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743,505 |
Zero risk of Mexican collapse---best predictive models of state failure agree
|
Couch, 2012
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Couch, 2012 (Neil, Brigadier, British Army, July 2012, “Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse’: Reality or Exaggeration?,” http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-house-papers/2012-seaford-house-papers/SHP-2012-Couch.pdf)
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A ‘collapsed’ state suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’ Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico disappearing like those earlier European states seems implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and higher predicted growth than either the UK, Germany or the USA; that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours, and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities Crime and corruption tend to be described not as causes but as symptoms demonstrating failure a study to build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either One of the principal scholars Rotberg, says that in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as effect rather than trigger This absence may reflect an assessment that numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure.
|
A ‘collapsed’ state suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’ Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico seems implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and high predicted growth that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities’ . Crime and corruption tend to be symptoms demonstrating failure a study build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either that numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail
|
A ‘collapsed’ state, however, as postulated in the Pentagon JOE paper, suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’.16 Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico disappearing like those earlier European states seems implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and higher predicted growth than either the UK, Germany or the USA; that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours, which was the ‘one constant’ in the European experience according to Tilly; and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities’ that Rotberg says is a feature common amongst failed states.17,18 A review of the literature does not reveal why the JOE paper might have suggested criminal gangs and drug cartels as direct causes leading to state collapse. Crime and corruption tend to be described not as causes but as symptoms demonstrating failure. For example, a study for Defense Research and Development Canada attempting to build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either.19 One of the principal scholars on the subject, Rotberg, says that in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as effect rather than trigger.20 The Fund for Peace Failed States Index, does not use either of them as a ‘headline’ indicator, though both are used as contributory factors. This absence may reflect an assessment that numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail. Mandel describes the corruption and extreme violence of the Chinese Triads, Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza and the Russian Mob that, in some cases, has continued for centuries.21 Yet none of these countries were singled out as potential collapsed or failed states in the Pentagon’s paper. Indeed, thousands of Americans were killed in gang warfare during Prohibition and many people ‘knew or at least suspected that politicians, judges, lawyers, bankers and business concerns collected many millions of dollars from frauds, bribes and various forms of extortion’.22 Organised crime and corruption were the norm in the political, business, and judicial systems and police forces ran their own ‘rackets’ rather than enforcing the law.23 Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure.
| 2,375 |
<h4>Zero risk of Mexican collapse---best predictive models of state failure agree </h4><p><strong>Couch, 2012</strong> (Neil, Brigadier, British Army, July 2012, “Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse’: Reality or Exaggeration?,” http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-house-papers/2012-seaford-house-papers/SHP-2012-Couch.pdf)</p><p><u><mark>A ‘collapsed’ state</u></mark>, however, as postulated in the Pentagon JOE paper, <u><mark>suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’</mark>, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’</u>.16 <u><strong><mark>Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico</mark> disappearing like those earlier European states <mark>seems </strong>implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and high</mark>er <mark>predicted growth</mark> than either the UK, Germany or the USA; <mark>that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours</mark>,</u> which was the ‘one constant’ in the European experience according to Tilly; <u><mark>and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities</u>’</mark> that Rotberg says is a feature common amongst failed states.17,18 A review of the literature does not reveal why the JOE paper might have suggested criminal gangs and drug cartels as direct causes leading to state collapse<mark>. <u>Crime and corruption tend to be</mark> described not as causes but as <mark>symptoms demonstrating failure</u></mark>. For example, <u><mark>a study</mark> </u>for Defense Research and Development Canada attempting <u>to <mark>build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either</u></mark>.19 <u>One of the principal scholars</u> on the subject, <u>Rotberg, says that in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as effect rather than trigger</u>.20 The Fund for Peace Failed States Index, does not use either of them as a ‘headline’ indicator, though both are used as contributory factors. <u>This absence may reflect an assessment <mark>that<strong> numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail</u></strong></mark>. Mandel describes the corruption and extreme violence of the Chinese Triads, Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza and the Russian Mob that, in some cases, has continued for centuries.21 Yet none of these countries were singled out as potential collapsed or failed states in the Pentagon’s paper. Indeed, thousands of Americans were killed in gang warfare during Prohibition and many people ‘knew or at least suspected that politicians, judges, lawyers, bankers and business concerns collected many millions of dollars from frauds, bribes and various forms of extortion’.22 Organised crime and corruption were the norm in the political, business, and judicial systems and police forces ran their own ‘rackets’ rather than enforcing the law.23 <u><strong>Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure.</p></u></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
cartels
| 45,874 | 64 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,506 |
Lynch will be confirmed now but it will be a fight
|
The Hill 11/11
|
The Hill 11/11/2014 (Dems unlikely to ram through Obama’s attorney general pick, http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/223598-dems-unlikely-to-ram-through-obamas-attorney-general-pick)
|
Obama will have to get his nominee for attorney general past a Republican-controlled Senate the time crunch and growing GOP opposition to Lynch make it exceedingly unlikely that the replacement for will be confirmed in December the task of approving a new attorney general will fall to the new Republican majority Leahy predicted Lynch would ultimately win broad bipartisan support this nominee is extremely well qualified There may be some who feel they have to vote no because it's a nominee by Obama but the majority will vote for her
|
Obama will have to get his nominee for attorney general past a Republican-controlled Senate time crunch make i e the task of approving a new attorney general fall to the new Republican majority predicted Lynch would ultimately win broad bipartisan suppor this nominee is extremely well qualified. There may be some who feel they have to vote no because it's a nominee by Obama, but the major will vote for her
|
President Obama will have to get his nominee for attorney general past a Republican-controlled Senate, Democratic and Republican aides say. A packed schedule after the election is almost certain to push the vetting process for Loretta Lynch into January, when Republicans are set to take power in the upper chamber. “It seems likely [the Lynch vote] would be in the next Congress. It’s difficult to process an [attorney general] that quickly,” said a Democratic aide. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) has not yet made a decision on whether to move Lynch’s nomination in the lame-duck session, according to spokesman Adam Jentleson. But aides say the time crunch and growing GOP opposition to Lynch make it exceedingly unlikely that the replacement for Eric Holder will be confirmed in December. That means the task of approving a new attorney general — a position that is a lightning rod for controversy — will fall to the new Republican majority of Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.). “Ms. Lynch will receive fair consideration by the Senate. And her nomination should be considered in the new Congress through regular order,” McConnell said in a statement. Senate Republicans are unified against Lynch’s nomination moving through the lame-duck session, giving Reid another incentive to postpone it. Reid needs Republican cooperation to pass other priorities in December, including an omnibus spending bill, a package extending a variety of expired tax cuts, the Defense Department authorization bill and dozens of lower-profile nominees. In addition to that legislative to-do list, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) is insisting on passing an overhaul of the National Security Agency (NSA) before the clock runs out on the Democratic majority. Leahy’s committee is tasked with vetting Lynch’s nomination. “Leahy says he wants to do the NSA reform bill before doing anything else in committee so it bottles that up,” the Democratic aide said. “Lynch is a very qualified nominee and should be confirmed no matter who is in charge.” If confirmed, Lynch would be the first African-American woman to serve as attorney general. The Senate has already confirmed her twice to serve as U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York, the post she holds currently. Leahy on Monday predicted Lynch would ultimately win broad bipartisan support, regardless of when the confirmation vote occurs. “I think most people would agree that this nominee is extremely well qualified. There may be some who feel they have to vote no simply because it's a nominee by President Obama, but the vast majority of Republicans and Democrats will vote for her,” Leahy said on MSNBC. “She's superbly qualified.”
| 2,714 |
<h4>Lynch will be confirmed now but it will be a fight</h4><p><strong>The Hill 11/11</strong>/2014 (Dems unlikely to ram through Obama’s attorney general pick, http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/223598-dems-unlikely-to-ram-through-obamas-attorney-general-pick)</p><p>President <u><mark>Obama will have to get his nominee for attorney general past a Republican-controlled Senate</u></mark>, Democratic and Republican aides say. A packed schedule after the election is almost certain to push the vetting process for Loretta Lynch into January, when Republicans are set to take power in the upper chamber. “It seems likely [the Lynch vote] would be in the next Congress. It’s difficult to process an [attorney general] that quickly,” said a Democratic aide. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) has not yet made a decision on whether to move Lynch’s nomination in the lame-duck session, according to spokesman Adam Jentleson. But aides say <u>the <mark>time crunch </mark>and growing GOP opposition to Lynch <mark>make i</mark>t <mark>e</mark>xceedingly unlikely that the replacement for</u> Eric Holder <u>will be confirmed in December</u>. That means <u><mark>the task of approving a new attorney general</u></mark> — a position that is a lightning rod for controversy — <u>will <mark>fall to the new Republican majority</u></mark> of Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.). “Ms. Lynch will receive fair consideration by the Senate. And her nomination should be considered in the new Congress through regular order,” McConnell said in a statement. Senate Republicans are unified against Lynch’s nomination moving through the lame-duck session, giving Reid another incentive to postpone it. Reid needs Republican cooperation to pass other priorities in December, including an omnibus spending bill, a package extending a variety of expired tax cuts, the Defense Department authorization bill and dozens of lower-profile nominees. In addition to that legislative to-do list, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) is insisting on passing an overhaul of the National Security Agency (NSA) before the clock runs out on the Democratic majority. Leahy’s committee is tasked with vetting Lynch’s nomination. “Leahy says he wants to do the NSA reform bill before doing anything else in committee so it bottles that up,” the Democratic aide said. “Lynch is a very qualified nominee and should be confirmed no matter who is in charge.” If confirmed, Lynch would be the first African-American woman to serve as attorney general. The Senate has already confirmed her twice to serve as U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York, the post she holds currently. <u>Leahy</u> on Monday <u><mark>predicted Lynch would ultimately win <strong>broad bipartisan suppor</mark>t</u></strong>, regardless of when the confirmation vote occurs. “I think most people would agree that <u><mark>this nominee is extremely well qualified</u>. <u>There may be some who feel they have to vote no</u></mark> simply <u><mark>because it's a nominee by</u></mark> President <u><mark>Obama</u>, <u>but the</u></mark> vast <u><mark>major</mark>ity</u> of Republicans and Democrats <u><mark>will vote for her</u><strong></mark>,” Leahy said on MSNBC. “She's superbly qualified.”</p></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 109,344 | 24 | 17,112 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| 565,260 |
N
|
Wake
|
2
|
Cornell Deng-Zhang
|
Stone
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaty DA
T-legalize
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,507 |
Plan costs an extraordinary amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities
|
Downs 12
|
Downs 12 David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/
|
As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
|
As much as he may want to reform drug laws , Obama is hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those laws the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities
|
Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws since their inception (see discussion above). Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law through legislative channels; and other issues, such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
| 563 |
<h4>Plan costs an <u>extraordinary</u> amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities</h4><p><strong>Downs 12 </strong>David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone<u>, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/</p><p></u>Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. <u><mark>As much as he may want to reform drug laws </mark>on a personal level<mark>, Obama is</mark> nonetheless <mark>hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those</mark> same <mark>laws</u></mark> since their inception (see discussion above). <u>Given this history, <mark>the president would <strong>risk an extraordinary level of political capital</u></strong> <u>on any</mark> proposed <mark>easing of federal law</u></mark> through legislative channels; <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><mark>other issues,</u></mark> such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to <u><mark>rank higher on his list of</u></mark> <u><mark>legislative</mark> <mark>priorities</mark>.</p></u>
| null |
1nc
| null | 305,170 | 62 | 17,110 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| 565,262 |
N
|
Wake
|
5
|
NYU Itliong-Zhan
|
McCleary
|
Fed CP (2NR)
AG Politics (2NR
Cede the Political DA
T - USFG
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,508 |
Credible heg solves several existential impacts
|
Keck 2014
|
Keck 2014 (Zachary, Managing Editor of The Diplomat, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?”, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/,)
|
on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar , much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world there is good reason to fear relative decline compared with China hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where no central authority can govern interactions We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East As China grows more powerful, it has sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This has to come at the expense of other powers these have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day All of this highlights the advantages of a unipolar system although the U.S. has asserted military force frequently it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of casualties America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests even if the transitions are managed successfully, there are significant negative effects on international relations it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples include climate change, health pandemics terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction A unipolar system, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and compel others to fall in line the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War
|
It’s difficult to imagine China defending open order if it were a power transition periods have been the most destabilizing eras in history the rise of new powers necessitates revisions to rules This is impossible to do in any organized fashion although the U.S. has asserted military force frequently its wars have been fairly limited preponderance has prevented great power war, and restrained regional powers from coming to blows. the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Iran-Iraq wars many challenges can only be solved through multilateral coop Examples include climate change, pandemics terrorism financial crises, and prolif A unipolar system, is uniquely suited for organizing global action preponderance lessens the intensity of competition among players
|
Still, on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar power, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world. Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, there is good reason to fear its relative decline compared with China and other emerging nations. To begin with, hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where there is no central authority that can govern interactions between states. We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific (and arguably the Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily has to come at the expense of other powers, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, these powers have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead. All of this highlights some of the advantages of a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has asserted military force quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties involved. At the same time, America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. For instance, the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers like Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests against their newly empowered rivals. But even if the transitions caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises are managed successfully, there are still likely to be significant negative effects on international relations. In today’s “globalized” world, it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples of this include climate change, health pandemics, organized crime and terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among many others. A unipolar system, for all its limitations, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues. This is because there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and, to some degree, compel others to fall in line. In addition, the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War.
| 4,352 |
<h4>Credible heg solves several existential impacts</h4><p><strong>Keck 2014</strong> (Zachary, Managing Editor of The Diplomat, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?”, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/,)</p><p>Still, <u>on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world</u>, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, <u>it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly</u> if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. <u><mark>It’s difficult to imagine China defending</mark> a rule-based, <mark>open </mark>international <mark>order if it were a</mark> unipolar </u><mark>power<u></mark>, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world</u>. Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, <u>there is good reason to fear</u> its <u>relative decline compared with China</u> and other emerging nations. To begin with, <u>hegemonic <mark>transition periods have </mark>historically<mark> been <strong>the most destabilizing eras</strong> in history</u></mark>. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). <u>Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, <mark>the rise of new </mark>global <mark>powers</mark> <mark>necessitates revisions to </mark>the “<mark>rules </mark>of the road.” <mark>This is <strong></mark>nearly <mark>impossible</strong> to do in any organized fashion </mark>given the anarchic nature of the international system, where</u> there is <u>no central authority</u> that <u>can govern interactions</u> between states. <u>We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific</u> (<u>and</u> arguably the <u>Middle East</u>). <u>As China grows more</u> economically and militarily <u>powerful, it has</u> unsurprisingly <u>sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This</u> necessarily <u>has to come at the expense of other powers</u>, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, <u>these</u> powers <u>have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation <strong>grows more tense</strong> with each passing day</u>. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead. <u>All of this highlights</u> some of <u>the advantages of a unipolar system</u>. Namely, <u><mark>although the U.S. has asserted military force</u></mark> quite <u><mark>frequently</u></mark> in the post-Cold War era, <u>it has only fought weak powers and thus <mark>its wars have been <strong>fairly limited</strong> </mark>in terms of</u> the number of <u>casualties</u> involved. At the same time, <u>America’s <mark>preponderance</mark> of power <mark>has prevented </mark>a <strong><mark>great power war</strong>, and </mark>even <mark>restrained </mark>major <strong><mark>regional powers from coming to blows.</u></strong></mark> For instance, <u><mark>the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the </mark>Israeli-Arab or <mark>Iran-Iraq wars </mark>of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises <strong>dramatically</strong>. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers</u> like Japan <u>acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests</u> against their newly empowered rivals. But <u>even if the transitions</u> caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises <u>are managed successfully, there are</u> still likely to be <u>significant negative effects on international relations</u>. In today’s “globalized” world, <u>it is commonly asserted that <mark>many </mark>of the defining <mark>challenges </mark>of our era <mark>can only be solved through multilateral coop</mark>eration. <mark>Examples</u> </mark>of this <u><mark>include <strong>climate change</strong>, <strong></mark>health <mark>pandemics</u></strong></mark>, organized crime and <u><strong><mark>terrorism</strong></mark>, <strong>global <mark>financial crises</strong>, and </mark>the <strong><mark>prolif</mark>eration of weapons of mass destruction</u></strong>, among many others. <u><mark>A unipolar system,</u> </mark>for all its limitations, <u><mark>is <strong>uniquely suited</strong> for organizing </mark>effective <strong><mark>global action</strong></mark> on these transnational issues</u>. This is because <u>there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and</u>, to some degree, <u>compel others to fall in line</u>. In addition, <u>the unipole’s <mark>preponderance </mark>of power <strong><mark>lessens the intensity of competition</strong> among </mark>the global <mark>players </mark>involved</u>. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that <u>global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War</u>.</p>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 45,610 | 739 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,509 |
substantive constraints on the debate are key to actualize effective pluralism and agonistic democracy
|
Dryzek 6, Professor of Social and Political Theory, The Australian National University, Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals, American Journal of Political Science,Vol. 50, No. 3, July 2006, Pp. 634–649
|
John Dryzek 6, Professor of Social and Political Theory, The Australian National University, Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals, American Journal of Political Science,Vol. 50, No. 3, July 2006, Pp. 634–649
|
critical pluralism is associated with agonists such as Connolly and Mouffe and difference democrats such as Young pluralists begin from the variety of ways it is possible to experience the world, but stress that the experiences and perspectives of marginalized groups are likely to be very different from dominant groups They have a strong suspicion ofliberal theory that looks neutral but in supports and serves the powerful. Difference democrats are hostile to consensus because consensus conceals informal oppression deliberation too easily equates the common good with the interests of the more powerful sidelining legitimate concerns of the marginalized. Asking the underprivileged to set aside their particularistic concerns also means marginalizing their favored forms of expression, especially the telling of personal stories Mouffe states: To aim at a universal rational consensus is the real threat to democracy this can lead to violence behind appeals to “rationality But neither Mouffe nor Young want to abolish communication in the name of pluralism and difference Mouffe also cautions against uncritical celebration of difference Mouffe raises the question of the terms in which engagement across difference might proceed it is a matter of being open to conversion due to adoption of a particular kind of democratic attitude that converts antagonism into agonism, fighting into critical engagement enemies into adversaries who are treated with respect For Young, a communicative democracy would be composed of people showing “equal respect,” under “procedural rules of fair discussion and decisionmaking Mouffe and Young neither proposes unregulated pluralism as an alternative to (deliberative) consensus This regulation cannot be just procedural, for that would imply “anything goes” in terms of the substance of positions Agonistic ideals demand judgments about what is worthy of respect and what is not dogmatic assertions of identity that fuel existential resentments would have to be changed to make agonism possible. Young seeks “transformation of private self-regarding desires into public appeals to justice for Mouffe, Connolly, and Young alike, regulative principles for democratic communication are not just attitudinal or procedural; they also refer to the substance of the kinds of claims that are worthy of respect These authors are suspicious of consensus But in retreating from “anything goes” relativism, they need principles to regulate the substance of what rightfully belongs in democratic debate.
|
agonists are hostile to consensus consensus can lead to violence behind rationality But neither want to abolish communication in the name of difference Mouffe raises the question of the terms in which engagement across difference might proceed it is a matter of being open to conversion due to a democratic attitude that converts antagonism into agonism a communicative democracy would be composed of people showing respect,” under “procedural rules of fair discussion and decisionmaking neither proposes unregulated pluralism as an alternative to consensus This regulation cannot be just procedural, for that would imply “anything goes” in terms of substance Agonistic ideals demand judgments about what is worthy of respect and what is not authors are suspicious of consensus. But in retreating from “ relativism, they need principles to regulate the substance of what rightfully belongs in democratic debate.
|
A more radical contemporary pluralism is suspicious of liberal and communitarian devices for reconciling difference. Such a critical pluralism is associated with agonists such as Connolly (1991), Honig (1993), and Mouffe (2000), and difference democrats such as Young (2000). As Honig puts it, “Difference is just another word for what used to be called pluralism” (1996, 60). Critical pluralists resemble liberals in that they begin from the variety of ways it is possible to experience the world, but stress that the experiences and perspectives of marginalized and oppressed groups are likely to be very different from dominant groups. They also have a strong suspicion ofliberal theory that looks neutral but in practice supports and serves the powerful. Difference democrats are hostile to consensus, partly because consensus decisionmaking (of the sort popular in 1970s radical groups) conceals informal oppression under the guise of concern for all by disallowing dissent (Zablocki 1980). But the real target is political theory that deploys consensus, especially deliberative and liberal theory. Young (1996, 125–26) argues that the appeals to unity and the common good that deliberative theorists under sway of the consensus ideal stress as the proper forms of political communication can often be oppressive. For deliberation so oriented all too easily equates the common good with the interests of the more powerful, thus sidelining legitimate concerns of the marginalized. Asking the underprivileged to set aside their particularistic concerns also means marginalizing their favored forms of expression, especially the telling of personal stories (Young 1996, 126).3 Speaking for an agonistic conception of democracy (to which Young also subscribes; 2000, 49–51), Mouffe states: To negate the ineradicable character of antagonism and aim at a universal rational consensus— that is the real threat to democracy. Indeed, this can lead to violence being unrecognized and hidden behind appeals to “rationality,” as is often the case in liberal thinking. (1996, 248) Mouffe is a radical pluralist: “By pluralism I mean the end of a substantive idea of the good life” (1996, 246). But neither Mouffe nor Young want to abolish communication in the name of pluralism and difference; much of their work advocates sustained attention to communication. Mouffe also cautions against uncritical celebration of difference, for some differences imply “subordination and should therefore be challenged by a radical democratic politics” (1996, 247). Mouffe raises the question of the terms in which engagement across difference might proceed. Participants should ideally accept that the positions of others are legitimate, though not as a result of being persuaded in argument. Instead, it is a matter of being open to conversion due to adoption of a particular kind of democratic attitude that converts antagonism into agonism, fighting into critical engagement, enemies into adversaries who are treated with respect. Respect here is notjust (liberal) toleration, but positive validation of the position of others. For Young, a communicative democracy would be composed of people showing “equal respect,” under “procedural rules of fair discussion and decisionmaking” (1996, 126). Schlosberg speaks of “agonistic respect” as “a critical pluralist ethos” (1999, 70). Mouffe and Young both want pluralism to be regulated by a particular kind of attitude, be it respectful, agonistic, or even in Young’s (2000, 16–51) case reasonable.Thus neither proposes unregulated pluralism as an alternative to (deliberative) consensus. This regulation cannot be just procedural, for that would imply “anything goes” in terms of the substance of positions. Recall thatMouffe rejects differences that imply subordination. Agonistic ideals demand judgments about what is worthy of respect and what is not. Connolly (1991, 211) worriesabout dogmatic assertions and denials of identity that fuel existential resentments that would have to be changed to make agonism possible. Young seeks “transformation of private, self-regarding desires into public appeals to justice” (2000, 51). Thus for Mouffe, Connolly, and Young alike, regulative principles for democratic communication are not just attitudinal or procedural; they also refer to the substance of the kinds of claims that are worthy of respect. These authors would not want to legislate substance and are suspicious of the content of any alleged consensus. But in retreating from “anything goes” relativism, they need principles to regulate the substance of what rightfully belongs in democratic debate.
| 4,637 |
<h4>substantive constraints on the debate are key to actualize effective pluralism and agonistic democracy </h4><p>John<strong> Dryzek 6<u>, Professor of Social and Political Theory, The Australian National University, Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals, American Journal of Political Science,Vol. 50, No. 3, July 2006, Pp. 634–649</p><p></u></strong>A more radical contemporary pluralism is suspicious of liberal and communitarian devices for reconciling difference. Such a <u>critical pluralism is associated with <mark>agonists </mark>such as Connolly</u> (1991), Honig (1993), <u>and Mouffe</u> (2000), <u>and difference democrats such as <strong>Young</u></strong> (2000). As Honig puts it, “Difference is just another word for what used to be called pluralism” (1996, 60). Critical <u>pluralists</u> resemble liberals in that they <u>begin from the variety of ways it is possible to experience the world, but stress that the experiences and perspectives of marginalized</u> and oppressed <u>groups are likely to be very different from dominant groups</u>. <u>They</u> also <u>have a strong suspicion ofliberal theory that <strong>looks neutral </strong>but in</u> practice <u>supports and serves the powerful.</u> <u>Difference democrats <mark>are <strong>hostile to consensus</u></strong></mark>, partly <u>because consensus</u> decisionmaking (of the sort popular in 1970s radical groups) <u>conceals informal oppression</u> under the guise of concern for all by disallowing dissent (Zablocki 1980). But the real target is political theory that deploys consensus, especially deliberative and liberal theory. Young (1996, 125–26) argues that the appeals to unity and the common good that deliberative theorists under sway of the consensus ideal stress as the proper forms of political communication can often be oppressive. For <u>deliberation</u> so oriented all <u>too easily equates the common good with the interests of the more powerful</u>, thus <u>sidelining legitimate concerns of the marginalized. Asking the underprivileged to set aside their particularistic concerns also means marginalizing their favored forms of expression, especially the telling of personal stories</u> (Young 1996, 126).3 Speaking for an agonistic conception of democracy (to which Young also subscribes; 2000, 49–51), <u>Mouffe states:</u> <u>To</u> negate the ineradicable character of antagonism and <u>aim at a universal rational <mark>consensus</u></mark>— that <u>is the real threat to democracy</u>. Indeed, <u>this <mark>can lead to violence</u></mark> being unrecognized and hidden <u><mark>behind</mark> appeals to “<strong><mark>rationality</u></strong></mark>,” as is often the case in liberal thinking. (1996, 248) Mouffe is a radical pluralist: “By pluralism I mean the end of a substantive idea of the good life” (1996, 246). <u><mark>But neither </mark>Mouffe nor Young <mark>want to <strong>abolish communication</strong> in the name of</mark> pluralism and <mark>difference</u></mark>; much of their work advocates sustained attention to communication. <u>Mouffe also cautions against uncritical celebration of difference</u>, for some differences imply “subordination and should therefore be challenged by a radical democratic politics” (1996, 247). <u><mark>Mouffe</mark> <mark>raises the question of the <strong>terms in which engagement across difference might proceed</u></strong></mark>. Participants should ideally accept that the positions of others are legitimate, though not as a result of being persuaded in argument. Instead, <u><mark>it is a matter of being <strong>open to conversion</strong> due to</mark> adoption of <mark>a</mark> particular kind of <strong><mark>democratic attitude</strong> that</mark> <mark>converts antagonism into agonism</mark>, fighting into critical engagement</u>, <u>enemies into adversaries who are treated with respect</u>. Respect here is notjust (liberal) toleration, but positive validation of the position of others. <u>For Young, <mark>a communicative democracy would</mark> <mark>be composed of people showing </mark>“equal <mark>respect,” under <strong>“procedural rules of fair discussion and decisionmaking</u></strong></mark>” (1996, 126). Schlosberg speaks of “agonistic respect” as “a critical pluralist ethos” (1999, 70). <u>Mouffe and Young</u> both want pluralism to be regulated by a particular kind of attitude, be it respectful, agonistic, or even in Young’s (2000, 16–51) case reasonable.Thus <u><strong><mark>neither proposes unregulated pluralism as</mark> <mark>an alternative to</mark> (deliberative) <mark>consensus</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>This regulation cannot be just procedural, for that would imply “anything goes” in terms of </mark>the <mark>substance </mark>of positions</u></strong>. Recall thatMouffe rejects differences that imply subordination. <u><mark>Agonistic ideals demand judgments about what is worthy of respect and what is not</u></mark>. Connolly (1991, 211) worriesabout <u><strong>dogmatic assertions</u></strong> and denials <u><strong>of identity that fuel existential resentments </u></strong>that <u><strong>would have to be changed to make agonism possible</strong>. Young seeks “transformation of private</u>, <u>self-regarding desires into public appeals to justice</u>” (2000, 51). Thus <u>for Mouffe, Connolly, and Young alike, <strong>regulative principles for democratic communication are not just attitudinal or procedural; they also refer to the substance of the kinds of claims that are worthy of respect</u></strong>. <u>These <mark>authors</u></mark> would not want to legislate substance and <u><mark>are</mark> <mark>suspicious of</u></mark> the content of any alleged <u><mark>consensus</u>. <u>But in retreating from “</mark>anything goes” <mark>relativism, <strong>they need principles to regulate the substance of what rightfully belongs in democratic debate.</mark> </p></u></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 54,851 | 155 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,510 |
Flexible interpretation solves and will be accepted- not perceived as abrogation
|
Huffington Post 10/14
|
Huffington Post 10/14/2014 (State Department Official Calls For 'Flexibility' On Drug Control Treaties, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/14/state-department-official_0_n_5985930.html)
|
A high-ranking State Department official called for "flexible" interpretations of international drug control treaties citing marijuana legalization in Colorado and Washington. the official U.S. diplomatic stance is clearly shifting toward the position that the drug control treaties don't need to be interpreted strictly. To have the United States government emerging as a defender and even champion of flexibility in interpreting the conventions represents a major step forward What's remarkable is the extent to which a popular vote in Colorado and Washington precipitated a shift in national posture with U.S. diplomats embracing "flexibility," "the U.S. has handed off the reins to the Russians as the leading global drug war proponent Putin has taken a stern anti-drug position at odds with the rest of the world Drug reformers want more room to experiment and see a prime opportunity at the 2016 U.N. General Assembly special session
|
flexible" interpretations of international drug control treaties citing marijuana legalization in Colorado and Washington the official U.S. diplomatic stance is clearly shifting toward the position that the drug control treaties don't need to be interpreted strictl emerging as a defender and even champion of flexibility in interpreting the conventions, that represents a major step forward What's remarkable is the extent to which a popular vote in Colorado and Washington in 2012 precipitated a shift i national posture Drug reformers wan more room to experiment and see a prime opportunity at the the 2016 U.N. General Assembly special session
|
A high-ranking State Department official called for "flexible" interpretations of international drug control treaties at the United Nations in New York City last week, citing marijuana legalization in Colorado and Washington. Assistant Secretary of State William Brownfield's Oct. 9 remarks were the third time this year he has made such a call. And the high-profile venue underscores the pressure that state legalization efforts have put on the U.S. to allow other countries to amend strict, decades-old international drug control treaties. Brownfield said one pillar of the new U.S. approach on drug policy is to "accept flexible interpretation" of U.N. drug treaties. "How could I, a representative of the government of the United States of America, be intolerant of a government that permits any experimentation with legalization of marijuana if two of the 50 states of the United States of America have chosen to walk down that road?" said Brownfield. Between Brownfield's remarks last week and two similar speeches in March, the official U.S. diplomatic stance is clearly shifting toward the position that the drug control treaties don't need to be interpreted strictly. "To now have the United States government emerging as a defender and even champion of flexibility in interpreting the conventions, that represents a major step forward," said Ethan Nadelmann, executive director of the Drug Policy Alliance. For decades the U.S. sought to impose stern prohibitionist policies not just on itself but on any country daring to take a new tack on drugs. The U.S. backed a harsh 1988 U.N. treaty, poured billions into counter-narcotics operations in Latin America and Asia, and opposed even modest efforts like decriminalizing the traditional consumption of the coca leaf in Bolivia. As recently as March 2012, the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala rebuked President Otto Perez Molina for proposing drug legalization. But then came the two successful marijuana legalization ballot initiatives in November 2012, which opened the United States to charges of hypocrisy. "What's remarkable is the extent to which a popular vote in Colorado and Washington in 2012 precipitated a shift in the Obama administration and the Justice Department's national posture, and that in turn precipitated a shift in the U.S. international posture," said Nadelmann. When Uruguay legalized marijuana sales in 2013, U.S. diplomats didn't raise public objections. The latest Obama administration budget still makes a large request -- $1.4 billion -- for drug control efforts abroad. But with U.S. diplomats embracing "flexibility," "the U.S. has handed off the reins to the Russians as the leading global drug war proponent," said Nadelmann. Under President Vladimir Putin, that country has taken a stern anti-drug position at odds with the rest of the world and funded counter-narcotics operations in places like Nicaragua. Drug reformers want to amend existing U.N. treaties to allow countries more room to experiment with strategies like decriminalizing so-called hard drugs, and see a prime opportunity at the the 2016 U.N. General Assembly special session on drugs.
| 3,142 |
<h4>Flexible interpretation solves and will be accepted- not perceived as abrogation</h4><p><strong>Huffington Post 10/14</strong>/2014 (State Department Official Calls For 'Flexibility' On Drug Control Treaties, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/14/state-department-official_0_n_5985930.html)</p><p><u>A high-ranking State Department official called for "<mark>flexible" interpretations of international drug control treaties</u></mark> at the United Nations in New York City last week, <u><mark>citing marijuana legalization in Colorado and Washington</mark>. </u>Assistant Secretary of State William Brownfield's Oct. 9 remarks were the third time this year he has made such a call. And the high-profile venue underscores the pressure that state legalization efforts have put on the U.S. to allow other countries to amend strict, decades-old international drug control treaties. Brownfield said one pillar of the new U.S. approach on drug policy is to "accept flexible interpretation" of U.N. drug treaties. "How could I, a representative of the government of the United States of America, be intolerant of a government that permits any experimentation with legalization of marijuana if two of the 50 states of the United States of America have chosen to walk down that road?" said Brownfield. Between Brownfield's remarks last week and two similar speeches in March, <u><mark>the official U.S. <strong>diplomatic stance is clearly shifting</strong> toward the position that the drug control treaties don't need to be interpreted strictl</mark>y. </u>"<u>To</u> now <u>have the United States government</u> <u><mark>emerging as a defender and even champion of flexibility in interpreting the conventions</u>, that <u><strong>represents a major step forward</u></strong></mark>," said Ethan Nadelmann, executive director of the Drug Policy Alliance. For decades the U.S. sought to impose stern prohibitionist policies not just on itself but on any country daring to take a new tack on drugs. The U.S. backed a harsh 1988 U.N. treaty, poured billions into counter-narcotics operations in Latin America and Asia, and opposed even modest efforts like decriminalizing the traditional consumption of the coca leaf in Bolivia. As recently as March 2012, the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala rebuked President Otto Perez Molina for proposing drug legalization. But then came the two successful marijuana legalization ballot initiatives in November 2012, which opened the United States to charges of hypocrisy. "<u><mark>What's remarkable is the extent to which a popular vote in Colorado and Washington</u> in 2012 <u><strong>precipitated a shift i</mark>n</u></strong> the Obama administration and the Justice Department's <u><strong><mark>national posture</u></strong></mark>, and that in turn precipitated a shift in the U.S. international posture," said Nadelmann. When Uruguay legalized marijuana sales in 2013, U.S. diplomats didn't raise public objections. The latest Obama administration budget still makes a large request -- $1.4 billion -- for drug control efforts abroad. But <u>with U.S. diplomats embracing "flexibility," "the U.S. has handed off the reins to the Russians as the leading global drug war proponent</u>," said Nadelmann. Under President Vladimir <u>Putin</u>, that country <u>has taken a stern anti-drug position at odds with the rest of the world</u> and funded counter-narcotics operations in places like Nicaragua. <u><mark>Drug reformers wan</mark>t</u> to amend existing U.N. treaties to allow countries <u><mark>more room to experiment</u></mark> with strategies like decriminalizing so-called hard drugs, <u><mark>and see a prime opportunity at the</u> the <u>2016 U.N. General Assembly special session</u></mark> on drugs.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
a1
| 430,972 | 2 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,511 |
Their evidence is out of date media hype – recent trends prove drug war is declining, there’s no impact, and Nieto’s reforms solve—no mexico failed state
|
Barone 14
|
Barone 14 (http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20140103/OPINION01/301030002/1008/OPINION01/Mexico-has-an-efficient-reformer? Michael Barone writes for the Washington Examiner. 1/3/14 Mexico has an efficient reformer)//trepka
|
Most Americans have an image of Mexico as a nation convulsed by violent drug wars and sending hundreds of thousands of desperate immigrants across our southern border.¶ That image is out-of-date. The drug war has largely quieted down and scarcely affects most of the country while net migration from Mexico to the U St has fallen to zero What has been happening in Mexico recently is the culmination of reforms that have been in train for the last 25 years.¶ In July 2012 PRI returned to power with Nieto Peña has proved to be an effective reformer he produced tripartisan reforms.¶
|
Most Americans have an image of Mexico convulsed by violent drug wars That is out-of-date The drug war has quieted down and scarcely affects most of the country net migration has fallen to zero What has been happening recently is the culmination of reforms Nieto produced
|
Most Americans have an image of Mexico as a nation convulsed by violent drug wars and sending hundreds of thousands of desperate immigrants across our southern border.¶ That image is out-of-date. The drug war has largely quieted down and scarcely affects most of the country while, according to the Pew Hispanic Center, net migration from Mexico to the United States since 2007 has fallen to zero.¶ What has been happening in Mexico recently is far more encouraging: the culmination of reforms that have been in train, but have been frustratingly delayed, for the last 25 years.¶ Some historical background is in order. For 71 years, Mexican politics and government was totally dominated by the paradoxically named Party of the Institutional Revolution, which held the presidency and virtually all governorships from 1929 to 2000.¶ Under the PRI system, presidents served one six-year term, and in their last year — usually a time of catastrophes — chose their successors, who paraded around the country and were elected without difficulty.¶ Once in office, the new president blamed all his problems on his predecessor, who often left the country. This system suited the sensibility of a nation whose culture is still at least partly Aztec: It combined elements of calendrical regularity, elaborate ceremony and human sacrifice.¶ This system worked tolerably well for 30-some years. But as time went on, it produced widespread corruption, periodic currency devaluations and massive out-migration. Mexico seemed to be falling further behind the U.S.¶ Reform began when the Machiavellian President Carlos Salinas, elected in 1988, started opening up its political process and was joined by Texans George H. W. Bush and Lloyd Bentsen in pushing successfully for the North American Free Trade Agreement. With support from Bill Clinton, Congress approved NAFTA in 1993.¶ Mexico reformed its electoral process in the 1990s, with key verification from exit poll pioneer Warren Mitofsky. PRI lost its congressional majorities in 1997, and in 2000, Vicente Fox of the center-right PAN party was elected president over the candidates of the PRI and the leftist PRD. In 2006, Fox was succeeded by the PAN’s Felipe Calderon.¶ But Fox and Calderon were unable to reform Mexico’s government-owned oil company Pemex or its dysfunctional union-dominated education system because of united congressional opposition by the PRI and PRD.¶ And they got sidetracked on other issues — Fox in responding to Zapatista protests, Calderon in waging war (with the army) on the drug lords.¶ In July 2012, Mexicans PRI returned to power with the election of Enrique Peña Nieto. He looked like a conventional politician: governor of the state that includes most Mexico City suburbs, movie star handsomely, a widower who was wooing a telenovela star.¶ But Peña has proved to be an effective reformer. On taking office, he joined with the PAN and PRD in a Pact for Mexico that produced tripartisan reforms.¶
| 2,974 |
<h4>Their evidence is <u>out of date</u> <u>media hype</u> – recent trends prove drug war is declining, there’s no impact, and Nieto’s reforms solve—no mexico failed state</h4><p><strong>Barone 14 </strong>(http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20140103/OPINION01/301030002/1008/OPINION01/Mexico-has-an-efficient-reformer? Michael Barone writes for the Washington Examiner. 1/3/14 Mexico has an efficient reformer)//trepka</p><p><u><mark>Most Americans have an image of Mexico </mark>as a nation <mark>convulsed by violent drug wars</mark> and sending hundreds of thousands of desperate immigrants across our southern border.¶</u> <u><mark>That</mark> image <mark>is <strong>out-of-date</mark>.</u></strong> <u><mark>The drug war has </mark>largely <strong><mark>quieted down</strong></mark> <mark>and <strong>scarcely affects </strong>most of the country </mark>while</u>, according to the Pew Hispanic Center, <u><mark>net migration</mark> from Mexico to the U</u>nited <u>St</u>ates since 2007 <u><mark>has fallen to <strong>zero</u></strong></mark>.¶ <u><mark>What has been happening </mark>in Mexico <mark>recently is</mark> </u>far more encouraging: <u><mark>the culmination of reforms</mark> that have been in train</u>, but have been frustratingly delayed, <u>for the last 25 years.¶</u> Some historical background is in order. For 71 years, Mexican politics and government was totally dominated by the paradoxically named Party of the Institutional Revolution, which held the presidency and virtually all governorships from 1929 to 2000.¶ Under the PRI system, presidents served one six-year term, and in their last year — usually a time of catastrophes — chose their successors, who paraded around the country and were elected without difficulty.¶ Once in office, the new president blamed all his problems on his predecessor, who often left the country. This system suited the sensibility of a nation whose culture is still at least partly Aztec: It combined elements of calendrical regularity, elaborate ceremony and human sacrifice.¶ This system worked tolerably well for 30-some years. But as time went on, it produced widespread corruption, periodic currency devaluations and massive out-migration. Mexico seemed to be falling further behind the U.S.¶ Reform began when the Machiavellian President Carlos Salinas, elected in 1988, started opening up its political process and was joined by Texans George H. W. Bush and Lloyd Bentsen in pushing successfully for the North American Free Trade Agreement. With support from Bill Clinton, Congress approved NAFTA in 1993.¶ Mexico reformed its electoral process in the 1990s, with key verification from exit poll pioneer Warren Mitofsky. PRI lost its congressional majorities in 1997, and in 2000, Vicente Fox of the center-right PAN party was elected president over the candidates of the PRI and the leftist PRD. In 2006, Fox was succeeded by the PAN’s Felipe Calderon.¶ But Fox and Calderon were unable to reform Mexico’s government-owned oil company Pemex or its dysfunctional union-dominated education system because of united congressional opposition by the PRI and PRD.¶ And they got sidetracked on other issues — Fox in responding to Zapatista protests, Calderon in waging war (with the army) on the drug lords.¶ <u>In July 2012</u>, Mexicans <u>PRI returned to power with</u> the election of Enrique Peña <u><mark>Nieto</u></mark>. He looked like a conventional politician: governor of the state that includes most Mexico City suburbs, movie star handsomely, a widower who was wooing a telenovela star.¶ But <u>Peña has proved to be an effective reformer</u>. On taking office, <u>he</u> joined with the PAN and PRD in a Pact for Mexico that <u><mark>produced </mark>tripartisan reforms.¶ </p></u>
|
1nc
| null |
cartels
| 431,063 | 1 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,512 |
Plan costs an extraordinary amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities
|
Downs 12
|
Downs 12 David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/
|
As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
|
As much as he may want to reform drug laws , Obama is hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those laws the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities
|
Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws since their inception (see discussion above). Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law through legislative channels; and other issues, such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
| 563 |
<h4><strong>Plan costs an <u>extraordinary</u> amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities</h4><p>Downs 12 <u></strong>David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/</p><p></u>Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. <u><mark>As much as he may want to reform drug laws </mark>on a personal level<mark>, Obama is</mark> nonetheless <mark>hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those</mark> same <mark>laws</u></mark> since their inception (see discussion above). <u>Given this history, <mark>the president would <strong>risk an extraordinary level of political capital</u></strong> <u>on any</mark> proposed <mark>easing of federal law</u></mark> through legislative channels; <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><mark>other issues,</u></mark> such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to <u><mark>rank higher on his list of</u></mark> <u><mark>legislative</mark> <mark>priorities</mark>.</p></u>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 305,170 | 62 | 17,112 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| 565,260 |
N
|
Wake
|
2
|
Cornell Deng-Zhang
|
Stone
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaty DA
T-legalize
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,513 |
PC’s key- overcomes GOP opposition
|
National Journal 11/8
|
National Journal 11/8/2014 (In Loretta Lynch, Obama Hopes to Find a Less Polarizing Attorney General, http://www.nationaljournal.com/white-house/obama-to-reportedly-nominate-loretta-lynch-to-replace-eric-holder-as-attorney-general-20141107)
|
In Lynch, Obama may hope to find a less polarizing figure Obama's appointment of Lynch will pass to the incoming Republican Congress, which could potentially derail the nomination it is unclear how Republicans will view Lynch's nomination Her nomination could give the administration a chance to reset its relationship with some Capitol Hill Republicans.
|
incoming Republican Congress, which could potentially derail the nomination it is unclear how Republicans will view Lynch's nominatio Her nomination could give the Obama administration a chance to reset its relationship with some Capitol Hill Republican
|
In Lynch, Obama may hope to find a less polarizing figure. On Saturday, the president was quick to note that during her tenure as a U.S. attorney, Lynch has brought charges against public officials "in both parties." That comment may have been a subtle rebuke of Republicans' criticism of the Justice Department under Holder, who has suffered blows from the Right over Operation Fast and Furious and an Internal Revenue Service scandal. She has served under Obama and President Clinton, and won a high-profile case in 2000 against New York police officers who viciously assaulted immigrant Abner Louima. "It's pretty hard to be more qualified for this job than Loretta," Obama said. "Loretta doesn't look to make headlines. She looks to make a difference." Obama's appointment of Lynch adds another item to an already packed lame-duck session. If the confirmation gets sidelined in the current Congress, it will pass to the incoming Republican Congress, which could potentially derail the nomination. At least one lawmaker says that leaving the decision up to the next Congress is the right way to go. "Democrat senators who just lost their seats shouldn't confirm new attorney general," Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, tweeted on Friday. "Should be vetted by new Congress." In the announcement on Saturday, Obama called on the Senate to confirm Lynch "without delay," but it is unclear how Republicans will view Lynch's nomination. In 2010, Lynch was easily confirmed to her current post on a voice vote. Her nomination could give the Obama administration a chance to reset its relationship with some Capitol Hill Republicans. "The DOJ is the only Cabinet department named for an ideal. And this is actually appropriate, because our work is both aspirational and grounded in gritty reality," Lynch said. "I will wake up every morning with the protection of the American people my first thought." "I have had the good fortune of working closely with Loretta on a range of important issues over the years," Holder said in a statement on Saturday. "I am confident that Loretta will lead the Department of Justice with integrity, honor, and distinction. I congratulate her, once again, on her appointment. And I wish her the best of luck."
| 2,228 |
<h4>PC’s key- overcomes GOP opposition</h4><p><strong>National Journal 11/8</strong>/2014 (In Loretta Lynch, Obama Hopes to Find a Less Polarizing Attorney General, http://www.nationaljournal.com/white-house/obama-to-reportedly-nominate-loretta-lynch-to-replace-eric-holder-as-attorney-general-20141107)</p><p><u>In Lynch, Obama may hope to find a less polarizing figure</u>. On Saturday, the president was quick to note that during her tenure as a U.S. attorney, Lynch has brought charges against public officials "in both parties." That comment may have been a subtle rebuke of Republicans' criticism of the Justice Department under Holder, who has suffered blows from the Right over Operation Fast and Furious and an Internal Revenue Service scandal. She has served under Obama and President Clinton, and won a high-profile case in 2000 against New York police officers who viciously assaulted immigrant Abner Louima. "It's pretty hard to be more qualified for this job than Loretta," Obama said. "Loretta doesn't look to make headlines. She looks to make a difference." <u>Obama's appointment of Lynch</u> adds another item to an already packed lame-duck session. If the confirmation gets sidelined in the current Congress, it <u>will pass to the <mark>incoming Republican Congress, which could potentially derail the nomination</u></mark>. At least one lawmaker says that leaving the decision up to the next Congress is the right way to go. "Democrat senators who just lost their seats shouldn't confirm new attorney general," Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, tweeted on Friday. "Should be vetted by new Congress." In the announcement on Saturday, Obama called on the Senate to confirm Lynch "without delay," but <u><mark>it is unclear how Republicans will view Lynch's nominatio</mark>n</u>. In 2010, Lynch was easily confirmed to her current post on a voice vote. <u><strong><mark>Her nomination could give the</u></strong> Obama <u><strong>administration a chance to reset its relationship with some Capitol Hill Republican</mark>s.</u></strong> "The DOJ is the only Cabinet department named for an ideal. And this is actually appropriate, because our work is both aspirational and grounded in gritty reality," Lynch said. "I will wake up every morning with the protection of the American people my first thought." "I have had the good fortune of working closely with Loretta on a range of important issues over the years," Holder said in a statement on Saturday. "I am confident that Loretta will lead the Department of Justice with integrity, honor, and distinction. I congratulate her, once again, on her appointment. And I wish her the best of luck."</p>
| null |
1nc
| null | 431,053 | 4 | 17,110 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| 565,262 |
N
|
Wake
|
5
|
NYU Itliong-Zhan
|
McCleary
|
Fed CP (2NR)
AG Politics (2NR
Cede the Political DA
T - USFG
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,514 |
The United States should issue a narrow ruling applying strict scrutiny to overrule current restrictions on stem cell research on the grounds that the United States Constitution guarantees the fundamental right to safe and effective medical treatment to protect life. The United States should not remove current bans on the sales of human organs.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States should issue a narrow ruling applying strict scrutiny to overrule current restrictions on stem cell research on the grounds that the United States Constitution guarantees the fundamental right to safe and effective medical treatment to protect life. The United States should not remove current bans on the sales of human organs.</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 431,064 | 1 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,515 |
The impact outweighs—deliberative debate models impart skills vital to respond to existential threats
|
Lundberg 10
|
Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p. 311
|
the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech debate builds capacity for critical thinking analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid change and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy place such a high premium on education Debate builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them to sort through and evaluate evidence for merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.
