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743,205 |
PC’s key to action in the lame duck
|
Baltimore Sun 9/26
|
Baltimore Sun 9/26/2014 (Eric Holder to step down as U.S. attorney general; Administration is expected to seek a quick Senate confirmation of a successor , lexis)
|
The battle over Holder's replacement set the stage for a partisan power struggle likely to extend into the lame-duck The administration hopes to win a quick confirmation but Republicans are calling for confirmation to be pushed to next year Democrats will want to swiftly approve a new attorney general That will be met with protests by Republicans even with Republican opposition, the Democratic-controlled Senate could theoretically push through a nominee Some Republicans already seek a delay.
|
battle over Holder's replacement set the stage for a partisan power struggle likely to extend into the lame-duck The administration hopes to win a quick confirmation Democrats will want to swiftly approve a new attorney general even with Republican opposition, the Democratic-controlled Senate could theoretically push through a nominee
|
Names already being tossed around inside the White House and the halls of Congress include Solicitor General Donald Verrilli Jr.; Preet Bharara, the U.S. attorney in New York, who handled bank fraud and terror cases; Janet Napolitano, former Homeland Department secretary; former White House counsel Kathryn Ruemmler; Deputy Attorney General James Cole, the No. 2 official at Justice; and Mary Jo White, a former U.S. attorney in New York who now heads the Securities and Exchange Commission. Two other potential successors, Massachusetts Gov. Deval Patrick and California Attorney General Kamala Harris, said Thursday that they had no plans to take the job. The likely battle over Holder's replacement set the stage for a partisan power struggle that is likely to extend into the post-election lame-duck session of Congress or even beyond. The administration hopes to win a quick confirmation from the Democratic-controlled Senate in the coming months, but some Republicans -- who are betting they will seize control of the Senate in the November election -- are already calling for the confirmation to be pushed to next year. Holder, who had hinted for months that he was planning to leave, came to the Justice Department in the winter of 2009 as the 82nd attorney general, a figure well-versed in the difficult, sometimes delicate, task of running a sprawling law enforcement agency after earlier serving as deputy attorney general in the Clinton administration. He pleased Democrats by reinvigorating the Justice Department's efforts on civil rights, same-sex marriage, voting protections and prosecution of abusive police officers. "When the history books are written, he will absolutely go down as one of the best attorney generals when it comes to civil rights, up there next to [Robert] Kennedy" said Leslie Proll, director of the Washington office of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund. "It was not only his policies but his talking about race that was important, Proll said. Yet Holder also deeply disappointed some progressives who expected more from the nation's first African-American attorney general. For much of Obama's first term, Holder was rarely seen or heard, and many thought his leadership style was lacking. "We've had profound disagreements with the attorney general on national security issues," said ACLU executive director Anthony D. Romero, after praising Holder's civil rights record. "During his tenure, DOJ approved the drone killing of an American far away from any battlefield, approved the NSA's mass surveillance programs, failed to prosecute any of the Bush administration torturers, and presided over more leak prosecutions than all previous Justice Departments combined." But in the past two years he seemed to find a new energy and purpose, mounting investigations into abusive police departments, moving to shorten prison sentences for some drug offenders, and championing civil rights, gay rights and protections for minority voters. "His dedication to defending Americans' voting rights, at a time when these constitutional rights are under attack, has been supremely important," said Sen. Patrick Leahy, a Vermont Democrat and staunch Holder supporter who is chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Conservatives were united in their animosity toward Holder, almost from the start. In his first major speech, Holder enraged conservatives for saying the U.S. had become a "nation of cowards" for not dealing with lingering racial tensions. He was pilloried for the scandal involving a failed gun-trafficking operation on the Southwestern border known as "Fast and Furious." A Border Patrol agent was killed, and Holder was found in contempt of Congress for refusing to turn over documents, a first for a sitting Cabinet member. Holder also stumbled badly by trying to send Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and four other top Sept. 11, 2001, plotters to a federal trial in New York, only to be forced to relinquish the case to a military tribunal at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, when lawmakers opposed prosecuting the alleged terrorists in U.S. civilian court. Rep. Darrell Issa, a California Republican and chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, issued a caustic statement Thursday almost gleeful at Holder's departure, calling him "the most divisive U.S. attorney general in modern history." But Obama praised Holder for his "deep and abiding fidelity to one of our most cherished ideals as a people, and that is equal justice under the law. ... He believes, as I do, that justice is not just an abstract theory. ... That's why I made him America's lawyer, the people's lawyer." Holder's departure leaves Obama without one of his closest personal friends in the Cabinet. But Holder also served as a sort of alter ego for Obama, particularly on racial issues, tackling thorny subjects that Obama, as president, could not or would not, and occasionally absorbing the backlash. Holder was at times more out front on traditional African-American issues than the first African-American president he worked for. While Obama waded in cautiously and tended not to align himself with the issues that had defined previous black politicians, Holder blamed harsh sentencing guidelines for the disproportionate incarceration of young black men and challenged state voting laws viewed as restrictive to minorities. The contrast was sharpest after Michael Brown's shooting in Ferguson, Mo. While Obama's initial reaction was somewhat cautious and reserved, Holder visited the hometown of the African-American teenager killed by a white police officer and launched a civil rights investigation into the case, easing public anger by recalling his personal experiences with racial discrimination. If Republicans take the majority in the Senate, Democrats will want to swiftly approve a new attorney general as well as dozens of Obama's picks for judges and administrative posts in the final weeks of the year before relinquishing control of the chamber in January. That will certainly be met with protests by Republicans, especially after Democrats changed historic Senate rules this session to allow a simple majority for confirmation of some nominees, taking away the filibuster-stopping power of the minority. Democrats now have a 55-seat majority, including two independents. But even with Republican opposition, the Democratic-controlled Senate could theoretically push through a nominee in as few as four weeks, about twice as fast as previous confirmations for attorneys general have taken. A moderate choice by the White House could offer some cushion against the need for a quick confirmation before the new Congress takes office in January, regardless of which party controls the Senate. Some Republicans already seek a delay. "The Senate should wait," said Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas, one of the Senate's most conservative Republicans. "Allowing Democratic senators, many of whom will likely have just been defeated at the polls, to confirm Holder's successor would be an abuse of power that should not be countenanced."
| 7,074 |
<h4><strong>PC’s key to action in the lame duck</h4><p>Baltimore Sun 9/26</strong>/2014 (Eric Holder to step down as U.S. attorney general; Administration is expected to seek a quick Senate confirmation of a successor , lexis)</p><p>Names already being tossed around inside the White House and the halls of Congress include Solicitor General Donald Verrilli Jr.; Preet Bharara, the U.S. attorney in New York, who handled bank fraud and terror cases; Janet Napolitano, former Homeland Department secretary; former White House counsel Kathryn Ruemmler; Deputy Attorney General James Cole, the No. 2 official at Justice; and Mary Jo White, a former U.S. attorney in New York who now heads the Securities and Exchange Commission. Two other potential successors, Massachusetts Gov. Deval Patrick and California Attorney General Kamala Harris, said Thursday that they had no plans to take the job. <u>The</u> likely <u><mark>battle over Holder's replacement set the stage for a <strong>partisan power struggle</u></strong></mark> that is <u><mark>likely to extend into the</mark> </u>post-election <u><mark>lame-duck</u></mark> session of Congress or even beyond. <u><mark>The administration hopes to win a quick confirmation</u></mark> from the Democratic-controlled Senate in the coming months, <u>but</u> some <u>Republicans</u> -- who are betting they will seize control of the Senate in the November election -- <u>are</u> already <u>calling for</u> the <u>confirmation to be pushed to next year</u>. Holder, who had hinted for months that he was planning to leave, came to the Justice Department in the winter of 2009 as the 82nd attorney general, a figure well-versed in the difficult, sometimes delicate, task of running a sprawling law enforcement agency after earlier serving as deputy attorney general in the Clinton administration. He pleased Democrats by reinvigorating the Justice Department's efforts on civil rights, same-sex marriage, voting protections and prosecution of abusive police officers. "When the history books are written, he will absolutely go down as one of the best attorney generals when it comes to civil rights, up there next to [Robert] Kennedy" said Leslie Proll, director of the Washington office of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund. "It was not only his policies but his talking about race that was important, Proll said. Yet Holder also deeply disappointed some progressives who expected more from the nation's first African-American attorney general. For much of Obama's first term, Holder was rarely seen or heard, and many thought his leadership style was lacking. "We've had profound disagreements with the attorney general on national security issues," said ACLU executive director Anthony D. Romero, after praising Holder's civil rights record. "During his tenure, DOJ approved the drone killing of an American far away from any battlefield, approved the NSA's mass surveillance programs, failed to prosecute any of the Bush administration torturers, and presided over more leak prosecutions than all previous Justice Departments combined." But in the past two years he seemed to find a new energy and purpose, mounting investigations into abusive police departments, moving to shorten prison sentences for some drug offenders, and championing civil rights, gay rights and protections for minority voters. "His dedication to defending Americans' voting rights, at a time when these constitutional rights are under attack, has been supremely important," said Sen. Patrick Leahy, a Vermont Democrat and staunch Holder supporter who is chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Conservatives were united in their animosity toward Holder, almost from the start. In his first major speech, Holder enraged conservatives for saying the U.S. had become a "nation of cowards" for not dealing with lingering racial tensions. He was pilloried for the scandal involving a failed gun-trafficking operation on the Southwestern border known as "Fast and Furious." A Border Patrol agent was killed, and Holder was found in contempt of Congress for refusing to turn over documents, a first for a sitting Cabinet member. Holder also stumbled badly by trying to send Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and four other top Sept. 11, 2001, plotters to a federal trial in New York, only to be forced to relinquish the case to a military tribunal at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, when lawmakers opposed prosecuting the alleged terrorists in U.S. civilian court. Rep. Darrell Issa, a California Republican and chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, issued a caustic statement Thursday almost gleeful at Holder's departure, calling him "the most divisive U.S. attorney general in modern history." But Obama praised Holder for his "deep and abiding fidelity to one of our most cherished ideals as a people, and that is equal justice under the law. ... He believes, as I do, that justice is not just an abstract theory. ... That's why I made him America's lawyer, the people's lawyer." Holder's departure leaves Obama without one of his closest personal friends in the Cabinet. But Holder also served as a sort of alter ego for Obama, particularly on racial issues, tackling thorny subjects that Obama, as president, could not or would not, and occasionally absorbing the backlash. Holder was at times more out front on traditional African-American issues than the first African-American president he worked for. While Obama waded in cautiously and tended not to align himself with the issues that had defined previous black politicians, Holder blamed harsh sentencing guidelines for the disproportionate incarceration of young black men and challenged state voting laws viewed as restrictive to minorities. The contrast was sharpest after Michael Brown's shooting in Ferguson, Mo. While Obama's initial reaction was somewhat cautious and reserved, Holder visited the hometown of the African-American teenager killed by a white police officer and launched a civil rights investigation into the case, easing public anger by recalling his personal experiences with racial discrimination. If Republicans take the majority in the Senate, <u><mark>Democrats will want to swiftly approve a new attorney general</u></mark> as well as dozens of Obama's picks for judges and administrative posts in the final weeks of the year before relinquishing control of the chamber in January. <u>That will</u> certainly <u>be met with protests by Republicans</u>, especially after Democrats changed historic Senate rules this session to allow a simple majority for confirmation of some nominees, taking away the filibuster-stopping power of the minority. Democrats now have a 55-seat majority, including two independents. But <u><mark>even with Republican opposition, the Democratic-controlled Senate could theoretically push through a nominee</u></mark> in as few as four weeks, about twice as fast as previous confirmations for attorneys general have taken. A moderate choice by the White House could offer some cushion against the need for a quick confirmation before the new Congress takes office in January, regardless of which party controls the Senate. <u>Some Republicans already seek a delay. </u>"The Senate should wait," said Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas, one of the Senate's most conservative Republicans. "Allowing Democratic senators, many of whom will likely have just been defeated at the polls, to confirm Holder's successor would be an abuse of power that should not be countenanced."</p>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NR
|
Turns Trafficking
| 430,959 | 1 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,206 |
Plan costs an extraordinary amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities
|
Downs 12
|
Downs 12 David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/
|
As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
|
As much as he may want to reform drug laws , Obama is hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those laws the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities
|
Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws since their inception (see discussion above). Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law through legislative channels; and other issues, such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
| 563 |
<h4>Plan costs an <u>extraordinary</u> amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities</h4><p><strong>Downs 12 </strong>David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About<u> Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/</p><p></u>Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. <u><mark>As much as he may want to reform drug laws </mark>on a personal level<mark>, Obama is</mark> nonetheless <mark>hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those</mark> same <mark>laws</u></mark> since their inception (see discussion above). <u>Given this history, <mark>the president would <strong>risk an extraordinary level of political capital</u></strong> <u>on any</mark> proposed <mark>easing of federal law</u></mark> through legislative channels; <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><mark>other issues,</u></mark> such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to <u><mark>rank higher on his list of</u></mark> <u><mark>legislative</mark> <mark>priorities</mark>.</p></u>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 305,170 | 62 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,207 |
And that market is widespread and expanding—desperation and profit ensures expansion and exploitation
|
Samadi 2012
|
Samadi 2012 – Vice Chairman of the Department of Urology and Chief of Robotics and Minimally Invasive Surgery at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine (David, May 30, 2012, “Consequences of the rise in illegal organ trafficking,” Fox News, http://www.foxnews.com/health/2012/05/30/consequences-rise-in-illegal-organ-trafficking/,)
|
the WHO released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. Unfortunately the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives with patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs In the majority of situations, those selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations In countries like Pakistan, China or India a person can sell a kidney for $5,000 while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit Prior reports demonstrated that the recipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower statistics might underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable
|
WHO) released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market , in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives, hose selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations. ipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally. the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower
|
Earlier this week, the World Health Organization (WHO) released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market. According to the paper, in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. Organ transplantation is a necessary treatment for many individuals whose organs have failed and has been in practice in the United States since the 1950s. In the U.S. organ donations are regulated by an independent non-for-profit organization, United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). Organs are given to those whose need is the greatest, regardless of wealth or position. Unfortunately, the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply. As of March 2012 over 113,115 patients are currently waiting for an organ to become available. An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation, and the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives, with patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney. According to the WHO report, 76 percent of organs sold were kidneys, reflecting the growing demand secondary to complications of high blood pressure and diabetes. There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs. In the majority of situations, those selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations. In countries like Pakistan, China or India, a person can sell a kidney for $5,000, while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit. Prior reports have also demonstrated that the recipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally. A recent meta-analysis involving 39 original publications revealed that those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV. Furthermore the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower. These statistics might even underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias; those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies. Additionally, given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams. In 2010, a former psychiatrist was sentenced to more than 15 years in prison for offering false promises of organ transplants in the Philippines, while taking over $400,000 dollars from patients. Over five patients actually travelled to the Philippines only to find out that there was no organ awaiting them. One of these patients died in the Philippines. Regretfully, the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable
| 2,662 |
<h4><strong>And that market is <u>widespread and expanding</u>—desperation and profit ensures expansion and exploitation</h4><p>Samadi 2012</strong> – Vice Chairman of the Department of Urology and Chief of Robotics and Minimally Invasive Surgery at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine (David, May 30, 2012, “Consequences of the rise in illegal organ trafficking,” Fox News, http://www.foxnews.com/health/2012/05/30/consequences-rise-in-illegal-organ-trafficking/,)</p><p>Earlier this week, <u>the</u> World Health Organization (<u><mark>WHO</u>) <u>released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market</u></mark>. According to the paper<mark>, <u>in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour.</mark> </u>Organ transplantation is a necessary treatment for many individuals whose organs have failed and has been in practice in the United States since the 1950s. In the U.S. organ donations are regulated by an independent non-for-profit organization, United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). Organs are given to those whose need is the greatest, regardless of wealth or position. <u>Unfortunately</u>, <u>the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply</u>. As of March 2012 over 113,115 patients are currently waiting for an organ to become available. <u><mark>An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation</u></mark>, and <u><mark>the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives</u>,</mark> <u>with</u> <u>patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney</u>. According to the WHO report, 76 percent of organs sold were kidneys, reflecting the growing demand secondary to complications of high blood pressure and diabetes. <u>There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs</u>. <u>In the majority of situations, t<mark>hose selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations</u>.</mark> <u>In countries like Pakistan, China or India</u>, <u>a person can sell a kidney for $5,000</u>, <u>while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit</u>. <u>Prior reports</u> have also <u>demonstrated that the rec<mark>ipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally</u>.</mark> A recent meta-analysis involving 39 original publications revealed that <u>those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV</u>. Furthermore <u><mark>the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower</u></mark>. These <u>statistics</u> <u>might</u> even <u>underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias</u>; <u>those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies</u>. Additionally, <u>given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams</u>. In 2010, a former psychiatrist was sentenced to more than 15 years in prison for offering false promises of organ transplants in the Philippines, while taking over $400,000 dollars from patients. Over five patients actually travelled to the Philippines only to find out that there was no organ awaiting them. One of these patients died in the Philippines. Regretfully, <u>the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable</u><strong> </p></strong>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 267,351 | 8 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,208 |
Lebanese economic instability now—structural long term threats outweigh
|
THEIR AUTHOR Itani 13
|
THEIR AUTHOR Itani 13 (Faysal, fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, "Syria’s War Threatens Lebanon’s Fragile Economy," mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/.../lebanons_fragile_economy.pdf)
|
Syrian civil war is accelerating Lebanon’s decline and poses a serious long-term threat to its economy Lebanon’s political dysfunction magnify the economic dangers With no end to the Syrian conflict in sight, Lebanon faces the prospect of a protracted economic crisis Lebanon faced serious economic challenges including high unemployment, debt-to-GDP ratio, and weak public finance unlikely that the state will be able to meaningfully address these issues in the short term. Barring a total collapse of security in Lebanon however—which is admittedly a growing possibility given the war in Syria—the state can concentrate on forming a government, managing the Syrian refugee issue, and pursuing relatively uncontroversial reforms aimed at keeping the economy afloat. This requires that the political elite resist prioritizing their parochial interests and holding economic policymaking hostage to the course of fighting in Syria.
|
Syrian civil war is accelerating Lebanon’s decline and poses a serious long-term threat to its economy Lebanon’s political dysfunction magnify the economic dangers With no end to the Syrian conflict in sight, Lebanon faces the prospect of a protracted economic crisis Lebanon faced serious economic challenges including high unemployment, debt-to-GDP ratio, and weak public finance unlikely that the state will be able to meaningfully address these issues i
|
The Syrian civil war is accelerating Lebanon’s political and institutional decline and poses a serious long-term threat to its economy. Lebanon has largely been spared the political upheavals of the Arab Spring, its fractious political system is intact, and the weakness of its central government means there is no authoritarian order to revolt against. However, Lebanon’s own political dysfunction, the regional powers’ stakes in Lebanese politics, and their anxieties over the geopolitical challenges that the Arab uprisings pose magnify the economic dangers of Syria’s disintegration. With no end to the Syrian conflict in sight, Lebanon faces the prospect of a protracted economic crisis that poses a threat to political stability, domestic and regional security, and citizens’ quality of life. Lebanon is a small country with insignificant military capability, and the political order in Syria profoundly shapes its security and economy. A serious deterioration in the Lebanese economy would accelerate the state’s weakening control over its territory, and further destabilize Syria as well. Lebanon has endured years of frequently violent political conflict, in addition to intermittent, economically disastrous wars between Hezbollah and Israel. It is unclear how much more pressure the Lebanese economy can withstand. Lebanon already faced serious economic challenges including high unemployment, a high debt-to-GDP ratio, and weak public finances before civil strife started in Syria. The regional and domestic political environments make it unlikely that the state will be able to meaningfully address these issues in the short term. Barring a total collapse of security in Lebanon however—which is admittedly a growing possibility given the war in Syria—the state can concentrate on forming a government, managing the Syrian refugee issue, and pursuing relatively uncontroversial reforms aimed at keeping the economy afloat. This requires that the political elite resist prioritizing their parochial interests and holding economic policymaking hostage to the course of fighting in Syria.
| 2,098 |
<h4>Lebanese economic instability now—structural <u>long term</u> threats outweigh </h4><p><strong>THEIR AUTHOR Itani 13</strong> (Faysal, fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, "Syria’s War Threatens Lebanon’s Fragile Economy," mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/.../lebanons_fragile_economy.pdf)</p><p>The <u><mark>Syrian civil war is accelerating Lebanon’s</mark> </u>political and institutional <u><mark>decline and poses a <strong>serious long-term threat</strong> to its economy</u></mark>. Lebanon has largely been spared the political upheavals of the Arab Spring, its fractious political system is intact, and the weakness of its central government means there is no authoritarian order to revolt against. However, <u><mark>Lebanon’s</u></mark> own <u><mark>political dysfunction</u></mark>, the regional powers’ stakes in Lebanese politics, and their anxieties over the geopolitical challenges that the Arab uprisings pose <u><mark>magnify the economic dangers</u></mark> of Syria’s disintegration. <u><mark>With no end to the Syrian conflict in sight, Lebanon faces the prospect of a protracted <strong>economic crisis</u></strong></mark> that poses a threat to political stability, domestic and regional security, and citizens’ quality of life. Lebanon is a small country with insignificant military capability, and the political order in Syria profoundly shapes its security and economy. A serious deterioration in the Lebanese economy would accelerate the state’s weakening control over its territory, and further destabilize Syria as well. Lebanon has endured years of frequently violent political conflict, in addition to intermittent, economically disastrous wars between Hezbollah and Israel. It is unclear how much more pressure the Lebanese economy can withstand. <u><mark>Lebanon</u></mark> already <u><mark>faced serious economic challenges including high unemployment,</mark> </u>a high <u><mark>debt-to-GDP ratio, and weak public finance</u></mark>s before civil strife started in Syria. The regional and domestic political environments make it <u><mark>unlikely that the state will be able to meaningfully address these issues i</mark>n the short term. Barring a total collapse of security in Lebanon however—which is admittedly a growing possibility given the war in Syria—the state can concentrate on forming a government, managing the Syrian refugee issue, and pursuing relatively uncontroversial reforms aimed at keeping the economy afloat. This requires that the political elite resist prioritizing their parochial interests and holding economic policymaking hostage to the course of fighting in Syria.</p></u>
|
1nc
| null |
A1
| 430,960 | 11 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,209 |
Their ev concludes ban on marijuana use has no effect
|
Sternstein 14
|
Aliya Sternstein 14, Next Gov Senior Correspondent, FEDERAL CYBER HIRING COULD TAKE A HIT UNDER MARIJUANA MANDATE, March 14, http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2014/03/federal-cyber-hiring-could-take-hit-under-marijuana-mandate/80527/
|
Federal employers might be able to entice computer whizzes with stimulants people who like doing cleared work is they like to work on cool stuff The price to work on cool stuff might be recreational drug use Cleared personnel will not protest the administration’s stance The jobs pay very well and they want to keep that clearance Jeff Snyder, president of SecurityRecruiter.com, said the antimarijuana mandate for government employees "has not been an issue for me or anyone I have heard about."
| null |
Federal employers might be able to entice nonconventional computer whizzes with stimulants instead of hallucinogens, Smith said. "What I found with people who like doing cleared work and working for the government is they like to work on the really cool stuff," said Smith, whose clients include security cleared professionals in the federal government and private sector. "The price to work on the really cool stuff might be: Some of the recreational drug use I can't do any longer." Cleared personnel already inside the government likely will not protest the administration’s stance, said Kathy Lavinder, executive director of Security and Investigative Placement Consultants, who helps professionals with military and government experience. "The jobs pay very well and they want to keep that clearance," she said. "If you are inside that tent, you are already emotionally tied in." Jeff Snyder, president of Colorado-based SecurityRecruiter.com, said the antimarijuana mandate for government employees "has not been an issue for me or anyone I have heard about." Maybe it's not a topic that comes up in job interviews? "They can be a little confessional at times -- but they won't tell me what they are doing in their off hours," Lavinder said.
| 1,247 |
<h4><strong>Their ev concludes ban on marijuana use has no effect</h4><p></strong>Aliya <strong>Sternstein 14</strong>, Next Gov Senior Correspondent, FEDERAL CYBER HIRING COULD TAKE A HIT UNDER MARIJUANA MANDATE, March 14, http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2014/03/federal-cyber-hiring-could-take-hit-under-marijuana-mandate/80527/</p><p><u>Federal employers might be able to entice</u> nonconventional <u>computer whizzes with stimulants</u> instead of hallucinogens, Smith said. "What I found with <u>people who like doing cleared work</u> and working for the government <u>is</u> <u>they like to work on</u> the really <u>cool stuff</u>," said Smith, whose clients include security cleared professionals in the federal government and private sector. "<u>The price to work on</u> the really <u>cool</u> <u>stuff might be</u>: Some of the <u>recreational drug use</u> I can't do any longer." <u>Cleared personnel</u> already inside the government likely <u>will not protest the administration’s stance</u>, said Kathy Lavinder, executive director of Security and Investigative Placement Consultants, who helps professionals with military and government experience. "<u>The jobs pay very well and they want to keep that clearance</u>," she said. "If you are inside that tent, you are already emotionally tied in." <u>Jeff Snyder, president of</u> Colorado-based <u>SecurityRecruiter.com, said the antimarijuana mandate for government employees "<strong>has not been an issue for me or anyone I have heard about." </u>Maybe it's not a topic that comes up in job interviews? "They can be a little confessional at times -- but they won't tell me what they are doing in their off hours," Lavinder said. </p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 2
| 430,961 | 10 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,210 |
Vote in the next few weeks
|
Reuters 1/15
|
Reuters 1/15/2015 (Iran bill debate seen in Senate by early February, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/15/us-usa-congress-iran-idUSKBN0KO26U20150115)
|
The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said he expected a bill addressing Iran's nuclear program to come to the Senate floor in early February, if not sooner toward the end of January or the first part of February, you’ll see something on the floor
|
The new chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee said he expected a bill addressing Iran's nuclear program in early February, if not sooner toward the end of January or the first part of February, you’ll see something on the floor,"
|
The new chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee said on Thursday he expected a bill addressing Iran's nuclear program to come to the U.S. Senate floor for debate ahead of a vote in early February, if not sooner. "I think sometime toward the end of January or the first part of February, you’ll see something being debated on the Senate floor," Republican Senator Bob Corker told reporters at a retreat for Republican lawmakers in Hershey, Pennsylvania.
| 468 |
<h4><strong>Vote in the next few weeks</h4><p>Reuters 1/15</strong>/2015 (Iran bill debate seen in Senate by early February, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/15/us-usa-congress-iran-idUSKBN0KO26U20150115)</p><p><u><mark>The</u> new <u>chairman</u> <u>of the</u> U.S. <u>Senate Foreign Relations Committee said</u></mark> on Thursday <u><mark>he expected a bill addressing Iran's nuclear program</mark> to come to the</u> U.S. <u>Senate floor</u> for debate ahead of a vote <u><mark>in early February, if not sooner</u></mark>. "I think sometime <u><mark>toward the end of January or the first part of February, you’ll see something</u></mark> being debated <u><mark>on the</u></mark> Senate <u><mark>floor</u>,"<strong></mark> Republican Senator Bob Corker told reporters at a retreat for Republican lawmakers in Hershey, Pennsylvania.</p></strong>
|
1nr
|
Top of Agenda
|
Nuclear, biological and chemical war
| 430,680 | 4 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,211 |
DA solves the case - A credible international treaty regime solves all impacts
|
Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, May 2002
|
Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, May 2002 (Rule of Power or Rule of Law) http://www.lcnp.org/pubs/RuleofLawPDF.pdf
|
Treaties involve some sacrifice of sovereignty powerful countries usually exercise great influence on the shape of treaties, and that has been true of the United States treaty regimes contribute to global security in important ways, including by: • articulating promoting and recognizing compliance with norms; • building enforcement increasing the likelihood of detecting violations establishing confidence , treaty regimes are a far more reliable basis for achieving objectives and compliance with norms than “do as we say, not as we do” directives In this global society, the repercussions of the actions are not confined within borders, whether we look to g h g accumulations, nuclear testing, the danger of accidental nuclear war, or the vast massacres of civilians The importance and weight of the United States makes a U.S. withdrawal from the global legal process a dangerous course for security as well as the environment.
|
powerful countries usually exercise great influence on the shape of treaties, and that has been true of the United States treaty regimes contribute t global security in important ways, including by: • articulating promoting and recognizing compliance with norms; • building enforcement increasing the likelihood of detecting violations establishing onfidenc treaty regimes are a far more reliable basis for achieving objectives and compliance with norms than “do as we say, not as we do” directives whether we look to g h g accumulations, nuclear testing, the danger of accidental nuclear war, or the vast massacres of civilians The importance and weight of the United States makes a U.S. withdrawal from the global legal process dangerous course for security as well as the environment.
|
Treaties by their very nature involve some sacrifice of sovereignty for the sake of the common good. Moreover, powerful countries usually exercise great influence on the shape of treaties, and that has been generally true of the United States in relation to the security treaties discussed in this report. And treaty regimes contribute to national and global security in important ways, including by: • articulating global norms; • promoting and recognizing compliance with norms; • building monitoring and enforcement mechanisms; • increasing the likelihood of detecting violations and effectively addressing them; • providing a benchmark for measurement of progress; • establishing a foundation of confidence, trust, experience, and expertise for further progress; • providing criteria to guide states’ activities and legislation, and focal points for discussion of policy issues. Over the long term, treaty regimes are a far more reliable basis for achieving global policy objectives and compliance with norms than “do as we say, not as we do” directives from an overwhelmingly powerful state. The concept of the rule of law was integral to the founding of the United States, which has been one of its staunchest advocates. The rule of law in international affairs is still emerging, evolving quickly as global forces drive countries closer together. Its development is largely a response to the demands of states and individuals living within a global society with a deeply integrated world economy. In this global society, the repercussions of the actions of states, non-state actors and individuals are not confined within borders, whether we look to greenhouse gas accumulations, nuclear testing, the danger of accidental nuclear war, or the vast massacres of civilians that have taken place over the course of the last hundred years and still continue. The people of the United States are part of this global society and failures at the global level will affect their security and well-being adversely, along with that of people elsewhere. The importance and weight of the United States makes a U.S. withdrawal from the global legal process except when its gets its own way a dangerous course for security as well as the environment.
| 2,241 |
<h4><strong>DA solves the case - A credible international treaty regime solves all impacts </h4><p>Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, May 2002<u></strong><mark> (Rule of Power or Rule of Law) http://www.lcnp.org/pubs/RuleofLawPDF.pdf</p><p></mark>Treaties</u> by their very nature <u>involve some sacrifice of sovereignty</u> for the sake of the common good. Moreover, <u><mark>powerful countries usually exercise great</mark> <mark>influence on the shape of treaties, and that has been</u></mark> generally <u><mark>true of the United States</u></mark> in relation to the security treaties discussed in this report. And <u><mark>treaty regimes contribute t</mark>o</u> national and <u><mark>global security in important ways, including by: • articulating</u></mark> global norms; • <u><mark>promoting and recognizing compliance with norms; • building</u></mark> monitoring and <u><mark>enforcement</u> </mark>mechanisms; • <u><mark>increasing the likelihood of detecting violations </u></mark>and effectively addressing them; • providing a benchmark for measurement of progress; • <u><mark>establishing</u></mark> a foundation of <u>c<mark>onfidenc</mark>e</u>, trust, experience, and expertise for further progress; • providing criteria to guide states’ activities and legislation, and focal points for discussion of policy issues. Over the long term<u>, <mark>treaty regimes are a far more reliable basis for achieving</u> </mark>global policy <u><mark>objectives and compliance with norms than “do as we say, not as we do” directives</u></mark> from an overwhelmingly powerful state. The concept of the rule of law was integral to the founding of the United States, which has been one of its staunchest advocates. The rule of law in international affairs is still emerging, evolving quickly as global forces drive countries closer together. Its development is largely a response to the demands of states and individuals living within a global society with a deeply integrated world economy. <u>In this global society, the repercussions of the actions</u> of states, non-state actors and individuals <u>are not confined within borders, <mark>whether we look to g</u></mark>reen<u><mark>h</u></mark>ouse <u><mark>g</u></mark>as <u><mark>accumulations, nuclear testing, the danger of accidental nuclear war, or the vast massacres of civilians</u></mark> that have taken place over the course of the last hundred years and still continue. The people of the United States are part of this global society and failures at the global level will affect their security and well-being adversely, along with that of people elsewhere. <u><mark>The importance and weight of the United States makes a U.S. withdrawal from the global legal process</u></mark> except when its gets its own way <u>a <strong><mark>dangerous course for security as well as the environment.</p></u></strong></mark>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
2NC
|
Treaties
| 61,063 | 23 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,212 |
It’s NOT a sure thing- PC is key to Dem unity and ensuring progress on our impacts
|
Newell 9/25
|
Newell 9/25/2014 (Jim, covers politics and media for Salon, Who will replace Eric Holder? The thorny politics of selecting a new attorney general, Salon, http://www.salon.com/2014/09/25/who_will_replace_eric_holder_the_thorny_politics_of_selecting_a_new_attorney_general/)
|
Holder has been leading the charge for drug war and prison sentencing reform, two of the few remaining areas in which this late-stage administration can effect real and profound progressive change Democrats will only need 51 votes to break a presumed Republican filibuster on Holder’s replacement. Procuring those 51 votes shouldn’t be considered a sure thing though Democrats should expect zero votes from Republican senators in the lame duck The GOP will be furious at the Democrats for using the lame duck the nuclear option’s track record has been stellar, but not perfect recall how Democrats joined the filibuster against Obama’s nominee to head the Civil Rights Division never underestimate the ability of conservative Democrats to throw their lot in with Republicans
|
. Holder has been leading the charge for drug war and prison sentencing reform, two areas i this late-stage administration can effect Democrats will only need 51 votes to break a presumed Republican filibuster on Holder’s replacement. Procuring those 51 votes shouldn’t be considered a sure thing The GOP will be furious at the Democrats for using the lame duc the nuclear option’s track record has been stellar, but not perfect never underestimate the ability of conservative Democrats to throw their lot in with Republicans
|
Eric Holder’s resignation as attorney general does come as a surprise. While he’s served a lengthy period already, dating to the beginning of the Obama administration, it looked like he might have gone the “full Reno” and weathered through two consecutive terms at the post. In the two years since the House of Representatives voted to find him in contempt, Holder finally appeared to feel comfortable enough in his role to pursue legacy issues of personal importance to him. His Civil Rights Division is in the midst of investigating police abuses in Ferguson, Missouri, and other departments across the country. Holder has also been leading the charge for drug war and prison sentencing reform, two of the few remaining areas in which this late-stage administration can effect real and profound progressive change. But however powerful Holder’s personal interest in civil rights and criminal justice arenas may have been, they’re apparently not powerful enough to overcome his exhaustion. He’s trying to get out before he’s “locked in” for the final quarter of the Obama administration. It’s the same rationale for why certain Bush administration staffers, like Karl Rove, left in late 2006: once you’re in for the final two years, you’re in. Karl Rove’s role as an aide to the president, though, wasn’t a Senate-confirmed position, and congressional politics are even more cutthroat now than they were back then. Holder claims he’s going to stay on the job until his successor is confirmed. Given the very real possibility of a Republican Senate majority next year, maybe Eric Holder will end up serving out the rest of President Obama’s second term after all. Except for our good friend, the post-election lame duck session. Once again Democrats who were cautious at the time should be grateful for Sen. Harry Reid’s invocation of the “nuclear option” on judicial and executive appointments. Democrats will only need 51 votes to break a presumed Republican filibuster on Holder’s replacement. Procuring those 51 votes shouldn’t be considered a sure thing, though. Democrats should expect zero votes from Republican senators in the lame duck if Republicans win control of the Senate this November. The GOP will be furious at the Democrats for using the lame duck to confirm a new leader of the Justice Department, denying Republicans the chance to make a circus of a confirmation hearing in 2015. And the nuclear option’s track record has been stellar, but not perfect: recall how a number of Senate Democrats joined the successful Republican filibuster against President Obama’s nominee to head the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, Dego Adegbile. Even though the 2014 election will be behind them, never underestimate the ability of conservative Democrats to throw their lot in with Republicans determined to blunt the Obama administration at every corner.
