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743,305 |
A new liberal is key- Holder’s actions weren’t enough
|
Reuters 9/26
|
Reuters 9/26/2014 (For Obama, Eric Holder's Exit Leaves A Void On Civil Rights Issues, reprinted in the Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/26/obama-eric-holder_n_5886950.html)
|
The departure of Holder deprives the administration of a powerful voice on civil rights advocates fear his exit leaves a hard-to-fill hole on Obama's team They are worried that his work on voting rights, sentencing reform, and addressing racial profiling measures used by police could fall by the wayside We've always seen him as an important spokesperson for the administration and that role should not go unfulfilled." Holder acknowledged that "work remains to be done Holder has asked federal prosecutors not to seek mandatory minimum sentences to be used when charging defendants in low-level drug cases Holder announced earlier this year that the department would review applications for executive clemency - another project that is under way but unfinished.
|
advocates fear his exit leaves a hard-to-fill hole They are worried that his work on voting rights, sentencing reform, and addressing racial profiling measures used by police could fall by the wayside important spokesperson for the administration and that role should not go unfulfilled work remains to be done asked federal prosecutors not to seek mandatory minimum sentences to be used when charging defendants in low-level drug case executive clemency - another project that is under way but unfinished
|
The departure of U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder deprives the Obama administration of a powerful voice on civil rights at a time when riots in Ferguson, Missouri, have thrust the issue into the spotlight. Civil rights advocates fear his exit leaves a hard-to-fill hole on Obama's team when it comes to events such as in Ferguson - where days of protests followed the fatal police shooting of an unarmed black teenager - and challenging laws in some states requiring voters to show photo identification, measures that Holder has said would prevent black and Latino voters from going to the polls. They are worried that his work on voting rights, sentencing reform, and addressing racial profiling measures used by police could fall by the wayside when his yet-to-be-determined successor sets a new set of priorities - particularly as the administration focuses on counterterrorism and the threat posed by Islamic State militants. "We always thought that he was able to say the things that Obama could not say," said Barbara Arnwine, president of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights. "We've always seen him as an important spokesperson for the administration and that role should not go unfulfilled." BONDS THAT GO 'MUCH DEEPER' In a speech choked with emotion on Thursday, Holder recounted how he had been part of Team Obama since his friend was a "young senator from Illinois" making "an improbable, idealistic effort" to become president. Obama stuck with Holder even as he became a lightning rod for Republican criticism of his administration. "We have been great colleagues, but the bonds between us are much deeper than that. In good times and in bad, in things personal and in things professional, you have been there for me," Holder said to Obama. Over the years, both men have spoken about racism they have experienced in their own lives. Before he became the nation's first black president, Obama wrote "Dreams from My Father," a memoir on racial identity. But since taking office, he has often shied away from talking publicly about race. By contrast, Holder - who worked for the NAACP legal defense fund early in his career - has been more outspoken. His sister-in-law, Vivian Malone Jones, became a hero in the desegregation movement of the 1960s after she was blocked from entering the University of Alabama when she arrived for classes. "I think in his own way, using his role as Attorney General, Holder has addressed issues that remain off-limits," said Wade Henderson, president of the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights. Holder talked openly about his own experiences with racial profiling after Trayvon Martin, a black teenager in Florida, was shot last year - days before Obama spoke out. Holder talked about the humiliation of being pulled over and searched on the New Jersey turnpike when he was not speeding, and about being stopped by police while running in Washington's tony Georgetown neighborhood. In August, after unarmed black teenager Michael Brown was shot and killed by a white policeman in Ferguson - sparking nights of riots - Obama sent Holder to meet with community members. Holder vowed the Justice Department would investigate whether criminal and civil charges are warranted, but the probe is unlikely to be complete before his departure. THINGS LEFT UNDONE As he listed his accomplishments, Holder acknowledged that "work remains to be done." On his to-do list in the weeks before he leaves, Holder hopes to announce new guidelines to curb racial profiling in federal law enforcement investigations, the Justice Department said. Holder has asked federal prosecutors not to seek mandatory minimum sentences to be used when charging defendants in low-level drug cases. But more sweeping proposals to abolish mandatory minimum sentences have failed to get traction in Congress. Holder announced earlier this year that the department would review potentially hundreds of applications for executive clemency - another project that is under way but unfinished.
| 4,013 |
<h4><strong>A new liberal is key- Holder’s actions weren’t enough</h4><p>Reuters 9/26</strong>/2014 (For Obama, Eric Holder's Exit Leaves A Void On Civil Rights Issues, reprinted in the Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/26/obama-eric-holder_n_5886950.html)</p><p><u>The departure of</u> U.S. Attorney General Eric <u>Holder</u> <u>deprives</u> <u>the</u> Obama <u>administration</u> <u>of a powerful voice on civil rights</u> at a time when riots in Ferguson, Missouri, have thrust the issue into the spotlight. Civil rights <u><mark>advocates fear his exit leaves a hard-to-fill hole</mark> on Obama's team</u> when it comes to events such as in Ferguson - where days of protests followed the fatal police shooting of an unarmed black teenager - and challenging laws in some states requiring voters to show photo identification, measures that Holder has said would prevent black and Latino voters from going to the polls. <u><mark>They are worried that his work on voting rights, <strong>sentencing reform</strong>, and addressing racial profiling measures used by police could fall by the wayside</u></mark> when his yet-to-be-determined successor sets a new set of priorities - particularly as the administration focuses on counterterrorism and the threat posed by Islamic State militants. "We always thought that he was able to say the things that Obama could not say," said Barbara Arnwine, president of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights. "<u>We've always seen him as an <strong><mark>important spokesperson for the administration</strong> and that role should not go unfulfilled</mark>."</u> BONDS THAT GO 'MUCH DEEPER' In a speech choked with emotion on Thursday, Holder recounted how he had been part of Team Obama since his friend was a "young senator from Illinois" making "an improbable, idealistic effort" to become president. Obama stuck with Holder even as he became a lightning rod for Republican criticism of his administration. "We have been great colleagues, but the bonds between us are much deeper than that. In good times and in bad, in things personal and in things professional, you have been there for me," Holder said to Obama. Over the years, both men have spoken about racism they have experienced in their own lives. Before he became the nation's first black president, Obama wrote "Dreams from My Father," a memoir on racial identity. But since taking office, he has often shied away from talking publicly about race. By contrast, Holder - who worked for the NAACP legal defense fund early in his career - has been more outspoken. His sister-in-law, Vivian Malone Jones, became a hero in the desegregation movement of the 1960s after she was blocked from entering the University of Alabama when she arrived for classes. "I think in his own way, using his role as Attorney General, Holder has addressed issues that remain off-limits," said Wade Henderson, president of the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights. Holder talked openly about his own experiences with racial profiling after Trayvon Martin, a black teenager in Florida, was shot last year - days before Obama spoke out. Holder talked about the humiliation of being pulled over and searched on the New Jersey turnpike when he was not speeding, and about being stopped by police while running in Washington's tony Georgetown neighborhood. In August, after unarmed black teenager Michael Brown was shot and killed by a white policeman in Ferguson - sparking nights of riots - Obama sent Holder to meet with community members. Holder vowed the Justice Department would investigate whether criminal and civil charges are warranted, but the probe is unlikely to be complete before his departure. THINGS LEFT UNDONE As he listed his accomplishments, <u>Holder acknowledged that "<mark>work remains to be done</u></mark>." On his to-do list in the weeks before he leaves, Holder hopes to announce new guidelines to curb racial profiling in federal law enforcement investigations, the Justice Department said. <u>Holder has <mark>asked federal prosecutors not to seek mandatory minimum sentences to be used when charging defendants in low-level drug case</mark>s</u>. But more sweeping proposals to abolish mandatory minimum sentences have failed to get traction in Congress. <u>Holder announced earlier this year that the department would review</u> potentially hundreds of <u>applications for <mark>executive clemency - another project that is under way but <strong>unfinished</mark>.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NR
|
Liberal key
| 430,956 | 2 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,306 |
Extra-T- they quite clearly get most of their solvency from the decrim part of their plan- proves that all of our arguments about legalization being bad are artificially made not to apply
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Extra-T- they quite clearly get most of their solvency from the decrim part of their plan- proves that all of our arguments about legalization being bad are artificially made not to apply</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 431,001 | 1 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,307 |
The Brownfield Doctrine is a framework for thinking about how to readjust international drug policy in the short term. It’s based on shifting enforcement priorities and allowing policy innovation via flexible interpretation of certain antiquated provisions of the international drug conventions. It’s derived from US constitutional principles around ‘purposive’ interpretations of legal texts rather than maintaining strict legalistic or ‘originalist’ interpretations. Ambassador Brownfield described this, similar to the US constitution, as viewing the treaties as ‘living breathing documents’ which should be interpreted via their preambulatory principles of protecting the ‘health and welfare of mankind’ instead of pedantic readings of outdated clauses. It is based on four points: Defend the integrity of the core of the conventions. Allow flexible interpretation of treaties. Allow different national/regional strategies. Tackle organised crime. The international response The response has been tentative and mixed. Member states of drug conventions are pushing ahead with it in many respects. For example the recent Organization of American States Special General Assembly on Drugs invoked principles derived from the doctrine. It has become particularly controversial within some circles because it’s a unilateral framework put forward by the former chief proselytizer and bully on international drug policy – the United States. Regardless of who authored it, the four-point approach is on balance a sensible path forward for the immediate future and allows breathing room for innovation and changes in policy, which could become stalled in messy discussions around treaty reform. If a Latin American or a European country had authored the framework it would likely have received a warmer response; it just so happens to be from the US. Many are justifiably wary of allowing states to redraw international agreements, seeing such a process as a slippery slope that might result in undermining other treaties such as human rights conventions. However, I think some realism is justified here. Empirically, the level of adherence to international agreements varies drastically. In the field of drug control this has been a consistent theme. As the UK acknowledged as early as 1951, drug conventions had ‘frequently been more honoured in the breach than in the observance’. Whether states were called out on the inadequacies of their compliance had little to do with legal reasoning and everything to do with realpolitik. Turkey, for example, was publicly praised as a model licit (legal) opium cultivator, whilst being quietly criticized for allowing frequent leakages into the illicit market. Iran was either loudly condemned or quietly ignored for flouting the conventions, depending on its utility to the leading powers at the time. Afghanistan was frequently overlooked out of a recognition that enforcing the treaties was, as the Ministry of the Economy pointed out in 1950, ‘impossible’. Meanwhile, altering international agreements, even if they prove misguided, is so minimal that greater flexibility is often required in their implementation. One of the key architects of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Herbert May, argued in 1955 that a central goal of the Convention was to provide ‘greater flexibility’ to the international system due to the likelihood of changed circumstances as well as medical-scientific innovations and research. The fact that the Single Convention took fourteen years, three drafts and an extremely rancorous plenipotentiary conference to negotiate should give pause to those who think redrafting is an immediate goal. The outcome of the Single Convention process was a breakdown in international drug diplomacy as the US set about torpedoing the document, viewing it as too weak relative to predecessor treaties. Thereafter member states struggled to agree on its interpretation, and it took two separate drafts to produce the Commentary which purports to explain it. The downsides to the State Department’s policy I have already discussed the human rights aspects. Some argue that the Doctrine doesn’t go far enough and allows for repressive approaches to be continued and that it’s a tool to hide US ‘violation’ of treaties around cannabis, while the US continues to enforce the parts of the war on drugs it wants. Further they question why the US should get to set out the terms for global drug policy reform or debates. I think these arguments miss the point. Firstly the Brownfield Doctrine is what states make of it. If they use it to develop innovations around policy, which improve the global approach to drugs and make the repressive model empirically unjustifiable, then I think it can be extremely positive, especially if it can be used to forward discussions on treaty reforms. If, on the other hand, it is used to ignore broader issues about drug policy reform, then I think it will be a negative. It will be up to civil society and reform-minded states to hold other member states’ feet to the fire on this, but ultimately I think the opportunities drastically outweigh the dangers. Secondly, it’s very hard to argue that the US is flat-out ‘breaching’ the treaties. The Federal Government is the executor of the treaties and national legislation is unchanged. The Federal Government also has no ability to force states to criminalise marijuana. They could use federal resources to enforce federal laws, but that would result in a drastic reshaping of state-federal relations. The real implications of the Brownfield Doctrine therefore fall on less powerful states. Uruguay has a far tougher time explaining its decision to legalise cannabis in the context of the drug treaties, but the Brownfield Doctrine essentially says that the US and other states will allow them breathing room while the debates around treaty reform play out. To me that seems like a rational approach to a difficult question. Thirdly, there is nothing in the treaties which mandates the current ‘war on drugs’ approach. There are certain legislative actions which adherence to the treaties require, but the level of resourcing is entirely up to states as is their implementation. The ‘war on drugs’ was a national and bilateral creation, facilitated by multilateral forums, such as the UN. To end the ‘war on drugs’ requires a rollback on various diplomatic, regional, national and local fronts. In the immediate term very few of these relate to the drug treaties. Further, evidence of efficacy around alternative policies is the best inoculation against states continuing the repressive model. In the future, increasing pluralism in international drug policies will likely render the treaties unsustainable, and that is when treaty rewriting will likely become inevitable. Fourthly, no member state is yet advocating rewriting the documents. Multilateral cooperation on any issue is hard to create. When it is created, the goal of member states becomes to sustain it, even in the face of variance in implementation and interpretation. The Brownfield Doctrine is just the application of this fact to the field of drug policy. The most rational reform strategy seems to me one which pushes the doctrine as far as practicable and uses it to hold the US to a standard of non-intervention outside its borders. When sufficient national level reforms have taken place, then issues around treaty reforms will become more apparent and practical, but there needs to be a sequential action process here.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><u>The <mark>Brownfield Doctrine</u> <u>is</u></mark> a framework for thinking about how to readjust international drug policy in the short term. It’s <u>based on shifting enforcement priorities and allowing policy innovation via <mark>flexible interpretation</u></mark> of certain antiquated provisions <u>of the international drug conventions.</u> <u>It’s derived from US constitutional principles around ‘purposive’ interpretations</u> of legal texts rather than maintaining strict legalistic or ‘originalist’ interpretations. Ambassador Brownfield described this, similar to the US constitution, as <u>viewing the treaties as ‘living</u> breathing <u>documents’</u> which should be interpreted via their preambulatory principles of protecting the ‘health and welfare of mankind’ instead of pedantic readings of outdated clauses. It is based on four points: Defend the integrity of the core of the conventions. Allow flexible interpretation of treaties. Allow different national/regional strategies. Tackle organised crime. The international response The response has been tentative and mixed. <u><mark>Member states of drug conventions are pushing ahead with it in many respects</u>.</mark> For example <u>the</u> recent <u>O</u>rganization of <u>A</u>merican <u>S</u>tates Special General Assembly on Drugs <u>invoked principles derived from the doctrine</u>. It has become particularly controversial within some circles because it’s a unilateral framework put forward by the former chief proselytizer and bully on international drug policy – the United States. Regardless of who authored it, <u>the</u> four-point <u>approach</u> <u>is</u> on balance a <u>sensible</u> path forward for the immediate future <u>and <mark>allows breathing room for innovation and change</mark>s</u> in policy, <u>which could become stalled in messy discussions around treaty reform.</u> If a Latin American or a European country had authored the framework it would likely have received a warmer response; it just so happens to be from the US. Many are justifiably wary of allowing states to redraw international agreements, seeing such a process as a slippery slope that might result in undermining other treaties such as human rights conventions. However, I think some realism is justified here. Empirically, the level of adherence to international agreements varies drastically. In the field of drug control this has been a consistent theme. As the UK acknowledged as early as 1951, drug conventions had ‘frequently been more honoured in the breach than in the observance’. Whether states were called out on the inadequacies of their compliance had little to do with legal reasoning and everything to do with realpolitik. Turkey, for example, was publicly praised as a model licit (legal) opium cultivator, whilst being quietly criticized for allowing frequent leakages into the illicit market. Iran was either loudly condemned or quietly ignored for flouting the conventions, depending on its utility to the leading powers at the time. Afghanistan was frequently overlooked out of a recognition that enforcing the treaties was, as the Ministry of the Economy pointed out in 1950, ‘impossible’. Meanwhile, <u><mark>altering international agreements</u></mark>, even if they prove misguided, <u>is so minimal that <strong><mark>greater flexibility is often required in their implementation</strong></mark>.</u> One of the key architects of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Herbert May, argued in 1955 that a central goal of the Convention was to provide ‘greater flexibility’ to the international system due to the likelihood of changed circumstances as well as medical-scientific innovations and research. The fact that the Single Convention took fourteen years, three drafts and an extremely rancorous plenipotentiary conference to negotiate should give pause to those who think redrafting is an immediate goal. The outcome of the Single Convention process was a breakdown in international drug diplomacy as the US set about torpedoing the document, viewing it as too weak relative to predecessor treaties. Thereafter member states struggled to agree on its interpretation, and it took two separate drafts to produce the Commentary which purports to explain it. The downsides to the State Department’s policy I have already discussed the human rights aspects. <u>Some argue</u> that the Doctrine doesn’t go far enough and allows for repressive approaches to be continued and that <u>it’s a tool to hide US ‘violation’</u> of treaties <u>around cannabis</u>, while the US continues to enforce the parts of the war on drugs it wants. Further they question why the US should get to set out the terms for global drug policy reform or debates. I think <u><strong>these arguments miss the point</u></strong>. Firstly <u><mark>the Brownfield Doctrine is what states make of it.</u> <u>If they use it to develop innovations around policy, which improve the global approach to drugs and make the repressive model empirically unjustifiable,</mark> then</u> I think <u>it can be extremely positive,</u> especially if it can be used to forward discussions on treaty reforms. If, on the other hand, it is used to ignore broader issues about drug policy reform, then I think it will be a negative. It will be up to civil society and reform-minded states to hold other member states’ feet to the fire on this, but ultimately I think <u>the opportunities drastically outweigh the dangers</u>. Secondly, <u><strong><mark>it’s very hard to argue that the US is flat-out ‘breaching’ the treaties</u></strong>. <u>The Federal Government is the executor of the treaties and <strong>national legislation is unchanged</u></strong>. <u>The Federal Government also has no ability to force states to criminalise marijuana</u></mark>. They could use federal resources to enforce federal laws, but that would result in a drastic reshaping of state-federal relations. The real implications of the Brownfield Doctrine therefore fall on less powerful states. Uruguay has a far tougher time explaining its decision to legalise cannabis in the context of the drug treaties, but <u>the Brownfield Doctrine</u> essentially <u>says that the US and other states will allow them breathing room while the debates around treaty reform play out</u>. To me that seems like a rational approach to a difficult question. Thirdly, <u><mark>there is nothing in the treaties which mandates the current ‘war on drugs’ approac</mark>h</u>. <u>There are certain legislative actions which adherence to the treaties require, but</u> <u><strong><mark>the level of resourcing is entirely up to states as is their implementatio</mark>n</u></strong>. The ‘war on drugs’ was a national and bilateral creation, facilitated by multilateral forums, such as the UN. To end the ‘war on drugs’ requires a rollback on various diplomatic, regional, national and local fronts. In the immediate term very few of these relate to the drug treaties. Further, <u><strong><mark>evidence of efficacy around alternative policies</strong> is the best inoculation against states continuing the repressive model</u></mark>. In the future, <u>increasing pluralism in international drug policies will likely render the treaties unsustainable, and that is when treaty rewriting will likely become inevitable</u>. Fourthly, <u><strong><mark>no member state is yet advocating rewriting the documents</u></strong>. <u>Multilateral cooperation on any issue is hard to create. When it is created, the goal of member states becomes to sustain it, </mark>even in the face of variance in implementation and interpretation.</u> <u>The Brownfield Doctrine is just the application of this fact to the field of drug policy.</u> <u>The most rational reform strategy</u> <u>seems</u> to me <u>one which pushes the doctrine as far as practicable</u> and uses it to hold the US to a standard of non-intervention outside its borders. When sufficient national level reforms have taken place, then issues around treaty reforms will become more apparent and practical, but <u><strong><mark>there needs to be a sequential action proces</mark>s</u></strong> here. </h4>
| null |
1nc
|
treaties
| 431,002 | 1 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,308 |
state legalization explicitly doesn’t link because of constitutional commitment
|
Kleiman 12
|
Kleiman 12 (Mark, 7/20/12, Marijuana policy and international law, www.samefacts.com/2012/07/drug-policy/marijuana-policy-and-international-law/)
|
Within the constraints of those treaties decriminalization and wink-wink nudge-nudge lack of enforcement are indeed all we could have at a national level First, the treaties don’t bind the fifty states. The treaties explicitly recognize that the obligations they impose on the signatories are limited by those signatories’ own domestic constitutional arrangements, and it’s settled constitutional law that the federal government may not require a state to criminalize something, or force a state to help carry out federal law
|
Within the constraints of those treaties F treaties don’t bind the fifty states. The treaties explicitly recognize that the obligations they impose on the signatories are limited by those signatories’ own domestic constitutional arrangements, and it’s settled constitutional law that the federal government may not require a state to criminalize something, or force a state to help carry out federal law
|
Commenting on Matt Yglesias’s essay about how cheap pot would be post-legalization, my old friend Kevin Drum notes that marijuana prohibition is built into the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its successor international drug control treaties. Within the constraints of those treaties, what Kevin calls “decriminalization and wink-wink nudge-nudge lack of enforcement” are indeed all we could have at a national level. But that doesn’t mean taxation-and-regulation needs to be completely off the table. First, the treaties don’t bind the fifty states. The treaties explicitly recognize that the obligations they impose on the signatories are limited by those signatories’ own domestic constitutional arrangements, and it’s settled constitutional law that the federal government may not require a state to criminalize something, or force a state to help carry out federal law. For example, if the Michigan proposal to simply repeal the state’s marijuana laws – parallel to what New York did with respect to alcohol in 1923 – had passed, Michigan would have been entirely within its constitutional powers, and no international law would have been violated.
| 1,161 |
<h4>state legalization explicitly doesn’t link because of constitutional commitment</h4><p><strong>Kleiman 12</strong> (Mark, 7/20/12, Marijuana policy and international law, www.samefacts.com/2012/07/drug-policy/marijuana-policy-and-international-law/)</p><p>Commenting on Matt Yglesias’s essay about how cheap pot would be post-legalization, my old friend Kevin Drum notes that marijuana prohibition is built into the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its successor international drug control treaties. <u><mark>Within the constraints of those treaties</u></mark>, what Kevin calls “<u>decriminalization and wink-wink nudge-nudge lack of enforcement</u>” <u>are indeed all we could have at a national level</u>. But that doesn’t mean taxation-and-regulation needs to be completely off the table. <u><mark>F</mark>irst, the <mark>treaties don’t bind the fifty states. The treaties explicitly recognize that the obligations they impose on the signatories are limited by those signatories’ own domestic constitutional arrangements, and it’s settled constitutional law that the federal government may not require a state to criminalize something, or force a state to help carry out federal law</u></mark>. For example, if the Michigan proposal to simply repeal the state’s marijuana laws – parallel to what New York did with respect to alcohol in 1923 – had passed, Michigan would have been entirely within its constitutional powers, and no international law would have been violated.</p>
|
2nr
| null |
AT: State Thumper
| 430,996 | 7 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,309 |
Link shield - Federal legalization has LITERALLY no support
|
Kleiman 2014
|
Kleiman 2014 (Mark, professor of public policy at the University of California Los Angeles, How Not to Make a Hash out of Cannabis legalization, Washington Monthly, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/how_not_to_make_a_hash_out_of049291.php?page=all)
|
The federal government would recognize the legal status of cannabis under a state system Could such a plan garner support in Washington Certainly not given a dysfunctional Congress, an administration with no taste for engaging one more culture war issue, and in the absence of a powerful national organization with a nuanced view of cannabis policy and the muscle to make that view politically salient. legalization it’s been slow going in other states in which legalization has to go through the legislature, where anti-pot law enforcement groups can easily block it. it could be many years before legalization reaches the rest of the country or gets formal federal approval that removes the stigma no national-level figure of any standing is willing to speak out for change.
discussion of political capital is whether or not it can be replenished over a term If a President expends political capital can it be replaced? Capital can be rebuilt, but only to a limited extent The decline of capital makes it difficult to access information recruit expertise and maintain energy If a lame duck President can be defined by a loss of political capital a lame duck can accomplish little
For cases where the president wants to lobby but has limited political capital to draw on the president's legislative options are limited. Lacking capital the strategy does not yield much influence the president simply does not have enough "juice" to substantially alter members' preferences or the outcome The president's prospects improve substantially, when he allocates political capital to lobbying for a particular initiative. At this point strategy becomes viable with political capital the president has enough resources to get opposing leaders to cut a "deal" with the White House political capital adds to attractiveness and effectiveness the predicted impact of the president's agenda-centered lobbying is real, and substantial but conditional often strategic stars do align the president is flush with political capital under these conditions, the president gets far more policy bang for his lobbying buck
Obama’s victory has made almost no difference in changing the psychology or incentives of the members of the G.O.P. who matter most breaking the fever” was the wrong metaphor There is no one event that can change a political party overnight A better metaphor for the coming battles with Congress may be three yards and a cloud of dust”: a series of grinding plays where small victories are earned only after lots of intense combat While the fiscal-cliff showdown demonstrated that there’s potential for bipartisan deal-making in the Senate, passing any Obama priority through the House of Representatives is nearly impossible unless the political pressure is extremely intense The fiscal-cliff bill offers the White House a general template for the coming fights over spending issues where there is very little consensus between Obama and most House Republicans. Deals will have to be negotiated in the Senate and gain the imprimatur of some high-profile Republicans. Then a pressure campaign will have to be mounted to convince Boehner to move the legislation to the floor of the House under rules that allow it to pass with mostly Democratic votes. It’s easier to see how this could happen with the coming budgetary issues, which have deadlines that force action, than for the rest of Obama’s agenda, which is more likely than not to simply die in the House.
President, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation)
Judging by congressional reaction President Obama still has his work cut out for him Republicans may not want to give him a big "win" in an election year).
The president initially enjoyed strong public approval and was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year and early into his second, But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. His impressive successes with Congress in 2009 and 2010 were accompanied by a shift in the public mood against him, evident in the rise of the tea party movement, the collapse in his approval rating, and the large GOP gains in the 2010 elections, which brought a return to divided government.
|
Could such a plan garner support in Washington Certainly not given a dysfunctional Congress in the absence of a powerful national organization with a nuanced view of cannabis policy and the muscle to make that view politically salient it’s been slow going in other states where anti-pot law enforcement groups can easily block it could be many years before or gets formal federal approval that removes the stigma no national-level figure of any standing is willing to speak out for change
discussion of political capital is whether or not it can be replenished over a term Capital can be rebuilt, but only to a limited extent The decline of capital makes it difficult to access information, recruit expertise and maintain energy
where the president wants to lobby but has limited political capital the president's legislative options are limited. Lacking capital the strategy does not yield much influence; the president does not have enough "juice" to alter members' preferences or the outcome. The president's prospects improve substantially when he allocates political capital with political capital the president has enough resources to get opposing leaders to cut a "deal" with the White House political capital adds to attractiveness and effectiveness the president flush with political capital gets far more policy bang for his lobbying buck
Obama’s victory made no difference in changing the psychology or incentives of members of the G.O.P. who matter that “breaking the fever” was the wrong metaphor There is no one event that can change a political party overnight A better metaphor for coming battles three yards and a cloud of dust a series of grinding plays where victories are earned only after intense combat fiscal-cliff demonstrated there’s potential for bipartisan deal-making passing the House is impossible unless pressure is extremely intense Deals will have to be negotiated and gain imprimatur of Republicans
President Obama still has his work cut out for him Republicans may not want to give him a big "win" in an election year).
The president initially enjoyed strong approval and was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned.
|
How could the federal government get the states to structure their pot markets in ways like these? By giving a new twist to a tried-and-true tool that the Obama administration has wielded particularly effectively: the policy waiver. The federal government would recognize the legal status of cannabis under a state system—making the activities permitted under that system actually legal, not merely tolerated, under federal law—only if the state system contained adequate controls to protect public health and safety, as determined by the attorney general and the secretary of the department of health and human services. That would change the politics of legalization at the state level, with legalization advocates and the cannabis industry supporting tight controls in order to get, and keep, the all-important waiver. Then we would see the laboratories of democracy doing some serious experimentation. Could such a plan garner enough support in Washington to become law? Certainly not now, given a dysfunctional Congress, an administration with no taste for engaging one more culture war issue, and in the absence of a powerful national organization with a nuanced view of cannabis policy and the muscle to make that view politically salient. But there is a mutually beneficial deal waiting to be made. Though legalization has made headway in states with strong initiative provisions in their constitutions, it’s been slow going in other states in which legalization has to go through the legislature, where anti-pot law enforcement groups can easily block it. So it could be many years before legalization reaches the rest of the country or gets formal federal approval that removes the stigma of (even unpunished) lawbreaking from cannabis users. Rather than wait, legalization advocates might be willing to accept something short of full commercialization; some of them actually prefer a noncommercial system. Meanwhile, those who have been opponents of legalization heretofore might—with the writing now on the wall—decide that a tightly regulated and potentially reversible system of legal availability is the least-bad out-come available. The current political situation seems anomalous. Public opinion continues to move against cannabis prohibition, but no national-level figure of any standing is willing to speak out for change. That’s unlikely to last. Soon enough, candidates for president are going to be asked their positions on marijuana legalization. They’re going to need a good answer. I suggest something like this: “I’m not against all legalization; I’m against dumb legalization.”
Link outweighs turn – Harder to rebuild capital than lose it
Marrissa Silber, prof of poli sci, samford, 8-30-2007, “What makes a president quack?” Prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
Important to the discussion of political capital is whether or not it can be replenished over a term. If a President expends political capital on his agenda, can it be replaced? Light suggests that “capital declines over time – public approval consistently falls: midterm losses occur” (31). Capital can be rebuilt, but only to a limited extent. The decline of capital makes it difficult to access information, recruit more expertise and maintain energy. If a lame duck President can be defined by a loss of political capital, this paper helps determine if such capital can be replenished or if a lame duck can accomplish little. Before determining this, a definition
Political capital theory is true – it’s key to cut deals and switch votes
Beckman 10 – Professor of Political Science
Matthew N. Beckman, Professor of Political Science @ UC-Irvine, 2010, “Pushing the Agenda: Presidential Leadership in U.S. Lawmaking, 1953-2004,” pg. 61-62
For cases where the president wants to lobby but has limited political capital to draw on (0 < C < C1), looking back, Figure 2.11 affirms the intuitive: the president's legislative options are limited. Lacking enough capital to induce leaders to accept any sort of "deal" that is better than he could get from lobbying pivotal voters, the president and his staffers' only viable strategy is the vote-centered one. But, of course, even executing the vote-centered strategy does not yield much influence; the president simply does not have enough "juice" to substantially alter members' preferences or, in turn, the outcome. The president's prospects improve substantially, though, when he allocates even modest levels of political capital (C, < C < c,.) to lobbying for a particular initiative. At this point - specifically, at C1 _ an agenda-centered-strategy becomes viable. That is, with a medium investment of political capital, now the president has enough resources to get opposing leaders to cut a "deal" with the White House that is better than he could get from just lobbying pivotal voters. In fact, even with this rather modest infusion of political capital, C, to 4, an agenda-centered lobbying strategy allows a president to exert even more influence than would be possible with a massive investment (up to Gj) in voce-centered lobbying. And granting the president even more political capital to invest in an issue (c,. < C) only adds to an agenda-centered strategy's attractiveness and effectiveness compared to the more familiar vote-centered strategy. Overall, the predicted impact of the president's agenda-centered lobbying is real, and potentially substantial, but also highly conditional. In contrast to a vote-centered strategy, which can be employed whenever a president is willing and able to invest lobbying resources in advocating an issue, the White House's agenda-centered strategy only applies with (I) a far-off status quo, and (2) a medium to large supply of political capital. Absent these prerequisites, the president's fate turns on pivotal voters and his ability to influence them via vote- centered lobbying. But often these strategic stars do align - that is, the president is flush with political capital when seeking to change a distant status quo - and when they do, an agenda-centered strategy affords presidents not just a second path for exerting influence but also a better path. Indeed, under these favorable conditions, the president gets far more policy bang for his lobbying buck from an agenda-centered strategy than a vote-centered one - without having to prevail in an all-out floor fight for pivotal voters' support.
Even if a confrontational strategy is key, that doesn’t mean the plan’s singular win spills-over—it’s more likely to undermine Obama’s careful strategy
Ryan Lizza, 1/7/13, Will Hagel Spike the G.O.P.’s Fever?, www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/01/how-much-will-the-nomination-of-chuck-hagel-hurt-obamas-second-term-agenda.html
But Obama’s victory has made almost no difference in changing the psychology or incentives of the members of the G.O.P. who matter most: the House Republicans. The idea that a bloc of conservative, mostly Southern, Republicans would start to coöperate with the President on issues like tax policy and immigration may have rested on a faulty assumption. The past few weeks of fiscal-cliff drama have taught us that “breaking the fever” was the wrong metaphor. There is no one event—even the election of a President—that can change a political party overnight. Congress is a co-equal branch of government, and House Republicans feel that they have as much of a mandate for their policies as Obama does for his. Shouldn’t House Republicans care that their views on Obama’s priorities, like tax cuts for the rich and immigration, helped cost Romney the White House and will make it difficult for their party’s nominee to win in 2016? In the abstract, many do, but that’s not enough to change the voting behavior of the average House Republican, who represents a gerrymandered and very conservative district. A better metaphor for the coming battles with Congress may be what Woody Hayes, the college-football coach, famously called “three yards and a cloud of dust”: a series of grinding plays where small victories are earned only after lots of intense combat. While the fiscal-cliff showdown demonstrated that there’s potential for bipartisan deal-making in the Senate, passing any Obama priority through the House of Representatives is nearly impossible unless the political pressure is extremely intense. The fiscal-cliff bill passed the House only when Speaker John Boehner’s members realized that their only alternative was blowing up the settlement negotiated by Joe Biden and Mitch McConnell—and accepting all the blame and consequences. That episode offers the White House a general template for the coming fights over spending, immigration, and gun control—three issues where there is very little consensus between Obama and most House Republicans. Deals will have to be negotiated in the Senate and gain the imprimatur of some high-profile Republicans. Then a pressure campaign will have to be mounted to convince Boehner to move the legislation to the floor of the House under rules that allow it to pass with mostly Democratic votes. It’s easier to see how this could happen with the coming budgetary issues, which have deadlines that force action, than for the rest of Obama’s agenda, which is more likely than not to simply die in the House.
Winners lose
Winners lose – prefer contextual evidence for election year
Atkinson 2/6 (Selling the President's Ambitious Trade Agenda 2/6/14 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-d-atkinson-phd/selling-the-presidents-am_b_4733087.html Robert D. Atkinson, Ph.D. ¶ President, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation)
Judging by congressional reaction to the trade elements in the State of the Union, President Obama still has his work cut out for him ift he's going to sell his plan to reticent Democrats (who remain unconvinced of the benefits of trade) and Republicans (who may not want to give him a big "win" in an election year).
b. empirics for Obama
Todd Eberly, 2013 (“The presidential power trap,” http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-capital-20130121_1_political-system-party-support-public-opinion/2, Accessed 1/24/2013, rwg)
Barack Obama's election in 2008 seemed to signal a change. Mr. Obama's popular vote majority was the largest for any president since 1988, and he was the first Democrat to clear the 50 percent mark since Lyndon Johnson. The president initially enjoyed strong public approval and, with a Democratic Congress, was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year and early into his second, capped by enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. His impressive successes with Congress in 2009 and 2010 were accompanied by a shift in the public mood against him, evident in the rise of the tea party movement, the collapse in his approval rating, and the large GOP gains in the 2010 elections, which brought a return to divided government.
| 11,092 |
<h4><strong>Link shield - Federal legalization has LITERALLY no support</h4><p>Kleiman 2014</strong> (Mark, professor of public policy at the University of California Los Angeles, How Not to Make a Hash out of Cannabis legalization, Washington Monthly, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/how_not_to_make_a_hash_out_of049291.php?page=all)</p><p>How could the federal government get the states to structure their pot markets in ways like these? By giving a new twist to a tried-and-true tool that the Obama administration has wielded particularly effectively: the policy waiver. <u>The federal government would recognize the legal status of cannabis under a state system</u>—making the activities permitted under that system actually legal, not merely tolerated, under federal law—only if the state system contained adequate controls to protect public health and safety, as determined by the attorney general and the secretary of the department of health and human services. That would change the politics of legalization at the state level, with legalization advocates and the cannabis industry supporting tight controls in order to get, and keep, the all-important waiver. Then we would see the laboratories of democracy doing some serious experimentation. <u><mark>Could such a plan garner</u></mark> enough <u><mark>support in Washington</u></mark> to become law? <u><strong><mark>Certainly not</u></strong></mark> now, <u><mark>given a dysfunctional Congress</mark>, an administration with no taste for engaging one more culture war issue, and <mark>in the absence of a powerful national organization with a nuanced view of cannabis policy and the muscle to make that view politically salient</mark>.</u> But there is a mutually beneficial deal waiting to be made. Though <u>legalization</u> has made headway in states with strong initiative provisions in their constitutions, <u><mark>it’s been slow going in other states </mark>in which legalization has to go through the legislature, <mark>where anti-pot law enforcement groups can easily block it</mark>.</u> So <u>it <mark>could be many years before</mark> legalization reaches the rest of the country <mark>or gets formal federal approval that removes the stigma</u></mark> of (even unpunished) lawbreaking from cannabis users. Rather than wait, legalization advocates might be willing to accept something short of full commercialization; some of them actually prefer a noncommercial system. Meanwhile, those who have been opponents of legalization heretofore might—with the writing now on the wall—decide that a tightly regulated and potentially reversible system of legal availability is the least-bad out-come available. The current political situation seems anomalous. Public opinion continues to move against cannabis prohibition, but <u><strong><mark>no national-level figure of any standing is willing to speak out for change</mark>.</u> That’s unlikely to last. Soon enough, candidates for president are going to be asked their positions on marijuana legalization. They’re going to need a good answer. I suggest something like this: “I’m not against all legalization; I’m against dumb legalization.”</p><p>Link outweighs turn – Harder to rebuild capital than lose it</p><p></strong>Marrissa <strong>Silber,</strong> prof of poli sci, samford, 8-30-<strong>2007,</strong> “What makes a president quack?” Prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.</p><p>Important to the <u><mark>discussion of political capital is whether or not it can be replenished over a term</u></mark>. <u>If a President expends political capital</u> on his agenda, <u>can it be replaced?</u> Light suggests that “capital declines over time – public approval consistently falls: midterm losses occur” (31). <u><mark>Capital can be rebuilt, but only to a limited extent</u></mark>. <u><mark>The decline of capital makes it difficult to access information</u>, <u>recruit</u></mark> more <u><mark>expertise and maintain energy</u></mark>. <u>If a lame duck President can be defined by a loss of political capital</u>, this paper helps determine if such capital can be replenished or if <u>a lame duck can accomplish little</u><strong>. Before determining this, a definition</p><p>Political capital theory is true – it’s key to cut deals and switch votes </p><p>Beckman 10 </strong>– Professor of Political Science</p><p>Matthew N. Beckman, Professor of Political Science @ UC-Irvine, 2010, “Pushing the Agenda: Presidential Leadership in U.S. Lawmaking, 1953-2004,” pg. 61-62</p><p><u>For cases <mark>where the president wants to lobby but has limited political capital</mark> to draw on</u> (0 < C < C1), looking back, Figure 2.11 affirms the intuitive: <u><mark>the president's legislative options are limited. Lacking</u></mark> enough <u><mark>capital</u></mark> to induce leaders to accept any sort of "deal" that is better than he could get from lobbying pivotal voters, the president and his staffers' only viable strategy is the vote-centered one. But, of course, even executing <u><mark>the</u></mark> vote-centered <u><mark>strategy does not yield much influence</u>; <u>the president</mark> simply <mark>does not have enough "juice" to</mark> substantially <mark>alter members' preferences or</u></mark>, in turn, <u><mark>the outcome</u>. <u>The president's prospects improve substantially</mark>,</u> though, <u><mark>when he allocates</u></mark> even modest levels of <u><mark>political capital</u></mark> (C, < C < c,.) <u>to lobbying for a particular initiative. At this point</u> - specifically, at C1 _ an agenda-centered-<u>strategy becomes viable</u>. That is, <u><mark>with</u></mark> a medium investment of <u><mark>political capital</u></mark>, now <u><mark>the president has <strong>enough resources</strong> to get opposing leaders to <strong>cut a "deal</strong>" with the White House</u></mark> that is better than he could get from just lobbying pivotal voters. In fact, even with this rather modest infusion of political capital, C, to 4, an agenda-centered lobbying strategy allows a president to exert even more influence than would be possible with a massive investment (up to Gj) in voce-centered lobbying. And granting the president even more <u><mark>political capital</u></mark> to invest in an issue (c,. < C) only <u><mark>adds to</u></mark> an agenda-centered strategy's <u><mark>attractiveness and effectiveness</u></mark> compared to the more familiar vote-centered strategy. Overall, <u>the predicted impact of the president's agenda-centered lobbying is real, and</u> potentially <u>substantial</u>, <u>but</u> also highly <u>conditional</u>. In contrast to a vote-centered strategy, which can be employed whenever a president is willing and able to invest lobbying resources in advocating an issue, the White House's agenda-centered strategy only applies with (I) a far-off status quo, and (2) a medium to large supply of political capital. Absent these prerequisites, the president's fate turns on pivotal voters and his ability to influence them via vote- centered lobbying. But <u>often</u> these <u>strategic stars do align</u> - that is, <u><mark>the president</mark> is <mark>flush with political capital</u></mark> when seeking to change a distant status quo - and when they do, an agenda-centered strategy affords presidents not just a second path for exerting influence but also a better path. Indeed, <u>under these</u> favorable <u>conditions, the president <mark>gets far more policy bang for his lobbying buck</u><strong></mark> from an agenda-centered strategy than a vote-centered one - without having to prevail in an all-out floor fight for pivotal voters' support.</p><p>Even if a confrontational strategy is key, that doesn’t mean the plan’s singular win spills-over—it’s more likely to undermine Obama’s careful strategy </p><p></strong>Ryan <strong>Lizza</strong>, 1/7/<strong>13</strong>, Will Hagel Spike the G.O.P.’s Fever?, www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/01/how-much-will-the-nomination-of-chuck-hagel-hurt-obamas-second-term-agenda.html</p><p>But <u><strong><mark>Obama’s victory</mark> has <mark>made </mark>almost <mark>no difference in changing the psychology or incentives of </mark>the <mark>members of the G.O.P. who matter</mark> most</u></strong>: the House Republicans. The idea that a bloc of conservative, mostly Southern, Republicans would start to coöperate with the President on issues like tax policy and immigration may have rested on a faulty assumption. The past few weeks of fiscal-cliff drama have taught us <mark>that “<u><strong>breaking the fever” was the wrong metaphor</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>There is no one event</u></strong></mark>—even the election of a President—<u><strong><mark>that can change a political party overnight</u></strong></mark>. Congress is a co-equal branch of government, and House Republicans feel that they have as much of a mandate for their policies as Obama does for his. Shouldn’t House Republicans care that their views on Obama’s priorities, like tax cuts for the rich and immigration, helped cost Romney the White House and will make it difficult for their party’s nominee to win in 2016? In the abstract, many do, but that’s not enough to change the voting behavior of the average House Republican, who represents a gerrymandered and very conservative district. <u><strong><mark>A better metaphor for </mark>the <mark>coming battles </mark>with Congress may be</u></strong> what Woody Hayes, the college-football coach, famously called “<u><strong><mark>three yards and a cloud of dust</mark>”: <mark>a series of grinding plays where </mark>small <mark>victories are earned only after </mark>lots of <mark>intense combat</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>While the <mark>fiscal-cliff</mark> showdown <mark>demonstrated </mark>that <mark>there’s potential for bipartisan deal-making </mark>in the Senate, <mark>passing </mark>any Obama priority through <mark>the House </mark>of Representatives <mark>is </mark>nearly <mark>impossible unless </mark>the political <mark>pressure is extremely intense</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The fiscal-cliff bill</u></strong> passed the House only when Speaker John Boehner’s members realized that their only alternative was blowing up the settlement negotiated by Joe Biden and Mitch McConnell—and accepting all the blame and consequences. That episode <u><strong>offers the White House a general template for the coming fights over spending</u></strong>, immigration, and gun control—three <u><strong>issues where there is very little consensus between Obama and most House Republicans. <mark>Deals will have to be negotiated</mark> in the Senate <mark>and gain </mark>the <mark>imprimatur of</mark> some high-profile <mark>Republicans</mark>. Then a pressure campaign will have to be mounted to convince Boehner to move the legislation to the floor of the House under rules that allow it to pass with mostly Democratic votes. It’s easier to see how this could happen with the coming budgetary issues, which have deadlines that force action, than for the rest of Obama’s agenda, which is more likely than not to simply die in the House.</p><p></u>Winners lose</p><p>Winners lose – prefer contextual evidence for election year</p><p>Atkinson 2/6 </strong>(Selling the President's Ambitious Trade Agenda 2/6/14 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-d-atkinson-phd/selling-the-presidents-am_b_4733087.html Robert D. Atkinson, Ph.D. ¶ <u><strong>President, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation)</p><p></strong>Judging by congressional reaction</u> to the trade elements in the State of the Union, <u><mark>President Obama still has his work cut out for him</u></mark> ift he's going to sell his plan to reticent Democrats (who remain unconvinced of the benefits of trade) and <u><mark>Republicans</u></mark> (who <u><strong><mark>may not want to give him a big "win" in an election year).</p><p></u></mark>b. empirics for Obama</p><p></strong>Todd <strong>Eberly, 2013</strong> (“The presidential power trap,” http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-capital-20130121_1_political-system-party-support-public-opinion/2, Accessed 1/24/2013, rwg)</p><p>Barack Obama's election in 2008 seemed to signal a change. Mr. Obama's popular vote majority was the largest for any president since 1988, and he was the first Democrat to clear the 50 percent mark since Lyndon Johnson. <u><strong><mark>The president initially enjoyed strong </mark>public <mark>approval and</u></strong></mark>, with a Democratic Congress, <u><strong><mark>was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year </mark>and early into his second, </u></strong>capped by enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. <u><strong><mark>But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. </mark>His impressive successes with Congress in 2009 and 2010 were accompanied by a shift in the public mood against him, evident in the rise of the tea party movement, the collapse in his approval rating, and the large GOP gains in the 2010 elections, which brought a return to divided government.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
At: link
|
Liberal key
| 7,519 | 53 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,310 |
Ground- the decrim CP is virtually the only competitive option rooted in the literature- going for “criminalization good” is almost impossible and would get stale fast- our interp is key to force in-depth defenses of regulatory mechanisms instead of patriarchy good/bad “debates”
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Ground- the decrim CP is virtually the only competitive option rooted in the literature- going for “criminalization good” is almost impossible and would get stale fast- our interp is key to force in-depth defenses of regulatory mechanisms instead of patriarchy good/bad “debates”</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 431,003 | 1 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,311 |
US Multilateralism Impossible—congress won’t follow through
|
Kaye 2013
|
By David Kaye Professor at the University of California, Irvine, School of Law, Sept/Oct 2013 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139649/david-kaye/stealth-multilateralism
|
he Senate rejects multilateral treaties as if it were sport Some outright Others through inaction dozens of treaties are pending before the Senate pertaining to labor, economic and cultural rights, endangered species, pollution, armed conflict, peacekeeping, nuclear weapons, the law of the sea, and discrimination presidents know the odds are long The United States’ commitment problem has grown so entrenched that foreign governments no longer expect Washington’s ratification or participation in the institutions treaties create The world is moving on when it comes to solving global problems the U S suffers the self-inflicted wound of diminishing relevance The foundation of the Senate’s posture is the belief that multilateral treaties represent a grave threat to American sovereignty and democracy These Republicans automatically resist treaties because such a small group of senators can block any given treaty, they control ratification
|
The Senate rejects multilateral treaties as if it were sport presidents know the odds are long The U S commitment problem has grown so entrenched that foreign governments no longer expect Washington’s ratification or participation in the institutions treaties create. The world is moving on when it comes to solving global problems the U S suffers the self-inflicted wound of diminishing relevance The foundation of the Senate’s posture is the belief multilateral treaties represent a grave threat to America These Republicans automatically resist treaties because such a small group of senators can block any given treaty, they control ratification
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The U.S. Senate rejects multilateral treaties as if it were sport. Some it rejects outright, as when it voted against the Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities in 2012 and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1999. Others it rejects through inaction: dozens of treaties are pending before the Senate, pertaining to such subjects as labor, economic and cultural rights, endangered species, pollution, armed conflict, peacekeeping, nuclear weapons, the law of the sea, and discrimination against women. Often, presidents don’t even bother pushing for ratification, since they know the odds are long: under the U.S. Constitution, it takes only one-third of the Senate to reject a treaty. The United States’ commitment problem has grown so entrenched that foreign governments no longer expect Washington’s ratification or its full participation in the institutions treaties create. The world is moving on; laws get made elsewhere, with limited (if any) American involvement. The United States still wields influence in the UN Security Council and in international financial and trade institutions, where it enjoys a formal veto or a privileged position. But when it comes to solving global problems beyond the old centers of diplomatic and economic power, the United States suffers the self-inflicted wound of diminishing relevance. Administrations operate under the shadow of Senate rejectionism, harboring low expectations that their work will be ratified. The foundation of the Senate’s posture is the belief, widespread among conservative Republicans, that multilateral treaties represent a grave threat to American sovereignty and democracy. Treaties, they argue, create rules that interfere with the democratic process by allowing foreigners to make law that binds the United States. These “sovereigntists” portray treaties as all constraint, no advantage, as Jon Kyl, Douglas Feith, and John Fonte did recently in these pages (“The War of Law,” July/August 2013). These Republicans automatically resist, in the words of the 2012 GOP platform, “treaties that weaken or encroach upon American sovereignty.” And because such a small group of senators can block any given treaty, they essentially control ratification.
| 2,248 |
<h4>US Multilateralism Impossible—congress won’t follow through</h4><p>By David <strong>Kaye</strong> Professor at the University of California, Irvine, School of Law,<strong> </strong>Sept/Oct <strong>2013</strong> http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139649/david-kaye/stealth-multilateralism</p><p><mark>T<u>he</u></mark> U.S. <u><mark>Senate rejects multilateral treaties <strong>as if it were sport</u></strong></mark>. <u>Some</u> it rejects <u>outright</u>, as when it voted against the Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities in 2012 and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1999. <u>Others</u> it rejects <u>through inaction</u>: <u>dozens of treaties are pending before the Senate</u>, <u>pertaining to</u> such subjects as <u>labor, economic and cultural rights, endangered species, pollution, armed conflict, peacekeeping, nuclear weapons, the law of the sea, and discrimination</u> against women. Often, <u><mark>presidents</u></mark> don’t even bother pushing for ratification, since they <u><mark>know the <strong>odds are long</u></strong></mark>: under the U.S. Constitution, it takes only one-third of the Senate to reject a treaty. <u><mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates’ <mark>commitment problem has grown <strong>so entrenched</strong> that foreign governments no longer expect Washington’s ratification or</u></mark> its full <u><mark>participation in</mark> <mark>the institutions treaties create</u>. <u><strong>The world is moving on</u></strong></mark>; laws get made elsewhere, with limited (if any) American involvement. The United States still wields influence in the UN Security Council and in international financial and trade institutions, where it enjoys a formal veto or a privileged position. But <u><mark>when it comes to solving global problems</u></mark> beyond the old centers of diplomatic and economic power, <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>suffers</strong> <strong>the self-inflicted wound of diminishing relevance</u></strong></mark>. Administrations operate under the shadow of Senate rejectionism, harboring low expectations that their work will be ratified. <u><mark>The foundation of the Senate’s posture is the belief</u></mark>, widespread among conservative Republicans, <u>that <mark>multilateral treaties represent a grave threat to America</mark>n sovereignty and democracy</u>. Treaties, they argue, create rules that interfere with the democratic process by allowing foreigners to make law that binds the United States. These “sovereigntists” portray treaties as all constraint, no advantage, as Jon Kyl, Douglas Feith, and John Fonte did recently in these pages (“The War of Law,” July/August 2013). <u><mark>These Republicans <strong>automatically resist</u></strong></mark>, in the words of the 2012 GOP platform, “<u><mark>treaties</u></mark> that weaken or encroach upon American sovereignty.” And <u><mark>because such a small group of senators can block any given treaty, they</u></mark> essentially <u><mark>control ratification</u></mark>.</p>
| null |
1nc
|
treaties
| 237,727 | 6 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,312 |
states maintain technical compliance because they didn’t sign the treaty and constitution means theyre not bound
|
Humphreys 13
|
Humphreys 13 (Keith, Professor of Psychiatry and Director of Mental Health Policy at Stanford, “Can the United Nations Block U.S. Marijuana Legalization?”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/keith-humphreys/can-the-united-nations-bl_b_3977683.html)
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the U.S. currently in violation of the UN treaties it signed agreeing to make marijuana illegal? No. federal government is a signatory to the treaty, but the States of Washington and Colorado are not federated systems of government can only make international commitments regarding their national-level policies. Constitutionally, U.S. states are simply not required to make marijuana illegal the U.S. made no such commitment on behalf of the 50 states in terms of the letter of the treaties, Attorney General Holder's refusal to challenge Washington and Colorado's marijuana policies is within bounds
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federal government is a signatory to the treaty, but the States are not federated systems of government can only make international commitments regarding their national-level policies Constitutionally, U.S. states are simply not required to make marijuana illegal , Attorney General Holder's refusal to challenge marijuana policies is within bounds
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1. Is the U.S. currently in violation of the UN treaties it signed agreeing to make marijuana illegal? No. The U.S. federal government is a signatory to the treaty, but the States of Washington and Colorado are not. Countries with federated systems of government like the U.S. and Germany can only make international commitments regarding their national-level policies. Constitutionally, U.S. states are simply not required to make marijuana illegal as it is in federal law. Hence, the U.S. made no such commitment on behalf of the 50 states in signing the UN drug control treaties.¶ Some UN officials believe that the spirit of the international treaties requires the U.S. federal government to attempt to override state-level marijuana legalization. But in terms of the letter of the treaties, Attorney General Holder's refusal to challenge Washington and Colorado's marijuana policies is within bounds.
| 905 |
<h4>states maintain technical compliance because they didn’t sign the treaty and constitution means theyre not bound</h4><p><strong>Humphreys 13</strong> (Keith, Professor of Psychiatry and Director of Mental Health Policy at Stanford, “Can the United Nations Block U.S. Marijuana Legalization?”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/keith-humphreys/can-the-united-nations-bl_b_3977683.html)</p><p>1. Is <u>the U.S. currently in violation of the UN treaties it signed agreeing to make marijuana illegal? No.</u> The U.S. <u><mark>federal government is a signatory to the treaty, but the States</mark> of Washington and Colorado<mark> are not</u></mark>. Countries with <u><mark>federated systems of government</mark> </u>like the U.S. and Germany<u> <mark>can only make international commitments regarding their national-level policies</mark>. <mark>Constitutionally, U.S. states are simply not required to make marijuana illegal</mark> </u>as it is in federal law. Hence, <u>the U.S. made no such commitment on behalf of the 50 states</u> in signing the UN drug control treaties.¶ Some UN officials believe that the spirit of the international treaties requires the U.S. federal government to attempt to override state-level marijuana legalization. But <u>in terms of the letter of the treaties<mark>, Attorney General Holder's refusal to challenge</mark> Washington and Colorado's <mark>marijuana policies is within bounds</u></mark>.</p>
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2nr
| null |
AT: State Thumper
| 431,005 | 33 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,313 |
Limits- the mechanism is the only stable part of the rez we can count on for CP competition and disad links- giving them every form of regulation AND deregulation AND hybrid schemes makes being neg impossible
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Limits- the mechanism is the only stable part of the rez we can count on for CP competition and disad links- giving them every form of regulation AND deregulation AND hybrid schemes makes being neg impossible</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 431,004 | 1 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,314 |
Multilateralism is structurally flawed
|
Harvey, 4
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Harvey, 4 – University Research Professor of International Relations, professor in the Department of Political Science, and the director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University (Frank, Smoke And Mirrors: Globalized Terrorism And The Illusion Of Multilateral Security, p. 43-45) // MS
|
there are several problems with defence of collective action and associated policy recommendations, particularly in relation to multilateral approaches to security in a post-9/11 setting. First, and foremost, state leaders often refuse to do what the UN asks of them, are often more than prepared to have their publics suffer the consequences of whatever sanctions the UN can mount, and are rarely directly affected by the sanctions that are implemented . The lessons from UN intervention and sanction efforts over the past decade are not at all encouraging in this regard. Second, many state and non-state actors fall outside the institutional constraints imposed on the system through global norms and regimes. As the capacity spreads for smaller and smaller groups to inflict increasingly devastating levels of damage on larger states, international institutions will lose the capacity to force or coerce compliance with international law Consequently, leaders of major powers, such as the U S will be compelled to respond to security threats through unilateral initiatives. This compulsion will force other powers to push that much harder to control American impulses by demanding that multilateral consensus remain the sole guarantor of legitimacy. tensions will be exacerbated by the prevailing perception in the U S that these same multilateral institutions are constraining the power and capacity of the U.S. government to protect American citizens from emerging threats of terrorism and prolif Third, the collective-action argument assumes that most states are governed by a similar set of political priorities, share common concerns about similar combinations of security threats, are stimulated into action by the same set of economic imperatives, are inspired by a common set of interests and overarching values (such as peace, security, stability), and are encouraged by their respective publics to meet their demands for a common set of public goods. But the differences, tensions, and overall level of competition among states in the system are far greater than proponents of multilateralism acknowledge. Some states are more threatened by terrorism and proliferation than others, have more substantial and direct economic interest in particular regions, are less interested in securing peace, and experience pressure from their respective publics to pursue very distinct foreign and security policies there is no guarantee that a collection of states will have the same motivation to change the status quo multi- lateral organizations are less likely today to act with the same level of urgency to address security threats that Washington considers imperative. The costs of inaction (derived from exclusive reliance on multilateral consensus) are now perceived as being higher than the costs of unilateralism
|
there are problems with defence of collective action . First state leaders often refuse to do what the UN asks of them, Second, many actors fall outside the institutional constraints imposed groups inflict devastating levels o damage international institutions will lose capacity major powers, will be compelled to respond through unilateral initiatives Third, assumes most states are governed by a similar set of political priorities, security threats economic imperatives overarching values multi- lateral organizations are less likely to act with the same level of urgency
|
The typical argument favouring multilateralism is a simple one, sum- marized by Ramesh Thakur: ‘Because the world is essentially anarchi- cal, it is fundamentally insecure, characterized by strategic uncertainty and complexity because of too many actors with multiple goals and interests and variable capabilities and convictions. Collective action embedded in international institutions that mirror mainly U.S. value preferences and interests enhances predictability, reduces uncertainty, and cuts the transaction costs of intemational action.’" With respect to peacekeeping, for example, Thakur argues that if ‘the UN helps to mute the costs and spread the risks of the terms of intemational engagement to maximise these benefits, the United States will need to instill in others, as well as itself embrace, the principle of multilateralism as a norm in its own right: states must do X because the United Nations has called for X, and good states do what the United Nations asks them to do.’l2 But there are several problems with Thakur's defence of collective action and associated policy recommendations, particularly in relation to multilateral approaches to security in a post-9/11 setting. First, and foremost, state leaders often refuse to do what the UN asks of them, are often more than prepared to have their publics suffer the consequences of whatever sanctions the UN can mount, and are rarely directly affected by the sanctions that are implemented – assuming the permanent members of the Security Council find it in their collective interest to implement a sanctions regime in the first place. The lessons from UN intervention and sanction efforts over the past decade are not at all encouraging in this regard. Second, many state and non-state actors fall outside the institutional constraints imposed on the system through global norms and regimes. As the capacity spreads for smaller and smaller groups to inflict increasingly devastating levels of damage on larger states, international institutions will lose the capacity to force or coerce compliance with international law. Consequently, leaders of major powers, such as the United States, will be compelled to respond to security threats through unilateral initiatives. This compulsion will force other powers to push that much harder to control American impulses by demanding that multilateral consensus remain the sole guarantor of legitimacy. These tensions will be exacerbated by the prevailing perception in the United States that these same multilateral institutions are constraining the power and capacity of the U.S. government to protect American citizens from emerging threats of terrorism and proliferation. Third, the collective-action argument put forward by Thai-cur typically (and erroneously) assumes that most states are governed by a similar set of political priorities, share common concerns about similar combinations of security threats, are stimulated into action (or inaction) by the same set of economic imperatives, are inspired by a common set of interests and overarching values (such as peace, security, stability), and are encouraged by their respective publics to meet their demands for a common set of public goods. But the differences, tensions, and overall level of competition among states in the system are far greater than proponents of multilateralism acknowledge. Some states are more threatened by terrorism and proliferation than others, have more substantial and direct economic interest in particular regions, are less interested in securing peace, and experience pressure from their respective publics to pursue very distinct foreign and security policies. Consequently, there is no guarantee that a collection of states will have the same motivation to change the status quo, or experience the same imperative to address the same security threats with the same level of resolve, commitment, or resources (relative to their size). In sum, multi- lateral organizations are less likely today to act with the same level of urgency to address security threats that Washington considers imperative. The costs of inaction (derived from exclusive reliance on multilateral consensus) are now perceived as being higher than the costs of unilateralism.
| 4,258 |
<h4>Multilateralism is structurally flawed</h4><p><strong>Harvey, 4</strong> – University Research Professor of International Relations, professor in the Department of Political Science, and the director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University (Frank, <u>Smoke And Mirrors: Globalized Terrorism And The Illusion Of Multilateral Security</u>, p. 43-45) // MS</p><p>The typical argument favouring multilateralism is a simple one, sum- marized by Ramesh Thakur: ‘Because the world is essentially anarchi- cal, it is fundamentally insecure, characterized by strategic uncertainty and complexity because of too many actors with multiple goals and interests and variable capabilities and convictions. Collective action embedded in international institutions that mirror mainly U.S. value preferences and interests enhances predictability, reduces uncertainty, and cuts the transaction costs of intemational action.’" With respect to peacekeeping, for example, Thakur argues that if ‘the UN helps to mute the costs and spread the risks of the terms of intemational engagement to maximise these benefits, the United States will need to instill in others, as well as itself embrace, the principle of multilateralism as a norm in its own right: states must do X because the United Nations has called for X, and good states do what the United Nations asks them to do.’l2 But <u><mark>there are</mark> several <mark>problems with</u></mark> Thakur's <u><mark>defence of collective action</mark> and associated policy recommendations, particularly in relation to multilateral approaches to security in a post-9/11 setting<mark>. First</mark>, and foremost, <mark>state leaders often refuse to do what the UN asks of them,</mark> are often more than prepared to have their publics suffer the consequences of whatever sanctions the UN can mount, and are rarely directly affected by the sanctions that are implemented </u>– assuming the permanent members of the Security Council find it in their collective interest to implement a sanctions regime in the first place<u>. The lessons from UN intervention and sanction efforts over the past decade are not at all encouraging in this regard. <mark>Second, many </mark>state and non-state <mark>actors fall outside the institutional constraints imposed </mark>on the system through global norms and regimes. As the capacity spreads for smaller and smaller <mark>groups </mark>to<mark> inflict </mark>increasingly <mark>devastating levels o</mark>f <mark>damage</mark> on larger states, <mark>international institutions will lose</mark> the <mark>capacity</mark> to force or coerce compliance with international law</u>. <u>Consequently, leaders of <mark>major powers,</mark> such as the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, <u><mark>will be compelled to respond </mark>to security threats <mark>through unilateral initiatives</mark>. This compulsion will force other powers to push that much harder to control American impulses by demanding that multilateral consensus remain the sole guarantor of legitimacy.</u> These <u>tensions will be exacerbated by the prevailing perception in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>that these same multilateral institutions are constraining the power and capacity of the U.S. government to protect American citizens from emerging threats of terrorism and prolif</u>eration. <u><mark>Third, </mark>the collective-action argument</u> put forward by Thai-cur typically (and erroneously) <u><mark>assumes</mark> that <mark>most</mark> <mark>states are governed by a similar set of political priorities, </mark>share common concerns about similar combinations of <mark>security threats</mark>, are stimulated into action</u> (or inaction) <u>by the same set of <mark>economic</mark> <mark>imperatives</mark>, are inspired by a common set of interests and <mark>overarching values</mark> (such as peace, security, stability), and are encouraged by their respective publics to meet their demands for a common set of public goods. But the differences, tensions, and overall level of competition among states in the system are far greater than proponents of multilateralism acknowledge. Some states are more threatened by terrorism and proliferation than others, have more substantial and direct economic interest in particular regions, are less interested in securing peace, and experience pressure from their respective publics to pursue very distinct foreign and security policies</u>. Consequently, <u>there is no guarantee that a collection of states will have the same motivation to change the status quo</u>, or experience the same imperative to address the same security threats with the same level of resolve, commitment, or resources (relative to their size). In sum, <u><mark>multi- lateral organizations are less likely</mark> today <mark>to act with the same level of urgency</mark> to address security threats that Washington considers imperative. The costs of inaction (derived from exclusive reliance on multilateral consensus) are now perceived as being higher than the costs of unilateralism</u>. </p>
| null |
1nc
|
treaties
| 179,791 | 19 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,315 |
Non enforcement is perceived through a flexible lens – several countries prove
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)
|
existing flexibility in the treaty regime has allowed to deviate from a repressive zero-tolerance drug law enforcement approach Non-enforcement of drug laws in the case of cannabis is the re ality in quite a few countries. Even though the 1961 Convention obliged traditional se to be phased out traditions led to lenient law enforcement practices in a number of states in several countries more formalised schemes of non-enforcement have been established by providing guidelines Many varieties of such decriminalization schemes exist All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypoc risy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits.
|
Non-enforcement of laws i of cannabis is the re ality in quite a few countries traditions led to lenient law enforcement practices in a number of states, in several countries more formalised schemes of non-enforcement have been established Many varieties of such decriminalization schemes exist All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude
|
The existing flexibility or room for manoeuvre in the treaty regime has allowed a variety of cannabis policy practices and re forms to deviate from a repressive zero-tolerance drug law enforcement approach, the legality of which is reviewed in detail in the third chapter. Non-enforcement of drug laws in the case of cannabis, rooted in social acceptance or long history of traditional use, is the re ality in quite a few countries. Even though the 1961 Convention obliged traditional, including religious, use of cannabis to be phased out within 25 years (with the exception of bhang as mentioned above), the widespread persistence of religious uses in Hindu, Sufi and Rastafarian ceremonies and traditions led to lenient law enforcement practices in a number of Indian states, Pakistan, the Middle East, Northern Africa and Ja maica.¶ Depending whether the legal system allows for dis- cretionary powers, in several countries more formalised schemes of non-enforcement have been established by providing guidelines for the police, the prosecution and/or the judiciary. In other countries cannabis consumption and possession for per sonal use are de jure no longer a crimi nal offence. Many varieties of such decriminalization schemes exist, in terms of distin guishing possession or cultivation for personal use from the intent to trade; and whether or not to apply administrative sanctions. Since the treaty requirements do not differentiate be tween possession and cultivation for personal use, first in Spain and more recently in some other countries, “cannabis social clubs” have started to engage in collective cultivation for personal use.¶ The inclusion of cannabis and its compounds in the strictest schedules of the conventions was a rejection of its usefulness for therapeutic pur poses and an effort to limit its use exclusively to research purposes, for which only very small amounts would be required. Today, however, many countries have rejected this position as scientifically untenable and have established legal re gimes recognising the medicinal properties of cannabis.¶ All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, not always ac knowl edged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypoc risy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis so cial clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.
| 3,162 |
<h4>Non enforcement is perceived through a flexible lens – several countries prove </h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)</p><p>The <u>existing flexibility </u>or room for manoeuvre <u>in the treaty regime has allowed</u> a variety of cannabis policy practices and re forms <u>to deviate from a repressive zero-tolerance drug law enforcement approach</u>, the legality of which is reviewed in detail in the third chapter. <u><mark>Non-enforcement of</mark> drug <mark>laws i</mark>n the case <mark>of cannabis</u></mark>, rooted in social acceptance or long history of traditional use, <u><mark>is the re ality in quite a few countries</mark>. Even though the 1961 Convention obliged traditional</u>, including religious, u<u>se</u> of cannabis <u>to be phased out</u> within 25 years (with the exception of bhang as mentioned above), the widespread persistence of religious uses in Hindu, Sufi and Rastafarian ceremonies and <u><mark>traditions led to lenient law enforcement practices in a number of</mark> </u>Indian<u> <mark>states</u>,</mark> Pakistan, the Middle East, Northern Africa and Ja maica.¶ Depending whether the legal system allows for dis- cretionary powers, <u><mark>in several countries more formalised schemes of non-enforcement have been established</mark> by providing guidelines</u> for the police, the prosecution and/or the judiciary. In other countries cannabis consumption and possession for per sonal use are de jure no longer a crimi nal offence. <u><mark>Many varieties of such decriminalization schemes exist</u></mark>, in terms of distin guishing possession or cultivation for personal use from the intent to trade; and whether or not to apply administrative sanctions. Since the treaty requirements do not differentiate be tween possession and cultivation for personal use, first in Spain and more recently in some other countries, “cannabis social clubs” have started to engage in collective cultivation for personal use.¶ The inclusion of cannabis and its compounds in the strictest schedules of the conventions was a rejection of its usefulness for therapeutic pur poses and an effort to limit its use exclusively to research purposes, for which only very small amounts would be required. Today, however, many countries have rejected this position as scientifically untenable and have established legal re gimes recognising the medicinal properties of cannabis.¶ <u><mark>All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude</mark>. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity,</u> not always ac knowl edged by the INCB. <u>And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypoc risy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. </u>Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis so cial clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.</p>
|
2nr
| null |
AT: State Thumper
| 430,419 | 39 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,316 |
The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage
|
Williams 14
|
Williams 14 Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver
|
Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the U S Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number requiring organs is likely higher This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains
|
many die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs more than 122,000 are waitlisted Due to other barriers actual number of requiring organs is likely higher.3 This gap continues to widen. NOTA) prohibits valuable consideration in exchange for organs for transplantation other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations.9 Despite these , a severe organ shortage remains
|
Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514
Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs.1 Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the United States.2 Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number of Americans requiring organs is likely higher.3 This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen.4 The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations.9 Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains.