The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy one of the primary failings of universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment This is a problem for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediated information environment
it did not matter which topic students had been assigned
Larkin's study substantiates Pack's claim that debate in college plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.
the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice as enhancing democratic deliberative capacities The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.
Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including issues of class, gender, and racial justice wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with existential challenges
|
the democratic capacities built by debate are critical thinking analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and public judgment. If the political life that underwrites critique of debate is a pessimistic view of bureaucratic and insular politics, it is a puzzling solution to warrant giving up on debate citizenry's capacities can change, which is the reasons theorists high premium on education Debate builds skills that allow research about decisions that impact them, to evaluate evidence for arguments in an increasingly information-rich environment and to prioritize their political energies
failings of universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex environment
it did not matter which topic students had been assigned
Larkin's study substantiates Pack's claim that debate plays a critical role in problem-solving skills
the evidence warrants strong support for debate as enhancing democratic deliberative capacities The combination of critical thinking info processing and capacities for thoughtful, open engagement argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich democratic life. and unmatched for creating self-critical students open to meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.
the more that can engage the process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that necessary if democracy is to thrive. Democracy faces challenges, including class, gender, and racial justice environmental destruction climate intervention and conflict More than any specific proposal citizenry that deliberates with greater skill provides the best hopes for existential challenges
|
The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.
The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediated information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:
To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)
Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.
There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.
Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.
| 6,396 |
<h4>The impact outweighs—deliberative debate models impart skills vital to respond to existential threats</h4><p>Christian O. <strong>Lundberg 10 </strong>Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p. 311</p><p>The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But <u><mark>the democratic capacities built by debate are</mark> not limited to speech</u>—as indicated earlier, <u>debate builds capacity for <mark>critical thinking</u></mark>, <u><mark>analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and </mark>better <strong><mark>public judgment</strong>. If the </mark>picture of modem <mark>political life that underwrites</mark> this <mark>critique of debate is a pessimistic view of</mark> increasingly labyrinthine and <mark>bureaucratic</mark> administrative politics, rapid</u> scientific and technological <u>change</u> outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, <u><mark>and</mark> ever-expanding <mark>insular</mark> special-interest- and money-driven <mark>politics, it is a puzzling solution</mark>, at best, <mark>to </mark>argue that these conditions <mark>warrant giving up</mark> <mark>on debate</u></mark>. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because <u>as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the <mark>citizenry's <strong>capacities can change</strong>, which is </mark>one of <mark>the</mark> primary <mark>reasons</mark> that <mark>theorists</mark> of democracy</u> such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems <u>place such a <mark>high premium on education</u></mark> (Dewey 1988,63, 154). <u><mark>Debate</u></mark> provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it <u><mark>builds </mark>precisely the <mark>skills that allow</mark> the citizenry to <mark>research</mark> and be informed <mark>about</mark> policy <mark>decisions that impact them</u>, <u>to</mark> sort through</u> <u>and <mark>evaluate</u></mark> the <u><mark>evidence for</u></mark> and relative <u>merits of <mark>arguments</mark> for and against a policy <mark>in an increasingly information-rich environment</mark>, <mark>and to prioritize their</mark> time and <mark>political energies</mark> toward policies that matter the most to them.</p><p>The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy</u>. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that <u>one of the primary <mark>failings of</u></mark> modern colleges and <u><mark>universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment</u>. <u>This is a problem for</u></mark> the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for <u><mark>the future of a</mark> <mark>citizenry that will need to make <strong>evaluative choices</strong> against an increasingly complex</mark> and multimediated information <mark>environment</u></mark> (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:</p><p>To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that <u><strong><mark>it did not matter which topic students had been assigned</u></strong></mark> . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)</p><p><u><mark>Larkin's study substantiates</u> </mark>Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn <u><mark>Pack's</u> </mark>(1992, 3) <u><mark>claim that debate </mark>in </u>the<u> college </u>classroom<u> <mark>plays a critical role in </mark>fostering the kind of <mark>problem-solving skills </mark>demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.</p><p></u>There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, <u><mark>the evidence </mark>presented here <mark>warrants strong support for </mark>expanding <mark>debate </mark>practice</u> in the classroom <u><mark>as</u></mark> a technology for<u><mark> enhancing democratic deliberative capacities</u></mark>. <u><mark>The</mark> unique <mark>combination of critical thinking</mark> skills, research and <mark>info</mark>rmation <mark>processing</mark> skills, oral communication skills, <mark>and capacities for </mark>listening and <mark>thoughtful, open engagement</mark> with hotly contested issues <mark>argues for</mark> <mark>debate as a crucial component of a rich</mark> and vital <mark>democratic life</u>. </mark>In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, <u><mark>and </mark>serves as an <mark>unmatched </mark>practice <mark>for creating</mark> thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and <mark>self-critical students</mark> who are <mark>open to</mark> the possibilities of <mark>meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.</p><p></mark>Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because <mark>the more </mark>we produce citizens <mark>that can</mark> actively and effectively <mark>engage the</mark> political <mark>process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that </mark>are <mark>necessary if democracy is</mark> not only to survive, but <mark>to thrive. Democracy faces</mark> a myriad of <mark>challenges, including</u></mark>: domestic and international <u>issues of <mark>class, gender, and racial justice</u></mark>; <u>wholesale <mark>environmental destruction</mark> and the potential for rapid <mark>climate </mark>change</u>; emerging <u>threats to international stability</u> <u>in the form of terrorism, <mark>intervention and</u></mark> new possibilities for <u>great power <mark>conflict</mark>; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization</u> including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. <u><mark>More than any specific</mark> policy or <mark>proposal</mark>, an informed and active <mark>citizenry that deliberates with greater skill</mark> </u>and sensitivity <u><mark>provides </mark>one of <mark>the best hopes for</mark> responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with </u>the <u><mark>existential challenges</u></mark> to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world. </p>
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1nc
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1
| 54,857 | 497 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
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Texas
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5
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Binghamton Herrera-Smith
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Garrett
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Framework (2NR)
cap good
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,516 |
*there’s no out – 1AC ev is about DECRIM NOT legalization
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their author BT 14
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Martin their author BT 14, coordinated TNI's Drugs & Democracy Programme, David R. Bewley-Taylor, University of Wales Swansea and Tom Blickman, “Cannabis reforms: the scope and limits of treaty latitude”, March, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, Transnational Institute, PDF
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the 1988 Convention. Article 3 repeats the provisions of article 36 of the Single Convention and article 22 of the 1971 Convention Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system, each party shall adopt such measures as may be seen necessary to establish as a criminal offence under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic drugs for personal consumption contrary to the provisions of the Convention a persuasive legal case can be made that article 3 still leaves significant scope for deviation from the punitive approach. “Subject to its constitutional principles and basic concepts of its legal system”, represents a clear “escape clause”. It implies that “any latitude existing under this Convention does not result exclusively from the Convention but also from the constitutional principles of each country”. Therefore, “Parties would not violate the Convention if their domestic courts held criminalization of personal use to be unconstitutional and consequently are not obliged to establish possession for personal use to be a criminal offence the article allows for alternatives to conviction or punishment for offences related to personal use and other offences “of a minor nature a country might rule that, in line with its own circumstances, it is not within the interest of society to prosecute for possession or cultivation for personal use These justifications have been argued and accepted respectively in the Netherlands, Alaska and Germany with regard to possession of cannabis for personal use The existence of an escape clause of this nature, based on constitutional principles as well as basic concepts of national legal systems, is relatively rare in international law It has been utilized by a range of authorities to create more policy flexibility while remaining within the confines of the treaty framework. Thus, despite widespread acceptance of the 1988 Convention, significant room for maneuver in relation to cannabis decriminalization has been retained since its enactment
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Parties would not violate the Convention if their domestic courts held criminalization to be unconstitutional and consequently are not obliged to establish possession to be criminal despite widespread acceptance of the Convention, significant room for maneuver in relation to cannabis decriminalization has been retained
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Circumstances became more complex with the introduction of the 1988 Convention. Article 3 repeats in slightly broader language the provisions of article 36 of the Single Convention and article 22 of the 1971 Convention. ¶ Paragraph 2 of article 3 adds: Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system, each party shall adopt such measures as may be seen necessary to establish as a criminal offence under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances for personal consumption contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended or the 1971 Convention.¶ Even though the language is more restrictive and might be regarded as reducing the flexibility of the earlier treaties, a persuasive legal case can be made that article 3, paragraph 2 still leaves significant scope for deviation from the punitive approach. “Subject to its constitutional principles and basic concepts of its legal system”, represents a clear “escape clause”. It implies that “any latitude existing under this Convention does not result exclusively from the Convention but also from the constitutional and other legal principles of each country”. Therefore, “Parties would not violate the Convention if their domestic courts held criminalization of personal use to be unconstitutional”,11 and consequently are not obliged to establish possession for personal use to be a criminal offence. A strong case can also be made that a party need not make cultivation for personal use a criminal offense either.12 Further, the article allows for alternatives to conviction or punishment for offences related to personal use and other offences “of a minor nature”, albeit restricting and strongly discouraging national discretionary powers related to illicit trafficking offences of a more serious nature.13¶ As a result, a country might rule that, in line with its own national circumstances, it is not within the interest of society to prosecute for possession or cultivation for personal use; that the right to privacy overrules state intervention regarding what people consume or possess in their private homes; or that self-destructive behaviour, be it consumption of potentially harmful substances or other behaviour including suicide, shall not be subject to punishment. These justifications have been argued and accepted respectively in the Netherlands, Alaska and Germany with regard to possession of cannabis for personal use. More recently, in Argentina the Supreme Court ruled that the section of the 1989 drug law criminalizing drug possession was unconstitutional.14 The existence of an escape clause of this nature, based on constitutional principles as well as basic concepts of national legal systems, is relatively rare in international law.15 It has been utilized by a range of authorities to create more policy flexibility while remaining within the confines of the treaty framework.16 Thus, despite widespread acceptance of the 1988 Convention, significant room for maneuver in relation to cannabis decriminalization has been retained since its enactment in 1990.
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<h4>*there’s no out – 1AC ev is about DECRIM NOT legalization</h4><p>Martin <strong>their author</strong> <strong>BT 14</strong>, coordinated TNI's Drugs & Democracy Programme, David R. Bewley-Taylor, University of Wales Swansea and Tom Blickman, “Cannabis reforms: the scope and limits of treaty latitude”, March, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, Transnational Institute, PDF</p><p>Circumstances became more complex with the introduction of <u><strong>the 1988 Convention. Article 3 repeats</u></strong> in slightly broader language <u><strong>the provisions of article 36 of the Single Convention and article 22 of the 1971 Convention</u></strong>. ¶ Paragraph 2 of article 3 adds: <u><strong>Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system, each party shall adopt such measures as may be seen necessary to establish as a criminal offence under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic drugs</u></strong> or psychotropic substances <u><strong>for personal consumption contrary to the provisions of the</u></strong> 1961 <u><strong>Convention</u></strong>, the 1961 Convention as amended or the 1971 Convention.¶ Even though the language is more restrictive and might be regarded as reducing the flexibility of the earlier treaties, <u><strong>a persuasive legal case can be made that article 3</u></strong>, paragraph 2 <u><strong>still leaves significant scope for deviation from the punitive approach. “Subject to its constitutional principles and basic concepts of its legal system”, represents a clear “escape clause”. It implies that “any latitude existing under this Convention does not result exclusively from the Convention but also from the constitutional</u></strong> and other legal <u><strong>principles of each country”. Therefore, “<mark>Parties would not violate the Convention if their domestic courts held criminalization</mark> of personal use <mark>to be unconstitutional</u></strong></mark>”,11 <u><strong><mark>and consequently are not obliged to establish possession</mark> for personal use <mark>to be</mark> a <mark>criminal </mark>offence</u></strong>. A strong case can also be made that a party need not make cultivation for personal use a criminal offense either.12 Further, <u><strong>the article allows for alternatives to conviction or punishment for offences related to personal use and other offences “of a minor nature</u></strong>”, albeit restricting and strongly discouraging national discretionary powers related to illicit trafficking offences of a more serious nature.13¶ As a result, <u><strong>a country might rule that, in line with its own</u></strong> national <u><strong>circumstances, it is not within the interest of society to prosecute for possession or cultivation for personal use</u></strong>; that the right to privacy overrules state intervention regarding what people consume or possess in their private homes; or that self-destructive behaviour, be it consumption of potentially harmful substances or other behaviour including suicide, shall not be subject to punishment. <u><strong>These justifications have been argued and accepted respectively in the Netherlands, Alaska and Germany with regard to possession of cannabis for personal use</u></strong>. More recently, in Argentina the Supreme Court ruled that the section of the 1989 drug law criminalizing drug possession was unconstitutional.14 <u><strong>The existence of an escape clause of this nature, based on constitutional principles as well as basic concepts of national legal systems, is relatively rare in international law</u></strong>.15 <u><strong>It has been utilized by a range of authorities to create more policy flexibility while remaining within the confines of the treaty framework.</u></strong>16 <u><strong>Thus, <mark>despite widespread acceptance of the</mark> 1988 <mark>Convention, significant room for maneuver in relation to cannabis decriminalization has been retained</mark> since its enactment</u></strong> in 1990. </p>
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a1
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
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Texas
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2
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Northwestern Esman-McCue
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Moss
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Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ah.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,517 |
No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant
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Mueller 10
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Mueller 10 (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)
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Politicians preach . This was dramatic risk inflation , terrorist groups have exhibited only limited desire and progress armed theft of fissile material is unlikely chase would be immediate terrorists have to transport it over unfamiliar terrain Once outside terrorists would need a well-equipped machine shop and skilled scientists technical requirements verge on the unfeasible Adopting bias in the terrorists’ favor the cumulative odds drop to one in three billion They are unlikely to be sold a bomb The terrorist group might steal a “loose nuke none exist. bombs have devices that destroy the bomb if tampered with. codes are required if a state were to collapse weapons remain under heavy guard al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond the Internet
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Politicians preach This was dramatic risk inflation terrorist groups have exhibited only limited desire and progress armed theft of fissile material is unlikely chase would be immediate terrorists have to transport it over unfamiliar terrain Once outside terrorists would need a well-equipped machine shop and skilled scientists technical requirements verge on the unfeasible Adopting bias in the terrorists’ favor the cumulative odds drop to one in three billion They are unlikely to be sold a bomb The terrorist group might steal a “loose nuke none exist bombs have devices that destroy the bomb if tampered with. codes are required if a state were to collapse weapons remain under heavy guard al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond the Internet.
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Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.
| 18,687 |
<h4>No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant</h4><p><u><strong>Mueller 10</u></strong> (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)</p><p><u><mark>Politicians</mark> </u>of all stripes<u> <mark>preach</mark> </u>to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York<u>. <mark>This</u> <u>was</mark> </u>an early expression of a pattern of<u> <mark>dramatic risk inflation</u></mark> that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions<u>, <mark>terrorist groups</u></mark> seem to <u><mark>have exhibited only limited desire and</mark> </u>even less<u> <mark>progress</mark> </u>in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright <u><mark>armed theft of fissile material is</u></mark> exceedingly<u><mark> unlikely</mark> </u>not only because of the resistance of guards, but because <u><mark>chase would be immediate</u></mark>. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If<u> <mark>terrorists</mark> </u>were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material,<u> </u>they would then probably <u><mark>have to transport it</u></mark> a long distance<u><mark> over unfamiliar terrain</u></mark> and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. <u><mark>Once outside</mark> </u>the country with their precious booty, <u><mark>terrorists would need</mark> </u>to set up<u> <mark>a </u></mark>large and<u><mark> well-equipped machine shop</mark> </u>to manufacture a bomb<u> <mark>and</mark> </u>then to populate it with a very select team of highly<u><mark> skilled scientists</u></mark>, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the <u><mark>technical requirements</u></mark> in several fields <u><mark>verge on the unfeasible</u></mark>. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. <u><mark>Adopting</mark> </u>probability estimates that purposely and heavily<u> <mark>bias </u></mark>the case <u><mark>in the terrorists’ favor</u></mark>—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, <u><mark>the cumulative odds</mark> </u>that they will be able to pull off the deed <u><mark>drop to one in</mark> </u>well over<u> <mark>three billion</u></mark>. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. <u><mark>They are unlikely to be</mark> </u>given or<u> <mark>sold a bomb</u></mark> by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. <u><mark>The terrorist group might</u></mark> also seek to <u><mark>steal</mark> </u>or illicitly purchase<u> <mark>a “loose nuke</u></mark>“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that <u><strong><mark>none exist</strong></mark>. </u>All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished <u><mark>bombs have</mark> </u>been out-fitted with <u><mark>devices that</u></mark> trigger a non-nuclear explosion that <u><mark>destroy</u></mark>s <u><mark>the bomb if </u></mark>it is<u><mark> tampered with.</mark> </u>And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple<u><mark> codes are required</mark> </u>not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge <u><mark>if a </u></mark>nuclear<u><mark> state were to</mark> </u>utterly<u> <mark>collapse</u></mark>; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear<u> <mark>weapons </u></mark>would probably <u><mark>remain under heavy guard</u></mark> by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that <u><mark>al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond</mark> </u>searching<u> <mark>the Internet</u>.</mark> After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
cartels
| 47,970 | 226 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,518 |
PC’s key- overcomes GOP opposition
|
National Journal 11/8
|
National Journal 11/8/2014 (In Loretta Lynch, Obama Hopes to Find a Less Polarizing Attorney General, http://www.nationaljournal.com/white-house/obama-to-reportedly-nominate-loretta-lynch-to-replace-eric-holder-as-attorney-general-20141107)
|
In Lynch, Obama may hope to find a less polarizing figure Obama's appointment of Lynch will pass to the incoming Republican Congress, which could potentially derail the nomination it is unclear how Republicans will view Lynch's nomination Her nomination could give the administration a chance to reset its relationship with some Capitol Hill Republicans.
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incoming Republican Congress, which could potentially derail the nomination it is unclear how Republicans will view Lynch's nominatio Her nomination could give the Obama administration a chance to reset its relationship with some Capitol Hill Republican
|
In Lynch, Obama may hope to find a less polarizing figure. On Saturday, the president was quick to note that during her tenure as a U.S. attorney, Lynch has brought charges against public officials "in both parties." That comment may have been a subtle rebuke of Republicans' criticism of the Justice Department under Holder, who has suffered blows from the Right over Operation Fast and Furious and an Internal Revenue Service scandal. She has served under Obama and President Clinton, and won a high-profile case in 2000 against New York police officers who viciously assaulted immigrant Abner Louima. "It's pretty hard to be more qualified for this job than Loretta," Obama said. "Loretta doesn't look to make headlines. She looks to make a difference." Obama's appointment of Lynch adds another item to an already packed lame-duck session. If the confirmation gets sidelined in the current Congress, it will pass to the incoming Republican Congress, which could potentially derail the nomination. At least one lawmaker says that leaving the decision up to the next Congress is the right way to go. "Democrat senators who just lost their seats shouldn't confirm new attorney general," Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, tweeted on Friday. "Should be vetted by new Congress." In the announcement on Saturday, Obama called on the Senate to confirm Lynch "without delay," but it is unclear how Republicans will view Lynch's nomination. In 2010, Lynch was easily confirmed to her current post on a voice vote. Her nomination could give the Obama administration a chance to reset its relationship with some Capitol Hill Republicans. "The DOJ is the only Cabinet department named for an ideal. And this is actually appropriate, because our work is both aspirational and grounded in gritty reality," Lynch said. "I will wake up every morning with the protection of the American people my first thought." "I have had the good fortune of working closely with Loretta on a range of important issues over the years," Holder said in a statement on Saturday. "I am confident that Loretta will lead the Department of Justice with integrity, honor, and distinction. I congratulate her, once again, on her appointment. And I wish her the best of luck."
| 2,228 |
<h4>PC’s key- overcomes GOP opposition</h4><p><strong>National Journal 11/8</strong>/2014 (In Loretta Lynch, Obama Hopes to Find a Less Polarizing Attorney General, http://www.nationaljournal.com/white-house/obama-to-reportedly-nominate-loretta-lynch-to-replace-eric-holder-as-attorney-general-20141107)</p><p><u>In Lynch, Obama may hope to find a less polarizing figure</u>. On Saturday, the president was quick to note that during her tenure as a U.S. attorney, Lynch has brought charges against public officials "in both parties." That comment may have been a subtle rebuke of Republicans' criticism of the Justice Department under Holder, who has suffered blows from the Right over Operation Fast and Furious and an Internal Revenue Service scandal. She has served under Obama and President Clinton, and won a high-profile case in 2000 against New York police officers who viciously assaulted immigrant Abner Louima. "It's pretty hard to be more qualified for this job than Loretta," Obama said. "Loretta doesn't look to make headlines. She looks to make a difference." <u>Obama's appointment of Lynch</u> adds another item to an already packed lame-duck session. If the confirmation gets sidelined in the current Congress, it <u>will pass to the <mark>incoming Republican Congress, which could potentially derail the nomination</u></mark>. At least one lawmaker says that leaving the decision up to the next Congress is the right way to go. "Democrat senators who just lost their seats shouldn't confirm new attorney general," Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, tweeted on Friday. "Should be vetted by new Congress." In the announcement on Saturday, Obama called on the Senate to confirm Lynch "without delay," but <u><mark>it is unclear how Republicans will view Lynch's nominatio</mark>n</u>. In 2010, Lynch was easily confirmed to her current post on a voice vote. <u><strong><mark>Her nomination could give the</u></strong> Obama <u><strong>administration a chance to reset its relationship with some Capitol Hill Republican</mark>s.</u></strong> "The DOJ is the only Cabinet department named for an ideal. And this is actually appropriate, because our work is both aspirational and grounded in gritty reality," Lynch said. "I will wake up every morning with the protection of the American people my first thought." "I have had the good fortune of working closely with Loretta on a range of important issues over the years," Holder said in a statement on Saturday. "I am confident that Loretta will lead the Department of Justice with integrity, honor, and distinction. I congratulate her, once again, on her appointment. And I wish her the best of luck."</p>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 431,053 | 4 | 17,112 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| 565,260 |
N
|
Wake
|
2
|
Cornell Deng-Zhang
|
Stone
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaty DA
T-legalize
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,519 |
Text: The United States Federal Government should
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Text: The United States Federal Government should</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
3
| 431,065 | 1 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,520 |
Lynch is key to continuing Holder’s civil rights agenda- specifically on sentencing reform and voter suppression
|
AP 11/9
|
AP 11/9/2014 (Loretta Lynch Seen As Strong Civil Rights Defender, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/09/loretta-lynch-seen-as-str_n_6128466.html)
|
Obama's nomination of Lynch seems intended to convey the message that civil rights will remain a principal focus after Holder Lynch has overseen corruption, terrorism and gang cases in her years as a federal prosecutor she has a personal history of involvement in prosecuting police misconduct, that suggests police misconduct will continue to be a priority of the Lynch Justice Department just as they were with Holder She has spent years in the trenches as a prosecutor, aggressively fighting terrorism, financial fraud, cybercrime, all while vigorously defending civil rights there's no doubt that selecting someone with civil rights experience could reaffirm the government's commitment to that cause. That figures to be an especially important signal Lynch would inherit a civil rights probe into the practices of the Ferguson Police Department Those cases are part of a broader civil rights push — including challenging strict state voter identification laws and promoting changes in how federal prosecutors negotiate sentences likely to help shape Holder's legacy Holder's supporters expect Lynch to continue that work
|
Lynch to civil rights will remain a principal focus Lynch has overseen corruption, terrorism and gang cases suggests that police misconduct will continue to be a priority of the Lynch She has spent years as a prosecutor, aggressively fighting terrorism, financial fraud, cybercrime, all while vigorously defending civil rights no doubt that selecting someone with civil rights experience could reaffirm the government's commitment to that cause. That figures to be an especially important signal including challenging strict state voter identification laws and promoting changes in how federal prosecutors negotiate sentences — likely to help shape Holder's legacy
|
Loretta Lynch was a federal prosecutor in New York when she encountered an astonishing case of police brutality: the broomstick sodomy of a Haitian immigrant in a precinct bathroom. The 1997 assault on Abner Louima set off street protests, frayed race relations and led to one of the most important federal civil rights cases of the past two decades — with Lynch a key part of the team that prosecuted officers accused in the beating or of covering it up. President Barack Obama's nomination of Lynch to be attorney general comes as the department she would take over continues to investigate the police shooting of an unarmed black 18-year-old in Ferguson, Missouri and seems partly intended to convey the message that police misconduct and civil rights will remain a principal focus even after the departure of Eric Holder. If confirmed by the Senate, Lynch would be the first black woman in the job and would follow the first black attorney general. Lynch has overseen corruption, terrorism and gang cases in her years as a federal prosecutor. But it's her involvement some 15 years ago in the Louima prosecution that gave her high-profile experience in step with a core priority of the Justice Department. "It is certainly significant that she has a personal history of involvement in prosecuting police misconduct," said Samuel Bagenstos, the former No. 2 official in the department's civil rights division. "Obviously that will be helpful, and probably suggests that police misconduct cases will continue to be a priority of the Lynch Justice Department just as they were with the Holder Justice Department. Lawyers say Obama likely selected Lynch, 55, the current U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York, on the strength of a varied career and stature within the department. "She has spent years in the trenches as a prosecutor, aggressively fighting terrorism, financial fraud, cybercrime, all while vigorously defending civil rights," Obama said in introducing Lynch at the White House ceremony Saturday. He said her prosecution of the officers in the Louima case was "one of her proudest achievements." But there's also no doubt that selecting someone with civil rights experience could reaffirm the government's commitment to that cause. That figures to be an especially important signal to send as community members in Ferguson brace for the real prospect that state and federal investigations into the shooting death of Michael Brown will close without criminal charges, outcomes that could disillusion civil rights activists and community members. Holder has said he expects the federal investigation to conclude before he resigns, but Lynch still would inherit a civil rights probe into the practices of the entire Ferguson Police Department. That investigation is one of roughly 20 that the Justice Department has initiated into troubled police departments in the past five years, more than twice the number undertaken in the five years before that. Those cases are part of a broader civil rights push — including challenging strict state voter identification laws and promoting changes in how federal prosecutors negotiate sentences — likely to help shape Holder's legacy. Holder's supporters expect Lynch to continue that work, though her experience in two different stints as U.S. attorney goes well beyond that.
| 3,342 |
<h4>Lynch is key to continuing Holder’s civil rights agenda- specifically on sentencing reform and voter suppression</h4><p><strong>AP 11/9</strong>/2014 (Loretta Lynch Seen As Strong Civil Rights Defender, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/09/loretta-lynch-seen-as-str_n_6128466.html)</p><p>Loretta Lynch was a federal prosecutor in New York when she encountered an astonishing case of police brutality: the broomstick sodomy of a Haitian immigrant in a precinct bathroom. The 1997 assault on Abner Louima set off street protests, frayed race relations and led to one of the most important federal civil rights cases of the past two decades — with Lynch a key part of the team that prosecuted officers accused in the beating or of covering it up. President Barack <u>Obama's nomination of <mark>Lynch</u> to</mark> be attorney general comes as the department she would take over continues to investigate the police shooting of an unarmed black 18-year-old in Ferguson, Missouri and <u>seems</u> partly <u>intended to convey the message that</u> police misconduct and <u><strong><mark>civil rights will remain a principal focus</u></strong></mark> even <u><strong>after</u></strong> the departure of Eric <u><strong>Holder</u></strong>. If confirmed by the Senate, Lynch would be the first black woman in the job and would follow the first black attorney general. <u><mark>Lynch has overseen corruption, terrorism and gang cases </mark>in her years as a federal prosecutor</u>. But it's her involvement some 15 years ago in the Louima prosecution that gave her high-profile experience in step with a core priority of the Justice Department. "It is certainly significant that <u>she has a personal history of involvement in prosecuting police misconduct,</u>" said Samuel Bagenstos, the former No. 2 official in the department's civil rights division. "Obviously <u>that</u> will be helpful, and probably <u><mark>suggests</u> that <u>police misconduct</u></mark> cases <u><mark>will continue to be a priority of the Lynch </mark>Justice Department just as they were with</u> the <u>Holder</u> Justice Department. Lawyers say Obama likely selected Lynch, 55, the current U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York, on the strength of a varied career and stature within the department. "<u><mark>She has spent years </mark>in the trenches <mark>as a prosecutor, aggressively fighting terrorism, financial fraud, cybercrime, all while vigorously defending civil rights</u></mark>," Obama said in introducing Lynch at the White House ceremony Saturday. He said her prosecution of the officers in the Louima case was "one of her proudest achievements." But <u>there's</u> also <u><mark>no doubt that selecting someone with civil rights experience could reaffirm the government's commitment to that cause.</u> <u><strong>That figures to be an especially important signal</u></strong></mark> to send as community members in Ferguson brace for the real prospect that state and federal investigations into the shooting death of Michael Brown will close without criminal charges, outcomes that could disillusion civil rights activists and community members. Holder has said he expects the federal investigation to conclude before he resigns, but <u>Lynch</u> still <u>would inherit a civil rights probe into the practices of the</u> entire <u>Ferguson Police Department</u>. That investigation is one of roughly 20 that the Justice Department has initiated into troubled police departments in the past five years, more than twice the number undertaken in the five years before that. <u>Those cases are part of a broader civil rights push — <mark>including challenging strict state voter identification laws and promoting changes in how federal prosecutors negotiate sentences</u> — <u>likely to help shape Holder's legacy</u></mark>. <u>Holder's supporters expect Lynch to continue that work</u>, though her experience in two different stints as U.S. attorney goes well beyond that.</p>
| null |
1nc
| null | 431,058 | 4 | 17,110 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| 565,262 |
N
|
Wake
|
5
|
NYU Itliong-Zhan
|
McCleary
|
Fed CP (2NR)
AG Politics (2NR
Cede the Political DA
T - USFG
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,521 |
Hip hop is so anti-establishment that it fails to produce viable visions for social change.
|
McWhorter 08
|
McWhorter 08-PhD in Linguistics @ Stanford University, Associate Professor of Linguistics @ UC-Berkeley, lecturer @ Columbia University, M.A. in American Studies @ NYU, Fellow @ the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, Contributing Editor @ the Manhattan Institutes City Journal, author of several books on Hip Hop in American Culture [John, All About the Beat, June 2008, Pg. 26-27, DavidK]
|
Tupac thought that welfare had always offered payments for kids on an open-ended basis, Tupac would likely have laughed along with most blacks at the welfare office's posted slogan "Keeping You in the Projects Since 1965." But if he was aware of Bill Clinton's promise in 1992 to end "welfare as we know it," he likely thought of it as covertly racist he likely had never considered the cognitive dissonance between laughing at that sign in The PJs and resisting welfare reform. Because—for him there was no dissonance at all. Rap is about dissing. You diss the "poverty pimps" at the welfare office who want to keep people on welfare in order to keep themselves employed and you diss white congressmen who want to time-limit welfare That's hip-hop's "politics." just as KRS-One today cannot see the death of welfare as we knew it as good news the hip-hop way of looking at things could not perceive one of [the] main sociopolitical problems was: welfare as we knew it. welfare as we knew it was every bit as important to the fate of Tupac's people as the police welfare reform would not make much of a rap track. Overall, welfare reform is quite low on rappers' list of what is relevant to the black condition. It isn't spiky enough. It wouldn't make music that would sell. Fine. But that means that hip-hop politics, once again, misses the action.
|
Tupac thought that welfare had always offered payments for kids on an open-ended basis Tupac would likely have laughed at : "Keeping You in the Projects Since 1965." But if he was aware of Bill Clinton's promise in 1992 to end "welfare as we know it," he likely thought of it as covertly racist for him there was no dissonance at all. Rap is about dissing the welfare office who want to keep people on welfare in order to keep themselves employed and you diss white congressmen who want to time-limit welfare !"). That's hip-hop's "politics the hip-hop way of looking at things could not perceive one of the] main sociopolitical problems was: welfare as we knew it. welfare reform would not, make much of a rap track. . It wouldn't make music that would sell. Fine. But that means that hip-hop politics, once again, misses the action
|
Tupac thought that welfare had always offered payments for kids on an open-ended basis, and that the problem was just that there had always been some small-minded people like Brenda's mother. Tupac would likely have laughed along with most blacks at the welfare office's posted slogan in Eddie Murphy's Claymation series The PJs about life in the projects: "Keeping You in the Projects Since 1965." But if he was aware of Bill Clinton's promise in 1992 to end "welfare as we know it," he likely thought of it as covertly racist—this was the standard position at the time among people of his leftist politics. Like so many, he likely had never considered the cognitive dissonance between laughing at that sign in The PJs and resisting welfare reform. Because—for him there was no dissonance at all. Rap is about dissing. You diss the "poverty pimps" at the welfare office who want to keep people on welfare in order to keep themselves employed ("Word!") and you diss white congressmen who want to time-limit welfare ("Word!"). That's hip-hop's "politics." To Tupac, then, Brenda was, as a poor black girl, "invisible" to America, and otherwise just up against the seamier side of human nature in the family circle sense. That's the hip-hop way of looking at things: anti-establishment, angsty. But just as KRS-One today cannot see the death of welfare as we knew it as good news for the black employment situation, the hip-hop way of looking at things could not perceive, in 1991, what one of Brenda's [the] main sociopolitical problems was: welfare as we knew it. In 1991, welfare as we knew it was every bit as important to the fate of Tupac's people as the police and how he got treated at stores now and then (as he chronicled in "I Don't Give a Fuck" on the same album 2Pacalypse Now). I'm well aware that welfare reform would not, let's face it, make much of a rap track. I am aware of one cut that makes a kind of stab at it, "She's Alive," on OutKast's smashing Speakerboxxx/The Love Below, actually weaving in interview clips with single mothers doing their best. But that one cut is just an exception, as are the handful of others in the whole body of hip-hop that one might smoke out. Overall, welfare reform is quite low on rappers' list of what is relevant to the black condition. It isn't spiky enough. It wouldn't make music that would sell. Fine. But that means that hip-hop politics, once again, misses the action.
| 2,430 |
<h4><strong>Hip hop is so anti-establishment that it fails to produce viable visions for social change. </h4><p>McWhorter 08</strong>-PhD in Linguistics @ Stanford University, Associate Professor of Linguistics @ UC-Berkeley, lecturer @ Columbia University, M.A. in American Studies @ NYU, Fellow @ the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, Contributing Editor @ the Manhattan Institutes City Journal, author of several books on Hip Hop in American Culture [John, <u>All About the Beat</u>, June 2008, Pg. 26-27, DavidK<u>]</p><p><mark>Tupac thought that welfare had always offered payments for kids on an open-ended basis</mark>,</u> and that the problem was just that there had always been some small-minded people like Brenda's mother. <u><mark>Tupac would likely have laughed</mark> along with most blacks <mark>at</mark> the welfare office's posted slogan</u> in Eddie Murphy's Claymation series The PJs about life in the projects<mark>: <u>"Keeping You in the Projects Since 1965." But if he was aware of Bill Clinton's promise in 1992 to end "welfare as we know it," he likely thought of it as covertly racist</u></mark>—this was the standard position at the time among people of his leftist politics. Like so many, <u>he likely had never considered the cognitive dissonance between laughing at that sign in The PJs and resisting welfare reform. Because—<mark>for him there was no dissonance at all. Rap is about dissing</mark>. You diss the "poverty pimps" at <mark>the welfare office who want to keep people on welfare in order to keep themselves employed</mark> </u>("Word!") <u><mark>and you diss white congressmen who want to time-limit welfare</u></mark> ("Word<mark>!"). <u>That's hip-hop's "politics</mark>."</u> To Tupac, then, Brenda was, as a poor black girl, "invisible" to America, and otherwise just up against the seamier side of human nature in the family circle sense. That's the hip-hop way of looking at things: anti-establishment, angsty. But <u>just as KRS-One today cannot see the death of welfare as we knew it as good news</u> for the black employment situation, <u><mark>the hip-hop way of looking at things could not perceive</u></mark>, in 1991, what <u><mark>one of</mark> </u>Brenda's <u>[<mark>the] main sociopolitical problems was: welfare as we knew it.</u></mark> In 1991, <u>welfare as we knew it was every bit as important to the fate of Tupac's people as the police </u>and how he got treated at stores now and then (as he chronicled in "I Don't Give a Fuck" on the same album 2Pacalypse Now). I'm well aware that <u><mark>welfare reform would not</u>, </mark>let's face it, <u><mark>make much of a rap track.</u></mark> I am aware of one cut that makes a kind of stab at it, "She's Alive," on OutKast's smashing Speakerboxxx/The Love Below, actually weaving in interview clips with single mothers doing their best. But that one cut is just an exception, as are the handful of others in the whole body of hip-hop that one might smoke out. <u>Overall, welfare reform is quite low on rappers' list of what is relevant to the black condition. It isn't spiky enough<mark>. It wouldn't make music that would sell. Fine. But that means that hip-hop politics, once again, misses the action</mark>.</p></u>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 207,294 | 2 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,522 |
*Amending the treaty is impossible- withdrawal can only lead to abandonment- the squo and CP establish international consensus through a flexible model which is the only way to solve
|
Collins 12/1
|
Collins 12/1/2014 (Jonathan, International Drug Policy Project Coordinator at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics. He served as Coordinator of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy and Editor of the 2014 report 'Ending the Drug Wars.', The State Department’s move to a more flexible diplomatic policy on drugs is a rational approach to a difficult question., http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-s-new-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrine-on-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-a-difficult-question/)
|
reforming this core is a very difficult question which we haven’t even started to grapple with The economic interests involved are legion also and unlikely to welcome a reopening of the trading arrangements locked into the system Focusing all efforts on reforming the language around the limbic prohibitionist aspects would be a wasted opportunity the goal should be to roll back prohibition as far as possible and develop our understanding of regulating previously illicit markets – as is happening with cannabis – via flexible interpretations and innovations When the beginnings of a consensus around reforming the core becomes apparent states can put the final nail in the coffin of the war on drugs by writing all remnants out of the international treaties.
|
reforming this core is a very difficult question Focusing all efforts on reforming the language around the limbic prohibitionist aspects would, in my opinion, be a wasted opportunity. Instead, the goal should be to roll back prohibition as far as possible and develop our understanding of regulating previously illicit markets – as is happening with cannabis – via flexible interpretations and innovations. When the beginnings of a consensus around reforming the cor becomes apparent, states put the final nail in the coffin of the war on drugs
|
Ultimately the core represents a weak regulatory framework and will need to be updated. For example, it was based on postwar principles of central economic planning that have since been discredited. As a result 83 percent of the world has virtually no access to essential pain medicines. However, reforming this core is a very difficult question which we haven’t even started to grapple with. The economic interests involved are legion also and unlikely to welcome a reopening of the trading arrangements locked into the system. Focusing all efforts on reforming the language around the limbic prohibitionist aspects would, in my opinion, be a wasted opportunity. Instead, the goal should be to roll back prohibition as far as possible and develop our understanding of regulating previously illicit markets – as is happening with cannabis – via flexible interpretations and innovations. When the beginnings of a consensus around reforming the core of the conventions becomes apparent, states can also put the final nail in the coffin of the war on drugs by writing all remnants out of the international treaties.
| 1,113 |
<h4>*Amending the treaty is impossible- withdrawal can only lead to abandonment- the squo and CP establish international consensus through a flexible model which is the only way to solve</h4><p><strong>Collins 12/1</strong>/2014 (Jonathan, International Drug Policy Project Coordinator at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics. He served as Coordinator of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy and Editor of the 2014 report 'Ending the Drug Wars.', The State Department’s move to a more flexible diplomatic policy on drugs is a rational approach to a difficult question.,<u> http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-s-new-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrine-on-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-a-difficult-question/)</p><p></u>Ultimately the core represents a weak regulatory framework and will need to be updated. For example, it was based on postwar principles of central economic planning that have since been discredited. As a result 83 percent of the world has virtually no access to essential pain medicines. However, <u><mark>reforming this core is a very difficult question</mark> which we haven’t even started to grapple with</u>. <u>The economic interests involved are legion also and unlikely to welcome a reopening of the trading arrangements locked into the system</u>. <u><strong><mark>Focusing all efforts on reforming the language around the limbic prohibitionist aspects would</u></strong>, in my opinion, <u><strong>be a wasted opportunity</u></strong>. Instead, <u>the goal should be to roll back prohibition as far as possible and develop our understanding of regulating previously illicit markets – as is happening with cannabis – via <strong>flexible interpretations and innovations</u></strong>. <u><strong>When the beginnings of a consensus around reforming the cor</mark>e</u></strong> of the conventions <u><strong><mark>becomes apparent</u></strong>, <u>states</mark> can</u> also <u><mark>put the final nail in the coffin of the war on drugs</mark> by writing all remnants out of the international treaties.</p></u>
|
1nc
| null |
a1
| 430,978 | 11 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,523 |
Extinction first
|
Bostrom, 12
|
Bostrom, 12 –Professor of Philosophy at Oxford, directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute and winner of the Gannon Award
|
human extinction risks are poorly understood and severely underestimated by society existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria
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human extinction risks are severely underestimated existential risk mitigation may be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering A human life is a human life future generations matter even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty
|
(Nick, Interview with Ross Andersen, correspondent at The Atlantic, “We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction,” http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/)
Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that human extinction risks are poorly understood and, worse still, severely underestimated by society. Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscure or even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects to grow in number and potency over the next century.¶ Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In fact, he is a longtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human nature itself, through technological means. In the long run he sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we humans must cross with great care, in order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory, to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation with Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuries to come, and about what we can do to make sure we outlast them.¶ Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering. Can you explain why? ¶ Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.
| 3,180 |
<h4>Extinction first </h4><p><strong>Bostrom, 12</strong> –Professor of Philosophy at Oxford, directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute and winner of the Gannon Award</p><p>(Nick, Interview with Ross Andersen, correspondent at The Atlantic, “We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction,” http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/)</p><p>Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that <u><mark>human extinction risks are</mark> poorly understood and</u>, worse still, <u><mark>severely underestimated</mark> by society</u>. Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscure or even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects to grow in number and potency over the next century.¶ Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In fact, he is a longtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human nature itself, through technological means. In the long run he sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we humans must cross with great care, in order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory, to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation with Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuries to come, and about what we can do to make sure we outlast them.¶ Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that <u><mark>existential risk mitigation may</mark> in fact <mark>be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering</u></mark>. Can you explain why? ¶ Bostrom: Well <u>suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people</u>. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. <u><mark>A human life is a human life</mark>. If you have that moral point of view that <mark>future generations matter</mark> in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, <mark>even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty</mark> or curing malaria</u>, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.</p>
|
1nc
|
Solvency
|
cartels
| 1,240,482 | 818 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,524 |
Lynch is key to continuing Holder’s civil rights agenda- specifically on sentencing reform and voter suppression
|
AP 11/9
|
AP 11/9/2014 (Loretta Lynch Seen As Strong Civil Rights Defender, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/09/loretta-lynch-seen-as-str_n_6128466.html)
|
Obama's nomination of Lynch seems intended to convey the message that civil rights will remain a principal focus after Holder Lynch has overseen corruption, terrorism and gang cases in her years as a federal prosecutor she has a personal history of involvement in prosecuting police misconduct, that suggests police misconduct will continue to be a priority of the Lynch Justice Department just as they were with Holder She has spent years in the trenches as a prosecutor, aggressively fighting terrorism, financial fraud, cybercrime, all while vigorously defending civil rights there's no doubt that selecting someone with civil rights experience could reaffirm the government's commitment to that cause. That figures to be an especially important signal Lynch would inherit a civil rights probe into the practices of the Ferguson Police Department Those cases are part of a broader civil rights push — including challenging strict state voter identification laws and promoting changes in how federal prosecutors negotiate sentences likely to help shape Holder's legacy Holder's supporters expect Lynch to continue that work
|
Lynch to civil rights will remain a principal focus Lynch has overseen corruption, terrorism and gang cases in her years as a federal prosecutor suggests that police misconduct will continue to be a priority of the Lynch Justice Departmen She has spent years in the trenches as a prosecutor, aggressively fighting terrorism, financial fraud, cybercrime, all while vigorously defending civil rights no doubt that selecting someone with civil rights experience could reaffirm the government's commitment to that cause. That figures to be an especially important signal including challenging strict state voter identification laws and promoting changes in how federal prosecutors negotiate sentences — likely to help shape Holder's legacy
|
Loretta Lynch was a federal prosecutor in New York when she encountered an astonishing case of police brutality: the broomstick sodomy of a Haitian immigrant in a precinct bathroom. The 1997 assault on Abner Louima set off street protests, frayed race relations and led to one of the most important federal civil rights cases of the past two decades — with Lynch a key part of the team that prosecuted officers accused in the beating or of covering it up. President Barack Obama's nomination of Lynch to be attorney general comes as the department she would take over continues to investigate the police shooting of an unarmed black 18-year-old in Ferguson, Missouri and seems partly intended to convey the message that police misconduct and civil rights will remain a principal focus even after the departure of Eric Holder. If confirmed by the Senate, Lynch would be the first black woman in the job and would follow the first black attorney general. Lynch has overseen corruption, terrorism and gang cases in her years as a federal prosecutor. But it's her involvement some 15 years ago in the Louima prosecution that gave her high-profile experience in step with a core priority of the Justice Department. "It is certainly significant that she has a personal history of involvement in prosecuting police misconduct," said Samuel Bagenstos, the former No. 2 official in the department's civil rights division. "Obviously that will be helpful, and probably suggests that police misconduct cases will continue to be a priority of the Lynch Justice Department just as they were with the Holder Justice Department. Lawyers say Obama likely selected Lynch, 55, the current U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York, on the strength of a varied career and stature within the department. "She has spent years in the trenches as a prosecutor, aggressively fighting terrorism, financial fraud, cybercrime, all while vigorously defending civil rights," Obama said in introducing Lynch at the White House ceremony Saturday. He said her prosecution of the officers in the Louima case was "one of her proudest achievements." But there's also no doubt that selecting someone with civil rights experience could reaffirm the government's commitment to that cause. That figures to be an especially important signal to send as community members in Ferguson brace for the real prospect that state and federal investigations into the shooting death of Michael Brown will close without criminal charges, outcomes that could disillusion civil rights activists and community members. Holder has said he expects the federal investigation to conclude before he resigns, but Lynch still would inherit a civil rights probe into the practices of the entire Ferguson Police Department. That investigation is one of roughly 20 that the Justice Department has initiated into troubled police departments in the past five years, more than twice the number undertaken in the five years before that. Those cases are part of a broader civil rights push — including challenging strict state voter identification laws and promoting changes in how federal prosecutors negotiate sentences — likely to help shape Holder's legacy. Holder's supporters expect Lynch to continue that work, though her experience in two different stints as U.S. attorney goes well beyond that.
