a society where peace and prosperity are possible for all citizens.
2,396
<h4>Victims of trafficking experience horrific forms of dehumanization- we must reject this violence </h4><p><strong>Crouse ’07</strong> (Janice, PhD, Senior Fellow at the Beverly LaHaye Institute, the think tank for Concerned Women for America, “Sex Trafficking Victims: Disposable or Human”, July 12, 2007, http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=13418<u>, [SG]) </p><p></u>We have all heard the catchy song lyrics about "what happens in Mexico" staying in Mexico or the advertisements about "what happens in Vegas" staying in Vegas. Ambassador Lagon addressed that fallacy. "<u><mark>What 'happens' in these places does not 'stay' in these places.</mark> It is a stain on humanity. Every time a woman, a girl, a foreign migrant is treated as less than human, <strong><mark>the loss of dignity for one is a loss of dignity for us all</mark>."</u></strong> It was gratifying to hear the ambassador directly address the problems of American popular culture in glamorizing the "ho" and "pimp." He said, <u>"It's high time we treat pimps as exploiters rather than hip urban rebels. When a pimp insists his name or symbol be tattooed on his 'girls' he is branding them like cattle — dehumanizing them, treating them like property."</u> There are those who would argue that human trafficking is the inevitable outcome of poverty and that some poverty—stricken people choose willingly to be involved. But, as Ambassador Lagon pointed out, <u>"<mark>There is a growing refusal to accept enslavement as an inevitable product of poverty or human viciousness. C</mark>orruption is typically poverty's handmaiden in cases of human trafficking."</u> CWA is pleased to be among those that Ambassador Lagon called an "indomitable force." We and other evangelical Christians are at the forefront of this battle as modern—day abolitionists who work for the human rights of women and for the dignity of all of God's people. <u>We agree with Ambassador Lagon that <mark>trafficking</mark> in persons "shouldn't be regulated or merely mitigated; it <mark>must be abolished</mark>." <strong><mark>The victims of this crime are among the "most degraded, most exploited, and most dehumanized people in the world</mark>."</u></strong> We join the ambassador in declaring, <u>"Exploiters must be stigmatized, prosecuted, and squeezed out of existence." <mark>Those who treat people as commercial</mark> <mark>commodities</mark> — pimps, madams and johns — <mark>are slavers who buy and sell human beings as disposable goods</mark> for their brothels, factories or fields.</u> We must work for good laws and good law enforcement that will treat human trafficking as a criminal offense that will be investigated and the perpetrators prosecuted, convicted and punished to the fullest extent of the law. <u>Otherwise, <mark>such crimes undermine everyone's liberty and freedom;</mark> only corruption—free democratic processes create a society where peace and prosperity are possible for all citizens.</p></u>
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Contention 2 is illegal markets
97,673
23
17,114
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
565,248
A
Wake
4
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
Voss
null
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
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Genealogy approaches are anti-political—They cause political paralysis and move-away from their ultimate objective
Wolin 2 )
Wolin 2 (Richard Wolin – Prof @ CUNY in Modern European Intellectual History. South Central Review, Vol. 19, No. 2/3, 9/11. (Summer - Autumn, 2002), pp. 39-49. J Stor)
for the “cultural left,” slavishly following the “genealogical” approach moral reasoning is merely another one of civilization’s clever “normalizing” ruses—hence, an intellectual weakness to be avoided at all costs. Once again, postmodernism’s intellectual pedigree has left it morally impotent and politically clueless. The Left can ignore imperatives only at its own peril. it suspends critical judgment, destroys its own credibility, and guarantees its own political irrelevance.
for the “cultural left,” slavishly following the “genealogical” approach is merely another one of civilization’s clever “normalizing” ruses has left it morally impotent and politically clueless The Left can ignore the imperatives only at its own peril suspends critical judgment, destroys its own credibility, and guarantees its own political irrelevance
Amid the fog of postmodern relativism disseminated by Baudrillard, Zizek and others, something essential is missing. Going back to the Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue, the massacre of civilian innocents has been a touchstone of civilized moral judgment. It remains today the cornerstone of human rights law and just war theory. Yet, for the “cultural left,” slavishly following the “genealogical” approach recommended by Nietzsche and Foucault, moral reasoning is merely another one of civilization’s clever “normalizing” ruses—hence, an intellectual weakness to be avoided at all costs. Once again, postmodernism’s right-wing intellectual pedigree—Nietzsche, Spengler, and Heidegger—has left it morally impotent and politically clueless. For years the Left has demonstrated a predilection to romanticize the “other”—Ho Chi Minh, Che, Fidel, as well as countless other apostles of Third World revolution—in the hope that the Wretched of the Earth would provide a remedy for our own seemingly intractable political impasse. Predictably, at a conference I attended recently, a friend with impeccable left- wing credentials who, until communism’s recent collapse, had been an ardent champion of the proletarian cause, jumped on the pan-Arab bandwagon, reciting the names of obscure Muslim intellectuals who, she claimed, offered a promising political alternative to the debilities of Western liberalism. Plus ça change. The Left can ignore the imperatives of morality and international law only at its own peril. By romanticizing the lifestyles and mores of non-Western peoples, it suspends critical judgment, destroys its own credibility, and guarantees its own political irrelevance.
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<h4><strong>Genealogy approaches are anti-political—They cause political <u>paralysis</u> and <u>move-away</u> from their ultimate objective</h4><p>Wolin 2</strong> (Richard Wolin – Prof @ CUNY in Modern European Intellectual History. South Central Review, Vol. 19, No. 2/3, 9/11. (Summer - Autumn, 2002), pp. 39-49. J Stor<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>Amid the fog of postmodern relativism disseminated by Baudrillard, Zizek and others, something essential is missing. Going back to the Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue, the massacre of civilian innocents has been a touchstone of civilized moral judgment. It remains today the cornerstone of human rights law and just war theory. Yet, <u><mark>for the “cultural left,” slavishly following the “genealogical” approach</mark> </u>recommended by Nietzsche and Foucault, <u>moral reasoning <mark>is merely another one of civilization’s clever “normalizing” ruses</mark>—hence, an intellectual weakness to be avoided at all costs. Once again, postmodernism’s </u>right-wing<u> intellectual pedigree</u>—Nietzsche, Spengler, and Heidegger—<u><strong><mark>has left it morally impotent and politically clueless</mark>.</u></strong> For years the Left has demonstrated a predilection to romanticize the “other”—Ho Chi Minh, Che, Fidel, as well as countless other apostles of Third World revolution—in the hope that the Wretched of the Earth would provide a remedy for our own seemingly intractable political impasse. Predictably, at a conference I attended recently, a friend with impeccable left- wing credentials who, until communism’s recent collapse, had been an ardent champion of the proletarian cause, jumped on the pan-Arab bandwagon, reciting the names of obscure Muslim intellectuals who, she claimed, offered a promising political alternative to the debilities of Western liberalism. Plus ça change. <u><mark>The Left can ignore </u>the<u> imperatives</mark> </u>of morality and international law <u><mark>only at its own peril</mark>. </u>By romanticizing the lifestyles and mores of non-Western peoples, <u>it <mark>suspends critical judgment, <strong>destroys its own credibility, and guarantees its own political irrelevance</mark>. </p></u></strong>
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
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N
Wake
5
NYU Itliong-Zhan
McCleary
Fed CP (2NR) AG Politics (2NR Cede the Political DA T - USFG
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
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Plan destroys the treaty regime- the CP is key to a model of re-interpretation that keeps it intact
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)
The United States invested more effort than any other nation to influence the design of the global control regime If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument regarding enforcement priorities claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession are still criminal offences under federal drug law and because the treaty provisions allow flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. if, the U.S. interpretation attracted political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include coffeeshops
If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument regarding enforcement priorities still criminal offences under federal drug law because the treaty provisions allow for considerable flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system f, the U.S. interpretation attracted of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation
The United States has invested probably more effort than any other nation over the past century to influence the design of the global control regime and enforce its almost universal adherence. If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department regarding enforcement priorities, claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession of cannabis are still criminal offences under federal drug law; and because the treaty provisions allow for considerable flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, if, the U.S. interpretation attracted a certain level of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up. Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the coffeeshops by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.
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<h4>Plan destroys the treaty regime- the CP is key to a model of re-interpretation that keeps it intact</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)</p><p><u>The United States</u> has <u>invested</u> probably <u>more effort than any other nation</u> over the past century <u>to</u> <u>influence the design of the global control regime</u> and enforce its almost universal adherence. <u><strong><mark>If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument</u></strong></mark> it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. <u><mark>Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument</u></mark>, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department <u><mark>regarding</u> <u><strong>enforcement priorities</u></strong></mark>, <u>claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession</u> of cannabis <u>are <strong><mark>still criminal offences under federal drug law</u></strong></mark>; <u>and <mark>because the treaty provisions allow</u> for considerable <u>flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system</mark>.</u> Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, <u>i<mark>f, the U.S. interpretation attracted</mark> </u>a certain level <mark>of <u>political acceptance</u> <u>and</u> <u>became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation</u>, <u><strong>significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up</u></strong></mark>. <u>Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments</u>, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. <u><mark>Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a <strong>de facto amendment</strong> by means of broad interpretation</u></mark> that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. <u><mark>If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation</u></mark> of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly <u>the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include</u> the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the <u>coffeeshops</u><strong> by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.</p></strong>
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
565,260
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Wake
2
Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
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NOTA and UAGA do not apply to gametes – a stem cell source
Korobkin 7
Korobkin 7 Russell Korobkin, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law; Faculty Fellow, UCLA Center for Society and Genetics; Faculty Associate, UCLA Center for Health Policy Research. Arizona Law Review Spring, 2007 49 Ariz. L. Rev. 45 ARTICLE: Buying and Selling Human Tissues for Stem Cell Research
neither of these statutes with national scope appears to apply, under any conditions, to gametes, which - especially ova - are likely to be needed in large numbers for stem cell research a federal law criminalizes the donation or sale of HIV-positive gametes, which seems, by implication, to recognize the validity of purchases involving uninfected gametes. , / Based on the latest report from the World Economic Forum the U.S. rank is number two The U.S. actually ranked number one in 2008 and 2009 and only missed the top spot this year due to the depth of the recession. we rank very high on two out of the three broad categories of factors important to the economy: innovation and efficiency The U.S. ranks number one in the world on innovation. The U.S. also has excellent colleges and universities that both produce these entrepreneurs and support them with discoveries and practical applications. While worker costs in the U.S. may be higher than in other countries, the productivity of our workers - is also commensurately higher also rate the U.S. high on worker flexibility. The biggest complaint in 2010 was access to financing. this was also mentioned as the top negative in most countries, .S. economic output represents a declining share of global output, the more relevant question is how readily can economic output be translated into military power? The European Union doesn’t have the advantages of a traditional state when it comes to raising an army. The Indian economy is taxed in a highly uneven manner, and much of the economy is black China shape of the economy, and its long frontiers pose serious barriers to translating potential power into effective power innovativeness” — based on the number of patents filed is crude to say the least The “global diffusion of technology” is real, and if anything it magnifies U.S. economic power. The global diffusion of technology is indeed sharply raising the costs of military conquest, a unipolar distribution of military power is more likely to persist. unipolar military power is less valuable The U.S. economy is extraordinarily resilient Consumption has been growing around 2% we’re becoming a lot more energy-independent we have some of the best demographics in the world Our demographics are better than China’s. China’s working-age population will actually be in decline by about 2015, 2017 Our immigration policy allows us to see good growth of demographics We have other anecdotes of individuals wanting to relocate assets to the U S The growth stories in China and Brazil and other places are really great, but the infrastructure [and] the lack of understanding what the rules of the game are can really unsettle folks the U.S. is still strong on those points we have the advantage of being innovative and technologically advanced. —stem cells not the lynchpin Wolfe 13 (Audra J. Wolfe is a writer, editor and historian based in Philadelphia Science diplomacy works, but only when it's genuine, 8/23/13 http://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2013/aug/23/obama-science-foreign-policy)//kyan Obama has embraced the science diplomacy to bridge cultural and economic gaps between the United States and the rest of the world director of the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy, regularly meets with his science policy counterparts from Brazil, China, India, Japan, Korea and Russia US State Department has sent a series of American scientists abroad as "Science Envoys" in hopes of using scientific relationships as an olive branch to the Muslim world. Since 2009, these science envoy have collectively visited almost 20 countries, including Indonesia, Morocco, Bangladesh, Kazahkstan and pre-revolution Egypt. This new interest in science diplomacy is explained by the nature of contemporary global problems: issues of resource distribution, climate change, and uneven economic growth can only be solved with input from science Nor do American scientists hold a monopoly on good ideas Science is no substitute for effective diplomacy. Any more than diplomatic initiatives lead to good science. given the increasing number of international issues with a scientific dimension that politicians have to deal with, this is essentially what the core of science diplomacy should be about diplomacy can play a significant role in facilitating science exchange and the launch of international science projects, essential for the development of science increasing restrictions on entry to certain countries have significantly impeded scientific exchange programmes. Here the challenge for diplomats was seen as helping to find ways to ease the burdens of such restrictions the failure of the Copenhagen climate summit had been partly due to a misplaced belief that scientific consensus would be sufficient to generate a commitment to collective action, without taking into account the political impact that scientific ideas would have. Political conflicts have deep roots that cannot easily be papered over, however open-minded scientists may be to professional colleagues in the developing world, high profile scientific projects could end up doing damage by inadvertently favouring one social group over another advances in science have led to new types of weaponry. Nor did science automatically lead to the reduction of global inequalities. “Science for diplomacy” ended up with a highly mixed review. The most recent climate models and fossil evidence indicate that during this time interval atmospheric CO2 would have exceeded 1200ppmv and tropical temperatures were between 5–10 ◦ C warmer than modern values There is evidence for relatively rapid intervals of extreme global warmth and massive carbon addition when global temperatures increased by 5 ◦ C in less than 10 000 years what was the response of biota to these ‘climate extremes’ and do we see the large-scale extinctions predicted by some of the most recent models associated with future climate changes the fossil record demonstrates the very opposite. at least in the plant fossil record, this was one of the most biodiverse intervals of time in the Neotropics the tropical forest biome was the most extensive in Earth’s history, extending to mid-latitudes in both the northern and southern hemispheres – and there was also no ice at the Poles and Antarctica was covered by needle-leaved forest There were certainly novel ecosystems, and an increase in community turnover with a mixture of tropical and temperate species in mid latitudes and plants persisting in areas that are currently polar deserts at the earlier Palaeocene–Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM) at 55.8 million years ago in the US Gulf Coast, there was a rapid vegetation response to climate change Several recent studies have demonstrated that CO2-induced global mean temperature change is irreversible on human timescales1 not only is this climate change irreversible, but that for some climate variables, such as Antarctic perature and North African rainfall, CO2-induced climate changes are simulated to continue to worsen for many centuries even after a complete cessation of emissions. a large committed thermosteric sea level rise is expected even after a cessation of emissions this effect may be compounded by ice shelf collapse, grounding line retreat, and ensuing accelerated ice discharge in marine-based sectors of the Antarctic ice sheet, precipitating a sea level rise of several metres our findings of Northern Hemisphere cooling, Southern Hemisphere warming, a southward shift of the intertropical convergence zone and delayed and ongoing ocean warming at intermediate depths following a cessation of emissions are likely to be robust. Nicolas Loris, Herbert and Joyce Morgan Fellow at Heritage, master's degree in economics from George Mason University, “No 'Following the Leader' on Climate Change,” Heritage Foundation, 1/30/2013, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2013/1/no-following-the-leader-on-climate-change In his second inaugural address Obama pledged that the United States “will respond to the threat of climate change” and will take the lead for other countries to follow suit developing nations such as China and India, refuse to play ball. why should they? Developing nations are not going to curb economic growth to solve a theoretical problem when their citizens face far more pressing environmental problems — especially when so many are trapped in grinding poverty and lack access to reliable electricity. the repeated failure of U.N. negotiations to produce multilateral climate action demonstrates a near universal disinclination to sacrifice economic growth on the altar of global warming.
The U.S. actually ranked number one in 2008 and 2009 and only missed the top spot this year due to the depth of the recession we rank very high on two out of the three broad categories of factors innovation and efficiency. The U.S. ranks number one in the world on innovation The U.S. also has excellent colleges and universities that both produce these entrepreneurs and support them with discoveries and practical applications the productivity of our workers is also commensurately higher how readily can economic output be translated into military power? China economy and its long frontiers, pose serious barriers to translating potential power into effective power innovativeness” — based on patents is crude global diffusion of technology” is real and it magnifies U.S. economic power The U.S. economy is extraordinarily resilient Consumption has been growing around 2% we’re becoming a lot more energy-independent we have some of the best demographics in the world Our demographics are better than China’s. China’s working-age population will actually be in decline by about 2015, 2017 Our immigration policy allows us to see good growth of demographics We have other anecdotes of individuals wanting to relocate assets to the U S The growth stories in China and Brazil and other places are really great, but the infrastructure [and] the lack of understanding what the rules of the game are can really unsettle folks we have the advantage of being innovative and technologically advanced. Obama has embrace science diplomacy to bridge gaps director of Office of Science and Technology regularly me with science policy counterparts from Brazil, China, India, Japan, Korea and Russia US sent scientists abroad as "Science Envoys" in hopes of using scientific relationships as an olive branch these envoys, visited almost 20 countries including Indonesia, Morocco, Bangladesh, Kazahkstan and Egypt. This new interest in science diplomacy is at explained by the nature of global problems Science is no substitute for diplomacy diplomacy play a significant role in facilitating science exchange the failure of Copenhagen been due to a misplaced belief that scientific consensus would generate a commitment to collective action, without taking into account the political impact scientific projects could end up doing damage by inadvertently favouring one social group over another The most recent climate models and fossil evidence indicate CO2 would have exceeded 1200ppmv temperatures were 5–10 ◦ warmer There is evidence for rapid intervals of extreme warmth do we see large-scale extinctions the fossil record demonstrates the very opposite. this was one of the most biodiverse intervals of time the tropical forest biome was the most extensive in Earth’s history There were novel ecosystems, and an increase in community turnover Several recent studies have demonstrated that CO2-induced change is irreversible Antarctic and African rainfall changes are simulated to worsen for many centuries 22 even after a complete cessation of emissions delayed and ongoing ocean warming at depths 35 following a cessation are robust In his inaugural address Obama pledged the U S will respond to climate change” and lead China and India, refuse they are not going to curb growth to solve a theoretical problem when their citizens face pressing poverty and lack electricity repeated failure of U.N. demonstrates universal disinclination to sacrifice growth
Furthermore, neither of these statutes with national scope appears to apply, under any conditions, to gametes, which - especially ova - are likely to be needed in large numbers for stem cell research if the practice of therapeutic cloning becomes widespread. In fact, a federal law criminalizes the donation or sale of HIV-positive gametes, n19 which seems, by implication, to recognize the validity of purchases involving uninfected gametes. US competitiveness high now – rankings Walden, NCSU economist, 7/28/10 ( Walden, Michael,William Neal Reynolds Distinguished Professor, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, North Carolina State University, " Is U.S. Still competitive? The Answer is a resounding 'Yes!" http://localtechwire.com/business/local_tech_wire/news/blogpost/8050877/ So should we just throw in the towel and wait for the day when everything we use will be made somewhere else? Is it inevitable that we become a nation of consumers and not producers? Based on the latest report from the World Economic Forum (WEF), the answer is a resounding "no." The WEF, which organizes a highly publicized and well-attended annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland each year, produces a Global Competitiveness Index for over 130 countries. The index is based on scores of factors, including worker costs and training, education quality, financing, infrastructure like roads and airports and innovation. The WEF combines these factors into a single number based on their relative importance to business persons and investors. And now the drum roll please. Based on the WEF Global Competitiveness Index, where does the U.S. rank in the latest reading for 2010? The answer is number two out of 133 countries. Only Switzerland ranked higher. The U.S. actually ranked number one in 2008 and 2009 and only missed the top spot this year due to the depth of the recession. Why are business people and investors so bullish on the U.S.? It's because we rank very high on two out of the three broad categories of factors important to the economy: innovation and efficiency. The U.S. ranks number one in the world on innovation. We are still the land of opportunity, where smart, creative and foresightful people can take a chance to follow their dream and hit it big. The U.S. also has excellent colleges and universities that both produce these entrepreneurs and support them with discoveries and practical applications. Efficiency means businesses get a lot of bang for their bucks spent on workers and other inputs. While worker costs in the U.S. may be higher than in other countries, the productivity of our workers - what they can produce in a given time period - is also commensurately higher. Investors also rate the U.S. high on worker flexibility. This means it's much easier to both downsize and upsize businesses and move workers from one firm to another. Again, our excellent higher education system helps with this transition. What issues do business people cite about locating their operations in the U.S.? The biggest complaint in 2010 was access to financing. However, this was also mentioned as the top negative in most countries, including China, and it will likely recede as the economy recovers. Also mentioned were tax rates, tax regulations and government red tape. Loss of competitiveness won’t allow rival powers overthrow unipolarity- their progress is unsustainable Salam Research Associate CFR ‘9 (Reihan-, Jan. 21, The American Scene, “Robert Pape Is Overheated”, http://www.theamericanscene.com/2009/01/21/ robert-pape-is-overheated) Pape spends a lot of time demonstrating that U.S. economic output represents a declining share of global output, which is hardly a surprise. Yet as Pape surely understands, the more relevant question is how much and how readily can economic output be translated into military power? The European Union, for example, has many state-like features, yet it doesn’t have the advantages of a traditional state when it comes to raising an army. The Indian economy is taxed in a highly uneven manner, and much of the economy is black — the same is true across the developing world. As for China, both the shape of the economy, as Yasheng Huang suggests, and its long frontiers, as Andrew Nathan has long argued, pose serious barriers to translating potential power into effective power. (Wohlforth and Brooks give Stephen Walt’s balance-of-threat its due.) So while this hardly obviates the broader point that relative American economic power is eroding — that was the whole idea of America’s postwar grand strategy — it is worth keeping in mind. This is part of the reason why sclerotic, statist economies can punch above their weight militarily, at least for a time — they are “better” at marshaling resources. Over the long run, the Singapores will beat the Soviets. But in the long run, we’re all dead. And given that this literature is rooted in the bogey of long-term coalition warfare, you can see why the unipolarity argument holds water. At the risk of sounding overly harsh, Pape’s understanding of “innovativeness” — based on the number of patents filed, it seems — is crude to say the least. I recommend Amar Bhidé‘s brilliant critique of Richard Freeman, which I’ll be talking about a lot. Pape cites Zakaria, who was relying on slightly shopworn ideas that Bhidé demolishes in The Venturesome Economy. The “global diffusion of technology” is real, and if anything it magnifies U.S. economic power. “Ah, but we’re talking about the prospect of coalition warfare!” The global diffusion of technology is indeed sharply raising the costs of military conquest, as the United States discovered in Iraq. The declining utility of military power means that a unipolar distribution of military power is more likely to persist. And yes, it also means that unipolar military power is less valuable than it was in 1945. Competitiveness inevitable—structural factors O’Connor 7/15/12¶ (Elizabeth – Vice President of Capital Strategy Research with U.S. and Global Macroeconomic and Capital Markets Research Responsibilities, Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, Finance, and Business Economics from the Marshall School of Business, “World Economic Update,” American Funds, https://www.americanfunds.com/resources/perspectives/world-economic-update/resilient-economy.htm)¶ ELIZABETH O’CONNOR: The U.S. economy is extraordinarily resilient. And, as I mentioned before, we have a subtraction to GDP from state and local government and federal government. Nothing has been added from housing and construction. Wage growth has been pretty sluggish. Consumption has been growing around 2%. I would say the trade outlook is weakening. And considering all of that, we’re becoming a lot more energy-independent, which, I think, is falling under the radar screen. It doesn’t get a lot of attention in the general media, so I don’t think that the general population or the general set of investors fully understand how beneficial that’s going to be to our economy over the next couple of decades.¶ The other issue is the fact that we have some of the best demographics in the world, even though we’re a developed, mature economy. Our demographics are better than China’s. China’s working-age population will actually be in decline by about 2015, 2017. This is called “old before rich.” It happened to Japan; you could argue that it happened in Korea. But in the U.S., it didn’t happen that way. Our immigration policy allows us to see good growth of demographics, and that really is a key factor. We certainly need a lot of skilled labor here, and we have a lot of excellent universities. However, there’s a lot of highly skilled labor outside the U.S. — India, China, Brazil, other places — who would really enjoy coming here and working.¶ It’s not that 2% growth is that exciting, but it’s that the quality of life, the rule of law, property rights — all of those things — are really important and things we take for granted. And being in China for a period of time, we talked to a young businessman there, and he was saying that he and his family have made it. They have an exporting business, they have a white goods business, they’re involved in real estate — they have a lot of businesses. They’re very high-net-worth individuals. And he was saying that their dream is to move back to Canada. We have other anecdotes of individuals wanting to relocate assets and/or family members to the United States, and Southern California in particular.¶ The growth stories in China and Brazil and other places are really great, but the infrastructure [and] the lack of understanding what the rules of the game are can really unsettle folks. So I would say that the U.S. is still strong on those points. I think that, given the other factors — an improving housing market, long-term energy independence (we have one of the biggest reserves in the world of shale gas and natural gas, which is actually a very clean fuel) — we have the advantage of being innovative and technologically advanced. And we export that.¶ So I think the U.S., for me — which, until very recently, was seen as the economy that’s never going to grow, “The U.S. is never going to regain its importance in the world economy” — I completely disagree with that, having travelled to several emerging economies recently. We need China to grow; they need us to grow. There’s a lot of collaboration that happens at the lower policymaker level that you tend not to see in the media, and so I’m very optimistic about that. Science diplomacy high now—stem cells not the lynchpin Wolfe 13 (Audra J. Wolfe is a writer, editor and historian based in Philadelphia Science diplomacy works, but only when it's genuine, 8/23/13 http://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2013/aug/23/obama-science-foreign-policy)//kyan The Obama Administration has embraced the concept of science diplomacy as a way to bridge cultural and economic gaps between the United States and the rest of the world. The director of the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy, John P Holdren, regularly meets with his science policy counterparts from Brazil, China, India, Japan, Korea and Russia. The US State Department has sent a series of American scientists abroad as "Science Envoys" in hopes of using scientific relationships as an olive branch to the Muslim world. Since 2009, these science envoys, acting as private citizens, have collectively visited almost 20 countries, including Indonesia, Morocco, Bangladesh, Kazahkstan and pre-revolution Egypt. This new interest in science diplomacy is at least partially explained by the nature of contemporary global problems: issues of resource distribution, climate change, and uneven economic growth can only be solved with input from science. Climate change, for instance, does not respect international borders; addressing it will require international partnerships. Nor do American scientists hold a monopoly on good ideas. For these and a host of other reasons, science diplomacy makes good sense and promises benefits for the countries on either end of scientific exchange. Science diplomacy doesn’t solve their impacts Dickson 10 (David, director of SciDev, June 28 http://scidevnet.wordpress.com/category/science-diplomacy-conference-2010/ 7/9/11)//NR There’s a general consensus in both the scientific and political worlds that the principle of science diplomacy, at least in the somewhat restricted sense of the need to get more and better science into international negotiations, is a desirable objective. There is less agreement, however, on how far the concept can – or indeed should – be extended to embrace broader goals and objectives, in particular attempts to use science to achieve political or diplomatic goals at the international level. Science, despite its international characteristics, is no substitute for effective diplomacy. Any more than diplomatic initiatives necessarily lead to good science. These seem to have been the broad conclusions to emerge from a three-day meeting at Wilton Park in Sussex, UK, organised by the British Foreign Office and the Royal Society, and attended by scientists, government officials and politicians from 17 countries around the world. The definition of science diplomacy varied widely among participants. Some saw it as a subcategory of “public diplomacy”, or what US diplomats have recently been promoting as “soft power” (“the carrot rather than the stick approach”, as a participant described it). Others preferred to see it as a core element of the broader concept of “innovation diplomacy”, covering the politics of engagement in the familiar fields of international scientific exchange and technology transfer, but raising these to a higher level as a diplomatic objective. Whatever definition is used, three particular aspects of the debate became the focus of attention during the Wilton Park meeting: how science can inform the diplomatic process; how diplomacy can assist science in achieving its objectives; and, finally, how science can provide a channel for quasi-diplomatic exchanges by forming an apparently neutral bridge between countries. There was little disagreement on the first of these. Indeed for many, given the increasing number of international issues with a scientific dimension that politicians have to deal with, this is essentially what the core of science diplomacy should be about. Chris Whitty, for example, chief scientist at the UK’s Department for International Development, described how knowledge about the threat raised by the spread of the highly damaging plant disease stem rust had been an important input by researchers into discussions by politicians and diplomats over strategies for persuading Afghan farmers to shift from the production of opium to wheat. Others pointed out that the scientific community had played a major role in drawing attention to issues such as the links between chlorofluorocarbons in the atmosphere and the growth of the ozone hole, or between carbon dioxide emissions and climate change. Each has made essential contributions to policy decisions. Acknowledging this role for science has some important implications. No-one dissented when Rohinton Medhora, from Canada’s International Development Research Centre, complained of the lack of adequate scientific expertise in the embassies of many countries of the developed and developing world alike. Nor – perhaps predictably – was there any major disagreement that diplomatic initiatives can both help and occasionally hinder the process of science. On the positive side, such diplomacy can play a significant role in facilitating science exchange and the launch of international science projects, both essential for the development of modern science. Europe’s framework programme of research programmes was quoted as a successful advantage of the first of these. Examples of the second range from the establishment of the European Organisation of Nuclear Research (usually known as CERN) in Switzerland after the Second World War, to current efforts to build a large new nuclear fusion facility (ITER). Less positively, increasing restrictions on entry to certain countries, and in particular the United States after the 9/11 attacks in New York and elsewhere, have significantly impeded scientific exchange programmes. Here the challenge for diplomats was seen as helping to find ways to ease the burdens of such restrictions. The broadest gaps in understanding the potential of scientific diplomacy lay in the third category, namely the use of science as a channel of international diplomacy, either as a way of helping to forge consensus on contentious issues, or as a catalyst for peace in situations of conflict. On the first of these, some pointed to recent climate change negotiations, and in particular the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, as a good example, of the way that the scientific community can provide a strong rationale for joint international action. But others referred to the failure of the Copenhagen climate summit last December to come up with a meaningful agreement on action as a demonstration of the limitations of this way of thinking. It was argued that this failure had been partly due to a misplaced belief that scientific consensus would be sufficient to generate a commitment to collective action, without taking into account the political impact that scientific ideas would have. Another example that received considerable attention was the current construction of a synchrotron facility SESAME in Jordan, a project that is already is bringing together researchers in a range of scientific disciplines from various countries in the Middle East (including Israel, Egypt and Palestine, as well as both Greece and Turkey). The promoters of SESAME hope that – as with the building of CERN 60 years ago, and its operation as a research centre involving, for example, physicists from both Russia and the United States – SESAME will become a symbol of what regional collaboration can achieve. In that sense, it would become what one participant described as a “beacon of hope” for the region. But others cautioned that, however successful SESAME may turn out to be in purely scientific terms, its potential impact on the Middle East peace process should not be exaggerated. Political conflicts have deep roots that cannot easily be papered over, however open-minded scientists may be to professional colleagues coming from other political contexts. Indeed, there was even a warning that in the developing world, high profile scientific projects, particular those with explicit political backing, could end up doing damage by inadvertently favouring one social group over another. Scientists should be wary of having their prestige used in this way; those who did so could come over as patronising, appearing unaware of political realities. Similarly, those who hold science in esteem as a practice committed to promoting the causes of peace and development were reminded of the need to take into account how advances in science – whether nuclear physics or genetic technology – have also led to new types of weaponry. Nor did science automatically lead to the reduction of global inequalities. “Science for diplomacy” therefore ended up with a highly mixed review. The consensus seemed to be that science can prepare the ground for diplomatic initiatives – and benefit from diplomatic agreements – but cannot provide the solutions to either. No impact to warming--- fossil record Willis et. al, ’10 [Kathy J. Willis, Keith D. Bennett, Shonil A. Bhagwat& H. John B. Birks (2010): 4 °C and beyond: what did this mean for biodiversity in the past?, Systematics and Biodiversity, 8:1, 3-9, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14772000903495833, ] The most recent climate models and fossil evidence for the early Eocene Climatic Optimum (53–51 million years ago) indicate that during this time interval atmospheric CO2 would have exceeded 1200ppmv and tropical temperatures were between 5–10 ◦ C warmer than modern values (Zachos et al., 2008). There is also evidence for relatively rapid intervals of extreme global warmth and massive carbon addition when global temperatures increased by 5 ◦ C in less than 10 000 years (Zachos et al., 2001). So what was the response of biota to these ‘climate extremes’ and do we see the large-scale extinctions (especially in the Neotropics) predicted by some of the most recent models associated with future climate changes (Huntingford et al., 2008)? In fact the fossil record for the early Eocene Climatic Optimum demonstrates the very opposite. All the evidence from low-latitude records indicates that, at least in the plant fossil record, this was one of the most biodiverse intervals of time in the Neotropics(Jaramillo et al., 2006). It was also a time when the tropical forest biome was the most extensive in Earth’s history, extending to mid-latitudes in both the northern and southern hemispheres – and there was also no ice at the Poles and Antarctica was covered by needle-leaved forest (Morley, 2007). There were certainly novel ecosystems, and an increase in community turnover with a mixture of tropical and temperate species in mid latitudes and plants persisting in areas that are currently polar deserts. [It should be noted; however, that at the earlier Palaeocene–Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM) at 55.8 million years ago in the US Gulf Coast, there was a rapid vegetation response to climate change. There was major compositional turnover, palynological richness decreased, and regional extinctions occurred (Harrington & Jaramillo, 2007). Reasons for these changes are unclear, but they may have resulted from continental drying, negative feedbacks on vegetation to changing CO2 (assuming that CO2 changed during the PETM), rapid cooling immediately after the PETM, or subtle changes in plant–animal interactions (Harrington & Jaramillo, 2007).] Warming’s inevitable Gillett et al 10—director @ the Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling and Analysis Nathan, “Ongoing climate change following a complete cessation of carbon dioxide emissions”. Nature Geoscience Several recent studies have demonstrated that CO2-induced 17 global mean temperature change is irreversible on human 18 timescales1_5. We find that not only is this climate change 19 irreversible, but that for some climate variables, such as Antarctic 20 temperature and North African rainfall, CO2-induced climate 21 changes are simulated to continue to worsen for many centuries 22 even after a complete cessation of emissions. Although it is 23 also well known that a large committed thermosteric sea level 24 rise is expected even after a cessation of emissions in 2100, 25 our finding of a strong delayed high-latitude Southern Ocean 26 warming at intermediate depths suggests that this effect may be 27 compounded by ice shelf collapse, grounding line retreat, and ensuing accelerated ice discharge in marine-based sectors of the 28 Antarctic ice sheet, precipitating a sea level rise of several metres. 29 Quantitative results presented here are subject to uncertainties 30 associated with the climate sensitivity, the rate of ocean heat 31 uptake and the rate of carbon uptake in CanESM1, but our 32 findings of Northern Hemisphere cooling, Southern Hemisphere 33 warming, a southward shift of the intertropical convergence zone, 34 and delayed and ongoing ocean warming at intermediate depths 35 following a cessation of emissions are likely to be robust. Geo- 36 engineering by stratospheric aerosol injection has been proposed 37 as a response measure in the event of a rapid melting of the 38 West Antarctic ice sheet24. Our results indicate that if such a 39 melting were driven by ocean warming at intermediate depths, as 40 is thought likely, a geoengineering response would be ineffective 41 for several centuries owing to the long delay associated with 42 subsurface ocean warming. No modeling and signal is non-unique Loris 13 Nicolas Loris, Herbert and Joyce Morgan Fellow at Heritage, master's degree in economics from George Mason University, “No 'Following the Leader' on Climate Change,” Heritage Foundation, 1/30/2013, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2013/1/no-following-the-leader-on-climate-change In his second inaugural address, President Obama pledged that the United States “will respond to the threat of climate change” and will take the lead for other countries to follow suit. This commitment is a willful rejection of reality. Congress has been unwilling to address climate change unilaterally through legislation. Multilateral attempts become more futile each year as major players, especially developing nations such as China and India, refuse to play ball. And why should they? Developing nations are not going to curb economic growth to solve a theoretical problem when their citizens face far more pressing environmental problems — especially when so many are trapped in grinding poverty and lack access to reliable electricity. This leaves the president with only one option for making good on his pledge: impose costly regulatory actions. This approach would be as pointless as unilateral legislative action. Why? Even accepting as fact the theory that Earth is warming and that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions are a warming agent does not make any of the following true: &bull; Man-made emissions are driving climate change and are a negative externality that needs to be internalized. Greenhouse gas emissions are a warming agent. But that fact doesn’t begin to settle the scientific debate about climate change and climate sensitivity — the amount of warming projected from increased greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, viewing man-made carbon dioxide as a strictly negative externality ignores a lot of peer-reviewed literature that identifies many positive effects (e.g., plant growth, human longevity, seed enrichment and less soil erosion as a result of more robust tree root growth) associated with higher levels of CO2 in the atmosphere. &bull; Earth is cooking at a catastrophic rate. The media breathlessly reported that a recent National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s study found 2012 to be the warmest on record for the continental United States. What they largely failed to report was that, globally, 2012 was only the ninth-warmest in the past 34 years. In fact, average global temperatures have leveled off over the past decade and a half. &bull; Sea levels will rise dramatically, threatening America’s coastlines. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report, the bible of CO2-reduction proponents, projects sea levels rising 7 inches to 23 inches over the next century. That’s not as alarming as it sounds. Sea level has risen at the lower end of that projection over the past two centuries. &bull; There will be more extreme droughts, heat waves, hurricanes and other natural disasters. Natural disasters (they’re called “natural” for a reason, right?) will occur with or without increased man-made emissions. Having failed repeatedly to win legislation limiting greenhouse gas emissions, the Obama administration appears bent on taking the regulatory route. The Environmental Protection Agency is promulgating stringent emission standards for new power plants that would effectively prohibit construction of coal-fired generators and prematurely shut down existing plants. The EPA also has introduced costly new air-quality standards for hydraulically fractured wells and new fuel-efficiency standards that will make cars and light-duty trucks more expensive, smaller and less safe. Restricting greenhouse gas emissions, whether unilaterally or multilaterally, will impose huge costs on consumers and the U.S. economy as a whole. Congress should exercise its seldom-used muscles as regulatory watchdog to keep regulatory proposals that are not cost-effective from full implementation and reverse the administration’s course on regulating CO2. As for the president’s suggestion that unilateral action by the U.S. will somehow inspire other countries to emulate our example — the repeated failure of U.N. negotiations to produce multilateral climate action demonstrates a near universal disinclination to sacrifice economic growth on the altar of global warming.
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<h4><strong>NOTA and UAGA do not apply to gametes – a stem cell source</h4><p>Korobkin 7</strong> Russell Korobkin<u>, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law; Faculty Fellow, UCLA Center for Society and Genetics; Faculty Associate, UCLA Center for Health Policy Research. Arizona Law Review Spring, 2007 49 Ariz. L. Rev. 45 ARTICLE: Buying and Selling Human Tissues for Stem Cell Research</p><p></u>Furthermore, <u>neither of these statutes with national scope appears to apply, under any conditions, to gametes, which - especially ova - are likely to be needed in large numbers for stem cell research</u> if the practice of therapeutic cloning becomes widespread. In fact, <u>a federal law criminalizes the donation or sale of HIV-positive gametes,</u> n19 <u><strong>which seems, by implication, to recognize the validity of purchases involving uninfected gametes.</p><p></u>US competitiveness high now – rankings</p><p>Walden, </strong>NCSU economist<u>, </u><strong>7/28<u></strong>/</u><strong>10</strong> ( Walden, Michael,William Neal Reynolds Distinguished Professor, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, North Carolina State University, " Is U.S. Still competitive? The Answer is a resounding 'Yes!" http://localtechwire.com/business/local_tech_wire/news/blogpost/8050877/</p><p>So should we just throw in the towel and wait for the day when everything we use will be made somewhere else? Is it inevitable that we become a nation of consumers and not producers?</p><p><u>Based on the latest report from the World Economic Forum</u> (WEF), the answer is a resounding "no." The WEF, which organizes a highly publicized and well-attended annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland each year, produces a Global Competitiveness Index for over 130 countries. The index is based on scores of factors, including worker costs and training, education quality, financing, infrastructure like roads and airports and innovation. The WEF combines these factors into a single number based on their relative importance to business persons and investors. And now the drum roll please. Based on the WEF Global Competitiveness Index, where does <u>the U.S. rank</u> in the latest reading for 2010? The answer <u>is number two </u>out of 133 countries. Only Switzerland ranked higher. <u><mark>The U.S. actually ranked number one in 2008 and 2009 and only missed the top spot this year due to the depth of the recession</mark>. </u>Why are business people and investors so bullish on the U.S.? It's because <u><mark>we rank very high on two out of the three broad categories of factors</mark> important to the economy: <mark>innovation and efficiency</u>.</mark> <u><mark>The U.S. ranks number one in the world on innovation</mark>.</u> We are still the land of opportunity, where smart, creative and foresightful people can take a chance to follow their dream and hit it big. <u><mark>The U.S. also has excellent colleges and universities that both produce these entrepreneurs and support them with discoveries and practical applications</mark>. </u>Efficiency means businesses get a lot of bang for their bucks spent on workers and other inputs. <u>While worker costs in the U.S. may be higher than in other countries, <mark>the productivity of our workers</u></mark> - what they can produce in a given time period <u>- <mark>is</u> <u>also commensurately higher</u></mark>. Investors <u>also rate the U.S. high on worker flexibility.</u> This means it's much easier to both downsize and upsize businesses and move workers from one firm to another. Again, our excellent higher education system helps with this transition. What issues do business people cite about locating their operations in the U.S.? <u>The biggest complaint in 2010 was access to financing.</u> However, <u>this was also mentioned as the top negative in most countries,</u><strong> including China, and it will likely recede as the economy recovers. Also mentioned were tax rates, tax regulations and government red tape. </p><p>Loss of competitiveness won’t allow rival powers overthrow unipolarity- their progress is unsustainable </p><p>Salam </strong>Research Associate CFR<strong> ‘9 </strong>(Reihan-, Jan. 21, The American Scene, “Robert Pape Is Overheated”, http://www.theamericanscene.com/2009/01/21/ </p><p>robert-pape-is-overheated) </p><p>Pape spends a lot of time demonstrating that U<u>.S. economic output represents a declining share of global output, </u>which is hardly a surprise. Yet as Pape surely understands, <u>the more relevant question is <mark>how</u></mark> much and how <u><mark>readily can economic output be translated into military power?</mark> The</u> <u>European Union</u>, for example, has many state-like features, yet it <u>doesn’t have the advantages of a traditional state when it comes to raising an army.</u> <u>The Indian economy is taxed in a highly uneven manner, and much of the economy is black</u> — the same is true across the developing world. As for <u><mark>China</u></mark>, both the <u>shape of the <mark>economy</mark>,</u> as Yasheng Huang suggests, <u><mark>and its long frontiers</u>,</mark> as Andrew Nathan has long argued, <u><mark>pose serious barriers to translating potential power into effective power</u></mark>. (Wohlforth and Brooks give Stephen Walt’s balance-of-threat its due.) So while this hardly obviates the broader point that relative American economic power is eroding — that was the whole idea of America’s postwar grand strategy — it is worth keeping in mind. This is part of the reason why sclerotic, statist economies can punch above their weight militarily, at least for a time — they are “better” at marshaling resources. Over the long run, the Singapores will beat the Soviets. But in the long run, we’re all dead. And given that this literature is rooted in the bogey of long-term coalition warfare, you can see why the unipolarity argument holds water. At the risk of sounding overly harsh, Pape’s understanding of “<u><mark>innovativeness” — based on</mark> the number of <mark>patents</mark> filed</u>, it seems — <u><mark>is crude</mark> to say the least</u>. I recommend Amar Bhidé‘s brilliant critique of Richard Freeman, which I’ll be talking about a lot. Pape cites Zakaria, who was relying on slightly shopworn ideas that Bhidé demolishes in The Venturesome Economy. <u>The “<mark>global diffusion of technology” is real</mark>, <mark>and</mark> if anything <mark>it magnifies U.S. economic power</mark>.</u> “Ah, but we’re talking about the prospect of coalition warfare!” <u>The global diffusion of technology is indeed sharply raising the costs of military conquest,</u> as the United States discovered in Iraq. The declining utility of military power means that <u>a unipolar distribution of military power is more likely to persist. </u>And yes, it also means that <u>unipolar military power is less valuable</u><strong> than it was in 1945.</p><p>Competitiveness inevitable—structural factors </p><p>O’Connor 7/15/12¶ </p><p>(Elizabeth – Vice President of Capital Strategy Research with U.S. and Global Macroeconomic and Capital Markets Research Responsibilities, Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, Finance, and Business Economics from the Marshall School of Business, “World Economic Update,” American Funds, </strong>https://www.americanfunds.com/resources/perspectives/world-economic-update/resilient-economy.htm)¶ ELIZABETH O’CONNOR: <u><mark>The U.S. economy is extraordinarily resilient</u></mark>. And, as I mentioned before, we have a subtraction to GDP from state and local government and federal government. Nothing has been added from housing and construction. Wage growth has been pretty sluggish. <u><mark>Consumption has been growing around 2%</u></mark>. I would say the trade outlook is weakening. And considering all of that, <u><mark>we’re becoming a lot more energy-independent</u></mark>, which, I think, is falling under the radar screen. It doesn’t get a lot of attention in the general media, so I don’t think that the general population or the general set of investors fully understand how beneficial that’s going to be to our economy over the next couple of decades.¶ The other issue is the fact that <u><mark>we have some of the best demographics in the world</u></mark>, even though we’re a developed, mature economy. <u><mark>Our demographics are better than China’s. China’s working-age population will actually be in decline by about 2015, 2017</u></mark>. This is called “old before rich.” It happened to Japan; you could argue that it happened in Korea. But in the U.S., it didn’t happen that way. <u><mark>Our immigration policy allows us to see good growth of demographics</u></mark>, and that really is a key factor. We certainly need a lot of skilled labor here, and we have a lot of excellent universities. However, there’s a lot of highly skilled labor outside the U.S. — India, China, Brazil, other places — who would really enjoy coming here and working.¶ It’s not that 2% growth is that exciting, but it’s that the quality of life, the rule of law, property rights — all of those things — are really important and things we take for granted. And being in China for a period of time, we talked to a young businessman there, and he was saying that he and his family have made it. They have an exporting business, they have a white goods business, they’re involved in real estate — they have a lot of businesses. They’re very high-net-worth individuals. And he was saying that their dream is to move back to Canada. <u><mark>We have other anecdotes of individuals wanting to relocate assets</u></mark> and/or family members <u><mark>to the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates, and Southern California in particular.¶ <u><mark>The growth stories in China and Brazil and other places are really great, but the infrastructure [and] the lack of understanding what the rules of the game are can really unsettle folks</u></mark>. So I would say that <u>the U.S. is still strong on those points</u>. I think that, given the other factors — an improving housing market, long-term energy independence (we have one of the biggest reserves in the world of shale gas and natural gas, which is actually a very clean fuel) — <u><mark>we have the advantage of being innovative and technologically advanced.</u></mark> And we export that.¶ So<strong> I think the U.S., for me — which, until very recently, was seen as the economy that’s never going to grow, “The U.S. is never going to regain its importance in the world economy” — I completely disagree with that, having travelled to several emerging economies recently. We need China to grow; they need us to grow. There’s a lot of collaboration that happens at the lower policymaker level that you tend not to see in the media, and so I’m very optimistic about that.</p><p>Science diplomacy high now<u></strong>—stem cells not the lynchpin </p><p>Wolfe 13 (Audra J. Wolfe is a writer, editor and historian based in Philadelphia</p><p>Science diplomacy works, but only when it's genuine, 8/23/13 http://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2013/aug/23/obama-science-foreign-policy)//kyan</p><p></u>The<u> <mark>Obama</mark> </u>Administration<u> <mark>has embrace</mark>d the </u>concept<u> </u>of<u> <mark>science diplomacy</mark> </u>as a way<u> <mark>to bridge</mark> cultural and economic <mark>gaps</mark> between the United States and the rest of the world</u>. The <u><mark>director</mark> <mark>of</mark> the White House's <mark>Office of Science and Technology</mark> Policy,</u> John P Holdren, <u><mark>regularly me</mark>ets <mark>with</mark> his <mark>science policy counterparts from Brazil, China, India, Japan, Korea and Russia</u></mark>. The <u><mark>US</mark> State Department has <mark>sent</mark> a series of American <mark>scientists abroad as "Science Envoys" in</mark> <mark>hopes of using scientific relationships as an olive branch</mark> to the Muslim world. Since 2009, <mark>these</mark> science <mark>envoy</u>s,</mark> acting as private citizens, <u>have collectively <mark>visited almost 20 countries</mark>, <mark>including Indonesia, Morocco, Bangladesh, Kazahkstan and</mark> pre-revolution <mark>Egypt. This new</mark> <mark>interest in science diplomacy is</u> at</mark> least partially <u><mark>explained by the nature of</mark> contemporary <mark>global</mark> <mark>problems</mark>: issues of resource distribution, climate change, and uneven economic growth can only be solved with input from science</u>. Climate change, for instance, does not respect international borders; addressing it will require international partnerships. <u>Nor do American scientists hold a monopoly on good ideas</u><strong>. For these and a host of other reasons, science diplomacy makes good sense and promises benefits for the countries on either end of scientific exchange.</p><p>Science diplomacy doesn’t solve their impacts</p><p>Dickson 10</strong> (David, director of SciDev, June 28 http://scidevnet.wordpress.com/category/science-diplomacy-conference-2010/ 7/9/11)//NR</p><p>There’s a general consensus in both the scientific and political worlds that the principle of science diplomacy, at least in the somewhat restricted sense of the need to get more and better science into international negotiations, is a desirable objective. There is less agreement, however, on how far the concept can – or indeed should – be extended to embrace broader goals and objectives, in particular attempts to use science to achieve political or diplomatic goals at the international level. <u><mark>Science</u></mark>, despite its international characteristics, <u><mark>is no substitute</mark> <mark>for</mark> effective <mark>diplomacy</mark>. Any more than diplomatic initiatives </u>necessarily<u> lead to good science.</u> These seem to have been the broad conclusions to emerge from a three-day meeting at Wilton Park in Sussex, UK, organised by the British Foreign Office and the Royal Society, and attended by scientists, government officials and politicians from 17 countries around the world. The definition of science diplomacy varied widely among participants. Some saw it as a subcategory of “public diplomacy”, or what US diplomats have recently been promoting as “soft power” (“the carrot rather than the stick approach”, as a participant described it). Others preferred to see it as a core element of the broader concept of “innovation diplomacy”, covering the politics of engagement in the familiar fields of international scientific exchange and technology transfer, but raising these to a higher level as a diplomatic objective. Whatever definition is used, three particular aspects of the debate became the focus of attention during the Wilton Park meeting: how science can inform the diplomatic process; how diplomacy can assist science in achieving its objectives; and, finally, how science can provide a channel for quasi-diplomatic exchanges by forming an apparently neutral bridge between countries. There was little disagreement on the first of these. Indeed for many, <u>given the increasing number of international issues with a scientific dimension that politicians have to deal with, this is essentially what the core of science diplomacy should be about</u>. Chris Whitty, for example, chief scientist at the UK’s Department for International Development, described how knowledge about the threat raised by the spread of the highly damaging plant disease stem rust had been an important input by researchers into discussions by politicians and diplomats over strategies for persuading Afghan farmers to shift from the production of opium to wheat. Others pointed out that the scientific community had played a major role in drawing attention to issues such as the links between chlorofluorocarbons in the atmosphere and the growth of the ozone hole, or between carbon dioxide emissions and climate change. Each has made essential contributions to policy decisions. Acknowledging this role for science has some important implications. No-one dissented when Rohinton Medhora, from Canada’s International Development Research Centre, complained of the lack of adequate scientific expertise in the embassies of many countries of the developed and developing world alike. Nor – perhaps predictably – was there any major disagreement that diplomatic initiatives can both help and occasionally hinder the process of science. On the positive side, such <u><mark>diplomacy</mark> can <mark>play a significant role in facilitating science exchange</mark> and the launch of international science projects,</u> both <u>essential for the development of </u>modern <u>science</u>. Europe’s framework programme of research programmes was quoted as a successful advantage of the first of these. Examples of the second range from the establishment of the European Organisation of Nuclear Research (usually known as CERN) in Switzerland after the Second World War, to current efforts to build a large new nuclear fusion facility (ITER). Less positively, <u>increasing restrictions on entry to certain countries</u>, and in particular the United States after the 9/11 attacks in New York and elsewhere, <u>have significantly impeded scientific exchange programmes. Here the challenge for diplomats was seen as helping to find ways to ease the burdens of such restrictions</u>. The broadest gaps in understanding the potential of scientific diplomacy lay in the third category, namely the use of science as a channel of international diplomacy, either as a way of helping to forge consensus on contentious issues, or as a catalyst for peace in situations of conflict. On the first of these, some pointed to recent climate change negotiations, and in particular the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, as a good example, of the way that the scientific community can provide a strong rationale for joint international action. But others referred to <u><mark>the</mark> <mark>failure</mark> <mark>of</mark> the <mark>Copenhagen</mark> climate summit </u>last December to come up with a meaningful agreement on action as a demonstration of the limitations of this way of thinking. It was argued that this failure <u>had <mark>been</mark> partly <mark>due to a misplaced belief that scientific consensus would</mark> be sufficient to <mark>generate</mark> <mark>a</mark> <mark>commitment to collective</mark> <mark>action, without taking into account the political</mark> <mark>impact</mark> that scientific ideas would have.</u> Another example that received considerable attention was the current construction of a synchrotron facility SESAME in Jordan, a project that is already is bringing together researchers in a range of scientific disciplines from various countries in the Middle East (including Israel, Egypt and Palestine, as well as both Greece and Turkey). The promoters of SESAME hope that – as with the building of CERN 60 years ago, and its operation as a research centre involving, for example, physicists from both Russia and the United States – SESAME will become a symbol of what regional collaboration can achieve. In that sense, it would become what one participant described as a “beacon of hope” for the region. But others cautioned that, however successful SESAME may turn out to be in purely scientific terms, its potential impact on the Middle East peace process should not be exaggerated. <u>Political conflicts have deep roots that cannot easily be papered over, however open-minded scientists may be to professional colleagues </u>coming from other political contexts. Indeed, there was even a warning that <u>in the developing world, high profile <mark>scientific</mark> <mark>projects</u></mark>, particular those with explicit political backing, <u><mark>could end up doing damage by</mark> <mark>inadvertently</mark> <mark>favouring one social group over another</u></mark>. Scientists should be wary of having their prestige used in this way; those who did so could come over as patronising, appearing unaware of political realities. Similarly, those who hold science in esteem as a practice committed to promoting the causes of peace and development were reminded of the need to take into account how <u>advances in science</u> – whether nuclear physics or genetic technology – <u>have</u> also <u>led to new types of weaponry. Nor did science automatically lead to the reduction of global inequalities. “Science for diplomacy” </u>therefore <u>ended up with a highly mixed review.</u><strong> The consensus seemed to be that science can prepare the ground for diplomatic initiatives – and benefit from diplomatic agreements – but cannot provide the solutions to either.</p><p>No impact to warming--- fossil record </p><p>Willis et. al, ’10 </strong>[Kathy J. Willis, Keith D. Bennett, Shonil A. Bhagwat& H. John B. Birks (2010): 4 °C and beyond: what did this mean for biodiversity in the past?, Systematics and Biodiversity, 8:1, 3-9, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14772000903495833, ]</p><p><u><mark>The most recent climate models and fossil evidence</u></mark> for the early Eocene Climatic Optimum (53–51 million years ago) <u><mark>indicate</mark> that during this time interval atmospheric <mark>CO2 would have exceeded 1200ppmv</mark> and tropical <mark>temperatures were</mark> between <mark>5–10 ◦</mark> C <mark>warmer</mark> than modern values</u> (Zachos et al., 2008). <u><mark>There is</u></mark> also <u><mark>evidence for</mark> relatively <mark>rapid intervals of extreme</mark> global <mark>warmth</mark> and massive carbon addition when global temperatures increased by 5 ◦ C in less than 10 000 years </u>(Zachos et al., 2001). So <u>what was the response of biota to these ‘climate extremes’ and <mark>do we see</mark> the <mark>large-scale extinctions</u></mark> (especially in the Neotropics) <u>predicted by some of the most recent models associated with future climate changes</u> (Huntingford et al., 2008)? In fact <u><strong><mark>the fossil record</u></strong></mark> for the early Eocene Climatic Optimum <u><strong><mark>demonstrates the very opposite.</u></strong></mark> All the evidence from low-latitude records indicates that, <u>at least in the plant fossil record, <mark>this was one of the most biodiverse intervals of time</mark> in the Neotropics</u>(Jaramillo et al., 2006). It was also a time when <u><mark>the tropical forest biome was the most extensive in Earth’s history</mark>, extending to mid-latitudes in both the northern and southern hemispheres – and there was also no ice at the Poles and Antarctica was covered by needle-leaved forest</u> (Morley, 2007). <u><mark>There were</mark> certainly <mark>novel ecosystems, and an increase in community turnover</mark> with a mixture of tropical and temperate species in mid latitudes and plants persisting in areas that are currently polar deserts</u>. [It should be noted; however, that <u>at the earlier Palaeocene–Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM) at 55.8 million years ago in the US Gulf Coast, there was a rapid vegetation response to climate change</u>. There was major compositional turnover, palynological<strong> richness decreased, and regional extinctions occurred (Harrington & Jaramillo, 2007). Reasons for these changes are unclear, but they may have resulted from continental drying, negative feedbacks on vegetation to changing CO2 (assuming that CO2 changed during the PETM), rapid cooling immediately after the PETM, or subtle changes in plant–animal interactions (Harrington & Jaramillo, 2007).] </p><p>Warming’s inevitable</p><p>Gillett et al 10</strong>—director @ the Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling and Analysis</p><p>Nathan, “Ongoing climate change following a complete cessation of carbon dioxide emissions”. Nature Geoscience </p><p><u><mark>Several recent studies have demonstrated that CO2-induced</u></mark> 17 <u>global mean temperature <mark>change is irreversible </mark>on human</u> 18 <u>timescales1</u>_5. We find that <u>not only is this climate change</u> 19 <u>irreversible, but that for some climate variables, such as <mark>Antarctic</u></mark> 20 tem<u>perature <mark>and</mark> North <mark>African rainfall</mark>, CO2-induced climate</u> 21 <u><mark>changes are simulated to </mark>continue to <mark>worsen for many centuries</u> 22 <u><strong>even after a complete cessation of emissions</mark>.</u></strong> Although it is 23 also well known that <u>a large committed thermosteric sea level</u> 24 <u>rise is expected even after a cessation of emissions</u> in 2100, 25 our finding of a strong delayed high-latitude Southern Ocean 26 warming at intermediate depths suggests that <u>this effect may be</u> 27 <u>compounded by ice shelf collapse, grounding line retreat, and ensuing accelerated ice discharge in marine-based sectors of the</u> 28 <u>Antarctic ice sheet, precipitating a sea level rise of several metres</u>. 29 Quantitative results presented here are subject to uncertainties 30 associated with the climate sensitivity, the rate of ocean heat 31 uptake and the rate of carbon uptake in CanESM1, but <u>our</u> 32 <u>findings of Northern Hemisphere cooling, Southern Hemisphere</u> 33 <u>warming, a southward shift of the intertropical convergence zone</u>, 34 <u>and <mark>delayed and ongoing ocean warming at </mark>intermediate <mark>depths</u> 35 <u>following a cessation </mark>of emissions <mark>are </mark>likely to be <mark>robust</mark>.</u><strong> Geo- 36 engineering by stratospheric aerosol injection has been proposed 37 as a response measure in the event of a rapid melting of the 38 West Antarctic ice sheet24. Our results indicate that if such a 39 melting were driven by ocean warming at intermediate depths, as 40 is thought likely, a geoengineering response would be ineffective 41 for several centuries owing to the long delay associated with 42 subsurface ocean warming.</p><p>No modeling and signal is non-unique</p><p>Loris 13</strong> <u>Nicolas Loris, Herbert and Joyce Morgan Fellow at Heritage, master's degree in economics from George Mason University, “No 'Following the Leader' on Climate Change,” Heritage Foundation, 1/30/2013, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2013/1/no-following-the-leader-on-climate-change</p><p><mark>In his</mark> second <mark>inaugural address</u></mark>, President <u><mark>Obama pledged</mark> that <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates “<mark>will respond to</mark> the threat of <mark>climate change” and</mark> will <strong>take the <mark>lead</strong></mark> for other countries to follow suit</u>. This commitment is a willful rejection of reality. Congress has been unwilling to address climate change unilaterally through legislation. Multilateral attempts become more futile each year as major players, especially <u>developing nations such as <mark>China and India, <strong>refuse</mark> to play ball</strong>. </u>And <u>why should <mark>they</mark>? Developing nations <mark>are not going to curb</mark> economic <mark>growth to solve a theoretical problem when their citizens face </mark>far more <mark>pressing </mark>environmental problems — especially when so many are trapped in grinding <mark>poverty and lack</mark> access to reliable <mark>electricity</mark>. </u>This leaves the president with only one option for making good on his pledge: impose costly regulatory actions. This approach would be as pointless as unilateral legislative action. Why? Even accepting as fact the theory that Earth is warming and that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions are a warming agent does not make any of the following true: &bull; Man-made emissions are driving climate change and are a negative externality that needs to be internalized. Greenhouse gas emissions are a warming agent. But that fact doesn’t begin to settle the scientific debate about climate change and climate sensitivity — the amount of warming projected from increased greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, viewing man-made carbon dioxide as a strictly negative externality ignores a lot of peer-reviewed literature that identifies many positive effects (e.g., plant growth, human longevity, seed enrichment and less soil erosion as a result of more robust tree root growth) associated with higher levels of CO2 in the atmosphere. &bull; Earth is cooking at a catastrophic rate. The media breathlessly reported that a recent National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s study found 2012 to be the warmest on record for the continental United States. What they largely failed to report was that, globally, 2012 was only the ninth-warmest in the past 34 years. In fact, average global temperatures have leveled off over the past decade and a half. &bull; Sea levels will rise dramatically, threatening America’s coastlines. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report, the bible of CO2-reduction proponents, projects sea levels rising 7 inches to 23 inches over the next century. That’s not as alarming as it sounds. Sea level has risen at the lower end of that projection over the past two centuries. &bull; There will be more extreme droughts, heat waves, hurricanes and other natural disasters. Natural disasters (they’re called “natural” for a reason, right?) will occur with or without increased man-made emissions. Having failed repeatedly to win legislation limiting greenhouse gas emissions, the Obama administration appears bent on taking the regulatory route. The Environmental Protection Agency is promulgating stringent emission standards for new power plants that would effectively prohibit construction of coal-fired generators and prematurely shut down existing plants. The EPA also has introduced costly new air-quality standards for hydraulically fractured wells and new fuel-efficiency standards that will make cars and light-duty trucks more expensive, smaller and less safe. Restricting greenhouse gas emissions, whether unilaterally or multilaterally, will impose huge costs on consumers and the U.S. economy as a whole. Congress should exercise its seldom-used muscles as regulatory watchdog to keep regulatory proposals that are not cost-effective from full implementation and reverse the administration’s course on regulating CO2. As for the president’s suggestion that unilateral action by the U.S. will somehow inspire other countries to emulate our example — <u>the <mark>repeated failure of U.N. </mark>negotiations to produce multilateral climate action <mark>demonstrates</mark> a <strong>near <mark>universal disinclination</strong> to sacrifice</mark> economic <mark>growth </mark>on the altar of global warming.</p></u>
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Focus on governmental change in drug policy is the best way to challenge structures of domination- allows the reclaiming of subjectivity for people that are “criminalized” and leads to change of social understanding of targeted populations
Sudbury 2008
Sudbury 2008 [Julia Sudbury is Metz Professor of Ethnic Studies at Mills College. She is a leading activist scholar in the prison abolitionist movement. She was a co-founder of Critical Resistance, a national abolitionist organization. “Rethinking Global Justice: Black Women Resist the Transnational Prison-Industrial Complex”, Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture, and Society, Volume 10, Issue 4]
Activists who pursue decarceration challenge stereotypical images of the “criminal” by making visible the human stories of prisoners, with the goal of demonstrating the inadequacy of incarceration as a response to the complex interaction of factors that produce harmful acts Decarceration usually involves targeting a specific prison population that the public sees as low-risk and arguing for an end to the use of imprisonment for this population. Decarcerative strategies often involve the promotion of alternatives to incarceration that are less expensive and more effective than prison and jail Drug law reform is a key area of decarcerative work Organizations and campaigns that promote drug law reform combines racial justice, economic, and public safety arguments by demonstrating that the laws have created a pipeline of prisoners of color FAMM dismantles popular representations of the war on drugs as a necessary protection against dangerous drug dealers and traffickers, demonstrating that most drug war prisoners are serving long sentences for low-level, non-violent drug-related activities In theorizing the intersections of racialized state violence and gendered interpersonal violence, FBW lays the groundwork for a broader abolitionist agenda that refutes the legitimacy of incarceration as a response to deep-rooted social inequalities based on interlocking systems of oppression By gradually shrinking the prison system, activists involved in decarcerative work hope to erode the public's reliance on the idea of imprisonment as a commonsense response to a wide range of social ills. the Prisoner Justice Action Committee formed the “81 Reasons” campaign, a multiracial collaboration of experienced anti-prison activists, youth and student organizers, in response to proposals to build a youth “superjail The campaign combined popular education on injustices in the juvenile system with an exercise in popular democracy that invited young people to decide themselves how they would spend the $81 million slated for the jail. Campaigners mobilized public concerns about spending cuts in other areas to create pressure on the provincial government to look into less expensive and less punitive alternatives to incarceration for youth. the campaign built a grassroots multiracial antiprison youth movement and raised public awareness of the social and economic costs of incarceration. Many anti-prison activists view campaigns for decarceration or moratorium as building blocks toward the ultimate goal of abolition. These practical actions promise short and medium-term successes that are essential markers on the road to long-term transformation. contemporary prison abolitionist movement in the U.S. and Canada dates to the 1970s, when political prisoners like Angela Y. Davis and Assata Shakur, in conjunction with other radical activists and scholars in the U.S., Canada, and Europe, began to call for the dismantling of prisons. These “common” prisoners challenged the state's legitimacy by declaring imprisonment a form of cruel and unusual punishment and confronting the brute force of state power activists drew deliberate links between the dismantling of prisons and the abolition of slavery. An abolitionist vision means that we must build models today that can represent how we want to live in the future It means developing practical strategies for taking small steps that move us toward making our dreams real and that lead the average person to believe that things really could be different It means living this vision in our daily lives. prison abolitionists are tasked with a dual burden: first, transforming people's consciousness so that they can believe that a world without prisons is possible, and second, taking practical steps to oppose the prison-industrial complex. Making abolition more than a utopian vision requires practical steps toward this long-term goal CR describes four steps that activists can get involved in shrinking the system creating alternatives, shifting public opinion and public policy
Activists who pursue decarceration challenge stereotypical images of the “criminal” Decarceration involves targeting a prison population and arguing for an end to imprisonment Drug law reform is a key area of decarcerative work Organizations that promote drug law reform combines racial justice economic, and public safety arguments by demonstrating that the laws have created a pipeline of prisoners of colo theorizing intersections of racialized state violence lays the groundwork for a abolitionist agenda that refutes legitimacy of incarceration activists involved in decarcerative erode the public's reliance on imprisonment the Prisoner Justice Action Committee formed a multiracial collaboration of activists, The campaign combined popular education on injustices with an exercise in popular democracy Campaigners mobilized public concerns to create pressure on the government , the campaign built a grassroots multiracial antiprison movement and raised public awareness activists view decarceration as building blocks toward abolition practical actions promise successes that are essential markers on the road to long-term transformation An abolitionist vision means that we must build models today that can represent how we want to live in the future. It means developing practical strategies for taking small steps that move us toward making our dreams real It means living this vision in our daily lives prison abolitionists are tasked with transforming people's consciousness so that they can believe that a world without prisons is possible, taking practical steps to oppose the prison-industrial complex. Making abolition more than a utopian vision requires practical steps toward this long-term goal
Chronic overcrowding has led to worsening conditions for prisoners. As a result of the unprecedented growth in sentenced populations, prison authorities have packed three or four prisoners into cells designed for two, and have taken over recreation rooms, gyms, and rooms designed for programming and turned them into cells, housing prisoners on bunk beds or on the floor. These new conditions have created challenges for activists, who have found themselves expending time and resources in pressuring prison authorities to provide every prisoner a bed, or to provide access to basic education programs. As prison populations continue to swell, anti-prison activists are faced with the limitations of reformist strategies. Gains temporarily won are swiftly undermined, new “women-centered” prison regimes are replaced with a focus on cost-efficiency and minimal programming and even changes enforced by legal cases like Shumate vs. Wilson are subject to backlash and resistance. 19 Of even greater concern is the well-documented tendency of prison regimes to co-opt reforms and respond to demands for changes in conditions by further expanding prison budgets. The vulnerability of prison reform efforts to cooption has led Angela Y. Davis to call for “non-reformist reforms,” reforms that do not lead to bigger and “better” prisons. 20 Despite the limited long-term impact of human rights advocacy and reforms, building bridges between prisoners, activists, and family members is an important step toward challenging the racialized dehumanization that undergirds the logic of incarceration. In this way, human rights advocacy carried out in solidarity with prisoner activists is an important component of a radical anti-prison agenda. Ultimately, however, anti-prison activists aim not to create more humane, culturally sensitive, women-centered prisons, but to dismantle prisons and enable formerly criminalized people to access services and resources outside the penal system. After three decades of prison expansion, more and more people are living with criminal convictions and histories of incarceration. In the U.S., nearly 650,000 people are released from state and federal prisons to the community each year. 21 Organizations of formerly incarcerated people focus on creating opportunities for former prisoners to survive after release, and on eliminating barriers to reentry, including extensive discrimination against former felons. The wide array of “post-incarceration sentences” that felons are subjected to has led activists to declare a “new civil rights movement.” 22 As a class, former prisoners can legally be disenfranchised and denied rights available to other citizens. While reentry has garnered official attention, with President Bush proposing a $300 million reentry initiative in his 2004 State of the Union address, anti-prison activists have critiqued this initiative for focusing on faith-based mentoring, job training, and housing without addressing the endemic discrimination against former prisoners or addressing the conditions in the communities which receive former prisoners, including racism, poverty, and gender violence. Organizations of ex-prisoners working to oppose discrimination against former prisoners and felons include All of Us Or None, the Nu Policy Leadership Group, Sister Outsider and the National Network for Women Prisoners in the U.S., and Justice 4 Women in Canada. All of Us Or None is described by members as “a national organizing initiative of prisoners, former prisoners and felons, to combat the many forms of discrimination that we face as the result of felony convictions.” 23 Founded by anti-imperialist and former political prisoner Linda Evans, and former prisoner and anti-prison activist Dorsey Nunn, and sponsored by the Northern California–based Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, All of Us Or None works to mobilize former prisoners nationwide and in Toronto, Canada. The organization's name, from a poem by Marxist playwright Bertold Brecht, invokes the need for solidarity across racial, class, and gender lines in creating a unified movement of former prisoners. Black women play a leading role in the organization, alongside other people of color. All of Us Or None focuses its lobbying and campaign work at city, county, and state levels, calling on local authorities to end discrimination based on felony convictions in public housing, benefits, and employment, to opt out of lifetime welfare and food stamp bans for felons, and to “ban the box” requiring disclosure of past convictions on applications for public employment. In addition, the organization calls for guaranteed housing, job training, drug and alcohol treatment, and public assistance for all newly released prisoners. 24 In the context of the war on drugs, many people with felony convictions also struggle with addictions. The recovery movement, which is made up of 12-step programs, treatment programs, community recovery centers, and indigenous healing programs run by and for people in recovery from addiction, offers an alternative response to problem drug use through programs focusing on spirituality, healing, and fellowship. However, the recovery movement's focus on individual transformation and accountability for past acts diverges from many anti-prison activists' focus on the harms done to criminalized communities by interlocking systems of dominance. As a result, anti-prison spaces seldom engage with the recovery movement, or tap the radical potential of its membership. Breaking with this trend, All of Us Or None has initiated a grassroots organizing effort to reach out to people in 12-step programs with felony convictions. This work is part of their wider organizing efforts that aim to mobilize former prisoners as agents of social change. Building on the strengths of identity politics, these organizations suggest that those who have experienced the prison-industrial complex first-hand may be best placed to provide leadership in dismantling it. As former prisoners have taken on a wide range of leadership positions across the movement, there has been a shift away from leadership by white middle-class progressives, and a move to promote the voices of those directly affected by the prison-industrial complex. Politicians who promote punitive “tough-on-crime” policies rely on racialized controlling images of “the criminal” to inspire fear and induce compliance among voters. Once dehumanized and depicted as dangerous and beyond rehabilitation, removing people from communities appears the only logical means of creating safety. Activists who pursue decarceration challenge stereotypical images of the “criminal” by making visible the human stories of prisoners, with the goal of demonstrating the inadequacy of incarceration as a response to the complex interaction of factors that produce harmful acts. Decarceration usually involves targeting a specific prison population that the public sees as low-risk and arguing for an end to the use of imprisonment for this population. Decarcerative strategies often involve the promotion of alternatives to incarceration that are less expensive and more effective than prison and jail. For example, Proposition 36, the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act, which passed in California in 2000 and allowed first- and second-time non-violent drug offenders charged with possession to receive substance abuse treatment instead of prison, channels approximately 35,000 people into treatment annually. 25 Drug law reform is a key area of decarcerative work. Organizations and campaigns that promote drug law reform include Drop the Rock, a coalition of youth, former prisoners, criminal justice reformers, artists, civil and labor leaders working to repeal New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws. The campaign combines racial justice, economic, and public safety arguments by demonstrating that the laws have created a pipeline of prisoners of color from New York City to newly built prisons in rural, mainly white areas represented Republican senators, resulting in a transfer of funding and electoral influence from communities of color to upstate rural communities. 26 Ultimately, the campaign calls for an end to mandatory minimum sentencing and the reinstatement of judges' sentencing discretion, a reduction in sentence lengths for drug-related offenses and the expansion of alternatives, including drug treatment, job training, and education. Former drug war prisoners play a leadership role in decarcerative efforts in the field of drug policy reform. Kemba Smith, an African–American woman who was sentenced to serve 24.5 years as a result of her relationship with an abusive partner who was involved in the drug industry, is one potent voice in opposition to the war on drugs. While she was incarcerated, Smith became an active advocate for herself and other victims of the war on drugs, securing interviews and feature articles in national media. Ultimately, Smith's case came to represent the failure of mandatory minimums, and in 2000, following a nation-wide campaign, she and fellow drug war prisoner Dorothy Gaines were granted clemency by outgoing President Clinton. After her release, Smith founded the Justice for People of Color Project (JPCP), which aims to empower young people of color to participate in drug policy reform and to promote a reallocation of public expenditures from incarceration to education. While women like Kemba Smith and Dorothy Gaines have become the human face of the drug war, prison invisibilizes and renders anonymous hundreds of thousands of drug war prisoners. The organization Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) challenges this process of erasure and dehumanization through its “Faces of FAMM” project. The project invites people in federal and state prisons serving mandatory minimum sentences to submit their cases to a database and provides online access to their stories and photographs. 27 The “Faces of FAMM” project highlights cases where sentencing injustices are particularly visible in order to galvanize public support for sentencing reform. At the same time, it dismantles popular representations of the war on drugs as a necessary protection against dangerous drug dealers and traffickers, demonstrating that most drug war prisoners are serving long sentences for low-level, non-violent drug-related activities or for being intimately connected to someone involved in these activities. Decarcerative work is not limited to drug law reform. Free Battered Women's (FBW) campaign for the release of incarcerated survivors is another example of decarcerative work. The organization supports women and transgender prisoners incarcerated for killing or assaulting an abuser in challenging their convictions by demonstrating that they acted in self-defense. Most recently, FBW secured the release of Flozelle Woodmore, an African–American woman serving a life sentence at CCWF for shooting her violent partner as an 18 year old. Released in August 2007, after five parole board recommendations for her release were rejected by Governors Davis and then Schwarzenegger, Woodmore's determined pursuit of justice made visible and ultimately challenged the racialized politics of gubernatorial parole releases. 28 While the number of women imprisoned for killing or assaulting an abuser is small—FBW submitted 34 petitions for clemency at its inception in 1991, and continues to fight 23 cases—FBW's campaign for the release of all incarcerated survivors challenges the mass incarceration of gender-oppressed prisoners on a far larger scale. FBW argues that experiences of intimate partner violence and abuse contribute to the criminalized activities that lead many women and transgender people into conflict with the law, including those imprisoned on drug or property charges, and calls for the release of all incarcerated survivors. Starting with a population generally viewed with sympathy—survivors of intimate partner violence—FBW generates a radical critique of both state and interpersonal violence, arguing that “the violence and control used by the state against people in prison mirrors the dynamics of battering that many incarcerated survivors have experienced in their intimate relationships and/or as children.” 29 In theorizing the intersections of racialized state violence and gendered interpersonal violence, FBW lays the groundwork for a broader abolitionist agenda that refutes the legitimacy of incarceration as a response to deep-rooted social inequalities based on interlocking systems of oppression. By gradually shrinking the prison system, Black women activists involved in decarcerative work hope to erode the public's reliance on the idea of imprisonment as a commonsense response to a wide range of social ills. At the other end of anti-expansionist work are activists who take a more confrontational approach. By starving correctional budgets of funds to continue building more prisons and jails, they hope to force politicians to embrace less expensive and more effective alternatives to incarceration. Prison moratorium organizing aims to stop construction of new prisons and jails. Unlike campaigns against prison privatization, which oppose prison-profiteering by private corporations, and seek to return imprisonment to the public sector, prison moratorium work opposes all new prison construction, public or private. In New York, the Brooklyn-based Prison Moratorium Project (PMP), co-founded by former prisoner Eddie Ellis and led by young women and gender non-conforming people of color, does this work through popular education and mass campaigns against prison expansion. Focusing on youth as a force for social change, New York's PMP uses compilations of progressive hip hop and rap artists to spread a critical analysis of the prison-industrial complex and its impact on people of color. PMP's strategies have been effective; for example, in 2002 the organization, as part of the Justice 4 Youth Coalition, succeeded in lobbying the New York Department of Juvenile Justice to redirect $53 million designated for expansion in Brooklyn and the Bronx. 30 PMP has also worked to make visible the connections between underfunding, policing of schools, and youth incarceration through their campaign “Stop the School-to-Prison Pipeline.” By demonstrating how zero tolerance policies and increased policing and use of surveillance technology in schools, combined with underfunded classrooms and overstretched teachers, has led to the criminalization of young people of color and the production of adult prisoners, PMP argues for a reprioritization of public spending from the criminal justice system to schools and alternatives to incarceration. 31 Moratorium work often involves campaigns to prevent the construction of a specific prison or jail. In Toronto, for example, the Prisoner Justice Action Committee formed the “81 Reasons” campaign, a multiracial collaboration of experienced anti-prison activists, youth and student organizers, in response to proposals to build a youth “superjail” in Brampton, a suburb of Toronto. 32 The campaign combined popular education on injustices in the juvenile system, including the disproportionate incarceration of Black and Aboriginal youth, with an exercise in popular democracy that invited young people to decide themselves how they would spend the $81 million slated for the jail. Campaigners mobilized public concerns about spending cuts in other areas, including health care and education, to create pressure on the provincial government to look into less expensive and less punitive alternatives to incarceration for youth. While this campaign did not ultimately prevent the construction of the youth jail, the size of the proposed facility was reduced. More importantly, the campaign built a grassroots multiracial antiprison youth movement and raised public awareness of the social and economic costs of incarceration. Moratorium campaigns face tough opposition from advocates who believe that building prisons stimulates economic development for struggling rural towns. Prisons are “sold” to rural towns that have suffered economic decline in the face of global competition, closures of local factories, and decline of small farms. In the context of economic stagnation, prisons are touted as providing stable, well-paying, unionized jobs, providing property and sales taxes and boosting real estate markets. The California Prison Moratorium Project has worked to challenge these assertions by documenting the actual economic, environmental, and social impact of prison construction in California's Central Valley prison towns. According to California PMP: We consider prisons to be a form of environmental injustice. They are normally built in economically depressed communities that eagerly anticipate economic prosperity. Like any toxic industry, prisons affect the quality of local schools, roads, water, air, land, and natural habitats. 33 California PMP opposes prison construction at a local level by building multiracial coalitions of local residents, farm workers, labor organizers, anti-prison activists, and former prisoners and their families to reject the visions of prison as a panacea for economic decline. 34 In the Californian context, where most new prisons are built in predominantly Latino/a communities and absorb land and water previously used for agriculture, PMP facilitates communication and solidarity between Latino/a farm worker communities, and urban Black and Latino/a prisoners in promoting alternative forms of economic development that do not rely on mass incarceration. Scholar-activist Ruth Wilson Gilmore's research on the political economy of prisons in California has been critical in providing evidence of the detrimental impact of prisons on local residents and the environment. 35 As an active member of CPMP, Gilmore's work is deeply rooted in anti-prison activism and in turn informs the work of other activists, demonstrating the important relationship between Black women's activist scholarship and the anti-prison movement. 36 Many anti-prison activists view campaigns for decarceration or moratorium as building blocks toward the ultimate goal of abolition. These practical actions promise short and medium-term successes that are essential markers on the road to long-term transformation. However, abolitionists believe that like slavery, the prison-industrial complex is a system of racialized state violence that cannot be “fixed.” The contemporary prison abolitionist movement in the U.S. and Canada dates to the 1970s, when political prisoners like Angela Y. Davis and Assata Shakur, in conjunction with other radical activists and scholars in the U.S., Canada, and Europe, began to call for the dismantling of prisons. 38 The explosion in political prisoners, fuelled by the FBI's Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) and targeting of Black liberation, American Indian and Puerto Rican independence movements in the U.S. and First Nations resistance in Canada as “threats” to national security, fed into an understanding of the role of the prison in perpetuating state repression against insurgent communities. 39 The new anti-prison politics were also shaped by a decade of prisoner litigation and radical prison uprisings, including the brutally crushed Attica Rebellion. These “common” prisoners, predominantly working-class people of color imprisoned for everyday acts of survival, challenged the state's legitimacy by declaring imprisonment a form of cruel and unusual punishment and confronting the brute force of state power. 40 By adopting the term “abolition” activists drew deliberate links between the dismantling of prisons and the abolition of slavery. Through historical excavations, the “new abolitionists” identified the abolition of prisons as the logical completion of the unfinished liberation marked by the 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution, which regulated, rather than ended, slavery. 41 Organizations that actively promote dialogue about what abolition means and how it can translate into concrete action include Critical Resistance (CR), New York's Prison Moratorium Project, Justice Now, California Coalition for Women Prisoners, Free Battered Women, and the Prison Activist Resource Center in the U.S. and the Prisoner Justice Action Committee (Toronto), the Prisoners' Justice Day Committee (Vancouver) and Joint Action in Canada. CR was founded in 1998 by a group of Bay Area activists including former political prisoner and scholar-activist Angela Y. Davis. Initially, CR focused on popular education and movement building, coordinating large conferences where diverse organizations could generate collective alternatives to the prison-industrial complex. Later work has included campaigns against prison construction in California's Central Valley and solidarity work with imprisoned Katrina survivors. CR describes abolition as: [A] political vision that seeks to eliminate the need for prisons, policing, and surveillance by creating sustainable alternatives to punishment and imprisonment … . An abolitionist vision means that we must build models today that can represent how we want to live in the future. It means developing practical strategies for taking small steps that move us toward making our dreams real and that lead the average person to believe that things really could be different. It means living this vision in our daily lives. 42 In this sense, prison abolitionists are tasked with a dual burden: first, transforming people's consciousness so that they can believe that a world without prisons is possible, and second, taking practical steps to oppose the prison-industrial complex. Making abolition more than a utopian vision requires practical steps toward this long-term goal. CR describes four steps that activists can get involved in: shrinking the system, creating alternatives, shifting public opinion and public policy, and building leadership among those directly impacted by the prison-industrial complex. 43 Since its inception in the San Francisco Bay Area, Critical Resistance has become a national organization with chapters in Baltimore, Chicago, Gainesville, Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York, Tampa/St. Petersburg, and Washington, D.C. As such, CR has played a critical role in re-invigorating abolitionist politics in the U.S. This work is rooted in the radical praxis of Black women and transgender activists.