| 2,871 |
<h4><strong>It’s NOT a sure thing- PC is key to Dem unity and ensuring progress on our impacts</h4><p>Newell 9/25</strong>/2014 (Jim, covers politics and media for Salon, Who will replace Eric Holder? The thorny politics of selecting a new attorney general, Salon, http://www.salon.com/2014/09/25/who_will_replace_eric_holder_the_thorny_politics_of_selecting_a_new_attorney_general/)</p><p>Eric Holder’s resignation as attorney general does come as a surprise. While he’s served a lengthy period already, dating to the beginning of the Obama administration, it looked like he might have gone the “full Reno” and weathered through two consecutive terms at the post. In the two years since the House of Representatives voted to find him in contempt, Holder finally appeared to feel comfortable enough in his role to pursue legacy issues of personal importance to him. His Civil Rights Division is in the midst of investigating police abuses in Ferguson, Missouri, and other departments across the country<mark>. <u>Holder has</u></mark> also <u><mark>been leading the charge for drug war and prison sentencing reform, two</mark> of the few remaining <mark>areas i</mark>n which <mark>this late-stage administration can effect</mark> <strong>real and profound progressive change</u></strong>. But however powerful Holder’s personal interest in civil rights and criminal justice arenas may have been, they’re apparently not powerful enough to overcome his exhaustion. He’s trying to get out before he’s “locked in” for the final quarter of the Obama administration. It’s the same rationale for why certain Bush administration staffers, like Karl Rove, left in late 2006: once you’re in for the final two years, you’re in. Karl Rove’s role as an aide to the president, though, wasn’t a Senate-confirmed position, and congressional politics are even more cutthroat now than they were back then. Holder claims he’s going to stay on the job until his successor is confirmed. Given the very real possibility of a Republican Senate majority next year, maybe Eric Holder will end up serving out the rest of President Obama’s second term after all. Except for our good friend, the post-election lame duck session. Once again Democrats who were cautious at the time should be grateful for Sen. Harry Reid’s invocation of the “nuclear option” on judicial and executive appointments. <u><mark>Democrats will only need 51 votes to break a presumed Republican filibuster on Holder’s replacement. <strong>Procuring those 51 votes shouldn’t be considered a sure thing</u></strong></mark>, <u>though</u>. <u>Democrats should expect zero votes from Republican senators in the lame duck</u> if Republicans win control of the Senate this November. <u><mark>The GOP will be furious at the Democrats for using the lame duc</mark>k</u> to confirm a new leader of the Justice Department, denying Republicans the chance to make a circus of a confirmation hearing in 2015. And <u><mark>the nuclear option’s track record has been stellar, <strong>but not perfect</u></strong></mark>: <u>recall how</u> a number of Senate <u>Democrats</u> <u>joined the</u> successful Republican <u>filibuster</u> <u>against</u> President <u>Obama’s nominee to head the</u> Justice Department’s <u>Civil Rights Division</u>, Dego Adegbile. Even though the 2014 election will be behind them, <u><strong><mark>never underestimate the ability of conservative Democrats to throw their lot in with Republicans</u></mark> determined to blunt the Obama administration at every corner.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NR
|
Turns Trafficking
| 430,962 | 5 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,213 |
New sanctions destroy the Iran deal- causes prolif and Israel strikes- extinction
|
Borger 12/31
|
Borger 12/31/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation)
|
There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba This deal will be about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. the parties to the talks have given themselves more time They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions That would provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment.
|
no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. is deal will b about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets anctions would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment
|
There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. This deal will not be about cash machines in the Caribbean, but about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away from the table. A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. So the parties to the talks have given themselves more time – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor. The legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. That would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, and a very volatile environment. It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year.
| 3,580 |
<h4>New sanctions destroy the Iran deal- causes prolif and Israel strikes- extinction</h4><p><strong>Borger 12/31</strong>/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation)</p><p><u>There will be <mark>no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.</mark> In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba</u>, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. <u>Th<mark>is deal will</u></mark> not <u><mark>b</mark>e</u> about cash machines in the Caribbean, but <u><mark>about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth</u></mark>. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These <u>gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away</u> from the table. <u><strong><mark>A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel</u></strong>; <u>the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a <strong>wave of proliferation across the region and beyond</strong> as other countries hedge their bets</mark>. </u>So <u>the parties to the talks have given themselves more time</u> – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. <u>They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran</u>. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, <u>the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor</u>. The <u>legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered s<mark>anctions</u></mark>, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. <u>That</u> would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it <u><mark>would</u> also <u>provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament</u></mark>, the Majlis, <u><mark>and a very volatile environment</mark>. </u>It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year.</p>
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1nc
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
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Navy
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3
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Boston College Kenner-Carelli
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Lopez
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Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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college
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743,214 |
The illicit market exploits in a way like slavery
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Delmonico 3
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Delmonico 3 Francis L. Delmonico, Director of the Renal Transplantation Unit at Massachusetts
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the exploitation of organ sellers veers dangerously close to human slavery The pressures put by organ brokers upon the desperation of the world’s dislocated, refugee, and poorest populations to provide the scarce commodities reveals the limits of argu- ments based solely on individual autonomy. the pressure of organ brokers upon the poor makes their decision to sell an organ anything but a free and autonomous choice. The most disturbing issue of organ sales is the formation of an economic underclass of organ donors throughout the world to serve the wealthy. they are indifferent to the social and individual pathologies that markets in kidneys and other body parts produce, such as the documented evidence of postsurgery medical complications, chronic pain, psychological problems, unemployment, decreased earning power, social ostracism, and social stigma faced by kidney sellers in many parts of the world
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exploitation of organ sellers veers dangerously close to human slavery pressures put by organ brokers provide the scarce commodities reveals the limits of argu- ments based solely on individual autonomy. makes their decision to sell an organ anything but a free and autonomous choice formation of an economic underclass of organ donors throughout the world to serve the wealthy they are indifferent to the social and individual pathologies that markets in kidneys and other body parts produce medical complications, chronic pain, psychological problems, unemployment, decreased earning power, social ostracism, and social stigma faced by kidney sellers
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General Hospital, the medical director at the New England Organ Bank, and Professor of
Surgery at Harvard Medical School; and Nancy Scheper-Hughes.Director of Organs Watch and Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley Zygon, vol. 38, no. 3 (September 2003)
WHY WE SHOULD NOT PAY FOR HUMAN ORGANS Ebsco
Although class distinctions are an almost naturalized part of social life in all complex societies, in this particular instance the exploitation of organ sellers veers dangerously close to human slavery, as argued by Giovanni Berlinguer (Berlinguer and Garrafa 1996). The pressures put by organ brokers upon the desperation of the world’s dislocated, refugee, and poorest populations to provide the scarce commodities reveals the limits of argu- ments based solely on individual autonomy. Yes, even the poorest people of the world “make choices,” but they do not make these freely or under social or economic conditions of their own making. Further, the pressure of organ brokers upon the poor makes their decision to sell an organ anything but a free and autonomous choice. These secular arguments reach a conclusion similar to one derived from Christian morality—that the sale of human organs is unethical. The most disturbing issue of organ sales to both Christian and secular ethicists is the formation of an economic underclass of organ donors throughout the world to serve the wealthy. This is not to suggest that proponents of organ sales are in favor of exploiting the poor but, rather, that they are indifferent to the social and individual pathologies that markets in kidneys and other body parts produce, such as the documented evidence of postsurgery medical complications, chronic pain, psychological problems, unemployment, decreased earning power, social ostracism, and social stigma faced by kidney sellers in many parts of the world (see Zargooshi 2002; Jimenez and Scheper-Hughes 2002a; Ram 2002).
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<h4><strong>The illicit market exploits in a way like slavery</h4><p>Delmonico 3 </strong>Francis L. Delmonico, Director of the Renal Transplantation Unit at Massachusetts</p><p>General Hospital, the medical director at the New England Organ Bank, and Professor of</p><p>Surgery at Harvard Medical School; and Nancy Scheper-Hughes.Director of Organs Watch and Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley Zygon, vol. 38, no. 3 (September 2003)</p><p>WHY WE SHOULD NOT PAY FOR HUMAN ORGANS Ebsco </p><p>Although class distinctions are an almost naturalized part of social life in all complex societies, in this particular instance <u>the <mark>exploitation of organ sellers veers dangerously close to human slavery</u></mark>, as argued by Giovanni Berlinguer (Berlinguer and Garrafa 1996). <u>The <mark>pressures put by organ brokers</mark> upon the desperation of the world’s dislocated, refugee, and poorest populations to <mark>provide the scarce commodities reveals the limits of argu- ments based solely on individual autonomy.</mark> </u>Yes, even the poorest people of the world “make choices,” but they do not make these freely or under social or economic conditions of their own making. Further, <u>the pressure of organ brokers upon the poor <mark>makes their decision to sell an organ anything but a free and autonomous choice</mark>. </u>These secular arguments reach a conclusion similar to one derived from Christian morality—that the sale of human organs is unethical. <u>The most disturbing issue of organ sales </u>to both Christian and secular ethicists <u>is the <mark>formation of an economic underclass of organ donors throughout the world to serve the wealthy</mark>.</u> This is not to suggest that proponents of organ sales are in favor of exploiting the poor but, rather, that <u><mark>they are indifferent to the social and individual pathologies that markets in kidneys and other body parts produce</mark>, such as the documented evidence of postsurgery <mark>medical complications, chronic pain, psychological problems, unemployment, decreased earning power, social ostracism, and social stigma faced by kidney sellers</mark> in many parts of the world</u> (see Zargooshi 2002; Jimenez and Scheper-Hughes 2002a; Ram 2002). </p>
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Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,260 | 15 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
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Navy
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9
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George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
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Allen, Steiner, Taylor
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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cx
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college
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743,215 |
Their ev’s all hype --- ISIS has no capabilities and their impact’s empirically denied by al Qaeda
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NBC 9/12/14
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NBC 9/12/14 (“Petraeus: Don't Overestimate ISIS in Iraq”, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/petraeus-dont-overestimate-isis-iraq-n202011)//trepka
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ISIS should not be overestimated and has “nowhere near” the strength of al Qaeda in Iraq at the height of the war in that country that ISIS in Syria is “far more complex.” it has nowhere near the roots, the numbers and the structure that al Qaeda in Iraq and the associated Sunni insurgents had when we launched the surge” in 2007.
Sunni shia non unique
Med impact stupid
Cooperation now solves
North Africa is a strategically important region for the United States and worthy of serious attention by Obama developments in the ¶ region impact significantly on our national interests The countries of the Maghreb Morocco, face problems and provide opportunities that have immediate regional and global implications Maghreb can be addressed best through a coordinated, communicated, comprehen‐¶ sive political, economic and social strategy led by Washington working in partnership with regimes in ¶ the region and in Europe. The Maghreb is the guardian of the Mediterra‐nean. Maintaining friendly relations with nations of the southern shore is nec‐essary for the US Sixth Fleet’s access At a time when the Russian ¶ navy is wandering into and out of the Mediterranean and China is assiduously building ties secure access to and cooperation with the Maghreb is vital to US interests the most immediate security issue con‐cerns AQIM) and other salafist/jihadist ¶ groups Loose‐knit groups of terrorists from the Sa‐hel and the Maghreb itself bring stabs of insecurity illegal trade and immigration.
No key to all oil—hormuz
no stage carries much risk of major war to control resources at no time have great powers come close to loggerheads over control of vital regions. No country has ever actively prepared to conquer weak areas, nor has any felt it necessary to prepare to defend them. Consumer cooperation, rather than conflict, is the rule. There has never been a war to control territory that contains fossil fuels, and there are good reasons to believe it is likely that there never will be. The conventional wisdom concerning the inevitability of energy wars is wrong. Why has great power behavior failed to live up to pessimistic expectations? Perhaps it is the fear of escalation toward a nuclear holocaust Perhaps liberal internationalists are correct 'Whatever the initial cause the idea that war would be a viable option to control the most valuable regions in the world does not seem to have occurred to the great consumer nations. As time goes on, it becomes more and more unlikely that it ever will. Resources have historically been a primary motivator for war Today, that calculation seems to have changed, even regarding the most vulnerable, valuable regions in the world states have reached the conclusion that oil is not worth fighting for for the first time, nothing is.
|
ISIS has “nowhere near” the strength of al Qaeda in Iraq at the height ISIS is more complex it has nowhere near the roots numbers and structure al Qaeda had in 2007.
North Africa is strategically important developments in the ¶ region impact significantly our national interests Morocco face problems and provide opportunities that have immediate regional and global implications. Maghreb can be addressed best through a coordinated, communicated, comprehen‐¶ sive political, economic and social strategy led by Washington working in partnership with regimes in ¶ the region and in Europe. Maintaining friendly relations is nec‐essary for the US Sixth Fleet’s access At a time when the Russian ¶ navy is wandering and China is assiduously building ties secure access and cooperation Maghreb is vital to US interests the most immediate security issue con‐cerns AQIM
no stage carries much risk of war to control resources at no time have great powers come close . Consumer cooperation is the rule. There has never been a war to control fossil fuels, wisdom concerning energy wars is wrong. Why has behavior failed expectations fear of escalation As time goes on, it becomes more unlikely calculation seems to have changed, states have reached the conclusion that oil is not worth fighting for
|
Gen. David Petraeus says ISIS should not be overestimated and has “nowhere near” the strength of al Qaeda in Iraq at the height of the war in that country. Petraeus, the former top American commander in Iraq and Afghanistan, told a crowd in Denver on Thursday that President Barack Obama made a compelling case for destroying ISIS militants. He said that the battle will probably outlast Obama’s administration, according to NBC affiliate KUSA. He also said that ISIS in Syria is “far more complex.” But in Iraq, the general said, ISIS “should not be overestimated in many respects — it has nowhere near the roots, the numbers and the structure that al Qaeda in Iraq and the associated Sunni insurgents had when we launched the surge” in 2007.
Sunni shia non unique
Med impact stupid
Cooperation now solves
Alexander 9 (Yonah, Professor at the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies and Senior Fellow and Director of the International Center at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, et al., “Why The Maghreb Matters: Threats, Opportunities, and Options for Effective American Engagement in North Africa”, Potomac Institute Special Report, March, http://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/studies/NorthAfricaPolicyPaper033109.pdf
North Africa (the Maghreb) is a strategically important region for the United States. Its location at ¶ the mouth of the Mediterranean, on the southern shore of Europe’s “Rio Grande,” and at the western ¶ end of the Arab world, and its prominence as an area of US interests in security, democratization, stability, ¶ development, and cooperation, make the Maghreb a region worthy of serious attention by the Obama ¶ administration. Unfortunately, North Africa has of‐ten fallen through the cracks of US Middle East, Afri‐¶ can, and European policies. Domestic constituencies concerned with the Middle East tend to focus on oil, ¶ the Middle East peace process, and Iran. Those con‐cerned with African policy tend to concentrate on ¶ conflict issues affecting sub‐Saharan Africa only. Those concerned with the Mediterranean tend to ¶ look to the northern shore and are content to leave the south to the European Union (EU). The absence ¶ of vocal domestic constituencies on Maghrebi issues has contributed to the lack of a clear US policy focus. ¶ Yet the US government should have a profound in‐terest in North Africa because developments in the ¶ region impact significantly on our national interests. As the new administration prepares its portfolio ¶ of foreign policy priorities, immediate attention should be given to a review of US interests and op‐¶ portunities in North Africa. The countries of the Maghreb—Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and ¶ Tunisia—face problems and provide opportunities that have immediate regional and global implications. The head of the UN Counter‐Terrorism Com‐mittee (CTC) Executive Directorate recently called ¶ North Africa the most worrisome area of the world in regard to terrorism because of its slow economic ¶ development and unemployed youth. Unlike intractable conflicts of the Middle East, however, the chal‐¶ lenges in the Maghreb can be addressed best through a coordinated, communicated, comprehen‐¶ sive political, economic and social strategy led by Washington working in partnership with regimes in ¶ the region and in Europe. THE INTERESTS The Maghreb is the guardian of the Mediterra‐nean. Maintaining friendly relations with nations of the southern shore, just across the straits from NATO ¶ Spain and Gibraltar and from Italy and Malta, is nec‐essary for the US Sixth Fleet’s access the Mediterra‐¶ nean. Morocco’s newly modernized and expanded Tanger‐Med entrepôt port, like its sister at Algeciras, ¶ provides immediate transshipment for all commer‐cial traffic to and from the Mediterranean Sea to the ¶ east. Wartime has underscored the importance of that strategic location, from Moroccan cooperation ¶ in efforts to combat the Barbary pirates to the Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria in 1942 that pro‐¶ vided the base for the liberation of Italy and then southern France in 1944. At a time when the Russian ¶ navy is wandering into and out of the Mediterranean and China is assiduously building ties in the region, ¶ secure access to and cooperation with the Maghreb is vital to US interests. Today, the most immediate security issue con‐cerns the land rather than the sea, as al‐Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other salafist/jihadist ¶ groups spread subversive terrorism along the shores (Sahel in Arabic) of the Sahara and then north into ¶ Europe. Loose‐knit groups of terrorists from the Sa‐hel and the Maghreb itself bring stabs of insecurity ¶ into the major cities of the region and into European capitals such as Madrid, carried by the pressures of ¶ illegal trade and immigration.
No key to all oil—hormuz
No oil wars – costs too high and calculations have changed
Fettweis ‘10 – Professor of Political Science @ Tulane (Christopher, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace, pg. 126, CMR)
If the cases above are any indication, no stage of this life cycle carries much risk of major war to control resources. In fact, the most obvious observation that emerges from the study of petropolitics is that at no time have great powers come close to loggerheads over control of these vital regions. No country has ever actively prepared to conquer these weak areas, nor has any felt it necessary to prepare to defend them. Consumer cooperation, rather than conflict, is the rule. There has never been a war to control territory that contains fossil fuels, and there are good reasons to believe it is likely that there never will be. The conventional wisdom concerning the inevitability of energy wars is probably wrong. Why has great power behavior failed to live up to pessimistic expectations? While it is hard to argue that democracy has helped confound the various ecopessimist projections, since not all interested parties are democracies, other rationalist explanations for stability cannot be entirely ruled out. Perhaps it is the fear of escalation toward a nuclear holocaust that has kept the great powers from fighting over oil. Perhaps liberal internationalists are correct and complex interdependence should be given primary credit. 'Whatever the initial cause the idea that war would be a viable option to control the most valuable regions in the world does not seem to have occurred to the great consumer nations. As time goes on, it becomes more and more unlikely that it ever will. Resources have historically been a primary motivator for war. The most valuable regions-those worthy of contestation and conquest-have always been those that were the richest. Today, that calculation seems to have changed, even regarding the most vulnerable, valuable regions in the world. It seems as if the states of the industrialized world have indeed taken Angell's ideas to heart and have reached the conclusion that oil is not worth fighting one another for. Perhaps, for the first time, nothing is.
| 7,050 |
<h4>Their ev’s all <u>hype</u> --- ISIS has <u>no capabilities</u> and their impact’s <u>empirically denied</u> by <u>al Qaeda</h4><p></u><strong>NBC 9/12/14 </strong>(“Petraeus: Don't Overestimate ISIS in Iraq”, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/petraeus-dont-overestimate-isis-iraq-n202011<u>)//trepka</p><p></u>Gen. David Petraeus says <u><mark>ISIS</mark> should not be overestimated and <mark>has “<strong>nowhere near</strong>” the</u> <u>strength of al Qaeda in Iraq at the <strong>height</strong> </mark>of the war in that country</u>. Petraeus, the former top American commander in Iraq and Afghanistan, told a crowd in Denver on Thursday that President Barack Obama made a compelling case for destroying ISIS militants. He said that the battle will probably outlast Obama’s administration, according to NBC affiliate KUSA. He also said <u>that <mark>ISIS</mark> in Syria <mark>is</mark> “<strong>far <mark>more complex</mark>.” </u></strong>But in Iraq, the general said, ISIS “should not be overestimated in many respects — <u><mark>it has nowhere near the <strong>roots</strong></mark>, the <strong><mark>numbers</strong> and</mark> the <strong><mark>structure</strong></mark> that <mark>al Qaeda </mark>in Iraq and the associated Sunni insurgents <mark>had</mark> when we launched the surge” <mark>in 2007.</p><p></mark>Sunni shia non unique</p><p>Med impact stupid </p><p>Cooperation now solves </p><p></u><strong>Alexander 9</strong> (Yonah, Professor at the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies and Senior Fellow and Director of the International Center at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, et al., “Why The Maghreb Matters: Threats, Opportunities, and Options for Effective American Engagement in North Africa”, Potomac Institute Special Report, March, http://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/studies/NorthAfricaPolicyPaper033109.pdf</p><p><u><strong><mark>North Africa</u></strong></mark> (the Maghreb)<u> <mark>is</mark> a <mark>strategically important</mark> region for the United States</u>. Its location at ¶ the mouth of the Mediterranean, on the southern shore of Europe’s “Rio Grande,” and at the western ¶ end of the Arab world, and its prominence as an area of US interests in security, democratization, stability, ¶ development, <u>and</u> cooperation, make the Maghreb a region <u>worthy of serious attention by</u> the <u>Obama</u> ¶ administration. Unfortunately, North Africa has of‐ten fallen through the cracks of US Middle East, Afri‐¶ can, and European policies. Domestic constituencies concerned with the Middle East tend to focus on oil, ¶ the Middle East peace process, and Iran. Those con‐cerned with African policy tend to concentrate on ¶ conflict issues affecting sub‐Saharan Africa only. Those concerned with the Mediterranean tend to ¶ look to the northern shore and are content to leave the south to the European Union (EU). The absence ¶ of vocal domestic constituencies on Maghrebi issues has contributed to the lack of a clear US policy focus. ¶ Yet the US government should have a profound in‐terest in North Africa because <u><mark>developments in the ¶ region <strong>impact significantly</strong></mark> on <mark>our national interests</u></mark>. As the new administration prepares its portfolio ¶ of foreign policy priorities, immediate attention should be given to a review of US interests and op‐¶ portunities in North Africa. <u>The countries of the Maghreb</u>—Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, <u><strong><mark>Morocco</mark>,</u></strong> and ¶ Tunisia—<u><mark>face problems and provide opportunities that have <strong>immediate regional and global implications</u></strong>.</mark> The head of the UN Counter‐Terrorism Com‐mittee (CTC) Executive Directorate recently called ¶ North Africa the most worrisome area of the world in regard to terrorism because of its slow economic ¶ development and unemployed youth. Unlike intractable conflicts of the Middle East, however, the chal‐¶ lenges in the <u><mark>Maghreb can be addressed best through a coordinated, communicated, comprehen‐¶ sive political, economic and social strategy led by Washington working in partnership with regimes in ¶ the region and in Europe.</u></mark> THE INTERESTS <u>The Maghreb is the guardian of the Mediterra‐nean. <mark>Maintaining friendly relations</mark> with nations of the southern shore</u>, just across the straits from NATO ¶ Spain and Gibraltar and from Italy and Malta, <u><strong><mark>is nec‐essary for the US Sixth Fleet’s access</u></strong></mark> the Mediterra‐¶ nean. Morocco’s newly modernized and expanded Tanger‐Med entrepôt port, like its sister at Algeciras, ¶ provides immediate transshipment for all commer‐cial traffic to and from the Mediterranean Sea to the ¶ east. Wartime has underscored the importance of that strategic location, from Moroccan cooperation ¶ in efforts to combat the Barbary pirates to the Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria in 1942 that pro‐¶ vided the base for the liberation of Italy and then southern France in 1944. <u><mark>At a time when the Russian ¶ navy is wandering</mark> into <mark>and</mark> out of the Mediterranean and <mark>China is assiduously building ties</u></mark> in the region, ¶ <u><strong><mark>secure access</mark> to <mark>and cooperation</mark> with the <mark>Maghreb is vital to US interests</u></strong></mark>. Today, <u><mark>the most immediate security issue con‐cerns</u></mark> the land rather than the sea, as al‐Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (<u><mark>AQIM</mark>) and other salafist/jihadist ¶ groups</u> spread subversive terrorism along the shores (Sahel in Arabic) of the Sahara and then north into ¶ Europe. <u>Loose‐knit groups of terrorists from the Sa‐hel and the Maghreb itself bring stabs of insecurity</u> ¶ into the major cities of the region and into European capitals such as Madrid, carried by the pressures of ¶<u> illegal trade and immigration. </p><p>No key to all oil—hormuz<strong> </p><p></u>No oil wars – costs too high and calculations have changed </p><p>Fettweis ‘10</strong> – Professor of Political Science @ Tulane (Christopher, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace, pg. 126, CMR)</p><p>If the cases above are any indication, <u><mark>no stage</u></mark> of this life cycle <u><mark>carries much risk of</mark> major <mark>war to control resources</u></mark>. In fact, the most obvious observation that emerges from the study of petropolitics is that <u><mark>at no time have great powers come close</mark> to loggerheads over control of</u> these <u>vital regions. No country has ever actively prepared to conquer</u> these <u>weak areas, nor has any felt it necessary to prepare to defend them<mark>. Consumer <strong>cooperation</strong></mark>, rather than conflict, <mark>is <strong>the rule</strong>. There has never been a war to control </mark>territory that contains <mark>fossil fuels,</mark> and there are good reasons to believe it is likely that there never will be. The conventional <mark>wisdom concerning</mark> the inevitability of <mark>energy wars is</u></mark> probably <u><strong><mark>wrong</strong>. Why has </mark>great power <mark>behavior failed</mark> to live up to pessimistic <mark>expectations</mark>?</u> While it is hard to argue that democracy has helped confound the various ecopessimist projections, since not all interested parties are democracies, other rationalist explanations for stability cannot be entirely ruled out. <u>Perhaps it is the <strong><mark>fear of escalation</strong></mark> toward a nuclear holocaust</u> that has kept the great powers from fighting over oil. <u>Perhaps liberal internationalists are correct</u> and complex interdependence should be given primary credit. <u>'Whatever the initial cause the idea that war would be a viable option to control the most valuable regions in the world does not seem to have occurred to the great consumer nations. <mark>As time goes on, it becomes <strong>more</strong></mark> and more <strong><mark>unlikely</strong></mark> that it ever will. Resources have historically been a primary motivator for war</u>. The most valuable regions-those worthy of contestation and conquest-have always been those that were the richest. <u>Today, that <mark>calculation seems to have changed,</mark> even regarding the most vulnerable, valuable regions in the world</u>. It seems as if the <u><mark>states</u></mark> of the industrialized world <u><mark>have</u></mark> indeed taken Angell's ideas to heart and have <u><mark>reached the conclusion that oil is <strong>not worth fighting</u></strong></mark> one another <u><strong><mark>for</u></strong></mark>. Perhaps, <u>for the first time, nothing is.</p></u>
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1nc
| null |
A1
| 118,656 | 6 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,216 |
Vote before State of the Union
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Jerusalem Post 1/14
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Jerusalem Post 1/14/2015 (Nuclear talks resume with warnings to Congress over Iran sanctions, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Nuclear-talks-resume-with-warnings-to-Congress-over-Iran-sanctions-387753)
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aides on Capitol Hill continue to work on the final touches of a bill that would "trigger" new sanctions on Iran Leadership plans to introduce the bill by the president's State of the Union address. a bill from Congress could "very well lead to a breakdown in these negotiations."
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Leadership plans to introduce the bill by the president's State of the Union address bill from Congress could "very well lead to a breakdown in these negotiations."
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The US, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany seek to end international concerns over the nature of Iran's nuclear program, which many suspect is military in nature. In Washington, however, aides on Capitol Hill continue to work on the final touches of a bill that would "trigger" new sanctions on Iran should talks ultimately fail, or should Tehran violate terms of an interim deal that laid the groundwork for negotiations, formally known as the Joint Plan of Action. Leadership in Congress, now under full Republican control, plans to introduce the bill by the president's State of the Union address. But any bill from Congress regarding new, nuclear-related sanctions on Iran during international talks over its nuclear program will be vetoed by US President Barack Obama, the State Department said this week. "Even with a trigger, if there's a bill that's signed into law, and it is US law, in our mind it is a violation of the Joint Plan of Action— which, as we've said, could encourage Iran to violate it," State Department deputy spokeswoman Marie Harf said on Tuesday. "A sanctions bill, trigger or not, that is passed and signed into law by the president, which we've said we will not do... would be a violation of the JPOA," she continued. If a deal does not come to pass, Harf said, "we could put initial sanctions on Iran in 24 hours." Harf added on Wednesday that a bill from Congress could "very well lead to a breakdown in these negotiations."
| 1,471 |
<h4><strong>Vote before State of the Union</h4><p>Jerusalem Post 1/14<u></strong>/2015 (Nuclear talks resume with warnings to Congress over Iran sanctions, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Nuclear-talks-resume-with-warnings-to-Congress-over-Iran-sanctions-387753)</p><p></u>The US, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany seek to end international concerns over the nature of Iran's nuclear program, which many suspect is military in nature. In Washington, however, <u>aides on Capitol Hill continue to work on the final touches of a bill that would "trigger" new sanctions on Iran</u> should talks ultimately fail, or should Tehran violate terms of an interim deal that laid the groundwork for negotiations, formally known as the Joint Plan of Action. <u><mark>Leadership</u></mark> in Congress, now under full Republican control, <u><strong><mark>plans to introduce the bill by the president's State of the Union address</mark>. </u></strong>But any bill from Congress regarding new, nuclear-related sanctions on Iran during international talks over its nuclear program will be vetoed by US President Barack Obama, the State Department said this week. "Even with a trigger, if there's a bill that's signed into law, and it is US law, in our mind it is a violation of the Joint Plan of Action— which, as we've said, could encourage Iran to violate it," State Department deputy spokeswoman Marie Harf said on Tuesday. "A sanctions bill, trigger or not, that is passed and signed into law by the president, which we've said we will not do... would be a violation of the JPOA," she continued. If a deal does not come to pass, Harf said, "we could put initial sanctions on Iran in 24 hours." Harf added on Wednesday that <u>a <strong><mark>bill from Congress could "very well lead to a breakdown in these negotiations."</p></u></strong></mark>
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1nr
|
Top of Agenda
|
Nuclear, biological and chemical war
| 430,683 | 5 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
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Navy
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2
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Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
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Watson
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Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,217 |
No impact to cyberwar
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Rid ’12
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Rid ’12 (Thomas Rid, war studies at King's College London, is author of "Cyber War Will Not Take Place" and co-author of "Cyber-Weapons.", Think Again: Cyberwar Don't fear the digital bogeyman. Virtual conflict is still more hype than reality., MARCH/APRIL 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar?page=0,0, EY)
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Cyberwar is still more hype than hazard. Consider the definition of an act of war: It has to be potentially violent, it has to be purposeful, and it has to be political. The cyberattacks we've seen so far, from Estonia to the Stuxnet virus, simply don't meet these criteria. After Reed's account came out, Vasily Pchelintsev, a former KGB head of the Tyumen region, where the alleged explosion supposedly took place, denied the story. There are also no media reports from 1982 that confirm such an explosion, though accidents and pipeline explosions in the Soviet Union were regularly reported in the early 1980s. but Reed's book is the only public mention of the incident and his account relied on a single documen , there is no known cyberattack that has caused the loss of human life. No cyberoffense has ever injured a person or damaged a building. And if an act is not at least potentially violent, What I'm concerned about are destructive attacks," Alexander said, "those that are coming." He then invoked a remarkable accident at Russia's Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric plant to highlight the kind of damage a cyberattack might be able to cause. The ill-fated turbine had been malfunctioning for some time, and the plant's management was notoriously poor. On top of that, the key event that ultimately triggered the catastrophe seems to have been a fire at Bratsk power station, about 500 miles away. Because the energy supply from Bratsk dropped, authorities remotely increased the burden on the Sayano-Shushenskaya plant. The sudden spike overwhelmed the turbine, which was two months shy of reaching the end of its 30-year life cycle, sparking the catastrophe potentially damaging or life-threatening cyberattacks should be more difficult to pull off. Why? Sensitive systems generally have built-in redundancy and safety systems, meaning an attacker's likely objective will not be to shut down a system, since merely forcing the shutdown of one control system, say a power plant, could trigger a backup and cause operators to start looking for the bug. To work as an effective weapon, malware would have to influence an active process -- but not bring it to a screeching halt. If the malicious activity extends over a lengthy period, it has to remain stealthy. That's a more difficult trick than hitting the virtual off-button. Take Stuxnet, the worm that sabotaged Iran's nuclear program in 2010. It didn't just crudely shut down the centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facility; rather, the worm subtly manipulated the system. Stuxnet stealthily infiltrated the plant's networks, then hopped onto the protected control systems, intercepted input values from sensors, recorded these data, and then provided the legitimate controller code with pre-recorded fake input signals, according to researchers who have studied the worm. As the destructive potential of a cyberweapon grows, the likelihood that it could do far-reaching damage across many systems shrinks. Stuxnet did infect more than 100,000 computers -- mainly in Iran, Indonesia, and India, though also in Europe and the United States. But it was so specifically programmed that it didn't actually damage those machines, afflicting only Iran's c
"In Cyberspace, Offense Dominates Defense." Wrong A closer examination reveals three factors that put the offense at a disadvantage. First is the high cost of developing a cyberweapon, in terms of time, talent, and intelligence the potential for generic offensive weapons may be far smaller than assumed and significant investments in highly specific attack programs may be deployable only against a very limited target set. once developed, an offensive tool is likely to have a far shorter half-life than the defensive measures put in place against it a weapon may only be able to strike a single time; once the exploits of a specialized piece of malware are discovered, the most critical systems will likely be patched and fixed quickly. And a weapon, even a potent one, is not much of a weapon if an attack cannot be repeated the coercive power of a cyberattack would be drastically reduced.
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Cyberwar is hype no known cyberattack t r injured person or damaged building cyberattacks difficult Sensitive systems have built-in redundancy and safety forcing the shutdown of one control system trigger a backup malware would have to influence an active process As destructive potential of a cyberweapon grows, damage across systems shrinks. Stuxnet was so specifically programmed that it didn't actually damage machines,
"In Cyberspace, Offense Dominates Defense." Wrong three factors put offense at a disadvantage. First is the high cost of developing a cyberweapon, in terms of time, talent, and intelligence the potential for generic offensive weapons may be far smaller than assumed and investments may be deployable only against a very limited target set. an offensive tool is likely to have a far shorter half-life than the defensive measures against it. a weapon may only be able to strike a single time; once the exploits are discovered systems will be patched and fixed quickly.