| 3,342 |
<h4>Lynch is key to continuing Holder’s civil rights agenda- specifically on sentencing reform and voter suppression</h4><p><strong>AP 11/9</strong>/2014 (Loretta Lynch Seen As Strong Civil Rights Defender, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/09/loretta-lynch-seen-as-str_n_6128466.html)</p><p>Loretta Lynch was a federal prosecutor in New York when she encountered an astonishing case of police brutality: the broomstick sodomy of a Haitian immigrant in a precinct bathroom. The 1997 assault on Abner Louima set off street protests, frayed race relations and led to one of the most important federal civil rights cases of the past two decades — with Lynch a key part of the team that prosecuted officers accused in the beating or of covering it up. President Barack <u>Obama's nomination of <mark>Lynch</u> to</mark> be attorney general comes as the department she would take over continues to investigate the police shooting of an unarmed black 18-year-old in Ferguson, Missouri and <u>seems</u> partly <u>intended to convey the message that</u> police misconduct and <u><strong><mark>civil rights will remain a principal focus</u></strong></mark> even <u><strong>after</u></strong> the departure of Eric <u><strong>Holder</u></strong>. If confirmed by the Senate, Lynch would be the first black woman in the job and would follow the first black attorney general. <u><mark>Lynch has overseen corruption, terrorism and gang cases in her years as a federal prosecutor</u></mark>. But it's her involvement some 15 years ago in the Louima prosecution that gave her high-profile experience in step with a core priority of the Justice Department. "It is certainly significant that <u>she has a personal history of involvement in prosecuting police misconduct,</u>" said Samuel Bagenstos, the former No. 2 official in the department's civil rights division. "Obviously <u>that</u> will be helpful, and probably <u><mark>suggests</u> that <u>police misconduct</u></mark> cases <u><mark>will continue to be a priority of the Lynch Justice Departmen</mark>t just as they were with</u> the <u>Holder</u> Justice Department. Lawyers say Obama likely selected Lynch, 55, the current U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York, on the strength of a varied career and stature within the department. "<u><mark>She has spent years in the trenches as a prosecutor, aggressively fighting terrorism, financial fraud, cybercrime, all while vigorously defending civil rights</u></mark>," Obama said in introducing Lynch at the White House ceremony Saturday. He said her prosecution of the officers in the Louima case was "one of her proudest achievements." But <u>there's</u> also <u><mark>no doubt that selecting someone with civil rights experience could reaffirm the government's commitment to that cause.</u> <u><strong>That figures to be an especially important signal</u></strong></mark> to send as community members in Ferguson brace for the real prospect that state and federal investigations into the shooting death of Michael Brown will close without criminal charges, outcomes that could disillusion civil rights activists and community members. Holder has said he expects the federal investigation to conclude before he resigns, but <u>Lynch</u> still <u>would inherit a civil rights probe into the practices of the</u> entire <u>Ferguson Police Department</u>. That investigation is one of roughly 20 that the Justice Department has initiated into troubled police departments in the past five years, more than twice the number undertaken in the five years before that. <u>Those cases are part of a broader civil rights push — <mark>including challenging strict state voter identification laws and promoting changes in how federal prosecutors negotiate sentences</u> — <u>likely to help shape Holder's legacy</u></mark>. <u>Holder's supporters expect Lynch to continue that work</u>, though her experience in two different stints as U.S. attorney goes well beyond that.</p>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 431,058 | 4 | 17,112 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| 565,260 |
N
|
Wake
|
2
|
Cornell Deng-Zhang
|
Stone
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaty DA
T-legalize
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,525 |
Sentencing reform key to US credibility
|
CGS 2013
|
CGS 2013 (Citizens for Global Solutions is a groundbreaking national online movement for Americans who want the United States to take a responsible and cooperative role in the world, 5 Disturbing Facts About the U.S. Prison Industry, http://globalsolutions.org/blog/2013/10/5-Disturbing-Facts-About-U.S.-Prison-Industry)
|
The United States holds five percent of the world's population, but 25 percent of the world's inmates The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare
|
The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform, prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society. As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare
|
The United States holds five percent of the world's population, but 25 percent of the world's inmates. This is not a reflection of crime rates so much as incarceration policy. The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform, and first thing to go should be the private prison model. For-profit prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society. As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare.
| 569 |
<h4>Sentencing reform key to US credibility</h4><p><strong>CGS 2013</strong> (Citizens for Global Solutions is a groundbreaking national online movement for Americans who want the United States to take a responsible and cooperative role in the world, 5 Disturbing Facts About the U.S. Prison Industry, http://globalsolutions.org/blog/2013/10/5-Disturbing-Facts-About-U.S.-Prison-Industry)</p><p><u>The United States holds five percent of the world's population, but 25 percent of the world's inmates</u>. This is not a reflection of crime rates so much as incarceration policy. <u><mark>The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform</u>,</mark> and first thing to go should be the private prison model. For-profit <u><mark>prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society</u>. <u><strong>As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare</u></strong></mark>.</p>
| null |
1nc
| null | 430,865 | 7 | 17,110 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| 565,262 |
N
|
Wake
|
5
|
NYU Itliong-Zhan
|
McCleary
|
Fed CP (2NR)
AG Politics (2NR
Cede the Political DA
T - USFG
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,526 |
permit and facilitate “paired-organ exchanges” with an indirect exchange if no direct exchange matches are available.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4> permit and facilitate “paired-organ exchanges” with an indirect exchange if no direct exchange matches are available. </h4>
| null |
1nc
|
3
| 431,066 | 1 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,527 |
State immigration laws would be the single biggest possible disaster for heg
|
Steinberg 2010
|
Steinberg 2010 (James B., Deputy Secretary of State, former Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Deputy National Security Adviser on the staff of the National Security Council, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, affidavit filed in US v. Arizona, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Case 2:10-cv-01413-NVW Document 6-1 Filed 07/06/10, http://www.scribd.com/doc/33977183/U-S-v-Arizona-Exh-1-to-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Affidavit-of-James-Steinberg)
|
If S.B. 1070 were to go into effect, it would directly call into question the ability of the United States to speak with one voice at the international level When the United States incurs criticism is normally in a position to defend the practices If the several states were each allowed to pursue independent immigration enforcement policies such as the Arizona law, these serious concerns would be multiplied significantly as the United States could be subjected to a cacophony of competing immigration enforcement priorities and agendas with an extreme adverse impact on the United States' ability to speak with one voice S.B. 1070 threatens ongoing adverse consequences for important and sensitive bilateral relationships with U.S. allies for our regional and global relations It is likely to hinder our ability to secure the cooperation of other states in efforts to promote U.S. interests internationally it is likely to undermine the United States' ability to engage effectively with the international community repairing such harm to international relations and U.S. stature after the fact can be extremely difficult.
|
If S.B. 1070 were to go into effect, it would directly call into question the ability of the United States to speak with one voice at the international level If the several states were each allowed to pursue independent immigration enforcement policies these serious concerns would be multiplied significantly, as the United States could be subjected to a cacophony of competing agendas, 1070 threatens sensitive bilateral relationships with U.S. allies for our global relations It is likely to hinder our ability to secure the cooperation of other states in efforts to promote U.S. interests internationally repairing such harm to international relations and U.S. stature after the fact can be extremely difficult.
|
55.If S.B. 1070, Arizona's attempt to set its own immigration policy in pursuit of "attrition through enforcement," were to go into effect, it would directly call into question the ability of the United States to speak with one voice at the international level on issues related to immigration and migration policy. Only the national government is in a position to accurately assess the impact of a policy such as S.B. 1070 on our overall foreign relations agenda and to balance the competing foreign relations considerations involved in the adoption and enforcement of such a law. When the United States incurs criticism of immigration law and policies adopted at the federal level, the United States is normally in a position to review the criticism and determine whether to defend the practices against attack or else to take appropriate action to modify its practices. The United States is also able to develop and implement immigration policy in anticipation of these and other foreign relations concerns. In this case, however, the policy being pursued has not been developed, nor would it be implemented, with sensitivity to the full range of foreign policy information and considerations available to the national government, and the United States is unable to calibrate its immigration and foreign policies to respond effectively to these claims. 56.If the several states were each allowed to pursue independent immigration enforcement policies such as the Arizona law, these serious concerns would be multiplied significantly, as the United States could be subjected to a cacophony of competing immigration enforcement priorities and agendas, with little regard for the sensitive diplomatic and foreign relations considerations that immigration policy addresses, and with an extreme adverse impact on the United States' ability to speak with one voice. 57.S.B. 1070 — and in particular the mandatory verification regime requirement — thus poses a risk of provoking retaliatory treatment against U.S. nationals by other states, and threatens ongoing adverse consequences for important and sensitive bilateral relationships with U.S. allies such as Mexico, for our regional relations in the western hemisphere, and for our global relations in regional and multilateral institutions. It is likely to hinder our ability to secure the cooperation of other states in efforts to promote U.S. interests internationally across a range of trade, security, tourism, and other interests unrelated to immigration. Finally, it is likely to undermine the United States' ability to engage effectively with the international community to promote the advancement and protection of human rights. Moreover, repairing such harm to international relations and U.S. stature in bilateral, regional and multilateral relationships after the fact can be extremely difficult.
| 2,862 |
<h4><strong>State immigration laws would be the single biggest possible disaster for heg</h4><p>Steinberg 2010</strong> (James B., Deputy Secretary of State, former Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Deputy National Security Adviser on the staff of the National Security Council, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, affidavit filed in US v. Arizona, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Case 2:10-cv-01413-NVW Document 6-1 Filed 07/06/10, http://www.scribd.com/doc/33977183/U-S-v-Arizona-Exh-1-to-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Affidavit-of-James-Steinberg)</p><p>55.<u><strong><mark>If S.B. 1070</u></strong></mark>, Arizona's attempt to set its own immigration policy in pursuit of "attrition through enforcement," <u><strong><mark>were to go into effect, it would directly call into question the ability of the United States to speak with one voice at the international level</u></strong></mark> on issues related to immigration and migration policy. Only the national government is in a position to accurately assess the impact of a policy such as S.B. 1070 on our overall foreign relations agenda and to balance the competing foreign relations considerations involved in the adoption and enforcement of such a law. <u><strong>When the United States incurs criticism</u></strong> of immigration law and policies adopted at the federal level, the United States <u><strong>is normally in a position to</u></strong> review the criticism and determine whether to <u><strong>defend the practices</u></strong> against attack or else to take appropriate action to modify its practices. The United States is also able to develop and implement immigration policy in anticipation of these and other foreign relations concerns. In this case, however, the policy being pursued has not been developed, nor would it be implemented, with sensitivity to the full range of foreign policy information and considerations available to the national government, and the United States is unable to calibrate its immigration and foreign policies to respond effectively to these claims. 56.<u><strong><mark>If the several states were each allowed to pursue independent immigration enforcement policies</mark> such as the Arizona law, <mark>these serious concerns would be </strong>multiplied significantly</u>, <u><strong>as the United States could be subjected to a cacophony of competing</mark> immigration enforcement priorities and <mark>agendas</u></strong>,</mark> with little regard for the sensitive diplomatic and foreign relations considerations that immigration policy addresses, and <u><strong>with an extreme adverse impact on the United States' ability to speak with one voice</u></strong>. 57.<u><strong>S.B. <mark>1070</u></strong></mark> — and in particular the mandatory verification regime requirement — thus poses a risk of provoking retaliatory treatment against U.S. nationals by other states, and <u><strong><mark>threatens</mark> ongoing adverse consequences for important and <mark>sensitive bilateral relationships with U.S. allies</u></strong></mark> such as Mexico, <u><strong><mark>for our</mark> regional</u></strong> relations in the western hemisphere, <u><strong>and</u></strong> for our <u><strong><mark>global relations</u></strong></mark> in regional and multilateral institutions. <u><strong><mark>It is likely to hinder our ability to secure the cooperation of other states in efforts to promote U.S. interests internationally</u></strong></mark> across a range of trade, security, tourism, and other interests unrelated to immigration. Finally, <u><strong>it is likely to undermine the United States' ability to engage effectively with the international community</u></strong> to promote the advancement and protection of human rights. Moreover, <u><strong><mark>repairing such harm to international relations and U.S. stature</u></strong></mark> in bilateral, regional and multilateral relationships <u><strong><mark>after the fact can be extremely difficult.</p></u></strong></mark>
|
1nc
| null |
a2
| 286,751 | 7 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,528 |
Must weigh consequences – their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize
|
Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University 2
|
Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University 2
(Jeffrey C, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)
|
unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern suffers from three fatal flaws It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. and it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
|
moral goodness undercuts political responsibility three fatal flaws fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure achievement 2) it fails to see real violence moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences t is the effects of action, rather than the motives that is most significant the pursuit of “good” it is not enough it is important to ask about the effects Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment
|
As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
| 1,802 |
<h4>Must weigh consequences – their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize</h4><p><strong>Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University 2</strong> </p><p><u>(Jeffrey C, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)</p><p></u>As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an <u>unyielding concern with <mark>moral goodness undercuts political responsibility</mark>. The concern </u>may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it <u>suffers from <mark>three fatal flaws</u></mark>: (1) <u>It <mark>fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure</mark> the <mark>achievement</mark> of what one intends. </u>Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if <u>such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters;</u> (<mark>2) <u>it fails to see </mark>that in a world of <mark>real violence</mark> and injustice, <mark>moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity</mark> in injustice.</u> This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; <u>and</u> (3) <u>it <mark>fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences</mark> as it is about intentions; i<mark>t is the effects of action, rather than the motives</mark> of action, <mark>that is most significant</mark>.</u> Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, <u>it is often <mark>the pursuit of “good”</mark> that generates evil</u>. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: <u><mark>it is not enough</mark> that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; <mark>it is </mark>equally <mark>important</mark>, always, <mark>to ask about the effects</mark> of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. <mark>Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment</mark>. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.</p></u>
|
1nc
|
Solvency
|
cartels
| 26,721 | 1,533 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,529 |
Limited and prepared debate where both sides has an equitable distribution of arguments matters. It’s crucial to personal agency and is only possible in a switch-side debate format where debaters sometimes defend views they do not completely agree with
|
Roberts-Miller ’03, (Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Texas) 3
|
Roberts-Miller ’03, (Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Texas) 3
(Patricia, "Fighting Without Hatred:Hannah Ar endt ' s Agonistic Rhetoric" JAC 22.2 2003)
|
the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. . Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. , Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; , Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference. Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsebility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both . Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism. Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere.
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the world of deliberate action is fragmented into unreflective behavior people are imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own experience obsession with one's own life prevents engaging in deliberate action Self-obsession is political because it aspires to be apolitical individuals abdicate their human capacities to a projected 'they' with consequences, the frightening aspect of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been anti-Semitic could be put to work on genocide striking was their insistence they were not responsible people who enact actions because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions In a totalitarian system, , everyone is doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can , defend policies. Arendt's solution is the agonism Arendt emphasizes competition in which qualities are not displays of one's self, but arguments, it involves passion for ideas to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy advancing argument means one must be open to criticisms agonistic because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference Eichmann was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsebility Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy denying our own agency enables the social to thrive theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling critical thinking is necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed agonism values disagreement, and equality but has the goal of reaching agreement communicability is how one tests the validity of one's thought rhetoric does not lead to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will be reconsidered. Agonism demands trust and doubt one' s own perceptions there are important positive political consequences of agonism. the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral The agonistic model' undermines conformity, it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma totalitarianism agonal rhetoric is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere
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Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Continued… Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsebility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking. Arendt's Polemical Agonism As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy. Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point: You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42) Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03). In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes. This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate. Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263). Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242). Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324). Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism. Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action. In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.
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<h4><u><strong>Limited and prepared debate where both sides has an equitable distribution of arguments matters. It’s crucial to personal agency and is only possible in a switch-side debate format where debaters sometimes defend views they do not completely agree with</h4><p></u>Roberts-Miller ’03, (<u>Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Texas) 3</p><p></u></strong>(Patricia, "Fighting Without Hatred:Hannah Ar endt ' s Agonistic Rhetoric" JAC 22.2 2003)</p><p>Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that<u> <mark>the </mark>common <mark>world of deliberate</mark> and joint <mark>action is fragmented into </mark>solipsistic and <mark>unreflective behavior</u></mark>. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society<u> <mark>people are</mark> all <mark>imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own </mark>singular <mark>experience</mark>, </u>which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because<u> <mark>obsession with one's own</mark> self and the particularities of one's <mark>life prevents</mark> one from <mark>engaging in</mark> conscious, <mark>deliberate</mark>, collective <mark>action</mark>. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. <mark>Self-obsession</mark>, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. </u>Perhaps a better way to put it is that<u> it <mark>is political </mark>precisely <mark>because it <strong>aspires to be apolitical</strong></mark>. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated <mark>individuals</mark>, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who <mark>abdicate their human capacities</mark> and responsibilities <mark>to a projected 'they'</mark> or 'it,' <mark>with </mark>disastrous <mark>consequences,</mark> both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of <mark>the </mark>most <mark>frightening aspect</mark>s <mark>of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been</mark> extraordinarily <mark>anti-Semitic could be put to work</mark> industriously and efficiently <mark>on </mark>the <mark>genocide </mark>of the Jews. And what was <mark>striking</mark> about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, <mark>was their </mark>constant and apparently sincere <mark>insistence </mark>that <mark>they were not responsible</mark>. </u>For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility<u>. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the <mark>people who enact </mark>the <mark>actions</mark> in question, <mark>because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions</mark>. They are simply doing their jobs. <mark>In a totalitarian system,</mark> however<mark>, everyone is </mark>simply <mark>doing his or her job; <strong>there never seems to be anyone who can </mark>explain<mark>, defend</mark>, and change the <mark>policies</strong>.</mark> </u>Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems<u>, <mark>Arendt's solution is the </mark>playful and competitive space of <strong><mark>agonism</strong></mark>; </u>it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib<u>, <mark>Arendt</mark>'s public realm <mark>emphasizes </mark>the assumption of <mark>competition</mark>, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space <mark>in which</mark> one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These <mark>qualities</mark> are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they <mark>are <strong>not displays of one's self, but </mark>of ideas and <mark>arguments</strong>, </mark>of one's thought. </u>When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs.<u> Instead, <mark>it involves</mark> something like having such a <mark>passion for ideas</mark> and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries <mark>to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy</mark>, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; <mark>advancing</mark> an <mark>argument means </mark>that <mark>one must be open to </mark>the <mark>criticisms</mark> others will make of it. The situation is <mark>agonistic </mark>not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but <mark>because conflict <strong>is a necessary consequence of difference</strong></mark>. </u>This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Continued…<u> <mark>Eichmann</mark> perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he <mark>was able to <strong>engage in mass murder</strong> because he was <strong>able not to think about it,</strong></mark> especially <mark>not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsebility</mark> by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both</u>. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause<u>. <mark>Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a <strong>purely ideological policy</strong></mark>, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) </u>Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge:<u> <mark>denying our own agency</mark> is what <mark>enables the social to thrive</mark>. To put it another way, <strong><mark>theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling </mark>prophecies</strong>. </u>Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. <u>Hence, as Arendt says, "<mark>critical thinking</mark>, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking <mark>is</mark>, in this view, <mark>necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only <strong>where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection</strong>"</mark> (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; <mark>it must be a world into which one enters and <strong>by which one might be changed</strong></mark>. </u>Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking. Arendt's Polemical Agonism As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. <u>Persuasive <mark>agonism </mark>still <mark>values </mark>conflict, <mark>disagreement, and equality</mark> among interlocutors, <mark>but </mark>it <mark>has the goal of reaching agreement</mark>, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). </u>Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it.<u> In this way, <mark>communicability</mark> serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it <strong><mark>is how one tests the validity of one's thought</strong></mark>. </u>In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy. Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point: You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42) Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03). In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes. This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate. Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263). Like other proponents of agonism,<u> Arendt argues that <mark>rhetoric does not lead </mark>individuals or communities <mark>to ultimate Truth; <strong>it leads to decisions that will </mark>necessarily have to <mark>be reconsidered.</strong></mark> </u>Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242).<u> <mark>Agonism demands </mark>that one <strong>simultaneously <mark>trust and doubt one' s own perceptions</strong></mark>, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. </u>The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324). <u>Yet, <mark>there are <strong>important positive political consequences of agonism</strong>.</mark> Arendt' s own promotion of <mark>the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system <strong>could be actively moral</strong></mark>. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. <mark>The agonistic model'</mark>s celebration of achievement and verbal skill <mark>undermines </mark>the political force of <mark>conformity, </mark>so <mark>it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma</mark>; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist <mark>totalitarianism</mark>. </u>And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action. In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that<u> <mark>agonal rhetoric</mark> (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) <mark>is the <strong>best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere</strong></mark>. </u>On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric. </p>
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Sentencing reform key to US credibility
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CGS 2013 (Citizens for Global Solutions is a groundbreaking national online movement for Americans who want the United States to take a responsible and cooperative role in the world, 5 Disturbing Facts About the U.S. Prison Industry, http://globalsolutions.org/blog/2013/10/5-Disturbing-Facts-About-U.S.-Prison-Industry)
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The United States holds five percent of the world's population, but 25 percent of the world's inmates The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare
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The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform, prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society. As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare
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The United States holds five percent of the world's population, but 25 percent of the world's inmates. This is not a reflection of crime rates so much as incarceration policy. The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform, and first thing to go should be the private prison model. For-profit prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society. As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare.
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<h4>Sentencing reform key to US credibility</h4><p><strong>CGS 2013</strong> (Citizens for Global Solutions is a groundbreaking national online movement for Americans who want the United States to take a responsible and cooperative role in the world, 5 Disturbing Facts About the U.S. Prison Industry, http://globalsolutions.org/blog/2013/10/5-Disturbing-Facts-About-U.S.-Prison-Industry)</p><p><u>The United States holds five percent of the world's population, but 25 percent of the world's inmates</u>. This is not a reflection of crime rates so much as incarceration policy. <u><mark>The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform</u>,</mark> and first thing to go should be the private prison model. For-profit <u><mark>prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society</u>. <u><strong>As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare</u></strong></mark>.</p>
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1
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| 565,260 |
N
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Wake
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2
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Cornell Deng-Zhang
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Stone
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AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaty DA
T-legalize
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,531 |
Credibility on human rights issues is key to soft power and international institutions
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Koh 2007 )
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Koh 2007 (Harold, Dean and Gerard C. & Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1998-2001; Attorney-Adviser at the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice, 1983-85., Restoring America's Human Rights Reputation, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1684/)
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the United States' image has plummeted abroad since September 11, anti- Americanism is becoming entrenched America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power the United States must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation Protecting our human rights system and reputation is a core challenge for the global rule of law
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America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power U S must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation Protecting our human rights system and reputation is, , a core challenge for global rule of law
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The Pew Global Attitudes Project recently found, based on in-depth interviews with about 110,000 people in fifty countries, that the United States' image has plummeted abroad since September 11, and that anti- Americanism increasingly is becoming entrenched in the twenty-first century. 3 4 America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power. As the director of the survey stated in congressional testimony, "favorable attitudes toward the U.S. declined in Germany, from seventy-eight percent in 2000 to thirtyseven percent currently. The numbers are similar in France, but even worse in Spain, where only twenty-three percent have a favorable view, and in Turkey, where it is twelve percent. Most people in these countries held positive views of the U.S. at the start of the decade."'1 35 Four years ago, I testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that: [I]n its single-minded pursuit of the war against terrorism, the Administration has permitted some human rights concerns to fall by the wayside and has consciously sacrificed others .... But democracy and human rights cannot be pursued in a selective or piecemeal fashion. [Rather, t]he events of September 11th make clear that the United States must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others .... [W]e have the tools to make the world safer and more democratic, [but] if only we use them fairly and consistently. 13 6 If anything, I believe those words even more strongly today. In sum, America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation and a People. What the last six years have taught us is that restoring that human rights reputation is simply too important a task to be left to politicians. Civil society has defended core principles of human rights and humanitarian law throughout the post-World War II Age of Human Rights. Protecting our human rights system and reputation is, and must remain, a core challenge for all thinking twenty-first-century citizens, especially those lawyers, educators, and law students, who are the guardians of tomorrow's global rule of law
| 2,254 |
<h4>Credibility on human rights issues is key to soft power and international institutions</h4><p><strong>Koh 2007</strong> (Harold, Dean and Gerard C. & Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1998-2001; Attorney-Adviser at the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice, 1983-85., Restoring America's Human Rights Reputation, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1684/<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>The Pew Global Attitudes Project recently found, based on in-depth interviews with about 110,000 people in fifty countries, that <u>the United States' image has plummeted abroad since September 11,</u> and that <u>anti- Americanism</u> increasingly <u>is becoming entrenched</u> in the twenty-first century. 3 4 <u><strong><mark>America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power</u></strong></mark>. As the director of the survey stated in congressional testimony, "favorable attitudes toward the U.S. declined in Germany, from seventy-eight percent in 2000 to thirtyseven percent currently. The numbers are similar in France, but even worse in Spain, where only twenty-three percent have a favorable view, and in Turkey, where it is twelve percent. Most people in these countries held positive views of the U.S. at the start of the decade."'1 35 Four years ago, I testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that: [I]n its single-minded pursuit of the war against terrorism, the Administration has permitted some human rights concerns to fall by the wayside and has consciously sacrificed others .... But democracy and human rights cannot be pursued in a selective or piecemeal fashion. [Rather, t]he events of September 11th make clear that <u>the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, <strong>holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others</u></strong></mark> .... [W]e have the tools to make the world safer and more democratic, [but] if only we use them fairly and consistently. 13 6 If anything, I believe those words even more strongly today. In sum, <u><mark>America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation</u></mark> and a People. What the last six years have taught us is that restoring that human rights reputation is simply too important a task to be left to politicians. Civil society has defended core principles of human rights and humanitarian law throughout the post-World War II Age of Human Rights. <u><mark>Protecting our human rights system and reputation is</u>, </mark>and must remain<mark>, <u><strong>a core challenge</u></strong> <u>for</u></mark> all thinking twenty-first-century citizens, especially those lawyers, educators, and law students, who are <u>the</u> guardians of tomorrow's <u><strong><mark>global rule of law</p></u></strong></mark>
| null |
1nc
| null | 430,866 | 7 | 17,110 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| 565,262 |
N
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Wake
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5
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NYU Itliong-Zhan
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McCleary
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Fed CP (2NR)
AG Politics (2NR
Cede the Political DA
T - USFG
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,532 |
Set up an opt-out system for cadaveric donations
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<h4>Set up an opt-out system for cadaveric donations</h4>
| null |
1nc
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3
| 431,067 | 1 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
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Wake
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3
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Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
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Watson
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AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,533 |
U
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>U</h4>
| null |
1nc
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Case
| 431,068 | 1 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
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Texas
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5
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Binghamton Herrera-Smith
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Garrett
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Framework (2NR)
cap good
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,534 |
Aff doesn’t meet their threshold—they don’t help every single veteran
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Aff doesn’t meet their threshold—they don’t help every single veteran </h4>
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1nc
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Solvency
|
cartels
| 431,069 | 1 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
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8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,535 |
The impact is global conflict escalation
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Brooks et al 13
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Brooks et al 13 [Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment Stephen G. Brooks (bio), G. John Ikenberry (bio) and William C. Wohlforth (bio), Stephen G. Brooks; G. John Ikenberry and William C. Wohlforth STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Emin
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deep engagement's A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment the U S presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action its core alliance commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus security dilemmas The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory Mearsheimer forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war 73 Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington—notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region's prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China 75 states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed the case 77 U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world's key regions. the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield a competitive regional multipolarity with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain which would generate great power war). overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states all of which would be concerning Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces proliferation decisions would generate pressure locally for more proliferation 79 the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt Confidence in probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states many dangers noted by analysts concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. the risk of "unforeseen crisis dynamics" that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. 81 83 the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world's key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals the United States' formidable military deter potential rivals 85 87 the security commitments of deep engagement support the global economic order by reducing the likelihood of security dilemmas, arms racing, instability, regional conflicts and, in extremis, major power war. In so doing, the strategy helps to maintain a stable and comparatively open world economy a long-standing U.S. national interest. the extensive set of U.S. military commitments and deployments helps to protect the "global economic commons."One key way is by helping to keep sea-lanes and other shipping corridors freely available for commerce Although it is not the only global actor relevant to protecting the global economic commons, the United States has by far the most important role given its massive naval superiority and the leadership role itplays in international economic institutions. If the United States were to pull back from the world, protecting the global economic commons would likely be much harder to accomplish for a number of reasons cooperating with other nations on these matters would be less likely to occur maintaining the relevant institutional foundations for promoting this goal would be harder and preserving access to bases throughout the world which is needed to accomplish this mission—would be curtailed
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engagement prevents a far more dangerous global security environment the U S presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from provocative action alliance commitments deter states and make partners more secure, reducing security dilemmas U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy Mearsheimer forecasts dangerous multipolar regions with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and regional rivalries, and runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war retrenchment would yield a competitive regional multipolarity with insecurity, arms racing instability proliferation, and bids for regional hegemony which would generate great power war one would see higher military spending and proxy wars and arming of client states insecurity could feed proliferation cascades dangers noted by analysts concerned about prolif go up as the number of nuclear powers grows the risk of "unforeseen crisis dynamics is higher that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the U S lowers security competition the United States' formidable military deter potential rivals If the U S pull back maintaining institutional foundations would be harder
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ence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, International Security Volume 37, Number 3, Winter 2012, p. Project Muse]
Assessing the Security Benefits of Deep Engagement Even if deep engagement's costs are far less than retrenchment advocates claim, they are not worth bearing unless they yield greater benefits. We focus here on the strategy's major security benefits; in the next section, we take up the wider payoffs of the United States' security role for its interests in other realms, notably the global economy—an interaction relatively unexplored by international relations scholars. A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States' overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas.The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the "American Pacifier" is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war.72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia's security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions.73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected [End Page 34] costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia's major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays.74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington—notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region's prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and [End Page 35] Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States.75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism's sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism's optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives.76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case.77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world's key regions. We have already [End Page 36] mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world's core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces.78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem.79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate [End Page 37] over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows.80 Moreover, the risk of "unforeseen crisis dynamics" that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and "pass the buck" to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the mid-twentieth century. The problem is that China's rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, "The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves."81 [End Page 38] Therefore, unless China's rise stalls, "the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War."82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia—just what the United States is doing.83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difficult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world's key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States' formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the "focused enmity" [End Page 39] of the United States.84 All of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America's alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking.85 In the end, therefore, deep engagement reduces security competition and does so in a way that slows the diffusion of power away from the United States. This in turn makes it easier to sustain the policy over the long term. The Wider Benefits of Deep Engagement The case against deep engagement overstates its costs and underestimates its security benefits. Perhaps its most important weakness, however, is that its preoccupation with security issues diverts attention from some of deep engagement's most important benefits: sustaining the global economy and fostering institutionalized cooperation in ways advantageous to U.S. national interests. Economic Benefits Deep engagement is based on a premise central to realist scholarship from E.H. Carr to Robert Gilpin: economic orders do not just emerge spontaneously; they are created and sustained by and for powerful states.86 To be sure, the sheer size of its economy would guarantee the United States a significant role in the politics of the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the fact that it is the leading military power and security provider also enables economic leadership. The security role figures in the creation, maintenance, and expansion of the system. In part because other states—including all but one of the world's largest economies—were heavily dependent on U.S. security protection during the Cold War, the United States was able not only to foster the economic order but also to prod other states to buy into it and to support plans for its progressive expansion.87 Today, as the discussion in the [End Page 40] previous section underscores, the security commitments of deep engagement support the global economic order by reducing the likelihood of security dilemmas, arms racing, instability, regional conflicts and, in extremis, major power war. In so doing, the strategy helps to maintain a stable and comparatively open world economy—a long-standing U.S. national interest. In addition to ensuring the global economy against important sources of insecurity, the extensive set of U.S. military commitments and deployments helps to protect the "global economic commons."One key way is by helping to keep sea-lanes and other shipping corridors freely available for commerce.88 A second key way is by helping to establish and protect property/sovereignty rights in the oceans. Although it is not the only global actor relevant to protecting the global economic commons, the United States has by far the most important role given its massive naval superiority and the leadership role itplays in international economic institutions. If the United States were to pull back from the world, protecting the global economic commons would likely be much harder to accomplish for a number of reasons: cooperating with other nations on these matters would be less likely to occur; maintaining the relevant institutional foundations for promoting this goal would be harder; and preserving access to bases throughout the world—which is needed to accomplish this mission—would likely be curtailed to some degree.
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<h4>The impact is global conflict escalation</h4><p><strong>Brooks et al 13</strong> [Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment Stephen G. Brooks (bio), G. John Ikenberry (bio) and William C. Wohlforth (bio), Stephen G. Brooks; G. John Ikenberry and William C. Wohlforth STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Emin</p><p>ence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, International Security Volume 37, Number 3, Winter 2012, p. Project Muse]</p><p>Assessing the Security Benefits of Deep Engagement Even if <u>deep engagement's</u> costs are far less than retrenchment advocates claim, they are not worth bearing unless they yield greater benefits. We focus here on the strategy's major security benefits; in the next section, we take up the wider payoffs of the United States' security role for its interests in other realms, notably the global economy—an interaction relatively unexplored by international relations scholars. <u>A core premise of deep <mark>engagement</u></mark> <u>is that it <mark>prevents</u></mark> <u>the emergence of <mark>a far more dangerous global security environment</u></mark>. For one thing, as noted above, <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates' overseas <u><mark>presence gives it the leverage to restrain<strong> partners </strong>from</u></mark> <u>taking <mark>provocative action</u></mark>. Perhaps more important, <u>its core <mark>alliance commitments</u></mark> also <u><mark>deter states</u></mark> <u>with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion <mark>and make</mark> its <mark>partners more secure, reducing</mark> their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus </u>stoke <u><mark>security dilemmas</u></mark>.<u>The</u> <u>contention that engaged <mark>U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy</mark> is consistent with influential variants of realist theory</u>. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the "American Pacifier" is provided in the works of John <u><mark>Mearsheimer</u></mark>, who <u><mark>forecasts</u> <u>dangerous multipolar regions</mark> replete <mark>with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and</mark> associated preventive war temptations</u>, <u><mark>regional</u> <u>rivalries, and</mark> even <mark>runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war</u></mark>.72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia's security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions.<u>73</u> Defensive realists maintain that the high expected [End Page 34] costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia's major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays.74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? <u>Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington—notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region's prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced</u>. Arguably <u>the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China</u>. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and [End Page 35] Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States.<u>75</u> The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism's sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism's optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: <u>states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs</u> among the various objectives.76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that <u>even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed</u> sometimes <u>the case</u>.<u>77</u> In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, <u>U.S. <mark>retrenchment would</mark> result in a significant deterioration in the</u> <u>security environment in at least some of the world's key regions.</u> We have already [End Page 36] mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that <u>the withdrawal of the American pacifier will <mark>yield</u></mark> either <u><mark>a competitive regional multipolarity</u></mark> complete<u> <mark>with</mark> associated <mark>insecurity, arms racing</mark>, crisis <mark>instability</mark>, nuclear <mark>proliferation, and</mark> the like, or <mark>bids for regional hegemony</u></mark>, <u><mark>which</u></mark> <u>may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain</u> (and <u>which</u> in any case <u><mark>would generate</mark> </u>intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional <u><mark>great power war</mark>). </u> Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world's core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, <u>overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place</u>. <u>Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, <mark>one would see</mark> overall <mark>higher</mark> levels of <mark>military spending</mark> and innovation <mark>and</mark> a higher likelihood of competitive regional</u> <u><mark>proxy wars and arming of client states</u></mark>—<u>all of which would be concerning</u>, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. <u>Greater regional <mark>insecurity could</mark> well <mark>feed proliferation cascades</mark>, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to</u> <u>create nuclear forces</u>.78 It is unlikely that <u>proliferation decisions</u> by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they <u>would</u> likely <u>generate pressure</u> <u>locally for more</u> <u>proliferation</u>. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem.<u>79</u> Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate [End Page 37] over <u>the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up</u>. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. <u>Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt</u> before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. <u>Confidence in </u>such<u> probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states</u>. In addition, <u>many</u> of the other <u><mark>dangers noted by analysts </u></mark>who are <u><mark>concerned about</mark> the destabilizing effects of nuclear <mark>prolif</mark>eration</u>—<u>including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly</u> <u>survivable forces</u>—<u>seem prone to <mark>go up as the number of nuclear powers grows</mark>.</u>80 Moreover, <u><mark>the risk of "unforeseen crisis dynamics</mark>" that could spin out of</u> <u>control <mark>is</mark> also</u> <u><mark>higher</u></mark> <u>as the number of nuclear powers increases</u>. Finally, <u>add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome.</u> The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and "pass the buck" to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the mid-twentieth century. The problem is that China's rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, "The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves."<u>81</u> [End Page 38] Therefore, unless China's rise stalls, "the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War."82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia—just what the United States is doing.<u>83</u> In sum, <u>the argument <mark>that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship</u></mark>, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difficult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. <u><mark>By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>lowers security competition</mark> in the world's key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities</u>. <u>Alliance ties dissuade partners from</u> <u>ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals</u>. On top of all this, <u><mark>the United States' formidable military</u></mark> machine may <u><mark>deter</u></mark> entry by <u><mark>potential rivals</u></mark>. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the "focused enmity" [End Page 39] of the United States.84 All of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America's alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking.<u>85</u> In the end, therefore, deep engagement reduces security competition and does so in a way that slows the diffusion of power away from the United States. This in turn makes it easier to sustain the policy over the long term. The Wider Benefits of Deep Engagement The case against deep engagement overstates its costs and underestimates its security benefits. Perhaps its most important weakness, however, is that its preoccupation with security issues diverts attention from some of deep engagement's most important benefits: sustaining the global economy and fostering institutionalized cooperation in ways advantageous to U.S. national interests. Economic Benefits Deep engagement is based on a premise central to realist scholarship from E.H. Carr to Robert Gilpin: economic orders do not just emerge spontaneously; they are created and sustained by and for powerful states.86 To be sure, the sheer size of its economy would guarantee the United States a significant role in the politics of the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the fact that it is the leading military power and security provider also enables economic leadership. The security role figures in the creation, maintenance, and expansion of the system. In part because other states—including all but one of the world's largest economies—were heavily dependent on U.S. security protection during the Cold War, the United States was able not only to foster the economic order but also to prod other states to buy into it and to support plans for its progressive expansion.<u>87</u> Today, as the discussion in the [End Page 40] previous section underscores, <u>the security commitments of deep engagement support the global economic order by reducing the likelihood of security dilemmas, arms racing, instability, regional conflicts and, in extremis, major power war. In so doing, the strategy helps to maintain a stable and</u> <u>comparatively open world economy</u>—<u>a long-standing U.S. national interest.</u> In addition to ensuring the global economy against important sources of insecurity, <u>the extensive set of U.S. military commitments and deployments helps to protect the "global economic commons."One key way is by helping to keep sea-lanes and other shipping corridors freely available for commerce</u>.88 A second key way is by helping to establish and protect property/sovereignty rights in the oceans. <u>Although it is not the only global actor relevant to protecting the global economic commons, the United States has by far the most important role given its massive naval superiority and the leadership role itplays in international economic institutions. <mark>If the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates were to <mark>pull back</mark> from the world, protecting the global economic commons would likely be much harder to accomplish for a number of reasons</u>: <u>cooperating with other nations on these matters would be less likely to occur</u>; <u><mark>maintaining</mark> the</u> <u>relevant <mark>institutional</mark> <mark>foundations</mark> for promoting this goal <mark>would be harder</u></mark>; <u>and preserving access to bases throughout the world</u>—<u>which is needed to accomplish this mission—would </u>likely <u>be curtailed</u> to some degree. </p>
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
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Texas
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2
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Northwestern Esman-McCue
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Moss
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Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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cx
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college
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743,536 |
Credibility on human rights issues is key to soft power and international institutions
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Koh 2007 )
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Koh 2007 (Harold, Dean and Gerard C. & Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1998-2001; Attorney-Adviser at the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice, 1983-85., Restoring America's Human Rights Reputation, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1684/)
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the United States' image has plummeted abroad since September 11, anti- Americanism is becoming entrenched America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power the United States must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation Protecting our human rights system and reputation is a core challenge for the global rule of law
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America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power U S must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation Protecting our human rights system and reputation is, , a core challenge for global rule of law
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The Pew Global Attitudes Project recently found, based on in-depth interviews with about 110,000 people in fifty countries, that the United States' image has plummeted abroad since September 11, and that anti- Americanism increasingly is becoming entrenched in the twenty-first century. 3 4 America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power. As the director of the survey stated in congressional testimony, "favorable attitudes toward the U.S. declined in Germany, from seventy-eight percent in 2000 to thirtyseven percent currently. The numbers are similar in France, but even worse in Spain, where only twenty-three percent have a favorable view, and in Turkey, where it is twelve percent. Most people in these countries held positive views of the U.S. at the start of the decade."'1 35 Four years ago, I testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that: [I]n its single-minded pursuit of the war against terrorism, the Administration has permitted some human rights concerns to fall by the wayside and has consciously sacrificed others .... But democracy and human rights cannot be pursued in a selective or piecemeal fashion. [Rather, t]he events of September 11th make clear that the United States must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others .... [W]e have the tools to make the world safer and more democratic, [but] if only we use them fairly and consistently. 13 6 If anything, I believe those words even more strongly today. In sum, America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation and a People. What the last six years have taught us is that restoring that human rights reputation is simply too important a task to be left to politicians. Civil society has defended core principles of human rights and humanitarian law throughout the post-World War II Age of Human Rights. Protecting our human rights system and reputation is, and must remain, a core challenge for all thinking twenty-first-century citizens, especially those lawyers, educators, and law students, who are the guardians of tomorrow's global rule of law
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<h4>Credibility on human rights issues is key to soft power and international institutions</h4><p><strong>Koh 2007</strong> (Harold, Dean and Gerard C. & Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1998-2001; Attorney-Adviser at the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice, 1983-85., Restoring America's Human Rights Reputation, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1684/<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>The Pew Global Attitudes Project recently found, based on in-depth interviews with about 110,000 people in fifty countries, that <u>the United States' image has plummeted abroad since September 11,</u> and that <u>anti- Americanism</u> increasingly <u>is becoming entrenched</u> in the twenty-first century. 3 4 <u><strong><mark>America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power</u></strong></mark>. As the director of the survey stated in congressional testimony, "favorable attitudes toward the U.S. declined in Germany, from seventy-eight percent in 2000 to thirtyseven percent currently. The numbers are similar in France, but even worse in Spain, where only twenty-three percent have a favorable view, and in Turkey, where it is twelve percent. Most people in these countries held positive views of the U.S. at the start of the decade."'1 35 Four years ago, I testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that: [I]n its single-minded pursuit of the war against terrorism, the Administration has permitted some human rights concerns to fall by the wayside and has consciously sacrificed others .... But democracy and human rights cannot be pursued in a selective or piecemeal fashion. [Rather, t]he events of September 11th make clear that <u>the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, <strong>holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others</u></strong></mark> .... [W]e have the tools to make the world safer and more democratic, [but] if only we use them fairly and consistently. 13 6 If anything, I believe those words even more strongly today. In sum, <u><mark>America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation</u></mark> and a People. What the last six years have taught us is that restoring that human rights reputation is simply too important a task to be left to politicians. Civil society has defended core principles of human rights and humanitarian law throughout the post-World War II Age of Human Rights. <u><mark>Protecting our human rights system and reputation is</u>, </mark>and must remain<mark>, <u><strong>a core challenge</u></strong> <u>for</u></mark> all thinking twenty-first-century citizens, especially those lawyers, educators, and law students, who are <u>the</u> guardians of tomorrow's <u><strong><mark>global rule of law</p></u></strong></mark>
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
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Wake
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Cornell Deng-Zhang
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Stone
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AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
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Ah.....