| 1,611 |
<h4>The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage</h4><p><strong>Williams 14</strong> Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver </p><p>Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514</p><p><u>Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, <mark>many</mark> individuals <mark>die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs</u></mark>.1 <u>Currently, <mark>more than</mark> <mark>122,000 </mark>individuals <mark>are waitlisted</mark> for organs in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates.2 <u><mark>Due to</mark> financial and <mark>other barriers</mark> to becoming waitlisted, the <mark>actual number </u>of</mark> Americans <u><mark>requiring organs is</mark> <mark>likely higher</u>.3</mark> <u><mark>This gap</mark> between available organs and the need for organs <mark>continues to widen</u>.</mark>4 <u>The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, </u>and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 <u>The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The</u> National Organ Transplantation Act <u>(<mark>NOTA) prohibits</mark> the receipt of any form of <mark>valuable consideration in exchange for organs</mark> to be used <mark>for transplantation</u></mark>.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, <u><mark>other methods have been</mark> <mark>employed in attempts to increase donations</u>.9 <u>Despite</mark> the implementation of <mark>these</mark> strategies<mark>, a severe organ shortage remains</u></mark>.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Shortage
| 430,245 | 16 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,317 |
The United States should remove criminal prohibitions and penalties for nearly all prostitution and facilitators of prostitution in the United States.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States should remove criminal prohibitions and penalties for nearly all prostitution and facilitators of prostitution in the United States.</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 431,006 | 1 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,318 |
They’re not the lynchpin of global coop—cooperation already on ISIS proves
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>They’re not the lynchpin of global coop—cooperation already on ISIS proves </h4></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
treaties
| 431,007 | 1 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,319 |
Technical compliance is sufficient to maintain the treaty system
|
Guercio et al 12
|
Guercio et al 12 (Susan; Heather Haase, consultant for International Drug Policy Consortium and the Harm Reduction Coalition, “The International Drug Control Treaties: How Important Are They to US Drug Reform?” http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/3_20072283-InternationalDrugControlTreaties.pdf)
|
If treaties are so destructive, and there is no real enforcement, then why does almost every country in the world remain signatory and, , faithfully comply many experts point to the reputation al aspect of international law — many countries do not want to be seen as uncooperative Instead of withdrawing from or disregarding their obligations under the treaties, many countries have reacted over the years by pushing the outer limits of what is technically allowable, or by broadly interpreting the language of the treaties. . For example 1988 Convention does not specify what the punishment must be Portugal’s ―decriminalization laws take advantage of this grey area . Holland exercises a policy of non - enforcement soft challenges to the treaties , skirt the problem by simply limiting compliance to ―technical compliance in law the only challenges to the treaties have been ―soft‖ challenges. It would seem that nations have gone to great pains to stay within technical compliance as much as possible while still enjoying more liberal drug control environment
|
I treaties are so destructive, and there is no real enforcement, then why does almost every country in the world remain signatory nd faithfully comply many experts point to the reputation al aspect countries do not want to be seen as uncooperative .¶ Instead of withdrawing from or disregarding bligations many countries pushing the outer limits of what is technically allowable For example, onvention does not specify unishment Holland exercises a policy of non - enforcement soft challenges to the treaties , skirt the problem by technical compliance in It would seem that nations have gone to great pains to stay within technical compliance as much as possible while still enjoying more liberal drug control environment
|
If the treaties are so destructive, and there is no real enforcement, then why does almost every country in the world remain signatory to and, for the most part, faithfully comply with them? Pressure from the United States (and fear of losing aid) is certainly a major factor. But many experts point to the reputation al aspect of international law — many countries do not want to be seen as uncooperative — in effect, ―pariah s ‖ — in the international community.¶ Instead of withdrawing from or disregarding their obligations under the treaties, many countries have reacted over the years by pushing the outer limits of what is technically allowable, or by broadly interpreting the language of the treaties.¶ The treaties themselves allow a certain amount of flexibility in their interpretation. For example, while the 1988 Convention requires that countries make possession for personal consumption a criminal violation, it does not specify what the punishment must be. Portugal’s ―decriminalization laws take advantage of this grey area and dictate that offenders are diverted to education classes, treatment sessions, or are given a fine. Holland continues to maintain laws on its books criminalizing possession of marijuana, but exercises a policy of non - enforcement when it comes to marijuana sold in its famous ―coffee houses.‖ In the U.S., m any argue that ―medical use‖ is not defined in the treaties and therefore, medical marijuana is technically allowed (the INCB and the DEA do not share this view).¶ These measures — non - enforcement, de criminalization/depenalization, and medicalization — known as ―soft challenges to the treaties , skirt the problem by simply limiting compliance to ―technical compliance in law, while allowing for de facto policies more in keeping with the desired policy change within each country .¶ Until recently, the only challenges to the treaties have been ―soft‖ challenges. It would seem that nations have gone to great pains to stay within technical compliance as much as possible while still enjoying more liberal drug control environment within their own borders.
| 2,114 |
<h4>Technical compliance is sufficient to maintain the treaty system</h4><p><u><strong>Guercio et al 12 </u></strong> (Susan; Heather Haase, consultant for International Drug Policy Consortium and the Harm Reduction Coalition, “The International Drug Control Treaties: How Important Are They to US Drug Reform?” http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/3_20072283-InternationalDrugControlTreaties.pdf)</p><p><u><mark>I</mark>f </u>the <u><mark>treaties are so destructive, and there is no real enforcement, then why does almost every country in the world remain signatory</u></mark> to <u>a<mark>nd</mark>,</u> for the most part<u>, <mark>faithfully comply</u></mark> with them? Pressure from the United States (and fear of losing aid) is certainly a major factor. But <u><mark>many experts point to the reputation al aspect</mark> of international law — many <mark>countries do not want to be seen as uncooperative</u></mark> — in effect, ―pariah s ‖ — in the international community<mark>.¶ <u>Instead of withdrawing from or disregarding</mark> their o<mark>bligations</mark> under the treaties, <mark>many countries</mark> have reacted over the years by <mark>pushing the outer limits of what is technically allowable</mark>, or by broadly interpreting the language of the treaties.</u>¶ The treaties themselves allow a certain amount of flexibility in their interpretation<u>. <mark>For example</u>,</mark> while the <u>1988 C<mark>onvention</u></mark> requires that countries make possession for personal consumption a criminal violation, it <u><mark>does not specify</mark> what the p<mark>unishment</mark> must be</u>. <u>Portugal’s ―decriminalization laws take advantage of this grey area</u> and dictate that offenders are diverted to education classes, treatment sessions, or are given a fine<u>. <mark>Holland</u></mark> continues to maintain laws on its books criminalizing possession of marijuana, but <u><mark>exercises a policy of non - enforcement</u></mark> when it comes to marijuana sold in its famous ―coffee houses.‖ In the U.S., m any argue that ―medical use‖ is not defined in the treaties and therefore, medical marijuana is technically allowed (the INCB and the DEA do not share this view).¶ These measures — non - enforcement, de criminalization/depenalization, and medicalization — known as ―<u><mark>soft challenges to the treaties , skirt the problem by</mark> simply limiting compliance to ―<mark>technical compliance in</mark> law</u>, while allowing for de facto policies more in keeping with the desired policy change within each country .¶ Until recently, <u>the only challenges to the treaties have been ―soft‖ challenges. <mark>It would seem that nations have gone to great pains to stay within technical compliance as much as possible while still enjoying more liberal drug control environment </u></mark>within their own borders.</p>
|
2nr
| null |
AT: State Thumper
| 431,009 | 19 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,320 |
Competes- the CP is just decriminalization. We legalize nothing. We don’t include the regulations placed on facilitated or organized prostitution.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Competes- the CP is just decriminalization. We legalize nothing. We don’t include the regulations placed on facilitated or organized prostitution.</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 431,008 | 1 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,321 |
Economic and military power means no lashout
|
Walt 11
|
Walt 11 (Stephen, Professor of International Relations – Harvard University, “Does the U.S. still need to reassure its allies?” Foreign Policy, 12-5, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/05/us_credibility_is_not_our_problem, GDI File)
|
A perennial preoccupation of U.S. diplomacy has been the perceived need to reassure allies of our reliability U.S. leaders worried that any loss of credibility might cause dominoes to fall, lead key allies to "bandwagon" with the Soviet Union The possibility that key allies would abandon us was almost always exaggerated but U.S. leaders remain overly sensitive to the possibility the United States isn't going anywhere I've never really understood why USS.S. leaders were so worried about the credibility of our commitments to others given our remarkably secure geopolitical position, whether U.S. pledges are credible is first and foremost a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help We should take allies' hints about realignment or neutrality they have every incentive to make us worry about it but in most cases little incentive to actually do it
|
leaders worried that loss of cred might cause dominoes to fall The possibility that key allies would abandon us was almost always exaggerated the United States isn't going anywhere." ( secure geopolitical position, allies hints about realignment but in most cases little incentive to actually do it.
|
A perennial preoccupation of U.S. diplomacy has been the perceived need to reassure allies of our reliability. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. leaders worried that any loss of credibility might cause dominoes to fall, lead key allies to "bandwagon" with the Soviet Union, or result in some form of "Finlandization." Such concerns justified fighting so-called "credibility wars" (including Vietnam), where the main concern was not the direct stakes of the contest but rather the need to retain a reputation for resolve and capability. Similar fears also led the United States to deploy thousands of nuclear weapons in Europe, as a supposed counter to Soviet missiles targeted against our NATO allies. The possibility that key allies would abandon us was almost always exaggerated, but U.S. leaders remain overly sensitive to the possibility. So Vice President Joe Biden has been out on the road this past week, telling various U.S. allies that "the United States isn't going anywhere." (He wasn't suggesting we're stuck in a rut, of course, but saying that the imminent withdrawal from Iraq doesn't mean a retreat to isolationism or anything like that.) There's nothing really wrong with offering up this sort of comforting rhetoric, but I've never really understood why USS.S. leaders were so worried about the credibility of our commitments to others. For starters, given our remarkably secure geopolitical position, whether U.S. pledges are credible is first and foremost a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help. We should therefore take our allies' occasional hints about realignment or neutrality with some skepticism; they have every incentive to try to make us worry about it, but in most cases little incentive to actually do it.
| 1,745 |
<h4>Economic and military power means no lashout </h4><p><strong>Walt 11</strong> (Stephen, Professor of International Relations – Harvard University, “Does the U.S. still need to reassure its allies?” Foreign Policy, 12-5, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/05/us_credibility_is_not_our_problem, GDI File)</p><p><u>A perennial preoccupation of U.S. diplomacy has been the perceived need to reassure allies of our reliability</u>. Throughout the Cold War, <u>U.S. <mark>leaders worried that</mark> any <mark>loss of cred</mark>ibility <mark>might cause dominoes to fall</mark>, lead key allies to "bandwagon" with the Soviet Union</u>, or result in some form of "Finlandization." Such concerns justified fighting so-called "credibility wars" (including Vietnam), where the main concern was not the direct stakes of the contest but rather the need to retain a reputation for resolve and capability. Similar fears also led the United States to deploy thousands of nuclear weapons in Europe, as a supposed counter to Soviet missiles targeted against our NATO allies. <u><mark>The possibility that key allies would abandon us was <strong>almost always exaggerated</u></strong></mark>, <u>but U.S. leaders remain overly sensitive to the possibility</u>. So Vice President Joe Biden has been out on the road this past week, telling various U.S. allies that "<u><mark>the United States isn't going anywhere</u>." (</mark>He wasn't suggesting we're stuck in a rut, of course, but saying that the imminent withdrawal from Iraq doesn't mean a retreat to isolationism or anything like that.) There's nothing really wrong with offering up this sort of comforting rhetoric, but <u>I've never really understood why USS.S. leaders were so worried about the credibility of our commitments to others</u>. For starters, <u>given our remarkably <mark>secure geopolitical position,</mark> whether U.S. pledges are credible is <strong>first and foremost</strong> a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help</u>. <u>We should</u> therefore <u>take</u> our <u><mark>allies</mark>'</u> occasional <u><mark>hints about realignment</mark> or neutrality</u> with some skepticism; <u>they have every incentive to</u> try to <u>make us worry about it</u>, <u><mark>but in most cases little incentive to actually do it</u>.</p></mark>
| null |
1nc
|
treaties
| 66,267 | 33 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,322 |
Varied efforts to increase voluntary donations fail – individually and in combination
|
Beard 8
|
Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy
|
the transplant industry has examined and adopted a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remote At least seven such actions have been implemented INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES ORGAN DONOR CARDS incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses. REQUIRED REQUEST Some federal legislation requiring all hospitals to request organ donation REQUIRED REFERRAL additional legislation to refer potential organ donors COLLABORATION the Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,” ■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS Finally, i legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct costs incurred by onors We must conclude that none of the policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage. . Rather, every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage
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transplant industry adopted policy options designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, maintain the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remo seven actions have been implemented INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES ORGAN DONOR CARDS REQUIRED REQUEST REQUIRED REFERRAL OLLABORATION Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative KIDNEY EXCHANGES REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS none of the policies resolve the transplant shortage it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage.
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http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf
Aware of the increasingly dire consequences of continued reliance on the existing approach to cadaveric organ procurement and alarmed at the figures shown above, the transplant industry has examined and adopted a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remote. At least seven such actions have been implemented over the last two decades or so: ■ INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount. ■ ORGAN DONOR CARDS A related activity has been the process of incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses. The cards can be easily completed and witnessed at the time the licenses are issued or renewed. They serve as a pre-mortem statement of the bearer’s wish to have his or her organs removed for transplantation purposes at the time of death. Their principal use, in practice, is to facilitate the opos’ efforts to convince surviving family members to consent to such removal by revealing the decedant’s wishes. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave all states the authority to issue donor cards and incorporate them in drivers’ licenses. Moreover, a few states have recently begun to rely entirely on donor cards to infer consent without requiring the surviving family’s permission when such cards are present. Survey evidence indicates that less than 40 percent of U.S. citizens have signed their donor cards. ■ REQUIRED REQUEST Some survey evidence published in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that in a number of cases families of potential deceased donors were not being asked to donate the organs. As a result, donation was apparently failing to occur in some of those instances simply because the request was not being presented. In response to this evidence, federal legislation was passed in 1987 requiring all hospitals receiving any federal funding (which, of course, is virtually all hospitals) to request organ donation in all deaths that occur under circumstances that would allow the deceased’s organs to be used in transplantation. It appears that this legal obligation is now being met in most, if not all, cases. Yet, the organ shortage has persisted and the waiting list has continued to grow. ■ REQUIRED REFERRAL While required-request legislation can compel hospitals to approach the families of recently deceased potential organ donors with an appeal for donation, it cannot ensure that the request will be made in a sincere, compassionate manner likely to elicit an agreement. Following implementation of the required-request law, there were a number of anecdotes in which the compulsory organ donation requests were presented in an insincere or even offensive manner that was clearly intended to elicit a negative response. The letter of the law was being met but not the spirit. As a result, additional legislation was passed that requires hospitals to refer potential organ donors to the regional opo so that trained procurement personnel can approach the surviving family with the donation request. This policy response has resulted in no perceptible progress in resolving the shortage. ■ COLLABORATION A fairly recent response to the organ shortage has been the so-called “Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,” which was championed by then-secretary of health and human services Tommy Thompson. The program was initiated shortly after Thompson took office in 2001 and is currently continuing. The program’s basic motivation is provided by the observation of a considerable degree of variation in performance across the existing opos. Specifically, the number of deceased organ donors per thousand hospital deaths has been found to vary by a factor of almost five across the organizations. The presumption, then, is that the relatively successful opos employ superior procurement techniques and/or knowledge that, if shared with the relatively unsuccessful organizations, would significantly improve their performance. Thus, diffusion of “best practice” techniques is seen as a promising method through which cadaveric donation rates may be greatly improved. A thorough and objective evaluation of the Thompson initiative has not, to our knowledge, been conducted. Figure 1, in conjunction with a recent econometric study of observed variations in opo efficiency, suggests that such an evaluation would yield both good news and bad news. The good news is that the program appears to have had a positive (and potentially significant) impact on the number of donations. In particular, it appears that, after 2002, the growth rate of the waiting list has slowed somewhat. Whether this effect will permanently lower the growth rate of the waiting list or simply cause a temporary intercept shift remains to be seen. The bad news, however, is unequivocal— the initiative is not going to resolve the organ shortage. Even if, contrary to reasonable expectations, all opo relative inefficiencies were miraculously eliminated (i.e., if al organizations’ performance were brought up to the most efficient unit), the increase in donor collection rates would still be insufficient to eliminate the shortage. ■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES Another approach that has received some attention recently involves the exchange of kidneys between families who have willing but incompatible living donors. Suppose, for example, a person in one family needs a kidney transplant and a sibling has offered to donate the needed organ. Further suppose that the two siblings are not compatible — perhaps their blood types differ. If this family can locate a second, similarly situated family, then it may be possible that the donor in the first family will match the recipient in the second, and vice versa. A relatively small number of such exchanges have recently occurred and a unos-based computerized system of matching such interfamily donors has been proposed to facilitate a larger number of these living donor transactions. Two observations regarding kidney exchanges are worth noting. First, such exchanges obviously constitute a crude type of market in living donor kidneys that is based upon barter rather than currency. Like all such barter markets, this exchange will be considerably less efficient than currency-based trade. Puzzlingly, some of the staunchest critics of using financial incentives for cadaveric donors have openly supported expanded use of living donor exchanges. Apparently, it is not market exchange per se that offends them but, rather, the use of money to facilitate efficient market exchange. This combination of positions merely highlights the critics’ lack of knowledge regarding the operation of market processes. It is quite apparent that living donor kidney exchanges are not going to resolve the organ shortage. Opportunities for such barter-based exchanges are simply too limited. ■ REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS Finally, in another effort to encourage an increase in the number of living (primarily kidney) donors, several states have passed legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct (explicit) costs incurred by such donors (e.g., travel expenses, lost wages, and so on). Economically, this policy action raises the price paid to living kidney donors from a negative amount to zero. As such, it should be expected to increase the quantity of organs supplied from this source. Because the explicit, out-of-pocket expenses associated with live kidney donation are unlikely to be large relative to the longer-term implicit costs of potential health risks, however, such reimbursement should not be expected to bring forth a flood of new donors. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors may have a negative impact on the number of deceased donors because of some degree of supply-side substitutability. Again, this policy is not a solution to the organ shortage. We must conclude that none of the above-listed policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage. We say this not because we oppose any of these policies; indeed, each appears sensible in its own right and some have unquestionably succeeded in raising the number of organ donors by some (perhaps nontrivial) amount. Rather, our concern is that every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage.
| 9,339 |
<h4>Varied efforts to increase voluntary donations fail – individually and in combination </h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p> Aware of the increasingly dire consequences of continued reliance on the existing approach to cadaveric organ procurement and alarmed at the figures shown above, <u>the <mark>transplant industry</mark> has examined and <mark>adopted</mark> a series of <mark>policy options</mark> ostensibly <mark>designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these,</mark> however, continue to <mark>maintain the</mark> basic zero-price property of the <mark>altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remo</mark>te</u>. <u>At least <mark>seven</mark> such <mark>actions have been</mark> <mark>implemented</u></mark> over the last two decades or so: ■ <u><mark>INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES</u></mark> In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount. ■ <u><mark>ORGAN DONOR CARDS</u></mark> A related activity has been the process of <u>incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses.</u> The cards can be easily completed and witnessed at the time the licenses are issued or renewed. They serve as a pre-mortem statement of the bearer’s wish to have his or her organs removed for transplantation purposes at the time of death. Their principal use, in practice, is to facilitate the opos’ efforts to convince surviving family members to consent to such removal by revealing the decedant’s wishes. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave all states the authority to issue donor cards and incorporate them in drivers’ licenses. Moreover, a few states have recently begun to rely entirely on donor cards to infer consent without requiring the surviving family’s permission when such cards are present. Survey evidence indicates that less than 40 percent of U.S. citizens have signed their donor cards.<u> </u>■ <u><mark>REQUIRED REQUEST</mark> Some</u> survey evidence published in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that in a number of cases families of potential deceased donors were not being asked to donate the organs. As a result, donation was apparently failing to occur in some of those instances simply because the request was not being presented. In response to this evidence, <u>federal legislation</u> was passed in 1987 <u>requiring all hospitals</u> receiving any federal funding (which, of course, is virtually all hospitals) <u>to request organ donation</u> in all deaths that occur under circumstances that would allow the deceased’s organs to be used in transplantation. It appears that this legal obligation is now being met in most, if not all, cases. Yet, the organ shortage has persisted and the waiting list has continued to grow. ■ <u><mark>REQUIRED REFERRAL</u></mark> While required-request legislation can compel hospitals to approach the families of recently deceased potential organ donors with an appeal for donation, it cannot ensure that the request will be made in a sincere, compassionate manner likely to elicit an agreement. Following implementation of the required-request law, there were a number of anecdotes in which the compulsory organ donation requests were presented in an insincere or even offensive manner that was clearly intended to elicit a negative response. The letter of the law was being met but not the spirit. As a result, <u>additional legislation</u> was passed that requires hospitals<u> to refer potential organ donors </u>to the regional opo so that trained procurement personnel can approach the surviving family with the donation request. This policy response has resulted in no perceptible progress in resolving the shortage. ■ <u>C<mark>OLLABORATION</mark> </u>A fairly recent response to the organ shortage has been <u>the </u>so-called “<u><mark>Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative</mark>,” </u>which was championed by then-secretary of health and human services Tommy Thompson. The program was initiated shortly after Thompson took office in 2001 and is currently continuing. The program’s basic motivation is provided by the observation of a considerable degree of variation in performance across the existing opos. Specifically, the number of deceased organ donors per thousand hospital deaths has been found to vary by a factor of almost five across the organizations. The presumption, then, is that the relatively successful opos employ superior procurement techniques and/or knowledge that, if shared with the relatively unsuccessful organizations, would significantly improve their performance. Thus, diffusion of “best practice” techniques is seen as a promising method through which cadaveric donation rates may be greatly improved. A thorough and objective evaluation of the Thompson initiative has not, to our knowledge, been conducted. Figure 1, in conjunction with a recent econometric study of observed variations in opo efficiency, suggests that such an evaluation would yield both good news and bad news. The good news is that the program appears to have had a positive (and potentially significant) impact on the number of donations. In particular, it appears that, after 2002, the growth rate of the waiting list has slowed somewhat. Whether this effect will permanently lower the growth rate of the waiting list or simply cause a temporary intercept shift remains to be seen. The bad news, however, is unequivocal— the initiative is not going to resolve the organ shortage. Even if, contrary to reasonable expectations, all opo relative inefficiencies were miraculously eliminated (i.e., if al organizations’ performance were brought up to the most efficient unit), the increase in donor collection rates would still be insufficient to eliminate the shortage. <u>■ <mark>KIDNEY</mark> <mark>EXCHANGES</u></mark> Another approach that has received some attention recently involves the exchange of kidneys between families who have willing but incompatible living donors. Suppose, for example, a person in one family needs a kidney transplant and a sibling has offered to donate the needed organ. Further suppose that the two siblings are not compatible — perhaps their blood types differ. If this family can locate a second, similarly situated family, then it may be possible that the donor in the first family will match the recipient in the second, and vice versa. A relatively small number of such exchanges have recently occurred and a unos-based computerized system of matching such interfamily donors has been proposed to facilitate a larger number of these living donor transactions. Two observations regarding kidney exchanges are worth noting. First, such exchanges obviously constitute a crude type of market in living donor kidneys that is based upon barter rather than currency. Like all such barter markets, this exchange will be considerably less efficient than currency-based trade. Puzzlingly, some of the staunchest critics of using financial incentives for cadaveric donors have openly supported expanded use of living donor exchanges. Apparently, it is not market exchange per se that offends them but, rather, the use of money to facilitate efficient market exchange. This combination of positions merely highlights the critics’ lack of knowledge regarding the operation of market processes. It is quite apparent that living donor kidney exchanges are not going to resolve the organ shortage. Opportunities for such barter-based exchanges are simply too limited. ■ <u><mark>REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS</u></mark> <u>Finally, i</u>n another effort to encourage an increase in the number of living (primarily kidney) donors, several states have passed <u>legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct </u>(explicit) <u>costs incurred by</u> such d<u>onors </u>(e.g., travel expenses, lost wages, and so on). Economically, this policy action raises the price paid to living kidney donors from a negative amount to zero. As such, it should be expected to increase the quantity of organs supplied from this source. Because the explicit, out-of-pocket expenses associated with live kidney donation are unlikely to be large relative to the longer-term implicit costs of potential health risks, however, such reimbursement should not be expected to bring forth a flood of new donors. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors may have a negative impact on the number of deceased donors because of some degree of supply-side substitutability. Again, this policy is not a solution to the organ shortage. <u>We must conclude that <mark>none of the</u></mark> above-listed <u><mark>policies</mark> should be expected to <mark>resolve the transplant</mark> organ <mark>shortage</mark>.</u> We say this not because we oppose any of these policies; indeed, each appears sensible in its own right and some have unquestionably succeeded in raising the number of organ donors by some (perhaps nontrivial) amount<u>. Rather,</u> our concern is that <u>every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, <mark>it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage</u>.</p></mark>
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Contention 1 – Shortage
| 430,246 | 21 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
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Texas
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1
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Kentucky Hampton-Roman
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Paul
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,323 |
Non enforcement is perceived through a flexible lens – several countries prove
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Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)
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existing flexibility in the treaty regime has allowed to deviate from a repressive zero-tolerance drug law enforcement approach Non-enforcement of drug laws in the case of cannabis is the re ality in quite a few countries. Even though the 1961 Convention obliged traditional se to be phased out traditions led to lenient law enforcement practices in a number of states in several countries more formalised schemes of non-enforcement have been established by providing guidelines Many varieties of such decriminalization schemes exist All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypoc risy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits.
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Non-enforcement of laws i of cannabis is the re ality in quite a few countries traditions led to lenient law enforcement practices in a number of states, in several countries more formalised schemes of non-enforcement have been established Many varieties of such decriminalization schemes exist All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude
|
The existing flexibility or room for manoeuvre in the treaty regime has allowed a variety of cannabis policy practices and re forms to deviate from a repressive zero-tolerance drug law enforcement approach, the legality of which is reviewed in detail in the third chapter. Non-enforcement of drug laws in the case of cannabis, rooted in social acceptance or long history of traditional use, is the re ality in quite a few countries. Even though the 1961 Convention obliged traditional, including religious, use of cannabis to be phased out within 25 years (with the exception of bhang as mentioned above), the widespread persistence of religious uses in Hindu, Sufi and Rastafarian ceremonies and traditions led to lenient law enforcement practices in a number of Indian states, Pakistan, the Middle East, Northern Africa and Ja maica.¶ Depending whether the legal system allows for dis- cretionary powers, in several countries more formalised schemes of non-enforcement have been established by providing guidelines for the police, the prosecution and/or the judiciary. In other countries cannabis consumption and possession for per sonal use are de jure no longer a crimi nal offence. Many varieties of such decriminalization schemes exist, in terms of distin guishing possession or cultivation for personal use from the intent to trade; and whether or not to apply administrative sanctions. Since the treaty requirements do not differentiate be tween possession and cultivation for personal use, first in Spain and more recently in some other countries, “cannabis social clubs” have started to engage in collective cultivation for personal use.¶ The inclusion of cannabis and its compounds in the strictest schedules of the conventions was a rejection of its usefulness for therapeutic pur poses and an effort to limit its use exclusively to research purposes, for which only very small amounts would be required. Today, however, many countries have rejected this position as scientifically untenable and have established legal re gimes recognising the medicinal properties of cannabis.¶ All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, not always ac knowl edged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypoc risy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis so cial clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.
| 3,162 |
<h4>Non enforcement is perceived through a flexible lens – several countries prove </h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)</p><p>The <u>existing flexibility </u>or room for manoeuvre <u>in the treaty regime has allowed</u> a variety of cannabis policy practices and re forms <u>to deviate from a repressive zero-tolerance drug law enforcement approach</u>, the legality of which is reviewed in detail in the third chapter. <u><mark>Non-enforcement of</mark> drug <mark>laws i</mark>n the case <mark>of cannabis</u></mark>, rooted in social acceptance or long history of traditional use, <u><mark>is the re ality in quite a few countries</mark>. Even though the 1961 Convention obliged traditional</u>, including religious, u<u>se</u> of cannabis <u>to be phased out</u> within 25 years (with the exception of bhang as mentioned above), the widespread persistence of religious uses in Hindu, Sufi and Rastafarian ceremonies and <u><mark>traditions led to lenient law enforcement practices in a number of</mark> </u>Indian<u> <mark>states</u>,</mark> Pakistan, the Middle East, Northern Africa and Ja maica.¶ Depending whether the legal system allows for dis- cretionary powers, <u><mark>in several countries more formalised schemes of non-enforcement have been established</mark> by providing guidelines</u> for the police, the prosecution and/or the judiciary. In other countries cannabis consumption and possession for per sonal use are de jure no longer a crimi nal offence. <u><mark>Many varieties of such decriminalization schemes exist</u></mark>, in terms of distin guishing possession or cultivation for personal use from the intent to trade; and whether or not to apply administrative sanctions. Since the treaty requirements do not differentiate be tween possession and cultivation for personal use, first in Spain and more recently in some other countries, “cannabis social clubs” have started to engage in collective cultivation for personal use.¶ The inclusion of cannabis and its compounds in the strictest schedules of the conventions was a rejection of its usefulness for therapeutic pur poses and an effort to limit its use exclusively to research purposes, for which only very small amounts would be required. Today, however, many countries have rejected this position as scientifically untenable and have established legal re gimes recognising the medicinal properties of cannabis.¶ <u><mark>All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude</mark>. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity,</u> not always ac knowl edged by the INCB. <u>And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypoc risy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. </u>Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis so cial clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.</p>
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2nr
| null |
AT: State Thumper
| 430,419 | 39 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
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Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
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Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
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Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,324 |
Net benefit-
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<h4>Net benefit-</h4>
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1nc
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3
| 431,010 | 1 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
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Navy
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5
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James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
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T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth
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743,325 |
The shortage means many die
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Beard 8
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Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy
|
our failure to adapt our organ procurement policy suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists We run the forecasts out 10 years a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.
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failure to adapt organ procurement suggests more than 80,000 lives have been sacrificed of our so-called “altruistic” system the pain and suffering of those forced to wait unemployment, and declining health must be reckoned Nonetheless, the death imposed pales in comparison to what lies ahead if change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.
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http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf
WAITING LISTS YET TO COME The consequences of our failure to adapt our cadaveric organ procurement policy to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists for each of our sample periods. We run the forecasts out 10 years from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage. Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.
| 5,967 |
<h4>The shortage means many die</h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p>WAITING LISTS YET TO COME The consequences of <u>our <mark>failure to adapt</mark> our</u> cadaveric <u><mark>organ</mark> <mark>procurement</mark> policy</u> to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, <u><mark>suggests</mark> that <mark>more than 80,000 lives have</mark> now <mark>been sacrificed</mark> on the altar <mark>of our so-called “altruistic” system</mark>. In addition, <mark>the</mark> unnecessary <mark>pain and</mark> <mark>suffering of those</mark> who have been <mark>forced to wait</mark> while undergoing dialysis, <mark>unemployment, and declining health must</mark> also <mark>be reckoned</mark> along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. <mark>Nonetheless, the</mark> pain, suffering, and <mark>death imposed</mark> on the innocents thus far <mark>pales in comparison to what lies ahead if</mark> more fundamental <mark>change is not forthcoming</u></mark>. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, <u><mark>we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists</u></mark> for each of our sample periods. <u>We run the forecasts out 10 years</u> from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, <u>a cumulative total of <mark>196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015</mark> <mark>as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.</u></mark> Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Shortage
| 430,247 | 16 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
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Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,326 |
No impact to warming --- fossil record
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Willis et. al, ’10
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Willis et. al, ’10 [Kathy J. Willis, Keith D. Bennett, Shonil A. Bhagwat& H. John B. Birks (2010): 4 °C and beyond: what did this mean for biodiversity in the past?, Systematics and Biodiversity, 8:1, 3-9, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14772000903495833, ]
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The most recent climate models and fossil evidence indicate that during this time interval atmospheric CO2 would have exceeded 1200ppmv and tropical temperatures were between 5–10 ◦ C warmer than modern values There is evidence for relatively rapid intervals of extreme global warmth and massive carbon addition when global temperatures increased by 5 ◦ C in less than 10 000 years what was the response of biota to these ‘climate extremes’ and do we see the large-scale extinctions predicted by some of the most recent models associated with future climate changes the fossil record demonstrates the very opposite. at least in the plant fossil record, this was one of the most biodiverse intervals of time in the Neotropics the tropical forest biome was the most extensive in Earth’s history, extending to mid-latitudes in both the northern and southern hemispheres – and there was also no ice at the Poles and Antarctica was covered by needle-leaved forest There were certainly novel ecosystems, and an increase in community turnover with a mixture of tropical and temperate species in mid latitudes and plants persisting in areas that are currently polar deserts at the earlier Palaeocene–Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM) at 55.8 million years ago in the US Gulf Coast, there was a rapid vegetation response to climate change
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The most recent climate models and fossil evidence indicate CO2 would have exceeded 1200ppmv temperatures were 5–10 ◦ warmer There is evidence for rapid intervals of extreme warmth do we see large-scale extinctions the fossil record demonstrates the very opposite. this was one of the most biodiverse intervals of time the tropical forest biome was the most extensive in Earth’s history There were novel ecosystems, and an increase in community turnover
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The most recent climate models and fossil evidence for the early Eocene Climatic Optimum (53–51 million years ago) indicate that during this time interval atmospheric CO2 would have exceeded 1200ppmv and tropical temperatures were between 5–10 ◦ C warmer than modern values (Zachos et al., 2008). There is also evidence for relatively rapid intervals of extreme global warmth and massive carbon addition when global temperatures increased by 5 ◦ C in less than 10 000 years (Zachos et al., 2001). So what was the response of biota to these ‘climate extremes’ and do we see the large-scale extinctions (especially in the Neotropics) predicted by some of the most recent models associated with future climate changes (Huntingford et al., 2008)? In fact the fossil record for the early Eocene Climatic Optimum demonstrates the very opposite. All the evidence from low-latitude records indicates that, at least in the plant fossil record, this was one of the most biodiverse intervals of time in the Neotropics(Jaramillo et al., 2006). It was also a time when the tropical forest biome was the most extensive in Earth’s history, extending to mid-latitudes in both the northern and southern hemispheres – and there was also no ice at the Poles and Antarctica was covered by needle-leaved forest (Morley, 2007). There were certainly novel ecosystems, and an increase in community turnover with a mixture of tropical and temperate species in mid latitudes and plants persisting in areas that are currently polar deserts. [It should be noted; however, that at the earlier Palaeocene–Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM) at 55.8 million years ago in the US Gulf Coast, there was a rapid vegetation response to climate change. There was major compositional turnover, palynological richness decreased, and regional extinctions occurred (Harrington & Jaramillo, 2007). Reasons for these changes are unclear, but they may have resulted from continental drying, negative feedbacks on vegetation to changing CO2 (assuming that CO2 changed during the PETM), rapid cooling immediately after the PETM, or subtle changes in plant–animal interactions (Harrington & Jaramillo, 2007).]
| 2,156 |
<h4>No impact to warming --- fossil record </h4><p><strong>Willis et. al, ’10 </strong>[Kathy J. Willis, Keith D. Bennett, Shonil A. Bhagwat& H. John B. Birks (2010): 4 °C and beyond: what did this mean for biodiversity in the past?, Systematics and Biodiversity, 8:1, 3-9, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14772000903495833, ]</p><p><u><mark>The most recent climate models and fossil evidence</u></mark> for the early Eocene Climatic Optimum (53–51 million years ago) <u><mark>indicate</mark> that during this time interval atmospheric <mark>CO2 would have exceeded 1200ppmv</mark> and tropical <mark>temperatures were</mark> between <mark>5–10 ◦</mark> C <mark>warmer</mark> than modern values</u> (Zachos et al., 2008). <u><mark>There is</u></mark> also <u><mark>evidence for</mark> relatively <mark>rapid intervals of extreme</mark> global <mark>warmth</mark> and massive carbon addition when global temperatures increased by 5 ◦ C in less than 10 000 years </u>(Zachos et al., 2001). So <u>what was the response of biota to these ‘climate extremes’ and <mark>do we see</mark> the <mark>large-scale extinctions</u></mark> (especially in the Neotropics) <u>predicted by some of the most recent models associated with future climate changes</u> (Huntingford et al., 2008)? In fact <u><strong><mark>the fossil record</u></strong></mark> for the early Eocene Climatic Optimum <u><strong><mark>demonstrates the very opposite.</u></strong></mark> All the evidence from low-latitude records indicates that, <u>at least in the plant fossil record, <mark>this was one of the most biodiverse intervals of time</mark> in the Neotropics</u>(Jaramillo et al., 2006). It was also a time when <u><mark>the tropical forest biome was the most extensive in Earth’s history</mark>, extending to mid-latitudes in both the northern and southern hemispheres – and there was also no ice at the Poles and Antarctica was covered by needle-leaved forest</u> (Morley, 2007). <u><mark>There were</mark> certainly <mark>novel ecosystems, and an increase in community turnover</mark> with a mixture of tropical and temperate species in mid latitudes and plants persisting in areas that are currently polar deserts</u>. [It should be noted; however, that <u>at the earlier Palaeocene–Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM) at 55.8 million years ago in the US Gulf Coast, there was a rapid vegetation response to climate change</u>. There was major compositional turnover, palynological richness decreased, and regional extinctions occurred (Harrington & Jaramillo, 2007). Reasons for these changes are unclear, but they may have resulted from continental drying, negative feedbacks on vegetation to changing CO2 (assuming that CO2 changed during the PETM), rapid cooling immediately after the PETM, or subtle changes in plant–animal interactions (Harrington & Jaramillo, 2007).] </p>
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1nc
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treaties
| 80,016 | 124 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,327 |
Technical compliance is sufficient to maintain the treaty system
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Guercio et al 12
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Guercio et al 12 (Susan; Heather Haase, consultant for International Drug Policy Consortium and the Harm Reduction Coalition, “The International Drug Control Treaties: How Important Are They to US Drug Reform?” http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/3_20072283-InternationalDrugControlTreaties.pdf)
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If treaties are so destructive, and there is no real enforcement, then why does almost every country in the world remain signatory and, , faithfully comply many experts point to the reputation al aspect of international law — many countries do not want to be seen as uncooperative Instead of withdrawing from or disregarding their obligations under the treaties, many countries have reacted over the years by pushing the outer limits of what is technically allowable, or by broadly interpreting the language of the treaties. . For example 1988 Convention does not specify what the punishment must be Portugal’s ―decriminalization laws take advantage of this grey area . Holland exercises a policy of non - enforcement soft challenges to the treaties , skirt the problem by simply limiting compliance to ―technical compliance in law the only challenges to the treaties have been ―soft‖ challenges. It would seem that nations have gone to great pains to stay within technical compliance as much as possible while still enjoying more liberal drug control environment
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I treaties are so destructive, and there is no real enforcement, then why does almost every country in the world remain signatory nd faithfully comply many experts point to the reputation al aspect countries do not want to be seen as uncooperative .¶ Instead of withdrawing from or disregarding bligations many countries pushing the outer limits of what is technically allowable For example, onvention does not specify unishment Holland exercises a policy of non - enforcement soft challenges to the treaties , skirt the problem by technical compliance in It would seem that nations have gone to great pains to stay within technical compliance as much as possible while still enjoying more liberal drug control environment
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If the treaties are so destructive, and there is no real enforcement, then why does almost every country in the world remain signatory to and, for the most part, faithfully comply with them? Pressure from the United States (and fear of losing aid) is certainly a major factor. But many experts point to the reputation al aspect of international law — many countries do not want to be seen as uncooperative — in effect, ―pariah s ‖ — in the international community.¶ Instead of withdrawing from or disregarding their obligations under the treaties, many countries have reacted over the years by pushing the outer limits of what is technically allowable, or by broadly interpreting the language of the treaties.¶ The treaties themselves allow a certain amount of flexibility in their interpretation. For example, while the 1988 Convention requires that countries make possession for personal consumption a criminal violation, it does not specify what the punishment must be. Portugal’s ―decriminalization laws take advantage of this grey area and dictate that offenders are diverted to education classes, treatment sessions, or are given a fine. Holland continues to maintain laws on its books criminalizing possession of marijuana, but exercises a policy of non - enforcement when it comes to marijuana sold in its famous ―coffee houses.‖ In the U.S., m any argue that ―medical use‖ is not defined in the treaties and therefore, medical marijuana is technically allowed (the INCB and the DEA do not share this view).¶ These measures — non - enforcement, de criminalization/depenalization, and medicalization — known as ―soft challenges to the treaties , skirt the problem by simply limiting compliance to ―technical compliance in law, while allowing for de facto policies more in keeping with the desired policy change within each country .¶ Until recently, the only challenges to the treaties have been ―soft‖ challenges. It would seem that nations have gone to great pains to stay within technical compliance as much as possible while still enjoying more liberal drug control environment within their own borders.
| 2,114 |
<h4>Technical compliance is sufficient to maintain the treaty system</h4><p><u><strong>Guercio et al 12 </u></strong> (Susan; Heather Haase, consultant for International Drug Policy Consortium and the Harm Reduction Coalition, “The International Drug Control Treaties: How Important Are They to US Drug Reform?” http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/3_20072283-InternationalDrugControlTreaties.pdf)</p><p><u><mark>I</mark>f </u>the <u><mark>treaties are so destructive, and there is no real enforcement, then why does almost every country in the world remain signatory</u></mark> to <u>a<mark>nd</mark>,</u> for the most part<u>, <mark>faithfully comply</u></mark> with them? Pressure from the United States (and fear of losing aid) is certainly a major factor. But <u><mark>many experts point to the reputation al aspect</mark> of international law — many <mark>countries do not want to be seen as uncooperative</u></mark> — in effect, ―pariah s ‖ — in the international community<mark>.¶ <u>Instead of withdrawing from or disregarding</mark> their o<mark>bligations</mark> under the treaties, <mark>many countries</mark> have reacted over the years by <mark>pushing the outer limits of what is technically allowable</mark>, or by broadly interpreting the language of the treaties.</u>¶ The treaties themselves allow a certain amount of flexibility in their interpretation<u>. <mark>For example</u>,</mark> while the <u>1988 C<mark>onvention</u></mark> requires that countries make possession for personal consumption a criminal violation, it <u><mark>does not specify</mark> what the p<mark>unishment</mark> must be</u>. <u>Portugal’s ―decriminalization laws take advantage of this grey area</u> and dictate that offenders are diverted to education classes, treatment sessions, or are given a fine<u>. <mark>Holland</u></mark> continues to maintain laws on its books criminalizing possession of marijuana, but <u><mark>exercises a policy of non - enforcement</u></mark> when it comes to marijuana sold in its famous ―coffee houses.‖ In the U.S., m any argue that ―medical use‖ is not defined in the treaties and therefore, medical marijuana is technically allowed (the INCB and the DEA do not share this view).¶ These measures — non - enforcement, de criminalization/depenalization, and medicalization — known as ―<u><mark>soft challenges to the treaties , skirt the problem by</mark> simply limiting compliance to ―<mark>technical compliance in</mark> law</u>, while allowing for de facto policies more in keeping with the desired policy change within each country .¶ Until recently, <u>the only challenges to the treaties have been ―soft‖ challenges. <mark>It would seem that nations have gone to great pains to stay within technical compliance as much as possible while still enjoying more liberal drug control environment </u></mark>within their own borders.</p>
|
2nr
| null |
AT: State Thumper
| 431,009 | 19 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,328 |
cadavers can never solve the shortage
|
Fry-Revere 14
|
Fry-Revere 14 Sigrid Fry-Revere. Director of bioethics studies, CATO Institute 2014
|
The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 6
Today the number of kidneys provided from cadavers could never be enough, even if every organ from every potential qualified donor could be harvested. This is true because not every death results in useable organs. Organs can be diseased or injured, or the body can be dead too long before it reaches the hospital. no matter how the process for retrieving organs from the dead improves, there will never be enough kidneys to meet the ever-growing demand.
|
number of kidneys provided from cadavers could never be enough, even if every organ from every potential qualified donor could be harvested. This is true because not every death results in useable organs. Organs can be diseased or injured, or the body can be dead too long before it reaches the hospital there will never be enough kidneys to meet the ever-growing demand
|
The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 6
At the time, what Congress did seemed reasonable, but over the following three decades, no matter how efficient the U.S. cadaver organ procurement sys- tem became, it could not satisfy the demand. Medical innovations keep people alive longer, and the ever-growing diabetes and hypertension epidemics contin- ually increased the number of people who could benefit from a kidney transplant. Today the number of kidneys provided from cadavers could never be enough, even if every organ from every potential qualified donor could be harvested. This is true because not every death results in useable organs. Organs can be diseased or injured, or the body can be dead too long before it reaches the hospital. Patients who die in the hospital after a car accident or similar trauma are the best potential organ donors because the appropriate medical equip- ment is at hand to switch gears from saving the patient to preserving organs for transplantation. Nevertheless, given what we know now, no matter how the process for retrieving organs from the dead improves, there will never be enough kidneys to meet the ever-growing demand.
| 1,179 |
<h4>cadavers can never solve the shortage </h4><p><strong>Fry-Revere 14</strong> Sigrid Fry-Revere. Director of bioethics studies, CATO Institute 2014 </p><p><u>The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 6</p><p></u>At the time, what Congress did seemed reasonable, but over the following three decades, no matter how efficient the U.S. cadaver organ procurement sys- tem became, it could not satisfy the demand. Medical innovations keep people alive longer, and the ever-growing diabetes and hypertension epidemics contin- ually increased the number of people who could benefit from a kidney transplant. <u>Today the <mark>number of kidneys provided from cadavers could never be enough, even if every organ from every potential qualified donor could be harvested. This is true because not every death results in useable organs. Organs can be diseased or injured, or the body can be dead too long before it reaches the hospital</mark>.</u> Patients who die in the hospital after a car accident or similar trauma are the best potential organ donors because the appropriate medical equip- ment is at hand to switch gears from saving the patient to preserving organs<u> </u>for transplantation. Nevertheless, given what we know now,<u> no matter how the process for retrieving organs from the dead improves, <mark>there will never be enough kidneys to meet the ever-growing demand</mark>.</p></u>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Shortage
| 430,248 | 7 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,329 |
The discourse of legalizing prostitution coopts struggle for justice for sex workers into a system of regulatory oppression. Legal prostitution requires an illegal other that should be punished. The discourse of legalization forms the subject position of the responsible sex worker who takes on responsibility for entrepreneurial success, health, and taxation.
|
Scoular 10,
|
Scoular 10, Jane, Professor of Law at University of Strathclyde, March 2010, “What's Law Got To Do With it? How and Why Law Matters in the Regulation of Sex Work,” Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 37, No. 1, Wiley Online, Accessed 9/10/14
|
contemporary forms of governance operate through these techniques of responsibilization. leading to increasing conditionality in citizenship and penality for those who cannot meet their terms regulation produces exclusions. legalized systems create a two-tiered industry, as the costs and norms of compliance are too onerous for most individuals and small brothel owners to bear. , it overwhelmingly favours profitable sex businesses which can now hardly be described as `other' to late-capitalist industries. the system of licensing encourages workers to self regulate to conform to certain modes of working in order to meet the conditions of registration. Inclusion is offered to those who `can perform the rituals of middle class society' with all of the typical exclusions based on age, status, race, health, and class This `ideal' typifies the rational subjects as law operates alongside practices while licensing can offer some increased improvement in the working conditions for a small section of workers, it operates to identify and exclude those who cannot meet the increasingly conditional nature of citizenship Thus in both systems, the moral engineering of advanced liberal governance has co-opted feminist concerns into techniques of governance and control. social exclusion is being used as leverage for increased control rather than for increased social justice. Empowerment simply operates to sanction forms of self-governance that support neo-liberal interests.
|
contemporary governance operate through techniques of responsibilization increasing conditionality in citizenship and penality for those who cannot meet terms regulation produces exclusions. legalized systems create a two-tiered industry, as the costs of compliance are too onerous for individuals and brothel owners it favours profitable sex businesses which as late-capitalist industries. licensing encourages workers to conform to modes of working Inclusion is offered to those who perform rituals of middle class society' with typical exclusions based on age, race, and class licensing operates to identify and exclude those who cannot meet the conditional nature of citizenship social exclusion is being used as leverage for control rather than justice. Empowerment operates to sanction forms of self-governance that support neo-liberal interests.
|
Despite being heralded as a `renewed welfare approach', which in any event is not necessarily benign, as my previous work with Maggie O'Neill94 points out, contemporary forms of governance operate through these techniques of responsibilization. Techniques of `exiting' women from prostitution must be viewed in the wider context of neo-liberalism in which welfare states, including the much renowned Swedish system, are retracting and being replaced by systems of private insurance, thus leading to increasing conditionality in citizenship and penality for those who cannot meet their terms/manage risks. In this context social exclusion is not tackled by structural change but via individual re-education, re-training, and entry into legitimate economies and relationships. By prioritizing `exiting' as a means of facilitating social inclusion rather than offering recognition, rights or redistribution to sex workers as a group, abolitionist systems promote forms of self-governance which require active citizens to self-regulate according to the norms of the family and the market. Those who act responsibly by adopting appropriate lifestyles via work and norms of sexuality are offered inclusion, those who do not or cannot and instead remain in sex work (which retains its criminal label) are further excluded, having failed to meet the increasingly normalized terms of citizenship in late-capitalist societies. The increased focus on male clients involves the promotion of similar individuating modes of governance. Despite the rhetoric of gender equality, the increased punitiveness towards (some) purchasers represents no more than the shifting of the `whore stigma' to a new deviant group. Responsibility becomes increasingly narrowed to client motives and individual sexual ethics, which are pathologized rather than explained in relation to their historical specificity and to the social and economic institutions that themselves structure the relations of gender domination.95 When action is taken through criminalization, or via the quasi-legal forums of john schools and name-and-shame campaigns, it typically operates on `a lower-tier of male heterosexual practices' or to `re-gender sexual stigma in certain middle class fractions',96 leaving the more mainstream corporate and private market untouched. The system of regulationism in the Netherlands encourages similar forms of self-governance and produces analogous exclusions. Research suggests that legalized systems create a two-tiered (if not more) industry, as the costs and norms of compliance are too onerous for most individuals and small brothel owners to bear. Thus, it overwhelmingly favours profitable sex businesses which, as Brents and Hausbeck note, can now hardly be described as `other' to late-capitalist industries.97 Alongside this, the system of licensing encourages workers to self regulate98 their behaviour in the interests of public health promotion, to conform to certain modes of working in order to meet the conditions of registration. Inclusion is offered to those who `can perform the rituals of middle class society'99 with all of the typical exclusions based on age, status, race, health, and class that this entails. This point is well illustrated in an advert which followed the decriminalization of brothels in New South Wales: . . . tall, blonde and stylish, she recently completed her tertiary marketing course and is looking for employment in the field . . . She provides her own condoms . . . and comes complete with a medical certificate.100 This `ideal' typifies the rational subjects encouraged by these processes, as law operates alongside practices, such as public health, to create and maintain what Scott calls a `responsible prostitution population'.101 The low take-up rate in the Netherlands indicates that very few can conform to this responsibilized model, meaning that while licensing can offer some increased improvement in the working conditions for a small section of workers, it also operates to identify and exclude those who cannot meet the increasingly conditional nature of citizenship, for example, migrants, the underage, and drug-users, all of whom are not incorporated within the framework of regulatory protection. Thus in both systems, the moral engineering of advanced liberal governance has co-opted feminist concerns into techniques of governance and control. Whether based on a recognition of sex workers' inherent agency or victimhood, social exclusion is being used as leverage for increased control rather than for increased social justice. Empowerment simply operates to sanction forms of self-governance that support neo-liberal interests. As Cruikshank notes, the recent proliferation of state-sponsored programmes of empowerment must be treated with critical caution, as even while they are utilizing the vocabulary of radical politics, their promise of emancipation may be merely rhetorical as they `endeavour to operationalise the self-governing capacity of the governed in the pursuit of governmental objectives'.102 Yet what both processes do well is to identify those who cannot perform, rendering them vulnerable to exclusion or banishment.
| 5,190 |
<h4>The discourse of legalizing prostitution coopts struggle for justice for sex workers into a system of regulatory oppression. Legal prostitution requires an illegal other that should be punished. The discourse of legalization forms the subject position of the responsible sex worker who takes on responsibility for entrepreneurial success, health, and taxation. </h4><p><strong>Scoular 10, </strong>Jane, Professor of Law at University of Strathclyde, March 2010, “What's Law Got To Do With it? How and Why Law Matters in the Regulation of Sex Work,” Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 37, No. 1, Wiley Online, Accessed 9/10/14</p><p>Despite being heralded as a `renewed welfare approach', which in any event is not necessarily benign, as my previous work with Maggie O'Neill94 points out, <u><mark>contemporary</mark> forms of <mark>governance operate through</mark> these <mark>techniques of responsibilization</mark>. </u>Techniques of `exiting' women from prostitution must be viewed in the wider context of neo-liberalism in which welfare states, including the much renowned Swedish system, are retracting and being replaced by systems of private insurance, thus <u>leading to <mark>increasing conditionality in citizenship and penality for those who cannot meet</mark> their <mark>terms</u></mark>/manage risks. In this context social<u> </u>exclusion is not tackled by structural change but via individual re-education, re-training, and entry into legitimate economies and relationships. By prioritizing `exiting' as a means of facilitating social inclusion rather than offering recognition, rights or redistribution to sex workers as a group, abolitionist systems promote forms of self-governance which require active citizens to self-regulate according to the norms of the family and the market. Those who act responsibly by adopting appropriate lifestyles via work and norms of sexuality are offered inclusion, those who do not or cannot and instead remain in sex work (which retains its criminal label) are further excluded, having failed to meet the increasingly normalized terms of citizenship in late-capitalist societies. The increased focus on male clients involves the promotion of similar individuating modes of governance. Despite the rhetoric of gender equality, the increased punitiveness towards (some) purchasers represents no more than the shifting of the `whore stigma' to a new deviant group. Responsibility becomes increasingly narrowed to client motives and individual sexual ethics, which are pathologized rather than explained in relation to their historical specificity and to the social and economic institutions that themselves structure the relations of gender domination.95 When action is taken through criminalization, or via the quasi-legal forums of john schools and name-and-shame campaigns, it typically operates on `a lower-tier of male heterosexual practices' or to `re-gender sexual stigma in certain middle class fractions',96 leaving the more mainstream corporate and private market untouched. The system of <u><strong><mark>regulation</u></strong></mark>ism in the Netherlands encourages similar forms of self-governance and <u><strong><mark>produces</u></strong></mark> analogous <u><strong><mark>exclusions.</u></strong></mark> Research suggests that <u><mark>legalized systems create a two-tiered</u></mark> (if not more) <u><mark>industry, as the costs</mark> and norms <mark>of compliance are too onerous for</mark> most <mark>individuals and</mark> small <mark>brothel owners</mark> to bear.</u> Thus<u>, <mark>it</mark> overwhelmingly <mark>favours profitable sex businesses which</u></mark>, as Brents and Hausbeck note, <u>can now hardly be described <mark>as</mark> `other' to <mark>late-capitalist industries.</u></mark>97 Alongside this, <u>the system of <mark>licensing encourages workers</mark> to self regulate</u>98 their behaviour in the interests of public health promotion, <u><mark>to conform to</mark> certain <mark>modes of working</mark> in order to meet the conditions of registration. <mark>Inclusion is offered to those who</mark> `can <mark>perform</mark> the <mark>rituals of middle class society'</u></mark>99 <u><mark>with</mark> all of the <mark>typical exclusions based on <strong>age,</strong></mark> status, <strong><mark>race,</strong></mark> health, <mark>and <strong>class</u></strong></mark> that this entails. This point is well illustrated in an advert which followed the decriminalization of brothels in New South Wales: . . . tall, blonde and stylish, she recently completed her tertiary marketing course and is looking for employment in the field . . . She provides her own condoms . . . and comes complete with a medical certificate.100 <u>This `ideal' typifies the rational subjects</u> encouraged by these processes, <u>as law operates alongside practices</u>, such as public health, to create and maintain what Scott calls a `responsible prostitution population'.101 The low take-up rate in the Netherlands indicates that very few can conform to this responsibilized model, meaning that <u>while <mark>licensing</mark> can offer some increased improvement in the working conditions for a small section of workers, it</u> also <u><mark>operates to identify and exclude those who cannot meet the</mark> increasingly <mark>conditional nature of citizenship</u></mark>, for example, migrants, the underage, and drug-users, all of whom are not incorporated within the framework of regulatory protection. <u>Thus in both systems, the moral engineering of advanced liberal governance has co-opted feminist concerns into techniques of governance and control.</u> Whether based on a recognition of sex workers' inherent agency or victimhood, <u><mark>social exclusion is being used as leverage for</mark> increased <mark>control rather than</mark> for increased social <mark>justice. Empowerment</mark> simply <mark>operates to sanction</mark> <mark>forms of self-governance that support neo-liberal interests.</u></mark> As Cruikshank notes, the recent proliferation of state-sponsored programmes of empowerment must be treated with critical caution, as even while they are utilizing the vocabulary of radical politics, their promise of emancipation may be merely rhetorical as they `endeavour to operationalise the self-governing capacity of the governed in the pursuit of governmental objectives'.102 Yet what both processes do well is to identify those who cannot perform, rendering them vulnerable to exclusion or banishment. </p>
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1nc
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3
| 429,913 | 13 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
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Navy
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5
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James Madison Lepp-Miller
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McElhinny
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T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
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college
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743,330 |
Warming’s inevitable
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Gillett et al 10
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Gillett et al 10—director @ the Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling and Analysis
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Several recent studies have demonstrated that CO2-induced global mean temperature change is irreversible on human timescales1 not only is this climate change irreversible, but that for some climate variables, such as Antarctic perature and North African rainfall, CO2-induced climate changes are simulated to continue to worsen for many centuries even after a complete cessation of emissions. a large committed thermosteric sea level rise is expected even after a cessation of emissions this effect may be compounded by ice shelf collapse, grounding line retreat, and ensuing accelerated ice discharge in marine-based sectors of the Antarctic ice sheet, precipitating a sea level rise of several metres our findings of Northern Hemisphere cooling, Southern Hemisphere warming, a southward shift of the intertropical convergence zone and delayed and ongoing ocean warming at intermediate depths following a cessation of emissions are likely to be robust. Geo- 36 engineering by stratospheric aerosol injection has been proposed 37 as a response measure in the event of a rapid melting of the 38 West Antarctic ice sheet24. Our results indicate that if such a 39 melting were driven by ocean warming at intermediate depths, as 40 is thought likely, a geoengineering response would be ineffective 41 for several centuries owing to the long delay associated with 42 subsurface ocean warming.
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Several recent studies have demonstrated that CO2-induced change is irreversible Antarctic and African rainfall changes are simulated to worsen for many centuries 22 even after a complete cessation of emissions delayed and ongoing ocean warming at depths 35 following a cessation are robust
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Nathan, “Ongoing climate change following a complete cessation of carbon dioxide emissions”. Nature Geoscience
Several recent studies have demonstrated that CO2-induced 17 global mean temperature change is irreversible on human 18 timescales1_5. We find that not only is this climate change 19 irreversible, but that for some climate variables, such as Antarctic 20 temperature and North African rainfall, CO2-induced climate 21 changes are simulated to continue to worsen for many centuries 22 even after a complete cessation of emissions. Although it is 23 also well known that a large committed thermosteric sea level 24 rise is expected even after a cessation of emissions in 2100, 25 our finding of a strong delayed high-latitude Southern Ocean 26 warming at intermediate depths suggests that this effect may be 27 compounded by ice shelf collapse, grounding line retreat, and ensuing accelerated ice discharge in marine-based sectors of the 28 Antarctic ice sheet, precipitating a sea level rise of several metres. 29 Quantitative results presented here are subject to uncertainties 30 associated with the climate sensitivity, the rate of ocean heat 31 uptake and the rate of carbon uptake in CanESM1, but our 32 findings of Northern Hemisphere cooling, Southern Hemisphere 33 warming, a southward shift of the intertropical convergence zone, 34 and delayed and ongoing ocean warming at intermediate depths 35 following a cessation of emissions are likely to be robust. Geo- 36 engineering by stratospheric aerosol injection has been proposed 37 as a response measure in the event of a rapid melting of the 38 West Antarctic ice sheet24. Our results indicate that if such a 39 melting were driven by ocean warming at intermediate depths, as 40 is thought likely, a geoengineering response would be ineffective 41 for several centuries owing to the long delay associated with 42 subsurface ocean warming.
| 1,909 |
<h4><strong>Warming’s inevitable</h4><p>Gillett et al 10</strong>—director @ the Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling and Analysis</p><p>Nathan, “Ongoing climate change following a complete cessation of carbon dioxide emissions”. Nature Geoscience </p><p><u><mark>Several recent studies have demonstrated that CO2-induced</u></mark> 17 <u>global mean temperature <mark>change is irreversible </mark>on human</u> 18 <u>timescales1</u>_5. We find that <u>not only is this climate change</u> 19 <u>irreversible, but that for some climate variables, such as <mark>Antarctic</u></mark> 20 tem<u>perature <mark>and</mark> North <mark>African rainfall</mark>, CO2-induced climate</u> 21 <u><mark>changes are simulated to </mark>continue to <mark>worsen for many centuries</u> 22 <u><strong>even after a complete cessation of emissions</mark>.</u></strong> Although it is 23 also well known that <u>a large committed thermosteric sea level</u> 24 <u>rise is expected even after a cessation of emissions</u> in 2100, 25 our finding of a strong delayed high-latitude Southern Ocean 26 warming at intermediate depths suggests that <u>this effect may be</u> 27 <u>compounded by ice shelf collapse, grounding line retreat, and ensuing accelerated ice discharge in marine-based sectors of the</u> 28 <u>Antarctic ice sheet, precipitating a sea level rise of several metres</u>. 29 Quantitative results presented here are subject to uncertainties 30 associated with the climate sensitivity, the rate of ocean heat 31 uptake and the rate of carbon uptake in CanESM1, but <u>our</u> 32 <u>findings of Northern Hemisphere cooling, Southern Hemisphere</u> 33 <u>warming, a southward shift of the intertropical convergence zone</u>, 34 <u>and <mark>delayed and ongoing ocean warming at </mark>intermediate <mark>depths</u> 35 <u>following a cessation </mark>of emissions <mark>are </mark>likely to be <mark>robust</mark>. Geo- 36 engineering by stratospheric aerosol injection has been proposed 37 as a response measure in the event of a rapid melting of the 38 West Antarctic ice sheet24. Our results indicate that if such a 39 melting were driven by ocean warming at intermediate depths, as 40 is thought likely, a geoengineering response would be ineffective 41 for several centuries owing to the long delay associated with 42 subsurface ocean warming.</p></u>
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treaties
| 184,908 | 14 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
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Navy
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3
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Boston College Kenner-Carelli
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Lopez
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Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,331 |
Non enforcement is perceived through a flexible lens – several countries prove
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Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
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Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)
|
existing flexibility in the treaty regime has allowed to deviate from a repressive zero-tolerance drug law enforcement approach Non-enforcement of drug laws in the case of cannabis is the re ality in quite a few countries. Even though the 1961 Convention obliged traditional se to be phased out traditions led to lenient law enforcement practices in a number of states in several countries more formalised schemes of non-enforcement have been established by providing guidelines Many varieties of such decriminalization schemes exist All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypoc risy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits.
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Non-enforcement of laws i of cannabis is the re ality in quite a few countries traditions led to lenient law enforcement practices in a number of states, in several countries more formalised schemes of non-enforcement have been established Many varieties of such decriminalization schemes exist All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude
|
The existing flexibility or room for manoeuvre in the treaty regime has allowed a variety of cannabis policy practices and re forms to deviate from a repressive zero-tolerance drug law enforcement approach, the legality of which is reviewed in detail in the third chapter. Non-enforcement of drug laws in the case of cannabis, rooted in social acceptance or long history of traditional use, is the re ality in quite a few countries. Even though the 1961 Convention obliged traditional, including religious, use of cannabis to be phased out within 25 years (with the exception of bhang as mentioned above), the widespread persistence of religious uses in Hindu, Sufi and Rastafarian ceremonies and traditions led to lenient law enforcement practices in a number of Indian states, Pakistan, the Middle East, Northern Africa and Ja maica.¶ Depending whether the legal system allows for dis- cretionary powers, in several countries more formalised schemes of non-enforcement have been established by providing guidelines for the police, the prosecution and/or the judiciary. In other countries cannabis consumption and possession for per sonal use are de jure no longer a crimi nal offence. Many varieties of such decriminalization schemes exist, in terms of distin guishing possession or cultivation for personal use from the intent to trade; and whether or not to apply administrative sanctions. Since the treaty requirements do not differentiate be tween possession and cultivation for personal use, first in Spain and more recently in some other countries, “cannabis social clubs” have started to engage in collective cultivation for personal use.¶ The inclusion of cannabis and its compounds in the strictest schedules of the conventions was a rejection of its usefulness for therapeutic pur poses and an effort to limit its use exclusively to research purposes, for which only very small amounts would be required. Today, however, many countries have rejected this position as scientifically untenable and have established legal re gimes recognising the medicinal properties of cannabis.¶ All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, not always ac knowl edged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypoc risy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis so cial clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.
| 3,162 |
<h4>Non enforcement is perceived through a flexible lens – several countries prove </h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)</p><p>The <u>existing flexibility </u>or room for manoeuvre <u>in the treaty regime has allowed</u> a variety of cannabis policy practices and re forms <u>to deviate from a repressive zero-tolerance drug law enforcement approach</u>, the legality of which is reviewed in detail in the third chapter. <u><mark>Non-enforcement of</mark> drug <mark>laws i</mark>n the case <mark>of cannabis</u></mark>, rooted in social acceptance or long history of traditional use, <u><mark>is the re ality in quite a few countries</mark>. Even though the 1961 Convention obliged traditional</u>, including religious, u<u>se</u> of cannabis <u>to be phased out</u> within 25 years (with the exception of bhang as mentioned above), the widespread persistence of religious uses in Hindu, Sufi and Rastafarian ceremonies and <u><mark>traditions led to lenient law enforcement practices in a number of</mark> </u>Indian<u> <mark>states</u>,</mark> Pakistan, the Middle East, Northern Africa and Ja maica.¶ Depending whether the legal system allows for dis- cretionary powers, <u><mark>in several countries more formalised schemes of non-enforcement have been established</mark> by providing guidelines</u> for the police, the prosecution and/or the judiciary. In other countries cannabis consumption and possession for per sonal use are de jure no longer a crimi nal offence. <u><mark>Many varieties of such decriminalization schemes exist</u></mark>, in terms of distin guishing possession or cultivation for personal use from the intent to trade; and whether or not to apply administrative sanctions. Since the treaty requirements do not differentiate be tween possession and cultivation for personal use, first in Spain and more recently in some other countries, “cannabis social clubs” have started to engage in collective cultivation for personal use.¶ The inclusion of cannabis and its compounds in the strictest schedules of the conventions was a rejection of its usefulness for therapeutic pur poses and an effort to limit its use exclusively to research purposes, for which only very small amounts would be required. Today, however, many countries have rejected this position as scientifically untenable and have established legal re gimes recognising the medicinal properties of cannabis.¶ <u><mark>All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude</mark>. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity,</u> not always ac knowl edged by the INCB. <u>And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypoc risy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. </u>Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis so cial clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.</p>
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2nr
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AT: State Thumper
| 430,419 | 39 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
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Navy
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Quarters
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Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
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Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
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Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,332 |
artificial organs are infeasible and decades away
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Adhikari 14
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Adhikari 14 Richard Adhikari has written about high-tech for leading industry publications since the 1990s
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http://www.technewsworld.com/story/80198.html
According to Jordan Miller at Rice "Parts of the body which require human cells to perform biomechanical functions, such as the liver or kidney, are still several decades away from reaching human patients," . "We are still in the feasibility stage -- not sure how to keep cells alive at high cell density and adequate size needed to match human organs." A 3D structure will require nearly 1 billion functioning cells to approximate the function of a liver or kidney, and "there are dozens of cell types in these organs," . "We are typically only looking at one or two cell types being put into a 3D printed structure."
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According t Jordan Miller, at Rice Parts of the body which require human cells to perform biomechanical functions, such as the liver or kidney, are still several decades away We are still in the feasibility stage -- not sure how to keep cells alive at high cell density and adequate size needed to match human organs there are dozens of cell types in these organs We are typically only looking at one or two cell types being put into a 3D printed structure
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03/26/14 Bioprinting, Part 1: The Promise and the Pitfalls http://www.technewsworld.com/story/80198.html
[According to Jordan Miller, assistant professor of bioengineering at Rice University]. "Parts of the body which require human cells to perform biomechanical functions, such as the liver or kidney, are still several decades away from reaching human patients," Miller said. "We are still in the feasibility stage -- not sure how to keep cells alive at high cell density and adequate size needed to match human organs." A 3D structure will require nearly 1 billion functioning cells to approximate the function of a liver or kidney, and "there are dozens of cell types in these organs," Miller pointed out. "We are typically only looking at one or two cell types being put into a 3D printed structure."
NOTE SOURCE WITH QUALS EDITED INTO BEGINNING OF CARD
| 861 |
<h4>artificial organs are infeasible and decades away</h4><p><strong>Adhikari 14</strong> Richard Adhikari has written about high-tech for leading industry publications since the 1990s </p><p>03/26/14 Bioprinting, Part 1: The Promise and the Pitfalls <u>http://www.technewsworld.com/story/80198.html</p><p></u>[<u><mark>According t</mark>o <mark>Jordan Miller</u>,</mark> assistant professor of bioengineering <u><mark>at Rice</u></mark> University]. <u>"<mark>Parts of the body which require human cells to perform biomechanical functions, such as the liver or kidney, are still several decades away </mark>from reaching human patients," </u>Miller said<u>. "<mark>We are still in the feasibility stage -- not sure how to keep cells alive at high cell density and adequate size needed to match human organs</mark>." A 3D structure will require nearly 1 billion functioning cells to approximate the function of a liver or kidney, and "<mark>there are dozens of cell types in these organs</mark>," </u>Miller pointed out<u>. "<mark>We are typically only looking at one or two cell types being put into a 3D printed structure</mark>."</p><p></u><strong>NOTE SOURCE WITH QUALS EDITED INTO BEGINNING OF CARD</p></strong>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Shortage
| 430,249 | 7 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
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Texas
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1
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Kentucky Hampton-Roman
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Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,333 |
Legal regimes for sex work require licensing and zoning. These mechanisms will be used to police racial and class Others.