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Time for a reality check: Cyberwar is still more hype than hazard. Consider the definition of an act of war: It has to be potentially violent, it has to be purposeful, and it has to be political. The cyberattacks we've seen so far, from Estonia to the Stuxnet virus, simply don't meet these criteria. Take the dubious story of a Soviet pipeline explosion back in 1982, much cited by cyberwar's true believers as the most destructive cyberattack ever. The account goes like this: In June 1982, a Siberian pipeline that the CIA had virtually booby-trapped with a so-called "logic bomb" exploded in a monumental fireball that could be seen from space. The U.S. Air Force estimated the explosion at 3 kilotons, equivalent to a small nuclear device. Targeting a Soviet pipeline linking gas fields in Siberia to European markets, the operation sabotaged the pipeline's control systems with software from a Canadian firm that the CIA had doctored with malicious code. No one died, according to Thomas Reed, a U.S. National Security Council aide at the time who revealed the incident in his 2004 book, At the Abyss; the only harm came to the Soviet economy. The Cyber War Is Already Upon Us But did it really happen? After Reed's account came out, Vasily Pchelintsev, a former KGB head of the Tyumen region, where the alleged explosion supposedly took place, denied the story. There are also no media reports from 1982 that confirm such an explosion, though accidents and pipeline explosions in the Soviet Union were regularly reported in the early 1980s. Something likely did happen, but Reed's book is the only public mention of the incident and his account relied on a single document. Even after the CIA declassified a redacted version of Reed's source, a note on the so-called Farewell Dossier that describes the effort to provide the Soviet Union with defective technology, the agency did not confirm that such an explosion occurred. The available evidence on the Siberian pipeline blast is so thin that it shouldn't be counted as a proven case of a successful cyberattack. Most other commonly cited cases of cyberwar are even less remarkable. Take the attacks on Estonia in April 2007, which came in response to the controversial relocation of a Soviet war memorial, the Bronze Soldier. The well-wired country found itself at the receiving end of a massive distributed denial-of-service attack that emanated from up to 85,000 hijacked computers and lasted three weeks. The attacks reached a peak on May 9, when 58 Estonian websites were attacked at once and the online services of Estonia's largest bank were taken down. "What's the difference between a blockade of harbors or airports of sovereign states and the blockade of government institutions and newspaper websites?" asked Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip. Despite his analogies, the attack was no act of war. It was certainly a nuisance and an emotional strike on the country, but the bank's actual network was not even penetrated; it went down for 90 minutes one day and two hours the next. The attack was not violent, it wasn't purposefully aimed at changing Estonia's behavior, and no political entity took credit for it. The same is true for the vast majority of cyberattacks on record. Indeed, there is no known cyberattack that has caused the loss of human life. No cyberoffense has ever injured a person or damaged a building. And if an act is not at least potentially violent, it's not an act of war. Separating war from physical violence makes it a metaphorical notion; it would mean that there is no way to distinguish between World War II, say, and the "wars" on obesity and cancer. Yet those ailments, unlike past examples of cyber "war," actually do kill people. "A Digital Pearl Harbor Is Only a Matter of Time." Keep waiting. U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta delivered a stark warning last summer: "We could face a cyberattack that could be the equivalent of Pearl Harbor." Such alarmist predictions have been ricocheting inside the Beltway for the past two decades, and some scaremongers have even upped the ante by raising the alarm about a cyber 9/11. In his 2010 book, Cyber War, former White House counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke invokes the specter of nationwide power blackouts, planes falling out of the sky, trains derailing, refineries burning, pipelines exploding, poisonous gas clouds wafting, and satellites spinning out of orbit -- events that would make the 2001 attacks pale in comparison. But the empirical record is less hair-raising, even by the standards of the most drastic example available. Gen. Keith Alexander, head of U.S. Cyber Command (established in 2010 and now boasting a budget of more than $3 billion), shared his worst fears in an April 2011 speech at the University of Rhode Island: "What I'm concerned about are destructive attacks," Alexander said, "those that are coming." He then invoked a remarkable accident at Russia's Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric plant to highlight the kind of damage a cyberattack might be able to cause. Shortly after midnight on Aug. 17, 2009, a 900-ton turbine was ripped out of its seat by a so-called "water hammer," a sudden surge in water pressure that then caused a transformer explosion. The turbine's unusually high vibrations had worn down the bolts that kept its cover in place, and an offline sensor failed to detect the malfunction. Seventy-five people died in the accident, energy prices in Russia rose, and rebuilding the plant is slated to cost $1.3 billion. Tough luck for the Russians, but here's what the head of Cyber Command didn't say: The ill-fated turbine had been malfunctioning for some time, and the plant's management was notoriously poor. On top of that, the key event that ultimately triggered the catastrophe seems to have been a fire at Bratsk power station, about 500 miles away. Because the energy supply from Bratsk dropped, authorities remotely increased the burden on the Sayano-Shushenskaya plant. The sudden spike overwhelmed the turbine, which was two months shy of reaching the end of its 30-year life cycle, sparking the catastrophe. If anything, the Sayano-Shushenskaya incident highlights how difficult a devastating attack would be to mount. The plant's washout was an accident at the end of a complicated and unique chain of events. Anticipating such vulnerabilities in advance is extraordinarily difficult even for insiders; creating comparable coincidences from cyberspace would be a daunting challenge at best for outsiders. If this is the most drastic incident Cyber Command can conjure up, perhaps it's time for everyone to take a deep breath. "Cyberattacks Are Becoming Easier." Just the opposite. U.S. Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper warned last year that the volume of malicious software on American networks had more than tripled since 2009 and that more than 60,000 pieces of malware are now discovered every day. The United States, he said, is undergoing "a phenomenon known as 'convergence,' which amplifies the opportunity for disruptive cyberattacks, including against physical infrastructures." ("Digital convergence" is a snazzy term for a simple thing: more and more devices able to talk to each other, and formerly separate industries and activities able to work together.) Just because there's more malware, however, doesn't mean that attacks are becoming easier. In fact, potentially damaging or life-threatening cyberattacks should be more difficult to pull off. Why? Sensitive systems generally have built-in redundancy and safety systems, meaning an attacker's likely objective will not be to shut down a system, since merely forcing the shutdown of one control system, say a power plant, could trigger a backup and cause operators to start looking for the bug. To work as an effective weapon, malware would have to influence an active process -- but not bring it to a screeching halt. If the malicious activity extends over a lengthy period, it has to remain stealthy. That's a more difficult trick than hitting the virtual off-button. Take Stuxnet, the worm that sabotaged Iran's nuclear program in 2010. It didn't just crudely shut down the centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facility; rather, the worm subtly manipulated the system. Stuxnet stealthily infiltrated the plant's networks, then hopped onto the protected control systems, intercepted input values from sensors, recorded these data, and then provided the legitimate controller code with pre-recorded fake input signals, according to researchers who have studied the worm. Its objective was not just to fool operators in a control room, but also to circumvent digital safety and monitoring systems so it could secretly manipulate the actual processes. Building and deploying Stuxnet required extremely detailed intelligence about the systems it was supposed to compromise, and the same will be true for other dangerous cyberweapons. Yes, "convergence," standardization, and sloppy defense of control-systems software could increase the risk of generic attacks, but the same trend has also caused defenses against the most coveted targets to improve steadily and has made reprogramming highly specific installations on legacy systems more complex, not less. "Cyberweapons Can Create Massive Collateral Damage." Very unlikely. When news of Stuxnet broke, the New York Times reported that the most striking aspect of the new weapon was the "collateral damage" it created. The malicious program was "splattered on thousands of computer systems around the world, and much of its impact has been on those systems, rather than on what appears to have been its intended target, Iranian equipment," the Times reported. Such descriptions encouraged the view that computer viruses are akin to highly contagious biological viruses that, once unleashed from the lab, will turn against all vulnerable systems, not just their intended targets. But this metaphor is deeply flawed. As the destructive potential of a cyberweapon grows, the likelihood that it could do far-reaching damage across many systems shrinks. Stuxnet did infect more than 100,000 computers -- mainly in Iran, Indonesia, and India, though also in Europe and the United States. But it was so specifically programmed that it didn't actually damage those machines, afflicting only Iran's centrifuges at Natanz. The worm's aggressive infection strategy was designed to maximize the likelihood that it would reach its intended target. Because that final target was not networked, "all the functionality required to sabotage a system was embedded directly in the Stuxnet executable," the security software company Symantec observed in its analysis of the worm's code. So yes, Stuxnet was "splattered" far and wide, but it only executed its damaging payload where it was supposed to. Collateral infection, in short, is not necessarily collateral damage. A sophisticated piece of malware may aggressively infect many systems, but if there is an intended target, the infection will likely have a distinct payload that will be harmless to most computers. Especially in the context of more sophisticated cyberweapons, the image of inadvertent collateral damage doesn't hold up. They're more like a flu virus that only makes one family sick. "
"In Cyberspace, Offense Dominates Defense." Wrong again. The information age has "offense-dominant attributes," Arquilla and Ronfeldt wrote in their influential 1996 book, The Advent of Netwar. This view has spread through the American defense establishment like, well, a virus. A 2011 Pentagon report on cyberspace stressed "the advantage currently enjoyed by the offense in cyberwarfare." The intelligence community stressed the same point in its annual threat report to Congress last year, arguing that offensive tactics -- known as vulnerability discovery and exploitation -- are evolving more rapidly than the federal government and industry can adapt their defensive best practices. The conclusion seemed obvious: Cyberattackers have the advantage over cyberdefenders, "with the trend likely getting worse over the next five years." A closer examination of the record, however, reveals three factors that put the offense at a disadvantage. First is the high cost of developing a cyberweapon, in terms of time, talent, and target intelligence needed. Stuxnet, experts speculate, took a superb team and a lot of time. Second, the potential for generic offensive weapons may be far smaller than assumed for the same reasons, and significant investments in highly specific attack programs may be deployable only against a very limited target set. Third, once developed, an offensive tool is likely to have a far shorter half-life than the defensive measures put in place against it. Even worse, a weapon may only be able to strike a single time; once the exploits of a specialized piece of malware are discovered, the most critical systems will likely be patched and fixed quickly. And a weapon, even a potent one, is not much of a weapon if an attack cannot be repeated. Any political threat relies on the credible threat to attack or to replicate a successful attack. If that were in doubt, the coercive power of a cyberattack would be drastically reduced.
Modernization inevitable—their Haney cites only WMD capabtilies—Russia and China don’t need hackers
| 13,350 |
<h4><strong>No impact to cyberwar</h4><p>Rid ’12</strong> (Thomas Rid, war studies at King's College London, is author of "Cyber War Will Not Take Place" and co-author of "Cyber-Weapons.", Think Again: Cyberwar Don't fear the digital bogeyman. Virtual conflict is still more hype than reality., MARCH/APRIL 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar?page=0,0, EY)</p><p>Time for a reality check: <u><mark>Cyberwar is </mark>still more <mark>hype</mark> than hazard. Consider the definition of an act of war: It has to be potentially violent, it has to be purposeful, and it has to be political. The cyberattacks we've seen so far, from Estonia to the Stuxnet virus, simply don't meet these criteria. </u>Take the dubious story of a Soviet pipeline explosion back in 1982, much cited by cyberwar's true believers as the most destructive cyberattack ever. The account goes like this: In June 1982, a Siberian pipeline that the CIA had virtually booby-trapped with a so-called "logic bomb" exploded in a monumental fireball that could be seen from space. The U.S. Air Force estimated the explosion at 3 kilotons, equivalent to a small nuclear device. Targeting a Soviet pipeline linking gas fields in Siberia to European markets, the operation sabotaged the pipeline's control systems with software from a Canadian firm that the CIA had doctored with malicious code. No one died, according to Thomas Reed, a U.S. National Security Council aide at the time who revealed the incident in his 2004 book, At the Abyss; the only harm came to the Soviet economy. The Cyber War Is Already Upon Us But did it really happen? <u>After Reed's account came out, Vasily Pchelintsev, a former KGB head of the Tyumen region, where the alleged explosion supposedly took place, denied the story. There are also no media reports from 1982 that confirm such an explosion, though accidents and pipeline explosions in the Soviet Union were regularly reported in the early 1980s. </u>Something likely did happen, <u>but Reed's book is the only public mention of the incident and his account relied on a single documen</u>t. Even after the CIA declassified a redacted version of Reed's source, a note on the so-called Farewell Dossier that describes the effort to provide the Soviet Union with defective technology, the agency did not confirm that such an explosion occurred. The available evidence on the Siberian pipeline blast is so thin that it shouldn't be counted as a proven case of a successful cyberattack. Most other commonly cited cases of cyberwar are even less remarkable. Take the attacks on Estonia in April 2007, which came in response to the controversial relocation of a Soviet war memorial, the Bronze Soldier. The well-wired country found itself at the receiving end of a massive distributed denial-of-service attack that emanated from up to 85,000 hijacked computers and lasted three weeks. The attacks reached a peak on May 9, when 58 Estonian websites were attacked at once and the online services of Estonia's largest bank were taken down. "What's the difference between a blockade of harbors or airports of sovereign states and the blockade of government institutions and newspaper websites?" asked Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip. Despite his analogies, the attack was no act of war. It was certainly a nuisance and an emotional strike on the country, but the bank's actual network was not even penetrated; it went down for 90 minutes one day and two hours the next. The attack was not violent, it wasn't purposefully aimed at changing Estonia's behavior, and no political entity took credit for it. The same is true for the vast majority of cyberattacks on record. Indeed<u>, there is <mark>no known cyberattack t</mark>hat has caused the loss of human life. No cyberoffense has eve<mark>r injured </mark>a <mark>person or damaged </mark>a <mark>building</mark>. And if an act is not at least potentially violent,</u> it's not an act of war. Separating war from physical violence makes it a metaphorical notion; it would mean that there is no way to distinguish between World War II, say, and the "wars" on obesity and cancer. Yet those ailments, unlike past examples of cyber "war," actually do kill people. "A Digital Pearl Harbor Is Only a Matter of Time." Keep waiting. U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta delivered a stark warning last summer: "We could face a cyberattack that could be the equivalent of Pearl Harbor." Such alarmist predictions have been ricocheting inside the Beltway for the past two decades, and some scaremongers have even upped the ante by raising the alarm about a cyber 9/11. In his 2010 book, Cyber War, former White House counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke invokes the specter of nationwide power blackouts, planes falling out of the sky, trains derailing, refineries burning, pipelines exploding, poisonous gas clouds wafting, and satellites spinning out of orbit -- events that would make the 2001 attacks pale in comparison. But the empirical record is less hair-raising, even by the standards of the most drastic example available. Gen. Keith Alexander, head of U.S. Cyber Command (established in 2010 and now boasting a budget of more than $3 billion), shared his worst fears in an April 2011 speech at the University of Rhode Island: "<u>What I'm concerned about are destructive attacks," Alexander said, "those that are coming." He then invoked a remarkable accident at Russia's Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric plant to highlight the kind of damage a cyberattack might be able to cause. </u>Shortly after midnight on Aug. 17, 2009, a 900-ton turbine was ripped out of its seat by a so-called "water hammer," a sudden surge in water pressure that then caused a transformer explosion. The turbine's unusually high vibrations had worn down the bolts that kept its cover in place, and an offline sensor failed to detect the malfunction. Seventy-five people died in the accident, energy prices in Russia rose, and rebuilding the plant is slated to cost $1.3 billion. Tough luck for the Russians, but here's what the head of Cyber Command didn't say: <u>The ill-fated turbine had been malfunctioning for some time, and the plant's management was notoriously poor. On top of that, the key event that ultimately triggered the catastrophe seems to have been a fire at Bratsk power station, about 500 miles away. Because the energy supply from Bratsk dropped, authorities remotely increased the burden on the Sayano-Shushenskaya plant. The sudden spike overwhelmed the turbine, which was two months shy of reaching the end of its 30-year life cycle, sparking the catastrophe</u>. If anything, the Sayano-Shushenskaya incident highlights how difficult a devastating attack would be to mount. The plant's washout was an accident at the end of a complicated and unique chain of events. Anticipating such vulnerabilities in advance is extraordinarily difficult even for insiders; creating comparable coincidences from cyberspace would be a daunting challenge at best for outsiders. If this is the most drastic incident Cyber Command can conjure up, perhaps it's time for everyone to take a deep breath. "Cyberattacks Are Becoming Easier." Just the opposite. U.S. Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper warned last year that the volume of malicious software on American networks had more than tripled since 2009 and that more than 60,000 pieces of malware are now discovered every day. The United States, he said, is undergoing "a phenomenon known as 'convergence,' which amplifies the opportunity for disruptive cyberattacks, including against physical infrastructures." ("Digital convergence" is a snazzy term for a simple thing: more and more devices able to talk to each other, and formerly separate industries and activities able to work together.) Just because there's more malware, however, doesn't mean that attacks are becoming easier. In fact, <u>potentially damaging or life-threatening <mark>cyberattacks </mark>should be more <mark>difficult </mark>to pull off. Why? <mark>Sensitive systems </mark>generally <mark>have built-in redundancy and safety </mark>systems, meaning an attacker's likely objective will not be to shut down a system, since merely <mark>forcing the shutdown of one control system</mark>, say a power plant, could <mark>trigger a backup </mark>and cause operators to start looking for the bug. To work as an effective weapon, <mark>malware would have to influence an active process</mark> -- but not bring it to a screeching halt. If the malicious activity extends over a lengthy period, it has to remain stealthy. That's a more difficult trick than hitting the virtual off-button. Take Stuxnet, the worm that sabotaged Iran's nuclear program in 2010. It didn't just crudely shut down the centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facility; rather, the worm subtly manipulated the system. Stuxnet stealthily infiltrated the plant's networks, then hopped onto the protected control systems, intercepted input values from sensors, recorded these data, and then provided the legitimate controller code with pre-recorded fake input signals, according to researchers who have studied the worm.</u> Its objective was not just to fool operators in a control room, but also to circumvent digital safety and monitoring systems so it could secretly manipulate the actual processes. Building and deploying Stuxnet required extremely detailed intelligence about the systems it was supposed to compromise, and the same will be true for other dangerous cyberweapons. Yes, "convergence," standardization, and sloppy defense of control-systems software could increase the risk of generic attacks, but the same trend has also caused defenses against the most coveted targets to improve steadily and has made reprogramming highly specific installations on legacy systems more complex, not less. "Cyberweapons Can Create Massive Collateral Damage." Very unlikely. When news of Stuxnet broke, the New York Times reported that the most striking aspect of the new weapon was the "collateral damage" it created. The malicious program was "splattered on thousands of computer systems around the world, and much of its impact has been on those systems, rather than on what appears to have been its intended target, Iranian equipment," the Times reported. Such descriptions encouraged the view that computer viruses are akin to highly contagious biological viruses that, once unleashed from the lab, will turn against all vulnerable systems, not just their intended targets. But this metaphor is deeply flawed. <u><mark>As </mark>the <mark>destructive potential of a cyberweapon grows,</mark> the likelihood that it could do far-reaching<mark> damage across </mark>many <mark>systems shrinks. Stuxnet</mark> did infect more than 100,000 computers -- mainly in Iran, Indonesia, and India, though also in Europe and the United States.</u> <u>But it <mark>was so specifically programmed that it didn't actually damage </mark>those <mark>machines, </mark>afflicting only Iran's c</u>entrifuges at Natanz. The worm's aggressive infection strategy was designed to maximize the likelihood that it would reach its intended target. Because that final target was not networked, "all the functionality required to sabotage a system was embedded directly in the Stuxnet executable," the security software company Symantec observed in its analysis of the worm's code. So yes, Stuxnet was "splattered" far and wide, but it only executed its damaging payload where it was supposed to. Collateral infection, in short, is not necessarily collateral damage. A sophisticated piece of malware may aggressively infect many systems, but if there is an intended target, the infection will likely have a distinct payload that will be harmless to most computers. Especially in the context of more sophisticated cyberweapons, the image of inadvertent collateral damage doesn't hold up. They're more like a flu virus that only makes one family sick. "</p><p><u><strong><mark>"In Cyberspace, Offense Dominates Defense." Wrong</u></strong></mark> again. The information age has "offense-dominant attributes," Arquilla and Ronfeldt wrote in their influential 1996 book, The Advent of Netwar. This view has spread through the American defense establishment like, well, a virus. A 2011 Pentagon report on cyberspace stressed "the advantage currently enjoyed by the offense in cyberwarfare." The intelligence community stressed the same point in its annual threat report to Congress last year, arguing that offensive tactics -- known as vulnerability discovery and exploitation -- are evolving more rapidly than the federal government and industry can adapt their defensive best practices. The conclusion seemed obvious: Cyberattackers have the advantage over cyberdefenders, "with the trend likely getting worse over the next five years." <u><strong>A closer examination</u></strong> of the record, however, <u><strong>reveals <mark>three factors </mark>that <mark>put</mark> the <mark>offense at a disadvantage. First is the high cost of developing a cyberweapon, in terms of time, talent, and</mark> </u></strong>target <u><strong><mark>intelligence</u></strong></mark> needed. Stuxnet, experts speculate, took a superb team and a lot of time. Second, <u><strong><mark>the potential for generic offensive weapons may be far smaller than assumed</u></strong></mark> for the same reasons, <u><strong><mark>and</mark> significant <mark>investments</mark> in highly specific attack programs <mark>may be deployable only against a very limited target set.</u></strong></mark> Third, <u><strong>once developed, <mark>an offensive tool is likely to have a far shorter half-life than the defensive measures</mark> put in place <mark>against it</u></strong>.</mark> Even worse, <u><strong><mark>a weapon may only be able to strike a single time; once the exploits</mark> of a specialized piece of malware <mark>are discovered</mark>, the most critical <mark>systems will</mark> likely <mark>be patched and fixed quickly. </mark>And a weapon, even a potent one, is not much of a weapon if an attack cannot be repeated</u></strong>. Any political threat relies on the credible threat to attack or to replicate a successful attack. If that were in doubt, <u><strong>the coercive power of a cyberattack would be drastically reduced.</u></strong> </p><p><strong>Modernization inevitable—their Haney cites only WMD capabtilies—Russia and China don’t need hackers </p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 2
| 64,302 | 132 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,218 |
Liberal AG leads to descheduling of marijuana- solves the aff
|
Lopez 9/25
|
Lopez 9/25/2014 (German [his name, not necessarily nationality], writer for Vox, covers criminal justice, the war on drugs, health, and LGBT issues, Eric Holder questions marijuana's legal status as he prepares to leave Justice Department, http://www.vox.com/2014/9/25/6842187/US-drug-schedule-marijuana-Justice-Department-Eric-Holder)
|
Holder said it's time to reconsider marijuana's legal classification A reclassification could dramatically shift how the federal government handles marijuana The question enshrines Holder's openness to drawing down the war on drugs. Holder's office had already allowed Colorado and Washington to carry out their own experiments in legalization without federal interference the most significant steps in dismantling the war on drugs since its beginnings in the 1970. Holder also supported reforms that will pull back prison sentences for nonviolent drug offenders. the US attorney general holds a lot of power in deciding when to review a drug's schedule the process involves significant bureaucratic processes, some of which are already underway for marijuana.
|
Holder said it's time to reconsider marijuana's legal classification A reclassification could dramatically shift how the federal government handles marijuan Holder's office had already allowed Colorado and Washington to carry out legalization without federal interferenc the US attorney general holds a lot of power in
|
On the eve of his reported resignation, US Attorney General Eric Holder said in an interview with Yahoo News that it's time to reconsider marijuana's legal classification in the federal government's scheduling system. Under the current classification, marijuana is placed in the same category as heroin, which severely limits how researchers and doctors can use the drug. A reclassification could dramatically shift how the federal government handles marijuana in the war on drugs and provide some legal legitimacy to medical marijuana at the federal level. "I think it's certainly a question that we need to ask ourselves — whether or not marijuana is as serious a drug as is heroin," Holder said. "[T]he question of whether or not they should be in the same category is something that I think we need to ask ourselves, and use science as the basis for making that determination." The question, which goes at the heart of US drug policy, enshrines Holder's openness to drawing down the war on drugs. Holder's office had already allowed Colorado and Washington to carry out their own experiments in legalization without federal interference — arguably the most significant steps in dismantling the war on drugs since its beginnings in the 1970. Holder also supported reforms that will pull back prison sentences for nonviolent drug offenders. Holder clarified that he's still unsure about where he stands on the decriminalization and legalization of marijuana, but he said legalization efforts at the state level should provide a lesson for federal policymakers. While decriminalization and legalization are largely up to an act of Congress, the US attorney general holds a lot of power in deciding when to review a drug's schedule, as I explained before. But the process also involves significant scientific and bureaucratic processes, some of which are already underway for marijuana.
| 1,886 |
<h4><strong>Liberal AG leads to descheduling of marijuana- solves the aff</h4><p>Lopez 9/25<u></strong>/2014 (German [his name, not necessarily nationality], writer for Vox, covers criminal justice, the war on drugs, health, and LGBT issues, Eric Holder questions marijuana's legal status as he prepares to leave Justice Department, http://www.vox.com/2014/9/25/6842187/US-drug-schedule-marijuana-Justice-Department-Eric-Holder) </p><p></u>On the eve of his reported resignation, US Attorney General Eric <u><mark>Holder said</u></mark> in an interview with Yahoo News that <u><mark>it's time to reconsider marijuana's legal classification</u></mark> in the federal government's scheduling system. Under the current classification, marijuana is placed in the same category as heroin, which severely limits how researchers and doctors can use the drug. <u><strong><mark>A reclassification could dramatically shift how the federal government handles marijuan</mark>a </u></strong>in the war on drugs and provide some legal legitimacy to medical marijuana at the federal level. "I think it's certainly a question that we need to ask ourselves — whether or not marijuana is as serious a drug as is heroin," Holder said. "[T]he question of whether or not they should be in the same category is something that I think we need to ask ourselves, and use science as the basis for making that determination." <u>The question</u>, which goes at the heart of US drug policy, <u>enshrines Holder's openness to drawing down the war on drugs.</u> <u><mark>Holder's office had already allowed Colorado and Washington to carry out </mark>their own experiments in <mark>legalization without federal interferenc</mark>e</u> — arguably <u>the most significant steps in dismantling the war on drugs since its beginnings in the 1970. Holder also supported reforms that will pull back prison sentences for nonviolent drug offenders. </u>Holder clarified that he's still unsure about where he stands on the decriminalization and legalization of marijuana, but he said legalization efforts at the state level should provide a lesson for federal policymakers. While decriminalization and legalization are largely up to an act of Congress, <u><mark>the US attorney general holds a lot of power in </mark>deciding when to review a drug's schedule</u>, as I explained before. But <u>the process</u> also <u>involves</u> <u>significant</u> scientific and <u><strong>bureaucratic processes, some of which are already underway for marijuana.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NR
|
Treaties
| 430,915 | 4 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,219 |
Link shield - Federal legalization has LITERALLY no support
|
Kleiman 2014
|
Kleiman 2014 (Mark, professor of public policy at the University of California Los Angeles, How Not to Make a Hash out of Cannabis legalization, Washington Monthly, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/how_not_to_make_a_hash_out_of049291.php?page=all)
|
The federal government would recognize the legal status of cannabis under a state system Could such a plan garner support in Washington Certainly not given a dysfunctional Congress, an administration with no taste for engaging one more culture war issue, and in the absence of a powerful national organization with a nuanced view of cannabis policy and the muscle to make that view politically salient. legalization it’s been slow going in other states in which legalization has to go through the legislature, where anti-pot law enforcement groups can easily block it. it could be many years before legalization reaches the rest of the country or gets formal federal approval that removes the stigma no national-level figure of any standing is willing to speak out for change.
discussion of political capital is whether or not it can be replenished over a term If a President expends political capital can it be replaced? Capital can be rebuilt, but only to a limited extent The decline of capital makes it difficult to access information recruit expertise and maintain energy If a lame duck President can be defined by a loss of political capital a lame duck can accomplish little. Before determining this, a definition
|
Could such a plan garner support in Washington Certainly not given a dysfunctional Congress in the absence of a powerful national organization with a nuanced view of cannabis policy and the muscle to make that view politically salient it’s been slow going in other states where anti-pot law enforcement groups can easily block it could be many years before or gets formal federal approval that removes the stigma no national-level figure of any standing is willing to speak out for change
discussion of political capital is whether or not it can be replenished over a term Capital can be rebuilt, but only to a limited extent The decline of capital makes it difficult to access information, recruit expertise and maintain energy
|
How could the federal government get the states to structure their pot markets in ways like these? By giving a new twist to a tried-and-true tool that the Obama administration has wielded particularly effectively: the policy waiver. The federal government would recognize the legal status of cannabis under a state system—making the activities permitted under that system actually legal, not merely tolerated, under federal law—only if the state system contained adequate controls to protect public health and safety, as determined by the attorney general and the secretary of the department of health and human services. That would change the politics of legalization at the state level, with legalization advocates and the cannabis industry supporting tight controls in order to get, and keep, the all-important waiver. Then we would see the laboratories of democracy doing some serious experimentation. Could such a plan garner enough support in Washington to become law? Certainly not now, given a dysfunctional Congress, an administration with no taste for engaging one more culture war issue, and in the absence of a powerful national organization with a nuanced view of cannabis policy and the muscle to make that view politically salient. But there is a mutually beneficial deal waiting to be made. Though legalization has made headway in states with strong initiative provisions in their constitutions, it’s been slow going in other states in which legalization has to go through the legislature, where anti-pot law enforcement groups can easily block it. So it could be many years before legalization reaches the rest of the country or gets formal federal approval that removes the stigma of (even unpunished) lawbreaking from cannabis users. Rather than wait, legalization advocates might be willing to accept something short of full commercialization; some of them actually prefer a noncommercial system. Meanwhile, those who have been opponents of legalization heretofore might—with the writing now on the wall—decide that a tightly regulated and potentially reversible system of legal availability is the least-bad out-come available. The current political situation seems anomalous. Public opinion continues to move against cannabis prohibition, but no national-level figure of any standing is willing to speak out for change. That’s unlikely to last. Soon enough, candidates for president are going to be asked their positions on marijuana legalization. They’re going to need a good answer. I suggest something like this: “I’m not against all legalization; I’m against dumb legalization.”
Link outweighs turn – Harder to rebuild capital than lose it
Marrissa Silber, prof of poli sci, samford, 8-30-2007, “What makes a president quack?” Prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
Important to the discussion of political capital is whether or not it can be replenished over a term. If a President expends political capital on his agenda, can it be replaced? Light suggests that “capital declines over time – public approval consistently falls: midterm losses occur” (31). Capital can be rebuilt, but only to a limited extent. The decline of capital makes it difficult to access information, recruit more expertise and maintain energy. If a lame duck President can be defined by a loss of political capital, this paper helps determine if such capital can be replenished or if a lame duck can accomplish little. Before determining this, a definition
| 3,521 |
<h4><strong>Link shield - Federal legalization has LITERALLY no support</h4><p>Kleiman 2014</strong> (Mark, professor of public policy at the University of California Los Angeles, How Not to Make a Hash out of Cannabis legalization, Washington Monthly, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/how_not_to_make_a_hash_out_of049291.php?page=all)</p><p>How could the federal government get the states to structure their pot markets in ways like these? By giving a new twist to a tried-and-true tool that the Obama administration has wielded particularly effectively: the policy waiver. <u>The federal government would recognize the legal status of cannabis under a state system</u>—making the activities permitted under that system actually legal, not merely tolerated, under federal law—only if the state system contained adequate controls to protect public health and safety, as determined by the attorney general and the secretary of the department of health and human services. That would change the politics of legalization at the state level, with legalization advocates and the cannabis industry supporting tight controls in order to get, and keep, the all-important waiver. Then we would see the laboratories of democracy doing some serious experimentation. <u><mark>Could such a plan garner</u></mark> enough <u><mark>support in Washington</u></mark> to become law? <u><strong><mark>Certainly not</u></strong></mark> now, <u><mark>given a dysfunctional Congress</mark>, an administration with no taste for engaging one more culture war issue, and <mark>in the absence of a powerful national organization with a nuanced view of cannabis policy and the muscle to make that view politically salient</mark>.</u> But there is a mutually beneficial deal waiting to be made. Though <u>legalization</u> has made headway in states with strong initiative provisions in their constitutions, <u><mark>it’s been slow going in other states </mark>in which legalization has to go through the legislature, <mark>where anti-pot law enforcement groups can easily block it</mark>.</u> So <u>it <mark>could be many years before</mark> legalization reaches the rest of the country <mark>or gets formal federal approval that removes the stigma</u></mark> of (even unpunished) lawbreaking from cannabis users. Rather than wait, legalization advocates might be willing to accept something short of full commercialization; some of them actually prefer a noncommercial system. Meanwhile, those who have been opponents of legalization heretofore might—with the writing now on the wall—decide that a tightly regulated and potentially reversible system of legal availability is the least-bad out-come available. The current political situation seems anomalous. Public opinion continues to move against cannabis prohibition, but <u><strong><mark>no national-level figure of any standing is willing to speak out for change</mark>.</u> That’s unlikely to last. Soon enough, candidates for president are going to be asked their positions on marijuana legalization. They’re going to need a good answer. I suggest something like this: “I’m not against all legalization; I’m against dumb legalization.”</p><p>Link outweighs turn – Harder to rebuild capital than lose it</p><p></strong>Marrissa <strong>Silber,</strong> prof of poli sci, samford, 8-30-<strong>2007,</strong> “What makes a president quack?” Prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.</p><p>Important to the <u><mark>discussion of political capital is whether or not it can be replenished over a term</u></mark>. <u>If a President expends political capital</u> on his agenda, <u>can it be replaced?</u> Light suggests that “capital declines over time – public approval consistently falls: midterm losses occur” (31). <u><mark>Capital can be rebuilt, but only to a limited extent</u></mark>. <u><mark>The decline of capital makes it difficult to access information</u>, <u>recruit</u></mark> more <u><mark>expertise and maintain energy</u></mark>. <u>If a lame duck President can be defined by a loss of political capital</u>, this paper helps determine if such capital can be replenished or if <u>a lame duck can accomplish little<strong>. Before determining this, a definition</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NR
|
Turns Trafficking
| 7,519 | 53 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,220 |
The fifty United States and relevant territories should legalize marijuana within the United States.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The fifty United States and relevant territories should legalize marijuana within the United States.</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 430,963 | 1 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,221 |
The illicit organ market is colonial in nature
|
Delmonico 3
|
Delmonico 3 Francis L. Delmonico, Director of the Renal Transplantation Unit at Massachusetts
|
The pattern of organ distribu- tion follows established routes of capital: from South to North, from Third to First World, from poor to rich, from black and brown to white, and from female to male recipients.
|
The pattern of organ distribu- tion follows established routes of capital: from South to North, from Third to First World, from poor to rich, from black and brown to white, and from female to male recipients
|
General Hospital, the medical director at the New England Organ Bank, and Professor of
Surgery at Harvard Medical School; and Nancy Scheper-Hughes.Director of Organs Watch and Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley Zygon, vol. 38, no. 3 (September 2003)
WHY WE SHOULD NOT PAY FOR HUMAN ORGANS Ebsco
For several years, one of us (Nancy Scheper-Hughes [2003]) has been actively involved in multi-sited, ethnographic field research in nine countries on the global traffic in human organs. The pattern of organ distribu- tion follows established routes of capital: from South to North, from Third to First World, from poor to rich, from black and brown to white, and from female to male recipients. Residents of Japan, the Gulf States in the Middle East (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman), Israel, Western Europe, and North America now travel in individually tailored or in organized group packages to medical centers in India, China, the Philippines, South America, Turkey, and Eastern Europe to purchase kidneys that are not available locally or legally. They are aided in their quest by a new class of organ brokers, some of whom operate on the Internet.
| 1,200 |
<h4><strong>The illicit organ market is colonial in nature</h4><p>Delmonico 3 </strong>Francis L. Delmonico, Director of the Renal Transplantation Unit at Massachusetts</p><p>General Hospital, the medical director at the New England Organ Bank, and Professor of</p><p>Surgery at Harvard Medical School; and Nancy Scheper-Hughes.Director of Organs Watch and Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley Zygon, vol. 38, no. 3 (September 2003)</p><p>WHY WE SHOULD NOT PAY FOR HUMAN ORGANS Ebsco </p><p>For several years, one of us (Nancy Scheper-Hughes [2003]) has been actively involved in multi-sited, ethnographic field research in nine countries on the global traffic in human organs. <u><mark>The pattern of organ distribu- tion follows established routes of capital: from South to North, from Third to First World, from poor to rich, from black and brown to white, and from female to male recipients</mark>. </u>Residents of Japan, the Gulf States in the Middle East (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman), Israel, Western Europe, and North America now travel in individually tailored or in organized group packages to medical centers in India, China, the Philippines, South America, Turkey, and Eastern Europe to purchase kidneys that are not available locally or legally. They are aided in their quest by a new class of organ brokers, some of whom operate on the Internet.</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,259 | 4 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,222 |
Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention
|
Rico 2014 )
|
Rico 2014 (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)
|
marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
|
marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
|
It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, marijuana legalization still violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
| 936 |
<h4>Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention</h4><p><strong>Rico 2014</strong> (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, <u><strong>marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic</u></strong>. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, <u><strong><mark>marijuana legalization</u></strong></mark> still <u><strong><mark>violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs</mark>.</p></u></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
A2
| 430,420 | 24 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,223 |
No risk of SCS war and no escalation
|
Richardson 12
|
Richardson 12 (Michael Richardson, visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, “China’s Iron Fist in a Velvet Glove,” The Japan Times, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20120628mr.html, Sawyer)
|
China could easily grab control of the South China Sea using its increasingly modern and powerful armed forces. China dwarfs the puny Philippine military. Yet it deliberately chose not to deploy its forces even though the standoff continued for more than two months. The Philippines is an ally of the U S and China could not be sure the U.S. would not intervene if Chinese armed forces became directly involved "The last thing China wants is to see these countries and the U.S. joining hands against China," This has created a major foreign policy issue for China as it prepares for a leadership transfer as its economy slows, China needs a stable neighborhood.
|
China dwarfs the Philippine military. Yet it chose not to deploy forces The Philippines is an ally of the U S and China could not be sure the U.S. would not intervene The last thing China wants is these countries and the U.S. joining hands as its economy slows, China needs a stable neighborhood
|
SINGAPORE — China could easily grab control of the disputed Scarborough Shoal fishing grounds in the South China Sea using its increasingly modern and powerful armed forces. Chinese naval, air and amphibious units, working in unison, already have the capability to enforce Beijing's claims of island ownership and maritime control in the northern sector of the sea, where the shoal is located just 220 km from the Philippine mainland. China dwarfs the puny Philippine military. Yet it deliberately chose not to deploy its regular armed forces to secure the unoccupied shoal, even though the standoff with the Philippines continued for more than two months. On June 16, Manila withdrew its remaining two coast guard vessels from the Scarborough area, ostensibly because of a passing typhoon, without saying whether they would return after the weather clears. There are several reasons for China's decision not to use warships. The Philippines is an ally of the United States and China could not be sure the U.S. would not intervene if Chinese armed forces became directly involved in a Scarborough clash and takeover. In the past few years, China's increasingly assertive actions not just in the South China Sea, but also against Japan over disputed islands and maritime boundaries in the East China Sea, have alarmed and alienated many of its neighbors. "The last thing China wants is to see these countries and the U.S. joining hands against China," Chen Xiangyang, deputy director of the Institute of World Political Studies in the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, wrote in the online edition of China Daily on June 11. This has created a major foreign policy management issue for China as it prepares for a once-in-a-decade leadership transfer later this year. At this sensitive time, and as its economy slows, China needs a stable neighborhood. Yet Chinese leaders bidding for the top posts cannot afford to appear weak in upholding national unity.