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ndtceda14
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743,537 |
Credible heg solves several existential impacts
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Keck 2014
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Keck 2014 (Zachary, Managing Editor of The Diplomat, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?”, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/,)
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on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar , much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world there is good reason to fear relative decline compared with China hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where no central authority can govern interactions We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East As China grows more powerful, it has sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This has to come at the expense of other powers these have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day All of this highlights the advantages of a unipolar system although the U.S. has asserted military force frequently it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of casualties America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests even if the transitions are managed successfully, there are significant negative effects on international relations it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples include climate change, health pandemics terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction A unipolar system, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and compel others to fall in line the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War
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It’s difficult to imagine China defending open order if it were a power transition periods have been the most destabilizing eras in history the rise of new powers necessitates revisions to rules This is impossible to do in any organized fashion although the U.S. has asserted military force frequently its wars have been fairly limited preponderance has prevented great power war, and restrained regional powers from coming to blows. the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Iran-Iraq wars many challenges can only be solved through multilateral coop Examples include climate change, pandemics terrorism financial crises, and prolif A unipolar system, is uniquely suited for organizing global action preponderance lessens the intensity of competition among players
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Still, on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar power, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world. Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, there is good reason to fear its relative decline compared with China and other emerging nations. To begin with, hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where there is no central authority that can govern interactions between states. We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific (and arguably the Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily has to come at the expense of other powers, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, these powers have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead. All of this highlights some of the advantages of a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has asserted military force quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties involved. At the same time, America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. For instance, the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers like Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests against their newly empowered rivals. But even if the transitions caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises are managed successfully, there are still likely to be significant negative effects on international relations. In today’s “globalized” world, it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples of this include climate change, health pandemics, organized crime and terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among many others. A unipolar system, for all its limitations, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues. This is because there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and, to some degree, compel others to fall in line. In addition, the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War.
| 4,352 |
<h4>Credible heg solves several existential impacts</h4><p><strong>Keck 2014</strong> (Zachary, Managing Editor of The Diplomat, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?”, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/,)</p><p>Still, <u>on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world</u>, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, <u>it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly</u> if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. <u><mark>It’s difficult to imagine China defending</mark> a rule-based, <mark>open </mark>international <mark>order if it were a</mark> unipolar </u><mark>power<u></mark>, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world</u>. Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, <u>there is good reason to fear</u> its <u>relative decline compared with China</u> and other emerging nations. To begin with, <u>hegemonic <mark>transition periods have </mark>historically<mark> been <strong>the most destabilizing eras</strong> in history</u></mark>. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). <u>Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, <mark>the rise of new </mark>global <mark>powers</mark> <mark>necessitates revisions to </mark>the “<mark>rules </mark>of the road.” <mark>This is <strong></mark>nearly <mark>impossible</strong> to do in any organized fashion </mark>given the anarchic nature of the international system, where</u> there is <u>no central authority</u> that <u>can govern interactions</u> between states. <u>We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific</u> (<u>and</u> arguably the <u>Middle East</u>). <u>As China grows more</u> economically and militarily <u>powerful, it has</u> unsurprisingly <u>sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This</u> necessarily <u>has to come at the expense of other powers</u>, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, <u>these</u> powers <u>have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation <strong>grows more tense</strong> with each passing day</u>. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead. <u>All of this highlights</u> some of <u>the advantages of a unipolar system</u>. Namely, <u><mark>although the U.S. has asserted military force</u></mark> quite <u><mark>frequently</u></mark> in the post-Cold War era, <u>it has only fought weak powers and thus <mark>its wars have been <strong>fairly limited</strong> </mark>in terms of</u> the number of <u>casualties</u> involved. At the same time, <u>America’s <mark>preponderance</mark> of power <mark>has prevented </mark>a <strong><mark>great power war</strong>, and </mark>even <mark>restrained </mark>major <strong><mark>regional powers from coming to blows.</u></strong></mark> For instance, <u><mark>the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the </mark>Israeli-Arab or <mark>Iran-Iraq wars </mark>of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises <strong>dramatically</strong>. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers</u> like Japan <u>acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests</u> against their newly empowered rivals. But <u>even if the transitions</u> caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises <u>are managed successfully, there are</u> still likely to be <u>significant negative effects on international relations</u>. In today’s “globalized” world, <u>it is commonly asserted that <mark>many </mark>of the defining <mark>challenges </mark>of our era <mark>can only be solved through multilateral coop</mark>eration. <mark>Examples</u> </mark>of this <u><mark>include <strong>climate change</strong>, <strong></mark>health <mark>pandemics</u></strong></mark>, organized crime and <u><strong><mark>terrorism</strong></mark>, <strong>global <mark>financial crises</strong>, and </mark>the <strong><mark>prolif</mark>eration of weapons of mass destruction</u></strong>, among many others. <u><mark>A unipolar system,</u> </mark>for all its limitations, <u><mark>is <strong>uniquely suited</strong> for organizing </mark>effective <strong><mark>global action</strong></mark> on these transnational issues</u>. This is because <u>there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and</u>, to some degree, <u>compel others to fall in line</u>. In addition, <u>the unipole’s <mark>preponderance </mark>of power <strong><mark>lessens the intensity of competition</strong> among </mark>the global <mark>players </mark>involved</u>. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that <u>global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War</u>.</p>
| null |
1nc
| null | 45,610 | 739 | 17,110 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| 565,262 |
N
|
Wake
|
5
|
NYU Itliong-Zhan
|
McCleary
|
Fed CP (2NR)
AG Politics (2NR
Cede the Political DA
T - USFG
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,538 |
Training health professionals to educate the public about organ donation
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Training health professionals to educate the public about organ donation</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
3
| 431,070 | 1 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,539 |
Human extinction outweighs—view the debate in a consequentialist framework
|
BOSTROM 2011
|
BOSTROM 2011 (Nick, Prof. of Philosophy at Oxford, The Concept of Existential Risk (Draft), http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html)
|
a basis for ethical theory can be found in a commitment to the future of humanity as a vast project The aspiration for a better society—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—is a part of this projec Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average) quality of life of a population- at-a-time We owe some loyalty to this project of the human future Since an existential catastrophe would put an end to the project of the future of humanity we would have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences an ethical view emphasizing that public policy should be determined through informed democratic deliberation would favor existential-risk mitigation if we suppose that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus
|
basis for ethical theory can be found in commitment to the future of humanity The aspiration for a better society is a part of this project Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures an existential catastrophe would put an end to the project of the future of humanity public policy should favor existential-risk mitigation We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations
|
We have thus far considered existential risk from the perspective of utilitarianism (combined with several simplifying assumptions). We may briefly consider how the issue might appear when viewed through the lenses of some other ethical outlooks. For example, the philosopher Robert Adams outlines a different view on these matters: I believe a better basis for ethical theory in this area can be found in quite a different direction—in a commitment to the future of humanity as a vast project, or network of overlapping projects, that is generally shared by the human race. The aspiration for a better society—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—is a part of this project. So are the potentially endless quests for scientific knowledge and philosophical understanding, and the development of artistic and other cultural traditions. This includes the particular cultural traditions to which we belong, in all their accidental historic and ethnic diversity. It also includes our interest in the lives of our children and grandchildren, and the hope that they will be able, in turn, to have the lives of their children and grandchildren as projects. To the extent that a policy or practice seems likely to be favorable or unfavorable to the carrying out of this complex of projects in the nearer or further future, we have reason to pursue or avoid it. … Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average) quality of life of a population- at-a-time, considered in isolation from how it got that way. We owe, I think, some loyalty to this project of the human future. We also owe it a respect that we would owe it even if we were not of the human race ourselves, but beings from another planet who had some understanding of it. (28: 472-473) Since an existential catastrophe would either put an end to the project of the future of humanity or drastically curtail its scope for development, we would seem to have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it, in Adams’ view. We also note that an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences, suggesting that from a preference-satisfactionist perspective it would be a bad thing. In a similar vein, an ethical view emphasizing that public policy should be determined through informed democratic deliberation by all stakeholders would favor existential-risk mitigation if we suppose, as is plausible, that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies upon reasonable deliberation (even if hypothetical future people are not included as stakeholders). We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants.[24] We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus. Further, many theological perspectives deplore naturalistic existential catastrophes, especially ones induced by human activities: If God created the world and the human species, one would imagine that He might be displeased if we took it upon ourselves to smash His masterpiece (or if, through our negligence or hubris, we allowed it to come to irreparable harm).[25]
| 3,812 |
<h4>Human extinction outweighs—view the debate in a <u>consequentialist</u> framework </h4><p><strong>BOSTROM 2011 </strong>(Nick, Prof. of Philosophy at Oxford, The Concept of Existential Risk (Draft), http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html)</p><p>We have thus far considered existential risk from the perspective of utilitarianism (combined with several simplifying assumptions). We may briefly consider how the issue might appear when viewed through the lenses of some other ethical outlooks. For example, the philosopher Robert Adams outlines a different view on these matters: I believe <u>a</u> better <u><mark>basis for ethical theory</u></mark> in this area <u><mark>can be found in</u></mark> quite a different direction—in <u>a <mark>commitment to the future of humanity</mark> as a vast project</u>, or network of overlapping projects, that is generally shared by the human race. <u><mark>The</mark> <mark>aspiration for a better society</mark>—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—<mark>is a part of this projec</u>t</mark>. So are the potentially endless quests for scientific knowledge and philosophical understanding, and the development of artistic and other cultural traditions. This includes the particular cultural traditions to which we belong, in all their accidental historic and ethnic diversity. It also includes our interest in the lives of our children and grandchildren, and the hope that they will be able, in turn, to have the lives of their children and grandchildren as projects. To the extent that a policy or practice seems likely to be favorable or unfavorable to the carrying out of this complex of projects in the nearer or further future, we have reason to pursue or avoid it. … <u><mark>Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project</mark> <mark>of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the</mark> <mark>projects</mark> <mark>of</mark> <mark>our own personal futures</mark>. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average) quality of life of a population- at-a-time</u>, considered in isolation from how it got that way. <u>We owe</u>, I think, <u>some loyalty to this project of the human future</u>. We also owe it a respect that we would owe it even if we were not of the human race ourselves, but beings from another planet who had some understanding of it. (28: 472-473) <u>Since <mark>an existential</mark> <mark>catastrophe would</u></mark> either <u><mark>put an end to the project of the future of humanity</u></mark> or drastically curtail its scope for development, <u>we would</u> seem to <u>have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it</u>, in Adams’ view. We also note that <u>an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences</u>, suggesting that from a preference-satisfactionist perspective it would be a bad thing. In a similar vein, <u>an ethical view emphasizing that <mark>public</mark> <mark>policy should</mark> be determined through informed democratic deliberation</u> by all stakeholders <u>would <mark>favor existential-risk mitigation</mark> if we suppose</u>, as is plausible, <u>that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies</u> upon reasonable deliberation (even if hypothetical future people are not included as stakeholders). <u>We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants</u>.[24] <u><mark>We do not want</mark> <mark>to be the failing link in the chain of generations</mark>, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus</u>. Further, many theological perspectives deplore naturalistic existential catastrophes, especially ones induced by human activities: If God created the world and the human species, one would imagine that He might be displeased if we took it upon ourselves to smash His masterpiece (or if, through our negligence or hubris, we allowed it to come to irreparable harm).[25]</p>
| null |
1nc
|
Case
| 93,995 | 284 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,540 |
only impact in barker is environmental destruction that is empirically denied
|
Taylor, 2k
|
Taylor, director of natural resource studies at the Cato Institute. 2k [jerry, The Environmental Movement: Running Out of Gas “, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4716 ]
|
Americans are growing numb to the constant cries of wolf. Back in the 1960s, environmentalists told us the population explosion would cause civilizational collapse never happened, and even 3rd-World people are living longer In the 1970s, environmentalists told us that we would run out of oil and most other valuable resources by the turn of the century, plunging us into a new Dark Age. It never happened, and resources are cheaper today that is to say, more abundant) than ever before. Later in the 1970s, the environmentalists told us that a new Ice Age was upon us unless we took drastic action to reduce pollution Now we're told that it's warming, not cooling Yet during all this warming, crop yields are at record levels, the economy is humming along quite nicely The environmental lobby is all too filled with pseudo science, quasi-paganism, self-righteousness and anticapitalist fervor for me to spill tears over its troubles Its childish morality plays and economic know-nothingism too often get in the way of serious discussion about real environmental issues. Perhaps Earth Day's flop last week means that we've matured enough to have that discussion.
|
in the 1960s, environmentalists told us the population explosion would cause civilizational collapse 3rd-World people are living longer In the 1970s, we would run out of oil . resources are cheaper today Later the environmentalists told us that a new Ice Age was upon us Now we're told that it's warming Yet crop yields are at record levels, The environmental lobby is too filled with pseudo science
|
Third, Americans are growing numb to the constant cries of wolf. Back in the 1960s, environmentalists told us the population explosion would cause civilizational collapse by 1990. It never happened, and even 3rd-World people are living longer, better-fed lives than ever before. In the 1970s, environmentalists told us that we would run out of oil and most other valuable resources by the turn of the century, plunging us into a new Dark Age. It never happened, and resources are cheaper today (that is to say, more abundant) than ever before. Later in the 1970s, the environmentalists told us that a new Ice Age was upon us unless we took drastic action to reduce pollution (which, we were told, clouded the skies, blocking the sun). Now we're told that it's warming, not cooling, that's the threat and that the four horsemen of the apocalypse are about to descend upon us. Yet during all this warming, crop yields are at record levels, the economy is humming along quite nicely and human welfare has never been better. If everyone's an environmentalist, then no one's an environmentalist. And that's fine with me. The environmental lobby, while it has its good points, is all too filled with pseudo science, quasi-paganism, self-righteousness and anticapitalist fervor for me to spill tears over its troubles. Its childish morality plays and economic know-nothingism too often get in the way of serious discussion about real environmental issues. Perhaps Earth Day's flop last week means that we've matured enough to have that discussion.
| 1,540 |
<h4>only impact in barker is environmental destruction that is empirically denied</h4><p><strong>Taylor, </strong>director of natural resource studies at the Cato Institute. <strong>2k </strong>[jerry, The Environmental Movement: Running Out of Gas “, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4716 ] </p><p>Third, <u>Americans are growing numb to the constant cries of wolf. Back <mark>in the 1960s, environmentalists told us the population explosion would cause civilizational collapse</mark> </u>by 1990. It <u>never happened, and even <mark>3rd-World people are living longer</u></mark>, better-fed lives than ever before. <u><mark>In the 1970s,</mark> environmentalists told us that <mark>we would run out of oil </mark>and most other valuable resources by the turn of the century, plunging us into a new Dark Age<mark>.</mark> It never happened, and <mark>resources are cheaper today</u></mark> (<u>that is to say, more abundant) than ever before.</u> <u><mark>Later</mark> in the 1970s, <mark>the environmentalists told us that a new Ice Age was upon us</mark> unless we took drastic action to reduce pollution</u> (which, we were told, clouded the skies, blocking the sun). <u><mark>Now we're told that it's warming</mark>, not cooling</u>, that's the threat and that the four horsemen of the apocalypse are about to descend upon us. <u><mark>Yet</mark> during all this warming, <mark>crop yields are at record levels,</mark> the economy is humming along quite nicely</u> and human welfare has never been better. If everyone's an environmentalist, then no one's an environmentalist. And that's fine with me. <u><mark>The environmental lobby</u></mark>, while it has its good points, <u><mark>is</mark> all <mark>too filled with pseudo science</mark>, quasi-paganism, self-righteousness and anticapitalist fervor for me to spill tears over its troubles</u>. <u>Its childish morality plays and economic know-nothingism too often get in the way of serious discussion about real environmental issues. Perhaps Earth Day's flop last week means that we've matured enough to have that discussion.</p></u>
|
1nc
| null |
a2
| 431,071 | 1 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,541 |
State action ALONE is sufficient to shut out cartel marijuana- EVEN IF the feds don’t shift
|
Jackson et al 2011
|
Jackson et al 2011 (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)
|
A weak federal response would be enough to shut Mexican DTOs out of the U.S. market If California alone legalized marijuana, and the federal government increased enforcement there is reason to believe the effects on a national level would be stunted. However if other states followed suit, or the federal government maintained or decreased current enforcement levels, the effects would certainly be more widespread there are two primary drug transportation corridors through which Mexican marijuana enters the United States Six states located along these corridors have already legalized medicinal marijuana; three of them are along the southwest border. Legalization of recreational marijuana in any of these states would likely have a significant effect states along these drug corridors often contain distribution centers, and they represent the areas where Mexican DTO influence over the wholesale marijuana market is most concentrated
|
A weak federal response would be enough to shut Mexican DTOs out of the U.S. market If California alone legalized marijuana there is reason to believe the effects on a national level would be stunted. However, if other states followed suit, or the federal government maintained or decreased current enforcement levels, the effects would certainly be more widespread. Six states located along the southwest border. Legalization of recreational marijuana in any of these states would likely have a significant effect they represent the areas where Mexican DTO influence over the wholesale marijuana market is most concentrated
|
A weak federal response would be enough to shut Mexican DTOs out of the U.S. market. If California alone legalized marijuana, and the federal government increased enforcement efforts against domestic interstate trafficking, there is reason to believe the effects on a national level would be stunted. However, if other states followed suit, or the federal government maintained or decreased current enforcement levels, the effects would certainly be more widespread. According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, there are two primary drug transportation corridors through which Mexican marijuana enters the United States and is trafficked to the rest of the country (see Corridors A and B in Figure 3). 96 Six states located along these corridors have already legalized medicinal marijuana; three of them are along the southwest border. Legalization of recreational marijuana in any of these states would likely have a significant effect. This is because states along these drug corridors often contain distribution centers, and they represent the areas where Mexican DTO influence over the wholesale marijuana market is most concentrated.97
| 1,148 |
<h4>State action ALONE is sufficient to shut out cartel marijuana- EVEN IF the feds don’t shift</h4><p><strong>Jackson et al 2011</strong> (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)</p><p><u><strong><mark>A weak federal response would be enough to shut Mexican DTOs out of the U.S. market</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>If California alone legalized marijuana</mark>, and the federal government increased enforcement</u> efforts against domestic interstate trafficking, <u><mark>there is reason to believe the effects on a national level would be stunted. However</u>, <u>if other states followed suit, or the federal government maintained or decreased current enforcement levels, the effects would certainly be more widespread</u>.</mark> According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, <u>there are two primary drug transportation corridors through which Mexican marijuana enters the United States</u> and is trafficked to the rest of the country (see Corridors A and B in Figure 3). 96 <u><mark>Six states located along</mark> these corridors have already legalized medicinal marijuana; three of them are along <mark>the southwest border. Legalization of recreational marijuana in any of these states would likely have a significant effect</u></mark>. This is because <u>states along these drug corridors often contain distribution centers, and <mark>they represent the areas where Mexican DTO influence over the wholesale marijuana market is most concentrated</u></mark>.97</p>
|
2nc
|
Solvency
|
cartels
| 430,453 | 8 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,542 |
ban xenotransplantation
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>ban xenotransplantation </h4>
| null |
1nc
|
3
| 431,072 | 1 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,543 |
Topical action requires government action—they don’t
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Topical action requires government action—they don’t </h4>
| null |
1nc
|
4
| 431,073 | 1 | 17,110 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| 565,262 |
N
|
Wake
|
5
|
NYU Itliong-Zhan
|
McCleary
|
Fed CP (2NR)
AG Politics (2NR
Cede the Political DA
T - USFG
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,544 |
Credible heg solves several existential impacts
|
Keck 2014
|
Keck 2014 (Zachary, Managing Editor of The Diplomat, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?”, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/,)
|
on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar , much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world there is good reason to fear relative decline compared with China hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where no central authority can govern interactions We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East As China grows more powerful, it has sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This has to come at the expense of other powers these have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day All of this highlights the advantages of a unipolar system although the U.S. has asserted military force frequently it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of casualties America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests even if the transitions are managed successfully, there are significant negative effects on international relations it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples include climate change, health pandemics terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction A unipolar system, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and compel others to fall in line the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War
|
It’s difficult to imagine China defending open order if it were a power transition periods have been the most destabilizing eras in history the rise of new powers necessitates revisions to rules This is impossible to do in any organized fashion although the U.S. has asserted military force frequently its wars have been fairly limited preponderance has prevented great power war, and restrained regional powers from coming to blows. the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Iran-Iraq wars many challenges can only be solved through multilateral coop Examples include climate change, pandemics terrorism financial crises, and prolif A unipolar system, is uniquely suited for organizing global action preponderance lessens the intensity of competition among players
|
Still, on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar power, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world. Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, there is good reason to fear its relative decline compared with China and other emerging nations. To begin with, hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where there is no central authority that can govern interactions between states. We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific (and arguably the Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily has to come at the expense of other powers, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, these powers have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead. All of this highlights some of the advantages of a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has asserted military force quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties involved. At the same time, America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. For instance, the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers like Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests against their newly empowered rivals. But even if the transitions caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises are managed successfully, there are still likely to be significant negative effects on international relations. In today’s “globalized” world, it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples of this include climate change, health pandemics, organized crime and terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among many others. A unipolar system, for all its limitations, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues. This is because there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and, to some degree, compel others to fall in line. In addition, the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War.
| 4,352 |
<h4>Credible heg solves several existential impacts</h4><p><strong>Keck 2014</strong> (Zachary, Managing Editor of The Diplomat, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?”, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/,)</p><p>Still, <u>on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world</u>, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, <u>it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly</u> if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. <u><mark>It’s difficult to imagine China defending</mark> a rule-based, <mark>open </mark>international <mark>order if it were a</mark> unipolar </u><mark>power<u></mark>, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world</u>. Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, <u>there is good reason to fear</u> its <u>relative decline compared with China</u> and other emerging nations. To begin with, <u>hegemonic <mark>transition periods have </mark>historically<mark> been <strong>the most destabilizing eras</strong> in history</u></mark>. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). <u>Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, <mark>the rise of new </mark>global <mark>powers</mark> <mark>necessitates revisions to </mark>the “<mark>rules </mark>of the road.” <mark>This is <strong></mark>nearly <mark>impossible</strong> to do in any organized fashion </mark>given the anarchic nature of the international system, where</u> there is <u>no central authority</u> that <u>can govern interactions</u> between states. <u>We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific</u> (<u>and</u> arguably the <u>Middle East</u>). <u>As China grows more</u> economically and militarily <u>powerful, it has</u> unsurprisingly <u>sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This</u> necessarily <u>has to come at the expense of other powers</u>, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, <u>these</u> powers <u>have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation <strong>grows more tense</strong> with each passing day</u>. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead. <u>All of this highlights</u> some of <u>the advantages of a unipolar system</u>. Namely, <u><mark>although the U.S. has asserted military force</u></mark> quite <u><mark>frequently</u></mark> in the post-Cold War era, <u>it has only fought weak powers and thus <mark>its wars have been <strong>fairly limited</strong> </mark>in terms of</u> the number of <u>casualties</u> involved. At the same time, <u>America’s <mark>preponderance</mark> of power <mark>has prevented </mark>a <strong><mark>great power war</strong>, and </mark>even <mark>restrained </mark>major <strong><mark>regional powers from coming to blows.</u></strong></mark> For instance, <u><mark>the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the </mark>Israeli-Arab or <mark>Iran-Iraq wars </mark>of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises <strong>dramatically</strong>. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers</u> like Japan <u>acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests</u> against their newly empowered rivals. But <u>even if the transitions</u> caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises <u>are managed successfully, there are</u> still likely to be <u>significant negative effects on international relations</u>. In today’s “globalized” world, <u>it is commonly asserted that <mark>many </mark>of the defining <mark>challenges </mark>of our era <mark>can only be solved through multilateral coop</mark>eration. <mark>Examples</u> </mark>of this <u><mark>include <strong>climate change</strong>, <strong></mark>health <mark>pandemics</u></strong></mark>, organized crime and <u><strong><mark>terrorism</strong></mark>, <strong>global <mark>financial crises</strong>, and </mark>the <strong><mark>prolif</mark>eration of weapons of mass destruction</u></strong>, among many others. <u><mark>A unipolar system,</u> </mark>for all its limitations, <u><mark>is <strong>uniquely suited</strong> for organizing </mark>effective <strong><mark>global action</strong></mark> on these transnational issues</u>. This is because <u>there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and</u>, to some degree, <u>compel others to fall in line</u>. In addition, <u>the unipole’s <mark>preponderance </mark>of power <strong><mark>lessens the intensity of competition</strong> among </mark>the global <mark>players </mark>involved</u>. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that <u>global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War</u>.</p>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 45,610 | 739 | 17,112 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| 565,260 |
N
|
Wake
|
2
|
Cornell Deng-Zhang
|
Stone
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaty DA
T-legalize
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,545 |
B
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>B</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
Case
| 431,074 | 1 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,546 |
Keeping the law on the books is competitive
|
Walsh 2013
|
Walsh 2013 (Senior Associate, Washington Office on Latin America; also includes contributions from Mark Kleiman (John, “Q&A: Legal Marijuana in Colorado and Washington” http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/05/21-legal-marijuana-colorado-washington)
|
the federal government could enter into cooperative enforcement agreements with the states that could implicitly allow state-regulated systems to function, though without making them legal under federal law The CSA itself directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments in enforcing the drug laws and gives power “to enter into contractual agreements [...] to provide for cooperative enforcement and regulatory activities Federal accommodation of the new state laws would increase the capacity of governments at all levels to shape the behavior of marijuana-industry participants; it might enable a joint enforcement focus on inter-state transactions; it would acknowledge the sovereign powers that the states share with the federal government it would involve effective acquiescence by the executive branch in the open violation of unrepealed federal criminal laws
|
the federal government could enter into c e a s with the states that could implicitly allow state-regulated systems to function, though without making them legal The CSA itself directs that the A G “shall cooperate” with state governments in enforcing and gives power “to enter into contractual agreements for cooperative regulatory activities.” Federal accommodation might enable a joint enforcement focus on inter-state transactions it would involve acquiescence by the executive in open violation of unrepealed federal criminal laws
|
8. Under current federal law, what are options are available to the federal government in responding to the new state laws? Given the constraints imposed by current federal law, the federal government could (1) sue to invalidate the state laws under the Supremacy Clause and to enjoin state authorities from issuing licenses to marijuana growers and sellers; (2) use injunctions, threats of asset forfeiture, or criminal prosecution to shut down state-licensed marijuana businesses; (3) unilaterally establish a set of enforcement priorities to de-emphasize attacks on state-legal businesses; or (4) enter into cooperative enforcement agreements with the states that could implicitly allow state-regulated systems to function, though without making them legal under federal law. The CSA itself (21 U.S.C. §873) directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments in enforcing the drug laws, and gives him the power “to enter into contractual agreements [...] to provide for cooperative enforcement and regulatory activities.” Federal accommodation of the new state laws would offer several potential advantages. It would increase the capacity of governments at all levels to shape the behavior of marijuana-industry participants; it might enable a joint enforcement focus on inter-state transactions; it would acknowledge the sovereign powers that the states share with the federal government; and it would enable the acquisition of more knowledge than is now available about the operations and consequences of legal, open marijuana markets. On the other hand, it would involve effective acquiescence by the executive branch in the open violation of unrepealed federal criminal laws, and its consistency with treaty obligations is questionable.
| 1,781 |
<h4>Keeping the law on the books is competitive</h4><p><strong>Walsh 2013</strong> (Senior Associate, Washington Office on Latin America; also includes contributions from Mark Kleiman (John, “Q&A: Legal Marijuana in Colorado and Washington” http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/05/21-legal-marijuana-colorado-washington)</p><p>8. Under current federal law, what are options are available to the federal government in responding to the new state laws? Given the constraints imposed by current federal law, <u><mark>the federal government could</u></mark> (1) sue to invalidate the state laws under the Supremacy Clause and to enjoin state authorities from issuing licenses to marijuana growers and sellers; (2) use injunctions, threats of asset forfeiture, or criminal prosecution to shut down state-licensed marijuana businesses; (3) unilaterally establish a set of enforcement priorities to de-emphasize attacks on state-legal businesses; or (4) <u><mark>enter into c</mark>ooperative <mark>e</mark>nforcement <mark>a</mark>greement<mark>s with the states that could implicitly allow state-regulated systems to function, though <strong>without making them legal</strong></mark> under federal law</u>. <u><mark>The CSA itself</u></mark> (21 U.S.C. §873) <u><mark>directs that the A</mark>ttorney <mark>G</mark>eneral <mark>“shall cooperate” with</mark> the <mark>state</mark> and local <mark>governments in enforcing</mark> the drug laws</u>, <u><mark>and gives</u></mark> him the <u><mark>power “to enter into contractual agreements</mark> [...] to provide <mark>for cooperative</mark> enforcement and <mark>regulatory activities</u>.”</mark> <u><mark>Federal accommodation</mark> of the new state laws would</u> offer several potential advantages. It would <u>increase the capacity of governments at all levels to shape the behavior of marijuana-industry participants; it <mark>might enable a joint enforcement focus on inter-state transactions</mark>; it would acknowledge the sovereign powers that the states share with the federal government</u>; and it would enable the acquisition of more knowledge than is now available about the operations and consequences of legal, open marijuana markets. On the other hand, <u><mark>it would involve</mark> effective <mark>acquiescence by the executive</mark> branch <mark>in</mark> the <strong><mark>open violation of unrepealed federal criminal laws</u></strong></mark>, and its consistency with treaty obligations is questionable.</p>
|
2nc
|
Solvency
|
cartels
| 56,739 | 17 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,547 |
No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant
|
Mueller 10
|
Mueller 10 (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)
|
Politicians preach . This was dramatic risk inflation , terrorist groups have exhibited only limited desire and progress armed theft of fissile material is unlikely chase would be immediate terrorists have to transport it over unfamiliar terrain Once outside terrorists would need a well-equipped machine shop and skilled scientists technical requirements verge on the unfeasible Adopting bias in the terrorists’ favor the cumulative odds drop to one in three billion They are unlikely to be sold a bomb The terrorist group might steal a “loose nuke none exist. bombs have devices that destroy the bomb if tampered with. codes are required if a state were to collapse weapons remain under heavy guard al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond the Internet
|
Politicians preach This was dramatic risk inflation terrorist groups have exhibited only limited desire and progress armed theft of fissile material is unlikely chase would be immediate terrorists have to transport it over unfamiliar terrain Once outside terrorists would need a well-equipped machine shop and skilled scientists technical requirements verge on the unfeasible Adopting bias in the terrorists’ favor the cumulative odds drop to one in three billion They are unlikely to be sold a bomb The terrorist group might steal a “loose nuke none exist bombs have devices that destroy the bomb if tampered with. codes are required if a state were to collapse weapons remain under heavy guard al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond the Internet.
|
Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.
| 18,687 |
<h4>No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant</h4><p><u><strong>Mueller 10</u></strong> (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)</p><p><u><mark>Politicians</mark> </u>of all stripes<u> <mark>preach</mark> </u>to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York<u>. <mark>This</u> <u>was</mark> </u>an early expression of a pattern of<u> <mark>dramatic risk inflation</u></mark> that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions<u>, <mark>terrorist groups</u></mark> seem to <u><mark>have exhibited only limited desire and</mark> </u>even less<u> <mark>progress</mark> </u>in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright <u><mark>armed theft of fissile material is</u></mark> exceedingly<u><mark> unlikely</mark> </u>not only because of the resistance of guards, but because <u><mark>chase would be immediate</u></mark>. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If<u> <mark>terrorists</mark> </u>were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material,<u> </u>they would then probably <u><mark>have to transport it</u></mark> a long distance<u><mark> over unfamiliar terrain</u></mark> and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. <u><mark>Once outside</mark> </u>the country with their precious booty, <u><mark>terrorists would need</mark> </u>to set up<u> <mark>a </u></mark>large and<u><mark> well-equipped machine shop</mark> </u>to manufacture a bomb<u> <mark>and</mark> </u>then to populate it with a very select team of highly<u><mark> skilled scientists</u></mark>, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the <u><mark>technical requirements</u></mark> in several fields <u><mark>verge on the unfeasible</u></mark>. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. <u><mark>Adopting</mark> </u>probability estimates that purposely and heavily<u> <mark>bias </u></mark>the case <u><mark>in the terrorists’ favor</u></mark>—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, <u><mark>the cumulative odds</mark> </u>that they will be able to pull off the deed <u><mark>drop to one in</mark> </u>well over<u> <mark>three billion</u></mark>. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. <u><mark>They are unlikely to be</mark> </u>given or<u> <mark>sold a bomb</u></mark> by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. <u><mark>The terrorist group might</u></mark> also seek to <u><mark>steal</mark> </u>or illicitly purchase<u> <mark>a “loose nuke</u></mark>“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that <u><strong><mark>none exist</strong></mark>. </u>All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished <u><mark>bombs have</mark> </u>been out-fitted with <u><mark>devices that</u></mark> trigger a non-nuclear explosion that <u><mark>destroy</u></mark>s <u><mark>the bomb if </u></mark>it is<u><mark> tampered with.</mark> </u>And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple<u><mark> codes are required</mark> </u>not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge <u><mark>if a </u></mark>nuclear<u><mark> state were to</mark> </u>utterly<u> <mark>collapse</u></mark>; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear<u> <mark>weapons </u></mark>would probably <u><mark>remain under heavy guard</u></mark> by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that <u><mark>al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond</mark> </u>searching<u> <mark>the Internet</u>.</mark> After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
a2
| 47,970 | 226 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,548 |
“Legalize” Must make an activity lawful--- doesnt allow discretion to prohibit
|
Quinn 92
|
Quinn 92 – Judge Quinn, Supreme Court of Colorado, 826 P.2d 1241; 1992 Colo. LEXIS 53; 16 BTR 133, 1-27, Lexis
|
we are satisfied the term "legalize" correctly and fairly expresses the true intent and meaning The word "legalize" means "to make legal" or "to give legal validity see also Black's Law legalize means "to make legal or lawful" or "to confirm or validate what was before void or unlawful In the context of the phrase "to legalize limited gaming the word "legalize" expresses the sense that these cities will be required to legislate so as to make limited gaming legal within their respective municipalities. we do not construe the word "legalize" as suggesting that the cities retain the discretion either to legalize or to prohibit limited gaming as they see fit. Nothing persuades us that the choice of language is in any way misrepresentative of the true intent
|
"legalize correctly expresses true intent and meaning to make legal or lawful legalize" expresses required to legislate to make legal we do not construe legalize" as suggesting cities retain discretion to legalize or prohibit
|
Turning to Verlo's claim, we are satisfied that the Board's use of the term "legalize" in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause correctly and fairly expresses the true intent and meaning of the proposed constitutional amendment. The word "legalize" means "to make legal" or "to give legal validity or sanction to." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1290 (1986); see also Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (legalize means "to make legal or lawful" or "to confirm or validate what was before void or unlawful"). In the context of the phrase "to legalize limited gaming in the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay," the word "legalize" expresses the sense that these cities will be required to legislate so as to make limited gaming legal within their respective municipalities. Contrary to Verlo's argument, we do not construe the word "legalize" as somehow suggesting that the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay [**11] will retain the discretion either to legalize or to prohibit limited gaming as they see fit. The Board's decision to add a sentence to the summary stating that under the proposed constitutional amendment the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay would be "required to enact certain ordinances to implement limited gaming" merely expands upon what is conveyed in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause by the phrase "to legalize limited gaming in the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay." Nothing in the record persuades us that the Board's choice of language in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause is in any way misrepresentative of the true intent and meaning of the proposed constitutional amendment. We accordingly affirm the ruling of the Board.
| 1,748 |
<h4>“Legalize” Must make an activity lawful--- doesnt allow <u>discretion</u> to prohibit </h4><p><strong>Quinn 92</strong> – Judge Quinn, Supreme Court of Colorado, 826 P.2d 1241; 1992 Colo. LEXIS 53; 16 BTR 133, 1-27, Lexis</p><p>Turning to Verlo's claim, <u>we are satisfied</u> that the Board's use of <u>the term <mark>"legalize</mark>"</u> in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause <u><mark>correctly</mark> and fairly <mark>expresses</mark> the <strong><mark>true intent and meaning</strong></mark> </u>of the proposed constitutional amendment. <u>The word "legalize" means "<strong>to make legal" or "to give legal validity</strong> </u>or sanction to." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1290 (1986); <u>see also Black's Law</u> Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (<u>legalize means "<strong><mark>to make legal or lawful</strong></mark>" or "to confirm or validate what was before void or unlawful</u>"). <u>In the context of the phrase "to legalize limited gaming</u> in the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay," <u>the word "<mark>legalize" expresses</mark> the sense that these cities will be <strong><mark>required </strong>to legislate</mark> so as <mark>to make</mark> limited gaming <mark>legal</mark> within their respective municipalities. </u>Contrary to Verlo's argument, <u><mark>we <strong>do not construe</mark> the word "<mark>legalize" as</u></strong></mark> somehow <u><strong><mark>suggesting</mark> that the <mark>cities</u></strong></mark> of Manitou Springs and Fairplay [**11] will <u><strong><mark>retain</mark> the <mark>discretion</strong></mark> either <mark>to legalize or</mark> to <mark>prohibit</mark> limited gaming</u> <u>as they see fit.</u> The Board's decision to add a sentence to the summary stating that under the proposed constitutional amendment the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay would be "required to enact certain ordinances to implement limited gaming" merely expands upon what is conveyed in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause by the phrase "to legalize limited gaming in the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay." <u>Nothing</u> in the record <u>persuades us that the</u> Board's <u>choice of language</u> in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause <u>is in any way misrepresentative of the true intent</u> and meaning of the proposed constitutional amendment. We accordingly affirm the ruling of the Board.</p>
| null |
1nc
|
3
| 430,284 | 78 | 17,112 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| 565,260 |
N
|
Wake
|
2
|
Cornell Deng-Zhang
|
Stone
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaty DA
T-legalize
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,549 |
1. The agent United State is the federal government
|
Family Guardian, 9
|
Family Guardian, 9 Family Guardian, Christian Ministry 8/16/09
|
The United States is a government, and, consequently, a body politic and corporate
United States v. Maurice
|
The United States is a government, and, consequently, a body politic and corporate
|
INVESTIGATION INTO THE MEANING OF THE TERM "UNITED STATES" http://famguardian.org/subjects/Taxes/ChallJurisdiction/Definitions/freemaninvestigation.htm
In case anyone has trouble with considering the U.S. a corporation, s/he will find this case, decided in 1823, of interest:
The United States is a government, and, consequently, a body politic and corporate This great corporation was ordained and established by the American people
[United States v. Maurice, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15, 747, 2 Brock 96, Circuit Court, D. Virginia]
| 526 |
<h4>1. The agent United State is the federal government</h4><p><strong>Family Guardian, 9</strong> Family Guardian, Christian Ministry 8/16/09 </p><p>INVESTIGATION INTO THE MEANING OF THE TERM "UNITED STATES" http://famguardian.org/subjects/Taxes/ChallJurisdiction/Definitions/freemaninvestigation.htm</p><p>In case anyone has trouble with considering the U.S. a corporation, s/he will find this case, decided in 1823, of interest:</p><p> <u><mark>The United States is a government, and, consequently, a body politic and corporate</u></mark> This great corporation was ordained and established by the American people</p><p> [<u>United States v. Maurice</u>, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15, 747, 2 Brock 96, Circuit Court, D. Virginia]</p>
| null |
1nc
|
4
| 431,075 | 1 | 17,110 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| 565,262 |
N
|
Wake
|
5
|
NYU Itliong-Zhan
|
McCleary
|
Fed CP (2NR)
AG Politics (2NR
Cede the Political DA
T - USFG
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,550 |
The United States should legalize the sale of all human organs from cadavers by applying strict scrutiny to overrule current bans on the sale of all human organs from cadavers on the grounds that the United States Constitution guarantees the fundamental right to safe and effective medical treatment to protect life.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States should legalize the sale of all human organs from cadavers by applying strict scrutiny to overrule current bans on the sale of all human organs from cadavers on the grounds that the United States Constitution guarantees the fundamental right to safe and effective medical treatment to protect life.</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
3
| 431,076 | 1 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,551 |
No impact—Relative inequality decreasing
|
Kenny 10
|
Kenny 10 [Charles, a contributing editor to Foreign Policy, is author of the forthcoming book Getting Better: Why Global Development Is Succeeding and How We Can Improve the World Even More, Best. Decade. Ever. SEPT. / OCT. 2010 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/16/best_decade_ever?page=full]
|
For all its problems, the first 10 years of the 21st century were in fact humanity's finest, a time when more people lived better, longer, more peaceful, and more prosperous lives than ever before. in 1990, roughly half the global population lived on less than $1 a day; by 07, the proportion had shrunk to 28 percent average worldwide incomes are at their highest levels ever growth has been faster in poor places like sub-Saharan Africa than across the world as a whole. cereal prices are now a fraction of what they were the developing world's population classified as "undernourished" fell even at the height of a global spike in food prices. Ag productivity continues to climb cereal yields increased at nearly twice the rate of population growth in the developing world. hundreds of millions of people are eating more -- and better -- each day.
| null |
But these horrific events, though mortal and economic catastrophes for many millions, don't sum up the decade as experienced by most of the planet's 6-billion-plus people. For all its problems, the first 10 years of the 21st century were in fact humanity's finest, a time when more people lived better, longer, more peaceful, and more prosperous lives than ever before. Consider that in 1990, roughly half the global population lived on less than $1 a day; by 2007, the proportion had shrunk to 28 percent -- and it will be lower still by the close of 2010. That's because, though the financial crisis briefly stalled progress on income growth, it was just a hiccup in the decade's relentless GDP climb. Indeed, average worldwide incomes are at their highest levels ever, at roughly $10,600 a year -- and have risen by as much as a quarter since 2000. Some 1.3 billion people now live on more than $10 a day, suggesting the continued expansion of the global middle class. Even better news is that growth has been faster in poor places like sub-Saharan Africa than across the world as a whole. There are still 1 billion people who go to bed each night desperately hungry, but cereal prices are now a fraction of what they were in the 1960s and 1970s. That, alongside continued income growth, is why the proportion of the developing world's population classified as "undernourished" fell from 34 percent in 1970 to 17 percent in 2008, even at the height of a global spike in food prices. Agricultural productivity, too, continues to climb: From 2000 to 2008, cereal yields increased at nearly twice the rate of population growth in the developing world. And though famine continues to threaten places such as Zimbabwe, hundreds of millions of people are eating more -- and better -- each day.
| 1,792 |
<h4>No impact—Relative inequality decreasing</h4><p><strong>Kenny 10</strong> [Charles, a contributing editor to Foreign Policy, is author of the forthcoming book Getting Better: Why Global Development Is Succeeding and How We Can Improve the World Even More, Best. Decade. Ever. <u>SEPT. / OCT. 2010 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/16/best_decade_ever?page=full]</p><p></u>But these horrific events, though mortal and economic catastrophes for many millions, don't sum up the decade as experienced by most of the planet's 6-billion-plus people. <u>For all its problems, the first 10 years of the 21st century were in fact humanity's finest, a time when more people lived better, longer, more peaceful, and more prosperous lives than ever before.</u> Consider that <u>in 1990, roughly half the global population lived on less than $1 a day; by</u> 20<u>07, the proportion had shrunk to 28 percent </u>-- and it will be lower still by the close of 2010. That's because, though the financial crisis briefly stalled progress on income growth, it was just a hiccup in the decade's relentless GDP climb. Indeed, <u>average worldwide incomes are at their highest levels ever</u>, at roughly $10,600 a year -- and have risen by as much as a quarter since 2000. Some 1.3 billion people now live on more than $10 a day, suggesting the continued expansion of the global middle class. Even better news is that <u>growth has been faster in poor places like sub-Saharan Africa than across the world as a whole. </u> There are still 1 billion people who go to bed each night desperately hungry, but <u>cereal prices are now a fraction of what they were</u> in the 1960s and 1970s. That, alongside continued income growth, is why the proportion of <u>the developing world's population classified as "undernourished" fell </u>from 34 percent in 1970 to 17 percent in 2008, <u>even at the height of a global spike in food prices. Ag</u>ricultural <u>productivity</u>, too, <u>continues to climb</u>: From 2000 to 2008, <u>cereal yields increased at nearly twice the rate of population growth in the developing world.</u> And though famine continues to threaten places such as Zimbabwe, <u>hundreds of millions of people are eating more -- and better -- each day.</p></u>
| null |
1nc
|
Case
| 228,477 | 4 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,552 |
No risk of nuclear terrorism---too many obstacles
|
Mearsheimer 14,
|
John J. Mearsheimer 14, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “America Unhinged”, January 2, nationalinterest.org/article/america-unhinged-9639?page=show
|
Am I overlooking terrorism? Not at all terrorism is a minor threat September 11, did not cripple the United States another attack of that magnitude is highly unlikely there has not been a single instance over the past twelve years of a terrorist organization exploding a primitive bomb on American soil, much less striking a major blow What about the possibility that a terrorist group might obtain a nuclear weapon? the chances of that are nil No nuclear-armed state is going to supply terrorists because it would have no control over how the recipients might use that weapon Political turmoil in a nuclear-armed state could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose nuclear weapon, but the United States already has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency. Terrorists might also try to acquire fissile material and build their own bomb But that scenario is extremely unlikely as well: there are significant obstacles to getting enough material and even bigger obstacles to building virtually every country has a profound interest in making sure no terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, because they cannot be sure they will not be the target of a nuclear attack, either by the terrorists or another country the terrorists strike. Nuclear terrorism, in short, is not a serious threat. And to the extent that we should worry about it, the main remedy is to encourage and help other states to place nuclear materials in highly secure custody.
|
terrorism is a minor threat. there has not been a single instance over the past twelve years of a primitive bomb What about a nuclear weapon? chances are nil. turmoil in a nuclear-armed state the U St already has detailed plans to deal with that build their own bomb is extremely unlikely there are obstacles to enough material and even bigger obstacles to building every country has interest in making sure no terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, because they cannot be sure they will not be the target of a nuclear attack, either by terrorists or country terrorists strike
|
Am I overlooking the obvious threat that strikes fear into the hearts of so many Americans, which is terrorism? Not at all. Sure, the United States has a terrorism problem. But it is a minor threat. There is no question we fell victim to a spectacular attack on September 11, but it did not cripple the United States in any meaningful way and another attack of that magnitude is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. Indeed, there has not been a single instance over the past twelve years of a terrorist organization exploding a primitive bomb on American soil, much less striking a major blow. Terrorism—most of it arising from domestic groups—was a much bigger problem in the United States during the 1970s than it has been since the Twin Towers were toppled.¶ What about the possibility that a terrorist group might obtain a nuclear weapon? Such an occurrence would be a game changer, but the chances of that happening are virtually nil. No nuclear-armed state is going to supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon because it would have no control over how the recipients might use that weapon. Political turmoil in a nuclear-armed state could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose nuclear weapon, but the United States already has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency.¶ Terrorists might also try to acquire fissile material and build their own bomb. But that scenario is extremely unlikely as well: there are significant obstacles to getting enough material and even bigger obstacles to building a bomb and then delivering it. More generally, virtually every country has a profound interest in making sure no terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, because they cannot be sure they will not be the target of a nuclear attack, either by the terrorists or another country the terrorists strike. Nuclear terrorism, in short, is not a serious threat. And to the extent that we should worry about it, the main remedy is to encourage and help other states to place nuclear materials in highly secure custody.