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Scoular 10,
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Scoular 10, Jane, Professor of Law at University of Strathclyde, March 2010, “What's Law Got To Do With it? How and Why Law Matters in the Regulation of Sex Work,” Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 37, No. 1, Wiley Online, Accessed 9/10/14
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Empirical evidence points to two parallel processes in which prostitution becomes a target for the state's wider efforts to responsibilize citizens, while simultaneously maintaining spaces for the operation of the capitalist economy. Processes of licensing and exiting operate to normalize particular forms of citizenship and sexual activity which enhance a broader structure of consumption, rendering deviant those who cannot through poverty, race, immigration status or health meet these increasingly restricted norms of citizenship, and marginalizing unproductive spaces. the normalization of commercial sex business reveal a shared set of underlying economic and cultural interests; the excision of class and racial Others from gentrifying inner cities, the facilitation of the post-industrial service sector, and the creation of clean urban spaces in which middle-class men can safely indulge in recreational commercial sexual consumption. This normative order is established via a continuum of regulatory mechanisms Law does play a vital role in authorizing other forms of knowledge, helping to shape content, and empowering a group of regulatory agents in exercising diffuse power an extended group of regulatory agents exercise normalizing power in `the bureaucratic workings of our over-governed existence'. These forums feature a hybridization of legal and non-legal authority. The state's role may be augmented by a wider range of control mechanisms and forms of professional intervention that may be even more pervasive Licensing decision making operates to reaffirm the dividing lines between legitimate and illegitimate forms of commercial sex. This ensures that the wider structures of governmentality fit with local conditions while appearing to comply with the liberal objection to state interference. the economic and racial segregation apparent in indoor settings appears distant and accidental as it is effected by powers exercised by diverse groups. the apparent increased `protection' promised by reforms results in the increased policing of many women's lives. the current preoccupation with particular subjects and spaces of sex work and the operationalizing of forms of governance to save, empower, responsibilize, and ethically reconstruct individuals all testament to law's increasing normalizing ambitions as it construct `the fabric of the modern subject'. both licensing and exiting operate to encourage subjects to perform as `self-governing, rational actors' required by the wider context of neo-liberalism and to identify those who cannot self-manage or who resist normalization in order that they be excluded.
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Empirical evidence points to two parallel processes in which prostitution becomes a target for the state's efforts to responsibilize citizens, while maintaining the capitalist economy. licensing and exiting operate to normalize particular forms of citizenship enhance a broader structure of consumption, rendering deviant those who cannot through poverty, race, immigration status or health and marginalizing unproductive spaces. the normalization of commercial sex business reveal the excision of class and racial Others from inner cities, the facilitation of the post-industrial service sector, and creation of clean urban spaces in which middle-class men can safely indulge in sexual consumption. via a continuum of regulatory mechanisms regulatory agents exercise normalizing power The state may be augmented by wider control mechanisms and professional intervention Licensing operates to reaffirm the dividing lines between legitimate and illegitimate forms of sex. `protection' promised results in increased policing licensing and exiting encourage subjects to perform as `self-governing, rational actors' required by neo-liberalism and to identify those who resist normalization in order that they be excluded.
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HOW LAW MATTERS 1. Norms By examining what law is doing in both cases, it becomes apparent that despite the difference in rhetoric, legal strategies for the governance of sex work share a number of similarities in terms of their regulatory ambitions. Empirical evidence points to two parallel processes in which prostitution becomes a target for the state's wider efforts to responsibilize citizens, while simultaneously maintaining spaces for the operation of the capitalist economy. Processes of licensing and exiting operate to normalize particular forms of citizenship and sexual activity which enhance a broader structure of consumption, rendering deviant those who cannot through poverty, race, immigration status or health meet these increasingly restricted norms of citizenship, and marginalizing unproductive spaces. As Bernstein notes: both the state policing of the street-level sex trade and the normalization of other forms of commercial sex business reveal a shared set of underlying economic and cultural interests; the excision of class and racial Others from gentrifying inner cities, the facilitation of the post-industrial service sector, and the creation of clean and shiny urban spaces in which middle-class men can safely indulge in recreational commercial sexual consumption.86 This normative order is established not through law as such but via a continuum of regulatory mechanisms of which it forms part. Law has no privilege in this system but it does play a vital role in authorizing other forms of knowledge, helping to shape content, and empowering a much wider group of regulatory agents in exercising more diffuse forms of power. 2. Authorizations Examining the extended forms of governance operating in this area may enlighten us more about what law is doing than the statute book. Thus, in the context of Sweden and the Netherlands, despite differences at a sovereign level in prostitution policy, law authorizes and operates though a number of quasi-legal forums (john schools, exiting programmes, rehabilitation schemes, and licensing boards) and techniques (anti-social behaviour orders, fines, rehabilitation orders, licenses) in which an extended group of regulatory agents exercise normalizing power: `all the little judges of conduct [who] exercise their petty powers of adjudication and enforcement'87 in what Valverde and Rose call `the bureaucratic workings of our over-governed existence'.88 These forums feature a hybridization of legal and non-legal authority. The state's role appears to recede but it may actually be augmented by a wider range of control mechanisms and forms of professional intervention that may be even more pervasive than the previous systems. Licensing decision making is devolved to a wider group, yet operates to reaffirm the dividing lines between legitimate and illegitimate forms of commercial sex. Indeed, it may be more useful than direct control as delegated authority refines law more minutely in response to shifting realities on the ground and employs a wider group of authorities in its realization. This ensures that the wider structures of governmentality fit with local conditions while appearing to comply with the liberal objection to state interference. Thus, in the case of the Netherlands, while street sex work has not been outlawed it has been made more and more difficult, as a number of municipalities in closing their tippelzones have dispensed with their previous assumed duties to provide safe places for street sex work. Similarly the economic and racial segregation apparent in indoor settings appears distant and accidental as it is effected by powers exercised by diverse groups. In Sweden decriminalization premised on exiting may actually signal a wider range of control mechanisms and forms of professional intervention which are even more pervasive than the previous system of fines. Thus, the apparent increased `protection' promised by reforms results in the increased policing of many women's lives.89 3. Subjectifications There is a question which is essential in the Modern Tribunal, but which would have had a strange ring to it 150 years [ago]: `Who are You?'90 Foucault's observation in The Dangerous Individual is that law in normalizing societies is increasingly concerned with lives rather than with acts. This is evident in the current preoccupation with particular subjects and spaces of sex work and the operationalizing of forms of governance to save, empower, responsibilize, and ethically reconstruct individuals – all testament to law's increasing normalizing ambitions as it acts alongside other discourses to construct `the fabric of the modern subject'.91 In doing so it operates not ideologically, as there is always resistance, nor through the simple imputation of legal consciousness,92 but through a process of subjectification, encouraging self-projects in ways that align with the diverse objectives of legislation.93 Thus, if we examine the continuities in the projects of self-governance promoted in each jurisdiction, we begin to see that the commonly accepted opposition between victim and agent may not be as marked when viewed through a governmental lens. Thus, through parallel forms of subjectification, both licensing and exiting operate to encourage subjects to perform as `self-governing, rational actors' required by the wider context of neo-liberalism and to identify those who cannot self-manage or who resist normalization in order that they be excluded.
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<h4>Legal regimes for sex work require licensing and zoning. These mechanisms will be used to police racial and class Others. </h4><p><strong>Scoular 10, </strong>Jane, Professor of Law at University of Strathclyde, March 2010, “What's Law Got To Do With it? How and Why Law Matters in the Regulation of Sex Work,” Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 37, No. 1, Wiley Online, Accessed 9/10/14</p><p>HOW LAW MATTERS 1. Norms By examining what law is doing in both cases, it becomes apparent that despite the difference in rhetoric, legal strategies for the governance of sex work share a number of similarities in terms of their regulatory ambitions. <u><mark>Empirical evidence points to two parallel processes in which prostitution becomes a target for the state's</mark> wider <mark>efforts to responsibilize citizens, while</mark> simultaneously <mark>maintaining</mark> spaces for the operation of <mark>the capitalist economy.</mark> Processes of <mark>licensing and exiting operate to normalize particular forms of citizenship</mark> and sexual activity which <mark>enhance a broader structure of consumption, rendering deviant those who cannot through <strong>poverty, race, immigration status or health</strong></mark> meet these increasingly restricted norms of citizenship, <mark>and <strong>marginalizing unproductive spaces.</u></strong></mark> As Bernstein notes: both the state policing of the street-level sex trade and <u><mark>the normalization of</u></mark> other forms of <u><mark>commercial sex business reveal</mark> a shared set of underlying economic and cultural interests; <strong><mark>the excision of class and racial Others</strong> from</mark> gentrifying <mark>inner cities,</mark> <mark>the facilitation of the post-industrial service sector, and</mark> the <mark>creation of clean</u></mark> and shiny <u><mark>urban spaces in which middle-class men can safely indulge in</mark> recreational commercial <mark>sexual consumption.</u></mark>86 <u>This normative order is established</u> not through law as such but <u><strong><mark>via a continuum of regulatory mechanisms</u></strong></mark> of which it forms part. <u>Law</u> has no privilege in this system but it <u>does play a vital role in authorizing other forms of knowledge, helping to shape content, and empowering a</u> much wider <u>group of regulatory agents in exercising </u>more <u>diffuse</u> forms of<u> power</u>. 2. Authorizations Examining the extended forms of governance operating in this area may enlighten us more about what law is doing than the statute book. Thus, in the context of Sweden and the Netherlands, despite differences at a sovereign level in prostitution policy, law authorizes and operates though a number of quasi-legal forums (john schools, exiting programmes, rehabilitation schemes, and licensing boards) and techniques (anti-social behaviour orders, fines, rehabilitation orders, licenses) in which <u>an extended group of <mark>regulatory agents exercise normalizing power</u></mark>: `all the little judges of conduct [who] exercise their petty powers of adjudication and enforcement'87 <u>in</u> what Valverde and Rose call <u>`the bureaucratic workings of our over-governed existence'.</u>88 <u>These forums feature a hybridization of legal and non-legal authority. <mark>The state</mark>'s role</u> appears to recede but it <u><mark>may</u></mark> actually <u><mark>be augmented by</mark> a <mark>wider</mark> range of <mark>control mechanisms and</mark> forms of <mark>professional intervention</mark> that may be even more pervasive</u> than the previous systems. <u><mark>Licensing</mark> decision making</u> is devolved to a wider group, yet <u><mark>operates to reaffirm the dividing lines between legitimate and illegitimate forms of </mark>commercial <mark>sex.</mark> </u>Indeed, it may be more useful than direct control as delegated authority refines law more minutely in response to shifting realities on the ground and employs a wider group of authorities in its realization. <u>This ensures that the wider structures of governmentality fit with local conditions while appearing to comply with the liberal objection to state interference.</u> Thus, in the case of the Netherlands, while street sex work has not been outlawed it has been made more and more difficult, as a number of municipalities in closing their tippelzones have dispensed with their previous assumed duties to provide safe places for street sex work. Similarly <u>the economic and racial segregation apparent in indoor settings appears distant and accidental as it is effected by powers exercised by diverse groups.</u> In Sweden decriminalization premised on exiting may actually signal a wider range of control mechanisms and forms of professional intervention which are even more pervasive than the previous system of fines. Thus, <u>the apparent increased <mark>`protection' promised</mark> by reforms <mark>results in</mark> the <mark>increased policing</mark> of many women's lives.</u>89 3. Subjectifications There is a question which is essential in the Modern Tribunal, but which would have had a strange ring to it 150 years [ago]: `Who are You?'90 Foucault's observation in The Dangerous Individual is that law in normalizing societies is increasingly concerned with lives rather than with acts. This is evident in <u>the current preoccupation with particular subjects and spaces of sex work and the operationalizing of forms of governance to save, empower, responsibilize, and ethically reconstruct individuals</u> – <u>all testament to law's increasing normalizing ambitions as it</u> acts alongside other discourses to <u>construct `the fabric of the modern subject'.</u>91 In doing so it operates not ideologically, as there is always resistance, nor through the simple imputation of legal consciousness,92 but through a process of subjectification, encouraging self-projects in ways that align with the diverse objectives of legislation.93 Thus, if we examine the continuities in the projects of self-governance promoted in each jurisdiction, we begin to see that the commonly accepted opposition between victim and agent may not be as marked when viewed through a governmental lens. Thus, through parallel forms of subjectification, <u>both <mark>licensing and exiting</mark> operate to <mark>encourage subjects to perform as `self-governing, rational actors' required by</mark> the wider context of <mark>neo-liberalism and to identify those</mark> who cannot self-manage or <mark>who resist normalization in order that they be excluded.</u></mark> </p>
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1nc
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3
| 1,240,914 | 14 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
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Navy
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5
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James Madison Lepp-Miller
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McElhinny
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T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ya.....
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Ah.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
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743,334 |
Technical compliance is sufficient to maintain the treaty system
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Guercio et al 12
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Guercio et al 12 (Susan; Heather Haase, consultant for International Drug Policy Consortium and the Harm Reduction Coalition, “The International Drug Control Treaties: How Important Are They to US Drug Reform?” http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/3_20072283-InternationalDrugControlTreaties.pdf)
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If treaties are so destructive, and there is no real enforcement, then why does almost every country in the world remain signatory and, , faithfully comply many experts point to the reputation al aspect of international law — many countries do not want to be seen as uncooperative Instead of withdrawing from or disregarding their obligations under the treaties, many countries have reacted over the years by pushing the outer limits of what is technically allowable, or by broadly interpreting the language of the treaties. . For example 1988 Convention does not specify what the punishment must be Portugal’s ―decriminalization laws take advantage of this grey area . Holland exercises a policy of non - enforcement soft challenges to the treaties , skirt the problem by simply limiting compliance to ―technical compliance in law the only challenges to the treaties have been ―soft‖ challenges. It would seem that nations have gone to great pains to stay within technical compliance as much as possible while still enjoying more liberal drug control environment
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I treaties are so destructive, and there is no real enforcement, then why does almost every country in the world remain signatory nd faithfully comply many experts point to the reputation al aspect countries do not want to be seen as uncooperative .¶ Instead of withdrawing from or disregarding bligations many countries pushing the outer limits of what is technically allowable For example, onvention does not specify unishment Holland exercises a policy of non - enforcement soft challenges to the treaties , skirt the problem by technical compliance in It would seem that nations have gone to great pains to stay within technical compliance as much as possible while still enjoying more liberal drug control environment
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If the treaties are so destructive, and there is no real enforcement, then why does almost every country in the world remain signatory to and, for the most part, faithfully comply with them? Pressure from the United States (and fear of losing aid) is certainly a major factor. But many experts point to the reputation al aspect of international law — many countries do not want to be seen as uncooperative — in effect, ―pariah s ‖ — in the international community.¶ Instead of withdrawing from or disregarding their obligations under the treaties, many countries have reacted over the years by pushing the outer limits of what is technically allowable, or by broadly interpreting the language of the treaties.¶ The treaties themselves allow a certain amount of flexibility in their interpretation. For example, while the 1988 Convention requires that countries make possession for personal consumption a criminal violation, it does not specify what the punishment must be. Portugal’s ―decriminalization laws take advantage of this grey area and dictate that offenders are diverted to education classes, treatment sessions, or are given a fine. Holland continues to maintain laws on its books criminalizing possession of marijuana, but exercises a policy of non - enforcement when it comes to marijuana sold in its famous ―coffee houses.‖ In the U.S., m any argue that ―medical use‖ is not defined in the treaties and therefore, medical marijuana is technically allowed (the INCB and the DEA do not share this view).¶ These measures — non - enforcement, de criminalization/depenalization, and medicalization — known as ―soft challenges to the treaties , skirt the problem by simply limiting compliance to ―technical compliance in law, while allowing for de facto policies more in keeping with the desired policy change within each country .¶ Until recently, the only challenges to the treaties have been ―soft‖ challenges. It would seem that nations have gone to great pains to stay within technical compliance as much as possible while still enjoying more liberal drug control environment within their own borders.
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<h4>Technical compliance is sufficient to maintain the treaty system</h4><p><u><strong>Guercio et al 12 </u></strong> (Susan; Heather Haase, consultant for International Drug Policy Consortium and the Harm Reduction Coalition, “The International Drug Control Treaties: How Important Are They to US Drug Reform?” http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/3_20072283-InternationalDrugControlTreaties.pdf)</p><p><u><mark>I</mark>f </u>the <u><mark>treaties are so destructive, and there is no real enforcement, then why does almost every country in the world remain signatory</u></mark> to <u>a<mark>nd</mark>,</u> for the most part<u>, <mark>faithfully comply</u></mark> with them? Pressure from the United States (and fear of losing aid) is certainly a major factor. But <u><mark>many experts point to the reputation al aspect</mark> of international law — many <mark>countries do not want to be seen as uncooperative</u></mark> — in effect, ―pariah s ‖ — in the international community<mark>.¶ <u>Instead of withdrawing from or disregarding</mark> their o<mark>bligations</mark> under the treaties, <mark>many countries</mark> have reacted over the years by <mark>pushing the outer limits of what is technically allowable</mark>, or by broadly interpreting the language of the treaties.</u>¶ The treaties themselves allow a certain amount of flexibility in their interpretation<u>. <mark>For example</u>,</mark> while the <u>1988 C<mark>onvention</u></mark> requires that countries make possession for personal consumption a criminal violation, it <u><mark>does not specify</mark> what the p<mark>unishment</mark> must be</u>. <u>Portugal’s ―decriminalization laws take advantage of this grey area</u> and dictate that offenders are diverted to education classes, treatment sessions, or are given a fine<u>. <mark>Holland</u></mark> continues to maintain laws on its books criminalizing possession of marijuana, but <u><mark>exercises a policy of non - enforcement</u></mark> when it comes to marijuana sold in its famous ―coffee houses.‖ In the U.S., m any argue that ―medical use‖ is not defined in the treaties and therefore, medical marijuana is technically allowed (the INCB and the DEA do not share this view).¶ These measures — non - enforcement, de criminalization/depenalization, and medicalization — known as ―<u><mark>soft challenges to the treaties , skirt the problem by</mark> simply limiting compliance to ―<mark>technical compliance in</mark> law</u>, while allowing for de facto policies more in keeping with the desired policy change within each country .¶ Until recently, <u>the only challenges to the treaties have been ―soft‖ challenges. <mark>It would seem that nations have gone to great pains to stay within technical compliance as much as possible while still enjoying more liberal drug control environment </u></mark>within their own borders.</p>
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2nr
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AT: State Thumper
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
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Navy
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Quarters
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Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
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Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
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Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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cx
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college
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743,335 |
No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant
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Mueller 10
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Mueller 10 (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)
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Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious choir when they, like Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism the most immediate threat This is hardly a new anxiety Oppenheimer warned that an atomic bomb could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation the we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task In contrast to predictions, terrorist groups have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful armed theft of fissile material unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase immediate this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates any one of whom could turn on them or furnish them with stuff that is useless If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining relevant material, have to transport over unfamiliar terrain while being pursued by security forces smuggling routes are not as chaotic as they appear and are under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators Once outside the country would need to set up a well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of skilled scientists The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated Members of the bomb-building team would have to be willing to put their lives at high risk the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting technical requirements verge on the unfeasible uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best Under If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are totally dedicated and technically proficient The financial costs could become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off vast conspiracy requires a considerable array of criminals each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small atomic terrorists will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are terminally dispiriting Adopting probability estimates that heavily bias in the terrorists’ favor the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion Other routes terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. unlikely to be given or sold a bomb because the risk would be high that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence group might steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices destroys the bomb if tampered with. And there are other security techniques codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it if a state utterly collapse nuclear weapons remain under heavy guard has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated the uranium episode never happened scientists were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design which is certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching Internet the reported assertions appear at best to be a desperate bluff Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted This has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face there is “little evidence that ideas ever developed into actual plans $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research the money was for chemical weapons Any “threat appears principally to derive from self-selected people who fantasize about performing dire deeds their capacities and schemes seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme history consistently demonstrates that and understand, not new, exotic ones We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are its capabilities are far inferior to its desires atomic terrorism is hugely unlikely At some point probabilities become so low that it may make sense to ignore them the risk becomes acceptable one in three billion per attempt.
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Politicians preach dramatic risk inflation terrorist groups have exhibited limited desire and progress armed theft unlikely chase immediate have to transport over unfamiliar terrain would need a well-equipped machine shop and skilled scientists technical requirements verge on the unfeasible Adopting bias in the terrorists’ favor the cumulative odds drop to one in three billion unlikely to be sold a bomb might steal a “loose nuke none exist bombs have devices destroys the bomb if tampered with. codes are required if a state collapse weapons remain under heavy guard al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond Internet.
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Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.
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<h4>No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant</h4><p><u><strong>Mueller 10</strong> (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)</p><p><mark>Politicians</mark> of all stripes <mark>preach</mark> to an anxious</u>, appreciative, and very numerous <u>choir when they, like</u> President <u>Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism</u> to be “<u>the most immediate</u> and extreme <u>threat</u> to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. <u>This is hardly a new anxiety</u>. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert <u>Oppenheimer</u> ominously <u>warned that</u> if three or four men could smuggle in units for <u>an atomic bomb</u>, they <u>could blow up New York. This</u> <u>was an early expression of a pattern of <mark>dramatic risk inflation</u></mark> that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, <u>the </u>blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, <u>we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task</u>. <u>In contrast to</u> these <u>predictions, <mark>terrorist groups</u></mark> seem to <u><mark>have exhibited</mark> only <mark>limited desire and</mark> even less <mark>progress</mark> in going atomic</u>. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that <u>the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful</u>. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright <u><mark>armed theft</mark> of fissile material </u>is exceedingly<u><mark> unlikely</mark> not only because of the resistance of guards, but because <mark>chase </u></mark>would be<u><mark> immediate</u></mark>. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, <u>this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates</u>, including brokers and money-transmitters, <u>any one of whom could turn on them or</u>, either out of guile or incompetence, <u>furnish them with stuff that is useless</u>. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” <u>If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining</u> a sufficient mass of <u>relevant material, </u>they would then probably <u><mark>have to transport </u></mark>it a long distance<u><mark> over unfamiliar terrain</u></mark> and probably <u>while being pursued by security forces</u>. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established <u>smuggling routes</u>, but these <u>are not as chaotic as they appear and are</u> often <u>under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators</u>. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. <u>Once outside the country</u> with their precious booty, terrorists<u><mark> would need</mark> to set up <mark>a </u></mark>large and<u><mark> well-equipped machine shop</mark> to manufacture a bomb <mark>and</mark> then to populate it with a very select team of </u>highly<u><mark> skilled scientists</u></mark>, technicians, machinists, and administrators. <u>The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated</u> among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. <u>Members of the bomb-building team</u> would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they <u>would have to be willing to put their lives</u> and certainly their careers <u>at high risk</u>, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that <u>the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group</u>.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that <u>the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting</u>, and that the <u><mark>technical requirements</u></mark> in several fields <u><mark>verge on the unfeasible</u></mark>. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that <u>uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine</u>” whereas “<u>plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered</u>, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “<u>to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best</u>.” <u>Under </u>the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. <u>If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton</u> or more, <u>would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are</u> at once <u>totally dedicated and technically proficient</u> at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. <u>The financial costs</u> of this extensive and extended operation <u>could</u> easily <u>become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off</u>. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the <u>vast conspiracy</u> also <u>requires</u> the subversion of <u>a considerable array of criminals</u> and opportunists, <u>each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible</u>. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But <u>although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small</u>. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be <u>atomic terrorists</u> would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they <u>will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are</u> daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even <u>terminally dispiriting</u>. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. <u><mark>Adopting</mark> probability estimates that</u> purposely and <u>heavily <mark>bias</u></mark> the case <u><mark>in the terrorists’ favor</u></mark>—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, <u><mark>the cumulative odds</mark> that they will be able to pull off the deed <mark>drop to one in</mark> well over <mark>three billion</u></mark>. <u>Other routes</u> would-be <u>terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. </u>They are<u> <mark>unlikely to be</mark> given or <mark>sold a bomb</u></mark> by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad <u>because the risk would be high</u>, even for a country led by extremists, <u>that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered</u> even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that <u>the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence</u>. The terrorist <u>group <mark>might</u></mark> also seek to <u><mark>steal</mark> or illicitly purchase <mark>a “loose nuke</u></mark>“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that <u><strong><mark>none exist</strong></mark>. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory</u> because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, <u>finished <mark>bombs have</mark> been out-fitted with <mark>devices </u></mark>that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that <u><mark>destroys the bomb if </u></mark>it is<u><mark> tampered with.</mark> And there are other security techniques</u>: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple<u><mark> codes are required</mark> not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it</u>. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge <u><mark>if a </u></mark>nuclear<u><mark> state </u></mark>were to<u> utterly <mark>collapse</u></mark>; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, <u>nuclear <mark>weapons </u></mark>would probably <u><mark>remain under heavy guard</u></mark> by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, <u>has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated</u>. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, <u>the uranium episode never happened</u>. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the <u>scientists</u> probably <u>were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design</u> but in the processing of fissile material, <u>which is</u> almost <u>certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group</u>. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that <u><mark>al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond</mark> searching </u>the<u><mark> Internet</u>.</mark> After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, <u>the reported assertions</u>, although unsettling, <u>appear at best to be a desperate bluff</u>. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “<u>Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted</u> as expressing a determination to use them. <u>This</u> in turn <u>has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face</u>.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” <u>there is “little evidence that</u> such <u>ideas ever developed into actual plans</u>, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to <u>$4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research</u> and that <u>the money was</u> mainly <u>for</u> very crude work on <u>chemical weapons</u>. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. <u>Any “threat</u>,” particularly to the West, <u>appears</u>, then, <u>principally to derive from self-selected people</u>, often isolated from each other, <u>who fantasize about performing dire deeds</u>. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, <u>their capacities and schemes</u>, or alleged schemes, <u>seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest</u>. Most important for present purposes, however, is that <u>any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme</u>. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, <u>history consistently demonstrates that </u>terrorists prefer weapons that they know<u> and understand, not new, exotic ones</u>. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “<u>We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated</u>. In fact, <u>we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are</u>.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “<u>its capabilities are far inferior to its desires</u>.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that <u>atomic terrorism</u> under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it <u>is hugely unlikely</u>. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. <u>At some point</u>, however, <u>probabilities become so low that</u>, even for catastrophic events, <u>it may make sense to ignore them</u> or at least put them on the back burner; in short, <u>the risk becomes acceptable</u>. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or <u><strong>one in three billion per attempt.</p></u></strong>
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
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Boston College Kenner-Carelli
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Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
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Gopar 14 Jennifer Julisa Gopar ans Dr. Rance LeFebvre 28 July 2014 COSMOS Cluster 7: Biomedical Sciences The Moral and Ethical Debate Regarding Artificial Organ Growth
http://cosmos.ucdavis.edu/archives/2014/Cluster7/Gopar_Jennifer_EthicsofGrowingOrgans.pdf
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The Scientist elaborated on this possible problem, stating Platt thinks that organ engineering is too costly to meet the needs of everyone waiting for a transplant. ‘You’d have to turn over the entire GDP of a country to accomplish that,’ he says. So it is still unclear whether the cost of these artificial organs will allow them to be within the reach of patients in need of an organ transplant.
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organ engineering is too costly to meet the needs of everyone waiting for a transplant. ‘You’d have to turn over the entire GDP of a country to accomplish that,’ it is unclear whether the cost of these artificial organs will allow them to be within the reach of patients in need of an organ transplant.
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With these possible outcomes taken consideration, it is now becoming clear that money will play an important role in artificial organ growth. If we begin producing artificial organs, will these be available to everyone? Or will these be only available to the wealthy? The whole purpose of artificial organ growth is to give hope to those waiting for an organ transplant. How would this fulfill that purpose if only the wealthy will be able to afford it? The Scientist elaborated on this possible problem, stating, “[Jeffrey] Platt thinks that organ engineering is too costly to meet the needs of everyone waiting for a transplant. ‘You’d have to turn over the entire GDP of a country to accomplish that,’ he says. On the other hand, ‘I could get a pig for a couple of hundred dollars.’ But [Paolo] Macchiarini argues that organ engineering is in its infancy, and every advance improves efficiency and lowers cost. ‘What we did in 2008 in 6 months, we can now do in a few weeks,’ he says. ‘We do care about getting this to every patient.’ [Joseph] Vacanti adds that mass-producing artificial scaffolds will make organ engineering even more cost-effective. ‘When you scale them up, the bulk materials and manufacturing tech are extremely cheap,’ he says. ‘I think it’s going to be cheaper than growing lots of pigs.’” So it is still unclear whether the cost of these artificial organs will allow them to be within the reach of patients in need of an organ transplant.
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<h4><strong>Artificial are too expensive</h4><p>Gopar 14</strong> Jennifer Julisa Gopar ans Dr. Rance LeFebvre 28 July 2014 COSMOS Cluster 7: Biomedical Sciences The Moral and Ethical Debate Regarding Artificial Organ Growth</p><p><u>http://cosmos.ucdavis.edu/archives/2014/Cluster7/Gopar_Jennifer_EthicsofGrowingOrgans.pdf</p><p></u>With these possible outcomes taken consideration, it is now becoming clear that money will play an important role in artificial organ growth. If we begin producing artificial organs, will these be available to everyone? Or will these be only available to the wealthy? The whole purpose of artificial organ growth is to give hope to those waiting for an organ transplant. How would this fulfill that purpose if only the wealthy will be able to afford it? <u>The Scientist elaborated on this possible problem, stating</u>, “[Jeffrey] <u>Platt thinks that <mark>organ engineering is too</u> <u>costly to meet the needs of everyone waiting for a transplant. ‘You’d have to turn over <strong>the entire GDP of a country</strong> to accomplish that,’</mark> he says.</u> On the other hand, ‘I could get a pig for a couple of hundred dollars.’ But [Paolo] Macchiarini argues that organ engineering is in its infancy, and every advance improves efficiency and lowers cost. ‘What we did in 2008 in 6 months, we can now do in a few weeks,’ he says. ‘We do care about getting this to every patient.’ [Joseph] Vacanti adds that mass-producing artificial scaffolds will make organ engineering even more cost-effective. ‘When you scale them up, the bulk materials and manufacturing tech are extremely cheap,’ he says. ‘I think it’s going to be cheaper than growing lots of pigs.’” <u>So <mark>it is</mark> still <strong><mark>unclear whether the cost of these artificial organs will allow them to be within the reach of patients in need of an organ transplant.</p></u></strong></mark>
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Contention 1 – Shortage
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Their ev’s all hype --- ISIS has no capabilities and their impact’s empirically denied
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NBC 9/12/14
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NBC 9/12/14 (“Petraeus: Don't Overestimate ISIS in Iraq”, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/petraeus-dont-overestimate-isis-iraq-n202011)//trepka
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ISIS should not be overestimated and has “nowhere near” the strength of al Qaeda in Iraq at the height of the war in that country that ISIS in Syria is “far more complex.” it has nowhere near the roots, the numbers and the structure that al Qaeda in Iraq and the associated Sunni insurgents had when we launched the surge” in 2007.
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ISIS has “nowhere near” the strength of al Qaeda in Iraq at the height ISIS is more complex it has nowhere near the roots numbers and structure al Qaeda had in 2007.
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Gen. David Petraeus says ISIS should not be overestimated and has “nowhere near” the strength of al Qaeda in Iraq at the height of the war in that country. Petraeus, the former top American commander in Iraq and Afghanistan, told a crowd in Denver on Thursday that President Barack Obama made a compelling case for destroying ISIS militants. He said that the battle will probably outlast Obama’s administration, according to NBC affiliate KUSA. He also said that ISIS in Syria is “far more complex.” But in Iraq, the general said, ISIS “should not be overestimated in many respects — it has nowhere near the roots, the numbers and the structure that al Qaeda in Iraq and the associated Sunni insurgents had when we launched the surge” in 2007.
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<h4>Their ev’s all <u>hype</u> --- ISIS has <u>no capabilities</u> and their impact’s <u>empirically denied</u> </h4><p><strong>NBC 9/12/14 </strong>(“Petraeus: Don't Overestimate ISIS in Iraq”, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/petraeus-dont-overestimate-isis-iraq-n202011<u>)//trepka</p><p></u>Gen. David Petraeus says <u><mark>ISIS</mark> should not be overestimated and <mark>has “<strong>nowhere near</strong>” the</u> <u>strength of al Qaeda in Iraq at the <strong>height</strong> </mark>of the war in that country</u>. Petraeus, the former top American commander in Iraq and Afghanistan, told a crowd in Denver on Thursday that President Barack Obama made a compelling case for destroying ISIS militants. He said that the battle will probably outlast Obama’s administration, according to NBC affiliate KUSA. He also said <u>that <mark>ISIS</mark> in Syria <mark>is</mark> “<strong>far <mark>more complex</mark>.” </u></strong>But in Iraq, the general said, ISIS “should not be overestimated in many respects — <u><mark>it has nowhere near the <strong>roots</strong></mark>, the <strong><mark>numbers</strong> and</mark> the <strong><mark>structure</strong></mark> that <mark>al Qaeda </mark>in Iraq and the associated Sunni insurgents <mark>had</mark> when we launched the surge” <mark>in 2007.</p></u></mark>
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treaties
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
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Boston College Kenner-Carelli
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Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
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We advocate the discourse of decriminalization instead of legalization.International sex worker rights organizations call for decriminalization, not legalization. The discourse of legalization empowers state-regulation and punitive action. Decriminalization meets the demand for dignity and respect for sex workers.
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McCLINTOCK 92
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Anne McCLINTOCK 92 Simone de Beauvoir Professor of English @ Wisconsin ’92 “Screwing the System: Sexwork, Race, and the Law” boundary 2
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Prostitutes around the world are becoming their own media advocates and political activists radically challenging the stigma of sexual and racial deviance hundreds of prostitution organizations have burgeoned worldwide launched the Second World Whores' Congress. Drawn from over sixteen countries and representing millions of sex workers worldwide the prostitutes drew up a Whores' Charter calling for the decriminalization of sex work prostitutes called for the right of women and men to work voluntarily in the sex trade under safe, unregulated and respected conditions Where prostitution is a crime Prostitutes cannot claims social welfare or life insurance healthcare or maternity benefits, childcare or pensions Sexwork that benefits the male state, however, is tolerated and administered by a system of international euphemisms massage parlors, escort agencies, bars, rest and recreation resorts, which are run not by hookers but by male "entertainment managers." Most prostitutes regard legalized prostitution as legalized abuse. Despite its benign ring, legalization places prostitution under criminal law instead of commercial law, where it is tightly curbed by the state and administered by the police Instead, prostitutes want the law off their bodies and are calling for the decriminalization of the profession and the repeal of all legislation not ordinarily applicable to a business or trade. Legalization puts women's bodies firmly in men's hands. In a legalized brothel in Nevada, prostitutes are forced to work three weeks at a stretch, servicing any man who picks them, at any time of the day or nigh In many of the legalized brothels and clubs in Europe, Women have no right to refuse men and often no right to use a condom. Under legalization The state becomes a licit pimp penning prostitutes in brothels and levying punitive taxes Under legalization the state controls prostitutes work and leisure, preventing organization and often making it very hard for them to leave the trade if they wish Most prostitutes prefer to work illegally rather than submit to the abusive and humiliating ordeals of state-controlled brothels. Legalizing prostitution sees women as a controlled substance-controlled by men The international prostitutes movement thus calls for the decriminalization, not the legalization Prostitutes demand that their work be respected as a social service for both men and women and that it be brought under commercial law like other professions.
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from over sixteen countries representing millions of sex workers prostitutes drew up a Whores' Charter calling for the decriminalization of sex work prostitutes called for women and men to work in the sex trade under safe, unregulated and respected conditions. prostitutes regard legalized prostitution as legalized abuse. legalization places prostitution under criminal law instead of commercial law, where it is administered by the police prostitutes want the law off their bodies and are calling for decriminalization Legalization puts women's bodies in men's hands. In legalized brothels Women have no right to refuse men and use a condom. Under legalization The state becomes a licit pimp, penning prostitutes in brothels and levying taxes Under legalization the state controls prostitutes preventing organization and making it hard for them to leave prostitutes prefer to work illegally than submit to the abusive and humiliating ordeals of state-controlled brothels. Legalizing prostitution sees women as a controlled substance The international prostitutes movement calls for the decriminalization, not the legalization
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"It's a Business Doing Pleasure with You": Prostitution Is Work Prostitutes around the world are now becoming their own media advocates and political activists, radically challenging the stigma of sexual and racial deviance.50 Since the 1970s, hundreds of prostitution organizations have burgeoned worldwide, from Hawaii to Austria, from Canada to the Philippines, from Zimbabwe to the Netherlands. In 1986, prostitutes from around the world met in Brussels at an extraordinary session of the European Parliament, where they launched the Second World Whores' Congress. Drawn from over sixteen countries and representing millions of sex workers worldwide the prostitutes drew up a Whores' Charter calling for the decriminalization of sex work and an end to all violations of sexworker rights. In October1 991, sexworkers from sixteen countries met in Frankfurt at the First European Prostitutes Congress to call for the recognition of voluntary prostitution as a profession in the European Charter and for full rights as workers under European labor l aw. To the consternation of many governments and some feminists, prostitutes called not for the abolition of prostitution but for the redistribution of sexual pleasure, power, and profit; for the transformation of land and property rights for the removal of foreign armies; and for the right of women and men to work voluntarily in the sex trade under safe, unregulated and respected conditions.53 Many men, however, prefer to find whores in their beds than in their Parliaments and attempts by sexworkers to organize have met with unswerving violence. An Irish organizer was burnt to death, and Thai organizers have been murdered Ecuadoran brothel owners rotate prostitutes regularly to prevent them from organizing.54Y et by and large, the international Left has been largely indifferent to the issue, while the abolitionist tendency among some feminists has been nothing short of calamitous for working prostitutes. Most prostitutes insist that the first target of their international organizing is the state and the law. Prostitutes argue that the laws punish rather than protect women, especially women of color. Where sexwork is a crime, clients can rape, rob, and batter women with impunity. Murderers know the weight of a prostitute's life in the scales of the law. As Dallas Judge Jack Hampton admitted", I'd be hard put to give somebody life for killing a prostitute." Not surprisingly more prostitutes are murdered in the United States, where prostitution is still a crime, than anywhere else in the world. Prostitutes denounce the laws that shunt them into dangerous, desolate docklands meatpacking districts and railwayards, unable to organize for decent conditions or against coercion. Where prostitution is a crime, women can not demand police protection or claim legal recourse for robbery or coercion, for they thereby expose themselves as implicated in a criminalized trade. Where sexwork is a crime, prostitutes are forced by landlords to pay exorbitant rents or are driven to work the freezing and dangerous streets. Prostitutes cannot claims social welfare or life insurance healthcare or maternity benefits, childcare or pensions. Where prostitution is a crime, migrant women are evicted from their homes, are denied work papers, and are detained and deported. Every cent of a prostitute's earnings is criminally contaminated. The property and possessions of prostitutes are often forfeited, and mothers, brothers friends, and lovers can be flung into prison for living off immoral earnings. Most cruelly, a prostitute cannot keep her children. Most prostitutes are mothers, and most are in the game for their children. In many countries, however, social workers have the power to take a prostitute's children out of "moral danger" into "care." In these ways, the state curtails women's power, diverting illicit female money back into the coffers of male circulation and curtailintg the emergence of independent female heads of family. Sexwork that benefits the male state, however, is tolerated and administered by a system of international euphemisms: massage parlors, escort agencies, bars, rest and recreation resorts, and so on, which are run not by hookers but by male "entertainment managers." In Thailand for example, prostitution inhabits a twilight realm of legal ambiguity. The law makes prostitution a crime, but the green light is given to male" tour operators" and "entertainment managers, "whose operations are sanctioned and defined as the "personal services sector." Most prostitutes regard legalized prostitution as legalized abuse. Despite its benign ring, legalization places prostitution under criminal law instead of commercial law, where it is tightly curbed by the state and administered by the police. Instead, prostitutes want the law off their bodies and are calling for the decriminalization of the profession and the repeal of all legislation not ordinarily applicable to a business or trade. Legalization puts women's bodies firmly in men's hands. In the aptly named Chicken Ranch, a legalized brothel in Nevada, prostitutes are forced to work three weeks at a stretch, servicing any man who picks them, at any time of the day or night, a dizzying and dispiriting carousel of faceless tricks. In many of the legalized brothels and clubs in Europe, Lisbet, a German prostitute, told me, "Women have no right to refuse men and often no right to use a condom." Under legalization, the profits of women's work clatter into men's pockets. The state becomes a licit pimp, penning prostitutes in brothels and levying punitive taxes at rates higher than other workers. In Germany, legalized prostitutes pay 56 percent of their earnings in taxes, but, unlike other taxpayers, they are not eligible for any social benefits whatsoever. Under legalization the state controls prostitutes work and leisure, preventing organization and often making it very hard for them to leave the trade if they wish. Most prostitutes prefer to work illegally rather than submit to the abusive and humiliating ordeals of state-controlled brothels. French prostitutes cannot live with a husband wife, lover, or child, as anyone under their roof can be charged with “cohabitation." Italian prostitutes cannot help their husbands or wives pay the rent or give their parents money, as they can be charged with living off "immoral earnings." In Britain, engaging in prostitution is not a crime (which lets the johns off the hook),but virtually every aspect of a prostitute's work is criminalized. Two women working together for safety can be charged with keeping a brothel. In Switzerland if a woman decides to leave the trade and seek other work, she first has to get a "good girl" letter from the police to prove her good conduct. To get the letter, she has to wait three years without working as a prostitute to prove her good conduct. Until then, she cannot legally find other work. In Frankfurt zoning laws force women to work the deserted harbor area, where they can be tortured and dumped in the water without a stir. In Canada, prostitution is not a crime, but "communicating for the purposes of prostitution is.” Prostitutes can be penalized for organizing and informing each other of dangerous tricks or corrupt police. Austrian prostitutes have to report to the polices imply to go on holiday. Some of the most appalling conditions prevail in India. Between 1980 and 1984, not a single landlord was arrested for illegally pandering to prostitutes, but 44,633 prostitutes were arrested for soliciting in Bombay alone. As Dolores French, author, activist, and prostitute, told me in a private interview", Legalizing prostitution sees women as a controlled substance-controlled by men. "The international prostitutes movement thus calls for the decriminalization, not the legalization, of their work. Prostitutes demand that their work be respected as a social service for both men and women and that it be brought under commercial law like other professions. Why, they ask, can masseurs command respect and gratitude for servicing naked clients in comfortable rooms, while prostitutes are criminalized? If their work were decriminalized, prostitutes could ply their trade in safety and respect, paying normal rent and taxes, in houses as clean and comfortable as those of the average therapist or chiropractor.
| 8,388 |
<h4>We advocate the discourse of decriminalization instead of legalization.International sex worker rights organizations call for decriminalization, not legalization. The discourse of legalization empowers state-regulation and punitive action. Decriminalization meets the demand for dignity and respect for sex workers. </h4><p>Anne <strong>McCLINTOCK 92</strong> Simone de Beauvoir Professor of English @ Wisconsin ’92 “Screwing the System: Sexwork, Race, and the Law” boundary 2 </p><p>"It's a Business Doing Pleasure with You": Prostitution Is Work <u>Prostitutes around the world are</u> now <u>becoming their own media advocates and political activists</u>, <u>radically challenging the stigma of sexual and racial deviance</u>.50 Since the 1970s, <u>hundreds of prostitution organizations have burgeoned worldwide</u>, from Hawaii to Austria, from Canada to the Philippines, from Zimbabwe to the Netherlands. In 1986, prostitutes from around the world met in Brussels at an extraordinary session of the European Parliament, where they <u>launched the Second World Whores' Congress. Drawn <mark>from over sixteen countries</mark> and <mark>representing millions of sex workers</mark> worldwide</u> <u>the <mark>prostitutes drew up a Whores' Charter calling for the <strong>decriminalization</strong> of sex work</u></mark> and an end to all violations of sexworker rights. In October1 991, sexworkers from sixteen countries met in Frankfurt at the First European Prostitutes Congress to call for the recognition of voluntary prostitution as a profession in the European Charter and for full rights as workers under European labor l aw. To the consternation of many governments and some feminists, <u><mark>prostitutes called</u></mark> not for the abolition of prostitution but for the redistribution of sexual pleasure, power, and profit; for the transformation of land and property rights <u><mark>for</u></mark> the removal of foreign armies; and for <u>the right of <mark>women and men to work</mark> voluntarily <mark>in the sex trade under safe, <strong>unregulated</strong> and <strong>respected</strong> conditions</u>.</mark>53 Many men, however, prefer to find whores in their beds than in their Parliaments and attempts by sexworkers to organize have met with unswerving violence. An Irish organizer was burnt to death, and Thai organizers have been murdered Ecuadoran brothel owners rotate prostitutes regularly to prevent them from organizing.54Y et by and large, the international Left has been largely indifferent to the issue, while the abolitionist tendency among some feminists has been nothing short of calamitous for working prostitutes. Most prostitutes insist that the first target of their international organizing is the state and the law. Prostitutes argue that the laws punish rather than protect women, especially women of color. Where sexwork is a crime, clients can rape, rob, and batter women with impunity. Murderers know the weight of a prostitute's life in the scales of the law. As Dallas Judge Jack Hampton admitted", I'd be hard put to give somebody life for killing a prostitute." Not surprisingly more prostitutes are murdered in the United States, where prostitution is still a crime, than anywhere else in the world. Prostitutes denounce the laws that shunt them into dangerous, desolate docklands meatpacking districts and railwayards, unable to organize for decent conditions or against coercion. <u>Where prostitution is a crime</u>, women can not demand police protection or claim legal recourse for robbery or coercion, for they thereby expose themselves as implicated in a criminalized trade. Where sexwork is a crime, prostitutes are forced by landlords to pay exorbitant rents or are driven to work the freezing and dangerous streets. <u>Prostitutes cannot claims social welfare or life insurance healthcare or maternity benefits, childcare or pensions</u>. Where prostitution is a crime, migrant women are evicted from their homes, are denied work papers, and are detained and deported. Every cent of a prostitute's earnings is criminally contaminated. The property and possessions of prostitutes are often forfeited, and mothers, brothers friends, and lovers can be flung into prison for living off immoral earnings. Most cruelly, a prostitute cannot keep her children. Most prostitutes are mothers, and most are in the game for their children. In many countries, however, social workers have the power to take a prostitute's children out of "moral danger" into "care." In these ways, the state curtails women's power, diverting illicit female money back into the coffers of male circulation and curtailintg the emergence of independent female heads of family. <u>Sexwork that benefits the male state, however, is tolerated and administered by a system of international euphemisms</u>: <u>massage parlors, escort agencies, bars, rest and recreation resorts,</u> and so on, <u>which are run not by hookers but by male "entertainment managers."</u> In Thailand for example, prostitution inhabits a twilight realm of legal ambiguity. The law makes prostitution a crime, but the green light is given to male" tour operators" and "entertainment managers, "whose operations are sanctioned and defined as the "personal services sector." <u>Most <mark>prostitutes regard <strong>legalized prostitution</strong> as <strong>legalized abuse.</u></strong></mark> <u>Despite its benign ring, <mark>legalization places prostitution under <strong>criminal law</strong> instead of <strong>commercial law</strong>, where it is</mark> tightly curbed by the state and <mark>administered by the police</u></mark>. <u>Instead, <mark>prostitutes want the law off their bodies and are calling for</mark> the <mark>decriminalization</mark> of the profession</u> <u>and the repeal of all legislation not ordinarily applicable to a business or trade.</u> <u><mark>Legalization puts women's bodies</mark> firmly <mark>in men's hands.</u></mark> <u>In</u> the aptly named Chicken Ranch, <u>a legalized brothel in Nevada, prostitutes are forced to work three weeks at a stretch, servicing any man who picks them, at any time of the day or nigh</u>t, a dizzying and dispiriting carousel of faceless tricks. <u><mark>In</mark> many of the <mark>legalized brothels</mark> and clubs in Europe,</u> Lisbet, a German prostitute, told me, "<u><mark>Women have no right to refuse men and</mark> often no right to <mark>use a condom.</u></mark>" <u><mark>Under legalization</u></mark>, the profits of women's work clatter into men's pockets. <u><mark>The state becomes a licit pimp</u>, <u>penning prostitutes in brothels and levying</mark> punitive <mark>taxes</u></mark> at rates higher than other workers. In Germany, legalized prostitutes pay 56 percent of their earnings in taxes, but, unlike other taxpayers, they are not eligible for any social benefits whatsoever. <u><mark>Under legalization the state controls prostitutes</mark> work and leisure, <mark>preventing organization and</mark> often <mark>making it</mark> very <mark>hard for them to leave</mark> the trade if they wish</u>. <u>Most <mark>prostitutes prefer to work illegally</mark> rather <mark>than submit to the <strong>abusive</strong> and <strong>humiliating</strong> ordeals of state-controlled brothels.</u></mark> French prostitutes cannot live with a husband wife, lover, or child, as anyone under their roof can be charged with “cohabitation." Italian prostitutes cannot help their husbands or wives pay the rent or give their parents money, as they can be charged with living off "immoral earnings." In Britain, engaging in prostitution is not a crime (which lets the johns off the hook),but virtually every aspect of a prostitute's work is criminalized. Two women working together for safety can be charged with keeping a brothel. In Switzerland if a woman decides to leave the trade and seek other work, she first has to get a "good girl" letter from the police to prove her good conduct. To get the letter, she has to wait three years without working as a prostitute to prove her good conduct. Until then, she cannot legally find other work. In Frankfurt zoning laws force women to work the deserted harbor area, where they can be tortured and dumped in the water without a stir. In Canada, prostitution is not a crime, but "communicating for the purposes of prostitution is.” Prostitutes can be penalized for organizing and informing each other of dangerous tricks or corrupt police. Austrian prostitutes have to report to the polices imply to go on holiday. Some of the most appalling conditions prevail in India. Between 1980 and 1984, not a single landlord was arrested for illegally pandering to prostitutes, but 44,633 prostitutes were arrested for soliciting in Bombay alone. As Dolores French, author, activist, and prostitute, told me in a private interview", <u><mark>Legalizing prostitution sees women as a <strong>controlled substance</strong></mark>-controlled by men</u>. "<u><mark>The international prostitutes movement</mark> thus <mark>calls for the decriminalization, not the legalization</u></mark>, of their work. <u>Prostitutes demand that their work be respected as a social service for both men and women and that it be brought under commercial law like other professions.</u> Why, they ask, can masseurs command respect and gratitude for servicing naked clients in comfortable rooms, while prostitutes are criminalized? If their work were decriminalized, prostitutes could ply their trade in safety and respect, paying normal rent and taxes, in houses as clean and comfortable as those of the average therapist or chiropractor.</p>
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
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Navy
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5
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James Madison Lepp-Miller
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McElhinny
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T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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college
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743,339 |
Non enforcement is perceived through a flexible lens – several countries prove
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Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
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Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)
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existing flexibility in the treaty regime has allowed to deviate from a repressive zero-tolerance drug law enforcement approach Non-enforcement of drug laws in the case of cannabis is the re ality in quite a few countries. Even though the 1961 Convention obliged traditional se to be phased out traditions led to lenient law enforcement practices in a number of states in several countries more formalised schemes of non-enforcement have been established by providing guidelines Many varieties of such decriminalization schemes exist All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypoc risy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits.
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Non-enforcement of laws i of cannabis is the re ality in quite a few countries traditions led to lenient law enforcement practices in a number of states, in several countries more formalised schemes of non-enforcement have been established Many varieties of such decriminalization schemes exist All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude
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The existing flexibility or room for manoeuvre in the treaty regime has allowed a variety of cannabis policy practices and re forms to deviate from a repressive zero-tolerance drug law enforcement approach, the legality of which is reviewed in detail in the third chapter. Non-enforcement of drug laws in the case of cannabis, rooted in social acceptance or long history of traditional use, is the re ality in quite a few countries. Even though the 1961 Convention obliged traditional, including religious, use of cannabis to be phased out within 25 years (with the exception of bhang as mentioned above), the widespread persistence of religious uses in Hindu, Sufi and Rastafarian ceremonies and traditions led to lenient law enforcement practices in a number of Indian states, Pakistan, the Middle East, Northern Africa and Ja maica.¶ Depending whether the legal system allows for dis- cretionary powers, in several countries more formalised schemes of non-enforcement have been established by providing guidelines for the police, the prosecution and/or the judiciary. In other countries cannabis consumption and possession for per sonal use are de jure no longer a crimi nal offence. Many varieties of such decriminalization schemes exist, in terms of distin guishing possession or cultivation for personal use from the intent to trade; and whether or not to apply administrative sanctions. Since the treaty requirements do not differentiate be tween possession and cultivation for personal use, first in Spain and more recently in some other countries, “cannabis social clubs” have started to engage in collective cultivation for personal use.¶ The inclusion of cannabis and its compounds in the strictest schedules of the conventions was a rejection of its usefulness for therapeutic pur poses and an effort to limit its use exclusively to research purposes, for which only very small amounts would be required. Today, however, many countries have rejected this position as scientifically untenable and have established legal re gimes recognising the medicinal properties of cannabis.¶ All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, not always ac knowl edged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypoc risy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis so cial clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.
| 3,162 |
<h4>Non enforcement is perceived through a flexible lens – several countries prove </h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)</p><p>The <u>existing flexibility </u>or room for manoeuvre <u>in the treaty regime has allowed</u> a variety of cannabis policy practices and re forms <u>to deviate from a repressive zero-tolerance drug law enforcement approach</u>, the legality of which is reviewed in detail in the third chapter. <u><mark>Non-enforcement of</mark> drug <mark>laws i</mark>n the case <mark>of cannabis</u></mark>, rooted in social acceptance or long history of traditional use, <u><mark>is the re ality in quite a few countries</mark>. Even though the 1961 Convention obliged traditional</u>, including religious, u<u>se</u> of cannabis <u>to be phased out</u> within 25 years (with the exception of bhang as mentioned above), the widespread persistence of religious uses in Hindu, Sufi and Rastafarian ceremonies and <u><mark>traditions led to lenient law enforcement practices in a number of</mark> </u>Indian<u> <mark>states</u>,</mark> Pakistan, the Middle East, Northern Africa and Ja maica.¶ Depending whether the legal system allows for dis- cretionary powers, <u><mark>in several countries more formalised schemes of non-enforcement have been established</mark> by providing guidelines</u> for the police, the prosecution and/or the judiciary. In other countries cannabis consumption and possession for per sonal use are de jure no longer a crimi nal offence. <u><mark>Many varieties of such decriminalization schemes exist</u></mark>, in terms of distin guishing possession or cultivation for personal use from the intent to trade; and whether or not to apply administrative sanctions. Since the treaty requirements do not differentiate be tween possession and cultivation for personal use, first in Spain and more recently in some other countries, “cannabis social clubs” have started to engage in collective cultivation for personal use.¶ The inclusion of cannabis and its compounds in the strictest schedules of the conventions was a rejection of its usefulness for therapeutic pur poses and an effort to limit its use exclusively to research purposes, for which only very small amounts would be required. Today, however, many countries have rejected this position as scientifically untenable and have established legal re gimes recognising the medicinal properties of cannabis.¶ <u><mark>All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude</mark>. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity,</u> not always ac knowl edged by the INCB. <u>And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypoc risy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. </u>Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis so cial clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.</p>
|
2nr
| null |
AT: State Thumper
| 430,419 | 39 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,340 |
sales solve – default to studies
|
Kaserman, 7
|
Kaserman, 7 Dr. David Kaserman is currently Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.
|
Proposals to resolve the organ shortage through the use of financial incentives have surfaced repeatedly over the years Importantly, every economist that has written on this subject has reached the same conclusion - i.e., that the shortage is caused by the zero price policy and that the straightforward cure, therefore, is the elimination of that policy.
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over the years every economist that has written on this subject has reached the same conclusion - i.e., that the shortage is caused by the zero price policy and that the straightforward cure, therefore, is the elimination of that polic
|
Issues in Law & Medicine Summer, 2007 23 Issues L. & Med. 45 ARTICLE: Fifty Years of Organ Transplants: The Successes and The Failures lexis
Financial Incentives Proposals to resolve the organ shortage through the use of financial incentives (or, similarly, through the formation of cadaveric organ procurement markets) have surfaced repeatedly over the years. n56 Importantly, every economist that has written on this subject has reached the same conclusion - i.e., that the shortage is caused by the zero price policy and that the straightforward cure, therefore, is the elimination of that policy. Other, non-economist commentators have reached that same conclusion as well.
| 688 |
<h4>sales solve – default to studies</h4><p><strong>Kaserman, 7</strong> Dr. David Kaserman is currently Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University. </p><p>Issues in Law & Medicine Summer, 2007 23 Issues L. & Med. 45 ARTICLE: Fifty Years of Organ Transplants: The Successes and The Failures lexis</p><p>Financial Incentives <u>Proposals to resolve the organ shortage through the use of financial incentives</u> (or, similarly, through the formation of cadaveric organ procurement markets) <u>have surfaced repeatedly <mark>over the years</u></mark>. n56 <u>Importantly, <mark>every economist that has written on this subject has reached the same conclusion - i.e., that the shortage is caused by the zero price policy and that the straightforward cure, therefore, is the elimination of that polic</mark>y. </u>Other, non-economist commentators have reached that same conclusion as well.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Shortage
| 430,250 | 3 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,341 |
Specifically, their “health” and “safety” regulations in the Kuo evidence are weak pretexts for expansive regulations of sex workers’ lives- leads to race and class hierarchies and replicates the problems of criminalization
|
Scoular 10,
|
Scoular 10, Jane, Professor of Law at University of Strathclyde, March 2010, “What's Law Got To Do With it? How and Why Law Matters in the Regulation of Sex Work,” Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 37, No. 1, Wiley Online, Accessed 9/10/14
|
Significant legislative change in the West resonates throughout the social body, appearing to threaten to disrupt associated norms. The threat of this social rupture provokes considerable anxieties on the part of certain groups, who seek to control the social order in order to preserve hegemonic forms of power relations. issues of problematic consumption prostitution) and dangerous identities have been convenient targets' for moral regulation. Prostitution appears throughout history as `a dense signifier around which a variety of social anxieties' can be expressed. moral panics around syphilis, venereal disease, and `white slavery trade' expressed wider cultural anxieties the Contagious Diseases Acts constructed the prostitute as morally and physically dangerous and vulnerable, justifying intensive ral, social, and legal regulation the public's health appeared to be secured, helping to consolidate a particular image of the nation state as healthy and enlightened, which facilitated its colonial expansion. This parallels with the present and the recent flurry of legislative activity in prostitution laws. This modern `unholy' alliance has coalesced around a crusade to combat `modern sexual slavery', the trafficked bodies of sex workers provide a useful metaphor for violated state boundaries and act as a trope for a more general politics of security the same forces have been the impetus behind efforts to legalize voluntary sex work in the Netherlands.
|
Significant legislative change in the West resonates appearing to threaten to disrupt norms. this social rupture provokes anxieties on the part of certain groups, who seek to control the social to preserve hegemonic power relations. prostitution) and dangerous identities have been convenient targets' for regulation. moral panics around disease expressed wider cultural anxieties the Contagious Diseases Acts constructed the prostitute as morally and physically vulnerable, justifying intensive ral, social, and legal regulation the public's health appeared to be secured, helping to consolidate a image of the nation state as healthy and enlightened which facilitated its colonial expansion. This parallels with present prostitution laws. the trafficked bodies of sex workers provide a useful metaphor for violated state boundaries the same forces have been the impetus behind efforts to legalize voluntary sex work
|
EXPLORING THE PARALLELS IN ABOLITIONIST AND REGULATORY APROACHES TO SEX WORK IN THE CONTEXT OF NEO-LIBERALISM The history of prostitution control shows that major reform is episodic and related to wider social transformations, to shifts in economy, culture, and `nation states'.8 Significant legislative change in the West has, for example, accompanied the period of transition from feudalism to industrialization and from that period to present-day late capitalism. Such rapid change resonates throughout the social body, appearing to threaten to disrupt the perceived social fabric and its associated norms. The threat and experience of this social rupture provokes considerable anxieties on the part of certain groups, who seek to control the social order in order to preserve hegemonic forms of power relations.9 During such periods of flux, issues of problematic consumption (alcohol, gambling, and prostitution) and dangerous identities have been convenient and familiar `targets' for programmes and campaigns of moral regulation.10 Prostitution, which combines both of these elements, thus appears throughout history as `a dense signifier around which a variety of social anxieties' can be expressed.11 Thus, during the intense social and economic transformation which characterized the Victorian era, moral panics around syphilis, venereal disease, and an imagined `white slavery trade'12 expressed wider cultural anxieties over the overlapping processes of urbanization, immigration, and women's shifting roles. Encouraged by a broad coalition of feminists and religious groups who had made saving fallen women their mission, the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1864, 1866, and 1869 constructed the prostitute as morally and physically dangerous and vulnerable, justifying the intensive moral, social, and legal regulation of many unmarried working-class women.13 In so doing, the public's individual moral and social health appeared to be secured, helping to consolidate a particular image of the nation state as healthy and enlightened, all of which facilitated its colonial expansion. As Burton notes, the spectre of sexual slavery employed in campaigns and reforms at this time operated to conceal their facilitation of a wider colonialist project.14 This parallels with the present late-modern period and the dynamics of globalization which provide much of the impetus behind the recent flurry of legislative activity in international prostitution laws. Here the major shifts and increased fluidity in the movement of people, capital, and commodities brought about by globalization and late-capitalist restructuring, alongside a burgeoning sex industry, have incited a similar broad coalition of the religious right, moral puritans, and radical feminists around an abolitionist mission.15 This modern `unholy' alliance has coalesced around a crusade to combat what it regards as `modern sexual slavery', a term applied variously to the `trafficking' of women and girls for purposes of prostitution and to commercial sex more generally. `Saving fallen women' has returned to the policy frame, yet while there is continuity with the earlier nineteenth-century campaigns, its reappearance relates to a new global economic and political context and invokes new forms of governance.16 Once again, the trafficked bodies of sex workers provide a useful metaphor for violated state boundaries and act as a trope for a more general politics of security:17 the putative re-emergence of the `white slave trade' triggered multiple initiatives intended to protect the sovereign spaces of the European Union as much as the sovereign bodies of women.18 The form these multiple initiatives have taken is contingent upon different political traditions and arrangements, meaning that the same forces (that is, globalization) have been the impetus behind what are often cast as opposing regulatory frameworks, the most notable being efforts to criminalize men in Sweden and to legalize voluntary sex work in the Netherlands.19
| 4,017 |
<h4>Specifically, their “health” and “safety” regulations in the Kuo evidence are weak pretexts for expansive regulations of sex workers’ lives- leads to race and class hierarchies and replicates the problems of criminalization</h4><p><strong>Scoular 10, </strong>Jane, Professor of Law at University of Strathclyde, March 2010, “What's Law Got To Do With it? How and Why Law Matters in the Regulation of Sex Work,” Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 37, No. 1, Wiley Online, Accessed 9/10/14</p><p>EXPLORING THE PARALLELS IN ABOLITIONIST AND REGULATORY APROACHES TO SEX WORK IN THE CONTEXT OF NEO-LIBERALISM The history of prostitution control shows that major reform is episodic and related to wider social transformations, to shifts in economy, culture, and `nation states'.8 <u><mark>Significant legislative change in the West</u></mark> has, for example, accompanied the period of transition from feudalism to industrialization and from that period to present-day late capitalism. Such rapid change <u><mark>resonates</mark> throughout the social body, <mark>appearing to threaten to disrupt</u></mark> the perceived social fabric and its <u>associated <mark>norms.</u> <u></mark>The threat</u> and experience <u>of <mark>this social rupture provokes</mark> considerable <mark>anxieties on the part of certain groups, who seek to control the social</mark> order in order <mark>to preserve hegemonic</mark> forms of <mark>power relations.</u></mark>9 During such periods of flux, <u>issues of problematic consumption</u> (alcohol, gambling, and <u><mark>prostitution) and dangerous identities have been convenient</mark> </u>and familiar `<u><mark>targets' for</u></mark> programmes and campaigns of <u>moral <mark>regulation.</u></mark>10 <u>Prostitution</u>, which combines both of these elements, thus <u>appears throughout history as `a dense signifier around which a variety of social anxieties' can be expressed.</u>11 Thus, during the intense social and economic transformation which characterized the Victorian era, <u><mark>moral panics around</mark> syphilis, venereal <mark>disease</mark>, and</u> an imagined <u>`white slavery trade'</u>12 <u><mark>expressed wider cultural anxieties</u></mark> over the overlapping processes of urbanization, immigration, and women's shifting roles. Encouraged by a broad coalition of feminists and religious groups who had made saving fallen women their mission, <u><mark>the Contagious Diseases Acts</u></mark> of 1864, 1866, and 1869 <u><mark>constructed the prostitute as morally and physically </mark>dangerous and <mark>vulnerable, justifying</u></mark> the <u><mark>intensive</u></mark> mo<u><strong><mark>ral, social, and legal regulation</u></strong></mark> of many unmarried working-class women.13 In so doing, <u><mark>the public's</u></mark> individual moral and social <u><mark>health appeared to be secured, helping to consolidate a</mark> particular <mark>image of the nation state as healthy and enlightened</mark>,</u> all of <u><mark>which facilitated its colonial expansion.</u></mark> As Burton notes, the spectre of sexual slavery employed in campaigns and reforms at this time operated to conceal their facilitation of a wider colonialist project.14 <u><mark>This parallels with</mark> the <mark>present</u></mark> late-modern period <u>and</u> the dynamics of globalization which provide much of the impetus behind <u>the recent flurry of legislative activity in</u> international <u><mark>prostitution laws.</u></mark> Here the major shifts and increased fluidity in the movement of people, capital, and commodities brought about by globalization and late-capitalist restructuring, alongside a burgeoning sex industry, have incited a similar broad coalition of the religious right, moral puritans, and radical feminists around an abolitionist mission.15 <u>This modern `unholy' alliance has coalesced around a crusade to combat</u> what it regards as <u>`modern sexual slavery',</u> a term applied variously to the `trafficking' of women and girls for purposes of prostitution and to commercial sex more generally. `Saving fallen women' has returned to the policy frame, yet while there is continuity with the earlier nineteenth-century campaigns, its reappearance relates to a new global economic and political context and invokes new forms of governance.16 Once again, <u><mark>the trafficked bodies of sex workers provide a useful metaphor for violated state boundaries</mark> and act as a trope for a more general politics of security</u>:17 the putative re-emergence of the `white slave trade' triggered multiple initiatives intended to protect the sovereign spaces of the European Union as much as the sovereign bodies of women.18<u> </u>The form these multiple initiatives have taken is contingent upon different political traditions and arrangements, meaning that <u><mark>the</u> <u>same forces</u></mark> (that is, globalization) <u><mark>have been the impetus behind</u></mark> what are often cast as opposing regulatory frameworks, the most notable being <u><mark>efforts to</u></mark> criminalize men in Sweden and to <u><mark>legalize</mark> <mark>voluntary sex work</mark> in the Netherlands.</u>19</p>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 430,336 | 3 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,342 |
Ukraine won’t escalate into war
|
Weber 3/5
|
Weber 3/5 (Peter, senior editor at TheWeek.com, “ What would a U.S.-Russia war look like?” Peter Weber | March 5, 2014 http://theweek.com/article/index/257406/what-would-a-us-russia-war-look-like)//kyan
|
The chances that the U.S. and Russia will clash militarily over Moscow's invasion of Ukraine are very, very slim Ukraine isn't a member of NATO, and President Obama isn't likely to volunteer for another war the U.S. and Russia almost certainly won't come to blows over Ukraine.