| 1,977 |
<h4><strong>No risk of SCS war and no escalation</h4><p>Richardson 12 </strong>(Michael Richardson, visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, “China’s Iron Fist in a Velvet Glove,” The Japan Times, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20120628mr.html, Sawyer)</p><p>SINGAPORE — <u>China could easily grab control of the</u> disputed Scarborough Shoal fishing grounds in the <u>South China Sea using its increasingly modern and powerful armed forces.</u> Chinese naval, air and amphibious units, working in unison, already have the capability to enforce Beijing's claims of island ownership and maritime control in the northern sector of the sea, where the shoal is located just 220 km from the Philippine mainland. <u><strong><mark>China dwarfs the </mark>puny <mark>Philippine military.</strong> Yet it</mark> deliberately <mark>chose not to deploy </mark>its</u> regular armed <u><mark>forces</u></mark> to secure the unoccupied shoal, <u>even though the standoff</u> with the Philippines <u>continued for more than two months.</u> On June 16, Manila withdrew its remaining two coast guard vessels from the Scarborough area, ostensibly because of a passing typhoon, without saying whether they would return after the weather clears. There are several reasons for China's decision not to use warships. <u><mark>The Philippines is an ally of the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>and China could not be sure the U.S. would not intervene </mark>if Chinese armed forces became directly involved</u> in a Scarborough clash and takeover. In the past few years, China's increasingly assertive actions not just in the South China Sea, but also against Japan over disputed islands and maritime boundaries in the East China Sea, have alarmed and alienated many of its neighbors. <u>"<mark>The last thing China wants</mark> <mark>is</mark> to see <mark>these countries and the U.S. joining hands </mark>against China,"</u> Chen Xiangyang, deputy director of the Institute of World Political Studies in the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, wrote in the online edition of China Daily on June 11. <u>This has created a major foreign policy</u> management <u>issue for China as it prepares for a</u> once-in-a-decade <u>leadership transfer</u> later this year. At this sensitive time, and <u><mark>as its economy slows,</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>China needs a stable neighborhood</mark>.</u> Yet Chinese leaders bidding for the top posts cannot afford to appear weak in upholding national unity.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 2
| 430,964 | 1 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,224 |
Obama’s only spending PC on foreign policy issues- that means Iran- it comes first
|
VOA 1/1
|
VOA 1/1/2015 (Obama, Republican Congress Likely to Clash on Global Affairs, http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-to-confront-republican-congress-on-global-affairs/2581620.html)
|
Congress will weigh in on global hotspots and America’s response to them when lawmakers return to Washington next week Conflicts from Ukraine to the Middle East are on legislators’ minds - as are high-profile international initiatives undertaken by Obama negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program resume one week after Congress gavels in makers will consider tougher sanctions on Tehran There will be a desire very quickly for Congress to weigh in on the Iran deal Obama is not immune to dissent from his own Democratic Party The president could have as many or more problems on the left, with Democrats, on international and national security issues as he could have with Republicans the president appears determined to leave a stamp on America’s outreach to the world
|
Obama. International negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program resume one week after Congress gavels in. lawmakers will consider tougher sanctions on Tehran There will be a desire very quickly for Congress to weigh on the Iran deal the president appears determined to leave a stamp on America’s outreach to the world
|
The new, entirely Republican-led U.S. Congress will weigh in on global hotspots and America’s response to them when lawmakers return to Washington next week. Conflicts from Ukraine to the Middle East are on legislators’ minds - as are high-profile international initiatives undertaken by President Barack Obama. International negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program resume one week after Congress gavels in. Skeptics, like Republican Senator Bob Corker, have said lawmakers will consider tougher sanctions on Tehran in case negotiations fail. “There will be a desire very quickly after the first of the year for Congress to weigh in on the topic in some form or fashion. Congress will want to weigh in on the Iran deal,” he said. Congressional wariness over Iran’s nuclear ambitions is not new. What no one anticipated just weeks ago is that Congress would wrestle with President Obama’s surprise diplomatic opening with Cuba. Ending the U.S. embargo of Cuba would require an act of Congress, something Democratic Senator Ben Cardin supports. “There will be a need for Congress to take action, hopefully, as we move to a new chapter in our Cuban relations. And it is going to be an interesting debate,” said Cardin. Republican Senator Marco Rubio is ready for that debate. “This Congress is not going to lift the embargo,” he said. “The White House has conceded everything and gained little [from Havana]. They gained no commitment on the part of the Cuban regime to freedom of the press, or freedom of speech, or elections.” Republicans want to be seen as offering constructive criticism, according to political scientist William Howell. “On the one hand, they want to underscore failings on the part of the Obama administration, and on the other hand, they need to be seen as a responsible, mature party that can lead the nation,” said Howell. Majority status in both houses of Congress will give Republicans a louder megaphone to critique the president’s handling of crises from Ukraine to the Islamic State insurgency in Iraq and Syria. Obama is also not immune to dissent from his own Democratic Party, according to political analyst Stuart Rothenberg. “The president could have as many or more problems on the left, with Democrats, on international and national security issues as he could have with Republicans. There are lots of Democrats who are more concerned about the U.S. recommitting troops,” said Rothenberg. Whatever Congress’ concerns, the president appears determined to leave a stamp on America’s outreach to the world. In a recent interview, he said: “I believe in diplomacy. I believe in dialogue. I believe in engagement.”
| 2,643 |
<h4><strong>Obama’s only spending PC on foreign policy issues- that means Iran- it comes first</h4><p>VOA 1/1</strong>/2015 (Obama, Republican Congress Likely to Clash on Global Affairs, http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-to-confront-republican-congress-on-global-affairs/2581620.html)</p><p>The new, entirely Republican-led U.S. <u>Congress will weigh in on global hotspots and America’s response to them when lawmakers return to Washington next week</u>. <u>Conflicts from Ukraine to the Middle East are on legislators’ minds - as are high-profile international initiatives undertaken by</u> President Barack <u><mark>Obama</u>. International <u>negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program resume one week after Congress gavels in</u>.</mark> Skeptics, like Republican Senator Bob Corker, have said <mark>law<u>makers will consider tougher sanctions on Tehran</u></mark> in case negotiations fail. “<u><strong><mark>There will be a desire very quickly</mark> </u></strong>after the first of the year <u><strong><mark>for Congress to weigh</mark> in</u></strong> on the topic in some form or fashion. Congress will want to weigh in <u><strong><mark>on the Iran deal</u></strong></mark>,” he said. Congressional wariness over Iran’s nuclear ambitions is not new. What no one anticipated just weeks ago is that Congress would wrestle with President Obama’s surprise diplomatic opening with Cuba. Ending the U.S. embargo of Cuba would require an act of Congress, something Democratic Senator Ben Cardin supports. “There will be a need for Congress to take action, hopefully, as we move to a new chapter in our Cuban relations. And it is going to be an interesting debate,” said Cardin. Republican Senator Marco Rubio is ready for that debate. “This Congress is not going to lift the embargo,” he said. “The White House has conceded everything and gained little [from Havana]. They gained no commitment on the part of the Cuban regime to freedom of the press, or freedom of speech, or elections.” Republicans want to be seen as offering constructive criticism, according to political scientist William Howell. “On the one hand, they want to underscore failings on the part of the Obama administration, and on the other hand, they need to be seen as a responsible, mature party that can lead the nation,” said Howell. Majority status in both houses of Congress will give Republicans a louder megaphone to critique the president’s handling of crises from Ukraine to the Islamic State insurgency in Iraq and Syria. <u>Obama is</u> also <u>not immune to dissent from his own Democratic Party</u>, according to political analyst Stuart Rothenberg. “<u>The president could have as many or more problems on the left, with Democrats, on international and national security issues as he could have with Republicans</u>. There are lots of Democrats who are more concerned about the U.S. recommitting troops,” said Rothenberg. Whatever Congress’ concerns, <u><strong><mark>the president appears determined to leave a stamp on America’s outreach to the world</u></mark>. In a recent interview, he said: “I believe in diplomacy. I believe in dialogue. I believe in engagement.” </p></strong>
|
1nr
|
Top of Agenda
|
Nuclear, biological and chemical war
| 430,548 | 6 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,225 |
It’s NOT a sure thing- PC is key to Dem unity and ensuring progress on our impacts
|
Newell 9/25
|
Newell 9/25/2014 (Jim, covers politics and media for Salon, Who will replace Eric Holder? The thorny politics of selecting a new attorney general, Salon, http://www.salon.com/2014/09/25/who_will_replace_eric_holder_the_thorny_politics_of_selecting_a_new_attorney_general/)
|
Holder has been leading the charge for drug war and prison sentencing reform, two of the few remaining areas in which this late-stage administration can effect real and profound progressive change Democrats will only need 51 votes to break a presumed Republican filibuster on Holder’s replacement. Procuring those 51 votes shouldn’t be considered a sure thing though Democrats should expect zero votes from Republican senators in the lame duck The GOP will be furious at the Democrats for using the lame duck the nuclear option’s track record has been stellar, but not perfect recall how Democrats joined the filibuster against Obama’s nominee to head the Civil Rights Division never underestimate the ability of conservative Democrats to throw their lot in with Republicans
|
. Holder has been leading the charge for drug war and prison sentencing reform, two areas i this late-stage administration can effect Democrats will only need 51 votes to break a presumed Republican filibuster on Holder’s replacement. Procuring those 51 votes shouldn’t be considered a sure thing The GOP will be furious at the Democrats for using the lame duc the nuclear option’s track record has been stellar, but not perfect never underestimate the ability of conservative Democrats to throw their lot in with Republicans
|
Eric Holder’s resignation as attorney general does come as a surprise. While he’s served a lengthy period already, dating to the beginning of the Obama administration, it looked like he might have gone the “full Reno” and weathered through two consecutive terms at the post. In the two years since the House of Representatives voted to find him in contempt, Holder finally appeared to feel comfortable enough in his role to pursue legacy issues of personal importance to him. His Civil Rights Division is in the midst of investigating police abuses in Ferguson, Missouri, and other departments across the country. Holder has also been leading the charge for drug war and prison sentencing reform, two of the few remaining areas in which this late-stage administration can effect real and profound progressive change. But however powerful Holder’s personal interest in civil rights and criminal justice arenas may have been, they’re apparently not powerful enough to overcome his exhaustion. He’s trying to get out before he’s “locked in” for the final quarter of the Obama administration. It’s the same rationale for why certain Bush administration staffers, like Karl Rove, left in late 2006: once you’re in for the final two years, you’re in. Karl Rove’s role as an aide to the president, though, wasn’t a Senate-confirmed position, and congressional politics are even more cutthroat now than they were back then. Holder claims he’s going to stay on the job until his successor is confirmed. Given the very real possibility of a Republican Senate majority next year, maybe Eric Holder will end up serving out the rest of President Obama’s second term after all. Except for our good friend, the post-election lame duck session. Once again Democrats who were cautious at the time should be grateful for Sen. Harry Reid’s invocation of the “nuclear option” on judicial and executive appointments. Democrats will only need 51 votes to break a presumed Republican filibuster on Holder’s replacement. Procuring those 51 votes shouldn’t be considered a sure thing, though. Democrats should expect zero votes from Republican senators in the lame duck if Republicans win control of the Senate this November. The GOP will be furious at the Democrats for using the lame duck to confirm a new leader of the Justice Department, denying Republicans the chance to make a circus of a confirmation hearing in 2015. And the nuclear option’s track record has been stellar, but not perfect: recall how a number of Senate Democrats joined the successful Republican filibuster against President Obama’s nominee to head the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, Dego Adegbile. Even though the 2014 election will be behind them, never underestimate the ability of conservative Democrats to throw their lot in with Republicans determined to blunt the Obama administration at every corner.
| 2,871 |
<h4><strong>It’s NOT a sure thing- PC is key to Dem unity and ensuring progress on our impacts</h4><p>Newell 9/25</strong>/2014 (Jim, covers politics and media for Salon, Who will replace Eric Holder? The thorny politics of selecting a new attorney general, Salon, http://www.salon.com/2014/09/25/who_will_replace_eric_holder_the_thorny_politics_of_selecting_a_new_attorney_general/)</p><p>Eric Holder’s resignation as attorney general does come as a surprise. While he’s served a lengthy period already, dating to the beginning of the Obama administration, it looked like he might have gone the “full Reno” and weathered through two consecutive terms at the post. In the two years since the House of Representatives voted to find him in contempt, Holder finally appeared to feel comfortable enough in his role to pursue legacy issues of personal importance to him. His Civil Rights Division is in the midst of investigating police abuses in Ferguson, Missouri, and other departments across the country<mark>. <u>Holder has</u></mark> also <u><mark>been leading the charge for drug war and prison sentencing reform, two</mark> of the few remaining <mark>areas i</mark>n which <mark>this late-stage administration can effect</mark> <strong>real and profound progressive change</u></strong>. But however powerful Holder’s personal interest in civil rights and criminal justice arenas may have been, they’re apparently not powerful enough to overcome his exhaustion. He’s trying to get out before he’s “locked in” for the final quarter of the Obama administration. It’s the same rationale for why certain Bush administration staffers, like Karl Rove, left in late 2006: once you’re in for the final two years, you’re in. Karl Rove’s role as an aide to the president, though, wasn’t a Senate-confirmed position, and congressional politics are even more cutthroat now than they were back then. Holder claims he’s going to stay on the job until his successor is confirmed. Given the very real possibility of a Republican Senate majority next year, maybe Eric Holder will end up serving out the rest of President Obama’s second term after all. Except for our good friend, the post-election lame duck session. Once again Democrats who were cautious at the time should be grateful for Sen. Harry Reid’s invocation of the “nuclear option” on judicial and executive appointments. <u><mark>Democrats will only need 51 votes to break a presumed Republican filibuster on Holder’s replacement. <strong>Procuring those 51 votes shouldn’t be considered a sure thing</u></strong></mark>, <u>though</u>. <u>Democrats should expect zero votes from Republican senators in the lame duck</u> if Republicans win control of the Senate this November. <u><mark>The GOP will be furious at the Democrats for using the lame duc</mark>k</u> to confirm a new leader of the Justice Department, denying Republicans the chance to make a circus of a confirmation hearing in 2015. And <u><mark>the nuclear option’s track record has been stellar, <strong>but not perfect</u></strong></mark>: <u>recall how</u> a number of Senate <u>Democrats</u> <u>joined the</u> successful Republican <u>filibuster</u> <u>against</u> President <u>Obama’s nominee to head the</u> Justice Department’s <u>Civil Rights Division</u>, Dego Adegbile. Even though the 2014 election will be behind them, <u><strong><mark>never underestimate the ability of conservative Democrats to throw their lot in with Republicans</u></mark> determined to blunt the Obama administration at every corner.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NR
|
Treaties
| 430,962 | 5 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,226 |
Obama will pick a liberal- wants to continue Holder’s agenda
|
MSNBC 9/29
|
MSNBC 9/29/2014 (The politics of replacing Eric Holder: Timing is everything, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/politics-replacing-eric-holder-timing-everything)
|
G W Law Professor Salzburg said Obama’s pick will demonstrate if “he wants Holder’s agenda to be fulfilled “I would be surprised if he didn’t appoint someone strong on civil rights who wants to enforce voting rights act Salzberg said.
|
G W Law Professor said Obama’s pick will demonstrate Holder’s agenda I would be surprised if he didn’t appoint someone strong on civil rights, who wants to enforce voting rights act
|
George Washington University Law Professor Stephen Salzburg said Obama’s pick will demonstrate if “he wants Holder’s agenda to be fulfilled or whether he wants to see the department take on some new issues.” “I would be surprised if he didn’t appoint someone strong on civil rights, who wants to enforce voting rights act…. I think he’s going to want somebody who is speaks for immigration,” Salzberg said.
| 406 |
<h4><strong>Obama will pick a liberal- wants to continue Holder’s agenda</h4><p>MSNBC 9/29</strong>/2014 (The politics of replacing Eric Holder: Timing is everything, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/politics-replacing-eric-holder-timing-everything)</p><p><u><mark>G</u></mark>eorge <u><mark>W</u></mark>ashington University <u><mark>Law Professor</u></mark> Stephen <u>Salzburg</u> <u><mark>said Obama’s pick will demonstrate</mark> <strong>if “he wants <mark>Holder’s agenda</mark> to be fulfilled</u></strong> or whether he wants to see the department take on some new issues.” <u>“<mark>I would be surprised if he didn’t appoint someone strong on civil rights</u>, <u>who wants to enforce voting rights act</u></mark>…. I think he’s going to want somebody who is speaks for immigration,” <u>Salzberg said<strong>.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
Liberal
|
Turns Trafficking
| 430,966 | 1 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,227 |
The United States Supreme Court should rule that the Controlled Substances Act’s prohibition on marihuana is not a valid exercise of Congressional commerce clause authority, but that such prohibition is a valid exercise of the Congressional treaty power.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Supreme Court should rule that the Controlled Substances Act’s prohibition on marihuana is not a valid exercise of Congressional commerce clause authority, but that such prohibition is a valid exercise of the Congressional treaty power. </h4>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 430,965 | 1 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,228 |
The illicit market is apartheid medicine
|
SCHEPER-HUGHES 3
|
SCHEPER-HUGHES 3 Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley, where she directs the doctoral program in Critical Studies in Medicine, Science, and the Body. JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, VOL . 2, NO. 2 (JUNE2003), 197–226 Rotten trade: millennial capitalism, human values and global justice in organs trafficking http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/ pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid =97cebe61-9315-4e5e-b8db-f7372c8a971e%40sessionmgr115&vid=1&hid=117
|
We have found almost everywhere a new form of globalized ‘apartheid medicine’ that privileges one class of patients, organ recipients, over another class of invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’, about whom almost nothing is known
|
We have found almost everywhere a new form of globalized ‘apartheid medicine’ that privileges one class of patients, organ recipients, over another class of invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’, about whom almost nothing is known
|
This paper continues my discussion (Scheper-Hughes 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2002) of the darker side of transplant practice. In all, three crucial points about the organs trade have emerged. The first is about invented scarcities and artificial needs within a new context of highly fetishized ‘fresh’ organs. The scarcity of cadaver organs has evolved into an active trade in ‘surplus’ organs from living ‘ suppliers’ as well as in new forms of ‘biopiracy’. The second point concerns the transplant rhetoric of altruism masking real demands for human sacrifice. The third point concerns surplus empathy and the relative visibility of two distinct populations – excluded and invisible organ givers and included and highly visible organ receivers. We have found almost everywhere a new form of globalized ‘apartheid medicine’ that privileges one class of patients, organ recipients, over another class of invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’, about whom almost nothing is known – an excellent place for a critical medical anthropologist (Scheper-Hughes 1990) to begin.
| 1,067 |
<h4>The illicit market is apartheid medicine</h4><p><strong>SCHEPER-HUGHES 3</strong> Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley, where she directs the doctoral program in Critical Studies in Medicine, Science, and the Body. JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, VOL . 2, NO. 2 (JUNE2003), 197–226 Rotten trade: millennial capitalism, human values and global justice in organs trafficking http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/ pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid =97cebe61-9315-4e5e-b8db-f7372c8a971e%40sessionmgr115&vid=1&hid=117</p><p>This paper continues my discussion (Scheper-Hughes 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2002) of the darker side of transplant practice. In all, three crucial points about the organs trade have emerged. The first is about invented scarcities and artificial needs within a new context of highly fetishized ‘fresh’ organs. The scarcity of cadaver organs has evolved into an active trade in ‘surplus’ organs from living ‘ suppliers’ as well as in new forms of ‘biopiracy’. The second point concerns the transplant rhetoric of altruism masking real demands for human sacrifice. The third point concerns surplus empathy and the relative visibility of two distinct populations – excluded and invisible organ givers and included and highly visible organ receivers. <u><mark>We have found almost everywhere a new form of globalized ‘apartheid medicine’ that privileges one class of patients, organ recipients, over another class of invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’, about whom almost nothing is known</u></mark> – an excellent place for a critical medical anthropologist (Scheper-Hughes 1990) to begin.</p>
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Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 171,178 | 30 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
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Navy
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9
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George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
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Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Pi.....
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Dartmouth
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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cx
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college
| 2 |
743,229 |
The Brownfield doctrine of flexible treaty interpretation will be accepted internationally and solves the war on drugs- staying within the treaty is the ONLY way to achieve reform- leaving the ban on the books is enough compliance
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Collins 12/1
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Collins 12/1/2014 (Jonathan, International Drug Policy Project Coordinator at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics. He served as Coordinator of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy and Editor of the 2014 report 'Ending the Drug Wars.', The State Department’s move to a more flexible diplomatic policy on drugs is a rational approach to a difficult question., http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-s-new-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrine-on-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-a-difficult-question/)
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The Brownfield Doctrine is based on shifting enforcement priorities and allowing policy innovation via flexible interpretation of the international drug conventions. It’s derived from US constitutional principles around ‘purposive’ interpretations viewing the treaties as ‘living documents’ Member states of drug conventions are pushing ahead with it in many respects the O A S invoked principles derived from the doctrine the approach is sensible and allows breathing room for innovation and changes which could become stalled in messy discussions around treaty reform. altering international agreements is so minimal that greater flexibility is often required in their implementation. Some argue it’s a tool to hide US ‘violation’ around cannabis these arguments miss the point the Brownfield Doctrine is what states make of it. If they use it to develop innovations around policy, which improve the global approach to drugs and make the repressive model empirically unjustifiable, then it can be extremely positive, the opportunities drastically outweigh the dangers it’s very hard to argue that the US is flat-out ‘breaching’ the treaties The Federal Government is the executor of the treaties and national legislation is unchanged The Federal Government also has no ability to force states to criminalise marijuana the Brownfield Doctrine says that the US and other states will allow them breathing room while the debates around treaty reform play out there is nothing in the treaties which mandates the current ‘war on drugs’ approach There are certain legislative actions which adherence to the treaties require, but the level of resourcing is entirely up to states as is their implementation evidence of efficacy around alternative policies is the best inoculation against states continuing the repressive model increasing pluralism in international drug policies will likely render the treaties unsustainable, and that is when treaty rewriting will likely become inevitable no member state is yet advocating rewriting the documents Multilateral cooperation on any issue is hard to create. When it is created, the goal of member states becomes to sustain it, even in the face of variance in implementation and interpretation. The Brownfield Doctrine is just the application of this fact to the field of drug policy. The most rational reform strategy seems one which pushes the doctrine as far as practicable there needs to be a sequential action process
|
Brownfield Doctrine is flexible interpretation Member states of drug conventions are pushing ahead with it in many respects. allows breathing room for innovation and change altering international agreements greater flexibility is often required in their implementation the Brownfield Doctrine is what states make of it. If they use it to develop innovations around policy, which improve the global approach to drugs and make the repressive model empirically unjustifiable, it’s very hard to argue that the US is flat-out ‘breaching’ the treaties. The Federal Government is the executor of the treaties and national legislation is unchanged. The Federal Government also has no ability to force states to criminalise marijuana there is nothing in the treaties which mandates the current ‘war on drugs’ approac the level of resourcing is entirely up to states as is their implementatio evidence of efficacy around alternative policies is the best inoculation against states continuing the repressive model no member state is yet advocating rewriting the documents. Multilateral cooperation on any issue is hard to create. When it is created, the goal of member states becomes to sustain it, there needs to be a sequential action proces
|
The Brownfield Doctrine is a framework for thinking about how to readjust international drug policy in the short term. It’s based on shifting enforcement priorities and allowing policy innovation via flexible interpretation of certain antiquated provisions of the international drug conventions. It’s derived from US constitutional principles around ‘purposive’ interpretations of legal texts rather than maintaining strict legalistic or ‘originalist’ interpretations. Ambassador Brownfield described this, similar to the US constitution, as viewing the treaties as ‘living breathing documents’ which should be interpreted via their preambulatory principles of protecting the ‘health and welfare of mankind’ instead of pedantic readings of outdated clauses. It is based on four points: Defend the integrity of the core of the conventions. Allow flexible interpretation of treaties. Allow different national/regional strategies. Tackle organised crime. The international response The response has been tentative and mixed. Member states of drug conventions are pushing ahead with it in many respects. For example the recent Organization of American States Special General Assembly on Drugs invoked principles derived from the doctrine. It has become particularly controversial within some circles because it’s a unilateral framework put forward by the former chief proselytizer and bully on international drug policy – the United States. Regardless of who authored it, the four-point approach is on balance a sensible path forward for the immediate future and allows breathing room for innovation and changes in policy, which could become stalled in messy discussions around treaty reform. If a Latin American or a European country had authored the framework it would likely have received a warmer response; it just so happens to be from the US. Many are justifiably wary of allowing states to redraw international agreements, seeing such a process as a slippery slope that might result in undermining other treaties such as human rights conventions. However, I think some realism is justified here. Empirically, the level of adherence to international agreements varies drastically. In the field of drug control this has been a consistent theme. As the UK acknowledged as early as 1951, drug conventions had ‘frequently been more honoured in the breach than in the observance’. Whether states were called out on the inadequacies of their compliance had little to do with legal reasoning and everything to do with realpolitik. Turkey, for example, was publicly praised as a model licit (legal) opium cultivator, whilst being quietly criticized for allowing frequent leakages into the illicit market. Iran was either loudly condemned or quietly ignored for flouting the conventions, depending on its utility to the leading powers at the time. Afghanistan was frequently overlooked out of a recognition that enforcing the treaties was, as the Ministry of the Economy pointed out in 1950, ‘impossible’. Meanwhile, altering international agreements, even if they prove misguided, is so minimal that greater flexibility is often required in their implementation. One of the key architects of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Herbert May, argued in 1955 that a central goal of the Convention was to provide ‘greater flexibility’ to the international system due to the likelihood of changed circumstances as well as medical-scientific innovations and research. The fact that the Single Convention took fourteen years, three drafts and an extremely rancorous plenipotentiary conference to negotiate should give pause to those who think redrafting is an immediate goal. The outcome of the Single Convention process was a breakdown in international drug diplomacy as the US set about torpedoing the document, viewing it as too weak relative to predecessor treaties. Thereafter member states struggled to agree on its interpretation, and it took two separate drafts to produce the Commentary which purports to explain it. The downsides to the State Department’s policy I have already discussed the human rights aspects. Some argue that the Doctrine doesn’t go far enough and allows for repressive approaches to be continued and that it’s a tool to hide US ‘violation’ of treaties around cannabis, while the US continues to enforce the parts of the war on drugs it wants. Further they question why the US should get to set out the terms for global drug policy reform or debates. I think these arguments miss the point. Firstly the Brownfield Doctrine is what states make of it. If they use it to develop innovations around policy, which improve the global approach to drugs and make the repressive model empirically unjustifiable, then I think it can be extremely positive, especially if it can be used to forward discussions on treaty reforms. If, on the other hand, it is used to ignore broader issues about drug policy reform, then I think it will be a negative. It will be up to civil society and reform-minded states to hold other member states’ feet to the fire on this, but ultimately I think the opportunities drastically outweigh the dangers. Secondly, it’s very hard to argue that the US is flat-out ‘breaching’ the treaties. The Federal Government is the executor of the treaties and national legislation is unchanged. The Federal Government also has no ability to force states to criminalise marijuana. They could use federal resources to enforce federal laws, but that would result in a drastic reshaping of state-federal relations. The real implications of the Brownfield Doctrine therefore fall on less powerful states. Uruguay has a far tougher time explaining its decision to legalise cannabis in the context of the drug treaties, but the Brownfield Doctrine essentially says that the US and other states will allow them breathing room while the debates around treaty reform play out. To me that seems like a rational approach to a difficult question. Thirdly, there is nothing in the treaties which mandates the current ‘war on drugs’ approach. There are certain legislative actions which adherence to the treaties require, but the level of resourcing is entirely up to states as is their implementation. The ‘war on drugs’ was a national and bilateral creation, facilitated by multilateral forums, such as the UN. To end the ‘war on drugs’ requires a rollback on various diplomatic, regional, national and local fronts. In the immediate term very few of these relate to the drug treaties. Further, evidence of efficacy around alternative policies is the best inoculation against states continuing the repressive model. In the future, increasing pluralism in international drug policies will likely render the treaties unsustainable, and that is when treaty rewriting will likely become inevitable. Fourthly, no member state is yet advocating rewriting the documents. Multilateral cooperation on any issue is hard to create. When it is created, the goal of member states becomes to sustain it, even in the face of variance in implementation and interpretation. The Brownfield Doctrine is just the application of this fact to the field of drug policy. The most rational reform strategy seems to me one which pushes the doctrine as far as practicable and uses it to hold the US to a standard of non-intervention outside its borders. When sufficient national level reforms have taken place, then issues around treaty reforms will become more apparent and practical, but there needs to be a sequential action process here.
| 7,536 |
<h4>The Brownfield doctrine of flexible treaty interpretation will be accepted internationally and solves the war on drugs- staying within the treaty is the ONLY way to achieve reform- leaving the ban on the books is enough compliance</h4><p><strong>Collins 12/1</strong>/2014 (Jonathan, International Drug Policy Project Coordinator at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics. He served as Coordinator of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy and Editor of the 2014 report 'Ending the Drug Wars.', The State Department’s move to a more flexible diplomatic policy on drugs is a rational approach to a difficult question., http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-s-new-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrine-on-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-a-difficult-question/)</p><p><u>The <mark>Brownfield Doctrine</u> <u>is</u></mark> a framework for thinking about how to readjust international drug policy in the short term. It’s <u>based on shifting enforcement priorities and allowing policy innovation via <mark>flexible interpretation</u></mark> of certain antiquated provisions <u>of the international drug conventions.</u> <u>It’s derived from US constitutional principles around ‘purposive’ interpretations</u> of legal texts rather than maintaining strict legalistic or ‘originalist’ interpretations. Ambassador Brownfield described this, similar to the US constitution, as <u>viewing the treaties as ‘living</u> breathing <u>documents’</u> which should be interpreted via their preambulatory principles of protecting the ‘health and welfare of mankind’ instead of pedantic readings of outdated clauses. It is based on four points: Defend the integrity of the core of the conventions. Allow flexible interpretation of treaties. Allow different national/regional strategies. Tackle organised crime. The international response The response has been tentative and mixed. <u><mark>Member states of drug conventions are pushing ahead with it in many respects</u>.</mark> For example <u>the</u> recent <u>O</u>rganization of <u>A</u>merican <u>S</u>tates Special General Assembly on Drugs <u>invoked principles derived from the doctrine</u>. It has become particularly controversial within some circles because it’s a unilateral framework put forward by the former chief proselytizer and bully on international drug policy – the United States. Regardless of who authored it, <u>the</u> four-point <u>approach</u> <u>is</u> on balance a <u>sensible</u> path forward for the immediate future <u>and <mark>allows breathing room for innovation and change</mark>s</u> in policy, <u>which could become stalled in messy discussions around treaty reform.</u> If a Latin American or a European country had authored the framework it would likely have received a warmer response; it just so happens to be from the US. Many are justifiably wary of allowing states to redraw international agreements, seeing such a process as a slippery slope that might result in undermining other treaties such as human rights conventions. However, I think some realism is justified here. Empirically, the level of adherence to international agreements varies drastically. In the field of drug control this has been a consistent theme. As the UK acknowledged as early as 1951, drug conventions had ‘frequently been more honoured in the breach than in the observance’. Whether states were called out on the inadequacies of their compliance had little to do with legal reasoning and everything to do with realpolitik. Turkey, for example, was publicly praised as a model licit (legal) opium cultivator, whilst being quietly criticized for allowing frequent leakages into the illicit market. Iran was either loudly condemned or quietly ignored for flouting the conventions, depending on its utility to the leading powers at the time. Afghanistan was frequently overlooked out of a recognition that enforcing the treaties was, as the Ministry of the Economy pointed out in 1950, ‘impossible’. Meanwhile, <u><mark>altering international agreements</u></mark>, even if they prove misguided, <u>is so minimal that <strong><mark>greater flexibility is often required in their implementation</strong></mark>.</u> One of the key architects of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Herbert May, argued in 1955 that a central goal of the Convention was to provide ‘greater flexibility’ to the international system due to the likelihood of changed circumstances as well as medical-scientific innovations and research. The fact that the Single Convention took fourteen years, three drafts and an extremely rancorous plenipotentiary conference to negotiate should give pause to those who think redrafting is an immediate goal. The outcome of the Single Convention process was a breakdown in international drug diplomacy as the US set about torpedoing the document, viewing it as too weak relative to predecessor treaties. Thereafter member states struggled to agree on its interpretation, and it took two separate drafts to produce the Commentary which purports to explain it. The downsides to the State Department’s policy I have already discussed the human rights aspects. <u>Some argue</u> that the Doctrine doesn’t go far enough and allows for repressive approaches to be continued and that <u>it’s a tool to hide US ‘violation’</u> of treaties <u>around cannabis</u>, while the US continues to enforce the parts of the war on drugs it wants. Further they question why the US should get to set out the terms for global drug policy reform or debates. I think <u><strong>these arguments miss the point</u></strong>. Firstly <u><mark>the Brownfield Doctrine is what states make of it.</u> <u>If they use it to develop innovations around policy, which improve the global approach to drugs and make the repressive model empirically unjustifiable,</mark> then</u> I think <u>it can be extremely positive,</u> especially if it can be used to forward discussions on treaty reforms. If, on the other hand, it is used to ignore broader issues about drug policy reform, then I think it will be a negative. It will be up to civil society and reform-minded states to hold other member states’ feet to the fire on this, but ultimately I think <u>the opportunities drastically outweigh the dangers</u>. Secondly, <u><strong><mark>it’s very hard to argue that the US is flat-out ‘breaching’ the treaties</u></strong>. <u>The Federal Government is the executor of the treaties and <strong>national legislation is unchanged</u></strong>. <u>The Federal Government also has no ability to force states to criminalise marijuana</u></mark>. They could use federal resources to enforce federal laws, but that would result in a drastic reshaping of state-federal relations. The real implications of the Brownfield Doctrine therefore fall on less powerful states. Uruguay has a far tougher time explaining its decision to legalise cannabis in the context of the drug treaties, but <u>the Brownfield Doctrine</u> essentially <u>says that the US and other states will allow them breathing room while the debates around treaty reform play out</u>. To me that seems like a rational approach to a difficult question. Thirdly, <u><mark>there is nothing in the treaties which mandates the current ‘war on drugs’ approac</mark>h</u>. <u>There are certain legislative actions which adherence to the treaties require, but</u> <u><strong><mark>the level of resourcing is entirely up to states as is their implementatio</mark>n</u></strong>. The ‘war on drugs’ was a national and bilateral creation, facilitated by multilateral forums, such as the UN. To end the ‘war on drugs’ requires a rollback on various diplomatic, regional, national and local fronts. In the immediate term very few of these relate to the drug treaties. Further, <u><strong><mark>evidence of efficacy around alternative policies</strong> is the best inoculation against states continuing the repressive model</u></mark>. In the future, <u>increasing pluralism in international drug policies will likely render the treaties unsustainable, and that is when treaty rewriting will likely become inevitable</u>. Fourthly, <u><strong><mark>no member state is yet advocating rewriting the documents</u></strong>. <u>Multilateral cooperation on any issue is hard to create. When it is created, the goal of member states becomes to sustain it, </mark>even in the face of variance in implementation and interpretation.</u> <u>The Brownfield Doctrine is just the application of this fact to the field of drug policy.</u> <u>The most rational reform strategy</u> <u>seems</u> to me <u>one which pushes the doctrine as far as practicable</u> and uses it to hold the US to a standard of non-intervention outside its borders. When sufficient national level reforms have taken place, then issues around treaty reforms will become more apparent and practical, but <u><strong><mark>there needs to be a sequential action proces</mark>s</u></strong> here.</p>
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1nc
| null |
A2
| 430,968 | 16 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
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Navy
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Quarters
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Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
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Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,230 |
Korean war is inevitable, but better now than later – solves future escalation and Asian economic collapse
Suri 13 (Jeremi, Professor of History and Public Affairs – University of Texas, “Bomb North Korea, Before It’s Too Late”, New York Times, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/13/opinion/bomb-north-korea-before-its-too-late.html)Earlier this week, North Korea closed the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the only facility where citizens from North and South Korea work together. And now the North is openly threatening (and visibly preparing) to fire a mobile-launcher-based Musudan missile with a range that could reach many of the places Mr. Kim has menaced in his public statements. American intelligence agencies believe that North Korea is working to prepare even longer-range delivery systems to carry the nuclear warheads already in its arsenal.¶ The Korean crisis has now become a strategic threat to America’s core national interests. The best option is to destroy the North Korean missile on the ground before it is launched. The United States should use a precise airstrike to render the missile and its mobile launcher inoperable.¶ President Obama should state clearly and forthrightly that this is an act of self-defense in response to explicit threats from North Korea and clear evidence of a prepared weapon. He should give the leaders of South Korea, Japan, China and Taiwan advance notice before acting. And he should explain that this is a limited defensive strike on a military target — an operation that poses no threat to civilians — and that America does not intend to bring about regime change. The purpose is to neutralize a clear and present danger. That is all.¶ If North Korea is left to continue its threatening behavior, it will jeopardize the fragile economies of the region and it will encourage South Korea and Japan to develop their own nuclear weapons — a policy already advocated by hawks in both countries. Most of all, North Korean threats will encourage isolated states across the world to follow suit. The Iranians are certainly watching. If North Korea can use its small nuclear arsenal to blackmail the region with impunity, why shouldn’t the mullahs in Tehran try to do the same?¶ The United States and its allies in East Asia have a legitimate right to self-defense and they have a deep interest in deterring future threats on this scale.¶ Thanks to precise satellite reconnaissance, striking the North Korean missile on the ground would be much easier than after it was launched. Since the United States cannot possibly know the missile’s trajectory before a launch, and Mr. Kim has said he is targeting America and its allies, we have reason to believe that civilians face serious danger.¶ Since a missile on the ground is an obvious and largely undefended target, we can be reasonably sure that a strike would destroy it and preserve regional stability and the safety of our allies. An American pre-emptive strike would also re-establish necessary red lines for North Korea and other countries in similar circumstances.¶ As President Xi Jinping of China stated earlier this month, “No one should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gains.” By eliminating the most recent North Korean missile threat, the United States will reduce the threat posed by the North’s arsenal. The United States would also reassure everyone in the region, and those watching from other parts of the world, that although it is not seeking regime change, America and its allies will not be blackmailed by threatened missile launches.¶ The North Korean government would certainly view the American strike as a provocation, but it is unlikely that Mr. Kim would retaliate by attacking South Korea, as many fear. First, the Chinese government would do everything it could to prevent such a reaction. Even if they oppose an American strike, China’s leaders understand that a full-scale war would be far worse. Second, Mr. Kim would see in the American strike a renewed commitment to the defense of South Korea. Any attack on Seoul would be an act of suicide for him, and he knows that.¶ A war on the Korean Peninsula is unlikely after an American strike, but it is not inconceivable. The North Koreans might continue to escalate, and Mr. Kim might feel obligated to start a war to save face. Under these unfortunate circumstances, the United States and its allies would still be better off fighting a war with North Korea today, when the conflict could still be confined largely to the Korean Peninsula. As North Korea’s actions over the last two months have shown, Mr. Kim’s government is willing to escalate its threats much more rapidly than his father’s regime did. An unending crisis would merely postpone war to a later date, when the damage caused by North Korea would be even greater.¶ China’s role in a potential war on the Korean Peninsula is hard to predict. Beijing will continue to worry about the United States extending its influence up to the Chinese border. If armed hostilities erupt, President Obama should be prepared for direct and close consultations with Chinese leaders to negotiate a postwar settlement, in a larger multinational framework, that respects Beijing’s legitimate security interests in North Korea. The United States has no interest in occupying North Korea. The Chinese are unlikely to pursue an occupation of their own.¶ Destroying the North Korean missile before it is launched is the best of bad options on the Korean Peninsula. A prolonged crisis would undermine regional security and global efforts to stop nuclear proliferation. And a future war would be much worse. The most prudent move is to eliminate the most imminent military threat in self-defense, establish clear and reasonable limits on future belligerence, and maintain allied unity for stability — not forced regime change — in the region. This is the kind of pre-emptive action that would save lives and maybe even preserve the uneasy peace on the Korean Peninsula.