22,526
<h4>Focus on governmental change in drug policy is the best way to challenge structures of domination- allows the reclaiming of subjectivity for people that are “criminalized” and leads to change of social<strong> understanding of targeted populations</h4><p>Sudbury 2008</strong> [Julia Sudbury is Metz Professor of Ethnic Studies at Mills College. She is a leading activist scholar in the prison abolitionist movement. She was a co-founder of Critical Resistance, a national abolitionist organization. “Rethinking Global Justice: Black Women Resist the Transnational Prison-Industrial Complex”, Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture, and Society, Volume 10, Issue 4]</p><p>Chronic overcrowding has led to worsening conditions for prisoners. As a result of the unprecedented growth in sentenced populations, prison authorities have packed three or four prisoners into cells designed for two, and have taken over recreation rooms, gyms, and rooms designed for programming and turned them into cells, housing prisoners on bunk beds or on the floor. These new conditions have created challenges for activists, who have found themselves expending time and resources in pressuring prison authorities to provide every prisoner a bed, or to provide access to basic education programs. As prison populations continue to swell, anti-prison activists are faced with the limitations of reformist strategies. Gains temporarily won are swiftly undermined, new “women-centered” prison regimes are replaced with a focus on cost-efficiency and minimal programming and even changes enforced by legal cases like Shumate vs. Wilson are subject to backlash and resistance. 19 Of even greater concern is the well-documented tendency of prison regimes to co-opt reforms and respond to demands for changes in conditions by further expanding prison budgets. The vulnerability of prison reform efforts to cooption has led Angela Y. Davis to call for “non-reformist reforms,” reforms that do not lead to bigger and “better” prisons. 20 Despite the limited long-term impact of human rights advocacy and reforms, building bridges between prisoners, activists, and family members is an important step toward challenging the racialized dehumanization that undergirds the logic of incarceration. In this way, human rights advocacy carried out in solidarity with prisoner activists is an important component of a radical anti-prison agenda. Ultimately, however, anti-prison activists aim not to create more humane, culturally sensitive, women-centered prisons, but to dismantle prisons and enable formerly criminalized people to access services and resources outside the penal system. After three decades of prison expansion, more and more people are living with criminal convictions and histories of incarceration. In the U.S., nearly 650,000 people are released from state and federal prisons to the community each year. 21 Organizations of formerly incarcerated people focus on creating opportunities for former prisoners to survive after release, and on eliminating barriers to reentry, including extensive discrimination against former felons. The wide array of “post-incarceration sentences” that felons are subjected to has led activists to declare a “new civil rights movement.” 22 As a class, former prisoners can legally be disenfranchised and denied rights available to other citizens. While reentry has garnered official attention, with President Bush proposing a $300 million reentry initiative in his 2004 State of the Union address, anti-prison activists have critiqued this initiative for focusing on faith-based mentoring, job training, and housing without addressing the endemic discrimination against former prisoners or addressing the conditions in the communities which receive former prisoners, including racism, poverty, and gender violence. Organizations of ex-prisoners working to oppose discrimination against former prisoners and felons include All of Us Or None, the Nu Policy Leadership Group, Sister Outsider and the National Network for Women Prisoners in the U.S., and Justice 4 Women in Canada. All of Us Or None is described by members as “a national organizing initiative of prisoners, former prisoners and felons, to combat the many forms of discrimination that we face as the result of felony convictions.” 23 Founded by anti-imperialist and former political prisoner Linda Evans, and former prisoner and anti-prison activist Dorsey Nunn, and sponsored by the Northern California–based Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, All of Us Or None works to mobilize former prisoners nationwide and in Toronto, Canada. The organization's name, from a poem by Marxist playwright Bertold Brecht, invokes the need for solidarity across racial, class, and gender lines in creating a unified movement of former prisoners. Black women play a leading role in the organization, alongside other people of color. All of Us Or None focuses its lobbying and campaign work at city, county, and state levels, calling on local authorities to end discrimination based on felony convictions in public housing, benefits, and employment, to opt out of lifetime welfare and food stamp bans for felons, and to “ban the box” requiring disclosure of past convictions on applications for public employment. In addition, the organization calls for guaranteed housing, job training, drug and alcohol treatment, and public assistance for all newly released prisoners. 24 In the context of the war on drugs, many people with felony convictions also struggle with addictions. The recovery movement, which is made up of 12-step programs, treatment programs, community recovery centers, and indigenous healing programs run by and for people in recovery from addiction, offers an alternative response to problem drug use through programs focusing on spirituality, healing, and fellowship. However, the recovery movement's focus on individual transformation and accountability for past acts diverges from many anti-prison activists' focus on the harms done to criminalized communities by interlocking systems of dominance. As a result, anti-prison spaces seldom engage with the recovery movement, or tap the radical potential of its membership. Breaking with this trend, All of Us Or None has initiated a grassroots organizing effort to reach out to people in 12-step programs with felony convictions. This work is part of their wider organizing efforts that aim to mobilize former prisoners as agents of social change. Building on the strengths of identity politics, these organizations suggest that those who have experienced the prison-industrial complex first-hand may be best placed to provide leadership in dismantling it. As former prisoners have taken on a wide range of leadership positions across the movement, there has been a shift away from leadership by white middle-class progressives, and a move to promote the voices of those directly affected by the prison-industrial complex. Politicians who promote punitive “tough-on-crime” policies rely on racialized controlling images of “the criminal” to inspire fear and induce compliance among voters. Once dehumanized and depicted as dangerous and beyond rehabilitation, removing people from communities appears the only logical means of creating safety. <u><mark>Activists who pursue decarceration challenge stereotypical images of the “criminal”</mark> by making visible the human stories of prisoners, with the goal of demonstrating <strong>the inadequacy of incarceration as a response to the complex interaction of factors</strong> that produce harmful acts</u>. <u><mark>Decarceration</mark> usually <mark>involves targeting a</mark> specific <mark>prison population </mark>that the public sees as low-risk <mark>and <strong>arguing for an end to </mark>the use of <mark>imprisonment</mark> for this population.</u></strong> <u>Decarcerative strategies often involve the promotion of alternatives to incarceration that are less expensive and more effective than prison and jail</u>. For example, Proposition 36, the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act, which passed in California in 2000 and allowed first- and second-time non-violent drug offenders charged with possession to receive substance abuse treatment instead of prison, channels approximately 35,000 people into treatment annually. 25 <u><strong><mark>Drug law reform is a key area of decarcerative work</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Organizations</mark> and campaigns <mark>that promote drug law reform</u></mark> include Drop the Rock, a coalition of youth, former prisoners, criminal justice reformers, artists, civil and labor leaders working to repeal New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws. The campaign <u><strong><mark>combines</mark> <mark>racial justice</mark>, <mark>economic, and public safety arguments by demonstrating that the laws have created a pipeline of prisoners of colo</mark>r</u></strong> from New York City to newly built prisons in rural, mainly white areas represented Republican senators, resulting in a transfer of funding and electoral influence from communities of color to upstate rural communities. 26 Ultimately, the campaign calls for an end to mandatory minimum sentencing and the reinstatement of judges' sentencing discretion, a reduction in sentence lengths for drug-related offenses and the expansion of alternatives, including drug treatment, job training, and education. Former drug war prisoners play a leadership role in decarcerative efforts in the field of drug policy reform. Kemba Smith, an African–American woman who was sentenced to serve 24.5 years as a result of her relationship with an abusive partner who was involved in the drug industry, is one potent voice in opposition to the war on drugs. While she was incarcerated, Smith became an active advocate for herself and other victims of the war on drugs, securing interviews and feature articles in national media. Ultimately, Smith's case came to represent the failure of mandatory minimums, and in 2000, following a nation-wide campaign, she and fellow drug war prisoner Dorothy Gaines were granted clemency by outgoing President Clinton. After her release, Smith founded the Justice for People of Color Project (JPCP), which aims to empower young people of color to participate in drug policy reform and to promote a reallocation of public expenditures from incarceration to education. While women like Kemba Smith and Dorothy Gaines have become the human face of the drug war, prison invisibilizes and renders anonymous hundreds of thousands of drug war prisoners. The organization Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) challenges this process of erasure and dehumanization through its “Faces of FAMM” project. The project invites people in federal and state prisons serving mandatory minimum sentences to submit their cases to a database and provides online access to their stories and photographs. 27 The “Faces of <u>FAMM</u>” project highlights cases where sentencing injustices are particularly visible in order to galvanize public support for sentencing reform. At the same time, it <u>dismantles popular representations of the war on drugs as a necessary protection against dangerous drug dealers and traffickers, demonstrating that most drug war prisoners are serving long sentences for low-level, non-violent drug-related activities</u> or for being intimately connected to someone involved in these activities. Decarcerative work is not limited to drug law reform. Free Battered Women's (FBW) campaign for the release of incarcerated survivors is another example of decarcerative work. The organization supports women and transgender prisoners incarcerated for killing or assaulting an abuser in challenging their convictions by demonstrating that they acted in self-defense. Most recently, FBW secured the release of Flozelle Woodmore, an African–American woman serving a life sentence at CCWF for shooting her violent partner as an 18 year old. Released in August 2007, after five parole board recommendations for her release were rejected by Governors Davis and then Schwarzenegger, Woodmore's determined pursuit of justice made visible and ultimately challenged the racialized politics of gubernatorial parole releases. 28 While the number of women imprisoned for killing or assaulting an abuser is small—FBW submitted 34 petitions for clemency at its inception in 1991, and continues to fight 23 cases—FBW's campaign for the release of all incarcerated survivors challenges the mass incarceration of gender-oppressed prisoners on a far larger scale. FBW argues that experiences of intimate partner violence and abuse contribute to the criminalized activities that lead many women and transgender people into conflict with the law, including those imprisoned on drug or property charges, and calls for the release of all incarcerated survivors. Starting with a population generally viewed with sympathy—survivors of intimate partner violence—FBW generates a radical critique of both state and interpersonal violence, arguing that “the violence and control used by the state against people in prison mirrors the dynamics of battering that many incarcerated survivors have experienced in their intimate relationships and/or as children.” 29 <u>In <mark>theorizing </mark>the <mark>intersections of racialized state violence </mark>and gendered interpersonal violence, FBW <strong><mark>lays the groundwork for a</mark> broader <mark>abolitionist agenda that refutes </mark>the <mark>legitimacy of incarceration</mark> as a response to deep-rooted social inequalities based on interlocking systems of oppression</u></strong>. <u><strong>By gradually shrinking the prison system,</u></strong> Black women <u><strong><mark>activists involved in decarcerative </mark>work hope to <mark>erode the public's reliance on </mark>the idea of <mark>imprisonment</mark> as a commonsense response to a wide range of social ills. </u></strong>At the other end of anti-expansionist work are activists who take a more confrontational approach. By starving correctional budgets of funds to continue building more prisons and jails, they hope to force politicians to embrace less expensive and more effective alternatives to incarceration. Prison moratorium organizing aims to stop construction of new prisons and jails. Unlike campaigns against prison privatization, which oppose prison-profiteering by private corporations, and seek to return imprisonment to the public sector, prison moratorium work opposes all new prison construction, public or private. In New York, the Brooklyn-based Prison Moratorium Project (PMP), co-founded by former prisoner Eddie Ellis and led by young women and gender non-conforming people of color, does this work through popular education and mass campaigns against prison expansion. Focusing on youth as a force for social change, New York's PMP uses compilations of progressive hip hop and rap artists to spread a critical analysis of the prison-industrial complex and its impact on people of color. PMP's strategies have been effective; for example, in 2002 the organization, as part of the Justice 4 Youth Coalition, succeeded in lobbying the New York Department of Juvenile Justice to redirect $53 million designated for expansion in Brooklyn and the Bronx. 30 PMP has also worked to make visible the connections between underfunding, policing of schools, and youth incarceration through their campaign “Stop the School-to-Prison Pipeline.” By demonstrating how zero tolerance policies and increased policing and use of surveillance technology in schools, combined with underfunded classrooms and overstretched teachers, has led to the criminalization of young people of color and the production of adult prisoners, PMP argues for a reprioritization of public spending from the criminal justice system to schools and alternatives to incarceration. 31 Moratorium work often involves campaigns to prevent the construction of a specific prison or jail. In Toronto, for example, <u><mark>the Prisoner Justice Action Committee formed </mark>the “81 Reasons” campaign, <mark>a multiracial collaboration of</mark> experienced anti-prison <mark>activists, <strong></mark>youth and student organizers</strong>, in response to proposals to build a youth “superjail</u>” in Brampton, a suburb of Toronto. 32 <u><mark>The campaign combined popular education on injustices</mark> in the juvenile system</u>, including the disproportionate incarceration of Black and Aboriginal youth, <u><mark>with an exercise in popular democracy</mark> that invited young people to decide themselves how they would spend the $81 million slated for the jail.</u> <u><strong><mark>Campaigners mobilized public concerns</strong></mark> about spending cuts in other areas</u>, including health care and education, <u><mark>to create pressure on the </mark>provincial <mark>government</mark> to look into less expensive and less punitive alternatives to incarceration for youth. </u>While this campaign did not ultimately prevent the construction of the youth jail, the size of the proposed facility was reduced. More importantly<mark>, <u>the campaign <strong>built a grassroots multiracial antiprison</mark> youth <mark>movement and raised public awareness</strong></mark> of the social and economic costs of incarceration. </u>Moratorium campaigns face tough opposition from advocates who believe that building prisons stimulates economic development for struggling rural towns. Prisons are “sold” to rural towns that have suffered economic decline in the face of global competition, closures of local factories, and decline of small farms. In the context of economic stagnation, prisons are touted as providing stable, well-paying, unionized jobs, providing property and sales taxes and boosting real estate markets. The California Prison Moratorium Project has worked to challenge these assertions by documenting the actual economic, environmental, and social impact of prison construction in California's Central Valley prison towns. According to California PMP: We consider prisons to be a form of environmental injustice. They are normally built in economically depressed communities that eagerly anticipate economic prosperity. Like any toxic industry, prisons affect the quality of local schools, roads, water, air, land, and natural habitats. 33 California PMP opposes prison construction at a local level by building multiracial coalitions of local residents, farm workers, labor organizers, anti-prison activists, and former prisoners and their families to reject the visions of prison as a panacea for economic decline. 34 In the Californian context, where most new prisons are built in predominantly Latino/a communities and absorb land and water previously used for agriculture, PMP facilitates communication and solidarity between Latino/a farm worker communities, and urban Black and Latino/a prisoners in promoting alternative forms of economic development that do not rely on mass incarceration. Scholar-activist Ruth Wilson Gilmore's research on the political economy of prisons in California has been critical in providing evidence of the detrimental impact of prisons on local residents and the environment. 35 As an active member of CPMP, Gilmore's work is deeply rooted in anti-prison activism and in turn informs the work of other activists, demonstrating the important relationship between Black women's activist scholarship and the anti-prison movement. 36 <u>Many anti-prison <mark>activists <strong>view </mark>campaigns for <mark>decarceration</mark> or moratorium <mark>as building blocks toward</mark> the ultimate goal of <mark>abolition</mark>.</u></strong> <u>These <mark>practical actions promise</mark> short and medium-term <mark>successes that <strong>are essential markers on the road to long-term transformation</mark>.</u></strong> However, abolitionists believe that like slavery, the prison-industrial complex is a system of racialized state violence that cannot be “fixed.” The <u>contemporary prison abolitionist movement in the U.S. and Canada dates to the 1970s, when political prisoners like Angela Y. Davis and Assata Shakur, in conjunction with other radical activists and scholars in the U.S., Canada, and Europe, began to call for the dismantling of prisons.</u> 38 The explosion in political prisoners, fuelled by the FBI's Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) and targeting of Black liberation, American Indian and Puerto Rican independence movements in the U.S. and First Nations resistance in Canada as “threats” to national security, fed into an understanding of the role of the prison in perpetuating state repression against insurgent communities. 39 The new anti-prison politics were also shaped by a decade of prisoner litigation and radical prison uprisings, including the brutally crushed Attica Rebellion. <u>These “common” prisoners</u>, predominantly working-class people of color imprisoned for everyday acts of survival, <u>challenged the state's legitimacy by declaring imprisonment a form of cruel and unusual punishment and confronting the brute force of state power</u>. 40 By adopting the term “abolition” <u>activists drew deliberate links between the dismantling of prisons and the abolition of slavery. </u>Through historical excavations, the “new abolitionists” identified the abolition of prisons as the logical completion of the unfinished liberation marked by the 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution, which regulated, rather than ended, slavery. 41 Organizations that actively promote dialogue about what abolition means and how it can translate into concrete action include Critical Resistance (CR), New York's Prison Moratorium Project, Justice Now, California Coalition for Women Prisoners, Free Battered Women, and the Prison Activist Resource Center in the U.S. and the Prisoner Justice Action Committee (Toronto), the Prisoners' Justice Day Committee (Vancouver) and Joint Action in Canada. CR was founded in 1998 by a group of Bay Area activists including former political prisoner and scholar-activist Angela Y. Davis. Initially, CR focused on popular education and movement building, coordinating large conferences where diverse organizations could generate collective alternatives to the prison-industrial complex. Later work has included campaigns against prison construction in California's Central Valley and solidarity work with imprisoned Katrina survivors. CR describes abolition as: [A] political vision that seeks to eliminate the need for prisons, policing, and surveillance by creating sustainable alternatives to punishment and imprisonment … . <u><mark>An abolitionist vision means that <strong>we must build models today that can represent how we want to live in the future</u></strong>. <u>It means <strong>developing practical strategies for taking small steps that move us toward making our dreams real </mark>and that lead the average person to believe that things really could be different</u></strong>. <u><mark>It means <strong>living this vision in our daily lives</strong></mark>.</u> 42 In this sense, <u><mark>prison abolitionists are tasked with</mark> a dual burden: first, <mark>transforming people's consciousness so that they can believe that a world without prisons is possible<strong>, </mark>and second, <mark>taking practical steps to oppose the prison-industrial complex.</u></strong> <u>Making abolition more than a utopian vision <strong>requires practical steps toward this long-term goal</u></strong></mark>. <u>CR describes four steps that activists can get involved in</u>: <u><strong>shrinking the system</u></strong>, <u><strong>creating alternatives, shifting public opinion and public policy</u></strong>, and building leadership among those directly impacted by the prison-industrial complex. 43 Since its inception in the San Francisco Bay Area, Critical Resistance has become a national organization with chapters in Baltimore, Chicago, Gainesville, Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York, Tampa/St. Petersburg, and Washington, D.C. As such, CR has played a critical role in re-invigorating abolitionist politics in the U.S. This work is rooted in the radical praxis of Black women and transgender activists.</p>
null
2nc
Case
45,050
89
17,111
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
565,271
N
Texas
5
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
Garrett
Framework (2NR) cap good
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,646
The illegal market is also a threat to public health—spreads anti-biotic resistant bacteria
Kelly 13
Kelly 13 Emily Kelly, Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Spring, 2013 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1317 NOTE: INTERNATIONAL ORGAN TRAFFICKING CRISIS: SOLUTIONS ADDRESSING THE HEART OF THE MATTER lexis
Because governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV Transplant tourism harms global public health policies Additionally, transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Because such bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across borders upon returning to their home countries
governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV Transplant tourism harms global public health policies transplant tourism facilitate spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across border
[*1324] With regard to recipients, the dangers of receiving medical care in developing countries can outweigh the benefits of life-saving transplant tourism. n66 Because governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV. n67 Tragically, transplant tourists also have "a higher cumulative incidence of acute [organ] rejection in the first year after transplantation." n68 Transplant tourism also harms global public health policies. n69 Most notably, the underground market impedes the success of legal organ donation frameworks. n70 For example, Thai patients have difficulty accessing health care because local doctors are preoccupied with the lucrative practice of treating transplant tourists. n71 In 2007, China banned transplant tourism because wealthy foreigners--rather than the 1.5 million Chinese on the waiting list--received an overwhelming amount of organ transplants. n72 Grisly tales of transplant tourism and conspiracy theories surrounding organ theft may also discourage individuals from agreeing to altruistic donation upon death out of fear that their bodies may be exploited. n73 This further contributes to the global organ shortage and exacerbates the underlying causes of OTC trafficking. n74 Additionally, transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. n75 Because such bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across borders upon returning to their home countries. n76 As a result of these effects, transplant tourism has drawn increasing attention to the root of the problem: organ shortages. n77
1,754
<h4>The illegal market is also a threat to public health—spreads <u>anti-biotic resistant </u>bacteria</h4><p><strong>Kelly 13</strong> Emily Kelly, Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Spring, 2013 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1317 NOTE: INTERNATIONAL ORGAN TRAFFICKING CRISIS: SOLUTIONS ADDRESSING THE HEART OF THE MATTER lexis</p><p> [*1324] With regard to recipients, the dangers of receiving medical care in developing countries can outweigh the benefits of life-saving transplant tourism. n66 <u>Because <mark>governmental disease control agencies do</mark> <mark>not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases</mark> <mark>like West Nile Virus and HIV</u></mark>. n67 Tragically, transplant tourists also have "a higher cumulative incidence of acute [organ] rejection in the first year after transplantation." n68 <u><mark>Transplant tourism</u></mark> also <u><mark>harms</mark> <mark>global public health policies</u></mark>. n69 Most notably, the underground market impedes the success of legal organ donation frameworks. n70 For example, Thai patients have difficulty accessing health care because local doctors are preoccupied with the lucrative practice of treating transplant tourists. n71 In 2007, China banned transplant tourism because wealthy foreigners--rather than the 1.5 million Chinese on the waiting list--received an overwhelming amount of organ transplants. n72 Grisly tales of transplant tourism and conspiracy theories surrounding organ theft may also discourage individuals from agreeing to altruistic donation upon death out of fear that their bodies may be exploited. n73 This further contributes to the global organ shortage and exacerbates the underlying causes of OTC trafficking. n74 <u>Additionally, <mark>transplant tourism</mark> and broader medical tourism <mark>facilitate</mark> the <mark>spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria</mark>.</u> n75 <u>Because such <mark>bacteria are</mark> <mark>frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique</mark> <mark>strains across border</mark>s upon returning to their home countries</u>. n76<strong> As a result of these effects, transplant tourism has drawn increasing attention to the root of the problem: organ shortages. n77</p></strong>
null
null
Contention 2 is illegal markets
430,429
9
17,114
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
565,248
A
Wake
4
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
Voss
null
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
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48,454
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ah.....
18,764
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,647
Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law
Bewley-Taylor 2003 (David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)
Bewley-Taylor 2003 (David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary including legalisation of cannabis Disregarding the treaties raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system selective application would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
Disregarding the treaties raises serious issues nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system selective application would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties or certain parts of them. In this way they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including for example the legalisation of cannabis and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. Disregarding all or selected components of the treaties, however, raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control. The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the selective application of such a principle would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
1,236
<h4>Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor 2003</strong> <u><strong>(David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)</p><p>Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties</u></strong> or certain parts of them. In this way <u><strong>they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary</u></strong> at the national level, <u><strong>including</u></strong> for example the <u><strong>legalisation of cannabis</u></strong> and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. <u><strong><mark>Disregarding</u></strong></mark> all or selected components of <u><strong><mark>the treaties</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>raises serious issues</mark> beyond the realm of drug control</u></strong>. <u><strong>The possibility of <mark>nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system</u></strong></mark>. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the <u><strong><mark>selective application</u></strong></mark> of such a principle <u><strong><mark>would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.</p></u></strong></mark>
null
1nc
4
193,806
47
17,112
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
565,260
N
Wake
2
Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,454
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Dartmouth YaAh
null
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Ya.....
Pi.....
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18,764
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
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college
2
743,648
Anti-politics causes extinction, turns the case, and destroys solvency
Boggs 97
Boggs 97 (CARL BOGGS – Professor and Ph.D. Political Science, National University, Los Angeles -- Theory and Society 26: 741-780)
urgent problems will go unsolved ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context diseases, retreat from politics comes when agendas that side-step these realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the U S political power will continue to decide the fate of human societies. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that state structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian elites the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise -- or it help rationalize existing power In either case
urgent problems will go unsolved ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious retreat from politics comes when agendas side-step realities the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The shrinkage of politics hardly means state structures will lose their hold over people's lives citizenry ready to participate can be filled by authoritarian elites
The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved -- perhaps even unrecognized -- only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context diseases, technological displacement of workers) of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side-step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites -- an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise -- or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collec- tive interests that had vanished from civil society.75
2,695
<h4><strong>Anti-politics causes extinction, turns the case, and destroys solvency</h4><p>Boggs 97</strong> (CARL BOGGS – Professor and Ph.D. Political Science, National University, Los Angeles -- Theory and Society 26: 741-780)</p><p>The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, <u><strong><mark>urgent problems</u></strong></mark> that are destroying the fabric of American society <u><strong><mark>will go unsolved</u></strong></mark> -- perhaps even unrecognized -- only to fester more ominously<u> </u>into the future. And such problems (<u><strong><mark>ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious </mark>cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context</strong> <strong>diseases</strong>, </u>technological displacement of<u> </u>workers) of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread<u><strong> <mark>retreat from politics</u></strong></mark>, often inspired by localist sentiment, <u><strong><mark>comes</mark> </u></strong>at a time<u><strong> <mark>when agendas</mark> that </u></strong>ignore or <u><strong><mark>side-step</mark> these</u></strong> global<u><strong> <mark>realities</mark> will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence.</u></strong> In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime,<u><strong> <mark>the fate of the world hangs in the balance.</mark> The unyielding truth is that, even as </u></strong>the ethos of<u><strong> anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the U</u></strong>nited<u> <strong>S</u></strong>tates, it is the vagaries of<u><strong> political power</u></strong> that<u><strong> will continue to decide the fate of human societies.</strong> </u>This last point demands further elaboration. <u><strong><mark>The shrinkage of politics hardly means</mark> that </u></strong>corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic <u><strong><mark>state</mark> </u></strong>and military<u><strong> <mark>structures will lose their hold over people's lives</mark>. Far from it: the space </strong>abdicated by a broad <mark>citizenry</mark>, well-informed and <mark>ready to participate</mark> at many levels, <strong><mark>can</strong></mark> in fact <strong><mark>be filled by authoritarian</mark> </u></strong>and reactionary<u><strong> <mark>elites</strong></mark> </u> -- an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way <u><strong>the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise -- or it </u></strong>might <u><strong>help </u></strong>further <u><strong>rationalize</u></strong> the<u><strong> existing power </u></strong>structure.<u><strong> In either case</u></strong>, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collec- tive interests that had vanished from civil society.75<strong> </p></strong>
null
1nc
3
35,468
182
17,110
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
565,262
N
Wake
5
NYU Itliong-Zhan
McCleary
Fed CP (2NR) AG Politics (2NR Cede the Political DA T - USFG
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
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Dartmouth
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,649
Breakthroughs in the bioprinting industry mean it’ll be ready soon
Phillips 14
Phillips 14 (Shanie, senior contributor and editor at Inside3DP “Latest Development Brings Us One Step Closer to Bioprinting Organs”, http://www.inside3dp.com/latest-development-brings-us-one-step-closer-bioprinting-organs/)
Printing organs many developments have been made that lead in that direction. This past week, another revelation in bioprinting was made that brings us one step closer to 3D printed organs A team of researchers from universities across the US and China tested biological ‘inks’ with different concentrations of mouse fibroblasts and hydrogel solutions, and found that adding more cells in the bioinks reduces both droplet size and the rate at which the ink gets dispensed. This is a significant breakthrough in bioprinting With the new bioink information discovered this week, researchers can now better conduct and tailor bioprinting studies, which could lead to quicker development of functional 3D printed ‘self-made’ organs that can’t be rejected.¶ “The new results will help scientists move forward with this promising technology, , , Ben, author of The great Brain Race: How Global Universities are Reshaping the World, "Do we Have to Be No. 1?" http://www.forbes.com/2010/08/01/higher-education-graduation-opinions-best-colleges-10-wildavsky.html The Great Brain Race increasing knowledge is not a zero-sum game, improved education in other countries ought to be viewed as a net plus for the world's human capital and prosperity, hence an opportunity for the United States, the rhetoric of competitiveness and world dominance shouldn't be read too literally nations as an informative reference point and assuming that our work is not done unless and until we are in the lead.
increasing knowledge is not a zero-sum game, improved education in other countries as a net plus for the world's prosperity the rhetoric of competitiveness shouldn't be read too literally
Printing organs is certainly one of the coolest and most talked about capabilities of 3D printing. Even though fully functional, implantation-safe organs have yet to be artificially created, many developments have been made that lead in that direction. This past week, another revelation in bioprinting was made that brings us one step closer to 3D printed organs.¶ A team of researchers from universities across the US and China tested biological ‘inks’ with different concentrations of mouse fibroblasts and hydrogel solutions, and found that adding more cells in the bioinks reduces both droplet size and the rate at which the ink gets dispensed. This is a significant breakthrough in bioprinting, as no studies have been done yet that really reveal how bioinks behave when dispensed through printer nozzles.¶ “There are a few different biofabricating methods, but inkjet printing has emerged as a frontrunner. It has been used to print live cells, from hamster ovary cells to human fibroblasts, which are a common type of cell in the body,” the researchers reported in the American Chemical Society journal Langmuir, which published the results.¶ Organ shortage is a serious issue. Currently over 120,000 people are on waiting lists for donated organs, yet less than 10,000 received the transplants they needed between January and April of this year. In addition to the shortage itself, available organs also run the risk of being rejected by the patient’s body. With the new bioink information discovered this week, researchers can now better conduct and tailor bioprinting studies, which could lead to quicker development of functional 3D printed ‘self-made’ organs that can’t be rejected.¶ “The new results will help scientists move forward with this promising technology,” said Yong Huang, one of the researchers from the University of Florida in Gainesville. Other researchers in the team were from Clemson University in South Carolina, Zheijiang University in China and the Medical University of South Carolina. Competitiveness is not zero sum Wildavsky, sr. fellow resarch and policy, Kauffman foundation, 8/11/10 ( Wildavsky, Ben, author of The great Brain Race: How Global Universities are Reshaping the World, "Do we Have to Be No. 1?" http://www.forbes.com/2010/08/01/higher-education-graduation-opinions-best-colleges-10-wildavsky.html If we succeed in preparing more students for college, enrolling more students in college and--an essential "and"--graduating more students from college, this would be a huge accomplishment for our citizens and our nation. If other countries can do this as well, more power to them. The same is true, as I argue in The Great Brain Race, about the efforts of other nations to create world-class universities that can compete with the best in the West. Once we understand that increasing knowledge is not a zero-sum game, improved education in other countries ought to be viewed as a net plus for the world's human capital and prosperity, hence an opportunity for the United States, not a threat. It can be argued that the rhetoric of competitiveness and world dominance shouldn't be read too literally. Perhaps we should simply view it as a rallying cry, a spur to greater efforts. Everybody understands that such audacious college attainment goals are intended to be aspirational; they certainly aren't reachable in such a short period. But there's an important distinction to be made between using the educational progress of other nations as an informative reference point and assuming that our work is not done unless and until we are in the lead.
3,603
<h4>Breakthroughs in the bioprinting industry mean it’ll be ready soon</h4><p><strong>Phillips 14</strong> (Shanie, senior contributor and editor at Inside3DP “Latest Development Brings Us One Step Closer to Bioprinting Organs”, http://www.inside3dp.com/latest-development-brings-us-one-step-closer-bioprinting-organs/)</p><p><u>Printing organs</u> is certainly one of the coolest and most talked about capabilities of 3D printing. Even though fully functional, implantation-safe organs have yet to be artificially created, <u>many developments have been made that lead in that direction. This past week, another revelation in bioprinting was made that brings us one step closer to 3D printed organs</u>.¶ <u>A team of researchers from universities across the US and China tested biological ‘inks’ with different concentrations of mouse fibroblasts and hydrogel solutions, and found that adding more cells in the bioinks reduces both droplet size and the rate at which the ink gets dispensed. This is a significant breakthrough in bioprinting</u>, as no studies have been done yet that really reveal how bioinks behave when dispensed through printer nozzles.¶ “There are a few different biofabricating methods, but inkjet printing has emerged as a frontrunner. It has been used to print live cells, from hamster ovary cells to human fibroblasts, which are a common type of cell in the body,” the researchers reported in the American Chemical Society journal Langmuir, which published the results.¶ Organ shortage is a serious issue. Currently over 120,000 people are on waiting lists for donated organs, yet less than 10,000 received the transplants they needed between January and April of this year. In addition to the shortage itself, available organs also run the risk of being rejected by the patient’s body. <u>With the new bioink information discovered this week, researchers can now better conduct and tailor bioprinting studies, which could lead to quicker development of functional 3D printed ‘self-made’ organs that can’t be rejected.¶ “The new results will help scientists move forward with this promising technology,</u>” said Yong Huang, one of the researchers from the University of Florida in Gainesville. Other researchers in the team were from Clemson University in South Carolina, Zheijiang<strong> University in China and the Medical University of South Carolina.</p><p>Competitiveness is not zero sum</p><p>Wildavsky<u></strong>,</u> sr. fellow resarch and policy, Kauffman foundation, <strong>8/11/10<u></strong> </u>( Wildavsky<u>, Ben, author of The great Brain Race: How Global Universities are Reshaping the World, "Do we Have to Be No. 1?" http://www.forbes.com/2010/08/01/higher-education-graduation-opinions-best-colleges-10-wildavsky.html</p><p></u>If we succeed in preparing more students for college, enrolling more students in college and--an essential "and"--graduating more students from college, this would be a huge accomplishment for our citizens and our nation. If other countries can do this as well, more power to them. The same is true, as I argue in <u>The Great Brain Race</u>, about the efforts of other nations to create world-class universities that can compete with the best in the West. Once we understand that <u><mark>increasing knowledge is not a zero-sum game, improved education in other countries</mark> ought to be viewed <mark>as a net plus for the world's</mark> human capital and <mark>prosperity</mark>, hence an opportunity for the United States,</u> not a threat. It can be argued that <u><mark>the rhetoric of competitiveness</mark> and world dominance <mark>shouldn't be read too literally</u></mark>. Perhaps we should simply view it as a rallying cry, a spur to greater efforts. Everybody understands that such audacious college attainment goals are intended to be aspirational; they certainly aren't reachable in such a short period. But there's an important distinction to be made between using the educational progress of other <u>nations as an informative reference point and assuming that our work is not done unless and until we are in the lead.</p></u>
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2nc
Bioprint UQ-soon
310,581
3
17,109
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
565,261
N
Wake
3
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
Watson
AG Politics (2NR) Narrow Ruling CP (2NR) Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR) T - nearly all Test Case Fiat
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
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Dartmouth
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2,014
cx
college
2
743,650
altruistic donations are biased against the poor
Fry-Revere 14
Fry-Revere 14 Sigrid Fry-Revere. Director of bioethics studies, CATO Institute 2014
there is a tragic consequence inherent in the system of altruistic organ donation that many people are not aware of, an insidious injustice so profound one might question whether our current policy is any less barbaric than the exploitation it sought to eliminate. By mandating altruistic living kidney donations, the U S has inadvertently relegated some very specific groups to die on dialysis while creating opportunities for others to get kidneys for free. Someone well-to-do or well-connected. or even someone who is a middle-class. white~collar worker is far more likely to have friends or relatives who qualify to donate than someone who is poor. unemployed, or a blue-collar worker. Donors must be healthy and insured. They can’t have diabetes, hypertension, or heart problems; can’t be more than a little overweight These are prevalent illnesses but the problem is especially acute among the poor and minorities. Donors must have time to spare. First, they need to make 3 to 10 week-day trips for pre-op meetings and testing Then after the operation, they need ‘two to seven days to recover in the hospital and at least two weeks to recover at home. This means taking a good deal of time away from work Donors must have money The actual nephrectomy is covered through the recipients insurance or federal and state health programs like Medicare and Medicaid, but there are donation related costs that are not covered Donors may have travel-related expenses while getting pre—operative testing done and before and after surgery. the donor might have to hire someone to help with non-work related obligations It is also quite possible that donors may need to take off more time from work than they have paid leave. The up-front costs associated with kidney donation are simply too great for many potential donors, particularly if they are members of an underprivileged socioeconomic class. As a result, the U S has a kidney donation system that, in the name of altruism, makes it possible for the well-to-do, to get living donor kidneys for free, while the average working class laborer, the poor, and the unemployed have to watch their friends and family die on dialysis, waiting for organs that rarely come.
there is tragic consequence in altruistic organ donation that many people are not aware of, an insidious injustice so profound one might question whether our current policy is any less barbaric than the exploitation it sought to eliminate. mandating altruistic donations has relegated some very specific groups to die on dialysis Someone well-to-do or middle-class. is far more likely to have friends or relatives who qualify to donate than someone who is poor : Donors must be healthy and insured. They can’t have diabetes, hypertension, or heart problems; These are prevalent illnesses especially acute among the poor and minorities Donors must have time to spare This means taking a good deal of time away from work Donors must have money. The actual nephrectomy is covered through the recipients insurance or federal and state health programs like Medicare and Medicaid, but there are donation related costs that are not covered. It is also quite possible that donors may need to take off more time from work than they have paid leave The up-front costs associated with kidney donation are simply too great for many potential donors average working class laborer, the poor, and the unemployed have to watch their friends and family die on dialysis
The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 201 But there is another tragic consequence inherent in the American system of altruistic organ donation that many people are not aware of, an insidious injustice so profound one might question whether our current policy is any less barbaric than the exploitation it sought to eliminate. By mandating altruistic living kidney donations, the United States has inadvertently relegated some very specific groups of Americans to die on dialysis while creating opportunities for others to get kidneys for free. Someone well-to-do or well-connected. or even someone who is a middle-class. white~collar worker is far more likely to have friends or relatives who qualify to donate than someone who is poor. unemployed, or a blue-collar worker. Listed here are some of the qualifications for being a living kidney donor: Donors must be healthy and insured. They can’t have diabetes, hypertension, or heart problems; can’t be more than a little overweight: and preferably don't have a history of diabetes or heart disease in their immediate families. These are prevalent illnesses among Americans—an estimated 8.3 percent of Americans suffer from diabetes, and heart disease caused nearly 25 percent of American deaths in 2OO8—but the problem is especially acute among the poor and minorities. A growing body of evidence points to strong links between socioeconomic status and the prevalence of diabetes, hypertension (a risk factor for heart disease), and end stage renal disease. On top of this, donors need health insurance which practically speaking means that donors or their_spouses must be full-time employees in a business large enough to provide insurance, must be making enough to purchase their own insurance, or must be under 26 and covered by their parents’ health insurance. Donors must have time to spare. First, they need to make 3 to 10 week-day trips to a hospital, clinic, or lab for pre-op meetings and testing with lab technicians, doctors, social workers, and psychologists. Then after the operation, they need ‘two to seven days to recover in the hospital and at least two weeks to recover at home. Even after three weeks, however, it remains unwise to do any heavy lifting. The period to limit heavy lift- ing might last anywhere from 2 to 6 months or longer depending on ‘the age and general health of the donor, whether there were any complications during surgery or afterwards, and how quickly the donor is healing. This means taking a good deal of time away from work or other responsibilities, particularly if the donor has to do more than is generally required of someone with a desk job. Donors must have a support group with time to spare. They need help during the donation and recovery period. Donors can’t drive themselves home from the hospital after the operation. They need people who can take care of them for at least the first week or two after surgery. And of course, someone must take on the responsibilities donors are unable to fulfill during recovery: any job-related duties as well as home responsibilities, such as caring for children, older relatives, the household, pets, and the yard. Donors must have money. The actual nephrectomy is covered through the recipients insurance or federal and state health programs like Medicare and Medicaid, but there are donation related costs that are not covered. Donors may have travel-related expenses like gas, flights, hotels and food while getting pre—operative testing done and before and after surgery. If a donor’s friends and family can't take off time to help the donor (or can’t take off weeks or months), the donor might have to hire someone to help with non-work related obligations: for example, a babtsitter, a pet sitter, and someone to clean the house and/or mow the lawn It is also quite possible that donors may need to take off more time from work than they have paid leave. (Recipients are legally permitted to reimburse donors for lost wages, but not all recipients, and particularly not impoverished ones, have the financial means to cover lost wages. Furthermore reimbursing the self-employed is prohibited because there is no clear measure, such as a salary, to value their work. State and federal programs provide some financial assistance for donors, but most of those programs only provide need-based support for travel expenses or only compensate donors a small percentage of their costs after the fact") The up-front costs associated with kidney donation are simply too great for many potential donors, particularly if they are members of an underprivileged socioeconomic class. The costs of donating are not limited to the out-of-pocket expenses that might not be reimbursed. Taking too many days off work can jeopardize a donor’s job status: A donor may lose his or her position altogether. fall behind in work responsibilities, or lose seniority when it comes to promotions or other benefits. There are also secondary costs such as the financial and emotional strain donation puts on family members and friends when they contribute financially or take time off work to help the donor during recovery. Given these restrictions. how many people do you know who would qua]- ify to be kidney donors? W'hite-collar workers might be able to “afford” to donate if they have enough vacation time. enough money saved to pay for donation-related expenses up front. friends and family who can take time off work to help with everyday responsibilities, and a job to return to that doesn’t require heavy lifting. Blue-collar workers are far less likely to have the resources needed to be living donors. They might not have sufficient, if any, paid leave, may not have friends and family who have enough free time to help with children and household responsibilities, and are more likely than white-collar workers to have jobs that require heavy lifting. Now consider the self-employed, people like family farmers and small business owners. How can they find the time or money to donate? And even if the self-employed qualify to donate, who would run their businesses in their absence, and how many of them have jobs that won't require at least some heavy lifting? And what about homemakers or people who care for children or elderly relatives? Who would take on their responsibilities while they arrange for and recover from a kidney donation, let alone the risks of heavy lifting too soon after surgery? _ _ Finally, poor and minority communities are harder hit with problems of obesity, diabetes, and hypertension, making it less likely that a potential recipient’s friends and family will even qualify medically as donors, let alone have the financial resources necessary to donate. And what about the unemployed? They don’t qualify because they don’t have insurance. So the unemployed, or even friends or relatives who work part-time, might not qualify to donate because they don’t have adequate insurance coverage. As a result, the United States has a kidney donation system that, in the name of altruism, makes it possible for the well-to-do, leisure class, and upper middle-class to get living donor kidneys for free, while the average working class laborer, the poor, and the unemployed have to watch their friends and family die on dialysis, waiting for second-best cadaver organs that rarely come.
7,345
<h4>altruistic donations are biased against the poor</h4><p><strong>Fry-Revere 14</strong> Sigrid Fry-Revere. Director of bioethics studies, CATO Institute 2014 </p><p>The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 201</p><p>But <u><mark>there is</mark> a</u>nother <u><mark>tragic consequence </mark>inherent<mark> in</mark> the</u> American <u>system of <mark>altruistic organ donation</mark> <mark>that many people are not aware of, an insidious injustice so profound one might question whether our current policy is any less barbaric than the exploitation it sought to eliminate. </mark>By<mark> mandating altruistic</mark> living kidney <mark>donations</mark>, the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u><mark>has</mark> inadvertently <mark>relegated some very specific groups</mark> </u>of Americans <u><mark>to die on dialysis </mark>while creating opportunities for others to get kidneys for free. <mark>Someone well-to-do or</mark> well-connected. or even someone who is a <mark>middle-class. </mark>white~collar worker <mark>is far more likely to have friends or relatives who qualify to donate than someone</u> <u>who is poor</mark>. unemployed, or a blue-collar worker. </u>Listed here are some of the qualifications for being a living kidney donor<mark>: <u>Donors must be healthy and insured. They can’t have diabetes, hypertension, or heart problems; </mark>can’t be more than a little overweight</u>: and preferably don't have a history of diabetes or heart disease in their immediate families. <u><mark>These are</mark> <mark>prevalent illnesses</u></mark> among Americans—an estimated 8.3 percent of Americans suffer from diabetes, and heart disease caused nearly 25 percent of American deaths in 2OO8—<u>but the problem is <mark>especially acute among the poor and minorities</mark>.</u> A growing body of evidence points to strong links between socioeconomic status and the prevalence of diabetes, hypertension (a risk factor for heart disease), and end stage renal disease. On top of this, donors need health insurance which practically speaking means that donors or their_spouses must be full-time employees in a business large enough to provide insurance, must be making enough to purchase their own insurance, or must be under 26 and covered by their parents’ health insurance. <u><mark>Donors must have time to spare</mark>. First, they need to make 3 to 10 week-day trips </u>to a hospital, clinic, or lab<u> for pre-op meetings and testing</u> with lab technicians, doctors, social workers, and psychologists. <u>Then after the operation, they need ‘two to seven days to recover in the hospital and at least two weeks to recover at home.</u> Even after three weeks, however, it remains unwise to do any heavy lifting. The period to limit heavy lift-<u> </u>ing might last anywhere from 2 to 6 months or longer depending on ‘the age and general health of the donor, whether there were any complications during surgery or afterwards, and how quickly the donor is healing. <u><mark>This means taking a good deal of time away from work</u></mark> or other responsibilities, particularly if the donor has to do more than is generally required of someone with a desk job. Donors must have a support group with time to spare. They need help during the donation and recovery period. Donors can’t drive themselves home from the hospital after the operation. They need people who can take care of them for at least the first week or two after surgery. And of course, someone must take on the responsibilities donors are unable to fulfill during recovery: any job-related duties as well as home responsibilities, such as caring for children, older relatives, the household, pets, and the yard. <u><mark>Donors must have money</u>. <u><strong>The actual nephrectomy is covered through the recipients insurance or federal and state health programs like Medicare and Medicaid,</strong> but there are donation related costs that are not covered</u>.</mark> <u>Donors may have travel-related expenses </u>like gas, flights, hotels and food <u>while getting pre—operative testing done and before and after surgery.</u> If a donor’s friends and family can't take off time to help the donor (or can’t take off weeks or months), <u>the donor might have to hire someone to help with non-work related obligations</u>: for example, a babtsitter, a pet sitter, and someone to clean the house and/or mow the lawn <u><mark>It is also quite possible that donors may need to take off more time from work than they have paid leave</mark>.</u> (Recipients are legally permitted to reimburse donors for lost wages, but not all recipients, and particularly<u> </u>not impoverished ones, have the financial means to cover lost wages. Furthermore reimbursing the self-employed is prohibited because there is no clear measure, such as a salary, to value their work. State and federal programs provide some financial assistance for donors, but most of those programs only provide need-based support for travel expenses or only compensate donors a small percentage of their costs after the fact") <u><mark>The up-front costs associated with kidney donation are simply too great for many potential donors</mark>, particularly if they are members of an underprivileged socioeconomic class.</u> The costs of donating are not limited to the out-of-pocket expenses that might not be reimbursed. Taking too many days off work can jeopardize a donor’s job status: A donor may lose his or her position altogether. fall behind in work responsibilities, or lose seniority when it comes to promotions or other benefits. There are also secondary costs such as the financial and emotional strain donation puts on family members and friends when they contribute financially or take time off work to help the donor during recovery. Given these restrictions. how many people do you know who would qua]-<u> </u>ify to be kidney donors? W'hite-collar workers might be able to “afford” to donate if they have enough vacation time. enough money saved to pay for donation-related expenses up front. friends and family who can take time off work to help with everyday responsibilities, and a job to return to that doesn’t require heavy lifting. Blue-collar workers are far less likely to have the resources needed to be living donors. They might not have sufficient, if any, paid leave, may not have friends and family who have enough free time to help with children and household responsibilities, and are more likely than white-collar workers to have jobs that require heavy lifting. Now consider the self-employed, people like family farmers and small business owners. How can they find the time or money to donate? And even if the self-employed qualify to donate, who would run their businesses in their absence, and how many of them have jobs that won't require at least some heavy lifting? And what about homemakers or people who care for children or elderly relatives? Who would take on their responsibilities while they arrange for and recover from a kidney donation, let alone the risks of heavy lifting too soon after surgery? _ _ Finally, poor and minority communities are harder hit with problems of obesity, diabetes, and hypertension, making it less likely that a potential recipient’s friends and family will even qualify medically as donors, let alone have the financial resources necessary to donate. And what about the unemployed? They don’t qualify because they don’t have insurance. So the unemployed, or even friends or relatives who work part-time, might not qualify to donate because they don’t have adequate insurance coverage. <u>As a result, the U</u>nited<u> S</u>tates<u> has a kidney donation system that, in the name of altruism, makes it possible for the well-to-do, </u>leisure class, and upper middle-class <u>to get living donor kidneys for free, while the <mark>average working class laborer, the poor, and the unemployed have to watch their friends and family die on dialysis</mark>, waiting for </u>second-best cadaver<u> organs that rarely come.</p></u>
null
2nc
Case
430,858
3
17,111
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
565,271
N
Texas
5
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
Garrett
Framework (2NR) cap good
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,651
Independetly, Increasing reliance on the illegal market means the threat is serious—specifically causes tropical disease
Franco-Paredes 10
Franco-Paredes 10 Carlos Franco-Paredes, Jesse T. Jacob. Alicia Hidrona, Alfonso J. Rodriguez-Morales,David Kuhara, and Angela M. Caliendoa all with Division of Infectious Diseases, Emory University School of Medicine except Redriguez-Morales at Division of Immunoparasitology, Tropical Medicine Institute, Universidad Central de Venezuela International Journal of Infectious Diseases Volume 14, Issue 3, March 2010, Pages e189–e196 Transplantation and tropical infectious diseases http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1201971209002045
More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in the number of immunocompromised hosts in the last decade, there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts in endemic and non-endemic settings The epidemiologic reasons for the growing number of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients include increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries and ( many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases
transplantation being performed resulting in an increase in number of immunocompromised hosts there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts The reasons for the growing number include increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries and (4) many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases
More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in the number of immunocompromised hosts.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 Most of the literature in infectious diseases in transplantation has focused on common pathogens prevalent in industrialized Western countries, where most transplantation surgeries occur.1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 However, in the last decade, there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts in endemic and non-endemic settings.3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 The epidemiologic reasons for the growing number of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients include: (1) increasing travel of transplanted patients to the tropics and subtropics;8, 12 and 13 (2) increasing population immigration from endemic areas for tropical infections to non-endemic settings;6, 14 and 15 (3) increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries;11, 16, 17, 18 and 19 and (4) many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases.20 and 21 In general, transmission of these infections occurs through three main routes: donor-derived infections,3, 4, 6, 15 and 22 reactivation or recrudescence of latent infections,16, 22, 23 and 24 or transmission de novo during the post-transplant period.4 and 16 Infectious pathogens may be carried by the graft or the infection may be acquired through transfusion of blood products during or after the transplantation.3, 4
1,559
<h4><strong>Independetly, Increasing reliance on the illegal market means the threat is serious—specifically causes tropical disease </h4><p>Franco-Paredes</strong> <strong>10 </strong> Carlos Franco-Paredes, Jesse T. Jacob. Alicia Hidrona, Alfonso J. Rodriguez-Morales,David Kuhara, and Angela M. Caliendoa all with Division of Infectious Diseases, Emory University School of Medicine except Redriguez-Morales at Division of Immunoparasitology, Tropical Medicine Institute, Universidad Central de Venezuela International Journal of Infectious Diseases Volume 14, Issue 3, March 2010, Pages e189–e196 Transplantation and tropical infectious diseases http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1201971209002045</p><p><u>More <mark>transplantation </mark>procedures are <mark>being performed</mark> annually, <mark>resulting in an increase</mark> <mark>in</mark> the <mark>number of immunocompromised hosts</u></mark>.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 Most of the literature in infectious diseases in transplantation has focused on common pathogens prevalent in industrialized Western countries, where most transplantation surgeries occur.1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 However, <u>in the last decade, <mark>there has been</mark> <mark>a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts</mark> in endemic and non-endemic settings</u>.3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 <u><mark>The</mark> epidemiologic <mark>reasons for the</mark> <mark>growing number</mark> of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients <mark>include</u></mark>: (1) increasing travel of transplanted patients to the tropics and subtropics;8, 12 and 13 (2) increasing population immigration from endemic areas for tropical infections to non-endemic settings;6, 14 and 15 (3) <u><mark>increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries</u></mark>;11, 16, 17, 18 and 19 <u><mark>and (</u>4) <u>many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases</u></mark>.20 and 21 In general, transmission of these infections occurs through three main routes: donor-derived infections,3, 4, 6, 15 and 22 reactivation or recrudescence of latent infections,16, 22, 23 and 24 or transmission de novo during the post-transplant period.4 and 16 Infectious pathogens may be carried by the graft or the infection may be acquired through transfusion of blood products during or after the transplantation.3, 4</p>
null
null
Contention 2 is illegal markets
430,431
5
17,114
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
565,248
A
Wake
4
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
Voss
null
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,652
International treaty system solves great power war
Muller 2000
Muller 2000 (Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)
As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age arms races are likely stabilization remains a key a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. arms limitation agreement are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth Global agreements also reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance
as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against major violence remains a pivotal task arms races are likely interlocking agreements create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome confrontations and enable transitions towards cooperative relationships arms limitation agreements are needed to ban existential dangers ecological safety, and the survival of human life Global agreements reduce the chances that conflicts will escalate. , it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance
In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists—and it exists today—constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task of global security policy. Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, arms races are likely to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or stabilization remains a key goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. At the global level, arms limitation or prohibition agreements, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. Global agreements also affect regional balances and help, if successful, to reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate. Under opportune circumstances, the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement, it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if it is implemented appropriately and, if not, means are available to ensure compliance. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.
3,802
<h4><strong>International treaty system solves great power war</h4><p>Muller 2000 </strong>(Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)</p><p>In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • <u>As long <mark>as the risk of <strong>great power rivalry</strong> and <strong>competition</strong> exists</u></mark>—and it exists today—<u><mark>constructing barriers</mark> <mark>against</mark> a degeneration of this competition into <strong><mark>major violence</strong> remains a pivotal task</u></mark> of global security policy. <u>Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age</u> since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, <u><mark>arms races are <strong>likely</u></strong></mark> to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or <u>stabilization remains a key</u> goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, <u>a web of <strong><mark>interlocking agreements</strong></mark> may even <mark>create enough of a sense of <strong>security</strong> and <strong>confidence</strong> to overcome</mark> past <mark>confrontations and enable transitions towards</mark> more <mark>cooperative relationships</mark>.</u> At the global level, <u><mark>arms limitation</u></mark> or prohibition <u><mark>agreement</u>s</mark>, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, <u><mark>are needed to ban <strong>existential dangers</strong></mark> for global stability, <strong><mark>ecological</strong> safety, and</mark> maybe <strong><mark>the</mark> very <mark>survival of human life</mark> on earth</u></strong>. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. <u><mark>Global agreements</mark> also</u> affect regional balances and help, if successful, to <u><strong><mark>reduce the chances</strong> that</mark> regional <mark>conflicts will escalate</u>.</mark> Under opportune circumstances, <u>the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation</u>. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement<mark>, <u>it will serve these worthwhile purposes <strong>only if</u></strong></mark> it is implemented appropriately and, if not, <u><mark>means are available to ensure <strong>compliance</u></strong></mark>. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.</p>
null
1nc
4
65,123
59
17,112
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
565,260
N
Wake
2
Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,653
Only State-based, macro-political approaches solve—The AFF is comparatively worse
Bronner 4
Bronner 4 Stephen Eric Bronner, Distinguished Professor of Political Science and a Member of the Graduate Faculty in Comparative Literature and German Studies at Rutgers University, 2004 (Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement, Published by Columbia University Press, ISBN 9780231126090, p. 151-153)
Seeking to constrain use of arbitrary power, they sought to protect free exercise of subjectivity The state was the best institution for social justice. That remains the case The left must overcome its more naïve populist inclinations This means looking beyond the town meeting, and the workers' council Neither seems willing to confront practical questions Bureaucracy is despised for the hierarchy it generates Arguments of this sort retreat from engaging the actual conflicts that continue to shape our world They are instead content to rest on anti-political politics
The state was the best institution for social justice. That remains the case The left must overcome town meeting, and workers' council Bureaucracy is despised for hierarchy it generates this retreat from engaging actual conflicts that continue to shape our world. They are instead content to rest on anti politics
Enlightenment thinkers wished neither to abolish the state nor to bring about some utopian alternative. Seeking to constrain the institutional use of arbitrary power, they sought to protect the free exercise of subjectivity and promote the free pursuit of scientific knowledge. The state became the anchor for that enterprise; it was seen as the best institution for securing civil [end page 151] liberties and for furthering social justice. That remains the case. Transnational organizations are, to be sure, required in order to contest emerging transnational economic structures. New ways of establishing and expressing the common interest and a m ore cosmopolitan outlook will also prove necessary not just in the United States or Europe but also in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Solidarity must surely be reconceived to meet new conditions. But this still does not justify simply dismissing the state or fantasizing about its future disappearance. Confronting an increasingly global society is impossible when indulging in a misplaced romantic nostalgia for the traditional, the organic, and the parochial. The left must overcome its more naïve populist inclinations. This means looking beyond the polis, the town meeting, and even the workers' council.1 Their partisans actually share much in common with the religious and traditional advocates of the organic community. Both seem blind to the dangers involved in dismissing "mechanical" notions of representative democracy with its mass parties, interest group pluralism, separation of powers, and checks and balances. Neither seems willing to confront practical questions of economic coordination, the disappearance of a homogenous citizenry or proletariat, and the implications of an increasingly complex division of labor. Rarely does either consider how local politics fosters patronage, provincialism, and corruption. Bureaucracy is despised for the routine and hierarchy it generates; the importance of an independent judiciary for the preservation of civil liberties is ignored, and little time is wasted on how to maintain acceptable investment or reproduce the conditions for participation in the modern world. Much easier then to condemn the Enlightenment for "severing the organic links that bind humans to their social nature," maintain that all communities should be "left alone," and insist that freedom is not the insight into but rather "the rejection of necessity."2 Arguments of this sort, of course, retreat from engaging the actual conflicts between real movements that continue to shape our world. They are instead content to rest on the belief that "the whole is false," and that the true pursuit of freedom requires an [end page 152] anti-political politics. It is the same with even with more serious radicals who insist that socialism can be conceived only as a utopian "other" in which alienation has been abolished and a world of direct democracy has been achieved.
2,954
<h4><strong>Only <u>State-based</u>, macro-political approaches <u>solve</u>—The AFF is <u>comparatively</u> worse</h4><p>Bronner 4 </strong>Stephen Eric Bronner, Distinguished Professor of Political Science and a Member of the Graduate Faculty in Comparative Literature and German Studies at Rutgers University, 2004 (Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement, Published by Columbia University Press, ISBN 9780231126090, p. 151-153)</p><p>Enlightenment thinkers wished neither to abolish the state nor to bring about some utopian alternative. <u><strong>Seeking to constrain</u></strong> the institutional <u><strong>use of arbitrary power, they sought to protect</u></strong> the <u><strong>free exercise of subjectivity</u></strong> and promote the free pursuit of scientific knowledge. <u><strong><mark>The state</u></strong></mark> became the anchor for that enterprise; it <u><strong><mark>was</u></strong></mark> seen as <u><strong><mark>the best institution for</mark> </u></strong>securing civil [end page 151] liberties and for furthering <u><strong><mark>social justice. That remains the case</u></strong></mark>. Transnational organizations are, to be sure, required in order to contest emerging transnational economic structures. New ways of establishing and expressing the common interest and a m ore cosmopolitan outlook will also prove necessary not just in the United States or Europe but also in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Solidarity must surely be reconceived to meet new conditions. But this still does not justify simply dismissing the state or fantasizing about its future disappearance. Confronting an increasingly global society is impossible when indulging in a misplaced romantic nostalgia for the traditional, the organic, and the parochial. <u><strong><mark>The left must overcome</mark> its more naïve populist inclinations</u></strong>. <u><strong>This means looking beyond the </u></strong>polis, the <u><strong><mark>town</mark> <mark>meeting, and</mark> </u></strong>even <u><strong>the <mark>workers' council</u></strong></mark>.1 Their partisans actually share much in common with the religious and traditional advocates of the organic community. Both seem blind to the dangers involved in dismissing "mechanical" notions of representative democracy with its mass parties, interest group pluralism, separation of powers, and checks and balances. <u><strong>Neither seems willing to confront practical questions </u></strong>of economic coordination, the disappearance of a homogenous citizenry or proletariat, and the implications of an increasingly complex division of labor. Rarely does either consider how local politics fosters patronage, provincialism, and corruption. <u><strong><mark>Bureaucracy is despised for </mark>the</u></strong> routine and <u><strong><mark>hierarchy it generates</u></strong></mark>; the importance of an independent judiciary for the preservation of civil liberties is ignored, and little time is wasted on how to maintain acceptable investment or reproduce the conditions for participation in the modern world. Much easier then to condemn the Enlightenment for "severing the organic links that bind humans to their social nature," maintain that all communities should be "left alone," and insist that freedom is not the insight into but rather "the rejection of necessity."2 <u><strong>Arguments of <mark>this</mark> sort</u></strong>, of course, <u><strong><mark>retreat from engaging</mark> the <mark>actual conflicts</u></strong></mark> between real movements <u><strong><mark>that continue to shape our world</u></strong>. <u><strong>They are instead content</u></strong> <u><strong>to rest on</u></strong></mark> the belief that "the whole is false," and that the true pursuit of freedom requires an [end page 152] <u><strong><mark>anti</mark>-political <mark>politics</u></strong></mark>. It is the same with even with more serious radicals who insist that socialism can be conceived only as a utopian "other" in which alienation has been abolished and a world of direct democracy has been achieved.</p>
null
1nc
3
412,963
12
17,110
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
565,262
N
Wake
5
NYU Itliong-Zhan
McCleary
Fed CP (2NR) AG Politics (2NR Cede the Political DA T - USFG
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,654
Schumer’s push means she will be confirmed
Roll Call 11/11
Roll Call 11/11/2014 (Schumer Expects Loretta Lynch Confirmation Will Be Delayed, http://blogs.rollcall.com/wgdb/schumer-expects-loretta-lynch-nomination-to-be-delayed/)
the Lynch nomination] will not be in the lame duck Schumer ’s willing to delay the pick because he is confident she will be confirmed If] we know she is going to get support, why poison the well? I have such confidence in her I think when they get to know her and see her they will support her.”