| 2,041 |
<h4>No risk of nuclear terrorism---too many obstacles</h4><p>John J. <strong>Mearsheimer 14,</strong> R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “America Unhinged”, January 2, nationalinterest.org/article/america-unhinged-9639?page=show</p><p><u>Am I overlooking</u> the obvious threat that strikes fear into the hearts of so many Americans, which is <u>terrorism? Not at all</u>. Sure, the United States has a <u><mark>terrorism</u></mark> problem. But it <u><mark>is a <strong>minor threat</u></strong>.</mark> There is no question we fell victim to a spectacular attack on <u>September 11, </u>but it <u>did not cripple the United States</u> in any meaningful way and <u>another attack of that magnitude is <strong>highly unlikely</strong> </u>in the foreseeable future. Indeed, <u><mark>there has not been a <strong>single instance over the past</u> <u>twelve years</u></strong> <u>of</mark> a terrorist organization exploding <mark>a <strong>primitive bomb</strong></mark> on American soil, <strong>much less striking a major blow</u></strong>. Terrorism—most of it arising from domestic groups—was a much bigger problem in the United States during the 1970s than it has been since the Twin Towers were toppled.¶ <u><mark>What about</mark> the possibility that a terrorist group might obtain <mark>a nuclear weapon?</mark> </u>Such an occurrence would be a game changer, but <u>the <mark>chances</mark> of that</u> happening <u><mark>are</u></mark> virtually <u><strong><mark>nil</u></strong>. <u></mark>No nuclear-armed state is going to supply terrorists</u> with a nuclear weapon <u>because it would have no control over how the recipients might use that weapon</u>. <u>Political <mark>turmoil in a nuclear-armed state</mark> could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose nuclear weapon, but <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>St</mark>ates <strong><mark>already has detailed plans</strong> to deal with that</mark> highly unlikely contingency.</u>¶<u> Terrorists might also try to acquire fissile material and <strong><mark>build their own bomb</u></strong></mark>. <u>But that scenario <mark>is <strong>extremely unlikely</mark> as well:</u></strong> <u><mark>there are</mark> significant <mark>obstacles to</mark> <strong>getting <mark>enough material</u></strong> <u>and even bigger obstacles to <strong>building</u></strong></mark> a bomb and then delivering it. More generally, <u>virtually <strong><mark>every country</strong></mark> <mark>has</mark> a profound <mark>interest in making sure no terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, because <strong>they cannot be sure they will not be the target of a nuclear attack</strong>, either by</mark> the <mark>terrorists or </mark>another <mark>country</mark> the <mark>terrorists strike</mark>. Nuclear terrorism, in short, is not a serious threat. And to the extent that we should worry about it, the main remedy is to encourage and help other states to place nuclear materials in highly secure custody.</p></u>
|
1nc
| null |
a2
| 21,456 | 411 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,553 |
Mexico is winning the war on drugs – must vigilantly pursue a military strategy—framing issue—they are capturing key leaders—that’s keyBonner, 12
|
. “The Cartel Crackdown.” Foreign Affairs. 91:3. EBSCO: Academic Search Elite.]
|
[Robert. Senior Principal of the Sentinel HS Group. He formerly served as Administrator of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and as Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection. “The Cartel Crackdown.” Foreign Affairs. 91:3. EBSCO: Academic Search Elite.]
|
In his pursuit of the cartels, Calderón has employed what is known as the kingpin strategy, . In the last three years alone, using this strategy, the Mexican government has captured or killed over 40 major cartel members. One of the greatest successes came in December 2009, when Mexican marines essentially destroyed the Beltrán Leyva cartel Even the Zetas (a spinoff of the Gulf cartel) and the Sinaloa, although they remain strong, have been disrupted; in early 2012, the Mexican government apprehended a founder of the Zetas and a high-level member of the Sinaloa cartel, among others When Mexico removes the kingpins, their successors, and their key operators, the cartels will splinter and collapse, unable to threaten the state any longer. That is when Mexico will have won its war against the drug organizations. Such a victory is now within the country's grasp, but Calderón does not have time to finish the job before he leaves office in December. Fortunately for Mexico, he will bequeath to his successor major successes against the cartels, newly invigorated institutions, and a sound strategy.
|
In his pursuit of the cartels, Calderón has employed the kingpin which the last three years Mexican government captured 40 major cartel members Mexican marines e destroyed the Beltrán Leyva cartel Even the Zetas and Sinaloa have been disrupted Mexican apprehended a founder of the Zetas and a high-level member of the Sinaloa cartel When Mexico removes the kingpins the cartels will collapse, unable to threaten the state That is when Mexico will have won its w Such a victory is within grasp, Calderón does not have time to finish the job . Fortunately he will bequeath to his successor major successes against the cartels newly invigorated institutions, and a sound strategy.
|
In his pursuit of the cartels, Calderón has employed what is known as the kingpin strategy, which Colombia used to defeat its drug cartels in the 1990s. This strategy calls for exploiting all the cartels' vulnerabilities: intercepting their communications, disrupting the supply and distribution of drugs and the chemicals needed to make them, and seizing the assets of cartel bosses. Once authorities have weakened a particular group, they can find and arrest the kingpin and the other essential members of the organization, including the leader's potential successors. In the last three years alone, using this strategy, the Mexican government has captured or killed over 40 major cartel members. One of the greatest successes came in December 2009, when Mexican marines essentially destroyed the Beltrán Leyva cartel, a spinoff of the Sinaloa, after killing its leader, Arturo Beltrán Leyva, and capturing nearly all his top deputies. Meanwhile, Mexican forces have also dismantled the Tijuana cartel and severely weakened the Gulf, the Juarez, and La Familia Michoacana cartels. Even the Zetas (a spinoff of the Gulf cartel) and the Sinaloa, although they remain strong, have been disrupted; in early 2012, the Mexican government apprehended a founder of the Zetas and a high-level member of the Sinaloa cartel, among others. To dismantle the remaining cartels, Calderón's successor will need to use an essential element of the kingpin strategy that has so far been missing: an aggressive asset-seizure program. This would involve identifying and confiscating not only the funds that the cartels use to conduct their criminal activity but also the assets that cartel members have purchased with illicit profits: houses, ranches, airplanes, boats, vehicles, and otherwise legitimate businesses. Such efforts against the Colombian cartels in the 1990s allowed Bogota to arrest their leaders. The Colombian government found the cartel kingpins Pablo Escobar and Jose Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha after freezing their assets, which exposed them by making it harder for them to pay friends and bribe public officials for protection. If Mexico follows this example, it will find it easier to apprehend the heads of the Sinaloa and Zetas cartels. When Mexico removes the kingpins, their successors, and their key operators, the cartels will splinter and collapse, unable to threaten the state any longer. That is when Mexico will have won its war against the drug organizations. Such a victory is now within the country's grasp, but Calderón does not have time to finish the job before he leaves office in December. Fortunately for Mexico, he will bequeath to his successor major successes against the cartels, newly invigorated institutions, and a sound strategy.
| 2,756 |
<h4>Mexico is winning the war on drugs – must vigilantly pursue a military strategy—framing issue—they are capturing <u>key leaders</u>—that’s keyBonner, 12</h4><p>[Robert. Senior Principal of the Sentinel HS Group. He formerly served as Administrator of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and as Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection<u><strong>. “The Cartel Crackdown.” Foreign Affairs. 91:3. EBSCO: Academic Search Elite.]</p><p></strong><mark>In his pursuit of the <strong>cartels</strong>, Calderón has employed</mark> what is known as <mark>the kingpin</mark> strategy,</u> <mark>which</mark> Colombia used to defeat its drug <strong>cartels</strong> in the 1990s. This strategy calls for exploiting all the <strong>cartels</strong>' vulnerabilities: intercepting their communications, disrupting the supply and distribution of drugs and the chemicals needed to make them, and seizing the assets of <strong>cartel</strong> bosses. Once authorities have weakened a particular group, they can find and arrest the kingpin and the other essential members of the organization, including the leader's potential successors<u>.<strong> </strong>In <mark>the last three years</mark> alone, using this strategy, the <mark>Mexican government</mark> has <mark>captured</mark> or killed over <mark>40 major <strong>cartel</strong> members</mark>. One of the greatest successes came in December 2009, when <mark>Mexican marines e</mark>ssentially <mark>destroyed the Beltrán Leyva <strong>cartel</u></strong></mark>, a spinoff of the Sinaloa, after killing its leader, Arturo Beltrán Leyva, and capturing nearly all his top deputies. Meanwhile, Mexican forces have also dismantled the Tijuana <strong>cartel</strong> and severely weakened the Gulf, the Juarez, and La Familia Michoacana <strong>cartels</strong>. <u><mark>Even the Zetas</mark> (a spinoff of the Gulf <strong>cartel</strong>) <mark>and</mark> the <mark>Sinaloa</mark>, although they remain strong, <mark>have been disrupted</mark>; in early 2012, the <mark>Mexican</mark> government <mark>apprehended a founder of the Zetas and a high-level member of the</mark> <mark>Sinaloa <strong>cartel</strong></mark>, among others</u>. To dismantle the remaining <strong>cartels</strong>, Calderón's successor will need to use an essential element of the kingpin strategy that has so far been missing: an aggressive asset-seizure program. This would involve identifying and confiscating not only the funds that the <strong>cartels</strong> use to conduct their criminal activity but also the assets that <strong>cartel</strong> members have purchased with illicit profits: houses, ranches, airplanes, boats, vehicles, and otherwise legitimate businesses. Such efforts against the Colombian <strong>cartels</strong> in the 1990s allowed Bogota to arrest their leaders. The Colombian government found the <strong>cartel</strong> kingpins Pablo Escobar and Jose Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha after freezing their assets, which exposed them by making it harder for them to pay friends and bribe public officials for protection. If Mexico follows this example, it will find it easier to apprehend the heads of the Sinaloa and Zetas <strong>cartels</strong>.<u><strong> </strong><mark>When Mexico removes the kingpins</mark>, their successors, and their key operators, <mark>the <strong>cartels</strong> will </mark>splinter and <mark>collapse, unable to threaten the state</mark> any longer. <mark>That is when Mexico will have won its w</mark>ar against the drug organizations. <mark>Such a victory is</mark> now <mark>within</mark> the country's <mark>grasp,</mark> but <mark>Calderón does not have time to finish the job</mark> before he leaves office in December<mark>. Fortunately</mark> for Mexico, <mark>he will bequeath to his successor major successes against the <strong>cartels</mark>, <mark>newly invigorated institutions, and a sound strategy.</p></u></strong></mark>
|
2nc
|
Th at: empirics
|
cartels
| 431,078 | 1 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,554 |
2. legalize requires government action
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>2. legalize requires government action</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
4
| 431,077 | 1 | 17,110 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| 565,262 |
N
|
Wake
|
5
|
NYU Itliong-Zhan
|
McCleary
|
Fed CP (2NR)
AG Politics (2NR
Cede the Political DA
T - USFG
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,555 |
CSA waivers don’t legalize – marijuana still presumptively prohibited nationwide
|
Grabarsky, 13
|
Grabarsky, 13 Todd, Law Clerk, United States Court, Northern District of California. J.D., Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, 2012; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, “CONFLICTING FEDERAL AND STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA POLICIES: ¶ A THREAT TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM,”
|
A Congressional Exemption for Marijuana in Compliance with State Law This Article proposes that Congress act to reconcile the state-federal conflict of laws regarding marijuana by creating an exemption from the CSA and distribution in compliance with approved state laws and regulatory schemes. At the most, Congress could amend the CSA to expressly provide the exemption Such an exemption would allow states to proceed with their marijuana programs while at the same time keeping the drug illegal at the federal level The result would be that medical marijuana would be presumptively prohibited nationwide, except in states that take affirmative legislative and administrative steps to legalize it It is extremely important to note that this proposal does not call for a federal exemption to the CSA for marijuana. the proposed exemption would allow those states' legislation and regulation to operate unimpeded by federal disruption. This will also allow these states to work with the federal authorities in focusing on the state-federal unity of interests in drug enforcement; state agents will still be able and encouraged to work with their federal counterparts to curb the distribution and possession of drugs in states that wish to keep marijuana prohibited, state authorities will continue to cooperate with the federal government to execute the CSA and its state law counterpart.
|
Congress could amend the CSA to expressly provide exemption, Such an exemption would allow states to proceed with their marijuana programs while at the same time keeping the drug illegal at the federal level The result would be marijuana would be presumptively prohibited nationwide except in states that take affirmative legislative and administrative steps to legalize it. It is extremely important to note this does not call for a federal exemption to the CSA for marijuana. in states that wish to keep marijuana prohibited state authorities will continue with the federal government to execute the CSA and state law counterpart
|
B. A Congressional Exemption for Medical Marijuana in Compliance with State Law Because it appears that the federal executive could not viably preserve the federalism balance, this Article turns to Congress. This Article proposes that Congress act to reconcile the state-federal conflict of laws regarding medical marijuana by creating an exemption from the CSA for medical marijuana usage and distribution in compliance with approved state laws and regulatory schemes. At the most, Congress could amend the CSA to expressly provide the exemption, or, at the very least, pass an act prohibiting the Executive from enforcing the CSA's medical marijuana proscription in states that permit it. Such an exemption would allow states to proceed with their medical marijuana programs while at the same time keeping the drug illegal at the federal level. The result would be that medical marijuana would be presumptively prohibited nationwide, except in states that take affirmative legislative and administrative steps (as some have already done) to legalize it. It is extremely important to note that this proposal does not call for a federal exemption to the CSA for medical marijuana. On one hand, in states like California that elect to legalize medical marijuana, the proposed exemption would allow those states' legislation and regulation to operate unimpeded by federal disruption. This will also allow these states to work with the federal authorities in focusing on the state-federal unity of interests in drug enforcement; for example California state agents will still be able and encouraged to work with their federal counterparts to curb the distribution and possession of drugs that remain illegal on both the federal and state level. On the other hand, in states that wish to keep medical marijuana prohibited, state authorities will continue to cooperate with the federal government to execute the CSA and its state law counterpart.
| 1,941 |
<h4>CSA waivers don’t legalize – marijuana still presumptively prohibited nationwide</h4><p><strong>Grabarsky, 13</strong> Todd, Law Clerk, United States Court, Northern District of California. J.D., Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, 2012; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, “CONFLICTING FEDERAL AND STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA POLICIES: ¶ <u>A THREAT TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM,”</p><p></u>B. <u>A Congressional Exemption for</u> Medical <u>Marijuana in Compliance with State Law</u> Because it appears that the federal executive could not viably preserve the federalism balance, this Article turns to Congress. <u>This Article proposes that Congress act to reconcile the state-federal conflict of laws regarding</u> medical <u>marijuana by creating an exemption from the CSA</u> for medical marijuana usage <u>and distribution in compliance with approved state laws and regulatory schemes.</u> <u>At the most, <mark>Congress could amend the CSA to expressly provide</mark> the <mark>exemption</u>,</mark> or, at the very least, pass an act prohibiting the Executive from enforcing the CSA's medical marijuana proscription in states that permit it. <u><mark>Such an exemption would allow states to proceed with their</u> </mark>medical <u><mark>marijuana programs</mark> <mark>while at the same time <strong>keeping the drug</strong> <strong>illegal at the federal level</u></strong></mark>.<u> <mark>The result would be</mark> that medical <mark>marijuana would be <strong>presumptively prohibited nationwide</strong></mark>, <mark>except in states that take affirmative legislative and administrative steps</u></mark> (as some have already done) <u><mark>to legalize it</u>.</mark> <u><mark>It is extremely important to note</mark> that <mark>this</mark> proposal <mark>does not call for a federal exemption to the CSA for</u></mark> medical <u><mark>marijuana.</u></mark> On one hand, in states like California that elect to legalize medical marijuana, <u>the proposed exemption would allow those states' legislation and regulation to operate unimpeded by federal disruption.</u> <u>This will also allow these states to work with the federal authorities in focusing on the state-federal unity of interests in drug enforcement;</u> for example California <u>state agents will still be able and encouraged to work with their federal counterparts to curb the distribution and possession of drugs</u> that remain illegal on both the federal and state level. On the other hand, <u><mark>in states that wish to keep</u></mark> medical <u><mark>marijuana prohibited</mark>, <mark>state authorities will continue </mark>to cooperate <mark>with the federal government to execute the CSA and </mark>its <mark>state law counterpart</mark>.</p></u>
| null |
1nc
|
3
| 56,734 | 14 | 17,112 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| 565,260 |
N
|
Wake
|
2
|
Cornell Deng-Zhang
|
Stone
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaty DA
T-legalize
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,556 |
Families and friends of two distinct patients can be matched up for two successful transplants under our advocacy-it solves
|
Morley 3’
|
Morley 3’ Michael T. “Increasing the Supply of Organs for Transplantation through Paired Organ Exchanges” Yale Law & Policy Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter, 2003), pp. 221-262 http://www.jstor.org/stable/40232670 PA
|
federal law should be amended so as to allow the already-existing registry of patients in need of organ transplants to bring together different patients on the waiting list in order to save lives A system of paired organ exchanges would facilitate transplantation in situations where a friend or family member of Patient A is incompatible with him, but would be compatible with some other person on the waiting list (Patient B), and a close friend or family member of Patient B is incompatible with her, but compatible with Patient A. The family member of patient A would donate a compatible nonvital organ to patient B, on the condition that the family member of patient B donates a compatible nonvital organ to patient A; hence the phrase "paired organ exchange paired organ exchanges should not only be permitted under federal law, but also facilitated, by expanding the existing national database of patients in need of organs to include information about individuals potentially willing to donate on behalf of each patient , the government could bring together compatible donors and recipients who would otherwise never meet, and in each successful case allow two transplants to occur that might otherwise be impossible
|
federal law should be amended so as to allow the already-existing registry of patients in need of organ transplants to bring together different patients on the waiting list in order to save live paired organ exchanges would facilitate in situations where a friend or family member of Patient A is incompatible with him, but would be compatible with some other person on the waiting list and a close friend or family member of Patient B is incompatible with her, but compatible with Patient A paired organ exchanges should not only be permitted under federal law, but also facilitated, by expanding the existing national database of patients
|
This Note argues that federal law should be amended so as to allow the already-existing registry of patients in need of organ transplants to bring together the families and friends of different patients on the waiting list in order to save lives. There are many people who, although willing to donate a nonvital organ to save the life of a loved one in need of a transplant, are unable to do so due to biological incompatibility.18 A system of paired organ exchanges would facilitate transplantation in situations where a friend or family member of Patient A is incompatible with him, but would be compatible with some other person on the waiting list (Patient B), and a close friend or family member of Patient B is incompatible with her, but compatible with Patient A. The family member of patient A would donate a compatible nonvital organ to patient B, on the condition that the family member of patient B donates a compatible nonvital organ to patient A; hence the phrase "paired organ exchange." While potential enforcement issues can be avoided by conducting the transplants at the same time and, if possible, in the same hospital, this is not essential to my proposal. I contend that paired organ exchanges should not only be permitted under federal law, but also facilitated, by expanding the existing national database of patients in need of organs to include information about individuals potentially willing to donate on behalf of each patient, and using this data to identify cross-matches. By permitting and facilitating paired organ exchanges, the government could bring together compatible donors and recipients who would otherwise never meet, and in each successful case allow two transplants to occur that might otherwise be impossible. This system would, of course, be limited to the exchange of nonvital or regenerable organs (kidneys and livers), where donation would not endanger the donor or adversely impact the donor's major life activities.
| 1,966 |
<h4>Families and friends of two distinct patients can be matched up for two successful transplants under our advocacy-it solves</h4><p><strong>Morley 3’ </strong>Michael T. “Increasing the Supply of Organs for Transplantation through Paired Organ Exchanges” Yale Law & Policy Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter, 2003), pp. 221-262 http://www.jstor.org/stable/40232670 PA</p><p>This Note argues that <u><mark>federal law should be amended so as to allow the already-existing registry of patients in need of organ transplants to bring together</u></mark> the families and friends of <u><mark>different patients on the waiting list in order to save live</mark>s</u>. There are many people who, although willing to donate a nonvital organ to save the life of a loved one in need of a transplant, are unable to do so due to biological incompatibility.18 <u>A system of <mark>paired organ exchanges would facilitate</mark> transplantation <mark>in situations where a friend or family member of Patient A is incompatible with him, but would be compatible with some other person on the waiting list</mark> (Patient B), <mark>and a close friend or family member of Patient B is incompatible with her, but compatible with Patient A</mark>. The family member of patient A would donate a compatible nonvital organ to patient B, on the condition that the family member of patient B donates a compatible nonvital organ to patient A; hence the phrase "paired organ exchange</u>." While potential enforcement issues can be avoided by conducting the transplants at the same time and, if possible, in the same hospital, this is not essential to my proposal. I contend that <u><mark>paired organ exchanges should not only be permitted under federal law, but also facilitated, by expanding the existing national database of patients</mark> in need of organs to include information about individuals potentially willing to donate on behalf of each patient</u>, and using this data to identify cross-matches. By permitting and facilitating paired organ exchanges<u>, the government could bring together compatible donors and recipients who would otherwise never meet, and in each successful case allow two transplants to occur that might otherwise be impossible</u>. This system would, of course, be limited to the exchange of nonvital or regenerable organs (kidneys and livers), where donation would not endanger the donor or adversely impact the donor's major life activities.</p>
| null |
1nc
|
3
| 430,427 | 2 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,557 |
Capitalism is progressive, self-correcting, and wealth-generating – ensures sustainability
|
Goklany 7
|
Goklany 7-Julia Simon Fellow @ the Political Economy Research Center [Indur, Reason.com, “Now for the Good News,” 3/23/2007, http://reason.com/archives/2007/03/23/now-for-the-good-news]
|
globalization foes are united in their fear that population and consumption accompanying growth and free trade degrade human and environmental well-being the 20th century saw the United States’ population multiply expectancy increased Onset of major has been postponed These improvements haven’t been restricted to the United States It’s a global phenomenon Worldwide, life expectancy has more than doubled poverty has halved Child labor in declined world is more literate and better educated More people choose their own rulers, and have freedom of expression. They are more likely to live under rule of law It’s easier than ever for people across the world to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth The early stages of development can indeed cause some environmental deterioration greater wealth alleviates these problems In time they put more of their recently acquired wealth and human capital into developing and implementing cleaner technologies This brings about an environmental transition via the twin forces of economic development and technological progress the richest countries are also the cleanest. This progress is a testament to the power of globalization and the transfer of ideas and knowledge It's also testament to the importance of trade in transferring technology from developed to developing countries The proximate cause of improvements in well-being is a “cycle of progress” composed of mutually reinforcing forces of economic development and technological progress free and open societies prosper. Isolation, intolerance, and hostility to the free exchange of knowledge, technology, people, and goods breed stagnation or regression
|
life expectancy more than doubled poverty has halved people choose their own rulers It’s easier for people to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth early stages of development can cause some environmental deterioration greater wealth alleviates these problems they put more of their wealth into cleaner technologies
|
Environmentalists and globalization foes are united in their fear that greater population and consumption of energy, materials, and chemicals accompanying economic growth, technological change and free trade—the mainstays of globalization—degrade human and environmental well-being. Indeed, the 20th century saw the United States’ population multiply by four, income by seven, carbon dioxide emissions by nine, use of materials by 27, and use of chemicals by more than 100. Yet life expectancy increased from 47 years to 77 years. Onset of major disease such as cancer, heart, and respiratory disease has been postponed between eight and eleven years in the past century. Heart disease and cancer rates have been in rapid decline over the last two decades, and total cancer deaths have actually declined the last two years, despite increases in population. Among the very young, infant mortality has declined from 100 deaths per 1,000 births in 1913 to just seven per 1,000 today. These improvements haven’t been restricted to the United States. It’s a global phenomenon. Worldwide, life expectancy has more than doubled, from 31 years in 1900 to 67 years today. India’s and China’s infant mortalities exceeded 190 per 1,000 births in the early 1950s; today they are 62 and 26, respectively. In the developing world, the proportion of the population suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1970 and 2001 despite a 83 percent increase in population. Globally average annual incomes in real dollars have tripled since 1950. Consequently, the proportion of the planet's developing-world population living in absolute poverty has halved since 1981, from 40 percent to 20 percent. Child labor in low income countries declined from 30 percent to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. Equally important, the world is more literate and better educated than ever. People are freer politically, economically, and socially to pursue their well-being as they see fit. More people choose their own rulers, and have freedom of expression. They are more likely to live under rule of law, and less likely to be arbitrarily deprived of life, limb, and property. Social and professional mobility have also never been greater. It’s easier than ever for people across the world to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth. People today work fewer hours and have more money and better health to enjoy their leisure time than their ancestors. Man’s environmental record is more complex. The early stages of development can indeed cause some environmental deterioration as societies pursue first-order problems affecting human well-being. These include hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy, and lack of education, basic public health services, safe water, sanitation, mobility, and ready sources of energy. Because greater wealth alleviates these problems while providing basic creature comforts, individuals and societies initially focus on economic development, often neglecting other aspects of environmental quality. In time, however, they recognize that environmental deterioration reduces their quality of life. Accordingly, they put more of their recently acquired wealth and human capital into developing and implementing cleaner technologies. This brings about an environmental transition via the twin forces of economic development and technological progress, which begin to provide solutions to environmental problems instead of creating those problems. All of which is why we today find that the richest countries are also the cleanest. And while many developing countries have yet to get past the “green ceiling,” they are nevertheless ahead of where today’s developed countries used to be when they were equally wealthy. The point of transition from "industrial period" to "environmental conscious" continues to fall. For example, the US introduced unleaded gasoline only after its GDP per capita exceeded $16,000. India and China did the same before they reached $3,000 per capita. This progress is a testament to the power of globalization and the transfer of ideas and knowledge (that lead is harmful, for example). It's also testament to the importance of trade in transferring technology from developed to developing countries—in this case, the technology needed to remove lead from gasoline. This hints at the answer to the question of why some parts of the world have been left behind while the rest of the world has thrived. Why have improvements in well-being stalled in areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world? The proximate cause of improvements in well-being is a “cycle of progress” composed of the mutually reinforcing forces of economic development and technological progress. But that cycle itself is propelled by a web of essential institutions, particularly property rights, free markets, and rule of law. Other important institutions would include science- and technology-based problem-solving founded on skepticism and experimentation; receptiveness to new technologies and ideas; and freer trade in goods, services—most importantly in knowledge and ideas. In short, free and open societies prosper. Isolation, intolerance, and hostility to the free exchange of knowledge, technology, people, and goods breed stagnation or regression.
| 5,331 |
<h4>Capitalism is progressive, self-correcting, and wealth-generating – ensures sustainability </h4><p><strong>Goklany 7</strong>-Julia Simon Fellow @ the Political Economy Research Center [Indur, Reason.com, “Now for the Good News,” 3/23/2007, http://reason.com/archives/2007/03/23/now-for-the-good-news]</p><p>Environmentalists and <u>globalization foes are united in their fear that </u>greater <u>population and consumption</u> of energy, materials, and chemicals <u>accompanying</u> economic <u>growth</u>, technological change <u>and free trade</u>—the mainstays of globalization—<u>degrade human and environmental well-being</u>. Indeed, <u>the 20th century saw the United States’ population multiply</u> by four, income by seven, carbon dioxide emissions by nine, use of materials by 27, and use of chemicals by more than 100. Yet life <u>expectancy increased</u> from 47 years to 77 years. <u>Onset of</u> <u>major</u> disease such as cancer, heart, and respiratory disease <u>has been postponed</u> between eight and eleven years in the past century. Heart disease and cancer rates have been in rapid decline over the last two decades, and total cancer deaths have actually declined the last two years, despite increases in population. Among the very young, infant mortality has declined from 100 deaths per 1,000 births in 1913 to just seven per 1,000 today. <u>These improvements haven’t been restricted to the United States</u>. <u>It’s a global phenomenon</u>. <u>Worldwide, <mark>life expectancy </mark>has <mark>more than doubled</u></mark>, from 31 years in 1900 to 67 years today. India’s and China’s infant mortalities exceeded 190 per 1,000 births in the early 1950s; today they are 62 and 26, respectively. In the developing world, the proportion of the population suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1970 and 2001 despite a 83 percent increase in population. Globally average annual incomes in real dollars have tripled since 1950. Consequently, the proportion of the planet's developing-world population living in absolute <u><strong><mark>poverty has halved</u></strong></mark> since 1981, from 40 percent to 20 percent. <u>Child labor in</u> low income countries <u>declined</u> from 30 percent to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. Equally important, the <u>world is more literate and better educated</u> than ever. People are freer politically, economically, and socially to pursue their well-being as they see fit. <u>More <mark>people choose their own rulers</mark>, and have freedom of expression. They are more likely to live under rule of law</u>, and less likely to be arbitrarily deprived of life, limb, and property. Social and professional mobility have also never been greater. <u><mark>It’s easier </mark>than ever <mark>for people</mark> across the world <mark>to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth</u></mark>. People today work fewer hours and have more money and better health to enjoy their leisure time than their ancestors. Man’s environmental record is more complex. <u>The <mark>early stages of development can</mark> indeed <mark>cause some environmental deterioration</u></mark> as societies pursue first-order problems affecting human well-being. These include hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy, and lack of education, basic public health services, safe water, sanitation, mobility, and ready sources of energy. Because <u><mark>greater wealth alleviates these problems</u></mark> while providing basic creature comforts, individuals and societies initially focus on economic development, often neglecting other aspects of environmental quality. <u>In time</u>, however, they recognize that environmental deterioration reduces their quality of life. Accordingly, <u><mark>they put more of their </mark>recently acquired <mark>wealth</mark> and human capital <mark>into</mark> developing and implementing <mark>cleaner technologies</u></mark>. <u>This brings about an environmental transition via the twin forces of economic development and technological progress</u>, which begin to provide solutions to environmental problems instead of creating those problems. All of which is why we today find that <u>the richest countries are also the cleanest.</u> And while many developing countries have yet to get past the “green ceiling,” they are nevertheless ahead of where today’s developed countries used to be when they were equally wealthy. The point of transition from "industrial period" to "environmental conscious" continues to fall. For example, the US introduced unleaded gasoline only after its GDP per capita exceeded $16,000. India and China did the same before they reached $3,000 per capita. <u>This progress is a testament to the power of globalization and the transfer of ideas and knowledge</u> (that lead is harmful, for example). <u>It's also testament to the importance of trade in transferring technology from developed to developing countries</u>—in this case, the technology needed to remove lead from gasoline. This hints at the answer to the question of why some parts of the world have been left behind while the rest of the world has thrived. Why have improvements in well-being stalled in areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world? <u>The proximate cause of improvements in well-being is a “cycle of progress” composed of</u> the <u>mutually reinforcing forces of economic development and technological progress</u>. But that cycle itself is propelled by a web of essential institutions, particularly property rights, free markets, and rule of law. Other important institutions would include science- and technology-based problem-solving founded on skepticism and experimentation; receptiveness to new technologies and ideas; and freer trade in goods, services—most importantly in knowledge and ideas. In short, <u>free and open societies prosper. Isolation, intolerance, and hostility to the free exchange of knowledge, technology, people, and goods breed stagnation or regression</u>. </p>
| null |
1nc
|
Case
| 219,913 | 62 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,558 |
New terror attack is critical to solve declining relations with Russia—solves nuclear war and the advantageHooson 8 (Paul, “New Wave of Terrorism may Draw Russia & U.S. closer again,” 11-30,http://wizbangblue.com/2008/11/30/new-wave-of-terrorism-may-draw-russia-us-closer-again.php)Interestingly, VOICE OF RUSSIA, the Russian news-service which is a virtual mouthpiece for the Russian government Putin regime and the Putin dominated United Russia political party seems to be taking a much less confrontational opinion of the U.S. in the last few days since the violence in Mumbai, India as well elsewhere in the world. Since the Russian military offensive in Georgia in August, American and Russian relations had been greatly strained, but now Russia views a recent uptick in international terrorism as evidence that the United States, Russia and the EU must work together as allies to prevent a spread of this epidemic of violence around the world.¶ Russia might also be realizing that with a fresh administration coming into power in Washington soon, that it might just be more pragmatic to paper-over the recent bad relations since Georgia, and work together for a better relationship with Washington. And the shared international fears of terrorism just might give both Washington as well as Moscow good enough of a reason to forget each nation's problems with the other somewhat, and work together to stem rising international terrorism.¶ Besides the terrorist violence in Mumbai, terrorism in Georgia claimed the life a pro-Moscow mayor, and a U.S. embassy in Kabul was attacked as well. VOICE OF RUSSIA notes that these actions came recently when Russian-Western relations have suffered in the wake of the Georgia conflict. Russia seems to be opening the door to improved relations with Washington and the EU by running such a feature on VOICE OF RUSSIA, where it appears that they are inviting an improvement in relations, perhaps viewing the incoming Obama Administration as less confrontational to Russia than the Bush administration.¶ Interestingly, the news coverage on VOICE OF RUSSIA appears to be far less anti-Washington in tone as well in recent days, a sharp contrast from the more heated opinions in Russia around the time of the August actions in Georgia.¶ Surprisingly, it appears as though Moscow might have blinked first here. And if anything, this is an important signal to the incoming Obama Administration that better relations with Russia built on common ground issues such as combating international terrorism are very possible.¶ An improvement in relations with Russia is very important because it is the only nation in the world with a nuclear weapons force large enough to battle the U.S. to draw or worse. The two world military superpowers. Russia and the U.S. need to work together on many issues, and not allow events like Georgia to put the two nations at dangerous odds with other, especially when world terrorism just might be on the rise once again, taking some advantage of the problems that Washington and Moscow have been having since the Georgia incident.¶ There is the saying that the, "Enemy of my enemy is my friend". And since Russia, the U.S. and the EU are all three disgusted with worldwide terrorist violence, then this may well provide the common ground required for better relations between the states.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>New terror attack is critical to solve declining relations with Russia—solves nuclear war and the advantageHooson 8 (Paul, “New Wave of Terrorism may Draw Russia & U.S. closer again,” 11-30,<u>http://wizbangblue.com/2008/11/30/new-wave-of-terrorism-may-draw-russia-us-closer-again.php</u>)Interestingly, VOICE OF RUSSIA, the Russian news-service which is a virtual mouthpiece for the <u>Russian government</u> Putin regime and the Putin dominated United Russia political <u>party seems to be taking a much less confrontational opinion of the U.S. in the last few days since the violence in Mumbai, India</u> as well elsewhere in the world. <u>Since the Russian </u>military <u>offensive in Georgia</u> in August, <u>American and Russian relations had been greatly strained, but now <mark>Russia views </mark>a recent <mark>uptick in </mark>international <mark>terror</mark>ism <mark>as evidence that the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates<mark>, Russia</mark> and the EU <mark>must work </mark>together <mark>as allies</u></mark> to prevent a spread of this epidemic of violence around the world.¶ Russia might also be realizing that with a fresh administration coming into power in Washington soon, that it might just be more pragmatic to paper-over the recent bad relations since Georgia, and work together for a better relationship with Washington. <u>And the <mark>shared </mark>international <mark>fears of terror</mark>ism just might <mark>give both </mark>Washington as well as Moscow good enough of<mark> a reason to forget </mark>each nation's <mark>problems </mark>with the other somewhat, and work together to stem rising international terrorism.</u>¶ Besides the terrorist violence in Mumbai, terrorism in Georgia claimed the life a pro-Moscow mayor, and a U.S. embassy in Kabul was attacked as well. VOICE OF RUSSIA notes that these actions came recently when Russian-Western relations have suffered in the wake of the Georgia conflict. <u>Russia seems to be <mark>opening the door to improved relations </mark>with Washington</u> and the EU by running such a feature on VOICE OF RUSSIA, where it appears that they are inviting an improvement in relations, perhaps viewing the incoming Obama Administration as less confrontational to Russia than the Bush administration.¶ Interestingly, the news coverage on VOICE OF RUSSIA appears to be far less anti-Washington in tone as well in recent days, a sharp contrast from the more heated opinions in Russia around the time of the August actions in Georgia.¶ Surprisingly, it appears as though Moscow might have blinked first here. And if anything, this is an important signal to the incoming Obama Administration that <u><mark>better relations with Russia built on </mark>common ground issues such as <mark>combating </mark>international <mark>terror</mark>ism <mark>are </mark>very <mark>possible.</u>¶ <u>An improvement </mark>in relations with Russia <mark>is very important</mark> <mark>because it is the only nation </mark>in the world <mark>with a nuclear weapons</mark> force <mark>large enough to battle the U.S. to draw or worse</mark>.</u> The two world military superpowers. <u>Russia and the U.S. need to work together on many issues, and not allow events</u> like Georgia <u>to put the two nations at dangerous odds</u> with other, <u>especially when world terrorism just might be on the rise once again</u>, taking some advantage of the problems that Washington and Moscow have been having since the Georgia incident.¶ There is the saying that the, "<u>Enemy of my enemy is my friend". And since Russia, the U.S</u>. and the EU <u>are</u> all three <u>disgusted with worldwide terrorist violence, then this may well provide the common ground required for better relations between the states.</h4></u>
|
1nc
| null |
a2
| 431,079 | 1 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,559 |
Obama’s PC will sustain the veto now
|
Einhorn 1/14
|
Einhorn 1/14/2015 (Robert, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. From 2009 to 2013, while serving as the State Department’s Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, he was a senior member of the U.S. delegation to the Iran nuclear negotiations, National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-iran-play-ball-nuke-talks-12031?page=show)
|
If Congress passes new sanctions Obama is very likely to veto administration officials would then go into overdrive in finding the 34 Senate votes necessary to sustain the veto some Democrats will not want to be seen as undermining the best prospect for resolving the nuclear issue peacefully It is therefore likely that the administration will have the votes to sustain the veto
|
Congress passes a new sanctions Obama is very likely to veto administration officials would then go into overdrive in finding the 34 Senate votes necessary to sustain the ve It is therefore likely that the administration will have the votes to sustain the veto
|
If the Congress passes a new sanctions bill that the administration considers damaging to prospects for negotiations, President Obama is very likely to veto it. Senior administration officials would then go into overdrive in finding the 34 Senate votes necessary to sustain the veto, focusing heavily on Senate Democrats. Although some Democrats can be expected to vote to override the veto, a substantial number, including some who have reservations about the negotiations, will not want to be seen as undermining the best prospect for resolving the nuclear issue peacefully or as undercutting their party’s president on a matter of such high priority. It is therefore likely that the administration will have the votes to sustain the veto and prevent legislation potentially damaging to the negotiations from being enacted. So while the Republican-controlled Congress will undoubtedly give the administration a tough time, it is likely that President Obama will be able, without legislative interference, to continue negotiating an agreement that he believes is in the U.S. interest.
| 1,085 |
<h4><strong>Obama’s PC will sustain the veto now</h4><p>Einhorn 1/14</strong>/2015 (Robert, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. From 2009 to 2013, while serving as the State Department’s Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, he was a senior member of the U.S. delegation to the Iran nuclear negotiations, National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-iran-play-ball-nuke-talks-12031?page=show)</p><p><u>If</u> the <u><mark>Congress</u> <u>passes</u> a <u>new sanctions</u></mark> bill that the administration considers damaging to prospects for negotiations, President <u><mark>Obama</u> <u>is very likely to veto</u></mark> it. Senior <u><mark>administration officials would then go into overdrive in finding the 34 Senate votes necessary to sustain the ve</mark>to</u>, focusing heavily on Senate Democrats. Although <u>some</u> <u>Democrats</u> can be expected to vote to override the veto, a substantial number, including some who have reservations about the negotiations, <u>will not want to be seen as undermining the best prospect for resolving the nuclear issue peacefully </u>or as undercutting their party’s president on a matter of such high priority. <u><mark>It is therefore likely that the administration <strong>will have the votes to sustain the veto</u></mark> and prevent legislation potentially damaging to the negotiations from being enacted. So while the Republican-controlled Congress will undoubtedly give the administration a tough time, it is likely that President Obama will be able, without legislative interference, to continue negotiating an agreement that he believes is in the U.S. interest.</p></strong>
|
1nr
|
Th at: empirics
|
UQ
| 430,686 | 4 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,560 |
Probabalism and effects – plan facially removes zero prohibitions, every state could refuse to remove prohibitions, only a few states have legalized so even if they said yes plan would only waive CSA for those states in the short term – crushes neg ground – destroys time sensitive disads, state specific legalization disads – unlimits – any policy could eventually result in legalization – including the status quo, or legalizing OTHER DRUGS
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Probabalism and effects – plan facially removes zero prohibitions, every state could refuse to remove prohibitions, only a few states have legalized so even if they said yes plan would only waive CSA for those states in the short term – crushes neg ground – destroys time sensitive disads, state specific legalization disads – unlimits – any policy could eventually result in legalization – including the status quo, or legalizing OTHER DRUGS</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
3
| 431,080 | 1 | 17,112 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| 565,260 |
N
|
Wake
|
2
|
Cornell Deng-Zhang
|
Stone
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaty DA
T-legalize
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,561 |
Legalize requires action by public authority
|
US Legal 14
|
US Legal 14 US Legal 2014 http://definitions.uslegal.com/l/legalization/
|
Legalization refers to authentication or certification by an appropriate public authority. It is an act to make something lawful.
|
Legalization refers to authentication or certification by an appropriate public authority. It is an act to make something lawful
|
Legalization refers to authentication or certification by an appropriate public authority. It is an act to make something lawful. It may also be called legitimation. For example, legalization of casino gambling refers to making casino gambling lawful; or legalization of assisted suicide refers to making assisted suicide lawful and legitimate, and legal consequences shall not follow a legitimate act.
| 402 |
<h4>Legalize requires action by public authority</h4><p><strong>US Legal 14</strong> US Legal 2014 http://definitions.uslegal.com/l/legalization/</p><p><u><mark>Legalization refers to authentication or certification by an appropriate public authority. It is an act to make something lawful</mark>.</u> It may also be called legitimation. For example, legalization of casino gambling refers to making casino gambling lawful; or legalization of assisted suicide refers to making assisted suicide lawful and legitimate, and legal consequences shall not follow a legitimate act.</p>
| null |
1nc
|
4
| 430,479 | 4 | 17,110 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| 565,262 |
N
|
Wake
|
5
|
NYU Itliong-Zhan
|
McCleary
|
Fed CP (2NR)
AG Politics (2NR
Cede the Political DA
T - USFG
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,562 |
Indirect Exchange backup guarantees minimal deficit
|
Zenios 2’
|
Zenios 2’ (Stefanos Zenios, “Optimal Control of a Paired-Kidney Exchange Program”, Management Science, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Mar., 2002), pp. 328-342, Stanford Graduate School of Business, http://www.jstor.org/stable/822569 ) PA
|
results in Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate that indirect exchanges serve a dual purpose some pairs are "forced" to participate in indirect exchanges to expedite access to direct exchanges for the vast majority of pairs who join the exchange system. As the arrival rates become increasingly imbalanced, the fraction of indirect exchanges converges the fraction of the total demand for organs in the exchange system that the system's donors cannot satisfy. these results demonstrate that tight control of the exchange system through the judicial use of indirect exchanges will guarantee quick access to living-donor organs to the largest possible number of donor-candidate pairs
|
results in Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate that indirect exchanges serve a dual purpos some pairs are "forced" to participate in indirect exchanges to expedite access to direct exchanges for the vast majority of pairs who join the exchange system. As the arrival rates become increasingly imbalanced, the fraction of indirect exchanges converges these results demonstrate that tight control of the exchange system through the judicial use of indirect exchanges will guarantee quick access to living-donor organs to the largest possible number of donor-candidate pairs.
|
*indirect exchange is between a donor-candidate pair and a priority member on the cadaveric list, the candidate on the cadaveric list would receive an organ and the original candidate would receive high priority on the cadaveric list
The results in Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate that indirect exchanges serve a dual purpose. When the arrival rates of the two pair types are approximately balanced, some pairs are "forced" to participate in indirect exchanges to expedite access to direct exchanges for the vast majority of pairs who join the exchange system. As the arrival rates become increasingly imbalanced, the fraction of indirect exchanges converges to IA1 - A2 /(Al + A2), the fraction of the total demand for organs in the exchange system that the system's donors cannot satisfy. Furthermore, the optimal barriers induce the required fraction of exchanges and optimize candidate wait. Note that in scenario A1 = 4, A2 = 6, all three policies achieve the same fraction of indirect exchanges, but only the heavy-traffic policy and heuristic policy effectively control the overall wait. (4) The results for the incentive compatible policy in Tables 3 and 4 reveal a major dilemma underlying the organ exchange system. […] In summary, these results demonstrate that tight control of the exchange system through the judicial use of indirect exchanges will guarantee quick access to living-donor organs to the largest possible number of donor-candidate pairs.
| 1,459 |
<h4>Indirect Exchange backup guarantees minimal deficit</h4><p><strong>Zenios 2’</strong> (Stefanos Zenios, “Optimal Control of a Paired-Kidney Exchange Program”, Management Science, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Mar., 2002), pp. 328-342, Stanford Graduate School of Business, http://www.jstor.org/stable/822569 ) PA</p><p>*indirect exchange is between a donor-candidate pair and a priority member on the cadaveric list, the candidate on the cadaveric list would receive an organ and the original candidate would receive high priority on the cadaveric list</p><p>The <u><mark>results in Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate that indirect exchanges serve a dual purpos</mark>e</u>. When the arrival rates of the two pair types are approximately balanced, <u><mark>some pairs are "forced" to participate in indirect exchanges to expedite access to direct exchanges for the vast majority of pairs who join the exchange system.</u></mark> <u><mark>As the arrival rates become increasingly imbalanced, the fraction of indirect exchanges converges</u></mark> to IA1 - A2 /(Al + A2), <u>the fraction of the total demand for organs in the exchange system that the system's donors cannot satisfy.</u> Furthermore, the optimal barriers induce the required fraction of exchanges and optimize candidate wait. Note that in scenario A1 = 4, A2 = 6, all three policies achieve the same fraction of indirect exchanges, but only the heavy-traffic policy and heuristic policy effectively control the overall wait. (4) The results for the incentive compatible policy in Tables 3 and 4 reveal a major dilemma underlying the organ exchange system. […] In summary, <u><mark>these results demonstrate that tight control of the exchange system through the judicial use of indirect exchanges will guarantee quick access to living-donor organs to the largest possible number of donor-candidate pairs</u><strong>.</p></strong></mark>
| null |
1nc
|
3
| 430,428 | 2 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,563 |
G
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>G</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
Case
| 431,081 | 1 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,564 |
Just removing enforcement isn’t enough- contextual ev proves legalization is an active authorization- requires new legislation
|
Jackson et al 2011
|
Jackson et al 2011 (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)
|
legalization and decriminalization are terms for very different proposals even though they are sometimes conflated Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production „Legalization‟ authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana, and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civil rather than criminal offense What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers. This is what separates decriminalization from legalization
|
legalization and decriminalization are terms for very different proposals Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production. „Legalization‟ authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana, and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption.4 What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers. This is what separates decriminalization from legalization.
|
Any white paper that includes a policy review of drug legislation must include key term definitions that are clear, accurate, and coherent. Thus, there are various definitions of „legalization‟ of marijuana use and commerce strewn across countless reports, papers and analyses of drug policy. It is critical to note that legalization and decriminalization are terms for very different proposals even though they are sometimes conflated. Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production. „Legalization‟ authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana, and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption.4 This study takes a holistic approach to examining how legalization of marijuana in the United States would affect Mexican DTOs. However, in the United States there has been no example of true marijuana legalization since the inception of the modern drug control regime. This is why our case studies will look at changes that occurred after various countries relaxed their system of marijuana prohibition. We will look at decriminalization in Mexico and Portugal, as well as a special case of toleration/de facto legalization in the Netherlands. However, we will first lay out in detail what each type of change entails. Decriminalization is one of the most common methods employed by countries that seek to ease or lighten anti-marijuana policies. A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civil (fines, counseling etc), rather than criminal offense. 5 One common example of this type of reform is the 2001 Law 30/2000 in Portugal. What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers. This is what separates decriminalization from legalization.