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Suri 13 This is the kind of pre-emptive action that would save lives and maybe even preserve the uneasy peace on the Korean Peninsula.
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<h4><u><strong>Korean war is inevitable, but better now than later – solves future escalation and Asian economic collapse</h4><p></u>Suri 13</strong> (Jeremi, Professor of History and Public Affairs – University of Texas, “Bomb North Korea, Before It’s Too Late”, New York Times, 2013, <u>http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/13/opinion/bomb-north-korea-before-its-too-late.html</u>)Earlier this week, <u>North Korea closed the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the only facility where citizens from North and South Korea work together</u>. And now <u>the <mark>North is </mark>openly <mark>threatening</u></mark> (and visibly preparing<mark>) <u>to fire a</mark> mobile-launcher-based Musudan <mark>missile</mark> with a range that could reach many of the places Mr. Kim has menaced in his public statements.</u> American intelligence agencies believe that <u><mark>North Korea is working to prepare </mark>even <mark>longer-range delivery</mark> systems <mark>to carry</mark> the <mark>nuclear warheads</mark> already in its arsenal.¶ </u>The Korean crisis has now become a strategic threat to America’s core national interests. <u>The best option is to destroy the North Korean missile on the ground before it is launched. The United States should use a <mark>precise airstrike</u></mark> to render the missile and its mobile launcher inoperable.¶ President Obama should state clearly and forthrightly that this is an act of self-defense in response to explicit threats from North Korea and clear evidence of a prepared weapon. He should give the leaders of South Korea, Japan, China and Taiwan advance notice before acting. And he should explain that <u>this is a limited defensive strike on a military target — an operation that <mark>poses no threat to civilians</u></mark> — and that America does not intend to bring about regime change. The purpose is to neutralize a clear and present danger. That is all.¶ <u><mark>If North Korea is left to continue </mark>its threatening behavior<mark>, it will jeopardize </mark>the <mark>fragile economies of the region and</mark> it will <mark>encourage South Korea and Japan to develop</mark> their own <mark>nuclear weapons</u></mark> — <u>a policy already advocated by hawks in both countries.</u> Most of all, <u>North Korean threats will encourage isolated states across the world to follow suit.</u> The Iranians are certainly watching. If North Korea can use its small nuclear arsenal to blackmail the region with impunity, why shouldn’t the mullahs in Tehran try to do the same?¶ <u>The United States and its allies in East Asia have</u> a legitimate right to self-defense and they have a <u>deep interest in deterring future threats on this scale.¶</u> <u><mark>Thanks to</mark> precise <mark>satellite </mark>reconnaissance, <mark>striking the</mark> North Korean <mark>missile on the ground would be </mark>much <mark>easier </mark>than after it was launched</u>. Since the United States cannot possibly know the missile’s trajectory before a launch, and Mr. Kim has said he is targeting America and its allies, we have reason to believe that civilians face serious danger.¶ Since a missile on the ground is an obvious and largely undefended target, we can be reasonably sure that a strike would destroy it and preserve regional stability and the safety of our allies. An American pre-emptive strike would also re-establish necessary red lines for North Korea and other countries in similar circumstances.¶ As President Xi Jinping of China stated earlier this month, “No one should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gains.” By eliminating the most recent North Korean missile threat, the United States will reduce the threat posed by the North’s arsenal. The United States would also reassure everyone in the region, and those watching from other parts of the world, that although it is not seeking regime change, America and its allies will not be blackmailed by threatened missile launches.¶ The North Korean government would certainly view the American strike as a provocation, but it is unlikely that Mr. Kim would retaliate by attacking South Korea, as many fear. First, the Chinese government would do everything it could to prevent such a reaction. Even if they oppose an American strike, China’s leaders understand that a full-scale war would be far worse. Second, Mr. Kim would see in the American strike a renewed commitment to the defense of South Korea. Any attack on Seoul would be an act of suicide for him, and he knows that.¶ <u>A <mark>war on the </mark>Korean <mark>Peninsula is unlikely after </mark>an American <mark>strike</u></mark>, but it is not inconceivable. <u>The North Koreans might continue to escalate,</u> and Mr. Kim might feel obligated to start a war to save face. <u>Under these unfortunate circumstances<mark>, the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates and its <mark>allies would </mark>still <mark>be better off</mark> fighting a war with North Korea <mark>today, when the conflict could </mark>still <mark>be confined</mark> largely <mark>to the</mark> Korean <mark>Peninsula</mark>. </u>As North Korea’s actions over the last two months have shown, Mr. Kim’s government is willing to escalate its threats much more rapidly than his father’s regime did. An unending crisis would merely postpone war to a later date, when the damage caused by North Korea would be even greater.¶ China’s role in a potential war on the Korean Peninsula is hard to predict. Beijing will continue to worry about the United States extending its influence up to the Chinese border. If armed hostilities erupt, President Obama should be prepared for direct and close consultations with Chinese leaders to negotiate a postwar settlement, in a larger multinational framework, that respects Beijing’s legitimate security interests in North Korea. The United States has no interest in occupying North Korea. The Chinese are unlikely to pursue an occupation of their own.¶ Destroying the North Korean missile before it is launched is the best of bad options on the Korean Peninsula. A prolonged crisis would undermine regional security and global efforts to stop nuclear proliferation. <u>And a future war would be much worse. The most prudent move is to eliminate the most imminent military threat in self-defense</u>, establish clear and reasonable limits on future belligerence, and maintain allied unity for stability — not forced regime change — in the region. <u><strong>This is the kind of pre-emptive action that would save lives and maybe even preserve the uneasy peace on the Korean Peninsula.</p></u></strong>
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Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 2
| 430,967 | 1 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,231 |
Other issues either come after the Iran vote or don’t actually involve PC use- our Politico ev says Obama is actively engaging Dems in the Senate to make sure they sustain a veto- he’s only engaging on foreign policy not things like Keystone
|
IBT 12/19
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IBT 12/19/2014 (International Business Times, President Barack Obama Plans For Corporate Tax Reform, Keystone XL; Will 'Work With' Congress, http://www.ibtimes.com/president-barack-obama-plans-corporate-tax-reform-keystone-xl-will-work-congress-1763795)
|
Obama said he would stay engaged with Congress as they debate his decision to relax the embargo against Cuba he made clear that he won't just sit back Obama also hinted at the way he could play the biggest role in the legislative process: by using his veto pen. A veto of Keystone would remind Washington how very relevant the president still is.
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Obama also said he would stay engaged with Congress as they debate his decision to relax the embargo against Cuba. he made clear that he won't just sit back. Obama also hinted at the way he could play the biggest role in the legislative process: by using his veto pen. A veto of Keystone would remind Washington how very relevant the president still is.
|
Obama also said he would stay engaged with Congress as they debate his decision to relax the embargo against Cuba. To actually lift the embargo, Obama needs Congress -- and is unlikely to get the support. But he made clear that he won't just sit back. Obama also hinted at the way he could play the biggest role in the legislative process: by using his veto pen. Asked about the Keystone XL pipeline, a controversial proposal to build a connector from Canada to the Gulf Coast, Obama offered his most negative comments on the pipeline to date. He said the pipeline wouldn’t actually help Americans seeking lower-priced gasoline, but would help only the Canadians. He didn't explicitly promise to veto the pipeline, but his tone more than hinted that he would. Obama’s growing opposition to Keystone won’t have to wait long to play out. Sen. Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., who will become Senate majority leader in January, has vowed to make authorizing the pipeline the first bill the Senate votes on. A veto of Keystone would remind Washington how very relevant the president still is.
| 1,079 |
<h4><strong>Other issues either come after the Iran vote or don’t actually involve PC use- our Politico ev says Obama is actively engaging Dems in the Senate to make sure they sustain a veto- he’s only engaging on foreign policy not things like Keystone</h4><p>IBT 12/19</strong>/2014 (International Business Times, President Barack Obama Plans For<u> Corporate Tax Reform, Keystone XL; Will 'Work With' Congress, http://www.ibtimes.com/president-barack-obama-plans-corporate-tax-reform-keystone-xl-will-work-congress-1763795)</p><p><mark>Obama</u> also <u>said he would stay engaged with Congress as they debate his decision to relax the embargo against Cuba</u>.</mark> To actually lift the embargo, Obama needs Congress -- and is unlikely to get the support. But <u><mark>he made clear that he won't just sit back</u>. <u>Obama also hinted at the way he could play the biggest role in the legislative process: by using his veto pen.</u></mark> Asked about the Keystone XL pipeline, a controversial proposal to build a connector from Canada to the Gulf Coast, Obama offered his most negative comments on the pipeline to date. He said the pipeline wouldn’t actually help Americans seeking lower-priced gasoline, but would help only the Canadians. He didn't explicitly promise to veto the pipeline, but his tone more than hinted that he would. Obama’s growing opposition to Keystone won’t have to wait long to play out. Sen. Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., who will become Senate majority leader in January, has vowed to make authorizing the pipeline the first bill the Senate votes on. <u><mark>A veto of Keystone would remind Washington how very relevant the president still is.</p></u></mark>
|
1nr
|
Top of Agenda
|
Nuclear, biological and chemical war
| 430,549 | 2 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,232 |
PC is key to a good nominee- their arg misunderstands our scenario
|
Manley 9/26/2014 (Jim, director of the communications practice at QGA Public Affairs, is a former aide to Sens. Harry Reid and Edward Kennedy, In Picking Holder’s Successor, How Progressive Should Obama Go?, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/09/26/in-picking-holders-successor-how-progressive-should-obama-go/)
|
Manley 9/26/2014 (Jim, director of the communications practice at QGA Public Affairs, is a former aide to Sens. Harry Reid and Edward Kennedy, In Picking Holder’s Successor, How Progressive Should Obama Go?, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/09/26/in-picking-holders-successor-how-progressive-should-obama-go/)
|
What does President Obama do? Under the current rules of the Senate, these kinds of executive branch nominees can’t be filibustered and thus can be confirmed with a simple majority. So does he swing for the fences and nominate a progressive activist who would guarantee a political brawl unanimous Democratic backing might not be guaranteed, especially if he swung for the fences a handful of Senate Democrats refused to support the nomination of Adegbile As long as the president makes a decision soon–there is plenty of time the process of confirming a successor won’t be trouble-free.
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President Obama swing for the fences and nominate a progressive activist who would guarantee a political brawl unanimous Democratic backing might not be guaranteed, especially if he swung for the fences a handful of Senate Democrats refused to support the nomination of Adegbile As long as the president makes a decision soon–there is plenty of time
|
But the real question is this: What does President Obama do? Under the current rules of the Senate, these kinds of executive branch nominees can’t be filibustered and thus can be confirmed with a simple majority. So does he swing for the fences and nominate a progressive activist who would guarantee a political brawl of a confirmation process? Or does he choose someone who has a chance of picking up some Republican votes? The problem is that unanimous Democratic backing might not be guaranteed, especially if he swung for the fences. In one of the more unfortunate situations in recent Senate history, a handful of Senate Democrats refused to support the nomination of Debo Adegbile to head the Justice Department’s Civil Right Division because as a lawyer he signed a brief supporting an appeal for convicted cop-killer Mimia Abu- Jamal. As long as the president makes a decision soon–there is plenty of time to do a background check, the committee hearings and have a vigorous debate on the Senate floor before the Senate adjourns, likely in December. Attorney General Holder is a good man who will be missed – perhaps more so now since the process of finding and confirming a successor won’t be trouble-free.
| 1,216 |
<h4><strong>PC is key to a good nominee- their arg misunderstands our scenario</h4><p>Manley 9/26<u>/2014 (Jim, director of the communications practice at QGA Public Affairs, is a former aide to Sens. Harry Reid and Edward Kennedy, In Picking Holder’s Successor, How Progressive Should Obama Go?, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/09/26/in-picking-holders-successor-how-progressive-should-obama-go/)</p><p></u></strong>But the real question is this: <u>What does <mark>President Obama</mark> do? Under the current rules of the Senate, these kinds of executive branch nominees can’t be filibustered and thus can be confirmed with a simple majority. So does he <mark>swing for the fences and nominate a progressive activist</u> <u>who would <strong>guarantee a political brawl</u></strong></mark> of a confirmation process? Or does he choose someone who has a chance of picking up some Republican votes? The problem is that <u><strong><mark>unanimous Democratic backing might not be guaranteed, especially if he swung for the fences</u></strong></mark>. In one of the more unfortunate situations in recent Senate history, <u><mark>a handful of Senate Democrats refused to support the nomination of</u></mark> Debo <u><mark>Adegbile</u></mark> to head the Justice Department’s Civil Right Division because as a lawyer he signed a brief supporting an appeal for convicted cop-killer Mimia Abu- Jamal. <u><mark>As long as the president makes a decision soon–there is plenty of time</u></mark> to do a background check, the committee hearings and have a vigorous debate on the Senate floor before the Senate adjourns, likely in December. Attorney General Holder is a good man who will be missed – perhaps more so now since <u>the process of</u> finding and <u>confirming a successor <strong>won’t be trouble-free.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NR
|
Treaties
| 430,969 | 3 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,233 |
Plan forces a shift to PEMEX sabotage
|
Francis 2014
|
Francis 2014 (David, , Fiscal Times editor-at-large, “Legalizing Pot Makes Mexican Cartels Even More Dangerous”, 1-7, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/01/07/Legalizing-Pot-Makes-Mexican-Cartels-Even-More-Dangerous)
|
Wider decriminalization would push the price of pot down, taking away a key revenue stream for cartels like Los Zetas and La Familia. It’s also forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa, upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests. Grayson also said that the cartels are stealing from energy companies, a practice more common in West Africa than Latin America. For instance, in 2012, the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May in Veracruz alone. “Los Zetas, in particular, are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from Pemex, the state oil company. Pemex uses the chemicals for hydraulic fracking; Los Zetas for cooking methamphetamines.”
Obama Administration has determined that the groups don’t have a presence in the region The assessment via a lengthy State Department report on terrorism, contradicts an alarming exposé broadcast last December in a Univision documentary titled “La Amenaza Irani Iranian Threat There were no “known operational cells” of Hezbollah The State Department claims that no known international terrorist organization had an operational presence in Mexico,” the focus of the worrisome Univision exposé. It further assures that “no terrorist group targeted U.S. citizens in or from Mexican territory” and that there is “no evidence of ties between Mexican criminal organizations and terrorist groups.”
Mueller 10
Politicians preach . This was dramatic risk inflation , terrorist groups have exhibited only limited desire and progress armed theft of fissile material is unlikely chase would be immediate terrorists have to transport it over unfamiliar terrain Once outside terrorists would need a well-equipped machine shop and skilled scientists technical requirements verge on the unfeasible Adopting bias in the terrorists’ favor the cumulative odds drop to one in three billion They are unlikely to be sold a bomb The terrorist group might steal a “loose nuke none exist. bombs have devices that destroy the bomb if tampered with. codes are required if a state were to collapse weapons remain under heavy guard al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond the Internet
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decriminalization would push the price of pot down taking away a key revenue stream for cartels It’s forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests cartels are stealing from energy companies a practice common in West Africa the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May Los Zetas are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from the state oil company
groups don’t have a presence in the region a lengthy State Department report on terrorism, contradicts alarming exposé There were no “known operational cells” of Hezbollah no known international terrorist organization in Mexico
Politicians preach This was dramatic risk inflation terrorist groups have exhibited only limited desire and progress armed theft of fissile material is unlikely chase would be immediate terrorists have to transport it over unfamiliar terrain Once outside terrorists would need a well-equipped machine shop and skilled scientists technical requirements verge on the unfeasible Adopting bias in the terrorists’ favor the cumulative odds drop to one in three billion They are unlikely to be sold a bomb The terrorist group might steal a “loose nuke none exist bombs have devices that destroy the bomb if tampered with. codes are required if a state were to collapse weapons remain under heavy guard al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond the Internet.
|
Wider decriminalization would push the price of pot down, taking away a key revenue stream for cartels like Los Zetas and La Familia. It’s pushing them to dive deeper into illegal markets for other drugs. It’s also forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa, upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests. A 2012 study by the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness says legalization in Colorado will cost cartels $1.425 billion annually, while Washington State’s legalization would cost cartels $1.372 billion. The study also found that legalization in these two states would push the cartels’ annual revenues down 20 to 30 percent, and cut revenue to the Sinaloa cartel by 50 percent. In two separate reports — one in 2010 and one from last September — Rand Corp. dismissed these numbers as overstated. These reports found that the biggest domino to fall would be California, a state where one-seventh of all pot in the United States is consumed. Reuter said he expects California to decriminalize pot in the coming years. He said the only reason a 2010 referendum to legalize marijuana failed was because it was poorly worded. “These two states account for 5 percent of U.S. pot consumption. It’s not a big deal. If California legalizes, that changes things,” he said. Reuter added that the lack of pushback from conservative interest groups also makes wider decriminalization more likely. Just one group — Smart Approaches to Marijuana, headed by former Rep. Patrick Kennedy, who has struggled with substance abuse — is vocally opposed to decriminalization. Other conservative groups have been oddly quiet, Reuter said. “One of the fascinating things is how little real criticism there’s been from the right,” he said. “Social conservatives have not made much of this.” That could change since a new study from Northwestern University shows teenagers who smoke marijuana daily may suffer changes in brain structure that resemble schizophrenia. George W. Grayson, an expert on Mexican cartels at The College of William & Mary in Virginia, said, “Mexican syndicates are diversifying their sources of revenue beyond marijuana, cocaine and heroin. They are heavily involved in kidnapping — number one in the world — extortion, prostitution, migrant smuggling,” he said. “In addition, the cartels are ever-more active in stealing and exporting opioids such as Oxycontin and Roxicodone. Even cigarette smuggling is on the rise.” Kidnapping has become so common that some have even been caught on tape. According to Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography, more than 105,000 people were kidnapped in 2012. Grayson also said that the cartels are stealing from energy companies, a practice more common in West Africa than Latin America. For instance, in 2012, the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May in Veracruz alone. “Los Zetas, in particular, are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from Pemex, the state oil company. Pemex uses the chemicals for hydraulic fracking; Los Zetas for cooking methamphetamines.”
No international terrorist organizations in Mexico – specifically hezbollah
Judicial Watch ’12 [Judicial Watch, “State Dept: “No Middle Eastern Terrorists in Latin America,”http://www.judicialwatch.org/blog/2012/08/state-dept-no-middle-eastern-terrorists-in-latin-america/MK]
Months after the world’s largest Spanish news network revealed that Middle Eastern terrorists infiltrated Latin America to plan an attack against the United States, the Obama Administration has determined that the groups don’t seem to have a presence in the region though there is growing concern. The assessment, made public recently via a lengthy State Department report on terrorism, contradicts an alarming exposé broadcast last December in a Univision documentary titled “La Amenaza Irani” (Iranian Threat). Using undercover, never-before-seen video footage, the documentary illustrates how Middle Eastern terrorists have infiltrated Latin American countries—especially Mexico—to plan an attack against the U.S. The videos were part of a seven-month investigation in which college-aged Mexicans infiltrated diplomatic circles in Mexico to obtain recordings that prove diplomats from Iran, Venezuela and Cuba planned a cybernetic attack against the White House, FBI, Pentagon and U.S. nuclear plants. The Univision documentary also features secret video taken by extremists linked to Iran and footage from an undercover journalist who infiltrated Venezuelan military camps where terrorists trained. The news network’s investigative team also tracked the expansion of Iranian interests in the hemisphere, including money-laundering and drug-trafficking activities by terrorist groups supported by Iran. A segment is dedicated to the connection between Mexican drug cartels and the foiled plot to murder the Saudi ambassador in Washington D.C. last year. One of the Iranians charged had been ordered by that country’s Special Forces to travel to Mexico to recruit members of the notorious drug cartel “Los Zetas” to carry out the plot. The massive scheme against U.S. government information and computer systems had been in the works years earlier, the documentary reveals. Around the same time the Congressional Research Service (CRS), which examines issues for federal lawmakers, published a report on Latin American terrorist concerns to the United States. It points out that, while Latin America has not been the focal point of the U.S. war on terrorism, the region has struggled with domestic terrorism for decades and international terrorist groups have used it as a battle ground to advance their causes. In fact, it reveals that sympathizers of Hezbollah and the Sunni Muslim Palestinian group Hamas are raising money among the sizable Middle Eastern communities in the tri-border area of Argentina. This makes the new State Department assessment appear less than credible. It claims that the majority of terrorist attacks within the Western Hemisphere in 2011 were committed by enterprises such as the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces and other “radical leftist Andean groups elsewhere.” There were no “known operational cells” of either Hezbollah or al-Qaeda, according to the report. The State Department also claims that “no known international terrorist organization had an operational presence in Mexico,” the focus of the worrisome Univision exposé. It further assures that “no terrorist group targeted U.S. citizens in or from Mexican territory” and that there is “no evidence of ties between Mexican criminal organizations and terrorist groups.”
No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant
Mueller 10 (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)
Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.
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<h4><strong>Plan forces a shift to PEMEX sabotage</h4><p>Francis 2014 </strong>(David, , Fiscal Times editor-at-large, “Legalizing Pot Makes Mexican Cartels Even More Dangerous”, 1-7, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/01/07/Legalizing-Pot-Makes-Mexican-Cartels-Even-More-Dangerous<u>)</p><p>Wider <mark>decriminalization would push the price of pot down</mark>, <mark>taking away a key revenue stream for cartels</mark> like Los Zetas and La Familia. </u>It’s pushing them to dive deeper into illegal markets for other drugs. <u><strong><mark>It’s</mark> also <mark>forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa</mark>, <mark>upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests</mark>.</u></strong> A 2012 study by the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness says legalization in Colorado will cost cartels $1.425 billion annually, while Washington State’s legalization would cost cartels $1.372 billion. The study also found that legalization in these two states would push the cartels’ annual revenues down 20 to 30 percent, and cut revenue to the Sinaloa cartel by 50 percent. In two separate reports — one in 2010 and one from last September — Rand Corp. dismissed these numbers as overstated. These reports found that the biggest domino to fall would be California, a state where one-seventh of all pot in the United States is consumed. Reuter said he expects California to decriminalize pot in the coming years. He said the only reason a 2010 referendum to legalize marijuana failed was because it was poorly worded. “These two states account for 5 percent of U.S. pot consumption. It’s not a big deal. If California legalizes, that changes things,” he said. Reuter added that the lack of pushback from conservative interest groups also makes wider decriminalization more likely. Just one group — Smart Approaches to Marijuana, headed by former Rep. Patrick Kennedy, who has struggled with substance abuse — is vocally opposed to decriminalization. Other conservative groups have been oddly quiet, Reuter said. “One of the fascinating things is how little real criticism there’s been from the right,” he said. “Social conservatives have not made much of this.” That could change since a new study from Northwestern University shows teenagers who smoke marijuana daily may suffer changes in brain structure that resemble schizophrenia. George W. Grayson, an expert on Mexican cartels at The College of William & Mary in Virginia, said, “Mexican syndicates are diversifying their sources of revenue beyond marijuana, cocaine and heroin. They are heavily involved in kidnapping — number one in the world — extortion, prostitution, migrant smuggling,” he said. “In addition, the cartels are ever-more active in stealing and exporting opioids such as Oxycontin and Roxicodone. Even cigarette smuggling is on the rise.” Kidnapping has become so common that some have even been caught on tape. According to Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography, more than 105,000 people were kidnapped in 2012. <u>Grayson also said that the <mark>cartels are stealing from energy companies</mark>, <mark>a practice</mark> more <mark>common in West Africa</mark> than Latin America. For instance, in 2012, <mark>the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May</mark> in Veracruz alone. “<mark>Los Zetas</mark>, in particular, <mark>are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from</mark> Pemex, <mark>the state oil company<strong></mark>. Pemex uses the chemicals for hydraulic fracking; Los Zetas for cooking methamphetamines.” </p><p></u>No international terrorist organizations in Mexico – specifically hezbollah</p><p>Judicial Watch ’12</strong> [Judicial Watch, “State Dept: “No Middle Eastern Terrorists in Latin America,”http://www.judicialwatch.org/blog/2012/08/state-dept-no-middle-eastern-terrorists-in-latin-america/MK]</p><p>Months after the world’s largest Spanish news network revealed that Middle Eastern terrorists infiltrated Latin America to plan an attack against the United States, the <u>Obama Administration has determined that the <mark>groups don’t</u></mark> seem to <u><mark>have a presence in the region</u></mark> though there is growing concern. <u>The assessment</u>, made public recently <u>via <mark>a lengthy State Department report on terrorism, contradicts </mark>an <mark>alarming exposé</mark> broadcast last December in a Univision documentary titled “La Amenaza Irani</u>” (<u>Iranian Threat</u>). Using undercover, never-before-seen video footage, the documentary illustrates how Middle Eastern terrorists have infiltrated Latin American countries—especially Mexico—to plan an attack against the U.S. The videos were part of a seven-month investigation in which college-aged Mexicans infiltrated diplomatic circles in Mexico to obtain recordings that prove diplomats from Iran, Venezuela and Cuba planned a cybernetic attack against the White House, FBI, Pentagon and U.S. nuclear plants. The Univision documentary also features secret video taken by extremists linked to Iran and footage from an undercover journalist who infiltrated Venezuelan military camps where terrorists trained. The news network’s investigative team also tracked the expansion of Iranian interests in the hemisphere, including money-laundering and drug-trafficking activities by terrorist groups supported by Iran. A segment is dedicated to the connection between Mexican drug cartels and the foiled plot to murder the Saudi ambassador in Washington D.C. last year. One of the Iranians charged had been ordered by that country’s Special Forces to travel to Mexico to recruit members of the notorious drug cartel “Los Zetas” to carry out the plot. The massive scheme against U.S. government information and computer systems had been in the works years earlier, the documentary reveals. Around the same time the Congressional Research Service (CRS), which examines issues for federal lawmakers, published a report on Latin American terrorist concerns to the United States. It points out that, while Latin America has not been the focal point of the U.S. war on terrorism, the region has struggled with domestic terrorism for decades and international terrorist groups have used it as a battle ground to advance their causes. In fact, it reveals that sympathizers of Hezbollah and the Sunni Muslim Palestinian group Hamas are raising money among the sizable Middle Eastern communities in the tri-border area of Argentina. This makes the new State Department assessment appear less than credible. It claims that the majority of terrorist attacks within the Western Hemisphere in 2011 were committed by enterprises such as the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces and other “radical leftist Andean groups elsewhere.” <u><mark>There were no “known operational cells” of</u></mark> either <u><mark>Hezbollah</u></mark> or al-Qaeda, according to the report. <u>The State Department </u>also <u>claims that</u> “<u><mark>no known international terrorist organization </mark>had an operational presence <mark>in Mexico<strong></mark>,” the focus of the worrisome Univision exposé. It further assures that “no terrorist group targeted U.S. citizens in or from Mexican territory” and that there is “no evidence of ties between Mexican criminal organizations and terrorist groups.” </p><p></u>No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant</p><p><u>Mueller 10</u></strong> (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)</p><p><u><mark>Politicians</mark> </u>of all stripes<u> <mark>preach</mark> </u>to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York<u>. <mark>This</u> <u>was</mark> </u>an early expression of a pattern of<u> <mark>dramatic risk inflation</u></mark> that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions<u>, <mark>terrorist groups</u></mark> seem to <u><mark>have exhibited only limited desire and</mark> </u>even less<u> <mark>progress</mark> </u>in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright <u><mark>armed theft of fissile material is</u></mark> exceedingly<u><mark> unlikely</mark> </u>not only because of the resistance of guards, but because <u><mark>chase would be immediate</u></mark>. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If<u> <mark>terrorists</mark> </u>were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material,<u> </u>they would then probably <u><mark>have to transport it</u></mark> a long distance<u><mark> over unfamiliar terrain</u></mark> and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. <u><mark>Once outside</mark> </u>the country with their precious booty, <u><mark>terrorists would need</mark> </u>to set up<u> <mark>a </u></mark>large and<u><mark> well-equipped machine shop</mark> </u>to manufacture a bomb<u> <mark>and</mark> </u>then to populate it with a very select team of highly<u><mark> skilled scientists</u></mark>, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the <u><mark>technical requirements</u></mark> in several fields <u><mark>verge on the unfeasible</u></mark>. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. <u><mark>Adopting</mark> </u>probability estimates that purposely and heavily<u> <mark>bias </u></mark>the case <u><mark>in the terrorists’ favor</u></mark>—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, <u><mark>the cumulative odds</mark> </u>that they will be able to pull off the deed <u><mark>drop to one in</mark> </u>well over<u> <mark>three billion</u></mark>. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. <u><mark>They are unlikely to be</mark> </u>given or<u> <mark>sold a bomb</u></mark> by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. <u><mark>The terrorist group might</u></mark> also seek to <u><mark>steal</mark> </u>or illicitly purchase<u> <mark>a “loose nuke</u></mark>“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that <u><strong><mark>none exist</strong></mark>. </u>All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished <u><mark>bombs have</mark> </u>been out-fitted with <u><mark>devices that</u></mark> trigger a non-nuclear explosion that <u><mark>destroy</u></mark>s <u><mark>the bomb if </u></mark>it is<u><mark> tampered with.</mark> </u>And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple<u><mark> codes are required</mark> </u>not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge <u><mark>if a </u></mark>nuclear<u><mark> state were to</mark> </u>utterly<u> <mark>collapse</u></mark>; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear<u> <mark>weapons </u></mark>would probably <u><mark>remain under heavy guard</u></mark> by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that <u><mark>al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond</mark> </u>searching<u> <mark>the Internet</u>.</mark> After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.</p>
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Fed CP
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,234 |
The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 430,970 | 1 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,235 |
Plan solves 2 internal links--
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Plan solves 2 internal links--</h4>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,971 | 1 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,236 |
Flexible interpretation solves and will be accepted- not perceived as abrogation
|
Huffington Post 10/14
|
Huffington Post 10/14/2014 (State Department Official Calls For 'Flexibility' On Drug Control Treaties, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/14/state-department-official_0_n_5985930.html)
|
A high-ranking State Department official called for "flexible" interpretations of international drug control treaties citing marijuana legalization in Colorado and Washington. the official U.S. diplomatic stance is clearly shifting toward the position that the drug control treaties don't need to be interpreted strictly. To have the United States government emerging as a defender and even champion of flexibility in interpreting the conventions represents a major step forward What's remarkable is the extent to which a popular vote in Colorado and Washington precipitated a shift in national posture with U.S. diplomats embracing "flexibility," "the U.S. has handed off the reins to the Russians as the leading global drug war proponent Putin has taken a stern anti-drug position at odds with the rest of the world Drug reformers want more room to experiment and see a prime opportunity at the 2016 U.N. General Assembly special session
|
flexible" interpretations of international drug control treaties citing marijuana legalization in Colorado and Washington the official U.S. diplomatic stance is clearly shifting toward the position that the drug control treaties don't need to be interpreted strictl emerging as a defender and even champion of flexibility in interpreting the conventions, that represents a major step forward What's remarkable is the extent to which a popular vote in Colorado and Washington in 2012 precipitated a shift i national posture Drug reformers wan more room to experiment and see a prime opportunity at the the 2016 U.N. General Assembly special session
|
A high-ranking State Department official called for "flexible" interpretations of international drug control treaties at the United Nations in New York City last week, citing marijuana legalization in Colorado and Washington. Assistant Secretary of State William Brownfield's Oct. 9 remarks were the third time this year he has made such a call. And the high-profile venue underscores the pressure that state legalization efforts have put on the U.S. to allow other countries to amend strict, decades-old international drug control treaties. Brownfield said one pillar of the new U.S. approach on drug policy is to "accept flexible interpretation" of U.N. drug treaties. "How could I, a representative of the government of the United States of America, be intolerant of a government that permits any experimentation with legalization of marijuana if two of the 50 states of the United States of America have chosen to walk down that road?" said Brownfield. Between Brownfield's remarks last week and two similar speeches in March, the official U.S. diplomatic stance is clearly shifting toward the position that the drug control treaties don't need to be interpreted strictly. "To now have the United States government emerging as a defender and even champion of flexibility in interpreting the conventions, that represents a major step forward," said Ethan Nadelmann, executive director of the Drug Policy Alliance. For decades the U.S. sought to impose stern prohibitionist policies not just on itself but on any country daring to take a new tack on drugs. The U.S. backed a harsh 1988 U.N. treaty, poured billions into counter-narcotics operations in Latin America and Asia, and opposed even modest efforts like decriminalizing the traditional consumption of the coca leaf in Bolivia. As recently as March 2012, the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala rebuked President Otto Perez Molina for proposing drug legalization. But then came the two successful marijuana legalization ballot initiatives in November 2012, which opened the United States to charges of hypocrisy. "What's remarkable is the extent to which a popular vote in Colorado and Washington in 2012 precipitated a shift in the Obama administration and the Justice Department's national posture, and that in turn precipitated a shift in the U.S. international posture," said Nadelmann. When Uruguay legalized marijuana sales in 2013, U.S. diplomats didn't raise public objections. The latest Obama administration budget still makes a large request -- $1.4 billion -- for drug control efforts abroad. But with U.S. diplomats embracing "flexibility," "the U.S. has handed off the reins to the Russians as the leading global drug war proponent," said Nadelmann. Under President Vladimir Putin, that country has taken a stern anti-drug position at odds with the rest of the world and funded counter-narcotics operations in places like Nicaragua. Drug reformers want to amend existing U.N. treaties to allow countries more room to experiment with strategies like decriminalizing so-called hard drugs, and see a prime opportunity at the the 2016 U.N. General Assembly special session on drugs.