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The chances that the U.S. and Russia will clash militarily over Ukraine are very, very slim. Ukraine isn't a member of NATO, and Obama isn't likely to volunteer for another war the U.S. and Russia almost certainly won't come to blows over Ukraine
|
The chances that the U.S. and Russia will clash militarily over Moscow's invasion of Ukraine are very, very slim. Ukraine isn't a member of NATO, and President Obama isn't likely to volunteer for another war. But many of Ukraine's neighbors are NATO members, including Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary. And so are the the Baltic states — Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia — further north and right on Russia's border. If any of those countries come to Ukraine's aid and find themselves in a war with Russia, NATO is obliged to intervene. That's also true if Russia comes up with some pretext to invade any of those countries, unlikely as that seems. If we learned anything from World War I, it's that huge, bloody conflicts can start with tiny skirmishes, especially in Eastern Europe. Again, the U.S. and Russia almost certainly won't come to blows over Ukraine. But what if they did?
| 888 |
<h4>Ukraine won’t escalate into war</h4><p><strong>Weber 3/5 </strong>(Peter, senior editor at TheWeek.com, “ What would a U.S.-Russia war look like?” Peter Weber | March 5, 2014 http://theweek.com/article/index/257406/what-would-a-us-russia-war-look-like)//kyan</p><p><u><mark>The chances that the U.S. and Russia will clash militarily over</mark> Moscow's invasion of <mark>Ukraine <strong>are very, very slim</u></strong>. <u>Ukraine isn't a member of NATO, and</mark> President <mark>Obama isn't likely to volunteer for another war</u></mark>. But many of Ukraine's neighbors are NATO members, including Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary. And so are the the Baltic states — Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia — further north and right on Russia's border. If any of those countries come to Ukraine's aid and find themselves in a war with Russia, NATO is obliged to intervene. That's also true if Russia comes up with some pretext to invade any of those countries, unlikely as that seems. If we learned anything from World War I, it's that huge, bloody conflicts can start with tiny skirmishes, especially in Eastern Europe. Again, <u><mark>the U.S. and Russia almost <strong>certainly</strong> won't come to blows over Ukraine</mark>. </u><strong>But what if they did?</p></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
treaties
| 66,355 | 30 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,343 |
Technical compliance is sufficient to maintain the treaty system
|
Guercio et al 12
|
Guercio et al 12 (Susan; Heather Haase, consultant for International Drug Policy Consortium and the Harm Reduction Coalition, “The International Drug Control Treaties: How Important Are They to US Drug Reform?” http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/3_20072283-InternationalDrugControlTreaties.pdf)
|
If treaties are so destructive, and there is no real enforcement, then why does almost every country in the world remain signatory and, , faithfully comply many experts point to the reputation al aspect of international law — many countries do not want to be seen as uncooperative Instead of withdrawing from or disregarding their obligations under the treaties, many countries have reacted over the years by pushing the outer limits of what is technically allowable, or by broadly interpreting the language of the treaties. . For example 1988 Convention does not specify what the punishment must be Portugal’s ―decriminalization laws take advantage of this grey area . Holland exercises a policy of non - enforcement soft challenges to the treaties , skirt the problem by simply limiting compliance to ―technical compliance in law the only challenges to the treaties have been ―soft‖ challenges. It would seem that nations have gone to great pains to stay within technical compliance as much as possible while still enjoying more liberal drug control environment
|
I treaties are so destructive, and there is no real enforcement, then why does almost every country in the world remain signatory nd faithfully comply many experts point to the reputation al aspect countries do not want to be seen as uncooperative .¶ Instead of withdrawing from or disregarding bligations many countries pushing the outer limits of what is technically allowable For example, onvention does not specify unishment Holland exercises a policy of non - enforcement soft challenges to the treaties , skirt the problem by technical compliance in It would seem that nations have gone to great pains to stay within technical compliance as much as possible while still enjoying more liberal drug control environment
|
If the treaties are so destructive, and there is no real enforcement, then why does almost every country in the world remain signatory to and, for the most part, faithfully comply with them? Pressure from the United States (and fear of losing aid) is certainly a major factor. But many experts point to the reputation al aspect of international law — many countries do not want to be seen as uncooperative — in effect, ―pariah s ‖ — in the international community.¶ Instead of withdrawing from or disregarding their obligations under the treaties, many countries have reacted over the years by pushing the outer limits of what is technically allowable, or by broadly interpreting the language of the treaties.¶ The treaties themselves allow a certain amount of flexibility in their interpretation. For example, while the 1988 Convention requires that countries make possession for personal consumption a criminal violation, it does not specify what the punishment must be. Portugal’s ―decriminalization laws take advantage of this grey area and dictate that offenders are diverted to education classes, treatment sessions, or are given a fine. Holland continues to maintain laws on its books criminalizing possession of marijuana, but exercises a policy of non - enforcement when it comes to marijuana sold in its famous ―coffee houses.‖ In the U.S., m any argue that ―medical use‖ is not defined in the treaties and therefore, medical marijuana is technically allowed (the INCB and the DEA do not share this view).¶ These measures — non - enforcement, de criminalization/depenalization, and medicalization — known as ―soft challenges to the treaties , skirt the problem by simply limiting compliance to ―technical compliance in law, while allowing for de facto policies more in keeping with the desired policy change within each country .¶ Until recently, the only challenges to the treaties have been ―soft‖ challenges. It would seem that nations have gone to great pains to stay within technical compliance as much as possible while still enjoying more liberal drug control environment within their own borders.
| 2,114 |
<h4>Technical compliance is sufficient to maintain the treaty system</h4><p><u><strong>Guercio et al 12 </u></strong> (Susan; Heather Haase, consultant for International Drug Policy Consortium and the Harm Reduction Coalition, “The International Drug Control Treaties: How Important Are They to US Drug Reform?” http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/3_20072283-InternationalDrugControlTreaties.pdf)</p><p><u><mark>I</mark>f </u>the <u><mark>treaties are so destructive, and there is no real enforcement, then why does almost every country in the world remain signatory</u></mark> to <u>a<mark>nd</mark>,</u> for the most part<u>, <mark>faithfully comply</u></mark> with them? Pressure from the United States (and fear of losing aid) is certainly a major factor. But <u><mark>many experts point to the reputation al aspect</mark> of international law — many <mark>countries do not want to be seen as uncooperative</u></mark> — in effect, ―pariah s ‖ — in the international community<mark>.¶ <u>Instead of withdrawing from or disregarding</mark> their o<mark>bligations</mark> under the treaties, <mark>many countries</mark> have reacted over the years by <mark>pushing the outer limits of what is technically allowable</mark>, or by broadly interpreting the language of the treaties.</u>¶ The treaties themselves allow a certain amount of flexibility in their interpretation<u>. <mark>For example</u>,</mark> while the <u>1988 C<mark>onvention</u></mark> requires that countries make possession for personal consumption a criminal violation, it <u><mark>does not specify</mark> what the p<mark>unishment</mark> must be</u>. <u>Portugal’s ―decriminalization laws take advantage of this grey area</u> and dictate that offenders are diverted to education classes, treatment sessions, or are given a fine<u>. <mark>Holland</u></mark> continues to maintain laws on its books criminalizing possession of marijuana, but <u><mark>exercises a policy of non - enforcement</u></mark> when it comes to marijuana sold in its famous ―coffee houses.‖ In the U.S., m any argue that ―medical use‖ is not defined in the treaties and therefore, medical marijuana is technically allowed (the INCB and the DEA do not share this view).¶ These measures — non - enforcement, de criminalization/depenalization, and medicalization — known as ―<u><mark>soft challenges to the treaties , skirt the problem by</mark> simply limiting compliance to ―<mark>technical compliance in</mark> law</u>, while allowing for de facto policies more in keeping with the desired policy change within each country .¶ Until recently, <u>the only challenges to the treaties have been ―soft‖ challenges. <mark>It would seem that nations have gone to great pains to stay within technical compliance as much as possible while still enjoying more liberal drug control environment </u></mark>within<strong> their own borders.</p></strong>
|
2nr
| null |
AT: State Thumper
| 431,009 | 19 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,344 |
no crowd out – only real neg study is wrong
|
Economist 11
|
Economist 11 The Economist Feb 16th 2011 Blood, not money
http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2011/02/volunteering_and_profiteering
|
In a classic 1970 study called "The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy" Titmuss compared the voluntary British system with the American one in which payments were then widely made. Titmuss reckoned such a market was inefficient and wasteful, that it created shortages and surpluses, he was wrong, and such arguments have since been widely discredited
|
In a classic 1970 study called "The Gift Titmuss compared the voluntary British system with the American one in which payments were then widely made. Titmuss reckoned such a market was inefficient and wasteful, that it created shortages and surpluses, he was wrong, and such arguments have since been widely discredited
|
Blood donors are also unpaid, in Britain and elsewhere. A debate over whether or not they should be compensated for their efforts has raged for at least four decades. In a classic 1970 study called "The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy" Richard Titmuss compared the voluntary British system favourably with the American one in which payments were then widely made. Titmuss reckoned such a market was inefficient and wasteful, that it created shortages and surpluses, and led eventually to a contaminated product. Although he was wrong, and such arguments have since been widely discredited, Americans mostly no longer receive payment for giving blood. Too many people in poor health lied about their medical histories in order to make a few bucks, endangering those who were to receive the blood. As the World Health Organisation notes, people who give blood voluntarily and for altruistic reasons have a lower prevalence of HIV, hepatitis viruses and other blood-borne infections than do those who seek monetary reward. Presumably that is because being rich is a great protection against disease.
| 1,117 |
<h4>no crowd out – only real neg study is wrong</h4><p><strong>Economist 11</strong> The Economist Feb 16th 2011 Blood, not money</p><p>http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2011/02/volunteering_and_profiteering</p><p>Blood donors are also unpaid, in Britain and elsewhere. A debate over whether or not they should be compensated for their efforts has raged for at least four decades. <u><mark>In a classic 1970 study called "The Gift</mark> Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy"</u> Richard <u><mark>Titmuss compared the voluntary British</u> <u>system</u></mark> favourably <u><mark>with the American one in which payments were then widely made. Titmuss reckoned such a market was inefficient and wasteful, that it created shortages and surpluses,</u></mark> and led eventually to a contaminated product. Although <u><mark>he was wrong, and such arguments have since been widely discredited</u></mark>, Americans mostly no longer receive payment for giving blood. Too many people in poor health lied about their medical histories in order to make a few bucks, endangering those who were to receive the blood. As the World Health Organisation notes, people who give blood voluntarily and for altruistic reasons have a lower prevalence of HIV, hepatitis viruses and other blood-borne infections than do those who seek monetary reward. Presumably that is because being rich is a great protection against disease.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Shortage
| 430,253 | 7 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,345 |
Root Causality arguments are flawed-Wars don’t have single causes – consensus of experts
|
Cashman 00
|
Cashman 00
|
Greg, “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9
Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war. For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence
|
multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, never explainable through a single factor research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war
|
Greg, Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9
Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war. For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence
| 966 |
<h4><strong>Root Causality arguments are flawed-<u>Wars don’t have single causes – consensus of experts</h4><p>Cashman 00</p><p></strong>Greg,</u><strong> Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University<u></strong> “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9</p><p>Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, <mark>multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex,</mark> they are almost <mark>never explainable through a single factor</mark>. Decades of <mark>research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war</mark>. For instance, international relations theorist J. David <strong>Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence</p></u></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
advantage
| 62,856 | 22 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,346 |
Yes strikes- and they escalate- prefer recent ev
|
Guardian 1/1
|
Guardian 1/1/2015 (Middle East, 2015: further standoffs, tripwires and catastrophes; The jihadist threat of Isis and ongoing Syria disaster will pile pressure on western leaders. Then there's Iran, Turkey, Israel-Palestine and north Africa, lexis)
|
The Middle East in 2015 features several dangerous tripwires that could tip the region into sudden chaos The most obvious is the standoff over Iran's suspect nuclear programme, which Israel regards as an existential threat. Opinions differ whether a deal can be reached. If it is, Iran could come in from the cold If not the possibility that Israel, led by Netanyahu, will take matters into its own hands and launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is very real
|
Middle East in 2015 features several dangerous tripwires that could tip the region into sudden chaos. The most obvious is Iran's nuclear programme, which Israel regards as an existential threat a deal can be reached. If not, the possibility that Israel, led by Binyamin Netanyahu, will take matters into its own hands and launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is very real
|
The Middle East in 2015 features several other dangerous tripwires that could tip the region into sudden chaos. The most obvious is the standoff over Iran's suspect nuclear programme, which Israel regards as an existential threat. Long-running talks again ended without agreement in November. A new deadline of July, 2015 has been set. Opinions differ whether a deal can be reached. If it is, Iran could come in from the cold for the first time since 1979. If not, the possibility that Israel, led by prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu, will take matters into its own hands and launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is very real indeed.
| 656 |
<h4><strong>Yes strikes- and they escalate- prefer recent ev</h4><p>Guardian 1/1</strong>/2015 (Middle East, 2015: further standoffs, tripwires and catastrophes; The jihadist threat of Isis and ongoing Syria disaster will pile pressure on western leaders. Then there's Iran, Turkey, Israel-Palestine and north Africa, lexis)</p><p><u>The <mark>Middle East in 2015 features several</u></mark> other <u><mark>dangerous tripwires that could tip the region</mark> <mark>into sudden chaos</u>. <u>The most obvious is</mark> the standoff over <mark>Iran's</mark> suspect <mark>nuclear programme, which Israel regards as an existential threat</mark>.</u> Long-running talks again ended without agreement in November. A new deadline of July, 2015 has been set. <u>Opinions differ whether <mark>a deal can be reached.</mark> If it is, Iran could come in from the cold </u>for the first time since 1979. <u><mark>If not</u>, <u>the possibility that Israel, led by</u></mark> prime minister <mark>Binyamin <u>Netanyahu, will take matters into its own hands and launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is <strong>very real</u></strong></mark> indeed.</p><p><u><strong> </p></u></strong>
|
1nr
|
Strikes
|
AT: State Thumper
| 430,495 | 6 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,347 |
No escalation – Obama proves
|
Gerstein 14
|
Gerstein 14 - JOSH GERSTEIN is a staff writer for Politico, (“Barack Obama: 'Not a new Cold War'”, 7/29/14, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/07/obama-sanctions-russia-ukraine-109510.html?hp=bn//nemo)
|
It’s not a new Cold War,” the president said Asked if the U.S. is considering sending weapons to Ukraine, Obama said the government in Kiev can hold its own capacity to take the path of de-escalation
|
It’s not a new Cold War,” the president said Asked if the U.S. is considering sending weapons to Ukraine, Obama said the government in Kiev can hold its own capacity to take the path of de-escalation
|
President Barack Obama on Tuesday announced escalated U.S. sanctions against Russia in the energy, arms and finance sectors, turning up the heat as European countries agreed to take their strongest steps yet targeting Russia over claims it is fomenting unrest in Ukraine. “Today is a reminder that the United States means what it says and we will rally the international community in standing up for the rights and freedom of people around the world,” Obama said from the South Lawn of the White House. “Russia’s energy, financial and defense sectors are feeling the pain. … Major sanctions we’re announcing today will continue to ratchet up the pressure on Russia, including the cronies and companies that are supporting Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine.” Asked by a reporter if the standoff amounts to a new Cold War, Obama said it does not. It’s not a new Cold War,” the president said. “What it is a very specific issue related to Russia’s unwillingness to recognize that Ukraine can chart its own path.” Stepping up the West’s showdown with Russia, European leaders Tuesday declared plans to impose sanctions against state-owned Russian banks, as well as certain types of oil-industry equipment and so-called dual-use technology capable of use by the military. The U.S. added three banks to its sanctions list, resulting in five of Russia’s six top banks being subject to sharp limits on refinancing of debt. ”The European Union is joining us in imposing major sanctions on Russia — its most significant and wide-ranging sanctions to date,” Obama said. The president said the U.S. will generally match the European moves and move further to punish Russia over what U.S. officials contend is support for separatists in eastern Ukraine suspected of responsibility for the shootdown of a Malaysian passenger jet passing over the region earlier this month. While Obama hailed the new actions, he conceded he can’t be confident they will prompt Russian President Vladimir Putin to change course. “We think that the combination of stronger U.S. and European sanctions is going to have a greater impact on the Russian economy than we’ve seen so far,” Obama said. “Obviously, we can’t in the end make President Putin see more clearly. Ultimately, that’s something President Putin has to do on his own.” Asked if the U.S. is considering sending weapons to Ukraine, Obama said the government in Kiev can hold its own against the rebels. He said nothing about Kiev’s ability to withstand a military attack by Russia, however. “The issue at this point is not Ukrainian capacity to outfight the separatists. They are better armed than the separatists,” Obama said. “The issue is how do we prevent bloodshed in eastern Ukraine.” After Russia’s incursion into and annexation of Crimea earlier this year, European countries balked at sanctions affecting key economic sectors, such as banking. However, after the apparent shootdown of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 on July 17, European leaders have taken a tougher line toward Moscow. Senior U.S. officials told reporters on a conference call that the steps the Europeans agreed to take Tuesday were the same ones the U.S. has been urging for months. “These are the very powerful sectoral sanctions that we’ve been describing for several months now,” said one official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “Russia finds itself today more isolated than at any point since the end of the Cold War.” The official also said additional sanctions are unlikely in the near future as the U.S. assesses the impact of Tuesday’s moves. ”We will certainly want the impact of these sanctions to sink in and to test Russia’s willingness and capacity to take the path of de-escalation,” the official added. The new rounds of sanctions follow a series of claims by Western intelligence officials that Russia is culpable for the shootdown, as well as general unrest in Ukraine’s east. U.S. officials say the passenger plane was shot down from territory controlled by pro-Russian separatists, likely with a sophisticated surface-to-air missile battery provided by Russia. On Sunday, the U.S. also released satellite images said to show shelling from Russian territory into Ukraine. Russian officials have denied providing arms to the separatists, denied involvement with the shootdown and claimed that the photos purporting to show cross-border shelling were faked. The U.S. kept up the fusillade of complaints against Moscow on Monday by sending Putin a letter accusing Russia of violating a nuclear arms control treaty by testing a cruise missile — though that matter appeared to have no direct connection to the showdown over Ukraine. U.S. officials said the decision to move forward with the sanctions was cemented Monday in a videoconference among Obama and British Prime Minister David Cameron, French President Francois Hollande and Italian Prime Minister Mateo Renzi, as well as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who joined the session by telephone. A top British diplomat predicted the new round of sanctions last week, indicating that the moves were likely despite the prospect of significant “pain” for many European countries. “It’s wrong to suggest that there is an ambivalence or that people don’t care, that we’re not actually responding to what Putin is doing. It is quite difficult. You’ve got 28 member states. The level of integration of the average European Union member state with Russia is 10 times that of the United States,” the United Kingdom’s ambassador to the U.S., Peter Westmacott, said Friday during an appearance at the Aspen Security Forum. “So, the level of pain that is going to be sustained, if we are going to go much further in terms of sanctions, is considerable.” London banks are likely to feel some impact from the new sanctions, since financial institutions there hold and invest money for Russian firms and individuals. But the largest impact could be in Germany, if Russia retaliates by cutting off or hiking the price of natural gas many German citizens and businesses depend on. The new European sanctions will block future arms sales to Russia but won’t upset existing deals, such as a French contract to sell a pair of sophisticated warships to Moscow. In addition, the banking-related sanctions don’t ban all transactions with the affected banks. Credit card transactions should not be affected, an official said.
Commerce
| 6,393 |
<h4>No escalation – Obama proves</h4><p><strong>Gerstein 14 </strong>- JOSH GERSTEIN is a staff writer for Politico, (“Barack Obama: 'Not a new Cold War'”, 7/29/14, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/07/obama-sanctions-russia-ukraine-109510.html?hp=bn//nemo)</p><p>President Barack Obama on Tuesday announced escalated U.S. sanctions against Russia in the energy, arms and finance sectors, turning up the heat as European countries agreed to take their strongest steps yet targeting Russia over claims it is fomenting unrest in Ukraine. “Today is a reminder that the United States means what it says and we will rally the international community in standing up for the rights and freedom of people around the world,” Obama said from the South Lawn of the White House. “Russia’s energy, financial and defense sectors are feeling the pain. … Major sanctions we’re announcing today will continue to ratchet up the pressure on Russia, including the cronies and companies that are supporting Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine.”<u> </u>Asked by a reporter if the standoff amounts to a new Cold War, Obama said it does not. <u><strong><mark>It’s not a new Cold War,” the president said</u></strong></mark>. “What it is a very specific issue related to Russia’s unwillingness to recognize that Ukraine can chart its own path.” Stepping up the West’s showdown with Russia, European leaders Tuesday declared plans to impose sanctions against state-owned Russian banks, as well as certain types of oil-industry equipment and so-called dual-use technology capable of use by the military. The U.S. added three banks to its sanctions list, resulting in five of Russia’s six top banks being subject to sharp limits on refinancing of debt. ”The European Union is joining us in imposing major sanctions on Russia — its most significant and wide-ranging sanctions to date,” Obama said. The president said the U.S. will generally match the European moves and move further to punish Russia over what U.S. officials contend is support for separatists in eastern Ukraine suspected of responsibility for the shootdown of a Malaysian passenger jet passing over the region earlier this month. While Obama hailed the new actions, he conceded he can’t be confident they will prompt Russian President Vladimir Putin to change course. “We think that the combination of stronger U.S. and European sanctions is going to have a greater impact on the Russian economy than we’ve seen so far,” Obama said. “Obviously, we can’t in the end make President Putin see more clearly. Ultimately, that’s something President Putin has to do on his own.” <u><mark>Asked if the U.S. is considering sending weapons to Ukraine, Obama said the government in Kiev can hold its own</mark> </u>against the rebels. He said nothing about Kiev’s ability to withstand a military attack by Russia, however. “The issue at this point is not Ukrainian capacity to outfight the separatists. They are better armed than the separatists,” Obama said. “The issue is how do we prevent bloodshed in eastern Ukraine.” After Russia’s incursion into and annexation of Crimea earlier this year, European countries balked at sanctions affecting key economic sectors, such as banking. However, after the apparent shootdown of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 on July 17, European leaders have taken a tougher line toward Moscow. Senior U.S. officials told reporters on a conference call that the steps the Europeans agreed to take Tuesday were the same ones the U.S. has been urging for months. “These are the very powerful sectoral sanctions that we’ve been describing for several months now,” said one official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “Russia finds itself today more isolated than at any point since the end of the Cold War.” The official also said additional sanctions are unlikely in the near future as the U.S. assesses the impact of Tuesday’s moves. ”We will certainly want the impact of these sanctions to sink in and to test Russia’s willingness and <u><strong><mark>capacity to take the path of de-escalation</u></strong></mark>,” the official added. The new rounds of sanctions follow a series of claims by Western intelligence officials that Russia is culpable for the shootdown, as well as general unrest in Ukraine’s east. U.S. officials say the passenger plane was shot down from territory controlled by pro-Russian separatists, likely with a sophisticated surface-to-air missile battery provided by Russia. On Sunday, the U.S. also released satellite images said to show shelling from Russian territory into Ukraine. Russian officials have denied providing arms to the separatists, denied involvement with the shootdown and claimed that the photos purporting to show cross-border shelling were faked. The U.S. kept up the fusillade of complaints against Moscow on Monday by sending Putin a letter accusing Russia of violating a nuclear arms control treaty by testing a cruise missile — though that matter appeared to have no direct connection to the showdown over Ukraine. U.S. officials said the decision to move forward with the sanctions was cemented Monday in a videoconference among Obama and British Prime Minister David Cameron, French President Francois Hollande and Italian Prime Minister Mateo Renzi, as well as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who joined the session by telephone. A top British diplomat predicted the new round of sanctions last week, indicating that the moves were likely despite the prospect of significant “pain” for many European countries. “It’s wrong to suggest that there is an ambivalence or that people don’t care, that we’re not actually responding to what Putin is doing. It is quite difficult. You’ve got 28 member states. The level of integration of the average European Union member state with Russia is 10 times that of the United States,” the United Kingdom’s ambassador to the U.S., Peter Westmacott, said Friday during an appearance at the Aspen Security Forum. “So, the level of pain that is going to be sustained, if we are going to go much further in terms of sanctions, is considerable.” London banks are likely to feel some impact from the new sanctions, since financial institutions there hold and invest money for Russian firms and individuals. But the largest impact could be in Germany, if Russia retaliates by cutting off or hiking the price of natural gas many German citizens and businesses depend on. The new European sanctions will block future arms sales to Russia but won’t upset existing deals, such as a French contract to sell a pair of sophisticated warships to Moscow. In addition, the banking-related sanctions don’t ban all transactions with the affected banks. Credit card transactions should not be affected, an official said.</p><p>Commerce</p>
| null |
1nc
|
treaties
| 431,011 | 1 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,348 |
no crowd out - empirics
|
Boyer 12
|
Boyer 12 J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis
|
allowing the sale of organs would not preclude someone from donating . Currently, the sale of blood and ova is allowed under law, but many of the donations of these tissues take place without compensation In fact, giving the donor the right to sell could actually increase the value of an uncompensated donation
|
allowing the sale of organs would not preclude someone from donating Currently, the sale of blood and ova is allowed under law, but many of the donations of these tissues take place without compensation. n157 In fact, giving the donor the right to sell could actually increase the value of an uncompensated donation
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It should also be noted that allowing the sale of organs would not preclude someone from donating without compensation. n156 Currently, the sale of blood and ova is allowed under law, but many of the donations of these tissues take place without compensation. n157 In fact, giving the donor the right to sell could actually increase the value of an uncompensated donation by providing donors with more power to ensure the recipient receives the surplus value of the organ through contractually stipulated prices to prevent any inflation by middlemen.
| 550 |
<h4>no crowd out - empirics</h4><p><strong>Boyer 12</strong> J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis</p><p>It should also be noted that<u> <mark>allowing the sale of organs would not preclude someone from donating</mark> </u>without compensation<u>.</u> n156 <u><mark>Currently, the sale of blood and ova is allowed under law, but many of the donations of these tissues take place without compensation</u>. n157 <u>In fact, giving the donor the right to sell could actually increase the value of an uncompensated donation</mark> </u>by providing donors with more power to ensure the recipient receives the surplus value of the organ through contractually stipulated prices to prevent any inflation by middlemen.</p>
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Contention 1 – Shortage
| 430,620 | 4 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
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A
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Texas
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1
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Kentucky Hampton-Roman
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Paul
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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cx
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college
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743,349 |
Food wars are a myth
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Salehyann, 7
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Salehyann, 7 – Professor of Political Science – University of North Texas (Idean, “The New Myth About Climate Change”, Foreign Policy, Summer, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3922) //SP
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aside from anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity lead to conflict several studies have shown that an abundance of resources is more likely to contribute to conflict 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for years. But Malawi has yet to experience war. Similarly, the tsunami in 2004 ed to severe shortages of food Yet the tsunami did not lead to resource wars. Clearly there is much more to conflict than resource scarcity
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empirical evidence that resource scarcity several studies have shown that an abundance of resources is more likely to contribute to conflict to severe shortages of foo did not lead to resource wars. Clearl there is much more to conflict than resource scarcity
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First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters.
| 1,555 |
<h4>Food wars are a myth</h4><p><strong>Salehyann, 7</strong> – Professor of Political Science – University of North Texas (Idean, “The New Myth About Climate Change”, Foreign Policy, Summer, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3922) //SP</p><p>First, <u>aside from</u> a few <u>anecdotes, there is little systematic <mark>empirical evidence that resource scarcity</mark> </u>and changing environmental conditions <u>lead to conflict</u>. In fact, <u><mark>several studies have shown that an abundance of</mark> </u>natural <u><mark>resources is more likely to contribute to conflict</u></mark>. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that <u>5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for</u> several <u>years. But</u> famine-wracked <u>Malawi has yet to experience</u> a major civil <u>war.</u> <u>Similarly, the</u> Asian <u>tsunami in 2004</u> killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and l<u>ed <mark>to severe shortages of</u></mark> shelter, <u><mark>foo</mark>d</u>, clean water, and electricity. <u>Yet the tsunami</u>, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, <u><mark>did not lead to</u></mark> an outbreak of <u><mark>resource wars. Clearl</mark>y</u> then, <u><mark>there is much more to</mark> </u>armed <u><mark>conflict than resource scarcity</mark> </u>and natural disasters. </p>
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treaties
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
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Navy
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3
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Boston College Kenner-Carelli
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Lopez
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Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,350 |
Life is improving-more evidence
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Pinker 11
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Pinker 11 Steven Pinker is Professor of psychology at Harvard University "Violence Vanquished" Sept 24 online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html
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On the day this article appears, you will read about a shocking act of violence. there will be a terrorist bombing, a senseless murder, a bloody insurrection. It's impossible to learn about these catastrophes without thinking, "What is the world coming to?"¶ Believe it or not, the world of the past was much worse Violence has been in decline for thousands of years, today we may be living in the most peaceable era The decline, to be sure, has not been smooth. It has not brought violence down to zero, and it is not guaranteed to continue But it is a persistent historical development, visible on scales from millennia to years, from the waging of wars to the spanking of children There will always be enough violent deaths to fill the evening news, so people's impressions of violence will be disconnected from its actual likelihood.¶ Today the decline in these brutal practices can be quantified over the course of our history, humankind has been blessed with six major declines of violence.¶ The first was a process of pacification: the transition from the anarchy to the first agricultural civilizations Forensic archeology—a kind of "CSI: Paleolithic"—can estimate rates of violence from the proportion of skeletons in ancient sites with bashed-in skulls ethnographers can tally the causes of death in tribal peoples that have recently lived outside of state control.¶ These investigations show that, on average, about 15% of people in prestate eras died violently, compared to about 3% of the citizens of the earliest states. Tribal violence subsides when a state or empire imposes control over a territory, leading to the various "paxes" (Romana, Islamica, Brittanica and so on) that are familiar to readers of history.¶ The second decline of violence was a civilizing process that is best documented in Europe. Historical records show that between the late Middle Ages and the 20th century, European countries saw a 10- to 50-fold decline in their rates of homicide.¶ Historians attribute this decline to the consolidation of a patchwork of feudal territories into large kingdoms with centralized authority and an infrastructure of commerce. Criminal justice was nationalized, and zero-sum plunder gave way to positive-sum trade People increasingly controlled their impulses and sought to cooperate with their neighbors the Enlightenment and The 18th century saw the widespread abolition of judicial torture, including the famous prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" in the eighth amendment of the U.S. Constitution.¶ At the same time, many nations began to whittle down their list of capital crimes from the hundreds (including poaching, sodomy, witchcraft and counterfeiting) to just murder and treason The fourth major transition is the respite from major interstate war that we have seen since the end of World War II. Historians sometimes refer to it as the Long Peace Today we take it for granted that Italy and Austria will not come to blows, nor will Britain and Russia. centuries ago, the great powers were almost always at war The cliché that the 20th century was "the most violent in history" ignores the second half of the century (and may not even be true of the first half, if one calculates violent deaths as a proportion of the world's population).¶ Though it's tempting to attribute the Long Peace to nuclear deterrence, non-nuclear developed states have stopped fighting each other as well. Political scientists point instead to the growth of democracy, trade and international organizations—all of which, the statistical evidence shows, reduce the likelihood of conflict since the peak of the cold war in the 1970s and '80s, organized conflicts of all kinds—civil wars, genocides, repression by autocratic governments, terrorist attacks—have declined throughout the world, and their death tolls have declined even more precipitously.¶ The rate of documented direct deaths from political violence (war, terrorism, genocide and warlord militias) in the past decade is an unprecedented few hundredths of a percentage point The most immediate cause of this New Peace was the demise of communism, which ended the proxy wars in the developing world Another contributor was the expansion of international peacekeeping forces, which really do keep the peace the postwar era has seen a cascade of "rights revolutions"—a growing revulsion against aggression on smaller scales the civil rights movement obliterated lynchings and lethal pogroms the women's-rights movement has helped to shrink the incidence of rape and the beating and killing of wives the movement for children's rights has significantly reduced rates of spanking, bullying, paddling in schools, and physical and sexual abuse campaign for gay rights has forced governments in the developed world to repeal laws criminalizing homosexuality and has had some success in reducing hate crimes against gay people Why has violence declined so dramatically for so long? Is it because violence has literally been bred out of us, leaving us more peaceful by nature?¶ This seems unlikely. Evolution has a speed limit measured in generations, and many of these declines have unfolded over decades or even years. Toddlers continue to kick, bite and hit It's more likely that human nature has always comprised inclinations toward violence and inclinations that counteract them Violence has declined because historical circumstances have increasingly favored our better angels The most obvious of these pacifying forces has been the state, with its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. A disinterested judiciary and police can defuse the temptation of exploitative attack We see evidence of the pacifying effects of government in the way that rates of killing declined following the expansion and consolidation of states in tribal societies and in medieval Europe Another pacifying force has been commerce, a game in which everybody can win. As technological progress allows the exchange of goods and ideas other people become more valuable alive than dead. They switch from being targets of demonization and dehumanization to potential partners in reciprocal altruism.¶ For example, though the relationship today between America and China is far from warm, we are unlikely to declare war on them or vice versa , they make too much of our stuff, and we owe them too much money.¶ These technologies have also powered an expansion of rationality and objectivity in human affairs. People are now less likely to privilege their own interests over those of others. They reflect more on the way they live and consider how they could be better off. Violence is often reframed as a problem to be solved rather than as a contest to be won.
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the world of the past was much worse. Violence has been in decline the most peaceable era It has not brought violence to zero, But is persistent development, visible from millennia to years, from wars to spanking the decline can be quantified Forensic archeology can estimate rates of violence ethnographers can tally the causes of death violence subsides when a empire imposes control leading to the various "paxes" Historians attribute this decline to centralized authority and commerce. respite from major interstate war centuries ago, great powers were almost always at war, Political scientists point to democracy, trade and international organizations which, the statistical evidence shows, reduce the likelihood of conflict organized conflicts of all kinds—civil wars, genocides, repression have declined deaths from political violence is an unprecedented few hundredths of a percentage point The most obvious of pacifying forces has been the state, with monopoly on force Another pacifying force has been commerce people
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On the day this article appears, you will read about a shocking act of violence. Somewhere in the world there will be a terrorist bombing, a senseless murder, a bloody insurrection. It's impossible to learn about these catastrophes without thinking, "What is the world coming to?"¶ But a better question may be, "How bad was the world in the past?"¶ Believe it or not, the world of the past was much worse. Violence has been in decline for thousands of years, and today we may be living in the most peaceable era in the existence of our species.¶ The decline, to be sure, has not been smooth. It has not brought violence down to zero, and it is not guaranteed to continue. But it is a persistent historical development, visible on scales from millennia to years, from the waging of wars to the spanking of children.¶ This claim, I know, invites skepticism, incredulity, and sometimes anger. We tend to estimate the probability of an event from the ease with which we can recall examples, and scenes of carnage are more likely to be beamed into our homes and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. There will always be enough violent deaths to fill the evening news, so people's impressions of violence will be disconnected from its actual likelihood.¶ Evidence of our bloody history is not hard to find. Consider the genocides in the Old Testament and the crucifixions in the New, the gory mutilations in Shakespeare's tragedies and Grimm's fairy tales, the British monarchs who beheaded their relatives and the American founders who dueled with their rivals.¶ Today the decline in these brutal practices can be quantified. A look at the numbers shows that over the course of our history, humankind has been blessed with six major declines of violence.¶ The first was a process of pacification: the transition from the anarchy of the hunting, gathering and horticultural societies in which our species spent most of its evolutionary history to the first agricultural civilizations, with cities and governments, starting about 5,000 years ago.¶ For centuries, social theorists like Hobbes and Rousseau speculated from their armchairs about what life was like in a "state of nature." Nowadays we can do better. Forensic archeology—a kind of "CSI: Paleolithic"—can estimate rates of violence from the proportion of skeletons in ancient sites with bashed-in skulls, decapitations or arrowheads embedded in bones. And ethnographers can tally the causes of death in tribal peoples that have recently lived outside of state control.¶ These investigations show that, on average, about 15% of people in prestate eras died violently, compared to about 3% of the citizens of the earliest states. Tribal violence commonly subsides when a state or empire imposes control over a territory, leading to the various "paxes" (Romana, Islamica, Brittanica and so on) that are familiar to readers of history.¶ It's not that the first kings had a benevolent interest in the welfare of their citizens. Just as a farmer tries to prevent his livestock from killing one another, so a ruler will try to keep his subjects from cycles of raiding and feuding. From his point of view, such squabbling is a dead loss—forgone opportunities to extract taxes, tributes, soldiers and slaves.¶ The second decline of violence was a civilizing process that is best documented in Europe. Historical records show that between the late Middle Ages and the 20th century, European countries saw a 10- to 50-fold decline in their rates of homicide.¶ The numbers are consistent with narrative histories of the brutality of life in the Middle Ages, when highwaymen made travel a risk to life and limb and dinners were commonly enlivened by dagger attacks. So many people had their noses cut off that medieval medical textbooks speculated about techniques for growing them back.¶ Historians attribute this decline to the consolidation of a patchwork of feudal territories into large kingdoms with centralized authority and an infrastructure of commerce. Criminal justice was nationalized, and zero-sum plunder gave way to positive-sum trade. People increasingly controlled their impulses and sought to cooperate with their neighbors.¶ The third transition, sometimes called the Humanitarian Revolution, took off with the Enlightenment. Governments and churches had long maintained order by punishing nonconformists with mutilation, torture and gruesome forms of execution, such as burning, breaking, disembowelment, impalement and sawing in half. The 18th century saw the widespread abolition of judicial torture, including the famous prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" in the eighth amendment of the U.S. Constitution.¶ At the same time, many nations began to whittle down their list of capital crimes from the hundreds (including poaching, sodomy, witchcraft and counterfeiting) to just murder and treason. And a growing wave of countries abolished blood sports, dueling, witchhunts, religious persecution, absolute despotism and slavery.¶ The fourth major transition is the respite from major interstate war that we have seen since the end of World War II. Historians sometimes refer to it as the Long Peace.¶ Today we take it for granted that Italy and Austria will not come to blows, nor will Britain and Russia. But centuries ago, the great powers were almost always at war, and until quite recently, Western European countries tended to initiate two or three new wars every year. The cliché that the 20th century was "the most violent in history" ignores the second half of the century (and may not even be true of the first half, if one calculates violent deaths as a proportion of the world's population).¶ Though it's tempting to attribute the Long Peace to nuclear deterrence, non-nuclear developed states have stopped fighting each other as well. Political scientists point instead to the growth of democracy, trade and international organizations—all of which, the statistical evidence shows, reduce the likelihood of conflict. They also credit the rising valuation of human life over national grandeur—a hard-won lesson of two world wars.¶ The fifth trend, which I call the New Peace, involves war in the world as a whole, including developing nations. Since 1946, several organizations have tracked the number of armed conflicts and their human toll world-wide. The bad news is that for several decades, the decline of interstate wars was accompanied by a bulge of civil wars, as newly independent countries were led by inept governments, challenged by insurgencies and armed by the cold war superpowers.¶ The less bad news is that civil wars tend to kill far fewer people than wars between states. And the best news is that, since the peak of the cold war in the 1970s and '80s, organized conflicts of all kinds—civil wars, genocides, repression by autocratic governments, terrorist attacks—have declined throughout the world, and their death tolls have declined even more precipitously.¶ The rate of documented direct deaths from political violence (war, terrorism, genocide and warlord militias) in the past decade is an unprecedented few hundredths of a percentage point. Even if we multiplied that rate to account for unrecorded deaths and the victims of war-caused disease and famine, it would not exceed 1%.¶ The most immediate cause of this New Peace was the demise of communism, which ended the proxy wars in the developing world stoked by the superpowers and also discredited genocidal ideologies that had justified the sacrifice of vast numbers of eggs to make a utopian omelet. Another contributor was the expansion of international peacekeeping forces, which really do keep the peace—not always, but far more often than when adversaries are left to fight to the bitter end.¶ Finally, the postwar era has seen a cascade of "rights revolutions"—a growing revulsion against aggression on smaller scales. In the developed world, the civil rights movement obliterated lynchings and lethal pogroms, and the women's-rights movement has helped to shrink the incidence of rape and the beating and killing of wives and girlfriends.¶ In recent decades, the movement for children's rights has significantly reduced rates of spanking, bullying, paddling in schools, and physical and sexual abuse. And the campaign for gay rights has forced governments in the developed world to repeal laws criminalizing homosexuality and has had some success in reducing hate crimes against gay people.¶ Why has violence declined so dramatically for so long? Is it because violence has literally been bred out of us, leaving us more peaceful by nature?¶ This seems unlikely. Evolution has a speed limit measured in generations, and many of these declines have unfolded over decades or even years. Toddlers continue to kick, bite and hit; little boys continue to play-fight; people of all ages continue to snipe and bicker, and most of them continue to harbor violent fantasies and to enjoy violent entertainment.¶ It's more likely that human nature has always comprised inclinations toward violence and inclinations that counteract them—such as self-control, empathy, fairness and reason—what Abraham Lincoln called "the better angels of our nature." Violence has declined because historical circumstances have increasingly favored our better angels.¶ The most obvious of these pacifying forces has been the state, with its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. A disinterested judiciary and police can defuse the temptation of exploitative attack, inhibit the impulse for revenge and circumvent the self-serving biases that make all parties to a dispute believe that they are on the side of the angels.¶ We see evidence of the pacifying effects of government in the way that rates of killing declined following the expansion and consolidation of states in tribal societies and in medieval Europe. And we can watch the movie in reverse when violence erupts in zones of anarchy, such as the Wild West, failed states and neighborhoods controlled by mafias and street gangs, who can't call 911 or file a lawsuit to resolve their disputes but have to administer their own rough justice.¶ Another pacifying force has been commerce, a game in which everybody can win. As technological progress allows the exchange of goods and ideas over longer distances and among larger groups of trading partners, other people become more valuable alive than dead. They switch from being targets of demonization and dehumanization to potential partners in reciprocal altruism.¶ For example, though the relationship today between America and China is far from warm, we are unlikely to declare war on them or vice versa. Morality aside, they make too much of our stuff, and we owe them too much money.¶ A third peacemaker has been cosmopolitanism—the expansion of people's parochial little worlds through literacy, mobility, education, science, history, journalism and mass media. These forms of virtual reality can prompt people to take the perspective of people unlike themselves and to expand their circle of sympathy to embrace them.¶ These technologies have also powered an expansion of rationality and objectivity in human affairs. People are now less likely to privilege their own interests over those of others. They reflect more on the way they live and consider how they could be better off. Violence is often reframed as a problem to be solved rather than as a contest to be won. We devote ever more of our brainpower to guiding our better angels. It is probably no coincidence that the Humanitarian Revolution came on the heels of the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment, that the Long Peace and rights revolutions coincided with the electronic global village.
| 11,743 |
<h4><strong>Life is improving-more evidence</h4><p>Pinker 11</strong> Steven Pinker is Professor of psychology at Harvard University "Violence Vanquished" Sept 24 online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html</p><p><u>On the day this article appears, you will read about a shocking act of violence.</u> Somewhere in the world <u>there will be a terrorist bombing, a senseless murder, a bloody insurrection. It's</u> <u>impossible to learn about these catastrophes without thinking, "What is the world coming to?"¶ </u>But a better question may be, "How bad was the world in the past?"¶ <u>Believe it or not, <strong><mark>the world of the past was </strong>much worse</u>. <u>Violence has been in decline</mark> for thousands of years,</u> and <u>today we may be living in <mark>the <strong>most peaceable era</u></strong></mark> in the existence of our species.¶ <u>The decline, to be sure, has not been smooth. <mark>It <strong>has not brought violence</mark> down <mark>to zero</strong>,</mark> and it <strong>is not guaranteed to continue</u></strong>. <u><mark>But</mark> it <mark>is</mark> a <mark>persistent</mark> historical <mark>development, visible</mark> on scales <mark>from millennia to years, from</mark> the waging of <mark>wars to</mark> the <mark>spanking</mark> of children</u>.¶ This claim, I know, invites skepticism, incredulity, and sometimes anger. We tend to estimate the probability of an event from the ease with which we can recall examples, and scenes of carnage are more likely to be beamed into our homes and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. <u>There will always be enough violent deaths to fill the evening news, so people's impressions of violence will be disconnected from its actual likelihood.¶ </u>Evidence of our bloody history is not hard to find. Consider the genocides in the Old Testament and the crucifixions in the New, the gory mutilations in Shakespeare's tragedies and Grimm's fairy tales, the British monarchs who beheaded their relatives and the American founders who dueled with their rivals.¶ <u>Today <mark>the decline</mark> in these brutal practices <strong><mark>can be quantified</u></strong></mark>. A look at the numbers shows that <u>over the course of our history, humankind has been blessed with <strong>six major declines of violence.¶ </strong>The first was a process of pacification: the transition from the anarchy</u> of the hunting, gathering and horticultural societies in which our species spent most of its evolutionary history <u>to the first agricultural civilizations</u>, with cities and governments, starting about 5,000 years ago.¶ For centuries, social theorists like Hobbes and Rousseau speculated from their armchairs about what life was like in a "state of nature." Nowadays we can do better. <u><mark>Forensic archeology</mark>—a kind of "CSI: Paleolithic"—<mark>can estimate rates</mark> <mark>of violence</mark> from the proportion of skeletons in ancient sites with bashed-in skulls</u>, decapitations or arrowheads embedded in bones. And <u><mark>ethnographers can</mark> <mark>tally the causes of death</mark> in tribal peoples that have recently lived outside of state control.¶ These investigations show that, on average, about 15% of people in prestate eras died violently, compared to about 3% of the citizens of the earliest states. Tribal <mark>violence</u></mark> commonly <u><mark>subsides when a <strong></mark>state or <mark>empire </strong>imposes control</mark> over a territory<strong>, <mark>leading to the various "paxes</strong>"</mark> (Romana, Islamica, Brittanica and so on) that are familiar to readers of history.¶ </u>It's not that the first kings had a benevolent interest in the welfare of their citizens. Just as a farmer tries to prevent his livestock from killing one another, so a ruler will try to keep his subjects from cycles of raiding and feuding. From his point of view, such squabbling is a dead loss—forgone opportunities to extract taxes, tributes, soldiers and slaves.¶ <u>The second decline of violence was a civilizing process that is best documented in Europe. Historical records show that between the late Middle Ages and the 20th century, European countries saw a <strong>10- to 50-fold decline in their rates of homicide</strong>.¶ </u>The numbers are consistent with narrative histories of the brutality of life in the Middle Ages, when highwaymen made travel a risk to life and limb and dinners were commonly enlivened by dagger attacks. So many people had their noses cut off that medieval medical textbooks speculated about techniques for growing them back.¶ <u><mark>Historians attribute this decline to</mark> the consolidation of a patchwork of feudal territories into large kingdoms with <mark>centralized authority and</mark> an infrastructure of <mark>commerce.</mark> Criminal justice was nationalized, and <strong>zero-sum plunder gave way to positive-sum trade</u></strong>. <u>People increasingly controlled their impulses and sought to cooperate with their neighbors</u>.¶ The third transition, sometimes called the Humanitarian Revolution, took off with <u>the Enlightenment</u>. Governments and churches had long maintained order by punishing nonconformists with mutilation, torture <u>and</u> gruesome forms of execution, such as burning, breaking, disembowelment, impalement and sawing in half. <u>The 18th century saw the widespread abolition of judicial torture, including the famous prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" in the eighth amendment of the U.S. Constitution.¶ At the same time, many nations began to whittle down their list of capital crimes from the hundreds (including poaching, sodomy, witchcraft and counterfeiting) to just murder and treason</u>. And a growing wave of countries abolished blood sports, dueling, witchhunts, religious persecution, absolute despotism and slavery.¶ <u>The fourth major transition is the <mark>respite from major interstate war</mark> that we have seen since the end of World War II. Historians sometimes refer to it as the Long Peace</u>.¶ <u>Today we take it for granted that Italy and Austria will not come to blows, nor will Britain and Russia.</u> But <u><mark>centuries ago,</mark> the <strong><mark>great powers were almost always at war</u></strong>,</mark> and until quite recently, Western European countries tended to initiate two or three new wars every year. <u>The cliché that the 20th century was "the most violent in history" <strong>ignores the second half</strong> of the century (<strong>and may not even be true of the first</strong> half, if one calculates violent deaths as a proportion of the world's population).¶ Though it's tempting to attribute the Long Peace to nuclear deterrence, non-nuclear developed states have stopped fighting each other as well. <mark>Political scientists point </mark>instead <mark>to</mark> the growth of <mark>democracy<strong>, </strong>trade<strong> and international organizations</strong></mark>—<strong>all of <mark>which, the </strong>statistical evidence<strong> shows, </strong>reduce the likelihood of conflict</u></mark>. They also credit the rising valuation of human life over national grandeur—a hard-won lesson of two world wars.¶ The fifth trend, which I call the New Peace, involves war in the world as a whole, including developing nations. Since 1946, several organizations have tracked the number of armed conflicts and their human toll world-wide. The bad news is that for several decades, the decline of interstate wars was accompanied by a bulge of civil wars, as newly independent countries were led by inept governments, challenged by insurgencies and armed by the cold war superpowers.¶ The less bad news is that civil wars tend to kill far fewer people than wars between states. And the best news is that, <u>since the peak of the cold war in the 1970s and '80s, <strong><mark>organized conflicts of all kinds</strong>—civil wars, genocides, repression</mark> by autocratic governments, terrorist attacks—<mark>have declined</mark> throughout the world, and their death tolls have declined even more precipitously.¶ The rate of documented direct <strong><mark>deaths from political violence</mark> (war, terrorism, genocide and warlord militias) in the past decade <mark>is an </strong>unprecedented few hundredths of a percentage point</u></mark>. Even if we multiplied that rate to account for unrecorded deaths and the victims of war-caused disease and famine, it would not exceed 1%.¶ <u>The most immediate cause of this New Peace was the demise of communism, which ended the proxy wars in the developing world</u> stoked by the superpowers and also discredited genocidal ideologies that had justified the sacrifice of vast numbers of eggs to make a utopian omelet. <u>Another contributor was the expansion of international peacekeeping forces, which <strong>really do keep the peace</u></strong>—not always, but far more often than when adversaries are left to fight to the bitter end.¶ Finally, <u>the postwar era has seen a cascade of "rights revolutions"—a growing revulsion against aggression on smaller scales</u>. In the developed world, <u>the civil rights movement obliterated lynchings and lethal pogroms</u>, and <u>the women's-rights movement has helped to shrink the incidence of rape and the beating and killing of wives</u> and girlfriends.¶ In recent decades, <u>the movement for children's rights has significantly reduced rates of spanking, bullying, paddling in schools, and physical and sexual abuse</u>. And the <u>campaign for gay rights has forced governments in the developed world to repeal laws criminalizing homosexuality and has had some success in reducing hate crimes against gay people</u>.¶ <u>Why has violence declined so dramatically for so long? Is it because violence has literally been bred out of us, leaving us more peaceful by nature?¶ This seems unlikely. Evolution has a speed limit measured in generations, and many of these declines have unfolded over decades or even years. Toddlers continue to kick, bite and hit</u>; little boys continue to play-fight; people of all ages continue to snipe and bicker, and most of them continue to harbor violent fantasies and to enjoy violent entertainment.¶ <u>It's more likely that human nature has always comprised inclinations toward violence and inclinations that counteract them</u>—such as self-control, empathy, fairness and reason—what Abraham Lincoln called "the better angels of our nature." <u>Violence has declined because historical circumstances have increasingly favored our better angels</u>.¶ <u><strong><mark>The most obvious of</mark> these <mark>pacifying forces has been </strong>the state<strong>, with</mark> its </strong><mark>monopoly on</mark> the legitimate use of <mark>force</mark>. A disinterested judiciary and police can defuse the temptation of exploitative attack</u>, inhibit the impulse for revenge and circumvent the self-serving biases that make all parties to a dispute believe that they are on the side of the angels.¶ <u>We see evidence of the pacifying effects of government in the way that rates of killing declined following the expansion and consolidation of states in tribal societies and in medieval Europe</u>. And we can watch the movie in reverse when violence erupts in zones of anarchy, such as the Wild West, failed states and neighborhoods controlled by mafias and street gangs, who can't call 911 or file a lawsuit to resolve their disputes but have to administer their own rough justice.¶ <u><mark>Another pacifying force has been commerce</mark>, a game in which everybody can win. As technological progress allows the exchange of goods and ideas</u> over longer distances and among larger groups of trading partners, <u>other <strong><mark>people</mark> become more valuable alive than dead</strong>. They switch from being targets of demonization and dehumanization to potential partners in reciprocal altruism.¶ For example, though the relationship today between America and China is far from warm, we are <strong>unlikely to declare war</strong> on them or vice versa</u>. Morality aside<u>, they make too much of our stuff, and we owe them too much money.¶ </u>A third peacemaker has been cosmopolitanism—the expansion of people's parochial little worlds through literacy, mobility, education, science, history, journalism and mass media. These forms of virtual reality can prompt people to take the perspective of people unlike themselves and to expand their circle of sympathy to embrace them.¶ <u>These technologies have also powered an expansion of rationality and objectivity in human affairs. People are now less likely to privilege their own interests over those of others. They reflect more on the way they live and consider how they could be better off. Violence is often reframed as a problem to be solved rather than as a contest to be won.</u> We devote ever more of our brainpower to guiding our better angels. It is probably no coincidence that the Humanitarian Revolution came on the heels of the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment, that<strong> the Long Peace and rights revolutions coincided with the electronic global village.</p></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
advantage
| 88,819 | 23 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,351 |
Weakness is the key internal link ---- need to keep key supporters on to avoid the bill, which proves why political capital is crucial
|
WSJ 1/19/2014
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WSJ 1/19/2014 http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-congress-and-iran-1421680348
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The bill that is likely to emerge after the Senate Banking Committee holds hearings Tuesday will be a revised version of last year’s bipartisan Kirk-Menendez bill, It’s never easy to oppose the foreign policy of a sitting President from your own party, especially on a deal that Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes recently called the foreign-policy equivalent of the Affordable Care Act. Then again, Democrats might reflect on what their lockstep support for ObamaCare has done for their Senate majority The next two years will be full of foreign-policy dangers as adversaries seek to exploit Mr. Obama’s weakness
|
The bill likely to emerge Tuesday will be a revised Kirk-Menendez It’s never easy to oppose the foreign policy of a sitting President from your own party Then again, Democrats might reflect on what their lockstep support for ObamaCare has done The next two years will be full of foreign-policy dangers as adversaries seek to exploit Mr. Obama’s weakness
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These are remarkable claims about legislation that would penalize Iran only after the current deadline expires and if Iran does not come to terms. The bill that is likely to emerge after the Senate Banking Committee holds hearings Tuesday will be a revised version of last year’s bipartisan Kirk-Menendez bill, named after sponsors Republican Mark Kirk of Illinois and Democrat Robert Menendez of New Jersey. It would reimpose the sanctions Mr. Obama suspended when he signed the interim deal, impose visa bans and asset blocks on top Iranian officials, and further tighten oil and financial sanctions. Passing the bill now could help persuade Iranian negotiators that they cannot string the West along indefinitely without paying a price. Would that cause Iran to walk away from negotiations? It’s a strange argument coming from an Administration that boasts that Iran agreed to the interim deal thanks to the bite of strong sanctions. As for Western unity, it must not be all that firm if it would collapse following a display of Congressional support for the very goal the P5+1 claims to favor. Russia didn’t walk away from Iran negotiations even when it was hit with Western sanctions, so why would it do so on behalf of Iran? The sanctions Tehran really fears—on the purchase of its energy, on its banks, and restrictions on its international financial transactions—depend on action by Washington and its European allies. Moscow is an outlier in this negotiation, if not bidding to be a spoiler. Mr. Obama’s real reason for opposing the bill may be that he knows it is also a message to him not to strike a bad deal. The talks have already devolved from a demand that Iran give up its nuclear program to how much of a “window” Iran will have to build a bomb. Mr. Kerry wants at least a year, as if Iran couldn’t disguise its progress. In any case this boils down to negotiating the terms of how easily Iran can violate the deal it is supposedly pledging not to violate. That is the measure of how much Iran has gained in these talks so far. All of this ought to persuade waverers to back Kirk-Menendez, especially the 12 Democrats who supported the bill last year and remain in the Senate. It’s never easy to oppose the foreign policy of a sitting President from your own party, especially on a deal that Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes recently called the foreign-policy equivalent of the Affordable Care Act. Then again, Democrats might reflect on what their lockstep support for ObamaCare has done for their Senate majority. The next two years will be full of foreign-policy dangers as adversaries seek to exploit Mr. Obama’s weakness and desire for diplomatic agreements of any kind. Passing Kirk-Menendez would at least send a signal that the American people are not as pliable and that help is on the way after 2016.
| 2,839 |
<h4><strong>Weakness is the key internal link ---- need to keep key supporters on to avoid the bill, which proves why political capital is crucial</h4><p>WSJ 1/19/2014</strong> http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-congress-and-iran-1421680348</p><p>These are remarkable claims about legislation that would penalize Iran only after the current deadline expires and if Iran does not come to terms. <u><mark>The bill</mark> that is <mark>likely to emerge</mark> after the Senate Banking Committee holds hearings <mark>Tuesday will be a revised</mark> version of last year’s bipartisan <mark>Kirk-Menendez</mark> bill,</u> named after sponsors Republican Mark Kirk of Illinois and Democrat Robert Menendez of New Jersey. It would reimpose the sanctions Mr. Obama suspended when he signed the interim deal, impose visa bans and asset blocks on top Iranian officials, and further tighten oil and financial sanctions. Passing the bill now could help persuade Iranian negotiators that they cannot string the West along indefinitely without paying a price. Would that cause Iran to walk away from negotiations? It’s a strange argument coming from an Administration that boasts that Iran agreed to the interim deal thanks to the bite of strong sanctions. As for Western unity, it must not be all that firm if it would collapse following a display of Congressional support for the very goal the P5+1 claims to favor. Russia didn’t walk away from Iran negotiations even when it was hit with Western sanctions, so why would it do so on behalf of Iran? The sanctions Tehran really fears—on the purchase of its energy, on its banks, and restrictions on its international financial transactions—depend on action by Washington and its European allies. Moscow is an outlier in this negotiation, if not bidding to be a spoiler. Mr. Obama’s real reason for opposing the bill may be that he knows it is also a message to him not to strike a bad deal. The talks have already devolved from a demand that Iran give up its nuclear program to how much of a “window” Iran will have to build a bomb. Mr. Kerry wants at least a year, as if Iran couldn’t disguise its progress. In any case this boils down to negotiating the terms of how easily Iran can violate the deal it is supposedly pledging not to violate. That is the measure of how much Iran has gained in these talks so far. All of this ought to persuade waverers to back Kirk-Menendez, especially the 12 Democrats who supported the bill last year and remain in the Senate.<u> <strong><mark>It’s never easy to oppose the foreign policy of a sitting President from your own party</strong></mark>, especially on a deal that Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes recently called the foreign-policy equivalent of the Affordable Care Act. <mark>Then again, Democrats might reflect on what their lockstep support for ObamaCare has done</mark> for their Senate majority</u>. <u><strong><mark>The next two years will be full of foreign-policy dangers as adversaries seek to exploit Mr. Obama’s weakness</u></mark> and desire for diplomatic agreements of any kind. Passing Kirk-Menendez would at least send a signal that the American people are not as pliable and that help is on the way after 2016.</p></strong>
|
1nr
|
Strikes
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UQ
| 431,012 | 1 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,352 |
Obama can sustain a veto of sanctions now but it’s close- PC’s key- new sanctions cause war with Iran
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CNN 1/9
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CNN 1/9/2015 (New Congress, new nuclear showdown over Iran, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/09/politics/iran-sanctions-fight-republican-congress/)
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Iranian and American negotiators will be eying another showdown in Washington GOP lawmakers are poised to push a bill authorizing additional sanctions the majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need and the fight is already underway for the votes that could fill the gap With fewer than two months until agreement deadline, and expecting the White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors supporters know the clock is ticking the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran Kirk expects a high-profile challenge from the White House four Democrats rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations after the White House made its push on Capitol Hill to keep the measure from a floor vote if Kirk, Menendez and their allies can pressure those four Democrats into signing on, they will need to pull three more Senate Democrats who didn't cosponsor the bill last year to secure the 15 needed to override a veto A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the toughest battle yet on this issue
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, GOP poised t push a bill authorizing additional sanctions majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need fight is already underway f With fewer than two months expecting the White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran Kirk expects a high-profile challenge from the White House the four Democrats rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations after the White House made its push . A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the toughest battle yet on this issue
|
Iranian and American negotiators preparing to square off in Geneva next week over Iran's nuclear ambitions will also be eying another showdown brewing in Washington. One year after a Republican-led coalition in the Senate came up just short of a deal, GOP lawmakers are poised to wield their new power in the Senate to push a bill authorizing additional sanctions against Iran. But the new 54-member majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need to override a presidential veto, and the fight is already underway for the votes that could fill the gap. With fewer than two months until diplomats' March 1 framework agreement deadline, and expecting the White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors, supporters know the clock is ticking to pass a sanctions bill they say will ratchet up pressure on Iran. But for opponents of additional sanctions, the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran, they claim. For Sen. Mark Kirk, the Republican half of the Kirk-Menendez sanctions bill he has pushed for the last three years, the sooner a sanctions bill hits the Senate floor, the better -- both politically and policy-wise. "If the Senate was allowed to vote tomorrow, I would be able to get two-thirds," Kirk said Sunday in a phone interview. "Now is the time to put pressure on Iran especially with oil prices so low. We are uniquely advantaged at this time to shut down this nuclear program." Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina), another major proponent of the legislation, told CNN last month the Kirk-Menendez bill "will come up for a vote in January," a pledge he made the same day to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a meeting in Jerusalem. Kirk said he backed that timing but insisted that it depends on Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. A McConnell spokesman called the legislation "a priority," but said there isn't yet a schedule for a sanctions bill. Republicans have been clamoring for additional sanctions on Iran, but with control of Congress in their hands, Republican lawmakers will also have to own the consequences of sanctions legislation -- which the President, State Department and Iranian officials have warned could derail negotiations. "We have long believed that Congress should not consider any new sanctions while negotiations are underway, in order to give our negotiators the time and space they need to fully test the current diplomatic opportunity. New sanctions threaten the diplomatic process currently underway," a senior administration official told CNN. The Kirk-Menendez bill that died in the Senate last year would reimpose sanctions on Iran if Obama couldn't certify that Iran doesn't finance terror groups that have attacked Americans and would keep Iran from maintaining low-level nuclear enrichment in a final deal, just a few terms that are much stricter than the current framework for negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 world powers. Those congressional provisions are "poison pills," according to Dylan Williams, head of government affairs at J Street, a group that bills itself as pro-Israel. It lobbied heavily on the issue last year and is ramping up for another forceful push. "All of these things are poison pills, far from the clean sanctions, just-if-things-go-wrong idea," Williams said. "We know that many if not most of the people pushing for legislation don't want diplomacy to work." Kirk has already been working with Sen. Bob Menendez, of New Jersey, his Democratic partner on the bill, to rework some of its language -- changes that could potentially draw more Democratic support. The pair are still working on final language for the bill, which drew 59 cosponsors last year, though Kirk said he is working to stave off as many changes as possible -- "The more changes, the worse," he said. The Illinois Republican expects a high-profile challenge from the White House and its allies, but he will be getting his own backup from some Capitol Hill heavyweights: the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, which typically spends more than $2.5 million a year on lobbying, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. "I think they're pretty damned strong. This would be the No. 1 thing for them," Kirk said of AIPAC. Intense lobbying from AIPAC could help the sanctions supporters win back the four Democrats who joined 13 others in cosponsoring the sanctions bill last year, but later backtracked their support. Sens. Kirsten Gillibrand of New York, Joe Manchin of West Virginia, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut and Chris Coons of Delaware rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations after the White House and allies made its push on Capitol Hill to keep the measure from a floor vote. "I did not sign it with the intention that it would ever be voted upon or used upon while we were negotiating," Manchin said on MSNBC after Obama talked about Iran in his State of the Union address. "I signed it because I wanted to make sure the president had a hammer if he needed it and showed them how determined we were to do it and use it if we had to." After talks failed to materialize into an agreement by the November 2014 deadline, some Democrats have started to lose patience with the stop-and-stall pace of negotiations with Iran and are facing pressure from groups like AIPAC to support a sanctions bill, though the White House insists the negotiations have yielded tangible results: rolling back Iran's nuclear program during negotiations. But even if Kirk, Menendez and their allies can pressure those four Democrats into signing on, they will need to pull three more Senate Democrats who didn't cosponsor the bill last year to secure the 15 Democrats needed to override a presidential veto. And they won't just be targeted by AIPAC. A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the toughest battle yet on this issue, and while they're clear-eyed about the uphill climb they face, they dismiss the overconfident stride of pro-sanctions leaders. These groups will look to paint any new sanctions as a step onto the warpath with Iran and show wary Democrats that they have the grassroots backing to stave off attacks from groups like AIPAC. More than 400 faith leaders and activists traveled to D.C. in late November to lobby Congress against the sanctions in a day of action organized by the Friends Committee on National Legislation, a Quaker-founded organization, and the group plans to drive its 50,000 supporters to flood Congress with calls and letters in the weeks ahead. "The real trick that we have to do is really to make that opposition -- both in the public and that opposition on the Hill -- to really make it become public and to amplify those voices," said Kate Gould, the group's lead lobbyist on the issue. "Because right now you hear from, it's Lindsey Graham and (Marco) Rubio, who are very confident in their prognosis and have made it sound like it's inevitable that these sanctions will pass with a veto-proof majority."
| 7,128 |
<h4>Obama can sustain a veto of sanctions now but it’s close- PC’s key- new sanctions cause war with Iran</h4><p><strong>CNN 1/9</strong>/2015 (New Congress, new nuclear showdown over Iran, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/09/politics/iran-sanctions-fight-republican-congress/)</p><p><u>Iranian and American negotiators</u> preparing to square off in Geneva next week over Iran's nuclear ambitions <u>will</u> also <u>be eying</u> <u>another showdown</u> brewing <u>in Washington</u>. One year after a Republican-led coalition in the Senate came up just short of a deal<mark>, <u>GOP</mark> lawmakers are <mark>poised t</mark>o</u> wield their new power in the Senate to <u><mark>push a bill authorizing additional sanctions</mark> </u>against Iran. But <u>the</u> new 54-member <u><mark>majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need</u></mark> to override a presidential veto, <u>and the <strong><mark>fight is already underway</strong> f</mark>or the votes that could fill the gap</u>. <u><mark>With fewer than two months</mark> until</u> diplomats' March 1 framework <u>agreement deadline, and <mark>expecting the <strong>White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors</u></strong></mark>, <u>supporters know the clock is ticking</u> to pass a sanctions bill they say will ratchet up pressure on Iran. But for opponents of additional sanctions, <u><strong><mark>the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran</u></strong></mark>, they claim. For Sen. Mark Kirk, the Republican half of the Kirk-Menendez sanctions bill he has pushed for the last three years, the sooner a sanctions bill hits the Senate floor, the better -- both politically and policy-wise. "If the Senate was allowed to vote tomorrow, I would be able to get two-thirds," Kirk said Sunday in a phone interview. "Now is the time to put pressure on Iran especially with oil prices so low. We are uniquely advantaged at this time to shut down this nuclear program." Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina), another major proponent of the legislation, told CNN last month the Kirk-Menendez bill "will come up for a vote in January," a pledge he made the same day to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a meeting in Jerusalem. Kirk said he backed that timing but insisted that it depends on Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. A McConnell spokesman called the legislation "a priority," but said there isn't yet a schedule for a sanctions bill. Republicans have been clamoring for additional sanctions on Iran, but with control of Congress in their hands, Republican lawmakers will also have to own the consequences of sanctions legislation -- which the President, State Department and Iranian officials have warned could derail negotiations. "We have long believed that Congress should not consider any new sanctions while negotiations are underway, in order to give our negotiators the time and space they need to fully test the current diplomatic opportunity. New sanctions threaten the diplomatic process currently underway," a senior administration official told CNN. The Kirk-Menendez bill that died in the Senate last year would reimpose sanctions on Iran if Obama couldn't certify that Iran doesn't finance terror groups that have attacked Americans and would keep Iran from maintaining low-level nuclear enrichment in a final deal, just a few terms that are much stricter than the current framework for negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 world powers. Those congressional provisions are "poison pills," according to Dylan Williams, head of government affairs at J Street, a group that bills itself as pro-Israel. It lobbied heavily on the issue last year and is ramping up for another forceful push. "All of these things are poison pills, far from the clean sanctions, just-if-things-go-wrong idea," Williams said. "We know that many if not most of the people pushing for legislation don't want diplomacy to work." Kirk has already been working with Sen. Bob Menendez, of New Jersey, his Democratic partner on the bill, to rework some of its language -- changes that could potentially draw more Democratic support. The pair are still working on final language for the bill, which drew 59 cosponsors last year, though <u><mark>Kirk</u></mark> said he is working to stave off as many changes as possible -- "The more changes, the worse," he said. The Illinois Republican <u><mark>expects a <strong>high-profile challenge from the White House</u></strong></mark> and its allies, but he will be getting his own backup from some Capitol Hill heavyweights: the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, which typically spends more than $2.5 million a year on lobbying, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. "I think they're pretty damned strong. This would be the No. 1 thing for them," Kirk said of AIPAC. Intense lobbying from AIPAC could help the sanctions supporters win back <mark>the <u>four Democrats</u></mark> who joined 13 others in cosponsoring the sanctions bill last year, but later backtracked their support. Sens. Kirsten Gillibrand of New York, Joe Manchin of West Virginia, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut and Chris Coons of Delaware <u><mark>rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations <strong>after the White House</strong></mark> </u>and allies<u> <strong><mark>made its push</strong></mark> on Capitol Hill to keep the measure from a floor vote</u>. "I did not sign it with the intention that it would ever be voted upon or used upon while we were negotiating," Manchin said on MSNBC after Obama talked about Iran in his State of the Union address. "I signed it because I wanted to make sure the president had a hammer if he needed it and showed them how determined we were to do it and use it if we had to." After talks failed to materialize into an agreement by the November 2014 deadline, some Democrats have started to lose patience with the stop-and-stall pace of negotiations with Iran and are facing pressure from groups like AIPAC to support a sanctions bill, though the White House insists the negotiations have yielded tangible results: rolling back Iran's nuclear program during negotiations. But even <u>if Kirk, Menendez and their allies can pressure those four Democrats into signing on, they will need to pull three more Senate Democrats who didn't cosponsor the bill last year to secure the 15</u> Democrats <u>needed to override a</u> presidential <u>veto</u><mark>.</mark> And they won't just be targeted by AIPAC. <u><mark>A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the <strong>toughest battle yet on this issue</u></strong></mark>, and while they're clear-eyed about the uphill climb they face, they dismiss the overconfident stride of pro-sanctions leaders. These groups will look to paint any new sanctions as a step onto the warpath with Iran and show wary Democrats that they have the grassroots backing to stave off attacks from groups like AIPAC. More than 400 faith leaders and activists traveled to D.C. in late November to lobby Congress against the sanctions in a day of action organized by the Friends Committee on National Legislation, a Quaker-founded organization, and the group plans to drive its 50,000 supporters to flood Congress with calls and letters in the weeks ahead. "The real trick that we have to do is really to make that opposition -- both in the public and that opposition on the Hill -- to really make it become public and to amplify those voices," said Kate Gould, the group's lead lobbyist on the issue. "Because right now you hear from, it's Lindsey Graham and (Marco) Rubio, who are very confident in their prognosis and have made it sound like it's inevitable that these sanctions will pass with a veto-proof majority."</p>
|
1nc
| null |
1
| 220,775 | 10 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,353 |
no crowd out - friends and family will still donate
|
Gill 2
|
Gill 2 Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45
|
In the early 1970s, Titmuss and Singer argued that the existence of financial incentives for blood products would decrease the amount of blood products overall, and some people might believe that the same argument can be extended to financial incentives for kidneys, first the available evidence does not support the conclusion that payment for blood products has reduced blood supply in the U S secondly, because live kidney donations are usually between family members, there is a significant difference between blood and kidneys that makes it illegitimate to transfer Titmuss and Singer's conclusions to the kidney debate.
|
first o the available evidence does not support the conclusion that payment for blood products has reduced blood supply in the U St secondly, because live kidney donations are usually between family members, there is a significant difference between blood and kidneys that makes it illegitimate to transfer Titmuss and Singer's conclusions to the kidney debate.
|
Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal/v012/12.1gill.html
3. In the early 1970s, Titmuss (1971) and Singer (1973) argued that the existence of financial incentives for blood products would decrease the amount of blood products overall, and some people might believe that the same argument can be extended to financial incentives for kidneys, leading to the conclusion that payment for kidneys will decrease the overall number of kidneys available for transplant. Singer and Titmuss's criticisms of payment for blood products are consequentialist—they argue that such payment is wrong because it would reduce the amount of blood for people who needed it. We believe, first of all, that their consequentialist arguments against payment for blood products have turned out to be inconclusive at best—that the available evidence does not support the conclusion that payment for blood products has reduced blood supply in the United States. And we believe, secondly, that because live kidney donations are usually between family members, there is a significant difference between blood and kidneys that makes it illegitimate to transfer Titmuss and Singer's conclusions to the kidney debate. We do, however, remain open to the possibility that future evidence may vitiate our belief that payment for kidneys will increase supplies. For discussion of Titmuss and Singer in relation to kidney sales, see Campbell (1992, pp. 41-42); Cherry (2000, pp. 340-41); and Harvey (1999, p. 119).
| 1,554 |
<h4>no crowd out - friends and family will still donate</h4><p><strong>Gill 2</strong> Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45</p><p>Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal/v012/12.1gill.html</p><p>3. <u>In the early 1970s, Titmuss</u> (1971) <u>and Singer</u> (1973) <u>argued that the existence of financial incentives for blood products would decrease the amount of blood products overall, and some people might believe that the same argument can be extended to financial incentives for kidneys,</u> leading to the conclusion that payment for kidneys will decrease the overall number of kidneys available for transplant. Singer and Titmuss's criticisms of payment for blood products are consequentialist—they argue that such payment is wrong because it would reduce the amount of blood for people who needed it. We believe, <u><mark>first </u>o</mark>f all, that their consequentialist arguments against payment for blood products have turned out to be inconclusive at best—that <u><mark>the available evidence does not support the conclusion that payment for blood products has reduced blood supply in the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u>t</mark>ates. And we believe, <u><mark>secondly,</mark> </u>that<u> <mark>because live kidney donations are usually between family members, there is a significant difference between blood and kidneys that makes it illegitimate to transfer Titmuss and Singer's conclusions to the kidney debate.</u></mark> We do, however, remain open to the possibility that future evidence may vitiate our belief that payment for kidneys will increase supplies. For discussion of Titmuss and Singer in relation to kidney sales, see Campbell (1992, pp. 41-42); Cherry (2000, pp. 340-41); and Harvey (1999, p. 119). </p>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Shortage
| 430,252 | 7 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
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Texas
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1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
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Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,354 |
Specific scenario planning is key to combating larger securitizing structures
|
Wæver 2000 International relations theory and the politics of European integration, p. 284-285
|
Ole Wæver, IR—University of Copenhagen, 2000 International relations theory and the politics of European integration, p. 284-285
The other main possibility is to stress' responsibility. Particularly in a field like security one has to make choices and deal with the challenges and risks that one confronts – and not shy away into long-range or principled trans-formations. The meta political line risks (despite the theoretical commitment to the concrete other) implying that politics can be contained within large 'systemic questions. In line with the classical revolutionary tradition, after the change (now no longer the revolution but the meta-physical transformation), there will be no more problems whereas in our situation (until the change) we should not deal with the 'small questions' of politics, only with the large one (cf. Rorty 1996). However, the ethical demand in post-structuralism (e.g. Derrida's 'justice') is of a kind that can never be instantiated in any concrete political order – It is an experience of the undecidable that exceeds any concrete solution and reinserts politics. Therefore, politics can never be reduced to meta-questions there is no way to erase the small, particular, banal conflicts and controversies. In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the 'opening' oriented version of deconstruction, we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event. To take a position, take part, and 'produce events' (Derrida 1994: 89) means to get involved in specific struggles. Politics takes place 'in the singular event of engagement' (Derrida 1996: 83). Derrida's politics is focused on the calls that demand response/responsibility contained in words like justice, Europe and emancipation. Should we treat security in this manner? No, security is not that kind of call. 'Security' is not a way to open (or keep open) an ethical horizon. Security is a much more situational concept oriented to the handling of specifics. It belongs to the sphere of how to handle challenges – and avoid 'the worst' (Derrida 1991). Here enters again the possible pessimism which for the security analyst might be occupational or structural. The infinitude of responsibility (Derrida 1996: 86) or the tragic nature of politics (Morgenthau 1946, Chapter 7) means that one can never feel reassured that by some 'good deed', 'I have assumed my responsibilities ' (Derrida 1996: 86). If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone, I know that it is to the detriment of an other; of one nation to the detriment of my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends, etc. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility; otherwise there would he no ethical problems or decisions. (ibid.; and parallel argumentation in Morgenthau 1946; Chapters 6 and 7) Because of this there will remain conflicts and risks - and the question of how to handle them. Should developments be securitized (and if so, in what terms)? Often, our reply will be to aim for de-securitization and then politics meet meta-politics; but occasionally the underlying pessimism regarding the prospects for orderliness and compatibility among human aspirations will point to scenarios sufficiently worrisome that responsibility will entail securitization in order to block the worst. As a security/securitization analyst, this means accepting the task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns, to try to assist in shaping the continent in a way that creates the least insecurity and violence - even if this occasionally means invoking/producing `structures' or even using the dubious instrument of securitization. In the case of the current European configuration, the above analysis suggests the use of securitization at the level of European scenarios with the aim of preempting and avoiding numerous instances of local securitization that could lead to security dilemmas and escalations, violence and mutual vilification.
|
the use of patriarchy as the one-size-fits-all paradigm and the dichotomy of injured women/male aggressor was totally inadequate. Sex-specific violence was inextricable from the plague of wars and insurgencies that laid waste to large parts of the world. Rape and female captivity were standard procedures of marauding militias and terrorist bands the sex trade was entangled with poverty, official corruption, labor flows across borders, and forced migration. Violence was inseparable from politics
|
the use of patriarchy as the one-size-fits-all and the dichotomy of injured women/male aggressor was totally inadequate. Sex- violence was inextricable from plague of wars and insurgencies that laid waste to large parts of the world the sex trade —was entangled with poverty, official corruption, labor flows and forced migration. Violence was inseparable from politic
|
Patriarchy not the root cause—inseparable from regional conflict and structural conditions.