Schumer, willing to delay the pick because he is confident she will be confirmed If] we know she is going to get support, why poison the well? I have such confidence in her I think when they get to know her and see her they will support her.
Senate Democrats won’t likely step on the gas to ensure the confirmation of Loretta Lynch as President Barack Obama’s attorney general pick, according to No. 3 Democrat Charles E. Schumer. “I think the likelihood is that [the Lynch nomination] will not be in the lame duck,” the New York Democrat told reporters Wednesday morning. “I think our Republican colleagues don’t want it during the lame duck and I think we are going to accede to that request.” If Democrats don’t confirm her nomination before Republicans take over the chamber on Jan. 3, her nomination will rest in GOP hands. President Barack Obama’s plans for expansive immigration action before the end of the year could endanger Lynch’s confirmation under that scenario. But Schumer, who is leading the charge for Lynch, the U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York, said he’s willing to delay the pick because he is confident she will be confirmed. “Because I think she’s going to get support,” he said when asked about the delay. “[If] we know she is going to get support, why poison the well? I have such confidence in her I think when they get to know her and see her they will support her.”
1,169
<h4><strong>Schumer’s push means she will be confirmed</h4><p>Roll Call 11/11<u></strong>/2014 (Schumer Expects Loretta Lynch Confirmation Will Be Delayed, http://blogs.rollcall.com/wgdb/schumer-expects-loretta-lynch-nomination-to-be-delayed/)</p><p></u>Senate Democrats won’t likely step on the gas to ensure the confirmation of Loretta Lynch as President Barack Obama’s attorney general pick, according to No. 3 Democrat Charles E. Schumer. “I think the likelihood is that [<u>the Lynch nomination] will not be in the lame duck</u>,” the New York Democrat told reporters Wednesday morning. “I think our Republican colleagues don’t want it during the lame duck and I think we are going to accede to that request.” If Democrats don’t confirm her nomination before Republicans take over the chamber on Jan. 3, her nomination will rest in GOP hands. President Barack Obama’s plans for expansive immigration action before the end of the year could endanger Lynch’s confirmation under that scenario. But <u><mark>Schumer</u>,</mark> who is leading the charge for Lynch, the U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York, said he<u>’s</u> <u><mark>willing to delay the pick because he is confident she will be confirmed</u></mark>. “Because I think she’s going to get support,” he said when asked about the delay. “[<u><mark>If] we know she is going to get support, why poison the well? I have such confidence in her I think when they get to know her and see her they will support her.<strong></mark>”</p></u></strong>
null
1nr
Bioprint UQ-soon
431,110
1
17,109
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
565,261
N
Wake
3
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
Watson
AG Politics (2NR) Narrow Ruling CP (2NR) Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR) T - nearly all Test Case Fiat
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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2
743,655
Debate inevitably involves exclusions---making sure that those exclusions occur along reciprocal lines is necessary to foster democratic habits and critical thinking---this process outweighs the content of the aff
Anderson 6—prof of English at Johns Hopkins (Amanda, The Way We Argue Now, 25-8)
Anderson 6—prof of English at Johns Hopkins (Amanda, The Way We Argue Now, 25-8)
substantive normative guidance through appeal to the principles of respect and reciprocity Attempt to redress the overwhelmingly negative forms of critique characteristic of poststructuralist traditions, he argues that the logocentrism of Western thought and the instrumentality of reason are not absolute but rather constitute “a systematic foreshortening and distortion of a potential always already operative in the communicative practice of everyday life The potential is the potential for mutual understanding “inscribed into communication in ordinary language Habermas acknowledges the dominance of instrumental reason his project is largely devoted to a systematic analysis of the conditions of that dominance yet he wishes to retrieve an emancipatory model of communicative reason derived from a linguistic understanding of intersubjective relations he does not believe any metaphysical grounding of such norms is possible he insists instead that we view the normative constraints of speech community as “universal pragmatic presuppositions” Benhabib promot a self-conscious universalism that locates the ethical principles of respect and reciprocity as “constituents of the moral point of view Benhabib constitutes, like Habermas’s, a strong defense of modernity differs in two key respects Habermas’s emphasis on consensus distorts his account of communicative ethics Like others who have argued against the conflation of understanding and consensus Benhabib champions a discourse model of ethics that is geared toward keeping the conversation going:¶ When we shift the burden of the moral test in communicative ethics from consensus to the idea of an ongoing conversation, we begin to ask not what all would agree to as a result of practical discourses to be morally permissible or impermissible but what would be allowed from the standpoint of continuing and sustaining the practice of the conversation The emphasis now is less on rational agreement, but more on sustaining those normative practices within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish Benhabib opposes any politics that privileges the detached self over the concrete, embodied, self she promotes what she calls an “interactive universalism”: Interactive universalism acknowledges the plurality of modes of being human, and differences among humans without endorsing all these pluralities as valid While agreeing that normative disputes can be settled rationally, and that fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are necessary conditions interactive universalism regards difference as a starting point for reflection In this sense, “universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied identity but aims at developing moral attitudes and encouraging political transformations that can yield a point of view acceptable to all Universality is not consensus but the concrete process in politics Benhabib’s position attempts to mediate between universalism and particularism On the one hand, universalism’s informing principles of rational argumentation, fairness, and reciprocity adjudicate between different positions in the ethicopolitical realm enabling crucial distinctions between notions of the good life that promote interactive universalism and those that threaten its key principles On the other hand, universalism “regards difference as a starting point.” It understands identity as “embodied and promotes encounters with otherness to nurture a moral attitude that will “yield a point of view acceptable to all.”¶ Of course it must simultaneously be recognized that the “all” here cannot coherently include those who have forfeited their place as equal participants in the ethicopolitical community redefinition of universalism insists on inevitable exclusion but not in the sense that poststructuralist critics do as the hardwired effect of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness, and as victimizing those disempowered by race, class, gender, or sexuality Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness which prove self-undermining in their toleration of practices that exclude others arbitrarily, interactive universalism claims that certain exclusions are not only justified, but indeed required by the principles of recognition and respect that underpin democratic institutions and practices.
substantive normative guidance through appeal to reciprocity wishes to retrieve emancipatory communicative reason derived from intersubjective relations he does not believe any metaphysical grounding of norms is possible instead we view the normative constraints of speech community as “ pragmatic presuppositions Benhabib promot a self-conscious universalism that locates reciprocity as “constituents of the moral view Benhabib champions a model geared toward keeping the conversation going: When we shift the burden of the moral test to the idea of an ongoing conversation we begin to ask not what all would agree to be morally impermissible but what would be allowed from the standpoint of sustaining the practice of conversation The emphasis now is on sustaining normative practices within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish Interactive universalism acknowledges differences agreeing that disputes can be settled rationally, and that fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are necessary universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied identity but aims at developing attitudes and encouraging political transformations that can yield a view acceptable to all Universality is not consensus but the process in politics all cannot include those who have forfeited their place as participants in the community redefinition of universalism insists on exclusion but not in the sense of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness victimizing those disempowered by race Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness which prove self-undermining in their toleration of practices that exclude others arbitrarily interactive universalism claims that certain exclusions are required by the principles of recognition that underpin democratic practices
25¶ Whether such a procedural approach actually helps to yield any substantive normative guidance is an issue of debate. Habermas has sought to justify communicative ethics through appeal to the principles of respect and reciprocity that he claims are inherent in linguistic practices geared toward reaching understanding. Attempting to redress the overwhelmingly negative forms of critique characteristic of both the Frankfurt School and poststructuralist traditions, he argues that the logocentrism of Western thought and the powerful instrumentality of reason are not absolute but rather constitute “a systematic foreshortening and distortion of a potential always already operative in the communicative practice of everyday life.” The potential he refers to is the potential for mutual understanding “inscribed into communication in ordinary language.” 7 Habermas acknowledges the dominance and reach of instrumental reason—his project is largely devoted to a systematic analysis of the historical conditions and social effects of that dominance—yet at the same time he wishes to retrieve an emancipatory model of communicative¶ ¶ 26¶ reason derived from a linguistic understanding of intersubjective relations. As Benhabib argues, this form of communicative action, embodied in the highly controversial and pervasively misunderstood concept of the “ideal speech situation,” entails strong ethical assumptions, namely the principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity (SS, 29).¶ Habermas has famously argued that he does not believe any metaphysical grounding of such norms is possible; he insists instead that we view the normative constraints of the ideal speech community as “universal pragmatic presuppositions” of competent moral actors who have reached the postconventional stage of moral reasoning. Habermas’s theory combines a “weak transcendental argument” concerning the four types of validity claims operative in speech acts with an empirical reconstruction of psychosocial development derived from Lawrence Kohlberg. Benhabib, though she, too, appeals to socialization processes, distinguishes her position from Habermas’s “weak transcendental argument” by promoting a “historically self-conscious universalism” that locates the ethical principles of respect and reciprocity as “constituents of the moral point of view from within the normative hermeneutic horizon of modernity” (SS, 30). Benhabib’s work thus constitutes, like Habermas’s, a strong defense of specific potentialities of modernity. She differs from him in two key respects, besides the emphasis already outlined. First, she believes that Habermas’s emphasis on consensus seriously distorts his account of communicative ethics. Like others who have argued against the conflation of understanding and consensus, Benhabib champions instead a discourse model of ethics that is geared toward keeping the conversation going:¶ When we shift the burden of the moral test in communicative ethics from consensus to the idea of an ongoing moral conversation, we begin to ask not what all would or could agree to as a result of practical discourses to be morally permissible or impermissible, but what would be allowed and perhaps even necessary from the standpoint of continuing and sustaining the practice of the moral conversation among us. The emphasis now is less on rational agreement, but more on sustaining those normative practices and moral relationships within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish and continue. (SS, 38)8¶ ¶ 27¶ The second significant difference between Habermas and Benhabib is that Benhabib rejects Habermas’s rigid opposition between justice and the good life, an opposition that effectively relegates identity-based politics to a lower plane of moral practice, and that for Benhabib undercuts our ability to apprehend the radical particularity of the other. While she believes in the importance of self-reflexive interrogations of conventional identities and roles, she strongly opposes any ethics or politics that privileges the unencumbered or detached self over the concrete, embodied, situated self. She argues in particular against those liberal models that imagine that conversations of moral justification should take place between individuals who have bracketed their strongest cultural or social identifications and attachments. Instead she promotes what she calls an “interactive universalism”:¶ Interactive universalism acknowledges the plurality of modes of being human, and differences among humans, without endorsing all these pluralities and differences as morally and politically valid. While agreeing that normative disputes can be settled rationally, and that fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are constituents, that is, necessary conditions of the moral standpoint, interactive universalism regards difference as a starting point for reflection and action. In this sense, “universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied and embedded identity, but aims at developing moral attitudes and encouraging political transformations that can yield a point of view acceptable to all. Universality is not the ideal consensus of fictitiously defined selves, but the concrete process in politics and morals of the struggle of concrete, embodied selves, striving for autonomy. (SS, 153) ¶ This passage encapsulates the core of Benhabib’s position, which attempts to mediate between universalism and particularism as traditionally understood. On the one hand, universalism’s informing principles of rational argumentation, fairness, and reciprocity adjudicate between different positions in the ethicopolitical realm, enabling crucial distinctions between those notions of the good life that promote interactive universalism and those that threaten its key principles. It insists, in other words, that there is a specifiable moral standpoint from which—to take a few prominent examples—Serbian aggression, neo-Nazism, and gay bashing can be definitively condemned. On the other hand, universalism “regards difference as a starting point.” It understands identity as “embodied and embedded” and promotes encounters with otherness so as to nurture the development of a moral attitude that will “yield a point of view acceptable to all.”¶ Of course it must simultaneously be recognized that the “all” here cannot coherently include those who have, according to universalism’s own principles, forfeited their place as equal participants in the ethicopolitical¶ ¶ 28¶ community. Ironically, then, Benhabib’s redefinition of universalism insists on inevitable exclusion, but not in the sense that many poststructuralist and postmodernist cultural critics do, as the hardwired effect of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness, and as victimizing those disempowered by race, class, gender, or sexuality. Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness and plurality, which ultimately prove self-undermining in their toleration of communities, individuals, and practices that exclude others arbitrarily, interactive universalism claims that certain exclusions are not only justified, but indeed required by the principles of recognition and respect that underpin democratic institutions and practices.
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<h4>Debate inevitably involves exclusions---making sure that those exclusions occur along reciprocal lines is necessary to foster democratic habits and critical thinking---this process outweighs the content of the aff </h4><p><strong>Anderson 6<u>—prof of English at Johns Hopkins (Amanda, The Way We Argue Now, 25-8)</p><p></u></strong>25¶ Whether such a procedural approach actually helps to yield any <u><mark>substantive normative guidance</u></mark> is an issue of debate. Habermas has sought to justify communicative ethics <u><mark>through appeal to </mark>the principles of respect and <strong><mark>reciprocity</u></strong></mark> that he claims are inherent in linguistic practices geared toward reaching understanding. <u>Attempt</u>ing <u>to redress the</u> <u><strong>overwhelmingly negative forms of critique</u></strong> <u>characteristic of </u>both the Frankfurt School and <u>poststructuralist traditions,</u> <u>he argues that the logocentrism of Western thought and the</u> powerful <u>instrumentality of reason are not absolute but rather constitute</u> <u>“a systematic foreshortening and distortion of a potential always already operative in the communicative practice of everyday life</u>.” <u>The potential</u> he refers to <u>is the potential for mutual</u> <u>understanding “inscribed into communication in ordinary language</u>.” 7 <u>Habermas acknowledges the dominance</u> and reach <u>of instrumental reason</u>—<u>his project is largely devoted to a</u> <u>systematic analysis of the</u> historical <u>conditions</u> and social effects <u>of that</u> <u>dominance</u>—<u>yet</u> at the same time <u>he <mark>wishes to retrieve </mark>an <strong><mark>emancipatory</mark> model of <mark>communicative</u></strong></mark>¶ ¶ 26¶ <u><strong><mark>reason derived from</mark> a linguistic understanding of <mark>intersubjective relations</u></strong></mark>. As Benhabib argues, this form of communicative action, embodied in the highly controversial and pervasively misunderstood concept of the “ideal speech situation,” entails strong ethical assumptions, namely the principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity (SS, 29).¶ Habermas has famously argued that <u><mark>he does not believe any metaphysical grounding</mark> <mark>of</mark> such <mark>norms is possible</u></mark>; <u>he insists <mark>instead </mark>that</u> <u><mark>we view the <strong>normative constraints of</u></strong> </mark>the ideal <u><strong><mark>speech community</u></strong> <u>as “<strong></mark>universal</strong> <strong><mark>pragmatic</strong></mark> <strong><mark>presuppositions</strong></mark>” </u>of competent moral actors who have reached the postconventional stage of moral reasoning. Habermas’s theory combines a “weak transcendental argument” concerning the four types of validity claims operative in speech acts with an empirical reconstruction of psychosocial development derived from Lawrence Kohlberg. <u><mark>Benhabib</u></mark>, though she, too, appeals to socialization processes, distinguishes her position from Habermas’s “weak transcendental argument” by <u><mark>promot</u></mark>ing <u><mark>a</mark> </u>“historically <u><strong><mark>self-conscious universalism</u></strong></mark>” <u><mark>that locates</mark> the ethical</u> <u>principles of <strong>respect and <mark>reciprocity</strong> as “constituents of the moral </mark>point of <mark>view</mark> </u>from within the normative hermeneutic horizon of modernity” (SS, 30). <u>Benhabib</u>’s work thus <u>constitutes, like Habermas’s, a strong defense of</u> specific potentialities of <u>modernity</u>. She <u>differs</u> from him <u>in two key respects</u>, besides the emphasis already outlined. First, she believes that <u>Habermas’s emphasis</u> <u>on</u> <u>consensus</u> seriously <u>distorts his account of communicative ethics</u>. <u>Like others who have <strong>argued against the conflation of understanding and consensus</u></strong>,<mark> <u>Benhabib champions</u></mark> instead <u><mark>a</mark> discourse <mark>model</mark> of ethics that is <mark>geared toward <strong>keeping the conversation going</strong>:</mark>¶ <strong><mark>When we shift the burden of the moral test</strong></mark> in communicative ethics from consensus <mark>to the idea of an <strong>ongoing</strong></mark> </u>moral<u> <strong><mark>conversation</strong></mark>,</u> <u><strong><mark>we begin to ask not what all would</u></strong></mark> or could <u><strong><mark>agree</strong></mark> to as a result of practical discourses <strong><mark>to be morally </mark>permissible </strong>or <strong><mark>impermissible</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>but what would be allowed</mark> </u></strong>and perhaps even necessary<u><strong> <mark>from the standpoint of </mark>continuing and <mark>sustaining the practice of </mark>the</u></strong> moral <u><strong><mark>conversation</u></strong></mark> among us. <u><mark>The emphasis now is</mark> less on rational agreement, but more <mark>on <strong>sustaining</mark> those <mark>normative</u></strong> <u><strong>practices</u></strong></mark> and moral relationships <u><strong><mark>within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish</u></strong></mark> and continue. (SS, 38)8¶ ¶ 27¶ The second significant difference between Habermas and Benhabib is that Benhabib rejects Habermas’s rigid opposition between justice and the good life, an opposition that effectively relegates identity-based politics to a lower plane of moral practice, and that for <u>Benhabib</u> undercuts our ability to apprehend the radical particularity of the other. While she believes in the importance of self-reflexive interrogations of conventional identities and roles, she strongly <u>opposes any </u>ethics or <u>politics that privileges the</u> unencumbered or <u>detached self over the concrete, embodied,</u> situated <u>self</u>. She argues in particular against those liberal models that imagine that conversations of moral justification should take place between individuals who have bracketed their strongest cultural or social identifications and attachments. Instead <u>she promotes what she calls an “interactive universalism”:</u>¶ <u><mark>Interactive universalism acknowledges</mark> the plurality of modes of being human, and <mark>differences</mark> among humans</u>, <u>without endorsing all</u> <u>these pluralities</u> and differences <u>as</u> morally and politically <u>valid</u>. <u>While <mark>agreeing that</mark> normative <mark>disputes can be settled rationally, <strong>and </strong>that<strong> fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are</mark> </u></strong>constituents, that is, <u><strong><mark>necessary </mark>conditions </u></strong>of the moral standpoint, <u>interactive universalism regards difference as a starting point for reflection</u> and action. <u>In this sense, <strong>“<mark>universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied</mark> </u></strong>and embedded<u><strong> <mark>identity</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>but aims at developing</u></mark> <u>moral <mark>attitudes and <strong>encouraging political transformations that can yield a </mark>point of <mark>view acceptable to all</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Universality is not</mark> </u>the ideal<u> <mark>consensus</mark> </u>of fictitiously defined selves, <u><mark>but the </mark>concrete <strong><mark>process in politics</u></strong></mark> and morals of the struggle of concrete, embodied selves, striving for autonomy. (SS, 153) ¶ This passage encapsulates the core of <u>Benhabib’s position</u>, which <u>attempts to mediate between universalism and particularism</u> as traditionally understood. <u>On the one hand, universalism’s informing principles of rational argumentation, fairness, and reciprocity adjudicate between different positions in the ethicopolitical realm</u>, <u>enabling crucial distinctions between </u>those<u> notions of the good life</u> <u>that promote interactive universalism and those that threaten its key principles</u>. It insists, in other words, that there is a specifiable moral standpoint from which—to take a few prominent examples—Serbian aggression, neo-Nazism, and gay bashing can be definitively condemned. <u>On the other hand, universalism “regards difference as a starting point.”</u> <u>It understands identity as “embodied</u> and embedded” <u>and promotes encounters with otherness</u> so as <u>to nurture</u> the development of <u>a moral attitude</u> <u>that will “yield a point of view acceptable to all.”¶ <strong>Of course it must simultaneously be recognized that the “<mark>all</mark>” here <mark>cannot</mark> coherently <mark>include those who have</u></strong></mark>, according to universalism’s own principles,<u><strong> <mark>forfeited their place as </mark>equal <mark>participants in the </mark>ethicopolitical</u></strong>¶<u><strong> </u></strong>¶ 28¶ <u><strong><mark>community</u></strong></mark>. Ironically, then, Benhabib’s <u><mark>redefinition of universalism insists on </mark>inevitable <mark>exclusion</u></mark>, <u><strong><mark>but not in the sense </mark>that </u></strong>many <u><strong>poststructuralist</u></strong> and postmodernist cultural <u><strong>critics</u></strong> <u><strong>do</u></strong>, <u>as the hardwired effect <mark>of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness</mark>, and</u> <u>as <mark>victimizing those</mark> <mark>disempowered by race</mark>, class, gender, or sexuality</u>. <u><strong><mark>Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness</strong></mark> </u>and plurality, <u><mark>which</u></mark> ultimately <u><strong><mark>prove self-undermining in their toleration of</mark> </u></strong>communities, individuals, and <u><strong><mark>practices that exclude others arbitrarily</mark>,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>interactive universalism</mark> <mark>claims that certain</mark> <mark>exclusions are</mark> not only justified, but indeed <mark>required by the</mark> <mark>principles of recognition</mark> and respect <mark>that underpin democratic </mark>institutions and <mark>practices</mark>.</p></u></strong>
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2nc
Case
74,354
284
17,111
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
565,271
N
Texas
5
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
Garrett
Framework (2NR) cap good
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
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Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
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1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,656
Tropical disease are uniquely likely to spread globally—they’re resistant to immunization
Franca et al. 13 Berlin Heidelberg, submitted November 26, 2012, published January 22, 2013, pg. 1)
Franca et al. 13 (R. Franca, Department of Pharmacology, School of Medicine of Ribeirao Preto, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, C. C. de Silva, Department of General Biology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, S.O. De Paula, Laboratory of Molecular Immunovirology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, “Recent Advances in Molecular Medicine Techniques for the Diagnosis, Prevention, and Control of Infectious Diseases,” Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, submitted November 26, 2012, published January 22, 2013, pg. 1)
the list of pathogenic microorganisms is extensive despite considerable progress, infectious diseases remain a strong challenge to human survival. Despite the great advances in medicine, particularly in new therapeutic drugs, diagnostic tools, and even ways to prevent diseases, the human species still faces serious health problems. Among these problems, those that draw the most attention are infectious diseases, especially in poor regions An important feature of infectious disease is its potential to arise globally, exemplified by known devastating past and present pandemics such as the bubonic–pneumonic plague, Spanish flu (1918 influenza pandemic), and the present pandemic of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) other non-viral diseases are significant public health problems as exemplified by tuberculosis (TB). In recent years, new forms of infectious diseases have become significantly important these forms are now widely known as emergent and re-emergent infectious diseases. With the appearance of new transmissible diseases, such as West Nile , in addition to reemerging diseases the concerns about a global epidemic are not unfounded Moreover, in the tropical and subtropical regions of the world, parasitic infections are a common cause of deat infectious diseases is of crucial importance to humankind.
despite progress, infectious diseases remain a strong challenge to human survival Despite advances in medicine the human species still faces serious health problems Among those that draw the most attention are infectious diseases, especially in poor regions. An important of infectious disease is its potential to arise globally exemplified by known devastating past and present pandemics new forms of infectious diseases have become significantly important With the appearance of new transmissible diseases, such as West Nile in addition to reemerging diseases the concerns about a global epidemic are not unfounded the tropical and subtropical regions of the world, parasitic infections are a common cause of death infectious diseases is of crucial importance to humankind.
Abstract In recent years we have observed great advances in our ability to combat infectious diseases. Through the development of novel genetic methodologies, including a better understanding of pathogen biology, pathogenic mechanisms, advances in vaccine development, designing new therapeutic drugs, and optimization of diagnostic tools, significant infectious diseases are now better controlled. Here, we briefly describe recent reports in the literature concentrating on infectious disease control. The focus of this review is to describe the molecular methods widely used in the diagnosis, prevention, and control of infectious diseases with regard to the innovation of molecular techniques. Since the list of pathogenic microorganisms is extensive, we emphasize some of the major human infectious diseases (AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, rotavirus, herpes virus, viral hepatitis, and dengue fever). As a consequence of these developments, infectious diseases will be more accurately and effectively treated; safe and effective vaccines are being developed and rapid detection of infectious agents now permits countermeasures to avoid potential outbreaks and epidemics. But, despite considerable progress, infectious diseases remain a strong challenge to human survival. Introduction Despite the great advances in medicine, particularly in new therapeutic drugs, diagnostic tools, and even ways to prevent diseases, the human species still faces serious health problems. Among these problems, those that draw the most attention are infectious diseases, especially in poor regions. An important feature of infectious disease is its potential to arise globally, as exemplified by known devastating past and present pandemics such as the bubonic–pneumonic plague, Spanish flu (1918 influenza pandemic), and the present pandemic of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), in which an estimated 33.3 million persons were living with the HIV infection worldwide at the end of 2009 [1–3]. In addition, other non-viral diseases are significant public health problems, as exemplified by tuberculosis (TB). This infectious disease accounts for one third of the world’s bacterial infections (TB infected), and in 2010 a total of 8.8 million people worldwide became sick with TB [1, 4]. In recent years, new forms of infectious diseases have become significantly important to medical and scientific communities; these forms are now widely known as emergent and re-emergent infectious diseases. With the appearance of new transmissible diseases, such as SARS, West Nile and H5N1/H1N1 Influenza viruses, in addition to reemerging diseases like dengue fever, the concerns about a global epidemic are not unfounded [5]. Moreover, in the tropical and subtropical regions of the world, parasitic infections are a common cause of death. Since one of the major characteristics of infectious diseases is its inter-individual transmission, advances in personal protection, effective public policy, and immunological procedures are efficient means of controlling the spread of these diseases. Thus, improvement of pre-existing technologies commonly used to monitor, prevent, and treat infectious diseases is of crucial importance not only to the medical community, but also to humankind.
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<h4>Tropical disease are uniquely likely to spread globally—they’re resistant to immunization</h4><p><strong>Franca et al. 13</strong> (R. Franca, Department of Pharmacology, School of Medicine of Ribeirao Preto, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, C. C. de Silva, Department of General Biology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, S.O. De Paula, Laboratory of Molecular Immunovirology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, “Recent Advances in Molecular Medicine Techniques for the Diagnosis, Prevention, and Control of Infectious Diseases,” Springer-Verlag<u><strong> Berlin Heidelberg, submitted November 26, 2012, published January 22, 2013, pg. 1)</p><p></u></strong>Abstract In recent years we have observed great advances in our ability to combat infectious diseases. Through the development of novel genetic methodologies, including a better understanding of pathogen biology, pathogenic mechanisms, advances in vaccine development, designing new therapeutic drugs, and optimization of diagnostic tools, significant infectious diseases are now better controlled. Here, we briefly describe recent reports in the literature concentrating on infectious disease control. The focus of this review is to describe the molecular methods widely used in the diagnosis, prevention, and control of infectious diseases with regard to the innovation of molecular techniques. Since <u>the list of pathogenic microorganisms is extensive</u>, we emphasize some of the major human infectious diseases (AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, rotavirus, herpes virus, viral hepatitis, and dengue fever). As a consequence of these developments, infectious diseases will be more accurately and effectively treated; safe and effective vaccines are being developed and rapid detection of infectious agents now permits countermeasures to avoid potential outbreaks and epidemics. But, <u><mark>despite</mark> considerable <mark>progress, infectious diseases remain a</mark> <mark>strong challenge to human survival</mark>. </u>Introduction <u><mark>Despite</mark> the great <mark>advances in medicine</mark>, particularly in new therapeutic drugs, diagnostic tools, and even ways to prevent diseases, <mark>the</mark> <mark>human species still faces serious health problems</mark>. <mark>Among</mark> these problems, <mark>those that draw the most attention are infectious diseases, especially in poor regions</u>. <u>An important</mark> feature <mark>of infectious disease is its <strong>potential to arise globally</strong></mark>,</u> as <u><mark>exemplified by known</mark> <mark>devastating past and present pandemics</mark> such as the bubonic–pneumonic plague, Spanish flu (1918 influenza pandemic), and the present pandemic of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)</u>, in which an estimated 33.3 million persons were living with the HIV infection worldwide at the end of 2009 [1–3]. In addition, <u>other non-viral diseases are significant public health problems</u>, <u>as exemplified by tuberculosis (TB). </u>This infectious disease accounts for one third of the world’s bacterial infections (TB infected), and in 2010 a total of 8.8 million people worldwide became sick with TB [1, 4]. <u>In recent years, <mark>new forms of infectious diseases have become significantly important</u></mark> to medical and scientific communities; <u>these forms are now widely known as emergent and re-emergent infectious diseases. <mark>With the appearance of new transmissible diseases, such as</u></mark> SARS, <u><mark>West</mark> <mark>Nile</mark> </u>and H5N1/H1N1 Influenza viruses<u>, <mark>in addition to reemerging diseases</u></mark> like dengue fever, <u><mark>the concerns about a <strong>global epidemic</strong> are not unfounded</u></mark> [5]. <u>Moreover, in <mark>the tropical and subtropical regions of the world, parasitic infections are a common cause of deat</u><strong>h</mark>.</strong> Since one of the major characteristics of infectious diseases is its inter-individual transmission, advances in personal protection, effective public policy, and immunological procedures are efficient means of controlling the spread of these diseases. Thus, improvement of pre-existing technologies commonly used to monitor, prevent, and treat <u><mark>infectious diseases is of crucial importance</mark> </u>not only to the medical community, but also <u><strong><mark>to humankind.</p></u></strong></mark>
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Contention 2 is illegal markets
109,170
32
17,114
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
565,248
A
Wake
4
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
Voss
null
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48,454
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Dartmouth YaAh
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18,764
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Dartmouth
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1,004
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,657
Must weigh consequences – their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize
Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University 2
Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University 2 (Jeffrey C, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)
unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern suffers from three fatal flaws It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. and it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
moral goodness undercuts political responsibility three fatal flaws fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure achievement 2) it fails to see real violence moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences t is the effects of action, rather than the motives that is most significant the pursuit of “good” it is not enough it is important to ask about the effects Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment
As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
1,802
<h4>Must weigh consequences – their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize</h4><p><strong>Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University 2</strong> </p><p><u>(Jeffrey C, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)</p><p></u>As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an <u>unyielding concern with <mark>moral goodness undercuts political responsibility</mark>. The concern </u>may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it <u>suffers from <mark>three fatal flaws</u></mark>: (1) <u>It <mark>fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure</mark> the <mark>achievement</mark> of what one intends. </u>Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if <u>such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters;</u> (<mark>2) <u>it fails to see </mark>that in a world of <mark>real violence</mark> and injustice, <mark>moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity</mark> in injustice.</u> This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; <u>and</u> (3) <u>it <mark>fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences</mark> as it is about intentions; i<mark>t is the effects of action, rather than the motives</mark> of action, <mark>that is most significant</mark>.</u> Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, <u>it is often <mark>the pursuit of “good”</mark> that generates evil</u>. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: <u><mark>it is not enough</mark> that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; <mark>it is </mark>equally <mark>important</mark>, always, <mark>to ask about the effects</mark> of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. <mark>Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment</mark>. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.</p></u>
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Prisons
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1,533
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
565,260
N
Wake
2
Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
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college
2
743,658
Legalization would increase poverty and be inaccessible to minority communities
Moran 2011
Moran 2011 (Thomas, Juris Doctor, Washington and Lee University School of Law 2011, Just a Little Bit of History Repeating: The California Model of Marijuana Legalization and How it Might Affect Racial and Ethnic Minorities, Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 8, http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1286&context=crsj&sei-redir=1)
legalization for minority groups might represent another tool of economic oppression bogging down their communities In the illegal market, high-quality marijuana costs, on average, over $4,000 per pound, while lower level marijuana nears $1,000 per pound. marijuana sales in the United States, top $100 billion annually the highest concentration of drug dealers is found in lower income, urban environments prone to minority dwelling billions of dollars are funneled into such lower income communities each year With the legalization of marijuana, money expended by consumers will be the same or higher, but minorities must ask where that money will drain The California initiative created licensing regulations for both the growing and selling of marijuana To the detriment of minorities, these licensing requirements required both money and a certain amount of business prowess cultivating marijuana would require a license fee all applicants to submit to a criminal history background check appropriate security and security plans with "satisfactory proof of the financial ability of the licensee to provide for that security and compliance with other employment inspection and recordkeeping measures These business and licensing regulations provided no assistance to entrepreneurs with little or no start-up capital marijuana, if legalized while becoming the nation’s next cash crop and a tremendous source of wealth, could potentially be so for mainly non-minorities, ones who have the financial means and business savvy to initiate such production. most of the money flowing into the minority communities from the illegal sale of marijuana would be diverted into the bank accounts of the new class of "marijuana business[
for minority group represent another tool of economic oppression bogging down their communities. In the illegal market, high-quality marijuana costs, on average, over $4,000 per pound, while lower level marijuana nears $1,000 per pound the highest concentration of drug dealers is found in lower income, urban environments prone to minority dwelling billion of dollars are funneled into such lower income communities each year. With the legalization of marijuana, money expended by consumers will be the same or higher, but minorities must ask where that money will drai marijuana, if legalized while becoming the nation’s next cash crop and a tremendous source of wealth, could potentially be so for mainly non-minorities, ones who have the financial means and business savvy to initiate
C. The Money Drain from Minority Communities Much is made by the proponents of marijuana legalization concerning marijuana’s potential to become the next "cash crop" creating billions of dollars in both sales and tax revenue.135 Particularly in the face of decriminalization proposals, which do nothing to divert money from the hands of drug dealers, legalization makes sense. The argument goes something like this: as history has shown, marijuana use will not stop; therefore, we might as well sell the drug legally, putting the money from drug dealers’ wallets into those of the people.136 Although this is generally a sound and sensible argument, for minority groups it might truthfully represent another tool of economic oppression bogging down their communities. In the illegal market, high-quality marijuana costs, on average, over $4,000 per pound, while lower level marijuana nears $1,000 per pound.137 As noted earlier, marijuana sales in the United States, top $100 billion annually.138 As also noted, the highest concentration of drug dealers is found in lower income, urban environments prone to minority dwelling.139 These figures tend to reflect that billions, and at the very least hundreds of millions, of dollars are funneled into such lower income communities each year. With the legalization of marijuana, money expended by consumers will be the same or higher, but minorities must ask where that money will drain. Meaning, will the billions or hundreds of millions of dollars continue their current flow into lower income communities, or will forces divert the money elsewhere? The California initiative created licensing regulations for both the growing140 and the selling141 of marijuana. To the detriment of minorities, these licensing requirements required both money and a certain amount of business prowess: cultivating or growing marijuana would require 1) a maximum license fee of $5,000 paid by all applicants to "reasonably cover the costs of assuring compliance with the regulations to be issued";142 2) all license applicants to submit to a criminal history background check;143 3) appropriate security and security plans with "satisfactory proof of the financial ability of the licensee to provide for that security";144 and 4) compliance with other employment,145 inspection,146 and recordkeeping147 measures. These business and licensing regulations provided no assistance to entrepreneurs with little or no start-up capital. Therefore, marijuana, if legalized in the California fashion, while becoming the nation’s next cash crop and a tremendous source of wealth, could potentially be so for mainly non-minorities, ones who have the financial means and business savvy to initiate such production. Worsening this dilemma, most of the money flowing into the minority communities from the illegal sale of marijuana would be diverted into the bank accounts of the new class of "marijuana business[man]."148 Minority community leaders should be mindful of this potential money drain, and wary of its wide range of effects on their communities.149
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<h4>Legalization would increase poverty and be inaccessible to minority communities</h4><p><strong>Moran 2011</strong> (Thomas, Juris Doctor, Washington and Lee University School of Law 2011, Just a Little Bit of History Repeating: The California Model of Marijuana Legalization and How it Might Affect Racial and Ethnic Minorities, Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 8, http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1286&context=crsj&sei-redir=1)</p><p>C. The Money Drain from Minority Communities Much is made by the proponents of marijuana legalization concerning marijuana’s potential to become the next "cash crop" creating billions of dollars in both sales and tax revenue.135 Particularly in the face of decriminalization proposals, which do nothing to divert money from the hands of drug dealers, <u>legalization</u> makes sense. The argument goes something like this: as history has shown, marijuana use will not stop; therefore, we might as well sell the drug legally, putting the money from drug dealers’ wallets into those of the people.136 Although this is generally a sound and sensible argument, <u><mark>for minority group</mark>s</u> it <u>might</u> truthfully <u><mark>represent another tool of economic oppression bogging down their communities</u>. <u>In the illegal market, high-quality marijuana costs, on average, over $4,000 per pound, while lower level marijuana nears $1,000 per pound</mark>.</u>137 As noted earlier, <u>marijuana sales in the United States, top $100 billion annually</u>.138 As also noted, <u><mark>the highest concentration of drug dealers is found in lower income, urban environments prone to minority dwelling</u></mark>.139 These figures tend to reflect that <u><mark>billion</mark>s</u>, and at the very least hundreds of millions, <u><mark>of dollars are funneled into such lower income communities each year</u>. <u>With the legalization of marijuana, money expended by consumers will be the same or higher, but minorities must ask where that money will drai</mark>n</u>. Meaning, will the billions or hundreds of millions of dollars continue their current flow into lower income communities, or will forces divert the money elsewhere? <u>The California initiative created licensing regulations for both the growing</u>140 <u>and</u> the <u>selling</u>141 <u>of marijuana</u>. <u>To the detriment of minorities, these licensing requirements required both money and a certain amount of business prowess</u>: <u>cultivating</u> or growing <u>marijuana</u> <u>would require</u> 1) <u>a </u>maximum <u>license fee</u> of $5,000 paid by all applicants to "reasonably cover the costs of assuring compliance with the regulations to be issued";142 2) <u>all</u> license <u>applicants to submit to a criminal history background check</u>;143 3) <u>appropriate security and security plans with "satisfactory proof of the financial ability of the licensee to provide for that security</u>";144 <u>and</u> 4) <u>compliance with other employment</u>,145 <u>inspection</u>,146 <u>and recordkeeping</u>147 <u>measures</u>. <u>These business and licensing regulations provided no assistance to entrepreneurs with little or no start-up capital</u>. Therefore, <u><mark>marijuana, if legalized</u></mark> in the California fashion, <u><mark>while becoming the nation’s next cash crop and a tremendous source of wealth, could potentially be so for mainly non-minorities, ones who have the financial means and business savvy to initiate</mark> such production.</u> Worsening this dilemma, <u>most of the money flowing into the minority communities from the illegal sale of marijuana would be diverted into the bank accounts of the new class of "marijuana business[</u>man]."148 Minority community leaders should be mindful of this potential money drain, and wary of its wide range of effects on their communities.149</p>
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case
299,332
8
17,110
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
565,262
N
Wake
5
NYU Itliong-Zhan
McCleary
Fed CP (2NR) AG Politics (2NR Cede the Political DA T - USFG
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
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college
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743,659
Bipartisan support for Lynch now- PC’s key to overcome fights on immigration
null
Roll Call 11/7/2014 (Confirmation Gauntlet Expected for Loretta Lynch, http://blogs.rollcall.com/white-house/loretta-lynch-attorney-general-confirmation/?dcz=)
Lynch could have an easier time getting through the Senate, especially with Schumer as her sherpa Grassley congratulated Lynch on the nomination Lynch will receive a thorough vetting by the Judiciary Committee She’ll likely face numerous questions from Republicans, including about the legality of the president’s planned executive actions on immigration something that has become an early flashpoint
Lync easier time getting through the Senate Lynch will receive a very fair, but thorough, vetting by the Judiciary Committee .” She’ll likely face numerous questions from Republicans, including about the legality of the president’s planned executive actions on immigration, something that has become an early flashpoint a
Hours after the White House insisted President Barack Obama hadn’t made a decision on a new attorney general, officials announced he is nominating Loretta Lynch, a U.S. attorney in New York. Lynch, an African-American woman with a Harvard law degree, has served two stints as the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, and has the strong support of Sen. Charles E. Schumer, D-N.Y. The move likely will be a disappointment to the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, which pushed hard for Obama to name Labor Secretary Thomas E. Perez, a former head of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division. But Perez would face a major confirmation battle and might only get through the Senate if Democrats jam a pick through in the coming weeks before Republicans take over. Lynch, who doesn’t have an extensive political résumé, could have an easier time getting through the Senate, especially with Schumer, the No. 2 Senate Democrat, as her sherpa. “Loretta Lynch is a consummate professional, has a first-rate legal mind and is committed in her bones to the equal application of justice for all people,” Schumer said in a statement. “I was proud to recommend her to be the US Attorney for my home community of the Eastern District of New York, and I will be prouder still to champion what must be her swift confirmation in the Senate.” Lynch made waves earlier this year in congressional circles when she announced the indictment of Rep. Michael Grimm, R-N.Y. Grimm won re-election easily on Tuesday but now faces trial. Sen. Charles E. Grassley of Iowa, current ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, congratulated Lynch on the nomination. “Being selected to serve as our nation’s top law enforcement officer is both a tremendous honor and responsibility,” he said. “As we move forward with the confirmation process, I have every confidence that Ms. Lynch will receive a very fair, but thorough, vetting by the Judiciary Committee. U.S. Attorneys are rarely elevated directly to this position, so I look forward to learning more about her, how she will interact with Congress, and how she proposes to lead the department. I’m hopeful that her tenure, if confirmed, will restore confidence in the Attorney General as a politically independent voice for the American people.” She’ll likely face numerous questions from Republicans, including about the legality of the president’s planned executive actions on immigration, something that has become an early flashpoint after the midterm elections.
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<h4><strong>Bipartisan support for Lynch now- PC’s key to overcome fights on immigration</h4><p></strong>Roll Call 11/7/2014 (Confirmation Gauntlet Expected for Loretta Lynch, http://blogs.rollcall.com/white-house/loretta-lynch-attorney-general-confirmation/?dcz=)</p><p>Hours after the White House insisted President Barack Obama hadn’t made a decision on a new attorney general, officials announced he is nominating Loretta Lynch, a U.S. attorney in New York. Lynch, an African-American woman with a Harvard law degree, has served two stints as the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, and has the strong support of Sen. Charles E. Schumer, D-N.Y. The move likely will be a disappointment to the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, which pushed hard for Obama to name Labor Secretary Thomas E. Perez, a former head of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division. But Perez would face a major confirmation battle and might only get through the Senate if Democrats jam a pick through in the coming weeks before Republicans take over. <u><mark>Lync</mark>h</u>, who doesn’t have an extensive political résumé, <u>could have an <mark>easier time getting through the Senate</mark>, especially with Schumer</u>, the No. 2 Senate Democrat, <u>as her sherpa</u>. “Loretta Lynch is a consummate professional, has a first-rate legal mind and is committed in her bones to the equal application of justice for all people,” Schumer said in a statement. “I was proud to recommend her to be the US Attorney for my home community of the Eastern District of New York, and I will be prouder still to champion what must be her swift confirmation in the Senate.” Lynch made waves earlier this year in congressional circles when she announced the indictment of Rep. Michael Grimm, R-N.Y. Grimm won re-election easily on Tuesday but now faces trial. Sen. Charles E. <u>Grassley</u> of Iowa, current ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, <u>congratulated Lynch on the nomination</u>. “Being selected to serve as our nation’s top law enforcement officer is both a tremendous honor and responsibility,” he said. “As we move forward with the confirmation process, I have every confidence that Ms. <u><mark>Lynch will receive a</u> very fair, but <u>thorough</u>, <u>vetting</u> <u>by the Judiciary Committee</u></mark>. U.S. Attorneys are rarely elevated directly to this position, so I look forward to learning more about her, how she will interact with Congress, and how she proposes to lead the department. I’m hopeful that her tenure, if confirmed, will restore confidence in the Attorney General as a politically independent voice for the American people<mark>.” <u>She’ll likely face numerous questions from Republicans, including about the legality of the president’s planned executive actions on immigration</u>, <u>something that has become an early flashpoint</u> a<strong></mark>fter the midterm elections.</p></strong>
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Bioprint UQ-soon
431,111
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17,109
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
565,261
N
Wake
3
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
Watson
AG Politics (2NR) Narrow Ruling CP (2NR) Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR) T - nearly all Test Case Fiat
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
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Every life is an end—the only ethical option is to maximize the number saved.
Cummisky 96
Cummisky 96
even if saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh killing one this still does not justify deontological constraints why would not killing one be a stronger obligation than saving two If I am concerned with priceless dignity I may still save two it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed each is priceless I have good reason to save as many as I can (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 18-19) Imagine an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants lined up against a wall. and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other. Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity by refusing to play his dirty game? The point is to show the value and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. But at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden? What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons from a terrorists' nuclear device? ? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the consequences? Now that it may be literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before. Since the end of the colonial era, the rising powers have been quick to condemn Western racism. Ethnocentrism and color prejudice can be found in virtually all human societies Even now, Americans are dealing with the effects of this monstrous ideological project. It is also true, however, that Americans have been fairly forthright in confronting this legacy The same can’t be said of the new racism that is taking shape in Asia. Huntington argued, “modernization” and “westernization” a Choe Sang-Hun described the intense discrimination faced by a growing number of migrant workers from impoverished Asian countries Koreans expressed concerns about the end of the country’s ethnic homogeneity, arguing that a larger influx of migrant would lead to a rise in the level of crime and social tension. These anxieties have the air of self-fulfilling prophecy most prize ethnic homogeneity, migrant workers will remain on the margins of society. This will fuel alienation and resentment Next to China’s race problem, South Korea’s pales in significance political scientists Valerie Hudson and Andrea van den Boer noted China also has tens of millions of so-called “surplus males” thanks to a strong cultural preference for male children China is not terribly hospitable to ethnic outsiders, including members of non-Han minorities native to China Observers tend to overstate the level of ethnic homogeneity in China because the Han category masks tremendous cultural diversity. “Hanness” is as broad and contingent a category as “whiteness.” Frank Dikötter traditional notions about culturally inferior “barbarians” intermingled with Western forms of scientific racism to form a distinctively Chinese racial consciousness in the 20th century. The “yellows” were locked in a struggle with their equals, the “whites”–and both were superior to the “blacks,” “browns” and “reds.” The distrust of Europeans was always mixed with envy The disdain for dark-skinned foreigners remains relatively uncomplicated Maoist China railed against Western imperialism, and saw itself as a leader of the global proletariat of Africans and Asians. Now, as China emerges as an economic and cultural superpower, those notions of Third World solidarity, always skin deep seem to have vanished. It is thus hard to imagine China welcoming millions of hard-working Nigerians and Bangladeshis with open arms the United States has become more culturally open and resilient– (Martin, Global Order is a book by British journalist and scholar Martin Jacques “ When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New” 2009)//kyan What will China be like as a great power fails to address the cultural factors that shape the way a people think, behave and perceive others. T a cultural analysis, rooted in history and popular consciousness, seeks to explain the values, attitudes, prejudices and assumptions of a people in the longer run people’s values and prejudices are far more significant and consequential. 1 Ultimately, nations see the world in terms of their own history, values and mindset and seek to shape that world in the light of those experiences and perceptions. ANDThis cultural approach is even more important in China’s case because it has only very recently come to see itself as a nation-state most Chinese attitudes, perceptions and behaviour are still best understood in terms of its civilizational inheritance . If we want to comprehend how China is likely to behave towards the rest of the world, then first we need to make sense of what has made China what it is today, how it has evolved, where the Chinese come from Once again, history, culture, race and ethnicity are central to the story.
even if saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh killing one this does not justify deontological constraints why would not killing one be a stronger obligation than saving two If I am concerned with priceless dignity I may still save two; it is just that loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed each is priceless I have good reason to save as many as I can an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden? What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons Since colonial era powers have quick to condemn Western racism color prejudice can be found in all human societies Americans are dealing with effects Americans have been fairly forthright in confronting this legacy. The same can’t be said of the new racism that is taking shape in Asia. A Hun described intense discrimination faced by growing number of migrant workers expressed concerns about the end of the country’s ethnic homogeneity hese anxieties have the air of self-fulfilling prophecy most prize ethnic homogeneity, migrant workers will remain on the margins China’s race problem Hudson noted China also has tens of millions surplus males” thanks to a strong cultural preference for male children China is not hospitable to ethnic outsiders, including members of non-Han minorities . Han category masks diversity. “Hanness” is as broad and contingent as “whiteness.” traditional notions about inferior “barbarians” intermingled with Western forms of scientific racism to form a distinctively Chinese racial consciousness in yellows” were locked in struggle with the “whites both superior to the “blacks,” “browns” and “reds.” The disdain for dark-skinned foreigners Maoist China saw itself as a leader of the global proletariat of Africans and Asians It is thus hard to imagine China welcoming millions of hard-working Nigerians and Bangladeshis with open arms the United States has become more culturally open and resilient What will China be like as a great power cultural factors shape a people behave cultural analysis, rooted in history and popular consciousness, seeks to values people’s values are consequential Ultimately, nations see the world in terms of their own history seek to shape that world cultural approach is, even more important in China’s case again, history, culture, race and ethnicity are central to the story.
(David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 130-131) Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one-because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way-this point still does not justify deontological constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that I may still save two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one. Consider Hill’s example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statues only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But similarly, the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss of the one, each is priceless; this, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better. 2. Utilitarianism is the only moral framework Nye, 86 (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 18-19) The significance and the limits of the two broad traditions can be captured by contemplating a hypothetical case.34 Imagine that you are visiting a Central American country and you happen upon a village square where an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants lined up against a wall. When you ask the reason, you are told someone in this village shot at the captain's men last night. When you object to the killing of possibly innocent people, you are told that civil wars do not permit moral niceties. Just to prove the point that we all have dirty hands in such situations, the captain hands you a rifle and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other. Otherwise both die. He warns you not to try any tricks because his men have their guns trained on you. Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity by refusing to play his dirty game? The point of the story is to show the value and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. But at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden? Would it matter if there were twenty or 1,000 peasants to be saved? What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons from a terrorists' nuclear device? At some point does not integrity become the ultimate egoism of fastidious self-righteousness in which the purity of the self is more important than the lives of countless others? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the consequences? Do absolutist approaches to integrity become self-contradictory in a world of nuclear weapons? "Do what is right though the world should perish" was a difficult principle even when Kant expounded it in the eighteenth century, and there is some evidence that he did not mean it to be taken literally even then. Now that it may be literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before. China is net worse for black and brown bodies Salam 09 (Reihan Salam is a fellow at the New America Foundation “China’s Race Problem” 11/09/09 http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/08/china-race-racism-opinions-columnists-reihan-salam.html)//kyan Is racism universal? Since the end of the colonial era, the rising powers of the developing world have been quick to condemn Western racism. Ethnocentrism and color prejudice can be found in virtually all human societies, going back centuries if not thousands of years. Yet racism as we know it first emerged in the late 17th century. While slavery is an ancient institution, the racial slavery that took hold in the Americas in that era was new and very unusual. In the English-speaking colonies of North America, the violent subjugation of enslaved Africans created a perverse solidarity among people of European descent, who were united by their place at the top of a racial hierarchy. Racial boundaries that had once been fairly fluid became increasingly rigid. Because the egalitarian ideals of the Declaration of Independence clearly contradicted the still profitable and pervasive practice of racial slavery, it was vitally important that the enslaved be regarded as subhuman, lest the whole corrupt edifice completely collapse. Even now, Americans are dealing with the scarring effects of this monstrous ideological project. It is also true, however, that Americans have been fairly forthright in confronting this legacy. The same can’t be said of the new racism that is taking shape in Asia. As the late political scientist Samuel Huntington argued, “modernization” and “westernization” aren’t the same thing. Economic progress in East Asia and South Asia and Latin America doesn’t mean that these regions will become carbon copies of Europe and America. But history has a tendency to rhyme. After decades of breakneck economic growth, South Korea has joined the ranks of the world’s richest and most powerful states. As such, a growth model built on cheap labor has been transformed by the emergence of a large and expensive welfare state, and also labor market rigidities that have led to high youth unemployment rates. Like the rich nations of the West, South Korea also has a low birthrate and, as a direct result, a rapidly aging population. This begs the question of whether South Korea should embrace large-scale immigration. Faced with a similar dilemma, West Germany signed a series of labor agreements in the 1950s and 1960s that led a large influx of guest workers. The idea was that these guest workers would come for a time and then return home. That, of course, is not how things turned out. Over 50 years since the beginning of the guest worker initiative, Germany is still struggling to deal with its growing population of ethnic outsiders. South Korea might have an even harder time. In a fascinating article published in The New York Times last week, Choe Sang-Hun described the intense discrimination faced by a small but growing number of migrant workers from impoverished Asian countries. A number of Koreans have expressed serious concerns about the end of the country’s ethnic homogeneity, arguing that a larger influx of migrant workers would lead to a rise in the level of crime and social tension. These anxieties have the air of self-fulfilling prophecy. Given that many if not most Koreans prize ethnic homogeneity, migrant workers will remain on the margins of society. This, in turn, will fuel alienation and resentment among this class of permanent second-class citizens. And so South Korea’s major cities could very well see the rise of segregated ethnic slums. It’s worth noting that anti-foreigner sentiments are flourishing in a time when South Korea is experiencing rapid economic change, including a new social and economic inequality. Just as racism provided the basis for solidarity among whites in U.S. history, it could be playing a similar role in South Korea. Next to China’s race problem, South Korea’s pales in significance. Earlier this year, the Center for Strategic and International Studies issued a report that found that the current ratio of 16 retirees to 100 workers is set to double in the next 15 years. In absolute terms, the number of over-65s will go from 166 million to 342 million. Someone will have to care for them, and though China has relaxed its profoundly wrongheaded one-child policy, the reform has come too late to arrest rapid aging. Moreover, as the political scientists Valerie Hudson and Andrea van den Boer noted in their book Bare Branches, China also has tens of millions of so-called “surplus males” thanks to a strong cultural preference for male children. This means that large numbers of Chinese men will have a difficult time finding wives in the near future. One obvious way for the China of 2025 to address this dilemma would be to embrace mass immigration. Because China remains a poor and populous country, the idea that it will become a magnet for immigrants seems faintly ridiculous, not least because millions of Chinese are desperate to emigrate. Of course, the same was once true of Ireland, which is now one of Europe’s most diverse countries. But like South Korea–and, for that matter, Japan–China is not terribly hospitable to ethnic outsiders, including members of non-Han minorities native to China. Observers tend to overstate the level of ethnic homogeneity in China, not least because the Han category masks tremendous cultural diversity. “Hanness” is as broad and contingent a category as “whiteness.” But as Frank Dikötter of the University of Hong Kong argued in his brilliant 1992 book The Discourse of Race in Modern China, traditional notions about culturally inferior “barbarians” intermingled with Western forms of scientific racism to form a distinctively Chinese racial consciousness in the 20th century. The “yellows” were locked in a struggle with their equals, the “whites”–and both were superior to the “blacks,” “browns” and “reds.” The dislike and distrust of Europeans was always mixed with envy and admiration. The disdain for dark-skinned foreigners, in contrast, was and remains relatively uncomplicated. Maoist China railed against Western imperialism, and saw itself as a leader of the global proletariat of Africans and Asians. Now, as China emerges as an economic and cultural superpower, those notions of Third World solidarity, always skin deep, seem to have vanished. It is thus hard to imagine China welcoming millions of hard-working Nigerians and Bangladeshis with open arms. This could change over the next couple of decades as China’s labor shortage grows acute. I wouldn’t bet on it. If China remains culturally closed, the Chinese Century will never come to pass. Instead, the United States–a country that has struggled with race and racism for centuries, and in the process has become more culturally open and resilient–will dominate this century as it did the last. China will export its cultural model Jacques 09 (Martin, Global Order is a book by British journalist and scholar Martin Jacques “ When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New” 2009)//kyan What will China be like as a great power? The traditional way of answering this question is in terms of geopolitics, foreign policy and interstate relations. In other words, it is seen as a specialist area of foreign ministries, diplomacy, bilateral talks, multinational negotiations and the military. A concentration on the formal structures of international relations, however, fails to address the cultural factors that shape the way a people think, behave and perceive others. The geopolitical approach informs how a state elite reasons and acts, while a cultural analysis, rooted in history and popular consciousness, seeks to explain the values, attitudes, prejudices and assumptions of a people. In the short run, the former may explain the conduct of relations between countries, but in the longer run people’s values and prejudices are far more significant and consequential. 1 Ultimately, nations see the world in terms of their own history, values and mindset and seek to shape that world in the light of those experiences and perceptions. ANDThis more cultural approach is, if anything, even more important in China’s case because it has only very recently come to see itself as a nation-state and engage in the protocol of a nation-state: most Chinese attitudes, perceptions and behaviour, as we saw in the last chapter, are still best understood in terms of its civilizational inheritance rather than its status as a nation-state. If we want to comprehend how China is likely to behave towards the rest of the world, then first we need to make sense of what has made China what it is today, how it has evolved, where the Chinese come from, and how they see themselves. We cannot appreciate their attitude towards the rest of the world without first understanding their view of themselves. Once again, history, culture, race and ethnicity are central to the story.
12,943
<h4><strong>Every life is an end—the only ethical option is to maximize the number saved.</h4><p>Cummisky 96 </p><p></strong>(David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 130-131)</p><p>Finally, <u><strong><mark>even if</u></strong></mark> one grants that <u><strong><mark>saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh</u></strong></mark> and compensate for<u><strong> <mark>killing one</u></strong></mark>-because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way-<u><strong><mark>this</u></strong></mark> point <u><strong>still <mark>does not justify deontological constraints</u></strong></mark>. On the extreme interpretation, <u><strong><mark>why would not killing one</u></strong></mark> person <u><strong><mark>be a stronger obligation than saving two</u></strong></mark> persons? <u><strong><mark>If I am concerned with</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>priceless dignity</u></strong></mark> of each, it would seem that <u><strong><mark>I may still save two</u></strong>; <u><strong>it is just that </mark>my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one</u></strong>. Consider Hill’s example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statues only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But similarly, <u><strong>the <mark>loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss of the one, <u><strong><mark>each is priceless</u></strong></mark>; this, <u><strong><mark>I have good reason to save as many as I can</u></mark>. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.</p><p>2. Utilitarianism is the only moral framework </p><p>Nye, 86<u></strong> (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 18-19)</p><p></u>The significance and the limits of the two broad traditions can be captured by contemplating a hypothetical case.34 <u>Imagine </u>that you are visiting a Central American country and you happen upon a village square where <u><mark>an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants</mark> lined up against a wall.</u> When you ask the reason, you are told someone in this village shot at the captain's men last night. When you object to the killing of possibly innocent people, you are told that civil wars do not permit moral niceties. Just to prove the point that we all have dirty hands in such situations, the captain hands you a rifle <u><mark>and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other</mark>.</u> Otherwise both die. He warns you not to try any tricks because his men have their guns trained on you. <u><mark>Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity</mark> by refusing to play his dirty game? The point</u> of the story <u>is to show the value and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. But <mark>at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden?</u></mark> Would it matter if there were twenty or 1,000 peasants to be saved? <u><mark>What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons</mark> from a terrorists' nuclear device?</u> At some point does not integrity become the ultimate egoism of fastidious self-righteousness in which the purity of the self is more important than the lives of countless others<u>? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the consequences?</u> Do absolutist approaches to integrity become self-contradictory in a world of nuclear weapons? "Do what is right though the world should perish" was a difficult principle even when Kant expounded it in the eighteenth century, and there is some evidence that he did not mean it to be taken literally even then. <u>Now that it may be literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.</p><p></u>China is net worse for black and brown bodies </p><p><strong>Salam 09 </strong>(Reihan Salam is a fellow at the New America Foundation “China’s Race Problem” 11/09/09</p><p>http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/08/china-race-racism-opinions-columnists-reihan-salam.html)//kyan</p><p>Is racism universal? <u><mark>Since</mark> the end of the <mark>colonial era</mark>, the rising <mark>powers</u></mark> of the developing world <u><mark>have</mark> been <mark>quick to condemn Western racism</mark>. Ethnocentrism and <mark>color prejudice can be found in</mark> virtually <mark>all human societies</u></mark>, going back centuries if not thousands of years. Yet racism as we know it first emerged in the late 17th century. While slavery is an ancient institution, the racial slavery that took hold in the Americas in that era was new and very unusual. In the English-speaking colonies of North America, the violent subjugation of enslaved Africans created a perverse solidarity among people of European descent, who were united by their place at the top of a racial hierarchy. Racial boundaries that had once been fairly fluid became increasingly rigid. Because the egalitarian ideals of the Declaration of Independence clearly contradicted the still profitable and pervasive practice of racial slavery, it was vitally important that the enslaved be regarded as subhuman, lest the whole corrupt edifice completely collapse. <u>Even now, <mark>Americans are dealing with</mark> the</u> scarring <u><mark>effects</mark> of this monstrous ideological project. It is also true, however, that <mark>Americans have been fairly</mark> <mark>forthright in confronting this legacy</u><strong>. <u></strong>The same can’t be said of the new racism that is taking shape in Asia. </u>A</mark>s the late political scientist Samuel <u>Huntington argued, “modernization” and “westernization” a</u>ren’t the same thing. Economic progress in East Asia and South Asia and Latin America doesn’t mean that these regions will become carbon copies of Europe and America. But history has a tendency to rhyme. After decades of breakneck economic growth, South Korea has joined the ranks of the world’s richest and most powerful states. As such, a growth model built on cheap labor has been transformed by the emergence of a large and expensive welfare state, and also labor market rigidities that have led to high youth unemployment rates. Like the rich nations of the West, South Korea also has a low birthrate and, as a direct result, a rapidly aging population. This begs the question of whether South Korea should embrace large-scale immigration. Faced with a similar dilemma, West Germany signed a series of labor agreements in the 1950s and 1960s that led a large influx of guest workers. The idea was that these guest workers would come for a time and then return home. That, of course, is not how things turned out. Over 50 years since the beginning of the guest worker initiative, Germany is still struggling to deal with its growing population of ethnic outsiders. South Korea might have an even harder time. In a fascinating article published in The New York Times last week, <u>Choe Sang-<mark>Hun described</mark> the <strong><mark>intense discrimination</strong> faced by</mark> a</u> small but <u><mark>growing number of migrant workers</mark> from impoverished Asian countries</u>. A number of <u>Koreans</u> have <u><mark>expressed</u></mark> serious <u><mark>concerns about the</mark> <mark>end of the country’s ethnic homogeneity</mark>, arguing that a larger influx of migrant </u>workers <u>would lead to a rise in the level of crime and social tension.</u> <u>T<mark>hese anxieties have the air of <strong>self-fulfilling prophecy</u></strong></mark>. Given that many if not <u><mark>most</u></mark> Koreans <u><mark>prize ethnic homogeneity,</mark> <mark>migrant workers will remain on the margins</mark> of society.</u> <u>This</u>, in turn, <u>will fuel alienation and resentment</u> among this class of permanent second-class citizens. And so South Korea’s major cities could very well see the rise of segregated ethnic slums. It’s worth noting that anti-foreigner sentiments are flourishing in a time when South Korea is experiencing rapid economic change, including a new social and economic inequality. Just as racism provided the basis for solidarity among whites in U.S. history, it could be playing a similar role in South Korea. <u>Next to <mark>China’s race problem</mark>, South Korea’s pales in significance</u>. Earlier this year, the Center for Strategic and International Studies issued a report that found that the current ratio of 16 retirees to 100 workers is set to double in the next 15 years. In absolute terms, the number of over-65s will go from 166 million to 342 million. Someone will have to care for them, and though China has relaxed its profoundly wrongheaded one-child policy, the reform has come too late to arrest rapid aging. Moreover, as the <u>political scientists Valerie <mark>Hudson</mark> and Andrea van den Boer <mark>noted</u></mark> in their book Bare Branches, <u><mark>China also has tens of millions</mark> of so-called “<mark>surplus males” thanks to a strong cultural preference for male children</u></mark>. This means that large numbers of Chinese men will have a difficult time finding wives in the near future. One obvious way for the China of 2025 to address this dilemma would be to embrace mass immigration. Because China remains a poor and populous country, the idea that it will become a magnet for immigrants seems faintly ridiculous, not least because millions of Chinese are desperate to emigrate. Of course, the same was once true of Ireland, which is now one of Europe’s most diverse countries. But like South Korea–and, for that matter, Japan–<u><mark>China is not</mark> terribly <mark>hospitable to ethnic outsiders, including members of non-Han minorities </mark>native to China</u><mark>.</mark> <u>Observers tend to overstate the level of ethnic homogeneity in China</u>, not least <u>because the <mark>Han category masks </mark>tremendous cultural <mark>diversity. “<strong>Hanness” is as broad and contingent</mark> a category <mark>as “whiteness.”</mark> </u></strong>But as <u>Frank Dikötter</u> of the University of Hong Kong argued in his brilliant 1992 book The Discourse of Race in Modern China, <u><mark>traditional notions about</mark> culturally <mark>inferior “barbarians” intermingled with Western forms of scientific racism to form a distinctively Chinese racial consciousness in</mark> the 20th century. The “<mark>yellows” were locked in</mark> a <mark>struggle with</mark> their equals, <mark>the “whites</mark>”–and <mark>both</mark> were <strong><mark>superior to the “blacks,” “browns” and “reds.”</strong></mark> The</u> dislike and <u>distrust of Europeans was always mixed with envy</u> and admiration. <u><mark>The disdain for dark-skinned foreigners</u></mark>, in contrast, was and <u>remains relatively uncomplicated</u>. <u><mark>Maoist China</mark> railed against Western imperialism, and <mark>saw itself as a leader</mark> <mark>of the global proletariat of Africans and Asians</mark>. Now, as China emerges as an economic and cultural superpower, those notions of Third World solidarity, always skin deep</u>, <u>seem to have vanished. <mark>It is thus hard to imagine China welcoming millions of hard-working Nigerians and Bangladeshis with open arms</u></mark>. This could change over the next couple of decades as China’s labor shortage grows acute. I wouldn’t bet on it. If China remains culturally closed, the Chinese Century will never come to pass. Instead, <u><mark>the United States</u></mark>–a country that has struggled with race and racism for centuries, and in the process <u><mark>has become more culturally open and resilient</mark>–</u><strong>will dominate this century as it did the last.</p><p>China will export its cultural model </p><p>Jacques 09 <u>(Martin, Global Order is a book by British journalist and scholar Martin Jacques “ When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New” 2009)//kyan</p><p></strong><mark>What will China be like as a great power</u></mark>? The traditional way of answering this question is in terms of geopolitics, foreign policy and interstate relations. In other words, it is seen as a specialist area of foreign ministries, diplomacy, bilateral talks, multinational negotiations and the military. A concentration on the formal structures of international relations, however, <u>fails to address the <mark>cultural factors</mark> that <mark>shape</mark> the way <mark>a people</mark> think, <mark>behave</mark> and perceive others. T</u>he geopolitical approach informs how a state elite reasons and acts, while <u>a <mark>cultural analysis, rooted in history and popular consciousness, seeks to</mark> explain the <mark>values</mark>, attitudes, prejudices and assumptions of a people</u>. In the short run, the former may explain the conduct of relations between countries, but <u>in the longer run <mark>people’s values</mark> and prejudices <mark>are</mark> far more significant and <mark>consequential</mark>. 1</u> <u><mark>Ultimately, nations see the world in terms of their own history</mark>, values and mindset and <mark>seek to shape that world</mark> in the light of those experiences and perceptions.</p><p>ANDThis</u> more <u><mark>cultural approach is</u>,</mark> if anything, <u><mark>even more important in China’s</u> <u>case</mark> because it has only very recently come to see itself as a nation-state</u> and engage in the protocol of a nation-state: <u>most Chinese attitudes, perceptions and behaviour</u>, as we saw in the last chapter, <u>are still best understood in terms of its civilizational inheritance</u> rather than its status as a nation-state<u>. If we want to comprehend how China is likely to behave towards the rest of the world, then first we need to make sense of what has made China what it is today, how it has evolved, where the Chinese come from</u>, and how they see themselves. We cannot appreciate their attitude towards the rest of the world without first understanding their view of themselves. <u>Once <mark>again, history, culture, race and ethnicity are central to the story.</p></u></mark>
null
1nr
Case
105,466
37
17,111
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
565,271
N
Texas
5
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
Garrett
Framework (2NR) cap good
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,661
Plan solves 2 internal links--
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>Plan solves 2 internal links--</h4>
null
null
Contention 2 is illegal markets
431,112
1
17,114
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
565,248
A
Wake
4
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
Voss
null
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,662
Human extinction outweighs and turns their impact
BOSTROM 2011
BOSTROM 2011 (Nick, Prof. of Philosophy at Oxford, The Concept of Existential Risk (Draft), http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html)
a basis for ethical theory can be found in a commitment to the future of humanity as a vast project The aspiration for a better society—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—is a part of this projec Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average) quality of life of a population- at-a-time We owe some loyalty to this project of the human future Since an existential catastrophe would put an end to the project of the future of humanity we would have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences an ethical view emphasizing that public policy should be determined through informed democratic deliberation would favor existential-risk mitigation if we suppose that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus
basis for ethical theory can be found in commitment to the future of humanity The aspiration for a better society is a part of this project Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures an existential catastrophe would put an end to the project of the future of humanity public policy should favor existential-risk mitigation We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations
We have thus far considered existential risk from the perspective of utilitarianism (combined with several simplifying assumptions). We may briefly consider how the issue might appear when viewed through the lenses of some other ethical outlooks. For example, the philosopher Robert Adams outlines a different view on these matters: I believe a better basis for ethical theory in this area can be found in quite a different direction—in a commitment to the future of humanity as a vast project, or network of overlapping projects, that is generally shared by the human race. The aspiration for a better society—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—is a part of this project. So are the potentially endless quests for scientific knowledge and philosophical understanding, and the development of artistic and other cultural traditions. This includes the particular cultural traditions to which we belong, in all their accidental historic and ethnic diversity. It also includes our interest in the lives of our children and grandchildren, and the hope that they will be able, in turn, to have the lives of their children and grandchildren as projects. To the extent that a policy or practice seems likely to be favorable or unfavorable to the carrying out of this complex of projects in the nearer or further future, we have reason to pursue or avoid it. … Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average) quality of life of a population- at-a-time, considered in isolation from how it got that way. We owe, I think, some loyalty to this project of the human future. We also owe it a respect that we would owe it even if we were not of the human race ourselves, but beings from another planet who had some understanding of it. (28: 472-473) Since an existential catastrophe would either put an end to the project of the future of humanity or drastically curtail its scope for development, we would seem to have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it, in Adams’ view. We also note that an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences, suggesting that from a preference-satisfactionist perspective it would be a bad thing. In a similar vein, an ethical view emphasizing that public policy should be determined through informed democratic deliberation by all stakeholders would favor existential-risk mitigation if we suppose, as is plausible, that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies upon reasonable deliberation (even if hypothetical future people are not included as stakeholders). We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants.[24] We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus. Further, many theological perspectives deplore naturalistic existential catastrophes, especially ones induced by human activities: If God created the world and the human species, one would imagine that He might be displeased if we took it upon ourselves to smash His masterpiece (or if, through our negligence or hubris, we allowed it to come to irreparable harm).[25]
3,812
<h4>Human extinction outweighs and turns their impact</h4><p><strong>BOSTROM 2011 </strong>(Nick, Prof. of Philosophy at Oxford, The Concept of Existential Risk (Draft), http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html)</p><p>We have thus far considered existential risk from the perspective of utilitarianism (combined with several simplifying assumptions). We may briefly consider how the issue might appear when viewed through the lenses of some other ethical outlooks. For example, the philosopher Robert Adams outlines a different view on these matters: I believe <u>a</u> better <u><mark>basis for ethical theory</u></mark> in this area <u><mark>can be found in</u></mark> quite a different direction—in <u>a <mark>commitment to the future of humanity</mark> as a vast project</u>, or network of overlapping projects, that is generally shared by the human race. <u><mark>The</mark> <mark>aspiration for a better society</mark>—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—<mark>is a part of this projec</u>t</mark>. So are the potentially endless quests for scientific knowledge and philosophical understanding, and the development of artistic and other cultural traditions. This includes the particular cultural traditions to which we belong, in all their accidental historic and ethnic diversity. It also includes our interest in the lives of our children and grandchildren, and the hope that they will be able, in turn, to have the lives of their children and grandchildren as projects. To the extent that a policy or practice seems likely to be favorable or unfavorable to the carrying out of this complex of projects in the nearer or further future, we have reason to pursue or avoid it. … <u><mark>Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project</mark> <mark>of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the</mark> <mark>projects</mark> <mark>of</mark> <mark>our own personal futures</mark>. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average) quality of life of a population- at-a-time</u>, considered in isolation from how it got that way. <u>We owe</u>, I think, <u>some loyalty to this project of the human future</u>. We also owe it a respect that we would owe it even if we were not of the human race ourselves, but beings from another planet who had some understanding of it. (28: 472-473) <u>Since <mark>an existential</mark> <mark>catastrophe would</u></mark> either <u><mark>put an end to the project of the future of humanity</u></mark> or drastically curtail its scope for development, <u>we would</u> seem to <u>have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it</u>, in Adams’ view. We also note that <u>an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences</u>, suggesting that from a preference-satisfactionist perspective it would be a bad thing. In a similar vein, <u>an ethical view emphasizing that <mark>public</mark> <mark>policy should</mark> be determined through informed democratic deliberation</u> by all stakeholders <u>would <mark>favor existential-risk mitigation</mark> if we suppose</u>, as is plausible, <u>that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies</u> upon reasonable deliberation (even if hypothetical future people are not included as stakeholders). <u>We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants</u>.[24] <u><mark>We do not want</mark> <mark>to be the failing link in the chain of generations</mark>, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus</u>. Further, many theological perspectives deplore naturalistic existential catastrophes, especially ones induced by human activities: If God created the world and the human species, one would imagine that He might be displeased if we took it upon ourselves to smash His masterpiece (or if, through our negligence or hubris, we allowed it to come to irreparable harm).[25]</p>
null
1nc
Prisons
93,995
284
17,112
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
565,260
N
Wake
2
Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,663
Legalization leads to more arrests and policing
Sabet 2012
Sabet 2012 (Kevin, Former Senior Policy Advisor to President Obama's Drug Czar, There Are Smarter Ways to Deal With Marijuana Than Legalization, http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-marijuana-use-be-legalized/there-are-smarter-ways-to-deal-with-marijuana-than-legalization)
under legalization, we could see arrest rates for marijuana actually increase, similar to what we see with alcohol as more users drive high or violate marijuana growing and using laws there is no guarantee that the underground market would significantly diminish. In a legal market, where marijuana is taxed, the well-established illegal drug trade has every incentive to remain. Today's thriving underground market for tobacco is a good example of this. The drug trade is so profitable that even undercutting the taxed price would leave cartels with a handsome profit Marijuana legalization would also do nothing to loosen the cartels' grip on other illegal trades Producing marijuana en masse at home is also much easier to do than with tobacco or alcohol. We can expect a thriving grey market
, under legalization, we could see arrest rates for marijuana actually increase, similar to what we see with alcoho as more users drive high or violate marijuana growing and using laws there is no guarantee that the underground market would significantly diminish. In a legal market, where marijuana is taxed, the well-established illegal drug trade has every incentive to remain.