| 3,142 |
<h4>Flexible interpretation solves and will be accepted- not perceived as abrogation</h4><p><strong>Huffington Post 10/14</strong>/2014 (State Department Official Calls For 'Flexibility' On Drug Control Treaties, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/14/state-department-official_0_n_5985930.html)</p><p><u>A high-ranking State Department official called for "<mark>flexible" interpretations of international drug control treaties</u></mark> at the United Nations in New York City last week, <u><mark>citing marijuana legalization in Colorado and Washington</mark>. </u>Assistant Secretary of State William Brownfield's Oct. 9 remarks were the third time this year he has made such a call. And the high-profile venue underscores the pressure that state legalization efforts have put on the U.S. to allow other countries to amend strict, decades-old international drug control treaties. Brownfield said one pillar of the new U.S. approach on drug policy is to "accept flexible interpretation" of U.N. drug treaties. "How could I, a representative of the government of the United States of America, be intolerant of a government that permits any experimentation with legalization of marijuana if two of the 50 states of the United States of America have chosen to walk down that road?" said Brownfield. Between Brownfield's remarks last week and two similar speeches in March, <u><mark>the official U.S. <strong>diplomatic stance is clearly shifting</strong> toward the position that the drug control treaties don't need to be interpreted strictl</mark>y. </u>"<u>To</u> now <u>have the United States government</u> <u><mark>emerging as a defender and even champion of flexibility in interpreting the conventions</u>, that <u><strong>represents a major step forward</u></strong></mark>," said Ethan Nadelmann, executive director of the Drug Policy Alliance. For decades the U.S. sought to impose stern prohibitionist policies not just on itself but on any country daring to take a new tack on drugs. The U.S. backed a harsh 1988 U.N. treaty, poured billions into counter-narcotics operations in Latin America and Asia, and opposed even modest efforts like decriminalizing the traditional consumption of the coca leaf in Bolivia. As recently as March 2012, the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala rebuked President Otto Perez Molina for proposing drug legalization. But then came the two successful marijuana legalization ballot initiatives in November 2012, which opened the United States to charges of hypocrisy. "<u><mark>What's remarkable is the extent to which a popular vote in Colorado and Washington</u> in 2012 <u><strong>precipitated a shift i</mark>n</u></strong> the Obama administration and the Justice Department's <u><strong><mark>national posture</u></strong></mark>, and that in turn precipitated a shift in the U.S. international posture," said Nadelmann. When Uruguay legalized marijuana sales in 2013, U.S. diplomats didn't raise public objections. The latest Obama administration budget still makes a large request -- $1.4 billion -- for drug control efforts abroad. But <u>with U.S. diplomats embracing "flexibility," "the U.S. has handed off the reins to the Russians as the leading global drug war proponent</u>," said Nadelmann. Under President Vladimir <u>Putin</u>, that country <u>has taken a stern anti-drug position at odds with the rest of the world</u> and funded counter-narcotics operations in places like Nicaragua. <u><mark>Drug reformers wan</mark>t</u> to amend existing U.N. treaties to allow countries <u><mark>more room to experiment</u></mark> with strategies like decriminalizing so-called hard drugs, <u><mark>and see a prime opportunity at the</u> the <u>2016 U.N. General Assembly special session</u></mark> on drugs.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
A2
| 430,972 | 2 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,237 |
Asian economic decline causes extinction
|
Auslin 9
|
Auslin 9 – resident scholar at AEI (Michael “Averting Disaster”, The Daily Standard, 2/6, http://www.aei.org/article/100044
|
when a depression strikes, war can follow. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, the most heavily armed region on earth and riven with ancient hatreds and territorial rivalries. Collapsing trade flows can lead to political tension, nationalist outbursts, growing distrust, and ultimately, military miscalculation No one should think that Asia is on the verge of conflict. But it is also important to remember what has helped keep the peace in this region for so long. Phenomenal growth rates in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, China and elsewhere since the 1960s have naturally turned national attention inward, to development and stability policymakers need to remember that even during these decades of growth, moments of economic shock led to instability and bursts of terrorist activity in Japan, while the uneven pace of growth in China has led to tens of thousands of armed clashes in the poor interior of the country. Now imagine such instability multiplied region-wide. Asia's political infrastructure may not be strong enough to resist the slide towards confrontation and conflict. It would almost certainly drag America in we have alliance responsibilities to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines should any of them come under armed attack it is unclear if the American military, already stretched too thin by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, could contain the crisis There is no reason to believe we are immune from the same types of miscalculation and greed that have destroyed international systems in the past
|
when depression strikes, war can follow. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, the most heavily armed region with ancient rivalries moments of economic shock led to instability and terrorist activity while the uneven pace of growth led to armed clashes imagine instability multiplied region-wide conflict would drag America in unclear if American military, stretched thin could contain the crisis
|
As they deal with a collapsing world economy, policymakers in Washington and around the globe must not forget that when a depression strikes, war can follow. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, the most heavily armed region on earth and riven with ancient hatreds and territorial rivalries. Collapsing trade flows can lead to political tension, nationalist outbursts, growing distrust, and ultimately, military miscalculation. The result would be disaster on top of an already dire situation. No one should think that Asia is on the verge of conflict. But it is also important to remember what has helped keep the peace in this region for so long. Phenomenal growth rates in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, China and elsewhere since the 1960s have naturally turned national attention inward, to development and stability. This has gradually led to increased political confidence, diplomatic initiatives, and in many nations the move toward more democratic systems. America has directly benefited as well, and not merely from years of lower consumer prices, but also from the general conditions of peace in Asia. Yet policymakers need to remember that even during these decades of growth, moments of economic shock, such as the 1973 Oil Crisis, led to instability and bursts of terrorist activity in Japan, while the uneven pace of growth in China has led to tens of thousands of armed clashes in the poor interior of the country. Now imagine such instability multiplied region-wide. The economic collapse Japan is facing, and China's potential slowdown, dwarfs any previous economic troubles, including the 1998 Asian Currency Crisis. Newly urbanized workers rioting for jobs or living wages, conflict over natural resources, further saber-rattling from North Korea, all can take on lives of their own. This is the nightmare of governments in the region, and particularly of democracies from newer ones like Thailand and Mongolia to established states like Japan and South Korea. How will overburdened political leaders react to internal unrest? What happens if Chinese shopkeepers in Indonesia are attacked, or a Japanese naval ship collides with a Korean fishing vessel? Quite simply, Asia's political infrastructure may not be strong enough to resist the slide towards confrontation and conflict. This would be a political and humanitarian disaster turning the clock back decades in Asia. It would almost certainly drag America in at some point, as well. First of all, we have alliance responsibilities to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines should any of them come under armed attack. Failure on our part to live up to those responsibilities could mean the end of America's credibility in Asia. Secondly, peace in Asia has been kept in good measure by the continued U.S. military presence since World War II. There have been terrible localized conflicts, of course, but nothing approaching a systemic conflagration like the 1940s. Today, such a conflict would be far more bloody, and it is unclear if the American military, already stretched too thin by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, could contain the crisis. Nor is it clear that the American people, worn out from war and economic distress, would be willing to shed even more blood and treasure for lands across the ocean. The result could be a historic changing of the geopolitical map in the world's most populous region. Perhaps China would emerge as the undisputed hegemon. Possibly democracies like Japan and South Korea would link up to oppose any aggressor. India might decide it could move into the vacuum. All of this is guess-work, of course, but it has happened repeatedly throughout history. There is no reason to believe we are immune from the same types of miscalculation and greed that have destroyed international systems in the past
| 3,830 |
<h4><strong>Asian economic decline causes extinction</h4><p>Auslin 9</strong> – resident scholar at AEI (Michael “Averting Disaster”, The Daily Standard, 2/6, http://www.aei.org/article/100044</p><p>As they deal with a collapsing world economy, policymakers in Washington and around the globe must not forget that <u><strong><mark>when</mark> a <mark>depression strikes, war can follow. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, the most heavily armed region</mark> on earth and riven <mark>with ancient</mark> hatreds and territorial <mark>rivalries</mark>. Collapsing trade flows can lead to political tension, nationalist outbursts, growing distrust, and ultimately, military miscalculation</u></strong>. The result would be disaster on top of an already dire situation. <u><strong>No one should think that Asia is on the verge of conflict. But it is also important to remember what has helped keep the peace in this region for so long. Phenomenal growth rates in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, China and elsewhere since the 1960s have naturally turned national attention inward, to development and stability</u></strong>. This has gradually led to increased political confidence, diplomatic initiatives, and in many nations the move toward more democratic systems. America has directly benefited as well, and not merely from years of lower consumer prices, but also from the general conditions of peace in Asia. Yet <u><strong>policymakers need to remember that even during these decades of growth, <mark>moments of economic shock</u></strong></mark>, such as the 1973 Oil Crisis, <u><strong><mark>led to instability and </mark>bursts of <mark>terrorist activity</mark> in Japan, <mark>while the uneven pace of growth </mark>in China has <mark>led to</mark> tens of thousands of <mark>armed clashes</mark> in the poor interior of the country.</u></strong> <u><strong>Now <mark>imagine </mark>such <mark>instability multiplied region-wide</mark>.</u></strong> The economic collapse Japan is facing, and China's potential slowdown, dwarfs any previous economic troubles, including the 1998 Asian Currency Crisis. Newly urbanized workers rioting for jobs or living wages, conflict over natural resources, further saber-rattling from North Korea, all can take on lives of their own. This is the nightmare of governments in the region, and particularly of democracies from newer ones like Thailand and Mongolia to established states like Japan and South Korea. How will overburdened political leaders react to internal unrest? What happens if Chinese shopkeepers in Indonesia are attacked, or a Japanese naval ship collides with a Korean fishing vessel? Quite simply, <u><strong>Asia's political infrastructure may not be strong enough to resist the slide towards confrontation and <mark>conflict</mark>. </u></strong>This would be a political and humanitarian disaster turning the clock back decades in Asia. <u><strong>It <mark>would</mark> almost certainly <mark>drag America in</u></strong></mark> at some point, as well. First of all, <u><strong>we have alliance responsibilities to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines should any of them come under armed attack</u></strong>. Failure on our part to live up to those responsibilities could mean the end of America's credibility in Asia. Secondly, peace in Asia has been kept in good measure by the continued U.S. military presence since World War II. There have been terrible localized conflicts, of course, but nothing approaching a systemic conflagration like the 1940s. Today, such a conflict would be far more bloody, and <u><strong>it is <mark>unclear if </mark>the <mark>American military, </mark>already <mark>stretched</mark> too <mark>thin </mark>by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, <mark>could contain the crisis</u></strong></mark>. Nor is it clear that the American people, worn out from war and economic distress, would be willing to shed even more blood and treasure for lands across the ocean. The result could be a historic changing of the geopolitical map in the world's most populous region. Perhaps China would emerge as the undisputed hegemon. Possibly democracies like Japan and South Korea would link up to oppose any aggressor. India might decide it could move into the vacuum. All of this is guess-work, of course, but it has happened repeatedly throughout history. <u><strong>There is no reason to believe we are immune from the same types of miscalculation and greed that have destroyed international systems in the past</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 2
| 34,275 | 62 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,238 |
He can’t—their ev is speculative guess work
|
Kredo 1/21
|
Kredo 1/21 (Adam, staff writer “Aims to unilaterally unwind sanctions laws”, http://freebeacon.com/white-house-seeks-to-bypass-congress-on-iran-deal/)//kyan
|
Kirk said that it is unacceptable for the White House to try to bypass Congress on such a critical global issue The administration cannot just ignore U.S. law and lift sanctions unilaterally.” Top White House aides have been “talking about ways to do that [lift sanctions] without Congress and we have no idea yet what that means,” said one senior congressional aide who works on sanctions
|
Kirk said that it is unacceptable White House to try to bypass Congres White House aides have been “talking about ways to do that [lift sanctions] without Congress and we have no idea yet what that means said one senior congressional aide who works on sanctions
|
Sen. Mark Kirk (R., Ill.), who is leading the charge on new sanctions legislation, said that it is unacceptable for the White House to try to bypass Congress on such a critical global issue. “The American people must get a say in any final nuclear agreement with Iran to ensure the mullahs never get the bomb,” Kirk told the Washington Free Beacon. “The administration cannot just ignore U.S. law and lift sanctions unilaterally.” Congressional insiders say that the White House is worried Congress will exert oversight of the deal and demand tougher nuclear restrictions on Tehran in exchange for sanctions relief. Top White House aides have been “talking about ways to do that [lift sanctions] without Congress and we have no idea yet what that means,” said one senior congressional aide who works on sanctions. “They’re looking for a way to lift them by fiat, overrule U.S. law, drive over the sanctions, and declare that they are lifted.”
| 942 |
<h4>He can’t—their ev is speculative guess work </h4><p><strong>Kredo 1/21<u></strong> (Adam, staff writer “Aims to unilaterally unwind sanctions laws”, http://freebeacon.com/white-house-seeks-to-bypass-congress-on-iran-deal/)//kyan</p><p></u>Sen. Mark <u><mark>Kirk</u></mark> (R., Ill.), who is leading the charge on new sanctions legislation, <u><mark>said that it is unacceptable</mark> for the <mark>White House to try to bypass Congres</mark>s on such a critical global issue</u>. “The American people must get a say in any final nuclear agreement with Iran to ensure the mullahs never get the bomb,” Kirk told the Washington Free Beacon. “<u>The administration cannot just ignore U.S. law and lift sanctions unilaterally.” </u>Congressional insiders say that the White House is worried Congress will exert oversight of the deal and demand tougher nuclear restrictions on Tehran in exchange for sanctions relief. <u>Top <mark>White House aides</mark> <mark>have been “talking about ways to do that [lift sanctions] without Congress <strong>and we have no idea yet what that means</strong></mark>,” <mark>said one senior congressional aide who works on sanctions</u></mark>. “They’re looking for a way to lift them by fiat, overrule U.S. law, drive over the sanctions, and declare that they are lifted.”</p>
|
1nr
|
AT: Waivers
|
Nuclear, biological and chemical war
| 430,973 | 1 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,239 |
Link shield - Federal legalization has LITERALLY no support
|
Kleiman 2014
|
Kleiman 2014 (Mark, professor of public policy at the University of California Los Angeles, How Not to Make a Hash out of Cannabis legalization, Washington Monthly, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/how_not_to_make_a_hash_out_of049291.php?page=all)
|
The federal government would recognize the legal status of cannabis under a state system Could such a plan garner support in Washington Certainly not given a dysfunctional Congress, an administration with no taste for engaging one more culture war issue, and in the absence of a powerful national organization with a nuanced view of cannabis policy and the muscle to make that view politically salient. legalization it’s been slow going in other states in which legalization has to go through the legislature, where anti-pot law enforcement groups can easily block it. it could be many years before legalization reaches the rest of the country or gets formal federal approval that removes the stigma no national-level figure of any standing is willing to speak out for change.
discussion of political capital is whether or not it can be replenished over a term If a President expends political capital can it be replaced? Capital can be rebuilt, but only to a limited extent The decline of capital makes it difficult to access information recruit expertise and maintain energy If a lame duck President can be defined by a loss of political capital a lame duck can accomplish little
|
Could such a plan garner support in Washington Certainly not given a dysfunctional Congress in the absence of a powerful national organization with a nuanced view of cannabis policy and the muscle to make that view politically salient it’s been slow going in other states where anti-pot law enforcement groups can easily block it could be many years before or gets formal federal approval that removes the stigma no national-level figure of any standing is willing to speak out for change
discussion of political capital is whether or not it can be replenished over a term Capital can be rebuilt, but only to a limited extent The decline of capital makes it difficult to access information, recruit expertise and maintain energy
|
How could the federal government get the states to structure their pot markets in ways like these? By giving a new twist to a tried-and-true tool that the Obama administration has wielded particularly effectively: the policy waiver. The federal government would recognize the legal status of cannabis under a state system—making the activities permitted under that system actually legal, not merely tolerated, under federal law—only if the state system contained adequate controls to protect public health and safety, as determined by the attorney general and the secretary of the department of health and human services. That would change the politics of legalization at the state level, with legalization advocates and the cannabis industry supporting tight controls in order to get, and keep, the all-important waiver. Then we would see the laboratories of democracy doing some serious experimentation. Could such a plan garner enough support in Washington to become law? Certainly not now, given a dysfunctional Congress, an administration with no taste for engaging one more culture war issue, and in the absence of a powerful national organization with a nuanced view of cannabis policy and the muscle to make that view politically salient. But there is a mutually beneficial deal waiting to be made. Though legalization has made headway in states with strong initiative provisions in their constitutions, it’s been slow going in other states in which legalization has to go through the legislature, where anti-pot law enforcement groups can easily block it. So it could be many years before legalization reaches the rest of the country or gets formal federal approval that removes the stigma of (even unpunished) lawbreaking from cannabis users. Rather than wait, legalization advocates might be willing to accept something short of full commercialization; some of them actually prefer a noncommercial system. Meanwhile, those who have been opponents of legalization heretofore might—with the writing now on the wall—decide that a tightly regulated and potentially reversible system of legal availability is the least-bad out-come available. The current political situation seems anomalous. Public opinion continues to move against cannabis prohibition, but no national-level figure of any standing is willing to speak out for change. That’s unlikely to last. Soon enough, candidates for president are going to be asked their positions on marijuana legalization. They’re going to need a good answer. I suggest something like this: “I’m not against all legalization; I’m against dumb legalization.”
Link outweighs turn – Harder to rebuild capital than lose it
Marrissa Silber, prof of poli sci, samford, 8-30-2007, “What makes a president quack?” Prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
Important to the discussion of political capital is whether or not it can be replenished over a term. If a President expends political capital on his agenda, can it be replaced? Light suggests that “capital declines over time – public approval consistently falls: midterm losses occur” (31). Capital can be rebuilt, but only to a limited extent. The decline of capital makes it difficult to access information, recruit more expertise and maintain energy. If a lame duck President can be defined by a loss of political capital, this paper helps determine if such capital can be replenished or if a lame duck can accomplish little. Before determining this, a definition
| 3,521 |
<h4><strong>Link shield - Federal legalization has LITERALLY no support</h4><p>Kleiman 2014</strong> (Mark, professor of public policy at the University of California Los Angeles, How Not to Make a Hash out of Cannabis legalization, Washington Monthly, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/how_not_to_make_a_hash_out_of049291.php?page=all)</p><p>How could the federal government get the states to structure their pot markets in ways like these? By giving a new twist to a tried-and-true tool that the Obama administration has wielded particularly effectively: the policy waiver. <u>The federal government would recognize the legal status of cannabis under a state system</u>—making the activities permitted under that system actually legal, not merely tolerated, under federal law—only if the state system contained adequate controls to protect public health and safety, as determined by the attorney general and the secretary of the department of health and human services. That would change the politics of legalization at the state level, with legalization advocates and the cannabis industry supporting tight controls in order to get, and keep, the all-important waiver. Then we would see the laboratories of democracy doing some serious experimentation. <u><mark>Could such a plan garner</u></mark> enough <u><mark>support in Washington</u></mark> to become law? <u><strong><mark>Certainly not</u></strong></mark> now, <u><mark>given a dysfunctional Congress</mark>, an administration with no taste for engaging one more culture war issue, and <mark>in the absence of a powerful national organization with a nuanced view of cannabis policy and the muscle to make that view politically salient</mark>.</u> But there is a mutually beneficial deal waiting to be made. Though <u>legalization</u> has made headway in states with strong initiative provisions in their constitutions, <u><mark>it’s been slow going in other states </mark>in which legalization has to go through the legislature, <mark>where anti-pot law enforcement groups can easily block it</mark>.</u> So <u>it <mark>could be many years before</mark> legalization reaches the rest of the country <mark>or gets formal federal approval that removes the stigma</u></mark> of (even unpunished) lawbreaking from cannabis users. Rather than wait, legalization advocates might be willing to accept something short of full commercialization; some of them actually prefer a noncommercial system. Meanwhile, those who have been opponents of legalization heretofore might—with the writing now on the wall—decide that a tightly regulated and potentially reversible system of legal availability is the least-bad out-come available. The current political situation seems anomalous. Public opinion continues to move against cannabis prohibition, but <u><strong><mark>no national-level figure of any standing is willing to speak out for change</mark>.</u> That’s unlikely to last. Soon enough, candidates for president are going to be asked their positions on marijuana legalization. They’re going to need a good answer. I suggest something like this: “I’m not against all legalization; I’m against dumb legalization.”</p><p>Link outweighs turn – Harder to rebuild capital than lose it</p><p></strong>Marrissa <strong>Silber,</strong> prof of poli sci, samford, 8-30-<strong>2007,</strong> “What makes a president quack?” Prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.</p><p>Important to the <u><mark>discussion of political capital is whether or not it can be replenished over a term</u></mark>. <u>If a President expends political capital</u> on his agenda, <u>can it be replaced?</u> Light suggests that “capital declines over time – public approval consistently falls: midterm losses occur” (31). <u><mark>Capital can be rebuilt, but only to a limited extent</u></mark>. <u><mark>The decline of capital makes it difficult to access information</u>, <u>recruit</u></mark> more <u><mark>expertise and maintain energy</u></mark>. <u>If a lame duck President can be defined by a loss of political capital</u>, this paper helps determine if such capital can be replenished or if <u>a lame duck can accomplish little</u><strong>. Before determining this, a definition</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NR
|
Link
| 7,519 | 53 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,240 |
The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state. </h4>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 430,974 | 1 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,241 |
First, It dries up the demand for illegal organs
|
Upchurch 12
|
Upchurch 12 Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18
|
By increasing the supply of available organs in the U S through compensation, citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ If demand dried up transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible that stories like this would become much less commonplace.
|
By increasing the supply of organs in the U S through compensation, citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ If demand dried up transplant tourism would take a major hit merican citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients Most organs ended up transplanted into American citizens If those American citizens were not forced abroad to find an organ, this would become much less commonplace.
|
By increasing the supply of available organs in the United States through compensation, American citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ. For example, Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.118 If demand dried up from foreign citizens, transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure. Statistical information is difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs succinctly stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens.”119 The black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients. Rather, it is driven upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire what they need domestically.120 One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.121 Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer.”122 Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.123 The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal deficiency.124 Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.125 If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible that stories like this would become much less commonplace.
| 2,141 |
<h4>First, It dries up the<u> demand</u> for illegal organs </h4><p><strong>Upchurch 12</strong> Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes<u> a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18</p><p><mark>By increasing the supply of</mark> available <mark>organs in the U</u></mark>nited<u> <mark>S</u></mark>tates<u> <mark>through compensation,</mark> </u>American<u> <mark>citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ</u></mark>. For example, Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.118 <u><mark>If demand dried up</u></mark> from foreign citizens, <u><mark>transplant tourism</mark> in these countries <mark>would take a major hit</u></mark> because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure. Statistical information is difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but <u>presumably A<mark>merican citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients</mark> seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report </u>about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs<u> </u>succinctly <u>stated, “<mark>Most </mark>of those <mark>organs ended up transplanted into American citizens</u></mark>.”119 The<u> </u>black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients. Rather, it is driven<u> </u>upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire<u> </u>what they need domestically.120 One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.121 Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer.”122 Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.123 The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal deficiency.124 Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.125 <u><mark>If those American citizens </mark>with the means to purchase <mark>were not forced abroad to find an organ,</mark> it is very possible that stories like <mark>this would become much less commonplace.</p></u></mark>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,262 | 14 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,242 |
Big internal link differential between perceptual violation and outright violation
|
Koplow 13
|
Koplow 13 (David, law professor at Georgetown University, “Indisputable Violations: What Happens When the United States Unambiguously Breaches a Treaty?” http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Koplow_37-1.pdf)
|
putative treaty violations are inconclusive because i aw is frequently contest - able country) adopts a certain interpretation of the treaty. If the issue becomes a cause célèbre , States might “win” or “lose” the debate over its interpretation. But if the matter is truly one on which countries could reasonably disagree, there may not be much embarrassment for a country that has in good faith advanced what subsequently turns out to be only a minority position in most of those instances, the United States at least had some - thing to say. It may have only been a half-baked legal theory, a justi " cation that rested on impressionistic “legitimacy” rather than strict “lawfulness,” or a nuanced rationale that inspired precious little international resonance. But at least U.S. representatives had a story to offer by way of defense, explanation, or mitigation.
|
putative treaty violations are nconclusive becaus contest - able States might “win” or “lose” the debate over its interpretation. But if the matter is truly one on which countries could reasonably disagree, in good faith advanced what turns out to be only a minority position in most of those instances, the United States at least had some - thing to say. It may have only been a half-baked legal theory rather than strict “lawfulness But at least U.S. representatives had a story to offer
|
Debates about putative treaty violations are also often inconclusive because international law, like domestic U.S. law, is frequently contest - able. For example, the rules for demarcating a disputed land or maritime boundary or the interpretation of a World Trade Organization obligation about improper barriers to international trade can be obscure, ambiguous, and debatable. Often, the United States (or any other country) adopts a certain interpretation of the treaty. If the issue becomes a cause célèbre , the United States might “win” or “lose” the debate over its interpretation. But if the matter is truly one on which countries could reasonably disagree, there may not be much embarrassment for a country that has in good faith advanced what subsequently turns out to be only a minority position.¶ We should not overstate this ambivalence—there are plenty of instances in which the United States publicly adopted a legal posture wholly at odds with the mainstream opinion of the world legal commu - nity. ! recent U.S. arguments that waterboarding was not “torture,” for example, or that “extraordinary rendi - tion” was legally permissible, failed the international laugh test. In the 1999 NATO bombing campaign against Serbia to arrest the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, the United States did not have a real legal justi " cation to propound, since it was acting without authoriza - tion from the Security Council and without a self-defense rationale. But the point is that in most of those instances, the United States at least had some - thing to say. It may have only been a half-baked legal theory, a justi " cation that rested on impressionistic “legitimacy” rather than strict “lawfulness,” or a nuanced rationale that inspired precious little international resonance. But at least U.S. representatives had a story to offer by way of defense, explanation, or mitigation.
| 1,886 |
<h4>Big internal link differential between perceptual violation and outright violation</h4><p><u><strong>Koplow 13</u></strong> (David, law professor at Georgetown University, “Indisputable Violations: What Happens When the United States Unambiguously Breaches a Treaty?” http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Koplow_37-1.pdf)</p><p>Debates about <u><mark>putative treaty violations are</u></mark> also often <u>i<mark>nconclusive becaus</mark>e i</u>nternational l<u>aw</u>, like domestic U.S. law, <u>is frequently <mark>contest - able</u></mark>. For example, the rules for demarcating a disputed land or maritime boundary or the interpretation of a World Trade Organization obligation about improper barriers to international trade can be obscure, ambiguous, and debatable. Often, the United States (or any other <u>country) adopts a certain interpretation of the treaty. If the issue becomes a cause célèbre ,</u> the United <u><mark>States might “win” or “lose” the debate over its interpretation. But if the matter is truly one on which countries could reasonably disagree,</mark> there may not be much embarrassment for a country that has <mark>in good faith advanced what</mark> subsequently <mark>turns out to be only a minority position</u></mark>.¶ We should not overstate this ambivalence—there are plenty of instances in which the United States publicly adopted a legal posture wholly at odds with the mainstream opinion of the world legal commu - nity. ! recent U.S. arguments that waterboarding was not “torture,” for example, or that “extraordinary rendi - tion” was legally permissible, failed the international laugh test. In the 1999 NATO bombing campaign against Serbia to arrest the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, the United States did not have a real legal justi " cation to propound, since it was acting without authoriza - tion from the Security Council and without a self-defense rationale. But the point is that <u><mark>in most of those instances, the United States at least had some - thing to say. It may have only been a half-baked legal theory</mark>, a justi " cation that rested on impressionistic “legitimacy” <mark>rather than strict “lawfulness</mark>,” or a nuanced rationale that inspired precious little international resonance. <mark>But at least U.S. representatives had a story to offer</mark> by way of defense, explanation, or mitigation.</p></u>
|
1nc
| null |
A2
| 430,975 | 17 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,243 |
Legalization in advance of treaty revision causes treaty withdrawal – only the CP alone maintains compliance
|
Donohue et al 2010
|
Donohue et al 2010 (C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford, John, “Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy” http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12096)
|
Another complication for legalization is international law the Single Convention binds all UN member nations to maintain prohibition of drugs, including cannabis specifically While the Single Convention requires that countries maintain prohibition it does not require a punitive regime reforms working within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require either a country’s withdrawal or revision due to the Single Convention even countries with more liberal narcotics policies lack full- fledged drug legalization in the Netherlands the importation and commercial production of cannabis remains illegal
|
the Single Convention binds nations to prohibition including cannabis specifically While the Convention requires prohibition it does not require a punitive regime reforms within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require withdrawal even countries with more liberal narcotics policies lack full- fledged legalization in the Netherlands importation and commercial production remains illegal
|
International Law. Another complication for legalization is international law. While many researchers attempt to make international comparisons in studying drugs, one area of drug control policy that receives scant attention is the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 which binds all UN member nations to maintain prohibition of drugs, including cannabis specifically (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 61). While the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs requires that countries maintain prohibition of manufacture, sales, and import, it does not require a punitive regime of the type currently found in the United States. Article 36 of the Single Convention, “Penal Provision,” specifically allows for treatment programs to either enhance or serve as a substitute for punishment.81 The Economist reports that countries like the Netherlands are able to allow for some innovation in controlling marijuana use through the convention’s commentary, which states that its goal is “improvement of the efficacy of national criminal justice systems in the field of drug trafficking” (“A Toker’s Guide” 2009). Thus, reforms working within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require either a country’s withdrawal from the treaty or revision thereof. Perhaps partly due to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, even countries with more liberal narcotics policies than the United States lack full- fledged drug legalization and at most allow for depenalization of marijuana and/ or widespread needle exchange programs. As discussed above, in the Netherlands, a country long known for its tolerance of marijuana smoking, the importation and commercial production of cannabis remains illegal (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 64). When considering its own drug reform, Portugal declined to adopt outright legalization likely in part because of its treaty obligations under the 1961 Single Convention (Cato Institute 2009).
| 1,974 |
<h4><strong>Legalization <u>in advance</u> of treaty revision causes <u>treaty withdrawal</u> – only the CP alone maintains compliance</h4><p>Donohue et al 2010 </strong> (C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford, John, “Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy” http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12096)</p><p>International Law. <u>Another complication for legalization is international law</u>. While many researchers attempt to make international comparisons in studying drugs, one area of drug control policy that receives scant attention is <u><mark>the</u></mark> United Nations <u><mark>Single Convention</u></mark> on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 which <u><mark>binds</mark> all UN member <mark>nations to</mark> maintain <mark>prohibition</mark> of drugs, <mark>including cannabis specifically</u></mark> (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 61). <u><mark>While the</mark> Single <mark>Convention</u></mark> on Narcotic Drugs <u><strong><mark>requires</mark> that countries maintain <mark>prohibition</mark> </u></strong>of manufacture, sales, and import, <u><strong><mark>it does not require a punitive regime</u></strong></mark> of the type currently found in the United States. Article 36 of the Single Convention, “Penal Provision,” specifically allows for treatment programs to either enhance or serve as a substitute for punishment.81 The Economist reports that countries like the Netherlands are able to allow for some innovation in controlling marijuana use through the convention’s commentary, which states that its goal is “improvement of the efficacy of national criminal justice systems in the field of drug trafficking” (“A Toker’s Guide” 2009). Thus, <u><mark>reforms</mark> working <strong><mark>within the framework of the existing treaty</strong> are possible, though <strong>full- scale legalization</strong> would require</mark> either a country’s <strong><mark>withdrawal</strong></mark> </u>from the treaty<u> <strong>or revision</strong> </u>thereof. Perhaps partly <u>due to the Single Convention </u>on Narcotic Drugs, <u><mark>even countries with more liberal narcotics policies</u></mark> than the United States <u><mark>lack <strong>full- fledged</mark> drug <mark>legalization</u></strong></mark> and at most allow for depenalization of marijuana and/ or widespread needle exchange programs. As discussed above, <u><mark>in the Netherlands</u></mark>, a country long known for its tolerance of marijuana smoking, <u>the <mark>importation and commercial production</mark> of cannabis <strong><mark>remains illegal</u></strong></mark> (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 64). When considering its own drug reform, Portugal declined to adopt outright legalization likely in part because of its treaty obligations under the 1961 Single Convention (Cato Institute 2009).</p>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 2
| 430,457 | 62 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,244 |
Waivers fail – joint resolution of disapproval and bill itself makes them impossible
|
Brown 13
|
Brown 13 (Senate Committee Chairs Issue Letter Slamming New Iran Sanctions Bill¶ Hayes Brown is a National Security Reporter ON DECEMBER 19, 2013 http://thinkprogress.org/security/2013/12/19/3091101/senate-chairs-issue-letter-slamming-iran-sanctions/)
|
Obama’s ability to waive any existing sanctions would only be allowed should Iran be banned from any enrichment of uranium whatsoever, an outcome most experts say is “unrealistic.” Congress could block Obama’s waivers by passing a ‘joint resolution of disapproval’ against a final deal,” The bill would also have Obama’s ability to waive sanctions expire
|
Congress could block Obama’s waivers by passing a ‘joint resolution of disapproval’ against a final deal,” The bill would also have Obama’s ability to waive sanctions expire
|
Under the terms of the Menendez bill, first reported in Foreign Policy, an extremely high bar would be placed on the terms under which a final deal could be reached. Obama’s ability to waive any existing sanctions would only be allowed should Iran be banned from any enrichment of uranium whatsoever, an outcome most experts say is “unrealistic.” “Congress could also block Obama’s waivers by passing a ‘joint resolution of disapproval’ against a final deal,” Foreign Policy notes. The bill would also have Obama’s ability to waive sanctions expire after a maximum of one year should the final deal not meet the Senate’s standards.
| 631 |
<h4>Waivers fail – <u>joint resolution of</u> <u>disapproval</u> and <u>bill itself</u> makes them impossible</h4><p><strong>Brown 13 </strong>(Senate Committee Chairs Issue Letter Slamming New Iran Sanctions Bill¶ Hayes Brown is a National Security Reporter ON DECEMBER 19, 2013 http://thinkprogress.org/security/2013/12/19/3091101/senate-chairs-issue-letter-slamming-iran-sanctions/)</p><p>Under the terms of the Menendez bill, first reported in Foreign Policy, an extremely high bar would be placed on the terms under which a final deal could be reached. <u>Obama’s ability to waive any existing sanctions would only be allowed should Iran be banned from any enrichment of uranium whatsoever, an outcome most experts say is “unrealistic.”</u> “<u><mark>Congress could</u></mark> also <u><mark>block Obama’s waivers by passing a ‘<strong>joint resolution of disapproval’</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>against a final deal,”</u></mark> Foreign Policy notes. <u><mark>The bill would also have Obama’s ability to waive sanctions <strong>expire</u></strong></mark> after a maximum of one year should the final deal not meet the Senate’s standards.</p>
|
1nr
|
AT: Waivers
|
Nuclear, biological and chemical war
| 430,977 | 1 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,245 |
Anti-drug forces dominate the debate- legalization would force PC from other issues
|
Youngers 2012 (Colletta, Senior Fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), a Representative of the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), and a independent consultant, NACLA Report on the Americas45.4 (Winter 2012): 71-75, proquest)
|
Youngers 2012 (Colletta, Senior Fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), a Representative of the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), and a independent consultant, NACLA Report on the Americas45.4 (Winter 2012): 71-75, proquest)
|
Three key factors help explain why continuity has prevailed over change in U.S. drug-control policies and each presents impediment to change drug "warriors" on Capitol Hill continue to have the upper hand in Congress there is no reason to expect that to change the drug-war bureaucracy remains bloated, firmly entrenched, and extremely resistant to change the same officials continue to be the driving force behind U.S. drug policy for decades high-level and committed leadership from the President is needed to begin to change the status quo. Yet Obama is engaged in major debates on a range of salient issues that continue into its second term the president's political capital will more likely be spent on issues such as immigration
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Three key factors each presents impediment to a change drug "warriors" on Capitol Hill continue to have the upper hand the drug-war bureaucracy remains bloated, firmly entrenched, and extremely resistant to change the same officials continue to be the driving force behind U.S. drug policy high-level and committed leadership from the President is needed to begin to change the status quo Yet Obama is engaged in major debate
|
Three key factors help explain why continuity has prevailed over change in U.S. drug-control policies, and each presents a possible impediment to a change in course during Obama's second term. First, for the most part drug "warriors" on Capitol Hill continue to have the upper hand on drug-policy issues debated in the U.S. Congress. As the elections reaffirmed the status quo in Washington, there is no reason to expect that to change. Second, the drug-war bureaucracy remains bloated, firmly entrenched, and extremely resistant to change. Apart from a few notable exceptions at ONDCP, the same officials continue to be the driving force behind U.S. drug policy, in some cases for decades. And over the years, the drug-policy bureaucracy has obtained a great deal of autonomy from the broader official policy-making community. Finally, because of these dynamics, high-level and committed leadership from the President is needed to begin to change the status quo. Yet the Obama administration is engaged in major debates on a range of salient issues that continue into its second term. Based on his comments following his reelection, the president's political capital will more likely be spent on issues such as climate change and immigration reform.
| 1,250 |
<h4><strong>Anti-drug forces dominate the debate- legalization would force PC from other issues</h4><p>Youngers 2012</strong> <u><strong>(Colletta, Senior Fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), a Representative of the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), and a independent consultant, NACLA Report on the Americas45.4 (Winter 2012): 71-75, proquest)</p><p></strong><mark>Three key factors</mark> help explain why continuity has prevailed over change in U.S. drug-control policies</u>, <u>and <mark>each presents</u></mark> a possible <u><mark>impediment</u> <u>to</u> a <u>change</u></mark> in course during Obama's second term. First, for the most part <u><strong><mark>drug "warriors" on Capitol Hill continue to have the upper hand</u></strong></mark> on drug-policy issues debated <u>in</u> the U.S. <u>Congress</u>. As the elections reaffirmed the status quo in Washington, <u>there is no reason to expect that to change</u>. Second, <u><mark>the drug-war bureaucracy remains bloated, firmly entrenched, and extremely resistant to change</u></mark>. Apart from a few notable exceptions at ONDCP, <u><mark>the same officials continue to be the driving force behind U.S. drug policy</u></mark>, in some cases <u>for decades</u>. And over the years, the drug-policy bureaucracy has obtained a great deal of autonomy from the broader official policy-making community. Finally, because of these dynamics, <u><mark>high-level and committed leadership from the President is needed to begin to change the status quo</mark>.</u> <u><mark>Yet</u></mark> the <u><mark>Obama</u></mark> administration <u><mark>is engaged in major debate</mark>s on a range of salient issues that continue into its second term</u>. Based on his comments following his reelection, <u><strong>the president's political capital will more likely be spent on issues such as</u></strong> climate change and <u><strong>immigration</u> reform.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NR
|
Link
| 305,169 | 8 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,246 |
The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.</h4>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 430,976 | 1 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,247 |
Second, Legalizing organ sales in the US spills over globally
|
Calandrillo 4
|
Calandrillo 4 Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis
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if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad.
|
if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs America might be the best response a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product a legalized market U.S. may lead to similar structures abroad
|
Moreover, if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today's black markets lead to a host of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy's advantage. n180 Stephen Spurr details the potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality. n181 Gloria Banks decries the exploitation of society's most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection. n182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness today. n183 FOOTNOTE ATTACHED n183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that regulated markets are superior to the existing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad. On the other hand, one might argue that competing markets might lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of regulatory standards, as each country tries to gain more market share.
| 1,779 |
<h4>Second, Legalizing organ sales in the US spills over globally </h4><p><strong>Calandrillo 4</strong> Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis</p><p> Moreover, <u><mark>if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs</mark> that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in <mark>America might be the best response</u></mark>. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today's black markets lead to a host of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy's advantage. n180 Stephen Spurr details the potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality. n181 Gloria Banks decries the exploitation of society's most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection. n182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness today. n183 FOOTNOTE ATTACHED n183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that regulated markets are superior to the existing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even <u><mark>a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S.</mark> </u>may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide<u> </u>if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. <u>However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market <mark>would <strong>significantly reduce the demand for black market organs</strong>, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure <strong>the quality of its product</strong></mark>. Furthermore, <mark>a legalized market</mark> in the <mark>U.S.</mark> (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) <strong><mark>may lead to similar structures abroad</strong></mark>.</u> On the other hand, one might argue that competing markets might lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of regulatory standards, as each country tries to gain more market share. </p>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,264 | 17 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,248 |
Amending the treaty is impossible- withdrawal can only lead to abandonment- the squo and CP establish international consensus through a flexible model which is the only way to solve
|
Collins 12/1
|
Collins 12/1/2014 (Jonathan, International Drug Policy Project Coordinator at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics. He served as Coordinator of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy and Editor of the 2014 report 'Ending the Drug Wars.', The State Department’s move to a more flexible diplomatic policy on drugs is a rational approach to a difficult question., http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-s-new-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrine-on-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-a-difficult-question/)
|
reforming this core is a very difficult question which we haven’t even started to grapple with The economic interests involved are legion also and unlikely to welcome a reopening of the trading arrangements locked into the system Focusing all efforts on reforming the language around the limbic prohibitionist aspects would be a wasted opportunity the goal should be to roll back prohibition as far as possible and develop our understanding of regulating previously illicit markets – as is happening with cannabis – via flexible interpretations and innovations When the beginnings of a consensus around reforming the core becomes apparent states can put the final nail in the coffin of the war on drugs by writing all remnants out of the international treaties.