Stansell 2010 (Christine, Professor of history at Princeton and the University of Chicago, “Global Feminism in a Conservative Age: Possibilities and Pieties Since 1980”, in Dissent, April 1st Edition, pg. 51-52)
But at the same time, the use of patriarchy as the one-size-fits-all paradigm and the dichotomy of injured women/male aggressor was totally inadequate. Sex-specific violence was inextricable from the plague of wars and insurgencies that laid waste to large parts of the world. Rape, torture, mutilation, and female captivity and enslavement were standard procedures of marauding militias and terrorist bands in Africa, from Liberia and Sierra Leone to Congo, northern Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, and Somalia. Coerced labor in the sex trade—what came to be called sexual slavery—was entangled with poverty, official corruption, labor flows across borders, and forced migration. Violence was inseparable from politics and reactionary religious regimes and parties: Muslim fundamentalists in Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran consolidated power by implementing draconian interpretations of sharia
| 1,213 |
<h4><strong>Specific scenario planning is key to combating larger securitizing structures </h4><p></strong>Ole <strong>Wæver</strong>, IR—University of Copenhagen, <strong>2000<u> International relations theory and the politics of European integration, p. 284-285</p><p></u></strong>The other main possibility is to stress' responsibility. Particularly <u><strong><mark>in a field like security one has to</mark> make choices and <mark>deal with the</mark> challenges and risks that one confronts – and not shy away into long-range or principled trans-formation</u></strong>s. <u><strong>The meta political line <mark>risks</u></strong></mark> (<u><strong><mark>despite the theoretical commitment to the concrete other</mark>) implying that politics can be contained within large 'systemic questions.</u></strong> In line with the classical revolutionary tradition, after the change (now no longer the revolution but the meta-physical transformation), there will be no more problems whereas in our situation (until the change) we should not deal with the 'small questions' of politics, only with the large one (cf. Rorty 1996). However, <u><strong>the ethical demand in post-structuralism</u></strong> (e.g. Derrida's 'justice') <u><strong>is of a kind that can never be instantiated in any concrete political order – It is an experience of the undecidable that exceeds any concrete solution and reinserts politics. Therefore, politics can never be reduced to meta-questions there is no way to erase the small, particular, banal conflicts and controversies. </u></strong> In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the 'opening' oriented version of deconstruction<u><strong>, we</u></strong> <u><strong>could</u></strong> with Derrida <u><strong>stress the singularity of the event. To take a position, take part, and 'produce events'</u></strong> (Derrida 1994: 89) <u><strong>means to get involved in specific struggles</u></strong>. <u><strong>Politics takes place 'in the singular event of engagement'</u></strong> (Derrida 1996: 83). Derrida's politics is focused on the calls that demand response/responsibility contained in words like justice, Europe and emancipation. Should we treat security in this manner? No, security is not that kind of call. 'Security' is not a way to open (or keep open) an ethical horizon. <u><strong><mark>Security is a</u></strong></mark> much <u><strong><mark>more situational concept oriented to the handling of specifics</mark>. <mark>It belongs to the sphere of how to handle challenges – and avoid 'the worst</mark>'</u></strong> (Derrida 1991). Here enters again the possible pessimism which for the security analyst might be occupational or structural. The infinitude of responsibility (Derrida 1996: 86) or the tragic nature of politics (Morgenthau 1946, Chapter 7) means that one can never feel reassured that by some 'good deed', 'I have assumed my responsibilities ' (Derrida 1996: 86). If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone, I know that it is to the detriment of an other; of one nation to the detriment of my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends, etc. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility; otherwise there would he no ethical problems or decisions. (ibid.; and parallel argumentation in Morgenthau 1946; Chapters 6 and 7) Because of this there will remain conflicts and risks - and the question of how to handle them. Should developments be securitized (and if so, in what terms)? <u><strong><mark>Often, our reply will be to aim for de-securitization</mark> and then politics meet meta-politics; <mark>but occasionally the underlying pessimism</mark> regarding the prospects for orderliness and compatibility among human aspirations <mark>will point to scenarios sufficiently worrisome that responsibility will entail securitization in order to block the worst</mark>. As a security/securitization analyst, <mark>this means accepting the task of trying to</mark> manage and <mark>avoid</mark> spirals and <mark>accelerating security concerns,</mark> to try to assist in shaping the continent <mark>in a way that creates the least insecurity</mark> and violence <mark>- even if this occasionally means</mark> invoking/<mark>producing `structures' or</mark> even <mark>using the dubious instrument of securitization</u></strong></mark>. In the case of the current European configuration, <u><strong><mark>the above</mark> analysis <mark>suggests</mark> <mark>the use of</u></strong> <u><strong>securitization at the level of</u></strong></mark> European <u><strong><mark>scenarios</mark> <mark>with the aim of preempting</mark> and avoiding <mark>numerous instances of local securitization that could lead to</mark> security dilemmas and <mark>escalations</mark>, violence and mutual vilification.</p><p></u>Patriarchy not the root cause—inseparable from regional conflict and structural conditions.</p><p>Stansell 2010 </strong>(Christine, Professor of history at Princeton and the University of Chicago, “Global Feminism in a Conservative Age: Possibilities and Pieties Since 1980”, in Dissent, April 1st Edition, pg. 51-52)</p><p>But at the same time, <u><mark>the use of patriarchy as the one-size-fits-all </mark>paradigm <mark>and the dichotomy of injured women/male aggressor was totally inadequate. Sex-</mark>specific <mark>violence was inextricable from </mark>the <mark>plague of wars and insurgencies that laid waste to large parts of the world</mark>. Rape</u>, torture, mutilation, <u>and female captivity</u> and enslavement <u>were standard procedures of marauding militias and terrorist bands</u> in Africa, from Liberia and Sierra Leone to Congo, northern Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, and Somalia. Coerced labor in <u><mark>the sex trade</u></mark>—what came to be called sexual slavery<mark>—<u>was entangled with poverty, official corruption, labor flows </mark>across borders, <mark>and forced migration. Violence was inseparable from politic</mark>s</u><strong> and reactionary religious regimes and parties: Muslim fundamentalists in Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran consolidated power by implementing draconian interpretations of sharia</p></strong>
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1nc
| null |
advantage
| 431,013 | 6 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
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Navy
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5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
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McElhinny
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T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,355 |
Obama’s PC will sustain the veto now
|
Einhorn 1/14
|
Einhorn 1/14/2015 (Robert, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. From 2009 to 2013, while serving as the State Department’s Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, he was a senior member of the U.S. delegation to the Iran nuclear negotiations, National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-iran-play-ball-nuke-talks-12031?page=show)
|
If Congress passes new sanctions Obama is very likely to veto administration officials would then go into overdrive in finding the 34 Senate votes necessary to sustain the veto some Democrats will not want to be seen as undermining the best prospect for resolving the nuclear issue peacefully It is therefore likely that the administration will have the votes to sustain the veto
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Congress passes a new sanctions Obama is very likely to veto administration officials would then go into overdrive in finding the 34 Senate votes necessary to sustain the ve It is therefore likely that the administration will have the votes to sustain the veto
|
If the Congress passes a new sanctions bill that the administration considers damaging to prospects for negotiations, President Obama is very likely to veto it. Senior administration officials would then go into overdrive in finding the 34 Senate votes necessary to sustain the veto, focusing heavily on Senate Democrats. Although some Democrats can be expected to vote to override the veto, a substantial number, including some who have reservations about the negotiations, will not want to be seen as undermining the best prospect for resolving the nuclear issue peacefully or as undercutting their party’s president on a matter of such high priority. It is therefore likely that the administration will have the votes to sustain the veto and prevent legislation potentially damaging to the negotiations from being enacted. So while the Republican-controlled Congress will undoubtedly give the administration a tough time, it is likely that President Obama will be able, without legislative interference, to continue negotiating an agreement that he believes is in the U.S. interest.
| 1,085 |
<h4><strong>Obama’s PC will sustain the veto now</h4><p>Einhorn 1/14</strong>/2015 (Robert, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. From 2009 to 2013, while serving as the State Department’s Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, he was a senior member of the U.S. delegation to the Iran nuclear negotiations, National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-iran-play-ball-nuke-talks-12031?page=show)</p><p><u>If</u> the <u><mark>Congress</u> <u>passes</u> a <u>new sanctions</u></mark> bill that the administration considers damaging to prospects for negotiations, President <u><mark>Obama</u> <u>is very likely to veto</u></mark> it. Senior <u><mark>administration officials would then go into overdrive in finding the 34 Senate votes necessary to sustain the ve</mark>to</u>, focusing heavily on Senate Democrats. Although <u>some</u> <u>Democrats</u> can be expected to vote to override the veto, a substantial number, including some who have reservations about the negotiations, <u>will not want to be seen as undermining the best prospect for resolving the nuclear issue peacefully </u>or as undercutting their party’s president on a matter of such high priority. <u><mark>It is therefore likely that the administration <strong>will have the votes to sustain the veto</u></mark> and prevent legislation potentially damaging to the negotiations from being enacted. So while the Republican-controlled Congress will undoubtedly give the administration a tough time, it is likely that President Obama will be able, without legislative interference, to continue negotiating an agreement that he believes is in the U.S. interest.</p></strong>
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1nr
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Strikes
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UQ
| 430,686 | 4 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
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Navy
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Quarters
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Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
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Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
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Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
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Dartmouth YaAh
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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cx
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743,356 |
Alt cause to ag collapse—Bee shortages prevent pollination
|
Grossman 13
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Grossman 13
|
food eaten worldwide depends on pollinators, especially bees, for a successful harvest beekeepers have been reporting annual hive losses of 30 percent or higher this winter U.S. beekeepers experienced losses of 40 to 50 percent or more California equire 1.6 million domesticated bee colonies to pollinate trees and produce the state’s largest overseas agricultural export But given the widespread bee losses to so-called “colony collapse disorder” this winter, California’s almond growers were able to pollinate their crop only through an intense cobble Current [bee] losses are not sustainable. The trend is down, as is the quality of bees. Neonicotinoids are one of the leading suspected causes of colony collapse disorder, a pesticides represented a “high acute risk” to honeybees and other pollinators. bees are so vital to our ecosystem and contribute [$29 billion to agriculture scientists have grown increasingly concerned about the impact of colony collapse disorder on the world’s food supply the majority of the planet’s 100 most important food crops depend on insect pollination healthy populations of wild bees are key to successful yields of crops ranging from pumpkins to grapefruit Honeybees are brought in to pollinate onion crops at a California farm. “There is no place to go hide,” says New York beekeeper The outlook is not good.”
|
food worldwide depends on pollinators bees for successful harvest this winter U.S. beekeepers experienced losses of 50 percent bee] losses are not sustainable The trend is down, pesticides represented a “high acute risk” bees are vital to our ecosystem and contribute [$29 billion to ag scientists have grown increasingly concerned about the impact of colony collapse on the world’s food supply the majority of the planet’s 100 most important food crops depend on insect pollination healthy populations of wild bees are key to successful yields of crops The outlook is not good.”
|
(Elizabeth, Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Declining Bee Populations Pose
A Threat to Global Agriculture” pg online at http://e360.yale.edu/feature/declining_bee_populations_pose_a_threat_to_global_agriculture/2645///sd)
One of every three bites of food eaten worldwide depends on pollinators, especially bees, for a successful harvest. And in the past several months, a scramble in California’s almond groves has given the world a taste of what may lie in store for food production if the widespread — and still puzzling — decimation of bee colonies continues. For much of the past 10 years, beekeepers, primarily in the United States and Europe, have been reporting annual hive losses of 30 percent or higher, substantially more than is considered normal or sustainable. But this winter, many U.S. beekeepers experienced losses of 40 to 50 percent or more, just as commercial bee operations prepared to transport their hives for the country’s largest pollinator event: the fertilizing of California’s almond trees. Spread across 800,000 acres, California’s almond orchards typically require 1.6 million domesticated bee colonies to pollinate the flowering trees and produce what has become the state’s largest overseas agricultural export. But given the widespread bee losses to so-called “colony collapse disorder” this winter, California’s almond growers were able to pollinate their crop only through an intense, nationwide push to cobble together the ‘In the long run, if we don't find some answers, we could lose a lot of bees,’ says one expert. necessary number of healthy bee colonies. “Other crops don’t need as many bees as the California almond orchards do, so shortages are not yet apparent, but if trends continue, there will be,” said Tim Tucker, vice-president of the American Beekeeping Federation and owner of Tuckerbees Honey in Kansas, which lost 50 percent of its hives this past winter. “Current [bee] losses are not sustainable. The trend is down, as is the quality of bees. In the long run, if we don’t find some answers, and the vigor continues to decline, we could lose a lot of bees.” The gravity of the situation was underscored on Monday, when the European Commission (EC) said it intended to impose a two-year ban on a class of pesticides known as neonicotinoids, now the world’s most widely used type of insecticide. Neonicotinoids are one of the leading suspected causes of colony collapse disorder, and the European Commission announced its controversial decision three months after the European Food Safety Agency concluded that the pesticides represented a “high acute risk” to honeybees and other pollinators. The EC action will restrict the use of three major neonicitinoids on seeds and plants attractive to bees, as well as grains, beginning December 1. “I pledge to my utmost to ensure that our bees, which are so vital to our ecosystem and contribute over 22 billion Euros [$29 billion] annually to European agriculture, are protected,” said European Union Health Commissioner Tonio Borg. The EC action comes as scientists and regulators have grown increasingly concerned about the impact of colony collapse disorder on the world’s food supply, given that the majority of the planet’s 100 most important food crops depend on insect pollination. A recent international study of 41 crop systems on six continents showed that healthy populations of wild bees are key to successful yields of crops ranging from pumpkins to grapefruit. Relying solely on domesticated honeybees could ultimately put those crops at risk, scientists say. Wild bees also have been declining in many places. No one investigating the issue is suggesting that neonicotinoids are the sole cause of current bee declines. Tucker, other beekeepers, and entomologists say that the cause of colony collapse disorder is likely a combination of factors that includes the widespread use of pesticides and fungicides, as well as the spread of viral pathogens and parasitic mites in beehives. While mites and diseases have long been known to cause significant declines in domesticated bee populations, no single pathogen or parasite, say entomologists, appears to sufficiently explain the current rate of hive collapse. A recent study that found unprecedented levels of agricultural pesticides — some at toxic levels — in honeybee colonies is prompting entomologists to look more closely at the role of neonicotinoids in current bee declines. No one is suggesting that neonicotinoids are the sole cause of current bee declines. Some studies have indicated that neonicotinoids can lead to a sharp decline in queen bees in colonies and can also interfere with the ability of bees to navigate back to their hives. James Frazier, a professor of entomology at Pennsylvania State University, said more research needs to be conducted into whether neonicotinoids, particularly in combination with other pesticides, may suppress the immune system of bees at “sub-lethal” levels, enabling diseases to take hold. “This is uncharted territory,” said Purdue University associate professor of entomology Christian Krupke. “We’ve never done pest management like this before.” While not downplaying neonicotinoids as a potential culprit, Eric Mussen, an apiculturiust at the University of California, Davis, noted that the case against these pesticides is not clear-cut. For example, honeybees are apparently doing fine in Australia, where neonicotinoids are widely used and varroa mites are not a problem. Neonicotinoid use is common in Canada, but colony collapse disorder is not significantly affecting hives there. University of California Honeybees are brought in to pollinate onion crops at a California farm. In the U.S., several national environmental advocacy organizations and commercial beekeepers filed suit in March against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for its conditional registration of certain neonicotinoids, contending that the agency did not properly ensure environmental health protections, particularly with respect to pollinators. The EPA is now reviewing its registration of neonicotinoids and has accelerated the review schedule due “to uncertainties about these pesticides and their potential effects on bees.” The agency said in an email that it is working with beekeepers, growers, pesticide manufacturers, and others to improve pesticide use, labeling, and management practices to protect bees and to thoroughly evaluate the effects of pesticides on honeybees and other pollinators. As part of these efforts, the EPA is working with pesticide and agricultural equipment manufacturers to reduce the release of neonicotinoid-contaminated dust during planting — a time when commercial bees are likely to encounter the insecticide. In the U.S., neonicotinoids are currently used on about 95 percent of corn and canola crops; the majority of cotton, sorghum, and sugar beets; and about half of all soybeans. They’re also used on the vast majority of fruit and vegetable crops, including apples, cherries, peaches, oranges, berries, leafy greens, tomatoes, and potatoes. Neonicotinoids are also applied to cereal grains, rice, nuts, and wine grapes. Charles Benbrook, research professor at Washington State University’s Center for Sustaining Agriculture and Natural Resources, has estimated that neonicotinoids are used on approximately 75 percent of the acres devoted to these crops in the U.S. They are also widely used on landscaping plants and urban trees and in numerous home garden pest-control products — all in places frequented by bees, domesticated and wild. “There is no place to go hide,” says New York beekeeper Jim Doan, a director of the American Beekeeping Federation. “The outlook is not good.”
| 7,785 |
<h4>Alt cause to ag<strong> collapse—Bee shortages prevent pollination </h4><p>Grossman 13</p><p></strong>(Elizabeth, Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Declining Bee Populations Pose</p><p>A Threat to Global Agriculture” pg online at http://e360.yale.edu/feature/declining_bee_populations_pose_a_threat_to_global_agriculture/2645///sd)</p><p>One of every three bites of <u><strong><mark>food</mark> eaten <mark>worldwide depends on pollinators</mark>, especially <mark>bees</mark>, <mark>for</mark> a <mark>successful</mark> <mark>harvest</u></strong></mark>. And in the past several months, a scramble in California’s almond groves has given the world a taste of what may lie in store for food production if the widespread — and still puzzling — decimation of bee colonies continues. For much of the past 10 years, <u>beekeepers</u>, primarily in the United States and Europe, <u>have been reporting annual hive losses of 30 percent or higher</u>, substantially more than is considered normal or sustainable. But <u><mark>this winter</u></mark>, many <u><mark>U.S. beekeepers experienced losses of</mark> 40 to <mark>50 percent</mark> or more</u>, just as commercial bee operations prepared to transport their hives for the country’s largest pollinator event: the fertilizing of California’s almond trees. Spread across 800,000 acres, <u>California</u>’s almond orchards typically r<u>equire 1.6 million domesticated bee colonies to pollinate</u> the flowering <u>trees</u> <u>and produce</u> what has become <u>the state’s largest overseas agricultural export</u>. <u>But given the widespread bee losses to so-called “colony collapse disorder” this winter, California’s almond growers were able to pollinate</u> <u>their crop only through an intense</u>, nationwide push to <u>cobble</u> together the ‘In the long run, if we don't find some answers, we could lose a lot of bees,’ says one expert. necessary number of healthy bee colonies. “Other crops don’t need as many bees as the California almond orchards do, so shortages are not yet apparent, but if trends continue, there will be,” said Tim Tucker, vice-president of the American Beekeeping Federation and owner of Tuckerbees Honey in Kansas, which lost 50 percent of its hives this past winter. “<u>Current [<mark>bee] losses are not sustainable</mark>. <mark>The trend is down,</mark> as is the quality of bees.</u> In the long run, if we don’t find some answers, and the vigor continues to decline, we could lose a lot of bees.” The gravity of the situation was underscored on Monday, when the European Commission (EC) said it intended to impose a two-year ban on a class of pesticides known as neonicotinoids, now the world’s most widely used type of insecticide. <u>Neonicotinoids are one of the leading suspected causes of colony collapse disorder, a</u>nd the European Commission announced its controversial decision three months after the European Food Safety Agency concluded that the <u><mark>pesticides</mark> <mark>represented a “high acute risk”</mark> to honeybees and other pollinators. </u>The EC action will restrict the use of three major neonicitinoids on seeds and plants attractive to bees, as well as grains, beginning December 1. “I pledge to my utmost to ensure that our <u><mark>bees</u></mark>, which <u><mark>are</mark> so <mark>vital</u></mark> <u><mark>to our ecosystem and contribute</u></mark> over 22 billion Euros <u><mark>[$29 billion</u></mark>] annually <u><mark>to</mark> </u>European <u><mark>ag</mark>riculture</u>, are protected,” said European Union Health Commissioner Tonio Borg. The EC action comes as <u><mark>scientists</u></mark> and regulators <u><mark>have</mark> <mark>grown</mark> <mark>increasingly</mark> <mark>concerned</mark> <mark>about the impact of</mark> <mark>colony</mark> <mark>collapse</mark> disorder <mark>on the world’s food supply</u></mark>, given that <u><strong><mark>the majority of the planet’s 100 most important food crops depend on insect pollination</u></strong></mark>. A recent international study of 41 crop systems on six continents showed that <u><strong><mark>healthy populations of wild bees are key to</mark> <mark>successful</mark> <mark>yields of crops</mark> </strong>ranging from pumpkins to grapefruit</u>. Relying solely on domesticated honeybees could ultimately put those crops at risk, scientists say. Wild bees also have been declining in many places. No one investigating the issue is suggesting that neonicotinoids are the sole cause of current bee declines. Tucker, other beekeepers, and entomologists say that the cause of colony collapse disorder is likely a combination of factors that includes the widespread use of pesticides and fungicides, as well as the spread of viral pathogens and parasitic mites in beehives. While mites and diseases have long been known to cause significant declines in domesticated bee populations, no single pathogen or parasite, say entomologists, appears to sufficiently explain the current rate of hive collapse. A recent study that found unprecedented levels of agricultural pesticides — some at toxic levels — in honeybee colonies is prompting entomologists to look more closely at the role of neonicotinoids in current bee declines. No one is suggesting that neonicotinoids are the sole cause of current bee declines. Some studies have indicated that neonicotinoids can lead to a sharp decline in queen bees in colonies and can also interfere with the ability of bees to navigate back to their hives. James Frazier, a professor of entomology at Pennsylvania State University, said more research needs to be conducted into whether neonicotinoids, particularly in combination with other pesticides, may suppress the immune system of bees at “sub-lethal” levels, enabling diseases to take hold. “This is uncharted territory,” said Purdue University associate professor of entomology Christian Krupke. “We’ve never done pest management like this before.” While not downplaying neonicotinoids as a potential culprit, Eric Mussen, an apiculturiust at the University of California, Davis, noted that the case against these pesticides is not clear-cut. For example, honeybees are apparently doing fine in Australia, where neonicotinoids are widely used and varroa mites are not a problem. Neonicotinoid use is common in Canada, but colony collapse disorder is not significantly affecting hives there. University of California <u>Honeybees are brought in to pollinate onion crops at a California farm. </u>In the U.S., several national environmental advocacy organizations and commercial beekeepers filed suit in March against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for its conditional registration of certain neonicotinoids, contending that the agency did not properly ensure environmental health protections, particularly with respect to pollinators. The EPA is now reviewing its registration of neonicotinoids and has accelerated the review schedule due “to uncertainties about these pesticides and their potential effects on bees.” The agency said in an email that it is working with beekeepers, growers, pesticide manufacturers, and others to improve pesticide use, labeling, and management practices to protect bees and to thoroughly evaluate the effects of pesticides on honeybees and other pollinators. As part of these efforts, the EPA is working with pesticide and agricultural equipment manufacturers to reduce the release of neonicotinoid-contaminated dust during planting — a time when commercial bees are likely to encounter the insecticide. In the U.S., neonicotinoids are currently used on about 95 percent of corn and canola crops; the majority of cotton, sorghum, and sugar beets; and about half of all soybeans. They’re also used on the vast majority of fruit and vegetable crops, including apples, cherries, peaches, oranges, berries, leafy greens, tomatoes, and potatoes. Neonicotinoids are also applied to cereal grains, rice, nuts, and wine grapes. Charles Benbrook, research professor at Washington State University’s Center for Sustaining Agriculture and Natural Resources, has estimated that neonicotinoids are used on approximately 75 percent of the acres devoted to these crops in the U.S. They are also widely used on landscaping plants and urban trees and in numerous home garden pest-control products — all in places frequented by bees, domesticated and wild. <u>“There is no place to go hide,”</u> <u>says</u> <u>New York beekeeper</u> Jim Doan, a director of the American Beekeeping Federation. “<u><mark>The outlook is not good.”</mark> </p></u>
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1nc
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treaties
| 289,475 | 5 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
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Navy
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3
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Boston College Kenner-Carelli
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Lopez
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Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,357 |
Plan costs an extraordinary amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities
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Downs 12
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Downs 12 David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/
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As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
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As much as he may want to reform drug laws , Obama is hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those laws the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities
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Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws since their inception (see discussion above). Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law through legislative channels; and other issues, such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
| 563 |
<h4>Plan costs an <u>extraordinary</u> amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities</h4><p><strong>Downs 12 </strong>David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About<u> Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/</p><p></u>Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. <u><mark>As much as he may want to reform drug laws </mark>on a personal level<mark>, Obama is</mark> nonetheless <mark>hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those</mark> same <mark>laws</u></mark> since their inception (see discussion above). <u>Given this history, <mark>the president would <strong>risk an extraordinary level of political capital</u></strong> <u>on any</mark> proposed <mark>easing of federal law</u></mark> through legislative channels; <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><mark>other issues,</u></mark> such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to <u><mark>rank higher on his list of</u></mark> <u><mark>legislative</mark> <mark>priorities</mark>.</p></u>
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1
| 305,170 | 62 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
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Navy
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8
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Navy Mueller-Roach
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Benedict
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Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,358 |
even with crowd out - Sales would solve the shortage. Study by Becker and Elias 14
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Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina. Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs
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http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth
Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. Paying for organs would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.
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Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths The most effective change would be to provide compensation we recommend a market for organs. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap sufficient payment would increase the supply by a large percentage, without increasing the total cost very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney Iran permits the sale by living donors waiting times have been eliminated Since the number uld be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply o there would no longer be any significant waiting time deaths due to long waits for a transplant would disappear the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortag isn't consistent with supply of other parts of the body for medical use.
|
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth
Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change, we believe, would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap. In particular, sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. Paying for organs would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.
| 10,811 |
<h4>even with crowd out - Sales would solve the shortage<strong>. Study by Becker and Elias 14 </h4><p></strong> Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina. Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs</p><p><u>http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth</p><p><mark>Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths</mark>, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. <mark>The most effective change</u></mark>, we believe, <u><mark>would be to provide</mark> <mark>compensation</mark> to people who give their organs—that is, <mark>we recommend</mark> establishing <mark>a market for organs.</mark> </u>Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. <u><mark>Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap</u></mark>. In particular, <u><mark>sufficient</mark> <mark>payment</mark> to kidney donors <mark>would increase the supply</mark> of kidneys <mark>by a large percentage,</mark> <mark>without</mark> greatly <mark>increasing the total cost</mark> of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. </u>These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. <u>Our conclusion is that a <mark>very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney</mark>.</u> That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but <u><mark>Iran permits the sale</mark> of kidneys <mark>by living donors</mark>.</u> Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that <u><mark>waiting times</mark> to get kidneys <mark>have</mark> <mark>been</mark> largely <mark>eliminated</u></mark>. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. <u><mark>Since the number</mark> of kidneys available at a reasonable price wo<mark>uld be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply o</mark>f kidneys, <mark>there would no longer be any significant waiting time </mark>to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and <mark>deaths due to long waits for a transplant</mark> <mark>would</mark> essentially <mark>disappear</mark>. </u>Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But <u><mark>the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortag</mark>e of organs <mark>isn't consistent with</mark> what we know about the <mark>supply of other parts of the body for medical use.</u></mark> For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. <u>Paying for organs </u>would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it <u><strong>would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.</p></u></strong>
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Contention 1 – Shortage
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
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Texas
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1
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Kentucky Hampton-Roman
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Paul
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
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Dartmouth YaAh
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college
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Can’t solve food—can’t keep up with increase in demand
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Specht 13 (Jonathan Specht, Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc. B.A., Louisiana State University, 2009; J.D., Washington University in St. Louis, “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States,” University of California, Davis, Vol. 36:2, April 24, 2013, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)//kyan
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Specht 13 (Jonathan Specht, Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc. B.A., Louisiana State University, 2009; J.D., Washington University in St. Louis, “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States,” University of California, Davis, Vol. 36:2, April 24, 2013, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)//kyan
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while exposing the ethanol to competition from imported ethanol might bring down corn prices, it would likely not be enough to reduce them enough There are many sources of demand for corn in addition to ethanol. majority of corn production does not become food for people fifty-nine percent — goes to animal feed one fifth crop is exporte remaining percentage of the crop is mostly processed include corn sweeteners Even if corn-based ethanol production were to decline, U.S. corn prices are likely to remain relatively high This is mainly due to global rise of the middle class, a resource-intensive phenomenon pronounced in India and China and is driving up prices for a large number of commodities more Chinese citizens join the and there will be upward pressure on demand for U.S. corn a reduction in demand for corn-based ethanol would not necessarily lead to low corn prices.
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exposing ethanol to competition might bring down prices, it would be enough There are many sources of demand for corn fifty-nine percent goes to animal one fifth is exported corn sweeteners This is due to global rise of the middle class pronounced in India and China there will be upward pressure on demand for U.S. corn
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Additionally, while exposing the domestic ethanol industry to competition from imported ethanol might bring down corn prices, it would likely not be enough to reduce them enough to bring a 1980s-style farm crisis to the Midwest. There are many sources of demand for corn in addition to ethanol. Contrary to popular perception, the majority of U.S. corn production does not become food for people — at least not directly. The largest percentage of the annual U.S. corn crop — between forty-eight and fifty-nine percent in the mid years of the 2000s — goes to animal feed.164 In addition, about one fifth of the annual U.S. corn crop is exported. 165 The remaining percentage of the crop is mostly processed in a number of ways. The products from corn processing include corn sweeteners (high fructose corn syrup), corn oil, corn starch, and biodegradable plastics. 166 Even if corn-based ethanol production were to decline, U.S. corn prices are likely to remain relatively high for the near-to-midterm future. This is mainly due to global rise of the middle class, a resource-intensive phenomenon that is especially pronounced in countries like India and China and is driving up prices for a large number of commodities. 167 For example, if the Chinese economy continues to grow and more Chinese citizens move from rural areas to cities, join the middle class, and therefore start eating more pork, 168 there will be upward pressure on demand for U.S. corn and therefore on U.S. corn prices. 169 Thus, because of factors outside of the entire debate over importing ethanol from elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere (and indeed, outside anything in the Western Hemisphere) a reduction in demand for corn-based ethanol would not necessarily lead to low corn prices.
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<h4><strong>Can’t solve food—can’t keep up with increase in demand </h4><p>Specht 13 (Jonathan Specht, Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc. B.A., Louisiana State University, 2009; J.D., Washington University in St. Louis, “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States,” University of California, Davis, Vol. 36:2, April 24, 2013, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)<u>//kyan</p><p></u></strong>Additionally, <u>while</u> <u><mark>exposing</u> <u></mark>the</u> domestic <u><mark>ethanol</u></mark> industry <u><mark>to competition</mark> from imported ethanol <mark>might bring</mark> <mark>down</mark> corn <mark>prices<strong>, it</mark> <mark>would </mark>likely not<mark> be enough </mark>to reduce them enough</u></strong> to bring a 1980s-style farm crisis to the Midwest. <u><mark>There are many sources of demand for corn</mark> in addition to ethanol.</u> Contrary to popular perception, the <u>majority</u> <u>of</u> U.S. <u>corn</u> <u>production does not become food for people </u>— at least not directly. The largest percentage of the annual U.S. corn crop — between forty-eight and <u><mark>fifty-nine percent</u></mark> in the mid years of the 2000s <u>— <mark>goes to animal</mark> feed</u>.164 In addition, about <u><mark>one</mark> <mark>fifth</u></mark> of the annual U.S. corn <u>crop <mark>is exporte</u>d</mark>. 165 The <u>remaining percentage of the crop is mostly processed</u> in a number of ways. The products from corn processing <u>include <mark>corn sweeteners</u></mark> (high fructose corn syrup), corn oil, corn starch, and biodegradable plastics. 166 <u>Even if corn-based ethanol production were to decline, U.S. corn prices are likely to remain relatively high</u> for the near-to-midterm future. <u><mark>This is</mark> mainly <mark>due to global rise of the middle</mark> <mark>class</mark>, a resource-intensive</u> <u>phenomenon</u> that is especially <u><mark>pronounced in</u></mark> countries like <u><mark>India and China</u></mark> <u>and is driving up prices for a large number of commodities</u>. 167 For example, if the Chinese economy continues to grow and <u>more Chinese citizens </u>move from rural areas to cities, <u>join the </u>middle class, <u>and</u> therefore start eating more pork, 168 <u><mark>there will be upward pressure on demand for U.S. corn</u></mark> and therefore on U.S. corn prices. 169 Thus, because of factors outside of the entire debate over importing ethanol from elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere (and indeed, outside anything in the Western Hemisphere) <u>a reduction in demand for corn-based ethanol would not necessarily lead to low corn prices.</p></u>
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Navy
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Boston College Kenner-Carelli
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Lopez
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Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
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Patriarchy is not the root cause – debate
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Crenshaw, 2.
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Carrie Crenshaw, 2. PhD, Former President of CEDA Perspectives In Controversy: Selected Articles from Contemporary Argumentation and Debate 2002 p. 119-126
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Increasingly, students rely on feminist such arguments exemplify the general absence of sound causal debate arguments about feminists suffer from a reductionism that tends to marginalize voices argued causal arguments are desirable for four reasons causal analysis increases the control of the arguer over events by promoting understanding use of causal reasoning increases rigor of analysis causal arguments promote understanding of the philosophical paradox that presumably good people tolerate the existence of evil causal reasoning supplies good reasons for "commitments to policy choices or to systems of belief which transcend whim, caprice, or the non-reflexive "claims of immediacy most desiring "big impacts," argued effects of patriarchy include nightmarish totalitarianism and/or nuclear annihilation Such arguments seem to have two assumptions there is a single feminism a single, monolithic, theoretical entity these arguments assume patriarchy is the single or root cause of all forms of oppression totalitarianism, environmental degradation, nuclear war, racism, and capitalist exploitation. These reductionist arguments reflect an unwillingness to debate complexities identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of all oppression is related in part to the current form of intercollegiate debate practice Debaters practice the convention of poor causal reasoning as a result of judges' unexamined reliance upon conventional form. Convention is the practice of arguing single-cause links to monolithic impacts Debaters practice the convention of establishing single-cause relationships to large monolithic impacts in order to conform to audience expectation the sequence is gratifying for judges because it relieves us from the responsibility and difficulties of evaluating rhetorical proofs The sacrifice has consequences for our students' knowledge of the subject matter they are debating identification of patriarchy as the sole cause The result is ignorance of the subject position of the particular feminist author Consequently, debaters do not challenge the basic assumptions of such argumentation and ignorance of feminists is perpetuated The controversy over the very definition of feminism has political implications. The power to define is the power both to include and exclude people and ideas in and from that feminism Debate arguments that assume a singular conception of feminism include and empower the voices of race- and class-privileged women while excluding and silencing the voices of feminists marginalized by race and class status when we examine - patriarchy is the sole cause Important feminist thought has resisted this assumption for good reason. Designating the sole cause of oppression allows the subjugation of resistance to other forms of oppression like racism and classism to the struggle against sexism. Such subjugation has the effect of denigrating the
legitimacy of resistance to racism and classism as struggles of equal importance this led to the assumption that resisting patriarchal domination is a more legitimate feminist action than resisting racism and other forms of domination identifying patriarchy as the single source obscures women's perpetration of other forms of subjugation and domination If focus on patriarchal domination masks this reality then women cooperate in suppressing and promoting false consciousness, inhibiting our capacity to assume responsibility for transforming ourselves and society Characterizing patriarchy as the sole cause allows mainstream feminists to abdicate responsibility for the exercise of class and race privilege Current debate practice promotes ignorance of these issues because debaters appeal to conventional form The result is either the mar-ginalization or colonization of certain feminist voices Privileging the act of speaking about feminism over the content of speech "often turns the voices and beings of non-white women into commodity, spectacle" ( Teaching sophisticated causal reasoning enables our students to learn more concerning the subject matter about which they argue. In this case, students would learn more about the multiplicity of feminists instead of reproducing the marginalization of many feminist voices in the debate itself arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate seem to be overdetermined by the expectation of common practice, the "game" that we play in assuming there is such a thing as a direct and sole causal link to a monolithic impact To play that game, we have gone along with the idea that there is a single feminism and the idea that patriarchal impacts can account for all oppression
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feminist a arguments only exemplify the general absence of sound causal reasoning causal arguments are desirable for four reasons control of the argue rigor of analysis understanding of the philosophical paradox that presumably good people tolerate the existence of ev big impacts have two assumptions there is a single feminism these arguments assume that patriarchy is the single or root cause of all forms of oppression These reductionist arguments reflect an unwillingness to debate about the complexities identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of all oppression is related in part to the current form of intercollegiate debate practice Convention is the practice of arguing single-cause links to monolithic impacts Debaters practice the convention of establishing single-cause relationships to large monolithic impacts in order to conform to audience expectation . The sacrifice has consequences for our students' knowledge of the subject matter The controversy over the very definition of feminism has political implications. The power to define is the power both to include and exclude people and ideas in and from that feminism. Designating patriarchy as the sole cause allows the subjugation of resistance to other forms of oppression
Characterizing patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression allows mainstream feminists to abdicate responsibility for the exercise of class and race privilege. It The result is either the mar-ginalization or colonization of certain feminist voices.
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Feminism is not dead. It is alive and well in intercollegiate debate. Increasingly, students rely on feminist authors to inform their analysis of resolutions. While I applaud these initial efforts to explore feminist thought, I am concerned that such arguments only exemplify the general absence of sound causal reasoning in debate rounds. Poor causal reasoning results from a debate practice that privileges empirical proof over rhetorical proof, fostering ignorance of the subject matter being debated. To illustrate my point, I claim that debate arguments about feminists suffer from a reductionism that tends to marginalize the voices of significant feminist authors. David Zarefsky made a persuasive case for the value of causal reasoning in intercollegiate debate as far back as 1979. He argued that causal arguments are desirable for four reasons. First, causal analysis increases the control of the arguer over events by promoting understanding of them. Second, the use of causal reasoning increases rigor of analysis and fairness in the decision-making process. Third, causal arguments promote understanding of the philosophical paradox that presumably good people tolerate the existence of evil. Finally, causal reasoning supplies good reasons for "commitments to policy choices or to systems of belief which transcend whim, caprice, or the non-reflexive "claims of immediacy" (117-9). Rhetorical proof plays an important role in the analysis of causal relationships. This is true despite the common assumption that the identification of cause and effect relies solely upon empirical investigation. For Zarefsky, there are three types of causal reasoning. The first type of causal reasoning describes the application of a covering law to account for physical or material conditions that cause a resulting event This type of causal reasoning requires empirical proof prominent in scientific investigation. A second type of causal reasoning requires the assignment of responsibility. Responsible human beings as agents cause certain events to happen; that is, causation resides in human beings (107-08). A third type of causal claim explains the existence of a causal relationship. It functions "to provide reasons to justify a belief that a causal connection exists" (108). The second and third types of causal arguments rely on rhetorical proof, the provision of "good reasons" to substantiate arguments about human responsibility or explanations for the existence of a causal relationship (108). I contend that the practice of intercollegiate debate privileges the first type of causal analysis. It reduces questions of human motivation and explanation to a level of empiricism appropriate only for causal questions concerning physical or material conditions. Arguments about feminism clearly illustrate this phenomenon. Substantive debates about feminism usually take one of two forms. First, on the affirmative, debaters argue that some aspect of the resolution is a manifestation of patriarchy. For example, given the spring 1992 resolution, "[rjesolved: That advertising degrades the quality of life," many affirmatives argued that the portrayal of women as beautiful objects for men's consumption is a manifestation of patriarchy that results in tangible harms to women such as rising rates of eating disorders. The fall 1992 topic, "(rjesolved: That the welfare system exacerbates the problems of the urban poor in the United States," also had its share of patri- archy cases. Affirmatives typically argued that women's dependence upon a patriarchal welfare system results in increasing rates of women's poverty. In addition to these concrete harms to individual women, most affirmatives on both topics, desiring "big impacts," argued that the effects of patriarchy include nightmarish totalitarianism and/or nuclear annihilation. On the negative, many debaters countered with arguments that the some aspect of the resolution in some way sustains or energizes the feminist movement in resistance to patriarchal harms. For example, some negatives argued that sexist advertising provides an impetus for the reinvigoration of the feminist movement and/or feminist consciousness, ultimately solving the threat of patriarchal nuclear annihilation. likewise, debaters negating the welfare topic argued that the state of the welfare system is the key issue around which the feminist movement is mobilizing or that the consequence of the welfare system - breakup of the patriarchal nuclear family -undermines patriarchy as a whole. Such arguments seem to have two assumptions in common. First, there is a single feminism. As a result, feminists are transformed into feminism. Debaters speak of feminism as a single, monolithic, theoretical and pragmatic entity and feminists as women with identical m otivations, methods, and goals. Second, these arguments assume that patriarchy is the single or root cause of all forms of oppression. Patriarchy not only is responsible for sexism and the consequent oppression of women, it also is the cause of totalitarianism, environmental degradation, nuclear war, racism, and capitalist exploitation. These reductionist arguments reflect an unwillingness to debate about the complexities of human motivation and explanation. They betray a reliance upon a framework of proof that can explain only material conditions and physical realities through empirical quantification. The transformation of feminists to feminism and the identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of all oppression is related in part to the current form of intercollegiate debate practice. By "form," I refer to Kenneth Burke's notion of form, defined as the "creation of appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite" (Counter-Statement 31). Though the framework for this understanding of form is found in literary and artistic criticism, it is appropriate in this context; as Burke notes, literature can be "equipment for living" (Biilosophy 293). He also suggests that form "is an arousing and fulfillment of desires. A work has form in so far as one part of it leads a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by the sequence" (Counter-Statement 124). Burke observes that there are several aspects to the concept of form. One of these aspects, conventional form, involves to some degree the appeal of form as form. Progressive, repetitive, and minor forms, may be effective even though the reader has no awareness of their formality. But when a form appeals as form, we designate it as conventional form. Any form can become conventional, and be sought for itself - whether it be as complex as the Greek tragedy or as compact as the sonnet (Counter-Statement 126). These concepts help to explain debaters' continuing reluctance to employ rhetorical proof in arguments about causality. Debaters practice the convention of poor causal reasoning as a result of judges' unexamined reliance upon conventional form. Convention is the practice of arguing single-cause links to monolithic impacts that arises out of custom or usage. Conventional form is the expectation of judges that an argument will take this form. Common practice or convention dictates that a case or disadvantage with nefarious impacts causally related to a single link will "outweigh" opposing claims in the mind of the judge. In this sense, debate arguments themselves are conventional. Debaters practice the convention of establishing single-cause relationships to large monolithic impacts in order to conform to audience expectation. Debaters practice poor causal reasoning because they are rewarded for it by judges. The convention of arguing single-cause links leads the judge to anticipate the certainty of the impact and to be gratified by the sequence. I suspect that the sequence is gratifying for judges because it relieves us from the responsibility and difficulties of evaluating rhetorical proofs. We are caught between our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proofs and our reluctance to succumb to complete relativism and subjectivity. To take responsibility for evaluating rhetorical proof is to admit that not every question has an empirical answer. However, when we abandon our responsibility to rhetorical proofs, we sacrifice our students' understanding of causal reasoning. The sacrifice has consequences for our students' knowledge of the subject matter they are debating. For example, when feminism is defined as a single entity, not as a pluralized movement or theory, that single entity results in the identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression. The result is ignorance of the subject position of the particular feminist author, for highlighting his or her subject position might draw attention to the incompleteness of the causal relationship between link and impact Consequently, debaters do not challenge the basic assumptions of such argumentation and ignorance of feminists is perpetuated. Feminists are not feminism. The topics of feminist inquiry are many and varied, as are the philosophical approaches to the study of these topics. Different authors have attempted categorization of various feminists in distinctive ways. For example, Alison Jaggar argues that feminists can be divided into four categories: liberal feminism, marxist feminism, radical feminism, and socialist feminism. While each of these feminists may share a common commitment to the improvement of women's situations, they differ from each other in very important ways and reflect divergent philosophical assumptions that make them each unique. Linda Alcoff presents an entirely different categorization of feminist theory based upon distinct understandings of the concept "woman," including cultural feminism and post-structural feminism. Karen Offen utilizes a comparative historical approach to examine two distinct modes of historical argumentation or discourse that have been used by women and their male allies on behalf of women's emancipation from male control in Western societies. These include relational feminism and individualist feminism. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron describe a whole category of French feminists that contain many distinct versions of the feminist project by French authors. Women of color and third-world feminists have argued that even these broad categorizations of the various feminism have neglected the contributions of non-white, non-Western feminists (see, for example, hooks; Hull; Joseph and Lewis; Lorde; Moraga; Omolade; and Smith). In this literature, the very definition of feminism is contested. Some feminists argue that "all feminists are united by a commitment to improving the situation of women" (Jaggar and Rothenberg xii), while others have resisted the notion of a single definition of feminism, bell hooks observes, "a central problem within feminist discourse has been our inability to either arrive at a consensus of opinion about what feminism is (or accept definitions) that could serve as points of unification" (Feminist Theory 17). The controversy over the very definition of feminism has political implications. The power to define is the power both to include and exclude people and ideas in and from that feminism. As a result, [bjourgeois white women interested in women's rights issues have been satisfied with simple definitions for obvious reasons. Rhetorically placing themselves in the same social category as oppressed women, they were not anxious to call attention to race and class privilege (hooks. Feminist Wieory 18). Debate arguments that assume a singular conception of feminism include and empower the voices of race- and class-privileged women while excluding and silencing the voices of feminists marginalized by race and class status. This position becomes clearer when we examine the second assumption of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate - patriarchy is the sole cause of oppression. Important feminist thought has resisted this assumption for good reason. Designating patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression allows the subjugation of resistance to other forms of oppression like racism and classism to the struggle against sexism. Such subjugation has the effect of denigrating the
legitimacy of resistance to racism and classism as struggles of equal importance. "Within feminist movement in the West, this led to the assumption that resisting patriarchal domination is a more legitimate feminist action than resisting racism and other forms of domination" (hooks. Talking Back 19). The relegation of struggles against racism and class exploitation to offspring status is not the only implication of the "sole cause" argument In addition, identifying patriarchy as the single source of oppression obscures women's perpetration of other forms of subjugation and domination, bell hooks argues that we should not obscure the reality that women can and do partici- pate in politics of domination, as perpetrators as well as victims - that we dominate, that we are dominated. If focus on patriarchal domination masks this reality or becomes the means by which women deflect attention from the real conditions and circumstances of our lives, then women cooperate in suppressing and promoting false consciousness, inhibiting our capacity to assume responsibility for transforming ourselves and society (hooks. Talking Back 20). Characterizing patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression allows mainstream feminists to abdicate responsibility for the exercise of class and race privilege. It casts the struggle against class exploitation and racism as secondary concerns. Current debate practice promotes ignorance of these issues because debaters appeal to conventional form, the expectation of judges that they will isolate a single link to a large impact Feminists become feminism and patriarchy becomes the sole cause of all evil. Poor causal arguments arouse and fulfill the expectation of judges by allowing us to surrender our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proof for complex causal relationships. The result is either the mar-ginalization or colonization of certain feminist voices. Arguing feminism in debate rounds risks trivializing feminists. Privileging the act of speaking about feminism over the content of speech "often turns the voices and beings of non-white women into commodity, spectacle" (hooks, Talking Back 14). Teaching sophisticated causal reasoning enables our students to learn more concerning the subject matter about which they argue. In this case, students would learn more about the multiplicity of feminists instead of reproducing the marginalization of many feminist voices in the debate itself. The content of the speech of feminists must be investigated to subvert the colonization of exploited women. To do so, we must explore alternatives to the formal expectation of single-cause links to enormous impacts for appropriation of the marginal voice threatens the very core of self-determination and free self-expression for exploited and oppressed peoples. If the identified audience, those spoken to, is determined solely by ruling groups who control production and distribution, then it is easy for the marginal voice striving for a hearing to allow what is said to be overdetermined by the needs of that majority group who appears to be listening, to be tuned in (hooks, Talking Back 14). At this point, arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate seem to be overdetermined by the expectation of common practice, the "game" that we play in assuming there is such a thing as a direct and sole causal link to a monolithic impact To play that game, we have gone along with the idea that there is a single feminism and the idea that patriarchal impacts can account for all oppression. In making this critique, I am by no means discounting the importance of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate. In fact, feminists contain the possibility of a transformational politic for two reasons. First, feminist concerns affect each individual intimately. We are most likely to encounter patriarchal domination "in an ongoing way in everyday life. Unlike other forms of domination, sexism directly shapes and determines relations of power in our private lives, in familiar social spaces..." (hooks. Talking Back 21). Second, the methodology of feminism, consciousness-raising, contains within it the possibility of real societal transformation. "lE]ducation for critical consciousness can be extended to include politicization of the self that focuses on creating understanding the ways sex, race, and class together determine our individual lot and our collective experience" (hooks, Talking Back 24). Observing the incongruity between advocacy of single-cause relationships and feminism does not discount the importance of feminists to individual or societal consciousness raising.
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<h4><strong>Patriarchy is not the root cause – debate</h4><p></strong>Carrie <strong>Crenshaw, 2. </strong> PhD, Former President of CEDA Perspectives In Controversy: Selected Articles from Contemporary Argumentation and Debate<u> 2002 p. 119-126</p><p></u> Feminism is not dead. It is alive and well in intercollegiate debate. <u>Increasingly, students rely on <mark>feminist </u>a</mark>uthors to inform their analysis of resolutions. While I applaud these initial efforts to explore feminist thought, I am concerned that <u>such <mark>arguments</u> only <u>exemplify the general absence of sound causal</mark> </u><mark>reasoning</mark> in debate rounds. Poor causal reasoning results from a debate practice that privileges empirical proof over rhetorical proof, fostering ignorance of the subject matter being debated. To illustrate my point, I claim that <u>debate arguments about feminists suffer from a reductionism that tends to marginalize</u> the <u>voices</u> of significant feminist authors. David Zarefsky made a persuasive case for the value of causal reasoning in intercollegiate debate as far back as 1979. He <u>argued</u> that <u><mark>causal arguments are desirable for four reasons</u></mark>. First, <u>causal analysis increases the <mark>control of the argue</mark>r over events by promoting understanding </u>of them. Second, the <u>use of causal reasoning increases <mark>rigor of analysis</u></mark> and fairness in the decision-making process. Third, <u>causal arguments promote <mark>understanding of the philosophical paradox that presumably good people tolerate the existence of ev</mark>il</u>. Finally, <u>causal reasoning supplies good reasons for "commitments to policy choices or to systems of belief which transcend whim, caprice, or the non-reflexive "claims of immediacy</u>" (117-9). Rhetorical proof plays an important role in the analysis of causal relationships. This is true despite the common assumption that the identification of cause and effect relies solely upon empirical investigation. For Zarefsky, there are three types of causal reasoning. The first type of causal reasoning describes the application of a covering law to account for physical or material conditions that cause a resulting event This type of causal reasoning requires empirical proof prominent in scientific investigation. A second type of causal reasoning requires the assignment of responsibility. Responsible human beings as agents cause certain events to happen; that is, causation resides in human beings (107-08). A third type of causal claim explains the existence of a causal relationship. It functions "to provide reasons to justify a belief that a causal connection exists" (108). The second and third types of causal arguments rely on rhetorical proof, the provision of "good reasons" to substantiate arguments about human responsibility or explanations for the existence of a causal relationship (108). I contend that the practice of intercollegiate debate privileges the first type of causal analysis. It reduces questions of human motivation and explanation to a level of empiricism appropriate only for causal questions concerning physical or material conditions. Arguments about feminism clearly illustrate this phenomenon. Substantive debates about feminism usually take one of two forms. First, on the affirmative, debaters argue that some aspect of the resolution is a manifestation of patriarchy. For example, given the spring 1992 resolution, "[rjesolved: That advertising degrades the quality of life," many affirmatives argued that the portrayal of women as beautiful objects for men's consumption is a manifestation of patriarchy that results in tangible harms to women such as rising rates of eating disorders. The fall 1992 topic, "(rjesolved: That the welfare system exacerbates the problems of the urban poor in the United States," also had its share of patri- archy cases. Affirmatives typically argued that women's dependence upon a patriarchal welfare system results in increasing rates of women's poverty. In addition to these concrete harms to individual women, <u>most</u> affirmatives on both topics, <u>desiring "<mark>big impacts</mark>," argued</u> that the <u>effects of patriarchy include nightmarish totalitarianism and/or nuclear annihilation</u>. On the negative, many debaters countered with arguments that the some aspect of the resolution in some way sustains or energizes the feminist movement in resistance to patriarchal harms. For example, some negatives argued that sexist advertising provides an impetus for the reinvigoration of the feminist movement and/or feminist consciousness, ultimately solving the threat of patriarchal nuclear annihilation. likewise, debaters negating the welfare topic argued that the state of the welfare system is the key issue around which the feminist movement is mobilizing or that the consequence of the welfare system - breakup of the patriarchal nuclear family -undermines patriarchy as a whole. <u>Such arguments seem to <mark>have two assumptions</u></mark> in common. First,<u> <mark>there is a single feminism</u></mark>. As a result, feminists are transformed into feminism. Debaters speak of feminism as <u>a single, monolithic, theoretical</u> and pragmatic <u>entity</u> and feminists as women with identical m otivations, methods, and goals. Second, <u><mark>these arguments assume</u> that <u>patriarchy is the single or root cause of all forms of oppression</u></mark>. Patriarchy not only is responsible for sexism and the consequent oppression of women, it also is the cause of <u>totalitarianism, environmental degradation, nuclear war, racism, and capitalist exploitation. <mark>These reductionist arguments reflect an unwillingness to debate</u> about the <u>complexities</u></mark> of human motivation and explanation. They betray a reliance upon a framework of proof that can explain only material conditions and physical realities through empirical quantification. The transformation of feminists to feminism and the <u><mark>identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of all oppression is related in part to the current form of intercollegiate debate practice</u></mark>. By "form," I refer to Kenneth Burke's notion of form, defined as the "creation of appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite" (Counter-Statement 31). Though the framework for this understanding of form is found in literary and artistic criticism, it is appropriate in this context; as Burke notes, literature can be "equipment for living" (Biilosophy 293). He also suggests that form "is an arousing and fulfillment of desires. A work has form in so far as one part of it leads a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by the sequence" (Counter-Statement 124). Burke observes that there are several aspects to the concept of form. One of these aspects, conventional form, involves to some degree the appeal of form as form. Progressive, repetitive, and minor forms, may be effective even though the reader has no awareness of their formality. But when a form appeals as form, we designate it as conventional form. Any form can become conventional, and be sought for itself - whether it be as complex as the Greek tragedy or as compact as the sonnet (Counter-Statement 126). These concepts help to explain debaters' continuing reluctance to employ rhetorical proof in arguments about causality. <u>Debaters practice the convention of poor causal reasoning as a result of judges' unexamined reliance upon conventional form. <mark>Convention is the practice of arguing single-cause links to monolithic impacts</mark> </u>that arises out of custom or usage. Conventional form is the expectation of judges that an argument will take this form. Common practice or convention dictates that a case or disadvantage with nefarious impacts causally related to a single link will "outweigh" opposing claims in the mind of the judge. In this sense, debate arguments themselves are conventional. <u><mark>Debaters practice the convention of establishing single-cause relationships to large monolithic impacts in order to conform to audience expectation</u></mark>. Debaters practice poor causal reasoning because they are rewarded for it by judges. The convention of arguing single-cause links leads the judge to anticipate the certainty of the impact and to be gratified by the sequence. I suspect that <u>the sequence is gratifying for judges because it relieves us from the responsibility and difficulties of evaluating rhetorical proofs</u>. We are caught between our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proofs and our reluctance to succumb to complete relativism and subjectivity. To take responsibility for evaluating rhetorical proof is to admit that not every question has an empirical answer. However, when we abandon our responsibility to rhetorical proofs, we sacrifice our students' understanding of causal reasoning<mark>. <u>The sacrifice has consequences for our students' knowledge of the subject matter</mark> they are debating</u>. For example, when feminism is defined as a single entity, not as a pluralized movement or theory, that single entity results in the <u>identification of patriarchy as the sole cause</u> of oppression. <u>The result is ignorance of the subject position of the particular feminist author</u>, for highlighting his or her subject position might draw attention to the incompleteness of the causal relationship between link and impact <u>Consequently, debaters do not challenge the basic assumptions of such argumentation and ignorance of feminists is perpetuated</u>. Feminists are not feminism. The topics of feminist inquiry are many and varied, as are the philosophical approaches to the study of these topics. Different authors have attempted categorization of various feminists in distinctive ways. For example, Alison Jaggar argues that feminists can be divided into four categories: liberal feminism, marxist feminism, radical feminism, and socialist feminism. While each of these feminists may share a common commitment to the improvement of women's situations, they differ from each other in very important ways and reflect divergent philosophical assumptions that make them each unique. Linda Alcoff presents an entirely different categorization of feminist theory based upon distinct understandings of the concept "woman," including cultural feminism and post-structural feminism. Karen Offen utilizes a comparative historical approach to examine two distinct modes of historical argumentation or discourse that have been used by women and their male allies on behalf of women's emancipation from male control in Western societies. These include relational feminism and individualist feminism. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron describe a whole category of French feminists that contain many distinct versions of the feminist project by French authors. Women of color and third-world feminists have argued that even these broad categorizations of the various feminism have neglected the contributions of non-white, non-Western feminists (see, for example, hooks; Hull; Joseph and Lewis; Lorde; Moraga; Omolade; and Smith). In this literature, the very definition of feminism is contested. Some feminists argue that "all feminists are united by a commitment to improving the situation of women" (Jaggar and Rothenberg xii), while others have resisted the notion of a single definition of feminism, bell hooks observes, "a central problem within feminist discourse has been our inability to either arrive at a consensus of opinion about what feminism is (or accept definitions) that could serve as points of unification" (Feminist Theory 17). <u><mark>The controversy over the very definition of feminism has political implications. The power to define is the power both to include and exclude people and ideas in and from that feminism</u>.</mark> As a result, [bjourgeois white women interested in women's rights issues have been satisfied with simple definitions for obvious reasons. Rhetorically placing themselves in the same social category as oppressed women, they were not anxious to call attention to race and class privilege (hooks. Feminist Wieory 18). <u>Debate arguments that assume a singular conception of feminism include and empower the voices of race- and class-privileged women while excluding and silencing the voices of feminists marginalized by race and class status</u>. This position becomes clearer <u>when we examine</u> the second assumption of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate <u>- patriarchy is the sole cause</u> of oppression. <u>Important feminist thought has resisted this assumption for good reason. <mark>Designating</u> patriarchy as <u>the sole cause</mark> of</u> <u>oppression <mark>allows the subjugation of resistance to other forms of oppression</mark> like racism and classism to the struggle against sexism. Such subjugation has the effect of denigrating the </p><p>legitimacy of resistance to racism and classism as struggles of equal importance</u>. "Within feminist movement in the West, <u>this led to the assumption that resisting patriarchal domination is a more legitimate feminist action than resisting racism and other forms of domination</u>" (hooks. Talking Back 19). The relegation of struggles against racism and class exploitation to offspring status is not the only implication of the "sole cause" argument In addition, <u>identifying patriarchy as the single source </u>of oppression <u>obscures women's perpetration of other forms of subjugation and domination</u>, bell hooks argues that we should not obscure the reality that women can and do partici- pate in politics of domination, as perpetrators as well as victims - that we dominate, that we are dominated. <u>If focus on patriarchal domination masks this reality</u> or becomes the means by which women deflect attention from the real conditions and circumstances of our lives, <u>then women cooperate in suppressing and promoting false consciousness, inhibiting our capacity to assume responsibility for transforming ourselves and society</u> (hooks. Talking Back 20). <u><mark>Characterizing patriarchy as the sole cause</u> of oppression <u>allows mainstream feminists to abdicate responsibility for the exercise of class and race privilege</u>. It</mark> casts the struggle against class exploitation and racism as secondary concerns.<u> Current debate practice promotes ignorance of these issues because debaters appeal to conventional form</u>, the expectation of judges that they will isolate a single link to a large impact Feminists become feminism and patriarchy becomes the sole cause of all evil. Poor causal arguments arouse and fulfill the expectation of judges by allowing us to surrender our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proof for complex causal relationships. <u><mark>The result is either the mar-ginalization or colonization of certain feminist voices</u>.</mark> Arguing feminism in debate rounds risks trivializing feminists. <u>Privileging the act of speaking about feminism over the content of speech "often turns the voices and beings of non-white women into commodity, spectacle" (</u>hooks, Talking Back 14).<u> Teaching sophisticated causal reasoning enables our students to learn more concerning the subject matter about which they argue. In this case, students would learn more about the multiplicity of feminists instead of reproducing the marginalization of many feminist voices in the debate itself</u>. The content of the speech of feminists must be investigated to subvert the colonization of exploited women. To do so, we must explore alternatives to the formal expectation of single-cause links to enormous impacts for appropriation of the marginal voice threatens the very core of self-determination and free self-expression for exploited and oppressed peoples. If the identified audience, those spoken to, is determined solely by ruling groups who control production and distribution, then it is easy for the marginal voice striving for a hearing to allow what is said to be overdetermined by the needs of that majority group who appears to be listening, to be tuned in (hooks, Talking Back 14). At this point, <u>arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate seem to be overdetermined by the expectation of common practice, the "game" that we play in assuming there is such a thing as a direct and sole causal link to a monolithic impact To play that game, we have gone along with the idea that there is a single feminism and the idea that patriarchal impacts can account for all oppression</u>. In making this critique, I am by no means discounting the importance of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate. In fact, feminists contain the possibility of a transformational politic for two reasons. First, feminist concerns affect each individual intimately. We are most likely to encounter patriarchal domination "in an ongoing way in everyday life. Unlike other forms of domination, sexism directly shapes and determines relations of power in our private lives, in familiar social spaces..." (hooks. Talking Back 21). Second, the methodology of feminism, consciousness-raising, contains within it the possibility of real societal transformation. "lE]ducation<strong> for critical consciousness can be extended to include politicization of the self that focuses on creating understanding the ways sex, race, and class together determine our individual lot and our collective experience" (hooks, Talking Back 24). Observing the incongruity between advocacy of single-cause relationships and feminism does not discount the importance of feminists to individual or societal consciousness raising. </p></strong>
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5
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James Madison Lepp-Miller
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Veto will be sustained now- enough Dems are on board
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Financial Times 1/16
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Financial Times 1/16/2015 (Obama and Cameron warn against new Iran sanctions, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/44d195d0-9d9b-11e4-8ea3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3P0tmmbW5)
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Congress appeared to be shaping up for a major foreign policy fight with the White House. With the backing of a handful of senior Democrats, Republican leaders said they hope to bring new sanctions legislation up for debate over the next few weeks. Corker said the Senate would take up the Iran sanctions bill as one of its first priorities Analysts believe the bill will pass the Senate but is unlikely to gather 67 votes given the strong opposition to new sanctions from a number of senior Democrats.
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Congress appeared to be shaping up for a major foreign policy fight with the White House . Analysts believe the bill will pass the Senate but is unlikely to gather the 67 votes , given the strong opposition to new sanctions from a number of senior Democrats
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Barack Obama and David Cameron warned on Friday that new sanctions on Iran could cause the collapse of nuclear negotiations, as the new Republican-controlled Congress appeared to be shaping up for a major foreign policy fight with the White House. Threatening to veto any sanctions bills that pass Congress, Mr Obama said that new US penalties on Iran would give Tehran an excuse to walk away from talks and to blame Washington for the failure, weakening support for the existing sanctions. With the backing of a handful of senior Democrats, Republican leaders in the Senate have said they hope to bring new sanctions legislation up for debate over the next few weeks. The talks between Iran and the US and other major powers, which have been under way for more than a year, were extended in November for another seven months. In return for potential relief on sanctions, the US wants decisive limits on Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon. Speaking at a White House press conference with Mr Cameron, Mr Obama said that “I respectfully request them [Congress] to hold off for a few months to see if we have the possibility of solving a big problem without resorting potentially to war.” He added that of the US were to impose new sanctions now, Iran “would be able to maintain that the reason that they ended negotiations was because the United States was operating in bad faith and blew up the deal. And there would be some sympathy to that view around the world.” Adopting a tactic most often used by Israel of talking directly with Congress, Mr Cameron said he had phoned two senators on Friday to express his concerns about new US sanctions on Iran. “They could fracture the international unity that there’s been which has been so valuable in presenting a united front to Iran,” he said. Senate aides said that two separate bills are presently under consideration. The first would impose a new round of sanctions on Iran if the current talks were to fail, while the second demands that Congress get to vote on any final agreement reached with Tehran. Bob Corker, the Tennessee Republican who is the new chair of the Senate foreign relations committee, said this week that the Senate would take up the Iran sanctions bill as one of its first priorities. A similar proposal passed the House comfortably last week. That sanctions bill is co-sponsored by Bob Menendez, the New Jersey Democrat, who had a tense exchange with Mr Obama over the issue at a closed-door session with Senate Democrats on Thursday, according to aides. Analysts believe the bill will pass the Senate but is unlikely to gather the 67 votes needed to override a presidential veto, given the strong opposition to new sanctions from a number of senior Democrats. Supporters of new sanctions insist that the bill would not be an act of bad faith to Iran because the penalties would only be implemented if the talks collapse without a final deal. However Tom Cotton, a new Republican senator with hawkish views on Iran, said this week that one of the objectives of the sanctions legislation was the collapse of the talks with Iran. “The end of these negotiations isn’t an unintended consequence of Congressional action, it is very much an intended consequence,” he said.
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<h4><strong>Veto will be sustained now- enough Dems are on board</h4><p>Financial Times 1/16</strong>/2015 (Obama and Cameron warn against new Iran sanctions, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/44d195d0-9d9b-11e4-8ea3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3P0tmmbW5)</p><p>Barack Obama and David Cameron warned on Friday that new sanctions on Iran could cause the collapse of nuclear negotiations, as the new Republican-controlled <u><mark>Congress appeared to be shaping up for a major foreign policy fight with the White House</mark>. </u>Threatening to veto any sanctions bills that pass Congress, Mr Obama said that new US penalties on Iran would give Tehran an excuse to walk away from talks and to blame Washington for the failure, weakening support for the existing sanctions. <u>With the backing of a handful of senior Democrats, Republican leaders</u> in the Senate have <u>said they hope to bring new sanctions legislation up for debate over the next few weeks. </u>The talks between Iran and the US and other major powers, which have been under way for more than a year, were extended in November for another seven months. In return for potential relief on sanctions, the US wants decisive limits on Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon. Speaking at a White House press conference with Mr Cameron, Mr Obama said that “I respectfully request them [Congress] to hold off for a few months to see if we have the possibility of solving a big problem without resorting potentially to war.” He added that of the US were to impose new sanctions now, Iran “would be able to maintain that the reason that they ended negotiations was because the United States was operating in bad faith and blew up the deal. And there would be some sympathy to that view around the world.” Adopting a tactic most often used by Israel of talking directly with Congress, Mr Cameron said he had phoned two senators on Friday to express his concerns about new US sanctions on Iran. “They could fracture the international unity that there’s been which has been so valuable in presenting a united front to Iran,” he said. Senate aides said that two separate bills are presently under consideration. The first would impose a new round of sanctions on Iran if the current talks were to fail, while the second demands that Congress get to vote on any final agreement reached with Tehran. Bob <u>Corker</u>, the Tennessee Republican who is the new chair of the Senate foreign relations committee, <u>said</u> this week that <u>the Senate would take up the Iran sanctions bill as one of its <strong>first priorities</u></strong>. A similar proposal passed the House comfortably last week. That sanctions bill is co-sponsored by Bob Menendez, the New Jersey Democrat, who had a tense exchange with Mr Obama over the issue at a closed-door session with Senate Democrats on Thursday, according to aides<mark>. <u>Analysts believe the bill will pass the Senate but is <strong>unlikely to gather</u></strong> the <u><strong>67 votes</u></strong> </mark>needed to override a presidential veto<mark>, <u>given the strong opposition to new sanctions from a number of senior Democrats</mark>. </u><strong>Supporters of new sanctions insist that the bill would not be an act of bad faith to Iran because the penalties would only be implemented if the talks collapse without a final deal. However Tom Cotton, a new Republican senator with hawkish views on Iran, said this week that one of the objectives of the sanctions legislation was the collapse of the talks with Iran. “The end of these negotiations isn’t an unintended consequence of Congressional action, it is very much an intended consequence,” he said.</p></strong>
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New sanctions destroy the Iran deal- causes prolif and Israel strikes- extinction
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Borger 12/31
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Borger 12/31/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation)
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There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba This deal will be about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. the parties to the talks have given themselves more time They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions That would provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment.