Even the supposed benefits of legalization may not pan out. Ironically, under legalization, we could see arrest rates for marijuana actually increase, similar to what we see with alcohol (there are 2.7 million arrests a year for alcohol versus 800,000 for marijuana), as more users drive high or violate marijuana growing and using laws. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the underground market would significantly diminish. In a legal market, where marijuana is taxed, the well-established illegal drug trade has every incentive to remain. Today's thriving underground market for tobacco is a good example of this. The drug trade is so profitable that even undercutting the taxed price would leave cartels with a handsome profit. Marijuana legalization would also do nothing to loosen the cartels' grip on other illegal trades such human trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, piracy, and other illicit drugs (marijuana accounts for a minority of revenues gained by drug trafficking groups). Producing marijuana en masse at home is also much easier to do than with tobacco or alcohol. We can expect a thriving grey market.
1,126
<h4>Legalization leads to more arrests and policing</h4><p><strong>Sabet 2012</strong> (Kevin, Former Senior Policy Advisor to President Obama's Drug Czar, There Are Smarter Ways to Deal With Marijuana Than Legalization, http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-marijuana-use-be-legalized/there-are-smarter-ways-to-deal-with-marijuana-than-legalization)</p><p>Even the supposed benefits of legalization may not pan out. Ironically<mark>, <u>under legalization, we could see arrest rates for marijuana actually increase, similar to what we see with alcoho</mark>l</u> (there are 2.7 million arrests a year for alcohol versus 800,000 for marijuana), <u><mark>as more users drive high or violate marijuana growing and using laws</u></mark>. Furthermore, <u><mark>there is no guarantee that the underground market would significantly diminish.</u> <u>In a legal market, where marijuana is taxed, the well-established illegal drug trade has every incentive to remain.</u></mark> <u>Today's thriving underground market for tobacco is a good example of this. The drug trade is so profitable that even undercutting the taxed price would leave cartels with a handsome profit</u>. <u>Marijuana legalization would also do nothing to loosen the cartels' grip on other illegal trades</u> such human trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, piracy, and other illicit drugs (marijuana accounts for a minority of revenues gained by drug trafficking groups). <u>Producing marijuana en masse at home is also much easier to do than with tobacco or alcohol. We can expect a thriving grey market</u><strong>.</p></strong>
null
1nc
case
56,579
11
17,110
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
565,262
N
Wake
5
NYU Itliong-Zhan
McCleary
Fed CP (2NR) AG Politics (2NR Cede the Political DA T - USFG
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,664
Lynch will be confirmed now
CSM 11/9
CSM 11/9/2014 (Christian Science Monitor, Loretta Lynch: GOP likely to confirm new Attorney General. But when? , http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2014/1109/Loretta-Lynch-GOP-likely-to-confirm-new-Attorney-General.-But-when-video)
Lynch would appear to be an ideal candidate designed not to raise any confirmation roadblocks She has a strong record as a crime-fighting US Attorney The key question is, how quickly will Republicans be willing to move on Lynch’s confirmation Grassley promises that Lynch “will receive “a thorough vetting Republicans are likely to use the hearings as a vehicle to make points about Obama administration actions and policies Cruz and Lee are set to pounce on immigration Obama decided against the option of trying to push Lynch's confirmation while Democrats still control the Senate and instead will leave it up to the Republican-controlled Senate
ynch appear to be an ideal candidate designed not to raise any confirmation roadblocks She has a strong record as a crime-fighting US Attorney “ The key question is, how quickly will Republicans be willing to move on Lynch’s confirmation? Republicans, are likely to use the hearings as a vehicle to make points about Obama administration actions and policies set to pounce on immigration
Loretta Lynch, President Obama’s pick to replace retiring US Attorney General Eric Holder, would appear to be an ideal candidate designed not to raise any confirmation roadblocks among Republicans soon to take control of the US Senate. She has a strong record as a crime-fighting US Attorney “who battles mobsters and drug lords and terrorists and still has the reputation for being a charming people person," as Obama put it in introducing Ms. Lynch Saturday. Plus, she is not Mr. Holder – a former judge and US Attorney who led what GOP critics charged was a highly-political Department of Justice, once being held in contempt of Congress. “I’m hopeful that her tenure, if confirmed, will restore confidence in the Attorney General as a politically independent voice for the American people,” said Sen. Chuck Grassley of Iowa, ranking Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee. The key question is, how quickly will Republicans be willing to move on Lynch’s confirmation? Before the end of the year, while Democrats still hold a Senate majority? Or not at least until January when they become the majority and a Republican – Sen. Grassley – chairs the hearings? Grassley promises that Lynch “will receive “a very fair, but thorough, vetting by the Judiciary Committee,” but he also notes that “US Attorneys are rarely elevated directly to this position.” Republicans, whether they’re in the majority or not, are likely to use the hearings as a vehicle to make points about Obama administration actions and policies they have fought – IRS probing (they would say harassment) of conservative political groups, the Affordable Health Care Act, and immigration. Senators Ted Cruz of Texas and Mike Lee of Utah are set to pounce on immigration – specifically, Obama’s pledge to take executive action on immigration by year’s end without waiting for Congress, including relief from deportation to several million people in the United States illegally. "The Attorney General is the President's chief law enforcement officer. As such, the nominee must demonstrate full and complete commitment to the law. Loretta Lynch deserves the opportunity to demonstrate those qualities, beginning with a statement whether or not she believes the President’s executive amnesty plans are constitutional and legal," Cruz and Lee said in a statement Saturday. GOP Senators Jeff Sessions, Rand Paul, and soon-to-be majority leader Mitch McConnell have made similar statements. So far, Democrats aren’t pushing for early confirmation hearings. They’re mainly focusing on Lynch’s qualifications and the fact that she’s already been confirmed – twice – as US Attorney for the Eastern District of New York. Senator Patrick Leahy (D) of Vermont, who chairs the Judiciary Committee, has been noncommittal on when confirmation hearings should begin. “I have spoken with the President about the need to confirm our next attorney general in a reasonable time period, and I look forward to beginning that process,” he said in a statement. So far, that seems to be OK with the White House. Obama decided against the option of trying to push Lynch's confirmation while Democrats still control the Senate and instead will leave it up to the Republican-controlled Senate to vote on the choice in 2015, according to the people who described Obama's plans, the Associated Press reports. They spoke only on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak on the record. Democrats on Capitol Hill have told the White House it would be difficult to win confirmation for a new attorney general during the lame-duck session of Congress beginning next week, especially considering all the other competing priorities they face before relinquishing power to Republicans in January. Pushing through a nominee so quickly could have tainted the new attorney general's start in the office.
3,858
<h4><strong>Lynch will be confirmed now</h4><p>CSM 11/9</strong>/2014 (Christian Science Monitor, Loretta Lynch: GOP likely to confirm new Attorney General. But when? , http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2014/1109/Loretta-Lynch-GOP-likely-to-confirm-new-Attorney-General.-But-when-video)</p><p>Loretta <u>L<mark>ynch</u></mark>, President Obama’s pick to replace retiring US Attorney General Eric Holder, <u>would <mark>appear to be an <strong>ideal candidate</strong> designed not to raise any confirmation roadblocks</u></mark> among Republicans soon to take control of the US Senate. <u><mark>She has a strong record as a crime-fighting US Attorney</u> “</mark>who battles mobsters and drug lords and terrorists and still has the reputation for being a charming people person," as Obama put it in introducing Ms. Lynch Saturday. Plus, she is not Mr. Holder – a former judge and US Attorney who led what GOP critics charged was a highly-political Department of Justice, once being held in contempt of Congress. “I’m hopeful that her tenure, if confirmed, will restore confidence in the Attorney General as a politically independent voice for the American people,” said Sen. Chuck Grassley of Iowa, ranking Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee. <u><mark>The key question is, how quickly will Republicans be willing to move on Lynch’s confirmation</u>?</mark> Before the end of the year, while Democrats still hold a Senate majority? Or not at least until January when they become the majority and a Republican – Sen. Grassley – chairs the hearings? <u>Grassley promises that Lynch “will receive “a</u> very fair, but <u>thorough</u>, <u>vetting</u> by the Judiciary Committee,” but he also notes that “US Attorneys are rarely elevated directly to this position.” <u><mark>Republicans</u>,</mark> whether they’re in the majority or not, <u><mark>are likely to use the hearings as a vehicle to make points about Obama administration actions and policies</u></mark> they have fought – IRS probing (they would say harassment) of conservative political groups, the Affordable Health Care Act, and immigration. Senators Ted <u>Cruz</u> of Texas <u>and</u> Mike <u>Lee</u> of Utah <u>are <mark>set to pounce on immigration</u></mark> – specifically, Obama’s pledge to take executive action on immigration by year’s end without waiting for Congress, including relief from deportation to several million people in the United States illegally. "The Attorney General is the President's chief law enforcement officer. As such, the nominee must demonstrate full and complete commitment to the law. Loretta Lynch deserves the opportunity to demonstrate those qualities, beginning with a statement whether or not she believes the President’s executive amnesty plans are constitutional and legal," Cruz and Lee said in a statement Saturday. GOP Senators Jeff Sessions, Rand Paul, and soon-to-be majority leader Mitch McConnell have made similar statements. So far, Democrats aren’t pushing for early confirmation hearings. They’re mainly focusing on Lynch’s qualifications and the fact that she’s already been confirmed – twice – as US Attorney for the Eastern District of New York. Senator Patrick Leahy (D) of Vermont, who chairs the Judiciary Committee, has been noncommittal on when confirmation hearings should begin. “I have spoken with the President about the need to confirm our next attorney general in a reasonable time period, and I look forward to beginning that process,” he said in a statement. So far, that seems to be OK with the White House. <u>Obama decided against the option of trying to push Lynch's confirmation while Democrats still control the Senate and instead will leave it up to the Republican-controlled Senate</u> to vote on the choice in 2015, according to the people who described Obama's plans, the Associated Press reports. They spoke only on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak on the record. Democrats on Capitol Hill have told the White House it would be difficult to win confirmation for a new attorney general during the lame-duck session of Congress beginning next week, especially considering all the other competing priorities they face before relinquishing power to Republicans in January. Pushing through a nominee so quickly could have tainted the new attorney general's start in the office.</p>
null
1nr
Bioprint UQ-soon
431,113
2
17,109
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
565,261
N
Wake
3
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
Watson
AG Politics (2NR) Narrow Ruling CP (2NR) Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR) T - nearly all Test Case Fiat
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,665
First, It dries up the demand for illegal organs
Upchurch 12
Upchurch 12 Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18
By increasing the supply of available organs in the U S through compensation, citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ If demand dried up transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible that stories like
By increasing the supply of organs in the U S through compensation, citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ If demand dried up transplant tourism would take a major hit merican citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients Most organs ended up transplanted into American citizens If those American citizens were not forced abroad to find an organ,
By increasing the supply of available organs in the United States through compensation, American citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ. For example, Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.118 If demand dried up from foreign citizens, transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure. Statistical information is difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs succinctly stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens.”119 The black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients. Rather, it is driven upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire what they need domestically.120 One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.121 Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer.”122 Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.123 The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal deficiency.124 Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.125 If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible that stories like this would become much less commonplace.
2,141
<h4>First, It dries up the<u> demand</u> for illegal organs </h4><p><strong>Upchurch 12</strong> Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination <u>of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18</p><p><mark>By increasing the supply of</mark> available <mark>organs in the U</u></mark>nited<u> <mark>S</u></mark>tates<u> <mark>through compensation,</mark> </u>American<u> <mark>citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ</u></mark>. For example, Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.118 <u><mark>If demand dried up</u></mark> from foreign citizens, <u><mark>transplant tourism</mark> in these countries <mark>would take a major hit</u></mark> because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure. Statistical information is difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but <u>presumably A<mark>merican citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients</mark> seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report </u>about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs<u> </u>succinctly <u>stated, “<mark>Most </mark>of those <mark>organs ended up transplanted into American citizens</u></mark>.”119 The<u> </u>black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients. Rather, it is driven<u> </u>upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire<u> </u>what they need domestically.120 One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.121 Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer.”122 Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.123 The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal deficiency.124 Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.125 <u><mark>If those American citizens </mark>with the means to purchase <mark>were not forced abroad to find an organ,</mark> it is very possible that stories like </u>this would become much less commonplace.</p>
null
null
Contention 2 is illegal markets
430,262
14
17,114
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
565,248
A
Wake
4
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
Voss
null
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,666
“Social movement” fails- specific to their advocate
Atwell 2012
Atwell 2012 (Mary Welek, Radford University, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, The Journal of Southern History78.1 (Feb 2012): 240-241, proquest)
Alexander's book slides to a disappointing conclusion when the author attempts to address a remedy for the injustices she has described. Her recommendation is that opponents of the new Jim Crow must begin "challenging the basic structure of society," a lofty and amorphous suggestion indeed
null
All of Alexander's points about the discriminatory impact of the drug laws are valid and generally acknowledged. Where she moves outside the mainstream is in her apparent claim that the criminal justice system is intentionally, universally, and inevitably malign. Her support for such assertions generally comes from popular journalism and the work of advocacy groups. Finally, the book slides to a disappointing conclusion when the author attempts to address a remedy for the injustices she has described. Her recommendation is that opponents of the new Jim Crow must begin "challenging the basic structure of society," a lofty and amorphous suggestion indeed (p. 246).
670
<h4><strong>“Social movement” fails- specific to their advocate</h4><p>Atwell 2012</strong> (Mary Welek, Radford University, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, The Journal of Southern History78.1 (Feb 2012): 240-241, proquest) </p><p>All of <u>Alexander's</u> points about the discriminatory impact of the drug laws are valid and generally acknowledged. Where she moves outside the mainstream is in her apparent claim that the criminal justice system is intentionally, universally, and inevitably malign. Her support for such assertions generally comes from popular journalism and the work of advocacy groups. Finally, the <u>book slides to a disappointing conclusion when the author attempts to address a remedy for the injustices she has described. Her recommendation is that opponents of the new Jim Crow must begin "challenging the basic structure of society," <strong>a lofty and amorphous suggestion</strong> indeed</u><strong> (p. 246).</p></strong>
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3
17,110
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
565,262
N
Wake
5
NYU Itliong-Zhan
McCleary
Fed CP (2NR) AG Politics (2NR Cede the Political DA T - USFG
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,667
No risk of endless warfare—postiive peace is wrong—crisis focus doesn’t force a tradeoff
Gray 7
Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf)
In the hands of a paranoid political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraq experiences reveal clearly that the conduct of war is disciplined by public attitudes  we ought not to endorse the argument the U S should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is not at all convincing . It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy must be nothing if not pragmatic.
In the hands of a paranoid leader prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American system was designed for the purpose of constraining the executive Vietnam and Iraq reveal war is disciplined by public attitudes the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is not convincing It should be dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit.
7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is not at all convincing. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, must be nothing if not pragmatic.
3,056
<h4>No risk of endless warfare—postiive peace is wrong—crisis focus doesn’t force a tradeoff </h4><p><strong>Gray 7</strong>—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf<u>)</p><p></u>7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. <u><mark>In the hands of a paranoid</mark> </u>or boundlessly ambitious <u>political <mark>leader</mark>, <mark>prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American </mark>political <mark>system</mark>, with its checks and balances, <mark>was designed</mark> explicitly <mark>for</mark> <mark>the purpose of constraining the executive</mark> from </u>excessive <u>folly. Both the <mark>Vietnam</mark> <mark>and</mark> the contemporary <mark>Iraq</u></mark>i<u> experiences <mark>reveal</mark> clearly that</u> although <u>the conduct of <mark>war is</u></mark> an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is <u><mark>disciplined by public attitudes</u></mark>. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But<u> we ought not to endorse the argument </u>that <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that</u> the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. <u>Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. </u>This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that <u><mark>the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search</mark> <mark>for total security is <strong>not </mark>at all <mark>convincing</u></strong></mark>. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government<u>. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. <mark>It should be</mark> recognized and <mark>dismissed for</mark> <mark>what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. </mark>And strategy</u>, though not always policy, <u><strong>must be nothing if not pragmatic.</p></u></strong>
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91,690
348
17,112
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
565,260
N
Wake
2
Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
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48,454
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Dartmouth YaAh
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18,764
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,668
PC’s key to overcome GOP objections on immigration- controls the focus of the hearings
Politico 11/10
Politico 11/10/2014 (The GOP plan for Lynch: It's all about immigration, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/11/loretta-lynch-nomination-gop-112765_Page2.html)
Republicans plan to turn the battle over attorney general nominee Loretta Lynch into a larger debate over immigration, using the confirmation hearings as a proxy war over presidential power rather than a debate over Lynch’s qualifications. Lynch is considered a strong nominee That makes the political fight over Obama a much better bet for Republicans The Republicans’ strategy centers on whether the president has the authority to bypass Congress on immigration allowing Republicans to write their own narrative on the nomination. Don’t underestimate the capacity for that to become a major battle front GOP senators are publicly positioning themselves around an immigration fight. immigration will be a large part of their line of questioning against Lynch when her confirmation process begins in January the dominant issue will be immigration Democrats don’t think the strategy will work. With Republicans on these issues, they always run the risk of overreach Efforts to tie her down to that stuff would come across as overly political.” Senate Democrats are banking on the view that the twice-confirmed Lynch would be qualified enough to be confirmed under a GOP-led chamber She should have no difficulty whatsoever on the merits ***Citing Ron Fournier, Senior Political Columnist and Editorial Director for the National Journal Fournier maintains that in most instances political mandates don't come in the wake of Election Day, but depend on "leaders who spend their political capital wisely taking advantage of events without overreaching."
Republicans plan to turn the battle over attorney general nominee Loretta Lynch into a larger debate over immigration, using the confirmation hearings as a proxy war over presidential power rather than a debate over Lynch’s qualifications. Lynch, considered a strong nominee, That makes the political fight centers on whether the president has the authority to bypass Congress on immigration — allowing Republicans to write their own narrative on the nomination that immigration will be a large part of their line of questioning against Lynch when her confirmation process begins Democrats don’t think the strategy will work … Efforts to tie her down to that stuff would come across as overly political.” Senate Democrats are banking on the view that the twice-confirmed Lynch, , would be qualified enough to be confirmed under a Democratic- or GOP-led chamber. “She should have no difficulty whatsoever on the merits Fournier maintains that in most instances political mandates don't come in the wake of Election Day, but depend on "leaders who spend capital wisely, taking advantage without overreaching."
Senate Republicans plan to turn the battle over attorney general nominee Loretta Lynch into a larger debate over immigration, using the confirmation hearings as a proxy war over presidential power rather than a debate over Lynch’s qualifications. Lynch, who would be the first black female attorney general, is considered a strong nominee, with a long record as a federal prosecutor. That makes the political fight over Barack Obama and his executive powers a much better bet for Republicans who took control of the Senate riding the president’s unpopularity. The Republicans’ early strategy, according to comments from senators and several Republican aides close to the Judiciary Committee, centers on whether the president has the authority to bypass Congress on immigration — allowing Republicans to write their own narrative on the nomination. “The president is increasingly on a smaller and smaller island if he goes forward with this action and the next item of business is the nomination of the attorney general,” one Senate Republican aide said Monday. “Don’t underestimate the capacity for that to become a major battle front.” Several GOP senators are publicly positioning themselves around an immigration fight. Sens. Ted Cruz of Texas and Mike Lee of Utah have signaled that immigration will be a large part of their line of questioning against Lynch when her confirmation process begins, which they said should happen after the new Republican majority is seated in January. “The nominee must demonstrate full and complete commitment to the law,” Cruz and Lee said in a joint statement. “Loretta Lynch deserves the opportunity to demonstrate those qualities, beginning with a statement whether or not she believes the president’s executive amnesty plans are constitutional and legal.” The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the strategy. But Hill Democrats say the Republican plan could backfire. “I don’t think that issue should be central to Loretta Lynch’s confirmation,” Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.), who sits on the Senate Judiciary Committee, said in an interview Monday, adding that he said he wanted to see Lynch considered and confirmed “promptly.” Since Attorney General Eric Holder said in September he planned to step down, a handful of other Senate Republicans have signaled the issue of executive action on immigration would be a central issue in confirming his successor. For example, Sen. Jeff Sessions of Alabama has, for weeks, been encouraging fellow senators to oppose any replacement for Holder who does not “firmly reject” Obama’s plan for executive action on immigration. The chatter is preliminary — Congress is officially back in session Wednesday, and senators will have more time then to hash out a more formal strategy on Lynch’s nomination process. But key aides on Monday sketched out an initial strategy that centers on grilling Lynch — the federal prosecutor for the Eastern District of New York — over Obama’s pending immigration action and whether she backs it. A slew of other hot-button issues are sure to surface during Lynch’s confirmation hearings, such as the Operation Fast and Furious gun-walking scandal, the contentious debate over voter ID laws and executive overreach, Republican aides added. “Decisions and actions by President Obama and Attorney General Holder have made the proper bounds of executive power a critically important issue for this confirmation process,” Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) said Monday, signaling that will be a priority in deciding whether to confirm Lynch. But the dominant issue will be immigration — and President Barack Obama’s looming executive action that could potentially halt deportations for millions of immigrants here without legal status. Obama has promised to keep his pledge to Latino and immigration advocates to act on deportations by the end of the year. Senate Democrats don’t think the strategy will work. “With Republicans on these issues, they always run the risk of overreach,” added a Senate Democratic leadership aide. “She’s not tied to the administration, she hasn’t had a tie to any of these past executive actions. … Efforts to tie her down to that stuff would come across as overly political.” No decisions have been made on when the Senate will take up Lynch’s nomination to be the nation’s chief law enforcement official, officials said Monday. But one Democratic leadership aide said senators were leaning toward installing Lynch in the new Congress, when the GOP will be in control of the chamber. Senate Democrats are banking on the view that the twice-confirmed Lynch, who would be the nation’s first black female attorney general with the Senate’s blessing, would be qualified enough to be confirmed under a Democratic- or GOP-led chamber. “She should have no difficulty whatsoever on the merits,” Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), a member of the Judiciary Committee, said in an interview Monday. “There is not a scintilla of factual basis to challenge her.” Capital still works Jager 11/4 --- NewsMax (Elliot, “Ron Fournier: GOP Victory Won't Mend D.C.'s 'Broken Politics'”, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/bipartisanship-midterms-congress-GOP/2014/11/04/id/604994/)//trepka ***Citing Ron Fournier, Senior Political Columnist and Editorial Director for the National Journal Having Mitch McConnell in charge of the Senate will make it no less dysfunctional, Fournier maintains. He believes that in most instances political mandates don't come in the wake of Election Day, but depend on "leaders who spend their political capital wisely, taking advantage of events without overreaching."
5,638
<h4><strong>PC’s key to overcome GOP objections on immigration- controls the focus of the hearings</h4><p>Politico 11/10</strong>/2014 (The GOP plan for Lynch: It's all about immigration, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/11/loretta-lynch-nomination-gop-112765_Page2.html)</p><p>Senate <u><mark>Republicans plan to turn the battle over attorney general nominee Loretta Lynch into a larger debate over immigration, using the confirmation hearings as a proxy war over presidential power <strong>rather than</strong> a debate over Lynch’s qualifications. Lynch</u>,</mark> who would be the first black female attorney general, <u>is <mark>considered a strong nominee</u>,</mark> with a long record as a federal prosecutor. <u><mark>That makes the <strong>political fight</u></strong></mark> <u>over</u> Barack <u>Obama</u> and his executive powers <u>a much better bet for Republicans</u> who took control of the Senate riding the president’s unpopularity. <u>The Republicans’</u> early <u>strategy</u>, according to comments from senators and several Republican aides close to the Judiciary Committee, <u><mark>centers on whether the president has the authority to bypass Congress on immigration</u> — <u>allowing Republicans to <strong>write their own narrative on the nomination</mark>. </u></strong>“The president is increasingly on a smaller and smaller island if he goes forward with this action and the next item of business is the nomination of the attorney general,” one Senate Republican aide said Monday. “<u>Don’t underestimate the capacity for that to become a major battle front</u>.” Several <u>GOP senators are publicly positioning themselves around an immigration fight.</u> Sens. Ted Cruz of Texas and Mike Lee of Utah have signaled <mark>that <u>immigration will be a large part of their line of questioning against Lynch when her confirmation process begins</u></mark>, which they said should happen after the new Republican majority is seated <u>in January</u>. “The nominee must demonstrate full and complete commitment to the law,” Cruz and Lee said in a joint statement. “Loretta Lynch deserves the opportunity to demonstrate those qualities, beginning with a statement whether or not she believes the president’s executive amnesty plans are constitutional and legal.” The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the strategy. But Hill Democrats say the Republican plan could backfire. “I don’t think that issue should be central to Loretta Lynch’s confirmation,” Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.), who sits on the Senate Judiciary Committee, said in an interview Monday, adding that he said he wanted to see Lynch considered and confirmed “promptly.” Since Attorney General Eric Holder said in September he planned to step down, a handful of other Senate Republicans have signaled the issue of executive action on immigration would be a central issue in confirming his successor. For example, Sen. Jeff Sessions of Alabama has, for weeks, been encouraging fellow senators to oppose any replacement for Holder who does not “firmly reject” Obama’s plan for executive action on immigration. The chatter is preliminary — Congress is officially back in session Wednesday, and senators will have more time then to hash out a more formal strategy on Lynch’s nomination process. But key aides on Monday sketched out an initial strategy that centers on grilling Lynch — the federal prosecutor for the Eastern District of New York — over Obama’s pending immigration action and whether she backs it. A slew of other hot-button issues are sure to surface during Lynch’s confirmation hearings, such as the Operation Fast and Furious gun-walking scandal, the contentious debate over voter ID laws and executive overreach, Republican aides added. “Decisions and actions by President Obama and Attorney General Holder have made the proper bounds of executive power a critically important issue for this confirmation process,” Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) said Monday, signaling that will be a priority in deciding whether to confirm Lynch. But <u>the dominant issue will be immigration</u> — and President Barack Obama’s looming executive action that could potentially halt deportations for millions of immigrants here without legal status. Obama has promised to keep his pledge to Latino and immigration advocates to act on deportations by the end of the year. Senate <u><mark>Democrats don’t think the strategy will work</mark>. </u>“<u>With Republicans on these issues, they always run the risk of overreach</u>,” added a Senate Democratic leadership aide. “She’s not tied to the administration, she hasn’t had a tie to any of these past executive actions. <mark>… <u>Efforts to tie her down to that stuff would come across as overly political.”</mark> </u>No decisions have been made on when the Senate will take up Lynch’s nomination to be the nation’s chief law enforcement official, officials said Monday. But one Democratic leadership aide said senators were leaning toward installing Lynch in the new Congress, when the GOP will be in control of the chamber. <u><mark>Senate Democrats are banking on the view that the twice-confirmed Lynch</u>, </mark>who would be the nation’s first black female attorney general with the Senate’s blessing<mark>, <u>would be qualified enough to be confirmed under a</u> Democratic- or <u>GOP-led chamber</u>. “<u><strong>She should have no difficulty whatsoever on the merits</u></mark>,” Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), a member of the Judiciary Committee, said in an interview Monday. “There is not a scintilla of factual basis to challenge her.”</p><p>Capital still works</p><p>Jager 11/4 </strong>--- NewsMax (Elliot, “Ron Fournier: GOP Victory Won't Mend D.C.'s 'Broken Politics'”, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/bipartisanship-midterms-congress-GOP/2014/11/04/id/604994/)//trepka</p><p><u>***Citing Ron Fournier, Senior Political Columnist and Editorial Director for the National Journal</p><p></u>Having Mitch McConnell in charge of the Senate will make it no less dysfunctional, <u><mark>Fournier maintains</u></mark>. He believes <u><mark>that in most instances political mandates <strong>don't come</strong> in</u> <u>the wake of Election Day, but depend on "leaders who <strong>spend</mark> their political <mark>capital wisely</u></strong>, <u>taking <strong>advantage</mark> of events </strong><mark>without <strong>overreaching</strong>."<strong></mark> </p></u></strong>
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1
17,109
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
565,261
N
Wake
3
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
Watson
AG Politics (2NR) Narrow Ruling CP (2NR) Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR) T - nearly all Test Case Fiat
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,669
Second, Legalizing organ sales in the US spills over globally
Calandrillo 4
Calandrillo 4 Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis
if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad.
if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs America might be the best response a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product a legalized market U.S. may lead to similar structures abroad
Moreover, if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today's black markets lead to a host of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy's advantage. n180 Stephen Spurr details the potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality. n181 Gloria Banks decries the exploitation of society's most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection. n182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness today. n183 FOOTNOTE ATTACHED n183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that regulated markets are superior to the existing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad. On the other hand, one might argue that competing markets might lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of regulatory standards, as each country tries to gain more market share.
1,779
<h4>Second, Legalizing organ sales in the US spills over globally </h4><p><strong>Calandrillo 4</strong> Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis</p><p> Moreover, <u><mark>if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs</mark> that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in <mark>America might be the best response</u></mark>. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today's black markets lead to a host of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy's advantage. n180 Stephen Spurr details the potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality. n181 Gloria Banks decries the exploitation of society's most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection. n182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness today. n183 FOOTNOTE ATTACHED n183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that regulated markets are superior to the existing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even <u><mark>a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S.</mark> </u>may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide<u> </u>if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. <u>However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market <mark>would <strong>significantly reduce the demand for black market organs</strong>, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure <strong>the quality of its product</strong></mark>. Furthermore, <mark>a legalized market</mark> in the <mark>U.S.</mark> (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) <strong><mark>may lead to similar structures abroad</strong></mark>.</u> On the other hand, one might argue that competing markets might lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of regulatory standards, as each country tries to gain more market share. </p>
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Contention 2 is illegal markets
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
565,248
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Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
Voss
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Legalization leads to more arrests and policing
Sabet 2012
Sabet 2012 (Kevin, Former Senior Policy Advisor to President Obama's Drug Czar, There Are Smarter Ways to Deal With Marijuana Than Legalization, http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-marijuana-use-be-legalized/there-are-smarter-ways-to-deal-with-marijuana-than-legalization)
under legalization, we could see arrest rates for marijuana actually increase, similar to what we see with alcohol as more users drive high or violate marijuana growing and using laws there is no guarantee that the underground market would significantly diminish. In a legal market, where marijuana is taxed, the well-established illegal drug trade has every incentive to remain. Today's thriving underground market for tobacco is a good example of this. The drug trade is so profitable that even undercutting the taxed price would leave cartels with a handsome profit Marijuana legalization would also do nothing to loosen the cartels' grip on other illegal trades Producing marijuana en masse at home is also much easier to do than with tobacco or alcohol. We can expect a thriving grey market
, under legalization, we could see arrest rates for marijuana actually increase, similar to what we see with alcoho as more users drive high or violate marijuana growing and using laws there is no guarantee that the underground market would significantly diminish. In a legal market, where marijuana is taxed, the well-established illegal drug trade has every incentive to remain.
Even the supposed benefits of legalization may not pan out. Ironically, under legalization, we could see arrest rates for marijuana actually increase, similar to what we see with alcohol (there are 2.7 million arrests a year for alcohol versus 800,000 for marijuana), as more users drive high or violate marijuana growing and using laws. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the underground market would significantly diminish. In a legal market, where marijuana is taxed, the well-established illegal drug trade has every incentive to remain. Today's thriving underground market for tobacco is a good example of this. The drug trade is so profitable that even undercutting the taxed price would leave cartels with a handsome profit. Marijuana legalization would also do nothing to loosen the cartels' grip on other illegal trades such human trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, piracy, and other illicit drugs (marijuana accounts for a minority of revenues gained by drug trafficking groups). Producing marijuana en masse at home is also much easier to do than with tobacco or alcohol. We can expect a thriving grey market. Can’t shift attitudes—police will just find another way to charge minorities—heroin and cocaine prove—they focus on the symptom not the system of oppression—no internal ink to Darcy
1,308
<h4><strong>Legalization leads to more arrests and policing</h4><p>Sabet 2012</strong> (Kevin, Former Senior Policy Advisor to President Obama's Drug Czar, There Are Smarter Ways to Deal With Marijuana Than Legalization, http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-marijuana-use-be-legalized/there-are-smarter-ways-to-deal-with-marijuana-than-legalization)</p><p>Even the supposed benefits of legalization may not pan out. Ironically<mark>, <u>under legalization, we could see arrest rates for marijuana actually increase, similar to what we see with alcoho</mark>l</u> (there are 2.7 million arrests a year for alcohol versus 800,000 for marijuana), <u><mark>as more users drive high or violate marijuana growing and using laws</u></mark>. Furthermore, <u><mark>there is no guarantee that the underground market would significantly diminish.</u> <u>In a legal market, where marijuana is taxed, the well-established illegal drug trade has every incentive to remain.</u></mark> <u>Today's thriving underground market for tobacco is a good example of this. The drug trade is so profitable that even undercutting the taxed price would leave cartels with a handsome profit</u>. <u>Marijuana legalization would also do nothing to loosen the cartels' grip on other illegal trades</u> such human trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, piracy, and other illicit drugs (marijuana accounts for a minority of revenues gained by drug trafficking groups). <u>Producing marijuana en masse at home is also much easier to do than with tobacco or alcohol. We can expect a thriving grey market</u><strong>.</p><p>Can’t shift attitudes—police will just find another way to charge minorities—heroin and cocaine prove—they focus on the symptom not the system of oppression—no internal ink to Darcy</p></strong>
null
1nc
Prisons
56,579
11
17,112
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
565,260
N
Wake
2
Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,454
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Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,671
Court action gets tied to the president
Harrison 2005
Harrison 2005 (Lindsay, Jenner and Block Litigation associate, “Does the Court Act as "Political Cover" for the Other Branches?” 11-18 legaldebate.blogspot.com)
While the Supreme Court may have historically been able to act as political cover for the President and/or Congress, that is not true in a world post-Bush v. Gore. The Court is seen today as a politicized body, and especially now that we are in the era of the Roberts Court, with a Chief Justice hand picked by the President and approved by the Congress, it is highly unlikely that Court action will not, at least to some extent, be blamed on and/or credited to the President and Congress it is preposterous to argue that the Court is entirely insulated from politics, and equally preposterous to argue that Bush and the Congress would not receive at least a large portion of the blame for a Court ruling that, for whatever reason, received the attention of the public.
the Court may have been able to act as cover that is not true in a world post-Bush v. Gore. The Court is politicized and now that we are in the era of the Roberts Court, it is highly unlikely that Court action will not be blamed or credited the President and Congress
While the Supreme Court may have historically been able to act as political cover for the President and/or Congress, that is not true in a world post-Bush v. Gore. The Court is seen today as a politicized body, and especially now that we are in the era of the Roberts Court, with a Chief Justice hand picked by the President and approved by the Congress, it is highly unlikely that Court action will not, at least to some extent, be blamed on and/or credited to the President and Congress. The Court can still get away with a lot more than the elected branches since people don't understand the technicalities of legal doctrine like they understand the actions of the elected branches; this is, in part, because the media does such a poor job of covering legal news. Nevertheless, it is preposterous to argue that the Court is entirely insulated from politics, and equally preposterous to argue that Bush and the Congress would not receive at least a large portion of the blame for a Court ruling that, for whatever reason, received the attention of the public.
1,061
<h4><strong>Court action gets tied to the president</h4><p>Harrison 2005 <u></strong>(Lindsay, Jenner and Block Litigation associate, “Does the Court Act as "Political Cover" for the Other Branches?” 11-18 legaldebate.blogspot.com)</p><p>While <mark>the</mark> Supreme <mark>Court</mark> <mark>may have</mark> historically <mark>been able to act as</mark> political <mark>cover</mark> for the President and/or Congress, <mark>that is not true in a world post-Bush v. Gore.</mark> <mark>The</mark> <mark>Court</mark> <mark>is</mark> seen today as a <mark>politicized</mark> body, <mark>and </mark>especially <mark>now that we are in the era of the Roberts Court,</mark> with a Chief Justice hand picked by the President and approved by the Congress, <mark>it is highly unlikely that Court action will not</mark>, at least to some extent, <mark>be</mark> <mark>blamed</mark> on and/<mark>or credited</mark> to <mark>the President and Congress</u></mark>. The Court can still get away with a lot more than the elected branches since people don't understand the technicalities of legal doctrine like they understand the actions of the elected branches; this is, in part, because the media does such a poor job of covering legal news. Nevertheless, <u><strong>it is preposterous to argue that the Court is entirely insulated from politics, and equally preposterous to argue that Bush and the Congress would not receive at least a large portion of the blame for a Court ruling that, for whatever reason, received the attention of the public. </p></u></strong>
null
1nr
Imm
36,501
70
17,109
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
565,261
N
Wake
3
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
Watson
AG Politics (2NR) Narrow Ruling CP (2NR) Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR) T - nearly all Test Case Fiat
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
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Dartmouth YaAh
null
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Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
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Dartmouth
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,672
Their social movement is stupid and useless
Hauhart 2011 )
Hauhart 2011 (Robert, Saint Martin’s University, Contemporary Sociology40.5 (Sep 2011): 557-559, proquest)
Alexander shies away from proposing a potentially successful strategy for redressing the dilemma she depicts Alexander offers conversation starters Alexander suggests we talk explicitly about race Alexander questions the success of the strategy to infiltrate elite institutions In lieu of traditional approaches Alexander offers little but platitudes and clichés she suggests that blacks and whites must lay down racial bribes join hands as sociologists everywhere recognize, to make a job "everyone's" responsibility is to make it "no one's" responsibility without irony, Alexander advises us that, "All of this is easier said than done her call upon the civil rights community to re-frame itself and get to work is not a call to arms but an invitation to snore Alexander's review evades the hard work of developing a potentially effective strategy for mobilizing progressive social action that is required.
Alexander offers conversation starters." Alexander questions the success of the strategy to infiltrate elite institutions, In lieu of these traditional approaches, unfortunately, Alexander offers little but platitudes and clichés without irony, Alexander advises us that, "All of this is easier said than done her call upon the civil rights community to re-frame itself and get to work is not a call to arms but an invitation to snore , Alexander's review evades the hard work of developing a potentially effective strategy for mobilizing progressive social action that is required.
In The New Jim Crow, civil rights lawyer and Ohio State University law professor Michelle Alexander examines the legal and social framework that supports the regime of mass incarceration of black men in the United States. As Alexander carefully recounts, beginning in the early 1980s with President Reagan's declaration of a "War on Drugs," a number of poticy initiatives, Supreme Court decisions, and vested interests, aided and abetted by political divisiveness and pubtic apathy, coalesced to create the social, legal, and political environment that has supported mass incarceration ever since. Alexander's analysis reveals disturbing parallels between the racial caste systems of slavery, Jim Crow, and today's mass incarceration of black men in our country. In the end, however, Alexander shies away from proposing a potentially successful strategy for redressing the dilemma she so carefully depicts. Rather, she "punts," or "cops out," as we would have said in earlier eras. Alexander begins her analysis with a brief history of the several hundred years of variously oppressive race relations between whites and blacks in the United States. Quite correctly, Alexander observes that this history may be f ruitfully understood as a sequence of renascent forms of social control refashioned to the new tenor of the times. Thus, Alexander traces the history of American political rhetoric in the latter hati of the twentieth century where "law and order" comes to constitute code for "the race problem" and a policy of matign neglect toward African Americans is transmuted into an active political strategy devised to develop Republican political dominance in the southern states. Ultimately, as we know, the twin themes of crime and welfare propelled Ronald Reagan into the presidency. Searching for a f ollow-up initiative to define his early presidency, Reagan settled on increased attention to street crune, especially drug law enforcement. In short, the War on Drugs was not some disembodied social agenda, nor was it driven by public demand, as only two percent of Americans believed crime was an important issue at the time. Rather, as Alexander shows, the War on Drugs was a direct outgrowth of race-based politics and therefore the fact that it has had a disproportionate impact on young black men should come as no surprise. Alexander next turns her attention to the interwoven details of the social, legal, and political fabric that wrap the War on Drugs in supportive garb. As Alexander recites, the War on Drugs is the cornerstone on which the current regime of race-based mass incarceration rests because: (a) convictions for drug offenses are the single most important cause of the explosion in incarceration rates since 1980, and (b) black Americans are disproportionately arrested, convicted, and subjected to lengthy sentences for drug offenses when compared to white Americans, even though drug use rates among white Americans have been consistently shown to be higher than for black Americans. Thus, any practices or policies that support the execution of the War on Drugs support the continuation of our movement toward mass incarceration of an entire category of Americans. Among the many developments Alexander reviews, one may note: changes in Supreme Court doctrine with respect to police stops, warrantless searches, consent searches, and suspicionless potice sweeps for drug activity; federal initiatives to offer grants to support narcotics task forces; the development and expansion of modern drug forfeiture laws which permitted state and local law enforcement agencies to keep the vast majority of seized cash and assets in drug raids; and the legislative enactment of mandatory minimum and "three strikes" sentencing schemes, and their ready acceptance by the Supreme Court. Alexander is at her masterful best when elucidating in concise form the emergence of each of these trends and their consequent impact on increased arrest, conviction, and incarceration for primarily young black men over the last thirty years. She is, of course, quite correct to be indignant about the fact that the Supreme Court upheld a sentence of forty years imprisonment for possession and an attempt to sell nine ounces of marijuana in 1982 (Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370). Moreover, as Alexander further explains, the debilitating impact of our country's War on Drugs does not end once a person convicted for a drug offense serves his or her sentence. Rather, an increasingly long and punitive Hst of collateral consequences now extends a person's assignment to second-class status nearly permanently. Thus, offenders may be ineligible (for Hfe) for federally-funded health and welfare benefits, food stamps, public housing, and federal educational assistance; denied admission and licensure to many forms of employment and professional occupations; denied the ability to enlist in the military, purchase a firearm, obtain a federal security clearance, and restricted from voting. The result, as Alexander compellingly depicts, is not that drug law offenders face "problems of reentry into society" as the current rhetoric of criminal justice exhorts, but rather that convicted offenders are "boxed in" (by having to admit their conviction on forms) and thereby forced out, often permanently, from many legitimate relationships with society. Alexander's analysis of these developments is pithy and nearly flawless. She falters occasionally, however, when she attempts to place some of these events in a political context and chart the political landscape that will need to emerge to put an end to The New Jim Crow. Alexander begins her final chapter by discussing what she calls the "relative quiet" of the civil rights community in the face of the mass incarceration of the people of color she describes. She wonders - given the magnitude and unfairness of the present system - why the War on Drugs has not become ". . .the top priority of every civil rights organization in the country" (p. 212). In answering her own question, Alexander notes that subsequent to Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 civil rights organizations became increasingly professionalized -primarily by lawyers. Consequently, many of the civil rights issues were framed in legal terms, pursued in the legal arena, and reduced to legally achievable solutions. By doing so, Alexander believes that the civil rights advocacy groups disconnected themselves from the community and relinquished the grassroots source of their moral strength. They also foreswore the goal of actively mobilizing public opinion against the oppressive laws and social conditions they deplored. In the end, Alexander offers a number of what she calls "conversation starters." First, she states unequivocally that "tinkering" with the present arrangements will not likely achieve notable results; rather, she believes we must end the War on Drugs. Second, in doing so, Alexander suggests we must talk explicitly about race and oppose the tendency to obfuscate the situation with a retreat into denial behind the official veil of colorblindness. Third, Alexander suggests that it may be time for civil rights groups to step away from affirmative action because of its tendency to shield the racial caste system from scrutiny and redress. Finally, Alexander questions the success of the African American strategy to infiltrate elite institutions, including President Obama's ascendance to the presidency, and thereby let civil rights "trickle down" to the mass of the black community. In lieu of these traditional approaches, unfortunately, Alexander offers little but platitudes, wishful bromides, and clichés. Thus, for example, she suggests that ". . . . [blacks and whites alike] must lay down our racial bribes, join hands with people of all colors who are not content to wait for change to trickle down, and say to those who would stand in our way: Accept all of us or none" (p. 245). However, as sociologists everywhere recognize, to make a job "everyone's" responsibility is to make it "no one's" responsibility. Apparently without irony, Alexander also soberly advises us that, "All of this is easier said than done" (p. 247). For a lawyer who has retreated from the entrenched fray of overturning the Supreme Court's precedents on sentencing, which she abhors, her call upon the civil rights community to re-frame itself and get to work is not a call to arms but an invitation to snore. In sum, like many other indignant analyses of the highly objectionable War on Drugs offered over the last thirty years, Alexander's superb historical and legal review evades the hard work of developing a potentially effective strategy for mobilizing progressive social action that is required.
8,753
<h4><strong>Their social movement is stupid and useless</h4><p>Hauhart 2011</strong> (Robert, Saint Martin’s University, Contemporary Sociology40.5 (Sep 2011): 557-559, proquest<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>In The New Jim Crow, civil rights lawyer and Ohio State University law professor Michelle Alexander examines the legal and social framework that supports the regime of mass incarceration of black men in the United States. As Alexander carefully recounts, beginning in the early 1980s with President Reagan's declaration of a "War on Drugs," a number of poticy initiatives, Supreme Court decisions, and vested interests, aided and abetted by political divisiveness and pubtic apathy, coalesced to create the social, legal, and political environment that has supported mass incarceration ever since. Alexander's analysis reveals disturbing parallels between the racial caste systems of slavery, Jim Crow, and today's mass incarceration of black men in our country. In the end, however, <u>Alexander shies away from proposing a potentially successful strategy for redressing</u> <u>the dilemma she</u> so carefully <u>depicts</u>. Rather, she "punts," or "cops out," as we would have said in earlier eras. Alexander begins her analysis with a brief history of the several hundred years of variously oppressive race relations between whites and blacks in the United States. Quite correctly, Alexander observes that this history may be f ruitfully understood as a sequence of renascent forms of social control refashioned to the new tenor of the times. Thus, Alexander traces the history of American political rhetoric in the latter hati of the twentieth century where "law and order" comes to constitute code for "the race problem" and a policy of matign neglect toward African Americans is transmuted into an active political strategy devised to develop Republican political dominance in the southern states. Ultimately, as we know, the twin themes of crime and welfare propelled Ronald Reagan into the presidency. Searching for a f ollow-up initiative to define his early presidency, Reagan settled on increased attention to street crune, especially drug law enforcement. In short, the War on Drugs was not some disembodied social agenda, nor was it driven by public demand, as only two percent of Americans believed crime was an important issue at the time. Rather, as Alexander shows, the War on Drugs was a direct outgrowth of race-based politics and therefore the fact that it has had a disproportionate impact on young black men should come as no surprise. Alexander next turns her attention to the interwoven details of the social, legal, and political fabric that wrap the War on Drugs in supportive garb. As Alexander recites, the War on Drugs is the cornerstone on which the current regime of race-based mass incarceration rests because: (a) convictions for drug offenses are the single most important cause of the explosion in incarceration rates since 1980, and (b) black Americans are disproportionately arrested, convicted, and subjected to lengthy sentences for drug offenses when compared to white Americans, even though drug use rates among white Americans have been consistently shown to be higher than for black Americans. Thus, any practices or policies that support the execution of the War on Drugs support the continuation of our movement toward mass incarceration of an entire category of Americans. Among the many developments Alexander reviews, one may note: changes in Supreme Court doctrine with respect to police stops, warrantless searches, consent searches, and suspicionless potice sweeps for drug activity; federal initiatives to offer grants to support narcotics task forces; the development and expansion of modern drug forfeiture laws which permitted state and local law enforcement agencies to keep the vast majority of seized cash and assets in drug raids; and the legislative enactment of mandatory minimum and "three strikes" sentencing schemes, and their ready acceptance by the Supreme Court. Alexander is at her masterful best when elucidating in concise form the emergence of each of these trends and their consequent impact on increased arrest, conviction, and incarceration for primarily young black men over the last thirty years. She is, of course, quite correct to be indignant about the fact that the Supreme Court upheld a sentence of forty years imprisonment for possession and an attempt to sell nine ounces of marijuana in 1982 (Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370). Moreover, as Alexander further explains, the debilitating impact of our country's War on Drugs does not end once a person convicted for a drug offense serves his or her sentence. Rather, an increasingly long and punitive Hst of collateral consequences now extends a person's assignment to second-class status nearly permanently. Thus, offenders may be ineligible (for Hfe) for federally-funded health and welfare benefits, food stamps, public housing, and federal educational assistance; denied admission and licensure to many forms of employment and professional occupations; denied the ability to enlist in the military, purchase a firearm, obtain a federal security clearance, and restricted from voting. The result, as Alexander compellingly depicts, is not that drug law offenders face "problems of reentry into society" as the current rhetoric of criminal justice exhorts, but rather that convicted offenders are "boxed in" (by having to admit their conviction on forms) and thereby forced out, often permanently, from many legitimate relationships with society. Alexander's analysis of these developments is pithy and nearly flawless. She falters occasionally, however, when she attempts to place some of these events in a political context and chart the political landscape that will need to emerge to put an end to The New Jim Crow. Alexander begins her final chapter by discussing what she calls the "relative quiet" of the civil rights community in the face of the mass incarceration of the people of color she describes. She wonders - given the magnitude and unfairness of the present system - why the War on Drugs has not become ". . .the top priority of every civil rights organization in the country" (p. 212). In answering her own question, Alexander notes that subsequent to Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 civil rights organizations became increasingly professionalized -primarily by lawyers. Consequently, many of the civil rights issues were framed in legal terms, pursued in the legal arena, and reduced to legally achievable solutions. By doing so, Alexander believes that the civil rights advocacy groups disconnected themselves from the community and relinquished the grassroots source of their moral strength. They also foreswore the goal of actively mobilizing public opinion against the oppressive laws and social conditions they deplored. In the end, <u><mark>Alexander offers</u></mark> a number of what she calls "<u><strong><mark>conversation starters</u></strong>."</mark> First, she states unequivocally that "tinkering" with the present arrangements will not likely achieve notable results; rather, she believes we must end the War on Drugs. Second, in doing so, <u>Alexander suggests we</u> must <u>talk</u> <u>explicitly about race</u> and oppose the tendency to obfuscate the situation with a retreat into denial behind the official veil of colorblindness. Third, Alexander suggests that it may be time for civil rights groups to step away from affirmative action because of its tendency to shield the racial caste system from scrutiny and redress. Finally, <u><mark>Alexander questions the success of</u> <u>the</u> </mark>African American <u><mark>strategy to infiltrate elite institutions</u>, </mark>including President Obama's ascendance to the presidency, and thereby let civil rights "trickle down" to the mass of the black community. <u><strong><mark>In lieu of</u></strong> these <u><strong>traditional approaches</u></strong>, unfortunately, <u><strong>Alexander offers little but platitudes</u></strong></mark>, wishful bromides, <u><strong><mark>and clichés</u></strong></mark>. Thus, for example, <u>she suggests that</u> ". . . . [<u>blacks and whites</u> alike] <u>must lay down</u> our <u>racial bribes</u>, <u>join hands</u> with people of all colors who are not content to wait for change to trickle down, and say to those who would stand in our way: Accept all of us or none" (p. 245). However, <u>as sociologists everywhere recognize, to make a job "everyone's" responsibility is to make it "no one's" responsibility</u>. Apparently <u><mark>without irony, Alexander</u></mark> also soberly <u><mark>advises us that, "All of this is easier said than done</u></mark>" (p. 247). For a lawyer who has retreated from the entrenched fray of overturning the Supreme Court's precedents on sentencing, which she abhors, <u><mark>her call upon the civil rights community to re-frame itself and get to work is <strong>not a call to arms but an invitation to snore</u></strong></mark>. In sum, like many other indignant analyses of the highly objectionable War on Drugs offered over the last thirty years<mark>, <u>Alexander's</u> </mark>superb historical and legal <u><mark>review <strong>evades the hard work of developing a potentially effective strategy for mobilizing progressive social action that is required.</p></u></strong></mark>
null
1nc
case
430,669
3
17,110
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
565,262
N
Wake
5
NYU Itliong-Zhan
McCleary
Fed CP (2NR) AG Politics (2NR Cede the Political DA T - USFG
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
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Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,673
A program with a government intermediary is viable means for "organ sales"
Wilkinson 11
Wilkinson 11 Stephen Wilkinson, Professor of Bioethics, Lancaster University (UK) 10-17-11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Sale of Human Organs" http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/
The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual sells to another But there are other possibilities too One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris who suggest that a market in human organs should have a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria. Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices Erin and Harris suggest that a market in human organs should have a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
1. Different Kinds of Organ Sale System The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual (who needs or wants money) sells his or her kidney to another (who needs a kidney). But there are other possibilities too. One (in countries where the prior consent of the deceased is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay people living now for rights over their body after death. Another (in countries where the consent of relatives is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay relatives for transplant rights over their recently deceased loved ones' bodies. Since the kidney is the most commonly transplanted organ and since the ethics literature on organ sale is mainly about kidney sale from live donors, that is the practice on which this entry will focus. ‘Organ sale’ as the term is used here does not include the sale of body products (a category which includes blood, eggs, hair, and sperm) since this is different in some important respects. For example, the risk of permanent harm is generally much less in the case of blood and hair donation; while, the donation of eggs and sperm raises additional issues relating to the creation and parenting of additional future people. That said, many of the fundamental issues are similar and the very same concerns about (for example) exploitation and consent arise in both cases. An important preliminary point is that almost all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say: It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market. While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade: … far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required, but most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that: At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care. One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris (1994; 2003) who suggest that a market in human organs should have the following features: It is limited to a particular geopolitical area, such as a state or the European Union, with only citizens or residents of that area being allowed to sell or to receive organs. There is a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria. Direct sales are banned. Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
3,355
<h4>A program with a government intermediary is viable means for "organ sales"</h4><p><strong>Wilkinson 11</strong> Stephen Wilkinson, Professor of Bioethics, Lancaster University (UK) 10-17-11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Sale of Human Organs" <u><mark>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/</p><p></u></mark>1. Different Kinds of Organ Sale System <u>The expression ‘<mark>organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices</mark>. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual</u> (who needs or wants money) <u>sells </u>his or her kidney <u>to another</u> (who needs a kidney). <u>But there are other possibilities too</u>. One (in countries where the prior consent of the deceased is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay people living now for rights over their body after death. Another (in countries where the consent of relatives is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay relatives for transplant rights over their recently deceased loved ones' bodies. Since the kidney is the most commonly transplanted organ and since the ethics literature on organ sale is mainly about kidney sale from live donors, that is the practice on which this entry will focus. ‘Organ sale’ as the term is used here does not include the sale of body products (a category which includes blood, eggs, hair, and sperm) since this is different in some important respects. For example, the risk of permanent harm is generally much less in the case of blood and hair donation; while, the donation of eggs and sperm raises additional issues relating to the creation and parenting of additional future people. That said, many of the fundamental issues are similar and the very same concerns about (for example) exploitation and consent arise in both cases. An important preliminary point is that almost all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say: It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market. While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade: … far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required, but most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that: At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care. <u>One noteworthy policy proposal comes from <mark>Erin and Harris</u></mark> (1994; 2003) <u>who <mark>suggest</mark> <mark>that a market in human organs should have</mark> </u>the following features: It is limited to a particular geopolitical area, such as a state or the European Union, with only citizens or residents of that area being allowed to sell or to receive organs. There is <u><mark>a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria</mark>. </u>Direct sales are banned. <u><mark>Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.</p></u></mark>
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Contention 3 Solvency
429,540
21
17,114
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
565,248
A
Wake
4
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
Voss
null
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
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Dartmouth
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1,004
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
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743,674
Legalization would increase poverty and be inaccessible to minority communities
Moran 2011
Moran 2011 (Thomas, Juris Doctor, Washington and Lee University School of Law 2011, Just a Little Bit of History Repeating: The California Model of Marijuana Legalization and How it Might Affect Racial and Ethnic Minorities, Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 8, http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1286&context=crsj&sei-redir=1)
legalization for minority groups might represent another tool of economic oppression bogging down their communities In the illegal market, high-quality marijuana costs, on average, over $4,000 per pound, while lower level marijuana nears $1,000 per pound. marijuana sales in the United States, top $100 billion annually the highest concentration of drug dealers is found in lower income, urban environments prone to minority dwelling billions of dollars are funneled into such lower income communities each year With the legalization of marijuana, money expended by consumers will be the same or higher, but minorities must ask where that money will drain The California initiative created licensing regulations for both the growing and selling of marijuana To the detriment of minorities, these licensing requirements required both money and a certain amount of business prowess cultivating marijuana would require a license fee all applicants to submit to a criminal history background check appropriate security and security plans with "satisfactory proof of the financial ability of the licensee to provide for that security and compliance with other employment inspection and recordkeeping measures These business and licensing regulations provided no assistance to entrepreneurs with little or no start-up capital marijuana, if legalized while becoming the nation’s next cash crop and a tremendous source of wealth, could potentially be so for mainly non-minorities, ones who have the financial means and business savvy to initiate such production. most of the money flowing into the minority communities from the illegal sale of marijuana would be diverted into the bank accounts of the new class of "marijuana business[ (Jamie, Nik Theodore, Neil Brenner, “Postneoliberalism and its Malcontents”, Antipode 41, January 2010, Wiley Online)//AS “Neoliberalism's transformation from a marginalized set of intellectual convictions into a full-blown hegemonic force” began with economic crisis”. neoliberalization has been repeatedly and cumulatively remade through crises Even during the first half-life of neoliberalism—when it existed largely as an ideational project it represented a form of crisis theory This project later achieved traction in the structural dislocations and macroregulatory failures of the 1970s—the crisis moment that it had long anticipated and which it was designed to exploit neoliberalism was both conceived and born as a crisis theory neoliberalism mutated into a series of state projects recurrent crises would continue, in effect, to animate the lurching, uneven advance of transnational neoliberalization crises and contradictions of neoliberalism's own making have since shaped cumulative roun s of roll-out, reconstruction, and reaction the uneven development of neoliberalism is contextually genetic rather than simply contingent programs of neoliberal restructuring are substantially absorbed also with the open-ended challenges of managing the attendant economic consequences, social fallout, and political counteractions this destructive moment is more than just a “brush-clearing” phase; it is actually integral to the origins, dynamics, and logics of neoliberalization every actually existing neoliberalism carries the residues of past regulatory struggles programs of neoliberal restructuring are in many ways sustained by repeated regulatory failure; typically, they “progress” through a roiling dynamic of experimentation, overreach, and crisis-driven adjustment.
for minority group represent another tool of economic oppression bogging down their communities. In the illegal market, high-quality marijuana costs, on average, over $4,000 per pound, while lower level marijuana nears $1,000 per pound the highest concentration of drug dealers is found in lower income, urban environments prone to minority dwelling billion of dollars are funneled into such lower income communities each year. With the legalization of marijuana, money expended by consumers will be the same or higher, but minorities must ask where that money will drai marijuana, if legalized while becoming the nation’s next cash crop and a tremendous source of wealth, could potentially be so for mainly non-minorities, ones who have the financial means and business savvy to initiate Neoliberalism's began with economic crisis neoliberalization has been repeatedly remade through crises This project later achieved traction in the structural dislocations and macroregulatory failures of the 1970s crises would continue to animate transnational neoliberalization neoliberalism is contextually genetic neoliberal restructuring are in many ways sustained by repeated regulatory failure
C. The Money Drain from Minority Communities Much is made by the proponents of marijuana legalization concerning marijuana’s potential to become the next "cash crop" creating billions of dollars in both sales and tax revenue.135 Particularly in the face of decriminalization proposals, which do nothing to divert money from the hands of drug dealers, legalization makes sense. The argument goes something like this: as history has shown, marijuana use will not stop; therefore, we might as well sell the drug legally, putting the money from drug dealers’ wallets into those of the people.136 Although this is generally a sound and sensible argument, for minority groups it might truthfully represent another tool of economic oppression bogging down their communities. In the illegal market, high-quality marijuana costs, on average, over $4,000 per pound, while lower level marijuana nears $1,000 per pound.137 As noted earlier, marijuana sales in the United States, top $100 billion annually.138 As also noted, the highest concentration of drug dealers is found in lower income, urban environments prone to minority dwelling.139 These figures tend to reflect that billions, and at the very least hundreds of millions, of dollars are funneled into such lower income communities each year. With the legalization of marijuana, money expended by consumers will be the same or higher, but minorities must ask where that money will drain. Meaning, will the billions or hundreds of millions of dollars continue their current flow into lower income communities, or will forces divert the money elsewhere? The California initiative created licensing regulations for both the growing140 and the selling141 of marijuana. To the detriment of minorities, these licensing requirements required both money and a certain amount of business prowess: cultivating or growing marijuana would require 1) a maximum license fee of $5,000 paid by all applicants to "reasonably cover the costs of assuring compliance with the regulations to be issued";142 2) all license applicants to submit to a criminal history background check;143 3) appropriate security and security plans with "satisfactory proof of the financial ability of the licensee to provide for that security";144 and 4) compliance with other employment,145 inspection,146 and recordkeeping147 measures. These business and licensing regulations provided no assistance to entrepreneurs with little or no start-up capital. Therefore, marijuana, if legalized in the California fashion, while becoming the nation’s next cash crop and a tremendous source of wealth, could potentially be so for mainly non-minorities, ones who have the financial means and business savvy to initiate such production. Worsening this dilemma, most of the money flowing into the minority communities from the illegal sale of marijuana would be diverted into the bank accounts of the new class of "marijuana business[man]."148 Minority community leaders should be mindful of this potential money drain, and wary of its wide range of effects on their communities.149 Internal link-impact differential--They read a generic neolib impact card—no internal link from Cannibis Businesses Neoliberalism is inevitable Peck et. al, Professor of geography at the University of British Columbia 10 (Jamie, Nik Theodore, Neil Brenner, “Postneoliberalism and its Malcontents”, Antipode 41, January 2010, Wiley Online)//AS “Neoliberalism's transformation from a marginalized set of intellectual convictions into a full-blown hegemonic force”, Mudge (2008:709) writes, “began with economic crisis”. More than this, as an historically specific, fungible, contradictory, and unstable process of market-driven sociospatial transformation, neoliberalization has been repeatedly and cumulatively remade through crises. Even during the first half-life of neoliberalism—when it existed largely as an ideational project, almost completely detached from state power—it represented a form of crisis theory (Peck 2008). The neoliberalism of the late 1940s, the 1950s, and the 1960s was an amalgam of free-market utopianism on the one hand, and a pointed, strategic critique of the prevailing Keynesian order on the other. This project later achieved traction in the structural dislocations and macroregulatory failures of the 1970s—the crisis moment that it had long anticipated and which it was designed to exploit. In this sense, neoliberalism was both conceived and born as a crisis theory. In the wake of the Reagan–Thatcher ascendancy, as neoliberalism mutated into a series of state projects, recurrent crises and regulatory failures would continue, in effect, to animate the lurching, uneven advance of transnational neoliberalization. Indeed, crises might be considered to be a primary “engine” of neoliberalism's transformation as a regulatory project, since (historically and geographically, socially and institutionally) specific crises of Keynesian welfarism and developmentalism established the socioinstitutional stakes and the fields of action for the first rounds of regulatory struggles, during the project's roll-back phase, while crises and contradictions of neoliberalism's own making have since shaped cumulative rounds of roll-out, reconstruction, and reaction (Brenner and Theodore 2002a;Peck and Tickell 2002). The legacies of these tawdry, crisis-driven historical geographies of neoliberalism remain starkly present in the current conjuncture. They underscore the claim that the uneven development of neoliberalism is contextually genetic rather than simply contingent (Brenner et al 2010), that neoliberalism is a reactionary credo in more than just a pejorative sense (Peck 2008). It follows that programs of neoliberal restructuring are substantially absorbed not only with the (always-incomplete) task of dismantling inherited institutional forms, but also with the open-ended challenges of managing the attendant economic consequences, social fallout, and political counteractions. Neoliberal strategies are deeply and indelibly shaped by diverse acts of institutional dissolution, but this destructive moment is more than just a “brush-clearing” phase; it is actually integral to the origins, dynamics, and logics of neoliberalization. Each and every actually existing neoliberalism carries the residues, therefore, of past regulatory struggles, which recursively shape political capacities and orientations, and future pathways of neoliberal restructuring. Perversely, programs of neoliberal restructuring are in many ways sustained by repeated regulatory failure; typically, they “progress” through a roiling dynamic of experimentation, overreach, and crisis-driven adjustment.
6,698
<h4><strong>Legalization would increase poverty and be inaccessible to minority communities</h4><p>Moran 2011</strong> (Thomas, Juris Doctor, Washington and Lee University School of Law 2011, Just a Little Bit of History Repeating: The California Model of Marijuana Legalization and How it Might Affect Racial and Ethnic Minorities, Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 8, http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1286&context=crsj&sei-redir=1)</p><p>C. The Money Drain from Minority Communities Much is made by the proponents of marijuana legalization concerning marijuana’s potential to become the next "cash crop" creating billions of dollars in both sales and tax revenue.135 Particularly in the face of decriminalization proposals, which do nothing to divert money from the hands of drug dealers, <u>legalization</u> makes sense. The argument goes something like this: as history has shown, marijuana use will not stop; therefore, we might as well sell the drug legally, putting the money from drug dealers’ wallets into those of the people.136 Although this is generally a sound and sensible argument, <u><mark>for minority group</mark>s</u> it <u>might</u> truthfully <u><mark>represent another tool of economic oppression bogging down their communities</u>. <u>In the illegal market, high-quality marijuana costs, on average, over $4,000 per pound, while lower level marijuana nears $1,000 per pound</mark>.</u>137 As noted earlier, <u>marijuana sales in the United States, top $100 billion annually</u>.138 As also noted, <u><mark>the highest concentration of drug dealers is found in lower income, urban environments prone to minority dwelling</u></mark>.139 These figures tend to reflect that <u><mark>billion</mark>s</u>, and at the very least hundreds of millions, <u><mark>of dollars are funneled into such lower income communities each year</u>. <u>With the legalization of marijuana, money expended by consumers will be the same or higher, but minorities must ask where that money will drai</mark>n</u>. Meaning, will the billions or hundreds of millions of dollars continue their current flow into lower income communities, or will forces divert the money elsewhere? <u>The California initiative created licensing regulations for both the growing</u>140 <u>and</u> the <u>selling</u>141 <u>of marijuana</u>. <u>To the detriment of minorities, these licensing requirements required both money and a certain amount of business prowess</u>: <u>cultivating</u> or growing <u>marijuana</u> <u>would require</u> 1) <u>a </u>maximum <u>license fee</u> of $5,000 paid by all applicants to "reasonably cover the costs of assuring compliance with the regulations to be issued";142 2) <u>all</u> license <u>applicants to submit to a criminal history background check</u>;143 3) <u>appropriate security and security plans with "satisfactory proof of the financial ability of the licensee to provide for that security</u>";144 <u>and</u> 4) <u>compliance with other employment</u>,145 <u>inspection</u>,146 <u>and recordkeeping</u>147 <u>measures</u>. <u>These business and licensing regulations provided no assistance to entrepreneurs with little or no start-up capital</u>. Therefore, <u><mark>marijuana, if legalized</u></mark> in the California fashion, <u><mark>while becoming the nation’s next cash crop and a tremendous source of wealth, could potentially be so for mainly non-minorities, ones who have the financial means and business savvy to initiate</mark> such production.</u> Worsening this dilemma, <u>most of the money flowing into the minority communities from the illegal sale of marijuana would be diverted into the bank accounts of the new class of "marijuana business[</u>man]<strong>."148 Minority community leaders should be mindful of this potential money drain, and wary of its wide range of effects on their communities.149</p><p>Internal link-impact differential--They read a generic neolib impact card—no internal link from Cannibis Businesses</p><p>Neoliberalism is inevitable</p><p>Peck et. al</strong>, Professor of geography at the University of British Columbia <strong>10<u></strong> (Jamie, Nik Theodore, Neil Brenner, “Postneoliberalism and its Malcontents”, Antipode 41, January 2010, Wiley Online)//AS</p><p>“<mark>Neoliberalism's</mark> transformation from a marginalized set of intellectual convictions into a full-blown hegemonic force”</u>, Mudge (2008:709) writes, “<u><mark>began with economic crisis</mark>”.</u> More than this, as an historically specific, fungible, contradictory, and unstable process of market-driven sociospatial transformation, <u><mark>neoliberalization has been repeatedly</mark> and cumulatively <mark>remade through crises</u></mark>. <u>Even during the first half-life of neoliberalism—when it existed largely as an ideational project</u>, almost completely detached from state power—<u>it represented a form of crisis theory </u>(Peck 2008). The neoliberalism of the late 1940s, the 1950s, and the 1960s was an amalgam of free-market utopianism on the one hand, and a pointed, strategic critique of the prevailing Keynesian order on the other. <u><mark>This project later achieved traction in the structural dislocations and macroregulatory failures of the 1970s</mark>—the crisis moment that it had long anticipated and which it was designed to exploit</u>. In this sense, <u>neoliberalism was both conceived and born as a crisis theory</u>. In the wake of the Reagan–Thatcher ascendancy, as <u>neoliberalism mutated into a series of state projects</u>, <u>recurrent <mark>crises</u></mark> and regulatory failures <u><mark>would continue</mark>, in effect, <mark>to animate</mark> the lurching, uneven advance of <mark>transnational neoliberalization</u></mark>. Indeed, crises might be considered to be a primary “engine” of neoliberalism's transformation as a regulatory project, since (historically and geographically, socially and institutionally) specific crises of Keynesian welfarism and developmentalism established the socioinstitutional stakes and the fields of action for the first rounds of regulatory struggles, during the project's roll-back phase, while <u>crises and contradictions of neoliberalism's own making have since shaped cumulative roun</u>d<u>s of roll-out, reconstruction, and reaction</u> (Brenner and Theodore 2002a;Peck and Tickell 2002). The legacies of these tawdry, crisis-driven historical geographies of neoliberalism remain starkly present in the current conjuncture. They underscore the claim that <u>the uneven development of <mark>neoliberalism is contextually genetic</mark> rather than simply contingent</u> (Brenner et al 2010), that neoliberalism is a reactionary credo in more than just a pejorative sense (Peck 2008). It follows that <u>programs of neoliberal restructuring are substantially absorbed</u> not only with the (always-incomplete) task of dismantling inherited institutional forms, but <u>also with the open-ended challenges of managing the attendant economic consequences, social fallout, and political counteractions</u>. Neoliberal strategies are deeply and indelibly shaped by diverse acts of institutional dissolution, but <u>this destructive moment is more than just a “brush-clearing” phase; it is actually integral to the origins, dynamics, and logics of neoliberalization</u>. Each and <u>every actually existing neoliberalism carries the residues</u>, therefore, <u>of past regulatory struggles</u>, which recursively shape political capacities and orientations, and future pathways of neoliberal restructuring. Perversely, <u>programs of <mark>neoliberal restructuring are in many ways sustained by</mark> <mark>repeated regulatory failure<strong></mark>; typically, they “progress” through a roiling dynamic of experimentation, overreach, and crisis-driven adjustment.</p></u></strong>
null
1nc
Corporate
299,332
8
17,112
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
565,260
N
Wake
2
Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,675
Focusing on the details and inner-workings of government policy-making is productive – critical approaches can’t resolve real world problems like poverty, racism and war
McClean, 01
McClean, 01 – Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, Molloy College, New York
leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. it is time for American social critics those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations" Or as Dewey put it "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West as mostly evil, the Cultural Left too often dismiss American society as beyond reform this is disastrous for our social hopes Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."
priori ruminations are irrelevant in narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions aimed at curing homelessness, poverty, and racism. critics have a disease, for jargon. Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach The new public philosopher might understand trade as much as critiques This means going into social institutions, to understand how those institutions actually function in the world before howling for their overthrow . This keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who know what they are talking about but lack awareness
(David E., “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” Presented at the 2001 Annual Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm, JMP) Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."