|
reforming this core is a very difficult question Focusing all efforts on reforming the language around the limbic prohibitionist aspects would, in my opinion, be a wasted opportunity. Instead, the goal should be to roll back prohibition as far as possible and develop our understanding of regulating previously illicit markets – as is happening with cannabis – via flexible interpretations and innovations. When the beginnings of a consensus around reforming the cor becomes apparent, states put the final nail in the coffin of the war on drugs
|
Ultimately the core represents a weak regulatory framework and will need to be updated. For example, it was based on postwar principles of central economic planning that have since been discredited. As a result 83 percent of the world has virtually no access to essential pain medicines. However, reforming this core is a very difficult question which we haven’t even started to grapple with. The economic interests involved are legion also and unlikely to welcome a reopening of the trading arrangements locked into the system. Focusing all efforts on reforming the language around the limbic prohibitionist aspects would, in my opinion, be a wasted opportunity. Instead, the goal should be to roll back prohibition as far as possible and develop our understanding of regulating previously illicit markets – as is happening with cannabis – via flexible interpretations and innovations. When the beginnings of a consensus around reforming the core of the conventions becomes apparent, states can also put the final nail in the coffin of the war on drugs by writing all remnants out of the international treaties.
| 1,113 |
<h4>Amending the treaty is impossible- withdrawal can only lead to abandonment- the squo and CP establish international consensus through a flexible model which is the only way to solve</h4><p><strong>Collins 12/1</strong>/2014 (Jonathan, International Drug Policy Project Coordinator at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics. He served as Coordinator of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy and Editor of the 2014 report 'Ending the Drug Wars.', The State Department’s move to a more flexible diplomatic policy on drugs is a rational approach to a difficult question.,<u> http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-s-new-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrine-on-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-a-difficult-question/)</p><p></u>Ultimately the core represents a weak regulatory framework and will need to be updated. For example, it was based on postwar principles of central economic planning that have since been discredited. As a result 83 percent of the world has virtually no access to essential pain medicines. However, <u><mark>reforming this core is a very difficult question</mark> which we haven’t even started to grapple with</u>. <u>The economic interests involved are legion also and unlikely to welcome a reopening of the trading arrangements locked into the system</u>. <u><strong><mark>Focusing all efforts on reforming the language around the limbic prohibitionist aspects would</u></strong>, in my opinion, <u><strong>be a wasted opportunity</u></strong>. Instead, <u>the goal should be to roll back prohibition as far as possible and develop our understanding of regulating previously illicit markets – as is happening with cannabis – via <strong>flexible interpretations and innovations</u></strong>. <u><strong>When the beginnings of a consensus around reforming the cor</mark>e</u></strong> of the conventions <u><strong><mark>becomes apparent</u></strong>, <u>states</mark> can</u> also <u><mark>put the final nail in the coffin of the war on drugs</mark> by writing all remnants out of the international treaties.</p></u>
|
1nc
| null |
A2
| 430,978 | 11 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,249 |
only Congress can do it – Constitution
|
Tobin 1/21
|
Tobin 1/21 ( http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2014/01/21/will-obama-bypass-congress-on-iran-sanctions/ Will Obama Bypass Congress on Iran?¶ Jonathan S. Tobin, Jonathan S. Tobin is Senior Online Editor of Commentary magazine with responsibility for managing the editorial content of the website as well as serving as chief politics blogger 01.21.2014)
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only Congress has the power to revoke the sanctions it has enacted he president may wish to end sanctions on his own. executive action would come dangerously close to unconstitutional behavior
|
only Congress has the power to revoke the sanctions it has enacted, executive action would come dangerously close to unconstitutional behavior
|
Although only Congress has the power to revoke the sanctions it has enacted, this is not a far-fetched scenario. It is entirely possible that the president may wish to end sanctions on his own. That could come as the result of a nuclear deal that failed to satisfy those who rightly worry about the possibility of an agreement that left Iran with its nuclear infrastructure intact. Or it might be part of a further effort to appease Tehran by scaling back sanctions in order to entice it to sign a deal. And the president believes he can achieve these ends by executive action that would come dangerously close to unconstitutional behavior, but for which Congress might have no remedy.
| 685 |
<h4><u>only Congress</u> can do it – Constitution</h4><p><strong>Tobin 1/21 </strong>( http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2014/01/21/will-obama-bypass-congress-on-iran-sanctions/ Will Obama Bypass Congress on Iran?¶ Jonathan S. Tobin, Jonathan S. Tobin is Senior Online Editor of Commentary magazine with responsibility for managing the editorial content of the website as well as serving as chief politics blogger 01.21.2014)</p><p>Although <u><strong><mark>only Congress has</strong> the power to revoke the sanctions it has enacted</u>,</mark> this is not a far-fetched scenario. It is entirely possible that t<u>he president may wish to end sanctions on his own.</u> That could come as the result of a nuclear deal that failed to satisfy those who rightly worry about the possibility of an agreement that left Iran with its nuclear infrastructure intact. Or it might be part of a further effort to appease Tehran by scaling back sanctions in order to entice it to sign a deal. And the president believes he can achieve these ends by <u><mark>executive action</u></mark> that <u><mark>would come <strong>dangerously close</u></strong> <u>to</u> <u><strong>unconstitutional behavior</u></mark>, but for which Congress might have no remedy.</p></strong>
|
1nr
|
AT: Waivers
|
Nuclear, biological and chemical war
| 430,979 | 1 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,250 |
We also solve federal enforcement- they’ll shift current resources to ONLY combat cartels (also in fed enforcement key block)
|
Schwartz 2014
|
Schwartz 2014 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, Presidential Politics as a Safeguard of Federalism: The Case of Marijuana Legalization, 62 Buffalo L. Rev. 599, May, lexis)
|
Obama said that an Obama Administration would stop DEA raids on providers of medical marijuana who were complying with state laws Obama followed this What may be lost underneath the rhetoric is the subtlety of the Administration's enforcement approach that has relied heavily on "cease and desist" or "threat letters." a policy of sending a warning before making a raid has an anti-deterrent effect: it creates a safe harbor, in essence signaling marijuana distributors that they will not be raided if they have not received a threat letter. The policy allowed storefront medical marijuana dispensaries to continue to operate in large numbers in Colorado which provides the most detailed regulatory scheme. Obama returned to a more overtly low-key enforcement approach the policy of the 2009 Ogden memo was extended in late August 2013 to the "recreational use" laws recently enacted in Washington and Colorado. the Justice Department expressed its "commitment to using its limited resources to address the most significant threats" posed by gangs or cartels while leaving "lower-level or localized activity" to state and local enforcement
|
Obama Administration would stop DEA raids on providers of medical marijuana who were complying with state Obama returned to a more overtly low-key enforcement approach to the recreational use" laws recently enacted in Washington and Colorado the Justice Department expressed its "commitment to using its limited resources to address the most significant threats" posed by gangs or cartels, while leaving "lower-level or localized activity" to state and local nforcement
|
2. The Obama Administration's Policy. As a presidential candidate in 2008, Barack Obama said that an Obama Administration would stop DEA raids on providers of medical marijuana who were complying with state compassionate use laws. n102 As President, Obama followed this policy-to a degree. As a matter of constitutional law, the President's duty to "take care the laws be faithfully executed" would seem to preclude a power to disregard an act of Congress based on a policy disagreement with the statute. On the other hand, the duty of the President to enforce a law he deems unconstitutional is a matter of some dispute. n103 A credible [*626] argument was made in 2005 in Gonzales v. Raich that the commerce power could not sustain the application of the CSA to users, suppliers, and possessors of small amounts of marijuana grown intrastate and used in compliance with state medical marijuana law. The fact that three Justices agreed with that argument might well have leant credibility to a presidential claim that the CSA was not constitutional as applied to medical marijuana. n104 Nevertheless, even assuming President Obama would have disagreed with the Raich conclusion, staking out a stark constitutional position on the CSA as applied to medical marijuana, particularly one flouting a Supreme Court decision, would have been a politically risky move. Far safer ground for his stated policy was reliance on the virtually unreviewable discretion of the executive to make prosecutorial resource allocation decisions. n105 The Obama Administration's policy in this regard was initially laid out in an October 19, 2009 memo from Deputy Attorney General David Ogden, entitled "Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana." n106 While reaffirming the Justice Department's "commitment to the enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act in all States," the Ogden memo suggested that "the Department is also committed to making [*627] efficient and rational use of its limited investigative and prosecutorial resources." n107 Noting federal prosecutors are "vested with . . . the broadest discretion in the exercise of [their authority over criminal matters]" the memo stated: The prosecution of significant traffickers of illegal drugs, including marijuana, and the disruption of illegal drug manufacturing and trafficking networks continues to be a core priority in the Department's efforts against narcotics and dangerous drugs, and the Department's investigative and prosecutorial resources should be directed towards these objectives. As a general matter, pursuit of these priorities should not focus federal resources in your States on individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana. For example, prosecution of individuals with cancer or other serious illnesses who use marijuana as part of a recommended treatment regimen consistent with applicable state law, or those caregivers in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state law who provide such individuals with marijuana, is unlikely to be an efficient use of limited federal resources. On the other hand, prosecution of commercial enterprises that unlawfully market and sell marijuana for profit continues to be an enforcement priority of the Department. n108 After listing several factors indicative of non-compliance with state laws, such as threats of violence or distribution to minors, the memo backtracked a bit: Of course, no State can authorize violations of federal law . . . . This guidance regarding resource allocation does not "legalize" marijuana or provide a legal defense to a violation of federal law, nor is it intended to create any privileges, benefits, or rights . . . . Nor does clear and unambiguous compliance with state law or the absence of one or all of the above factors create a legal defense to a violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Rather, this memorandum is intended solely as a guide to the exercise of investigative and prosecutorial discretion. Finally, nothing herein precludes investigation or prosecution where there is a reasonable basis to believe that compliance with state law is being invoked as a pretext for the production or distribution of marijuana for purposes not authorized by state law. Nor does this guidance preclude investigation or prosecution, [*628] even when there is clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state law, in particular circumstances where investigation or prosecution otherwise serves important federal interests. Your offices should continue to review marijuana cases for prosecution on a case-by-case basis . . . . n109 To be sure, this policy guidance creates a complicated picture due to the variation in state laws. For example, while Colorado and California laws authorized the operation of medical marijuana sales by storefront dispensaries, Oregon law permitted possession and use of medical marijuana, but not sales. Accordingly, the Oregon U.S. Attorney's office issued cease and desist letters to dispensaries in that state. n110 In 2011, medical marijuana advocates began publicizing what they claimed to be a notable increase in investigations, raids, and prosecutions of medical marijuana distributors in various states, charging President Obama with backtracking on the Ogden memo and "betrayal" of his 2008 campaign promise. n111 By 2012, some advocates claimed that the number of medical marijuana prosecutions exceeded the level of prosecutorial activity that took place under the Bush Administration, notwithstanding the latter's near "zero tolerance" policy. n112 President Obama responded to questions about this in an April 2012 interview in Rolling Stone magazine: [*629] Here's what's up: What I specifically said was that we were not going to prioritize prosecutions of persons who are using medical marijuana. I never made a commitment that somehow we were going to give carte blanche to large-scale producers and operators of marijuana-and the reason is, because it's against federal law. I can't nullify congressional law. I can't ask the Justice Department to say, 'Ignore completely a federal law that's on the books.' What I can say is, 'Use your prosecutorial discretion and properly prioritize your resources to go after things that are really doing folks damage.' As a consequence, there haven't been prosecutions of users of marijuana for medical purposes. The only tension that's come up-and this gets hyped up a lot-is a murky area where you have large-scale, commercial operations that may supply medical marijuana users, but in some cases may also be supplying recreational users. In that situation, we put the Justice Department in a very difficult place if we're telling them, 'This is supposed to be against the law, but we want you to turn the other way.' That's not something we're going to do. n113 It is important, however, to see through the political rhetoric of both President Obama and the marijuana legalization advocates. Both had an incentive to exaggerate the extent of CSA enforcement: the legalization advocates in hopes of shaming the President into a posture of increased permissiveness, and the President to continue walking a tightrope between courting marijuana legalization proponents and avoiding "soft-on-crime" attacks on his flank. What may be lost underneath the rhetoric is the subtlety of the Administration's enforcement approach that has relied heavily on "cease and desist" or "threat letters." n114 If the intent of federal authorities were to maximize the deterrent effect of the CSA, the best approach would be to make random unannounced raids on dispensaries in the hope of scaring off those not actually raided. But a policy of sending a warning before making a raid has an anti-deterrent effect: it creates a safe harbor, in essence [*630] signaling marijuana distributors that they will not be raided if they have not received a threat letter. The policy allowed storefront medical marijuana dispensaries to continue to operate in large numbers in Colorado, n115 which provides the most detailed regulatory scheme. n116 In the aftermath of the 2012 election, moreover, the Obama Administration seems to have returned to a more overtly low-key enforcement approach. Most notably, the policy of the 2009 Ogden memo was extended in late August 2013 to the "recreational use" laws recently enacted in Washington and Colorado. In a Memorandum for all U.S. Attorneys, the Justice Department expressed its "commitment to using its limited investigative and prosecutorial resources to address the most significant threats" posed by distribution of marijuana by gangs or cartels, while leaving "lower-level or localized activity" to state and local law enforcement under state drug laws. n117 [*631] In jurisdictions that have enacted laws legalizing marijuana in some form and that have also implemented strong and effective regulatory and enforcement systems to control the cultivation, distribution, sale, and possession of marijuana, conduct in compliance with those laws and regulations is less likely to threaten the federal priorities set forth above. Indeed, a robust system may affirmatively address those priorities by, for example, implementing effective measures to prevent diversion of marijuana outside the regulated system and to other states, prohibiting access to marijuana by minors, and replacing an illicit marijuana trade that funds criminal enterprises with a tightly regulated market in which revenues are tracked and accounted for. In those circumstances, consistent with the traditional allocation of federal-state efforts in this area, enforcement of state law by state and local law enforcement and regulatory bodies should remain the primary means of addressing marijuana-related activity. n118 The memo goes on to assert that the policy guidance is not a legal defense to any marijuana prosecution nor a limit on the authority of the federal government to enforce the CSA fully; instead, the memo states that it is merely a guide to prosecutorial discretion and that U.S. Attorneys should review potential prosecutions on a case-by-case basis. n119
| 10,235 |
<h4><strong>We also solve federal enforcement- they’ll shift current resources to ONLY combat cartels </strong>(also in fed enforcement key block)</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2014</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, Presidential Politics as a Safeguard of Federalism: The Case of Marijuana Legalization, 62 Buffalo L. Rev. 599, May, lexis)</p><p>2. The Obama Administration's Policy. As a presidential candidate in 2008, Barack <u>Obama said that an <mark>Obama Administration would stop DEA raids on providers of medical marijuana who were complying with state</u></mark> compassionate use <u>laws</u>. n102 As President, <u>Obama followed this</u> policy-to a degree. As a matter of constitutional law, the President's duty to "take care the laws be faithfully executed" would seem to preclude a power to disregard an act of Congress based on a policy disagreement with the statute. On the other hand, the duty of the President to enforce a law he deems unconstitutional is a matter of some dispute. n103 A credible [*626] argument was made in 2005 in Gonzales v. Raich that the commerce power could not sustain the application of the CSA to users, suppliers, and possessors of small amounts of marijuana grown intrastate and used in compliance with state medical marijuana law. The fact that three Justices agreed with that argument might well have leant credibility to a presidential claim that the CSA was not constitutional as applied to medical marijuana. n104 Nevertheless, even assuming President Obama would have disagreed with the Raich conclusion, staking out a stark constitutional position on the CSA as applied to medical marijuana, particularly one flouting a Supreme Court decision, would have been a politically risky move. Far safer ground for his stated policy was reliance on the virtually unreviewable discretion of the executive to make prosecutorial resource allocation decisions. n105 The Obama Administration's policy in this regard was initially laid out in an October 19, 2009 memo from Deputy Attorney General David Ogden, entitled "Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana." n106 While reaffirming the Justice Department's "commitment to the enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act in all States," the Ogden memo suggested that "the Department is also committed to making [*627] efficient and rational use of its limited investigative and prosecutorial resources." n107 Noting federal prosecutors are "vested with . . . the broadest discretion in the exercise of [their authority over criminal matters]" the memo stated: The prosecution of significant traffickers of illegal drugs, including marijuana, and the disruption of illegal drug manufacturing and trafficking networks continues to be a core priority in the Department's efforts against narcotics and dangerous drugs, and the Department's investigative and prosecutorial resources should be directed towards these objectives. As a general matter, pursuit of these priorities should not focus federal resources in your States on individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana. For example, prosecution of individuals with cancer or other serious illnesses who use marijuana as part of a recommended treatment regimen consistent with applicable state law, or those caregivers in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state law who provide such individuals with marijuana, is unlikely to be an efficient use of limited federal resources. On the other hand, prosecution of commercial enterprises that unlawfully market and sell marijuana for profit continues to be an enforcement priority of the Department. n108 After listing several factors indicative of non-compliance with state laws, such as threats of violence or distribution to minors, the memo backtracked a bit: Of course, no State can authorize violations of federal law . . . . This guidance regarding resource allocation does not "legalize" marijuana or provide a legal defense to a violation of federal law, nor is it intended to create any privileges, benefits, or rights . . . . Nor does clear and unambiguous compliance with state law or the absence of one or all of the above factors create a legal defense to a violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Rather, this memorandum is intended solely as a guide to the exercise of investigative and prosecutorial discretion. Finally, nothing herein precludes investigation or prosecution where there is a reasonable basis to believe that compliance with state law is being invoked as a pretext for the production or distribution of marijuana for purposes not authorized by state law. Nor does this guidance preclude investigation or prosecution, [*628] even when there is clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state law, in particular circumstances where investigation or prosecution otherwise serves important federal interests. Your offices should continue to review marijuana cases for prosecution on a case-by-case basis . . . . n109 To be sure, this policy guidance creates a complicated picture due to the variation in state laws. For example, while Colorado and California laws authorized the operation of medical marijuana sales by storefront dispensaries, Oregon law permitted possession and use of medical marijuana, but not sales. Accordingly, the Oregon U.S. Attorney's office issued cease and desist letters to dispensaries in that state. n110 In 2011, medical marijuana advocates began publicizing what they claimed to be a notable increase in investigations, raids, and prosecutions of medical marijuana distributors in various states, charging President Obama with backtracking on the Ogden memo and "betrayal" of his 2008 campaign promise. n111 By 2012, some advocates claimed that the number of medical marijuana prosecutions exceeded the level of prosecutorial activity that took place under the Bush Administration, notwithstanding the latter's near "zero tolerance" policy. n112 President Obama responded to questions about this in an April 2012 interview in Rolling Stone magazine: [*629] Here's what's up: What I specifically said was that we were not going to prioritize prosecutions of persons who are using medical marijuana. I never made a commitment that somehow we were going to give carte blanche to large-scale producers and operators of marijuana-and the reason is, because it's against federal law. I can't nullify congressional law. I can't ask the Justice Department to say, 'Ignore completely a federal law that's on the books.' What I can say is, 'Use your prosecutorial discretion and properly prioritize your resources to go after things that are really doing folks damage.' As a consequence, there haven't been prosecutions of users of marijuana for medical purposes. The only tension that's come up-and this gets hyped up a lot-is a murky area where you have large-scale, commercial operations that may supply medical marijuana users, but in some cases may also be supplying recreational users. In that situation, we put the Justice Department in a very difficult place if we're telling them, 'This is supposed to be against the law, but we want you to turn the other way.' That's not something we're going to do. n113 It is important, however, to see through the political rhetoric of both President Obama and the marijuana legalization advocates. Both had an incentive to exaggerate the extent of CSA enforcement: the legalization advocates in hopes of shaming the President into a posture of increased permissiveness, and the President to continue walking a tightrope between courting marijuana legalization proponents and avoiding "soft-on-crime" attacks on his flank. <u>What may be lost underneath the rhetoric is the subtlety of the Administration's enforcement approach that has relied heavily on "cease and desist" or "threat letters."</u> n114 If the intent of federal authorities were to maximize the deterrent effect of the CSA, the best approach would be to make random unannounced raids on dispensaries in the hope of scaring off those not actually raided. But <u>a policy of sending a warning before making a raid has an anti-deterrent effect: it creates a safe harbor, in essence</u> [*630] <u>signaling marijuana distributors that they will not be raided if they have not received a threat letter.</u> <u>The policy allowed storefront medical marijuana dispensaries to continue to operate in large numbers in Colorado</u>, n115 <u>which provides the most detailed regulatory scheme.</u> n116 In the aftermath of the 2012 election, moreover, the <u><mark>Obama</u></mark> Administration seems to have <u><mark>returned to a more overtly low-key enforcement approach</u></mark>. Most notably, <u>the policy of the 2009 Ogden memo was extended in late August 2013 <mark>to the</mark> "<mark>recreational use" laws recently enacted in Washington and Colorado</mark>.</u> In a Memorandum for all U.S. Attorneys, <u><mark>the Justice Department expressed its "<strong>commitment to using its limited</u></strong> </mark>investigative and prosecutorial <u><strong><mark>resources to address the most significant threats" posed by</mark> </u></strong>distribution of marijuana by <u><strong><mark>gangs or cartels</u></strong>, <u>while leaving "lower-level or localized activity" to state and local</u> </mark>law <u>e<mark>nforcement</u><strong></mark> under state drug laws. n117 [*631] In jurisdictions that have enacted laws legalizing marijuana in some form and that have also implemented strong and effective regulatory and enforcement systems to control the cultivation, distribution, sale, and possession of marijuana, conduct in compliance with those laws and regulations is less likely to threaten the federal priorities set forth above. Indeed, a robust system may affirmatively address those priorities by, for example, implementing effective measures to prevent diversion of marijuana outside the regulated system and to other states, prohibiting access to marijuana by minors, and replacing an illicit marijuana trade that funds criminal enterprises with a tightly regulated market in which revenues are tracked and accounted for. In those circumstances, consistent with the traditional allocation of federal-state efforts in this area, enforcement of state law by state and local law enforcement and regulatory bodies should remain the primary means of addressing marijuana-related activity. n118 The memo goes on to assert that the policy guidance is not a legal defense to any marijuana prosecution nor a limit on the authority of the federal government to enforce the CSA fully; instead, the memo states that it is merely a guide to prosecutorial discretion and that U.S. Attorneys should review potential prosecutions on a case-by-case basis. n119</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 2
| 430,939 | 3 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,251 |
Link shield - Legalization has zero federal support- treaty commitments and decades of bills getting shot down in committee empirics prove
|
Jackson et al 2011
|
Jackson et al 2011 (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)
|
Federal legalization of marijuana is unlikely. There is no indication that a complete removal of marijuana from the list of controlled substances is a politically viable option To unilaterally do so would put the United States in noncompliance with several international legal obligations the domestic process for rescheduling of marijuana makes the task seem extremely arduous both Congress and the Department of Health and Human Services have the authority to reschedule marijuana, and neither seems willing to consider the possibility Legislation has been introduced in Congress to reschedule marijuana to a Schedule II drug in order to allow for medical marijuana every year since 1997. In fourteen years of being introduced, proposals to reschedule marijuana have never moved beyond committee referral in order for this drug to be reclassified under any other schedule, it must be proven to have accepted medicinal uses However, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the National Institutes of Health have made it difficult for scientists to procure the supply of marijuana necessary to perform experiments on the medicinal properties of marijuana All of this makes for a daunting task confronting anyone who would try to go the federal route in legalizing marijuana.
|
no indication that marijuana a politically viable option To unilaterally do so would put the United States in noncompliance with several international legal obligations Legislation has been introduced in Congress every year since 1997. , proposals have never moved beyond committee referral the Dr E A and the N I H have made it All of this makes for a daunting task confronting anyone who would try to go the federal route in legalizing marijuana.
|
Federal legalization of marijuana is unlikely. There is no indication that a complete removal of marijuana from the list of controlled substances is a politically viable option in the short, medium, or long term. To unilaterally do so would put the United States in noncompliance with several international legal obligations. In order to avoid this, the United States would have to convince the signatories to the international conventions discussed in Chapter 2 of this report to agree to end marijuana controls. Even ignoring the international angle, the domestic process for rescheduling of marijuana makes the task seem extremely arduous. First, both Congress and the Department of Health and Human Services have the authority to reschedule marijuana, and neither seems willing to consider the possibility.76 Legislation has been introduced in Congress to reschedule marijuana to a Schedule II drug in order to allow for medical marijuana every year since 1997. In fourteen years of being introduced, proposals to reschedule marijuana have never moved beyond the committee referral process.77 A citizen petition submitted to the DEA in 1995 to reschedule marijuana was denied in 2001. In its denial, the DEA cited the Department of Health and Human Services‟ guidance that due to marijuana‟s “high potential for abuse” and no proven medicinal value, it must remain a Schedule I drug.78 Therefore, in order for this drug to be reclassified under any other schedule, it must be proven to have accepted medicinal uses. However, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the National Institutes of Health have made it difficult for scientists to procure the supply of marijuana necessary to perform experiments on the medicinal properties of marijuana.79 All of this makes for a daunting task confronting anyone who would try to go the federal route in legalizing marijuana.
| 1,872 |
<h4><strong>Link shield - Legalization has zero federal support- treaty commitments and decades of bills getting shot down in committee empirics prove</h4><p>Jackson et al 2011</strong> (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)</p><p><u>Federal legalization of marijuana is unlikely. There is <mark>no indication that </mark>a complete removal of <mark>marijuana</mark> from the list of controlled substances is <mark>a politically viable option</u></mark> in the short, medium, or long term. <u><mark>To unilaterally do so would put the United States in noncompliance with several international legal obligations</u></mark>. In order to avoid this, the United States would have to convince the signatories to the international conventions discussed in Chapter 2 of this report to agree to end marijuana controls. Even ignoring the international angle, <u>the domestic process for rescheduling of marijuana makes the task seem extremely arduous</u>. First, <u>both Congress and the Department of Health and Human Services have the authority to reschedule marijuana, and neither seems willing to consider the possibility</u>.76 <u><mark>Legislation has been introduced in Congress </mark>to reschedule marijuana to a Schedule II drug in order to allow for medical marijuana<mark> every year since 1997. </mark>In fourteen years of being introduced<mark>, proposals </mark>to reschedule marijuana <mark>have never moved beyond</u></mark> the <u><mark>committee</u> <u>referral</u></mark> process.77 A citizen petition submitted to the DEA in 1995 to reschedule marijuana was denied in 2001. In its denial, the DEA cited the Department of Health and Human Services‟ guidance that due to marijuana‟s “high potential for abuse” and no proven medicinal value, it must remain a Schedule I drug.78 Therefore, <u>in order for this drug to be reclassified under any other schedule, it must be proven to have accepted medicinal uses</u>. <u>However, <mark>the Dr</mark>ug <mark>E</mark>nforcement <mark>A</mark>dministration <mark>and the N</mark>ational <mark>I</mark>nstitutes of <mark>H</mark>ealth <mark>have made it </mark>difficult for scientists to procure the supply of marijuana necessary to perform experiments on the medicinal properties of marijuana</u>.79 <u><mark>All of this makes for a daunting task confronting anyone who would try to go the federal route in legalizing marijuana<strong>.</p></u></strong></mark>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NR
|
Link
| 430,579 | 13 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,252 |
CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement
|
Schwartz 2013
|
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. marijuana legalization provides a salient example the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
|
only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the political obstacles that would prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
|
Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. [*633] The marijuana legalization issue provides a salient example. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous. As of 2008, there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities." n240 Thus, commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism. Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly.
| 2,875 |
<h4>CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, <u>forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. </u>[*633] The <u>marijuana legalization</u> issue <u>provides a salient example</u>. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But <u>the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous</u>. As of 2008, <u>there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level</u>. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "<u><strong><mark>only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities</u></strong></mark>." n240 Thus, <u><mark>commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states</u>. <u></mark>The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism</u>. <u>Such <mark>a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the</mark> significant <mark>political obstacles that would </mark>likely<mark> prevent Congress from taking such a step directly</u></mark>.</p>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 430,416 | 19 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,253 |
Illegal market abuses are not an indication of what legal sales would be like – just the opposite
|
Kaserman, 7
|
Kaserman, 7 Dr. David Kaserman is currently Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.
|
In a truly ironic twist of logic, some opponents of the use of financial incentives have cited abuses and high prices associated with such black market activities as har-bingers of the sorts of outcomes likely to accompany legalized organ markets This line of "reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would lead to the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibi-tion. This argument stands accepted economic theory on its head. The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized Eliminating the shortage of cadaveric organs through legalization of financial incentives would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the demand for living donor kidneys obtained through black markets
|
some opponents of the use of financial incentives ited buses to accompany legalized organ markets This line of "reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would lead to the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibi-tion This argument stands accepted economic theory on its head. The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized.
|
Issues in Law & Medicine Summer, 2007 23 Issues L. & Med. 45 ARTICLE: Fifty Years of Organ Transplants: The Successes and The Failures lexis
In a truly ironic twist of logic, some opponents of the use of financial incentives for cadaveric organ donors have cited various human rights abuses and extraordinarily high prices associated with such black market activities as har-bingers of the sorts of outcomes likely to accompany legalized organ markets. n32 This line of "reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would lead to the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibi-tion. This argument stands accepted economic theory on its head. The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized. Legalized trade allows the market price to fall as legitimate businesses enter the market and increase supply. Moreover, costs decrease as the risks of both prosecution and violent actions by rival producers are eliminated. The outcome is lower prices, an increase in the volume of trade, and a cessation of criminal activities. Thus, the types of conduct associated with illegal suppliers involved in black market trade and the prices at which such trade takes place do not accurately reflect the behavior and prices likely to result from legalized sales. In fact, it has long been recognized that the most effective remedy for undesirable black market activity is to eliminate restrictions on trade. Stated succinctly, the cure for black market abuses is legalized trade. That conclusion holds a fortiori, in the case at hand. Eliminating the shortage of cadaveric organs through legalization of financial incentives would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the demand for living donor kidneys obtained through black markets. Therefore, if one is opposed to current black market activities, then one should favor financial incentives for cadaveric organ donors.
| 2,002 |
<h4>Illegal market abuses are not an indication of what legal sales would be like – just the opposite</h4><p><strong>Kaserman, 7</strong> Dr. David Kaserman is currently Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University. </p><p>Issues in Law & Medicine Summer, 2007 23 Issues L. & Med. 45 ARTICLE: Fifty Years of Organ Transplants: The Successes and The Failures lexis</p><p><u>In a truly ironic twist of logic, <mark>some opponents of the use of financial incentives</u></mark> for cadaveric organ donors <u>have c<mark>ited</mark> </u>various human rights <u>a<mark>buses</mark> and </u>extraordinarily <u>high prices associated with such black market activities as har-bingers of the sorts of outcomes likely <mark>to accompany legalized organ markets</u></mark>. n32 <u><mark>This line of "reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would lead to the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibi-tion</mark>. <mark>This argument stands accepted economic theory on its head. The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized</u>.</mark> Legalized trade allows the market price to fall as legitimate businesses enter the market and increase supply. Moreover, costs decrease as the risks of both prosecution and violent actions by rival producers are eliminated. The outcome is lower prices, an increase in the volume of trade, and a cessation of criminal activities. Thus, the types of conduct associated with illegal suppliers involved in black market trade and the prices at which such trade takes place do not accurately reflect the behavior and prices likely to result from legalized sales. In fact, it has long been recognized that the most effective remedy for undesirable black market activity is to eliminate restrictions on trade. Stated succinctly, the cure for black market abuses is legalized trade. That conclusion holds a fortiori, in the case at hand. <u>Eliminating the shortage of cadaveric organs through legalization of financial incentives would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the demand for living donor kidneys obtained through black markets</u><strong>. Therefore, if one is opposed to current black market activities, then one should favor financial incentives for cadaveric organ donors. </p></strong>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,263 | 5 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,254 |
Treaty amendment fails- staying within the system with a flexible approach solves
|
Collins 12/1 http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-s-new-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrine-on-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-a-difficult-question/)
|
Collins 12/1/2014 (Jonathan, International Drug Policy Project Coordinator at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics. He served as Coordinator of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy and Editor of the 2014 report 'Ending the Drug Wars.', The State Department’s move to a more flexible diplomatic policy on drugs is a rational approach to a difficult question., http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-s-new-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrine-on-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-a-difficult-question/)
|
I’ve never heard a treaty reform process elaborated convincingly Some argue open debate would provide the answers Given the very real economic and structural interests underpinning the current system, that seems unlikely Many describe the treaty system as a ‘prohibitionist regime’. The implication is that it’s a monolithic legal framework, created to enforce a global prohibitionist model and therefore reform is required That’s ahistorical the reality is more complicated. The implementation of the UN system from the 1970s onwards was overwhelmingly characterized by an extreme implementation of prohibitionist aspects of the treaties it was driven by state level responses to a domestic problem Asia was an epicenter for the prohibitionist model, not a recipient. The colonial powers stalled implementing prohibition as long as they could These drives towards prohibitionist and repressive models were facilitated by the treaty system but not necessarily driven by it. The implication is that they can be drastically rolled back without any treaty revision.
scenarios ignore significant changes Asia has seen a major growth in economic internationalism production networks straddle national boundaries, making them especially costly to break institutions have proliferated; and cooperative institutions now outnumber formal military alliances groups like the ASEAN Regional Forum or the East Asian Summit facilitate the peaceful engagement of great powers China supports and sustains Asian economic interdependence and institutions, as do the US, Japan and India. there are multiple mechanisms of stability: economic interdependence raises the stakes of mutual survival and well-being; US-centred alliances preserve the balance of power; and cooperative institutions develop a habit of dialogue and moderate extreme, unilateral behaviour.
|
Some argue that an open debate would provide the answers. Given the very real economic and structural interests underpinning the current system, that seems unlikely ‘prohibitionist regime’. The implication is that it’s a monolithic legal framework, created to enforce a global prohibitionist model and therefore treaty reform is fundamentally required reality is far more complicated it was driven by state level responses to a domestic problem These drives towards prohibitionist and repressive models were facilitated by the treaty system but not necessarily driven by it. The implication is that they can be drastically rolled back without any treaty revision
cooperative institutions outnumber military alliances groups like ASEAN facilitate peaceful engagement China supports Asian economic interdependence and institutions, as do the US, Japan and India multiple mechanisms of stability: economic interdependence US-centred alliances and cooperative institutions
|
I’ve never heard a treaty reform process elaborated convincingly. Some argue that an open debate would provide the answers. Given the very real economic and structural interests underpinning the current system, that seems unlikely. Many describe the treaty system as a ‘prohibitionist regime’. The implication is that it’s a monolithic legal framework, created to enforce a global prohibitionist model and therefore treaty reform is fundamentally required to change it. That’s a useful conceptual term, but it’s ahistorical and the reality is far more complicated. It’s a system which has overseen an array of regimes throughout its history, often running concurrently. Some outlived their usefulness and simply died out. For example, in the 1930s the drug control system encompassed many regimes, including a regime around regulating global drug manufacturing; one around minimizing illicit trafficking; another around prohibiting opium smoking (which many states including Britain ignored out of deference to local security concerns in their colonies) and a regime around developing regulations on production (again happily ignored by many states when it conflicted with economic interests). These aspects intersected in various ways at national, regional and international levels, but were far from monolithic. The implementation of the UN system from the 1970s onwards was overwhelmingly characterized by an extreme implementation of prohibitionist aspects of the treaties. For certain states it was driven by the US outsourcing its control efforts, particularly in Latin America. But for many others it was driven by state level responses to a domestic problem. For example, Asia was an epicenter for the prohibitionist model, not a recipient. The colonial powers stalled implementing prohibition as long as they could, recognising the dangers of the illicit market as well as for fiscal reasons. Post-colonial Asian elites associated opium and the opium monopolies with colonialism and cultural backwardness and enthusiastically embraced strict prohibitionist models. These drives towards prohibitionist and repressive models were facilitated by the treaty system but not necessarily driven by it. The implication is that they can be drastically rolled back without any treaty revision.