| 2,020 |
<h4>Just removing enforcement isn’t enough- contextual ev proves legalization is an active authorization- requires new legislation</h4><p><strong>Jackson et al 2011</strong> (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)</p><p>Any white paper that includes a policy review of drug legislation must include key term definitions that are clear, accurate, and coherent. Thus, there are various definitions of „legalization‟ of marijuana use and commerce strewn across countless reports, papers and analyses of drug policy. It is critical to note that <u><mark>legalization and decriminalization are terms for <strong>very different proposals</strong></mark> even though they are sometimes conflated</u>. <u><mark>Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production</u>. <u>„Legalization‟ <strong>authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana</strong>, <strong>and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption</u></strong>.4</mark> This study takes a holistic approach to examining how legalization of marijuana in the United States would affect Mexican DTOs. However, in the United States there has been no example of true marijuana legalization since the inception of the modern drug control regime. This is why our case studies will look at changes that occurred after various countries relaxed their system of marijuana prohibition. We will look at decriminalization in Mexico and Portugal, as well as a special case of toleration/de facto legalization in the Netherlands. However, we will first lay out in detail what each type of change entails. Decriminalization is one of the most common methods employed by countries that seek to ease or lighten anti-marijuana policies. <u>A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civil</u> (fines, counseling etc), <u>rather than criminal offense</u>. 5 One common example of this type of reform is the 2001 Law 30/2000 in Portugal. <u><mark>What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers.</u> <u><strong>This is what separates decriminalization from legalization</u></strong>.</p></mark>
|
2NC
| null |
a2
| 430,568 | 11 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,565 |
Veto will be sustained now- enough Dems are on board
|
Financial Times 1/16
|
Financial Times 1/16/2015 (Obama and Cameron warn against new Iran sanctions, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/44d195d0-9d9b-11e4-8ea3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3P0tmmbW5)
|
Congress appeared to be shaping up for a major foreign policy fight with the White House. With the backing of a handful of senior Democrats, Republican leaders said they hope to bring new sanctions legislation up for debate over the next few weeks. Corker said the Senate would take up the Iran sanctions bill as one of its first priorities Analysts believe the bill will pass the Senate but is unlikely to gather 67 votes given the strong opposition to new sanctions from a number of senior Democrats.
|
Congress appeared to be shaping up for a major foreign policy fight with the White House . Analysts believe the bill will pass the Senate but is unlikely to gather the 67 votes , given the strong opposition to new sanctions from a number of senior Democrats
|
Barack Obama and David Cameron warned on Friday that new sanctions on Iran could cause the collapse of nuclear negotiations, as the new Republican-controlled Congress appeared to be shaping up for a major foreign policy fight with the White House. Threatening to veto any sanctions bills that pass Congress, Mr Obama said that new US penalties on Iran would give Tehran an excuse to walk away from talks and to blame Washington for the failure, weakening support for the existing sanctions. With the backing of a handful of senior Democrats, Republican leaders in the Senate have said they hope to bring new sanctions legislation up for debate over the next few weeks. The talks between Iran and the US and other major powers, which have been under way for more than a year, were extended in November for another seven months. In return for potential relief on sanctions, the US wants decisive limits on Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon. Speaking at a White House press conference with Mr Cameron, Mr Obama said that “I respectfully request them [Congress] to hold off for a few months to see if we have the possibility of solving a big problem without resorting potentially to war.” He added that of the US were to impose new sanctions now, Iran “would be able to maintain that the reason that they ended negotiations was because the United States was operating in bad faith and blew up the deal. And there would be some sympathy to that view around the world.” Adopting a tactic most often used by Israel of talking directly with Congress, Mr Cameron said he had phoned two senators on Friday to express his concerns about new US sanctions on Iran. “They could fracture the international unity that there’s been which has been so valuable in presenting a united front to Iran,” he said. Senate aides said that two separate bills are presently under consideration. The first would impose a new round of sanctions on Iran if the current talks were to fail, while the second demands that Congress get to vote on any final agreement reached with Tehran. Bob Corker, the Tennessee Republican who is the new chair of the Senate foreign relations committee, said this week that the Senate would take up the Iran sanctions bill as one of its first priorities. A similar proposal passed the House comfortably last week. That sanctions bill is co-sponsored by Bob Menendez, the New Jersey Democrat, who had a tense exchange with Mr Obama over the issue at a closed-door session with Senate Democrats on Thursday, according to aides. Analysts believe the bill will pass the Senate but is unlikely to gather the 67 votes needed to override a presidential veto, given the strong opposition to new sanctions from a number of senior Democrats. Supporters of new sanctions insist that the bill would not be an act of bad faith to Iran because the penalties would only be implemented if the talks collapse without a final deal. However Tom Cotton, a new Republican senator with hawkish views on Iran, said this week that one of the objectives of the sanctions legislation was the collapse of the talks with Iran. “The end of these negotiations isn’t an unintended consequence of Congressional action, it is very much an intended consequence,” he said.
| 3,246 |
<h4><strong>Veto will be sustained now- enough Dems are on board</h4><p>Financial Times 1/16</strong>/2015 (Obama and Cameron warn against new Iran sanctions, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/44d195d0-9d9b-11e4-8ea3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3P0tmmbW5)</p><p>Barack Obama and David Cameron warned on Friday that new sanctions on Iran could cause the collapse of nuclear negotiations, as the new Republican-controlled <u><mark>Congress appeared to be shaping up for a major foreign policy fight with the White House</mark>. </u>Threatening to veto any sanctions bills that pass Congress, Mr Obama said that new US penalties on Iran would give Tehran an excuse to walk away from talks and to blame Washington for the failure, weakening support for the existing sanctions. <u>With the backing of a handful of senior Democrats, Republican leaders</u> in the Senate have <u>said they hope to bring new sanctions legislation up for debate over the next few weeks. </u>The talks between Iran and the US and other major powers, which have been under way for more than a year, were extended in November for another seven months. In return for potential relief on sanctions, the US wants decisive limits on Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon. Speaking at a White House press conference with Mr Cameron, Mr Obama said that “I respectfully request them [Congress] to hold off for a few months to see if we have the possibility of solving a big problem without resorting potentially to war.” He added that of the US were to impose new sanctions now, Iran “would be able to maintain that the reason that they ended negotiations was because the United States was operating in bad faith and blew up the deal. And there would be some sympathy to that view around the world.” Adopting a tactic most often used by Israel of talking directly with Congress, Mr Cameron said he had phoned two senators on Friday to express his concerns about new US sanctions on Iran. “They could fracture the international unity that there’s been which has been so valuable in presenting a united front to Iran,” he said. Senate aides said that two separate bills are presently under consideration. The first would impose a new round of sanctions on Iran if the current talks were to fail, while the second demands that Congress get to vote on any final agreement reached with Tehran. Bob <u>Corker</u>, the Tennessee Republican who is the new chair of the Senate foreign relations committee, <u>said</u> this week that <u>the Senate would take up the Iran sanctions bill as one of its <strong>first priorities</u></strong>. A similar proposal passed the House comfortably last week. That sanctions bill is co-sponsored by Bob Menendez, the New Jersey Democrat, who had a tense exchange with Mr Obama over the issue at a closed-door session with Senate Democrats on Thursday, according to aides<mark>. <u>Analysts believe the bill will pass the Senate but is <strong>unlikely to gather</u></strong> the <u><strong>67 votes</u></strong> </mark>needed to override a presidential veto<mark>, <u>given the strong opposition to new sanctions from a number of senior Democrats</mark>. </u><strong>Supporters of new sanctions insist that the bill would not be an act of bad faith to Iran because the penalties would only be implemented if the talks collapse without a final deal. However Tom Cotton, a new Republican senator with hawkish views on Iran, said this week that one of the objectives of the sanctions legislation was the collapse of the talks with Iran. “The end of these negotiations isn’t an unintended consequence of Congressional action, it is very much an intended consequence,” he said.</p></strong>
|
1nr
|
Th at: empirics
|
UQ
| 431,014 | 3 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,566 |
Ground – fiating removal of prohibition on nearly all marijuana activities is the CORE locus of negative ground on the topic – uniquely key because there’s no stable actor and legalization already allows tons of flexibility in regulatory regime
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Ground – fiating removal of prohibition on nearly all marijuana activities is the CORE locus of negative ground on the topic – uniquely key because there’s no stable actor and legalization already allows tons of flexibility in regulatory regime</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
3
| 431,082 | 1 | 17,112 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| 565,260 |
N
|
Wake
|
2
|
Cornell Deng-Zhang
|
Stone
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaty DA
T-legalize
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,567 |
limits – infinite research burden to prepare for all non-state actors
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>limits – infinite research burden to prepare for all non-state actors</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
4
| 431,083 | 1 | 17,110 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| 565,262 |
N
|
Wake
|
5
|
NYU Itliong-Zhan
|
McCleary
|
Fed CP (2NR)
AG Politics (2NR
Cede the Political DA
T - USFG
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,568 |
Opt-out gets much higher commitment than opt-in
|
O'Sullivan 11
|
O'Sullivan 11 Sophia O'Sullivan, historical contributor 9 August 2011 Heart to Heart- An Investigation of Globalisation and the Illegal Organ Trade http://smartsgroupd.blogspot.com/p/sophia.html
|
Johnson and Goldstein note that when opt-in donation systems are present: donation rates can be as low as 4.25% of the population, conversely donation rates for opt-out systems average around 98%, a trend demonstrated in countries such as France, Austria and Portugal
|
opt-in donation rates can be as low as 4.25% conversel opt-out systems average around 98%, a trend demonstrated in countries such as France, Austria and Portuga
|
The reasons for the lack of organ donors may often be due to the donation system which exists within a country; Johnson and Goldstein note that when opt-in donation systems are present: donation rates can be as low as 4.25% of the population, as in Denmark; conversely donation rates for opt-out systems average around 98%, a trend demonstrated in countries such as France, Austria and Portugal. Cultural differences appear to have an impact on donation, New Mexico Donor Services 2003 report states that the Roma people are opposed to the donation of organs, a tentative link may be made between their high concentration in Eastern Europe and those countries’ low donation rates (New Mexico Donor Services). The Japan Organ Transplant Network argues that the scandal and corruption surrounding the country’s first heart transplant operation has lead to a national mindset of distrust (Japan Organ Transplant Network). This has been substituted for the crippling lifestyle disease rates that have caused organ shortages in the western world.
| 1,041 |
<h4><strong>Opt-out gets much higher commitment than opt-in</h4><p>O'Sullivan 11</strong> Sophia O'Sullivan, historical contributor 9 August 2011 Heart to Heart- An Investigation of Globalisation and the Illegal Organ Trade http://smartsgroupd.blogspot.com/p/sophia.html</p><p>The reasons for the lack of organ donors may often be due to the donation system which exists within a country; <u>Johnson and Goldstein note that when <mark>opt-in donation </mark>systems are present: donation <mark>rates can be as low as 4.25%</mark> of the population,</u> as in Denmark; <u><mark>conversel</mark>y donation rates for <mark>opt-out systems average around 98%, a trend demonstrated in countries such as France, Austria and Portuga</mark>l</u>. Cultural differences appear to have an impact on donation, New Mexico Donor Services 2003 report states that the Roma people are opposed to the donation of organs, a tentative link may be made between their high concentration in Eastern Europe and those countries’ low donation rates (New Mexico Donor Services). The Japan Organ Transplant Network argues that the scandal and corruption surrounding the country’s first heart transplant operation has lead to a national mindset of distrust (Japan Organ Transplant Network). This has been substituted for the crippling lifestyle disease rates that have caused organ shortages in the western world.</p>
| null |
1nc
|
3
| 430,430 | 2 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,569 |
W
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>W</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
Case
| 431,084 | 1 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,570 |
Courts can’t REMOVE CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS- requires legislative change
|
Treanor and Sperling 1993
|
Treanor and Sperling 1993 (William and Gene, Prof Law @ Fordham, Deputy Assistant to President for Economic Policy, Columbia LR, Dec)
|
Commentators have generally agreed with the overwhelming majority of courts laws found unconstitutional are merely unenforceable until such time as they are found valid." Gunther has pronounced Attorney General Cummings's conclusion that Adkins "simply "suspended' enforcement" of the District of Columbia minimum wage statute "persuasive," and Nimmer similarly declared that "it seems clear that Cummings' opinion was correct." Finally, Professor Field noted that a statute that has been found unconstitutional becomes enforceable when the case in which it was held unconstitutional is reversed because "a declaration of unconstitutionality does not operate as a repeal of a statute."
|
laws found unconstitutional are merely unenforceable until such time as they are found valid Adkins "simply "suspended' enforcement" of the District of Columbia minimum wage statute a statute that has been found unconstitutional becomes enforceable when the case in which it was held unconstitutional is reversed because "a declaration of unconstitutionality does not operate as a repeal of a statute."
|
Commentators have generally agreed with the overwhelming majority of courts that an overruling decision has the effect of automatically reviving statutes. For example, Erica Frohman Plave observed that revival was a necessary function of the limited scope of a judicial determination of unconstitutionality: "Such laws found unconstitutional are merely unenforceable until such time as they are found valid." 54 Professor Gerald Gunther has pronounced Attorney General Cummings's conclusion that Adkins "simply "suspended' enforcement" 55 of the District of Columbia minimum wage statute "persuasive," 56 and Professor Melville Nimmer similarly declared that "it seems clear that Attorney General Homer Cummings' opinion was correct." 57 Finally, Professor Oliver Field noted that a statute that has been found unconstitutional becomes enforceable when the case in which it was held unconstitutional is reversed because "a declaration of unconstitutionality does not operate as a repeal of a statute."
| 1,001 |
<h4>Courts can’t REMOVE CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS- requires legislative change</h4><p><strong>Treanor and Sperling 1993</strong> <u>(William and Gene, Prof Law @ Fordham, Deputy Assistant to President for Economic Policy, Columbia LR, Dec)</p><p>Commentators have generally agreed with the <strong>overwhelming majority of courts</strong> </u>that an overruling decision has the effect of automatically reviving statutes. For example, Erica Frohman Plave observed that revival was a necessary function of the limited scope of a judicial determination of unconstitutionality: "Such <u><mark>laws found unconstitutional are <strong>merely unenforceable</strong> until such time as they are found valid</mark>." </u><strong>54</strong> Professor Gerald <u>Gunther has pronounced Attorney General Cummings's conclusion that <mark>Adkins "<strong>simply "suspended' enforcement</strong>"</mark> </u><strong>55<u></strong> <mark>of the District of Columbia minimum wage statute</mark> "persuasive," </u><strong>56<u></strong> and</u> Professor Melville <u>Nimmer similarly declared that "it seems clear that </u>Attorney General Homer <u>Cummings' opinion was correct."</u> <strong>57</strong> <u>Finally, Professor</u> Oliver <u>Field noted that <mark>a statute that has been found unconstitutional becomes enforceable when the case in which it was held unconstitutional is reversed because "a declaration of unconstitutionality <strong>does not operate as a repeal of a statute</strong>."</p></u></mark>
|
2NC
| null |
a2
| 109,016 | 4 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,571 |
It’s top of the agenda- no veto-proof majority- Republicans admit
|
Reuters 1/15
|
Reuters 1/15/2015 (Exclusive: U.S. lawmakers push ahead on Iran sanctions - senior senator, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/15/us-usa-congress-iran-idUSKBN0KO01X20150115)
|
Republican and Democratic U.S. lawmakers will press ahead with a plan for more sanctions on Iran despite White House warnings The Senate Banking Committee is due to hold a hearing on Iran sanctions on Tuesday Although Republicans now hold a majority in the Senate, Corker said he did not know if there would be enough votes needed to override an Obama veto
|
Republican and Democratic U.S. lawmakers will press ahead with a plan for more sanctions on Iran The Senate Banking Committee is due to hold a hearing on Iran sanctions on Tuesday, Although Republicans now hold a 54-46 seat majority in the Senate, Corker said he did not know if there would be enough votes - - needed to override an Obama veto
|
Republican and Democratic U.S. lawmakers will press ahead with a plan for more sanctions on Iran, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said on Wednesday, despite White House warnings that they risked derailing nuclear talks. Lawmakers, who say they fear Obama administration negotiators may not take a hard enough line with Tehran, are also at work on a separate bill to have Congress approve any final agreement on Iran's nuclear program, Senator Bob Corker, the chairman, told Reuters in an interview. "There's continual efforts to try to figure out a way for Congress to play a role to strengthen whatever final deal may occur," the Tennessee Republican senator said. Republican Senator Mark Kirk and Democratic Senator Robert Menendez are finalizing a bill for tougher sanctions on Iran if there is no final nuclear deal by June 30. The Senate Banking Committee is due to hold a hearing on Iran sanctions on Tuesday, said Corker, a member also of that panel. Kirk and Menendez introduced a sanctions bill in December 2013, but it did not come up for a vote in the Senate, then controlled by President Barack Obama's fellow Democrats, who lost control of the chamber because of big losses in November elections. The White House has insisted passage of a sanctions bill now - even one that would impose new restrictions only if there is no deal by the deadline - could prompt Iran to back out of the nuclear talks with six world powers. Although Republicans now hold a 54-46 seat majority in the Senate, Corker said he did not know if there would be enough votes - 67 - needed in the Senate to override an Obama veto of any Iran legislation.
| 1,661 |
<h4><strong>It’s top of the agenda- no veto-proof majority- Republicans admit</h4><p>Reuters 1/15</strong>/2015 (Exclusive: U.S. lawmakers push ahead on Iran sanctions - senior senator, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/15/us-usa-congress-iran-idUSKBN0KO01X20150115)</p><p><u><mark>Republican and Democratic U.S. lawmakers will press ahead with a plan for more sanctions on Iran</u></mark>, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said on Wednesday, <u>despite White House warnings</u> that they risked derailing nuclear talks. Lawmakers, who say they fear Obama administration negotiators may not take a hard enough line with Tehran, are also at work on a separate bill to have Congress approve any final agreement on Iran's nuclear program, Senator Bob Corker, the chairman, told Reuters in an interview. "There's continual efforts to try to figure out a way for Congress to play a role to strengthen whatever final deal may occur," the Tennessee Republican senator said. Republican Senator Mark Kirk and Democratic Senator Robert Menendez are finalizing a bill for tougher sanctions on Iran if there is no final nuclear deal by June 30. <u><mark>The Senate Banking Committee is due to hold a hearing on Iran sanctions on <strong>Tuesday</u></strong>,</mark> said Corker, a member also of that panel. Kirk and Menendez introduced a sanctions bill in December 2013, but it did not come up for a vote in the Senate, then controlled by President Barack Obama's fellow Democrats, who lost control of the chamber because of big losses in November elections. The White House has insisted passage of a sanctions bill now - even one that would impose new restrictions only if there is no deal by the deadline - could prompt Iran to back out of the nuclear talks with six world powers. <u><mark>Although Republicans now hold a</u> 54-46 seat <u>majority</u> <u>in the Senate, Corker said he <strong>did not know if there would be enough votes </u></strong>-</mark> 67 <mark>- <u><strong>needed</u></strong> </mark>in the Senate <u><strong><mark>to override an Obama veto</u></mark> of any Iran legislation.</p></strong>
|
1nr
|
Th at: empirics
|
UQ
| 220,784 | 7 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,572 |
The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 431,085 | 1 | 17,112 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| 565,260 |
N
|
Wake
|
2
|
Cornell Deng-Zhang
|
Stone
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaty DA
T-legalize
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,573 |
grounds – don’t get links to politics Das or Treties disad – key neg ground on a topic with shitty topic DAs
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>grounds – don’t get links to politics Das or Treties disad – key neg ground on a topic with shitty topic DAs</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
4
| 431,086 | 1 | 17,110 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| 565,262 |
N
|
Wake
|
5
|
NYU Itliong-Zhan
|
McCleary
|
Fed CP (2NR)
AG Politics (2NR
Cede the Political DA
T - USFG
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,574 |
Educating and training health professionals could solve shortage
|
Schwark 11
|
Schwark 11 DAVID SCHWARK, J.D. expected 2011, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. Journal of Law and Health 2011 24 J.L. & Health 323 NOTE: ORGAN CONSCRIPTION: HOW THE DEAD CAN SAVE THE LIVING lexis
|
One commentator proposes that the solution to the organ shortage lies in addressing the psychological issues involved in procurement rather than adopting more restrictive legal regimes, This solution could be accomplished by educating health providers about the need to ask families for consent and by providing training that allows them to do so in a manner that respects the family's grieving, These measures alone, he argues, would significantly increase the number of organ donors.
kyan
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) published an "industry guidance" instituted a de facto ban on live organ, cell, and tissue transplants from nonhuman primates There are safer, more cost-effective, and humane alternatives to xenotransplantation These include investing heavily in preventive medicine programs to reduce the need for transplants of all kinds Demand that the Department of Health and Human Services ban xenotransplantation from all nonhuman species immediately.
|
the solution to the organ shortage lies in addressing the psychological issues involved in procurement could be accomplished by educating health providers about the need to ask families for consent and by providing training that allows them to do so in a manner that respects the family's grieving would significantly increase the number of organ donors
|
There have been several attempts to explain why this occurs. One commentator has suggested that this outcome is a result of psychological factors. n150 He suggests that individuals may have negative feelings towards organ procurement because of its relationship with death and that these feelings impact the legal systems designed to encourage donation. n151 Emotional issues involved may deter the decedent's family from agreeing to donation, as well as prevent health care professionals from feeling comfortable enough to sensitively request donation from the family. n152 Therefore, he proposes that the solution to the organ shortage lies in addressing the psychological issues involved in procurement rather than adopting more restrictive legal regimes, like presumed consent. n153 This solution could be accomplished by educating health providers about the need to ask families for consent and by providing training that allows them to do so in a manner that respects the family's grieving, n154 These measures alone, he argues, would significantly increase the number of organ donors.
CP prevents Xenotransplantation
Fano 99 (Alix Fano, Director CRT FDA HAS NOT BANNED PIG-TO-HUMAN TRANSPLANTS AND NEEDS TO HEAR FROM YOU -web.linkny.com/~civitas/page100.html)//kyan
On April 6, 1999, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) published an "industry guidance" in the Federal Register on "Public Health Issues Posed by the Use of Nonhuman Primate Xenografts." This "guidance" instituted a de facto ban on live organ, cell, and tissue transplants from nonhuman primates because they would expose the public to "significant infectious disease risk". But the FDA guidelines failed to address the dangers posed by transplanting organs from non-primate species. Genetically-altered pigs are being considered as the primary source for xenotransplants despite the existence of over 25 diseases in pigs that can infect humans. New pig viruses continue to be discovered daily. The deadly Malaysian "Nipah" virus infected over 250 humans, killed 100, and led to the mass slaughter of some one million pigs. The FDA must be flooded with your letters and postcards now. The deadline for comments is July 6, 1999. Here are some key points to make: Pigs are not any safer than nonhuman primates: witness swine influenza, the Porcine Endogenous Retroviruses (PERVS), the Australian paramyxovirus, a novel strain of Hepatitis E found in US pig herds, and the new Malaysian "Nipah" virus that has devastated humans and pigs alike. PERVS, present throughout the pig genome, have infected human cells in vitro. The influenza virus of 1918, which resembled a common swine flu virus, killed more people in modern history than any other epidemic including AIDS and the Black Plague. Remind the FDA that it violated the national Environmental Policy Act by failing to perform an environmental impact statement before allowing clinical xenotransplantation experiments. Xenotransplantation is receiving substantial public (and private) financing without adequate public debate. Tell the FDA that you do not want your tax dollars used to develop xenotransplantation. There are safer, more cost-effective, and humane alternatives to xenotransplantation that are not being explored by regulatory authorities. These include investing heavily in preventive medicine programs to reduce the need for transplants of all kinds, and increasing the pool of human organs as many European countries have successfully done through legislative schemes. Demand that the Department of Health and Human Services ban xenotransplantation from all nonhuman species immediately.
| 3,638 |
<h4>Educating and training health professionals could solve shortage</h4><p><strong>Schwark 11<u></strong> DAVID SCHWARK, J.D. expected 2011, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. Journal of Law and Health 2011 24 J.L. & Health 323 NOTE: ORGAN CONSCRIPTION: HOW THE DEAD CAN SAVE THE LIVING lexis</p><p></u>There have been several attempts to explain why this occurs. <u>One commentator</u> has suggested that this outcome is a result of psychological factors. n150 He suggests that individuals may have negative feelings towards organ procurement because of its relationship with death and that these feelings impact the legal systems designed to encourage donation. n151 Emotional issues involved may deter the decedent's family from agreeing to donation, as well as prevent health care professionals from feeling comfortable enough to sensitively request donation from the family. n152 Therefore, he <u>proposes that <mark>the solution to the organ shortage lies in addressing the psychological issues involved in procurement</mark> rather than adopting more restrictive legal regimes,</u> like presumed consent. n153 <u>This solution <mark>could be accomplished by educating health providers about the need to ask families for consent and by providing training that allows them to do so in a manner that respects the family's grieving</mark>,</u> n154 <u>These measures alone, he argues, <mark>would significantly increase the number of organ donors<strong></mark>.</p><p></u>CP prevents Xenotransplantation </p><p>Fano 99 </strong>(Alix Fano, Director CRT FDA HAS NOT BANNED PIG-TO-HUMAN TRANSPLANTS AND NEEDS TO HEAR FROM YOU -web.linkny.com/~civitas/page100.html)//<u>kyan</p><p></u>On April 6, 1999, the <u>Food and Drug Administration (FDA) published an "industry guidance"</u> in the Federal Register on "Public Health Issues Posed by the Use of Nonhuman Primate Xenografts." This "guidance" <u>instituted a de facto ban on live organ, cell, and tissue transplants from nonhuman primates </u>because they would expose the public to "significant infectious disease risk". But the FDA guidelines failed to address the dangers posed by transplanting organs from non-primate species. Genetically-altered pigs are being considered as the primary source for xenotransplants despite the existence of over 25 diseases in pigs that can infect humans. New pig viruses continue to be discovered daily. The deadly Malaysian "Nipah" virus infected over 250 humans, killed 100, and led to the mass slaughter of some one million pigs. The FDA must be flooded with your letters and postcards now. The deadline for comments is July 6, 1999. Here are some key points to make: Pigs are not any safer than nonhuman primates: witness swine influenza, the Porcine Endogenous Retroviruses (PERVS), the Australian paramyxovirus, a novel strain of Hepatitis E found in US pig herds, and the new Malaysian "Nipah" virus that has devastated humans and pigs alike. PERVS, present throughout the pig genome, have infected human cells in vitro. The influenza virus of 1918, which resembled a common swine flu virus, killed more people in modern history than any other epidemic including AIDS and the Black Plague. Remind the FDA that it violated the national Environmental Policy Act by failing to perform an environmental impact statement before allowing clinical xenotransplantation experiments. Xenotransplantation is receiving substantial public (and private) financing without adequate public debate. Tell the FDA that you do not want your tax dollars used to develop xenotransplantation. <u>There are safer, more cost-effective, and humane alternatives to xenotransplantation</u> that are not being explored by regulatory authorities. <u>These include investing heavily in preventive medicine programs to reduce the need for transplants of all kinds</u>, and increasing the pool of human organs as many European countries have successfully done through legislative schemes. <u>Demand that the Department of Health and Human Services ban xenotransplantation from all nonhuman species immediately.</p></u>
| null |
1nc
|
3
| 430,432 | 2 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,575 |
capitalism reduces war—only authors use a testable empirical method
|
Weede, 04
|
Weede, 04 – professor of sociology at the University of Bonn, Germany, In Winter 1986-87, he was Visiting Professor of International Relations at the Bologna Center of The Johns Hopkins University. (Erich, “BALANCE OF POWER, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE CAPITALIST PEACE,” http://www.fnf.org.ph/downloadables/Balance%20of%20Power,%20Globalization%20and%20Capitalist%20Peace.pdf)
|
others one cannot avoid some epistemological commitments
My own approach is definitely nomothetic at
Nomothetic research focuses on hypothesizing, testing and establishing law-like general statements or nomological propositions Examples of such propositions are: the more economic freedom in a nation prevails, the less frequently it is involved in war. One characteristic of such propositions is that they say something about observable reality Nomothetic researchers look for refutations. They try to falsify their propositions or theories Although certitude about possession of the truth is beyond the capabilities of human inquiry, growth of knowledge is conceivable by the successive elimination of errors
|
one cannot avoid epistemological commitments
Nomothetic research focuses on hypothesizing, testing and establishing general statements the more economic freedom in a nation the less frequently it is in war. such propositions say something about observable reality. Nomothetic researchers look for refutations. They try to falsify their theories Although certitude is beyond human inquiry, knowledge is conceivable by elimination of errors
|
If one does research or summarize the research of others – of course, most of the ideas, theories, and evidence discussed below have been produced by others – one cannot avoid some epistemological commitments. In the social sciences the fundamental choice is whether to pursue an ideographic or a nomothetic approach. Almost all historians choose the ideographic approach and focus on the description of structures or events, whereas most economists and psychologists choose the nomothetic approach and focus on the search for law-like general statements. Sociologists and political scientists are still divided – sometimes even by the Atlantic Ocean. In American political science the nomothetic approach dominates the flagship journal of the profession, the American Political Science Review, as well as more specialized journals, such as International Studies Quarterly, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, or World Politics. In German political science, however, the nomothetic approach has advanced little beyond electoral studies.
My own approach is definitely nomothetic. This is related to my training in psychology at one of the first German universities focusing on quantitative research methods in the early 1960s, the University of Hamburg. This epistemological orientation has been reinforced by graduate training in international politics at one of the first American universities emphasizing quantitative research in the late 1960s, Northwestern University, which is located in a suburb of Chicago.
Nomothetic research focuses on hypothesizing, testing and establishing law-like general statements or nomological propositions. Examples of such propositions are: The higher average incomes in a nation are, the more likely is democratic government. Or, the more economic freedom in a nation prevails, the less frequently it is involved in war. One characteristic of such propositions is that they say something about observable reality. Whenever you say something about reality, you risk that others find out that you are wrong. If we observed that most poor countries were democracies, but most rich countries were autocracies, then we should reject or, at least, modify the proposition about prosperity and democracy mentioned above.1 Nomothetic researchers look for refutations. They try to falsify their propositions or theories (Popper 1934/1959). If the empirical evidence is compatible with one's theory, then one keeps the hypothetical propositions and regards them as supported – until negative evidence turns up. Although certitude about possession of the truth is beyond the capabilities of human inquiry, growth of knowledge is conceivable by the successive elimination of errors.
| 2,706 |
<h4>capitalism reduces war—only authors use a testable empirical method </h4><p><strong>Weede, 04</strong> – professor of sociology at the University of Bonn, Germany, In Winter 1986-87, he was Visiting Professor of International Relations at the Bologna Center of The Johns Hopkins University. (Erich, “BALANCE OF POWER, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE CAPITALIST PEACE,” http://www.fnf.org.ph/downloadables/Balance%20of%20Power,%20Globalization%20and%20Capitalist%20Peace.pdf)</p><p>If one does research or summarize the research of others – of course, most of the ideas, theories, and evidence discussed below have been produced by <u>others</u> – <u><mark>one cannot avoid </mark>some <mark>epistemological commitments</u></mark>. In the social sciences the fundamental choice is whether to pursue an ideographic or a nomothetic approach. Almost all historians choose the ideographic approach and focus on the description of structures or events, whereas most economists and psychologists choose the nomothetic approach and focus on the search for law-like general statements. Sociologists and political scientists are still divided – sometimes even by the Atlantic Ocean. In American political science the nomothetic approach dominates the flagship journal of the profession, the American Political Science Review, as well as more specialized journals, such as International Studies Quarterly, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, or World Politics. In German political science, however, the nomothetic approach has advanced little beyond electoral studies.</p><p><u>My own approach is definitely nomothetic</u>. This is related to my training in psychology at one of the first German universities focusing on quantitative research methods in the early 1960s, the University of Hamburg. This epistemological orientation has been reinforced by graduate training in international politics <u>at</u> one of the first American universities emphasizing quantitative research in the late 1960s, Northwestern University, which is located in a suburb of Chicago.</p><p><u><mark>Nomothetic research focuses on hypothesizing, testing and establishing </mark>law-like <mark>general statements</mark> or nomological propositions</u>. <u>Examples of such propositions are:</u> The higher average incomes in a nation are, the more likely is democratic government. Or, <u><mark>the more economic freedom in a nation</mark> prevails, <mark>the less frequently it is </mark>involved <mark>in war. </mark>One characteristic of <mark>such propositions </mark>is that they <mark>say something about observable reality</u>.</mark> Whenever you say something about reality, you risk that others find out that you are wrong. If we observed that most poor countries were democracies, but most rich countries were autocracies, then we should reject or, at least, modify the proposition about prosperity and democracy mentioned above.1 <u><mark>Nomothetic researchers look for refutations. They try to falsify their </mark>propositions or <mark>theories</u></mark> (Popper 1934/1959). If the empirical evidence is compatible with one's theory, then one keeps the hypothetical propositions and regards them as supported – until negative evidence turns up. <u><mark>Although certitude </mark>about possession of the truth <mark>is beyond </mark>the capabilities of <mark>human inquiry, </mark>growth of <mark>knowledge is conceivable by </mark>the successive <mark>elimination of errors</u></mark>.</p>
| null |
1nc
|
Case
| 204,485 | 9 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,576 |
State legalization is key to build RESILIENCY into the economy- federal legalization crushes that by causing a few MNCs to dominate
|
Breger 2014
|
Breger 2014 (Sasha, Lecturer at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver and author of the recent book Derivatives and Development. Her research includes global finance, derivatives, social policy, food, and farming, Big Food, Big Pharma, Big Tobacco, Big Finance, and Little Marijuana, http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/05/big-food-big-pharma-big-tobacco-big-finance-little-marijuana.html) leads to small business competition which solves innovation and job growth-
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Colorado’s Amendment 64 legalized marijuana creating new jobs, boosting real estate values, and increasing state and local tax revenues the local marijuana market is recession-proof and is bolstering resilience to global crisis As I’ve watched this unfold I’ve grown increasingly concerned about legalization on the federal level state level legalization has motivated economic recovery and helped folks earn more income get better jobs and enjoy more public services federal legalization risks these benefits leaking out of local economies into the pockets of Big Business today, the legal marijuana market is the domain of small operations slightly larger local chains and other generally smaller businesses explain the decentralized and relatively competitive marketplace. First, state regulations work limit the size of firms regulating the number of plants that a single firm can grow, the amount of marijuana a single person can purchase and possess, and increases/decreases in firm space and capacity residency requirements out of state ownership is effectively prohibited federal illegality prevents larger businesses from outside of Colorado from engaging in growing and retailing, and even from providing certain services to Colorado marijuana firms. Federally insured banks, for example, cannot provide banking and financial services to the marijuana industry for fear of incurring federal penalties for violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Federal illegality has meant that Colorado’s pot revenues flow into local credit unions, and will soon support a network of local banking cooperatives. I’m deeply worried about Colorado’s economic fortunes should federal legalization occur the local marketplace will be replaced by a national market governed by large multinational firms that whisk their profits away to other places, degrade product quality, and stymie innovation and employment evolution of the food system is instructive Small innovative firms will be bought out by ever-larger conglomerates Mass, centralized production will displace local If the food system is any indication, federal legalization will impoverish local economies benefits will leak to MNCs markets like Colorado’s marijuana market provide a safe-haven for small businesses and a stimulus to local economies.
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Colorado’s Amendment 64 creating jobs boosting real estate values, and increasing tax revenues the local market is recession-proof and bolstering resilience to global crisis state legalization motivated economic recovery helped folks earn more income, get better jobs and enjoy more services federal legalization risks these benefits leaking out of local economies into the pockets of Big Business today legal market is the domain of small operations , federal level illegality prevents larger businesses from outside of Colorado from engaging in growing and retailing, and even from providing certain services to Colorado marijuana firms. Federally insured banks, for example, cannot provide banking and financial services to the marijuana industry for fear of incurring federal penalties for violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Federal illegality has meant that Colorado’s pot revenues flow into local credit unions, and will soon support a network of local banking cooperatives. should federal legalization occur the local marketplace will be replaced by a national market governed by large multinational firms that whisk their profits away to other places, degrade product quality, and stymie innovation and employment. Small innovative firms will be bought out If the food system is any indication, federal legalization will impoverish local economies markets like Colorado’s provide a safe-haven for small businesses and stimulus to local economies
|
Passed in 2012, Colorado’s Amendment 64 legalized the growing and selling of marijuana on a recreational basis. With medical marijuana, recreational marijuana has helped lift the people of Denver out of the Great Recession by inspiring leagues of new small businesses, creating new jobs, boosting commercial real estate values, and increasing state and local tax revenues. It turns out that the local marijuana market is fairly recession-proof and is actually bolstering local resilience to global crisis. As I’ve watched this novelty unfold over the past couple of years (with considerable delight, to be frank) and witnessed first hand the important benefits for our local economy, I’ve grown increasingly concerned about the possibility of legalization on the federal level. While state level legalization has—for all of its still considerable problems—motivated economic recovery and helped working and middle class folks earn more income, get better jobs and enjoy more robust public services, federal legalization risks these benefits leaking out of local economies into the pockets of Big Business. As things stand today, the $2.3 billion legal U.S. marijuana market is the domain of small pot shops and grow operations, slightly larger local chains (with a handful of stores), a few inter-state mid-sized retail establishments with outlets in two or more states, and other generally smaller local businesses that provide inputs and services to the marijuana growing and retail firms. In Colorado, a few different dynamics explain the structure of this highly decentralized and relatively competitive marketplace. First, state regulations work to limit the size of growing and retailing firms by regulating the number of plants that a single firm can grow, the amount of marijuana a single person can purchase and possess, and increases/decreases in firm space and capacity, among other constraints (go to this link and this link for the most recent state laws). Because the state has established residency requirements for marijuana firm ownership and operation, out of state ownership is effectively prohibited. Second, and perhaps more importantly in the long-run, federal level illegality prevents larger businesses from outside of Colorado from engaging in growing and retailing, and even from providing certain services to Colorado marijuana firms. Federally insured banks, for example, cannot provide banking and financial services to the marijuana industry for fear of incurring federal penalties for violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Federal illegality has meant that Colorado’s pot revenues flow into local credit unions, and will soon support a network of local banking cooperatives. I’m deeply worried about Colorado’s economic fortunes should federal level legalization occur. I fear that the local and decentralized marketplace will be replaced by a national or even international market governed by large multinational firms that whisk their profits away to other places, degrade product quality, and stymie innovation and employment. The evolution of the global food system is instructive in thinking about what may happen to pot in a fully legalized world. Small and innovative firms will be bought out by ever-larger conglomerates seeking to add one more brand to their portfolio. Mass, centralized, industrial pot production will displace local artisanal and craft production. Indeed, rumor has it that Marlboro already attempted to patent the name “Marley” in anticipation of federal legalization. If we’re not careful, you’ll soon be able to buy Marley’s by the case at the Wal-Mart near you. If the Waltons are smart, they’ll probably be shelved right next to the Twinkies. Multinational input providers will displace local garden and hydroponics stores, providing cheap fertilizers and grow equipment at prices with which the mom and pop stores can’t compete. Round-up Ready AK-47 clones from Monsanto, anyone? Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline will patent strains that have been pioneered by Colorado locals to treat various health problems. I can hear the drug commercials now: speak with your doctor to see if Canna is right for you! Don’t forget that the global financial system will also intervene—Visa and Mastercard will take 5% of every pot transaction, Goldman Sachs will develop an exchange-traded Global Marijuana Fund, and maybe we’ll be able to start trading “weed” futures on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. If the rest of the world goes the way of Uruguay and Jamaica, then we can also look forward to Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland monopolizing the global weed trade and buying up all of the world’s pot storage facilities. Who knows? Perhaps the World Bank will even incorporate weed into structural adjustment programs, and start recommending marijuana exports to developing countries as a way to finance debt repayment. If the food system is any indication, federal legalization of pot will impoverish vibrant, local marijuana economies. Local economic benefits will leak out to already wealthy and powerful MNCs. In a world where big monopolistic companies rule the formal economy, grey markets like Colorado’s marijuana market provide a safe-haven for small businesses and a stimulus to local economies.
| 5,262 |
<h4>State legalization is key to build RESILIENCY into the economy- federal legalization crushes that by causing a few MNCs to dominate</h4><p><strong>Breger 2014</strong> (Sasha, Lecturer at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver and author of the recent book Derivatives and Development. Her research includes global finance, derivatives, social policy, food, and farming, Big Food, Big Pharma, Big Tobacco, Big Finance, and Little Marijuana, http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/05/big-food-big-pharma-big-tobacco-big-finance-little-marijuana.html) <u>leads to small business competition which solves innovation and job growth-</p><p></u>Passed in 2012, <u><mark>Colorado’s Amendment 64 </mark>legalized</u> the growing and selling of <u>marijuana</u> on a recreational basis. With medical marijuana, recreational marijuana has helped lift the people of Denver out of the Great Recession by inspiring leagues of new small businesses, <u><mark>creating</mark> new <mark>jobs</mark>, <mark>boosting</u></mark> commercial <u><mark>real estate values, and</u> <u>increasing</mark> state and local <mark>tax revenues</u></mark>. It turns out that <u><mark>the local</mark> marijuana <mark>market is</u></mark> fairly <u><strong><mark>recession-proof</u></strong> <u>and</mark> is</u> actually <u><strong><mark>bolstering</u></strong></mark> local <u><strong><mark>resilience to global crisis</u></strong></mark>. <u>As I’ve watched this</u> novelty <u>unfold</u> over the past couple of years (with considerable delight, to be frank) and witnessed first hand the important benefits for our local economy, <u><strong>I’ve grown increasingly concerned about</u></strong> the possibility of <u><strong>legalization on the federal level</u></strong>. While <u><mark>state</mark> level <mark>legalization</mark> has</u>—for all of its still considerable problems—<u><strong><mark>motivated economic recovery</u></strong></mark> <u>and <mark>helped</u></mark> working and middle class <u><mark>folks earn more income</u>, <u>get better jobs and enjoy more</u></mark> robust <u>public <mark>services</u></mark>, <u><strong><mark>federal legalization risks these benefits leaking out of local economies into the pockets of Big Business</u></strong></mark>. As things stand <u><mark>today</mark>, the</u> $2.3 billion <u><mark>legal</u></mark> U.S. <u>marijuana <mark>market</mark> <mark>is the domain of small</u></mark> pot shops and grow <u><mark>operations</u></mark>, <u>slightly larger local chains</u> (with a handful of stores), a few inter-state mid-sized retail establishments with outlets in two or more states, <u>and other generally smaller</u> local <u>businesses</u> that provide inputs and services to the marijuana growing and retail firms. In Colorado, a few different dynamics <u>explain the</u> structure of this highly <u>decentralized and relatively competitive marketplace. First, state regulations work</u> to <u>limit the size of </u>growing and retailing <u>firms</u> by <u>regulating the number of plants that a single firm can grow, the amount of marijuana a single person can purchase and possess, and increases/decreases in firm space and capacity</u>, among other constraints (go to this link and this link for the most recent state laws). Because the state has established <u>residency requirements</u> for marijuana firm ownership and operation, <u>out of state ownership is effectively prohibited</u>. Second, and perhaps more importantly in the long-run<mark>, <u><strong>federal</u></strong> level <u><strong>illegality prevents larger businesses from outside of Colorado </strong>from engaging<strong> in growing and retailing, and even from providing certain services to Colorado marijuana firms. Federally insured banks, for example, cannot provide banking and financial services to the marijuana industry for fear of incurring federal penalties for violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Federal illegality has meant that Colorado’s pot revenues flow into local credit unions, and will soon support a network of local banking cooperatives.</u></strong></mark> <u>I’m deeply worried about Colorado’s economic fortunes <mark>should federal</mark> </u>level<u> <mark>legalization occur</u></mark>. I fear that <u><strong><mark>the</mark> <mark>local</u></strong></mark> and decentralized <u><strong><mark>marketplace will be replaced by a national</u></strong></mark> or even international <u><strong><mark>market governed by large multinational</u></strong> <u><strong>firms</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>that whisk their profits away to other places, degrade product quality, and <strong>stymie innovation and employment</u></strong>.</mark> The <u>evolution of the</u> global <u>food system is instructive</u> in thinking about what may happen to pot in a fully legalized world. <u><mark>Small</u></mark> and <u><mark>innovative firms will be bought out</mark> by</u> <u>ever-larger conglomerates</u> seeking to add one more brand to their portfolio. <u>Mass, centralized</u>, industrial pot <u>production will displace local</u> artisanal and craft production. Indeed, rumor has it that Marlboro already attempted to patent the name “Marley” in anticipation of federal legalization. If we’re not careful, you’ll soon be able to buy Marley’s by the case at the Wal-Mart near you. If the Waltons are smart, they’ll probably be shelved right next to the Twinkies. Multinational input providers will displace local garden and hydroponics stores, providing cheap fertilizers and grow equipment at prices with which the mom and pop stores can’t compete. Round-up Ready AK-47 clones from Monsanto, anyone? Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline will patent strains that have been pioneered by Colorado locals to treat various health problems. I can hear the drug commercials now: speak with your doctor to see if Canna is right for you! Don’t forget that the global financial system will also intervene—Visa and Mastercard will take 5% of every pot transaction, Goldman Sachs will develop an exchange-traded Global Marijuana Fund, and maybe we’ll be able to start trading “weed” futures on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. If the rest of the world goes the way of Uruguay and Jamaica, then we can also look forward to Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland monopolizing the global weed trade and buying up all of the world’s pot storage facilities. Who knows? Perhaps the World Bank will even incorporate weed into structural adjustment programs, and start recommending marijuana exports to developing countries as a way to finance debt repayment. <u><mark>If the food system is any indication, federal legalization</u></mark> of pot <u><mark>will <strong>impoverish</u></strong></mark> vibrant, <u><mark>local</u></mark> marijuana <u><mark>economies</u></mark>. Local economic <u>benefits will leak</u> out <u>to</u> already wealthy and powerful <u>MNCs</u>. In a world where big monopolistic companies rule the formal economy, grey <u><mark>markets like Colorado’s</mark> marijuana market <mark>provide a safe-haven for small businesses and</mark> a <mark>stimulus to local economies</mark>.</p></u>
|
2NC
| null |
a2
| 430,951 | 5 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,577 |
Obama can sustain a veto of Iran sanctions now- but it’s close- PC’s key
|
Politico 12/29
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Politico 12/29/2014 (GOP to move on Iran sanctions legislation, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/gop-senate-iran-sanctions-bill-113852.html)
|
Republicans are setting up early challenges to Obama preparing to move forward quickly on Iran The Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next year taking a confrontational stance toward Iran appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority. You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the Kirk-Menendez legislation in 2014, though Obama convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off legislation could upset ongoing negotiations While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress aides declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. the largest challenge is building veto-proof support that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House. Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP Kirk expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate.”