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<h4>Focusing on the details and inner-workings of government policy-making is productive – critical approaches can’t resolve real world problems like poverty, racism and war </h4><p><strong>McClean, 01</strong> – Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, Molloy College, New York</p><p>(David E., “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” Presented at the 2001 Annual Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm, JMP)</p><p>Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, <u>leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a <mark>priori ruminations</mark> of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others</u> including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, <u>who <mark>are </mark>to me hugely more <mark>irrelevant </mark>than Habermas <mark>in </mark>their <mark>narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions</u></mark> (when they actually do suggest them) <u><mark>aimed at curing </mark>the ills of <mark>homelessness, poverty, </mark>market greed, national belligerence <mark>and racism.</u></mark> I would like to suggest that <u>it is time for American social <mark>critics</u></mark> who are enamored with this group, <u>those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they <mark>have a disease</u>,</mark> and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. <u>The disease is the need <mark>for </mark>elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic <mark>jargon. </mark>These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature</u> (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), <u>in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty").</u> As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These <u>futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a <mark>Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach </mark>to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"</u>(italics mine).(1) <u>Or as</u> John <u>Dewey put it</u> in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, <u>"I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes</u>, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action."</p><p>Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. <u>Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West</u>, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, <u>as mostly evil,</u> and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, <u>the Cultural Left</u>, in this country, <u>too often dismiss American society as beyond reform</u> and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that <u>this is</u> a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be <u>disastrous for our social hopes</u>, as I will explain.</p><p><u>Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country</u> - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. <u>We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves</u> and from within our ranks <u>a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing</u> - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?"</p><p><u><mark>The new public philosopher might </mark>seek to <mark>understand</mark> labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and<mark> trade </mark>agreements <mark>as much as critiques </mark>of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power</u> (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) <u><mark>This means going </mark>down deep<mark> into </mark>the guts of our quotidian <mark>social institutions, </mark>into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts <mark>to </mark>truly <strong><mark>understand how those institutions actually function in the </mark>actual <mark>world before howling for their overthrow </mark>commences<mark>.</strong> This </mark>might help <mark>keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who </mark>actually <mark>know what they are talking about but</mark> who <mark>lack awareness</mark> of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."</p></u>
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SOTOMAYOR MEANS OBAMA IS BLAMED FOR COURT DECISIONS.
SAMUEL 9
SAMUEL 9 (Terence Samuel, Deputy Editor– The Root and Senior Correspondent - Prospect, “Obama's Honeymoon Nears Its End”, American Prospect, 5/29, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=obamas_honeymoon_nears_its_end)
Obama named his nominee to the Supreme Court This is now his presidency in his own right. The chance to choose a Supreme Court justice is such a sui generis exercise of executive power that blame-shifting has become a less effective political strategy, Obama's political maturation will be hastened by the impending ideological fight that is now virtually a guarantee for Supreme Court nominations Already we see the effect in the polls with his overwhelmingly Democratic Senate, the public may be sending preemptory signals that they are not interested in a huge swing on some of these cultural issues that tend to explode during nomination hearings her confirmation is likely to leave him less popular in the end because it will involve contentious issues -- questions of race and gender politics like affirmative action and abortion -- that he managed to avoid or at least finesse through his campaign and during his presidency so far. Obama’s victory has made almost no difference in changing the psychology or incentives of the members of the G.O.P. who matter most breaking the fever” was the wrong metaphor There is no one event that can change a political party overnight A better metaphor for the coming battles with Congress may be three yards and a cloud of dust”: a series of grinding plays where small victories are earned only after lots of intense combat While the fiscal-cliff showdown demonstrated that there’s potential for bipartisan deal-making in the Senate, passing any Obama priority through the House of Representatives is nearly impossible unless the political pressure is extremely intense The fiscal-cliff bill offers the White House a general template for the coming fights over spending issues where there is very little consensus between Obama and most House Republicans. Deals will have to be negotiated in the Senate and gain the imprimatur of some high-profile Republicans. Then a pressure campaign will have to be mounted to convince Boehner to move the legislation to the floor of the House under rules that allow it to pass with mostly Democratic votes. It’s easier to see how this could happen with the coming budgetary issues, which have deadlines that force action, than for the rest of Obama’s agenda, which is more likely than not to simply die in the House. President, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation) Judging by congressional reaction President Obama still has his work cut out for him Republicans may not want to give him a big "win" in an election year). The president initially enjoyed strong public approval and was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year and early into his second, But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. His impressive successes with Congress in 2009 and 2010 were accompanied by a shift in the public mood against him, evident in the rise of the tea party movement, the collapse in his approval rating, and the large GOP gains in the 2010 elections, which brought a return to divided government. media spin Purdum, 10 ) Obama has managed to achieve a overhaul of health insurance sweeping change in the financial regulatory system stabilization of the auto industry and the repeal of a once well-intended policy that even the military itself had come to see as unnecessary and unfair. So why isn’t his political standing higher? Precisely because of the raft of legislative victories he’s achieved. he has suffered not because he hasn’t “done” anything but because he’s done so much—way, way too much in the eyes of his most conservative critics. With each victory, Obama’s opponents grow more frustrated, filling the airwaves and what passes for political discourse with fulminations about some supposed sin or another the guy is bleeding To him, the merit of all these programs has been self-evident, he has not always done all he could to explain them, There is a price for everything in politics, (even as he has remained outspokenly critical of business as usual by both parties in Washington). Illogical—a president would never lose PC Obama faces the stark reality little of what he hopes to accomplish will come to pass Obama occupies an office many assume all powerful but the president faces a political capital problem and a power trap presidents have found effective leadership difficult To lead well, a president needs support If presidents fail to satisfy these they face the prospect of inadequate political capital to back their power assertions two parties ideologically divergent resulted in intense polarization diminishing the possibility of compromise These introduced significant challenges to presidential leadership In recent years presidents' political capital has shrunk while their power assertions have grown, Obama's narrow re-election hardly signals a grand resurgence of political capital Presidents have been unable to prevent their political capital from eroding short-term legislative strategies may win policy success but do not serve as an antidote to declining political capital the political capital is the central political challenge confronted by modern presidents and one that will likely weigh heavily on the current president's mind today as he takes his second oath of office. Obama signaled the release of torture memos , but then backtracked Obama's self wrestled the most important obstacle for change Obama's conception of national unity Obama defaults to the politics of accommodation. Link proves Plan=/=win key role Kumar, Journal of Theoretical Politics, “How presidents push, when presidents win: A model of positive presidential power in US lawmaking,” SAGE Journals Database) presidents can target marginal voters to shift the preference distribution on roll-call votes and they can target congressional leaders to censor the policy alternatives making it that far. By detailing the actual mechanisms of president-led coalition building on Capitol Hill, ours is a theory that puts positive presidential power on a firmer conceptual footing; legislative opportunities are predictable (if not controllable) and capitalizing on them depends on nothing more heroic than the normal grist of legislative politics: arm-twisting, brow-beating, and horse-trading. we subscribe to Eisenhower’s observation: ‘I’ll tell you what leadership is: it’s persuasion, and conciliation, and education, and patience. It’s long, slow, tough work’ spending political capital is a necessary condition for presidents to have positive influence in Congress those presidents who seek to change far-off status quos and confront pliable leading opponents and/or pivotal voters are expected to wield the greatest policymaking impact presidents with little to no political capital, seeking to change centrist status quos, or confronting opposing leaders and pivotal voters who staunchly oppose their proposals can find themselves with ‘nothing to do but stand there and take it’, as Lyndon Johnson once put it. Robert, Senior Fellow – Demos and Co-editor – American Prospect, “Barack Obama's Theory of Power,” The American Prospect, 5-16, http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=barack_obamas_theory_of_power) As the political scientist Neustadt observed the essence of a president's power is "the power to persuade." presidents amass power by making strategic choices about when to use the latent authority of the presidency to move public and elite opinion and then use that added prestige as clout to move Congress. though an American chief executive is weak by constitutional design, a president possesses several points of leverage. He can play an effective outside game, motivating and shaping public sentiment, making clear the differences between his values and those of his opposition, and using popular support to box in his opponents and move them in his direction. He can complement the outside bully pulpit with a nimble inside game, uniting his legislative party, bestowing or withholding benefits on opposition legislators, forcing them to take awkward votes, and using the veto. He can also enlist the support of interest groups to pressure Congress, and use media to validate his framing of choices. Done well, all of this signals leadership that often moves the public agenda. Insiders Light defines several components of political capital: party support of the president in Congress, public approval of the president's conduct of his job, the president's electoral margin, and patronage appointments Light derived this list from the observations of 126 White House staff members he interviewed Light's research reveals that they are central to the “players' perspective” in Washington. those “in the game” view these items as crucial for presidential effectiveness on both theoretical and practical levels, the components of political capital are central to the fate of presidencies presidents over the last 70 years have suffered from a trend of declining levels of political capital, a trend that is at the heart of their political authority problem even in polarization widespread disagreement does not necessarily indicate a broken policy-making process, nor are legislative failures always benign. For even though the framers did not want congressional coalition-building to be easy, nor did they want it to be impossible polarization presents a challenge for practitioners understanding how, the nation's representatives can corral the votes needed to avoid “doing nothing.” congressional polarization frequently produces legislative gridlock results showed that even as polarization renders coalition building more difficult when the president lacks political capital (or chooses not to use it promoting legislation), polarization around the pivotal voter can actually provide presidents a unique opportunity to win key votes, secure legislative success, and influence national legislation. polarization can actually boost presidents' chances for prevailing on important, contested roll-call votes, presidents often help pass important legislation even when confronted with substantial polarization, divided government, or both
Obama named his nominee to the Supreme Court blame-shifting has become a less effective political strategy, her confirmation is likely to leave him less popular in the end because it will involve contentious issues Obama’s victory made no difference in changing the psychology or incentives of members of the G.O.P. who matter that “breaking the fever” was the wrong metaphor There is no one event that can change a political party overnight A better metaphor for coming battles three yards and a cloud of dust a series of grinding plays where victories are earned only after intense combat fiscal-cliff demonstrated there’s potential for bipartisan deal-making passing the House is impossible unless pressure is extremely intense Deals will have to be negotiated and gain imprimatur of Republicans President Obama still has his work cut out for him Republicans may not want to give him a big "win" in an election year). The president initially enjoyed strong approval and was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. Obama managed to achieve a overhaul of health insurance change in the financial system why isn’t his political standing higher because of the raft of legislative victories he’s achieved he has suffered because he’s done so much With each victory, Obama’s opponents grow more frustrated filling the airwaves the guy is bleeding he has not always done all he could to explain them Obama faces stark reality little of what he hopes to accomplish will pass two parties ideologically divergent result in intense polarization diminishing compromise These introduced significant challenges to leadership presidents' p c shrunk while power assertions have grown Presidents have been unable to prevent p c from eroding short-term legislative strategies do not serve as an antidote to declining p c Obama signaled the release of torture memos but then backtracked Obama's self wrestled Obama defaults to the politics of accommodation. presidents can target marginal voters to shift preference distribution president-led coalition building puts positive presidential power on a firmer conceptual footing capitalizing depends on arm-twisting, and horse-trading spending political capital is a necessary condition for presidents to have positive influence in Congress Neustadt observed the president's power to persuade presidents amass power by making strategic choices about when to use authority a president possesses several points of leverage. using popular support to box in his opponents He can also enlist the support of interest groups to pressure Congress, and use media to validate his framing of choices Light's research reveals they are central to the “players' perspective” in Washington those “in the game” view these items as crucial declining capital is the heart of their authority problem polarization can provide presidents a unique opportunity to win key votes, secure legislative success, and influence legislation presidents often help pass important legislation even when confronted with polarization
This week, Barack Obama named his first nominee to the Supreme Court, then headed west to Las Vegas and Los Angeles to raise money for Democrats in the 2010 midterms. Taken together, these two seemingly disparate acts mark the end of a certain period of innocence in the Obama administration: The "blame Bush" phase of the Obama administration is over, and the prolonged honeymoon that the president has enjoyed with the country and the media will soon come to an end as well. Obama is no longer just the inheritor of Bush's mess. This is now his presidency in his own right. The chance to choose a Supreme Court justice is such a sui generis exercise of executive power -- it so powerfully underscores the vast and unique powers of a president -- that blame-shifting has become a less effective political strategy, and less becoming as well. Obama's political maturation will be hastened by the impending ideological fight that is now virtually a guarantee for Supreme Court nominations. Old wounds will be opened, and old animosities will be triggered as the process moves along. Already we see the effect in the polls. While Obama himself remains incredibly popular, only 47 percent of Americans think his choice of Judge Sonia Sotomayor is an excellent or good choice for the Court, according to the latest Gallup poll. The stimulus package scored better than that. The prospect of a new justice really seems to force people to reconsider their culture warrior allegiances in the context of the party in power. This month, after news of Justice David Souter's retirement, a Gallup poll showed that more Americans considered themselves against abortion rights than in favor: 51 percent to 42 percent. Those number were almost exactly reversed a year ago when Bush was in office and Obama was on the verge of wrapping up the Democratic nomination. "This is the first time a majority of U.S. adults have identified themselves as pro-life since Gallup began asking this question in 1995," according to the polling organization. Is this the same country that elected Obama? Yes, but with his overwhelmingly Democratic Senate, the public may be sending preemptory signals that they are not interested in a huge swing on some of these cultural issues that tend to explode during nomination hearings. Even though Obama will win the Sotomayor fight, her confirmation is likely to leave him less popular in the end because it will involve contentious issues -- questions of race and gender politics like affirmative action and abortion -- that he managed to avoid or at least finesse through his campaign and during his presidency so far. Even if a confrontational strategy is key, that doesn’t mean the plan’s singular win spills-over—it’s more likely to undermine Obama’s careful strategy Ryan Lizza, 1/7/13, Will Hagel Spike the G.O.P.’s Fever?, www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/01/how-much-will-the-nomination-of-chuck-hagel-hurt-obamas-second-term-agenda.html But Obama’s victory has made almost no difference in changing the psychology or incentives of the members of the G.O.P. who matter most: the House Republicans. The idea that a bloc of conservative, mostly Southern, Republicans would start to coöperate with the President on issues like tax policy and immigration may have rested on a faulty assumption. The past few weeks of fiscal-cliff drama have taught us that “breaking the fever” was the wrong metaphor. There is no one event—even the election of a President—that can change a political party overnight. Congress is a co-equal branch of government, and House Republicans feel that they have as much of a mandate for their policies as Obama does for his. Shouldn’t House Republicans care that their views on Obama’s priorities, like tax cuts for the rich and immigration, helped cost Romney the White House and will make it difficult for their party’s nominee to win in 2016? In the abstract, many do, but that’s not enough to change the voting behavior of the average House Republican, who represents a gerrymandered and very conservative district. A better metaphor for the coming battles with Congress may be what Woody Hayes, the college-football coach, famously called “three yards and a cloud of dust”: a series of grinding plays where small victories are earned only after lots of intense combat. While the fiscal-cliff showdown demonstrated that there’s potential for bipartisan deal-making in the Senate, passing any Obama priority through the House of Representatives is nearly impossible unless the political pressure is extremely intense. The fiscal-cliff bill passed the House only when Speaker John Boehner’s members realized that their only alternative was blowing up the settlement negotiated by Joe Biden and Mitch McConnell—and accepting all the blame and consequences. That episode offers the White House a general template for the coming fights over spending, immigration, and gun control—three issues where there is very little consensus between Obama and most House Republicans. Deals will have to be negotiated in the Senate and gain the imprimatur of some high-profile Republicans. Then a pressure campaign will have to be mounted to convince Boehner to move the legislation to the floor of the House under rules that allow it to pass with mostly Democratic votes. It’s easier to see how this could happen with the coming budgetary issues, which have deadlines that force action, than for the rest of Obama’s agenda, which is more likely than not to simply die in the House. Winners lose Winners lose – prefer contextual evidence for election year Atkinson 2/6 (Selling the President's Ambitious Trade Agenda 2/6/14 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-d-atkinson-phd/selling-the-presidents-am_b_4733087.html Robert D. Atkinson, Ph.D. ¶ President, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation) Judging by congressional reaction to the trade elements in the State of the Union, President Obama still has his work cut out for him ift he's going to sell his plan to reticent Democrats (who remain unconvinced of the benefits of trade) and Republicans (who may not want to give him a big "win" in an election year). b. empirics for Obama Todd Eberly, 2013 (“The presidential power trap,” http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-capital-20130121_1_political-system-party-support-public-opinion/2, Accessed 1/24/2013, rwg) Barack Obama's election in 2008 seemed to signal a change. Mr. Obama's popular vote majority was the largest for any president since 1988, and he was the first Democrat to clear the 50 percent mark since Lyndon Johnson. The president initially enjoyed strong public approval and, with a Democratic Congress, was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year and early into his second, capped by enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. His impressive successes with Congress in 2009 and 2010 were accompanied by a shift in the public mood against him, evident in the rise of the tea party movement, the collapse in his approval rating, and the large GOP gains in the 2010 elections, which brought a return to divided government. c. causes backlash and media spin Purdum, 10 – Award winning journalist who spent 23 years with the NY Times (12/20/10, Todd S., Vanity Affair, “Obama Is Suffering Because of His Achievements, Not Despite Them,” http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2010/12/obama-is-suffering-because-of-his-achievements-not-despite-them.html) With this weekend’s decisive Senate repeal of the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy for gay service members, can anyone seriously doubt Barack Obama’s patient willingness to play the long game? Or his remarkable success in doing so? In less than two years in office—often against the odds and the smart money’s predictions at any given moment—Obama has managed to achieve a landmark overhaul of the nation’s health insurance system; the most sweeping change in the financial regulatory system since the Great Depression; the stabilization of the domestic auto industry; and the repeal of a once well-intended policy that even the military itself had come to see as unnecessary and unfair. So why isn’t his political standing higher? Precisely because of the raft of legislative victories he’s achieved. Obama has pushed through large and complicated new government initiatives at a time of record-low public trust in government (and in institutions of any sort, for that matter), and he has suffered not because he hasn’t “done” anything but because he’s done so much—way, way too much in the eyes of his most conservative critics. With each victory, Obama’s opponents grow more frustrated, filling the airwaves and what passes for political discourse with fulminations about some supposed sin or another. Is it any wonder the guy is bleeding a bit? For his part, Obama resists the pugilistic impulse. To him, the merit of all these programs has been self-evident, and he has been the first to acknowledge that he has not always done all he could to explain them, sensibly and simply, to the American public. But Obama is nowhere near so politically maladroit as his frustrated liberal supporters—or implacable right-wing opponents—like to claim. He proved as much, if nothing else, with his embrace of the one policy choice he surely loathed: his agreement to extend the Bush-era income tax cuts for wealthy people who don’t need and don’t deserve them. That broke one of the president’s signature campaign promises and enraged the Democratic base and many members of his own party in Congress. But it was a cool-eyed reflection of political reality: The midterm election results guaranteed that negotiations would only get tougher next month, and a delay in resolving the issue would have forced tax increases for virtually everyone on January 1—creating nothing but uncertainty for taxpayers and accountants alike. Obama saw no point in trying to score political debating points in an argument he knew he had no chance of winning. Moreover, as The Washington Post’s conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer bitterly noted, Obama’s agreement to the tax deal amounted to a second economic stimulus measure—one that he could never otherwise have persuaded Congressional Republicans to support. Krauthammer denounced it as the “swindle of the year,” and suggested that only Democrats could possibly be self-defeating enough to reject it. In the end, of course, they did not. Obama knows better than most people that politics is the art of the possible (it’s no accident that he became the first black president after less than a single term in the Senate), and an endless cycle of two steps forward, one step back. So he just keeps putting one foot in front of the other, confident that he can get where he wants to go, eventually. The short-term results are often messy and confusing. Just months ago, gay rights advocates were distraught because Obama wasn’t pressing harder to repeal “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Now he is apparently paying a price for his victory because some Republican Senators who’d promised to support ratification of the START arms-reduction treaty—identified by Obama as a signal priority for this lame-duck session of Congress—are balking because Obama pressed ahead with repealing DADT against their wishes. There is a price for everything in politics, and Obama knows that, too. Finally, Obama is hardly in anything close to disastrous political shape. Yes, the voters administered a shellacking to his party in December, but there are advantages to working with a hostile Republican Congress as a foil, instead of a balky Democratic one as a quarrelsome ally. His own personal likeability rating remains high—much higher than that of most politicians—and his job approval rating hovers at just a bit below 50 percent, where it has held for more than a year, nowhere near the level of a “failed presidency.” Sarah Palin’s presence for the moment assures an uncertain and divided Republican field heading into the 2012 election cycle, and the one man who could cause Obama a world of trouble if he mounted an independent campaign—Mayor Mike Bloomberg of New York—has recently made statements of non-candidacy that sound Shermanesque (even as he has remained outspokenly critical of business as usual by both parties in Washington). Illogical—a president would never lose PC PC finite- legislative wins don’t spillover –empirics, true for Obama, too polarized Eberly 13 Todd is coordinator of Public Policy Studies and assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at St. Mary's College of Maryland. His email is [email protected]. This article is excerpted from his book, co-authored with Steven Schier, "American Government and Popular Discontent: Stability without Success," to published later this year by Routledge Press., 1-21-2013 http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-capital-20130121_1_political-system-party-support-public-opinion/2 As Barack Obama prepares to be sworn in for the second time as president of the United States, he faces the stark reality that little of what he hopes to accomplish in a second term will likely come to pass. Mr. Obama occupies an office that many assume to be all powerful, but like so many of his recent predecessors, the president knows better. He faces a political capital problem and a power trap.¶ In the post-1960s American political system, presidents have found the exercise of effective leadership a difficult task. To lead well, a president needs support — or at least permission — from federal courts and Congress; steady allegiance from public opinion and fellow partisans in the electorate; backing from powerful, entrenched interest groups; and accordance with contemporary public opinion about the proper size and scope of government. This is a long list of requirements. If presidents fail to satisfy these requirements, they face the prospect of inadequate political support or political capital to back their power assertions.¶ What was so crucial about the 1960s? We can trace so much of what defines contemporary politics to trends that emerged then. Americans' confidence in government began a precipitous decline as the tumult and tragedies of the 1960s gave way to the scandals and economic uncertainties of the 1970s. Long-standing party coalitions began to fray as the New Deal coalition, which had elected Franklin Roosevelt to four terms and made Democrats the indisputable majority party, faded into history. The election of Richard Nixon in 1968 marked the beginning of an unprecedented era of divided government. Finally, the two parties began ideologically divergent journeys that resulted in intense polarization in Congress, diminishing the possibility of bipartisan compromise. These changes, combined with the growing influence of money and interest groups and the steady "thickening" of the federal bureaucracy, introduced significant challenges to presidential leadership.¶ Political capital can best be understood as a combination of the president's party support in Congress, public approval of his job performance, and the president's electoral victory margin. The components of political capital are central to the fate of presidencies. It is difficult to claim warrants for leadership in an era when job approval, congressional support and partisan affiliation provide less backing for a president than in times past. In recent years, presidents' political capital has shrunk while their power assertions have grown, making the president a volatile player in the national political system.¶ Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush joined the small ranks of incumbents defeated while seeking a second term. Ronald Reagan was elected in two landslides, yet his most successful year for domestic policy was his first year in office. Bill Clinton was twice elected by a comfortable margin, but with less than majority support, and despite a strong economy during his second term, his greatest legislative successes came during his first year with the passage of a controversial but crucial budget bill, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the North American Free Trade Agreement. George W. Bush won election in 2000 having lost the popular vote, and though his impact on national security policy after the Sept. 11 attacks was far reaching, his greatest domestic policy successes came during 2001. Ambitious plans for Social Security reform, following his narrow re-election in 2004, went nowhere.¶ Faced with obstacles to successful leadership, recent presidents have come to rely more on their formal powers. The number of important executive orders has increased significantly since the 1960s, as have the issuance of presidential signing statements. Both are used by presidents in an attempt to shape and direct policy on their terms. Presidents have had to rely more on recess appointments as well, appointing individuals to important positions during a congressional recess (even a weekend recess) to avoid delays and obstruction often encountered in the Senate. Such power assertions typically elicit close media scrutiny and often further erode political capital.¶ Barack Obama's election in 2008 seemed to signal a change. Mr. Obama's popular vote majority was the largest for any president since 1988, and he was the first Democrat to clear the 50 percent mark since Lyndon Johnson. The president initially enjoyed strong public approval and, with a Democratic Congress, was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year and early into his second, capped by enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. His impressive successes with Congress in 2009 and 2010 were accompanied by a shift in the public mood against him, evident in the rise of the tea party movement, the collapse in his approval rating, and the large GOP gains in the 2010 elections, which brought a return to divided government.¶ By mid-2011, Mr. Obama's job approval had slipped well below its initial levels, and Congress was proving increasingly intransigent. In the face of declining public support and rising congressional opposition, Mr. Obama, like his predecessors, looked to the energetic use of executive power. In 2012, the president relied on executive discretion and legal ambiguity to allow homeowners to more easily refinance federally backed mortgages, to help veterans find employment and to make it easier for college graduates to consolidate federal student loan debt. He issued several executive orders effecting change in the nation's enforcement of existing immigration laws. He used an executive order to authorize the Department of Education to grant states waivers from the requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act — though the enacting legislation makes no accommodation for such waivers. Contrary to the outcry from partisan opponents, Mr. Obama's actions were hardly unprecedented or imperial. Rather, they represented a rather typical power assertion from a contemporary president.¶ Many looked to the 2012 election as a means to break present trends. But Barack Obama's narrow re-election victory, coupled with the re-election of a somewhat-diminished Republican majority House and Democratic majority Senate, hardly signals a grand resurgence of his political capital. The president's recent issuance of multiple executive orders to deal with the issue of gun violence is further evidence of his power trap. Faced with the likelihood of legislative defeat in Congress, the president must rely on claims of unilateral power. But such claims are not without limit or cost and will likely further erode his political capital.¶ Only by solving the problem of political capital is a president likely to avoid a power trap. Presidents in recent years have been unable to prevent their political capital from eroding. When it did, their power assertions often got them into further political trouble. Through leveraging public support, presidents have at times been able to overcome contemporary leadership challenges by adopting as their own issues that the public already supports. Bill Clinton's centrist "triangulation" and George W. Bush's careful issue selection early in his presidency allowed them to secure important policy changes — in Mr. Clinton's case, welfare reform and budget balance, in Mr. Bush's tax cuts and education reform — that at the time received popular approval.¶ However, short-term legislative strategies may win policy success for a president but do not serve as an antidote to declining political capital over time, as the difficult final years of both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies demonstrate. None of Barack Obama's recent predecessors solved the political capital problem or avoided the power trap. It is the central political challenge confronted by modern presidents and one that will likely weigh heavily on the current president's mind today as he takes his second oath of office. Even if PC isn’t finite, Obama thinks it is – he’ll back off controversial issues even if he’s winning Robert Kuttner, co-editor of The American Prospect and a senior fellow at Demos, author of "Obama's Challenge: America's Economic Crisis and the Power of a Transformative Presidency, “Obama Has Amassed Enormous Political Capital, But He Doesn't Know What to Do with It,” 4-28-2011, http://www.alternet.org/economy/138641/obama_has_amassed_enormous_political_capital,_but_he_doesn%27t_know_what_to_do_with_it/?page=entire We got a small taste of what a more radical break might feel like when Obama briefly signaled with the release of Bush's torture memos that he might be open to further investigation of the Bush's torture policy, but then backtracked and quickly asked the Democratic leadership to shut the idea down. Evidently, Obama's political self wrestled with his constitutional conscience, and won. Civil libertarians felt a huge letdown, but protest was surprisingly muted. Thus the most important obstacle for seizing the moment to achieve enduring change: Barack Obama's conception of what it means to promote national unity. Obama repeatedly declared during the campaign that he would govern as a consensus builder. He wasn't lying. However, there are two ways of achieving consensus. One is to split the difference with your political enemies and the forces obstructing reform. The other is to use presidential leadership to transform the political center and alter the political dynamics. In his first hundred days, Obama has done a little of both, but he defaults to the politics of accommodation. Link proves Plan=/=win Political capital play’s a key role Beckmann & Kumar, 11 --- Department of Poli Sci and UC Irvine (Matthew N. Beckmann and Vimal Kumar, Journal of Theoretical Politics, “How presidents push, when presidents win: A model of positive presidential power in US lawmaking,” SAGE Journals Database) Agreeing that presidents’ strategic options in Congress do indeed depend heavily on factors beyond their control, our model’s first insight is explicating the two systematic strategies presidents have available for exerting influence in Congress: they can target marginal voters to shift the preference distribution on roll-call votes and they can target congressional leaders to censor the policy alternatives making it that far. While the first of these is widely recognized and studied, the second is not. By detailing the actual mechanisms of president-led coalition building on Capitol Hill, ours is a theory that puts positive presidential power on a firmer conceptual footing; legislative opportunities are predictable (if not controllable) and capitalizing on them depends on nothing more heroic than the normal grist of legislative politics: arm-twisting, brow-beating, and horse-trading. In this way, we subscribe to President Eisenhower’s observation: ‘I’ll tell you what leadership is: it’s persuasion, and conciliation, and education, and patience. It’s long, slow, tough work’ (Hughes, 1963: 124). However, if spending political capital in the service of vote-centered and agenda-centered strategies is a necessary condition for presidents to have positive influence in Congress, it certainly is not a sufficient condition. Instead, we find the exact policy return on a particular presidential lobbying campaign is conditioned by the location of the status quo, and the nature of leading opponents’ and pivotal voters’ preferences. Beyond enjoying ample political capital, then, those presidents who seek to change far-off status quos and confront pliable leading opponents and/or pivotal voters are expected to wield the greatest policymaking impact. By comparison, presidents with little to no political capital, seeking to change centrist status quos, or confronting opposing leaders and pivotal voters who staunchly oppose their proposals can find themselves with ‘nothing to do but stand there and take it’, as Lyndon Johnson once put it. Political capital is key to switching votes Kuttner 11 (Robert, Senior Fellow – Demos and Co-editor – American Prospect, “Barack Obama's Theory of Power,” The American Prospect, 5-16, http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=barack_obamas_theory_of_power) As the political scientist Richard Neustadt observed in his classic work, Presidential Power, a book that had great influence on President John F. Kennedy, the essence of a president's power is "the power to persuade." Because our divided constitutional system does not allow the president to lead by commanding, presidents amass power by making strategic choices about when to use the latent authority of the presidency to move public and elite opinion and then use that added prestige as clout to move Congress. In one of Neustadt's classic case studies, Harry Truman, a president widely considered a lame duck, nonetheless persuaded the broad public and a Republican Congress in 1947-1948 that the Marshall Plan was a worthy idea. As Neustadt and Burns both observed, though an American chief executive is weak by constitutional design, a president possesses several points of leverage. He can play an effective outside game, motivating and shaping public sentiment, making clear the differences between his values and those of his opposition, and using popular support to box in his opponents and move them in his direction. He can complement the outside bully pulpit with a nimble inside game, uniting his legislative party, bestowing or withholding benefits on opposition legislators, forcing them to take awkward votes, and using the veto. He can also enlist the support of interest groups to pressure Congress, and use media to validate his framing of choices. Done well, all of this signals leadership that often moves the public agenda. Insiders believe it’s true Schier, 11 --- Professor of Political Science at Carleton College (December 2011, Steven E., Presidential Studies Quarterly, “The Contemporary Presidency: The Presidential Authority Problem and the Political Power Trap,” vol. 41, no. 4, Wiley Online Library) The concept of political capital captures many of the aspects of a president's political authority. Paul Light defines several components of political capital: party support of the president in Congress, public approval of the president's conduct of his job, the president's electoral margin, and patronage appointments (Light 1999, 15). Light derived this list from the observations of 126 White House staff members he interviewed (1999, 14). His indicators have two central uses. First, Light's research reveals that they are central to the “players' perspective” in Washington. That is, those “in the game” view these items as crucial for presidential effectiveness. Second, they relate to many central aspects of political authority as defined by Skowronek. So on both theoretical and practical levels, the components of political capital are central to the fate of presidencies. The data here will reveal that presidents over the last 70 years have suffered from a trend of declining levels of political capital, a trend that is at the heart of their political authority problem. Many scholars have examined particular aspects of presidential political capital, from congressional support (for example, Bond and Fleisher 1992, 2000; Mayhew 2005; Peterson 1993) to job approval (Brace and Hinckley 1991; Kernell 1978; Nicholson Segura and Woods 2002). From these, we know that presidential job approval is influenced by economic performance, tends to drop over time, and that divided government can boost job approval. Also, job approval and control of Congress by fellow partisans boosts presidential success in floor votes but does not produce more important legislation than does periods of divided government. These “micro” findings, however, comport with a “macro trend” of declining presidential political capital over time. This analysis explores that macro trend and relates it to previous micro findings. Works even in polarization Beckmann and Kumar, 2011- *Professor of Political Science at UC Irvine and author of multiple books on how presidents push their agenda through, AND **Professor of Economics at the Indian Institute of Technology (*Matthew N. AND **Vimal, September 2011, “Opportunism in Polarization: Presidential Success in Key Senate Votes, 1953-2008,” Published in Presidential Studies Quarterly, Volume 41 Issue 3, Accessed using Wiley Online Library FG) The United States' founders never intended federal lawmaking to be easy and, in fact, fashioned a constitutional design—including bicameralism and vetoes, staggered terms and separated constituencies—to ensure the nation's elected officials could not easily impose new laws on their constituents. As a first point, therefore, it is worth underscoring that disagreements across Pennsylvania are not necessarily symptomatic of a poorly functioning republic. If anything, George Will's insight is apt: “Gridlock is not an American problem, it is an American achievement” (Washington Post, November 4, 1999, A 35). Yet widespread disagreement does not necessarily indicate a broken policy-making process, nor are legislative failures always benign. For even though the framers did not want congressional coalition-building to be easy, nor did they want it to be impossible—not in addressing the nation's pressing problems, not in answering citizens' considered demands. And this is why the polarization that currently grips the nation's capital matters. By making winning coalitions so hard to assemble, a broad swath of status quos effectively impossible to replace, polarization presents a comparable challenge for practitioners and political scientists alike: understanding how, even amidst vast divisions, the nation's representatives can corral the votes needed to avoid “doing nothing.” A modest step in this direction is what this paper sought to offer. First, building on previous research that shows congressional polarization frequently produces legislative gridlock, we augmented this work in ways that helped uncover polarization's conditional impact on lawmaking. We did so by first highlighting presidents' key coalition-building role in postwar America and second, incorporating it into familiar voting models while varying both presidents' political capital and Congress's polarization. Theoretical results showed that even as polarization renders coalition building more difficult when the president lacks political capital (or chooses not to use it promoting legislation), also uncovered was an interesting and somewhat counterintuitive prediction: polarization around the pivotal voter can actually provide presidents a unique opportunity to win key votes, secure legislative success, and influence national legislation. Using CQ's key Senate votes from 1954 to 2008, a first test of our opportunism in polarization model corroborated these principal hypotheses, including the prediction that polarization qua polarization can actually boost presidents' chances for prevailing on important, contested roll-call votes, especially when enjoying high approval ratings and strong economic growth. In doing so, these results also shed light on familiar empirical findings showing presidents often, but not always, help pass important legislation even when confronted with substantial polarization, divided government, or both (Beckmann 2010; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Mayhew 2005; Peterson 1990). Going forward, then, we hope this study spawns follow-up work on the relationship between polarization, presidents, and policy making. For our argument and evidence suggest that in today's polarized political environment—where winning coalitions rarely emerge effortlessly—key to understanding policy-making outcomes is understanding what policies presidents support and, even more, what policies they are willing to invest resources promoting on Capitol Hill. Thus, research better capturing presidents' lobbying and political capital would offer more precise estimates of presidents' attempts at exerting influence, while developing better measures of policy outcomes (especially ones not inferred from roll-call votes) would permit more robust tests of those efforts' effectiveness. All of this would shine new light on the conditions that shape national policy making in today's polarized environment, particularly presidents' vital role therein.
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<h4><strong>SOTOMAYOR MEANS OBAMA IS BLAMED FOR COURT DECISIONS. </h4><p>SAMUEL 9 </strong> (Terence Samuel, Deputy Editor– The Root and Senior Correspondent - Prospect, “Obama's Honeymoon Nears Its End”, American Prospect, 5/29, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=obamas_honeymoon_nears_its_end)</p><p>This week, Barack <u><strong><mark>Obama named his</u></strong></mark> first <u><strong><mark>nominee to the Supreme Court</u></strong></mark>, then headed west to Las Vegas and Los Angeles to raise money for Democrats in the 2010 midterms. Taken together, these two seemingly disparate acts mark the end of a certain period of innocence in the Obama administration: The "blame Bush" phase of the Obama administration is over, and the prolonged honeymoon that the president has enjoyed with the country and the media will soon come to an end as well. Obama is no longer just the inheritor of Bush's mess. <u><strong>This is now his presidency in his own right. The chance to choose a Supreme Court justice is such a sui generis exercise of executive power</u></strong> -- it so powerfully underscores the vast and unique powers of a president -- <u><strong>that</strong> <strong><mark>blame-shifting has become a less effective political strategy,</u></strong></mark> and less becoming as well. <u><strong>Obama's political maturation will be hastened by the impending ideological fight that is now virtually a guarantee for Supreme Court nominations</u></strong>. Old wounds will be opened, and old animosities will be triggered as the process moves along<strong>. <u>Already we see the effect in the polls</u></strong>. While Obama himself remains incredibly popular, only 47 percent of Americans think his choice of Judge Sonia Sotomayor is an excellent or good choice for the Court, according to the latest Gallup poll. The stimulus package scored better than that. The prospect of a new justice really seems to force people to reconsider their culture warrior allegiances in the context of the party in power. This month, after news of Justice David Souter's retirement, a Gallup poll showed that more Americans considered themselves against abortion rights than in favor: 51 percent to 42 percent. Those number were almost exactly reversed a year ago when Bush was in office and Obama was on the verge of wrapping up the Democratic nomination. "This is the first time a majority of U.S. adults have identified themselves as pro-life since Gallup began asking this question in 1995," according to the polling organization. Is this the same country that elected Obama? Yes, but <u><strong>with his overwhelmingly Democratic Senate, the public may be sending preemptory signals that they are not interested in a huge swing on some of these cultural issues that tend to explode during nomination hearings</u></strong>. Even though Obama will win the Sotomayor fight, <u><strong><mark>her confirmation is likely to leave him less popular in the end because it will involve contentious issues</mark> -- questions of race and gender politics like affirmative action and abortion -- that he managed to avoid or at least finesse through his campaign and during his presidency so far.</p><p></u>Even if a confrontational strategy is key, that doesn’t mean the plan’s singular win spills-over—it’s more likely to undermine Obama’s careful strategy </p><p></strong>Ryan <strong>Lizza</strong>, 1/7/<strong>13</strong>, Will Hagel Spike the G.O.P.’s Fever?, www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/01/how-much-will-the-nomination-of-chuck-hagel-hurt-obamas-second-term-agenda.html</p><p>But <u><strong><mark>Obama’s victory</mark> has <mark>made </mark>almost <mark>no difference in changing the psychology or incentives of </mark>the <mark>members of the G.O.P. who matter</mark> most</u></strong>: the House Republicans. The idea that a bloc of conservative, mostly Southern, Republicans would start to coöperate with the President on issues like tax policy and immigration may have rested on a faulty assumption. The past few weeks of fiscal-cliff drama have taught us <mark>that “<u><strong>breaking the fever” was the wrong metaphor</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>There is no one event</u></strong></mark>—even the election of a President—<u><strong><mark>that can change a political party overnight</u></strong></mark>. Congress is a co-equal branch of government, and House Republicans feel that they have as much of a mandate for their policies as Obama does for his. Shouldn’t House Republicans care that their views on Obama’s priorities, like tax cuts for the rich and immigration, helped cost Romney the White House and will make it difficult for their party’s nominee to win in 2016? In the abstract, many do, but that’s not enough to change the voting behavior of the average House Republican, who represents a gerrymandered and very conservative district. <u><strong><mark>A better metaphor for </mark>the <mark>coming battles </mark>with Congress may be</u></strong> what Woody Hayes, the college-football coach, famously called “<u><strong><mark>three yards and a cloud of dust</mark>”: <mark>a series of grinding plays where </mark>small <mark>victories are earned only after </mark>lots of <mark>intense combat</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>While the <mark>fiscal-cliff</mark> showdown <mark>demonstrated </mark>that <mark>there’s potential for bipartisan deal-making </mark>in the Senate, <mark>passing </mark>any Obama priority through <mark>the House </mark>of Representatives <mark>is </mark>nearly <mark>impossible unless </mark>the political <mark>pressure is extremely intense</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The fiscal-cliff bill</u></strong> passed the House only when Speaker John Boehner’s members realized that their only alternative was blowing up the settlement negotiated by Joe Biden and Mitch McConnell—and accepting all the blame and consequences. That episode <u><strong>offers the White House a general template for the coming fights over spending</u></strong>, immigration, and gun control—three <u><strong>issues where there is very little consensus between Obama and most House Republicans. <mark>Deals will have to be negotiated</mark> in the Senate <mark>and gain </mark>the <mark>imprimatur of</mark> some high-profile <mark>Republicans</mark>. Then a pressure campaign will have to be mounted to convince Boehner to move the legislation to the floor of the House under rules that allow it to pass with mostly Democratic votes. It’s easier to see how this could happen with the coming budgetary issues, which have deadlines that force action, than for the rest of Obama’s agenda, which is more likely than not to simply die in the House.</p><p></u>Winners lose</p><p>Winners lose – prefer contextual evidence for election year</p><p>Atkinson 2/6 </strong>(Selling the President's Ambitious Trade Agenda 2/6/14 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-d-atkinson-phd/selling-the-presidents-am_b_4733087.html Robert D. Atkinson, Ph.D. ¶ <u><strong>President, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation)</p><p></strong>Judging by congressional reaction</u> to the trade elements in the State of the Union, <u><mark>President Obama still has his work cut out for him</u></mark> ift he's going to sell his plan to reticent Democrats (who remain unconvinced of the benefits of trade) and <u><mark>Republicans</u></mark> (who <u><strong><mark>may not want to give him a big "win" in an election year).</p><p></u></mark>b. empirics for Obama</p><p></strong>Todd <strong>Eberly, 2013</strong> (“The presidential power trap,” http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-capital-20130121_1_political-system-party-support-public-opinion/2, Accessed 1/24/2013, rwg)</p><p>Barack Obama's election in 2008 seemed to signal a change. Mr. Obama's popular vote majority was the largest for any president since 1988, and he was the first Democrat to clear the 50 percent mark since Lyndon Johnson. <u><strong><mark>The president initially enjoyed strong </mark>public <mark>approval and</u></strong></mark>, with a Democratic Congress, <u><strong><mark>was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year </mark>and early into his second, </u></strong>capped by enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. <u><strong><mark>But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. </mark>His impressive successes with Congress in 2009 and 2010 were accompanied by a shift in the public mood against him, evident in the rise of the tea party movement, the collapse in his approval rating, and the large GOP gains in the 2010 elections, which brought a return to divided government.</p><p></u>c. causes backlash and <u>media spin</p><p>Purdum, 10</u> – Award winning journalist who spent 23 years with the NY Times (12/20/10, Todd S., Vanity Affair, “Obama Is Suffering Because of His Achievements, Not Despite Them,” http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2010/12/obama-is-suffering-because-of-his-achievements-not-despite-them.html<u>)</p><p></u></strong>With this weekend’s decisive Senate repeal of the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy for gay service members, can anyone seriously doubt Barack Obama’s patient willingness to play the long game? Or his remarkable success in doing so? In less than two years in office—often against the odds and the smart money’s predictions at any given moment—<u><mark>Obama</mark> has <mark>managed to achieve a</u></mark> landmark <u><mark>overhaul of</u></mark> the nation’s <u><mark>health insurance</u></mark> system; the most <u>sweeping <mark>change in the financial</mark> regulatory <mark>system</u></mark> since the Great Depression; the <u>stabilization of the</u> domestic <u>auto industry</u>; <u>and the repeal of a once well-intended policy that even the military itself had come to see as unnecessary and unfair.</u> <u>So <mark>why isn’t his political standing higher</mark>?</p><p>Precisely <mark>because of the raft of legislative victories he’s achieved</mark>.</u> Obama has pushed through large and complicated new government initiatives at a time of record-low public trust in government (and in institutions of any sort, for that matter), and <u><mark>he has suffered</mark> not because he hasn’t “done” anything but <mark>because he’s done so much</mark>—way, way too much in the eyes of his most conservative critics.</u> <u><mark>With each victory, Obama’s opponents grow more frustrated</mark>, <mark>filling the airwaves</mark> and what passes for political discourse with fulminations about some supposed sin or another</u>. Is it any wonder <u><mark>the guy is bleeding</u></mark> a bit? For his part, Obama resists the pugilistic impulse. <u>To him, the merit of all these programs has been self-evident,</u> and he has been the first to acknowledge that <u><mark>he has not always done all he could to explain them</mark>,</u> sensibly and simply, to the American public. But Obama is nowhere near so politically maladroit as his frustrated liberal supporters—or implacable right-wing opponents—like to claim. He proved as much, if nothing else, with his embrace of the one policy choice he surely loathed: his agreement to extend the Bush-era income tax cuts for wealthy people who don’t need and don’t deserve them. That broke one of the president’s signature campaign promises and enraged the Democratic base and many members of his own party in Congress. But it was a cool-eyed reflection of political reality: The midterm election results guaranteed that negotiations would only get tougher next month, and a delay in resolving the issue would have forced tax increases for virtually everyone on January 1—creating nothing but uncertainty for taxpayers and accountants alike. Obama saw no point in trying to score political debating points in an argument he knew he had no chance of winning. Moreover, as The Washington Post’s conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer bitterly noted, Obama’s agreement to the tax deal amounted to a second economic stimulus measure—one that he could never otherwise have persuaded Congressional Republicans to support. Krauthammer denounced it as the “swindle of the year,” and suggested that only Democrats could possibly be self-defeating enough to reject it. In the end, of course, they did not. Obama knows better than most people that politics is the art of the possible (it’s no accident that he became the first black president after less than a single term in the Senate), and an endless cycle of two steps forward, one step back. So he just keeps putting one foot in front of the other, confident that he can get where he wants to go, eventually. The short-term results are often messy and confusing. Just months ago, gay rights advocates were distraught because Obama wasn’t pressing harder to repeal “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Now he is apparently paying a price for his victory because some Republican Senators who’d promised to support ratification of the START arms-reduction treaty—identified by Obama as a signal priority for this lame-duck session of Congress—are balking because Obama pressed ahead with repealing DADT against their wishes. <u>There is a price for everything in politics,</u> and Obama knows that, too. Finally, Obama is hardly in anything close to disastrous political shape. Yes, the voters administered a shellacking to his party in December, but there are advantages to working with a hostile Republican Congress as a foil, instead of a balky Democratic one as a quarrelsome ally. His own personal likeability rating remains high—much higher than that of most politicians—and his job approval rating hovers at just a bit below 50 percent, where it has held for more than a year, nowhere near the level of a “failed presidency.” Sarah Palin’s presence for the moment assures an uncertain and divided Republican field heading into the 2012 election cycle, and the one man who could cause Obama a world of trouble if he mounted an independent campaign—Mayor Mike Bloomberg of New York—has recently made statements of non-candidacy that sound Shermanesque<u><strong> (even as he has remained outspokenly critical of business as usual by both parties in Washington).</p><p>Illogical—a president would never lose PC </p><p></u>PC finite- legislative wins don’t spillover –empirics, true for Obama, too polarized </p><p>Eberly 13</strong> Todd is coordinator of Public Policy Studies and assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at St. Mary's College of Maryland. His email is [email protected]. This article is excerpted from his book, co-authored with Steven Schier, "American Government and Popular Discontent: Stability without Success," to published later this year by Routledge Press., 1-21-2013 http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-capital-20130121_1_political-system-party-support-public-opinion/2</p><p>As Barack <u><mark>Obama</u></mark> prepares to be sworn in for the second time as president of the United States, he <u><mark>faces</u></mark> <u>the <mark>stark</u> <u>reality</u></mark> that <u><strong><mark>little of what he hopes to accomplish</u></strong></mark> in a second term <u><strong><mark>will</u></strong></mark> likely <u><strong>come to <mark>pass</u></strong></mark>. Mr. <u>Obama occupies</u> <u>an office</u> that <u>many</u> <u>assume</u> to be <u>all powerful</u>, <u>but</u> like so many of his recent predecessors, <u>the president</u> knows better. He <u>faces a political capital problem and a power trap</u>.¶ In the post-1960s American political system, <u>presidents have found</u> the exercise of <u>effective leadership</u> a <u>difficult</u> task. <u>To lead well, a president needs support</u> — or at least permission — from federal courts and Congress; steady allegiance from public opinion and fellow partisans in the electorate; backing from powerful, entrenched interest groups; and accordance with contemporary public opinion about the proper size and scope of government. This is a long list of requirements. <u>If presidents fail to satisfy these</u> requirements, <u>they face the</u> <u>prospect of inadequate</u> political support or <u>political capital to back their power assertions</u>.¶ What was so crucial about the 1960s? We can trace so much of what defines contemporary politics to trends that emerged then. Americans' confidence in government began a precipitous decline as the tumult and tragedies of the 1960s gave way to the scandals and economic uncertainties of the 1970s. Long-standing party coalitions began to fray as the New Deal coalition, which had elected Franklin Roosevelt to four terms and made Democrats the indisputable majority party, faded into history. The election of Richard Nixon in 1968 marked the beginning of an unprecedented era of divided government. Finally, the <u><mark>two parties</u></mark> began <u><mark>ideologically</mark> <mark>divergent</u></mark> journeys that <u><mark>result</mark>ed</u> <u><mark>in</u> <u>intense polarization</u></mark> in Congress, <u><mark>diminishing</u></mark> <u>the possibility of</u> bipartisan <u><mark>compromise</u></mark>. <u><mark>These</u></mark> changes, combined with the growing influence of money and interest groups and the steady "thickening" of the federal bureaucracy, <u><mark>introduced</u> <u>significant</u> <u>challenges to </mark>presidential <mark>leadership</u></mark>.¶ Political capital can best be understood as a combination of the president's party support in Congress, public approval of his job performance, and the president's electoral victory margin. The components of political capital are central to the fate of presidencies. It is difficult to claim warrants for leadership in an era when job approval, congressional support and partisan affiliation provide less backing for a president than in times past. <u>In recent years</u>, <u><strong><mark>presidents' p</mark>olitical <mark>c</mark>apital has <mark>shrunk while</mark> their <mark>power</mark> <mark>assertions</mark> <mark>have</mark> <mark>grown</mark>,</u></strong> making the president a volatile player in the national political system.¶ Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush joined the small ranks of incumbents defeated while seeking a second term. Ronald Reagan was elected in two landslides, yet his most successful year for domestic policy was his first year in office. Bill Clinton was twice elected by a comfortable margin, but with less than majority support, and despite a strong economy during his second term, his greatest legislative successes came during his first year with the passage of a controversial but crucial budget bill, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the North American Free Trade Agreement. George W. Bush won election in 2000 having lost the popular vote, and though his impact on national security policy after the Sept. 11 attacks was far reaching, his greatest domestic policy successes came during 2001. Ambitious plans for Social Security reform, following his narrow re-election in 2004, went nowhere.¶ Faced with obstacles to successful leadership, recent presidents have come to rely more on their formal powers. The number of important executive orders has increased significantly since the 1960s, as have the issuance of presidential signing statements. Both are used by presidents in an attempt to shape and direct policy on their terms. Presidents have had to rely more on recess appointments as well, appointing individuals to important positions during a congressional recess (even a weekend recess) to avoid delays and obstruction often encountered in the Senate. Such power assertions typically elicit close media scrutiny and often further erode political capital.¶ Barack Obama's election in 2008 seemed to signal a change. Mr. Obama's popular vote majority was the largest for any president since 1988, and he was the first Democrat to clear the 50 percent mark since Lyndon Johnson. The president initially enjoyed strong public approval and, with a Democratic Congress, was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year and early into his second, capped by enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. His impressive successes with Congress in 2009 and 2010 were accompanied by a shift in the public mood against him, evident in the rise of the tea party movement, the collapse in his approval rating, and the large GOP gains in the 2010 elections, which brought a return to divided government.¶ By mid-2011, Mr. Obama's job approval had slipped well below its initial levels, and Congress was proving increasingly intransigent. In the face of declining public support and rising congressional opposition, Mr. Obama, like his predecessors, looked to the energetic use of executive power. In 2012, the president relied on executive discretion and legal ambiguity to allow homeowners to more easily refinance federally backed mortgages, to help veterans find employment and to make it easier for college graduates to consolidate federal student loan debt. He issued several executive orders effecting change in the nation's enforcement of existing immigration laws. He used an executive order to authorize the Department of Education to grant states waivers from the requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act — though the enacting legislation makes no accommodation for such waivers. Contrary to the outcry from partisan opponents, Mr. Obama's actions were hardly unprecedented or imperial. Rather, they represented a rather typical power assertion from a contemporary president.¶ Many looked to the 2012 election as a means to break present trends. But Barack <u>Obama's narrow re-election</u> victory, coupled with the re-election of a somewhat-diminished Republican majority House and Democratic majority Senate, <u>hardly signals a grand resurgence of</u> his <u>political capital</u>. The president's recent issuance of multiple executive orders to deal with the issue of gun violence is further evidence of his power trap. Faced with the likelihood of legislative defeat in Congress, the president must rely on claims of unilateral power. But such claims are not without limit or cost and will likely further erode his political capital.¶ Only by solving the problem of political capital is a president likely to avoid a power trap. <u><strong><mark>Presidents</u></strong></mark> in recent years <u><strong><mark>have been unable to prevent</mark> their <mark>p</mark>olitical <mark>c</mark>apital <mark>from eroding</u></strong></mark>. When it did, their power assertions often got them into further political trouble. Through leveraging public support, presidents have at times been able to overcome contemporary leadership challenges by adopting as their own issues that the public already supports. Bill Clinton's centrist "triangulation" and George W. Bush's careful issue selection early in his presidency allowed them to secure important policy changes — in Mr. Clinton's case, welfare reform and budget balance, in Mr. Bush's tax cuts and education reform — that at the time received popular approval.¶ However, <u><mark>short-term legislative</mark> <mark>strategies</u></mark> <u>may win policy success</u> for a president <u>but <mark>do not serve as an antidote to</u> <u>declining <strong>p</strong></mark>olitical <strong><mark>c</strong></mark>apital</u> over time, as the difficult final years of both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies demonstrate. None of Barack Obama's recent predecessors solved <u>the political capital</u> problem or avoided the power trap. It <u>is the central political challenge</u> <u>confronted by modern presidents<strong> and one that will likely weigh heavily on the current president's mind today as he takes his second oath of office.</p><p></u>Even if PC isn’t finite, Obama thinks it is – he’ll back off controversial issues even if he’s winning</p><p></strong>Robert <strong>Kuttner</strong>, co-editor of The American Prospect and a senior fellow at Demos, author of "Obama's Challenge: America's Economic Crisis and the Power of a Transformative Presidency, “Obama Has Amassed Enormous Political Capital, But He Doesn't Know What to Do with It,” 4-28-<strong>2011,</strong> http://www.alternet.org/economy/138641/obama_has_amassed_enormous_political_capital,_but_he_doesn%27t_know_what_to_do_with_it/?page=entire</p><p>We got a small taste of what a more radical break might feel like when <u><mark>Obama</u></mark> briefly <u><mark>signaled</u></mark> with <u><mark>the</u> <u>release of</u></mark> Bush's <u><mark>torture memos</u></mark> that he might be open to further investigation of the Bush's torture policy<u>, <mark>but then backtracked</u></mark> and quickly asked the Democratic leadership to shut the idea down. Evidently, <u><mark>Obama's</u></mark> political <u><mark>self wrestled</u></mark> with his constitutional conscience, and won. Civil libertarians felt a huge letdown, but protest was surprisingly muted. Thus <u>the most important obstacle for</u> seizing the moment to achieve enduring <u>change</u>: Barack <u>Obama's conception of</u> what it means to promote <u>national unity</u>. Obama repeatedly declared during the campaign that he would govern as a consensus builder. He wasn't lying. However, there are two ways of achieving consensus. One is to split the difference with your political enemies and the forces obstructing reform. The other is to use presidential leadership to transform the political center and alter the political dynamics. In his first hundred days, <u><mark>Obama</u></mark> has done a little of both, but he <u><strong><mark>defaults to the politics of accommodation.</p><p></mark>Link proves Plan=/=win</p><p></u>Political capital play’s a <u>key role</p><p></u>Beckmann & Kumar, 11</strong> --- Department of Poli Sci and UC Irvine (Matthew N. Beckmann and Vimal<u> Kumar, Journal of Theoretical Politics, “How presidents push, when presidents win: A model of positive presidential power in US lawmaking,” SAGE Journals Database)</p><p></u>Agreeing that presidents’ strategic options in Congress do indeed depend heavily on factors beyond their control, our model’s first insight is explicating the two systematic strategies <u><mark>presidents</u></mark> have available for exerting influence in Congress: they <u><mark>can <strong>target marginal voters </strong>to <strong>shift</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>preference distribution</strong></mark> on roll-call votes and they can target congressional leaders to censor the policy alternatives making it that far.</u> While the first of these is widely recognized and studied, the second is not. <u>By detailing the actual mechanisms of <mark>president-led coalition building</mark> on Capitol Hill, ours is a theory that <mark>puts <strong>positive presidential power</strong> on a <strong>firmer conceptual footing</strong></mark>; legislative opportunities are predictable (if not controllable) and <mark>capitalizing</mark> on them <mark>depends on</mark> nothing more heroic than the normal grist of legislative politics: <strong><mark>arm-twisting</strong>, <strong></mark>brow-beating</strong>, <mark>and <strong>horse-trading</strong></mark>.</u> In this way, <u>we subscribe to</u> President <u>Eisenhower’s observation: ‘I’ll tell you what leadership is: it’s persuasion, and conciliation, and education, and patience. It’s long, slow, tough work’</u> (Hughes, 1963: 124). However, if <u><mark>spending <strong>political capital</u></strong></mark> in the service of vote-centered and agenda-centered strategies <u><mark>is a <strong>necessary condition</strong> for presidents to have <strong>positive influence</strong> in Congress</u></mark>, it certainly is not a sufficient condition. Instead, we find the exact policy return on a particular presidential lobbying campaign is conditioned by the location of the status quo, and the nature of leading opponents’ and pivotal voters’ preferences. Beyond enjoying ample political capital, then, <u>those presidents who seek to change far-off status quos and confront pliable leading opponents and/or pivotal voters are expected to wield the greatest policymaking impact</u>. By comparison, <u><strong>presidents with little to no political capital, seeking to change centrist status quos, or confronting opposing leaders and pivotal voters who staunchly oppose their proposals can find themselves with ‘nothing to do but stand there and take it’, as Lyndon Johnson once put it.</p><p></u>Political capital is key to switching votes</p><p>Kuttner 11 (<u></strong>Robert, Senior Fellow – Demos and Co-editor – American Prospect, “Barack Obama's Theory of Power,” The American Prospect, 5-16, http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=barack_obamas_theory_of_power)</p><p>As the political scientist</u> Richard <u><mark>Neustadt observed</u></mark> in his classic work, Presidential Power, a book that had great influence on President John F. Kennedy, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> essence of a <mark>president's power</mark> is "the power <mark>to persuade</mark>."</u></strong> Because our divided constitutional system does not allow the president to lead by commanding, <u><mark>presidents amass power by <strong>making strategic choices</strong> about when to use</mark> the latent <mark>authority</mark> of the presidency to move public and elite opinion and then use that added prestige as clout to move Congress.</u> In one of Neustadt's classic case studies, Harry Truman, a president widely considered a lame duck, nonetheless persuaded the broad public and a Republican Congress in 1947-1948 that the Marshall Plan was a worthy idea. As Neustadt and Burns both observed, <u>though an American chief executive is weak by constitutional design, <strong><mark>a president possesses several points of leverage</strong>.</mark> He can play an effective outside game, motivating and shaping public sentiment, making clear the differences between his values and those of his opposition, and <strong><mark>using popular support to box in his opponents</mark> and move them in his direction</strong>. He can complement the outside bully pulpit with a nimble inside game, uniting his legislative party, bestowing or withholding benefits on opposition legislators, forcing them to take awkward votes, and using the veto. <mark>He can also enlist the support of interest groups to pressure Congress, and use media to validate his framing of choices<strong></mark>. Done well, all of this signals leadership that often moves the public agenda.</p><p>Insiders</u> believe it’s true</p><p>Schier, 11</strong> --- Professor of Political Science at Carleton College (December 2011, Steven E., Presidential Studies Quarterly, “The Contemporary Presidency: The Presidential Authority Problem and the Political Power Trap,” vol. 41, no. 4, Wiley Online Library)</p><p>The concept of political capital captures many of the aspects of a president's political authority. Paul <u>Light defines several components of political capital: party support of the president in Congress, public approval of the president's conduct of his job, the president's electoral margin, and patronage appointments</u> (Light 1999, 15). <u>Light derived this list from the observations of 126 White House staff members he interviewed</u> (1999, 14). His indicators have two central uses. First, <u><mark>Light's research reveals </mark>that <mark>they are <strong>central to the “players' perspective” in Washington</strong></mark>.</u> That is, <u><strong><mark>those “in the game”</strong> view these items as crucial</mark> for presidential effectiveness</u>. Second, they relate to many central aspects of political authority as defined by Skowronek. So <u>on both theoretical and practical levels, the components of political capital are central to the fate of presidencies</u>. The data here will reveal that <u>presidents over the last 70 years have suffered from a trend of <mark>declining</mark> levels of political <mark>capital</mark>, a trend that <mark>is</mark> at <mark>the <strong>heart of their</mark> political <mark>authority problem</u></strong></mark>. Many scholars have examined particular aspects of presidential political capital, from congressional support (for example, Bond and Fleisher 1992, 2000; Mayhew 2005; Peterson 1993) to job approval (Brace and Hinckley 1991; Kernell<strong> 1978; Nicholson Segura and Woods 2002). From these, we know that presidential job approval is influenced by economic performance, tends to drop over time, and that divided government can boost job approval. Also, job approval and control of Congress by fellow partisans boosts presidential success in floor votes but does not produce more important legislation than does periods of divided government. These “micro” findings, however, comport with a “macro trend” of declining presidential political capital over time. This analysis explores that macro trend and relates it to previous micro findings.</p><p>Works <u>even in polarization</p><p></u>Beckmann and Kumar, 2011</strong>- *Professor of Political Science at UC Irvine and author of multiple books on how presidents push their agenda through, AND **Professor of Economics at the Indian Institute of Technology (*Matthew N. AND **Vimal, September 2011, “Opportunism in Polarization: Presidential Success in Key Senate Votes, 1953-2008,” Published in Presidential Studies Quarterly, Volume 41 Issue 3, Accessed using Wiley Online Library FG)</p><p>The United States' founders never intended federal lawmaking to be easy and, in fact, fashioned a constitutional design—including bicameralism and vetoes, staggered terms and separated constituencies—to ensure the nation's elected officials could not easily impose new laws on their constituents. As a first point, therefore, it is worth underscoring that disagreements across Pennsylvania are not necessarily symptomatic of a poorly functioning republic. If anything, George Will's insight is apt: “Gridlock is not an American problem, it is an American achievement” (Washington Post, November 4, 1999, A 35).</p><p>Yet <u>widespread disagreement does not necessarily indicate a broken policy-making process, nor are legislative failures always benign. For even though the framers did not want congressional coalition-building to be easy, nor did they want it to be impossible</u>—not in addressing the nation's pressing problems, not in answering citizens' considered demands. And this is why the polarization that currently grips the nation's capital matters. By making winning coalitions so hard to assemble, a broad swath of status quos effectively impossible to replace, <u>polarization presents a</u> comparable <u>challenge for practitioners</u> and political scientists alike: <u>understanding how,</u> even amidst vast divisions, <u>the nation's representatives can corral the votes needed to avoid “doing nothing.”</u> A modest step in this direction is what this paper sought to offer. First, building on previous research that shows <u>congressional polarization frequently produces legislative gridlock</u>, we augmented this work in ways that helped uncover polarization's conditional impact on lawmaking. We did so by first highlighting presidents' key coalition-building role in postwar America and second, incorporating it into familiar voting models while varying both presidents' political capital and Congress's polarization. Theoretical <u>results showed that even as polarization renders coalition building more difficult when the president lacks political capital (or chooses not to use it promoting legislation),</u> also uncovered was an interesting and somewhat counterintuitive prediction: <u><strong><mark>polarization</mark> around the pivotal voter <mark>can </mark>actually <mark>provide presidents a unique opportunity to win key votes, secure legislative success, and influence</mark> national <mark>legislation</mark>. </u></strong>Using CQ's key Senate votes from 1954 to 2008, a first test of our opportunism in polarization model corroborated these principal hypotheses, including the prediction that <u>polarization</u> qua polarization <u>can actually boost presidents' chances for prevailing on important, contested roll-call votes,</u> especially when enjoying high approval ratings and strong economic growth. In doing so, these results also shed light on familiar empirical findings showing <u><strong><mark>presidents often</u></strong></mark>, but not always,<u> <strong><mark>help pass important legislation even when confronted with</mark> substantial <mark>polarization</strong></mark>, divided government, or both</u> (Beckmann 2010; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Mayhew 2005; Peterson 1990). Going forward, then, we hope this study spawns follow-up work on the relationship between polarization, presidents, and policy making. For our argument and evidence suggest that in today's polarized political environment—where winning coalitions rarely emerge effortlessly—key to understanding policy-making outcomes is understanding what policies presidents support and, even more, what policies they are willing to invest resources promoting on Capitol Hill. Thus, research better capturing presidents' lobbying and political capital would offer more precise estimates of presidents' attempts at exerting influence, while developing better measures of policy outcomes (especially ones not inferred from roll-call votes) would permit more robust tests of those efforts' effectiveness. All of this would shine new light on the conditions that shape national policy making in today's polarized environment, particularly presidents' vital role therein.</p>
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Imm
129,598
22
17,109
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
565,261
N
Wake
3
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
Watson
AG Politics (2NR) Narrow Ruling CP (2NR) Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR) T - nearly all Test Case Fiat
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
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18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,677
Stores can’t meet demand and artificially inflate the price – causes black markets
Davidson, 14
Davidson, 14 [Price War Heats up between Legal Marijuana and the Black Market Jacob Davidson @JakeD July 8, 2014, http://time.com/money/2965578/marijuana-price-war-heats-up/]
Recreational marijuana went on sale legally in Washington State a combination of tough regulations financing troubles meticulous inspectors and tight land-use laws have severely slowed the rollout of recreational dispensaries. A shortage of stores meeting an avalanche of new demand adds up to high prices an ounce is expected to sell for at least $400. that’s over twice as much as Washington’s black market consumers pay If one point of marijuana legalization is to stamp out the unregulated black market and thus avoid funding drug cartels that cause larger societal harms, sky-high prices for legal marijuana are a serious concern
tough reg financing inspectors, and land-use laws have slowed rollout shortage of stores meeting new demand adds up to high prices legalization stamp out the unregulated black market, and thus avoid funding cartels prices are a concern
Recreational marijuana went on sale legally for the first time in Washington State Tuesday, and early reports indicate it’s not cheap to be an early adopter. The New York Times reports that a combination of tough regulations, financing troubles, meticulous inspectors, and tight land-use laws have severely slowed the rollout of recreational marijuana dispensaries. Of the 334 vendor licensees authorized for the first wave of stores, only about 20 have actually been granted. A shortage of stores meeting an avalanche of new demand adds up to high prices for the state’s first recreational pot consumers. According to the Times, an ounce is expected to sell for at least $400. Based on numbers from PriceOfWeed.com, a site that crowdsources national marijuana prices, that’s over twice as much as Washington’s black market consumers pay for an ounce of average quality pot. If one point of marijuana legalization is to stamp out the unregulated black market, and thus avoid funding drug cartels that cause larger societal harms, sky-high prices for legal marijuana are a serious concern. Most consumers would prefer to purchase dope legally, but the corner dealer might be tempting if he’s selling at half price.