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no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. is deal will b about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets anctions would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment
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There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. This deal will not be about cash machines in the Caribbean, but about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away from the table. A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. So the parties to the talks have given themselves more time – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor. The legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. That would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, and a very volatile environment. It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year.
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<h4>New sanctions destroy the Iran deal- causes prolif and Israel strikes- extinction</h4><p><strong>Borger 12/31</strong>/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation)</p><p><u>There will be <mark>no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.</mark> In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba</u>, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. <u>Th<mark>is deal will</u></mark> not <u><mark>b</mark>e</u> about cash machines in the Caribbean, but <u><mark>about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth</u></mark>. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These <u>gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away</u> from the table. <u><strong><mark>A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel</u></strong>; <u>the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a <strong>wave of proliferation across the region and beyond</strong> as other countries hedge their bets</mark>. </u>So <u>the parties to the talks have given themselves more time</u> – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. <u>They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran</u>. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, <u>the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor</u>. The <u>legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered s<mark>anctions</u></mark>, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. <u>That</u> would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it <u><mark>would</u> also <u>provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament</u></mark>, the Majlis, <u><mark>and a very volatile environment</mark>. </u>It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year.</p>
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1nc
| null |
1
| 171,429 | 23 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,363 |
Iran proves – they have a surplus
|
Minton 14
|
Minton 14 Michelle Minton • March 27, 2014 Human Achievement of the Day from HumanProgress.org: Organ Replacement Technology
|
There are 120,000 people waiting for organ transplants in the U S alone. Compare this shortage to Iran where organ donors may be compensated with cash. In contrast to the U S , there is a donor waiting list in Iran.
|
shortage to Iran where organ donors may be compensated with cash. In contrast to the U S there is a donor waiting list in Iran
|
https://cei.org/blog/human-achievement-day-humanprogressorg-organ-replacement-technology
Medical breakthroughs are giving hope to hundreds of thousands of people waiting for organ transplants. There are 120,000 people waiting for organ transplants in the United States alone. By this time tomorrow, twenty to thirty Americans will die because they cannot get a new kidney—not to mention other organs. Compare this man-made shortage to Iran where organ donors may be compensated with cash. In contrast to the United States, there is a donor waiting list in Iran. As long as the industrialized world rejects the Iranian model, we must turn to innovation to resolve the organ shortage crisis.
| 689 |
<h4>Iran proves – they have a surplus</h4><p><strong>Minton 14 </strong>Michelle Minton • March 27, 2014 Human Achievement of the Day from HumanProgress.org: Organ Replacement Technology</p><p>https://cei.org/blog/human-achievement-day-humanprogressorg-organ-replacement-technology</p><p> Medical breakthroughs are giving hope to hundreds of thousands of people waiting for organ transplants. <u>There are 120,000 people waiting for organ transplants in the U</u>nited<u> S</u>tates<u> alone. </u>By this time tomorrow, twenty to thirty Americans will die because they cannot get a new kidney—not to mention other organs. <u>Compare this</u> man-made <u><mark>shortage to Iran where organ donors may be compensated with cash. In contrast to the U</u></mark>nited<u><mark> S</u></mark>tates<u>, <mark>there is a donor waiting list in Iran</mark>.</u> As long as the industrialized world rejects the Iranian model, we must turn to innovation to resolve the organ shortage crisis. </p>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Shortage
| 430,837 | 2 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,364 |
No policy failure. Language is clear enough to use common assumptions. Policy and theory do succeed on this basis.
|
Harvey ’97
|
Harvey ’97 (Frank, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. – Dalhousie U., “The Future’s Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War”, p. 138-139)
|
the linguistic variant of criticism contends that any attempt to reduce terms "to a singular essentialist meaning" is problematic given "the multiplicity of meaning in social activity a word cannot correspond "to some externally derived object Phillips argues that the validity of theory cannot be determined because "There is no standard or objective reality it is not entirely clear how this "multiplicity of meaning" is sufficient to render meaningless an approach that assumes the existence of an objective reality A distinction must be drawn between the assertion that these discrepancies might have a significant impact on scientific theorizing and the assertion that they do have such an effect. In most cases, errors of interpretation and generalization produced by linguistic nuances are relatively insignificant and ultimately have very little impact on the generalizability of social theories. There are numerous words, symbols, concepts, and ideas, for example, that are commonly understood, regardless of other linguistic variations, but the implications of this standardized concep¬tual framework are frequently overlooked and ignored in the post¬modern critique scholars are more likely than not to understand and agree on the underlying meaning of most words, symbols and phrases theorists generally do have a common starting point and often suspend coun¬terproductive debates over meaning in order to shift emphasis towards the strength and logical consistency of the theory itself a more important issue that has nothing to do with language the lack of purity and precision does not necessarily imply irrelevance of purpose or approach. The study of international relations may not be exact, but precision is a practical research problem, not an insurmountable barrier to progress Clearly, our understanding of the causes of international conflict has improved considerably as a consequence of applying sound scientific methods and valid operationalizations The alternative is to throw one's hands up in failure
|
the linguistic variant of the criticism contends that any attempt to reduce everyday terms "to a singular essentialist meaning" is problematic given "the multiplicity of meaning in social activity it is not entirely clear how is sufficient to render meaningless an approach that assumes the existence of an objective reality In most cases, errors of interpretation and generalization produced by linguistic nuances are relatively insignificant and have little impact coun¬terproductive debates over meaning more important issue that has nothing to do with language . The study of international relations may not be exact but precision is a practical research problem, our understanding of the causes of international conflict has improved considerably as a consequence of applying sound scientific methods and valid operationalizations
|
Linguistic Relativism. One approach of postmodernists is to point to the complex nature of language and meaning as a critique of positiv¬ism; this critique is, in turn, relevant to the overwhelming amount of work in IR (Phillips 1977; Giddens 1979; George and Campbell 1990). Although a comprehensive assessment of the linguistic relativism debate is beyond the scope of this project, it is possible to address the underlying philosophical argument, which is fairly straightforward. Building on the work of Wittgenstein (1968), the linguistic variant of the criticism contends that any attempt to reduce everyday terms "to a singular essentialist meaning" is problematic given "the multiplicity of meaning to be found in social activity" (George and Campbell 1990, 273). By implication, a concept, term, word, or symbol cannot correspond "to some ... externally derived foundation or object" and ulti¬mately is context-dependent. Similarly, Phillips argues that the validity of theory cannot be determined because "There is no standard or objective reality (always fixed, never changing) against which to com¬pare a universe of discourse ... nothing exists outside of our language and actions which can be used to justify ... a statement's truth or falsity" (1977, 273). Of course, it is not entirely clear how this "multiplicity of meaning" is sufficient to render meaningless an approach that assumes the existence of an objective reality. An important distinction must be drawn between the assertion that these discrepancies might have a significant impact on scientific theorizing and the assertion that they do have such an effect. In most cases, errors of interpretation and generalization produced by linguistic nuances are relatively insignificant and ultimately have very little impact on the generalizability of social theories. There are numerous words, symbols, concepts, and ideas, for example, that are commonly understood, regardless of other linguistic variations, but the implications of this standardized concep¬tual framework are frequently overlooked and ignored in the post¬modern critique. In any case, it is contingent upon the theorist to specify the precise meaning of any variable or symbol that is central to a theory. Although definitions may vary — possibly partly, but not entirely, as a conse¬quence of language — scholars nevertheless are more likely than not to understand and agree on the underlying meaning of most words, symbols and phrases. The point is that theorists generally do have a common starting point and often suspend, at least temporarily, coun¬terproductive debates over meaning in order to shift emphasis towards the strength and logical consistency of the theory itself, a more important issue that has nothing to do with language. Evaluating the internal consistency of the central assumptions and propositions of a theory, that is, criticising from within, is likely to be more conducive to theoretical progress than the alternative, which is to reject the idea of theory building entirely. Finally, the lack of purity and precision, another consequence of linguistic relativism, does not necessarily imply irrelevance of purpose or approach. The study of international relations may not be exact, given limitations noted by Wittgenstein and others, but precision is a practical research problem, not an insurmountable barrier to progress. In fact, most observers who point to the context-dependent nature of language are critical not so much of the social sciences but of the incorrect application of scientific techniques to derive overly precise measurement of weakly developed concepts. Clearly, our understanding of the causes of international conflict — and most notably war — has improved considerably as a consequence of applying sound scientific methods and valid operationalizations (Vasquez 1987, 1993). The alternative approach, implicit in much of the postmodern literature, is to fully accept the inadequacy of positivism, throw one's hands up in failure, given the complexity of the subject, and repudiate the entire enterprise. The most relevant question is whether we would know more or less about international relations if we pursued that strategy.
| 4,224 |
<h4><strong>No policy failure. Language is clear enough to use common assumptions. Policy and theory do succeed on this basis.</h4><p>Harvey ’97</strong> (Frank, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. – Dalhousie U., “The Future’s Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War”, p. 138-139)</p><p>Linguistic Relativism. One approach of postmodernists is to point to the complex nature of language and meaning as a critique of positiv¬ism; this critique is, in turn, relevant to the overwhelming amount of work in IR (Phillips 1977; Giddens 1979; George and Campbell 1990). Although a comprehensive assessment of the linguistic relativism debate is beyond the scope of this project, it is possible to address the underlying philosophical argument, which is fairly straightforward. Building on the work of Wittgenstein (1968), <u><mark>the linguistic variant of</u> the <u>criticism contends that any attempt to reduce</u> everyday <u>terms "to a singular essentialist meaning" is problematic given "the multiplicity of meaning</u></mark> to be found <u><mark>in social activity</u></mark>" (George and Campbell 1990, 273). By implication, <u>a</u> concept, term, <u>word</u>, or symbol <u>cannot correspond "to some</u> ... <u>externally derived</u> foundation or <u>object</u>" and ulti¬mately is context-dependent. Similarly, <u>Phillips argues that the validity of theory cannot be determined because "There is no standard or objective reality</u> (always fixed, never changing) against which to com¬pare a universe of discourse ... nothing exists outside of our language and actions which can be used to justify ... a statement's truth or falsity" (1977, 273). Of course, <u><mark>it is not entirely clear how </mark>this "multiplicity of meaning"<mark> is sufficient to render meaningless an approach that assumes the existence of an objective reality</u></mark>. <u>A</u>n important <u>distinction must be drawn between the assertion that these discrepancies might have a significant impact on scientific theorizing and the assertion that they do have such an effect.</u> <u><mark>In most cases, errors of interpretation and generalization produced by linguistic nuances are relatively insignificant and </mark>ultimately <mark>have</mark> very <mark>little impact </mark>on the generalizability of social theories. There are numerous words, symbols, concepts, and ideas, for example, that are commonly understood, regardless of other linguistic variations, but the implications of this standardized concep¬tual framework are frequently overlooked and ignored in the post¬modern critique</u>. In any case, it is contingent upon the theorist to specify the precise meaning of any variable or symbol that is central to a theory. Although definitions may vary — possibly partly, but not entirely, as a conse¬quence of language — <u>scholars </u>nevertheless <u>are more likely than not to understand and agree on the underlying meaning of most words, symbols and phrases</u>. The point is that <u>theorists generally do have a common starting point and often suspend</u>, at least temporarily, <u><mark>coun¬terproductive debates</mark> <mark>over meaning</mark> in order to shift emphasis towards the strength and logical consistency of the theory itself</u>, <u>a <mark>more important issue that has nothing to do with language</u></mark>. Evaluating the internal consistency of the central assumptions and propositions of a theory, that is, criticising from within, is likely to be more conducive to theoretical progress than the alternative, which is to reject the idea of theory building entirely. Finally, <u>the lack of purity and precision</u>, another consequence of linguistic relativism, <u>does not necessarily imply irrelevance of purpose or approach<mark>. The study of international relations may not be exact</mark>,</u> given limitations noted by Wittgenstein and others, <u><mark>but precision is a practical research problem,</mark> not an insurmountable barrier to progress</u>. In fact, most observers who point to the context-dependent nature of language are critical not so much of the social sciences but of the incorrect application of scientific techniques to derive overly precise measurement of weakly developed concepts. <u>Clearly, <strong><mark>our understanding of the causes of international conflict</u></strong></mark> — and most notably war — <u><strong><mark>has improved considerably as a consequence of applying sound scientific methods and valid operationalizations</u></strong></mark> (Vasquez 1987, 1993). <u>The alternative</u> approach, implicit in much of the postmodern literature, <u>is to</u> fully accept the inadequacy of positivism, <u>throw one's hands up in failure</u>, given the complexity of the subject, and repudiate the entire enterprise. The most relevant question is whether we would know more or less about international relations if we pursued that strategy.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
advantage
| 179,982 | 22 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,365 |
It’s top of the agenda- no veto-proof majority- Republicans admit
|
Reuters 1/15
|
Reuters 1/15/2015 (Exclusive: U.S. lawmakers push ahead on Iran sanctions - senior senator, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/15/us-usa-congress-iran-idUSKBN0KO01X20150115)
|
Republican and Democratic U.S. lawmakers will press ahead with a plan for more sanctions on Iran despite White House warnings The Senate Banking Committee is due to hold a hearing on Iran sanctions on Tuesday Although Republicans now hold a majority in the Senate, Corker said he did not know if there would be enough votes needed to override an Obama veto
|
Republican and Democratic U.S. lawmakers will press ahead with a plan for more sanctions on Iran The Senate Banking Committee is due to hold a hearing on Iran sanctions on Tuesday, Although Republicans now hold a 54-46 seat majority in the Senate, Corker said he did not know if there would be enough votes - - needed to override an Obama veto
|
Republican and Democratic U.S. lawmakers will press ahead with a plan for more sanctions on Iran, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said on Wednesday, despite White House warnings that they risked derailing nuclear talks. Lawmakers, who say they fear Obama administration negotiators may not take a hard enough line with Tehran, are also at work on a separate bill to have Congress approve any final agreement on Iran's nuclear program, Senator Bob Corker, the chairman, told Reuters in an interview. "There's continual efforts to try to figure out a way for Congress to play a role to strengthen whatever final deal may occur," the Tennessee Republican senator said. Republican Senator Mark Kirk and Democratic Senator Robert Menendez are finalizing a bill for tougher sanctions on Iran if there is no final nuclear deal by June 30. The Senate Banking Committee is due to hold a hearing on Iran sanctions on Tuesday, said Corker, a member also of that panel. Kirk and Menendez introduced a sanctions bill in December 2013, but it did not come up for a vote in the Senate, then controlled by President Barack Obama's fellow Democrats, who lost control of the chamber because of big losses in November elections. The White House has insisted passage of a sanctions bill now - even one that would impose new restrictions only if there is no deal by the deadline - could prompt Iran to back out of the nuclear talks with six world powers. Although Republicans now hold a 54-46 seat majority in the Senate, Corker said he did not know if there would be enough votes - 67 - needed in the Senate to override an Obama veto of any Iran legislation.
| 1,661 |
<h4><strong>It’s top of the agenda- no veto-proof majority- Republicans admit</h4><p>Reuters 1/15</strong>/2015 (Exclusive: U.S. lawmakers push ahead on Iran sanctions - senior senator, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/15/us-usa-congress-iran-idUSKBN0KO01X20150115)</p><p><u><mark>Republican and Democratic U.S. lawmakers will press ahead with a plan for more sanctions on Iran</u></mark>, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said on Wednesday, <u>despite White House warnings</u> that they risked derailing nuclear talks. Lawmakers, who say they fear Obama administration negotiators may not take a hard enough line with Tehran, are also at work on a separate bill to have Congress approve any final agreement on Iran's nuclear program, Senator Bob Corker, the chairman, told Reuters in an interview. "There's continual efforts to try to figure out a way for Congress to play a role to strengthen whatever final deal may occur," the Tennessee Republican senator said. Republican Senator Mark Kirk and Democratic Senator Robert Menendez are finalizing a bill for tougher sanctions on Iran if there is no final nuclear deal by June 30. <u><mark>The Senate Banking Committee is due to hold a hearing on Iran sanctions on <strong>Tuesday</u></strong>,</mark> said Corker, a member also of that panel. Kirk and Menendez introduced a sanctions bill in December 2013, but it did not come up for a vote in the Senate, then controlled by President Barack Obama's fellow Democrats, who lost control of the chamber because of big losses in November elections. The White House has insisted passage of a sanctions bill now - even one that would impose new restrictions only if there is no deal by the deadline - could prompt Iran to back out of the nuclear talks with six world powers. <u><mark>Although Republicans now hold a</u> 54-46 seat <u>majority</u> <u>in the Senate, Corker said he <strong>did not know if there would be enough votes </u></strong>-</mark> 67 <mark>- <u><strong>needed</u></strong> </mark>in the Senate <u><strong><mark>to override an Obama veto</u></mark> of any Iran legislation.</p></strong>
|
1nr
|
Strikes
|
UQ
| 220,784 | 7 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,366 |
--Structural factors overwhelm—this evidence is comparative
|
Koh 08 (Lian Pin Koh Assistant Professor of Applied Ecology & Conservation at the ETH Zurich, and Jaboury Ghazoul “Biofuels, biodiversity, and people: Understanding the conflicts and finding opportunities”, Institute of Terrestrial Ecosystems BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION141 (2008), 14 September 2008)//kyan
|
Koh 08 (Lian Pin Koh Assistant Professor of Applied Ecology & Conservation at the ETH Zurich, and Jaboury Ghazoul “Biofuels, biodiversity, and people: Understanding the conflicts and finding opportunities”, Institute of Terrestrial Ecosystems BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION141 (2008), 14 September 2008)//kyan
|
underlying causes of rising food prices are many factors such as adverse weather conditions affect crop productivity speculative demand export bans of foods structural factors that include rising energy costs, stagnation in crop productivity climate change demand for grain-intensive foods A popular allegory to illustrate the impacts of biofuels on food equates the grain biofuels have received a disproportionate amount of the blame for increased food prices
|
underlying causes of rising food prices are adverse weather affect crop productivity speculative export bans of foods structural factors include rising energy costs, stagnation crop productivity climate change demand for grain-intensive fo biofuels have received a disproportionate amount of the blam
|
The underlying causes of rising food prices are many and complex. They include factors such as adverse weather conditions that affect crop productivity, speculative or precautionary demand for food commodities, and inappropriate policy responses such as export bans of foods (James et al., 2008; Josserand, 2008; Rahman et al., 2008). More important are structural factors that include rising energy costs, stagnation in crop productivity, policy inadequacies or failures that constrain agricultural development, climate change, rising demand for higher value and grain-intensive foods (e.g., meat), and diversion of crops or croplands to biofuel production. Among these factors, biofuels have borne the brunt of the blame due largely to the media’s sensationalisation of the ‘food vs. fuel’ debate. A popular allegory to illustrate the impacts of biofuels on food equates the grain required to fill the tank of a sports utility vehicle to grain that could otherwise feed a person for an entire year (Byerlee et al., 2008). Although biofuels may have received a disproportionate amount of the blame for increased food prices, it clearly does deserve some of the blame: the use of corn to produce bioethanol in the US has increased from 6% of total corn production to 23% over the last three years (Rahman et al., 2008), and this has undoubtedly contributed to tightening food supplies and rising food prices
| 1,407 |
<h4>--Structural factors overwhelm—this evidence is comparative</h4><p><strong>Koh 08 (Lian Pin Koh Assistant Professor of Applied Ecology & Conservation at the ETH Zurich, and Jaboury Ghazoul “Biofuels, biodiversity, and people: Understanding the conflicts and finding opportunities”, Institute of Terrestrial Ecosystems BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION141 (2008), 14 September 2008)//kyan</p><p></strong>The <u><mark>underlying causes of rising food prices are</mark> many</u> and complex. They include <u>factors such as <mark>adverse</mark> <mark>weather </mark>conditions</u> that <u><mark>affect crop productivity</u></mark>, <u><mark>speculative</u></mark> or precautionary <u>demand</u> for food commodities, and inappropriate policy responses such as <u><mark>export bans of foods</u></mark> (James et al., 2008; Josserand, 2008; Rahman et al., 2008). More important are <u><mark>structural factors</mark> that <mark>include rising energy costs, stagnation</mark> in <mark>crop productivity</u></mark>, policy inadequacies or failures that constrain agricultural development, <u><mark>climate change</u></mark>, rising <u><mark>demand for</u></mark> higher value and <u><mark>grain-intensive fo</mark>ods</u> (e.g., meat), and diversion of crops or croplands to biofuel production. Among these factors, biofuels have borne the brunt of the blame due largely to the media’s sensationalisation of the ‘food vs. fuel’ debate. <u>A popular allegory to illustrate the impacts of biofuels on food equates the grain</u> required to fill the tank of a sports utility vehicle to grain that could otherwise feed a person for an entire year (Byerlee et al., 2008). Although <u><mark>biofuels</u></mark> may <u><mark>have received a disproportionate amount of the blam</mark>e for</u> <u>increased food prices</u><strong>, it clearly does deserve some of the blame: the use of corn to produce bioethanol in the US has increased from 6% of total corn production to 23% over the last three years (Rahman et al., 2008), and this has undoubtedly contributed to tightening food supplies and rising food prices</p></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
treaties
| 431,015 | 3 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,367 |
A. Definitions
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>A. Definitions</h4></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
4
| 431,016 | 1 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,368 |
Market-clearing price specifically solves the shortage
|
Watkins 5
|
Watkins 5 Christy M. Watkins, University of Tulsa Journal of International and Comparative Law Spring, 2005 5 JICL 1 ARTICLE: A Deadly Dilemma: The Failure of Nations' Organ Procurement Systems and Potential Reform Alternatives n1 lexis
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the organ supplier (potential donor or his or her surviving relatives) would be offered a market-determined price, which would fluctuate depending on supply and demand. Price flexibility would eliminate surpluses or shortages automatically.
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the organ supplier (potential donor or his or her surviving relatives) would be offered a market-determined price, which would fluctuate depending on supply and demand Price flexibility would eliminate shortages automatically. n
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2. The Market Process
A minimum of five groups would be seriously affected by an organ market: (1) current and potential transplant candidates; (2) actual and potential organ donors and their families; (3) hospitals, physicians, and other transplant caregivers; (4) The United Network for Organ Sharing, the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, and other organ procurement [*27] organizations; and (5) taxpayers and those who finance patient care. n214 First, the organ supplier (potential donor or his or her surviving relatives) would be offered a market-determined price, which would fluctuate depending on supply and demand. n215 Price flexibility would eliminate surpluses or shortages automatically. n216 Organ procurement firms would then remove the organs at death and sell them to transplant centers that have put in an organ order. n217 In turn, the centers would include the price paid to the firm in the operation bill, with the resale price being the price paid to the donor plus the firm's collection and distribution cost. n218 From here, the center could allocate the organs in "precisely the same fashion they are allocated today" under the guidelines of the UNOS. n219 The firms acquiring the organs for sale would presumably operate competitively on a for-profit basis, resulting in powerful market incentives to create and use the best strategies in finding potential donors and encouraging them to donate. n220 Procurement agencies currently operate on a nonprofit basis, and while they may work diligently, it is doubtful they could match the performance of the competitive for-profit firms. n221
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<h4>Market-clearing price specifically solves the shortage</h4><p><strong>Watkins 5</strong> Christy M. Watkins, University of Tulsa Journal of International and Comparative Law Spring, 2005 5 JICL 1 ARTICLE: A Deadly Dilemma: The Failure of Nations' Organ Procurement Systems and Potential Reform Alternatives n1 lexis</p><p>2. The Market Process</p><p>A minimum of five groups would be seriously affected by an organ market: (1) current and potential transplant candidates; (2) actual and potential organ donors and their families; (3) hospitals, physicians, and other transplant caregivers; (4) The United Network for Organ Sharing, the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, and other organ procurement [*27] organizations; and (5) taxpayers and those who finance patient care. n214 First, <u><mark>the organ supplier (potential donor or his or her surviving relatives) would be offered a market-determined price, which would fluctuate depending on supply and demand</mark>. </u> n215 <u><mark>Price flexibility would eliminate</mark> surpluses or <mark>shortages automatically. </u> n</mark>216 Organ procurement firms would then remove the organs at death and sell them to transplant centers that have put in an organ order. n217 In turn, the centers would include the price paid to the firm in the operation bill, with the resale price being the price paid to the donor plus the firm's collection and distribution cost. n218 From here, the center could allocate the organs in "precisely the same fashion they are allocated today" under the guidelines of the UNOS. n219 The firms acquiring the organs for sale would presumably operate competitively on a for-profit basis, resulting in powerful market incentives to create and use the best strategies in finding potential donors and encouraging them to donate. n220 Procurement agencies currently operate on a nonprofit basis, and while they may work diligently, it is doubtful they could match the performance of the competitive for-profit firms. n221</p>
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Contention 1 – Shortage
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Kentucky Hampton-Roman
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Humanitarian Justifications solve war- “pretext wars” are wrong
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Goodman 6
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By Ryan Goodman 6 * ¶ J. Sinclair Armstrong Assistant Professor of Foreign, International, and Comparative Law, Harvard Law ¶ School. “HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND PRETEXTS FOR WAR” THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 100:107] http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanHumanitarianInterventionPretextsforWar.pdf
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Second the plausibility of a humanitarian justification may depend on how it is expressed in conjunction with other rationales for using force. According to a standard version of the pre- text model, state R will employ a humanitarian exception to conceal its ulterior motives the availability of an authorized humanitarian justification would suppress the artic- ulation of other reasons for escalating hostilities state R will need to invest consid- erably in a humanitarian rationale-possibly to the relative exclusion of other (generally less justifiable) reasons. This factor may partially explain why past uses of a humanitarian rationale failed to gain meaningful political traction Some points discussed might cast doubt on whether a humanitarian rationale can alter the course of events if leaders have already embarked on different justifications preexisting public rationales may preclude leaders from reframing a dispute along humanitar- ian lines. This observation raises a legitimate concern but does not undermine the present anal- ysis of UHI. First to the extent that preexisting rationales foreclose the promulgation of alter- native rationales, the pretext objection to legalizing UHI loses its force; concerns about states' abuse of a humanitarian exception are misplaced or exaggerated if leaders are unable to succeed with a justification after having espoused an earlier one Second such consider- ations regarding the impact of preexisting rationale should prospect of early lock-ins simply helps to establish the tasks for institutional design Third studies on MIDs recognize that multiple issues might be at stake in a dispute. T Finally if the assertion of humanitarian claims only supplement rather than displaces- other issues, a road to war may yet be averted. One means for defusing a crisis involves issue linkage. Accordingly, the introduction of humanitarian issues can facilitate conflict resolution by expanding bargaining opportunities for trade-offs with other issues in a dispute studies of international crises suggest that issue linkage is more likely to succeed when the salience ascribed to an issue is different for the disputing parties a situation we should expect to occur when the issue involves human rights conditions in one of the countries. Another means for defusing a crisis is to facilitate face-saving compromises other disputed issues can propel leaders unwittingly to a point at which they have trouble "bail[ing] out." the addition of humanitarian issues might reduce the political costs of such a reversal. An "important finding related to crisis bargaining," accord- ing to a leading review of the literature by Paul Huth, is that the inclusion of secondary issues can allow leaders to take politically sensitive, pacifying steps that avert war: [D]iplomatic policies that include flexibility and a willingness to compromise and nego- tiate on secondary issues combined with a refusal to concede on vital security issues can help leaders of attacker states to retreat from their threats by reducing the domestic or international political costs of backing away from a military confrontation. Leaders can claim that defender concessions on certain issues were a major gain, or that a defender's willingness to negotiate was a promising diplomatic development. In either case, foreign policy leaders can use even limited accommodative diplomatic actions of the defender to fend off domestic or foreign political adversaries who claim that the government of the would-be attacker state has retreated under pressure humanitarian issues can provide these types of opportunities for deescalation: [T]o induce the challenger to make concessions, the terms of a settlement need to be formulated so that leaders can counter charges of appeasement and capitulation if claims to territory have to be withdrawn, some form of concessions by the target on policies within the disputed territory (e.g., treatment of ethnic minorities) may be critical to pack- aging a politically viable agreement
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state R will need to invest consid- erably in a humanitarian rationale- to the exclusion of other ( reasons. the pretext objection loses force concerns are misplaced or exaggerated if humanitarian claims supplement other issues, war may be averted introduction of humanitarian issues can facilitate conflict resolution by expanding bargaining opportunities issue linkage is likely to succeed when salience is different for the disputing parties'37-a situation we should expect to occur when the issue involves human rights Another means for defusing a crisis is to facilitate face-saving compromises the addition of humanitarian issues might reduce the political costs of a reversal allow leaders to take politically sensitive, pacifying steps that avert war: policies that include willingness to compromise on secondary issues, combined with a refusal to concede on vital security issues ... can help attacker states to retreat from their threats by reducing the domestic costs of backing away Leaders can claim defender concessions were a major gain leaders can use even limited accommodative actions of the defender to fend off political adversaries humanitarian issues can provide opportunities for deescalation so leaders can counter charges of appeasement
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**NOTE: UHI=Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention
Second, the plausibility of a humanitarian justification may depend on how it is expressed in conjunction with other rationales for using force. According to a standard version of the pre- text model, state R will employ a humanitarian exception to conceal its ulterior motives. On this view, the availability of an authorized humanitarian justification would suppress the artic- ulation of other reasons for escalating hostilities. Similarly, state R would have difficulty in pro- claiming humanitarianism as the reason for using force if the proclamation is superficially attached to existing objectives. A meager, formal reference to humanitarianism while military efforts are obviously pursued for other reasons should not obtain the political benefits of a pub- licly legitimated use of force. The important point is that state R will need to invest consid- erably in a humanitarian rationale-possibly to the relative exclusion of other (generally less justifiable) reasons. This factor may partially explain why past uses of a humanitarian rationale failed to gain meaningful political traction, even though the factual predicate was potentially meritorious (an issue that I explore later with respect to the United States' 2003 invasion of Iraq). Some of the points just discussed might cast doubt on whether a humanitarian rationale can alter the course of events if leaders have already embarked on different justifications; that is, preexisting public rationales may preclude leaders from reframing a dispute along humanitar- ian lines. This observation raises a legitimate concern but does not undermine the present anal- ysis of UHI. First, to the extent that preexisting rationales foreclose the promulgation of alter- native rationales, the pretext objection to legalizing UHI loses its force; that is, concerns about states' abuse of a humanitarian exception are misplaced or exaggerated if leaders are unable to succeed with a justification after having espoused an earlier one.134 Second, such consider- ations regarding the impact of preexisting rationale should, if anything, add support to the project of fashioning institutions to take account of empirical patterns of state practice. The prospect of early lock-ins simply helps to establish the tasks for institutional design. Accord- ingly, in part III, I propose some institutional reforms to encourage the early and emphatic articulation of humanitarian purposes in interstate disputes. Third, recall that the studies on MIDs recognize that multiple issues might be at stake in a dispute. The question is: which issue becomes the principal claim raised by the revisionist state. A humanitarian claim need not com- pletely replace or retire an earlier claim; in such cases, it is more a matter of emphasis.135 Finally, if the assertion of humanitarian claims only supplements-rather than displaces- other issues, a road to war may yet be averted. One means for defusing a crisis involves issue linkage. Accordingly, the introduction of humanitarian issues can facilitate conflict resolution by expanding bargaining opportunities for trade-offs with other issues in a dispute.'36 More- over, studies of international crises suggest that issue linkage is more likely to succeed when the salience ascribed to an issue is different for the disputing parties'37-a situation we should expect to occur when the issue involves human rights conditions in one of the countries. Another means for defusing a crisis is to facilitate face-saving compromises. As Senese and Vasquez posit, other disputed issues can propel leaders unwittingly to a point at which they have trouble "bail[ing] out." In this context, the addition of humanitarian issues might reduce the political costs of such a reversal. An "important finding related to crisis bargaining," accord- ing to a leading review of the literature by Paul Huth, is that the inclusion of secondary issues can allow leaders to take politically sensitive, pacifying steps that avert war: [D]iplomatic policies that include flexibility and a willingness to compromise and nego- tiate on secondary issues, combined with a refusal to concede on vital security issues ... can help leaders of attacker states to retreat from their threats by reducing the domestic or international political costs of backing away from a military confrontation. Leaders can claim that defender concessions on certain issues were a major gain, or that a defender's willingness to negotiate was a promising diplomatic development. In either case, foreign policy leaders can use even limited accommodative diplomatic actions of the defender to fend off domestic or foreign political adversaries who claim that the government of the would-be attacker state has retreated under pressure.38 In Huth's own work on territorial disputes, he notes that humanitarian issues can provide these types of opportunities for deescalation: [T]o induce the challenger to make concessions, the terms of a settlement need to be formulated so that leaders can counter charges of appeasement and capitulation. Thus, if claims to territory have to be withdrawn, some form of concessions by the target on policies within the disputed territory (e.g., treatment of ethnic minorities) may be critical to pack- aging a politically viable agreement. 39 For such a tactic to work, however, the secondary issue would presumably need to be perceived as a genuine part of the dispute.
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<h4>Humanitarian Justifications solve war- “pretext wars” are wrong</h4><p>By Ryan <strong>Goodman 6</strong> * ¶ J. Sinclair Armstrong Assistant Professor of Foreign, International, and Comparative Law, Harvard Law ¶ School. “HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND PRETEXTS FOR WAR” THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 100:107] http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanHumanitarianInterventionPretextsforWar.pdf</p><p>**NOTE: UHI=Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention</p><p><u><strong>Second</u></strong>, <u>the plausibility of a humanitarian justification may depend on how it is expressed in conjunction with other rationales for using force. According to a standard version of the pre- text model, state R will employ a humanitarian exception to <strong>conceal</strong> its <strong>ulterior motives</u></strong>. On this view, <u>the availability of an authorized humanitarian justification would <strong>suppress</strong> the artic- ulation of other reasons for escalating hostilities</u>. Similarly, state R would have difficulty in pro- claiming humanitarianism as the reason for using force if the proclamation is superficially attached to existing objectives. A meager, formal reference to humanitarianism while military efforts are obviously pursued for other reasons should not obtain the political benefits of a pub- licly legitimated use of force. The important point is that <u><mark>state R will need to <strong>invest consid- erably in a humanitarian rationale</strong>-</mark>possibly <strong><mark>to the</strong> </mark>relative <strong><mark>exclusion of other</strong> (</mark>generally less justifiable) <strong><mark>reasons</strong>. </mark>This factor may partially explain why past uses of a humanitarian rationale failed to gain meaningful political traction</u>, even though the factual predicate was potentially meritorious (an issue that I explore later with respect to the United States' 2003 invasion of Iraq). <u>Some</u> of the <u>points</u> just <u>discussed might cast doubt on whether a humanitarian rationale can alter the course of events if leaders have <strong>already embarked</strong> on different justifications</u>; that is, <u>preexisting public rationales may preclude leaders from reframing a dispute along humanitar- ian lines. This observation raises a legitimate concern but does not undermine the present anal- ysis of UHI.</u> <u><strong>First</u></strong>, <u>to the extent that preexisting rationales foreclose the promulgation of alter- native rationales, <mark>the <strong>pretext</strong> objection</mark> to legalizing UHI <mark>loses</mark> its <mark>force</mark>;</u> that is, <u><mark>concerns </mark>about states' abuse of a humanitarian exception<mark> are <strong>misplaced</strong> or <strong>exaggerated</strong></mark> if leaders are unable to succeed with a justification after having espoused an earlier one</u>.134 <u><strong>Second</u></strong>, <u>such consider- ations regarding the impact of preexisting rationale should</u>, if anything, add support to the project of fashioning institutions to take account of empirical patterns of state practice. The <u>prospect of early lock-ins simply helps to establish the tasks for institutional design</u>. Accord- ingly, in part III, I propose some institutional reforms to encourage the early and emphatic articulation of humanitarian purposes in interstate disputes. <u><strong>Third</u></strong>, recall that the <u>studies on MIDs recognize that multiple issues might be at stake in a dispute. T</u>he question is: which issue becomes the principal claim raised by the revisionist state. A humanitarian claim need not com- pletely replace or retire an earlier claim; in such cases, it is more a matter of emphasis.135 <u><strong>Finally</u></strong>, <u><mark>if</mark> the assertion of <mark>humanitarian claims</mark> only <mark>supplement</u></mark>s-<u>rather than displaces- <mark>other issues, </mark>a road to <mark>war <strong>may </mark>yet <mark>be averted</strong></mark>. One means for defusing a crisis involves issue linkage. Accordingly, the <mark>introduction of humanitarian issues can <strong>facilitate conflict resolution by expanding bargaining opportunities</mark> for trade-offs with other issues in a dispute</u></strong>.'36 More- over, <u>studies of international crises suggest that <mark>issue linkage is</mark> more <mark>likely to succeed when</mark> the <mark>salience</mark> ascribed to an issue <mark>is different for the disputing parties</u>'37-<u>a situation we should expect to occur when the issue involves human rights</mark> conditions in one of the countries. <mark>Another means for defusing a crisis is to facilitate <strong>face-saving compromises</u></strong></mark>. As Senese and Vasquez posit, <u>other disputed issues can propel leaders unwittingly to a point at which they have trouble "bail[ing] out."</u> In this context, <u><mark>the addition of humanitarian issues might <strong>reduce the political costs </strong>of </mark>such <mark>a reversal</mark>. An "important finding related to crisis bargaining," accord- ing to a leading review of the literature by Paul Huth, is that the inclusion of secondary issues can <mark>allow leaders to take <strong>politically sensitive, pacifying</strong> steps that <strong>avert war:</strong></mark> [D]iplomatic <mark>policies that include</mark> flexibility and a <mark>willingness to compromise</mark> and nego- tiate <mark>on <strong>secondary issues</u></strong>, <u>combined with a <strong>refusal to concede</strong> on vital security issues</u> ...</mark> <u><mark>can help</mark> leaders of <mark>attacker states to retreat from their threats by <strong>reducing</strong> the domestic</mark> or international political <mark>costs of backing away</mark> from a military confrontation. <mark>Leaders can claim</mark> that <mark>defender concessions</mark> on certain issues <mark>were a <strong>major gain</strong></mark>, or that a defender's willingness to negotiate was a promising diplomatic development. In either case, foreign policy <mark>leaders can use even <strong>limited accommodative </mark>diplomatic <mark>actions</strong> of the defender to fend off </mark>domestic or foreign <mark>political adversaries</mark> who claim that the government of the would-be attacker state has retreated under pressure</u>.38 In Huth's own work on territorial disputes, he notes that <u><mark>humanitarian issues can provide </mark>these types of <mark>opportunities for deescalation</mark>: [T]o induce the challenger to make concessions, the terms of a settlement need to be formulated <mark>so </mark>that <mark>leaders can counter charges of appeasement</mark> and capitulation</u>. Thus, <u>if claims to territory have to be withdrawn, some form of concessions by the target on policies within the disputed territory (e.g., treatment of ethnic minorities) may be <strong>critical</strong> to pack- aging a politically viable agreement</u>. 39 For such a tactic to work, however, the secondary issue would presumably need to be perceived as a genuine part of the dispute. </p>
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Multiple alternate causes to food prices –energy prices, depreciation of the dollar, population trends, ethanol, urbanization, and export bans
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Teslik 08
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Teslik 08 – Assistant Editor at Council on Foreign Relations (Lee Hudson, “Food Prices”, 6/30/2008, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16662/food_prices.html)
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Rising energy prices have direct causal implications for the food market. Fuel is used in several aspects of the agricultural production process, including fertilization, processing, and transportation These costs are typically passed along to customers and are reflected in global spot prices the valuation of the dollar has fallen with respect to many other major world currencies food prices in dollars would have risen experts say population trends, distinct from sheer growth rates, have had a major impact on food prices the past decade has seen the rapid growth of a global middle class. This has led to changing tastes Livestock require farmland for grazing and also compete directly with humans for food resources government policies that provide incentives for farmers to use crops to produce energy have exacerbated food shortages The effects of ramped-up U.S. ethanol production has spawned ethanol subsidies in many countries speculative trading practices push up spot prices Even as demand for agricultural products has risen, several factors have pinched global supply global economic growth has featured expansion throughout industrial and service sector development The result has often been a boost for per capita earnings but a drag on domestic agriculture Farmland has in many cases been repurposed for urban or industrial development projects All this has put an increased burden on developing-world farmers, precisely as they dwindle in number and supply capacity urbanization opens markets up to other factors—transportation costs and risks and prevent the smooth functioning of trade weather-related factors tighten supply Agricultural trade barriers have long been faulted for gumming up trade negotiations export bans took food off the market, led to stockpiling, and brought a spike in prices flaws in food aid policies have limited its effectiveness and exacerbated price pressures on food food grown in the United States is far more expensive, both to produce and to transport, than food grown in recipient countries. Such a policy guarantees that the dollar value of donations goes much less far than it would if aid were directed to funds that could be spent in local markets
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Before considering factors like supply and demand within food markets, it is important to understand the umbrella factors influencing costs of production and, even more broadly, the currencies with which and economies within which food is traded. Energy Prices. Rising energy prices have direct causal implications for the food market. Fuel is used in several aspects of the agricultural production process, including fertilization, processing, and transportation. The percentage of total agricultural input expenditures directed toward energy costs has risen significantly in recent years. A briefing from the U.S. Department of Agriculture notes that the U.S. agricultural industry’s total expenditures on fuel and oil are forecast to rise 12.6 percent in 2008, following a rise of 11.5 percent in 2007. These costs are typically passed along to customers and are reflected in global spot prices (i.e. the current price a commodity trades for at market). The input costs of electricity have also risen, furthering the burden. Though it isn’t itself an energy product, fertilizer is an energy-intensive expense, particularly when substantial transport costs are borne by local farmers—so that expense, too, is reflected in the final price of foodstuffs. (Beyond direct causation, energy prices are also correlated to food prices, in the sense that many of the same factors pushing up energy prices—population trends, for instance, or market speculation—also affect food prices.) Currencies/Inflation. When food is traded internationally—particularly on commodities exchanges or futures markets—it is often denominated in U.S. dollars. In recent years, the valuation of the dollar has fallen with respect to many other major world currencies. This means that even if food prices stayed steady with respect to a basket of currencies, their price in dollars would have risen. Of course, food prices have not stayed steady—they have risen across the board—but if you examine international food prices in dollar terms, it is worth noting that the decline of the dollar accentuates any apparent price increase. Demand Demand for most kinds of food has risen in the past decade. This trend can be attributed to several factors: Population trends. The world’s population has grown a little more than 12 percent in the past decade. Virtually nobody argues that this trend alone accounts for rising food prices—agricultural production has, in many cases, become more efficient, offsetting the needs of a larger population—and some analysts say population growth hasn’t had any impact whatsoever on food prices. The shortcomings of a Malthusian food-price argument are most obvious in the very recent past. Richard Posner, a professor of law and economics at the University of Chicago, argues this point on his blog. He notes that in 2007 the food price index used by the FAO rose 40 percent, as compared to 9 percent in 2006—clearly a much faster rate than global population growth for that year, which measured a little over 1 percent. Nonetheless, experts say population trends, distinct from sheer growth rates, have had a major impact on food prices. For instance, the past decade has seen the rapid growth of a global middle class. This, Posner says, has led to changing tastes, and increasing demand for food that is less efficient to produce. Specifically, he cites an increased demand for meats. Livestock require farmland for grazing (land that could be used to grow other food), and also compete directly with humans for food resources like maize. The production of one serving of meat, economists say, is vastly less efficient than the production of one serving of corn or rice. Biofuels. Experts say government policies that provide incentives for farmers to use crops to produce energy, rather than food, have exacerbated food shortages. Specifically, many economists fault U.S. policies diverting maize crops to the production of ethanol and other biofuels. The effects of ramped-up U.S. ethanol production—which President Bush called for as part of an initiative to make the United States “energy independent”—was highlighted in a 2007 Foreign Affairs article by C. Ford Runge and Benjamin Senauer. Runge and Senauer write that the push to increase ethanol production has spawned ethanol subsidies in many countries, not just the United States. Brazil, they note, produced 45.2 percent of the world’s ethanol in 2005 (from sugar cane), and the United States 44.5 percent (from corn). Europe also produces biodiesel, mostly from oilseeds. In all cases, the result is the diversion of food products from global food markets, accentuating demand, pinching supply, and pushing up prices. Joachim von Braun, the director general of IFPRI, writes in an April 2008 briefing (PDF) that 30 percent of all maize produced in the United States (by far the largest maize producer in the world) will be diverted to biofuel production in 2008. This raises prices not only for people buying maize directly, but also for those buying maize products (cornflakes) or meat from livestock that feed on maize (cattle). Speculation. Many analysts point to speculative trading practices as a factor influencing rising food prices. In May 2008 testimony (PDF) before the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Homeland Security, Michael W. Masters, the managing partner of the hedge fund Masters Capital Management, explained the dynamic. Masters says institutional investors like hedge funds and pension funds started pouring money into commodities futures markets in the early 2000s, pushing up futures contracts and, in turn, spot prices. Spot traders often use futures markets as a benchmark for what price they are willing to pay, so even if futures contracts are inflated by an external factor like a flood of interest from pension funds, this still tends to result in a bump for spot prices. Still, much debate remains about the extent to which speculation in futures markets in fact pushes up food prices. “In general we [economists] think futures markets are a good reflection of what’s likely to happen in the real future,” says IFPRI’s Orden. Orden acknowledges that more capital has flowed into agricultural commodities markets in recent years, but says that he “tends to think these markets are pretty efficient and that you shouldn’t look for a scapegoat in speculators.” Supply Even as demand for agricultural products has risen, several factors have pinched global supply. These include: Development/urbanization. During the past half decade, global economic growth has featured expansion throughout emerging markets, even as developed economies in the United States, Europe, and Japan have cooled. The economies of China, India, Russia, numerous countries in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, and a handful of achievers in the Middle East and Africa have experienced strong economic growth rates. This is particularly true in Asian cities, where industrial and service sector development has clustered. The result has often been a boost for per capita earnings but a drag on domestic agriculture, as discussed in this backgrounder on African agriculture. Farmland has in many cases been repurposed for urban or industrial development projects. Governments have not, typically, been as eager to invest in modernizing farm equipment or irrigation techniques as they have been to sink money into urban development. All this has put an increased burden on developing-world farmers, precisely as they dwindle in number and supply capacity. Production capacity in other parts of the world has increased by leaps and bounds as efficiency has increased, and, as previously noted, total global production exceeds global demand. But urbanization opens markets up to other factors—transportation costs and risks, for instance, which are particularly high in less accessible parts of the developing world—and prevent the smooth functioning of trade, even where there are willing buyers and sellers. Weather. Some of the factors leading to recent price increases have been weather-related factors that tightened supply in specific markets. In 2008, for instance, two major weather events worked in concert to squeeze Asian rice production—Cyclone Nargis, which led to massive flooding and the destruction of rice harvests in Myanmar; and a major drought in parts of Australia. Estimates indicate Myanmar’s flooding instantly destroyed a substantial portion of Myanmar’s harvest, limiting the country’s ability to export rice. Meanwhile, Australia’s drought wiped out 98 percent of the country’s rice harvest in 2008, forcing Canberra to turn to imports and further straining Asia’s rice market. Trade policy. Agricultural trade barriers have long been faulted for gumming up trade negotiations, including the Doha round of World Trade Organization talks. But in the midst of the recent food pinch, a different kind of trade barrier has emerged as a problem—export bans. As discussed before (in the instance of the Philippines meeting difficulty in its efforts to import rice), several exporters have tightened the reins in light of domestic supply concerns. According to the UN’s World Food Program, over forty countries have imposed some form of export ban in an effort to increase domestic food security. India, for instance, imposed bans on exporting some forms of rice and oil in June 2008—a move that took food off the market, led to stockpiling, and brought a spike in prices. China, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia, among other countries, have introduced similar bans. The distorting effects of these barriers are particularly troubling in the developing world, where a much larger percentage of average household income is spent on food. The African Development Bank warned in May 2008 that similar moves among African countries could rapidly exacerbate food concerns on the African continent. A group of West African countries, meanwhile, sought to mitigate the negative effects of export bans by exempting one another. Food aid policy and other policies. Experts say flaws in food aid policies have limited its effectiveness and in some cases exacerbated price pressures on food. CFR Senior Fellow Laurie Garrett discusses some of these factors in a recent working paper. Garrett cites illogical aid policies such as grants for irrigation and mechanization of crop production that the Asian Development Bank plans to give to Bangladesh, a densely populated country without “a spare millimeter of arable land.” Garrett also criticizes food aid policies (U.S. aid policies are one example) that mandate food aid to be doled out in the form of crops grown by U.S. farmers, rather than cash. The rub, she says, is that food grown in the United States is far more expensive, both to produce and to transport, than food grown in recipient countries. Such a policy guarantees that the dollar value of donations goes much less far than it would if aid were directed to funds that could be spent in local markets. Other experts note additional policies that limit supply. In a recent interview with CFR.org, Paul Collier, an economics professor at Oxford University, cites European bans on genetically modified crops as a prime example.
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<h4>Multiple alternate causes to food prices –energy prices, depreciation of the dollar, population trends, ethanol, urbanization, and export bans </h4><p><strong>Teslik 08</strong> – Assistant Editor at Council on Foreign Relations (Lee Hudson, “Food Prices”, 6/30/2008, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16662/food_prices.html) </p><p>Before considering factors like supply and demand within food markets, it is important to understand the umbrella factors influencing costs of production and, even more broadly, the currencies with which and economies within which food is traded. Energy Prices. <u>Rising energy prices have direct causal implications for the food market. Fuel is used in several aspects of the agricultural production process, including fertilization, processing, and transportation</u>. The percentage of total agricultural input expenditures directed toward energy costs has risen significantly in recent years. A briefing from the U.S. Department of Agriculture notes that the U.S. agricultural industry’s total expenditures on fuel and oil are forecast to rise 12.6 percent in 2008, following a rise of 11.5 percent in 2007. <u>These costs are typically passed along to customers and are reflected in global spot prices</u> (i.e. the current price a commodity trades for at market). The input costs of electricity have also risen, furthering the burden. Though it isn’t itself an energy product, fertilizer is an energy-intensive expense, particularly when substantial transport costs are borne by local farmers—so that expense, too, is reflected in the final price of foodstuffs. (Beyond direct causation, energy prices are also correlated to food prices, in the sense that many of the same factors pushing up energy prices—population trends, for instance, or market speculation—also affect food prices.) Currencies/Inflation. When food is traded internationally—particularly on commodities exchanges or futures markets—it is often denominated in U.S. dollars. In recent years, <u>the valuation of the dollar has fallen with respect to many other major world currencies</u>. This means that even if <u>food prices</u> stayed steady with respect to a basket of currencies, their price <u>in dollars would have risen</u>. Of course, food prices have not stayed steady—they have risen across the board—but if you examine international food prices in dollar terms, it is worth noting that the decline of the dollar accentuates any apparent price increase. Demand Demand for most kinds of food has risen in the past decade. This trend can be attributed to several factors: Population trends. The world’s population has grown a little more than 12 percent in the past decade. Virtually nobody argues that this trend alone accounts for rising food prices—agricultural production has, in many cases, become more efficient, offsetting the needs of a larger population—and some analysts say population growth hasn’t had any impact whatsoever on food prices. The shortcomings of a Malthusian food-price argument are most obvious in the very recent past. Richard Posner, a professor of law and economics at the University of Chicago, argues this point on his blog. He notes that in 2007 the food price index used by the FAO rose 40 percent, as compared to 9 percent in 2006—clearly a much faster rate than global population growth for that year, which measured a little over 1 percent. Nonetheless, <u>experts say population trends, distinct from sheer growth rates, have had a major impact on food prices</u>. For instance, <u>the past decade has seen the rapid growth of a global middle class. This</u>, Posner says, <u>has led to changing tastes</u>, and increasing demand for food that is less efficient to produce. Specifically, he cites an increased demand for meats. <u>Livestock require farmland for grazing</u> (land that could be used to grow other food), <u>and also compete directly with humans for food resources</u> like maize. The production of one serving of meat, economists say, is vastly less efficient than the production of one serving of corn or rice. Biofuels. Experts say <u>government policies that provide incentives for farmers to use crops to produce energy</u>, rather than food, <u>have exacerbated food shortages</u>. Specifically, many economists fault U.S. policies diverting maize crops to the production of ethanol and other biofuels. <u>The effects of ramped-up U.S. ethanol production</u>—which President Bush called for as part of an initiative to make the United States “energy independent”—was highlighted in a 2007 Foreign Affairs article by C. Ford Runge and Benjamin Senauer. Runge and Senauer write that the push to increase ethanol production <u>has spawned ethanol subsidies in many countries</u>, not just the United States. Brazil, they note, produced 45.2 percent of the world’s ethanol in 2005 (from sugar cane), and the United States 44.5 percent (from corn). Europe also produces biodiesel, mostly from oilseeds. In all cases, the result is the diversion of food products from global food markets, accentuating demand, pinching supply, and pushing up prices. Joachim von Braun, the director general of IFPRI, writes in an April 2008 briefing (PDF) that 30 percent of all maize produced in the United States (by far the largest maize producer in the world) will be diverted to biofuel production in 2008. This raises prices not only for people buying maize directly, but also for those buying maize products (cornflakes) or meat from livestock that feed on maize (cattle). Speculation. Many analysts point to <u>speculative trading practices</u> as a factor influencing rising food prices. In May 2008 testimony (PDF) before the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Homeland Security, Michael W. Masters, the managing partner of the hedge fund Masters Capital Management, explained the dynamic. Masters says institutional investors like hedge funds and pension funds started pouring money into commodities futures markets in the early 2000s, <u>push</u>ing <u>up</u> futures contracts and, in turn, <u>spot prices</u>. Spot traders often use futures markets as a benchmark for what price they are willing to pay, so even if futures contracts are inflated by an external factor like a flood of interest from pension funds, this still tends to result in a bump for spot prices. Still, much debate remains about the extent to which speculation in futures markets in fact pushes up food prices. “In general we [economists] think futures markets are a good reflection of what’s likely to happen in the real future,” says IFPRI’s Orden. Orden acknowledges that more capital has flowed into agricultural commodities markets in recent years, but says that he “tends to think these markets are pretty efficient and that you shouldn’t look for a scapegoat in speculators.” Supply <u>Even as demand for agricultural products has risen, several factors have pinched global supply</u>. These include: Development/urbanization. During the past half decade, <u>global economic growth has featured expansion throughout</u> emerging markets, even as developed economies in the United States, Europe, and Japan have cooled. The economies of China, India, Russia, numerous countries in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, and a handful of achievers in the Middle East and Africa have experienced strong economic growth rates. This is particularly true in Asian cities, where <u>industrial and service sector development</u> has clustered. <u>The result has often been a boost for per capita earnings but a drag on domestic agriculture</u>, as discussed in this backgrounder on African agriculture. <u>Farmland has in many cases been repurposed for urban or industrial development projects</u>. Governments have not, typically, been as eager to invest in modernizing farm equipment or irrigation techniques as they have been to sink money into urban development. <u>All this has put an increased burden on developing-world farmers, precisely as they dwindle in number and supply capacity</u>. Production capacity in other parts of the world has increased by leaps and bounds as efficiency has increased, and, as previously noted, total global production exceeds global demand. But <u>urbanization opens markets up to other factors—transportation costs and risks</u>, for instance, which are particularly high in less accessible parts of the developing world—<u>and prevent the smooth functioning of trade</u>, even where there are willing buyers and sellers. Weather. Some of the factors leading to recent price increases have been <u>weather-related factors</u> that <u>tighten</u>ed <u>supply</u> in specific markets. In 2008, for instance, two major weather events worked in concert to squeeze Asian rice production—Cyclone Nargis, which led to massive flooding and the destruction of rice harvests in Myanmar; and a major drought in parts of Australia. Estimates indicate Myanmar’s flooding instantly destroyed a substantial portion of Myanmar’s harvest, limiting the country’s ability to export rice. Meanwhile, Australia’s drought wiped out 98 percent of the country’s rice harvest in 2008, forcing Canberra to turn to imports and further straining Asia’s rice market. Trade policy. <u>Agricultural trade barriers have long been faulted for gumming up trade negotiations</u>, including the Doha round of World Trade Organization talks. But in the midst of the recent food pinch, a different kind of trade barrier has emerged as a problem—<u>export bans</u>. As discussed before (in the instance of the Philippines meeting difficulty in its efforts to import rice), several exporters have tightened the reins in light of domestic supply concerns. According to the UN’s World Food Program, over forty countries have imposed some form of export ban in an effort to increase domestic food security. India, for instance, imposed bans on exporting some forms of rice and oil in June 2008—a move that <u>took food off the market, led to stockpiling, and brought a spike in prices</u>. China, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia, among other countries, have introduced similar bans. The distorting effects of these barriers are particularly troubling in the developing world, where a much larger percentage of average household income is spent on food. The African Development Bank warned in May 2008 that similar moves among African countries could rapidly exacerbate food concerns on the African continent. A group of West African countries, meanwhile, sought to mitigate the negative effects of export bans by exempting one another. Food aid policy and other policies. Experts say <u>flaws in food aid policies have limited its effectiveness and</u> in some cases <u>exacerbated price pressures on food</u>. CFR Senior Fellow Laurie Garrett discusses some of these factors in a recent working paper. Garrett cites illogical aid policies such as grants for irrigation and mechanization of crop production that the Asian Development Bank plans to give to Bangladesh, a densely populated country without “a spare millimeter of arable land.” Garrett also criticizes food aid policies (U.S. aid policies are one example) that mandate food aid to be doled out in the form of crops grown by U.S. farmers, rather than cash. The rub, she says, is that <u>food grown in the United States is far more expensive, both to produce and to transport, than food grown in recipient countries. Such a policy guarantees that the dollar value of donations goes much less far than it would if aid were directed to funds that could be spent in local markets</u>. Other experts note additional policies that limit supply. In a recent interview with CFR.org, Paul Collier, an economics professor at Oxford University, cites European bans on genetically modified crops as a prime example. </p>
| null |
1nc
|
treaties
| 239,636 | 11 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
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Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,371 |
Obama can sustain a veto of Iran sanctions now- but it’s close- PC’s key
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Politico 12/29
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Politico 12/29/2014 (GOP to move on Iran sanctions legislation, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/gop-senate-iran-sanctions-bill-113852.html)
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Republicans are setting up early challenges to Obama preparing to move forward quickly on Iran The Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next year taking a confrontational stance toward Iran appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority. You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the Kirk-Menendez legislation in 2014, though Obama convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off legislation could upset ongoing negotiations While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress aides declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. the largest challenge is building veto-proof support that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House. Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP Kirk expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate.”
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Republicans are setting up early challenges o bama Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next yea taking a confrontational stance toward Iran appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority Kirk-Menendez Obama’s convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off legislation could upset ongoing negotiations. the largest challenge is building veto-proof support Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task, given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP
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Congressional Republicans are setting up early challenges to President Barack Obama in January, preparing to move forward quickly on new Iran sanctions legislation following on the heels of a vote on a bill approving the Keystone XL Pipeline. The Republican-controlled Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next year, according to Republican senators and aides. The starting point would be a bill written a year ago by Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) that managed to accrue the support of 60 senators in both parties despite opposition from the White House. Kirk and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) said over the weekend that an Iran vote could occur in January after a vote on Keystone, which is the first bill the Republican Senate will take up and is also opposed by President Barack Obama. Republican leaders have not yet finalized their legislative schedule, but the bipartisan Iran proposal is supported by incoming Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and all of his leadership team. And taking a confrontational stance toward Iran as diplomatic negotiations continue with a group of Western nations appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority. “It’s an important issue, a priority, and has wide bipartisan support in the Senate,” said McConnell spokesman Don Stewart on Monday. The Republican House overwhelmingly passed a sanctions bill targeting Iran’s energy industry in 2013, though that legislation was never taken up by the Senate. The Kirk-Menendez legislation would tighten economic sanctions on Iran if the country walks away from ongoing negotiations over nuclear enrichment or reneges on an interim agreement that has frozen some of Iran’s nuclear activities in return for unwinding some sanctions. In November, Western and Iranians negotiators extended that interim deal until July as they attempt to hammer out a permanent deal that would curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions and relax sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy and isolated the country globally. A separate bill written by Graham and incoming Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) would require Congress to approve of any final deal and could figure into the GOP’s plans next year. “You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran. You will see a Congress making sure that sanctions are real and will be reimposed at the drop of a hat. You will see a Congress wanting to have any say about a final deal,” Graham said at a weekend press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the Kirk-Menendez legislation in 2014, though President Barack Obama’s administration convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off public support after warning that voting on that legislation could upset ongoing negotiations. While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress, Democratic aides on Monday declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. Indeed, the largest challenge for both supporters of Iran sanctions and the Keystone pipeline is building veto-proof levels of support in Congress that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House. White House press secretary Josh Earnest said in November that new penalties during negotiations would be “counterproductive.” Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task, given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP. But Kirk said on Sunday in an interview with Fox news that he expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate.”
| 3,916 |
<h4><strong>Obama can sustain a veto of Iran sanctions now- but it’s close- PC’s key</h4><p>Politico 12/29</strong>/2014 (GOP to move on Iran sanctions legislation, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/gop-senate-iran-sanctions-bill-113852.html)</p><p>Congressional <u><mark>Republicans are setting up early challenges</mark> t<mark>o</u></mark> President Barack <u>O<mark>bama</u></mark> in January, <u>preparing to move forward quickly on</u> new <u>Iran</u> sanctions legislation following on the heels of a vote on a bill approving the Keystone XL Pipeline. <u>The</u> Republican-controlled <u><mark>Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next yea</mark>r</u>, according to Republican senators and aides. The starting point would be a bill written a year ago by Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) that managed to accrue the support of 60 senators in both parties despite opposition from the White House. Kirk and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) said over the weekend that an Iran vote could occur in January after a vote on Keystone, which is the first bill the Republican Senate will take up and is also opposed by President Barack Obama. Republican leaders have not yet finalized their legislative schedule, but the bipartisan Iran proposal is supported by incoming Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and all of his leadership team. And <u><mark>taking a confrontational stance toward Iran</u></mark> as diplomatic negotiations continue with a group of Western nations <u><mark>appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority</mark>. </u>“It’s an important issue, a priority, and has wide bipartisan support in the Senate,” said McConnell spokesman Don Stewart on Monday. The Republican House overwhelmingly passed a sanctions bill targeting Iran’s energy industry in 2013, though that legislation was never taken up by the Senate. The Kirk-Menendez legislation would tighten economic sanctions on Iran if the country walks away from ongoing negotiations over nuclear enrichment or reneges on an interim agreement that has frozen some of Iran’s nuclear activities in return for unwinding some sanctions. In November, Western and Iranians negotiators extended that interim deal until July as they attempt to hammer out a permanent deal that would curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions and relax sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy and isolated the country globally. A separate bill written by Graham and incoming Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) would require Congress to approve of any final deal and could figure into the GOP’s plans next year. “<u>You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran</u>. You will see a Congress making sure that sanctions are real and will be reimposed at the drop of a hat. You will see a Congress wanting to have any say about a final deal,” Graham said at a weekend press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. <u>A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the <mark>Kirk-Menendez</mark> legislation in 2014, though </u>President Barack <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong>’s</mark> administration <u><strong><mark>convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off</u></strong></mark> public support after warning that voting on that <u><strong><mark>legislation could upset ongoing negotiations</u></strong>.</mark> <u>While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress</u>, Democratic <u>aides</u> on Monday <u>declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. </u>Indeed, <u><strong><mark>the largest challenge</u></strong></mark> for both supporters of Iran sanctions and the Keystone pipeline <u><strong><mark>is building veto-proof</u></strong></mark> levels of <u><strong><mark>support</u></strong></mark> in Congress <u>that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House.</u> White House press secretary Josh Earnest said in November that new penalties during negotiations would be “counterproductive.” <u><mark>Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a <strong>steep task</u></strong>,</mark> <u><mark>given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP</u></mark>. But <u>Kirk</u> said on Sunday in an interview with Fox news that he <u>expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate<strong>.”</p></u></strong>
|
1nr
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Strikes
|
UQ
| 430,411 | 46 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
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Navy
|
Quarters
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Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
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Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
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Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,372 |
1. Legalize means removal of all restrictions
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Woods 11
|
Woods 11 Jordan Blair Woods, Ph.D. candidate in Criminology, University of Cambridge, expected 2013; M.Phil., University of Cambridge, 2010; J.D., UCLA School of Law, 2009; A.B., Harvard University, 2006. University of the District of Columbia Law Review Fall, 2011 15 UDC-DCSL L. Rev. 1 ARTICLE: A DECADE AFTER DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION: WHAT CAN THE UNITED STATES LEARN FROM THE PORTUGUESE MODEL? lexis
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("'Legalization' means that there are no prohibitions of any kind under the law on drug manufacturing, sales, possession, or usage."); ("Legalization is defined as the complete removal of sanctions, making a certain behaviour legal and applying no criminal or administrative penalty.").