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Republicans are setting up early challenges o bama Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next yea taking a confrontational stance toward Iran appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority Kirk-Menendez Obama’s convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off legislation could upset ongoing negotiations. the largest challenge is building veto-proof support Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task, given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP
|
Congressional Republicans are setting up early challenges to President Barack Obama in January, preparing to move forward quickly on new Iran sanctions legislation following on the heels of a vote on a bill approving the Keystone XL Pipeline. The Republican-controlled Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next year, according to Republican senators and aides. The starting point would be a bill written a year ago by Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) that managed to accrue the support of 60 senators in both parties despite opposition from the White House. Kirk and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) said over the weekend that an Iran vote could occur in January after a vote on Keystone, which is the first bill the Republican Senate will take up and is also opposed by President Barack Obama. Republican leaders have not yet finalized their legislative schedule, but the bipartisan Iran proposal is supported by incoming Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and all of his leadership team. And taking a confrontational stance toward Iran as diplomatic negotiations continue with a group of Western nations appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority. “It’s an important issue, a priority, and has wide bipartisan support in the Senate,” said McConnell spokesman Don Stewart on Monday. The Republican House overwhelmingly passed a sanctions bill targeting Iran’s energy industry in 2013, though that legislation was never taken up by the Senate. The Kirk-Menendez legislation would tighten economic sanctions on Iran if the country walks away from ongoing negotiations over nuclear enrichment or reneges on an interim agreement that has frozen some of Iran’s nuclear activities in return for unwinding some sanctions. In November, Western and Iranians negotiators extended that interim deal until July as they attempt to hammer out a permanent deal that would curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions and relax sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy and isolated the country globally. A separate bill written by Graham and incoming Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) would require Congress to approve of any final deal and could figure into the GOP’s plans next year. “You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran. You will see a Congress making sure that sanctions are real and will be reimposed at the drop of a hat. You will see a Congress wanting to have any say about a final deal,” Graham said at a weekend press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the Kirk-Menendez legislation in 2014, though President Barack Obama’s administration convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off public support after warning that voting on that legislation could upset ongoing negotiations. While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress, Democratic aides on Monday declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. Indeed, the largest challenge for both supporters of Iran sanctions and the Keystone pipeline is building veto-proof levels of support in Congress that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House. White House press secretary Josh Earnest said in November that new penalties during negotiations would be “counterproductive.” Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task, given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP. But Kirk said on Sunday in an interview with Fox news that he expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate.”
| 3,916 |
<h4><strong>Obama can sustain a veto of Iran sanctions now- but it’s close- PC’s key</h4><p>Politico 12/29</strong>/2014 (GOP to move on Iran sanctions legislation, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/gop-senate-iran-sanctions-bill-113852.html)</p><p>Congressional <u><mark>Republicans are setting up early challenges</mark> t<mark>o</u></mark> President Barack <u>O<mark>bama</u></mark> in January, <u>preparing to move forward quickly on</u> new <u>Iran</u> sanctions legislation following on the heels of a vote on a bill approving the Keystone XL Pipeline. <u>The</u> Republican-controlled <u><mark>Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next yea</mark>r</u>, according to Republican senators and aides. The starting point would be a bill written a year ago by Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) that managed to accrue the support of 60 senators in both parties despite opposition from the White House. Kirk and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) said over the weekend that an Iran vote could occur in January after a vote on Keystone, which is the first bill the Republican Senate will take up and is also opposed by President Barack Obama. Republican leaders have not yet finalized their legislative schedule, but the bipartisan Iran proposal is supported by incoming Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and all of his leadership team. And <u><mark>taking a confrontational stance toward Iran</u></mark> as diplomatic negotiations continue with a group of Western nations <u><mark>appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority</mark>. </u>“It’s an important issue, a priority, and has wide bipartisan support in the Senate,” said McConnell spokesman Don Stewart on Monday. The Republican House overwhelmingly passed a sanctions bill targeting Iran’s energy industry in 2013, though that legislation was never taken up by the Senate. The Kirk-Menendez legislation would tighten economic sanctions on Iran if the country walks away from ongoing negotiations over nuclear enrichment or reneges on an interim agreement that has frozen some of Iran’s nuclear activities in return for unwinding some sanctions. In November, Western and Iranians negotiators extended that interim deal until July as they attempt to hammer out a permanent deal that would curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions and relax sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy and isolated the country globally. A separate bill written by Graham and incoming Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) would require Congress to approve of any final deal and could figure into the GOP’s plans next year. “<u>You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran</u>. You will see a Congress making sure that sanctions are real and will be reimposed at the drop of a hat. You will see a Congress wanting to have any say about a final deal,” Graham said at a weekend press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. <u>A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the <mark>Kirk-Menendez</mark> legislation in 2014, though </u>President Barack <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong>’s</mark> administration <u><strong><mark>convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off</u></strong></mark> public support after warning that voting on that <u><strong><mark>legislation could upset ongoing negotiations</u></strong>.</mark> <u>While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress</u>, Democratic <u>aides</u> on Monday <u>declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. </u>Indeed, <u><strong><mark>the largest challenge</u></strong></mark> for both supporters of Iran sanctions and the Keystone pipeline <u><strong><mark>is building veto-proof</u></strong></mark> levels of <u><strong><mark>support</u></strong></mark> in Congress <u>that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House.</u> White House press secretary Josh Earnest said in November that new penalties during negotiations would be “counterproductive.” <u><mark>Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a <strong>steep task</u></strong>,</mark> <u><mark>given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP</u></mark>. But <u>Kirk</u> said on Sunday in an interview with Fox news that he <u>expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate<strong>.”</p></u></strong>
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1nr
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Th at: empirics
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UQ
| 430,411 | 46 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,578 |
The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana entities.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana entities.</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 431,087 | 1 | 17,112 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| 565,260 |
N
|
Wake
|
2
|
Cornell Deng-Zhang
|
Stone
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaty DA
T-legalize
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,579 |
voter for competitive equity and education
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>voter<u><strong> for competitive equity and education</h4></u></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
4
| 431,088 | 1 | 17,110 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| 565,262 |
N
|
Wake
|
5
|
NYU Itliong-Zhan
|
McCleary
|
Fed CP (2NR)
AG Politics (2NR
Cede the Political DA
T - USFG
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,580 |
. interpretation – the affirmative must legalize close to all possible sales
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>. interpretation – the affirmative must legalize close to all possible sales</h4></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
4
| 431,089 | 1 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,581 |
S
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><u>S</h4></u>
| null |
1nc
|
Case
| 431,090 | 1 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,582 |
Vote in the next few weeks
|
Reuters 1/15
|
Reuters 1/15/2015 (Iran bill debate seen in Senate by early February, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/15/us-usa-congress-iran-idUSKBN0KO26U20150115)
|
The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said he expected a bill addressing Iran's nuclear program to come to the Senate floor in early February, if not sooner toward the end of January or the first part of February, you’ll see something on the floor
|
The new chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee said he expected a bill addressing Iran's nuclear program in early February, if not sooner toward the end of January or the first part of February, you’ll see something on the floor,"
|
The new chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee said on Thursday he expected a bill addressing Iran's nuclear program to come to the U.S. Senate floor for debate ahead of a vote in early February, if not sooner. "I think sometime toward the end of January or the first part of February, you’ll see something being debated on the Senate floor," Republican Senator Bob Corker told reporters at a retreat for Republican lawmakers in Hershey, Pennsylvania.
| 468 |
<h4><strong>Vote in the next few weeks</h4><p>Reuters 1/15</strong>/2015 (Iran bill debate seen in Senate by early February, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/15/us-usa-congress-iran-idUSKBN0KO26U20150115)</p><p><u><mark>The</u> new <u>chairman</u> <u>of the</u> U.S. <u>Senate Foreign Relations Committee said</u></mark> on Thursday <u><mark>he expected a bill addressing Iran's nuclear program</mark> to come to the</u> U.S. <u>Senate floor</u> for debate ahead of a vote <u><mark>in early February, if not sooner</u></mark>. "I think sometime <u><mark>toward the end of January or the first part of February, you’ll see something</u></mark> being debated <u><mark>on the</u></mark> Senate <u><mark>floor</u>,"<strong></mark> Republican Senator Bob Corker told reporters at a retreat for Republican lawmakers in Hershey, Pennsylvania.</p></strong>
|
1nr
|
Top
|
UQ
| 430,680 | 4 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,583 |
US Economic decline turns every impact – collapses hegemony and creates a world of nuclear chaos
|
Friedberg and Schoenfeld 2008
|
Friedberg and Schoenfeld 2008 – *Professor of politics and IR at Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School, **senior editor of Commentary and visiting scholar at the Witherspoon Institute at Princeton (10/21, Aaron and Gabriel, Wall Street Journal, “The dangers of a diminished America”, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html)
|
One immediate implication of the crisis on Wall Street is that the primary instruments of U.S. foreign policy will be crimped we may be headed toward a major reduction in America's world role, and a new era of financially-induced isolationism. Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy made it easier for us to run deficits traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying al Qaeda has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing down the road to chaos If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of Middle East sources could all be placed at risk. there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers exploited their divisions we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices China is perhaps even more fragile None of this is good news if leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures There is no substitute for America on the world stage. The choice we have before us is between the potentially disastrous effects of disengagement and the stiff price tag of continued American leadership.
|
immediate implication of the crisis on Wall Street is tha .S. foreign policy will be crimped a major reduction in America's world role new era of financially-induced isolationism. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy made it easier for us to run deficits, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying al Qaeda Iran and North Korea Pakistan and Afghanistan If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence at risk. 1930s, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers exploited their divisions rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless f Russian has demonstrate fragility China is fragile, There is no substitute for America on the world stage
|
With the global financial system in serious trouble, is America's geostrategic dominance likely to diminish? If so, what would that mean? One immediate implication of the crisis that began on Wall Street and spread across the world is that the primary instruments of U.S. foreign policy will be crimped. The next president will face an entirely new and adverse fiscal position. Estimates of this year's federal budget deficit already show that it has jumped $237 billion from last year, to $407 billion. With families and businesses hurting, there will be calls for various and expensive domestic relief programs. In the face of this onrushing river of red ink, both Barack Obama and John McCain have been reluctant to lay out what portions of their programmatic wish list they might defer or delete. Only Joe Biden has suggested a possible reduction -- foreign aid. This would be one of the few popular cuts, but in budgetary terms it is a mere grain of sand. Still, Sen. Biden's comment hints at where we may be headed: toward a major reduction in America's world role, and perhaps even a new era of financially-induced isolationism. Pressures to cut defense spending, and to dodge the cost of waging two wars, already intense before this crisis, are likely to mount. Despite the success of the surge, the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular. Precipitous withdrawal -- attractive to a sizable swath of the electorate before the financial implosion -- might well become even more popular with annual war bills running in the hundreds of billions. Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow. Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures. As for our democratic friends, the present crisis comes when many European nations are struggling to deal with decades of anemic growth, sclerotic governance and an impending demographic crisis. Despite its past dynamism, Japan faces similar challenges. India is still in the early stages of its emergence as a world economic and geopolitical power. What does this all mean? There is no substitute for America on the world stage. The choice we have before us is between the potentially disastrous effects of disengagement and the stiff price tag of continued American leadership.
| 4,801 |
<h4>US Economic decline turns every impact – collapses hegemony and creates a world of <u>nuclear</u> chaos</h4><p><strong>Friedberg and Schoenfeld 2008</strong> – *Professor of politics and IR at Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School, **senior editor of Commentary and visiting scholar at the Witherspoon Institute at Princeton (10/21, Aaron and Gabriel, Wall Street Journal, “The dangers of a diminished America”, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html)</p><p>With the global financial system in serious trouble, is America's geostrategic dominance likely to diminish? If so, what would that mean? <u>One <mark>immediate implication of the crisis</mark> </u>that began <u><mark>on Wall Street</u></mark> and spread across the world <u><mark>is tha</mark>t the primary instruments of U<mark>.S. foreign policy will be crimped</u></mark>. The next president will face an entirely new and adverse fiscal position. Estimates of this year's federal budget deficit already show that it has jumped $237 billion from last year, to $407 billion. With families and businesses hurting, there will be calls for various and expensive domestic relief programs. In the face of this onrushing river of red ink, both Barack Obama and John McCain have been reluctant to lay out what portions of their programmatic wish list they might defer or delete. Only Joe Biden has suggested a possible reduction -- foreign aid. This would be one of the few popular cuts, but in budgetary terms it is a mere grain of sand. Still, Sen. Biden's comment hints at where<u> we may be headed</u>:<u> toward <mark>a major reduction in America's world role</mark>, and </u>perhaps even<u> a <mark>new era of financially-induced isolationism.</mark> </u>Pressures to cut defense spending, and to dodge the cost of waging two wars, already intense before this crisis, are likely to mount. Despite the success of the surge, the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular. Precipitous withdrawal -- attractive to a sizable swath of the electorate before the financial implosion -- might well become even more popular with annual war bills running in the hundreds of billions. <u>Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger</u> as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow. Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, <u>Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system.</u> <u><mark>The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy</u></mark>, among other things, <u><mark>made it easier for us to run</u></mark> huge budget <u><mark>deficits</u>,</mark> as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, <u><mark>traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying</u></mark>. The threat from <u><mark>al Qaeda</u></mark> and Islamic terrorist affiliates <u>has not been extinguished. <mark>Iran and North Korea</mark> are continuing</u> <u>on their bellicose paths, while <mark>Pakistan and Afghanistan</mark> are progressing</u> smartly <u>down the road to chaos</u>. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. <u><mark>If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum</u>.</mark> <u><mark>The stabilizing effects of our presence</mark> in Asia, our </u>continuing <u>commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of </u>last resort for<u> Middle East </u>energy <u>sources</u> and supply lines <u>could all be placed <mark>at risk.</u></mark> In such a scenario <u>there are shades of the <mark>1930s,</mark> when global trade</u> and finance <u>ground nearly to a halt, <mark>the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers</mark> </u>led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster <u><mark>exploited their divisions</u></mark>. Today <u>we run the risk that <mark>rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless</mark> with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. </u>The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. <u>The dramatic <mark>f</mark>ree fall of the <mark>Russian</mark> stock market <mark>has demonstrate</mark>d the <mark>fragility</mark> of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices</u>, now driven down by the global slowdown. <u><mark>China is</mark> perhaps even more <mark>fragile</u>,</mark> its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. <u>None of this is good news if</u> the authoritarian <u>leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures</u>. As for our democratic friends, the present crisis comes when many European nations are struggling to deal with decades of anemic growth, sclerotic governance and an impending demographic crisis. Despite its past dynamism, Japan faces similar challenges. India is still in the early stages of its emergence as a world economic and geopolitical power. What does this all mean? <u><mark>There is no substitute for America on the world stage</mark>. The choice we have before us is between the potentially disastrous effects of disengagement and the stiff price tag of continued American leadership.</p></u>
|
2NC
| null |
a2
| 42,129 | 155 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,584 |
The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the federal government will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state, so long as those laws include the following baseline regulations for noncommercial marihuana production and sale:
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the federal government will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state, so long as those laws include the following baseline regulations for noncommercial marihuana production and sale:</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 431,091 | 1 | 17,112 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| 565,260 |
N
|
Wake
|
2
|
Cornell Deng-Zhang
|
Stone
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaty DA
T-legalize
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,585 |
The fifty United States and relevant territories should legalize marijuana.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The fifty United States and relevant territories should legalize marijuana.</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 431,092 | 1 | 17,110 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| 565,262 |
N
|
Wake
|
5
|
NYU Itliong-Zhan
|
McCleary
|
Fed CP (2NR)
AG Politics (2NR
Cede the Political DA
T - USFG
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,586 |
1. Legalize means remove all restrictions
|
Woods 11
|
Woods 11 Jordan Blair Woods, Ph.D. candidate in Criminology, University of Cambridge, expected 2013; M.Phil., University of Cambridge, 2010; J.D., UCLA School of Law, 2009; A.B., Harvard University, 2006. University of the District of Columbia Law Review Fall, 2011 15 UDC-DCSL L. Rev. 1 ARTICLE: A DECADE AFTER DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION: WHAT CAN THE UNITED STATES LEARN FROM THE PORTUGUESE MODEL? lexis
|
("'Legalization' means that there are no prohibitions of any kind under the law ("Legalization is defined as the complete removal of sanctions, making a certain behaviour legal and applying no criminal or administrative penalty.").
| null |
n30. See Greenwald, supra note 21, at 2 ("'Legalization' - which no EU state has yet adopted - means that there are no prohibitions of any kind under the law on drug manufacturing, sales, possession, or usage."); Hughes & Stevens, supra note 24, at 999 ("Legalization is defined as the complete removal of sanctions, making a certain behaviour legal and applying no criminal or administrative penalty.").
| 404 |
<h4><strong>1. Legalize means remove all restrictions</h4><p>Woods 11</strong> Jordan Blair Woods, Ph.D. candidate in Criminology, University of Cambridge, expected 2013; M.Phil., University of Cambridge, 2010; J.D., UCLA School of Law, 2009; A.B., Harvard University, 2006. University of the District of Columbia Law Review Fall, 2011 15 UDC-DCSL L. Rev. 1 ARTICLE: A DECADE AFTER DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION: WHAT CAN THE UNITED STATES LEARN FROM THE PORTUGUESE MODEL? lexis</p><p>n30. See Greenwald, supra note 21, at 2 <u>("'Legalization'</u> - which no EU state has yet adopted - <u>means that there are no prohibitions of any kind under the law </u>on drug manufacturing, sales, possession, or usage."); Hughes & Stevens, supra note 24, at 999 <u>("Legalization is defined as the complete removal of sanctions, making a certain behaviour legal and applying no criminal or administrative penalty.").</u><strong> </p></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
4
| 430,509 | 7 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,587 |
Capitalism is key to space exploration and development
|
Blundell 4
|
Blundell 4, director general of the Institute for Economic Affairs, (John, “Mission to Mars must go private to succeed,” February 2, http://www.iea.org.uk/record.jsp?type=news&ID=166)
|
What we need is capitalists in space. Capitalism needs property rights, enforcement of contracts and the rule of law. none of us imagined the entertainment potential from satellites Who could , or that global position techniques could plot where we all are These are business applications. Business is already in space. Markets detect and apply opportunities that are not envisaged by even the most accomplished technicians companies define and refine what public bodies cannot achieve. satellite firms are an intricate web of experts supplying ideas and services. We have an infant space market. What use will the Moon be? Is there value on Mars other than the TV rights the best results may be medical. Zero, or low, gravity techniques may allow therapies of which we are ignorant tourism may be a big part of space opportunity NASA could be a procurement body. It need not design and run all space ventures. It could sub-contract far more extensively There are private space entrepreneurs already. Goldin, the NASA leader, says he favours the privatisation of space: "We can’t afford to do solar system exploration until we turn these activities over to the private sector..."Some when NASA can creatively partner, all of humankind will reap the benefits of access to open space". Is it possible the Moon has a more noble future than merely a branch office of NASA? Is it tolerable that Mars could be a subsidiary of the USA? Could it be nominally a further state of the union? These are not silly questions. In time space will be defined by lawyers and accountants as property rights will need to be deliberated We can survey and explore the planet better from 200 miles up than stomping on the surface. The emerging commercial body of space law is derived from telecommunications law Many of the business results of space exploration are unintended consequences of NASA’s early adventures. Computer development would probably have been slower but for the need for instrumentation for Apollo. commercial spin offs, could patent new medicines By opening space to entrepreneurship we will be starting on what FA Hayek memorably describes as "a discovery procedure". Science is an open system. So is capitalism.
| null |
What we need is capitalists in space. Capitalism needs property rights, enforcement of contracts and the rule of law. The ideological tussle does not cease once we are beyond the ionosphere. With the exception of Arthur C Clarke, none of us imagined the entertainment potential from satellites. Geostationary lumps of electronic gadgetry beam us our BSkyB television pictures. I remain in awe that Rupert Murdoch can place a device in the skies above Brazil that sends a signal to every home in each hemisphere. Who could have foreseen that mobile phones could keep us chattering without any wiring, or that global position techniques could plot where we all are to within a metre? These are business applications. Business is already in space. Markets detect and apply opportunities that are not envisaged by even the most accomplished technicians. I’m not saying Murdoch has special competences. I imagine he is as baffled by digital miracles as I am. The point is that companies define and refine what public bodies cannot achieve. Lift the veil of course and all those satellite firms are an intricate web of experts supplying ideas and services. We have an infant space market. What use will the Moon be? Is there value on Mars other than the TV rights? The answer is nobody can know. We can only make some guesses. The Spanish ships that set off for the US thought they would get to India. The Portuguese knew they’d reach China. The English followed them westwards seeking gold. In fact, they got tobacco. Events always confound expectations. The arguments for putting men on Mars are expressly vague from President Bush. Perhaps he was really bidding for votes. From my reading the best results may be medical. Zero, or low, gravity techniques may allow therapies of which we are ignorant. It seems facetious to suggest tourism may be a big part of space opportunity but as both the North and South poles are over-populated and there is a queue at the top of Mount Everest, a trip to the Sea of Tranquility may prove a magnet for the wealthy. Instead of NASA’s grotesque bureaucracy it may be Thomas Cook will be a greater force for exploration. NASA could be a procurement body. It need not design and run all space ventures. It could sub-contract far more extensively. Without specialised engineering expertise it is not easy to criticise projects such as the shuttle. It seems to be excessively costly and far too fragile. There are private space entrepreneurs already. They are tiddlers up against the mighty NASA. Yet Dan Goldin, the NASA leader, says he favours the privatisation of space: "We can’t afford to do solar system exploration until we turn these activities over to the cutting edge private sector..."Some may say that commercialising portions of NASA’s functions is heresy. Others may think we are taking a path that will ruin the wonders of space. I believe that when NASA can creatively partner, all of humankind will reap the benefits of access to open space". Is it possible the Moon has a more noble future than merely a branch office of NASA? Is it tolerable that Mars could be a subsidiary of the USA? Could it be nominally a further state of the union? These are not silly questions. In time space will be defined by lawyers and accountants as property rights will need to be deliberated. One possibility may be that both environments are so hostile that Mars and the Moon will never be more than token pockets for humanity. On the evidence so far it is the orbiting satellites that have made us see the Earth through new eyes. We can survey and explore the planet better from 200 miles up than stomping on the surface. The emerging commercial body of space law is derived from telecommunications law. It is perplexing and contrary to our immediate senses. How can you own or exchange something as intangible as digital messages bouncing off satellites? Yet we all pay our mobile phone bills. Many of the business results of space exploration are unintended consequences of NASA’s early adventures. Computer development would probably have been slower but for the need for instrumentation for Apollo. Are there prospects for Scottish firms in space? The prizes will not go to only the mega corporations. Perhaps Dobbies, the Edinburgh garden centre group, can create new roses by placing pots beyond gravity. Edinburgh University laboratories, or rather their commercial spin offs, could patent new medicines. Is it possible the genetic magicians at the Bush could hitch a ride into space and extend their discoveries? NASA is a monopolist. All monopolies are bad for business. They only stunt opportunities. They blunt alternatives. By opening space to entrepreneurship we will be starting on what FA Hayek memorably describes as "a discovery procedure". Science is an open system. So is capitalism.
| 4,843 |
<h4>Capitalism is key to space exploration and development</h4><p><strong>Blundell 4<u></strong>,</u> director general of the Institute for Economic Affairs, (John, “Mission to Mars must go private to succeed,” February 2, http://www.iea.org.uk/record.jsp?type=news&ID=166) </p><p><u>What we need is capitalists in space. Capitalism needs property rights, enforcement of contracts and the rule of law. </u>The ideological tussle does not cease once we are beyond the ionosphere. With the exception of Arthur C Clarke, <u>none of us imagined the entertainment potential from satellites</u>. Geostationary lumps of electronic gadgetry beam us our BSkyB television pictures. I remain in awe that Rupert Murdoch can place a device in the skies above Brazil that sends a signal to every home in each hemisphere. <u>Who could </u>have foreseen that mobile phones could keep us chattering without any wiring<u>, or that global position techniques could plot where we all are</u> to within a metre? <u>These are business applications. Business is already in space. Markets detect and apply opportunities that are not envisaged by even the most accomplished technicians</u>. I’m not saying Murdoch has special competences. I imagine he is as baffled by digital miracles as I am. The point is that <u>companies define and refine what public bodies cannot achieve. </u>Lift the veil of course and all those <u>satellite firms are an intricate web of experts supplying ideas and services. We have an infant space market.</u> <u>What use will the Moon be? Is there value on Mars other than the TV rights</u>? The answer is nobody can know. We can only make some guesses. The Spanish ships that set off for the US thought they would get to India. The Portuguese knew they’d reach China. The English followed them westwards seeking gold. In fact, they got tobacco. Events always confound expectations. The arguments for putting men on Mars are expressly vague from President Bush. Perhaps he was really bidding for votes. From my reading <u>the best results may be medical. Zero, or low, gravity techniques may allow therapies of which we are ignorant</u>. It seems facetious to suggest <u>tourism may be a big part of space opportunity</u> but as both the North and South poles are over-populated and there is a queue at the top of Mount Everest, a trip to the Sea of Tranquility may prove a magnet for the wealthy. Instead of NASA’s grotesque bureaucracy it may be Thomas Cook will be a greater force for exploration. <u>NASA could be a procurement body. It need not design and run all space ventures. It could sub-contract far more extensively</u>. Without specialised engineering expertise it is not easy to criticise projects such as the shuttle. It seems to be excessively costly and far too fragile. <u>There are private space entrepreneurs already. </u>They are tiddlers up against the mighty NASA. Yet Dan <u>Goldin, the NASA leader, says he favours the privatisation of space: "We can’t afford to do solar system exploration until we turn these activities over to the </u>cutting edge <u>private sector..."Some </u>may say that commercialising portions of NASA’s functions is heresy. Others may think we are taking a path that will ruin the wonders of space. I believe that <u>when NASA can creatively partner, all of humankind will reap the benefits of access to open space". Is it possible the Moon has a more noble future than merely a branch office of NASA? Is it tolerable that Mars could be a subsidiary of the USA? Could it be nominally a further state of the union? These are not silly questions. In time space will be defined by lawyers and accountants as property rights will need to be deliberated</u>. One possibility may be that both environments are so hostile that Mars and the Moon will never be more than token pockets for humanity. On the evidence so far it is the orbiting satellites that have made us see the Earth through new eyes. <u>We can survey and explore the planet better from 200 miles up than stomping on the surface. The emerging commercial body of space law is derived from telecommunications law</u>. It is perplexing and contrary to our immediate senses. How can you own or exchange something as intangible as digital messages bouncing off satellites? Yet we all pay our mobile phone bills. <u>Many of the business results of space exploration are unintended consequences of NASA’s early adventures. Computer development would probably have been slower but for the need for instrumentation for Apollo.</u> Are there prospects for Scottish firms in space? The prizes will not go to only the mega corporations. Perhaps Dobbies, the Edinburgh garden centre group, can create new roses by placing pots beyond gravity. Edinburgh University laboratories, or rather their <u>commercial spin offs, could patent new medicines</u>. Is it possible the genetic magicians at the Bush could hitch a ride into space and extend their discoveries? NASA is a monopolist. All monopolies are bad for business. They only stunt opportunities. They blunt alternatives. <u>By opening space to entrepreneurship we will be starting on what FA Hayek memorably describes as "a discovery procedure". Science is an open system. So is capitalism.</u> </p>
| null |
1nc
|
Case
| 91,561 | 33 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,588 |
We definitely compete- “legalizing in the US” means marijuana has to be LEGAL IN THE US as a mandate of the plan- if they don’t change the CSA, they can’t be topical
|
Jackson et al 2011
|
Jackson et al 2011 (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)
|
legalization and decriminalization are terms for very different proposals even though they are sometimes conflated Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production „Legalization‟ authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana, and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civil rather than criminal offense What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers. This is what separates decriminalization from legalization
|
legalization and decriminalization are terms for very different proposals even though they are sometimes conflated. Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production. „Legalization‟ authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana, A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civi rather than criminal offense What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers. This is what separates decriminalization from legalization.
|
Any white paper that includes a policy review of drug legislation must include key term definitions that are clear, accurate, and coherent. Thus, there are various definitions of „legalization‟ of marijuana use and commerce strewn across countless reports, papers and analyses of drug policy. It is critical to note that legalization and decriminalization are terms for very different proposals even though they are sometimes conflated. Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production. „Legalization‟ authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana, and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption.4 This study takes a holistic approach to examining how legalization of marijuana in the United States would affect Mexican DTOs. However, in the United States there has been no example of true marijuana legalization since the inception of the modern drug control regime. This is why our case studies will look at changes that occurred after various countries relaxed their system of marijuana prohibition. We will look at decriminalization in Mexico and Portugal, as well as a special case of toleration/de facto legalization in the Netherlands. However, we will first lay out in detail what each type of change entails. Decriminalization is one of the most common methods employed by countries that seek to ease or lighten anti-marijuana policies. A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civil (fines, counseling etc), rather than criminal offense. 5 One common example of this type of reform is the 2001 Law 30/2000 in Portugal. What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers. This is what separates decriminalization from legalization.
| 2,020 |
<h4>We definitely compete- “legalizing in the US” means marijuana has to be LEGAL IN THE US as a mandate of the plan- if they don’t change the CSA, they can’t be topical</h4><p><strong>Jackson et al 2011</strong> (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)</p><p>Any white paper that includes a policy review of drug legislation must include key term definitions that are clear, accurate, and coherent. Thus, there are various definitions of „legalization‟ of marijuana use and commerce strewn across countless reports, papers and analyses of drug policy. It is critical to note that <u><mark>legalization and decriminalization are terms for <strong>very different proposals</strong> even though they are sometimes conflated</u>. <u>Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production</u>. <u>„Legalization‟ <strong>authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana</strong>,</mark> and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption</u>.4 This study takes a holistic approach to examining how legalization of marijuana in the United States would affect Mexican DTOs. However, in the United States there has been no example of true marijuana legalization since the inception of the modern drug control regime. This is why our case studies will look at changes that occurred after various countries relaxed their system of marijuana prohibition. We will look at decriminalization in Mexico and Portugal, as well as a special case of toleration/de facto legalization in the Netherlands. However, we will first lay out in detail what each type of change entails. Decriminalization is one of the most common methods employed by countries that seek to ease or lighten anti-marijuana policies. <u><mark>A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civi</mark>l</u> (fines, counseling etc), <u><mark>rather than criminal offense</u></mark>. 5 One common example of this type of reform is the 2001 Law 30/2000 in Portugal. <u><mark>What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers.</u> <u><strong>This is what separates decriminalization from legalization</u>.</p></strong></mark>
|
2NC
| null |
a2
| 430,568 | 11 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,589 |
Vote before State of the Union
|
Jerusalem Post 1/14
|
Jerusalem Post 1/14/2015 (Nuclear talks resume with warnings to Congress over Iran sanctions, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Nuclear-talks-resume-with-warnings-to-Congress-over-Iran-sanctions-387753)
|
aides on Capitol Hill continue to work on the final touches of a bill that would "trigger" new sanctions on Iran Leadership plans to introduce the bill by the president's State of the Union address. a bill from Congress could "very well lead to a breakdown in these negotiations."
|
Leadership plans to introduce the bill by the president's State of the Union address bill from Congress could "very well lead to a breakdown in these negotiations."
|
The US, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany seek to end international concerns over the nature of Iran's nuclear program, which many suspect is military in nature. In Washington, however, aides on Capitol Hill continue to work on the final touches of a bill that would "trigger" new sanctions on Iran should talks ultimately fail, or should Tehran violate terms of an interim deal that laid the groundwork for negotiations, formally known as the Joint Plan of Action. Leadership in Congress, now under full Republican control, plans to introduce the bill by the president's State of the Union address. But any bill from Congress regarding new, nuclear-related sanctions on Iran during international talks over its nuclear program will be vetoed by US President Barack Obama, the State Department said this week. "Even with a trigger, if there's a bill that's signed into law, and it is US law, in our mind it is a violation of the Joint Plan of Action— which, as we've said, could encourage Iran to violate it," State Department deputy spokeswoman Marie Harf said on Tuesday. "A sanctions bill, trigger or not, that is passed and signed into law by the president, which we've said we will not do... would be a violation of the JPOA," she continued. If a deal does not come to pass, Harf said, "we could put initial sanctions on Iran in 24 hours." Harf added on Wednesday that a bill from Congress could "very well lead to a breakdown in these negotiations."
| 1,471 |
<h4><strong>Vote before State of the Union</h4><p>Jerusalem Post 1/14<u></strong>/2015 (Nuclear talks resume with warnings to Congress over Iran sanctions, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Nuclear-talks-resume-with-warnings-to-Congress-over-Iran-sanctions-387753)</p><p></u>The US, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany seek to end international concerns over the nature of Iran's nuclear program, which many suspect is military in nature. In Washington, however, <u>aides on Capitol Hill continue to work on the final touches of a bill that would "trigger" new sanctions on Iran</u> should talks ultimately fail, or should Tehran violate terms of an interim deal that laid the groundwork for negotiations, formally known as the Joint Plan of Action. <u><mark>Leadership</u></mark> in Congress, now under full Republican control, <u><strong><mark>plans to introduce the bill by the president's State of the Union address</mark>. </u></strong>But any bill from Congress regarding new, nuclear-related sanctions on Iran during international talks over its nuclear program will be vetoed by US President Barack Obama, the State Department said this week. "Even with a trigger, if there's a bill that's signed into law, and it is US law, in our mind it is a violation of the Joint Plan of Action— which, as we've said, could encourage Iran to violate it," State Department deputy spokeswoman Marie Harf said on Tuesday. "A sanctions bill, trigger or not, that is passed and signed into law by the president, which we've said we will not do... would be a violation of the JPOA," she continued. If a deal does not come to pass, Harf said, "we could put initial sanctions on Iran in 24 hours." Harf added on Wednesday that <u>a <strong><mark>bill from Congress could "very well lead to a breakdown in these negotiations."</p></u></strong></mark>
|
1nr
|
Top
|
UQ
| 430,683 | 5 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,590 |
The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage
|
Williams 14
|
Williams 14 Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver
|
Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the U S Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number requiring organs is likely higher This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains
|
many die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs more than 122,000 are waitlisted Due to other barriers actual number of requiring organs is likely higher.3 This gap continues to widen. NOTA) prohibits valuable consideration in exchange for organs for transplantation other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations.9 Despite these , a severe organ shortage remains
|
Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514
Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs.1 Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the United States.2 Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number of Americans requiring organs is likely higher.3 This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen.4 The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations.9 Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains.
| 1,611 |
<h4>The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage</h4><p><strong>Williams 14</strong> Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver </p><p>Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514</p><p><u>Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, <mark>many</mark> individuals <mark>die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs</u></mark>.1 <u>Currently, <mark>more than</mark> <mark>122,000 </mark>individuals <mark>are waitlisted</mark> for organs in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates.2 <u><mark>Due to</mark> financial and <mark>other barriers</mark> to becoming waitlisted, the <mark>actual number </u>of</mark> Americans <u><mark>requiring organs is</mark> <mark>likely higher</u>.3</mark> <u><mark>This gap</mark> between available organs and the need for organs <mark>continues to widen</u>.</mark>4 <u>The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, </u>and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 <u>The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The</u> National Organ Transplantation Act <u>(<mark>NOTA) prohibits</mark> the receipt of any form of <mark>valuable consideration in exchange for organs</mark> to be used <mark>for transplantation</u></mark>.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, <u><mark>other methods have been</mark> <mark>employed in attempts to increase donations</u>.9 <u>Despite</mark> the implementation of <mark>these</mark> strategies<mark>, a severe organ shortage remains</u></mark>.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives
| 430,245 | 16 | 17,114 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
| 565,248 |
A
|
Wake
|
4
|
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
|
Voss
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,591 |
First, marihuana can only be produced by state-licensed growers who use pesticide-free cultivation methods and allow periodic testing for chemical content and contaminants. Second, marihuana can only be sold by licensed noncommercial entities, with product labels that display information about chemical content. Marihuana should be sold in compliance with minimum prices that are lower than comparable marihuana that is for sale on the illegal market. The post-tax maximum price of legal marihuana should not match or exceed the illegal market price.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>First, marihuana can only be produced by state-licensed growers who use pesticide-free cultivation methods and allow periodic testing for chemical content and contaminants. Second, marihuana can only be sold by licensed noncommercial entities, with product labels that display information about chemical content. Marihuana should be sold in compliance with minimum prices that are lower than comparable marihuana that is for sale on the illegal market. The post-tax maximum price of legal marihuana should not match or exceed the illegal market price.</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 431,094 | 1 | 17,112 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| 565,260 |
N
|
Wake
|
2
|
Cornell Deng-Zhang
|
Stone
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaty DA
T-legalize
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,592 |
The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 431,093 | 1 | 17,110 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| 565,262 |
N
|
Wake
|
5
|
NYU Itliong-Zhan
|
McCleary
|
Fed CP (2NR)
AG Politics (2NR
Cede the Political DA
T - USFG
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,593 |
2. Nearly all is close to 100%
|
Foley 98
|
Foley 98 JACK FOLEY, Mercury News Staff Writer September 21, 1998 San Jose Mercury News
|
Unz said. `` `Nearly all' could mean 98 99 or even 97 percent, but it does not mean 60 percent.
| null |
Unz: District Violates Law-Bilingual education dispute crops up in Gilroy.
http://www.languagepolicy.net/archives/SJMN47.htm
Gilroy schools are violating Proposition 227, said the law's author, which means school board members and the superintendent could be sued for damages by parents.
Trustees voted unanimously in August to teach non-English-speaking students 60 percent in English and 40 percent in Spanish as they phased out bilingual programs to comply with the new law.
But Proposition 227 author Ron Unz said Friday that the law's actual wording stipulates that classroom instruction for non-English- to complying, Unz said Friday when told of the Gilroy policy. He said his office had received calls from parents asking about it.speaking students -- those enrolled in ``sheltered English immersion'' programs -- must be conducted ``nearly all'' in English.
Sixty percent does not come close
``It's completely illegal,'' Unz said. `` `Nearly all' could mean 98 percent or 99 percent or even 97 percent, but it does not mean 60 percent. The law is very clear and the district seems to be ignoring the law.''
| 1,115 |
<h4><strong>2. Nearly all is close to 100%</h4><p>Foley 98</strong> JACK FOLEY, Mercury News Staff Writer<strong> </strong>September 21, 1998 San Jose Mercury News </p><p>Unz: District Violates Law-Bilingual education dispute crops up in Gilroy.</p><p>http://www.languagepolicy.net/archives/SJMN47.htm</p><p>Gilroy schools are violating Proposition 227, said the law's author, which means school board members and the superintendent could be sued for damages by parents.</p><p>Trustees voted unanimously in August to teach non-English-speaking students 60 percent in English and 40 percent in Spanish as they phased out bilingual programs to comply with the new law.</p><p>But Proposition 227 author Ron Unz said Friday that the law's actual wording stipulates that classroom instruction for non-English- to complying, Unz said Friday when told of the Gilroy policy. He said his office had received calls from parents asking about it.speaking students -- those enrolled in ``sheltered English immersion'' programs -- must be conducted ``nearly all'' in English.</p><p>Sixty percent does not come close </p><p>``It's completely illegal,'' <u>Unz said. ``<strong> `Nearly all' could mean 98 </u></strong>percent or<u><strong> 99 </u></strong>percent<u><strong> or even 97 percent, but it does not mean 60 percent.</u> The law is very clear and the district seems to be ignoring the law.''</p></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
4
| 430,510 | 11 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,594 |
That solves overuse of resources and extinction
|
Engdahl 94 1994 (Sylvia, “Space and Human Survival, Part I,” http://www.sylviaengdahl.com/space/survival.htm)
|
Engdahl 94, award-winning science fiction writer, 1994 (Sylvia, “Space and Human Survival, Part I,” http://www.sylviaengdahl.com/space/survival.htm)
|
I have called this stage in our evolution the “Critical Stage Levinson says that we have only a narrow window to get into space, a relatively Expansion into space demands high technology and full utilization of our world’s material resources it demands spiritual resources, which we are not likely to retain under the sort of dictatorship that would be necessary to maintain a “sustainable” global civilization. if we don’t expand into space now, we can never do it. Even if we survive stagnation, it will be too late to escape from this solar system, problem of war can’t be solved without expansion. The problem of hunger is the direct result of our planet’s limited resources; though it could be solved for the near-term by political reforms, we are not likely to see such reforms while nations are playing a “ zero-sum game” with what resources Earth still has. Widespread poverty, when not politically based, is caused by insufficient access to high technology and by the fact that there aren’t enough resources to go is the result of stress; overcrowding certainly increases it. The problem of atmospheric pollution is the result of trying to contain the industry necessary to maintain our technology within the biosphere instead of moving it into orbit where it belongs. all the worldwide problems we want to solve are related to the fact that we’ve outgrown the ecological niche we presently occupy I would like to believe that they’ll prove spurs to expansion I’ll explain how humanizing space can not only save our species, but give all cultures equal access to resources that are virtually unlimited.
|
. Expansion into space demands high technology and full utilization of resources if we don’t expand into space now it will be too late war can’t be solved without expansion poverty s caused by insufficient access to high technology ll the worldwide problems we want to solve are related to that we’ve outgrown the ecological niche humanizing space can save our species give all equal access to resources that are unlimited.
|
I have called this stage in our evolution the “Critical Stage.” Paul Levinson [the Director of Connected Education] uses different terminology for the same concept. He says that we have only a narrow window to get into space, a relatively short time during which we have the capability, but have not yet run out of the resources to do it. I agree with him completely about this. Expansion into space demands high technology and full utilization of our world’s material resources (although not destructive utilization). It also demands financial resources that we will not have if we deplete the material resources of Earth. And it demands human resources, which we will lose if we are reduced to global war or widespread starvation. Finally, it demands spiritual resources, which we are not likely to retain under the sort of dictatorship that would be necessary to maintain a “sustainable” global civilization. Because the window is narrow, then, we not only have to worry about immediate perils. The ultimate, unavoidable danger for our planet, the transformation of our sun, is distant—but if we don’t expand into space now, we can never do it. Even if I’m wrong and we survive stagnation, it will be too late to escape from this solar system, much less to explore for the sake of exploring. I realize that what I’ve been saying here doesn’t sound like my usual optimism. But the reason it doesn’t, I think, is that most people don’t understand what’s meant by “space humanization.” Some of you are probably thinking that space travel isn’t going to be a big help with these problems, as indeed, the form of it shown in today’s mythology would not. Almost certainly, you’re thinking that it won’t solve the other problems of Earth, and I fear you may be thinking that the other problems should be solved first. One big reason why they should not is the “narrow window” concept. The other is that they could not. I have explained why I believe the problem of war can’t be solved without expansion. The problem of hunger is, or ultimately will be, the direct result of our planet’s limited resources; though it could be solved for the near-term by political reforms, we are not likely to see such reforms while nations are playing a “ zero-sum game” with what resources Earth still has. Widespread poverty, when not politically based, is caused by insufficient access to high technology and by the fact that there aren’t enough resources to go around (if you doubt this, compare the amount of poverty here with the amount in the Third World, and the amount on the Western frontier with the amount in our modern cities). Non-contagious disease, such as cancer, is at least partially the result of stress; and while expansion won’t eliminate stress, overcrowding certainly increases it. The problem of atmospheric pollution is the result of trying to contain the industry necessary to maintain our technology within the biosphere instead of moving it into orbit where it belongs. In short, all the worldwide problems we want to solve, and feel we should have solved, are related to the fact that we’ve outgrown the ecological niche we presently occupy. I view them not as pathologies, but as natural indicators of our evolutionary stage. I would like to believe that they’ll prove spurs to expansion. If they don’t, we’ll be one of evolution’s failures. If I have frightened any readers here, I’m not sorry! But cheer up; in Part II I’ll explain how humanizing space can not only save our species, but give all cultures equal access to resources that are virtually unlimited.