1,213
<h4>Stores can’t meet demand and artificially inflate the price – causes black markets </h4><p><strong>Davidson, 14</strong> [Price War Heats up between Legal Marijuana and the Black Market Jacob Davidson @JakeD July 8, 2014, http://time.com/money/2965578/marijuana-price-war-heats-up/]</p><p><u>Recreational marijuana went on sale <strong>legally</u></strong> for the first time <u>in Washington State</u> Tuesday, and early reports indicate it’s not cheap to be an early adopter. The New York Times reports that <u>a combination of <strong><mark>tough</mark> <mark>reg</mark>ulations</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>financing</mark> troubles</u></strong>, <u><strong>meticulous <mark>inspectors</u></strong>, <u>and</mark> <strong>tight <mark>land-use laws</u></strong> <u>have</mark> severely <mark>slowed</mark> the <mark>rollout</mark> of recreational</u> marijuana<u> dispensaries.</u> Of the 334 vendor licensees authorized for the first wave of stores, only about 20 have actually been granted. <u><strong>A <mark>shortage of stores meeting</mark> an avalanche of <mark>new demand adds up to high prices</u></strong></mark> for the state’s first recreational pot consumers. According to the Times, <u><strong>an ounce is expected to sell for at least $400.</u></strong> Based on numbers from PriceOfWeed.com, a site that crowdsources national marijuana prices, <u><strong>that’s over twice as much as Washington’s black market consumers pay</u></strong> for an ounce of average quality pot. <u>If one point of marijuana <mark>legalization</mark> is to <mark>stamp out the <strong>unregulated black market</u></strong>, <u>and thus avoid funding</mark> drug <mark>cartels</mark> that cause</u> <u>larger societal harms, <strong>sky-high <mark>prices</mark> for legal marijuana <mark>are a</mark> serious <mark>concern</u></strong></mark>. Most consumers would prefer to purchase dope legally, but the corner dealer might be tempting if he’s selling at half price.</p>
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431,115
1
17,112
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
565,260
N
Wake
2
Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
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2,014
cx
college
2
743,678
This would maximize organ sales
Erin and Harris 3
Erin and Harris 3 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester J Med Ethics 2003; 29 :141 Janet Radcliffe Richards on our modest proposal http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/138.full.pdf+html
We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts.
2 We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts
Thus when Radcliffe Richards says: “Of course there is something undesirable about a one way international traffic from poor to rich; but that is not enough to settle the all things considered question of whether it should be allowed” she is again right. It is not enough to settle that question. Our paper was not trying to settle that question. 2 We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts. In our paper we note that:“In 1994, we made a proposal in which we outlined possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically, and in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme” and this is the proposal that we repeat in abbreviated form. The claim we make, which it seems Radcliffe Richards judges tobe too strong, is that our proposal outlines “possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically”; but note that there is a qualification to this claim, namely that if the first part of our claim is true it is so because it defends organ sales “in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme”. It may be that organ sales could be defended (possibly by Janet Radcliffe Richards and for that matter by the present authors) in a way that does not minimise such dangers. But that is not what we were trying to do in our paper.
1,450
<h4><strong>This would maximize organ sales</h4><p>Erin and Harris 3 </strong>Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester J Med Ethics 2003; 29 :141<strong> </strong>Janet Radcliffe Richards on our modest<strong> </strong>proposal</p><p>http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/138.full.pdf+html</p><p>Thus when Radcliffe Richards says: “Of course there is something undesirable about a one way international traffic from poor to rich; but that is not enough to settle the all things considered question of whether it should be allowed” she is again right. It is not enough to settle that question. Our paper was not trying to settle that question. <mark>2 <u>We have proposed a scheme that would <strong>maximise organ sales</strong> by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts</mark>.</u> In our paper we note that:“In 1994, we made a proposal in which we outlined possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically, and in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme” and this is the proposal that we repeat in abbreviated form. The claim we make, which it seems Radcliffe Richards judges tobe too strong, is that our proposal outlines “possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically”; but note that there is a qualification to this claim, namely that if the first part of our claim is true it is so because it defends organ sales “in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme”. It may be that organ sales could be defended (possibly by Janet Radcliffe Richards and for that matter by the present authors) in a way that does not minimise such dangers. But that is not what we were trying to do in our paper.</p>
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Contention 3 Solvency
430,338
11
17,114
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
565,248
A
Wake
4
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
Voss
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48,454
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college
2
743,679
Genealogy links to itself—it is a part of a never ending process that begins and ends at the same point
Deacon 2003
Deacon 2003 Fabricating Foucault: Rationalising the Management of Individuals (Roger Deacon is a Honorary Lecturer in Education and Honorary Research Lecturer in Politics at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, and Managing Editor of Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory., MS)
In a roundabout way we arrive back at our starting point Foucault's genealogy of the present would have been impossible unless 'a certain number of factors' had rendered modernity 'uncertain' by 'provoking a certain number of difficulties' philosophical disillusionment juxtaposed against scientific progress of a globalising but no longer visibly revolutionary Western culture the currently problematic nature of the Enlightenment project, which genealogy seeks to address, was itself made possible by a prior genealogical process genealogy is thus present at its own birth, as it were.
null
In a roundabout but necessary way, we have arrived back at our starting point, namely, the contemporary importance of the Enlightenment. Indeed, Foucault's genealogy of the present would have been impossible unless 'a certain number of factors' had rendered modernity and its Enlightenment origins 'uncertain' and 'unfamiliar' by 'provoking a certain number of difficulties' around it: widespread civil apathy and philosophical disillusionment juxtaposed against the scientific and technological progress of a globalising but no longer visibly revolutionary Western culture. To this extent, the currently problematic nature of the Enlightenment project, which genealogy seeks to address, was itself made possible by a prior genealogical process (in which the work of Nietzsche no doubts figures prominently): genealogy is thus present at its own birth, as it were.
864
<h4>Genealogy links to itself—it is a part of a never ending process that begins and ends at the same point </h4><p><strong>Deacon 2003</strong> Fabricating Foucault: Rationalising the Management of Individuals (Roger Deacon is a Honorary Lecturer in Education and Honorary Research Lecturer in Politics at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, and Managing Editor of Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory., MS)</p><p><u>In a roundabout</u> but necessary <u>way</u>, <u>we </u>have <u>arrive</u>d <u>back at our starting point</u>, namely, the contemporary importance of the Enlightenment. Indeed, <u>Foucault's genealogy of the present would have been impossible unless 'a certain number of factors' had rendered modernity</u> and its Enlightenment origins <u>'uncertain' </u>and 'unfamiliar' <u>by 'provoking a certain number of difficulties'</u> around it: widespread civil apathy and <u>philosophical disillusionment juxtaposed against </u>the <u>scientific </u>and technological <u>progress of a globalising but no longer visibly revolutionary Western culture</u>. To this extent, <u>the currently problematic nature of the Enlightenment project, which genealogy seeks to address, was itself made possible by a prior genealogical process</u> (in which the work of Nietzsche no doubts figures prominently): <u>genealogy is thus present at its own birth, as it were.</p></u>
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1nc
case
431,116
1
17,110
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
565,262
N
Wake
5
NYU Itliong-Zhan
McCleary
Fed CP (2NR) AG Politics (2NR Cede the Political DA T - USFG
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
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48,454
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ya.....
Pi.....
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18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
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college
2
743,680
Can’t solve black market
Sack 14
Sack 14 (Kevin Sack, New York Times, 8/17/14, “Transplant Brokers in Israel Lure Desperate Kidney Patients to Costa Rica,” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/world/middleeast/transplant-brokers-in-israel-lure-desperate-kidney-patients-to-costa-rica.html?_r=0)
A broker who trades in human organs might seem a difficult thing to find The men were, The New York Times learned during an investigation of the global organ trade, among the central operators in Israel’s irrepressible underground kidney market The brokers maintain they operate legally and do not directly help clients buy organs. Dodging international condemnation and tightening enforcement, they have nimbly shifted operations across the globe when any one destination closes its doors Although there is no reliable data, experts say thousands of patients most likely receive illicit transplants abroad each year a Times analysis of major trafficking cases since 2000 suggests that Israelis have played a disproportionate role That is in part because of religious strictures regarding death and desecration that have kept deceased donation rates so low that some patients feel they must turn elsewhere.¶ “When someone needs an organ transplant, they’ll do everything in their power,
The men were among the central operators in Israel’s irrepressible underground kidney market The brokers maintain they operate legally and do not directly help clients buy organs. Dodging international condemnation and tightening enforcement, they have nimbly shifted operations across the globe when any one destination closes its doors experts say thousands of patients most likely receive illicit transplants abroad each year.
A broker who trades in human organs might seem a difficult thing to find. But Ms. Dorin’s mother began making inquiries around the hospital where she worked, and in short order the family came up with three names: Avigad Sandler, a former insurance agent long suspected of trafficking; Boris Volfman, a young Ukrainian émigré and Sandler protégé; and Yaacov Dayan, a wily businessman with interests in real estate and marketing.¶ The men were, The New York Times learned during an investigation of the global organ trade, among the central operators in Israel’s irrepressible underground kidney market. For years, they have pocketed enormous sums for arranging overseas transplants for patients who are paired with foreign donors, court filings and government documents show.¶ The brokers maintain they operate legally and do not directly help clients buy organs. Dodging international condemnation and tightening enforcement, they have nimbly shifted operations across the globe when any one destination closes its doors.¶ The supply of transplantable organs is estimated by the World Health Organization to meet no more than a tenth of the need. Although there is no reliable data, experts say thousands of patients most likely receive illicit transplants abroad each year. Almost always, the sellers are poor and ill-informed about the medical risks.¶ The vast marketplace includes the United States, where federal prosecutors in New Jersey won the first conviction for illegal brokering in 2011.¶ But a Times analysis of major trafficking cases since 2000 suggests that Israelis have played a disproportionate role. That is in part because of religious strictures regarding death and desecration that have kept deceased donation rates so low that some patients feel they must turn elsewhere.¶ “When someone needs an organ transplant, they’ll do everything in their power,” said Meir Broder, a top legal adviser to Israel’s Ministry of Health.
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<h4><strong>Can’t solve black market </h4><p>Sack 14</strong> (Kevin Sack, New York Times, 8/17/14, “Transplant Brokers in Israel Lure Desperate Kidney Patients to Costa Rica,” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/world/middleeast/transplant-brokers-in-israel-lure-desperate-kidney-patients-to-costa-rica.html?_r=0)</p><p><u>A broker who trades in human organs might seem a difficult thing to find</u>. But Ms. Dorin’s mother began making inquiries around the hospital where she worked, and in short order the family came up with three names: Avigad Sandler, a former insurance agent long suspected of trafficking; Boris Volfman, a young Ukrainian émigré and Sandler protégé; and Yaacov Dayan, a wily businessman with interests in real estate and marketing.¶ <u><mark>The men were</mark>, The New York Times learned during an investigation of the global organ trade, <mark>among the central operators in Israel’s irrepressible underground kidney market</u></mark>. For years, they have pocketed enormous sums for arranging overseas transplants for patients who are paired with foreign donors, court filings and government documents show.¶ <u><mark>The brokers maintain they operate legally and do not directly help clients buy organs. Dodging international condemnation and tightening enforcement, they have nimbly shifted operations across the globe when any one destination closes its doors</u></mark>.¶ The supply of transplantable organs is estimated by the World Health Organization to meet no more than a tenth of the need. <u>Although there is no reliable data, <mark>experts say thousands of patients most likely receive illicit transplants abroad each year</u>.</mark> Almost always, the sellers are poor and ill-informed about the medical risks.¶ The vast marketplace includes the United States, where federal prosecutors in New Jersey won the first conviction for illegal brokering in 2011.¶ But <u>a Times analysis of major trafficking cases since 2000 suggests that Israelis have played a disproportionate role</u>. <u>That is in part because of religious strictures regarding death and desecration that have kept deceased donation rates so low that some patients feel they must turn elsewhere.¶ “When someone needs an organ transplant, they’ll do everything in their power,</u>” said Meir Broder, a top legal adviser to Israel’s Ministry of Health.</p>
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1nr
Link
431,117
2
17,109
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
565,261
N
Wake
3
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
Watson
AG Politics (2NR) Narrow Ruling CP (2NR) Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR) T - nearly all Test Case Fiat
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
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48,454
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18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
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2,014
cx
college
2
743,681
Live donations are key--Cadaver donations will never be enough
Satel 12
Satel 12 Sally L. Satel, a physician, is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute 4 May 7, 2012 Bloomberg View Facebook’s Organ Donation Success Needs Follow-Up http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-05-07/facebook-s-organ-donation-success-needs-follow-up
Even if every American agreed to be an organ donor, there still wouldn’t be enough kidneys for transplantation. I specify kidneys because people with renal failure represent about 80 percent of those on the national organ waiting list. Last year, roughly 91,000 people needed a renal transplant, but only one fifth of them received one. Of the roughly 2 million Americans who die annually, it has been estimated that only 10,500 to 13,000 possess organs healthy enough for transplanting. So, if every eligible person donated his organs at death, surgeons might be able to double the number of transplant surgeries. (Last year, 7,433 deceased donors yielded an average of 1.5 kidneys each, for a total of 11,043 operations
Even if every American agreed to be an organ donor, there still wouldn’t be enough kidneys for transplantation people with renal failure represent 80 percent roughly 91,000 people only one fifth of them received one. Of the 2 million only 10,500 possess organs healthy for transplantin
Organ-donation groups are rightly thrilled with Facebook’s initiative. Yet it’s important to keep the larger picture in mind. Even if every American agreed to be an organ donor, there still wouldn’t be enough kidneys for transplantation. I specify kidneys because people with renal failure represent about 80 percent of those on the national organ waiting list. Last year, roughly 91,000 people needed a renal transplant, but only one fifth of them received one. Transplant Math Now look more closely at the donor math: Of the roughly 2 million Americans who die annually, it has been estimated that only 10,500 to 13,000 possess organs healthy enough for transplanting. So, if every eligible person donated his organs at death, surgeons might be able to double the number of transplant surgeries. (Last year, 7,433 deceased donors yielded an average of 1.5 kidneys each, for a total of 11,043 operations; the rest were done with organs supplied by living relatives and friends.)
979
<h4>Live donations are key--Cadaver donations will never be enough</h4><p><strong>Satel 12</strong> Sally L. Satel, a physician, is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute</p><p>4 May 7, 2012 Bloomberg View Facebook’s Organ Donation Success Needs Follow-Up <u>http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-05-07/facebook-s-organ-donation-success-needs-follow-up</p><p></u>Organ-donation groups are rightly thrilled with Facebook’s initiative. Yet it’s important to keep the larger picture in mind. <u><mark>Even if every American agreed to be an organ donor, there still wouldn’t be enough kidneys for transplantation</mark>.</p><p>I specify kidneys because <mark>people with renal failure represent</mark> about <mark>80 percent</mark> of those on the national organ waiting list. Last year, <mark>roughly 91,000 people</mark> needed a renal transplant, but <mark>only one fifth of them received one.</p><p></u></mark>Transplant Math</p><p>Now look more closely at the donor math: <u><mark>Of the</mark> roughly <mark>2 million</mark> Americans who die annually, it has been estimated that <mark>only 10,500</mark> to 13,000 <mark>possess organs healthy</mark> enough <mark>for transplantin</mark>g. So, if every eligible person donated his organs at death, surgeons might be able to double the number of transplant surgeries. (Last year, 7,433 deceased donors yielded an average of 1.5 kidneys each, for a total of 11,043 operations</u>; the rest were done with organs supplied by living relatives and friends.)</p>
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Contention 3 Solvency
430,439
4
17,114
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
565,248
A
Wake
4
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
Voss
null
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
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2,014
cx
college
2
743,682
Even their 1AC Kleiman agrees
Sullum, 13
Sullum, 13 [“How Much Will Legal Pot Cost in Washington?” Jacob Sullum, Oct. 21, 2013 7:30 a, http://reason.com/blog/2013/10/21/how-much-will-legal-pot-cost-in-washingt]
When I interviewed UCLA drug policy expert Kleiman about marijuana legalization he worried that the state-licensed stores will have trouble competing with black-market dealers He called the projected price advantage for those alternative sources "a big problem," marijuana in state-licensed stores will cost two to three times what it costs in the black market black and gray markets will not only persist but dominate
Kleiman worried state stores have trouble competing with black-market dealers marijuana in state-licensed stores will cost two to three times what it costs in the black market black and gray markets will not only persist but dominate
When I interviewed UCLA drug policy expert Mark Kleiman about marijuana legalization in Washington a couple of months ago, he worried that the state-licensed stores will have trouble competing with black-market dealers and medical marijuana dispensaries. He called the projected price advantage for those alternative sources "a big problem," adding, "The legal market is going to have a hard time competing with the illegal market, but a particularly hard time competing with the untaxed, unregulated sort-of-legal market." Kleiman, whose consulting firm, BOTEC, was hired to advise Washington's marijuana regulators, now says he is more optimistic, partly because of the Justice Department's August 29 memo suggesting that federal prosecutors will refrain from interfering with legalization as long as regulations are strict enough, which Deputy Attorney General James Cole issued a few days after I talked to Kleiman. "I think the DoJ announcement makes a big difference," Kleiman says in an email message. "Of course things could change. But if they don't, we're going to see prices drop like stone." Kleiman adds that BOTEC's June 28 projections suggesting that marijuana in state-licensed stores will cost two to three times what it costs in the black market were based on the assumption that legal pot would be grown indoors, which imposes additional regulatory and logistical burdens. But the Washington State Liquor Control Board later decided, perhaps partly in response to BOTEC's projections, to allow outdoor growing as well. "Marijuana as a dirt-farmed licit product will be dirt-cheap," Kleiman says. Commenting on my recent Forbes column about marijuana taxes, Russ Belville, a longtime marijuana activist and writer, notes that BOTEC's projections also depend on assumptions about markups: Those BOTEC analyses of $2 and $3 / gram production costs also included 100% markups at all three levels. What retailer is going to survive selling $482 ounces when, as noted, Seattle prices are currently less than half that? If production costs can't decrease, markup must decrease. When BOTEC plugged in a reasonable markup found at a liquor store (31%) or other equivalent industries, the retail price of marijuana came down to something more like the current retail prices. What about the liquor control board's goal of capturing just 25 percent of marijuana sales, which reinforces the impression that the black and gray markets will not only persist but dominate? Kleiman sees that goal as reasonable:
2,513
<h4>Even their 1AC Kleiman agrees</h4><p><strong>Sullum, 13</strong> [“How Much Will Legal Pot Cost in Washington?” Jacob Sullum, Oct. 21, 2013 7:30 a, http://reason.com/blog/2013/10/21/how-much-will-legal-pot-cost-in-washingt]</p><p><u>When I interviewed UCLA drug policy expert </u>Mark <u><mark>Kleiman</mark> about <strong>marijuana legalization</u></strong> in Washington a couple of months ago, <u>he <mark>worried</mark> that <strong>the <mark>state</mark>-licensed <mark>stores</mark> will <mark>have trouble competing with black-market dealers</u></strong></mark> and medical marijuana dispensaries. <u>He called the projected price advantage for those alternative sources <strong>"a big problem,"</u></strong> adding, "The legal market is going to have a hard time competing with the illegal market, but a particularly hard time competing with the untaxed, unregulated sort-of-legal market." Kleiman, whose consulting firm, BOTEC, was hired to advise Washington's marijuana regulators, now says he is more optimistic, partly because of the Justice Department's August 29 memo suggesting that federal prosecutors will refrain from interfering with legalization as long as regulations are strict enough, which Deputy Attorney General James Cole issued a few days after I talked to Kleiman. "I think the DoJ announcement makes a big difference," Kleiman says in an email message. "Of course things could change. But if they don't, we're going to see prices drop like stone." Kleiman adds that BOTEC's June 28 projections suggesting that <u><mark>marijuana in state-licensed stores will cost two <strong>to three times what it costs in the black market</u></strong></mark> were based on the assumption that legal pot would be grown indoors, which imposes additional regulatory and logistical burdens. But the Washington State Liquor Control Board later decided, perhaps partly in response to BOTEC's projections, to allow outdoor growing as well. "Marijuana as a dirt-farmed licit product will be dirt-cheap," Kleiman says. Commenting on my recent Forbes column about marijuana taxes, Russ Belville, a longtime marijuana activist and writer, notes that BOTEC's projections also depend on assumptions about markups: Those BOTEC analyses of $2 and $3 / gram production costs also included 100% markups at all three levels. What retailer is going to survive selling $482 ounces when, as noted, Seattle prices are currently less than half that? If production costs can't decrease, markup must decrease. When BOTEC plugged in a reasonable markup found at a liquor store (31%) or other equivalent industries, the retail price of marijuana came down to something more like the current retail prices. What about the liquor control board's goal of capturing just 25 percent of marijuana sales, which reinforces the impression that the <u><strong><mark>black and gray markets will not only persist but dominate</u></strong></mark>? Kleiman sees that goal as reasonable:</p>
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1nc
Corporate
431,118
1
17,112
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
565,260
N
Wake
2
Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
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48,454
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18,764
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2
743,683
No solvency—depolitiscized and ahistorical analyses like genealogy fail because they disregard fact in favor of speculation
Shapiro 89
Michael J. Shapiro February 1989 Politicizing Ulysses: Rationalistic, Critical, and Genealogical Commentaries Political Theory, Vol. 17, No. 1 Professor of political science at the University of Hawaii, MS
What we call rationality in a given age has to do with what are regarded as legitimate performances within the strictures of our prevailing institutions which have a historically specific and local character this cannot be accessed or read with the discrete temporal tropes and logically oriented rhetoric which constructs the self and the order. ahistorcal depoliticized rhetoric has institutionalized meaning and value, for they operate in neutral space that is objectified, bearing no trace of the historical and current struggles, complexities, and possible differences They are pacified social spaces
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For Elias, the individual functions within a preconstituted reality that exceeds "mental habits." What we call rationality in a given age has to do with what are regarded as legitimate performances within the strictures of our prevailing institutions that control the meanings, which have a historically specific and local character. All of this cannot be accessed or read with the discrete temporal tropes and logically oriented rhetoric with which Elster constructs the self and the order. His ahistorcal, depoliticized rhetoric has selves, on which we cannot discern the scripting of historical, institutionalized meaning and value, for they operate in neutral space that is objectified, bearing no trace of the historical and current struggles, complexities, and possible differences. They are pacified social spaces, which Elster's rhetoric further pacifies. Elster's rationalistic textual practice amounts to what Habermas, in his meditation on decisionist models of the self and the order, has called "instruction in control over objective or objectified processes
1,071
<h4>No solvency—depolitiscized and ahistorical analyses like genealogy fail because they disregard fact in favor of speculation </h4><p>Michael J. <strong>Shapiro</strong> February 19<strong>89</strong> Politicizing Ulysses: Rationalistic, Critical, and Genealogical Commentaries Political Theory, Vol. 17, No. 1 Professor of political science at the University of Hawaii, MS</p><p>For Elias, the individual functions within a preconstituted reality that exceeds "mental habits." <u>What we call rationality in a given age has to do with what are regarded as legitimate performances within the strictures of our prevailing institutions</u> that control the meanings, <u>which have a historically specific and local character</u>. All of <u>this cannot be accessed or read with the discrete temporal tropes and logically oriented rhetoric</u> with <u>which </u>Elster <u>constructs the self and the order.</u> His <u>ahistorcal</u>, <u>depoliticized rhetoric has</u> selves, on which we cannot discern the scripting of historical, <u>institutionalized meaning and value, for they operate in neutral space that is objectified, bearing no trace of the historical and current struggles, complexities, and possible differences</u>. <u>They are pacified social spaces</u>, which Elster's rhetoric further pacifies. Elster's rationalistic textual practice amounts to what Habermas, in his meditation on decisionist models of the self and the order, has called "instruction in control over objective or objectified processes</p>
null
1nc
case
431,119
1
17,110
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
565,262
N
Wake
5
NYU Itliong-Zhan
McCleary
Fed CP (2NR) AG Politics (2NR Cede the Political DA T - USFG
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
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null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,684
government purchaser avoids exploitation
Erin and Harris 3
Erin and Harris 3 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full
While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
organs available for transplantation, we must give ration to any option that may make up the shortfal The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it,
While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. A market in organs from living donors is one such option. The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
461
<h4>government purchaser avoids exploitation</h4><p><strong>Erin and Harris 3</strong> Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, <strong> </strong>J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs</p><p><u>http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full</p><p>While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of <mark>organs available for transplantation, we must give</mark> urgent conside<mark>ration to any option that may make up the shortfal</mark>l. </u>A market in organs from living donors is one such option.<u> <mark>The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, </mark>for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.</p></u>
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null
Contention 3 Solvency
430,342
13
17,114
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
565,248
A
Wake
4
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
Voss
null
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
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Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,685
“Local buy-in” is a DA to the plan- Tax law 280E would force businesses to reorganize as 501-c-4s which have to focus on social welfare activities – the aff takes out this tax law and causes backlash from local governments which hurts the industry- 501c4 structure gets them on board- ONLY the CP solves
Leff 2014
Leff 2014 (Ben, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523, lexis)
current law permits marijuana sellers to avoid the impact of § 280E by operating as tax-exempt social welfare organizations federal tax law creates a strong incentive for marijuana sellers to do just that the incentive created in such a strange manner is good policy The use of federal tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is superior policy because it encourages "multi-jurisdictional" federalism. a dualist model state and national is too limited it is important to recognize that localities have conflicts with states conflicts between states that have liberalized marijuana laws and localities seeking to restrict or prohibit marijuana sales have become common in assessing the merits of any particular approach that the federal government could take it makes sense to take into account local stakeholders nonprofit social welfare organizations are more likely than for-profit operations to advance the interests of localities The IRS could make clear that this "minimum standards of acceptable conduct" standard is based on local standards it would be using federal law to intervene in marijuana policy, but only when state laws and local laws were in harmony the tax law would incentivize marijuana sales in communities that permitted such sales, and dis-incentivize such sales in communities that objected to them This could mitigate inter-jurisdictional conflict
current law permits marijuana sellers to avoid the impact of § 280E by operating as tax-exempt social welfare organizations. federal tax law creates a strong incentive for marijuana sellers to do just that. The use of federal tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is superior policy because it encourages "multi-jurisdictional" federalism a dualist model state and t national is too limited it is important to recognize that localitie ave conflicts with states, conflicts between states that have liberalized marijuana laws and localities seeking to restrict or prohibit marijuana sales have become common it makes sense to take into account local stakeholders nonprofit social welfare organizations are more likely than for-profit operations to advance the interests of localities the tax law would incentivize marijuana sales in communities that permitted such sales, and dis-incentivize such sales in communities that objected to them. This could mitigate inter-jurisdictional conflict
The previous Part argues that current law plausibly permits marijuana sellers to avoid the impact of § 280E by operating as tax-exempt social welfare organizations. If that is true, federal tax law creates a strong incentive for marijuana sellers to do just that. This incentive may well be no more than a historical oddity: an unintended consequence of the confluence of the creation of a type of tax-exempt organization that is unaffected by the public policy doctrine and the placement in the tax code [*564] of a penalty for selling marijuana. But it is possible that the incentive created in such a strange manner is good policy. This Part explores that question: Does a tax incentive encouraging marijuana selling by social welfare organizations solve certain federalism issues better than other federal laws addressing the marijuana issue? The conflict between state and federal laws governing the marijuana industry presents a stark example of inter-jurisdictional conflict. The federal government has criminalized all sale and use of marijuana; a number of states have legalized marijuana for medical purposes; and, as of this year, Washington and Colorado have legalized marijuana for any purpose. This conflict creates a potentially extreme federalism problem. n188 Robert Mikos describes a "war" between the federal government and some states over marijuana policy. n189 The most predictable outcome of the war would be a victory for the federal government, given that the Constitution permits the federal government to preempt state law when acting within its authority, and the Supreme Court has held that regulating marijuana is within the federal government's authority. n190 However, Mikos argues that "the states - and not the federal government - have already won the war over medical marijuana," n191 largely because states have continued to legalize marijuana and public opinion is strongly behind them. n192 If the President wanted to use force to fight the war, he could direct the Department of Justice to criminally prosecute marijuana users or sellers to the full extent of federal law, presumably resulting in significant prison sentences for people who are behaving in ways sanctioned by their state governments. While there are practical constraints on the federal government's ability to prosecute marijuana sellers, n193 it [*565] presumably could deter a lot of individual actors if it vigorously enforced the criminal law. Instead, the President appears to have tactically retreated from this inter-jurisdictional conflict, at least with respect to criminal enforcement of federal drug laws against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n194 As discussed above, the IRS has not participated in this retreat, and its current policy appears to be vigorous enforcement of § 280E against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. I argue that § 280E enforcement, coupled with recognition of tax-exempt status for properly operated marijuana sellers, provides the federal government with a superior resolution to its "war" with the states. Using tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is better policy than either returning to a policy of enforcing criminal penalties against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers or a policy of benign neglect of state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n195 The use of federal tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is superior policy because it encourages "multi-jurisdictional" federalism. Multiple scholars of federalism have pointed out that a dualist model of federalism, in which the goal is to allocate authority between or balance the interests of only two parties - a state government and the national government - is too limited. n196 Instead, it is important to recognize that localities may have inter-jurisdictional conflicts with their states, and the principles of federalism may apply with equal force to these sub-national, inter-jurisdictional conflicts, even if localities are not truly sovereign. n197 In the marijuana context, conflicts between states that have liberalized marijuana laws and localities seeking to restrict or prohibit marijuana sales have become common. n198 Therefore, in assessing the merits [*566] of any particular approach that the federal government could take to the question of how to influence national marijuana policy, it makes sense to take into account not just policy made at state level, but the interests of local stakeholders in each locality as well. How could this "multi-jurisdictional" federalism be advanced by an IRS policy of channeling marijuana sellers into nonprofit social welfare organizations? First, as discussed above, nonprofit social welfare organizations are more likely than for-profit operations to advance the interests of localities because of their commitment to social welfare purposes. To qualify as a social welfare organization, an organization would have to provide job training and employment opportunities for hard-to-employ members of the community. Providing these jobs has the potential to reduce the negative effects of illegal drug markets and thereby positively impact the neighborhood in which the organization operates. But perhaps as importantly, while I have argued that an intention to violate federal law should not prevent an organization from qualifying for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4), I have also argued that an intention to violate state or local laws should. Remember, the one piece of guidance from the IRS on the relationship between illegal activities and § 501(c)(4) status involved an organization whose intention was to violate local laws and ordinances by engaging in civil disobedience. The IRS argued that an organization that intended to disrupt the peace of a community could not advance the social welfare of that community because it intended to engage in activities that "violate the minimum standards of acceptable conduct necessary to the preservation of an orderly society." n199 The IRS could make clear that this "minimum standards of acceptable conduct" standard is based on local standards, and could thereby refuse to recognize the tax-exempt status of a social welfare organization that intended to sell marijuana contrary to local law. If that was the IRS's standard then it would be using federal law to intervene in marijuana policy, but only when state laws and local laws were in harmony. In effect, the tax law would incentivize marijuana sales in communities that permitted such sales, and dis-incentivize such sales in communities that objected to them. This type of "multi-jurisdictional" approach to a key federalism issue could mitigate inter-jurisdictional conflict, and would arm localities in their struggle for control over marijuana policy.
6,802
<h4>“Local buy-in” is a DA to the plan- Tax law 280E would force businesses to reorganize as 501-c-4s which have to focus on social welfare activities – the aff takes out this tax law and causes backlash from local governments which hurts the industry- 501c4 structure gets them on board- ONLY the CP solves</h4><p><strong>Leff 2014</strong> (Ben, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523, lexis)</p><p>The previous Part argues that <u><mark>current law</u></mark> plausibly <u><mark>permits</u> <u>marijuana sellers to avoid the impact of § 280E</u> <u>by operating as tax-exempt social welfare organizations</u>. </mark>If that is true, <u><strong><mark>federal tax law creates a strong incentive for marijuana sellers to do just that</u></strong>.</mark> This incentive may well be no more than a historical oddity: an unintended consequence of the confluence of the creation of a type of tax-exempt organization that is unaffected by the public policy doctrine and the placement in the tax code [*564] of a penalty for selling marijuana. But it is possible that <u>the incentive created in such a strange manner <strong>is good policy</u></strong>. This Part explores that question: Does a tax incentive encouraging marijuana selling by social welfare organizations solve certain federalism issues better than other federal laws addressing the marijuana issue? The conflict between state and federal laws governing the marijuana industry presents a stark example of inter-jurisdictional conflict. The federal government has criminalized all sale and use of marijuana; a number of states have legalized marijuana for medical purposes; and, as of this year, Washington and Colorado have legalized marijuana for any purpose. This conflict creates a potentially extreme federalism problem. n188 Robert Mikos describes a "war" between the federal government and some states over marijuana policy. n189 The most predictable outcome of the war would be a victory for the federal government, given that the Constitution permits the federal government to preempt state law when acting within its authority, and the Supreme Court has held that regulating marijuana is within the federal government's authority. n190 However, Mikos argues that "the states - and not the federal government - have already won the war over medical marijuana," n191 largely because states have continued to legalize marijuana and public opinion is strongly behind them. n192 If the President wanted to use force to fight the war, he could direct the Department of Justice to criminally prosecute marijuana users or sellers to the full extent of federal law, presumably resulting in significant prison sentences for people who are behaving in ways sanctioned by their state governments. While there are practical constraints on the federal government's ability to prosecute marijuana sellers, n193 it [*565] presumably could deter a lot of individual actors if it vigorously enforced the criminal law. Instead, the President appears to have tactically retreated from this inter-jurisdictional conflict, at least with respect to criminal enforcement of federal drug laws against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n194 As discussed above, the IRS has not participated in this retreat, and its current policy appears to be vigorous enforcement of § 280E against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. I argue that § 280E enforcement, coupled with recognition of tax-exempt status for properly operated marijuana sellers, provides the federal government with a superior resolution to its "war" with the states. Using tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is better policy than either returning to a policy of enforcing criminal penalties against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers or a policy of benign neglect of state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n195 <u><mark>The use of federal tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is superior policy because it <strong>encourages "multi-jurisdictional" federalism</mark>. </u></strong>Multiple scholars of federalism have pointed out that <u><mark>a dualist model</u></mark> of federalism, in which the goal is to allocate authority between or balance the interests of only two parties - a <u><mark>state</u></mark> government <u><mark>and</u> t</mark>he <u><mark>national</u> </mark>government - <u><mark>is too limited</u></mark>. n196 Instead, <u><mark>it is important to recognize that localitie</mark>s</u> may <u>h<mark>ave</u></mark> inter-jurisdictional <u><mark>conflicts</u> <u>with</u></mark> their <u><mark>states</u>,</mark> and the principles of federalism may apply with equal force to these sub-national, inter-jurisdictional conflicts, even if localities are not truly sovereign. n197 In the marijuana context, <u><strong><mark>conflicts between states that have liberalized marijuana laws and localities seeking to restrict or prohibit marijuana sales have become common</u></strong></mark>. n198 Therefore, <u>in assessing the merits</u> [*566] <u>of any particular approach that the federal government could take</u> to the question of how to influence national marijuana policy, <u><mark>it makes sense to take into account</u></mark> not just policy made at state level, but the interests of <u><mark>local stakeholders</u></mark> in each locality as well. How could this "multi-jurisdictional" federalism be advanced by an IRS policy of channeling marijuana sellers into nonprofit social welfare organizations? First, as discussed above, <u><mark>nonprofit social welfare organizations are more likely than for-profit operations to advance the interests of localities</u></mark> because of their commitment to social welfare purposes. To qualify as a social welfare organization, an organization would have to provide job training and employment opportunities for hard-to-employ members of the community. Providing these jobs has the potential to reduce the negative effects of illegal drug markets and thereby positively impact the neighborhood in which the organization operates. But perhaps as importantly, while I have argued that an intention to violate federal law should not prevent an organization from qualifying for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4), I have also argued that an intention to violate state or local laws should. Remember, the one piece of guidance from the IRS on the relationship between illegal activities and § 501(c)(4) status involved an organization whose intention was to violate local laws and ordinances by engaging in civil disobedience. The IRS argued that an organization that intended to disrupt the peace of a community could not advance the social welfare of that community because it intended to engage in activities that "violate the minimum standards of acceptable conduct necessary to the preservation of an orderly society." n199 <u>The IRS could make clear that this "minimum standards of acceptable conduct" standard is <strong>based on local standards</u></strong>, and could thereby refuse to recognize the tax-exempt status of a social welfare organization that intended to sell marijuana contrary to local law. If that was the IRS's standard then <u>it would be using federal law to intervene in marijuana policy, but only when state laws and local laws were in harmony</u>. In effect, <u><mark>the tax law would incentivize marijuana sales in communities that permitted such sales, and dis-incentivize such sales in communities that objected to them</u>. <u><strong>This</u></strong></mark> type of "multi-jurisdictional" approach to a key federalism issue <u><strong><mark>could mitigate inter-jurisdictional conflict</u></strong></mark>, and would arm localities in their struggle for control over marijuana policy.</p>
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2nc
Corporate
430,932
5
17,112
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
565,260
N
Wake
2
Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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GENEALOGY MISSES THE POINT AND REPLICATES ITS OWN PROBLEMS—CREATING A HIERARCHIZED AND REGIMENTED DISCIPLINE
Stevens 03
Jacqueline Stevens, Istanbul Bilgi University, “On the Morals of Genealogy,” POLITICAL THEORY v. 31 n. 4, August 2003, www.lawso.ucsb.edu/documents/jstevens_Genealogy.pdf, accessed 6/21/06.
null
the genealogical form remains fashionabl the actual substance of this endeavor remains murky W genealogy amounts to one more disciplining convention. he prevalence of a Foucauldian lexicon in the humanities calls attention to itself precisely because of its advocates’general reluctance to impose orthodoxies. The problem with the success of Foucault’s method is its own specialized jargon that turns out to be belied by its own intellectual history, leading to strained readings and analyses that at times mirror the pointless, obsessive methodism in other fields
What does the past mean to us? Why do we value it? How ought we to pursue our questions about the past? For the last few decades, Foucault has given us the answers, solutions that seem both obvious and difficult. The proliferation of works calling themselves “genealogical” and acknowledging their debt to Foucault suggests his lessons (e.g., Foucault [1969] 1972a, [1971] 1977a, [1976] 1980) have been taken to heart. While Foucault’s insights took a while to gain acceptance, his many initiates now do genealogy instead of history. But then again, when we look at what has been learned, the matter seems unhappily unsettled, with genealogists far more anxious and defensive than one might expect among associates in a gay science. While the genealogical form remains fashionably that of a counter-narrative—notwithstanding the high status of its practitioners in various disciplines—the actual substance of this endeavor remains rather murky despite its aherents’ efforts to elucidate. Consider the reams of paper devoted to distinguishing Foucauldian “genealogy” from his “archaeology,” amid the strong suspicion that the difference amounts only to a shift in vocabulary, not method.1 As a consequence of Foucault’s influence, one can now list hundreds of books and articles whose authors pursue a “genealogy” and not a “history” of this or that.2 So, we might now ask: What does a genealogy mean to us? What is the value of a genealogy? How ought we to pursue questions about genealogies? The quick answer first. We value genealogies for political resistance, aesthetic criticism, and rote professionalization. No serious student of cultural studies today would do a “history of X” and not its genealogy for her dissertation. The fad indicates nothing especially insidious about cultural studies or the linguistic turn in parts of the academy, but amounts to one more disciplining convention. Far less insistent or hegemonic than, say, the requirement of rational choice theory or behavioral studies in the social sciences, the prevalence of a Foucauldian lexicon in the humanities calls attention to itself precisely because of its advocates’general reluctance to impose orthodoxies. The problem with the success of Foucault’s method is not its opacity or relativism, as conservative critics of Foucault carp, but rather that it holds forth its own specialized jargon that turns out to be belied by its own intellectual history, leading to strained readings and analyses that at times mirror the pointless, obsessive methodism in other fields.
2,548
<h4>GENEALOGY MISSES THE POINT AND REPLICATES ITS OWN PROBLEMS—CREATING A HIERARCHIZED AND REGIMENTED DISCIPLINE</h4><p>Jacqueline <u><strong>Stevens</u></strong>, Istanbul Bilgi University, “On the Morals of Genealogy,” POLITICAL THEORY v. 31 n. 4, August 20<u><strong>03</u></strong>, www.lawso.ucsb.edu/documents/jstevens_Genealogy.pdf, accessed 6/21/06.</p><p>What does the past mean to us? Why do we value it? How ought we to pursue our questions about the past? For the last few decades, Foucault has given us the answers, solutions that seem both obvious and difficult. The proliferation of works calling themselves “genealogical” and acknowledging their debt to Foucault suggests his lessons (e.g., Foucault [1969] 1972a, [1971] 1977a, [1976] 1980) have been taken to heart. While Foucault’s insights took a while to gain acceptance, his many initiates now do genealogy instead of history. But then again, when we look at what has been learned, the matter seems unhappily unsettled, with genealogists far more anxious and defensive than one might expect among associates in a gay science. While <mark>the genealogical form remains fashionabl</mark>y that of a counter-narrative—notwithstanding the high status of its practitioners in various disciplines—<mark>the actual substance of this endeavor remains </mark>rather<mark> murky </mark>despite its aherents’ efforts to elucidate. Consider the reams of paper devoted to distinguishing Foucauldian “genealogy” from his “archaeology,” amid the strong suspicion that the difference amounts only to a shift in vocabulary, not method.1 As a consequence of Foucault’s influence, one can now list hundreds of books and articles whose authors pursue a “genealogy” and not a “history” of this or that.2 So, we might now ask: What does a genealogy mean to us? What is the value of a genealogy? How ought we to pursue questions about genealogies? The quick answer first. <mark>W</mark>e value genealogies for political resistance, aesthetic criticism, and rote professionalization. No serious student of cultural studies today would do a “history of X” and not its <mark>genealogy </mark>for her dissertation. The fad indicates nothing especially insidious about cultural studies or the linguistic turn in parts of the academy, but <mark>amounts to one more disciplining convention. </mark>Far less insistent or hegemonic than, say, the requirement of rational choice theory or behavioral studies in the social sciences, t<mark>he prevalence of a Foucauldian lexicon in the humanities calls attention to itself precisely because of its advocates’general reluctance to impose orthodoxies. The problem with the success of Foucault’s method</mark> <mark>is</mark> not its opacity or relativism, as conservative critics of Foucault carp, but rather that it holds forth <mark>its own specialized jargon that turns out to be belied by its own intellectual history, leading to strained readings and analyses that at times mirror the pointless, obsessive methodism in other fields</mark>.</p>
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1nc
case
431,120
8
17,110
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
565,262
N
Wake
5
NYU Itliong-Zhan
McCleary
Fed CP (2NR) AG Politics (2NR Cede the Political DA T - USFG
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,687
united states means the united states of america
American Civil Procedure 9
American Civil Procedure: A Guide to Civil Adjudication in US Courts, Edited by John Bilyeu Oakley, Professor of Law at the University of California, Davis, and Vikram D. Amar, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs of the School of Law of the University of California at Davis, Kluwer Law International, 2009, page 19
Although it is commonplace today to refer to “the United States” as a single entity and as the subject of statements that grammatically employ singular verbs it is important to remember that “the United States” remains in many important ways a collective term Within the community of nations, the United States is a geopolitical superpower that acts through a federal government granted constitutionally specified and limited powers The organizing principle of the federal Constitution is one of popular sovereignty, with governmental powers distributed in the first instance to republican institutions of government organized autonomously and uniquely in each of the fifty states
the U S ” remains a collective term Within community of nations, the U S acts through a federal government granted constitutionally limited powers. The principle of Constitution , is popular sovereignty, with governmental powers distributed to republican institutions of government organized autonomously and uniquely in each of the fifty states
Although it is commonplace today to refer to “the United States” as a single entity and as the subject of statements that grammatically employ singular verbs, it is important to remember that “the United States” remains in many important ways a collective term. The enduring legal significance of the fifty states that together constitute the United States, and their essential dominion over most legal matters affecting day-to-day life within the United States, vastly complicates any attempt to summarize the civil procedures within the United States. Within the community of nations, the United States is a geopolitical superpower that acts through a federal government granted constitutionally specified and limited powers. The organizing principle of the federal Constitution,1 however, is one of popular sovereignty, with governmental powers distributed in the first instance to republican institutions of government organized autonomously and uniquely in each of the fifty states. Although there are substantial similarities in the organization of state governments, idiosyncrasies abound.
1,096
<h4>united states means the united states of america</h4><p><strong>American Civil Procedure</strong>: A Guide to Civil Adjudication in US Courts, Edited by John Bilyeu Oakley, Professor of Law at the University of California, Davis, and Vikram D. Amar, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs of the School of Law of the University of California at Davis, Kluwer Law International, 200<strong>9</strong>, page 19</p><p><u>Although it is commonplace today to refer to “the United States” as a single entity and as the subject of statements that grammatically employ singular verbs</u>, <u>it is important to remember that “<mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates<mark>” remains</mark> in many important ways <strong><mark>a collective term</u></strong></mark>. The enduring legal significance of the fifty states that together constitute the United States, and their essential dominion over most legal matters affecting day-to-day life within the United States, vastly complicates any attempt to summarize the civil procedures within the United States. <u><mark>Within </mark>the <mark>community of nations, the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates is a</u> <u>geopolitical superpower that <strong><mark>acts through a federal government</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>granted constitutionally</mark> specified and <mark>limited powers</u>. <u>The</mark> organizing <mark>principle of</mark> the federal <mark>Constitution</u></mark>,1 however<mark>, <u>is</mark> one of <mark>popular sovereignty, with governmental powers distributed </mark>in the first instance <mark>to republican institutions of government organized autonomously and uniquely in each of the fifty states</u><strong></mark>. Although there are substantial similarities in the organization of state governments, idiosyncrasies abound. </p></strong>
1NC
null
T
90,989
171
17,116
./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round3.docx
565,426
N
D6seceda
3
Louisville Barnett-Lattimore
Foley
1NC T PIC out of legalization K of black separatism "mass incarceration" word K 2NR K case
ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round3.docx
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48,463
DeBo
Emory DeBo
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De.....
Ni.....
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18,765
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Emory
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743,688
Regulated market could minimize exploitation
Crane 12
Crane 12 Andrew Crane, George R. Gardiner Professor of Business Ethics and Dirk Matten, the Hewlett Packard Chair in Corporate Social Responsibility, Schulich School of Business in Toronto Posted June 1, 2012 Is Selling Human Organs Really So Unethical? http://sustainablebusinessforum.com/craneandmatten/58240/selling-human-organs-really-so-unethical
it is possible to conceive of a tightly regulated system that could eliminate most if not all of the worst forms of exploitation. Price controls for organ donations, strict rules for participation as donors and recipients, mandatory counseling for prospective donors, enforcement of medical follow-up, quality control checks, a transparent system to ensure clear organ provenance - these are the kind of arrangements that a serious regulator might want to put in place.
tightly regulated system could eliminate all of the worst forms of exploitatio . Price controls strict rules for participation mandatory counseling enforcement of medical follow-up, quality control checks, a transparent system ensure clear organ provenance
There's no easy answer to this, but it is possible to conceive of a tightly regulated system that could eliminate most if not all of the worst forms of exploitation. Price controls for organ donations, strict rules for participation as donors and recipients, mandatory counseling for prospective donors, enforcement of medical follow-up, quality control checks, a transparent system to ensure clear organ provenance - these are the kind of arrangements that a serious regulator might want to put in place.
505
<h4>Regulated market could minimize exploitation</h4><p><strong>Crane 12</strong> Andrew Crane, George R. Gardiner Professor of Business Ethics and Dirk Matten, the Hewlett Packard Chair in Corporate Social Responsibility, Schulich School of Business in Toronto Posted June 1, 2012 Is Selling Human Organs Really So Unethical? <u>http://sustainablebusinessforum.com/craneandmatten/58240/selling-human-organs-really-so-unethical</p><p></u>There's no easy answer to this, but <u>it is possible to conceive of a <mark>tightly regulated system</mark> that <mark>could eliminate</mark> most if not <mark>all of the worst forms of exploitatio</mark>n<mark>. Price controls</mark> for organ donations, <mark>strict rules for participation</mark> as donors and recipients, <mark>mandatory counseling</mark> for prospective donors, <mark>enforcement of medical follow-up, quality control checks, a transparent system</mark> to <mark>ensure clear organ provenance</mark> - these are the kind of arrangements that a serious regulator might want to put in place.</p></u>
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Contention 3 Solvency
430,441
2
17,114
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
565,248
A
Wake
4
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
Voss
null
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
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Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
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743,689
State-local conflict results in outright marijuana bans- turns the case
Kamin 2012
Kamin 2012 (Sam, Professor and Director, Constitutional Rights and Remedies Program, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law, THE ROAD TO LEGITIMIZING MARIJUANA: WHAT BENEFIT AT WHAT COST?: Medical Marijuana in Colorado and the Future of Marijuana Regulation in the United States, 43 McGeorge L. Rev. 147, lexis)
In addition to conflict between state and federal law there is conflict between state and local governments. there is often tension between state and municipal governments over whether and to what extent the drug may be regulated In Colorado municipalities and counties are free to enact zoning restrictions on the sale of marijuana - including complete bans - and a number of local bodies have recently chosen to ban it outright there will likely be many places where marijuana cannot lawfully be manufactured or purchased. it is not surprising that different jurisdictions within the same state would have such disparate views we might be concerned that localism will allow municipalities to subvert state-wide policy
there is often a tension between state and municipal governments over whether and to what extent the drug may be regulated In Colorado a number of local bodies have recently chosen to ban it outright. there will likely be many places where marijuana cannot lawfully be manufactured or purchased it is not surprising that different jurisdictions within the same state would have such disparate views we might be concerned that localism will allow municipalities to subvert state-wide policy
V. The State-Local Junction In addition to the ambiguity and conflict between state laws (some of which purport to legalize marijuana) and the federal law (which continues to criminalize it), there is another level of intergovernmental conflict in the area of marijuana regulation and reform - the interplay between state and local governments. Even in those states that have legalized marijuana for medical purposes, there is often a tension between state and municipal governments over whether and to what extent the drug may be regulated at the local level. In Colorado, for example, municipalities and counties are free to enact zoning restrictions on the sale of marijuana - including complete bans - and a number of local bodies have recently chosen to ban it outright. n67 Even though the Colorado Constitution prohibits the conviction of those using marijuana for medical purposes, there will likely be many places in the state where marijuana cannot lawfully be manufactured or purchased. In California, which has delegated much of the regulation of marijuana from the state to the local level, the counties of San Diego and San Bernardino sued the state in 2006 to enjoin it from requiring them to participate in the state-mandated medical marijuana program. n68 The counties argued that the CSA [*163] preempted the state law requiring them to facilitate the applications of those seeking to register as marijuana patients under the state's medicinal marijuana provisions. The counties asked to be excused from their state obligations, arguing that participation in the state regulatory regime would make them complicit in the medical marijuana patients and care-givers' in violations of the federal law. The counties - like the sheriffs in Willis v. Winters - thus presented a non-trivial argument that they were incapable of complying with both state and federal law; the state obligated them to facilitate the very drug transactions that federal law expressly prohibits them from facilitating. n69 Although the counties lost their suit, the San Diego NORML case illustrates that, even in those states that have voted to make medical marijuana legally available, support for such policies is hardly uniform. Just as there are pockets of support and resistance to federal policy among the several states, similarly counties and towns can be expected to support state policy with varying levels of enthusiasm. For example, a number of municipalities in medical marijuana states have embraced the new industry as a boon to tax coffers. Most famously, the City of Oakland, California, has sought to establish itself as the Amsterdam of the United States. Facing fading industry and disappearing tax dollars, the city voted in 2010 to permit large-scale marijuana production, pledging to become the "Silicon Valley of Marijuana." n70 Of course, it is not surprising that different jurisdictions within the same state would have such disparate views of medical marijuana. But it raises disconcerting questions about the ability of a city or county to opt out of a state-wide policy. The traditional understanding of the state-local dynamic is one of master and servant. n71 Generally considered the mere creations and instrumentalities of the state, local governments were seen as having essentially no power to contest state authority: Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to them. For the purpose of executing these powers properly and efficiently they usually are given the power to [*164] acquire, hold, and manage personal and real property. The number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state. Neither their charters, nor any law conferring governmental powers, or vesting in them property to be used for governmental purposes, or authorizing them to hold or manage such property, or exempting them from taxation upon it, constitutes a contract with the state within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States. n72 This is certainly the view underlying the California court's decision in San Diego NORML. The court held that, "as a general rule, a local governmental entity "charged with the ministerial duty of enforcing a statute ... generally does not have the authority, in the absence of a judicial determination of unconstitutionality, to refuse to enforce the statute on the basis of the [entity's] view that it is unconstitutional.'" n73 This traditional view has come under criticism in recent years, largely from legal academics. n74 These authors argue that the principle of federalism - with its embrace of a variety of approaches and views - should include support for a diversity of opinions within states as well as between them. n75 In other words, the [*165] things that we like about "Our Federalism" apply with equal or perhaps greater power to state-local (and sub-local) federalism. n76 If the states are laboratories of ideas, then surely the even more diverse collection of local entities can produce even greater innovation and insights. This argument for a "localist" parallel to federalism makes a strong case for giving the municipalities the right to contest state policies, including the choice of a state to permit marijuana for medical purposes. However, just as segregation and interposition are the dark side of the argument for state power vis-a-vis the federal government, so localism creates the opportunity for localities to subvert the will of the voters of a particular state. We would look askance, for example, at a municipality that barred churches, bookstores, or abortion clinics outright. If we mean what we say about there being a state right to use marijuana, why should we permit localities to defeat state policy through zoning and regulating marijuana businesses out of their jurisdictions? Just as we worry that the rhetoric of states' rights will allow states to undermine important federal principles, so we might be concerned that localism will allow municipalities to subvert state-wide policy.
6,885
<h4>State-local conflict results in outright marijuana bans- turns the case</h4><p><strong>Kamin 2012</strong> (Sam, Professor and Director, Constitutional Rights and Remedies Program, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law, THE ROAD TO LEGITIMIZING MARIJUANA: WHAT BENEFIT AT WHAT COST?: Medical Marijuana in Colorado and the Future of Marijuana Regulation in the United States, 43 McGeorge L. Rev. 147, lexis)</p><p>V. The State-Local Junction <u>In addition to</u> the ambiguity and <u>conflict between state</u> laws (some of which purport to legalize marijuana) <u>and</u> the <u>federal law</u> (which continues to criminalize it), <u>there is</u> another level of intergovernmental <u>conflict </u>in the area of marijuana regulation and reform - the interplay <u>between state and local governments.</u> Even in those states that have legalized marijuana for medical purposes, <u><mark>there is often</u> a <u>tension between state and municipal governments over whether and to what extent the drug may be regulated</u></mark> at the local level. <u><mark>In Colorado</u></mark>, for example, <u>municipalities and counties are free to enact zoning restrictions on the sale of marijuana - including complete bans - and <strong><mark>a number of local bodies have recently chosen to ban it outright</u></strong>.</mark> n67 Even though the Colorado Constitution prohibits the conviction of those using marijuana for medical purposes, <u><strong><mark>there will likely be many places</u></strong></mark> in the state <u><strong><mark>where marijuana cannot lawfully be manufactured or purchased</mark>. </u></strong>In California, which has delegated much of the regulation of marijuana from the state to the local level, the counties of San Diego and San Bernardino sued the state in 2006 to enjoin it from requiring them to participate in the state-mandated medical marijuana program. n68 The counties argued that the CSA [*163] preempted the state law requiring them to facilitate the applications of those seeking to register as marijuana patients under the state's medicinal marijuana provisions. The counties asked to be excused from their state obligations, arguing that participation in the state regulatory regime would make them complicit in the medical marijuana patients and care-givers' in violations of the federal law. The counties - like the sheriffs in Willis v. Winters - thus presented a non-trivial argument that they were incapable of complying with both state and federal law; the state obligated them to facilitate the very drug transactions that federal law expressly prohibits them from facilitating. n69 Although the counties lost their suit, the San Diego NORML case illustrates that, even in those states that have voted to make medical marijuana legally available, support for such policies is hardly uniform. Just as there are pockets of support and resistance to federal policy among the several states, similarly counties and towns can be expected to support state policy with varying levels of enthusiasm. For example, a number of municipalities in medical marijuana states have embraced the new industry as a boon to tax coffers. Most famously, the City of Oakland, California, has sought to establish itself as the Amsterdam of the United States. Facing fading industry and disappearing tax dollars, the city voted in 2010 to permit large-scale marijuana production, pledging to become the "Silicon Valley of Marijuana." n70 Of course, <u><mark>it is not surprising that different jurisdictions within the same state would have such disparate views</mark> </u>of medical marijuana. But it raises disconcerting questions about the ability of a city or county to opt out of a state-wide policy. The traditional understanding of the state-local dynamic is one of master and servant. n71 Generally considered the mere creations and instrumentalities of the state, local governments were seen as having essentially no power to contest state authority: Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to them. For the purpose of executing these powers properly and efficiently they usually are given the power to [*164] acquire, hold, and manage personal and real property. The number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state. Neither their charters, nor any law conferring governmental powers, or vesting in them property to be used for governmental purposes, or authorizing them to hold or manage such property, or exempting them from taxation upon it, constitutes a contract with the state within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States. n72 This is certainly the view underlying the California court's decision in San Diego NORML. The court held that, "as a general rule, a local governmental entity "charged with the ministerial duty of enforcing a statute ... generally does not have the authority, in the absence of a judicial determination of unconstitutionality, to refuse to enforce the statute on the basis of the [entity's] view that it is unconstitutional.'" n73 This traditional view has come under criticism in recent years, largely from legal academics. n74 These authors argue that the principle of federalism - with its embrace of a variety of approaches and views - should include support for a diversity of opinions within states as well as between them. n75 In other words, the [*165] things that we like about "Our Federalism" apply with equal or perhaps greater power to state-local (and sub-local) federalism. n76 If the states are laboratories of ideas, then surely the even more diverse collection of local entities can produce even greater innovation and insights. This argument for a "localist" parallel to federalism makes a strong case for giving the municipalities the right to contest state policies, including the choice of a state to permit marijuana for medical purposes. However, just as segregation and interposition are the dark side of the argument for state power vis-a-vis the federal government, so localism creates the opportunity for localities to subvert the will of the voters of a particular state. We would look askance, for example, at a municipality that barred churches, bookstores, or abortion clinics outright. If we mean what we say about there being a state right to use marijuana, why should we permit localities to defeat state policy through zoning and regulating marijuana businesses out of their jurisdictions? Just as we worry that the rhetoric of states' rights will allow states to undermine important federal principles, so <u><mark>we might be concerned that localism will <strong>allow municipalities to subvert state-wide policy</u></strong></mark>.</p>
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“Local buy-in” is a DA to the plan- Tax law 280E would force businesses to reorganize as 501-c-4s which have to focus on social welfare activities – the aff takes out this tax law and causes backlash from local governments which hurts the industry- 501c4 structure gets them on board- ONLY the CP solves
Leff 2014
Leff 2014 (Ben, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523, lexis)
current law permits marijuana sellers to avoid the impact of § 280E by operating as tax-exempt social welfare organizations federal tax law creates a strong incentive for marijuana sellers to do just that the incentive created in such a strange manner is good policy The use of federal tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is superior policy because it encourages "multi-jurisdictional" federalism. a dualist model state and national is too limited it is important to recognize that localities have conflicts with states conflicts between states that have liberalized marijuana laws and localities seeking to restrict or prohibit marijuana sales have become common in assessing the merits of any particular approach that the federal government could take it makes sense to take into account local stakeholders nonprofit social welfare organizations are more likely than for-profit operations to advance the interests of localities The IRS could make clear that this "minimum standards of acceptable conduct" standard is based on local standards it would be using federal law to intervene in marijuana policy, but only when state laws and local laws were in harmony the tax law would incentivize marijuana sales in communities that permitted such sales, and dis-incentivize such sales in communities that objected to them This could mitigate inter-jurisdictional conflict
current law permits marijuana sellers to avoid the impact of § 280E by operating as tax-exempt social welfare organizations. federal tax law creates a strong incentive for marijuana sellers to do just that. The use of federal tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is superior policy because it encourages "multi-jurisdictional" federalism a dualist model state and t national is too limited it is important to recognize that localitie ave conflicts with states, conflicts between states that have liberalized marijuana laws and localities seeking to restrict or prohibit marijuana sales have become common it makes sense to take into account local stakeholders nonprofit social welfare organizations are more likely than for-profit operations to advance the interests of localities the tax law would incentivize marijuana sales in communities that permitted such sales, and dis-incentivize such sales in communities that objected to them. This could mitigate inter-jurisdictional conflict
The previous Part argues that current law plausibly permits marijuana sellers to avoid the impact of § 280E by operating as tax-exempt social welfare organizations. If that is true, federal tax law creates a strong incentive for marijuana sellers to do just that. This incentive may well be no more than a historical oddity: an unintended consequence of the confluence of the creation of a type of tax-exempt organization that is unaffected by the public policy doctrine and the placement in the tax code [*564] of a penalty for selling marijuana. But it is possible that the incentive created in such a strange manner is good policy. This Part explores that question: Does a tax incentive encouraging marijuana selling by social welfare organizations solve certain federalism issues better than other federal laws addressing the marijuana issue? The conflict between state and federal laws governing the marijuana industry presents a stark example of inter-jurisdictional conflict. The federal government has criminalized all sale and use of marijuana; a number of states have legalized marijuana for medical purposes; and, as of this year, Washington and Colorado have legalized marijuana for any purpose. This conflict creates a potentially extreme federalism problem. n188 Robert Mikos describes a "war" between the federal government and some states over marijuana policy. n189 The most predictable outcome of the war would be a victory for the federal government, given that the Constitution permits the federal government to preempt state law when acting within its authority, and the Supreme Court has held that regulating marijuana is within the federal government's authority. n190 However, Mikos argues that "the states - and not the federal government - have already won the war over medical marijuana," n191 largely because states have continued to legalize marijuana and public opinion is strongly behind them. n192 If the President wanted to use force to fight the war, he could direct the Department of Justice to criminally prosecute marijuana users or sellers to the full extent of federal law, presumably resulting in significant prison sentences for people who are behaving in ways sanctioned by their state governments. While there are practical constraints on the federal government's ability to prosecute marijuana sellers, n193 it [*565] presumably could deter a lot of individual actors if it vigorously enforced the criminal law. Instead, the President appears to have tactically retreated from this inter-jurisdictional conflict, at least with respect to criminal enforcement of federal drug laws against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n194 As discussed above, the IRS has not participated in this retreat, and its current policy appears to be vigorous enforcement of § 280E against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. I argue that § 280E enforcement, coupled with recognition of tax-exempt status for properly operated marijuana sellers, provides the federal government with a superior resolution to its "war" with the states. Using tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is better policy than either returning to a policy of enforcing criminal penalties against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers or a policy of benign neglect of state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n195 The use of federal tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is superior policy because it encourages "multi-jurisdictional" federalism. Multiple scholars of federalism have pointed out that a dualist model of federalism, in which the goal is to allocate authority between or balance the interests of only two parties - a state government and the national government - is too limited. n196 Instead, it is important to recognize that localities may have inter-jurisdictional conflicts with their states, and the principles of federalism may apply with equal force to these sub-national, inter-jurisdictional conflicts, even if localities are not truly sovereign. n197 In the marijuana context, conflicts between states that have liberalized marijuana laws and localities seeking to restrict or prohibit marijuana sales have become common. n198 Therefore, in assessing the merits [*566] of any particular approach that the federal government could take to the question of how to influence national marijuana policy, it makes sense to take into account not just policy made at state level, but the interests of local stakeholders in each locality as well. How could this "multi-jurisdictional" federalism be advanced by an IRS policy of channeling marijuana sellers into nonprofit social welfare organizations? First, as discussed above, nonprofit social welfare organizations are more likely than for-profit operations to advance the interests of localities because of their commitment to social welfare purposes. To qualify as a social welfare organization, an organization would have to provide job training and employment opportunities for hard-to-employ members of the community. Providing these jobs has the potential to reduce the negative effects of illegal drug markets and thereby positively impact the neighborhood in which the organization operates. But perhaps as importantly, while I have argued that an intention to violate federal law should not prevent an organization from qualifying for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4), I have also argued that an intention to violate state or local laws should. Remember, the one piece of guidance from the IRS on the relationship between illegal activities and § 501(c)(4) status involved an organization whose intention was to violate local laws and ordinances by engaging in civil disobedience. The IRS argued that an organization that intended to disrupt the peace of a community could not advance the social welfare of that community because it intended to engage in activities that "violate the minimum standards of acceptable conduct necessary to the preservation of an orderly society." n199 The IRS could make clear that this "minimum standards of acceptable conduct" standard is based on local standards, and could thereby refuse to recognize the tax-exempt status of a social welfare organization that intended to sell marijuana contrary to local law. If that was the IRS's standard then it would be using federal law to intervene in marijuana policy, but only when state laws and local laws were in harmony. In effect, the tax law would incentivize marijuana sales in communities that permitted such sales, and dis-incentivize such sales in communities that objected to them. This type of "multi-jurisdictional" approach to a key federalism issue could mitigate inter-jurisdictional conflict, and would arm localities in their struggle for control over marijuana policy.
6,802
<h4>“Local buy-in” is a DA to the plan- Tax law 280E would force businesses to reorganize as 501-c-4s which have to focus on social welfare activities – the aff takes out this tax law and causes backlash from local governments which hurts the industry- 501c4 structure gets them on board- ONLY the CP solves</h4><p><strong>Leff 2014</strong> (Ben, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523, lexis)</p><p>The previous Part argues that <u><mark>current law</u></mark> plausibly <u><mark>permits</u> <u>marijuana sellers to avoid the impact of § 280E</u> <u>by operating as tax-exempt social welfare organizations</u>. </mark>If that is true, <u><strong><mark>federal tax law creates a strong incentive for marijuana sellers to do just that</u></strong>.</mark> This incentive may well be no more than a historical oddity: an unintended consequence of the confluence of the creation of a type of tax-exempt organization that is unaffected by the public policy doctrine and the placement in the tax code [*564] of a penalty for selling marijuana. But it is possible that <u>the incentive created in such a strange manner <strong>is good policy</u></strong>. This Part explores that question: Does a tax incentive encouraging marijuana selling by social welfare organizations solve certain federalism issues better than other federal laws addressing the marijuana issue? The conflict between state and federal laws governing the marijuana industry presents a stark example of inter-jurisdictional conflict. The federal government has criminalized all sale and use of marijuana; a number of states have legalized marijuana for medical purposes; and, as of this year, Washington and Colorado have legalized marijuana for any purpose. This conflict creates a potentially extreme federalism problem. n188 Robert Mikos describes a "war" between the federal government and some states over marijuana policy. n189 The most predictable outcome of the war would be a victory for the federal government, given that the Constitution permits the federal government to preempt state law when acting within its authority, and the Supreme Court has held that regulating marijuana is within the federal government's authority. n190 However, Mikos argues that "the states - and not the federal government - have already won the war over medical marijuana," n191 largely because states have continued to legalize marijuana and public opinion is strongly behind them. n192 If the President wanted to use force to fight the war, he could direct the Department of Justice to criminally prosecute marijuana users or sellers to the full extent of federal law, presumably resulting in significant prison sentences for people who are behaving in ways sanctioned by their state governments. While there are practical constraints on the federal government's ability to prosecute marijuana sellers, n193 it [*565] presumably could deter a lot of individual actors if it vigorously enforced the criminal law. Instead, the President appears to have tactically retreated from this inter-jurisdictional conflict, at least with respect to criminal enforcement of federal drug laws against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n194 As discussed above, the IRS has not participated in this retreat, and its current policy appears to be vigorous enforcement of § 280E against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. I argue that § 280E enforcement, coupled with recognition of tax-exempt status for properly operated marijuana sellers, provides the federal government with a superior resolution to its "war" with the states. Using tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is better policy than either returning to a policy of enforcing criminal penalties against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers or a policy of benign neglect of state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n195 <u><mark>The use of federal tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is superior policy because it <strong>encourages "multi-jurisdictional" federalism</mark>. </u></strong>Multiple scholars of federalism have pointed out that <u><mark>a dualist model</u></mark> of federalism, in which the goal is to allocate authority between or balance the interests of only two parties - a <u><mark>state</u></mark> government <u><mark>and</u> t</mark>he <u><mark>national</u> </mark>government - <u><mark>is too limited</u></mark>. n196 Instead, <u><mark>it is important to recognize that localitie</mark>s</u> may <u>h<mark>ave</u></mark> inter-jurisdictional <u><mark>conflicts</u> <u>with</u></mark> their <u><mark>states</u>,</mark> and the principles of federalism may apply with equal force to these sub-national, inter-jurisdictional conflicts, even if localities are not truly sovereign. n197 In the marijuana context, <u><strong><mark>conflicts between states that have liberalized marijuana laws and localities seeking to restrict or prohibit marijuana sales have become common</u></strong></mark>. n198 Therefore, <u>in assessing the merits</u> [*566] <u>of any particular approach that the federal government could take</u> to the question of how to influence national marijuana policy, <u><mark>it makes sense to take into account</u></mark> not just policy made at state level, but the interests of <u><mark>local stakeholders</u></mark> in each locality as well. How could this "multi-jurisdictional" federalism be advanced by an IRS policy of channeling marijuana sellers into nonprofit social welfare organizations? First, as discussed above, <u><mark>nonprofit social welfare organizations are more likely than for-profit operations to advance the interests of localities</u></mark> because of their commitment to social welfare purposes. To qualify as a social welfare organization, an organization would have to provide job training and employment opportunities for hard-to-employ members of the community. Providing these jobs has the potential to reduce the negative effects of illegal drug markets and thereby positively impact the neighborhood in which the organization operates. But perhaps as importantly, while I have argued that an intention to violate federal law should not prevent an organization from qualifying for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4), I have also argued that an intention to violate state or local laws should. Remember, the one piece of guidance from the IRS on the relationship between illegal activities and § 501(c)(4) status involved an organization whose intention was to violate local laws and ordinances by engaging in civil disobedience. The IRS argued that an organization that intended to disrupt the peace of a community could not advance the social welfare of that community because it intended to engage in activities that "violate the minimum standards of acceptable conduct necessary to the preservation of an orderly society." n199 <u>The IRS could make clear that this "minimum standards of acceptable conduct" standard is <strong>based on local standards</u></strong>, and could thereby refuse to recognize the tax-exempt status of a social welfare organization that intended to sell marijuana contrary to local law. If that was the IRS's standard then <u>it would be using federal law to intervene in marijuana policy, but only when state laws and local laws were in harmony</u>. In effect, <u><mark>the tax law would incentivize marijuana sales in communities that permitted such sales, and dis-incentivize such sales in communities that objected to them</u>. <u><strong>This</u></strong></mark> type of "multi-jurisdictional" approach to a key federalism issue <u><strong><mark>could mitigate inter-jurisdictional conflict</u></strong></mark>, and would arm localities in their struggle for control over marijuana policy.</p>
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Legalization means changing the law and removing an existing prohibition
EMCCDA 01
EMCCDA 01 European monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction,
“Decriminalisation in Europe?: Recent developments in legal approaches to drug use” November 2001 http://eldd.emcdda.org/databases/eldd_comparative_xanalyses.cfm Concept and Definition of Decriminalisation Decriminalisation takes away the status of criminal law from those acts to which it is applied certain acts no longer constitute criminal offences With regard to drugs, it is usually used to refer to demand acts of acquisition, possession and consumption. it still is illegal to use, possess, acquire or in certain cases import drugs, but those acts are no longer criminal offences. sanctions can still be applied In contrast, legalisation is the process of bringing within the control of the law a specified activity that was previously illegal and prohibited or strictly regulated the term is most commonly applied to acts of supply; production, manufacture or sale for non-medical use Legalisation would mean that such activities, and use and possession, would be regulated by states’ norms any form of legalisation would be contrary to the current UN conventions.
Decriminalisation takes away the status of criminal law sanctions can still be applied In contrast, legalisation is the process of bringing within the control of the law a specified activity that was previously illegal Legalisation would mean that such activities, and use and possession, would be regulated
“Decriminalisation in Europe?: Recent developments in legal approaches to drug use” November 2001 http://eldd.emcdda.org/databases/eldd_comparative_xanalyses.cfm Concept and Definition of Decriminalisation Decriminalisation. Decriminalisation takes away the status of criminal law from those acts to which it is applied. This means that certain acts no longer constitute criminal offences. With regard to drugs, it is usually used to refer to demand; acts of acquisition, possession and consumption. Following decriminalisation, it still is illegal to use, possess, acquire or in certain cases import drugs, but those acts are no longer criminal offences. However, administrative sanctions can still be applied; these can be a fine, suspension of the driving or firearms licence, or just a warning. In contrast, legalisation is the process of bringing within the control of the law a specified activity that was previously illegal and prohibited or strictly regulated. Related to drugs, the term is most commonly applied to acts of supply; production, manufacture or sale for non-medical use. Legalisation would mean that such activities, and use and possession, would be regulated by states’ norms, in the same way that it is legal to use alcohol and tobacco. There can still exist some administrative controls and regulations, which might even be supported by criminal sanctions (e.g. when juveniles or road traffic are concerned). From a legal point of view, any form of legalisation would be contrary to the current UN conventions.