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Legalizatio means no prohibitions of any kind on drug sales
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n30. See Greenwald, supra note 21, at 2 ("'Legalization' - which no EU state has yet adopted - means that there are no prohibitions of any kind under the law on drug manufacturing, sales, possession, or usage."); Hughes & Stevens, supra note 24, at 999 ("Legalization is defined as the complete removal of sanctions, making a certain behaviour legal and applying no criminal or administrative penalty.").
| 404 |
<h4><strong>1. Legalize means removal of all restrictions</h4><p>Woods 11</strong> Jordan Blair Woods, Ph.D. candidate in Criminology, University of Cambridge, expected 2013; M.Phil., University of Cambridge, 2010; J.D., UCLA School of Law, 2009; A.B., Harvard University, 2006. University of the District of Columbia Law Review Fall, 2011 15 UDC-DCSL L. Rev. 1 ARTICLE: A DECADE AFTER DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION: WHAT CAN THE UNITED STATES LEARN FROM THE PORTUGUESE MODEL? lexis</p><p>n30. See Greenwald, supra note 21, at 2 <u>("'<mark>Legalizatio</mark>n'</u> - which no EU state has yet adopted - <u><mark>means</mark> that there are <mark>no prohibitions of any kind</mark> under the law <mark>on drug</mark> manufacturing, <mark>sales</mark>, possession, or usage.");</u> Hughes & Stevens, supra note 24, at 999 <u>("Legalization is defined as the complete removal of sanctions, making a certain behaviour legal and applying no criminal or administrative penalty.").</u><strong> </p></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
4
| 430,509 | 7 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,373 |
war is a form of structural violence – turns Scheper Hughes
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>war is a form of structural violence – turns Scheper<strong> Hughes</h4></strong>
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1nc
| null |
advantage
| 431,018 | 1 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,374 |
The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market
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Hughes 9
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Hughes 9 J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.
|
U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid
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A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. banning organ sales. illegality of the trade is insufficient to discourage many faced with the possibility of dying on an waiting list transplant tourism" has become its own industry S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, under don't ask, don't tell" policy The lack of regulated organ marketplace in the U.S resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world .S. policy have produced immoral and unethical consequences
|
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351
Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models
U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global black market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales. n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid. n92
| 2,620 |
<h4>The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market</h4><p><strong>Hughes 9</strong> J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.</p><p>Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351</p><p>Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models</p><p><u>U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. <mark>A</mark> <mark>thriving global</u></mark> black <u><mark>market in human organs has resulted from U.S.</mark> policy <mark>banning organ sales</u>.</mark> n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 <u>The <mark>illegality of the</mark> organ <mark>trade is insufficient to</mark> <mark>discourage many </mark>of those <mark>faced with the possibility of dying on an</mark> organ <mark>waiting list</mark>, and "<mark>transplant tourism" has become its own industry</mark>.</u> n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 <u>U.<mark>S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too,</mark> often <mark>under</mark> hospitals' "<mark>don't ask, don't tell" policy</mark> regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related</u>. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 <u><mark>The lack of</mark> a <mark>regulated organ marketplace in the U.S</mark>. has <mark>resulted in</mark> <mark>exploitation of the poor throughout the world</mark>.</u> n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 <u>In short, U<mark>.S. policy</mark> and its ban on organ sales <mark>have produced</mark> some of the same <mark>immoral and unethical consequences</mark> the ban was designed to avoid</u>. n92</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 Illicit market
| 430,256 | 14 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,375 |
Legalization in advance of treaty revision causes treaty withdrawal – only the CP alone maintains compliance
|
Donohue et al 2010
|
Donohue et al 2010 (C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford, John, “Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy” http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12096)
|
Another complication for legalization is international law the Single Convention binds all UN member nations to maintain prohibition of drugs, including cannabis specifically While the Single Convention requires that countries maintain prohibition it does not require a punitive regime reforms working within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require either a country’s withdrawal or revision due to the Single Convention even countries with more liberal narcotics policies lack full- fledged drug legalization in the Netherlands the importation and commercial production of cannabis remains illegal
|
the Single Convention binds nations to prohibition including cannabis specifically While the Convention requires prohibition it does not require a punitive regime reforms within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require withdrawal even countries with more liberal narcotics policies lack full- fledged legalization in the Netherlands importation and commercial production remains illegal
|
International Law. Another complication for legalization is international law. While many researchers attempt to make international comparisons in studying drugs, one area of drug control policy that receives scant attention is the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 which binds all UN member nations to maintain prohibition of drugs, including cannabis specifically (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 61). While the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs requires that countries maintain prohibition of manufacture, sales, and import, it does not require a punitive regime of the type currently found in the United States. Article 36 of the Single Convention, “Penal Provision,” specifically allows for treatment programs to either enhance or serve as a substitute for punishment.81 The Economist reports that countries like the Netherlands are able to allow for some innovation in controlling marijuana use through the convention’s commentary, which states that its goal is “improvement of the efficacy of national criminal justice systems in the field of drug trafficking” (“A Toker’s Guide” 2009). Thus, reforms working within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require either a country’s withdrawal from the treaty or revision thereof. Perhaps partly due to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, even countries with more liberal narcotics policies than the United States lack full- fledged drug legalization and at most allow for depenalization of marijuana and/ or widespread needle exchange programs. As discussed above, in the Netherlands, a country long known for its tolerance of marijuana smoking, the importation and commercial production of cannabis remains illegal (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 64). When considering its own drug reform, Portugal declined to adopt outright legalization likely in part because of its treaty obligations under the 1961 Single Convention (Cato Institute 2009).
| 1,974 |
<h4>Legalization <u>in advance</u> of treaty revision causes <u>treaty withdrawal</u> – only the CP alone maintains compliance</h4><p><strong>Donohue et al 2010 </strong> (C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford, John, “Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy” http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12096)</p><p>International Law. <u>Another complication for legalization is international law</u>. While many researchers attempt to make international comparisons in studying drugs, one area of drug control policy that receives scant attention is <u><mark>the</u></mark> United Nations <u><mark>Single Convention</u></mark> on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 which <u><mark>binds</mark> all UN member <mark>nations to</mark> maintain <mark>prohibition</mark> of drugs, <mark>including cannabis specifically</u></mark> (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 61). <u><mark>While the</mark> Single <mark>Convention</u></mark> on Narcotic Drugs <u><strong><mark>requires</mark> that countries maintain <mark>prohibition</mark> </u></strong>of manufacture, sales, and import, <u><strong><mark>it does not require a punitive regime</u></strong></mark> of the type currently found in the United States. Article 36 of the Single Convention, “Penal Provision,” specifically allows for treatment programs to either enhance or serve as a substitute for punishment.81 The Economist reports that countries like the Netherlands are able to allow for some innovation in controlling marijuana use through the convention’s commentary, which states that its goal is “improvement of the efficacy of national criminal justice systems in the field of drug trafficking” (“A Toker’s Guide” 2009). Thus, <u><mark>reforms</mark> working <strong><mark>within the framework of the existing treaty</strong> are possible, though <strong>full- scale legalization</strong> would require</mark> either a country’s <strong><mark>withdrawal</strong></mark> </u>from the treaty<u> <strong>or revision</strong> </u>thereof. Perhaps partly <u>due to the Single Convention </u>on Narcotic Drugs, <u><mark>even countries with more liberal narcotics policies</u></mark> than the United States <u><mark>lack <strong>full- fledged</mark> drug <mark>legalization</u></strong></mark> and at most allow for depenalization of marijuana and/ or widespread needle exchange programs. As discussed above, <u><mark>in the Netherlands</u></mark>, a country long known for its tolerance of marijuana smoking, <u>the <mark>importation and commercial production</mark> of cannabis <strong><mark>remains illegal</u></mark> (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 64). When considering its own drug reform, Portugal declined to adopt outright legalization likely in part because of its treaty obligations under the 1961 Single Convention (Cato Institute 2009).</p></strong>
| null |
2nc
|
treaties
| 430,457 | 62 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,376 |
This is the fight coming first
|
AP 1/18/2014
|
AP 1/18/2014 http://www.journalnow.com/news/nation_world/senator-to-push-for-iran-sanctions/article_f1f0f960-9f74-11e4-ba43-236578136a37.html
|
Graham of South Carolina did say Sunday that he would be willing to set aside his efforts if Obama would submit any agreement with Tehran to Congress for lawmakers to approve or reject An Obama adviser scoffed at the idea as an infringement on presidential authority The new GOP-led Congress has picked an early foreign policy fight with the president, with the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee holding a hearing Tuesday on possible new penalties against Tehran White House adviser Dan Pfeiffer contended that Graham “would like to make all the foreign policy decisions of the United States and be commander in chief. ... It’s the president’s authority The White House will continue to consult with Congress, he said
|
Graham would be willing to set aside his efforts if Obama would submit any agreement for lawmakers to approve An Obama adviser scoffed at the idea as an infringement on presidential authority The new GOP-led Congress has picked an early foreign policy fight with the president, The White House will continue to consult with Congress
|
Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina did say Sunday that he would be willing to set aside his efforts if Obama would submit any agreement with Tehran to Congress for lawmakers to approve or reject. An Obama adviser scoffed at the idea as an infringement on presidential authority. The new GOP-led Congress has picked an early foreign policy fight with the president, with the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee holding a hearing Tuesday on possible new penalties against Tehran. The U.S. and its partners in the negotiations are trying to reach a framework agreement with Iran by March and hoping to complete a longer-term deal by July that would limit Iran ’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon. Iran says its program is for peaceful purposes. Secretary of State John Kerry has stepped up talks with Iran’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif , and they may hold further discussions this week when both are expected to attend the World Economic Forum in Switzerland . The proposed sanctions, which have bipartisan support, would go into effect only if the negotiations fail and the June 30 deadline is not met, according to a congressional aide who spoke on background because the bill has not been finalized. Graham described congressional efforts as signaling to the Iranians that “we would like a political nego tiation , a diplomatic solution. But please understand in Iran that the Congress is intent on reapplying sanctions if you walk away from the negotiating table and if you cheat,” Graham said. “I don’t think that’s a disruptive message.” As an alternative, he said that if Obama “thinks sanctions is disruptive to a good outcome, I’m willing to forgo that vote with the understanding that any deal he negotiates will come to the Congress for our approval or disapproval as a check and balance.” White House adviser Dan Pfeiffer contended that Graham “would like to make all the foreign policy decisions of the United States and be commander in chief. ... It’s the president’s authority.” Pfeiffer added, “It does not make any sense for Congress to scuttle that deal ... because that would put America in a bad place, not just in dealing with Iran but with the world.” The White House will continue to consult with Congress, he said.
| 2,259 |
<h4><strong>This is the fight coming first</h4><p>AP 1/18/2014</strong> http://www.journalnow.com/news/nation_world/senator-to-push-for-iran-sanctions/article_f1f0f960-9f74-11e4-ba43-236578136a37.html</p><p>Sen. Lindsey <u><mark>Graham</mark> of South Carolina did say Sunday that he <mark>would be willing to set aside his efforts if Obama would submit any agreement</mark> with Tehran to Congress <mark>for lawmakers to approve</mark> or reject</u>. <u><strong><mark>An Obama adviser scoffed at the idea</strong> as an infringement on presidential authority</u></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The new GOP-led Congress has picked an early foreign policy fight with the president,</strong></mark> with the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee holding a hearing Tuesday on possible new penalties against Tehran</u>. The U.S. and its partners in the negotiations are trying to reach a framework agreement with Iran by March and hoping to complete a longer-term deal by July that would limit Iran ’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon. Iran says its program is for peaceful purposes. Secretary of State John Kerry has stepped up talks with Iran’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif , and they may hold further discussions this week when both are expected to attend the World Economic Forum in Switzerland . The proposed sanctions, which have bipartisan support, would go into effect only if the negotiations fail and the June 30 deadline is not met, according to a congressional aide who spoke on background because the bill has not been finalized. Graham described congressional efforts as signaling to the Iranians that “we would like a political nego tiation , a diplomatic solution. But please understand in Iran that the Congress is intent on reapplying sanctions if you walk away from the negotiating table and if you cheat,” Graham said. “I don’t think that’s a disruptive message.” As an alternative, he said that if Obama “thinks sanctions is disruptive to a good outcome, I’m willing to forgo that vote with the understanding that any deal he negotiates will come to the Congress for our approval or disapproval as a check and balance.” <u>White House adviser Dan Pfeiffer contended that Graham “would like to make all the foreign policy decisions of the United States and be commander in chief. ... It’s the president’s authority</u>.” Pfeiffer added, “It does not make any sense for Congress to scuttle that deal ... because that would put America in a bad place, not just in dealing with Iran but with the world.” <u><mark>The White House will continue to consult with Congress</mark>, he said</u><strong>.</p></strong>
|
1nr
|
Strikes
|
Top of Agenda
| 431,019 | 1 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,377 |
2. nearly all is close to 100%
|
Foley 98
|
Foley 98 JACK FOLEY, Mercury News Staff Writer September 21, 1998 San Jose Mercury News
|
Sixty percent does not come close
Unz said. `` `Nearly all' could mean 98 99 or even 97 percent, but it does not mean 60 percent.
|
Nearly all' could mean 98 or even 97 percent, but it does not mean 60 percent
|
Unz: District Violates Law-Bilingual education dispute crops up in Gilroy.
http://www.languagepolicy.net/archives/SJMN47.htm
Gilroy schools are violating Proposition 227, said the law's author, which means school board members and the superintendent could be sued for damages by parents.
Trustees voted unanimously in August to teach non-English-speaking students 60 percent in English and 40 percent in Spanish as they phased out bilingual programs to comply with the new law.
But Proposition 227 author Ron Unz said Friday that the law's actual wording stipulates that classroom instruction for non-English-speaking students -- those enrolled in ``sheltered English immersion'' programs -- must be conducted ``nearly all'' in English.
Sixty percent does not come close to complying, Unz said Friday when told of the Gilroy policy. He said his office had received calls from parents asking about it.
``It's completely illegal,'' Unz said. `` `Nearly all' could mean 98 percent or 99 percent or even 97 percent, but it does not mean 60 percent. The law is very clear and the district seems to be ignoring the law.''
| 1,115 |
<h4><strong>2. nearly all is close to 100%</h4><p>Foley 98</strong> JACK FOLEY, Mercury News Staff Writer<strong> </strong>September 21, 1998 San Jose Mercury News </p><p>Unz: District Violates Law-Bilingual education dispute crops up in Gilroy.</p><p>http://www.languagepolicy.net/archives/SJMN47.htm</p><p>Gilroy schools are violating Proposition 227, said the law's author, which means school board members and the superintendent could be sued for damages by parents.</p><p>Trustees voted unanimously in August to teach non-English-speaking students 60 percent in English and 40 percent in Spanish as they phased out bilingual programs to comply with the new law.</p><p>But Proposition 227 author Ron Unz said Friday that the law's actual wording stipulates that classroom instruction for non-English-speaking students -- those enrolled in ``sheltered English immersion'' programs -- must be conducted ``nearly all'' in English.</p><p><u>Sixty percent does not come close </u>to complying, Unz said Friday when told of the Gilroy policy. He said his office had received calls from parents asking about it.</p><p>``It's completely illegal,'' <u>Unz said. ``<strong> `<mark>Nearly all' could mean 98</mark> </u></strong>percent or<u><strong> 99 </u></strong>percent<u><strong> <mark>or even 97 percent, but it does not mean 60 percent</mark>.</u> The law is very clear and the district seems to be ignoring the law.''</p></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
4
| 430,510 | 11 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,378 |
Trafficking is increasing now—global legislation is ineffective—most recent trends prove
|
Da Silva and Frontera 15
|
Da Silva and Frontera 15 (Ivan Rocha Ferreira Da Silva, MD1; Jennifer A. Frontera, MD2 Neurocritical Care Unit and Stroke Department, Hospital Copa D’Or, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 2Cerebrovascular Center of the Neurological Institute, Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland, Ohio “Worldwide Barriers to Organ Donation” JAMA Neurol. 2015;72(1):112-118. doi:10.1001/jamaneurol.2014.3083. http://archneur.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=1934718)
|
Globally, legislation guiding organ transplant varies widely. Only 20% of African nations report having a transplant organ coordinating structure Even fewer countries have a mechanism for collection and analysis of data related to donation, donor safety, and transplantation activities transplants are performed despite a lack of legislation promulgate illegal transplantation and organ trafficking Even in countries that have legislation regulating organ trafficking there is weak enforcement and few international regulations that can effectively police the problem illicit organ trade generates 1.2 billion per yea this market is fueled not only by profit but also by long waiting lists for organs A growing number of countries report patients have traveled to countries to buy organs on the black (illicit) market known as transplant tourism. American citizens received foreign transplants in 35 countries, led by China, the Philippines, and India
|
Globally, legislation guiding organ transplant varies widely.1 Only 20% of African nations report having a coordinating structure Even fewer have a mechanism for c analysis of data related to transplantation activities transplants are performed despite a lack of legislation promulgate organ trafficking Even in countries that have legislation regulating organ trafficking, there is weak enforcement illicit organ trade generate 1.2 billion per year this market is fueled not only by profit but also by long waiting lists for organs growing number report patients traveled to buy organs on the illicit) market American citizens received f transplants in 35 countries
|
Globally, legislation guiding organ donation and transplant varies widely.1 Only 20% of African nations report having a transplant and organ donation coordinating structure, while 95% of countries in the Americas have such a system in place. Even fewer countries have a mechanism for collection and analysis of data related to donation, donor safety, and transplantation activities. Some countries report that liver and/or kidney transplants are performed despite a lack of legislation. Such lack of oversight may promulgate illegal transplantation and organ trafficking. Even in countries that have legislation regulating organ trafficking, there is weak enforcement and few international regulations that can effectively police the problem.43 A recent report by Global Financial Integrity estimates that the illicit organ trade generates illegal profits between $600 million and $1.2 billion per year.44 It is hypothesized that this market is fueled not only by profit but also by cultural and religious barriers to organ donation and transplantation in some countries, long waiting lists for organs, precarious infrastructure for transplants in the country of origin, and difficult access to chronic life support (in the case of renal replacement therapy).45 A growing number of countries report that patients have allegedly traveled to countries to buy organs on the black (illicit) market, a practice known as transplant tourism. The World Health Organization estimates that 5% to 10% of kidney transplants worldwide occur as a result of commercial transactions.46,47 A study of American citizens who received organ transplants abroad showed that roughly 90% were kidney transplants and that male sex, Asian race, resident and nonresident alien status, and college education were significantly and independently associated with foreign transplant.48 In 2006, patients from 34 states, plus the District of Columbia, received foreign transplants in 35 countries, led by China, the Philippines, and India.48
| 2,009 |
<h4>Trafficking is increasing now—global legislation is <u>ineffective</u>—most recent <u>trends</u> prove</h4><p><strong>Da Silva and Frontera 15 </strong>(Ivan Rocha Ferreira Da Silva, MD1; Jennifer A. Frontera, MD2 Neurocritical Care Unit and Stroke Department, Hospital Copa D’Or, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 2Cerebrovascular Center of the Neurological Institute, Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland, Ohio “Worldwide Barriers to Organ Donation” JAMA Neurol. 2015;72(1):112-118. doi:10.1001/jamaneurol.2014.3083. http://archneur.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=1934718)</p><p><u><mark>Globally, legislation guiding organ</mark> </u>donation and <u><mark>transplant <strong>varies widely.</u></strong>1 <u>Only <strong>20% of African nations</strong> report having a</mark> transplant</u> and <u>organ</u> donation <u><mark>coordinating structure</u></mark>, while 95% of countries in the Americas have such a system in place. <u><mark>Even</u> <u>fewer</mark> countries <mark>have a mechanism for c</mark>ollection and <mark>analysis of data related to</mark> donation, donor safety, and <mark>transplantation activities</u></mark>. Some countries report that liver and/or kidney <u><mark>transplants are performed despite a lack of legislation</u></mark>. Such lack of oversight may <u><mark>promulgate</mark> <strong>illegal transplantation and <mark>organ trafficking</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Even in countries that have legislation regulating organ trafficking</u>, <u>there is <strong>weak enforcement</strong></mark> and few international regulations</u> <u>that can effectively police the problem</u>.43 A recent report by Global Financial Integrity estimates that the <u><mark>illicit organ trade generate</mark>s</u> illegal profits between $600 million and $<u><strong><mark>1.2 billion</strong> per yea</u>r</mark>.44 It is hypothesized that <u><mark>this</u> <u>market is fueled not only by profit but also by</u></mark> cultural and religious barriers to organ donation and transplantation in some countries, <u><mark>long waiting lists for organs</u></mark>, precarious infrastructure for transplants in the country of origin, and difficult access to chronic life support (in the case of renal replacement therapy).45 <u>A <strong><mark>growing number</strong></mark> of countries</u> <u><mark>report</u></mark> that <u><mark>patients</u></mark> <u>have</u> allegedly <u><mark>traveled</mark> to countries <mark>to buy organs on the</mark> black (<mark>illicit) market</u></mark>, a practice <u>known as transplant tourism.</u> The World Health Organization estimates that 5% to 10% of kidney transplants worldwide occur as a result of commercial transactions.46,47 A study of <u><mark>American citizens</u></mark> who received organ transplants abroad showed that roughly 90% were kidney transplants and that male sex, Asian race, resident and nonresident alien status, and college education were significantly and independently associated with foreign transplant.48 In 2006, patients from 34 states, plus the District of Columbia, <u><mark>received f</mark>oreign <mark>transplants in 35 countries</mark>, led by China, the Philippines, and India</u>.48</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 Illicit market
| 430,585 | 4 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,379 |
Must weigh consequences – their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize
|
Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University 2
|
Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University 2
(Jeffrey C, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)
|
unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern suffers from three fatal flaws It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. and it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
|
moral goodness undercuts political responsibility three fatal flaws fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure achievement 2) it fails to see real violence moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences t is the effects of action, rather than the motives that is most significant the pursuit of “good” it is not enough it is important to ask about the effects Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment
|
As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
| 1,802 |
<h4><strong>Must weigh consequences – their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize</h4><p>Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University 2</strong> </p><p>(Jeffrey C, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest<u>)</p><p></u>As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an <u>unyielding concern with <mark>moral goodness undercuts political responsibility</mark>. The concern </u>may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it <u>suffers from <mark>three fatal flaws</u></mark>: (1) <u>It <mark>fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure</mark> the <mark>achievement</mark> of what one intends. </u>Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if <u>such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters;</u> (<mark>2) <u>it fails to see </mark>that in a world of <mark>real violence</mark> and injustice, <mark>moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity</mark> in injustice.</u> This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; <u>and</u> (3) <u>it <mark>fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences</mark> as it is about intentions; i<mark>t is the effects of action, rather than the motives</mark> of action, <mark>that is most significant</mark>.</u> Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, <u>it is often <mark>the pursuit of “good”</mark> that generates evil</u>. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: <u><mark>it is not enough</mark> that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; <mark>it is </mark>equally <mark>important</mark>, always, <mark>to ask about the effects</mark> of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. <mark>Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment<strong></mark>. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.</p></u></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
advantage
| 26,721 | 1,533 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,380 |
Big internal link differential between perceptual violation and outright violation
|
Koplow 13
|
Koplow 13 (David, law professor at Georgetown University, “Indisputable Violations: What Happens When the United States Unambiguously Breaches a Treaty?” http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Koplow_37-1.pdf)
|
putative treaty violations are inconclusive because i aw is frequently contest - able country) adopts a certain interpretation of the treaty. If the issue becomes a cause célèbre , States might “win” or “lose” the debate over its interpretation. But if the matter is truly one on which countries could reasonably disagree, there may not be much embarrassment for a country that has in good faith advanced what subsequently turns out to be only a minority position in most of those instances, the United States at least had some - thing to say. It may have only been a half-baked legal theory, a justi " cation that rested on impressionistic “legitimacy” rather than strict “lawfulness,” or a nuanced rationale that inspired precious little international resonance. But at least U.S. representatives had a story to offer by way of defense, explanation, or mitigation.
|
putative treaty violations are nconclusive becaus contest - able States might “win” or “lose” the debate over its interpretation. But if the matter is truly one on which countries could reasonably disagree, in good faith advanced what turns out to be only a minority position in most of those instances, the United States at least had some - thing to say. It may have only been a half-baked legal theory rather than strict “lawfulness But at least U.S. representatives had a story to offer
|
Debates about putative treaty violations are also often inconclusive because international law, like domestic U.S. law, is frequently contest - able. For example, the rules for demarcating a disputed land or maritime boundary or the interpretation of a World Trade Organization obligation about improper barriers to international trade can be obscure, ambiguous, and debatable. Often, the United States (or any other country) adopts a certain interpretation of the treaty. If the issue becomes a cause célèbre , the United States might “win” or “lose” the debate over its interpretation. But if the matter is truly one on which countries could reasonably disagree, there may not be much embarrassment for a country that has in good faith advanced what subsequently turns out to be only a minority position.¶ We should not overstate this ambivalence—there are plenty of instances in which the United States publicly adopted a legal posture wholly at odds with the mainstream opinion of the world legal commu - nity. ! recent U.S. arguments that waterboarding was not “torture,” for example, or that “extraordinary rendi - tion” was legally permissible, failed the international laugh test. In the 1999 NATO bombing campaign against Serbia to arrest the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, the United States did not have a real legal justi " cation to propound, since it was acting without authoriza - tion from the Security Council and without a self-defense rationale. But the point is that in most of those instances, the United States at least had some - thing to say. It may have only been a half-baked legal theory, a justi " cation that rested on impressionistic “legitimacy” rather than strict “lawfulness,” or a nuanced rationale that inspired precious little international resonance. But at least U.S. representatives had a story to offer by way of defense, explanation, or mitigation.
| 1,886 |
<h4><strong>Big internal link differential between perceptual violation and outright violation</h4><p><u>Koplow 13</strong> (David, law professor at Georgetown University, “Indisputable Violations: What Happens When the United States Unambiguously Breaches a Treaty?” http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Koplow_37-1.pdf)</p><p></u>Debates about <u><mark>putative treaty violations are</u></mark> also often <u>i<mark>nconclusive becaus</mark>e i</u>nternational l<u>aw</u>, like domestic U.S. law, <u>is frequently <mark>contest - able</u></mark>. For example, the rules for demarcating a disputed land or maritime boundary or the interpretation of a World Trade Organization obligation about improper barriers to international trade can be obscure, ambiguous, and debatable. Often, the United States (or any other <u>country) adopts a certain interpretation of the treaty. If the issue becomes a cause célèbre ,</u> the United <u><mark>States might “win” or “lose” the debate over its interpretation. But if the matter is truly one on which countries could reasonably disagree,</mark> there may not be much embarrassment for a country that has <mark>in good faith advanced what</mark> subsequently <mark>turns out to be only a minority position</u></mark>.¶ We should not overstate this ambivalence—there are plenty of instances in which the United States publicly adopted a legal posture wholly at odds with the mainstream opinion of the world legal commu - nity. ! recent U.S. arguments that waterboarding was not “torture,” for example, or that “extraordinary rendi - tion” was legally permissible, failed the international laugh test. In the 1999 NATO bombing campaign against Serbia to arrest the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, the United States did not have a real legal justi " cation to propound, since it was acting without authoriza - tion from the Security Council and without a self-defense rationale. But the point is that <u><mark>in most of those instances, the United States at least had some - thing to say. It may have only been a half-baked legal theory</mark>, a justi " cation that rested on impressionistic “legitimacy” <mark>rather than strict “lawfulness</mark>,” or a nuanced rationale that inspired precious little international resonance. <mark>But at least U.S. representatives had a story to offer<strong></mark> by way of defense, explanation, or mitigation.</p></u></strong>
| null |
2nc
|
treaties
| 430,975 | 17 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,381 |
Vote before State of the Union
|
Jerusalem Post 1/14
|
Jerusalem Post 1/14/2015 (Nuclear talks resume with warnings to Congress over Iran sanctions, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Nuclear-talks-resume-with-warnings-to-Congress-over-Iran-sanctions-387753)
|
aides on Capitol Hill continue to work on the final touches of a bill that would "trigger" new sanctions on Iran Leadership plans to introduce the bill by the president's State of the Union address. a bill from Congress could "very well lead to a breakdown in these negotiations."
|
Leadership plans to introduce the bill by the president's State of the Union address bill from Congress could "very well lead to a breakdown in these negotiations."
|
The US, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany seek to end international concerns over the nature of Iran's nuclear program, which many suspect is military in nature. In Washington, however, aides on Capitol Hill continue to work on the final touches of a bill that would "trigger" new sanctions on Iran should talks ultimately fail, or should Tehran violate terms of an interim deal that laid the groundwork for negotiations, formally known as the Joint Plan of Action. Leadership in Congress, now under full Republican control, plans to introduce the bill by the president's State of the Union address. But any bill from Congress regarding new, nuclear-related sanctions on Iran during international talks over its nuclear program will be vetoed by US President Barack Obama, the State Department said this week. "Even with a trigger, if there's a bill that's signed into law, and it is US law, in our mind it is a violation of the Joint Plan of Action— which, as we've said, could encourage Iran to violate it," State Department deputy spokeswoman Marie Harf said on Tuesday. "A sanctions bill, trigger or not, that is passed and signed into law by the president, which we've said we will not do... would be a violation of the JPOA," she continued. If a deal does not come to pass, Harf said, "we could put initial sanctions on Iran in 24 hours." Harf added on Wednesday that a bill from Congress could "very well lead to a breakdown in these negotiations."
| 1,471 |
<h4><strong>Vote before State of the Union</h4><p>Jerusalem Post 1/14<u></strong>/2015 (Nuclear talks resume with warnings to Congress over Iran sanctions, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Nuclear-talks-resume-with-warnings-to-Congress-over-Iran-sanctions-387753)</p><p></u>The US, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany seek to end international concerns over the nature of Iran's nuclear program, which many suspect is military in nature. In Washington, however, <u>aides on Capitol Hill continue to work on the final touches of a bill that would "trigger" new sanctions on Iran</u> should talks ultimately fail, or should Tehran violate terms of an interim deal that laid the groundwork for negotiations, formally known as the Joint Plan of Action. <u><mark>Leadership</u></mark> in Congress, now under full Republican control, <u><strong><mark>plans to introduce the bill by the president's State of the Union address</mark>. </u></strong>But any bill from Congress regarding new, nuclear-related sanctions on Iran during international talks over its nuclear program will be vetoed by US President Barack Obama, the State Department said this week. "Even with a trigger, if there's a bill that's signed into law, and it is US law, in our mind it is a violation of the Joint Plan of Action— which, as we've said, could encourage Iran to violate it," State Department deputy spokeswoman Marie Harf said on Tuesday. "A sanctions bill, trigger or not, that is passed and signed into law by the president, which we've said we will not do... would be a violation of the JPOA," she continued. If a deal does not come to pass, Harf said, "we could put initial sanctions on Iran in 24 hours." Harf added on Wednesday that <u>a <strong><mark>bill from Congress could "very well lead to a breakdown in these negotiations."</p></u></strong></mark>
|
1nr
|
Strikes
|
Top of Agenda
| 430,683 | 5 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,382 |
And that market is widespread and expanding—desperation and profit ensures expansion and exploitation
|
Samadi 2012
|
Samadi 2012 – Vice Chairman of the Department of Urology and Chief of Robotics and Minimally Invasive Surgery at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine (David, May 30, 2012, “Consequences of the rise in illegal organ trafficking,” Fox News, http://www.foxnews.com/health/2012/05/30/consequences-rise-in-illegal-organ-trafficking/,)
|
the WHO released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. Unfortunately the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives with patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs In the majority of situations, those selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations In countries like Pakistan, China or India a person can sell a kidney for $5,000 while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit Prior reports demonstrated that the recipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower statistics might underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable
|
WHO) released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market , in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives, hose selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations. ipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally. the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower
|
Earlier this week, the World Health Organization (WHO) released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market. According to the paper, in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. Organ transplantation is a necessary treatment for many individuals whose organs have failed and has been in practice in the United States since the 1950s. In the U.S. organ donations are regulated by an independent non-for-profit organization, United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). Organs are given to those whose need is the greatest, regardless of wealth or position. Unfortunately, the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply. As of March 2012 over 113,115 patients are currently waiting for an organ to become available. An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation, and the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives, with patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney. According to the WHO report, 76 percent of organs sold were kidneys, reflecting the growing demand secondary to complications of high blood pressure and diabetes. There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs. In the majority of situations, those selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations. In countries like Pakistan, China or India, a person can sell a kidney for $5,000, while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit. Prior reports have also demonstrated that the recipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally. A recent meta-analysis involving 39 original publications revealed that those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV. Furthermore the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower. These statistics might even underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias; those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies. Additionally, given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams. In 2010, a former psychiatrist was sentenced to more than 15 years in prison for offering false promises of organ transplants in the Philippines, while taking over $400,000 dollars from patients. Over five patients actually travelled to the Philippines only to find out that there was no organ awaiting them. One of these patients died in the Philippines. Regretfully, the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable
| 2,662 |
<h4>And that market is widespread and <u>expanding</u>—desperation and profit ensures expansion and exploitation</h4><p><strong>Samadi 2012</strong> – Vice Chairman of the Department of Urology and Chief of Robotics and Minimally Invasive Surgery at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine (David, May 30, 2012, “Consequences of the rise in illegal organ trafficking,” Fox News, http://www.foxnews.com/health/2012/05/30/consequences-rise-in-illegal-organ-trafficking/,)</p><p>Earlier this week, <u>the</u> World Health Organization (<u><mark>WHO</u>) <u>released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market</u></mark>. According to the paper<mark>, <u>in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour.</mark> </u>Organ transplantation is a necessary treatment for many individuals whose organs have failed and has been in practice in the United States since the 1950s. In the U.S. organ donations are regulated by an independent non-for-profit organization, United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). Organs are given to those whose need is the greatest, regardless of wealth or position. <u>Unfortunately</u>, <u>the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply</u>. As of March 2012 over 113,115 patients are currently waiting for an organ to become available. <u><mark>An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ <strong>desperation</u></strong></mark>, and <u><mark>the prospects of <strong>large profits</strong> are creating unfortunate incentives</u>,</mark> <u>with</u> <u>patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney</u>. According to the WHO report, 76 percent of organs sold were kidneys, reflecting the growing demand secondary to complications of high blood pressure and diabetes. <u>There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs</u>. <u>In the majority of situations, t<mark>hose selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations</u>.</mark> <u>In countries like Pakistan, China or India</u>, <u>a person can sell a kidney for $5,000</u>, <u>while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit</u>. <u>Prior reports</u> have also <u>demonstrated that the rec<mark>ipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally</u>.</mark> A recent meta-analysis involving 39 original publications revealed that <u>those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV</u>. Furthermore <u><mark>the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower</u></mark>. These <u>statistics</u> <u>might</u> even <u>underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias</u>; <u>those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies</u>. Additionally, <u>given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams</u>. In 2010, a former psychiatrist was sentenced to more than 15 years in prison for offering false promises of organ transplants in the Philippines, while taking over $400,000 dollars from patients. Over five patients actually travelled to the Philippines only to find out that there was no organ awaiting them. One of these patients died in the Philippines. Regretfully, <u>the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable</u> </p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 Illicit market
| 267,351 | 8 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,383 |
3. In domestic law, United States is both the federal government and the states. Only in international relations is the United States the federal government
|
Oakly 9
|
Oakly 9 American Civil Procedure: A Guide to Civil Adjudication in US Courts, Edited by John Bilyeu Oakley, Professor of Law at the University of California, Davis, and Vikram D. Amar, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs of the School of Law of the University of California at Davis, Kluwer Law International, 2009, page 19
|
Although it is commonplace today to refer to “the United States” as a single entity “the United States” remains in many important ways a collective term. The enduring legal significance of the fifty states that together constitute the United States, and their essential dominion over most legal matters affecting day-to-day life within the United States, vastly complicates any attempt to summarize the civil procedures within the United States. Within the community of nations, the United States is a geopolitical superpower that acts through a federal government granted constitutionally specified and limited powers. The organizing principle of the federal Constitution,1 however, is one of popular sovereignty, with governmental powers distributed in the first instance to republican institutions of government organized autonomously and uniquely in each of the fifty states
|
United States” remains in important ways a collective term. over most legal matters affecting day-to-day life the United States acts through a federal government with powers distribute to republican institutions of government in each of the fifty states
|
Although it is commonplace today to refer to “the United States” as a single entity and as the subject of statements that grammatically employ singular verbs, it is important to remember that “the United States” remains in many important ways a collective term. The enduring legal significance of the fifty states that together constitute the United States, and their essential dominion over most legal matters affecting day-to-day life within the United States, vastly complicates any attempt to summarize the civil procedures within the United States. Within the community of nations, the United States is a geopolitical superpower that acts through a federal government granted constitutionally specified and limited powers. The organizing principle of the federal Constitution,1 however, is one of popular sovereignty, with governmental powers distributed in the first instance to republican institutions of government organized autonomously and uniquely in each of the fifty states. Although there are substantial similarities in the organization of state governments, idiosyncrasies abound.
| 1,096 |
<h4><strong>3. In domestic law, United States is both the federal government and the states. Only in international relations is the United States the federal government</h4><p>Oakly 9</strong> American Civil Procedure: A Guide to Civil Adjudication in US Courts, Edited by John Bilyeu Oakley, Professor of Law at the University of California, Davis, and Vikram D. Amar, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs of the School of Law of the University of California at Davis, Kluwer Law International, 2009, page 19</p><p><u>Although it is commonplace today to refer to “the United States” as a single entity</u> and as the subject of statements that grammatically employ singular verbs, it is important to remember that <u>“the <mark>United States” remains in</mark> many <mark>important ways a</mark> <mark>collective term.</mark> The enduring legal significance of the fifty states that together constitute the United States, and their essential dominion <mark>over</mark> <strong><mark>most legal matters affecting day-to-day life</strong></mark> within the United States, vastly complicates any attempt to summarize the civil procedures within the United States.</u> <u><strong>Within the community of nations,</strong> <mark>the United States</mark> is a <strong>geopolitical</strong> superpower that <mark>acts</mark> <mark>through a federal government</mark> granted constitutionally specified and limited powers. The organizing principle of the federal Constitution,1 however, is one of popular sovereignty, <mark>with</mark> governmental <mark>powers distribute</mark>d in the first instance <mark>to</mark> <mark>republican institutions of government </mark>organized autonomously and uniquely <mark>in each of the fifty states</u><strong></mark>. Although there are substantial similarities in the organization of state governments, idiosyncrasies abound. </p></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
4
| 90,989 | 171 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,384 |
Non enforcement is perceived through a flexible lens – several countries prove
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)
|
existing flexibility in the treaty regime has allowed to deviate from a repressive zero-tolerance drug law enforcement approach Non-enforcement of drug laws in the case of cannabis is the re ality in quite a few countries. Even though the 1961 Convention obliged traditional se to be phased out traditions led to lenient law enforcement practices in a number of states in several countries more formalised schemes of non-enforcement have been established by providing guidelines Many varieties of such decriminalization schemes exist All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypoc risy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits.
|
Non-enforcement of laws i of cannabis is the re ality in quite a few countries traditions led to lenient law enforcement practices in a number of states, in several countries more formalised schemes of non-enforcement have been established Many varieties of such decriminalization schemes exist All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude
|
The existing flexibility or room for manoeuvre in the treaty regime has allowed a variety of cannabis policy practices and re forms to deviate from a repressive zero-tolerance drug law enforcement approach, the legality of which is reviewed in detail in the third chapter. Non-enforcement of drug laws in the case of cannabis, rooted in social acceptance or long history of traditional use, is the re ality in quite a few countries. Even though the 1961 Convention obliged traditional, including religious, use of cannabis to be phased out within 25 years (with the exception of bhang as mentioned above), the widespread persistence of religious uses in Hindu, Sufi and Rastafarian ceremonies and traditions led to lenient law enforcement practices in a number of Indian states, Pakistan, the Middle East, Northern Africa and Ja maica.¶ Depending whether the legal system allows for dis- cretionary powers, in several countries more formalised schemes of non-enforcement have been established by providing guidelines for the police, the prosecution and/or the judiciary. In other countries cannabis consumption and possession for per sonal use are de jure no longer a crimi nal offence. Many varieties of such decriminalization schemes exist, in terms of distin guishing possession or cultivation for personal use from the intent to trade; and whether or not to apply administrative sanctions. Since the treaty requirements do not differentiate be tween possession and cultivation for personal use, first in Spain and more recently in some other countries, “cannabis social clubs” have started to engage in collective cultivation for personal use.¶ The inclusion of cannabis and its compounds in the strictest schedules of the conventions was a rejection of its usefulness for therapeutic pur poses and an effort to limit its use exclusively to research purposes, for which only very small amounts would be required. Today, however, many countries have rejected this position as scientifically untenable and have established legal re gimes recognising the medicinal properties of cannabis.¶ All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, not always ac knowl edged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypoc risy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis so cial clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.
| 3,162 |
<h4><strong>Non enforcement is perceived through a flexible lens – several countries prove </h4><p>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)</p><p>The <u>existing flexibility </u>or room for manoeuvre <u>in the treaty regime has allowed</u> a variety of cannabis policy practices and re forms <u>to deviate from a repressive zero-tolerance drug law enforcement approach</u>, the legality of which is reviewed in detail in the third chapter. <u><mark>Non-enforcement of</mark> drug <mark>laws i</mark>n the case <mark>of cannabis</u></mark>, rooted in social acceptance or long history of traditional use, <u><mark>is the re ality in quite a few countries</mark>. Even though the 1961 Convention obliged traditional</u>, including religious, u<u>se</u> of cannabis <u>to be phased out</u> within 25 years (with the exception of bhang as mentioned above), the widespread persistence of religious uses in Hindu, Sufi and Rastafarian ceremonies and <u><mark>traditions led to lenient law enforcement practices in a number of</mark> </u>Indian<u> <mark>states</u>,</mark> Pakistan, the Middle East, Northern Africa and Ja maica.¶ Depending whether the legal system allows for dis- cretionary powers, <u><mark>in several countries more formalised schemes of non-enforcement have been established</mark> by providing guidelines</u> for the police, the prosecution and/or the judiciary. In other countries cannabis consumption and possession for per sonal use are de jure no longer a crimi nal offence. <u><mark>Many varieties of such decriminalization schemes exist</u></mark>, in terms of distin guishing possession or cultivation for personal use from the intent to trade; and whether or not to apply administrative sanctions. Since the treaty requirements do not differentiate be tween possession and cultivation for personal use, first in Spain and more recently in some other countries, “cannabis social clubs” have started to engage in collective cultivation for personal use.¶ The inclusion of cannabis and its compounds in the strictest schedules of the conventions was a rejection of its usefulness for therapeutic pur poses and an effort to limit its use exclusively to research purposes, for which only very small amounts would be required. Today, however, many countries have rejected this position as scientifically untenable and have established legal re gimes recognising the medicinal properties of cannabis.¶ <u><mark>All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude</mark>. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity,</u> not always ac knowl edged by the INCB. <u>And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypoc risy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. </u>Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis so cial clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.</p>
| null |
2nc
|
treaties
| 430,419 | 39 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,385 |
We’re addressing trafficking now—prosecution rates prove
|
Campbell 13
|
Campbell 13 (Joseph, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Combating Human Trafficking”, 9-23-13, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/combating-human-trafficking)
|
Taken together, USAOs, HTPU, and CEOS initiated a total of 128 federal human trafficking prosecutions in FY 2012, charging 200 defendants 162 defendants engaged predominately in sex trafficking and 38 engaged predominantly in labor trafficking, although several defendants engaged in both During FY 2012, the Department convicted a total of 138 traffickers in cases involving forced labor, sex trafficking of adults, and sex trafficking of children This is in addition to the substantial increase in the number of adult sex trafficking cases prosecuted by the Civil Rights Division and USAOs. the Department and DHS have collaborated with Mexican law enforcement counterparts on the U.S./Mexico Human Trafficking Bilateral Enforcement Initiative, which has contributed significantly to restoring the rights and dignity of human trafficking victims through outreach, interagency coordination, international collaboration, and capacity-building the United States and Mexico have worked as partners to bring high-impact prosecutions under both U.S. and Mexican law to more effectively dismantle human trafficking networks operating across the U.S.-Mexico border, prosecute human traffickers, rescue human trafficking victims, and reunite victims with their families. These efforts have already resulted in three cross-border collaborative prosecutions, involving defendants who have been sentenced in Mexico and the United States to terms of imprisonment of up to 37.5 years, and resulting in the vindication of the rights of dozens of sex trafficking victims.
|
Taken together, USAOs, HTPU, and CEOS initiated a total of 128 prosecutions charging 200 defendants the Department convicted a total of 138 traffickers This is in addition to the substantial increase in the number of adult sex trafficking cases prosecuted the Department and DHS have collaborated with Mexican law enforcement which has contributed significantly to restoring the rights of trafficking victims the U S and Mexico have worked as partners to bring prosecutions under both U.S. and Mexican law to more effectively dismantle human trafficking networks operating across the border These efforts have already resulted in prosecutions, and the vindication of the rights of dozens of trafficking victims
|
The Department’s prosecution efforts are led by two specialized units—the Civil Rights Division’s Human Trafficking Prosecution Unit, and the Criminal Division’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, which provide subject matter expertise and partner with our 94 United States Attorneys’ Offices (USAOs) on prosecutions nationwide. The Civil Rights Division, through its Criminal Section Human Trafficking Prosecution Unit (HTPU), in collaboration with USAOs nationwide, has principal responsibility for prosecuting forced labor and sex trafficking of adults by force, fraud, and coercion, while CEOS provides expertise in child exploitation crimes, including child sex trafficking, and works in collaboration with USAOs to investigate and prosecute cases arising under federal statutes prohibiting the commercial sexual exploitation of children and the extraterritorial sexual abuse of children. Taken together, USAOs, HTPU, and CEOS initiated a total of 128 federal human trafficking prosecutions in FY 2012, charging 200 defendants. Of these, 162 defendants engaged predominately in sex trafficking and 38 engaged predominantly in labor trafficking, although several defendants engaged in both. In FY 2012, the Civil Rights Division, in coordination with USAOs, initiated 55 prosecutions involving forced labor and sex trafficking of adults by force, fraud, or coercion. Of these, 34 were predominantly sex trafficking and 21 were predominantly labor trafficking; several cases involved both. In FY 2012, CEOS, in coordination with USAOs, initiated 18 prosecutions involving the sex trafficking of children and child sex tourism. During FY 2012, the Department convicted a total of 138 traffickers in cases involving forced labor, sex trafficking of adults, and sex trafficking of children. Of these, 105 predominantly involved sex trafficking and 33 predominantly involved labor trafficking, although some cases involved both. The average prison sentence imposed for federal trafficking crimes during FY 2012 was nine years, and terms imposed ranged from probation to life imprisonment. During the reporting period, federal prosecutors secured life sentences against both sex and labor traffickers in four cases, including a sentence of life plus 20 years, the longest sentence ever imposed in a labor trafficking case. Civil Rights Division Since the Department created the HTPU within the Criminal Section of the Civil Rights Division in January 2007, HTPU has played a significant role in coordinating the Department’s human trafficking prosecution programs. HTPU’s mission is to focus the Civil Rights Division’s human trafficking expertise and expand its anti-trafficking enforcement program to increase human trafficking investigations and prosecutions throughout the nation. HTPU works to enhance the Department's investigation and prosecution of significant human trafficking cases, particularly novel, complex, multi-jurisdictional, and multi-agency cases and those involving transnational organized crime and financial crimes. Consistent with increases in trafficking caseloads across the Department, in the past four fiscal years, from 2009 through 2012, the Civil Rights Division and USAOs have brought 94 labor trafficking cases, compared to 43 such cases over the previous four years, an increase of over 118 percent. This is in addition to the substantial increase in the number of adult sex trafficking cases prosecuted by the Civil Rights Division and USAOs. The HTPU, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA), and multiple USAOs have continued to lead the six anti-trafficking coordination teams (ACTeams) in collaboration with the FBI, DHS, and the Department of Labor. Following a competitive, nation-wide selection process, six pilot ACTeams were launched in July 2011 in Los Angeles, California; El Paso, Texas; Kansas City, Missouri; Atlanta, Georgia; Miami, Florida; and Memphis, Tennessee. Since that time, the ACTeams, through enhanced coordination among federal prosecutors and multiple federal investigative agencies, have developed significant human trafficking investigations and prosecutions, including the first multi-district, multi-defendant combined sex trafficking and forced labor case in the Western District of Texas; the first domestic servitude prosecution in the Western District of Missouri; and the first Eastern European forced labor case initiated in the Northern District of Georgia, in addition to numerous other significant investigations and prosecutions. Of particular interest to this committee, the Department and DHS have collaborated with Mexican law enforcement counterparts on the U.S./Mexico Human Trafficking Bilateral Enforcement Initiative, which has contributed significantly to restoring the rights and dignity of human trafficking victims through outreach, interagency coordination, international collaboration, and capacity-building. Through the Initiative, the United States and Mexico have worked as partners to bring high-impact prosecutions under both U.S. and Mexican law to more effectively dismantle human trafficking networks operating across the U.S.-Mexico border, prosecute human traffickers, rescue human trafficking victims, and reunite victims with their families. Significant bilateral cases have been prosecuted in Atlanta, Georgia; Miami, Florida; and New York, New York. To advance the interdisciplinary initiative, the Department and DHS have participated in meetings in both the United States and Mexico to ensure that simultaneous investigations and prosecutions enhance, rather than impede, each other. These efforts have already resulted in three cross-border collaborative prosecutions, involving defendants who have been sentenced in Mexico and the United States to terms of imprisonment of up to 37.5 years, and resulting in the vindication of the rights of dozens of sex trafficking victims. Outreach and training continue to be a large part of the Department’s efforts to combat human trafficking. HTPU attorneys presented numerous in-person trainings as part of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center's State and Local Law Enforcement Training Symposiums. CRT, FBI, and other Department components joined with the Department of State to create an Advanced Human Trafficking Investigator course at the FBI Training Academy in Quantico, Virginia for Central American law enforcement officers. The program has trained investigators from El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama. The Department, DHS, and DOL collaborated to develop and deliver the Advanced Human Trafficking Training Program to the ACTeams, bringing federal agents and federal prosecutors together for an intensive skill-building and strategic planning to enhance their anti-trafficking enforcement efforts.
| 6,790 |
<h4><strong>We’re addressing trafficking now—prosecution rates prove</h4><p>Campbell 13</strong> (Joseph, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Combating Human Trafficking”, 9-23-13, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/combating-human-trafficking)</p><p>The Department’s prosecution efforts are led by two specialized units—the Civil Rights Division’s Human Trafficking Prosecution Unit, and the Criminal Division’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, which provide subject matter expertise and partner with our 94 United States Attorneys’ Offices (USAOs) on prosecutions nationwide. The Civil Rights Division, through its Criminal Section Human Trafficking Prosecution Unit (HTPU), in collaboration with USAOs nationwide, has principal responsibility for prosecuting forced labor and sex trafficking of adults by force, fraud, and coercion, while CEOS provides expertise in child exploitation crimes, including child sex trafficking, and works in collaboration with USAOs to investigate and prosecute cases arising under federal statutes prohibiting the commercial sexual exploitation of children and the extraterritorial sexual abuse of children. <u><mark>Taken together, USAOs, HTPU, and CEOS initiated a total of 128</mark> federal human trafficking <mark>prosecutions</mark> in FY 2012, <strong><mark>charging 200 defendants</u></strong></mark>. Of these, <u>162 defendants engaged predominately in sex trafficking and 38 engaged predominantly in labor trafficking, although several defendants engaged in both</u>. In FY 2012, the Civil Rights Division, in coordination with USAOs, initiated 55 prosecutions involving forced labor and sex trafficking of adults by force, fraud, or coercion. Of these, 34 were predominantly sex trafficking and 21 were predominantly labor trafficking; several cases involved both. In FY 2012, CEOS, in coordination with USAOs, initiated 18 prosecutions involving the sex trafficking of children and child sex tourism. <u>During FY 2012, <mark>the Department convicted a total of 138 traffickers</mark> in cases involving forced labor, sex trafficking of adults, and sex trafficking of children</u>. Of these, 105 predominantly involved sex trafficking and 33 predominantly involved labor trafficking, although some cases involved both. The average prison sentence imposed for federal trafficking crimes during FY 2012 was nine years, and terms imposed ranged from probation to life imprisonment. During the reporting period, federal prosecutors secured life sentences against both sex and labor traffickers in four cases, including a sentence of life plus 20 years, the longest sentence ever imposed in a labor trafficking case. Civil Rights Division Since the Department created the HTPU within the Criminal Section of the Civil Rights Division in January 2007, HTPU has played a significant role in coordinating the Department’s human trafficking prosecution programs. HTPU’s mission is to focus the Civil Rights Division’s human trafficking expertise and expand its anti-trafficking enforcement program to increase human trafficking investigations and prosecutions throughout the nation. HTPU works to enhance the Department's investigation and prosecution of significant human trafficking cases, particularly novel, complex, multi-jurisdictional, and multi-agency cases and those involving transnational organized crime and financial crimes. Consistent with increases in trafficking caseloads across the Department, in the past four fiscal years, from 2009 through 2012, the Civil Rights Division and USAOs have brought 94 labor trafficking cases, compared to 43 such cases over the previous four years, an increase of over 118 percent. <u><mark>This is in addition to</mark> <mark>the <strong>substantial increase</strong> in the number of adult sex trafficking cases <strong>prosecuted</strong></mark> by the Civil Rights Division and USAOs. </u>The HTPU, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA), and multiple USAOs have continued to lead the six anti-trafficking coordination teams (ACTeams) in collaboration with the FBI, DHS, and the Department of Labor. Following a competitive, nation-wide selection process, six pilot ACTeams were launched in July 2011 in Los Angeles, California; El Paso, Texas; Kansas City, Missouri; Atlanta, Georgia; Miami, Florida; and Memphis, Tennessee. Since that time, the ACTeams, through enhanced coordination among federal prosecutors and multiple federal investigative agencies, have developed significant human trafficking investigations and prosecutions, including the first multi-district, multi-defendant combined sex trafficking and forced labor case in the Western District of Texas; the first domestic servitude prosecution in the Western District of Missouri; and the first Eastern European forced labor case initiated in the Northern District of Georgia, in addition to numerous other significant investigations and prosecutions. Of particular interest to this committee, <u><mark>the</mark> <mark>Department and DHS have collaborated with</mark> <mark>Mexican law enforcement</mark> counterparts on the U.S./Mexico Human Trafficking Bilateral Enforcement Initiative, <mark>which has contributed</mark> <strong><mark>significantly</strong> to restoring the</mark> <mark>rights</mark> and dignity <mark>of</mark> human <mark>trafficking victims</mark> through outreach, interagency coordination, international collaboration, and capacity-building</u>. Through the Initiative, <u><mark>the <strong>U</strong></mark>nited <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>tates <mark>and Mexico have worked as partners to bring</mark> high-impact <mark>prosecutions under both U.S. and Mexican law to <strong>more effectively</strong> dismantle human</mark> <mark>trafficking networks operating across the</mark> U.S.-Mexico <mark>border</mark>, prosecute human traffickers, rescue human trafficking victims, and reunite victims with their families. </u>Significant bilateral cases have been prosecuted in Atlanta, Georgia; Miami, Florida; and New York, New York. To advance the interdisciplinary initiative, the Department and DHS have participated in meetings in both the United States and Mexico to ensure that simultaneous investigations and prosecutions enhance, rather than impede, each other. <u><mark>These efforts have already resulted in</mark> three cross-border collaborative <mark>prosecutions,</mark> involving defendants who have been sentenced in Mexico and the United States to terms of imprisonment of up to 37.5 years, <mark>and</mark> resulting in <mark>the vindication of the rights of dozens of </mark>sex <mark>trafficking victims</mark>. </u>Outreach and training continue to be a large part of the Department’s efforts to combat human trafficking. HTPU attorneys presented numerous in-person trainings as part of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center's State and Local Law Enforcement Training Symposiums. CRT, FBI, and other Department components joined with the Department of State to create an Advanced Human Trafficking Investigator course at the FBI Training Academy in Quantico, Virginia for Central American law enforcement officers. The program has trained investigators from El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama. The Department, DHS, and DOL collaborated to develop and deliver the Advanced Human Trafficking Training Program to the ACTeams<strong>, bringing federal agents and federal prosecutors together for an intensive skill-building and strategic planning to enhance their anti-trafficking enforcement efforts. </p></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
advantage
| 431,020 | 24 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,386 |
Obama’s only spending PC on foreign policy issues- that means Iran- it comes first
|
VOA 1/1
|
VOA 1/1/2015 (Obama, Republican Congress Likely to Clash on Global Affairs, http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-to-confront-republican-congress-on-global-affairs/2581620.html)
|
Congress will weigh in on global hotspots and America’s response to them when lawmakers return to Washington next week Conflicts from Ukraine to the Middle East are on legislators’ minds - as are high-profile international initiatives undertaken by Obama negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program resume one week after Congress gavels in makers will consider tougher sanctions on Tehran There will be a desire very quickly for Congress to weigh in on the Iran deal Obama is not immune to dissent from his own Democratic Party The president could have as many or more problems on the left, with Democrats, on international and national security issues as he could have with Republicans the president appears determined to leave a stamp on America’s outreach to the world. In a recent interview, he said: “I believe in diplomacy. I believe in dialogue. I believe in engagement.”
|
Obama. International negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program resume one week after Congress gavels in. lawmakers will consider tougher sanctions on Tehran There will be a desire very quickly for Congress to weigh on the Iran deal the president appears determined to leave a stamp on America’s outreach to the world
|
The new, entirely Republican-led U.S. Congress will weigh in on global hotspots and America’s response to them when lawmakers return to Washington next week. Conflicts from Ukraine to the Middle East are on legislators’ minds - as are high-profile international initiatives undertaken by President Barack Obama. International negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program resume one week after Congress gavels in. Skeptics, like Republican Senator Bob Corker, have said lawmakers will consider tougher sanctions on Tehran in case negotiations fail. “There will be a desire very quickly after the first of the year for Congress to weigh in on the topic in some form or fashion. Congress will want to weigh in on the Iran deal,” he said. Congressional wariness over Iran’s nuclear ambitions is not new. What no one anticipated just weeks ago is that Congress would wrestle with President Obama’s surprise diplomatic opening with Cuba. Ending the U.S. embargo of Cuba would require an act of Congress, something Democratic Senator Ben Cardin supports. “There will be a need for Congress to take action, hopefully, as we move to a new chapter in our Cuban relations. And it is going to be an interesting debate,” said Cardin. Republican Senator Marco Rubio is ready for that debate. “This Congress is not going to lift the embargo,” he said. “The White House has conceded everything and gained little [from Havana]. They gained no commitment on the part of the Cuban regime to freedom of the press, or freedom of speech, or elections.” Republicans want to be seen as offering constructive criticism, according to political scientist William Howell. “On the one hand, they want to underscore failings on the part of the Obama administration, and on the other hand, they need to be seen as a responsible, mature party that can lead the nation,” said Howell. Majority status in both houses of Congress will give Republicans a louder megaphone to critique the president’s handling of crises from Ukraine to the Islamic State insurgency in Iraq and Syria. Obama is also not immune to dissent from his own Democratic Party, according to political analyst Stuart Rothenberg. “The president could have as many or more problems on the left, with Democrats, on international and national security issues as he could have with Republicans. There are lots of Democrats who are more concerned about the U.S. recommitting troops,” said Rothenberg. Whatever Congress’ concerns, the president appears determined to leave a stamp on America’s outreach to the world. In a recent interview, he said: “I believe in diplomacy. I believe in dialogue. I believe in engagement.”
| 2,643 |
<h4><strong>Obama’s only spending PC on foreign policy issues- that means Iran- it comes first</h4><p>VOA 1/1</strong>/2015 (Obama, Republican Congress Likely to Clash on Global Affairs, http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-to-confront-republican-congress-on-global-affairs/2581620.html)</p><p>The new, entirely Republican-led U.S. <u>Congress will weigh in on global hotspots and America’s response to them when lawmakers return to Washington next week</u>. <u>Conflicts from Ukraine to the Middle East are on legislators’ minds - as are high-profile international initiatives undertaken by</u> President Barack <u><mark>Obama</u>. International <u>negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program resume one week after Congress gavels in</u>.</mark> Skeptics, like Republican Senator Bob Corker, have said <mark>law<u>makers will consider tougher sanctions on Tehran</u></mark> in case negotiations fail. “<u><strong><mark>There will be a desire very quickly</mark> </u></strong>after the first of the year <u><strong><mark>for Congress to weigh</mark> in</u></strong> on the topic in some form or fashion. Congress will want to weigh in <u><strong><mark>on the Iran deal</u></strong></mark>,” he said. Congressional wariness over Iran’s nuclear ambitions is not new. What no one anticipated just weeks ago is that Congress would wrestle with President Obama’s surprise diplomatic opening with Cuba. Ending the U.S. embargo of Cuba would require an act of Congress, something Democratic Senator Ben Cardin supports. “There will be a need for Congress to take action, hopefully, as we move to a new chapter in our Cuban relations. And it is going to be an interesting debate,” said Cardin. Republican Senator Marco Rubio is ready for that debate. “This Congress is not going to lift the embargo,” he said. “The White House has conceded everything and gained little [from Havana]. They gained no commitment on the part of the Cuban regime to freedom of the press, or freedom of speech, or elections.” Republicans want to be seen as offering constructive criticism, according to political scientist William Howell. “On the one hand, they want to underscore failings on the part of the Obama administration, and on the other hand, they need to be seen as a responsible, mature party that can lead the nation,” said Howell. Majority status in both houses of Congress will give Republicans a louder megaphone to critique the president’s handling of crises from Ukraine to the Islamic State insurgency in Iraq and Syria. <u>Obama is</u> also <u>not immune to dissent from his own Democratic Party</u>, according to political analyst Stuart Rothenberg. “<u>The president could have as many or more problems on the left, with Democrats, on international and national security issues as he could have with Republicans</u>. There are lots of Democrats who are more concerned about the U.S. recommitting troops,” said Rothenberg. Whatever Congress’ concerns, <u><strong><mark>the president appears determined to leave a stamp on America’s outreach to the world</mark>. In a recent interview, he said: “I believe in diplomacy. I believe in dialogue. I believe in engagement.” </p></u></strong>
|
1nr
|
Strikes
|
Top of Agenda
| 430,548 | 6 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,387 |
B. Solely federal action does not legalize nearly all
|
Kreit 2010
|
Kreit 2010 (Alex, Associate Professor and Director, Center for Law and Social Justice, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on Federal Drug Laws in an Age of State Reforms, 13 Chapman Law Review 555, October)
|
the debate about legalizing or decriminalizing marijuana truly is misplaced in the context of federal drug laws. Even if they were to pass legislation that removed all federal criminal penalties for possessing, manufacturing, or selling marijuana, the drug would still be illegal everywhere in the country because all fifty states have their own laws criminalizing the sale of marijuana. if the federal government were to remove criminal penalties for the cultivation and distribution of marijuana That would not be "legalization" of the drug inasmuch as marijuana would not be legal to buy and sell in any state unless and until that state also changed its laws unless the federal government decided to preempt state law it could not unilaterally "legalize" a controlled substance even if it wanted to
|
debate about legalizing marijuana is misplaced in the context of federal drug laws Even if they were to pass legislation that removed all federal criminal penalties for selling marijuana, the drug would still be illegal everywhere in the country because all fifty states have their own laws That would not be "legalization" of inasmuch as marijuana would not be legal to buy and sell in any state unless that state also changed its laws
|
In an important sense, however, the debate about legalizing or decriminalizing marijuana truly is misplaced in the context of federal drug laws. Indeed, to ask if the federal government should legalize marijuana is to ask an essentially irrelevant question-irrelevant not because it is unimportant or on the political fringe (certainly, if the polling is to be believed, it is not), but because it misunderstands the role of the federal law in shaping drug policy. Whether or not legalizing or decriminalizing marijuana is a good idea, the federal government simply does not have the power to effect such a change. Imagine, for example, that every federal elected official decided tomorrow that marijuana should be taxed and regulated like alcohol. Even if they were to pass legislation that removed all federal criminal penalties for possessing, manufacturing, or selling marijuana, the drug would still be illegal everywhere in the country because all fifty states have their own laws criminalizing the sale of marijuana.30 To be sure, if the federal government were to remove criminal penalties for the cultivation and distribution of marijuana, it would have a substantial impact on the enforcement of marijuana laws in the United States. That impact, however, would not be "legalization" of the drug inasmuch as marijuana would not be legal to buy and sell in any state unless and until that state also changed its laws. In short, unless the federal government decided to preempt state law,31 it could not unilaterally "legalize" a controlled substance even if it wanted to.
| 1,579 |
<h4><strong>B. Solely federal action does not legalize nearly all</h4><p>Kreit 2010</strong> (Alex, Associate Professor and Director, Center for Law and Social Justice, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on Federal Drug Laws in an Age of State Reforms, 13 Chapman Law Review 555, October)</p><p>In an important sense, however, <u>the <mark>debate about legalizing</mark> or decriminalizing <mark>marijuana</mark> truly <mark>is misplaced in the context of federal drug laws</mark>.</u> Indeed, to ask if the federal government should legalize marijuana is to ask an essentially irrelevant question-irrelevant not because it is unimportant or on the political fringe (certainly, if the polling is to be believed, it is not), but because it misunderstands the role of the federal law in shaping drug policy. Whether or not legalizing or decriminalizing marijuana is a good idea, the federal government simply does not have the power to effect such a change. Imagine, for example, that every federal elected official decided tomorrow that marijuana should be taxed and regulated like alcohol. <u><mark>Even if they were to pass legislation that removed all federal criminal penalties for</mark> possessing, manufacturing, or <mark>selling marijuana, the drug would still be illegal everywhere in the country</u> <u>because all fifty states have their own laws</mark> criminalizing the sale of marijuana.</u>30 To be sure, <u>if the federal government were to remove criminal penalties for the cultivation and distribution of marijuana</u>, it would have a substantial impact on the enforcement of marijuana laws in the United States. <u><mark>That</u></mark> impact, however, <u><strong><mark>would not be "legalization" of</mark> the drug <mark>inasmuch as marijuana would not be legal to buy and sell in any state unless</mark> and until <mark>that state also changed its laws</u></strong></mark>. In short, <u>unless the federal government decided to preempt state law</u>,31 <u>it could not unilaterally "legalize" a controlled substance even if it wanted to</u><strong>.</p></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
4
| 50,460 | 28 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,388 |
Economically desperate people are coerced into selling their organs in the hope of bettering their situation. As a result of the actions of unscrupulous organ brokers and inadequate medical care, they are actually made worse off.