| 3,574 |
<h4>That solves overuse of resources and extinction</h4><p><strong>Engdahl 94</strong>, award-winning science fiction writer, <u><strong>1994 (Sylvia, “Space and Human Survival, Part I,” http://www.sylviaengdahl.com/space/survival.htm) </p><p>I have called this stage in our evolution the “Critical Stage</u></strong>.” Paul <u><strong>Levinson</u></strong> [the Director of Connected Education] uses different terminology for the same concept. He <u><strong>says that we have only a narrow window to get into space, a relatively </u></strong>short time during which we have the capability, but have not yet run out of the resources to do it<mark>.</mark> I agree with him completely about this. <u><strong><mark>Expansion into space demands high technology and full utilization of</mark> our world’s material <mark>resources</mark> </u></strong>(although not destructive utilization). It also demands financial resources that we will not have if we deplete the material resources of Earth. And it demands human resources, which we will lose if we are reduced to global war or widespread starvation. Finally,<u><strong> it demands spiritual resources, which we are not likely to retain under the sort of dictatorship that would be necessary to maintain a “sustainable” global civilization.</u></strong> Because the window is narrow, then, we not only have to worry about immediate perils. The ultimate, unavoidable danger for our planet, the transformation of our sun, is distant—but <u><strong><mark>if we don’t expand into space now</mark>, we can never do it. Even if</u></strong> I’m wrong and <u><strong>we survive stagnation, <mark>it will be too late</mark> to escape from this solar system,</u></strong> much less to explore for the sake of exploring. I realize that what I’ve been saying here doesn’t sound like my usual optimism. But the reason it doesn’t, I think, is that most people don’t understand what’s meant by “space humanization.” Some of you are probably thinking that space travel isn’t going to be a big help with these problems, as indeed, the form of it shown in today’s mythology would not. Almost certainly, you’re thinking that it won’t solve the other problems of Earth, and I fear you may be thinking that the other problems should be solved first. One big reason why they should not is the “narrow window” concept. The other is that they could not. I have explained why I believe the<u><strong> problem of <mark>war can’t be solved without expansion</mark>. The problem of hunger is</u></strong>, or ultimately will be,<u><strong> the direct result of our planet’s limited resources; though it could be solved for the near-term by political reforms, we are not likely to see such reforms while nations are playing a “ zero-sum game” with what resources Earth still has. Widespread <mark>poverty</mark>, when not politically based, i<mark>s caused by insufficient access to high technology</mark> and by the fact that there aren’t enough resources to go </u></strong>around (if you doubt this, compare the amount of poverty here with the amount in the Third World, and the amount on the Western frontier with the amount in our modern cities). Non-contagious disease, such as cancer,<u><strong> is </u></strong>at least partially<u><strong> the result of stress;</u></strong> and while expansion won’t eliminate stress, <u><strong>overcrowding certainly increases it. The problem of atmospheric pollution is the result of trying to contain the industry necessary to maintain our technology within the biosphere instead of moving it into orbit where it belongs.</u></strong> In short, <u><strong>a<mark>ll the worldwide problems we want to solve</u></strong></mark>, and feel we should have solved, <u><strong><mark>are related to</mark> the fact <mark>that we’ve outgrown the ecological niche </mark>we presently occupy</u></strong>. I view them not as pathologies, but as natural indicators of our evolutionary stage. <u><strong>I would like to believe that they’ll prove spurs to expansion</u></strong>. If they don’t, we’ll be one of evolution’s failures. If I have frightened any readers here, I’m not sorry! But cheer up; in Part II <u><strong>I’ll explain how <mark>humanizing space can </mark>not only <mark>save our species</mark>, but <mark>give all </mark>cultures <mark>equal access to resources that are </mark>virtually <mark>unlimited.</mark> </p></u></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
Case
| 48,431 | 10 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,595 |
Federalism model solves Ukraine war
|
Sasse and Hughes 2014
|
Sasse and Hughes 2014 (Gwendolyn Sasse and James Hughes 3-19-2014; Professorial Fellow, Nuffield College & University Reader in Comparative Politics at Oxford and London School of Economics political scientist “Building a federal Ukraine?” Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/19/building-a-federal-ukraine/)
|
The idea of a remaking of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction. Yatsenyuk reached out to Russophones announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution Senior U.S. administration officials have encouraged the Ukrainian leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines. Until recently the federal idea was an anathema The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state Overall, Ukraine’s elites have been moderate in their approach to state- and nation-building. Ukraine now needs to reestablish regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a hitherto informal mechanism. a state-wide comprehensive federalization or decentralization of more powers to all regions We could expect greater powers to include self-government reform process could be achieved by either a constitutional convention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. These steps would generate a democratic process of debate, dialogue and engagement, and hopefully reunite Ukrainian society. There would be international monitoring and advice This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the United States and the E.U. are not short of is experts on , federalism implementation depends critically on leadership The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected. In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict The Ukraine crisis offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of autonomy and federalism to peacefully manage conflict and enhance state stability federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward in Ukraine
|
U.S. officials have encouraged leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines Ukraine’s elites have been moderate Ukraine now needs regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a mechanism decentralization could be achieved by con con These steps would generate engagement, and reunite Ukrainian society. There would be international monitoring and advice. This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the U S are not short of is experts on federalism implementation depends critically on leadership Ukraine offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of federalism to peacefully manage conflict
|
The idea of a remaking of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction. On March 18, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk reached out to Russophones in the eastern and southern regions, announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution.” Senior U.S. administration officials have encouraged the Ukrainian leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines. On March 17, the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed the establishment of an international “support group” to manage the crisis. The list of items that Russia wants to be the basis for negotiation in Ukraine includes a new federal structure for Ukraine and the recognition of Russian as a second language. Until recently the federal idea was an anathema among the greater part of Ukraine’s political elite. As a constitutional form it was largely rejected in the 1990s, partly as a negative reaction to the experience of Soviet federalism, and partly from fear of its centrifugal potential for splitting the country along ethnolinguistic fault lines. The negative view of federalism as a destabilizing constitutional order in ethnically divided places was one that was not only perceived by elites as a lived experience in former communist federations, such as the Soviet Union successor states Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, but was also prevalent among scholars studying the collapse of communism. Federalism, or “ethnofederalism” as it was usually termed by political scientists, came to be seen as part of the problem of “mismanaging” ethnically diverse countries, not part of the solution. The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. Prospects for federalism in Ukraine The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state. The ideas of decentralization and federalism have undulated in the Ukrainian political discourse since the early 1990s. At first these ideas were an agenda of the western regions. Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil and the ‘national-democratic’ forces he represented promoted federalism as a means to protect the cultural distinctiveness of Western Ukraine. From the mid-to late 1990s, after independence, calls for autonomy or federalism came from the mainly Russophone south-east and Crimea, in particular in crisis situations like the Orange Revolution or the recent protests. Overall, Ukraine’s elites have been moderate in their approach to state- and nation-building. The first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, did not impose the state language on the southeast or Crimea as envisaged by the Ukrainian language law. The cautious approach continued after the 1994 presidential elections, which saw the “eastern” candidate Leonid Kuchma defeat Kravchuk. Although Kuchma ran on an election platform of more power to the regions and the recognition of the Russian language as an official language, he actually did not deliver on this agenda during his two terms in office between 1994 and 2004. The implicit consensus on balancing regional interests helped to preserve political stability during Ukraine’s transition, while also slowing economic reforms and adjustment. It was also evident in the ambivalent foreign policy approaches toward Russia and the European Union/ NATO. Ukraine now needs to reestablish this important regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a hitherto informal mechanism. There are two scenarios: First, there could be an asymmetric decentralization (that is, different agreements with different regions of the country). The new government in Kiev could engage in bilateral negotiations with individual regions in the south-east. Given the long-standing inability of Ukrainian elites to agree on the reform of center-regional relations as whole, a selective divide and rule strategy offers the advantages of fragmenting the “Russophone” bloc, and the potential for making deals on a case-by-case basis. Such a process would inevitably be largely non-transparent. This asymmetric federal approach, as with Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s approach to ethnic republics in Russia in the mid-1990s, might generate some short-term stability but it would also antagonize other regions and would be vulnerable to unraveling. Second, there could be a state-wide process of constitutional reform with the aim of either a comprehensive federalization, or decentralization of more powers to all regions. We could expect greater powers to include self-government in culture (including language and education), economic management, taxation, and policing. The election (rather than the presidential appointment) of regional governors is an important aspect of reform. This could be part of a synchronization of regional elections, including for governors, with early parliamentary elections. This reform process could be achieved by either a constitutional convention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. These steps would generate a democratic process of debate, dialogue and engagement, and hopefully reunite Ukrainian society. There would almost certainly be international monitoring and advice. This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the United States and the E.U. are not short of is legal experts on autonomy, federalism and minority rights. The implementation of constitutional reform depends critically on political will and leadership, and it would have to be championed by the new president to be elected in May. Constitutional reform will be on the agenda in any event, as Ukraine currently finds itself between constitutions (2004 and 2010) – and neither of these constitutions was clearly defined. Regional oligarchs will also have to be part of this process. Just how they are to be managed in the new Ukraine will be one of the greatest challenges facing the political elites. A properly functioning constitutional court that is insulated better against political interference is crucial for decentralization or federalization to be lasting. Opponents of federalization will no doubt raise the dangers of state disintegration and secession that might flow from such a constitutional reform process, especially given the Crimea example and the ongoing unrest in the southeast. The fact that Russia has indicated that greater autonomy is its own preferred outcome for Ukraine means, however, that there is now potential for substantive negotiations to move forward – assuming that Russia can switch off the Russian nationalist mobilization that it has so far been promoting. Reassessing the turn against “ethnofederalism” There was a turn against ethnofederalism in the 1990s that is ripe for a reassessment. Prior to the collapse of communism, there was a dominant paradigm that federalism as “self rule and shared rule” has positive “win-win” effects on promoting stable politics, and indeed, that it was the constitutional order (following the U.S. example) that was most conducive to democracy. Federalism was also seen as an essential constitutional design for the “politics of accommodation” in “deeply divided” or “plural” societies. From the early 1990s this paradigm was shaken by critiques which argued that federalism and autonomy more generally were highly destabilizing in ethnically divided states where the federal administrative architecture and boundaries were drawn to reflect ethnic divisions. The three socialist ethnofederations (USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) were used as cases to demonstrate this thesis. The argument is that the mode of socialist federalism, which while it was intrinsically a “sham” in terms of power distribution given that real power resided in communist parties, was flawed because of its “ethnic” structure leading to a mismanagement of nationalism. Consequently, a major cause of the collapse was the fact that the previously disempowered federal architecture became a platform for ethnonational mobilization. Socialist-era federal structures were essentially “subversive institutions”. The negative thesis was developed further in perspectives on the “frozen conflicts” to include even the prospect of autonomy and decentralization. In the Caucasus region, autonomy was seen as “a root cause of conflict” and a driver for secession. The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected. In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict. The Russian Federation is partially divided into ethnic units, and only Chechnya posed a serious threat to its territorial integrity. If one analyzes the case of Tatarstan and other ethnic republics of the Russian Federation the fact is that the asymmetric federalism and autonomy in key areas relating to self-rule, culture and, to some extent, economic power, was sufficient to quash secessionist demands and maintain state stability. That stability has persisted even when Putin recentralized powers from the ethnic republics to create his “power vertical” (see this recent Monkey Cage post). A similar argument holds with regard to conflict-prevention in Crimea in the 1990s (see the recent Monkey Cage post). The Ukraine crisis offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of autonomy and federalism to peacefully manage conflict and enhance state stability. It is of note that the federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward not just in Ukraine but in other places of conflict in the post-communist space, and beyond (for example, Iraq, Syria, and Libya).
| 9,859 |
<h4><strong>Federalism model solves Ukraine war </h4><p>Sasse and Hughes 2014</strong> (Gwendolyn Sasse and James Hughes 3-19-2014; Professorial Fellow, Nuffield College & University Reader in Comparative Politics at Oxford and London School of Economics political scientist “Building a federal Ukraine?” Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/19/building-a-federal-ukraine/)</p><p><u>The idea of a <strong>remaking</strong> of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction.</u> On March 18, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy <u>Yatsenyuk</u> <u>reached out to Russophones</u> in the eastern and southern regions, <u>announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution</u>.” <u>Senior <mark>U.S.</mark> administration <mark>officials have <strong>encouraged</strong></mark> the Ukrainian <mark>leadership to consider constitutional reform <strong>along federal lines</mark>. </u></strong>On March 17, the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed the establishment of an international “support group” to manage the crisis. The list of items that Russia wants to be the basis for negotiation in Ukraine includes a new federal structure for Ukraine and the recognition of Russian as a second language. <u>Until recently the federal idea was an anathema</u> among the greater part of Ukraine’s political elite. As a constitutional form it was largely rejected in the 1990s, partly as a negative reaction to the experience of Soviet federalism, and partly from fear of its centrifugal potential for splitting the country along ethnolinguistic fault lines. The negative view of federalism as a destabilizing constitutional order in ethnically divided places was one that was not only perceived by elites as a lived experience in former communist federations, such as the Soviet Union successor states Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, but was also prevalent among scholars studying the collapse of communism. Federalism, or “ethnofederalism” as it was usually termed by political scientists, came to be seen as part of the problem of “mismanaging” ethnically diverse countries, not part of the solution. <u>The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that <strong>now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism</strong>, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. </u>Prospects for federalism in Ukraine <u>The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state</u>. The ideas of decentralization and federalism have undulated in the Ukrainian political discourse since the early 1990s. At first these ideas were an agenda of the western regions. Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil and the ‘national-democratic’ forces he represented promoted federalism as a means to protect the cultural distinctiveness of Western Ukraine. From the mid-to late 1990s, after independence, calls for autonomy or federalism came from the mainly Russophone south-east and Crimea, in particular in crisis situations like the Orange Revolution or the recent protests. <u>Overall, <mark>Ukraine’s elites have been moderate</mark> in their approach to state- and nation-building. </u>The first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, did not impose the state language on the southeast or Crimea as envisaged by the Ukrainian language law. The cautious approach continued after the 1994 presidential elections, which saw the “eastern” candidate Leonid Kuchma defeat Kravchuk. Although Kuchma ran on an election platform of more power to the regions and the recognition of the Russian language as an official language, he actually did not deliver on this agenda during his two terms in office between 1994 and 2004. The implicit consensus on balancing regional interests helped to preserve political stability during Ukraine’s transition, while also slowing economic reforms and adjustment. It was also evident in the ambivalent foreign policy approaches toward Russia and the European Union/ NATO. <u><mark>Ukraine now needs</mark> to reestablish</u> this important <u><mark>regional balance</u> <u>and has the opportunity to <strong>formalize a </mark>hitherto informal <mark>mechanism</strong></mark>. </u>There are two scenarios: First, there could be an asymmetric decentralization (that is, different agreements with different regions of the country). The new government in Kiev could engage in bilateral negotiations with individual regions in the south-east. Given the long-standing inability of Ukrainian elites to agree on the reform of center-regional relations as whole, a selective divide and rule strategy offers the advantages of fragmenting the “Russophone” bloc, and the potential for making deals on a case-by-case basis. Such a process would inevitably be largely non-transparent. This asymmetric federal approach, as with Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s approach to ethnic republics in Russia in the mid-1990s, might generate some short-term stability but it would also antagonize other regions and would be vulnerable to unraveling. Second, there could be <u>a state-wide</u> process of constitutional reform with the aim of either a <u>comprehensive federalization</u>, <u>or <mark>decentralization</mark> of more powers to all regions</u>. <u>We could expect greater powers to include self-government</u> in culture (including language and education), economic management, taxation, and policing. The election (rather than the presidential appointment) of regional governors is an important aspect of reform. This could be part of a synchronization of regional elections, including for governors, with early parliamentary elections. This <u>reform process <mark>could be achieved by </mark>either a <mark>con</mark>stitutional <mark>con</mark>vention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. <mark>These steps would generate </mark>a democratic process of debate, dialogue and <mark>engagement, and</mark> hopefully <strong><mark>reunite Ukrainian society. There would</strong></mark> </u>almost certainly<u><strong><mark> be</strong> <strong>international monitoring and advice</u></strong>. <u>This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates and the E.U. <mark>are <strong>not short of is</strong></mark> </u>legal<u> <strong><mark>experts on</strong></mark> </u>autonomy<u>, <strong><mark>federalism</strong></mark> </u>and minority rights. The<u> <mark>implementation</mark> </u>of constitutional reform<u> <mark>depends critically on</mark> </u>political will and <u><mark>leadership</u></mark>, and it would have to be championed by the new president to be elected in May. Constitutional reform will be on the agenda in any event, as Ukraine currently finds itself between constitutions (2004 and 2010) – and neither of these constitutions was clearly defined. Regional oligarchs will also have to be part of this process. Just how they are to be managed in the new Ukraine will be one of the greatest challenges facing the political elites. A properly functioning constitutional court that is insulated better against political interference is crucial for decentralization or federalization to be lasting. Opponents of federalization will no doubt raise the dangers of state disintegration and secession that might flow from such a constitutional reform process, especially given the Crimea example and the ongoing unrest in the southeast. The fact that Russia has indicated that greater autonomy is its own preferred outcome for Ukraine means, however, that there is now potential for substantive negotiations to move forward – assuming that Russia can switch off the Russian nationalist mobilization that it has so far been promoting. Reassessing the turn against “ethnofederalism” There was a turn against ethnofederalism in the 1990s that is ripe for a reassessment. Prior to the collapse of communism, there was a dominant paradigm that federalism as “self rule and shared rule” has positive “win-win” effects on promoting stable politics, and indeed, that it was the constitutional order (following the U.S. example) that was most conducive to democracy. Federalism was also seen as an essential constitutional design for the “politics of accommodation” in “deeply divided” or “plural” societies. From the early 1990s this paradigm was shaken by critiques which argued that federalism and autonomy more generally were highly destabilizing in ethnically divided states where the federal administrative architecture and boundaries were drawn to reflect ethnic divisions. The three socialist ethnofederations (USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) were used as cases to demonstrate this thesis. The argument is that the mode of socialist federalism, which while it was intrinsically a “sham” in terms of power distribution given that real power resided in communist parties, was flawed because of its “ethnic” structure leading to a mismanagement of nationalism. Consequently, a major cause of the collapse was the fact that the previously disempowered federal architecture became a platform for ethnonational mobilization. Socialist-era federal structures were essentially “subversive institutions”. The negative thesis was developed further in perspectives on the “frozen conflicts” to include even the prospect of autonomy and decentralization. In the Caucasus region, autonomy was seen as “a root cause of conflict” and a driver for secession. <u>The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected.</u> <u>In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict</u>. The Russian Federation is partially divided into ethnic units, and only Chechnya posed a serious threat to its territorial integrity. If one analyzes the case of Tatarstan and other ethnic republics of the Russian Federation the fact is that the asymmetric federalism and autonomy in key areas relating to self-rule, culture and, to some extent, economic power, was sufficient to quash secessionist demands and maintain state stability. That stability has persisted even when Putin recentralized powers from the ethnic republics to create his “power vertical” (see this recent Monkey Cage post). A similar argument holds with regard to conflict-prevention in Crimea in the 1990s (see the recent Monkey Cage post). <u>The <mark>Ukraine</mark> crisis <mark>offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of</mark> autonomy and <mark>federalism to <strong>peacefully manage conflict</mark> </strong>and <strong>enhance state stability</u></strong>. It is of note that the <u>federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward</u> not just <u>in Ukraine</u> but in other places of conflict in the post-communist space, and beyond (for example, Iraq, Syria, and Libya).</p>
|
2NC
| null |
a2
| 242,776 | 13 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,596 |
Link shield - Federal legalization has LITERALLY no support
|
Kleiman 2014
|
Kleiman 2014 (Mark, professor of public policy at the University of California Los Angeles, How Not to Make a Hash out of Cannabis legalization, Washington Monthly, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/how_not_to_make_a_hash_out_of049291.php?page=all)
|
The federal government would recognize the legal status of cannabis under a state system Could such a plan garner support in Washington Certainly not given a dysfunctional Congress, an administration with no taste for engaging one more culture war issue, and in the absence of a powerful national organization with a nuanced view of cannabis policy and the muscle to make that view politically salient. legalization it’s been slow going in other states in which legalization has to go through the legislature, where anti-pot law enforcement groups can easily block it. it could be many years before legalization reaches the rest of the country or gets formal federal approval that removes the stigma no national-level figure of any standing is willing to speak out for change. That’s unlikely to last. Soon enough, candidates for president are going to be asked their positions on marijuana legalization. They’re going to need a good answer. I suggest something like this: “I’m not against all legalization; I’m against dumb legalization.”
|
Could such a plan garner support in Washington Certainly not given a dysfunctional Congress in the absence of a powerful national organization with a nuanced view of cannabis policy and the muscle to make that view politically salient it’s been slow going in other states where anti-pot law enforcement groups can easily block it could be many years before or gets formal federal approval that removes the stigma no national-level figure of any standing is willing to speak out for change
|
How could the federal government get the states to structure their pot markets in ways like these? By giving a new twist to a tried-and-true tool that the Obama administration has wielded particularly effectively: the policy waiver. The federal government would recognize the legal status of cannabis under a state system—making the activities permitted under that system actually legal, not merely tolerated, under federal law—only if the state system contained adequate controls to protect public health and safety, as determined by the attorney general and the secretary of the department of health and human services. That would change the politics of legalization at the state level, with legalization advocates and the cannabis industry supporting tight controls in order to get, and keep, the all-important waiver. Then we would see the laboratories of democracy doing some serious experimentation. Could such a plan garner enough support in Washington to become law? Certainly not now, given a dysfunctional Congress, an administration with no taste for engaging one more culture war issue, and in the absence of a powerful national organization with a nuanced view of cannabis policy and the muscle to make that view politically salient. But there is a mutually beneficial deal waiting to be made. Though legalization has made headway in states with strong initiative provisions in their constitutions, it’s been slow going in other states in which legalization has to go through the legislature, where anti-pot law enforcement groups can easily block it. So it could be many years before legalization reaches the rest of the country or gets formal federal approval that removes the stigma of (even unpunished) lawbreaking from cannabis users. Rather than wait, legalization advocates might be willing to accept something short of full commercialization; some of them actually prefer a noncommercial system. Meanwhile, those who have been opponents of legalization heretofore might—with the writing now on the wall—decide that a tightly regulated and potentially reversible system of legal availability is the least-bad out-come available. The current political situation seems anomalous. Public opinion continues to move against cannabis prohibition, but no national-level figure of any standing is willing to speak out for change. That’s unlikely to last. Soon enough, candidates for president are going to be asked their positions on marijuana legalization. They’re going to need a good answer. I suggest something like this: “I’m not against all legalization; I’m against dumb legalization.”
| 2,604 |
<h4><strong>Link shield - Federal legalization has LITERALLY no support</h4><p>Kleiman 2014</strong> (Mark, professor of public policy at the University of California Los Angeles, How Not to Make a Hash out of Cannabis legalization, Washington Monthly, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/how_not_to_make_a_hash_out_of049291.php?page=all)</p><p>How could the federal government get the states to structure their pot markets in ways like these? By giving a new twist to a tried-and-true tool that the Obama administration has wielded particularly effectively: the policy waiver. <u>The federal government would recognize the legal status of cannabis under a state system</u>—making the activities permitted under that system actually legal, not merely tolerated, under federal law—only if the state system contained adequate controls to protect public health and safety, as determined by the attorney general and the secretary of the department of health and human services. That would change the politics of legalization at the state level, with legalization advocates and the cannabis industry supporting tight controls in order to get, and keep, the all-important waiver. Then we would see the laboratories of democracy doing some serious experimentation. <u><mark>Could such a plan garner</u></mark> enough <u><mark>support in Washington</u></mark> to become law? <u><strong><mark>Certainly not</u></strong></mark> now, <u><mark>given a dysfunctional Congress</mark>, an administration with no taste for engaging one more culture war issue, and <mark>in the absence of a powerful national organization with a nuanced view of cannabis policy and the muscle to make that view politically salient</mark>.</u> But there is a mutually beneficial deal waiting to be made. Though <u>legalization</u> has made headway in states with strong initiative provisions in their constitutions, <u><mark>it’s been slow going in other states </mark>in which legalization has to go through the legislature, <mark>where anti-pot law enforcement groups can easily block it</mark>.</u> So <u>it <mark>could be many years before</mark> legalization reaches the rest of the country <mark>or gets formal federal approval that removes the stigma</u></mark> of (even unpunished) lawbreaking from cannabis users. Rather than wait, legalization advocates might be willing to accept something short of full commercialization; some of them actually prefer a noncommercial system. Meanwhile, those who have been opponents of legalization heretofore might—with the writing now on the wall—decide that a tightly regulated and potentially reversible system of legal availability is the least-bad out-come available. The current political situation seems anomalous. Public opinion continues to move against cannabis prohibition, but <u><strong><mark>no national-level figure of any standing is willing to speak out for change</mark>. That’s unlikely to last. Soon enough, candidates for president are going to be asked their positions on marijuana legalization. They’re going to need a good answer. I suggest something like this: “I’m not against all legalization; I’m against dumb legalization.”</p></u></strong>
|
1nr
|
Link
|
UQ
| 64,830 | 174 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,597 |
Each of the 50 United States should legalize nearly all marihuana and implement the baseline regulations.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Each of the 50 United States should legalize nearly all marihuana and implement the baseline regulations.</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 431,095 | 1 | 17,112 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| 565,260 |
N
|
Wake
|
2
|
Cornell Deng-Zhang
|
Stone
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaty DA
T-legalize
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,598 |
The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state. </h4>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 431,096 | 1 | 17,110 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| 565,262 |
N
|
Wake
|
5
|
NYU Itliong-Zhan
|
McCleary
|
Fed CP (2NR)
AG Politics (2NR
Cede the Political DA
T - USFG
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,599 |
Varied efforts to increase voluntary donations fail – individually and in combination
|
Beard 8
|
Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy
|
the transplant industry has examined and adopted a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remote At least seven such actions have been implemented INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses. federal legislation requiring all hospitals to request organ donation additional legislation to refer potential organ donors the Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,” ■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES Finally, i legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct costs incurred by onors We must conclude that none of the policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage. . Rather, every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage
|
transplant industry adopted policy options designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, maintain the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remo seven actions have been implemented INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses legislation requiring all hospitals to request organ donation additional legislation to refer potential organ donors Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative KIDNEY EXCHANGES none of the policies resolve the transplant shortage it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage.
|
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf
Aware of the increasingly dire consequences of continued reliance on the existing approach to cadaveric organ procurement and alarmed at the figures shown above, the transplant industry has examined and adopted a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remote. At least seven such actions have been implemented over the last two decades or so: ■ INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount. ■ ORGAN DONOR CARDS A related activity has been the process of incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses. The cards can be easily completed and witnessed at the time the licenses are issued or renewed. They serve as a pre-mortem statement of the bearer’s wish to have his or her organs removed for transplantation purposes at the time of death. Their principal use, in practice, is to facilitate the opos’ efforts to convince surviving family members to consent to such removal by revealing the decedant’s wishes. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave all states the authority to issue donor cards and incorporate them in drivers’ licenses. Moreover, a few states have recently begun to rely entirely on donor cards to infer consent without requiring the surviving family’s permission when such cards are present. Survey evidence indicates that less than 40 percent of U.S. citizens have signed their donor cards. ■ REQUIRED REQUEST Some survey evidence published in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that in a number of cases families of potential deceased donors were not being asked to donate the organs. As a result, donation was apparently failing to occur in some of those instances simply because the request was not being presented. In response to this evidence, federal legislation was passed in 1987 requiring all hospitals receiving any federal funding (which, of course, is virtually all hospitals) to request organ donation in all deaths that occur under circumstances that would allow the deceased’s organs to be used in transplantation. It appears that this legal obligation is now being met in most, if not all, cases. Yet, the organ shortage has persisted and the waiting list has continued to grow. ■ REQUIRED REFERRAL While required-request legislation can compel hospitals to approach the families of recently deceased potential organ donors with an appeal for donation, it cannot ensure that the request will be made in a sincere, compassionate manner likely to elicit an agreement. Following implementation of the required-request law, there were a number of anecdotes in which the compulsory organ donation requests were presented in an insincere or even offensive manner that was clearly intended to elicit a negative response. The letter of the law was being met but not the spirit. As a result, additional legislation was passed that requires hospitals to refer potential organ donors to the regional opo so that trained procurement personnel can approach the surviving family with the donation request. This policy response has resulted in no perceptible progress in resolving the shortage. ■ COLLABORATION A fairly recent response to the organ shortage has been the so-called “Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,” which was championed by then-secretary of health and human services Tommy Thompson. The program was initiated shortly after Thompson took office in 2001 and is currently continuing. The program’s basic motivation is provided by the observation of a considerable degree of variation in performance across the existing opos. Specifically, the number of deceased organ donors per thousand hospital deaths has been found to vary by a factor of almost five across the organizations. The presumption, then, is that the relatively successful opos employ superior procurement techniques and/or knowledge that, if shared with the relatively unsuccessful organizations, would significantly improve their performance. Thus, diffusion of “best practice” techniques is seen as a promising method through which cadaveric donation rates may be greatly improved. A thorough and objective evaluation of the Thompson initiative has not, to our knowledge, been conducted. Figure 1, in conjunction with a recent econometric study of observed variations in opo efficiency, suggests that such an evaluation would yield both good news and bad news. The good news is that the program appears to have had a positive (and potentially significant) impact on the number of donations. In particular, it appears that, after 2002, the growth rate of the waiting list has slowed somewhat. Whether this effect will permanently lower the growth rate of the waiting list or simply cause a temporary intercept shift remains to be seen. The bad news, however, is unequivocal— the initiative is not going to resolve the organ shortage. Even if, contrary to reasonable expectations, all opo relative inefficiencies were miraculously eliminated (i.e., if al organizations’ performance were brought up to the most efficient unit), the increase in donor collection rates would still be insufficient to eliminate the shortage. ■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES Another approach that has received some attention recently involves the exchange of kidneys between families who have willing but incompatible living donors. Suppose, for example, a person in one family needs a kidney transplant and a sibling has offered to donate the needed organ. Further suppose that the two siblings are not compatible — perhaps their blood types differ. If this family can locate a second, similarly situated family, then it may be possible that the donor in the first family will match the recipient in the second, and vice versa. A relatively small number of such exchanges have recently occurred and a unos-based computerized system of matching such interfamily donors has been proposed to facilitate a larger number of these living donor transactions. Two observations regarding kidney exchanges are worth noting. First, such exchanges obviously constitute a crude type of market in living donor kidneys that is based upon barter rather than currency. Like all such barter markets, this exchange will be considerably less efficient than currency-based trade. Puzzlingly, some of the staunchest critics of using financial incentives for cadaveric donors have openly supported expanded use of living donor exchanges. Apparently, it is not market exchange per se that offends them but, rather, the use of money to facilitate efficient market exchange. This combination of positions merely highlights the critics’ lack of knowledge regarding the operation of market processes. It is quite apparent that living donor kidney exchanges are not going to resolve the organ shortage. Opportunities for such barter-based exchanges are simply too limited. ■ REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS Finally, in another effort to encourage an increase in the number of living (primarily kidney) donors, several states have passed legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct (explicit) costs incurred by such donors (e.g., travel expenses, lost wages, and so on). Economically, this policy action raises the price paid to living kidney donors from a negative amount to zero. As such, it should be expected to increase the quantity of organs supplied from this source. Because the explicit, out-of-pocket expenses associated with live kidney donation are unlikely to be large relative to the longer-term implicit costs of potential health risks, however, such reimbursement should not be expected to bring forth a flood of new donors. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors may have a negative impact on the number of deceased donors because of some degree of supply-side substitutability. Again, this policy is not a solution to the organ shortage. We must conclude that none of the above-listed policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage. We say this not because we oppose any of these policies; indeed, each appears sensible in its own right and some have unquestionably succeeded in raising the number of organ donors by some (perhaps nontrivial) amount. Rather, our concern is that every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage.
| 9,339 |
<h4>Varied efforts to increase voluntary donations fail – individually and in combination </h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p> Aware of the increasingly dire consequences of continued reliance on the existing approach to cadaveric organ procurement and alarmed at the figures shown above, <u>the <mark>transplant industry</mark> has examined and <mark>adopted</mark> a series of <mark>policy options</mark> ostensibly <mark>designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these,</mark> however, continue to <mark>maintain the</mark> basic zero-price property of the <mark>altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remo</mark>te</u>. <u>At least <mark>seven</mark> such <mark>actions have been</mark> <mark>implemented</u></mark> over the last two decades or so: ■ <u><mark>INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES</u></mark> In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount. ■ ORGAN DONOR CARDS A related activity has been the process of <u><mark>incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses</mark>.</u> The cards can be easily completed and witnessed at the time the licenses are issued or renewed. They serve as a pre-mortem statement of the bearer’s wish to have his or her organs removed for transplantation purposes at the time of death. Their principal use, in practice, is to facilitate the opos’ efforts to convince surviving family members to consent to such removal by revealing the decedant’s wishes. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave all states the authority to issue donor cards and incorporate them in drivers’ licenses. Moreover, a few states have recently begun to rely entirely on donor cards to infer consent without requiring the surviving family’s permission when such cards are present. Survey evidence indicates that less than 40 percent of U.S. citizens have signed their donor cards.<u> </u>■ REQUIRED REQUEST Some survey evidence published in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that in a number of cases families of potential deceased donors were not being asked to donate the organs. As a result, donation was apparently failing to occur in some of those instances simply because the request was not being presented. In response to this evidence, <u>federal <mark>legislation</u></mark> was passed in 1987 <u><mark>requiring all hospitals</u></mark> receiving any federal funding (which, of course, is virtually all hospitals) <u><mark>to request organ donation</u></mark> in all deaths that occur under circumstances that would allow the deceased’s organs to be used in transplantation. It appears that this legal obligation is now being met in most, if not all, cases. Yet, the organ shortage has persisted and the waiting list has continued to grow. ■ REQUIRED REFERRAL While required-request legislation can compel hospitals to approach the families of recently deceased potential organ donors with an appeal for donation, it cannot ensure that the request will be made in a sincere, compassionate manner likely to elicit an agreement. Following implementation of the required-request law, there were a number of anecdotes in which the compulsory organ donation requests were presented in an insincere or even offensive manner that was clearly intended to elicit a negative response. The letter of the law was being met but not the spirit. As a result, <u><mark>additional</mark> <mark>legislation</u></mark> was passed that requires hospitals<u> <mark>to refer potential organ donors</mark> </u>to the regional opo so that trained procurement personnel can approach the surviving family with the donation request. This policy response has resulted in no perceptible progress in resolving the shortage. ■ COLLABORATION A fairly recent response to the organ shortage has been <u>the </u>so-called “<u><mark>Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative</mark>,” </u>which was championed by then-secretary of health and human services Tommy Thompson. The program was initiated shortly after Thompson took office in 2001 and is currently continuing. The program’s basic motivation is provided by the observation of a considerable degree of variation in performance across the existing opos. Specifically, the number of deceased organ donors per thousand hospital deaths has been found to vary by a factor of almost five across the organizations. The presumption, then, is that the relatively successful opos employ superior procurement techniques and/or knowledge that, if shared with the relatively unsuccessful organizations, would significantly improve their performance. Thus, diffusion of “best practice” techniques is seen as a promising method through which cadaveric donation rates may be greatly improved. A thorough and objective evaluation of the Thompson initiative has not, to our knowledge, been conducted. Figure 1, in conjunction with a recent econometric study of observed variations in opo efficiency, suggests that such an evaluation would yield both good news and bad news. The good news is that the program appears to have had a positive (and potentially significant) impact on the number of donations. In particular, it appears that, after 2002, the growth rate of the waiting list has slowed somewhat. Whether this effect will permanently lower the growth rate of the waiting list or simply cause a temporary intercept shift remains to be seen. The bad news, however, is unequivocal— the initiative is not going to resolve the organ shortage. Even if, contrary to reasonable expectations, all opo relative inefficiencies were miraculously eliminated (i.e., if al organizations’ performance were brought up to the most efficient unit), the increase in donor collection rates would still be insufficient to eliminate the shortage. <u>■ <mark>KIDNEY</mark> <mark>EXCHANGES</u></mark> Another approach that has received some attention recently involves the exchange of kidneys between families who have willing but incompatible living donors. Suppose, for example, a person in one family needs a kidney transplant and a sibling has offered to donate the needed organ. Further suppose that the two siblings are not compatible — perhaps their blood types differ. If this family can locate a second, similarly situated family, then it may be possible that the donor in the first family will match the recipient in the second, and vice versa. A relatively small number of such exchanges have recently occurred and a unos-based computerized system of matching such interfamily donors has been proposed to facilitate a larger number of these living donor transactions. Two observations regarding kidney exchanges are worth noting. First, such exchanges obviously constitute a crude type of market in living donor kidneys that is based upon barter rather than currency. Like all such barter markets, this exchange will be considerably less efficient than currency-based trade. Puzzlingly, some of the staunchest critics of using financial incentives for cadaveric donors have openly supported expanded use of living donor exchanges. Apparently, it is not market exchange per se that offends them but, rather, the use of money to facilitate efficient market exchange. This combination of positions merely highlights the critics’ lack of knowledge regarding the operation of market processes. It is quite apparent that living donor kidney exchanges are not going to resolve the organ shortage. Opportunities for such barter-based exchanges are simply too limited. ■ REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS <u>Finally, i</u>n another effort to encourage an increase in the number of living (primarily kidney) donors, several states have passed <u>legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct </u>(explicit) <u>costs incurred by</u> such d<u>onors </u>(e.g., travel expenses, lost wages, and so on). Economically, this policy action raises the price paid to living kidney donors from a negative amount to zero. As such, it should be expected to increase the quantity of organs supplied from this source. Because the explicit, out-of-pocket expenses associated with live kidney donation are unlikely to be large relative to the longer-term implicit costs of potential health risks, however, such reimbursement should not be expected to bring forth a flood of new donors. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors may have a negative impact on the number of deceased donors because of some degree of supply-side substitutability. Again, this policy is not a solution to the organ shortage. <u>We must conclude that <mark>none of the</u></mark> above-listed <u><mark>policies</mark> should be expected to <mark>resolve the transplant</mark> organ <mark>shortage</mark>.</u> We say this not because we oppose any of these policies; indeed, each appears sensible in its own right and some have unquestionably succeeded in raising the number of organ donors by some (perhaps nontrivial) amount<u>. Rather,</u> our concern is that <u>every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, <mark>it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage</u>.</p></mark>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives
| 430,246 | 21 | 17,114 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
| 565,248 |
A
|
Wake
|
4
|
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
|
Voss
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,600 |
B. Cadaver organs violates -- they are not nearly all. Organs from living donors are a large portion of current trasnplants and an even larger source of orgsans from sales.
|
Jefferson-Jones 13
|
Jefferson-Jones 13 Jamila Jefferson-Jones, J.D., Harvard Law School, Assistant Professor of Law at Barry University's Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law in Orlando The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice Winter, 2013 16 J. Gender Race & Just. 105 ARTICLE: The Exchange of Inmate Organs for Liberty: Diminishing the "Yuck Factor" in the Bioethics Repugnance Debate lexis
|
a little more than one-third of the kidneys that are transplanted come from living donors, although living-donor kidneys are of a higher overall quality, and survive in a recipient on average for twice as long as deceased-donor kidneys
| null |
There were over 115,000 people on the United States organ transplant waiting list by the beginning of the first quarter of 2012. n30 Of those, nearly a third - approximately 93,000 - are waiting for a kidney. n31 However, only approximately 16,000 kidney transplants are performed each year. n32 Additionally, only a little more than one-third of the kidneys that are transplanted come from living donors, n33 although living-donor kidneys are of a higher overall quality, and survive in a recipient on average for twice as long as deceased-donor kidneys. n34
| 559 |
<h4><strong>B. Cadaver organs violates -- they are not nearly all. Organs from living donors are a large portion of current trasnplants and an even larger source of orgsans from sales.</h4><p>Jefferson-Jones 13</strong> Jamila Jefferson-Jones, J.D., Harvard Law School, Assistant Professor of Law at Barry University's Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law in Orlando The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice Winter, 2013 16 J. Gender Race & Just. 105 ARTICLE: The Exchange of Inmate Organs for Liberty: Diminishing the "Yuck Factor" in the Bioethics Repugnance Debate lexis</p><p>There were over 115,000 people on the United States organ transplant waiting list by the beginning of the first quarter of 2012. n30 Of those, nearly a third - approximately 93,000 - are waiting for a kidney. n31 However, only approximately 16,000 kidney transplants are performed each year. n32 Additionally, only<u> a little more than one-third of the kidneys that are transplanted come from living donors,</u> n33 <u>although living-donor kidneys are of a higher overall quality, and survive in a recipient on average for twice as long as deceased-donor kidneys</u><strong>. n34</p></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
4
| 430,514 | 2 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,601 |
D
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><u><strong>D</h4></u></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
Case
| 431,097 | 1 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,602 |
state legalization explicitly doesn’t link because of constitutional commitment
|
Kleiman 12
|
Kleiman 12 (Mark, 7/20/12, Marijuana policy and international law, www.samefacts.com/2012/07/drug-policy/marijuana-policy-and-international-law/)
|
Within the constraints of those treaties decriminalization and wink-wink nudge-nudge lack of enforcement are indeed all we could have at a national level First, the treaties don’t bind the fifty states. The treaties explicitly recognize that the obligations they impose on the signatories are limited by those signatories’ own domestic constitutional arrangements, and it’s settled constitutional law that the federal government may not require a state to criminalize something, or force a state to help carry out federal law
|
Within the constraints of those treaties F treaties don’t bind the fifty states. The treaties explicitly recognize that the obligations they impose on the signatories are limited by those signatories’ own domestic constitutional arrangements, and it’s settled constitutional law that the federal government may not require a state to criminalize something, or force a state to help carry out federal law
|
Commenting on Matt Yglesias’s essay about how cheap pot would be post-legalization, my old friend Kevin Drum notes that marijuana prohibition is built into the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its successor international drug control treaties. Within the constraints of those treaties, what Kevin calls “decriminalization and wink-wink nudge-nudge lack of enforcement” are indeed all we could have at a national level. But that doesn’t mean taxation-and-regulation needs to be completely off the table. First, the treaties don’t bind the fifty states. The treaties explicitly recognize that the obligations they impose on the signatories are limited by those signatories’ own domestic constitutional arrangements, and it’s settled constitutional law that the federal government may not require a state to criminalize something, or force a state to help carry out federal law. For example, if the Michigan proposal to simply repeal the state’s marijuana laws – parallel to what New York did with respect to alcohol in 1923 – had passed, Michigan would have been entirely within its constitutional powers, and no international law would have been violated.
| 1,161 |
<h4>state legalization explicitly doesn’t link because of constitutional commitment</h4><p><strong>Kleiman 12</strong> (Mark, 7/20/12, Marijuana policy and international law, www.samefacts.com/2012/07/drug-policy/marijuana-policy-and-international-law/)</p><p>Commenting on Matt Yglesias’s essay about how cheap pot would be post-legalization, my old friend Kevin Drum notes that marijuana prohibition is built into the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its successor international drug control treaties. <u><mark>Within the constraints of those treaties</u></mark>, what Kevin calls “<u>decriminalization and wink-wink nudge-nudge lack of enforcement</u>” <u>are indeed all we could have at a national level</u>. But that doesn’t mean taxation-and-regulation needs to be completely off the table. <u><mark>F</mark>irst, the <mark>treaties don’t bind the fifty states. The treaties explicitly recognize that the obligations they impose on the signatories are limited by those signatories’ own domestic constitutional arrangements, and it’s settled constitutional law that the federal government may not require a state to criminalize something, or force a state to help carry out federal law</u><strong></mark>. For example, if the Michigan proposal to simply repeal the state’s marijuana laws – parallel to what New York did with respect to alcohol in 1923 – had passed, Michigan would have been entirely within its constitutional powers, and no international law would have been violated.</p></strong>
|
2NC
| null |
a2
| 430,996 | 7 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,603 |
Deal will succeed now- multiple pressures on Iran
|
CNN 1/1
|
CNN 1/1/2015 (What (not) to look forward to in 2015: ISIS, life on Mars, Europe's mood, http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/31/world/lister-2015-predictions/)
|
A common enemy -- ISIS -- has led to a tacit understanding between the United States and Iran. Whether that opens the window to a broader relationship -- and whether negotiations on Iran's nuclear program will succeed -- is one of the big questions of 2015 Deadlines for agreement on limiting Iran's nuclear program have come and gone: the next is July Obama has invested heavily in seeking a deal Rouhani is keen to show the Iranian people he can end their economic and political isolation Hardliners in Iran may see such an opening as undermining their influence The momentum appears to be flowing against them but the gaps between Tehran and the international community remain formidable.
|
A common enemy -- ISIS -- has led to a tacit understanding between the United States and Iran. Whether that opens the window to a broader relationship -- and whethe negotiations on Iran's nuclear program will succeed -- is one of the big questions of 2015 Rouhani is keen to show the Iranian people he can end their economic and political isolation. ardliners e momentum appears to be flowing against them, but the gaps between Tehran and the international community remain formidable
|
Obama also spoke of "strategic patience" -- which is very much on show in Washington's gradual reaching-out to Tehran. A common enemy -- ISIS -- has led to a tacit understanding between the United States and Iran. Whether that opens the window to a broader relationship -- and whether negotiations on Iran's nuclear program will succeed -- is one of the big questions of 2015. Deadlines for agreement on limiting Iran's nuclear program have come and gone: the next is July. The Obama administration has invested heavily in seeking a deal since President Hassan Rouhani's election in 2013, and Rouhani is keen to show the Iranian people he can end their economic and political isolation. Obama, in his year-end interview with NPR, said he believed "there are elements inside of Iran that recognize the opportunity and want to take it." Hardliners in Iran may see such an opening as undermining their influence and opening the door to all sorts of Western influences. The momentum appears to be flowing against them, but the gaps between Tehran and the international community remain formidable. Perhaps the best to be expected is an interim deal that further eases sanctions.
| 1,174 |
<h4><strong>Deal will succeed now- multiple pressures on Iran</h4><p>CNN 1/1</strong>/2015 (What (not) to look forward to in 2015: ISIS, life on Mars, Europe's mood, http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/31/world/lister-2015-predictions/)</p><p>Obama also spoke of "strategic patience" -- which is very much on show in Washington's gradual reaching-out to Tehran. <u><mark>A common enemy -- ISIS -- has led to a tacit understanding between the United States and Iran. Whether that opens the window to a broader relationship -- and whethe</mark>r<mark> negotiations on Iran's nuclear program will succeed -- is one of the big questions of 2015</u></mark>. <u>Deadlines for agreement on limiting Iran's nuclear program have come and gone: the next is July</u>. The <u>Obama</u> administration <u>has invested heavily in seeking a deal</u> since President Hassan Rouhani's election in 2013, and <u><mark>Rouhani is keen to show the Iranian people he can end their economic and political isolation</u>.</mark> Obama, in his year-end interview with NPR, said he believed "there are elements inside of Iran that recognize the opportunity and want to take it." <u>H<mark>ardliners</mark> in Iran may see such an opening as undermining their influence</u> and opening the door to all sorts of Western influences. <u><strong>Th<mark>e momentum appears to be flowing against them</u></strong>, <u>but the gaps between Tehran and the international community remain formidable</mark>.</u><strong> Perhaps the best to be expected is an interim deal that further eases sanctions.</p></strong>
|
1nr
|
Sanctions fail
|
UQ
| 431,100 | 1 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,604 |
The shortage means many die
|
Beard 8
|
Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy
|
our failure to adapt our organ procurement policy suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists We run the forecasts out 10 years a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.
|
failure to adapt organ procurement suggests more than 80,000 lives have been sacrificed of our so-called “altruistic” system the pain and suffering of those forced to wait unemployment, and declining health must be reckoned Nonetheless, the death imposed pales in comparison to what lies ahead if change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.
|
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf
WAITING LISTS YET TO COME The consequences of our failure to adapt our cadaveric organ procurement policy to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists for each of our sample periods. We run the forecasts out 10 years from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage. Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.
| 5,967 |
<h4>The shortage means many die</h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p>WAITING LISTS YET TO COME The consequences of <u>our <mark>failure to adapt</mark> our</u> cadaveric <u><mark>organ</mark> <mark>procurement</mark> policy</u> to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, <u><mark>suggests</mark> that <mark>more than 80,000 lives have</mark> now <mark>been sacrificed</mark> on the altar <mark>of our so-called “altruistic” system</mark>. In addition, <mark>the</mark> unnecessary <mark>pain and</mark> <mark>suffering of those</mark> who have been <mark>forced to wait</mark> while undergoing dialysis, <mark>unemployment, and declining health must</mark> also <mark>be reckoned</mark> along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. <mark>Nonetheless, the</mark> pain, suffering, and <mark>death imposed</mark> on the innocents thus far <mark>pales in comparison to what lies ahead if</mark> more fundamental <mark>change is not forthcoming</u></mark>. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, <u><mark>we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists</u></mark> for each of our sample periods. <u>We run the forecasts out 10 years</u> from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, <u>a cumulative total of <mark>196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015</mark> <mark>as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.</u></mark> Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives
| 430,247 | 16 | 17,114 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
| 565,248 |
A
|
Wake
|
4
|
Mary Washington Wimberly-Adam
|
Voss
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Wake-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
Subsets and Splits
Filtered Text and Summaries
This query fetches 100 rows where the text length is between 400 and 600 and ensures that summary, spoken, and fulltext fields are not null, providing a simple filtered dataset but limited analytical insights.
Filtered Text Length 9900-1
Retrieves specific records with a text length between 9900 and 10100 characters, ensuring all text fields are not null, which provides limited insight into data distribution.
Filtered Text Length 4900-5
Returns a sample of records with text lengths between 4900 and 5100 where both summary, spoken, and fulltext fields are present, providing limited insight into the dataset's structure.
Filtered Text Length 3900-4
This query retrieves a limited set of records that meet specific criteria, which can be useful for a closer look at specific data points but doesn't provide deeper insights.
Filtered Text Length 2900-3
Retrieves a sample of rows with textLength between 2900 and 3100, ensuring none of the summary, spoken, or fulltext fields are null.
Filtered Text Length 1900-2
Retrieves a sample of records with text length between 1900 and 2100 characters where summary, spoken, and fulltext fields are not null, providing limited filtering for data exploration.
Filtered Text Length 900-11
Retrieves a sample of entries with text lengths between 900 and 1100 characters, ensuring that the entries have both summaries and spoken text available, providing a basic filtering of the dataset.