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<h4><strong>Legalization means changing the law and removing an existing prohibition</h4><p>EMCCDA 01 </strong> European monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction, </p><p><u>“Decriminalisation in Europe?: Recent developments in legal approaches to drug use” November 2001 http://eldd.emcdda.org/databases/eldd_comparative_xanalyses.cfm</p><p>Concept and Definition of Decriminalisation</u> Decriminalisation. <u><mark>Decriminalisation takes away the status of criminal law </mark>from those acts to which it is applied</u>. This means that <u>certain acts no longer constitute criminal offences</u>. <u>With regard to drugs, it is usually used to refer to demand</u>; <u>acts of acquisition, possession and consumption.</u> Following decriminalisation, <u>it still is illegal to use, possess, acquire or in certain cases import drugs, but those acts are no longer criminal offences.</u> However, administrative <u><mark>sanctions can still be applied</u></mark>; these can be a fine, suspension of the driving or firearms licence, or just a warning. <u><mark>In contrast, legalisation is the process of bringing within the control of the law a specified activity that was previously illegal</mark> and prohibited or strictly regulated</u>. Related to drugs, <u>the term is most commonly applied to acts of supply; production, manufacture or sale for non-medical use</u>. <u><mark>Legalisation would mean that such activities, and use and possession, would be regulated </mark>by states’ norms</u>, in the same way that it is legal to use alcohol and tobacco. There can still exist some administrative controls and regulations, which might even be supported by criminal sanctions (e.g. when juveniles or road traffic are concerned). From a legal point of view, <u>any form of legalisation would be contrary to the current UN conventions.</p></u>
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Inequality in ability to purchase is avoided with central purchasing
Radcliffe-Richards et al 98
Radcliffe-Richards et al 98 J. Radcliffe-Richards, Department of Philosophy, the Open University, Milton Keynes et al J; Daar, A S; Guttmann, R D; Hoffenberg, R; Kennedy, I; Lock, M; Sells, R A;
case for allowing kidney sales Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor. all purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution
Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor. purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution. [12]
Tilney, N The Lancet Volume 351(9120) 27 June 1998 pp 1950-1952 The case for allowing kidney sales http://elsa.berkeley.edu/pub/users/webfac/held/157_VIII.pdf Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor. This argument, however, is irrelevant to the issue of organ selling as such. If organ selling is wrong for this reason, so are all benefits available to the rich, including all private medicine, and, for that matter, all public provision of medicine in rich countries (including transplantation of donated organs) that is unavailable in poor ones. Furthermore, all purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution. [12]
727
<h4>Inequality in ability to purchase is avoided with central purchasing</h4><p><strong>Radcliffe-Richards et al 98</strong> J. Radcliffe-Richards, Department of Philosophy, the Open University, Milton Keynes et al J; Daar, A S; Guttmann, R D; Hoffenberg, R; Kennedy, I; Lock, M; Sells, R A;</p><p>Tilney, N The Lancet Volume 351(9120) 27 June 1998 pp 1950-1952 The<u> case for allowing kidney sales</p><p></u>http://elsa.berkeley.edu/pub/users/webfac/held/157_VIII.pdf</p><p><u><mark>Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor.</mark> </u>This argument, however, is irrelevant to the issue of organ selling as such. If organ selling is wrong for this reason, so are all benefits available to the rich, including all private medicine, and, for that matter, all public provision of medicine in rich countries (including transplantation of donated organs) that is unavailable in poor ones. Furthermore, <u>all <mark>purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution</u>. [12]</p></mark>
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430,346
7
17,114
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
565,248
A
Wake
4
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
Voss
null
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
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48,454
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college
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743,693
Federalism model solves Ukraine war
Sasse and Hughes 2014
Sasse and Hughes 2014 (Gwendolyn Sasse and James Hughes 3-19-2014; Professorial Fellow, Nuffield College & University Reader in Comparative Politics at Oxford and London School of Economics political scientist “Building a federal Ukraine?” Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/19/building-a-federal-ukraine/)
The idea of a remaking of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction. Yatsenyuk reached out to Russophones announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution Senior U.S. administration officials have encouraged the Ukrainian leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines. Until recently the federal idea was an anathema The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state Overall, Ukraine’s elites have been moderate in their approach to state- and nation-building. Ukraine now needs to reestablish regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a hitherto informal mechanism. a state-wide comprehensive federalization or decentralization of more powers to all regions We could expect greater powers to include self-government reform process could be achieved by either a constitutional convention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. These steps would generate a democratic process of debate, dialogue and engagement, and hopefully reunite Ukrainian society. There would be international monitoring and advice This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the United States and the E.U. are not short of is experts on , federalism implementation depends critically on leadership The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected. In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict The Ukraine crisis offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of autonomy and federalism to peacefully manage conflict and enhance state stability federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward in Ukraine
U.S. officials have encouraged leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines Ukraine’s elites have been moderate Ukraine now needs regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a mechanism decentralization could be achieved by con con These steps would generate engagement, and reunite Ukrainian society. There would be international monitoring and advice. This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the U S are not short of is experts on federalism implementation depends critically on leadership Ukraine offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of federalism to peacefully manage conflict
The idea of a remaking of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction. On March 18, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk reached out to Russophones in the eastern and southern regions, announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution.” Senior U.S. administration officials have encouraged the Ukrainian leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines. On March 17, the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed the establishment of an international “support group” to manage the crisis. The list of items that Russia wants to be the basis for negotiation in Ukraine includes a new federal structure for Ukraine and the recognition of Russian as a second language. Until recently the federal idea was an anathema among the greater part of Ukraine’s political elite. As a constitutional form it was largely rejected in the 1990s, partly as a negative reaction to the experience of Soviet federalism, and partly from fear of its centrifugal potential for splitting the country along ethnolinguistic fault lines. The negative view of federalism as a destabilizing constitutional order in ethnically divided places was one that was not only perceived by elites as a lived experience in former communist federations, such as the Soviet Union successor states Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, but was also prevalent among scholars studying the collapse of communism. Federalism, or “ethnofederalism” as it was usually termed by political scientists, came to be seen as part of the problem of “mismanaging” ethnically diverse countries, not part of the solution. The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. Prospects for federalism in Ukraine The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state. The ideas of decentralization and federalism have undulated in the Ukrainian political discourse since the early 1990s. At first these ideas were an agenda of the western regions. Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil and the ‘national-democratic’ forces he represented promoted federalism as a means to protect the cultural distinctiveness of Western Ukraine. From the mid-to late 1990s, after independence, calls for autonomy or federalism came from the mainly Russophone south-east and Crimea, in particular in crisis situations like the Orange Revolution or the recent protests. Overall, Ukraine’s elites have been moderate in their approach to state- and nation-building. The first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, did not impose the state language on the southeast or Crimea as envisaged by the Ukrainian language law. The cautious approach continued after the 1994 presidential elections, which saw the “eastern” candidate Leonid Kuchma defeat Kravchuk. Although Kuchma ran on an election platform of more power to the regions and the recognition of the Russian language as an official language, he actually did not deliver on this agenda during his two terms in office between 1994 and 2004. The implicit consensus on balancing regional interests helped to preserve political stability during Ukraine’s transition, while also slowing economic reforms and adjustment. It was also evident in the ambivalent foreign policy approaches toward Russia and the European Union/ NATO. Ukraine now needs to reestablish this important regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a hitherto informal mechanism. There are two scenarios: First, there could be an asymmetric decentralization (that is, different agreements with different regions of the country). The new government in Kiev could engage in bilateral negotiations with individual regions in the south-east. Given the long-standing inability of Ukrainian elites to agree on the reform of center-regional relations as whole, a selective divide and rule strategy offers the advantages of fragmenting the “Russophone” bloc, and the potential for making deals on a case-by-case basis. Such a process would inevitably be largely non-transparent. This asymmetric federal approach, as with Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s approach to ethnic republics in Russia in the mid-1990s, might generate some short-term stability but it would also antagonize other regions and would be vulnerable to unraveling. Second, there could be a state-wide process of constitutional reform with the aim of either a comprehensive federalization, or decentralization of more powers to all regions. We could expect greater powers to include self-government in culture (including language and education), economic management, taxation, and policing. The election (rather than the presidential appointment) of regional governors is an important aspect of reform. This could be part of a synchronization of regional elections, including for governors, with early parliamentary elections. This reform process could be achieved by either a constitutional convention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. These steps would generate a democratic process of debate, dialogue and engagement, and hopefully reunite Ukrainian society. There would almost certainly be international monitoring and advice. This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the United States and the E.U. are not short of is legal experts on autonomy, federalism and minority rights. The implementation of constitutional reform depends critically on political will and leadership, and it would have to be championed by the new president to be elected in May. Constitutional reform will be on the agenda in any event, as Ukraine currently finds itself between constitutions (2004 and 2010) – and neither of these constitutions was clearly defined. Regional oligarchs will also have to be part of this process. Just how they are to be managed in the new Ukraine will be one of the greatest challenges facing the political elites. A properly functioning constitutional court that is insulated better against political interference is crucial for decentralization or federalization to be lasting. Opponents of federalization will no doubt raise the dangers of state disintegration and secession that might flow from such a constitutional reform process, especially given the Crimea example and the ongoing unrest in the southeast. The fact that Russia has indicated that greater autonomy is its own preferred outcome for Ukraine means, however, that there is now potential for substantive negotiations to move forward – assuming that Russia can switch off the Russian nationalist mobilization that it has so far been promoting. Reassessing the turn against “ethnofederalism” There was a turn against ethnofederalism in the 1990s that is ripe for a reassessment. Prior to the collapse of communism, there was a dominant paradigm that federalism as “self rule and shared rule” has positive “win-win” effects on promoting stable politics, and indeed, that it was the constitutional order (following the U.S. example) that was most conducive to democracy. Federalism was also seen as an essential constitutional design for the “politics of accommodation” in “deeply divided” or “plural” societies. From the early 1990s this paradigm was shaken by critiques which argued that federalism and autonomy more generally were highly destabilizing in ethnically divided states where the federal administrative architecture and boundaries were drawn to reflect ethnic divisions. The three socialist ethnofederations (USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) were used as cases to demonstrate this thesis. The argument is that the mode of socialist federalism, which while it was intrinsically a “sham” in terms of power distribution given that real power resided in communist parties, was flawed because of its “ethnic” structure leading to a mismanagement of nationalism. Consequently, a major cause of the collapse was the fact that the previously disempowered federal architecture became a platform for ethnonational mobilization. Socialist-era federal structures were essentially “subversive institutions”. The negative thesis was developed further in perspectives on the “frozen conflicts” to include even the prospect of autonomy and decentralization. In the Caucasus region, autonomy was seen as “a root cause of conflict” and a driver for secession. The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected. In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict. The Russian Federation is partially divided into ethnic units, and only Chechnya posed a serious threat to its territorial integrity. If one analyzes the case of Tatarstan and other ethnic republics of the Russian Federation the fact is that the asymmetric federalism and autonomy in key areas relating to self-rule, culture and, to some extent, economic power, was sufficient to quash secessionist demands and maintain state stability. That stability has persisted even when Putin recentralized powers from the ethnic republics to create his “power vertical” (see this recent Monkey Cage post). A similar argument holds with regard to conflict-prevention in Crimea in the 1990s (see the recent Monkey Cage post). The Ukraine crisis offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of autonomy and federalism to peacefully manage conflict and enhance state stability. It is of note that the federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward not just in Ukraine but in other places of conflict in the post-communist space, and beyond (for example, Iraq, Syria, and Libya).
9,859
<h4>Federalism model solves Ukraine war </h4><p><strong>Sasse and Hughes 2014</strong> (Gwendolyn Sasse and James Hughes 3-19-2014; Professorial Fellow, Nuffield College & University Reader in Comparative Politics at Oxford and London School of Economics political scientist “Building a federal Ukraine?” Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/19/building-a-federal-ukraine/)</p><p><u>The idea of a <strong>remaking</strong> of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction.</u> On March 18, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy <u>Yatsenyuk</u> <u>reached out to Russophones</u> in the eastern and southern regions, <u>announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution</u>.” <u>Senior <mark>U.S.</mark> administration <mark>officials have <strong>encouraged</strong></mark> the Ukrainian <mark>leadership to consider constitutional reform <strong>along federal lines</mark>. </u></strong>On March 17, the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed the establishment of an international “support group” to manage the crisis. The list of items that Russia wants to be the basis for negotiation in Ukraine includes a new federal structure for Ukraine and the recognition of Russian as a second language. <u>Until recently the federal idea was an anathema</u> among the greater part of Ukraine’s political elite. As a constitutional form it was largely rejected in the 1990s, partly as a negative reaction to the experience of Soviet federalism, and partly from fear of its centrifugal potential for splitting the country along ethnolinguistic fault lines. The negative view of federalism as a destabilizing constitutional order in ethnically divided places was one that was not only perceived by elites as a lived experience in former communist federations, such as the Soviet Union successor states Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, but was also prevalent among scholars studying the collapse of communism. Federalism, or “ethnofederalism” as it was usually termed by political scientists, came to be seen as part of the problem of “mismanaging” ethnically diverse countries, not part of the solution. <u>The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that <strong>now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism</strong>, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. </u>Prospects for federalism in Ukraine <u>The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state</u>. The ideas of decentralization and federalism have undulated in the Ukrainian political discourse since the early 1990s. At first these ideas were an agenda of the western regions. Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil and the ‘national-democratic’ forces he represented promoted federalism as a means to protect the cultural distinctiveness of Western Ukraine. From the mid-to late 1990s, after independence, calls for autonomy or federalism came from the mainly Russophone south-east and Crimea, in particular in crisis situations like the Orange Revolution or the recent protests. <u>Overall, <mark>Ukraine’s elites have been moderate</mark> in their approach to state- and nation-building. </u>The first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, did not impose the state language on the southeast or Crimea as envisaged by the Ukrainian language law. The cautious approach continued after the 1994 presidential elections, which saw the “eastern” candidate Leonid Kuchma defeat Kravchuk. Although Kuchma ran on an election platform of more power to the regions and the recognition of the Russian language as an official language, he actually did not deliver on this agenda during his two terms in office between 1994 and 2004. The implicit consensus on balancing regional interests helped to preserve political stability during Ukraine’s transition, while also slowing economic reforms and adjustment. It was also evident in the ambivalent foreign policy approaches toward Russia and the European Union/ NATO. <u><mark>Ukraine now needs</mark> to reestablish</u> this important <u><mark>regional balance</u> <u>and has the opportunity to <strong>formalize a </mark>hitherto informal <mark>mechanism</strong></mark>. </u>There are two scenarios: First, there could be an asymmetric decentralization (that is, different agreements with different regions of the country). The new government in Kiev could engage in bilateral negotiations with individual regions in the south-east. Given the long-standing inability of Ukrainian elites to agree on the reform of center-regional relations as whole, a selective divide and rule strategy offers the advantages of fragmenting the “Russophone” bloc, and the potential for making deals on a case-by-case basis. Such a process would inevitably be largely non-transparent. This asymmetric federal approach, as with Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s approach to ethnic republics in Russia in the mid-1990s, might generate some short-term stability but it would also antagonize other regions and would be vulnerable to unraveling. Second, there could be <u>a state-wide</u> process of constitutional reform with the aim of either a <u>comprehensive federalization</u>, <u>or <mark>decentralization</mark> of more powers to all regions</u>. <u>We could expect greater powers to include self-government</u> in culture (including language and education), economic management, taxation, and policing. The election (rather than the presidential appointment) of regional governors is an important aspect of reform. This could be part of a synchronization of regional elections, including for governors, with early parliamentary elections. This <u>reform process <mark>could be achieved by </mark>either a <mark>con</mark>stitutional <mark>con</mark>vention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. <mark>These steps would generate </mark>a democratic process of debate, dialogue and <mark>engagement, and</mark> hopefully <strong><mark>reunite Ukrainian society. There would</strong></mark> </u>almost certainly<u><strong><mark> be</strong> <strong>international monitoring and advice</u></strong>. <u>This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates and the E.U. <mark>are <strong>not short of is</strong></mark> </u>legal<u> <strong><mark>experts on</strong></mark> </u>autonomy<u>, <strong><mark>federalism</strong></mark> </u>and minority rights. The<u> <mark>implementation</mark> </u>of constitutional reform<u> <mark>depends critically on</mark> </u>political will and <u><mark>leadership</u></mark>, and it would have to be championed by the new president to be elected in May. Constitutional reform will be on the agenda in any event, as Ukraine currently finds itself between constitutions (2004 and 2010) – and neither of these constitutions was clearly defined. Regional oligarchs will also have to be part of this process. Just how they are to be managed in the new Ukraine will be one of the greatest challenges facing the political elites. A properly functioning constitutional court that is insulated better against political interference is crucial for decentralization or federalization to be lasting. Opponents of federalization will no doubt raise the dangers of state disintegration and secession that might flow from such a constitutional reform process, especially given the Crimea example and the ongoing unrest in the southeast. The fact that Russia has indicated that greater autonomy is its own preferred outcome for Ukraine means, however, that there is now potential for substantive negotiations to move forward – assuming that Russia can switch off the Russian nationalist mobilization that it has so far been promoting. Reassessing the turn against “ethnofederalism” There was a turn against ethnofederalism in the 1990s that is ripe for a reassessment. Prior to the collapse of communism, there was a dominant paradigm that federalism as “self rule and shared rule” has positive “win-win” effects on promoting stable politics, and indeed, that it was the constitutional order (following the U.S. example) that was most conducive to democracy. Federalism was also seen as an essential constitutional design for the “politics of accommodation” in “deeply divided” or “plural” societies. From the early 1990s this paradigm was shaken by critiques which argued that federalism and autonomy more generally were highly destabilizing in ethnically divided states where the federal administrative architecture and boundaries were drawn to reflect ethnic divisions. The three socialist ethnofederations (USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) were used as cases to demonstrate this thesis. The argument is that the mode of socialist federalism, which while it was intrinsically a “sham” in terms of power distribution given that real power resided in communist parties, was flawed because of its “ethnic” structure leading to a mismanagement of nationalism. Consequently, a major cause of the collapse was the fact that the previously disempowered federal architecture became a platform for ethnonational mobilization. Socialist-era federal structures were essentially “subversive institutions”. The negative thesis was developed further in perspectives on the “frozen conflicts” to include even the prospect of autonomy and decentralization. In the Caucasus region, autonomy was seen as “a root cause of conflict” and a driver for secession. <u>The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected.</u> <u>In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict</u>. The Russian Federation is partially divided into ethnic units, and only Chechnya posed a serious threat to its territorial integrity. If one analyzes the case of Tatarstan and other ethnic republics of the Russian Federation the fact is that the asymmetric federalism and autonomy in key areas relating to self-rule, culture and, to some extent, economic power, was sufficient to quash secessionist demands and maintain state stability. That stability has persisted even when Putin recentralized powers from the ethnic republics to create his “power vertical” (see this recent Monkey Cage post). A similar argument holds with regard to conflict-prevention in Crimea in the 1990s (see the recent Monkey Cage post). <u>The <mark>Ukraine</mark> crisis <mark>offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of</mark> autonomy and <mark>federalism to <strong>peacefully manage conflict</mark> </strong>and <strong>enhance state stability</u></strong>. It is of note that the <u>federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward</u> not just <u>in Ukraine</u> but in other places of conflict in the post-communist space, and beyond (for example, Iraq, Syria, and Libya).</p>
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2nc
Corporate
242,776
13
17,112
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
565,260
N
Wake
2
Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,454
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Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
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Pi.....
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Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,694
State-local conflict results in outright marijuana bans- turns the case
Kamin 2012
Kamin 2012 (Sam, Professor and Director, Constitutional Rights and Remedies Program, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law, THE ROAD TO LEGITIMIZING MARIJUANA: WHAT BENEFIT AT WHAT COST?: Medical Marijuana in Colorado and the Future of Marijuana Regulation in the United States, 43 McGeorge L. Rev. 147, lexis)
In addition to conflict between state and federal law there is conflict between state and local governments. there is often tension between state and municipal governments over whether and to what extent the drug may be regulated In Colorado municipalities and counties are free to enact zoning restrictions on the sale of marijuana - including complete bans - and a number of local bodies have recently chosen to ban it outright there will likely be many places where marijuana cannot lawfully be manufactured or purchased. it is not surprising that different jurisdictions within the same state would have such disparate views we might be concerned that localism will allow municipalities to subvert state-wide policy
there is often a tension between state and municipal governments over whether and to what extent the drug may be regulated In Colorado a number of local bodies have recently chosen to ban it outright. there will likely be many places where marijuana cannot lawfully be manufactured or purchased it is not surprising that different jurisdictions within the same state would have such disparate views we might be concerned that localism will allow municipalities to subvert state-wide policy
V. The State-Local Junction In addition to the ambiguity and conflict between state laws (some of which purport to legalize marijuana) and the federal law (which continues to criminalize it), there is another level of intergovernmental conflict in the area of marijuana regulation and reform - the interplay between state and local governments. Even in those states that have legalized marijuana for medical purposes, there is often a tension between state and municipal governments over whether and to what extent the drug may be regulated at the local level. In Colorado, for example, municipalities and counties are free to enact zoning restrictions on the sale of marijuana - including complete bans - and a number of local bodies have recently chosen to ban it outright. n67 Even though the Colorado Constitution prohibits the conviction of those using marijuana for medical purposes, there will likely be many places in the state where marijuana cannot lawfully be manufactured or purchased. In California, which has delegated much of the regulation of marijuana from the state to the local level, the counties of San Diego and San Bernardino sued the state in 2006 to enjoin it from requiring them to participate in the state-mandated medical marijuana program. n68 The counties argued that the CSA [*163] preempted the state law requiring them to facilitate the applications of those seeking to register as marijuana patients under the state's medicinal marijuana provisions. The counties asked to be excused from their state obligations, arguing that participation in the state regulatory regime would make them complicit in the medical marijuana patients and care-givers' in violations of the federal law. The counties - like the sheriffs in Willis v. Winters - thus presented a non-trivial argument that they were incapable of complying with both state and federal law; the state obligated them to facilitate the very drug transactions that federal law expressly prohibits them from facilitating. n69 Although the counties lost their suit, the San Diego NORML case illustrates that, even in those states that have voted to make medical marijuana legally available, support for such policies is hardly uniform. Just as there are pockets of support and resistance to federal policy among the several states, similarly counties and towns can be expected to support state policy with varying levels of enthusiasm. For example, a number of municipalities in medical marijuana states have embraced the new industry as a boon to tax coffers. Most famously, the City of Oakland, California, has sought to establish itself as the Amsterdam of the United States. Facing fading industry and disappearing tax dollars, the city voted in 2010 to permit large-scale marijuana production, pledging to become the "Silicon Valley of Marijuana." n70 Of course, it is not surprising that different jurisdictions within the same state would have such disparate views of medical marijuana. But it raises disconcerting questions about the ability of a city or county to opt out of a state-wide policy. The traditional understanding of the state-local dynamic is one of master and servant. n71 Generally considered the mere creations and instrumentalities of the state, local governments were seen as having essentially no power to contest state authority: Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to them. For the purpose of executing these powers properly and efficiently they usually are given the power to [*164] acquire, hold, and manage personal and real property. The number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state. Neither their charters, nor any law conferring governmental powers, or vesting in them property to be used for governmental purposes, or authorizing them to hold or manage such property, or exempting them from taxation upon it, constitutes a contract with the state within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States. n72 This is certainly the view underlying the California court's decision in San Diego NORML. The court held that, "as a general rule, a local governmental entity "charged with the ministerial duty of enforcing a statute ... generally does not have the authority, in the absence of a judicial determination of unconstitutionality, to refuse to enforce the statute on the basis of the [entity's] view that it is unconstitutional.'" n73 This traditional view has come under criticism in recent years, largely from legal academics. n74 These authors argue that the principle of federalism - with its embrace of a variety of approaches and views - should include support for a diversity of opinions within states as well as between them. n75 In other words, the [*165] things that we like about "Our Federalism" apply with equal or perhaps greater power to state-local (and sub-local) federalism. n76 If the states are laboratories of ideas, then surely the even more diverse collection of local entities can produce even greater innovation and insights. This argument for a "localist" parallel to federalism makes a strong case for giving the municipalities the right to contest state policies, including the choice of a state to permit marijuana for medical purposes. However, just as segregation and interposition are the dark side of the argument for state power vis-a-vis the federal government, so localism creates the opportunity for localities to subvert the will of the voters of a particular state. We would look askance, for example, at a municipality that barred churches, bookstores, or abortion clinics outright. If we mean what we say about there being a state right to use marijuana, why should we permit localities to defeat state policy through zoning and regulating marijuana businesses out of their jurisdictions? Just as we worry that the rhetoric of states' rights will allow states to undermine important federal principles, so we might be concerned that localism will allow municipalities to subvert state-wide policy.
6,885
<h4>State-local conflict results in outright marijuana bans- turns the case</h4><p><strong>Kamin 2012</strong> (Sam, Professor and Director, Constitutional Rights and Remedies Program, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law, THE ROAD TO LEGITIMIZING MARIJUANA: WHAT BENEFIT AT WHAT COST?: Medical Marijuana in Colorado and the Future of Marijuana Regulation in the United States, 43 McGeorge L. Rev. 147, lexis)</p><p>V. The State-Local Junction <u>In addition to</u> the ambiguity and <u>conflict between state</u> laws (some of which purport to legalize marijuana) <u>and</u> the <u>federal law</u> (which continues to criminalize it), <u>there is</u> another level of intergovernmental <u>conflict </u>in the area of marijuana regulation and reform - the interplay <u>between state and local governments.</u> Even in those states that have legalized marijuana for medical purposes, <u><mark>there is often</u> a <u>tension between state and municipal governments over whether and to what extent the drug may be regulated</u></mark> at the local level. <u><mark>In Colorado</u></mark>, for example, <u>municipalities and counties are free to enact zoning restrictions on the sale of marijuana - including complete bans - and <strong><mark>a number of local bodies have recently chosen to ban it outright</u></strong>.</mark> n67 Even though the Colorado Constitution prohibits the conviction of those using marijuana for medical purposes, <u><strong><mark>there will likely be many places</u></strong></mark> in the state <u><strong><mark>where marijuana cannot lawfully be manufactured or purchased</mark>. </u></strong>In California, which has delegated much of the regulation of marijuana from the state to the local level, the counties of San Diego and San Bernardino sued the state in 2006 to enjoin it from requiring them to participate in the state-mandated medical marijuana program. n68 The counties argued that the CSA [*163] preempted the state law requiring them to facilitate the applications of those seeking to register as marijuana patients under the state's medicinal marijuana provisions. The counties asked to be excused from their state obligations, arguing that participation in the state regulatory regime would make them complicit in the medical marijuana patients and care-givers' in violations of the federal law. The counties - like the sheriffs in Willis v. Winters - thus presented a non-trivial argument that they were incapable of complying with both state and federal law; the state obligated them to facilitate the very drug transactions that federal law expressly prohibits them from facilitating. n69 Although the counties lost their suit, the San Diego NORML case illustrates that, even in those states that have voted to make medical marijuana legally available, support for such policies is hardly uniform. Just as there are pockets of support and resistance to federal policy among the several states, similarly counties and towns can be expected to support state policy with varying levels of enthusiasm. For example, a number of municipalities in medical marijuana states have embraced the new industry as a boon to tax coffers. Most famously, the City of Oakland, California, has sought to establish itself as the Amsterdam of the United States. Facing fading industry and disappearing tax dollars, the city voted in 2010 to permit large-scale marijuana production, pledging to become the "Silicon Valley of Marijuana." n70 Of course, <u><mark>it is not surprising that different jurisdictions within the same state would have such disparate views</mark> </u>of medical marijuana. But it raises disconcerting questions about the ability of a city or county to opt out of a state-wide policy. The traditional understanding of the state-local dynamic is one of master and servant. n71 Generally considered the mere creations and instrumentalities of the state, local governments were seen as having essentially no power to contest state authority: Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to them. For the purpose of executing these powers properly and efficiently they usually are given the power to [*164] acquire, hold, and manage personal and real property. The number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state. Neither their charters, nor any law conferring governmental powers, or vesting in them property to be used for governmental purposes, or authorizing them to hold or manage such property, or exempting them from taxation upon it, constitutes a contract with the state within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States. n72 This is certainly the view underlying the California court's decision in San Diego NORML. The court held that, "as a general rule, a local governmental entity "charged with the ministerial duty of enforcing a statute ... generally does not have the authority, in the absence of a judicial determination of unconstitutionality, to refuse to enforce the statute on the basis of the [entity's] view that it is unconstitutional.'" n73 This traditional view has come under criticism in recent years, largely from legal academics. n74 These authors argue that the principle of federalism - with its embrace of a variety of approaches and views - should include support for a diversity of opinions within states as well as between them. n75 In other words, the [*165] things that we like about "Our Federalism" apply with equal or perhaps greater power to state-local (and sub-local) federalism. n76 If the states are laboratories of ideas, then surely the even more diverse collection of local entities can produce even greater innovation and insights. This argument for a "localist" parallel to federalism makes a strong case for giving the municipalities the right to contest state policies, including the choice of a state to permit marijuana for medical purposes. However, just as segregation and interposition are the dark side of the argument for state power vis-a-vis the federal government, so localism creates the opportunity for localities to subvert the will of the voters of a particular state. We would look askance, for example, at a municipality that barred churches, bookstores, or abortion clinics outright. If we mean what we say about there being a state right to use marijuana, why should we permit localities to defeat state policy through zoning and regulating marijuana businesses out of their jurisdictions? Just as we worry that the rhetoric of states' rights will allow states to undermine important federal principles, so <u><mark>we might be concerned that localism will <strong>allow municipalities to subvert state-wide policy</u></strong></mark>.</p>
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There is an unambiguously topical aff that would address much of the 1AC: Their Alexander evidence is about legalization in the United States
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<h4>There is an unambiguously topical aff that would address much of the 1AC: Their Alexander evidence is about legalization in the United States</h4>
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./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round3.docx
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1NC T PIC out of legalization K of black separatism "mass incarceration" word K 2NR K case
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Commodification Impact is empirically denied – people distinguish
Boyer 12
Boyer 12 J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis
that the current commoditization of the human body has not led to degradation of the term "human." individuals are able to distinguish between a person, individual, or soul and the parts, organs, and tissues that comprise the physical body. The fear that the value of human life would be reduced to the sum of the value of the body's parts has, in large part, not proven true, even in the face of extreme increases in the monetary value of human parts.
that the current commoditization of the human body has not led to degradation of the term "human individuals are able to distinguish between a person, individual, or soul and the parts, organs that comprise the physical body. The fear that the value of human life would be reduced to the sum of the value of the body's parts has, in large part, not proven true, even in the face of extreme increases in the monetary value of human parts.
Analyzing societal concerns in this context shows that the current commoditization of the human body has not led to degradation of the term "human." Rather, both the increase in the number of transplantations performed, n151 and the social acceptance of organ transplantation, n152 seem to indicate that individuals are able to distinguish between a person, individual, or soul and the parts, organs, and tissues that comprise the physical body. The fear that the value of human life would be reduced to the sum of the value of the body's parts has, in large part, not proven true, even in the face of extreme increases in the monetary value of human parts. Worldwide, society remains disgusted and shocked with the small subset of people who do, in fact, view humanity in such base terms. n153
794
<h4>Commodification Impact is empirically denied – people distinguish </h4><p><strong>Boyer 12</strong> J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis</p><p>Analyzing societal concerns in this context shows <u><mark>that the current commoditization of the human body has not led to degradation of the term "human</mark>." </u>Rather, both the increase in the number of transplantations performed, n151 and the social acceptance of organ transplantation, n152 seem to indicate that<u> <mark>individuals are able to distinguish between a person, individual, or soul and the parts, organs</mark>, and tissues <mark>that comprise the physical body. The fear that the value of human life would be reduced to the sum of the value of the body's parts has, in large part, not proven true, even in the face of extreme increases in the monetary value of human parts.</u></mark> Worldwide, society remains disgusted and shocked with the small subset of people who do, in fact, view humanity in such base terms. n153</p>
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
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Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
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Doesn’t solve the politics link- no part of the CP ever removes federal marijuana prohibition, the courts can’t shield if they’re not doing the same thing
Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum --- means they must enact a policy
Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum --- means they must enact a policy Army Officer School, 04 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)
The colon introduces A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:"Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor. dictionary.com) Resolved: To express, as an opinion or determination, by resolution and vote; to declare or decide by a formal vote; -- followed by a clause Definition of resolve is “to express by resolution to enact by law To reach a decision or make a determination: resolve on a course of action
The colon introduces A formal resolution, after the word "resolved Resolved: To express, as an opinion or determination, by vote; to decide by formal vote Definition of resolve is “to express by resolution to enact by law resolve on a course of action
The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:"Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor. Resolved means to express by formal vote—this is the only definition that’s in the context of the resolution Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary, 1998 (dictionary.com) Resolved: 5. To express, as an opinion or determination, by resolution and vote; to declare or decide by a formal vote; -- followed by a clause; as, the house resolved (or, it was resolved by the house) that no money should be apropriated (or, to appropriate no money). ‘Resolved’ means to enact a policy by law. Words and Phrases 64(Permanent Edition) Definition ofthe word “resolve,” given by Websteris “to expressan opinion or determination by resolution or vote;as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It isofsimilarforceto the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvierasmeaning “to establish by law”. Specific course of action AHD 6 (American Heritage Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved) INTRANSITIVE VERB:1. To reach a decision or make a determination: resolve on a course of action. 2. To become separated or reduced to constituents. 3. Music To undergo resolution.
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<h4><strong>Doesn’t solve the politics link- no part of the CP ever removes federal marijuana prohibition, the courts can’t shield if they’re not doing the same thing</h4><p>Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum --- means they must enact a policy</p><p>Army Officer School, 04<u></strong> (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)</p><p><mark>The colon introduces</u></mark> the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  <u><mark>A formal resolution, after the word "resolved</mark>:"Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor<strong>.</p><p></u>Resolved means to express by formal vote—this is the only definition that’s in the context of the resolution</p><p>Webster’s </strong>Revised Unabridged Dictionary<strong>, 1998</strong> (<u>dictionary.com)</p><p><mark>Resolved:</p><p></u></mark>5. <u><mark>To express, as an opinion or determination, by</mark> resolution and <mark>vote; to</mark> declare or <mark>decide by</mark> a <mark>formal vote</mark>; -- followed by a clause</u>; as, the house resolved (or, it was resolved by the house) that no money should be apropriated<strong> (or, to appropriate no money).</p><p>‘Resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.</p><p>Words and Phrases 64</strong>(Permanent Edition)</p><p><u><mark>Definition of</u></mark>the word “<u><mark>resolve</u></mark>,” given by Webster<u><mark>is “to express</u></mark>an opinion or determination <u><mark>by resolution</u> </mark>or vote;as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It isofsimilarforce<u><mark>to</u></mark> the word “<u><mark>enact</u></mark>,” which is defined by Bouvierasmeaning “to establish <u><mark>by law</u><strong></mark>”.</p><p>Specific course of action </p><p>AHD 6</strong> (American Heritage Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved)</p><p>INTRANSITIVE VERB:1. <u>To reach a decision or make a determination: <mark>resolve on a course of action</u></mark>. 2. To become separated or reduced to constituents. 3. Music To<strong> undergo resolution. </p></strong>
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Nuke war
Thompson 14
Loren Thompson 4-24-2014 “Four Ways The Ukraine Crisis Could Escalate To Use Of Nuclear Weapons” http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/04/24/four-ways-the-ukraine-crisis-could-escalate-to-use-of-nuclear-weapons/
this year’s crisis over Ukraine is a reminder that Russia remains a nuclear superpower, and that the geopolitical sources of its security concerns have not vanished Moscow may have greater reason for worrying today, because it has lost the buffer of allies that insulated it from Western attack during the Cold War, and now finds its capital only a few minutes from the eastern border of Ukraine it is easy to see why Moscow might fear aggression. the Obama Administration credibility is on the line with regional allies and Russian leader Vladimir Putin has not been helpful in defusing the fears of his neighbors Having fomented revolt in eastern Ukraine Moscow now says it might be forced to come to the aid of ethnic Russians Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence in the neighborhood reiterating security guarantees to local members of NATO tensions are ratcheting up. successive revisions of Russian military strategy appear “to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons” to balance the U.S. advantage in high-tech conventional weapons. Russian doctrine explicitly recognizes the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression Not only does Moscow see nuclear use as a potential escalatory option in a regional war, but it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conflict. This isn’t just Russian saber-rattling The U.S. and its NATO partners too envision the possibility of nuclear use in a European war The Obama Administration had the opportunity to back away and instead decided it would retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons improbable though it may seem, doctrine and capabilities exist on both sides that could lead to nuclear use in a confrontation over Ukraine what started out as a local crisis could turn into something much worse. It is easy to imagine misjudgments in Ukraine which Washington and Moscow approach from very different perspectives Any deployment could provoke Russian escalation. Misinterpretation of signals can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides up the “ladder of escalation” quickly, to a point where nuclear use seems like the logical next step. Whichever side found itself losing would have to weigh the drawbacks of losing against those of escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons U.S. policy even envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads against enemy targets. Russian doctrine endorses nuclear-weapons use in response to conventional aggression threatening the homeland, and obstacles to local initiative often break down once hostilities commence. When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint in wartime — poor intelligence, garbled communication, battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and a host of other influences — it seems reasonable to consider that a military confrontation between NATO and Russia might in some manner escalate out of control, even to the point of using nuclear weapons. because Ukraine is so close to the Russian heartland there’s no telling what might happen once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed 90 (Lincoln, “The Utilitarianism Response”) there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism. utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing . The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. Without or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason, we are likely to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being. Michael Blain, RHETORICAL PRACTICE IN AN ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAMPAIGN, Peace & Change Peace activism can be understood as a sociopolitical performance. It enacts a pattern of discourse that can be rhetorically analyzed in terms of its strategy of incitement. As peace activists mobilized their forces in the 1980s, they built up a discourse -- a repertoire of possible political statements for use against nuclear weapons policies. Such statements as nuclear annihilation, radiation pollution, and strategic madness have been the primary incitements to peace activism. Activists use language pragmatically. As political actors addressing a public audience, they know they must speak a language familiar to that audience. Nineteenth-century activists were educated, middle-class women, clergymen, educators, and businessmen with a reform Christian conscience. Twentieth-century activists have included political leftists and cultural dissidents as well as traditional pacifists and religious liberals.(n1) Middle-class professionals have played prominent roles in the peace movement. For example, medical activists like Helen Caldicott and Robert Lifton have elaborated a discourse on the madness of "nuclearism"(n2) In fact, some analysts interpret the peace movement as a power struggle of middle-class radicals and countercultural rebels against the power elite.(n3) This article presents the results of a rhetorical analysis of activists' discursive practices in a victorious campaign to defeat a U.S. government plan to construct the first new nuclear weapons plant in twenty years in the state of Idaho, the Special Isotope Separator (SIS). It shows how activists in the Snake River Alliance (SRA), a Boise, Idaho, antinuclear organization, mobilized hundreds of "Idahoans" to act as "concerned citizens" and "Life Guards," to lobby, testify, demonstrate, and finally, to kill this plan. The article introduces a perspective on how discourse functions in political movements. An effective movement discourse must accomplish two things: (1) knowledge, or the constitution of the subjects and objects of struggle, and (2) ethics, or the moral incitement of people to political action. I will show how this perspective can illuminate how anti-SIS activists developed an effective discourse to kill this crucial nuclear weapons program. A critical evaluation of this campaign can contribute to peace in at least three ways: it can celebrate the artful practices these activists engaged in to achieve their political objectives; it can add a case study of a victorious campaign to the emerging literature on the tactics of nonviolent action; and finally, it can contribute to the current debate about the future of the peace movement in a post-cold war world. The anti-SIS campaign involved an alliance of environmental and peace groups, which suggests one possible political strategy for future peace actions. POLITICAL MOVEMENTS AS VICTIMAGE RITUALS Political activists must engage in discourse to fight and win power struggles with their adversaries. In political battles, such as the anti-SIS campaign, words are weapons with tactical functions. Michel Foucault clearly articulates this perspective: Indeed, it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together. And for this reason, we must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable ... as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies. It is this distribution that we must reconstruct ... according to who is speaking, his position of power, the institutional context in which he happens to be situated ... with the shifts and reutilizations of identical formulas for contrary objectives.(n4) A power strategy refers to all means, including discursive practices, put into play by an actor in a particular power relationship to influence the actions of others. The language of political movements, including peace activism, is militaristic; activists talk strategy, tactics, and objectives. And it is important to see that discourse is itself a part of any power strategy. Kenneth Burke's concepts of victimage rhetoric and rituals can be used to illuminate this process.(n5) Political activists use victimage rhetoric to mobilize people to fight and defeat their adversaries. Victimage rhetoric is melodramatic in form. It functions to incite those who identify with it to engage in political acts of ritual scapegoating. Activists mobilize people to engage in activism by getting them to identify with an actual or impending violation of some communal "ideal"--a problem, concern, or danger. Activists mount "education" campaigns to get the public to identify with the imminent danger. A critical knowledge of the nature of this danger is constructed, taking the form of villainous powers inflicting or threatening to inflict some terrible wrong on the world. This rhetorical practice is tactical in the sense that it is designed to generate intense anger and moral outrage at what has, is, or could be happening to the values of those who identify with it. These people can then be mobilized in a campaign to fight the villain. This effect is intensified by emphasizing the negative features of the actions of the agents and agencies responsible for the violation. Once implanted, this knowledge exerts an ethical incitement to activism. Activists, this model suggests, must develop a discourse that does two things: vilify and activate. These two functions correspond to two moments in a melodramatic victimage ritual. These two moments of identification are (1) acts of violation or vilification and (2) acts of redemptive or heroic action. Movement leaders must construct images of both villains and activists fighting villains. They must convince us that acts of violation have occurred or will happen, and then they must goad us into doing something about it. This analysis suggests that a movement discourse is a rhetorical system composed of two elements working in tandem. One of the main features of motive in victimage ritual is the aim to destroy the destroyer. In the anti- SIS campaign, as we shall see, the objective was to kill a Department of Energy (DOE) program to build a nuclear weapons plant. One means of accomplishing that objective was to vilify its proponents. The second element in a movement discourse is redemptive or ethical. Once leaders succeed in convincing their followers that there is a real threat, they must then incite those convinced to act. To accomplish these objectives, peace activists have assembled a discourse charged with peril and power--a knowledge of the scene they confront and an ethic of political activism. They have constituted a "knowledge" of the dangers posed by the nuclear arms race and nuclear war that is infused with a redemptive ethic of political activism. Activists use this knowledge and ethic to goad people into campaigns to achieve antinuclear objectives. For example, activists have invoked the term power in two distinct ethical senses. There is the "bad" power of the agents of the nuclear arms race (politicians such as Ronald Reagan or Margaret Thatcher; agencies such as the U.S. government, NATO, or the Department of Energy). And there is the "good" power that activists produce by their concerted political actions, including a subjective effect called "empowerment." Activists empower themselves by "taking personal responsibility for the fate of the earth," sacrificing time, energy, and money to the cause. By engaging in political activism, peace activists say they transcend psychological despair and obtain a sense of personal power.(n6) Richard J. Epstein and Y. Zhao ‘9 – Laboratory of Computational Oncology, Department of Medicine, University of Hong Kong, The Threat That Dare Not Speak Its Name; Human Extinction, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine Volume 52, Number 1, Winter 2009, Muse Human extinction is 100% certain—the only uncertainties are when and how. Like the men and women of Shakespeare’s As You Like It, our species is but one of many players making entrances and exits on the evolutionary stage. That we generally deny that such exits for our own species are possible is to be expected, given the brutish selection pressures on our biology. Death, which is merely a biological description of evolutionary selection, is fundamental to life as we know it. Similarly, death occurring at the level of a species—extinction—is as basic to biology as is the death of individual organisms or cells. Hence, to regard extinction as catastrophic—which implies that it may somehow never occur, provided that we are all well behaved—is not only specious, but self-defeating.  Man is both blessed and cursed by the highest level of self-awareness of any life-form on Earth. This suggests that the process of human extinction is likely to be accompanied by more suffering than that associated with any previous species extinction event. Such suffering may only be eased by the getting of wisdom: the same kind of wisdom that could, if applied sufficiently early, postpone extinction. But the tragedy of our species is that evolution does not select for such foresight. Man’s dreams of being an immortal species in an eternal paradise are unachievable not because of original sin—the doomsday scenario for which we choose to blame our “free will,” thereby perpetuating our creationist illusion of being at the center of the universe—but rather, in reductionist terms, because paradise is incompatible with evolution. More scientific effort in propounding this central truth of our species’ mortality, rather than seeking spiritual comfort in escapist fantasies, could pay dividends in minimizing the eventual cumulative burden of human suffering. O’Kane 97 ( Modern bureaucracy is not capable of genocidal action' Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method very ordinary and common attributes of modernity stand in the way of modern genocides farsightedness has become a priority in world affairs due to the appearance of new global threats Virulent forms of ethno-racial nationalism that had mostly been kept in check during the Cold War have reasserted themselves if nuclear mutually assured destruction has come to pass, other dangers are filling the vacuum remembrance of past atrocities has galvanized public opinion made the international community’s unwillingness to adequately intervene before genocides significance of foresight is a direct outcome of the transition toward a dystopian imaginary dystopian novels remain as influential as ever in framing public discourse dystopianism need not imply fear since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain against their absolutist counterparts Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and any course of action produces unintended and unexpected consequences responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene becomes compelling dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their own scenarios Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action spurring involvement in the work of preventive foresight fear a direct worry about your physical health and safety — trumps almost everything else in human cognition The problem with climate change has been that very few people truly fear it It doesn’t ring the right psychological risk perception alarm bells It is seen as delayed, not a current danger It’s abstract and global, not tangible and local. Most of all, the threat doesn’t feel personal So climate change has yet to hit trigger our powerful self-protective instinctive fear response. Fear of climate change will likely supercede ideological concerns to make the threat of climate change more tangible, current, and personal, psychological characteristics that make any risk scarier. History teaches that fear trumps everything. Fear unites, and fear motivates, and dominates most other instincts. At some point the fear of climate change will even trump the fear that divides us and climate denialism will move even further into the fringe human interaction with the world is destroying the very ecosystems that sustain life1 Nevertheless academic communities are divided over which discursive tactic ontological position, or strategy should be adopted ecocriticism most effectively produces change when it doesn’t neglect tangible reality This demands including violence within all our accounts Retreating from images of ecological collapse to speak purely within academic circles isolates our conversations away from the rest of the world—as it dies before our eyes Oftentimes it takes images of planetary annihilation to motivate people into action after years of sitting idly by watching things slowly decay it takes awareness of impending disaster to compel policymakers to enact reform it takes the actual appearance of ecological apocalypse to set the plot in motion We cannot motivate people to change ecological conditions without reference to the concrete environmental destruction ongoing in reality. This means that, even when our images of apocalypse aren’t fully accurate, our use reconstructs power structures in beneficial ways In recent years ecocritics have shied away from metaphors that compel a sense of urgency. Such critics ignore how what we advocate alters our understanding of ourselves to the surrounding ecology rather than withdrawing from images of apocalypse we should utilize them in subversive ways to disrupt the current relationship people have to their ecology instead of bemoaning dystopian imaginary it can enable a novel form of transnational socio-political action ... that can be termed preventive foresight [I]t is a mode of ethico-political practice enacted by participants in the emerging realm of global civil society ... [by] putting into practice a sense of responsibility for the future by attempting to prevent global catastrophes 455).
this year’s crisis is a reminder that geopolitical concerns have not vanished Putin might be forced to aid ethnic Russians Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence tensions are ratcheting up revisions of Russian military strategy place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons” in response to conventional aggression it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate This isn’t saber-rattling It is easy to imagine misjudgments Misinterpretation can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides up the “ladder of escalation” quickly U.S. policy even envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint — poor intel battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and other influences — it seems reasonable to consider because Ukraine is so close there’s no telling what might happen once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. we are likely to to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being. peace activists built discourse political statements for use against weapons policies statements as nuclear annihilation pollution, and madness have been primary incitements to peace activism they must speak familiar to that audience activists mobilized to lobby, testify, demonstrate, and kill this plan effective movement must accomplish knowledge constitution of subjects and objects of struggle, and incitement of people to political action activists engage in discourse to fight and win struggles words are weapons Political activists use rhetoric to mobilize to fight and defeat adversaries Activists mount campaigns to get the public to identify imminent danger knowledge is constructed leaders construct images of villains and activists They convince us that acts of violation occurred and they goad us into doing something peace activists assembled peril and power good" power activists produce including empowerment." Activists empower themselves taking personal responsibility for fate of earth engaging in political activism activists transcend psychological despair and obtain personal power Human extinction is 100% certain uncertainties are when and how , to regard extinction as catastrophic is self-defeating the process of extinction is accompanied by suffering suffering may only be eased by wisdom that could postpone extinction scientific effort in propounding this truth could pay dividends in minimizing cumulative burden of human suffering. Modern bureaucracy is not capable of genocidal action' Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror Modern societies have pluralist democratic political systems economic pluralism where workers are free economic pluralism promotes and is served by the open scientific method very ordinary and common attributes of modernity stand in the way of modern genocides. farsightedness has become a priority due to new global threats if nuclear m a d has come to pass, other dangers are filling the vacuum remembrance of past atrocities has galvanized public opinion Once we recognize the future is uncertain any action produces unintended consequences responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene becomes compelling Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and action, spurring preventive foresight. The problem with climate change very few fear it It is seen as delayed It’s abstract and global the threat doesn’t feel personal climate change has yet to hit trigger our self-protective instinctive response Fear unites, and fear motivates and dominates most other instincts the fear of climate change will trump the fear that divides us human interaction is destroying the very ecosystems that sustain life1 doesn’t neglect tangible reality Retreating from images of ecological collapse to speak purely within academic isolates our conversations from the world as it dies before our eyes it takes images of planetary annihilation to motivate people into action it takes awareness of impending disaster to compel policymakers to enact actual appearance of ecological apocalypse to set the plot in motion it can enable a novel form of transnational socio-political action ... that can be termed preventive foresight.
Americans haven’t thought much about such scenarios since the Cold War ended, because the Soviet Union dissolved and the ideological rivalry between Washington and Moscow ceased. However, this year’s crisis over Ukraine is a reminder that Russia remains a nuclear superpower, and that the geopolitical sources of its security concerns have not vanished. In fact, Moscow may have greater reason for worrying today, because it has lost the buffer of allies that insulated it from Western attack during the Cold War, and now finds its capital only a few minutes from the eastern border of Ukraine by jet (less by missile). If you know the history of the region, then it is easy to see why Moscow might fear aggression. Although the Obama Administration is responding cautiously to Moscow’s annexation of Ukraine’s province of Crimea in March, its credibility is on the line with regional allies and Russian leader Vladimir Putin has not been helpful in defusing the fears of his neighbors. Having fomented revolt in eastern Ukraine, Moscow now says it might be forced to come to the aid of ethnic Russians there (it has massed 40,000 troops on the other side of the border, in what was first called an exercise). Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence in the neighborhood, reiterating security guarantees to local members of NATO. So little by little, tensions are ratcheting up. One facet of the regional military balance that bears watching is the presence of so-called nonstrategic nuclear weapons on both sides. Once called tactical nuclear weapons, these missiles, bombs and other devices were bought during the Cold War to compensate for any shortfalls in conventional firepower during a conflict. According to Amy Woolf of the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. has about 200 such weapons in Europe, some of which are available for use by local allies in a war. Woolf says Russia has about 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads in its active arsenal — many of them within striking distance of Ukraine — and that successive revisions of Russian military strategy appear “to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons” to balance the U.S. advantage in high-tech conventional weapons. A 2011 study by the respected RAND Corporation came to much the same conclusion, stating that Russian doctrine explicitly recognizes the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression. Not only does Moscow see nuclear use as a potential escalatory option in a regional war, but it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conflict. This isn’t just Russian saber-rattling. The U.S. and its NATO partners too envision the possibility of nuclear use in a European war. The Obama Administration had the opportunity to back away from such thinking in a 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, and instead decided it would retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe under a doctrine known as extended deterrence. Eastern European nations that joined NATO after the Soviet collapse have been especially supportive of having U.S. nuclear weapons nearby. So improbable though it may seem, doctrine and capabilities exist on both sides that could lead to nuclear use in a confrontation over Ukraine. Here are four ways that what started out as a local crisis could turn into something much worse. Bad intelligence. As the U.S. has stumbled from one military mis-adventure to another over the last several decades, it has become clear that Washington isn’t very good at interpreting intelligence. Even when vital information is available, it gets filtered by preconceptions and bureaucratic processes so that the wrong conclusions are drawn. Similar problems exist in Moscow. For instance, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 arose partly from Soviet leader Khrushchev’s assessment that President Kennedy was weaker than he turned out to be, and the U.S. Navy nearly provoked use of a nuclear torpedo by a Russian submarine during the blockade because it misjudged the enemy’s likely reaction to being threatened. It is easy to imagine similar misjudgments in Ukraine, which Washington and Moscow approach from very different perspectives. Any sizable deployment of U.S. forces in the region could provoke Russian escalation. Defective signaling. When tensions are high, rival leaders often seek to send signals about their intentions as a way of shaping outcomes. But the meaning of such signals can easily be confused by the need of leaders to address multiple audiences at the same time, and by the different frames of reference each side is applying. Even the process of translation can change the apparent meaning of messages in subtle ways. So when Russian foreign minister Lavrov spoke this week (in English) about the possible need to come to the aid of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, Washington had to guess whether he was stating the public rationale for an invasion, sending a warning signal to Kiev about its internal counter-terror campaign, or trying to accomplish some other purpose. Misinterpretation of such signals can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides up the “ladder of escalation” quickly, to a point where nuclear use seems like the logical next step. Looming defeat. If military confrontation between Russia and NATO gave way to conventional conflict, one side or the other would eventually face defeat. Russia has a distinct numerical advantage in the area around Ukraine, but its military consists mainly of conscripts and is poorly equipped compared with Western counterparts. Whichever side found itself losing would have to weigh the drawbacks of losing against those of escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Moscow would have to contemplate the possibility of a permanent enemy presence near its heartland, while Washington might face the collapse of NATO, its most important alliance. In such circumstances, the use of “only” one or two tactical nuclear warheads to avert an outcome with such far-reaching consequences might seem reasonable — especially given the existence of relevant capabilities and supportive doctrine on both sides. Command breakdown. Strategic nuclear weapons like intercontinental ballistic missiles are tightly controlled by senior military leaders in Russia and America, making their unauthorized or accidental use nearly impossible. That is less the case with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which at some point in the course of an escalatory process need to be released to the control of local commanders if they are to have military utility. U.S. policy even envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads against enemy targets. Moscow probably doesn’t trust its allies to that degree, but with more tactical nuclear weapons in more locations, there is a greater likelihood that local Russian commanders might have the latitude to initiate nuclear use in the chaos of battle. Russian doctrine endorses nuclear-weapons use in response to conventional aggression threatening the homeland, and obstacles to local initiative often break down once hostilities commence. When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint in wartime — poor intelligence, garbled communication, battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and a host of other influences — it seems reasonable to consider that a military confrontation between NATO and Russia might in some manner escalate out of control, even to the point of using nuclear weapons. And because Ukraine is so close to the Russian heartland (about 250 miles from Moscow) there’s no telling what might happen once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed. All this terminology — firebreaks, ladders of escalation, extended deterrence — was devised during the Cold War to deal with potential warfighting scenarios in Europe. So if there is a renewed possibility of tensions leading to war over Ukraine (or some other former Soviet possession), perhaps the time has come to revive such thinking. Allison 90, Professor of Political Philosophy at University of Warwick, 1990 (Lincoln, “The Utilitarianism Response”) And yet if an idea can be compared to a castle, though we find a breached wall, damaged foundation and a weapons spiked where not actually destroyed, there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism. As Raymond Frey puts it, utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing ... [and] has come to have a significant impact upon the moral thinking of many laymen. The simple core of the doctrine lies in the ideas that actions should be judged by their consequences and that the best actions are those which make people, as-a whole, better off than do the alternatives. What utilitarianism always excludes therefore, is any idea-about the Tightness or wrongness of actions which is not explicable in terms of the consequences of those actions. The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. Without a serious God (one, this is, prepared to reveal Truth and instruction) or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason, we are likely to turn towards Bentham and to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being. Debate about apocalyptic impacts is crucial to activism and effective policy education Blain – professor of Sociology – 91 Michael Blain, RHETORICAL PRACTICE IN AN ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAMPAIGN, Peace & Change Peace activism can be understood as a sociopolitical performance. It enacts a pattern of discourse that can be rhetorically analyzed in terms of its strategy of incitement. As peace activists mobilized their forces in the 1980s, they built up a discourse -- a repertoire of possible political statements for use against nuclear weapons policies. Such statements as nuclear annihilation, radiation pollution, and strategic madness have been the primary incitements to peace activism. Activists use language pragmatically. As political actors addressing a public audience, they know they must speak a language familiar to that audience. Nineteenth-century activists were educated, middle-class women, clergymen, educators, and businessmen with a reform Christian conscience. Twentieth-century activists have included political leftists and cultural dissidents as well as traditional pacifists and religious liberals.(n1) Middle-class professionals have played prominent roles in the peace movement. For example, medical activists like Helen Caldicott and Robert Lifton have elaborated a discourse on the madness of "nuclearism"(n2) In fact, some analysts interpret the peace movement as a power struggle of middle-class radicals and countercultural rebels against the power elite.(n3) This article presents the results of a rhetorical analysis of activists' discursive practices in a victorious campaign to defeat a U.S. government plan to construct the first new nuclear weapons plant in twenty years in the state of Idaho, the Special Isotope Separator (SIS). It shows how activists in the Snake River Alliance (SRA), a Boise, Idaho, antinuclear organization, mobilized hundreds of "Idahoans" to act as "concerned citizens" and "Life Guards," to lobby, testify, demonstrate, and finally, to kill this plan. The article introduces a perspective on how discourse functions in political movements. An effective movement discourse must accomplish two things: (1) knowledge, or the constitution of the subjects and objects of struggle, and (2) ethics, or the moral incitement of people to political action. I will show how this perspective can illuminate how anti-SIS activists developed an effective discourse to kill this crucial nuclear weapons program. A critical evaluation of this campaign can contribute to peace in at least three ways: it can celebrate the artful practices these activists engaged in to achieve their political objectives; it can add a case study of a victorious campaign to the emerging literature on the tactics of nonviolent action; and finally, it can contribute to the current debate about the future of the peace movement in a post-cold war world. The anti-SIS campaign involved an alliance of environmental and peace groups, which suggests one possible political strategy for future peace actions. POLITICAL MOVEMENTS AS VICTIMAGE RITUALS Political activists must engage in discourse to fight and win power struggles with their adversaries. In political battles, such as the anti-SIS campaign, words are weapons with tactical functions. Michel Foucault clearly articulates this perspective: Indeed, it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together. And for this reason, we must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable ... as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies. It is this distribution that we must reconstruct ... according to who is speaking, his position of power, the institutional context in which he happens to be situated ... with the shifts and reutilizations of identical formulas for contrary objectives.(n4) A power strategy refers to all means, including discursive practices, put into play by an actor in a particular power relationship to influence the actions of others. The language of political movements, including peace activism, is militaristic; activists talk strategy, tactics, and objectives. And it is important to see that discourse is itself a part of any power strategy. Kenneth Burke's concepts of victimage rhetoric and rituals can be used to illuminate this process.(n5) Political activists use victimage rhetoric to mobilize people to fight and defeat their adversaries. Victimage rhetoric is melodramatic in form. It functions to incite those who identify with it to engage in political acts of ritual scapegoating. Activists mobilize people to engage in activism by getting them to identify with an actual or impending violation of some communal "ideal"--a problem, concern, or danger. Activists mount "education" campaigns to get the public to identify with the imminent danger. A critical knowledge of the nature of this danger is constructed, taking the form of villainous powers inflicting or threatening to inflict some terrible wrong on the world. This rhetorical practice is tactical in the sense that it is designed to generate intense anger and moral outrage at what has, is, or could be happening to the values of those who identify with it. These people can then be mobilized in a campaign to fight the villain. This effect is intensified by emphasizing the negative features of the actions of the agents and agencies responsible for the violation. Once implanted, this knowledge exerts an ethical incitement to activism. Activists, this model suggests, must develop a discourse that does two things: vilify and activate. These two functions correspond to two moments in a melodramatic victimage ritual. These two moments of identification are (1) acts of violation or vilification and (2) acts of redemptive or heroic action. Movement leaders must construct images of both villains and activists fighting villains. They must convince us that acts of violation have occurred or will happen, and then they must goad us into doing something about it. This analysis suggests that a movement discourse is a rhetorical system composed of two elements working in tandem. One of the main features of motive in victimage ritual is the aim to destroy the destroyer. In the anti- SIS campaign, as we shall see, the objective was to kill a Department of Energy (DOE) program to build a nuclear weapons plant. One means of accomplishing that objective was to vilify its proponents. The second element in a movement discourse is redemptive or ethical. Once leaders succeed in convincing their followers that there is a real threat, they must then incite those convinced to act. To accomplish these objectives, peace activists have assembled a discourse charged with peril and power--a knowledge of the scene they confront and an ethic of political activism. They have constituted a "knowledge" of the dangers posed by the nuclear arms race and nuclear war that is infused with a redemptive ethic of political activism. Activists use this knowledge and ethic to goad people into campaigns to achieve antinuclear objectives. For example, activists have invoked the term power in two distinct ethical senses. There is the "bad" power of the agents of the nuclear arms race (politicians such as Ronald Reagan or Margaret Thatcher; agencies such as the U.S. government, NATO, or the Department of Energy). And there is the "good" power that activists produce by their concerted political actions, including a subjective effect called "empowerment." Activists empower themselves by "taking personal responsibility for the fate of the earth," sacrificing time, energy, and money to the cause. By engaging in political activism, peace activists say they transcend psychological despair and obtain a sense of personal power.(n6) Human extinction is the greatest act of suffering imaginable – using scientific methods to forestall extinction is crucial Epstein and Zhao 9 – Lab of Medicine @ Hong Kong Richard J. Epstein and Y. Zhao ‘9 – Laboratory of Computational Oncology, Department of Medicine, University of Hong Kong, The Threat That Dare Not Speak Its Name; Human Extinction, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine Volume 52, Number 1, Winter 2009, Muse Human extinction is 100% certain—the only uncertainties are when and how. Like the men and women of Shakespeare’s As You Like It, our species is but one of many players making entrances and exits on the evolutionary stage. That we generally deny that such exits for our own species are possible is to be expected, given the brutish selection pressures on our biology. Death, which is merely a biological description of evolutionary selection, is fundamental to life as we know it. Similarly, death occurring at the level of a species—extinction—is as basic to biology as is the death of individual organisms or cells. Hence, to regard extinction as catastrophic—which implies that it may somehow never occur, provided that we are all well behaved—is not only specious, but self-defeating.  Man is both blessed and cursed by the highest level of self-awareness of any life-form on Earth. This suggests that the process of human extinction is likely to be accompanied by more suffering than that associated with any previous species extinction event. Such suffering may only be eased by the getting of wisdom: the same kind of wisdom that could, if applied sufficiently early, postpone extinction. But the tragedy of our species is that evolution does not select for such foresight. Man’s dreams of being an immortal species in an eternal paradise are unachievable not because of original sin—the doomsday scenario for which we choose to blame our “free will,” thereby perpetuating our creationist illusion of being at the center of the universe—but rather, in reductionist terms, because paradise is incompatible with evolution. More scientific effort in propounding this central truth of our species’ mortality, rather than seeking spiritual comfort in escapist fantasies, could pay dividends in minimizing the eventual cumulative burden of human suffering. There won’t be any genocidal state O’Kane 97 (Prof Comparative Political Theory, U Keele (Rosemary, “Modernity, the Holocaust and politics,” Economy and Society 26:1, p 58-9) Modern bureaucracy is not 'intrinsically capable of genocidal action' (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin's USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very 'ordinary and common' attributes of truly modern societies. It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which stand in the way of modern genocides. Threats aren’t just representations – they are material, real, and disaster discourse mobilizes people to deal with them Kurasawa 4 (Fuyuki Kurasawa, Associate Professor of Sociology at York University in Toronto, Canada, 2004, Constellations Vol 11, No 4, 2004, Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf) In addition, farsightedness has become a priority in world affairs due to the appearance of new global threats and the resurgence of ‘older’ ones. Virulent forms of ethno-racial nationalism and religious fundamentalism that had mostly been kept in check or bottled up during the Cold War have reasserted themselves in ways that are now all-too-familiar – civil warfare, genocide, ‘ethnic cleansing,’ and global terrorism. And if nuclear mutually assured destruction has come to pass, other dangers are filling the vacuum: climate change, AIDS and other diseases (BSE, SARS, etc.), as well as previously unheralded genomic perils (genetically modified organisms, human cloning). Collective remembrance of past atrocities and disasters has galvanized some sectors of public opinion and made the international community’s unwillingness to adequately intervene before and during the genocides in the ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or to take remedial steps in the case of the spiraling African and Asian AIDS pandemics, appear particularly glaring. Returning to the point I made at the beginning of this paper, the significance of foresight is a direct outcome of the transition toward a dystopian imaginary (or what Sontag has called “the imagination of disaster”).11 Huxley’s Brave New World and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, two groundbreaking dystopian novels of the first half of the twentieth century, remain as influential as ever in framing public discourse and understanding current techno-scientific dangers, while recent paradigmatic cultural artifacts – films like The Matrix and novels like Atwood’s Oryx and Crake – reflect and give shape to this catastrophic sensibility.12 And yet dystopianism need not imply despondency, paralysis, or fear. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts.13 Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their own nightmare scenarios (‘Frankenfoods’ and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action, spurring citizens’ involvement in the work of preventive foresight. Fear and disaster discourse are the only way to mobilize action – your cross ex example is wrong – warming proves Ropeik 12 (David Ropeik, Instructor at Harvard University, author, and a consultant on risk perception, risk communication, and risk management, 7/11/12, Fear of the Physical Threat of Climate Change Is Starting to Trump Ideological Denial, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/how-risky-is-it-really/201207/fear-the-physical-threat-climate-change-is-starting-trump-ideolog)//EM 3. Fear. Often the penultimate survival instinct of plain old fear — a direct worry about your physical health and safety — trumps almost everything else in human cognition. Think back to the frightening days after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Remember how all the angry ugly divisive tribal polarization between so many groups in America just disappeared?! In an instant, the mantra became “We are ALL Americans”. That fear (and don’t forget the anthrax attacks that hit a month later) made a lot of liberals ready to believe the Bush Administration’s lies about Saddam Hussein’s biological weapons of mass destruction and his non-existent connection with Al Qaeda, and support the invasion of Iraq. Fear – 1, Tribal Cohesion – 0. The problem with climate change, so far anyway, has been that for all its monstrous potential harm, very few people truly fear it, down in their gut. It just doesn’t ring the right psychological risk perception alarm bells. (Those ‘risk perception factors’ are described in Chapter Three of “How Risky Is It, Really? Why Our Fears Don’t Match the Facts”, available free here. ) It is seen as delayed, not a current danger. It’s abstract and global, not tangible and local. Most of all, the threat doesn’t feel personal. Even among the those really worried about it, few can honestly say to themselves “I’m worried something really bad is going to happen to ME.” So climate change has yet to hit trigger our powerful self-protective instinctive fear response. Instead, climate deniers remain more worried about the social and political and economic changes that responding to climate change might mean, changes they see as a threat to the way their tribe wants society to operate. Deniers even use the word “threat” when they talk about climate change, but to them the greater threat is to freedom and the free market, not to human and environmental health. Sooner or later, that will change, and the bad things that climate change is likely to do…really bad things…will start happening. Fear of climate change…real, visceral, good old-fashioned in-the-gut “I’m in serious physical danger” fear…will start to kick in. When it does, it will likely supercede their ideological/tribal concerns. And that shift may already be underway. Heat waves and droughts and fires in tinder dry forests, torrential rains and flooding, storms that cut off power to millions…lethal extremes that experts say are consistent with how climate change is likely to alter local weather…are starting to make the threat of climate change more tangible, current, and personal, psychological characteristics that make any risk scarier. And not just for ‘those poor people in Africa’ but all across the developed world, including places that are home to concentrations of conservatives and climate deniers. Weather, after all, makes no distinctions based on local politics. History teaches that fear trumps everything. Fear unites, and fear motivates, and fear for our physical health and safety dominates most other instincts. As the threat of climate change becomes big enough and real enough and ‘now’ enough, increased concern will first motivate the general public, the majority not caught up in the Climate Wars. At some point the fear of climate change will even trump the fear that divides us into tribes, and climate denialism will move even further into the fringe it is already heading towards (see the recent Heartland Institute embarrassment) Apocalyptic discourse solves extinction Leeson-Schatz 12 – PhD candidate in English @ Binghamton Joe, “The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-Of- The-World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism,” Journal of Ecocriticism, 4.2 It is no longer a question that human interaction with the world is destroying the very ecosystems that sustain life1. Nevertheless, within academic communities people are divided over which discursive tactic, ontological position, or strategy for activism should be adopted. I contend that regardless of an ecocritic’s particular orientation that ecocriticism most effectively produces change when it doesn’t neglect the tangible reality that surrounds any discussion of the environment. This demands including human-‐induced ecocidal violence within all our accounts. Retreating from images of ecological collapse to speak purely within inner-‐academic or policymaking circles isolates our conversations away from the rest of the world—as it dies before our eyes. This is not to argue that interrogating people’s discourse, tactics, ontological orientation, or anything else lacks merit. Timothy Luke, Chair and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, explains that Because nothing in Nature simply is given within society, such terms must be assigned sig-‐ nificance by every social group that mobilizes them[.] ... Many styles of ecologically grounded criticism circulate in present-‐day American mass culture, partisan debate, consumer society, academic discourse, and electoral politics as episodes of ecocritique, contesting our politics of nature, economy, and culture in the contemporary global system of capitalist production and consumption. (1997: xi) Luke reminds us that regardless of how ecocritics advance their agenda they always impact our environmental awareness and therefore alter our surrounding ecology. In doing so he shows that both literal governmental policies and the symbolic universe they take place within reconstruct the discourses utilized to justify policy and criticism in the first place. This is why films like The Day After Tomorrow and 2012 can put forth realistic depictions of government response to environmental apocalypse. And despite being fictional, these films in turn can influence the reality of governmental policy. Even the science-‐fiction of weather-‐controlling weapons are now only steps away from becoming reality2. Oftentimes it takes images of planetary annihilation to motivate people into action after years of sitting idly by watching things slowly decay. In reality it takes awareness of impending disaster to compel policymakers to enact even piecemeal reform. On the screen it takes the actual appearance of ecological apocalypse to set the plot in motion. What is constant is that “as these debates unfold, visions of what is the good or bad life ... find many of their most compelling articulations as ecocritiques ... [that are] mobilized for and against various projects of power and economy in the organization of our everyday existence” (Luke 1997: xi). We cannot motivate people to change the ecological conditions that give rise to thoughts of theorization without reference to the concrete environmental destruction ongoing in reality. This means that, even when our images of apocalypse aren’t fully accurate, our use of elements of scientifically-‐established reality reconstructs the surrounding power structures in beneficial ways. When we ignore either ecological metaphors or environmental reality we only get part of the picture.` In recent years, many ecocritics have shied away from the very metaphors that compel a sense of urgency. They have largely done so out of the fear that its deployment will get co-‐opted by hegemonic institutions. Such critics ignore how what we advocate alters our understanding of ourselves to the surrounding ecology. In doing so, our advocacies render such co-optation meaningless because of the possibility to redeploy our metaphors in the future. In the upcoming sections, I will provide an overview of how poststructuralist thinkers like Michel Foucault and Martin Heidegger influence some ecocritics to retreat from omnicidal rhetoric. This retreat minimizes the main objectives of their ecocriticism. I argue that rather than withdrawing from images of apocalypse that we should utilize them in subversive ways to disrupt the current relationship people have to their ecology. Professor of Sociology at York University, Fuyuki Kurasawa argues that “instead of bemoaning the contemporary preeminence of a dystopian imaginary ... it can enable a novel form of transnational socio-political action ... that can be termed preventive foresight. ... [I]t is a mode of ethico-political practice enacted by participants in the emerging realm of global civil society ... [by] putting into practice a sense of responsibility for the future by attempting to prevent global catastrophes” (454-‐455).