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Jaycox 12
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Jaycox 12 Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,
Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
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Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:
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Moazam found almost all organ vendors were in significant debt at the time they sold their kidneys Although vendors were promised by brokers 160,000 rupees the amount received was 103,000 rupees a majority were either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady majority expressed regret because they were not freed from their debts sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:
|
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf
Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority (17) of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them: In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.
| 2,479 |
<h4>Economically desperate people are coerced into selling their organs in the hope of bettering their situation. As a result of the actions of unscrupulous organ brokers and inadequate medical care, they are actually made worse off.</h4><p><strong>Jaycox 12</strong> Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,</p><p>Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION</p><p>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf</p><p><u>Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat <mark>Moazam</mark> offers the results of a recent study </u>in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 <u>He <mark>found</mark> that <mark>almost all </mark>of these <mark>organ vendors were in significant debt</mark> to wealthy landlords <mark>at the time they sold their kidneys</mark>;</u> the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. <u><mark>Although</mark> the <mark>vendors were promised by</mark> third-party <mark>brokers </mark>an average price of <mark>160,000 rupees</mark> per kidney, <mark>the amount</mark> actually <mark>received</mark> by the vendors <mark>was</mark> an average of <mark>103,000 rupees</mark>. As a result, <mark>a majority</mark> </u>(17) <u>of them <mark>were</mark> ‘<mark>either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’</mark> </u>at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, <u>a majority of the <mark>vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady</mark> as a result of their nephrectomies, and a <mark>majority</mark> also <mark>expressed regret</mark> or shame for their decision <mark>because they were not freed from their debts</mark> and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act.</u> When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and<u> </u>ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,<u><strong>Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the <mark>sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:</strong></mark> </u>In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 Illicit market
| 430,255 | 14 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
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Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,389 |
Extinction outweighs – no coping mechanisms, no experience, no trial-and-error, future generations
|
Bostrom 2
|
Bostrom 2 (Nick Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale.. www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html.)JFS
|
Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. We have not evolved mechanisms for managing such risks Our coping strategies have been shaped by experience with risks and trial-and-error from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples They haven’t determined the long-term fate of our species. The first existential risk was the atomic bomb If we don’t know whether something is risky then it is risky [2] we must use our best estimate of risk [3] [4] nuclear Armageddon are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century Our approach to existential risks cannot be trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach is unworkable we must take a proactive approach. This requires foresight and preventive action We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should because we have never witnessed such disasters [5] Reductions in existential risks are global public goods If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied the gravest risks stem from future that we have only begun to understand The point is not to wallow in doom but to take a sober look at what could go wrong so we can create responsible strategies for improving our chances of survival.
|
We have not evolved mechanisms for managing such risks. Our coping strategies have been shaped by experience with risks and trial-and-error The first existential risk was the atomic bomb. If we don’t know whether something is o y risky , then it is risky y : Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors. This requires foresight to and preventive action We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied The point, is not to wallow in doom but to take a sober look at what could go wrong so we can create responsible strategies for improving our chances of survival
|
Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples on the surface of the great sea of life. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on. HYPERLINK "file:///C:\\Users\\pirzada\\Documents\\Speech%20case%201-18%207AM.docx" \l "_ftn2" [2]At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are. HYPERLINK "file:///C:\\Users\\pirzada\\Documents\\Speech%20case%201-18%207AM.docx" \l "_ftn3" [3]A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that mighthave been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization. HYPERLINK "file:///C:\\Users\\pirzada\\Documents\\Speech%20case%201-18%207AM.docx" \l "_ftn4" [4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century. The special nature of the challenges posed by existential risks is illustrated by the following points: Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach – see what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience – is unworkable. Rather, we must take a proactive approach. This requires foresight to anticipate new types of threats and a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions. We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast. We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters. HYPERLINK "file:///C:\\Users\\pirzada\\Documents\\Speech%20case%201-18%207AM.docx" \l "_ftn5" [5] Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat. Reductions in existential risks are global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for everybody and may require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk. If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied by another factor, the size of which depends on whether and how much we discount future benefits [15,16]. In view of its undeniable importance, it is surprising how little systematic work has been done in this area. Part of the explanation may be that many of the gravest risks stem (as we shall see) from anticipated future technologies that we have only recently begun to understand. Another part of the explanation may be the unavoidably interdisciplinary and speculative nature of the subject. And in part the neglect may also be attributable to an aversion against thinking seriously about a depressing topic. The point, however, is not to wallow in gloom and doom but simply to take a sober look at what could go wrong so we can create responsible strategies for improving our chances of survival. In order to do that, we need to know where to focus our efforts.
| 6,049 |
<h4><strong>Extinction outweighs – no coping mechanisms, no experience, no trial-and-error, future generations</h4><p>Bostrom 2 </strong>(Nick Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale.. www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html.)JFS</p><p><u><strong>Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon.</u></strong> This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. <u><strong><mark>We have not evolved mechanisms</u></strong></mark>, either biologically or culturally, <u><strong><mark>for managing such risks</u></strong>. <u><strong>Our</u></strong></mark> intuitions and <u><strong><mark>coping strategies have been shaped by</u></strong> </mark>our long <u><strong><mark>experience with risks</u></strong></mark> such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by <u><strong><mark>trial-and-error</u></strong></mark> in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – <u><strong>from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples</u></strong> on the surface of the great sea of life. <u><strong>They haven’t</u></strong> significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or <u><strong>determined the long-term fate of our species.</u></strong> With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. <u><strong><mark>The first</u></strong></mark> manmade <u><strong><mark>existential risk was the</u></strong></mark> inaugural detonation of an <u><strong><mark>atomic bomb</u></strong>.</mark> At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. <u><strong><mark>If we don’t know whether something is</u></strong> o</mark>bjectivel<mark>y <u><strong>risky</u></strong> </mark>or not<mark>, <u><strong>then it is risky</u></strong></mark> in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on. HYPERLINK "file:///C:\\Users\\pirzada\\Documents\\Speech%20case%201-18%207AM.docx" \l "_ftn2" <u>[2]</u>At any given time <u><strong>we must use our best</u></strong> current subjective <u><strong>estimate of</u></strong> what the objective <u><strong>risk</u></strong> factors are. HYPERLINK "file:///C:\\Users\\pirzada\\Documents\\Speech%20case%201-18%207AM.docx" \l "_ftn3" <u>[3]</u>A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that mighthave been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization. HYPERLINK "file:///C:\\Users\\pirzada\\Documents\\Speech%20case%201-18%207AM.docx" \l "_ftn4" <u>[4]</u> Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that <u><strong>nuclear Armageddon</u></strong> and comet or asteroid strikes <u><strong>are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st centur<mark>y</u></strong></mark>. The special nature of the challenges posed by existential risks is illustrated by the following points<mark>: <u>Our approach to existential risks cannot be</u> one of <u>trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors.<strong></mark> The reactive approach</u></strong> – see what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience – <u><strong>is unworkable</u></strong>. Rather, <u><strong>we must take a proactive approach.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>This requires foresight </u></strong>to</mark> anticipate new types of threats <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> a willingness to take decisive <u><strong><mark>preventive action</mark> </u></strong>and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions. We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast. <u><strong><mark>We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should</u></strong> simply <u><strong>because we have never</u></strong> yet <u><strong>witnessed such disasters</u></strong></mark>. HYPERLINK "file:///C:\\Users\\pirzada\\Documents\\Speech%20case%201-18%207AM.docx" \l "_ftn5" <u>[5]</u> Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat. <u><strong>Reductions in existential risks are global public goods</u></strong> [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for everybody and may require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk. <u><strong><mark>If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied</u></strong></mark> by another factor, the size of which depends on whether and how much we discount future benefits [15,16]. In view of its undeniable importance, it is surprising how little systematic work has been done in this area. Part of the explanation may be that many of <u><strong>the gravest risks stem</u></strong> (as we shall see) <u><strong>from</u></strong> anticipated <u><strong>future</u></strong> technologies <u><strong>that we have only</u></strong> recently <u><strong>begun to understand</u></strong>. Another part of the explanation may be the unavoidably interdisciplinary and speculative nature of the subject. And in part the neglect may also be attributable to an aversion against thinking seriously about a depressing topic. <u><strong><mark>The point</u></strong>, </mark>however,<mark> <u><strong>is not to wallow in</u></strong> </mark>gloom and <u><strong><mark>doom but</u></strong> </mark>simply<mark> <u><strong>to take a sober look at what could go wrong so we can create responsible strategies for improving our chances of survival</mark>.</u></strong> In order to do that, we need to know where to focus our efforts.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
advantage
| 5,437 | 850 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,390 |
Amending the treaty is impossible- withdrawal can only lead to abandonment- the squo and CP establish international consensus through a flexible model which is the only way to solve
|
Collins 12/1
|
Collins 12/1/2014 (Jonathan, International Drug Policy Project Coordinator at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics. He served as Coordinator of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy and Editor of the 2014 report 'Ending the Drug Wars.', The State Department’s move to a more flexible diplomatic policy on drugs is a rational approach to a difficult question., http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-s-new-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrine-on-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-a-difficult-question/)
|
reforming this core is a very difficult question which we haven’t even started to grapple with The economic interests involved are legion also and unlikely to welcome a reopening of the trading arrangements locked into the system Focusing all efforts on reforming the language around the limbic prohibitionist aspects would be a wasted opportunity the goal should be to roll back prohibition as far as possible and develop our understanding of regulating previously illicit markets – as is happening with cannabis – via flexible interpretations and innovations When the beginnings of a consensus around reforming the core becomes apparent states can put the final nail in the coffin of the war on drugs by writing all remnants out of the international treaties.
|
reforming this core is a very difficult question Focusing all efforts on reforming the language around the limbic prohibitionist aspects would, in my opinion, be a wasted opportunity. Instead, the goal should be to roll back prohibition as far as possible and develop our understanding of regulating previously illicit markets – as is happening with cannabis – via flexible interpretations and innovations. When the beginnings of a consensus around reforming the cor becomes apparent, states put the final nail in the coffin of the war on drugs
|
Ultimately the core represents a weak regulatory framework and will need to be updated. For example, it was based on postwar principles of central economic planning that have since been discredited. As a result 83 percent of the world has virtually no access to essential pain medicines. However, reforming this core is a very difficult question which we haven’t even started to grapple with. The economic interests involved are legion also and unlikely to welcome a reopening of the trading arrangements locked into the system. Focusing all efforts on reforming the language around the limbic prohibitionist aspects would, in my opinion, be a wasted opportunity. Instead, the goal should be to roll back prohibition as far as possible and develop our understanding of regulating previously illicit markets – as is happening with cannabis – via flexible interpretations and innovations. When the beginnings of a consensus around reforming the core of the conventions becomes apparent, states can also put the final nail in the coffin of the war on drugs by writing all remnants out of the international treaties.
| 1,113 |
<h4>Amending the treaty is impossible- withdrawal can only lead to abandonment- the squo and CP establish international consensus through a flexible model which is the only way to solve</h4><p><strong>Collins 12/1</strong>/2014 (Jonathan, International Drug Policy Project Coordinator at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics. He served as Coordinator of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy and Editor of the 2014 report 'Ending the Drug Wars.', The State Department’s move to a more flexible diplomatic policy on drugs is a rational approach to a difficult question.,<u> http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-s-new-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrine-on-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-a-difficult-question/)</p><p></u>Ultimately the core represents a weak regulatory framework and will need to be updated. For example, it was based on postwar principles of central economic planning that have since been discredited. As a result 83 percent of the world has virtually no access to essential pain medicines. However, <u><mark>reforming this core is a very difficult question</mark> which we haven’t even started to grapple with</u>. <u>The economic interests involved are legion also and unlikely to welcome a reopening of the trading arrangements locked into the system</u>. <u><strong><mark>Focusing all efforts on reforming the language around the limbic prohibitionist aspects would</u></strong>, in my opinion, <u><strong>be a wasted opportunity</u></strong>. Instead, <u>the goal should be to roll back prohibition as far as possible and develop our understanding of regulating previously illicit markets – as is happening with cannabis – via <strong>flexible interpretations and innovations</u></strong>. <u><strong>When the beginnings of a consensus around reforming the cor</mark>e</u></strong> of the conventions <u><strong><mark>becomes apparent</u></strong>, <u>states</mark> can</u> also <u><mark>put the final nail in the coffin of the war on drugs</mark> by writing all remnants out of the international treaties.</p></u>
| null |
2nc
|
treaties
| 430,978 | 11 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,391 |
Our disad is only about Democrats in the Senate- the only “fight” on Keystone would be with Republicans
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>Our disad is only about Democrats in the Senate- the only “fight” on Keystone would be with Republicans</h4></strong>
|
1nr
|
Strikes
|
At: keystone
| 431,021 | 1 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,392 |
C. The affirmative interpretation is bad for debate. Retaining state law destroys negative ground, and being less than nearly all explodes the topic with all sorts of partial actions
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>C. The affirmative interpretation is bad for debate. Retaining state law destroys negative ground, and being less than nearly all explodes the topic with all sorts of partial actions</h4></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
4
| 431,022 | 1 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,393 |
For many, the coercion is more violent
|
Bowden 13
|
Bowden 13 Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis
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Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades Imagine living in a poor country As you walk peacefully you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live , there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem.
|
Organ trafficking depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given Your body is then dumped you are extremely lucky if you live. on of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking
|
[*452] Introduction Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades. n1 Imagine living in a poor country, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. As you walk peacefully to your home at the end of the day, you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live. Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [*453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However, there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10
| 1,529 |
<h4>For many, the coercion is more violent</h4><p><strong>Bowden 13</strong> Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis</p><p> [*452] Introduction <u><mark>Organ trafficking</mark> has been <mark>depriving innocent people of their</mark> <mark>fundamental right to life</mark> for decades</u>. n1 <u>Imagine living in a poor country</u>, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. <u>As you walk peacefully</u> to your home at the end of the day, <u><mark>you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck</mark>. </u>n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as <u><mark>a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney</u></mark>. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, <u><mark>no anesthesia is administered and no medication</mark> <mark>is given</mark> to prevent infection</u>. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. <u><mark>Your body is then dumped</mark> on a side street, and <mark>you are extremely lucky if you live</u>.</mark> Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [*453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However<u>, there are reported accounts suggesting that abducti<mark>on of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking</mark>.</u> n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 <u>Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. </u>n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10</p><p> </p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 Illicit market
| 430,258 | 14 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,394 |
Decrim and legalize are distinct policy proposals- not complementary
|
Showden, 9 -
|
Showden, 9 - Assistant Professor Political Science University of North Carolina Greensboro (Carisa, “Prostitution and Women’s Agency: A Feminist Argument for Decriminalization” http://policeprostitutionandpolitics.com/pdfs_all/Academics%20Research%20Articles%20Support%20Prostitution%20%20Decriminalization/2009%20Prostitution%20and%20Womens%20Agency%20A%20Feminist%20Argument%20for%20Decriminalization%20.pdf
|
Finally, I look briefly at two models of legalized prostitution, one in rural Nevada, the other in the Netherlands in order to assess the benefits of legalization versus decriminalization. Based on these policy models, I argue that decriminalization of prostitution is necessary
| null |
To this end, my paper proceeds in four parts. First I set out the three main competing views of prostitution within feminism, ignoring here non-feminist accounts of both prostitution and women‘s sexuality. Second, I draw on the work of Michel Foucault to explain why sexuality needs to be seen as central to feminist analyses and why the abolitionist perspective on prostitution that dominates U.S. public policy and feminist analyses is ultimately detrimental to women‘s agency. I argue here that, with many emendations, prostitution could be part of a more open sexual discipline producing both male and female desire.2 Third, I compare prostitution to pornography, which is legal, while prostitution mostly is not. Through this comparison I try to assess whether pornography‘s phenomenological distinction from prostitution can explain or justify its legal distinction from prostitution, and how this legal distinction serves the hegemonic gender order far more than women‘s agency interests. Finally, I look briefly at two models of legalized prostitution, one in rural Nevada, the other in the Netherlands in order to assess the benefits of legalization versus decriminalization. Based on these policy models, I argue that decriminalization of prostitution is an imperfect but necessary step in the long road to producing a less-misogynistic discourse and material practice of female sexuality.
| 1,399 |
<h4><strong>Decrim and legalize are distinct policy proposals- not complementary</h4><p>Showden, 9 -</strong> Assistant Professor Political Science University of North Carolina Greensboro (Carisa, “Prostitution and Women’s Agency: A Feminist Argument for Decriminalization” http://policeprostitutionandpolitics.com/pdfs_all/Academics%20Research%20Articles%20Support%20Prostitution%20%20Decriminalization/2009%20Prostitution%20and%20Womens%20Agency%20A%20Feminist%20Argument%20for%20Decriminalization%20.pdf</p><p>To this end, my paper proceeds in four parts. First I set out the three main competing views of prostitution within feminism, ignoring here non-feminist accounts of both prostitution and women‘s sexuality. Second, I draw on the work of Michel Foucault to explain why sexuality needs to be seen as central to feminist analyses and why the abolitionist perspective on prostitution that dominates U.S. public policy and feminist analyses is ultimately detrimental to women‘s agency. I argue here that, with many emendations, prostitution could be part of a more open sexual discipline producing both male and female desire.2 Third, I compare prostitution to pornography, which is legal, while prostitution mostly is not. Through this comparison I try to assess whether pornography‘s phenomenological distinction from prostitution can explain or justify its legal distinction from prostitution, and how this legal distinction serves the hegemonic gender order far more than women‘s agency interests. <u>Finally, I look briefly at two models of legalized prostitution, one in rural Nevada, the other in the Netherlands in order to assess the benefits of <strong>legalization versus decriminalization</strong>.</u> <u>Based on these policy models, I argue that decriminalization of prostitution is </u>an imperfect but <u>necessary</u><strong> step in the long road to producing a less-misogynistic discourse and material practice of female sexuality. </p></strong>
|
2nc
| null |
advantage
| 431,023 | 1 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,395 |
Obama’s not actually engaging Congress on Keystone- he’s just saying he’d veto it and that’s all- Obama’s strategy is to set red lines on a few issues like Keystone beforehand and then actually spend PC on other issues
|
WSJ 1/1
|
WSJ 1/1/2015 (Wall Street Journal, Obama Pivots to Lawmakers, http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-pivots-to-lawmakers-1420158788)
|
The White House plans to invest more in a legislative strategy aimed at trying to advance key policy goals The question is whether the two sides can get past rancor of the past several years by agreeing to disagree on certain issues where their philosophies’ diverge, and engaging on issues where there is room for compromise. Obama’s aim is to draw only a few red lines on issues where he feels strongly Republicans are expected to put Obama on the spot right away They plan to send legislation approving Keystone Obama laid the groundwork for rejecting the pipeline the president has been clear that there will be some actions by Congress that he won’t support, “just like some in Congress will oppose steps that we take on our own.” “But those disagreements should not interfere with the many areas of bipartisan interest where we can work together to get things done for the American people,” Mr. Schultz said.
| null |
The White House plans to pivot from President Barack Obama ’s reliance on executive actions in the coming year and invest more in a legislative strategy aimed at trying to advance key policy goals with the new, Republican-controlled Congress, senior administration officials said. The new approach reflects a White House acknowledgment that Mr. Obama has already taken some of the most significant executive actions in his arsenal as well as the idea that several of his top priorities might actually be more easily achieved without Democrats in control of the Senate, senior administration officials said. The question is whether the two sides can get past rancor of the past several years by agreeing to disagree on certain issues where their philosophies’ diverge, and engaging on issues where there is room for compromise. Republican leaders, aides say, want to work with Mr. Obama but are skeptical that he will compromise and that even if he does, that he will deliver the votes needed from his party. “If he’s going to run around the country talking about things that have no chance of passing rather than running around the country focusing on the areas where we agree, he’s not going to be very productive,” said Don Stewart, deputy chief of staff to incoming Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R., Ky.). “We just had an election on his policies.” Messrs. Obama and McConnell discussed trade, taxes and infrastructure as areas of compromise during a one-on-one meeting after the November elections. Mr. Obama’s aim is to draw only a few red lines on issues where he feels strongly, such as efforts to roll back his immigration policies, climate-change initiatives and key provisions of the health-care law, to leave maximum room for negotiating. And there are some issues, such as energy, where Republicans are expected to put Mr. Obama on the spot right away. They plan to quickly send Mr. Obama legislation approving construction of the Keystone XL pipeline. Mr. Obama has laid the groundwork in recent weeks for rejecting the pipeline, senior administration officials said, by arguing that it is environmentally and economically unsound. Such a move could antagonize Republicans, who plan to make energy issues a key focus. “I think that would be a mistake,” said Michael Steel, a spokesman for House Speaker John Boehner (R., Ohio). White House spokesman Eric Schultz said the president has been clear that there will be some actions by Congress that he won’t support, “just like some in Congress will oppose steps that we take on our own.” “But those disagreements should not interfere with the many areas of bipartisan interest where we can work together to get things done for the American people,” Mr. Schultz said.
| 2,737 |
<h4><strong>Obama’s not actually engaging Congress on Keystone- he’s just saying he’d veto it and that’s all- Obama’s strategy is to set red lines on a few issues like Keystone beforehand and then actually spend PC on other issues</h4><p>WSJ 1/1</strong>/2015 (Wall Street Journal, Obama Pivots to Lawmakers, http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-pivots-to-lawmakers-1420158788)</p><p><u>The White House plans to </u>pivot from President Barack Obama ’s reliance on executive actions in the coming year and <u>invest more in a legislative strategy aimed at trying to advance key policy goals</u> with the new, Republican-controlled Congress, senior administration officials said. The new approach reflects a White House acknowledgment that Mr. Obama has already taken some of the most significant executive actions in his arsenal as well as the idea that several of his top priorities might actually be more easily achieved without Democrats in control of the Senate, senior administration officials said. <u>The question is whether the two sides can get past rancor of the past several years by <strong>agreeing to disagree on certain issues</u></strong> <u>where their philosophies’ diverge, and engaging on issues where there is room for compromise. </u>Republican leaders, aides say, want to work with Mr. Obama but are skeptical that he will compromise and that even if he does, that he will deliver the votes needed from his party. “If he’s going to run around the country talking about things that have no chance of passing rather than running around the country focusing on the areas where we agree, he’s not going to be very productive,” said Don Stewart, deputy chief of staff to incoming Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R., Ky.). “We just had an election on his policies.” Messrs. Obama and McConnell discussed trade, taxes and infrastructure as areas of compromise during a one-on-one meeting after the November elections. Mr. <u>Obama’s aim is to draw only <strong>a few red lines</strong> on issues where he feels strongly</u>, such as efforts to roll back his immigration policies, climate-change initiatives and key provisions of the health-care law, to leave maximum room for negotiating. And there are some issues, such as energy, where <u>Republicans are expected to put</u> Mr. <u>Obama</u> <u>on the spot right away</u>. <u>They plan to</u> quickly <u>send</u> Mr. Obama <u>legislation</u> <u>approving</u> construction of the <u>Keystone</u> XL pipeline. Mr. <u>Obama</u> has <u>laid the groundwork</u> in recent weeks <u>for rejecting the pipeline</u>, senior administration officials said, by arguing that it is environmentally and economically unsound. Such a move could antagonize Republicans, who plan to make energy issues a key focus. “I think that would be a mistake,” said Michael Steel, a spokesman for House Speaker John Boehner (R., Ohio). White House spokesman Eric Schultz said <u>the president has been clear that there will be some actions by Congress that he won’t support<strong>, “just like some in Congress will oppose steps that we take on our own.” “But those disagreements should not interfere with the many areas of bipartisan interest where we can work together to get things done for the American people,” Mr. Schultz said.</p></u></strong>
|
1nr
|
Strikes
|
At: keystone
| 431,024 | 3 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,396 |
torture, police brutality, deportations, and the war on terror all thump
|
Newman 12/3/14
|
Newman 12/3/14 (Alex, "UN Torture Committee Slams U.S. Police and Military." The New American. 12/3/14. www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/19645-un-torture-committee-slams-u-s-police-and-military, TD)
|
the controversial UN body released a scathing report last week accusing U.S. authorities of widespread violations of what it calls “international law.” the panel cited everything from “police brutality” by state and local officials domestically to the actions of the U.S. military and intelligence agencies abroad. Other criticism directed at the United States focused on immigration policies, deportations, prison conditions, Guantanamo Bay, the terror war, and more.¶ the panel called on federal officials to alter U.S. laws to comply with its demands — including abolishing the death penalty In light of the overseas torture the UN called for “prompt, impartial and effective investigations” The Committee is concerned about numerous reports of police brutality and excessive use of force by law enforcement officials, in particular against persons belonging to certain racial and ethnic groups, immigrants and LGBTI individuals, racial profiling by police and immigration offices and growing militarization of policing activities
Authority over China’s energy sector is fractured China’s fragmented policymaking structure has impeded energy governance because there is no single institution with the authority to coordinate interests of stakeholders implementation is hampered The central government is managing the energy sector with a skeleton crew the NEA’s staff it ended up with just 112 people the NDRC had only 50 people China’s administration is unlikely to substantially improve governance changes are tantamount to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic we can expect business as usual: conflicts of interest will impede decision-making energy companies will remain important drivers the NEA will resort to “second best” administrative measures US policymakers should recognize that China’s fractured energy policymaking apparatus may constrain the Chinese government from doing all that US policymakers would like it to do to combat climate change. If China falls short it may reflect the limited capacity of its national energy institutions to bend other actors, notably firms and local governments, to its will
. H
China is now the world’s biggest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2)—the pollutant most responsible for global warming.1 . Yet continued reliance on coal-fired power threatens to create a climate catastrophe.
|
UN body released a scathing report last week accusing U.S. authorities of widespread violations of international law.” everything from “police brutality to U.S. military and intelligence agencies abroad. immigration policies, deportations, prison conditions, Guantanamo Bay, the terror war, and more panel called on officials to alter U.S. laws to comply with its demands — including abolishing the death penalty concerned about excessive use of force by law enforcement officials, in particular against persons belonging to certain racial and ethnic groups,
China’s fragmented policymaking structure has impeded energy governance there is no single institution to coordinate The central government is managing the energy sector with a skeleton crew China’s fractured energy policymaking may constrain the Chinese government from combat climate change
China is the world’s biggest emitter of carbon dioxide the pollutant most responsible for global warming.1 continued reliance on coal threatens to create a climate catastrophe.
|
After a spectacle featuring senior Obama administration officials prostrating themselves before the United Nations “Committee Against Torture,” the controversial UN body released a scathing report last week accusing U.S. authorities of widespread violations of what it calls “international law.” Among other concerns, the global panel cited everything from “police brutality” by state and local officials domestically to the actions of the U.S. military and intelligence agencies abroad. Other criticism directed at the United States focused on immigration policies, deportations, prison conditions, Guantanamo Bay, the terror war, and more.¶ In response to the UN committee’s findings, the panel called on federal officials to alter U.S. laws to comply with its demands — including abolishing the death penalty, reforming deportation procedures, and more. The report also called on the U.S. government to pass new federal laws defining torture in accordance with the UN Convention. In the same section, it lashed out at the U.S. government’s “interpretation” of the global “torture” regime, saying that “under international law, reservations that are contrary to the object and purpose of a treaty are impermissible.”¶ In other words, the dictator-dominated UN, rather than the U.S. Constitution, purports to be the arbiter of what is or is not “permissible.” ¶ advertisement¶ ¶ The UN bureaucrats on the committee — one comes from Morocco, another from Communist China, and one more from Communist Nepal — also called on U.S. authorities to amend “laws and regulations” to be in compliance with the global agreement. In addition, the UN committee said it “encourages” the U.S. government to ratify other global agreements purporting to bind the American people and their elected officials to globalist demands rather than the U.S. Constitution. Finally, the document is packed with calls for the federal government to go beyond its constitutional limitations in commandeering state and local governments.¶ All across the report, the UN also offered instructions to the Obama administration on everything from indefinite detention without charges or trial to releasing information on post-9/11 atrocities allegedly perpetrated by various agencies within the U.S. government. Among other demands, the UN experts called on the Obama administration to “cease the use of indefinite detention without charge or trial” — something that constitutes a serious crime against the U.S. Constitution, regardless of what the UN and its oftentimes brutal member governments claim regarding their planetary torture regime.¶ Moreover, the White House should release information on numerous instances of CIA “human rights violations, including torture, ill-treatment and enforced disappearance of persons suspected of involvement in terrorism-related crimes.” In addition to the CIA, the U.S. military and its policies — ranging from the treatment of detainees to its policy manuals — came under severe criticism in the document. Of course, virtually all of the UN’s complaints should be considered moot, because the U.S. Constitution, which established the federal government in the first place and granted it a few limited powers, already prohibits such schemes.¶ Separately, in an open letter to Obama, a UN group of self-styled “human rights experts” with bombastic titles also called on the administration to release a U.S. Senate report on CIA “interrogation” practices. “As a nation that has publicly affirmed its belief that respect for truth advances respect for the rule of law, and as a nation that frequently calls for transparency and accountability in other countries, the United States must rise to meet the standards it has set both for itself and for others,” the UN “experts” declared.¶ According to the UN “human-rights” operatives, victims of torture and human-rights defenders around the world would be “emboldened” if the Obama administration — widely described as the most secrecy-obsessed, least transparent in U.S. history — would support transparency. “On the contrary, if you yield to the CIA's demands for continued secrecy on this issue, those resisting accountability will surely misuse this decision to bolster their own agenda in their countries,” the open letter continued.¶ As The New American has reported on multiple occasions, in addition to the draconian secrecy, the Obama administration has also improperly worked to protect George W. Bush administration officials from prosecution for the myriad alleged crimes they perpetrated under color of law. “The Committee expresses concern over the ongoing failure to fully investigate allegations of torture and ill-treatment of suspects held in U.S. custody abroad, evidenced by the limited number of criminal prosecutions and convictions,” the UN torture committee said in its report about the United States, the first such “periodic review” since 2006.¶ In light of the overseas torture (such as water boarding) carried out by U.S. officials, the UN called for “prompt, impartial and effective investigations” to “ensure that alleged perpetrators and accomplices are duly prosecuted, including persons in positions of command and those who provided legal cover to torture.” If found guilty of the charges, the criminals in government should be punished with serious penalties “commensurate with the grave nature of their acts,” the UN said. Victims of U.S. government torture should also be compensated and rehabilitated, the panel said. ¶ On law enforcement, which is a power generally reserved for state and local government by the U.S. Constitution, the UN also expressed a wide array of concerns. “The Committee is concerned about numerous reports of police brutality and excessive use of force by law enforcement officials, in particular against persons belonging to certain racial and ethnic groups, immigrants and LGBTI individuals, racial profiling by police and immigration offices and growing militarization of policing activities,” the report said, citing Chicago’s police department as particularly alarming. ¶
No modeling in China – it’s structurally impossible
Downs 8
Eric, Fellow @ Brookings, China Energy Fellow, Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, China’s Energy Policies and Their Environmental Impacts, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0813_china_downs.aspx
China suffers from a disconnect between the increasingly prominent position of energy issues on its domestic and foreign policy agendas and the capacity of the country’s institutions to manage the energy sector. Some Chinese commentators have even argued that the biggest threat to China’s energy security is posed by the very institutions responsible for enhancing it. Consequently, restructuring China’s energy policymaking apparatus has been a subject of intense debate in recent years as the country has grappled with an unexpected surge in energy demand, growing dependence on energy imports, rising global energy prices and periodic domestic energy supply shortages. Authority over China’s energy sector at the national level is fractured among more than a dozen government agencies, the most important of which is the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Within the NDRC itself, responsibility for energy is similarly scattered among multiple departments. Prior to the restructuring in March 2008, the key component was the Energy Bureau, which had a broad mandate but lacked the authority, tools and manpower to fulfill it. In 2005, the government added another cook to the kitchen with the establishment of the National Energy Leading Group, an advisory body headed by Premier Wen Jiabao. While the leading group’s creation reflected recognition of the need to strengthen energy sector management, it did not eradicate China’s energy governance woes. China’s fragmented energy policymaking structure has impeded energy governance because there is no single institution, such as a Ministry of Energy, with the authority to coordinate the interests of the various stakeholders. For example, the implementation of energy laws is hampered by the fact that those laws often do not specify the government agencies responsible for implementation because of disputes over who should be in charge. Similarly, the fuel tax that the NPC approved in 1999 has not been implemented because of the failure of the relevant stakeholders to reach an agreement. The policy paralysis within the energy bureaucracy stands in sharp contrast to the activism of China’s state-owned energy companies. These firms are powerful and relatively autonomous actors. Their influence is derived from their full and vice ministerial ranks, the membership of some top executives in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, industry expertise, internationally listed subsidiaries and profitability (at least until recently). More often than not, it is China’s energy firms who initiate major energy projects and policies that are later embraced by the government, such as the West-East Pipeline and the acquisition of foreign energy assets. The companies also have some capacity to advance corporate interests at the expense of national ones. For example, oil and power generating companies have periodically reduced their output to pressure the government to raise the state-set prices of refined products and electricity, which have not kept pace with increases in the market-determined prices of crude oil and coal. Similarly, China’s national oil companies have ignored guidance from the central government about where they should invest overseas. II. China’s “new” energy policymaking structure The recent changes to China’s energy policymaking apparatus are the latest in a series of institutional reforms aimed at improving energy governance. In March 2008, the NPC approved two additions to China’s energy bureaucracy – the State Energy Commission (SEC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA). The SEC, a high-level discussion and coordination body whose specific functions, organization and staffing have not yet been determined, will replace the National Energy Leading Group. The daily affairs of the SEC will be handled by the NEA, a vice-ministerial component of the NDRC, which is the successor to the NDRC’s Energy Bureau. In addition to the Energy Bureau, the NEA is also comprised of other energy offices from the NDRC, the Office of the National Leading Group, and the nuclear power administration of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. The NEA has a broad mandate, which includes managing the country’s energy industries, drafting energy plans and policies, negotiating with international energy agencies and approving foreign energy investments. The NEA, like its predecessor, will struggle to fulfill its mandate because it lacks the authority, autonomy, manpower and tools to deal with the country’s energy challenges. Although the NEA’s capabilities in each of these areas are greater than those possessed by the NDRC Energy Bureau, they still fall short of what the NEA needs to do its job. Authority: The NEA has more political clout than its predecessor, but not enough to mitigate the bureaucratic infighting that undermines energy decision-making. The NEA is a vice-ministerial body, which is a step above that of the Energy Bureau, which was a bureau-level organization. However, the NEA still does not have the authority it needs to coordinate the interests of ministries, commissions and state-owned energy companies. One of the frustrations of officials in the NDRC Energy Bureau was that the energy companies often undercut their authority by circumventing the Bureau to hold face-to-face discussions with China’s senior leadership. The authority of the NEA is somewhat enhanced by the appointment of Zhang Guobao, a Vice-Chairman of the NDRC with full ministerial rank, as head of the NEA. While it was widely expected that Zhang would retire, his new position is a reflection of his substantial energy expertise. Zhang, who has worked at the NDRC since 1983, is a smart and skillful bureaucrat with encyclopedic knowledge of China’s energy sector. He has overseen the development of some of the country’s major infrastructure projects, including the West-East Pipeline, the transmission of electricity from west to east, the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and the expansion of Beijing Capital International Airport. Autonomy: The NEA is a creature of the NDRC. Some Chinese media reports speculated that the fact that the NEA’s offices will be separate from those of the NDRC and that the NEA will have its own Party Group – which will give the NEA greater autonomy in managing its affairs, including personnel decisions – are signs of the NEA’s independence. However, the fact that Zhang Guobao – an NDRC “lifer” – is head of the NEA and its Party Group indicates that the NEA’s room to maneuver will be constrained by the NDRC. Moreover, the NEA’s independence is limited by the fact that key tools it needs to effectively manage the energy sector are in the hands of the NDRC. Tools: Arguably the greatest constraint on the NEA’s ability to fulfill its mandate is the fact that is does not possess the authority to set energy prices, which remain the purview of the NDRC’s Pricing Department. The issue of who would end up with the power to determine energy prices was, in the words of Zhang Guobao, a subject of “constant dispute” during the bureaucratic reorganization. Although the NEA can make suggestions about energy price adjustments and should be consulted by the NDRC on any proposed changes, the shots are still being called by the NDRC (and ultimately the State Council, whose approval is needed for any major energy price changes). The fact that the NDRC retained control over energy prices is hardly surprising. The power to set prices is one of the NDRC’s main instruments of macroeconomic control, which it understandably is reluctant to relinquish, especially to a subordinate component which might be tempted to adjust energy prices in ways that run counter to broader NDRC objectives, such as combating inflation. The NEA’s lack of authority over energy prices makes its task of mitigating the current electricity shortages, which are partly rooted in price controls, especially challenging. Electricity prices are set by the state, while coal prices are determined by the market. The failure of electricity price increases to keep pace with soaring coal prices has contributed to the national power shortage because some electricity producers can't afford coal while others are unwilling to operate at a loss. With no pricing power, the NEA has little choice but to resort to administrative measures to achieve an objective that would be more effectively realized by raising and ultimately liberalizing electricity prices. Personnel: The central government is still managing the energy sector with a skeleton crew. Contrary to rumors that the NEA’s staff would be as large as 200, it ended up with just 112 people. This staff quota is certainly larger than that of the NDRC Energy Bureau, which had only 50 people, but it does not represent a major increase in the number of people directly involved in managing the energy sector at the national level. Moreover, some Chinese media reports have speculated that the NEA may face the problem of “too many generals and not enough soldiers” because at least half of the 112 slots at the NEA are for positions at the deputy department head level and above. The Party organ that determines the functions, internal structure and staff quotas for government institutions probably resisted calls for more personnel out of concern that if it approved a large staff for the NEA, then other government bodies would also press for more manpower at a time when the State Council is trying to streamline the bureaucracy. In sum, China’s new energy administration is unlikely to substantially improve energy governance. The organizational changes are tantamount to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. Although the energy bureaucracy looks a bit different, its limited capacities remain largely unchanged. Consequently, we can expect to see a continuation of business as usual: conflicts of interest will impede decision-making; the energy companies will remain important drivers of projects and policies; state-set energy prices will continue to contribute to periodic domestic energy supply shortfalls; and the NEA, with no authority to adjust energy prices, probably will resort to “second best” administrative measures to try to eradicate those shortages. The modest tinkering to China’s energy policymaking apparatus unveiled during the March 2008 NPC meeting reflects the conflicts of interest that stymie energy decision-making. Despite widespread recognition among Chinese officials and energy experts of the need to get the country’s energy institutions “right” and the growing chorus of voices calling for the establishment of a Ministry of Energy (MOE), there are powerful ministerial and corporate interests that favor the status quo. The opposition to the creation of a MOE, a hot topic of debate in Chinese energy circles in recent years, was led by the NDRC and the state-owned energy companies. The mere specter of a MOE strikes fear in the heart of the NDRC because it would deprive the NDRC of a substantial portion of its portfolio and important tools of macroeconomic control. The NDRC’s aversion is shared by the energy firms who are reluctant to have another political master and afraid that a MOE would limit their direct access to China’s leadership. Such opposition helps explain why the government was unable to forge a consensus in favor of more robust changes to China’s energy policymaking apparatus. Implications for the United States First, US policymakers should recognize that China’s fractured energy policymaking apparatus may constrain the Chinese government from doing all that US policymakers would like it to do – and indeed what Chinese leaders themselves might want to do – to enhance international energy security and combat climate change. If China falls short of our expectations it may not reflect a conscious decision by Beijing to shirk its global responsibilities but rather the limited capacity of its national energy institutions to bend other actors, notably firms and local governments, to its will.
Can’t solve warming without China—largest CO2 emitter
Chen et al 10 Chen, Qian, Peridas, Qiu, Ho: Natural Resources Defense Council, Friedmann: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Li, Wei: Institute of Rock and Soil Mechanics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Sung, Fowler: Clean Air Task Force, Seligsohn, Liu, Forbes: World Resources Institute, Zhang: China Tsinghua University, Zhao: Institute of Engineering Thermophysics, Chinese Academy of Sciences (Jason Chen, Jingjing Qian, George Peridas, Yueming Qiu, Bruce Ho, Julio Friedmann, Xiaochun Li, Ning Wei, S. Ming Sung, Mike Fowler, Deborah Seligsohn, Yue Liu, Sarah Forbes, Dongjie Zhang, Lifeng Zhao, December 2010, “Identifying Near-Term Opportunities For Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) in China,” http://docs.nrdc.org/international/files/int_10121001a.pdf)//DR. H
After three decades of rapid industrialization fueled by coal, China is now the world’s biggest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2)—the pollutant most responsible for global warming.1 This economic growth has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, and millions more could gain from further economic development. Yet continued reliance on coal-fired power threatens to create a climate catastrophe.
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<h4>torture, police brutality, deportations, and the war on terror all thump</h4><p><strong>Newman 12/3/14</strong> (Alex, "UN Torture Committee Slams U.S. Police and Military." The New American. 12/3/14. www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/19645-un-torture-committee-slams-u-s-police-and-military, TD)</p><p>After a spectacle featuring senior Obama administration officials prostrating themselves before the United Nations “Committee Against Torture,” <u>the controversial <mark>UN body released a scathing report last week accusing U.S. authorities of widespread</mark> <mark>violations of </mark>what it calls “<strong><mark>international law.”</u></strong></mark> Among other concerns, <u>the</u> global <u>panel cited <mark>everything from “police brutality</mark>” by state and local officials domestically <mark>to</mark> the actions of the <mark>U.S. military and intelligence agencies abroad.</mark> Other criticism directed at the United States focused on <strong><mark>immigration</strong> policies, <strong>deportations</strong>, <strong>prison conditions,</u></strong> <u><strong>Guantanamo Bay,</strong> the <strong>terror war</strong>, and more</mark>.¶</u> In response to the UN committee’s findings, <u>the <mark>panel called on</mark> federal <mark>officials to alter U.S. laws to comply with its demands — including abolishing the death penalty</u></mark>, reforming deportation procedures, and more. The report also called on the U.S. government to pass new federal laws defining torture in accordance with the UN Convention. In the same section, it lashed out at the U.S. government’s “interpretation” of the global “torture” regime, saying that “under international law, reservations that are contrary to the object and purpose of a treaty are impermissible.”¶ In other words, the dictator-dominated UN, rather than the U.S. Constitution, purports to be the arbiter of what is or is not “permissible.” ¶ advertisement¶ ¶ The UN bureaucrats on the committee — one comes from Morocco, another from Communist China, and one more from Communist Nepal — also called on U.S. authorities to amend “laws and regulations” to be in compliance with the global agreement. In addition, the UN committee said it “encourages” the U.S. government to ratify other global agreements purporting to bind the American people and their elected officials to globalist demands rather than the U.S. Constitution. Finally, the document is packed with calls for the federal government to go beyond its constitutional limitations in commandeering state and local governments.¶ All across the report, the UN also offered instructions to the Obama administration on everything from indefinite detention without charges or trial to releasing information on post-9/11 atrocities allegedly perpetrated by various agencies within the U.S. government. Among other demands, the UN experts called on the Obama administration to “cease the use of indefinite detention without charge or trial” — something that constitutes a serious crime against the U.S. Constitution, regardless of what the UN and its oftentimes brutal member governments claim regarding their planetary torture regime.¶ Moreover, the White House should release information on numerous instances of CIA “human rights violations, including torture, ill-treatment and enforced disappearance of persons suspected of involvement in terrorism-related crimes.” In addition to the CIA, the U.S. military and its policies — ranging from the treatment of detainees to its policy manuals — came under severe criticism in the document. Of course, virtually all of the UN’s complaints should be considered moot, because the U.S. Constitution, which established the federal government in the first place and granted it a few limited powers, already prohibits such schemes.¶ Separately, in an open letter to Obama, a UN group of self-styled “human rights experts” with bombastic titles also called on the administration to release a U.S. Senate report on CIA “interrogation” practices. “As a nation that has publicly affirmed its belief that respect for truth advances respect for the rule of law, and as a nation that frequently calls for transparency and accountability in other countries, the United States must rise to meet the standards it has set both for itself and for others,” the UN “experts” declared.¶ According to the UN “human-rights” operatives, victims of torture and human-rights defenders around the world would be “emboldened” if the Obama administration — widely described as the most secrecy-obsessed, least transparent in U.S. history — would support transparency. “On the contrary, if you yield to the CIA's demands for continued secrecy on this issue, those resisting accountability will surely misuse this decision to bolster their own agenda in their countries,” the open letter continued.¶ As The New American has reported on multiple occasions, in addition to the draconian secrecy, the Obama administration has also improperly worked to protect George W. Bush administration officials from prosecution for the myriad alleged crimes they perpetrated under color of law. “The Committee expresses concern over the ongoing failure to fully investigate allegations of torture and ill-treatment of suspects held in U.S. custody abroad, evidenced by the limited number of criminal prosecutions and convictions,” the UN torture committee said in its report about the United States, the first such “periodic review” since 2006.¶ <u>In light of the overseas torture</u> (such as water boarding) carried out by U.S. officials, <u>the UN called for “prompt, impartial and effective investigations”</u> to “ensure that alleged perpetrators and accomplices are duly prosecuted, including persons in positions of command and those who provided legal cover to torture.” If found guilty of the charges, the criminals in government should be punished with serious penalties “commensurate with the grave nature of their acts,” the UN said. Victims of U.S. government torture should also be compensated and rehabilitated, the panel said. ¶ On law enforcement, which is a power generally reserved for state and local government by the U.S. Constitution, the UN also expressed a wide array of concerns. “<u>The Committee is <mark>concerned about</mark> numerous reports of police brutality and <mark>excessive use of force by law enforcement officials, in particular against persons belonging to certain racial and ethnic groups,</mark> immigrants and LGBTI individuals, racial profiling by police and immigration offices and growing militarization of policing activities</u>,” the report said, citing Chicago’s police department as particularly alarming. ¶<strong> </p><p>No modeling in China – it’s structurally impossible</p><p>Downs 8</p><p></strong>Eric, Fellow @ Brookings, China Energy Fellow, Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, China’s Energy Policies and Their Environmental Impacts, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0813_china_downs.aspx</p><p>China suffers from a disconnect between the increasingly prominent position of energy issues on its domestic and foreign policy agendas and the capacity of the country’s institutions to manage the energy sector. Some Chinese commentators have even argued that the biggest threat to China’s energy security is posed by the very institutions responsible for enhancing it. Consequently, restructuring China’s energy policymaking apparatus has been a subject of intense debate in recent years as the country has grappled with an unexpected surge in energy demand, growing dependence on energy imports, rising global energy prices and periodic domestic energy supply shortages. <u>Authority over China’s energy sector</u> at the national level <u>is fractured</u> among more than a dozen government agencies, the most important of which is the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Within the NDRC itself, responsibility for energy is similarly scattered among multiple departments. Prior to the restructuring in March 2008, the key component was the Energy Bureau, which had a broad mandate but lacked the authority, tools and manpower to fulfill it. In 2005, the government added another cook to the kitchen with the establishment of the National Energy Leading Group, an advisory body headed by Premier Wen Jiabao. While the leading group’s creation reflected recognition of the need to strengthen energy sector management, it did not eradicate China’s energy governance woes. <u><mark>China’s fragmented</u></mark> energy <u><mark>policymaking structure has impeded energy governance</mark> because <mark>there is no single institution</u></mark>, such as a Ministry of Energy, <u>with the authority <mark>to coordinate</u></mark> the <u>interests of</u> the various <u>stakeholders</u>. For example, the <u>implementation</u> of energy laws <u>is hampered</u> by the fact that those laws often do not specify the government agencies responsible for implementation because of disputes over who should be in charge. Similarly, the fuel tax that the NPC approved in 1999 has not been implemented because of the failure of the relevant stakeholders to reach an agreement. The policy paralysis within the energy bureaucracy stands in sharp contrast to the activism of China’s state-owned energy companies. These firms are powerful and relatively autonomous actors. Their influence is derived from their full and vice ministerial ranks, the membership of some top executives in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, industry expertise, internationally listed subsidiaries and profitability (at least until recently). More often than not, it is China’s energy firms who initiate major energy projects and policies that are later embraced by the government, such as the West-East Pipeline and the acquisition of foreign energy assets. The companies also have some capacity to advance corporate interests at the expense of national ones. For example, oil and power generating companies have periodically reduced their output to pressure the government to raise the state-set prices of refined products and electricity, which have not kept pace with increases in the market-determined prices of crude oil and coal. Similarly, China’s national oil companies have ignored guidance from the central government about where they should invest overseas. II. China’s “new” energy policymaking structure The recent changes to China’s energy policymaking apparatus are the latest in a series of institutional reforms aimed at improving energy governance. In March 2008, the NPC approved two additions to China’s energy bureaucracy – the State Energy Commission (SEC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA). The SEC, a high-level discussion and coordination body whose specific functions, organization and staffing have not yet been determined, will replace the National Energy Leading Group. The daily affairs of the SEC will be handled by the NEA, a vice-ministerial component of the NDRC, which is the successor to the NDRC’s Energy Bureau. In addition to the Energy Bureau, the NEA is also comprised of other energy offices from the NDRC, the Office of the National Leading Group, and the nuclear power administration of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. The NEA has a broad mandate, which includes managing the country’s energy industries, drafting energy plans and policies, negotiating with international energy agencies and approving foreign energy investments. The NEA, like its predecessor, will struggle to fulfill its mandate because it lacks the authority, autonomy, manpower and tools to deal with the country’s energy challenges. Although the NEA’s capabilities in each of these areas are greater than those possessed by the NDRC Energy Bureau, they still fall short of what the NEA needs to do its job. Authority: The NEA has more political clout than its predecessor, but not enough to mitigate the bureaucratic infighting that undermines energy decision-making. The NEA is a vice-ministerial body, which is a step above that of the Energy Bureau, which was a bureau-level organization. However, the NEA still does not have the authority it needs to coordinate the interests of ministries, commissions and state-owned energy companies. One of the frustrations of officials in the NDRC Energy Bureau was that the energy companies often undercut their authority by circumventing the Bureau to hold face-to-face discussions with China’s senior leadership. The authority of the NEA is somewhat enhanced by the appointment of Zhang Guobao, a Vice-Chairman of the NDRC with full ministerial rank, as head of the NEA. While it was widely expected that Zhang would retire, his new position is a reflection of his substantial energy expertise. Zhang, who has worked at the NDRC since 1983, is a smart and skillful bureaucrat with encyclopedic knowledge of China’s energy sector. He has overseen the development of some of the country’s major infrastructure projects, including the West-East Pipeline, the transmission of electricity from west to east, the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and the expansion of Beijing Capital International Airport. Autonomy: The NEA is a creature of the NDRC. Some Chinese media reports speculated that the fact that the NEA’s offices will be separate from those of the NDRC and that the NEA will have its own Party Group – which will give the NEA greater autonomy in managing its affairs, including personnel decisions – are signs of the NEA’s independence. However, the fact that Zhang Guobao – an NDRC “lifer” – is head of the NEA and its Party Group indicates that the NEA’s room to maneuver will be constrained by the NDRC. Moreover, the NEA’s independence is limited by the fact that key tools it needs to effectively manage the energy sector are in the hands of the NDRC. Tools: Arguably the greatest constraint on the NEA’s ability to fulfill its mandate is the fact that is does not possess the authority to set energy prices, which remain the purview of the NDRC’s Pricing Department. The issue of who would end up with the power to determine energy prices was, in the words of Zhang Guobao, a subject of “constant dispute” during the bureaucratic reorganization. Although the NEA can make suggestions about energy price adjustments and should be consulted by the NDRC on any proposed changes, the shots are still being called by the NDRC (and ultimately the State Council, whose approval is needed for any major energy price changes). The fact that the NDRC retained control over energy prices is hardly surprising. The power to set prices is one of the NDRC’s main instruments of macroeconomic control, which it understandably is reluctant to relinquish, especially to a subordinate component which might be tempted to adjust energy prices in ways that run counter to broader NDRC objectives, such as combating inflation. The NEA’s lack of authority over energy prices makes its task of mitigating the current electricity shortages, which are partly rooted in price controls, especially challenging. Electricity prices are set by the state, while coal prices are determined by the market. The failure of electricity price increases to keep pace with soaring coal prices has contributed to the national power shortage because some electricity producers can't afford coal while others are unwilling to operate at a loss. With no pricing power, the NEA has little choice but to resort to administrative measures to achieve an objective that would be more effectively realized by raising and ultimately liberalizing electricity prices. Personnel: <u><mark>The central government is</u></mark> still <u><mark>managing the energy sector with a skeleton crew</u></mark>. Contrary to rumors that <u>the NEA’s staff </u>would be as large as 200, <u>it ended up with just 112 people</u>. This staff quota is certainly larger than that of <u>the</u> <u>NDRC</u> Energy Bureau, which <u>had only 50 people</u>, but it does not represent a major increase in the number of people directly involved in managing the energy sector at the national level. Moreover, some Chinese media reports have speculated that the NEA may face the problem of “too many generals and not enough soldiers” because at least half of the 112 slots at the NEA are for positions at the deputy department head level and above. The Party organ that determines the functions, internal structure and staff quotas for government institutions probably resisted calls for more personnel out of concern that if it approved a large staff for the NEA, then other government bodies would also press for more manpower at a time when the State Council is trying to streamline the bureaucracy. In sum, <u>China’s</u> new energy <u>administration is unlikely to substantially improve</u> energy <u>governance</u>. The organizational <u>changes are</u> <u>tantamount to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic</u>. Although the energy bureaucracy looks a bit different, its limited capacities remain largely unchanged. Consequently, <u>we can expect</u> to see a continuation of <u>business as usual: conflicts of interest will impede decision-making</u>; the <u>energy companies will remain important drivers</u> of projects and policies; state-set energy prices will continue to contribute to periodic domestic energy supply shortfalls; and <u>the NEA</u>, with no authority to adjust energy prices, probably <u>will resort to “second best” administrative measures</u> to try to eradicate those shortages. The modest tinkering to China’s energy policymaking apparatus unveiled during the March 2008 NPC meeting reflects the conflicts of interest that stymie energy decision-making. Despite widespread recognition among Chinese officials and energy experts of the need to get the country’s energy institutions “right” and the growing chorus of voices calling for the establishment of a Ministry of Energy (MOE), there are powerful ministerial and corporate interests that favor the status quo. The opposition to the creation of a MOE, a hot topic of debate in Chinese energy circles in recent years, was led by the NDRC and the state-owned energy companies. The mere specter of a MOE strikes fear in the heart of the NDRC because it would deprive the NDRC of a substantial portion of its portfolio and important tools of macroeconomic control. The NDRC’s aversion is shared by the energy firms who are reluctant to have another political master and afraid that a MOE would limit their direct access to China’s leadership. Such opposition helps explain why the government was unable to forge a consensus in favor of more robust changes to China’s energy policymaking apparatus. Implications for the United States First, <u>US policymakers should recognize that <mark>China’s fractured energy policymaking</mark> apparatus <mark>may constrain the Chinese government from </mark>doing all that US policymakers would like it to do </u>– and indeed what Chinese leaders themselves might want to do – <u>to</u> enhance international energy security and <u><mark>combat climate change</mark>. If China falls short</u> of our expectations <u>it may</u> not <u>reflect</u> a conscious decision by Beijing to shirk its global responsibilities but rather <u>the limited capacity of its national energy institutions to bend other actors, notably firms and local governments, to its will</u><strong>.</p><p>Can’t solve warming without China—largest CO2 emitter </p><p>Chen et al 10 </strong>Chen, Qian, Peridas, Qiu, Ho: Natural Resources Defense Council, Friedmann: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Li, Wei: Institute of Rock and Soil Mechanics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Sung, Fowler: Clean Air Task Force, Seligsohn, Liu, Forbes: World Resources Institute, Zhang: China Tsinghua University, Zhao: Institute of Engineering Thermophysics, Chinese Academy of Sciences (Jason Chen, Jingjing Qian, George Peridas, Yueming Qiu, Bruce Ho, Julio Friedmann, Xiaochun Li, Ning Wei, S. Ming Sung, Mike Fowler, Deborah Seligsohn, Yue Liu, Sarah Forbes, Dongjie Zhang, Lifeng Zhao, December 2010, “Identifying Near-Term Opportunities For Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) in China,” http://docs.nrdc.org/international/files/int_10121001a.pdf)//DR<u>. H</p><p></u>After three decades of rapid industrialization fueled by coal, <u><mark>China is</mark> now <mark>the world’s biggest emitter of carbon dioxide</mark> (CO2)—<mark>the pollutant most responsible for global warming.1</mark> </u>This economic growth has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, and millions more could gain from further economic development<u>. Yet <mark>continued reliance on coal</mark>-fired power <mark>threatens to create a <strong>climate catastrophe</strong>.</p></u></mark>
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| 440,924 | 9 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,397 | null | null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4> </h4>
| null | null |
Contention 2 Illicit market
| 431,026 | 1 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,398 |
D. T is a voter because it's needed for clash and good debate
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>D. T is a voter because it's needed for clash and good debate</h4></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
4
| 431,025 | 1 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,399 |
Legalization requires regulation
|
Showden, 9 -
|
Showden, 9 - Assistant Professor Political Science University of North Carolina Greensboro (Carisa, “Prostitution and Women’s Agency: A Feminist Argument for Decriminalization” http://policeprostitutionandpolitics.com/pdfs_all/Academics%20Research%20Articles%20Support%20Prostitution%20%20Decriminalization/2009%20Prostitution%20and%20Womens%20Agency%20A%20Feminist%20Argument%20for%20Decriminalization%20.pdf
|
There are three broad legal approaches to dealing with prostitution: criminalization, decriminalization, and legalization Decriminalization removes legal penalties from engaging in prostitution; legalization imposes some form of state regulation which can be achieved through a number of, and different combinations of, means: zoning, mandatory health testing brothel residency rules, required registration with state authorities
| null |
There are three broad legal approaches to dealing with prostitution: criminalization, decriminalization, and legalization. Decriminalization removes legal penalties from engaging in prostitution; legalization imposes some form of state regulation, which can be achieved through a number of, and different combinations of, means: zoning, mandatory health testing of prostitutes, brothel residency rules, required registration with state authorities, etc. Criminalization is the tactic supported by radical feminists, and abolitionism has had the most success as a political and legal argument in the United States. Unfortunately, making prostitution illegal has done nothing to decrease the demand for prostitution, the cultural understanding of prostitution, or the harms to women in prostitution. Instead, the abolition arguments help to continue to mark ―whores‖ off from other women as a separate and stigmatized category; they vest in the state continued power over women‘s bodies and with it powers of domination and discipline; they essentialize male and female sexuality and their relationship to each other. At a practical level, criminalization contributes to some of the worst abuses of streetwalking in particular and makes it harder for women to leave prostitution for jobs in the ―licit‖ economy, particularly if they have a criminal record because of prostitution work.
| 1,383 |
<h4><strong>Legalization requires regulation</h4><p>Showden, 9 -</strong> Assistant Professor Political Science University of North Carolina Greensboro (Carisa, “Prostitution and Women’s Agency: A Feminist Argument for Decriminalization” http://policeprostitutionandpolitics.com/pdfs_all/Academics%20Research%20Articles%20Support%20Prostitution%20%20Decriminalization/2009%20Prostitution%20and%20Womens%20Agency%20A%20Feminist%20Argument%20for%20Decriminalization%20.pdf</p><p><u>There are three broad legal approaches to dealing with prostitution: criminalization, decriminalization, and legalization</u>. <u>Decriminalization removes legal penalties from engaging in prostitution; <strong>legalization imposes some form of state regulation</u></strong>, <u>which can be achieved through a number of, and different combinations of, means: zoning, mandatory health testing</u> of prostitutes, <u>brothel residency rules, required registration with state authorities</u>, etc. Criminalization is the tactic supported by radical feminists, and abolitionism has had the most success as a political and legal argument in the United States. Unfortunately, making prostitution illegal has done nothing to decrease the demand for prostitution, the cultural understanding of prostitution, or the harms to women in prostitution. Instead, the abolition arguments help to continue to mark ―whores‖ off from other women as a separate and stigmatized category; they vest in the state continued power over women‘s bodies and with it powers of domination and discipline; they essentialize<strong> male and female sexuality and their relationship to each other. At a practical level, criminalization contributes to some of the worst abuses of streetwalking in particular and makes it harder for women to leave prostitution for jobs in the ―licit‖ economy, particularly if they have a criminal record because of prostitution work. </p></strong>
|
2nc
| null |
advantage
| 431,028 | 5 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,400 |
Q solves- collaboration with private sector overcomes any shortage and prosecutorial deterrence solves
|
Konkel 9/10
|
Konkel 9/10/2014 (Frank, writer for NextGov, IS THERE ANY PART OF GOVERNMENT THAT HASN’T BEEN HACKED YET?, http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2014/09/there-any-part-government-hasnt-been-hacked-yet/93704/)
|
The way to stay ahead of the evolving threats is to collaborate and share information with the private sector We’re engaging in an unprecedented level of collaboration” with industry international law organizations and other bodies, those partnerships will continue to expand. the FBI released 40 near real-time alerts on “current and emerging threat trends and technical indicators,” to the private sector – with 21 of those alerts sent to the financial industry. The agency is now engaging in a more back-and-forth dialogue as opposed to the FBI listening and rarely sharing – which used to be the case Anderson also vowed harsher deterrents for malicious actors, referencing the recent indictments of Chinese citizens who were caught hacking Coburn was pleased with FBI’s get-tough approach. “I’m happy to see the FBI being aggressive on deterrence We need prosecutorial deterrence. I’m thankful of that attitude from FBI both domestically and internationally
|
The way to stay ahead of the evolving threats is to collaborate with the private sector We’re engaging in an unprecedented level of collaboration partnerships will continue to expand. The agency is engaging in back-and-forth dialogue . Anderson vowed harsher deterrents
|
Feds Cite ‘Unprecedented’ Collaboration with Industry The only way to stay ahead of the evolving threats is to collaborate and share information with the private sector, officials testified. “We’re engaging in an unprecedented level of collaboration” with industry, international law organizations and other bodies, Anderson said, and those partnerships will continue to expand. For example, the FBI released 40 near real-time alerts on “current and emerging threat trends and technical indicators,” to the private sector – with 21 of those alerts sent to the financial industry. The agency is now engaging in a more back-and-forth dialogue as opposed to the FBI listening and rarely sharing – which used to be the case. Anderson also vowed harsher deterrents for malicious actors, referencing the recent indictments of Chinese citizens who were caught hacking the networks of American companies. Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla., said he was pleased with FBI’s get-tough approach. “I’m happy to see the FBI being aggressive on deterrence,” said Coburn, the committee’s ranking Republican. “For so long, we thought building a higher wall was [the way to protect], but people are going to climb over any war we have. We need prosecutorial deterrence. I’m thankful of that attitude from FBI both domestically and internationally.”
| 1,320 |
<h4><strong>Q solves- collaboration with private sector overcomes any shortage and prosecutorial deterrence solves</h4><p>Konkel 9/10</strong>/2014 (Frank, writer for NextGov, IS THERE ANY PART OF GOVERNMENT THAT HASN’T BEEN HACKED YET?, http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2014/09/there-any-part-government-hasnt-been-hacked-yet/93704/)</p><p>Feds Cite ‘Unprecedented’ Collaboration with Industry <u><mark>The</u></mark> only <u><mark>way to stay ahead of the evolving threats</mark> <mark>is to collaborate</mark> and share information <mark>with the private sector</u></mark>, officials testified. “<u><strong><mark>We’re</mark> <mark>engaging in an unprecedented level of collaboration</mark>” with industry</u></strong>, <u>international law organizations and other bodies,</u> Anderson said, and <u>those <mark>partnerships will continue to</mark> <mark>expand.</u></mark> For example, <u>the FBI released 40 near real-time alerts on “current and emerging threat trends and technical indicators,” to the private sector – with 21 of those alerts sent to the financial industry.</u> <u><mark>The agency is</mark> now <mark>engaging in</mark> a more <strong><mark>back-and-forth dialogue</strong></mark> as opposed to the FBI listening and rarely sharing – which used to be the case</u><mark>. <u>Anderson</mark> also <mark>vowed harsher deterrents</mark> for malicious actors, referencing the recent indictments of Chinese citizens who were caught hacking</u> the networks of American companies. Sen. Tom <u>Coburn</u>, R-Okla., said he <u>was pleased with FBI’s get-tough approach. “I’m happy to see the FBI being aggressive on deterrence</u>,” said Coburn, the committee’s ranking Republican. “For so long, we thought building a higher wall was [the way to protect], but people are going to climb over any war we have. <u>We need prosecutorial deterrence. I’m thankful of that attitude from FBI both domestically and internationally</u><strong>.”</p></strong>
| null |
1nr
|
DA
| 203,265 | 4 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,401 |
Deal will succeed now- multiple pressures on Iran
|
CNN 1/1
|
CNN 1/1/2015 (What (not) to look forward to in 2015: ISIS, life on Mars, Europe's mood, http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/31/world/lister-2015-predictions/)
|
A common enemy -- ISIS -- has led to a tacit understanding between the United States and Iran. Whether that opens the window to a broader relationship -- and whether negotiations on Iran's nuclear program will succeed -- is one of the big questions of 2015 Deadlines for agreement on limiting Iran's nuclear program have come and gone: the next is July Obama has invested heavily in seeking a deal Rouhani is keen to show the Iranian people he can end their economic and political isolation Hardliners in Iran may see such an opening as undermining their influence The momentum appears to be flowing against them but the gaps between Tehran and the international community remain formidable.
There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba This deal will be about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. the parties to the talks have given themselves more time They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions That would provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment.
|
A common enemy -- ISIS -- has led to a tacit understanding between the United States and Iran. Whether that opens the window to a broader relationship -- and whethe negotiations on Iran's nuclear program will succeed -- is one of the big questions of 2015 Rouhani is keen to show the Iranian people he can end their economic and political isolation. ardliners e momentum appears to be flowing against them, but the gaps between Tehran and the international community remain formidable
no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. is deal will b about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets anctions would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment
|
Obama also spoke of "strategic patience" -- which is very much on show in Washington's gradual reaching-out to Tehran. A common enemy -- ISIS -- has led to a tacit understanding between the United States and Iran. Whether that opens the window to a broader relationship -- and whether negotiations on Iran's nuclear program will succeed -- is one of the big questions of 2015. Deadlines for agreement on limiting Iran's nuclear program have come and gone: the next is July. The Obama administration has invested heavily in seeking a deal since President Hassan Rouhani's election in 2013, and Rouhani is keen to show the Iranian people he can end their economic and political isolation. Obama, in his year-end interview with NPR, said he believed "there are elements inside of Iran that recognize the opportunity and want to take it." Hardliners in Iran may see such an opening as undermining their influence and opening the door to all sorts of Western influences. The momentum appears to be flowing against them, but the gaps between Tehran and the international community remain formidable. Perhaps the best to be expected is an interim deal that further eases sanctions.
Progress—prefer momentum
Borger 12/31/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation)
There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. This deal will not be about cash machines in the Caribbean, but about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away from the table. A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. So the parties to the talks have given themselves more time – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor. The legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. That would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, and a very volatile environment. It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year.
| 5,144 |
<h4><strong>Deal will succeed now- multiple pressures on Iran</h4><p>CNN 1/1</strong>/2015 (What (not) to look forward to in 2015: ISIS, life on Mars, Europe's mood, http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/31/world/lister-2015-predictions/)</p><p>Obama also spoke of "strategic patience" -- which is very much on show in Washington's gradual reaching-out to Tehran. <u><mark>A common enemy -- ISIS -- has led to a tacit understanding between the United States and Iran. Whether that opens the window to a broader relationship -- and whethe</mark>r<mark> negotiations on Iran's nuclear program will succeed -- is one of the big questions of 2015</u></mark>. <u>Deadlines for agreement on limiting Iran's nuclear program have come and gone: the next is July</u>. The <u>Obama</u> administration <u>has invested heavily in seeking a deal</u> since President Hassan Rouhani's election in 2013, and <u><mark>Rouhani is keen to show the Iranian people he can end their economic and political isolation</u>.</mark> Obama, in his year-end interview with NPR, said he believed "there are elements inside of Iran that recognize the opportunity and want to take it." <u>H<mark>ardliners</mark> in Iran may see such an opening as undermining their influence</u> and opening the door to all sorts of Western influences. <u><strong>Th<mark>e momentum appears to be flowing against them</u></strong>, <u>but the gaps between Tehran and the international community remain formidable</mark>.</u><strong> Perhaps the best to be expected is an interim deal that further eases sanctions.</p><p>Progress—prefer momentum </p><p>Borger 12/31</strong>/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation)</p><p><u>There will be <mark>no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.</mark> In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba</u>, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. <u>Th<mark>is deal will</u></mark> not <u><mark>b</mark>e</u> about cash machines in the Caribbean, but <u><mark>about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth</u></mark>. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These <u><mark>gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away</u></mark> from the table. <u><strong><mark>A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel</u></strong>; <u>the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a <strong>wave of proliferation across the region and beyond</strong> as other countries hedge their bets</mark>. </u>So <u>the parties to the talks have given themselves more time</u> – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. <u>They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran</u>. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, <u>the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor</u>. The <u>legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered s<mark>anctions</u></mark>, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. <u>That</u> would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it <u><mark>would</u> also <u>provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament</u></mark>, the Majlis, <u><mark>and a very volatile environment</mark>. </u><strong>It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year.</p></strong>
|
1nr
|
Strikes
|
Talks fail
| 171,429 | 23 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,402 |
The fifty United States and relevant territories should legalize nearly all marihuana.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The fifty United States and relevant territories should legalize nearly all marihuana.</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 431,027 | 1 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,403 |
The illicit market exploits in a way like slavery
|
Delmonico 3
|
Delmonico 3 Francis L. Delmonico, Director of the Renal Transplantation Unit at Massachusetts
|
the exploitation of organ sellers veers dangerously close to human slavery The pressures put by organ brokers upon the desperation of the world’s dislocated, refugee, and poorest populations to provide the scarce commodities reveals the limits of argu- ments based solely on individual autonomy. the pressure of organ brokers upon the poor makes their decision to sell an organ anything but a free and autonomous choice. The most disturbing issue of organ sales is the formation of an economic underclass of organ donors throughout the world to serve the wealthy. they are indifferent to the social and individual pathologies that markets in kidneys and other body parts produce, such as the documented evidence of postsurgery medical complications, chronic pain, psychological problems, unemployment, decreased earning power, social ostracism, and social stigma faced by kidney sellers in many parts of the world
|
exploitation of organ sellers veers dangerously close to human slavery pressures put by organ brokers provide the scarce commodities reveals the limits of argu- ments based solely on individual autonomy. makes their decision to sell an organ anything but a free and autonomous choice formation of an economic underclass of organ donors throughout the world to serve the wealthy they are indifferent to the pathologies that markets in kidneys and other body parts produce medical complications, chronic pain, psychological problems, unemployment, decreased earning power, social ostracism, and social stigma faced by kidney sellers
|
General Hospital, the medical director at the New England Organ Bank, and Professor of
Surgery at Harvard Medical School; and Nancy Scheper-Hughes.Director of Organs Watch and Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley Zygon, vol. 38, no. 3 (September 2003)
WHY WE SHOULD NOT PAY FOR HUMAN ORGANS Ebsco
Although class distinctions are an almost naturalized part of social life in all complex societies, in this particular instance the exploitation of organ sellers veers dangerously close to human slavery, as argued by Giovanni Berlinguer (Berlinguer and Garrafa 1996). The pressures put by organ brokers upon the desperation of the world’s dislocated, refugee, and poorest populations to provide the scarce commodities reveals the limits of argu- ments based solely on individual autonomy. Yes, even the poorest people of the world “make choices,” but they do not make these freely or under social or economic conditions of their own making. Further, the pressure of organ brokers upon the poor makes their decision to sell an organ anything but a free and autonomous choice. These secular arguments reach a conclusion similar to one derived from Christian morality—that the sale of human organs is unethical. The most disturbing issue of organ sales to both Christian and secular ethicists is the formation of an economic underclass of organ donors throughout the world to serve the wealthy. This is not to suggest that proponents of organ sales are in favor of exploiting the poor but, rather, that they are indifferent to the social and individual pathologies that markets in kidneys and other body parts produce, such as the documented evidence of postsurgery medical complications, chronic pain, psychological problems, unemployment, decreased earning power, social ostracism, and social stigma faced by kidney sellers in many parts of the world (see Zargooshi 2002; Jimenez and Scheper-Hughes 2002a; Ram 2002).
| 1,963 |
<h4><strong>The illicit market exploits in a way like slavery</h4><p>Delmonico 3 </strong>Francis L. Delmonico, Director of the Renal Transplantation Unit at Massachusetts</p><p>General Hospital, the medical director at the New England Organ Bank, and Professor of</p><p>Surgery at Harvard Medical School; and Nancy Scheper-Hughes.Director of Organs Watch and Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley Zygon, vol. 38, no. 3 (September 2003)</p><p>WHY WE SHOULD NOT PAY FOR HUMAN ORGANS Ebsco </p><p>Although class distinctions are an almost naturalized part of social life in all complex societies, in this particular instance <u>the <mark>exploitation of organ sellers veers dangerously close to human slavery</u></mark>, as argued by Giovanni Berlinguer (Berlinguer and Garrafa 1996). <u>The <mark>pressures put by organ brokers</mark> upon the desperation of the world’s dislocated, refugee, and poorest populations to <mark>provide the scarce commodities reveals the limits of argu- ments based solely on individual autonomy.</mark> </u>Yes, even the poorest people of the world “make choices,” but they do not make these freely or under social or economic conditions of their own making. Further, <u>the pressure of organ brokers upon the poor <mark>makes their decision to sell an organ anything but a free and autonomous choice</mark>. </u>These secular arguments reach a conclusion similar to one derived from Christian morality—that the sale of human organs is unethical. <u>The most disturbing issue of organ sales </u>to both Christian and secular ethicists <u>is the <mark>formation of an economic underclass of organ donors throughout the world to serve the wealthy</mark>.</u> This is not to suggest that proponents of organ sales are in favor of exploiting the poor but, rather, that <u><mark>they are indifferent to the </mark>social and individual <mark>pathologies that markets in kidneys and other body parts produce</mark>, such as the documented evidence of postsurgery <mark>medical complications, chronic pain, psychological problems, unemployment, decreased earning power, social ostracism, and social stigma faced by kidney sellers</mark> in many parts of the world</u> (see Zargooshi 2002; Jimenez and Scheper-Hughes 2002a; Ram 2002). </p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 Illicit market
| 430,260 | 15 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,404 |
Their “legalize key” ev says decrim is sufficient—the decrim bad parts of the card are a straw person about sex-negative feminists
|
Frug 91
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Frug 91, their author [Mary, Professor, New England School of Law, “A POSTMODERN FEMINIST LEGAL MANIFESTO”, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1045]
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Feminists who are against legalization envision a decriminalization project that would develop strategies for preventing women from participating in sex work their conviction that women are defined as women by their sexual subordination to men leads them to argue that sex workers should be extricated from their condition Not all legal feminist believe that prostitutes are terrorized full time I do not think that the sex workers' claims for legalization constitute the postmodern feminist legal voice. I am also unsure whether I support their position on legalization. But I believe that my analysis of the decriminalization dispute in which they are participating illustrates how postmodern legal feminism can seek and claim different voices, voices which will challenge the power of the congealed meanings of the female body that legal rules and legal discourse permit and sustain.
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Feminists who are against legalization envision decriminalization that would prevent women from participating in sex work Not all legal feminist believe prostitutes are terrorized I do not think sex workers' claims for legalization constitute the feminist legal voice. I am unsure whether I support their position on legalization. But I believe decriminalization illustrates how legal feminism can seek and claim different voices which will challenge the power of the congealed meanings of the female body that legal rules and legal discourse permit and sustain.
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Feminists who are against legalization -- this is the radical position -- envision a decriminalization project that would develop strategies for preventing women from participating in sex work, rather than strategies that would make prostitution a more comfortable line of work. Radical feminists, such as Kathleen Barry, are sympathetic to the plight of sex workers. n20 But their conviction that women are defined as women by their sexual subordination to men leads them to argue that sex workers are particularly victimized by patriarchy and that they should be extricated from their condition rather than supported in their work. These arguments against legalization are in the language of the terrorized female body. Not all legal feminist believe that prostitutes are terrorized full time. Some feminists -- I'll call this group the liberals -- believe that at least some sex workers, occasionally, exercise sexual autonomy. But these feminists do not favor assimilating sex work into the wage market. They oppose legalization because they object to the kind of sexual autonomy legalization would support. n21 That is, although they support the right of women to do sex work -- even at the cost of reinforcing male dominance -- they resist the commodification of women's sexuality. Sex workers themselves -- who inspire the postmodern position as I develop it here -- want legal support for sex that is severed from its reproduction function and from romance, affection, and long-term relationships. n22 Because "legal" sexual autonomy is conventionally extended to women only by rules that locate sexuality in marriage or [*1059] by rules that allow women decisional autonomy regarding reproductive issues, arguments in support of law reforms that would legalize sex work conflict with the language of the maternalized female body. The arguments that sex workers are making to assimilate their work into the wage market appeal to a sexualized femininity that is something other than a choice between criminalized and maternalized sex or a choice between terrorized and maternalized sex. This appeal to a fresh image of the female body is based on a reorganization of the three images of femininity I described earlier; it arises within the play of these three images. Its originality suggests, to me, resistance to the dominant images. It is significant that sex workers have "found" a different voice of feminine sexuality through the process of political organizing, through efforts to speak out against and to change the conditions of their lives. For me, the promise of postmodern legal feminism lies in the juncture of feminist politics and the genealogy of the female body in law. It is in this juncture that we can simultaneously deploy the commonalities among real women, in their historically situated, material circumstances, and at the same time challenge the conventional meanings of "woman" that sustain the subordinating conditions of women's lives. I do not think that the sex workers' claims for legalization constitute the postmodern feminist legal voice. I am also unsure whether I support their position on legalization. But I believe that my analysis of the decriminalization dispute in which they are participating illustrates how postmodern legal feminism can seek and claim different voices, voices which will challenge the power of the congealed meanings of the female body that legal rules and legal discourse permit and sustain.
| 3,461 |
<h4><strong>Their “legalize key” ev says decrim is sufficient—the decrim bad parts of the card are a <u>straw person </u>about <u>sex-negative feminists</h4><p></u>Frug 91</strong>, their author [Mary, Professor, New England School of Law, “A POSTMODERN FEMINIST LEGAL MANIFESTO”, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1045]</p><p><u><mark>Feminists <strong>who are against legalization</u></strong></mark> -- this is the radical position -- <u><mark>envision</mark> a <mark>decriminalization</mark> project <strong><mark>that would</mark> develop strategies for <mark>prevent</mark>ing <mark>women from participating in sex work</u></strong></mark>, rather than strategies that would make prostitution a more comfortable line of work. Radical feminists, such as Kathleen Barry, are sympathetic to the plight of sex workers. n20 But <u>their conviction that <strong>women are defined as women by their sexual subordination to men </strong>leads them to argue that sex workers</u> are particularly victimized by patriarchy and that they <u>should be extricated from their condition</u> rather than supported in their work. These arguments against legalization are in the language of the terrorized female body. <u><strong><mark>Not all legal feminist believe</mark> that <mark>prostitutes are terrorized</mark> full time</u></strong>. Some feminists -- I'll call this group the liberals -- believe that at least some sex workers, occasionally, exercise sexual autonomy. But these feminists do not favor assimilating sex work into the wage market. They oppose legalization because they object to the kind of sexual autonomy legalization would support. n21 That is, although they support the right of women to do sex work -- even at the cost of reinforcing male dominance -- they resist the commodification of women's sexuality. Sex workers themselves -- who inspire the postmodern position as I develop it here -- want legal support for sex that is severed from its reproduction function and from romance, affection, and long-term relationships. n22 Because "legal" sexual autonomy is conventionally extended to women only by rules that locate sexuality in marriage or [*1059] by rules that allow women decisional autonomy regarding reproductive issues, arguments in support of law reforms that would legalize sex work conflict with the language of the maternalized female body. The arguments that sex workers are making to assimilate their work into the wage market appeal to a sexualized femininity that is something other than a choice between criminalized and maternalized sex or a choice between terrorized and maternalized sex. This appeal to a fresh image of the female body is based on a reorganization of the three images of femininity I described earlier; it arises within the play of these three images. Its originality suggests, to me, resistance to the dominant images. It is significant that sex workers have "found" a different voice of feminine sexuality through the process of political organizing, through efforts to speak out against and to change the conditions of their lives. For me, the promise of postmodern legal feminism lies in the juncture of feminist politics and the genealogy of the female body in law. It is in this juncture that we can simultaneously deploy the commonalities among real women, in their historically situated, material circumstances, and at the same time challenge the conventional meanings of "woman" that sustain the subordinating conditions of women's lives. <u><mark>I <strong>do not think</strong></mark> that the <mark>sex workers' claims for legalization constitute the </mark>postmodern <mark>feminist legal voice. I am</mark> also <strong><mark>unsure</strong> whether I support their position on legalization. But I believe</mark> that my analysis of the <strong><mark>decriminalization</strong></mark> dispute in which they are participating <mark>illustrates how </mark>postmodern <mark>legal feminism can seek and claim <strong>different voices</strong></mark>, voices <mark>which will challenge the power of the congealed meanings of the female body that legal rules and legal discourse permit and sustain.</mark> </p></u>
|
2nc
| null |
advantage
| 98,410 | 5 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
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Navy
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5
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James Madison Lepp-Miller
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McElhinny
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T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
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