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<h4>Nuke war </h4><p>Loren <strong>Thompson</strong> 4-24-20<strong>14</strong> “Four Ways The Ukraine Crisis Could Escalate To Use Of Nuclear Weapons” http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/04/24/four-ways-the-ukraine-crisis-could-escalate-to-use-of-nuclear-weapons/</p><p>Americans haven’t thought much about such scenarios since the Cold War ended, because the Soviet Union dissolved and the ideological rivalry between Washington and Moscow ceased. However, <u><mark>this year’s crisis</mark> over Ukraine <mark>is a reminder that </mark>Russia remains a nuclear superpower, and that the <mark>geopolitical</mark> sources of its security <mark>concerns have not vanished</u></mark>. In fact, <u>Moscow may have greater reason for worrying today, because it has lost the buffer of allies that insulated it from Western attack during the Cold War, and now finds its capital only a few minutes from the eastern border of Ukraine</u> by jet (less by missile). If you know the history of the region, then <u>it is easy to see why Moscow might fear aggression. </u>Although <u>the Obama Administration</u> is responding cautiously to Moscow’s annexation of Ukraine’s province of Crimea in March, its <u>credibility is on the line with regional allies and Russian leader Vladimir <mark>Putin</mark> has not been helpful in defusing the fears of his neighbors</u>. <u>Having fomented <strong>revolt</strong> in eastern Ukraine</u>, <u>Moscow now says it <mark>might be forced to</mark> <strong>come to the <mark>aid</mark> of <mark>ethnic Russians</u></strong></mark> there (it has massed 40,000 troops on the other side of the border, in what was first called an exercise). <u><mark>Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence</mark> in the neighborhood</u>, <u>reiterating security guarantees to local members of NATO</u>. So little by little,<u> <strong><mark>tensions</strong> are <strong>ratcheting up</mark>. </u></strong>One facet of the regional military balance that bears watching is the presence of so-called nonstrategic nuclear weapons on both sides. Once called tactical nuclear weapons, these missiles, bombs and other devices were bought during the Cold War to compensate for any shortfalls in conventional firepower during a conflict. According to Amy Woolf of the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. has about 200 such weapons in Europe, some of which are available for use by local allies in a war. Woolf says Russia has about 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads in its active arsenal — many of them within striking distance of Ukraine — and that <u>successive <mark>revisions of Russian military strategy</mark> appear “to <mark>place a <strong>greater reliance on nuclear</mark> <mark>weapons”</strong> </mark>to balance the U.S. advantage in high-tech conventional weapons. </u>A 2011 study by the respected RAND Corporation came to much the same conclusion, stating that <u>Russian doctrine explicitly recognizes the possibility of using nuclear weapons <mark>in response to <strong>conventional aggression</u></strong></mark>. <u>Not only does Moscow see nuclear use as a potential escalatory option in a regional war, but <mark>it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate</mark> a conflict. <mark>This <strong>isn’t</strong></mark> just Russian <strong><mark>saber-rattling</u></strong></mark>. <u>The U.S. and its NATO partners too envision the possibility of nuclear use in a European war</u>. <u>The Obama Administration had the opportunity to back away</u> from such thinking in a 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, <u>and instead decided it would retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons</u> in Europe under a doctrine known as extended deterrence. Eastern European nations that joined NATO after the Soviet collapse have been especially supportive of having U.S. nuclear weapons nearby. So <u>improbable though it may seem, doctrine and capabilities exist on both sides that could lead to nuclear use in a confrontation over Ukraine</u>. Here are four ways that <u>what started out as a local crisis could turn into something <strong>much worse.</strong> </u>Bad intelligence. As the U.S. has stumbled from one military mis-adventure to another over the last several decades, it has become clear that Washington isn’t very good at interpreting intelligence. Even when vital information is available, it gets filtered by preconceptions and bureaucratic processes so that the wrong conclusions are drawn. Similar problems exist in Moscow. For instance, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 arose partly from Soviet leader Khrushchev’s assessment that President Kennedy was weaker than he turned out to be, and the U.S. Navy nearly provoked use of a nuclear torpedo by a Russian submarine during the blockade because it misjudged the enemy’s likely reaction to being threatened. <u><mark>It is easy to imagine</u></mark> similar <u><strong><mark>misjudgments</strong></mark> in Ukraine</u>, <u>which Washington and Moscow approach from very different perspectives</u>. <u>Any</u> sizable <u>deployment</u> of U.S. forces in the region <u>could provoke Russian escalation. </u>Defective signaling. When tensions are high, rival leaders often seek to send signals about their intentions as a way of shaping outcomes. But the meaning of such signals can easily be confused by the need of leaders to address multiple audiences at the same time, and by the different frames of reference each side is applying. Even the process of translation can change the apparent meaning of messages in subtle ways. So when Russian foreign minister Lavrov spoke this week (in English) about the possible need to come to the aid of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, Washington had to guess whether he was stating the public rationale for an invasion, sending a warning signal to Kiev about its internal counter-terror campaign, or trying to accomplish some other purpose. <u><mark>Misinterpretation</mark> of </u>such<u> signals <mark>can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides <strong>up the “ladder of escalation” quickly</strong></mark>, to a point where nuclear use seems like the logical next step. </u>Looming defeat. If military confrontation between Russia and NATO gave way to conventional conflict, one side or the other would eventually face defeat. Russia has a distinct numerical advantage in the area around Ukraine, but its military consists mainly of conscripts and is poorly equipped compared with Western counterparts. <u>Whichever side found itself losing would have to weigh the drawbacks of losing against those of escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons</u>. Moscow would have to contemplate the possibility of a permanent enemy presence near its heartland, while Washington might face the collapse of NATO, its most important alliance. In such circumstances, the use of “only” one or two tactical nuclear warheads to avert an outcome with such far-reaching consequences might seem reasonable — especially given the existence of relevant capabilities and supportive doctrine on both sides. Command breakdown. Strategic nuclear weapons like intercontinental ballistic missiles are tightly controlled by senior military leaders in Russia and America, making their unauthorized or accidental use nearly impossible. That is less the case with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which at some point in the course of an escalatory process need to be released to the control of local commanders if they are to have military utility. <u><mark>U.S. policy even envisions <strong>letting allies deliver tactical warheads</strong></mark> against enemy targets.</u> Moscow probably doesn’t trust its allies to that degree, but with more tactical nuclear weapons in more locations, there is a greater likelihood that local Russian commanders might have the latitude to initiate nuclear use in the chaos of battle. <u>Russian doctrine endorses nuclear-weapons use in response to conventional aggression threatening the homeland, and obstacles to local initiative often break down once hostilities commence. <mark>When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint</mark> in wartime</u> <u><mark>— poor intel</mark>ligence, garbled communication, <mark>battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and</mark> a host of <mark>other influences — it seems reasonable to consider</mark> that a military confrontation between NATO and Russia might in some manner escalate out of control, even to the point of using nuclear weapons.</u> And <u><mark>because Ukraine is so close</mark> to the Russian heartland</u> (about 250 miles from Moscow) <u><mark>there’s no telling what might happen <strong>once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed</u></strong></mark>. All this terminology — firebreaks, ladders of escalation, extended deterrence — was devised during the Cold War to deal with potential warfighting scenarios in Europe. So if there is a renewed possibility of tensions leading to war over Ukraine (or some other former Soviet possession), perhaps the time has come to revive such thinking.</p><p><strong>Allison 90</strong>, Professor of Political Philosophy at University of Warwick, 19<u>90 (Lincoln, “The Utilitarianism Response”) </p><p></u>And yet if an idea can be compared to a castle, though we find a breached wall, damaged foundation and a weapons spiked where not actually destroyed, <u>there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism.</u> As Raymond Frey puts it, <u><mark>utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing</mark> .</u>.. [and] has come to have a significant impact upon the moral thinking of many laymen. The simple core of the doctrine lies in the ideas that actions should be judged by their consequences and that the best actions are those which make people, as-a whole, better off than do the alternatives. What utilitarianism always excludes therefore, is any idea-about the Tightness or wrongness of actions which is not explicable in terms of the consequences of those actions. <u><mark>The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people.</u></mark> <u>Without</u> a serious God (one, this is, prepared to reveal Truth and instruction) <u>or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason,</u> <u><mark>we are likely to</mark> </u>turn towards Bentham and <mark>to<u> judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being<strong>.</p><p></u></mark>Debate about apocalyptic impacts is crucial to activism and effective policy education</p><p>Blain – professor of Sociology – 91</p><p><u></strong>Michael Blain, RHETORICAL PRACTICE IN AN ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAMPAIGN, Peace & Change</p><p>Peace activism can be understood as a sociopolitical performance. It enacts a pattern of discourse that can be rhetorically analyzed in terms of its strategy of incitement. As <mark>peace activists</mark> mobilized their forces in the 1980s, they <mark>built</mark> up a <mark>discourse</mark> -- a repertoire of possible <mark>political statements for use against</mark> nuclear <mark>weapons policies</mark>. Such <mark>statements as <strong>nuclear annihilation</strong></mark>, radiation <mark>pollution, and</mark> strategic <mark>madness have been </mark>the <strong><mark>primary incitements to peace activism</strong></mark>. Activists use language pragmatically. As political actors addressing a public audience, they know <mark>they must speak</mark> a language <strong><mark>familiar to that audience</strong></mark>. Nineteenth-century activists were educated, middle-class women, clergymen, educators, and businessmen with a reform Christian conscience. Twentieth-century activists have included political leftists and cultural dissidents as well as traditional pacifists and religious liberals.(n1) Middle-class professionals have played prominent roles in the peace movement. For example, medical activists like Helen Caldicott and Robert Lifton have elaborated a discourse on the madness of "nuclearism"(n2) In fact, some analysts interpret the peace movement as a power struggle of middle-class radicals and countercultural rebels against the power elite.(n3) This article presents the results of a rhetorical analysis of activists' discursive practices in a victorious campaign to defeat a U.S. government plan to construct the first new nuclear weapons plant in twenty years in the state of Idaho, the Special Isotope Separator (SIS). It shows how <mark>activists</mark> in the Snake River Alliance (SRA), a Boise, Idaho, antinuclear organization, <mark>mobilized</mark> hundreds of "Idahoans" <mark>to</mark> act as "concerned citizens" and "Life Guards," to <mark>lobby, testify, demonstrate, and</mark> finally, to <mark>kill this plan</mark>. The article introduces a perspective on how discourse functions in political movements. An <mark>effective movement</mark> discourse <mark>must accomplish</mark> two things: (1) <mark>knowledge</mark>, or the <mark>constitution of</mark> the <mark>subjects and objects of struggle, and</mark> (2) ethics, or the moral <mark>incitement of people to political action</mark>. I will show how this perspective can illuminate how anti-SIS activists developed an effective discourse to kill this crucial nuclear weapons program. A critical evaluation of this campaign can contribute to peace in at least three ways: it can celebrate the artful practices these activists engaged in to achieve their political objectives; it can add a case study of a victorious campaign to the emerging literature on the tactics of nonviolent action; and finally, it can contribute to the current debate about the future of the peace movement in a post-cold war world. The anti-SIS campaign involved an alliance of environmental and peace groups, which suggests one possible political strategy for future peace actions. POLITICAL MOVEMENTS AS VICTIMAGE RITUALS Political <mark>activists</mark> must <strong><mark>engage in discourse to fight and win</strong></mark> power <mark>struggles</mark> with their adversaries. In political battles, such as the anti-SIS campaign, <mark>words are weapons</mark> with tactical functions. Michel Foucault clearly articulates this perspective: Indeed, it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together. And for this reason, we must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable ... as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies. It is this distribution that we must reconstruct ... according to who is speaking, his position of power, the institutional context in which he happens to be situated ... with the shifts and reutilizations of identical formulas for contrary objectives.(n4) A power strategy refers to all means, including discursive practices, put into play by an actor in a particular power relationship to influence the actions of others. The language of political movements, including peace activism, is militaristic; activists talk strategy, tactics, and objectives. And it is important to see that discourse is itself a part of any power strategy. Kenneth Burke's concepts of victimage rhetoric and rituals can be used to illuminate this process.(n5) <mark>Political activists use</mark> victimage <mark>rhetoric to mobilize</mark> people <mark>to fight and defeat</mark> their <mark>adversaries</mark>. Victimage rhetoric is melodramatic in form. It functions to incite those who identify with it to engage in political acts of ritual scapegoating. Activists mobilize people to engage in activism by getting them to identify with an actual or impending violation of some communal "ideal"--a problem, concern, or danger. <mark>Activists</mark> <mark>mount</mark> "education" <mark>campaigns to get the public to <strong>identify</mark> with the <mark>imminent danger</strong></mark>. A critical <mark>knowledge</mark> of the nature of this danger <mark>is constructed</mark>, taking the form of villainous powers inflicting or threatening to inflict some terrible wrong on the world. This rhetorical practice is tactical in the sense that it is designed to generate intense anger and moral outrage at what has, is, or could be happening to the values of those who identify with it. These people can then be mobilized in a campaign to fight the villain. This effect is intensified by emphasizing the negative features of the actions of the agents and agencies responsible for the violation. Once implanted, this knowledge exerts an ethical incitement to activism. Activists, this model suggests, must develop a discourse that does two things: vilify and activate. These two functions correspond to two moments in a melodramatic victimage ritual. These two moments of identification are (1) acts of violation or vilification and (2) acts of redemptive or heroic action. Movement <mark>leaders</mark> must <mark>construct images of</mark> both <mark>villains and activists</mark> fighting villains. <mark>They</mark> must <mark>convince us that acts of <strong>violation</mark> have <mark>occurred</mark> or will happen</strong>, <mark>and</mark> then <mark>they</mark> must <strong><mark>goad us</strong> into doing something</mark> about it. This analysis suggests that a movement discourse is a rhetorical system composed of two elements working in tandem. One of the main features of motive in victimage ritual is the aim to destroy the destroyer. In the anti- SIS campaign, as we shall see, the objective was to kill a Department of Energy (DOE) program to build a nuclear weapons plant. One means of accomplishing that objective was to vilify its proponents. The second element in a movement discourse is redemptive or ethical. Once leaders succeed in convincing their followers that there is a real threat, they must then incite those convinced to act. To accomplish these objectives, <mark>peace activists</mark> have <mark>assembled</mark> a discourse charged with <mark>peril and power</mark>--a knowledge of the scene they confront and an ethic of political activism. They have constituted a "knowledge" of the dangers posed by the nuclear arms race and nuclear war that is infused with a redemptive ethic of political activism. Activists use this knowledge and ethic to goad people into campaigns to achieve antinuclear objectives. For example, activists have invoked the term power in two distinct ethical senses. There is the "bad" power of the agents of the nuclear arms race (politicians such as Ronald Reagan or Margaret Thatcher; agencies such as the U.S. government, NATO, or the Department of Energy). And there is the "<mark>good" power</mark> that <mark>activists produce</mark> by their concerted political actions, <mark>including</mark> a subjective effect called "<mark>empowerment." Activists empower themselves</mark> by "<mark>taking personal responsibility for</mark> the <mark>fate of</mark> the <mark>earth</mark>," sacrificing time, energy, and money to the cause. By <mark>engaging in political activism</mark>, peace <mark>activists</mark> say they <strong><mark>transcend psychological despair</strong> and obtain</mark> a sense of <mark>personal power</mark>.(<strong>n6)</p><p></u>Human extinction is the greatest act of suffering imaginable – using scientific methods to forestall extinction is crucial </p><p>Epstein and Zhao 9 – Lab of Medicine @ Hong Kong</p><p><u>Richard J. Epstein and Y. Zhao ‘9 – Laboratory of Computational Oncology, Department of Medicine, University of Hong Kong, The Threat That Dare Not Speak Its Name; Human Extinction, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine Volume 52, Number 1, Winter 2009, Muse</p><p></strong><mark>Human extinction is 100% certain</mark>—the only <mark>uncertainties are when and how</mark>. Like the men and women of Shakespeare’s As You Like It, our species is but one of many players making entrances and exits on the evolutionary stage. That we generally deny that such exits for our own species are possible is to be expected, given the brutish selection pressures on our biology. Death, which is merely a biological description of evolutionary selection, is fundamental to life as we know it. Similarly, death occurring at the level of a species—extinction—is as basic to biology as is the death of individual organisms or cells. Hence<mark>, to regard extinction as catastrophic</mark>—which implies that it may somehow never occur, provided that we are all well behaved—<mark>is</mark> not only specious, but <mark>self-defeating</mark>.  Man is both blessed and cursed by the highest level of self-awareness of any life-form on Earth. This suggests that <mark>the process of</mark> human <mark>extinction is </mark>likely to be <mark>accompanied by</mark> more <mark>suffering</mark> than that associated with any previous species extinction event. Such <mark>suffering</mark> <mark>may only be eased by</mark> the getting of <mark>wisdom</mark>: the same kind of wisdom <mark>that could</mark>, if applied sufficiently early, <mark>postpone</mark> <mark>extinction</mark>. But the tragedy of our species is that evolution does not select for such foresight. Man’s dreams of being an immortal species in an eternal paradise are unachievable not because of original sin—the doomsday scenario for which we choose to blame our “free will,” thereby perpetuating our creationist illusion of being at the center of the universe—but rather, in reductionist terms, because paradise is incompatible with evolution. More <mark>scientific effort in propounding this</mark> central <mark>truth</mark> of our species’ mortality, rather than seeking spiritual comfort in escapist fantasies, <mark>could pay dividends in minimizing</mark> the eventual <mark>cumulative burden of human suffering.<strong></mark> </p><p></u>There won’t be any genocidal state</p><p><u>O’Kane 97 (</u></strong>Prof Comparative Political Theory, U Keele (Rosemary, “Modernity, the Holocaust and politics,” Economy and Society 26:1, p 58-9)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Modern bureaucracy is not</u></strong></mark> 'intrinsically <u><strong><mark>capable of genocidal action'</u></strong></mark> (Bauman 1989: 106). <u><strong><mark>Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror</u></strong></mark>. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin's USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. <u><strong><mark>Modern societies have</mark> not only <mark>pluralist democratic political systems</mark> but also <mark>economic pluralism where workers are free</mark> to change jobs and bargain wages</u></strong> and <u><strong>where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies</u></strong>, <u><strong>exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises</u></strong>. In modern societies this <u><strong><mark>economic pluralism</mark> both <mark>promotes and is served by the open scientific method</u></strong></mark>. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very 'ordinary and common' attributes of truly modern societies. It is these <u><strong><mark>very ordinary and common attributes of modernity</u></strong></mark> which <u><strong><mark>stand in the way of modern genocides</u>.</p><p></mark>Threats aren’t just representations – they are material, real, and disaster discourse mobilizes people to deal with them</p><p>Kurasawa 4 </strong>(Fuyuki Kurasawa, Associate Professor of Sociology at York University in Toronto, Canada, 2004, Constellations Vol 11, No 4, 2004, Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf)</p><p>In addition<strong>, <u><mark>farsightedness has become a priority</mark> in world affairs <mark>due to</mark> the appearance of <mark>new global threats</u></strong></mark> and the resurgence of ‘older’ ones. <u><strong>Virulent forms of ethno-racial nationalism</u> </strong>and religious fundamentalism<strong> <u>that had mostly been kept in check</u></strong> or bottled up <u><strong>during</u> <u>the Cold War have reasserted themselves</u></strong> in ways that are now all-too-familiar – civil warfare, genocide, ‘ethnic cleansing,’ and global terrorism. And <u><strong><mark>if nuclear m</mark>utually <mark>a</mark>ssured <mark>d</mark>estruction <mark>has come to pass, other dangers are filling the vacuum</u></strong></mark>: climate change, AIDS and other diseases (BSE, SARS, etc.), as well as previously unheralded genomic perils (genetically modified organisms, human cloning). Collective <u><strong><mark>remembrance of past atrocities</u></strong></mark> and disasters <u><strong><mark>has galvanized</u></strong></mark> some sectors of <u><strong><mark>public opinion</u></strong></mark> and <u><strong>made the international community’s unwillingness to adequately intervene before</u></strong> and during the <u><strong>genocides</u></strong> in the ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or to take remedial steps in the case of the spiraling African and Asian AIDS pandemics, appear particularly glaring. Returning to the point I made at the beginning of this paper, the <u><strong>significance of foresight is a direct outcome of the transition toward a dystopian imaginary</u> </strong>(or what Sontag has called “the imagination of disaster”).11 Huxley’s Brave New World and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, two groundbreaking <u><strong>dystopian novels</u></strong> of the first half of the twentieth century, <u><strong>remain as influential as ever in framing public discourse</u></strong> and understanding current techno-scientific dangers, while recent paradigmatic cultural artifacts – films like The Matrix and novels like Atwood’s Oryx and Crake – reflect and give shape to this catastrophic sensibility.12 And yet <u><strong>dystopianism need not imply</u></strong> despondency, paralysis, or <u><strong>fear</u></strong>. Quite the opposite, in fact, <u><strong>since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain</u></strong> traction <u><strong>against their</u></strong> determinist and <u><strong>absolutist counterparts</u></strong>.13 <u><strong><mark>Once we recognize</mark> that <mark>the future is uncertain</mark> and</u></strong> that <u><strong><mark>any</mark> course of <mark>action produces</u></strong></mark> both <u><strong><mark>unintended</mark> and unexpected <mark>consequences</u></strong></mark>, the <u><strong><mark>responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene</u></strong></mark> before they strike <u><strong><mark>becomes compelling</u></strong></mark>. From another angle, <u><strong>dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their own </u></strong>nightmare <u><strong>scenarios</u></strong> (‘Frankenfoods’ and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). <u><strong><mark>Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and</mark> socio-political <mark>action</u>, <u>spurring</u></strong></mark> citizens’ <u><strong>involvement in the work of <mark>preventive foresight</u></strong>.<strong></mark> </p><p>Fear and disaster discourse are the only way to mobilize action – your cross ex example is wrong – warming proves </p><p>Ropeik 12</strong> (David Ropeik, Instructor at Harvard University, author, and a consultant on risk perception, risk communication, and risk management, 7/11/12, Fear of the Physical Threat of Climate Change Is Starting to Trump Ideological Denial, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/how-risky-is-it-really/201207/fear-the-physical-threat-climate-change-is-starting-trump-ideolog)//EM</p><p>3. Fear. Often the penultimate survival instinct of plain old <u>fear</u> — <u>a direct worry about your physical health and safety — trumps almost everything else in human cognition</u>. Think back to the frightening days after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Remember how all the angry ugly divisive tribal polarization between so many groups in America just disappeared?! In an instant, the mantra became “We are ALL Americans”. That fear (and don’t forget the anthrax attacks that hit a month later) made a lot of liberals ready to believe the Bush Administration’s lies about Saddam Hussein’s biological weapons of mass destruction and his non-existent connection with Al Qaeda, and support the invasion of Iraq. Fear – 1, Tribal Cohesion – 0. <u><mark>The problem</u> <u>with climate change</u></mark>, so far anyway, <u>has been</u> <u>that</u> for all its monstrous potential harm, <u><mark>very few </mark>people truly <mark>fear it</u></mark>, down in their gut. <u>It</u> just <u>doesn’t ring the right psychological risk perception alarm bells</u>. (Those ‘risk perception factors’ are described in Chapter Three of “How Risky Is It, Really? Why Our Fears Don’t Match the Facts”, available free here. ) <u><mark>It is seen as delayed</mark>, not a current danger</u>. <u><mark>It’s abstract and global</mark>, not tangible and local. Most of all, <mark>the threat doesn’t feel personal</u></mark>. Even among the those really worried about it, few can honestly say to themselves “I’m worried something really bad is going to happen to ME.” <u>So <mark>climate change has yet to hit trigger our</mark> powerful <mark>self-protective instinctive</mark> fear <mark>response</mark>.</u> Instead, climate deniers remain more worried about the social and political and economic changes that responding to climate change might mean, changes they see as a threat to the way their tribe wants society to operate. Deniers even use the word “threat” when they talk about climate change, but to them the greater threat is to freedom and the free market, not to human and environmental health. Sooner or later, that will change, and the bad things that climate change is likely to do…really bad things…will start happening. <u>Fear of climate change</u>…real, visceral, good old-fashioned in-the-gut “I’m in serious physical danger” fear…will start to kick in. When it does, it <u>will likely supercede</u> their <u>ideological</u>/tribal <u>concerns</u>. And that shift may already be underway. Heat waves and droughts and fires in tinder dry forests, torrential rains and flooding, storms that cut off power to millions…lethal extremes that experts say are consistent with how climate change is likely to alter local weather…are starting <u>to make the threat of climate change more tangible, current, and personal, psychological characteristics that make any risk scarier.</u> And not just for ‘those poor people in Africa’ but all across the developed world, including places that are home to concentrations of conservatives and climate deniers. Weather, after all, makes no distinctions based on local politics. <u>History teaches that fear trumps everything. <mark>Fear unites, and fear motivates</mark>,</u> and fear for our physical health <u><mark>and</u></mark> safety <u><mark>dominates most other instincts</mark>.</u> As the threat of climate change becomes big enough and real enough and ‘now’ enough, increased concern will first motivate the general public, the majority not caught up in the Climate Wars. <u>At some point <mark>the fear of climate change will</mark> even <mark>trump the fear that divides us</u></mark> into tribes, <u>and climate denialism will move even further into the fringe</u><strong> it is already heading towards (see the recent Heartland Institute embarrassment)</p><p>Apocalyptic discourse solves extinction</p><p>Leeson-Schatz 12</strong> – PhD candidate in English @ Binghamton</p><p>Joe, “The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-Of- The-World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism,” Journal of Ecocriticism, 4.2</p><p>It is no longer a question that <u><mark>human interaction</mark> with the world <mark>is destroying the very ecosystems that <strong>sustain life1</u></strong></mark>. <u>Nevertheless</u>, within <u>academic communities</u> people <u>are divided over which discursive tactic</u>, <u>ontological position, or strategy</u> for activism <u>should be adopted</u>. I contend that regardless of an ecocritic’s particular orientation that <u>ecocriticism most effectively produces change when it <mark>doesn’t neglect</u></mark> the <u><mark>tangible reality</u></mark> that surrounds any discussion of the environment. <u>This demands including</u> human-‐induced ecocidal <u>violence within all our accounts</u>. <u><mark>Retreating from images of ecological collapse to speak purely within</mark> </u>inner-‐<u><mark>academic</u></mark> or policymaking <u>circles</u><mark> <u><strong>isolates our conversations</strong></mark> away <mark>from the</mark> rest of the <mark>world</mark>—<mark>as it <strong>dies before our eyes</u></strong></mark>. This is not to argue that interrogating people’s discourse, tactics, ontological orientation, or anything else lacks merit. Timothy Luke, Chair and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, explains that Because nothing in Nature simply is given within society, such terms must be assigned sig-‐ nificance by every social group that mobilizes them[.] ... Many styles of ecologically grounded criticism circulate in present-‐day American mass culture, partisan debate, consumer society, academic discourse, and electoral politics as episodes of ecocritique, contesting our politics of nature, economy, and culture in the contemporary global system of capitalist production and consumption. (1997: xi) Luke reminds us that regardless of how ecocritics advance their agenda they always impact our environmental awareness and therefore alter our surrounding ecology. In doing so he shows that both literal governmental policies and the symbolic universe they take place within reconstruct the discourses utilized to justify policy and criticism in the first place. This is why films like The Day After Tomorrow and 2012 can put forth realistic depictions of government response to environmental apocalypse. And despite being fictional, these films in turn can influence the reality of governmental policy. Even the science-‐fiction of weather-‐controlling weapons are now only steps away from becoming reality2. <u>Oftentimes <mark>it takes images of <strong>planetary annihilation</strong> to <strong>motivate people</strong> into action</mark> after years of sitting idly by watching things slowly decay</u>. In reality <u><mark>it takes awareness of impending disaster to compel policymakers to enact</u></mark> even piecemeal <u>reform</u>. On the screen <u>it takes the <strong><mark>actual appearance</strong> of ecological apocalypse to <strong>set the plot in motion</u></strong></mark>. What is constant is that “as these debates unfold, visions of what is the good or bad life ... find many of their most compelling articulations as ecocritiques ... [that are] mobilized for and against various projects of power and economy in the organization of our everyday existence” (Luke 1997: xi). <u>We cannot motivate people to change</u> the <u>ecological conditions</u> that give rise to thoughts of theorization <u>without reference to the <strong>concrete environmental destruction</strong> ongoing in reality. This means that, even when our images of apocalypse aren’t fully accurate, our use</u> of elements of scientifically-‐established reality <u>reconstructs</u> the surrounding <u>power structures in beneficial ways</u>. When we ignore either ecological metaphors or environmental reality we only get part of the picture.` <u>In recent years</u>, many <u>ecocritics have shied away from</u> the very <u>metaphors that compel a sense of urgency. </u>They have largely done so out of the fear that its deployment will get co-‐opted by hegemonic institutions. <u>Such critics ignore how what we advocate alters our understanding of ourselves to the surrounding ecology</u>. In doing so, our advocacies render such co-optation meaningless because of the possibility to redeploy our metaphors in the future. In the upcoming sections, I will provide an overview of how poststructuralist thinkers like Michel Foucault and Martin Heidegger influence some ecocritics to retreat from omnicidal rhetoric. This retreat minimizes the main objectives of their ecocriticism. I argue that <u>rather than withdrawing from images of apocalypse</u> that <u>we should utilize them in <strong>subversive ways</strong> to disrupt the current relationship people have to their ecology</u>. Professor of Sociology at York University, Fuyuki Kurasawa argues that “<u>instead of bemoaning</u> the contemporary preeminence of a <u>dystopian imaginary</u> ... <u><mark>it can enable a novel form of <strong>transnational socio-political action</strong> ... that can be termed <strong>preventive foresight</u></strong>.</mark> ... <u>[I]t is a mode of ethico-political practice enacted by participants in the emerging realm of global civil society ... [by] putting into practice a sense of responsibility for the future by attempting to prevent global catastrophes</u>” (454-‐<u><strong>455).</p></u></strong>
null
2nc
Corporate
22,852
87
17,112
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
565,260
N
Wake
2
Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,699
Voting issue:
1. Predictability—allowing the affirmative to dicuss anything tangentially related to the resolution without explicitly defending a topical action opens the floodgates—any important social or political issue can be a topical aff—the resolution exists to focus discussion
1. Predictability—allowing the affirmative to dicuss anything tangentially related to the resolution without explicitly defending a topical action opens the floodgates—any important social or political issue can be a topical aff—the resolution exists to focus discussion
2. Controversial Ground—
null
2. Controversial Ground—The resolution waxs selected precisely because its morally ambiguous and controversial—engaging this resolution is necessary to providing both sides with the ability to engage in a discussion and provides a stasis point for argument—sidestepping the resolution allows the affirmative to select the moral high ground and establish standards for evaluation that make the game impossible.x
411
<h4><strong>Voting issue:</h4><p><u>1. Predictability—</u>allowing the affirmative to dicuss anything tangentially related to the resolution without explicitly defending a topical action opens the floodgates—any important social or political issue can be a topical aff—the resolution exists to focus discussion</p><p><u>2. Controversial Ground—</u>The resolution waxs selected precisely because its morally ambiguous and controversial—engaging this resolution is necessary to providing both sides with the ability to engage in a discussion and provides a stasis point for argument—sidestepping the resolution allows the affirmative to select the moral high ground and establish standards for evaluation that make the game impossible.x</p></strong>
1NC
null
T
431,123
2
17,116
./documents/ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round3.docx
565,426
N
D6seceda
3
Louisville Barnett-Lattimore
Foley
1NC T PIC out of legalization K of black separatism "mass incarceration" word K 2NR K case
ndtceda14/Emory/DeBo/Emory-Dean-Bontha-Neg-D6seceda-Round3.docx
null
48,463
DeBo
Emory DeBo
null
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De.....
Ni.....
Bo.....
18,765
Emory
Emory
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,700
Iran Proves success; recent problems have been because of budget cuts
Beard et al 13
Beard et al 13 T. Randolph "Randy" Beard, Professor of Economics at Auburn University.; Rigmar Osterkamp, Fellow at the School for Political Studies at University of Munich.; And David L. Kaserman, Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.2013 The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses
The Iranian system has been successful historically, increasing the numbers of transplants performed by 577 percent However, a recent lack of public funding seems to have undermined the past successes . The "market price" for a donation is now likely to be around three times the official public payment. During certain periods, it is reported that the public system was unable to pay any compensation to donors. Lack of public funds seems to have also eroded the formerly strictly regulated donor system, and today there is a tolerated "free market" in which recipient income status has become a major determinant in the acquisition of a kidney. Thus, although the Iranian experience strongly suggested the viability of compensated living-donor kidney supply in some settings, it also provides a cautionary tale regarding the consequences of underfunding for such systems. sales the best alternative to organ transplantation appears to be the artificial growth of organs in a laboratory. The Human Genome Project reports that this is still a science in its early stages It is likely that this will not become as widespread as transplantation for at least a decade ethical, legal and clinical concerns must be addressed before such a treatment is perfected and offered to the public. It is interesting to note that, at present, these organs are grown from embryonic stem cells, a process which many consider unethical. It is for this reason that this science has stalled; conservative legislators refuse to allocate government funding to the development of embryonic technology The impact that this “organ growing” has on the illegal organ trade will undoubtedly be determined by the cost to the party in need of an organ; if the international response is to be truly successful in ceasing the exploitation of such desperate people, all nations must look inwards
Iranian system has been successful historically, increasing transplants performed by 577 percent However, a recent lack of public funding seems to have undermined the past successes. artificial growth of organs is still a in its early stages this will not becom widespread ethical, legal and clinical concerns must be addressed before such a treatment is perfected and offered to the public. science has stalled; conservative legislators refuse to allocate funding The impact that this “organ growing” has on the illegal organ trade will undoubtedly be determined by the cost to the party in need of an organ if the international response is to be truly successful in ceasing the exploitation of such desperate people, all nations must look inwards
The Iranian system has, by most accounts, been successful historically, increasing the numbers of transplants performed by 577 percent between 1988 and 2003. This result has been obtained within a bureaucratized framework in which religious judges examine potential living donors, looking for signs of coercion or mixed motivations. Great emphasis has been placed on continuing care for donors, with medical follow-up, insurance benefits, and so on made widely available, at least in principle. Foreigners may not donate or receive a transplant in Iran, except under special, rare circumstances. This latter practice has apparently gone some distance in allowing Iran to avoid the sorts of com¬mercialization that would offend ethical sensibilities. However, a recent lack of public funding seems to have undermined the past successes. Zargooshi (2008a, b) reports that the recent annual kidney transplant figure has decreased and now amounts to about one-tenth of the annual number of new ESRD patients. Obviously, the official public payment to donors of Tolman Imio (around U.S.$1,000) has been eroded by inflation. Kidney vendors seem to ask for increasing private copayments from the re¬cipients. The "market price" for a donation is now likely to be around three times the official public payment. During certain periods, it is reported that the public system was unable to pay any compensation to donors. Lack of public funds seems to have also eroded the formerly strictly regulated donor system, and today there is a tolerated "free market" in which recipient income status has become a major determinant in the acquisition of a kidney. Thus, although the Iranian experience strongly suggested the viability of compensated living-donor kidney supply in some settings, it also provides a cautionary tale regarding the consequences of underfunding for such systems. Organ sales are key—artificial organs can’t solve O'Sullivan 11 Sophia O'Sullivan, historical contributor 9 August 2011 Heart to Heart- An Investigation of Globalisation and the Illegal Organ Trade http://smartsgroupd.blogspot.com/p/sophia.html As the demand for organs rises, and waiting list times stretch out by years, it seems logical that the illegal organ trade will grow. A significant improvement in the lifestyles of first world countries and new cures for organ-destroying disease may reduce the demand for organs. However, the best alternative to organ transplantation appears to be the artificial growth of organs in a laboratory. The Human Genome Project reports that while this is still a science in its early stages, these organs would be a healthy clone of the organ in need of replacing and would contain the patient’s DNA, thus reducing the risk of rejection. It is likely that this will not become as widespread as transplantation for at least a decade; ethical, legal and clinical concerns must be addressed before such a treatment is perfected and offered to the public. It is interesting to note that, at present, these organs are grown from embryonic stem cells, a process which many consider unethical. It is for this reason that this science has stalled; conservative legislators refuse to allocate government funding to the development of embryonic technology. In the face of a possible solution to the exploitative organ trade, is it morally better to allow the destruction of embryos or to allow the organ trade, which harms donors and recipients, to continue? These are questions which those in government and medical technology sectors must address. The impact that this “organ growing” has on the illegal organ trade will undoubtedly be determined by the cost to the party in need of an organ; it is safer and preferable than travelling overseas for a transplant but if it is significantly more expensive the organ trade may still thrive. Another possibility is that the organ trade will be opened to classes in the donor country; relatively wealthy residents in a poor country may be able to buy organs from those who would have previously sold organs to foreigners. There is an increased international awareness of the epidemic of the organ trade, and legislation of both vendors and recipients is becoming tougher. However, if the international response is to be truly successful in ceasing the exploitation of such desperate people, all nations must look inwards to solve the problems of inescapable poverty and inadequate healthcare systems.
4,461
<h4>Iran Proves success; recent problems have been because of budget cuts</h4><p><strong>Beard et al 13</strong> T. Randolph "Randy" Beard, Professor of Economics at Auburn University.; Rigmar Osterkamp, Fellow at the School for Political Studies at University of Munich.; And David L. Kaserman, Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.2013 The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses</p><p><u>The <mark>Iranian system has</u></mark>, by most accounts, <u><mark>been successful historically, increasing</mark> the numbers of <mark>transplants performed by 577 percent</u></mark> between 1988 and 2003. This result has been obtained within a bureaucratized framework in which religious judges examine potential living donors, looking for signs of coercion or mixed motivations. Great emphasis has been placed on continuing care for donors, with medical follow-up, insurance benefits, and so on made widely available, at least in principle. Foreigners may not donate or receive a transplant in Iran, except under special, rare circumstances. This latter practice has apparently gone some distance in allowing Iran to avoid the sorts of com¬mercialization that would offend ethical sensibilities.</p><p><u><mark>However, a recent lack of public funding seems to have undermined the past successes</u>.</mark> Zargooshi (2008a, b) reports that the recent annual kidney transplant figure has decreased and now amounts to about one-tenth of the annual number of new ESRD patients. Obviously, the official public payment to donors of Tolman Imio (around U.S.$1,000) has been eroded by inflation. Kidney vendors seem to ask for increasing private copayments from the re¬cipients<u>. The "market price" for a donation is now likely to be around three times the official public payment. During certain periods, it is reported that the public system was unable to pay any compensation to donors. Lack of public funds seems to have also eroded the formerly strictly regulated donor system, and today there is a tolerated "free market" in which recipient income status has become a major determinant in the acquisition of a kidney. Thus, although the Iranian experience strongly suggested the viability of compensated living-donor kidney supply in some settings, it also provides a cautionary tale regarding the consequences of underfunding for such systems.</p><p></u><strong> </p><p>Organ <u>sales </u>are key—artificial organs can’t solve </p><p>O'Sullivan 11</strong> Sophia O'Sullivan, historical contributor 9 August 2011 Heart to Heart- An Investigation of Globalisation and the Illegal Organ Trade http://smartsgroupd.blogspot.com/p/sophia.html</p><p>As the demand for organs rises, and waiting list times stretch out by years, it seems logical that the illegal organ trade will grow. A significant improvement in the lifestyles of first world countries and new cures for organ-destroying disease may reduce the demand for organs. However, <u>the best alternative to organ transplantation appears to be the <mark>artificial growth of organs</mark> in a laboratory. The Human Genome Project reports that </u>while <u>this <mark>is still a</mark> science <mark>in its early stages</u></mark>, these organs would be a healthy clone of the organ in need of replacing and would contain the patient’s DNA, thus reducing the risk of rejection. <u>It is likely that <mark>this will not becom</mark>e as <mark>widespread</mark> as transplantation for at least a decade</u>; <u><mark>ethical, legal and clinical concerns must be addressed before such a treatment is perfected and offered to the public.</mark> It is interesting to note that, at present, these organs are grown from embryonic stem cells, a process which many consider unethical. It is for this reason that this <mark>science has stalled; conservative legislators refuse to</mark> <mark>allocate</mark> government <mark>funding</mark> to the development of embryonic technology</u>. In the face of a possible solution to the exploitative organ trade, is it morally better to allow the destruction of embryos or to allow the organ trade, which harms donors and recipients, to continue? These are questions which those in government and medical technology sectors must address.<u> <mark>The impact that this “organ growing” has on the illegal organ trade will undoubtedly be determined by the cost to the party in need of an organ</mark>;</u> it is safer and preferable than travelling overseas for a transplant but if it is significantly more expensive the organ trade may still thrive. Another possibility is that the organ trade will be opened to classes in the donor country; relatively wealthy residents in a poor country may be able to buy organs from those who would have previously sold organs to foreigners. There is an increased international awareness of the epidemic of the organ trade, and legislation of both vendors and recipients is becoming tougher. However, <u><mark>if the international response is to be truly successful in ceasing the exploitation of such desperate people, all nations must look inwards</u></mark> to solve the problems of inescapable poverty and inadequate healthcare systems. </p>
null
null
Contention 3 Solvency
430,448
7
17,114
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
565,248
A
Wake
4
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
Voss
null
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,701
AG is sufficient to solve incarceration
Newell 7/21
Newell 7/21/2014 (Jim, covers politics and media for Salon, Drug war’s massive defeat: An under-the-radar early release transformation, http://www.salon.com/2014/07/21/drug_wars_massive_defeat_an_under_the_radar_early_release_transformation/)
there’s one issue that’s largely flown under the radar Holder and the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s attempts to reduce the prison sentences of non-violent drug criminals The Sentencing Commission voted to alter its formula for drug sentences lowering those sentences the Sentencing Commission voted to apply full retroactivity of the new guidelines to those sentenced before they go into effect. some 46,000 prisoners will be able to petition judges to have their sentences reduced by years Holder came out in support of full retroactivity The department looks forward to implementing this plan to reduce sentences for certain incarcerated individuals This is a milestone in the effort to make more efficient use of our law enforcement resources and to ease the burden on our overcrowded prison system.” This comes in addition to Holder’s plan to prioritize clemency petitions His Justice Department also announced it would try to steer prosecutors away from pursuing mandatory minimum sentences
there’s one issue that’s largely flown under the radar: Eric Holder and the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s attempts to reduce the prison sentences of non-violent drug crimina , voted to alter its formula for entences 46,000 prisoners will be able to petition judges to have their sentences reduced, Holder came out in support of full retroactivity This is a milestone in the effort to make more efficient use of our law enforcement resources and to ease the burden on our overcrowded prison system.” This comes in addition to Holder’s plan to prioritize clemency petitions
Amid all the far-flung examples given about the Obama administration’s hatred for the rule of law and the “imperial presidency,” there’s one issue that’s largely flown under the radar: Eric Holder and the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s attempts to reduce the prison sentences of non-violent drug criminals during the administration’s second term. The Sentencing Commission, which recommends guidelines for federal crimes that judges look to when applying sentences, voted earlier this year to alter its formula for certain non-violent drug trafficking sentences — in effect lowering those sentences. Those guidelines go into place this November, barring congressional action to block them. On Friday, the Sentencing Commission made an even more dramatic move: it voted, unanimously, to apply full retroactivity of the new guidelines to those sentenced before they go into effect. Once again, unless Congress gets in the way, some 46,000 prisoners — about a quarter of the federal prison population — will be able to petition judges to have their sentences reduced, perhaps by a matter of years. This change goes even farther than what Holder and the Justice Department had been recommending, which would have only affected some 27,000 prisoners. After the commission’s vote, however, Holder came out in support of full retroactivity. The department looks forward to implementing this plan to reduce sentences for certain incarcerated individuals. We have been in ongoing discussions with the Commission during its deliberations on this issue, and conveyed the department’s support for this balanced approach. In the interest of fairness, it makes sense to apply changes to the sentencing guidelines retroactively, and the idea of a one-year implementation delay will adequately address public safety concerns by ensuring that judges have adequate time to consider whether an eligible individual is an appropriate candidate for a reduced sentence. At my direction, the Bureau of Prisons will begin notifying federal inmates of the opportunity to apply for a reduction in sentence immediately. This is a milestone in the effort to make more efficient use of our law enforcement resources and to ease the burden on our overcrowded prison system.” This comes in addition to Holder’s plan to prioritize clemency petitions for certain non-violent offenders. His Justice Department also announced last year that it would try to steer prosecutors away from pursuing mandatory minimum sentences. Elimination of federal mandatory minimum sentences would require congressional action.
2,571
<h4><strong>AG is sufficient to solve incarceration</h4><p>Newell 7/21</strong>/2014 (Jim, covers politics and media for Salon, Drug war’s massive defeat: An under-the-radar early release transformation, http://www.salon.com/2014/07/21/drug_wars_massive_defeat_an_under_the_radar_early_release_transformation/)</p><p>Amid all the far-flung examples given about the Obama administration’s hatred for the rule of law and the “imperial presidency,” <u><mark>there’s one issue that’s largely flown under the radar</u>: Eric <u>Holder and the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s attempts to reduce the prison sentences of non-violent drug crimina</mark>ls</u> during the administration’s second term. <u>The Sentencing Commission</u>, which recommends guidelines for federal crimes that judges look to when applying sentences<mark>, <u>voted</u></mark> earlier this year <u><mark>to alter its formula for</mark> </u>certain non-violent <u>drug</u> trafficking <u>s<mark>entences</u></mark> — in effect <u>lowering those sentences</u>. Those guidelines go into place this November, barring congressional action to block them. On Friday, <u>the Sentencing Commission</u> made an even more dramatic move: it <u>voted</u>, unanimously, <u>to apply full retroactivity of the new guidelines to those sentenced before they go into effect. </u>Once again, unless Congress gets in the way, <u>some <mark>46,000 prisoners</u></mark> — about a quarter of the federal prison population — <u><mark>will be able to petition judges to have their sentences reduced</u>,</mark> perhaps <u>by</u> a matter of <u>years</u>. This change goes even farther than what Holder and the Justice Department had been recommending, which would have only affected some 27,000 prisoners. After the commission’s vote, however, <u><mark>Holder came out in support of full retroactivity</u></mark>. <u>The department looks forward to implementing this plan to reduce sentences for certain incarcerated individuals</u>. We have been in ongoing discussions with the Commission during its deliberations on this issue, and conveyed the department’s support for this balanced approach. In the interest of fairness, it makes sense to apply changes to the sentencing guidelines retroactively, and the idea of a one-year implementation delay will adequately address public safety concerns by ensuring that judges have adequate time to consider whether an eligible individual is an appropriate candidate for a reduced sentence. At my direction, the Bureau of Prisons will begin notifying federal inmates of the opportunity to apply for a reduction in sentence immediately. <u><mark>This is a milestone in the effort to make more efficient use of our law enforcement resources and to ease the burden on our overcrowded <strong>prison</strong> system.” This comes in addition to Holder’s plan to prioritize clemency petitions</u></mark> for certain non-violent offenders. <u>His Justice Department also announced</u> last year that <u>it would try to steer prosecutors away from pursuing mandatory minimum sentences</u>. Elimination of federal mandatory minimum sentences would require congressional action.</p>
null
1nr
1AR Apoc rhetoric good
431,124
1
17,112
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
565,260
N
Wake
2
Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,702
That outweighs—Anti-politics will re-entrench the worst aspects of the status quo
McCann and Szalay 5 (Sean, Associate professor of English and Director of American Studies at Wesleyan University & Michael, Associate professor of English and Director of the Humanities Center at the University of California, Irvine, The Yale Journal of Criticism, 18.2, p. 456-459)
McCann and Szalay 5 (Sean, Associate professor of English and Director of American Studies at Wesleyan University & Michael, Associate professor of English and Director of the Humanities Center at the University of California, Irvine, The Yale Journal of Criticism, 18.2, p. 456-459)
antipathy to the public sphere might be fairly called an antipolitical version of cultural activism 93 systematically downplayed the role to be played by the formal institutions of political action (the state, but also parties, organizations, and the press) The upshot was not just a dismissal of the formal sphere of political action and a consignment of the legitimate powers of government to the ash heap of history, but increasingly a denunciation of public debate and political disagreement Such attitudes have been matched only by the frequently reiterated conviction that merely adopting that language amounts to a political challenge however its consequences appear imperceptible this attitude strikes us as exactly wrong. It is the romantic appeal to "the disruptive, disorienting" force of "vertiginous knowledge" that is impoverished; the fascination with the authority of "political inarticulateness" that is hackneyed and banal.109 All the trappings of this sort of thinking, deserve the scrutiny the related dismissal of formal politics; the conviction that ordinary language is in some significant way a prison house; and, above all, the inflation of self-realization to revolutionary importance—all of these notions deserve to be seen for what they have become: less concepts that might ever be evaluated or tested than aspects of a cherished and ultimately comforting folklore of the late capitalist economy.
antipathy to the public sphere called an antipolitical, cultural activism downplayed formal institutions of political action The upshot was a denunciation of debate and political disagreement the related dismissal of formal politics; the conviction language is a prison the inflation of self-realization to revolutionary importance these become: less concepts evaluated
No surprise, then, that as in the larger development of professionalism generally, the U.S. literary academy's embrace of the attitudes associated with Foucault has tended to follow him toward an antipathy to the public sphere and to what, following Foucault's own optimistic prediction that "we are perhaps experiencing the end of politics," might be fairly called an antipolitical, or at least an antigovernmental, version of cultural activism.93In keeping with the directions charted by the New Left and the counterculture, Foucault, along with his American followers, systematically downplayed the role to be played by the formal institutions of political action (the state, but also parties, organizations, and the press) in order to emphasize the importance of what he called "moral" issues.94 Pointing in his own defense of the "professional and technological class" to an inherent conflict between the powers of "the sovereign" and "matters of professional competence," Paul Goodman had suggested that "'sovereignty' and 'law'" might have become "outmoded concepts."95 Foucault made a far more radical version of a similar point. In the same interview in which he invoked the "specific intellectual," Foucault made his famous call "to cut off the King's head"—to refuse, that is, to pose political issues with reference to "the State" or "in terms of . . . sovereignty." (Ironically, but not surprisingly, he suggested just as American New Leftists had that, if the state were relatively unimportant, "the university and the academic" by comparison might be "privileged points of intersection" in contemporary political struggle.)96 The upshot was not just a dismissal of the formal sphere of political action and a consignment of the legitimate powers of government to the ash heap of history, but increasingly a denunciation of public debate and political disagreement about the proper aims of the state or the just purposes of law. Explaining what he had learned from the events of 1968 by remarking that he would not "play the part of one who prescribes solutions," Foucault suggested instead that the true intellectual refused to engage in public debate or political polemic, declined to play "the role of alter-ego" to "the political party," and preferred instead to reveal issues to be "of such complexity as to shut the mouths of prophets and legislators." "I play my role at the moment I make problems evident in all their complexity, by provoking doubts and uncertainties and calling for profound changes"—changes presumably of the "heterotopic" variety that would "stop words in their tracks." Society should be left to work out its own problems, without the interference of ideologues or governments and even ideally without deliberation or debate at all. "The most important thing is that . . . [problems] be tested and stirred up so deep within society to the point that society allows a new balance of relations to flourish by itself."97 It is difficult not to see in that remark the mystified vision of society common to libertarian philosophies, where progress is brought about solely through the combined interaction of individual choices and the instrumentalities of the state turn out to be irrelevant. And indeed, during the seventies and eighties—when his seminar briefly considered the founding voices of contemporary libertarianism, Ludwig von Mises and Frederick Hayek—Foucault moved ever more [End Page 458] radically away from political issues and ever more completely toward a therapeutic emphasis on, as he famously put it, the care of the self.98 In the late sixties and early seventies, New Left thinkers like Greg Calvert and Carol Neiman similarly argued that the elision of personal emancipation and political change was one of the principal accomplishments of the countercultural left. Genuine change would come about only when the movement abandoned a "politics of guilt"—built around the "liberal-reformist" desire to alleviate injustice—and fully committed instead to "personal liberation." "The revolution," they declared, "is about our lives."99 Though less grandiosely, the late Foucault says much the same. "Care for others should not be put before the care of oneself," he suggests, a premise consistent with the aim of his late work to replace an emphasis on "political institutions" with a private "exercise of the self on the self."100 Foucault's is merely the most striking version of a widely shared retreat away from public debate and civic engagement and toward a commitment to personal freedom. The libertarian premises that appear explicitly in his work are articulated in less direct ways throughout the whole range of poststructuralist theory. These premises are evident, for example, in Jean-François Lyotard's embrace of a "postmodern condition" that, as he recognized, corresponds to the increasing displacement of seemingly "permanent institutions" by "the temporary contract"—a development that he acknowledged makes efforts to contest injustice or inequality appear unlikely.101They appear more abstractly in Gilles Deleuze's analogous defense of a masochistic freedom of contract against the sadistic domination of institutions.102 And they crop up throughout a range of theories that invoke the singular, the individual, and the inassimilable against the basic elements (norms, institutions, deliberation) of the public realm.103 At the core of the poststructuralist consensus, as Lyotard noted, stands the shared premise that "consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value."104 Such attitudes have long since become commonplace features of the American literary academy, whose attraction to the recondite discourse and libertarian sentiments of poststructuralist philosophy have been matched only by the frequently reiterated conviction that merely adopting that language amounts to a political challenge to contemporary society. If, however, that challenge always appears profound—cutting, as Foucault said, to "the fundamental codes of a culture"—its consequences by the same token inevitably appear imperceptible, and put off for a future accounting.105 What lies between the apocalyptic and the mundane, of course—in that place otherwise occupied by formal political organization or the state—is mystery. It is difficult to fault academic literary intellectuals for being drawn [End Page 459] to the allure of that mystery. After all, few have easy access to Washington or the local statehouse. They do not as a group command much in the way of economic power. Nor do they have many strong connections to other constituencies. Turning that marginality into a source of authority, however, many academic humanists see the political universe entirely in symbolic terms, imagining, like Mailer, Mills and the New Left, that to change the cultural apparatus could be to change the world—that to provide, as Mills put it, "alternative definitions of reality" could itself be the most radically political of acts.106 As our political and economic world has been shaped more and more by the prevalence of inegalitarian private agreements and weak public institutions, this longing for cultural power has left literary academics with ever less to say. Indeed, by at least one account, having nothing to say is how the academic left stays true to the sixties. Refusing to don "the pose of the ethically communicative replicant," Lauren Berlant suggests, is the way to remain "'68 or something." To resist "the bureaucratic impulse" one must embrace "the sublime productivities of political failure" and say "'something unspeakable.'"107 That, we believe, is the dead end of cultural politics and an impasse long since time to step around. No doubt this notion will seem mistaken to many of our contemporaries. Those like Eric Lott who think that "the 60s" lives on most powerfully in a commitment to refuse the "liberal analytical division between symbolic politics and real politics" will continue to believe that "the realest way to intervene in matters of state" is to offer "continuing revelations" of the fact that "our relation to the state is by definition coerced, thus distant, thus mystified, thus, perforce, imaginary."108 Readers who agree with this assessment might also agree with the editors of the recent volume Left Legalism/Left Critique who, believing that the most acute danger to "the left" today is not the vast power of the radical right but the fact that left ambitions have become "nearly indistinguishable from mainstream liberal ones," also believe that criticisms of postmodern radicalism betray an "impoverished understanding." But this attitude strikes us as exactly wrong. It is the romantic appeal to "the disruptive, disorienting" force of "vertiginous knowledge" that is impoverished; the fascination with the authority of "political inarticulateness" that is hackneyed and banal.109 All the trappings of this sort of thinking, we believe, deserve the scrutiny of the type offered by the essays in this volume. The simplistic visions of both "reason" and "the state"; the related dismissal of formal politics; the conviction that ordinary language is in some significant way a prison house; and, above all, the inflation of self-realization to revolutionary importance—all of these notions deserve to be seen for what they have become: less concepts that might ever be evaluated or tested than aspects of a cherished and ultimately comforting folklore of the late capitalist economy.
9,491
<h4><strong>That outweighs—Anti-politics will <u>re-entrench</u> the worst aspects of the <u>status quo</h4><p></u>McCann and Szalay 5<u> (Sean, Associate professor of English and Director of American Studies at Wesleyan University & Michael, Associate professor of English and Director of the Humanities Center at the University of California, Irvine, The Yale Journal of Criticism, 18.2, p. 456-459) </p><p></u></strong>No surprise, then, that as in the larger development of professionalism generally, the U.S. literary academy's embrace of the attitudes associated with Foucault has tended to follow him toward an <u><mark>antipathy to the public sphere</u></mark> and to what, following Foucault's own optimistic prediction that "we are perhaps experiencing the end of politics," <u>might be fairly <mark>called an antipolitical</u>,</mark> or at least an antigovernmental, <u>version of <mark>cultural activism</u></mark>.<u>93</u>In keeping with the directions charted by the New Left and the counterculture, Foucault, along with his American followers,<u> systematically <strong><mark>downplayed</strong></mark> the role to be played by the <strong><mark>formal institutions of political action</strong></mark> (the state, but also parties, organizations, and the press)</u> in order to emphasize the importance of what he called "moral" issues.94 Pointing in his own defense of the "professional and technological class" to an inherent conflict between the powers of "the sovereign" and "matters of professional competence," Paul Goodman had suggested that "'sovereignty' and 'law'" might have become "outmoded concepts."95 Foucault made a far more radical version of a similar point. In the same interview in which he invoked the "specific intellectual," Foucault made his famous call "to cut off the King's head"—to refuse, that is, to pose political issues with reference to "the State" or "in terms of . . . sovereignty." (Ironically, but not surprisingly, he suggested just as American New Leftists had that, if the state were relatively unimportant, "the university and the academic" by comparison might be "privileged points of intersection" in contemporary political struggle.)96 <u><mark>The upshot was</mark> not just a dismissal of the formal sphere of political action and a consignment of the legitimate powers of government to the ash heap of history, but increasingly <strong><mark>a denunciation of </mark>public <mark>debate and political disagreement</u></strong></mark> about the proper aims of the state or the just purposes of law. Explaining what he had learned from the events of 1968 by remarking that he would not "play the part of one who prescribes solutions," Foucault suggested instead that the true intellectual refused to engage in public debate or political polemic, declined to play "the role of alter-ego" to "the political party," and preferred instead to reveal issues to be "of such complexity as to shut the mouths of prophets and legislators." "I play my role at the moment I make problems evident in all their complexity, by provoking doubts and uncertainties and calling for profound changes"—changes presumably of the "heterotopic" variety that would "stop words in their tracks." Society should be left to work out its own problems, without the interference of ideologues or governments and even ideally without deliberation or debate at all. "The most important thing is that . . . [problems] be tested and stirred up so deep within society to the point that society allows a new balance of relations to flourish by itself."97 It is difficult not to see in that remark the mystified vision of society common to libertarian philosophies, where progress is brought about solely through the combined interaction of individual choices and the instrumentalities of the state turn out to be irrelevant. And indeed, during the seventies and eighties—when his seminar briefly considered the founding voices of contemporary libertarianism, Ludwig von Mises and Frederick Hayek—Foucault moved ever more [End Page 458] radically away from political issues and ever more completely toward a therapeutic emphasis on, as he famously put it, the care of the self.98 In the late sixties and early seventies, New Left thinkers like Greg Calvert and Carol Neiman similarly argued that the elision of personal emancipation and political change was one of the principal accomplishments of the countercultural left. Genuine change would come about only when the movement abandoned a "politics of guilt"—built around the "liberal-reformist" desire to alleviate injustice—and fully committed instead to "personal liberation." "The revolution," they declared, "is about our lives."99 Though less grandiosely, the late Foucault says much the same. "Care for others should not be put before the care of oneself," he suggests, a premise consistent with the aim of his late work to replace an emphasis on "political institutions" with a private "exercise of the self on the self."100 Foucault's is merely the most striking version of a widely shared retreat away from public debate and civic engagement and toward a commitment to personal freedom. The libertarian premises that appear explicitly in his work are articulated in less direct ways throughout the whole range of poststructuralist theory. These premises are evident, for example, in Jean-François Lyotard's embrace of a "postmodern condition" that, as he recognized, corresponds to the increasing displacement of seemingly "permanent institutions" by "the temporary contract"—a development that he acknowledged makes efforts to contest injustice or inequality appear unlikely.101They appear more abstractly in Gilles Deleuze's analogous defense of a masochistic freedom of contract against the sadistic domination of institutions.102 And they crop up throughout a range of theories that invoke the singular, the individual, and the inassimilable against the basic elements (norms, institutions, deliberation) of the public realm.103 At the core of the poststructuralist consensus, as Lyotard noted, stands the shared premise that "consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value."104 <u>Such attitudes </u>have long since become commonplace features of the American literary academy, whose attraction to the recondite discourse and libertarian sentiments of poststructuralist philosophy <u>have been matched only by the frequently reiterated conviction that merely adopting that language amounts to a political challenge</u> to contemporary society. If, <u>however</u>, that challenge always appears profound—cutting, as Foucault said, to "the fundamental codes of a culture"—<u>its consequences</u> by the same token inevitably <u>appear imperceptible</u>, and put off for a future accounting.105 What lies between the apocalyptic and the mundane, of course—in that place otherwise occupied by formal political organization or the state—is mystery. It is difficult to fault academic literary intellectuals for being drawn [End Page 459] to the allure of that mystery. After all, few have easy access to Washington or the local statehouse. They do not as a group command much in the way of economic power. Nor do they have many strong connections to other constituencies. Turning that marginality into a source of authority, however, many academic humanists see the political universe entirely in symbolic terms, imagining, like Mailer, Mills and the New Left, that to change the cultural apparatus could be to change the world—that to provide, as Mills put it, "alternative definitions of reality" could itself be the most radically political of acts.106 As our political and economic world has been shaped more and more by the prevalence of inegalitarian private agreements and weak public institutions, this longing for cultural power has left literary academics with ever less to say. Indeed, by at least one account, having nothing to say is how the academic left stays true to the sixties. Refusing to don "the pose of the ethically communicative replicant," Lauren Berlant suggests, is the way to remain "'68 or something." To resist "the bureaucratic impulse" one must embrace "the sublime productivities of political failure" and say "'something unspeakable.'"107 That, we believe, is the dead end of cultural politics and an impasse long since time to step around. No doubt this notion will seem mistaken to many of our contemporaries. Those like Eric Lott who think that "the 60s" lives on most powerfully in a commitment to refuse the "liberal analytical division between symbolic politics and real politics" will continue to believe that "the realest way to intervene in matters of state" is to offer "continuing revelations" of the fact that "our relation to the state is by definition coerced, thus distant, thus mystified, thus, perforce, imaginary."108 Readers who agree with this assessment might also agree with the editors of the recent volume Left Legalism/Left Critique who, believing that the most acute danger to "the left" today is not the vast power of the radical right but the fact that left ambitions have become "nearly indistinguishable from mainstream liberal ones," also believe that criticisms of postmodern radicalism betray an "impoverished understanding." But <u>this attitude strikes us as exactly wrong. It is the romantic appeal to "the disruptive, disorienting" force of "vertiginous knowledge" that is impoverished; the fascination with the authority of "political inarticulateness" that is hackneyed and banal.109 All the trappings of this sort of thinking,</u> we believe,<u> deserve the scrutiny </u>of the type offered by the essays in this volume. The simplistic visions of both "reason" and "the state";<u> <mark>the related dismissal of formal politics; the conviction </mark>that ordinary <mark>language is</mark> in some significant way <mark>a prison</mark> house; and, above all, <mark>the inflation of self-realization to revolutionary importance</mark>—all of <mark>these </mark>notions deserve to be seen for what they have <strong><mark>become: less concepts </mark>that might ever be<mark> evaluated</mark> or tested than aspects of a cherished and ultimately comforting folklore of the late capitalist economy. </p></u></strong>
null
2NC
A/T “Do Both”
423,587
9
17,110
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
565,262
N
Wake
5
NYU Itliong-Zhan
McCleary
Fed CP (2NR) AG Politics (2NR Cede the Political DA T - USFG
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
null
48,454
YaAh
Dartmouth YaAh
null
Ka.....
Ya.....
Pi.....
Ah.....
18,764
Dartmouth
Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
743,703
Crowd out would not be a net reduction
Erin and Harris 94
Erin and Harris 94 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester 1994 A monopsonistic market: or how to buy and sell human organs, tissues and cells ethically in Life and Death Under High Technology Medicin, edited by Ian Robinson
policies could include offering prospective payments for organs retrieved post mortem, It has been argued that this would lead to a fall in the numbers of organs donated on purely humanitarian or altruistic groundsf but nevertheless it seems probable that the introduction of such a commercial interest would lead to an overall increase in organ yield
has been argued that this would lead to a fall in organs donated on altruistic groundsf but nevertheless the introduction a commercial interest would lead to an overall increase
Arguing for commerce in the context of organs obtained from cadavers is less morally problematic than in the case of the living. For a start, a cadaver cannot be argued, reasonably, to be a person and thus considerations of personal autonomy do not enter the picture: to talk of the autonomy of the dead is absurd. Each year several thousands of persons die prematurely from the lack of donated organs. Certain organs, hearts for example, can only be obtained from cadavers? Whilst this shortfall of cadaver organs for transplantation persists it seems morally insupportable to ignore policies which would likely save lives unless they are counterbalanced by arguments of comparable moral force. Such policies could include offering prospective payments for organs retrieved post mortem, Such prospective payments, whether in money or present medical care, are currently offered in some American states in return for the delivery of one’s body at death (Munzer 1990 p. 52). It has been argued that this would lead to a fall in the numbers of organs donated on purely humanitarian or altruistic groundsf but nevertheless it seems probable that the introduction of such a commercial interest would lead to an overall increase in organ yield (Brams 1977; Buc and Bernstein 1984).
1,276
<h4>Crowd out would not be a net reduction</h4><p><strong>Erin and Harris 94</strong> Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester 1994 A monopsonistic market: or how to buy and sell human organs, tissues and cells ethically in Life and Death Under High Technology Medicin, edited by Ian Robinson </p><p>Arguing for commerce in the context of organs obtained from cadavers is less morally problematic than in the case of the living. For a start, a cadaver cannot be argued, reasonably, to be a person and thus considerations of personal autonomy do not enter the picture: to talk of the autonomy of the dead is absurd. Each year several thousands of persons die prematurely from the lack of donated organs. Certain organs, hearts for example, can only be obtained from cadavers? Whilst this shortfall of cadaver organs for transplantation persists it seems morally insupportable to ignore policies which would likely save lives unless they are counterbalanced by arguments of comparable moral force. Such <u>policies could include offering prospective payments for organs retrieved post mortem,</u> Such prospective payments, whether in money or present medical care, are currently offered in some American states in return for the delivery of one’s body at death (Munzer 1990 p. 52). <u>It <mark>has been argued that this would lead to a fall in</mark> the numbers of <mark>organs donated on </mark>purely humanitarian or<mark> altruistic groundsf but nevertheless </mark>it seems probable that <mark>the introduction </mark>of such <mark>a commercial interest would lead to an <strong>overall increase</strong> </mark>in organ yield</u> (Brams 1977; Buc and Bernstein 1984).</p>
null
null
Contention 3 Solvency
430,451
5
17,114
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
565,248
A
Wake
4
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
Voss
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48,454
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Pi.....
Ah.....
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Dartmouth
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cx
college
2
743,704
Bipartisan support for Lynch now- PC’s key to overcome fights on immigration
Roll Call 11/7
Roll Call 11/7/2014 (Confirmation Gauntlet Expected for Loretta Lynch, http://blogs.rollcall.com/white-house/loretta-lynch-attorney-general-confirmation/?dcz=)
Lynch could have an easier time getting through the Senate, especially with Schumer as her sherpa Grassley congratulated Lynch on the nomination Lynch will receive a thorough vetting by the Judiciary Committee She’ll likely face numerous questions from Republicans, including about the legality of the president’s planned executive actions on immigration something that has become an early flashpoint
Lync easier time getting through the Senate Lynch will receive a very fair, but thorough, vetting by the Judiciary Committee .” She’ll likely face numerous questions from Republicans, including about the legality of the president’s planned executive actions on immigration, something that has become an early flashpoint a
Hours after the White House insisted President Barack Obama hadn’t made a decision on a new attorney general, officials announced he is nominating Loretta Lynch, a U.S. attorney in New York. Lynch, an African-American woman with a Harvard law degree, has served two stints as the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, and has the strong support of Sen. Charles E. Schumer, D-N.Y. The move likely will be a disappointment to the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, which pushed hard for Obama to name Labor Secretary Thomas E. Perez, a former head of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division. But Perez would face a major confirmation battle and might only get through the Senate if Democrats jam a pick through in the coming weeks before Republicans take over. Lynch, who doesn’t have an extensive political résumé, could have an easier time getting through the Senate, especially with Schumer, the No. 2 Senate Democrat, as her sherpa. “Loretta Lynch is a consummate professional, has a first-rate legal mind and is committed in her bones to the equal application of justice for all people,” Schumer said in a statement. “I was proud to recommend her to be the US Attorney for my home community of the Eastern District of New York, and I will be prouder still to champion what must be her swift confirmation in the Senate.” Lynch made waves earlier this year in congressional circles when she announced the indictment of Rep. Michael Grimm, R-N.Y. Grimm won re-election easily on Tuesday but now faces trial. Sen. Charles E. Grassley of Iowa, current ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, congratulated Lynch on the nomination. “Being selected to serve as our nation’s top law enforcement officer is both a tremendous honor and responsibility,” he said. “As we move forward with the confirmation process, I have every confidence that Ms. Lynch will receive a very fair, but thorough, vetting by the Judiciary Committee. U.S. Attorneys are rarely elevated directly to this position, so I look forward to learning more about her, how she will interact with Congress, and how she proposes to lead the department. I’m hopeful that her tenure, if confirmed, will restore confidence in the Attorney General as a politically independent voice for the American people.” She’ll likely face numerous questions from Republicans, including about the legality of the president’s planned executive actions on immigration, something that has become an early flashpoint after the midterm elections.
2,512
<h4><strong>Bipartisan support for Lynch now- PC’s key to overcome fights on immigration</h4><p>Roll Call 11/7</strong>/2014 (Confirmation Gauntlet Expected for Loretta Lynch, http://blogs.rollcall.com/white-house/loretta-lynch-attorney-general-confirmation/?dcz=)</p><p>Hours after the White House insisted President Barack Obama hadn’t made a decision on a new attorney general, officials announced he is nominating Loretta Lynch, a U.S. attorney in New York. Lynch, an African-American woman with a Harvard law degree, has served two stints as the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, and has the strong support of Sen. Charles E. Schumer, D-N.Y. The move likely will be a disappointment to the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, which pushed hard for Obama to name Labor Secretary Thomas E. Perez, a former head of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division. But Perez would face a major confirmation battle and might only get through the Senate if Democrats jam a pick through in the coming weeks before Republicans take over. <u><mark>Lync</mark>h</u>, who doesn’t have an extensive political résumé, <u>could have an <mark>easier time getting through the Senate</mark>, especially with Schumer</u>, the No. 2 Senate Democrat, <u>as her sherpa</u>. “Loretta Lynch is a consummate professional, has a first-rate legal mind and is committed in her bones to the equal application of justice for all people,” Schumer said in a statement. “I was proud to recommend her to be the US Attorney for my home community of the Eastern District of New York, and I will be prouder still to champion what must be her swift confirmation in the Senate.” Lynch made waves earlier this year in congressional circles when she announced the indictment of Rep. Michael Grimm, R-N.Y. Grimm won re-election easily on Tuesday but now faces trial. Sen. Charles E. <u>Grassley</u> of Iowa, current ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, <u>congratulated Lynch on the nomination</u>. “Being selected to serve as our nation’s top law enforcement officer is both a tremendous honor and responsibility,” he said. “As we move forward with the confirmation process, I have every confidence that Ms. <u><mark>Lynch will receive a</u> very fair, but <u>thorough</u>, <u>vetting</u> <u>by the Judiciary Committee</u></mark>. U.S. Attorneys are rarely elevated directly to this position, so I look forward to learning more about her, how she will interact with Congress, and how she proposes to lead the department. I’m hopeful that her tenure, if confirmed, will restore confidence in the Attorney General as a politically independent voice for the American people<mark>.” <u>She’ll likely face numerous questions from Republicans, including about the legality of the president’s planned executive actions on immigration</u>, <u>something that has become an early <strong>flashpoint</u></strong> a<strong></mark>fter the midterm elections.</p></strong>
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431,111
2
17,112
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
565,260
N
Wake
2
Cornell Deng-Zhang
Stone
AG Politics (2NR) Fed CP (2NR) Treaty DA T-legalize
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null
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Ah.....
18,764
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2