No risk of Asian war—specific to japan
Acharya 12 [Amitav Acharya is Professor of International Relations at American University, Washington, DC. This article is from East Asia Forum (www.eastasiaforum.org) at the Crawford School, ANU. China’s rise and security in the Asian century May 6th, 2012 Author: Amitav Acharya, AU http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/05/06/china-s-rise-and-security-in-the-asian-century/]//NR
The problem with these scenarios is that they ignore significant changes that have taken place in Asia in recent decades. Asian security in the aftermath of World War II was shaped by three forces: economic nationalism, security bilateralism (anchored on the US’s ‘hub-and-spoke’ alliances), and political authoritarianism. Over the decades, Asia has seen a major growth in economic internationalism, multilateral institutions and democratisation. Since the mid-1950s, intra-Asian trade has nearly doubled to over 50 per cent of the region’s total trade. The effect of economic interdependence and multilateral institutions in promoting peace has been well documented by international relations scholars. In Asia today, production networks straddle national boundaries, making them especially costly to break; multipurpose regional institutions have proliferated; and cooperative institutions now outnumber formal military alliances, thus reversing the Cold War pattern. Democracies in Asia today outnumber autocracies and, despite fears that democratic transitions might produce aggressively nationalistic regimes, no newly democratic regime in Asia has behaved this way. The Asian regional order today resembles neither the 19th century Concert of Europe, nor the EU of today. The EU model is implausible in a highly sovereignty-conscious Asia. An Asian concert of powers is unrealistic and dangerous. The two most important pitfalls of this idea are long-known. First, for a concert to function successfully it requires a degree of ideological convergence among the major powers. Such a convergence does not exist pending China’s democratisation. On the other hand, a concert based on current ideological conditions would be a welcome gift to China’s authoritarian rulers, as it would preserve a conservative status quo that would arrest China’s democratisation. A concert of this type would also necessarily marginalise weaker states. The Concert of Europe, as historian Richard Elrod points out, ensured a degree of self-restraint among the great powers toward each other, but also brought about ‘great power tutelage over the rest of Europe’ before collapsing over ideological divergence. An Asian concert would imply de facto Sino–US joint rule, but will the rest of Asia really want to live under Chinese or US tutelage? In contrast, Asia’s regional groups like the ASEAN Regional Forum or the East Asian Summit facilitate the peaceful engagement of great powers with each other and with the region, without reducing weaker states to the status of vassals and pawns. The rise of China requires adjustments and strengthening of the current order — not reinventing an outdated model. Asia’s future need not resemble Europe’s past or present. Nor will it resemble past US foreign policy. The revival of a tributary order would be similarly countered by the economic, strategic and cultural influence of the US, Japan, India and Russia. Moreover, a concert model may not serve Australia’s security interests because it will almost certainly be excluded from it. Asia and Australia are better served by a model based on the kind of ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘intellectual’ leadership to which Japan, Australia and ASEAN (now South Korea, Indonesia and India) have made a contribution, and which has brought about the simultaneous engagement of China and the US. For all its recent diplomatic assertiveness, China supports and sustains Asian economic interdependence and institutions, as do the US, Japan and India. At the same time, US alliances and security ties with India offer a hedge against any future uncertainty in Chinese behaviour. In Asia today there are multiple mechanisms of stability: economic interdependence raises the stakes of mutual survival and well-being; US-centred alliances preserve the balance of power; and cooperative institutions develop a habit of dialogue and thereby moderate extreme, unilateral behaviour. None of these is sufficient by itself to guarantee order, but together they create the conditions for stability.
| 6,768 |
<h4>Treaty amendment fails- staying within the system with a flexible approach solves</h4><p><strong>Collins 12/1</strong>/2014 (Jonathan, International Drug Policy Project Coordinator at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics. He served as Coordinator of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy and Editor of the 2014 report 'Ending the Drug Wars.', The State Department’s move to a more flexible diplomatic policy on drugs is a rational approach to a difficult question.,<u><strong> http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-s-new-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrine-on-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-a-difficult-question/)</p><p></strong>I’ve never heard a treaty reform process elaborated convincingly</u>. <u><mark>Some argue</u> that an <u>open debate would provide the answers</u>. <u>Given the very real economic and structural interests underpinning the current system, that seems unlikely</u></mark>. <u>Many describe the treaty system as a <mark>‘prohibitionist regime’. The implication is that it’s a monolithic legal framework, created to enforce a global prohibitionist model</u> <u>and therefore</u> treaty <u>reform is</u> fundamentally <u>required</u></mark> to change it. <u>That’s</u> a useful conceptual term, but it’s <u>ahistorical</u> and <u>the <mark>reality is</u> far <u>more complicated</mark>. </u>It’s a system which has overseen an array of regimes throughout its history, often running concurrently. Some outlived their usefulness and simply died out. For example, in the 1930s the drug control system encompassed many regimes, including a regime around regulating global drug manufacturing; one around minimizing illicit trafficking; another around prohibiting opium smoking (which many states including Britain ignored out of deference to local security concerns in their colonies) and a regime around developing regulations on production (again happily ignored by many states when it conflicted with economic interests). These aspects intersected in various ways at national, regional and international levels, but were far from monolithic. <u>The implementation of the UN system from the 1970s onwards was overwhelmingly characterized by an extreme implementation of prohibitionist aspects of the treaties</u>. For certain states it was driven by the US outsourcing its control efforts, particularly in Latin America. But for many others <u><mark>it was driven by state level responses to a domestic problem</u></mark>. For example, <u>Asia was an epicenter for the prohibitionist model, not a recipient. The colonial powers stalled implementing prohibition as long as they could</u>, recognising the dangers of the illicit market as well as for fiscal reasons. Post-colonial Asian elites associated opium and the opium monopolies with colonialism and cultural backwardness and enthusiastically embraced strict prohibitionist models. <u><mark>These drives towards prohibitionist and repressive models were facilitated by the treaty system but not necessarily driven by it.</u> <u><strong>The implication is that they can be drastically rolled back without any treaty revision</mark>.</p><p></u>No risk of Asian war—specific to japan </p><p>Acharya 12 </strong>[Amitav Acharya is Professor of International Relations at American University, Washington, DC. This article is from East Asia Forum (www.eastasiaforum.org) at the Crawford School, ANU. China’s rise and security in the Asian century May 6th, 2012 Author: Amitav Acharya, AU http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/05/06/china-s-rise-and-security-in-the-asian-century/]//NR</p><p>The problem with these <u>scenarios</u> is that they <u>ignore significant changes</u> that have taken place in Asia in recent decades. Asian security in the aftermath of World War II was shaped by three forces: economic nationalism, security bilateralism (anchored on the US’s ‘hub-and-spoke’ alliances), and political authoritarianism. Over the decades, <u>Asia has seen a major growth in economic internationalism</u>, multilateral institutions and democratisation. Since the mid-1950s, intra-Asian trade has nearly doubled to over 50 per cent of the region’s total trade. The effect of economic interdependence and multilateral institutions in promoting peace has been well documented by international relations scholars. In Asia today, <u>production networks straddle national boundaries, making them especially costly to break</u>; multipurpose regional <u>institutions have proliferated; and <mark>cooperative institutions</mark> now <mark>outnumber</mark> formal <mark>military alliances</u></mark>, thus reversing the Cold War pattern. Democracies in Asia today outnumber autocracies and, despite fears that democratic transitions might produce aggressively nationalistic regimes, no newly democratic regime in Asia has behaved this way. The Asian regional order today resembles neither the 19th century Concert of Europe, nor the EU of today. The EU model is implausible in a highly sovereignty-conscious Asia. An Asian concert of powers is unrealistic and dangerous. The two most important pitfalls of this idea are long-known. First, for a concert to function successfully it requires a degree of ideological convergence among the major powers. Such a convergence does not exist pending China’s democratisation. On the other hand, a concert based on current ideological conditions would be a welcome gift to China’s authoritarian rulers, as it would preserve a conservative status quo that would arrest China’s democratisation. A concert of this type would also necessarily marginalise weaker states. The Concert of Europe, as historian Richard Elrod points out, ensured a degree of self-restraint among the great powers toward each other, but also brought about ‘great power tutelage over the rest of Europe’ before collapsing over ideological divergence. An Asian concert would imply de facto Sino–US joint rule, but will the rest of Asia really want to live under Chinese or US tutelage? In contrast, Asia’s regional <u><mark>groups like</mark> the <mark>ASEAN</mark> Regional Forum or the East Asian Summit <mark>facilitate</mark> the <mark>peaceful engagement</mark> of great powers</u> with each other and with the region, without reducing weaker states to the status of vassals and pawns. The rise of China requires adjustments and strengthening of the current order — not reinventing an outdated model. Asia’s future need not resemble Europe’s past or present. Nor will it resemble past US foreign policy. The revival of a tributary order would be similarly countered by the economic, strategic and cultural influence of the US, Japan, India and Russia. Moreover, a concert model may not serve Australia’s security interests because it will almost certainly be excluded from it. Asia and Australia are better served by a model based on the kind of ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘intellectual’ leadership to which Japan, Australia and ASEAN (now South Korea, Indonesia and India) have made a contribution, and which has brought about the simultaneous engagement of China and the US. For all its recent diplomatic assertiveness, <u><mark>China supports</mark> and sustains <mark>Asian economic interdependence and institutions, as do the US, Japan</mark> <mark>and India</mark>.</u> At the same time, US alliances and security ties with India offer a hedge against any future uncertainty in Chinese behaviour. In Asia today <u>there are <mark>multiple mechanisms of stability: economic interdependence</mark> raises the stakes of mutual survival and well-being; <mark>US-centred alliances</mark> preserve the balance of power; <mark>and cooperative institutions</mark> develop a habit of dialogue and</u> thereby <u>moderate extreme, unilateral behaviour.</u> None of these is sufficient by itself to guarantee order, but together they create the conditions for stability.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
A2
| 97,821 | 6 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,255 |
State action ALONE is sufficient to shut out cartel marijuana- EVEN IF the feds don’t shift
|
Jackson et al 2011
|
Jackson et al 2011 (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)
|
A weak federal response would be enough to shut Mexican DTOs out of the U.S. market If California alone legalized marijuana, and the federal government increased enforcement there is reason to believe the effects on a national level would be stunted. However if other states followed suit, or the federal government maintained or decreased current enforcement levels, the effects would certainly be more widespread there are two primary drug transportation corridors through which Mexican marijuana enters the United States Six states located along these corridors have already legalized medicinal marijuana; three of them are along the southwest border. Legalization of recreational marijuana in any of these states would likely have a significant effect states along these drug corridors often contain distribution centers, and they represent the areas where Mexican DTO influence over the wholesale marijuana market is most concentrated
|
A weak federal response would be enough to shut Mexican DTOs out of the U.S. market If California alone legalized marijuana there is reason to believe the effects on a national level would be stunted. However, if other states followed suit, or the federal government maintained or decreased current enforcement levels, the effects would certainly be more widespread. Six states located along the southwest border. Legalization of recreational marijuana in any of these states would likely have a significant effect they represent the areas where Mexican DTO influence over the wholesale marijuana market is most concentrated
|
A weak federal response would be enough to shut Mexican DTOs out of the U.S. market. If California alone legalized marijuana, and the federal government increased enforcement efforts against domestic interstate trafficking, there is reason to believe the effects on a national level would be stunted. However, if other states followed suit, or the federal government maintained or decreased current enforcement levels, the effects would certainly be more widespread. According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, there are two primary drug transportation corridors through which Mexican marijuana enters the United States and is trafficked to the rest of the country (see Corridors A and B in Figure 3). 96 Six states located along these corridors have already legalized medicinal marijuana; three of them are along the southwest border. Legalization of recreational marijuana in any of these states would likely have a significant effect. This is because states along these drug corridors often contain distribution centers, and they represent the areas where Mexican DTO influence over the wholesale marijuana market is most concentrated.97
| 1,148 |
<h4><strong>State action ALONE is sufficient to shut out cartel marijuana- EVEN IF the feds don’t shift</h4><p>Jackson et al 2011</strong> (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)</p><p><u><strong><mark>A weak federal response would be enough to shut Mexican DTOs out of the U.S. market</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>If California alone legalized marijuana</mark>, and the federal government increased enforcement</u> efforts against domestic interstate trafficking, <u><mark>there is reason to believe the effects on a national level would be stunted. However</u>, <u>if other states followed suit, or the federal government maintained or decreased current enforcement levels, the effects would certainly be more widespread</u>.</mark> According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, <u>there are two primary drug transportation corridors through which Mexican marijuana enters the United States</u> and is trafficked to the rest of the country (see Corridors A and B in Figure 3). 96 <u><mark>Six states located along</mark> these corridors have already legalized medicinal marijuana; three of them are along <mark>the southwest border. Legalization of recreational marijuana in any of these states would likely have a significant effect</u></mark>. This is because <u>states along these drug corridors often contain distribution centers, and <mark>they represent the areas where Mexican DTO influence over the wholesale marijuana market is most concentrated</u><strong></mark>.97</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 2
| 430,453 | 8 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,256 |
The bill make these waivers impossible
|
Reuters 12/12/13
|
Reuters 12/12/13 (US lawmakers to introduce bill on new Iran sanctions soon By REUTERS¶ 12/12/2013 http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/US-lawmakers-to-introduce-bill-on-new-Iran-sanctions-soon-334747)
|
legislation would limit Obama's ability to waive sanctions the measure would impose the new sanctions only if the interim deal has gone nowhere in six months or Iran violates terms of the agreement the measure faces an uphill battle to become law.
|
legislation would limit Obama's ability to waive sanctions the measure faces an uphill battle to become law.
|
¶ Robert Menendez, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Republican Senator Mark Kirk are finishing legislation that would target Iran's remaining oil exports and foreign exchange and seek to limit President Barack Obama's ability to waive sanctions. However, the measure would impose the new sanctions only if the interim deal has gone nowhere in six months or Iran violates terms of the agreement. Supporters said that would comply with the administration's request to allow negotiators to pursue a comprehensive diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear crisis.¶ ¶ But the measure faces an uphill battle to become law.
| 652 |
<h4>The bill make these waivers impossible</h4><p><strong>Reuters 12/12/13 </strong>(US lawmakers to introduce bill on new Iran sanctions soon By REUTERS¶ <u>12/12/2013 http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/US-lawmakers-to-introduce-bill-on-new-Iran-sanctions-soon-334747)</p><p></u>¶ Robert Menendez, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Republican Senator Mark Kirk are finishing <u><mark>legislation</u></mark> that <u><mark>would</mark> </u>target Iran's remaining oil exports and foreign exchange and seek to <u><strong><mark>limit</u></strong></mark> President Barack <u><strong><mark>Obama's ability to waive sanctions</u></strong></mark>. However, <u>the measure would impose the new sanctions only if the interim deal has gone nowhere in six months or Iran violates terms of the agreement</u>. Supporters said that would comply with the administration's request to allow negotiators to pursue a comprehensive diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear crisis.¶ ¶ But <u><mark>the measure faces an <strong>uphill battle</strong> to become law.</p></u></mark>
|
1nr
|
AT: Waivers
|
Nuclear, biological and chemical war
| 430,980 | 1 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,257 |
A new, progressive AG is key- solves prisons and civil rights and prevents backsliding
|
Butler 9/30
|
Butler 9/30/2014 (Paul, professor at Georgetown University Law Center. A former trial attorney with the United States Department of Justice, he is the author of "Let's Get Free: A Hip-Hop Theory of Justice,” Obama struggles to set his racial legacy, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-eric-holder-legacy-perspec-1001-20140930-story.html)
|
Holder is leaving with much unfinished business His civil rights record is extraordinary No government official has done more to reform criminal justice than Holder Holder explained the devastating impact of mass incarceration on our economy and democracy He ratcheted down the war on drugs spoke against prison for minor, nonviolent offenses; and offered the opportunity for clemency to people imprisoned under draconian sentencing laws in the Justice Department, there is still work to be done Officials are expecting thousands of petitions for clemency for drug offenders incarcerated under the harsh old sentencing regime. Unless the next attorney general shares Holder's compassion, his efforts will be for naught if ever people of color needed an attorney general committed to civil rights, they need him or her now
|
Holder is leaving with much unfinished business in the Justice Department, there is still work to be done. Officials are expecting thousands of petitions for clemency for drug offenders incarcerated under the harsh old sentencing regime. Unless the next attorney general shares Holder's compassion, his efforts will be for naught if ever people of color needed an attorney general committed to civil rights, they sure do need him or her now.
|
Attorney General Eric Holder's resignation is bad news for President Barack Obama's racial justice legacy. Obama has done little to address race during his presidency, beyond the actions of his Justice Department. With Holder's exit, that track record suggests the president is now done with race. And that's a shame, because Holder is leaving with much unfinished business. Holder is not an attorney general who happens to be black. He is, proudly, the first black attorney general. His civil rights record, including suing states on voting rights, strengthening the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division and bringing cases against police departments for excessive force, is extraordinary. Holder will be remembered alongside his hero, Robert Kennedy, as well as Ramsey Clark and Nicholas Katzenbach, as the attorneys general who did the most to uphold "equal justice under law." No government official has done more to reform criminal justice than Holder. The United States locks up more people than any other country in the world. For most prosecutors, that's been the source of bragging rights. Holder, on the other hand, explained the devastating impact of mass incarceration on our families, economy and democracy. He ratcheted down the war on drugs; spoke against prison for minor, nonviolent offenses; and offered the opportunity for clemency to people imprisoned under draconian sentencing laws. In other words, for black Americans, Holder has been everything that Obama has not. The African-Americans who danced in the streets of Harlem when Obama was first elected did not expect that the president would, in four or eight years, reverse centuries of entrenched subjugation. But they did assume he would make racial justice a significant part of his platform. They were sadly mistaken. For all of Holder's focus on structural discrimination in the criminal and civil justice systems, the president has tended to blame black culture. Early in his presidency, he told a church audience, "Too many fathers . . . have abandoned their responsibilities, acting like boys instead of men . . . You and I know how true this is in the African-American community." Obama's scolding has sometimes seemed misplaced, as when he told members of the Congressional Black Caucus to "quit whining, quit complaining," and the graduates of Morehouse that there is no room for excuses: "Nobody cares if you suffered some discrimination." From his early years on the national stage, Obama has aimed his cultural critiques at the most dispossessed African-Americans. Campaigning in 2007, Obama mocked the work ethic of "gang bangers," saying, "Why I gotta do it? Why you didn't ask Pookie to do it?" What Pookie needed from the president was a job. Yet black unemployment has remained at least twice the level of white unemployment throughout the Obama administration. Pookie's sister needs some help too. But on the president's watch, the percentage of black women living under the poverty line has risen. In short, the two most powerful African-Americans in the country think about race in fundamentally different ways. Holder is not as much the president's alter ego on race as he is the brother from another planet. The attorney general has forcefully advocated for race-based remedies, including affirmative action in college admissions and drawing voting districts to enhance minority voting power. While Obama also supports these programs, he has said, "I think it's a mistake to start thinking in terms of particular ethnic segments of the United States rather than to think that we are all in this together." The concern that the president simply doesn't get race is why some African-Americans are worried now that Holder is on the way out. Holder's frank talk is unlikely to be matched by the president. Holder famously called us a "nation of cowards" when it comes to talking about race. Obama pushed back, explaining, "I'm not somebody who believes that constantly talking about race somehow solves racial tensions." That's a problem because in the Justice Department, there is still work to be done. Officials are expecting thousands of petitions for clemency for drug offenders incarcerated under the harsh old sentencing regime. Unless the next attorney general shares Holder's compassion, his efforts will be for naught. Last November, Holder said the Justice Department would soon announce its decision on bringing federal civil rights charges against George Zimmerman, Trayvon Martin's killer. Almost a year later, there has been no announcement. And this summer appeared to be open season on police shootings of unarmed blacks (we don't know if the number actually increased because no federal agency is required to keep records of police shootings). So if ever people of color needed an attorney general committed to civil rights, they sure do need him or her now.
| 4,876 |
<h4><strong>A new, progressive AG is key- solves prisons and civil rights and prevents backsliding</h4><p>Butler 9/30</strong>/2014 (Paul, professor at Georgetown University Law Center. A former trial attorney with the United States Department of Justice, he is the author of "Let's Get Free: A Hip-Hop Theory of Justice,” Obama struggles to set his racial legacy, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-eric-holder-legacy-perspec-1001-20140930-story.html)</p><p>Attorney General Eric Holder's resignation is bad news for President Barack Obama's racial justice legacy. Obama has done little to address race during his presidency, beyond the actions of his Justice Department. With Holder's exit, that track record suggests the president is now done with race. And that's a shame, because <u><mark>Holder is leaving with much unfinished business</u></mark>. Holder is not an attorney general who happens to be black. He is, proudly, the first black attorney general. <u>His civil rights record</u>, including suing states on voting rights, strengthening the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division and bringing cases against police departments for excessive force, <u>is extraordinary</u>. Holder will be remembered alongside his hero, Robert Kennedy, as well as Ramsey Clark and Nicholas Katzenbach, as the attorneys general who did the most to uphold "equal justice under law." <u>No government official has done more to reform criminal justice than Holder</u>. The United States locks up more people than any other country in the world. For most prosecutors, that's been the source of bragging rights. <u>Holder</u>, on the other hand, <u>explained the devastating impact of mass incarceration on our</u> families, <u>economy and democracy</u>. <u>He ratcheted down the war on drugs</u>; <u>spoke against prison for minor, nonviolent offenses; and offered the opportunity for clemency to people imprisoned under draconian sentencing laws</u>. In other words, for black Americans, Holder has been everything that Obama has not. The African-Americans who danced in the streets of Harlem when Obama was first elected did not expect that the president would, in four or eight years, reverse centuries of entrenched subjugation. But they did assume he would make racial justice a significant part of his platform. They were sadly mistaken. For all of Holder's focus on structural discrimination in the criminal and civil justice systems, the president has tended to blame black culture. Early in his presidency, he told a church audience, "Too many fathers . . . have abandoned their responsibilities, acting like boys instead of men . . . You and I know how true this is in the African-American community." Obama's scolding has sometimes seemed misplaced, as when he told members of the Congressional Black Caucus to "quit whining, quit complaining," and the graduates of Morehouse that there is no room for excuses: "Nobody cares if you suffered some discrimination." From his early years on the national stage, Obama has aimed his cultural critiques at the most dispossessed African-Americans. Campaigning in 2007, Obama mocked the work ethic of "gang bangers," saying, "Why I gotta do it? Why you didn't ask Pookie to do it?" What Pookie needed from the president was a job. Yet black unemployment has remained at least twice the level of white unemployment throughout the Obama administration. Pookie's sister needs some help too. But on the president's watch, the percentage of black women living under the poverty line has risen. In short, the two most powerful African-Americans in the country think about race in fundamentally different ways. Holder is not as much the president's alter ego on race as he is the brother from another planet. The attorney general has forcefully advocated for race-based remedies, including affirmative action in college admissions and drawing voting districts to enhance minority voting power. While Obama also supports these programs, he has said, "I think it's a mistake to start thinking in terms of particular ethnic segments of the United States rather than to think that we are all in this together." The concern that the president simply doesn't get race is why some African-Americans are worried now that Holder is on the way out. Holder's frank talk is unlikely to be matched by the president. Holder famously called us a "nation of cowards" when it comes to talking about race. Obama pushed back, explaining, "I'm not somebody who believes that constantly talking about race somehow solves racial tensions." That's a problem because <u><mark>in the Justice Department, there is still work to be done</u>. <u>Officials are expecting thousands of petitions for clemency for drug offenders incarcerated under the harsh old sentencing regime.</u> <u><strong>Unless the next attorney general shares Holder's compassion, his efforts will be for naught</u></strong></mark>. Last November, Holder said the Justice Department would soon announce its decision on bringing federal civil rights charges against George Zimmerman, Trayvon Martin's killer. Almost a year later, there has been no announcement. And this summer appeared to be open season on police shootings of unarmed blacks (we don't know if the number actually increased because no federal agency is required to keep records of police shootings). So <u><mark>if ever people of color needed an attorney general committed to civil rights, they</u> sure do <u>need him or her now</u>.</p></mark>
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Neg vs NW OW
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1NR
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At: withdrawl
| 430,955 | 2 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
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Gannon
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Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,258 |
Specifically, debate over organ sales is necessary given shortages
|
Smith 11
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Smith 11 Lewis Smith 05 January 2011 The Independent Sale of human organs should be legalised, say surgeons http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/sale-of-human-organs-should-be-legalised-say-surgeons-2176110.html
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Professor John Harris, an ethicist at the University of Manchester, believes a debate of an organ market long overdue. Professor Bell, former vice-president of the Royal College of Surgeons wants a public debate because there is such a shortage of organs for transplantation: "It is time to debate it again Opponents agree there should be a public debate about the merits and flaws of a market in organs. "The British Transplantation Society opposes this view, however it is prepared to debate this issue as the theoretical and empirical literature evolves," said a spokesman. Keith Rigg, the transplant surgeon and BTS president, said: "I'm happy to debate it. There are pros and cons
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an ethicist at the University of Manchester, believes a debate of an organ market long overdue former vice-president of the Royal College of Surgeons wants a public debate because there is such a shortage of organs for transplantation: "It is time to debate it again Opponents agree there should be a public debate about the merits and flaws of a market in organs
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Professor John Harris, an ethicist at the University of Manchester, believes a debate and the introduction of an organ market are long overdue. "Morality demands it," he said. "It's time to consider it because this country, to its eternal shame, has allowed a completely unnecessary shortage for 30 years. Thousands of people die each year [internationally] for want of organs. That's the measure of the urgency of the problem. "Being paid doesn't nullify altruism – doctors aren't less caring because they are paid. With the current system, everyone gets paid except for the donor." Professor Harris has developed proposals for an ethical market in organs in which donors would be paid as part of a regulated system. Such a system, he said, would have to be controlled within a strictly defined community, probably the UK but possibly extended to the EU, so every organ could be accounted for. No imports would be allowed. The NHS would be the sole supplier and would distribute organs as it does other treatments – ability to pay would not be a factor. Consent would be required for every donation and would have to be rigorously carried out to ensure no donor was subjected to untoward pressure. Professor Sir Peter Bell, former vice-president of the Royal College of Surgeons but now retired from practice, wants a public debate because there is such a shortage of organs for transplantation: "It is time to debate it again.[…] There is a great shortage of organs." There remains stiff opposition to liberalising the market, not least from the British Transplantation Society (BTS). Opponents agree there should be a public debate about the merits and flaws of a market in organs. "The British Transplantation Society opposes this view, however it is prepared to debate this issue as the theoretical and empirical literature evolves," said a spokesman. Keith Rigg, the transplant surgeon and BTS president, said: "I'm happy to debate it. There are pros and cons. I think the trouble is it would require a huge change in public opinion and legislation. One argument against a regulated market is if you are paying some people, what would be the impact on the existing deceased donor programme and living donor programme?"
| 2,224 |
<h4><strong>Specifically, debate over organ sales is necessary given shortages</h4><p>Smith 11</strong> Lewis Smith 05 January 2011 The Independent Sale of human organs should be legalised, say surgeons http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/sale-of-human-organs-should-be-legalised-say-surgeons-2176110.html</p><p><u>Professor John Harris, <mark>an ethicist at the University of Manchester, believes a debate</mark> </u>and the introduction <u><mark>of an organ market</mark> </u>are <u><mark>long overdue</mark>.</u> "Morality demands it," he said. "It's time to consider it because this country, to its eternal shame, has allowed a completely unnecessary shortage for 30 years. Thousands of people die each year [internationally] for want of organs. That's the measure of the urgency of the problem. "Being paid doesn't nullify altruism – doctors aren't less caring because they are paid. With the current system, everyone gets paid except for the donor." Professor Harris has developed proposals for an ethical market in organs in which donors would be paid as part of a regulated system. Such a system, he said, would have to be controlled within a strictly defined community, probably the UK but possibly extended to the EU, so every organ could be accounted for. No imports would be allowed. The NHS would be the sole supplier and would distribute organs as it does other treatments – ability to pay would not be a factor. Consent would be required for every donation and would have to be rigorously carried out to ensure no donor was subjected to untoward pressure. <u>Professor</u> Sir Peter <u>Bell, <mark>former vice-president of the Royal College of Surgeons</u></mark> but now retired from practice, <u><mark>wants a public debate because there is such a shortage of organs for transplantation: "It is time to debate it again</u></mark>.[…] There is a great shortage of organs." There remains stiff opposition to liberalising the market, not least from the British Transplantation Society (BTS). <u><mark>Opponents agree there should be a public debate about the merits and flaws of a market in organs</mark>. "The British Transplantation Society opposes this view, however it is prepared to debate this issue as the theoretical and empirical literature evolves," said a spokesman. Keith Rigg, the transplant surgeon and BTS president, said: "I'm happy to debate it. There are pros and cons</u>. I think the trouble is it would require a huge change in public opinion and legislation. One argument against a regulated market is if you are paying some people, what would be the impact on the existing deceased donor programme and living donor programme?"</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,265 | 4 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
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Navy
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9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,259 |
The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism
|
Schwartz 2013
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Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
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The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is
|
The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief held by key justices that constitutional law must accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states the anti-commandeering doctrine is not y entrenched; the vote of just one conservative justices could limit the anti-commandeering doctrine, to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA a loophole would make it even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment designed to regulate would-be consumers , if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is.
|
B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough and clear enough to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it, in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" under Reno. Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data. Put another way, while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions. Rather the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way, if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is. I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.]
| 8,599 |
<h4>The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes <u><mark>The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization</u></mark>. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. <u>Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases</u>. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. <u><strong><mark>We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong </u></mark>enough and clear enough<u></strong><mark> <strong>to overcome a strong belief</strong></mark> possibly <mark>held <strong>by key justices that constitutional law must </mark>somehow <mark>accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states</mark>.</u></strong> Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, <u><mark>the <strong>anti-commandeering doctrine is not</strong> </mark>exactl<mark>y <strong>entrenched</strong>; the vote of just one </mark>of the five <mark>conservative justices could </mark>produce a decision qualifying or <mark>limit</mark>ing<mark> the anti-commandeering doctrine,</mark> if not entirely scrapping it</u>, <u>in order <mark>to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA</u></mark>. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? <u>Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno</u>. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, <u>such <mark>a loophole would make it </mark>easier to characterize the CSA - <mark>even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering"</u></mark> under Reno. <u><mark>Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, </mark>and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custod<mark>y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment </mark>ultimately<mark> designed to regulate would-be consumers</mark> of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data</u>. Put another way, <u>while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities</u>. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. <u>The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions</u>. Rather <u>the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine</u>. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way<mark>, <u><strong>if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is</u></strong>.</mark> I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.]</p>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 430,417 | 18 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,260 |
Regional cooperation will prevent escalation
|
Innocent and Carpenter 9
|
Innocent and Carpenter 9 (Malou, Foreign Policy Analyst – Cato Institute and Ted Galen, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies – Cato Institute, “Escaping the Graveyard of Empires: A Strategy to Exist Afghanistan”, http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf)
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regional stakeholders, especially Russia and Iran, have an interest in a stable Afghanistan countries possess the capacity to facilitate development in the country and may be willing to assist Western forces Mutual interests between Western forces and Afghanistan’s neighbors converge on terrorism energy organized crime, and weapons smuggling. Enhanced cooperation will stabilize Afghanistan engaging stakeholders may lead to tighter regional security
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regional stakeholders have an interest in a stable Afghanistan countries may be willing to assist Western forces Mutual interests between Western forces and Afghanistan’s neighbors converge on terrorism energy organized crime, and weapons smuggling. Enhanced cooperation will stabilize Afghanistan engaging stakeholders may lead to tighter regional security
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Additionally, regional stakeholders, especially Russia and Iran, have an interest in a stable Afghanistan. Both countries possess the capacity to facilitate development in the country and may even be willing to assist Western forces. In July, leaders in Moscow allowed the United States to use Russian airspace to transport troops and lethal military equipment into Afghanistan. Yet another relevant regional player is the Collective Security Treaty Organization, made up of Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, and Belarus. At the moment, CSTO appears amenable to forging a security partnership with NATO. CSTO secretary general Nikolai Bordyuzha told journalists in March 2009 of his bloc’s intention to cooperate. “The united position of the CSTO is that we should give every kind of aid to the anti-terror coalition operating in Afghanistan. . . . The interests of NATO and the CSTO countries regarding Afghanistan conform unequivocally.”83 Mutual interests between Western forces and Afghanistan’s surrounding neighbors can converge on issues of transnational terrorism, the Caspian and Central Asia region’s abundant energy resources, cross-border organized crime, and weapons smuggling. Enhanced cooperation alone will not stabilize Afghanistan, but engaging stakeholders may lead to tighter regional security.
| 1,345 |
<h4>Regional cooperation will prevent escalation</h4><p><strong>Innocent and Carpenter 9</strong> (Malou, Foreign Policy Analyst – Cato Institute and Ted Galen, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies – Cato Institute, “Escaping the Graveyard of Empires: A Strategy to Exist Afghanistan”, <u>http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf)</p><p></u>Additionally, <u><mark>regional stakeholders</mark>, especially Russia and Iran, <mark>have an interest in a stable Afghanistan</u></mark>. Both <u><mark>countries</mark> possess the capacity to facilitate development in the country and <mark>may</u></mark> even <u><mark>be willing to assist Western forces</u></mark>. In July, leaders in Moscow allowed the United States to use Russian airspace to transport troops and lethal military equipment into Afghanistan. Yet another relevant regional player is the Collective Security Treaty Organization, made up of Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, and Belarus. At the moment, CSTO appears amenable to forging a security partnership with NATO. CSTO secretary general Nikolai Bordyuzha told journalists in March 2009 of his bloc’s intention to cooperate. “The united position of the CSTO is that we should give every kind of aid to the anti-terror coalition operating in Afghanistan. . . . The interests of NATO and the CSTO countries regarding Afghanistan conform unequivocally.”83 <u><mark>Mutual interests between Western forces and Afghanistan’s</u></mark> surrounding <u><mark>neighbors</u></mark> can <u><mark>converge on</u></mark> issues of transnational <u><mark>terrorism</u></mark>, the Caspian and Central Asia region’s abundant <u><mark>energy</u></mark> resources, cross-border <u><mark>organized crime, and weapons smuggling. Enhanced cooperation</u></mark> alone <u><mark>will</u></mark> not <u><mark>stabilize Afghanistan</u></mark>, but <u><mark>engaging stakeholders may lead to tighter regional security</u></mark>.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
A2
| 108,695 | 8 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,261 |
Relaxing banking restrictions leads to federal legalization
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Guardian 8/22/2014
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Guardian 8/22/2014 (Guardian Weekly: Legal highs and lows of the US marijuana experiment: A new industry is springing up to support Colorado's cannabis 'green rush', but its pioneers remain hampered by the hostility of the federal government, reports Andrew Gumbel, lexis)
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Colorado has allowed recreational marijuana sales for months Most entrepreneurs are tough enough to put up with the many obstacles, because this is the new frontier and the market is taking off People in the industry are calling this the "green rush" they get creative when it comes to the lack of access to financing The hope, over time, is that the federal government will lift the banking restrictions if that happens, they expect big companies to move in, with investment capital, buyout offers and marketing muscle that will add to the clamour for blanket legalisation of marijuana. National legalisation is on an expedited path the days of cannabis prohibition will be over soon
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People in the industry are calling this the "green rush they get creative when it comes to the lack of access to financing The hope, over time, is that the federal government will lift the banking restrictions if that happens, they expect big companies to move that will add to the clamour for blanket legalisation of marijuana. "National legalisation is on an expedited path
|
It is, of course, very early days. Colorado has allowed recreational marijuana sales for seven months and Washington state began a month ago. Most entrepreneurs are tough enough to put up with the many obstacles, because this is the new frontier and the market is taking off. 3D invites customers to tour its indoor plant-growing facility, much as wine buyers in the Napa valley might be invited to tour a winery. Dope tourism is booming, as tour companies offer smoke-clogged limo rides to cannabis shops, tourist sights and even - on the so called Willie Wonka tour offered by Rocky Mountain High Tours - a chocolate factory offering dope-infused food. People are offering rooms and apartments to tourists offering free samples, dope-infused mints on the pillow and, occasionally, instructions that while dope-smoking is tolerated or even encouraged, tobacco is not. People in the industry are calling this the "green rush" and they couldn't be more excited. "We're creating a brand new industry," Fox said. "We have to have patience and also be a little crazy." So they get creative when it comes to the lack of access to financing. Poiss found another bank willing not only to take his business, but to relieve him of the onerous cash-handling fees his previous bank had levied - about $40,000 in 2014 alone. The hope, over time, is that the federal government will lift the banking restrictions and bring the industry's tax reporting in line with other businesses. And, if that happens, they expect big companies to move in, with investment capital, buyout offers and marketing muscle that will add to the clamour for blanket legalisation of marijuana. "National legalisation is on an expedited path," said Mark Scruggs, who helps run a website called weedmaps, the industry's answer to online directories and review sites like Yelp. "I thought when I got into this business that it would take 20 years longer. It's hard to change the mindset of 70 years of propaganda, but the days of cannabis prohibition will be over soon."
| 2,031 |
<h4><strong>Relaxing banking restrictions leads to federal legalization</h4><p>Guardian 8/22/2014</strong> (Guardian Weekly: Legal highs and lows of the US marijuana experiment: A new industry is springing up to support Colorado's cannabis 'green rush', but its pioneers remain hampered by the hostility of the federal government, reports Andrew Gumbel, lexis)</p><p>It is, of course, very early days. <u>Colorado has allowed recreational marijuana sales for</u> seven <u>months</u> and Washington state began a month ago. <u>Most entrepreneurs are tough enough to put up with the many obstacles, because this is the new frontier and the market is taking off</u>. 3D invites customers to tour its indoor plant-growing facility, much as wine buyers in the Napa valley might be invited to tour a winery. Dope tourism is booming, as tour companies offer smoke-clogged limo rides to cannabis shops, tourist sights and even - on the so called Willie Wonka tour offered by Rocky Mountain High Tours - a chocolate factory offering dope-infused food. People are offering rooms and apartments to tourists offering free samples, dope-infused mints on the pillow and, occasionally, instructions that while dope-smoking is tolerated or even encouraged, tobacco is not. <u><mark>People in the industry are calling this the "green</mark> <mark>rush</mark>"</u> and they couldn't be more excited. "We're creating a brand new industry," Fox said. "We have to have patience and also be a little crazy." So <u><mark>they get creative when it comes to the lack of access to financing</u></mark>. Poiss found another bank willing not only to take his business, but to relieve him of the onerous cash-handling fees his previous bank had levied - about $40,000 in 2014 alone. <u><mark>The hope, over time, is that the federal government will lift the banking restrictions</u></mark> and bring the industry's tax reporting in line with other businesses. And, <u><mark>if that happens, they expect big companies to move</mark> in, with investment capital, buyout offers and marketing muscle <mark>that will <strong>add to the clamour for blanket legalisation of marijuana.</mark> </u></strong><mark>"<u>National legalisation is on an expedited path</u></mark>," said Mark Scruggs, who helps run a website called weedmaps, the industry's answer to online directories and review sites like Yelp. "I thought when I got into this business that it would take 20 years longer. It's hard to change the mindset of 70 years of propaganda, but <u>the days of cannabis prohibition will be over soon</u><strong>."</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 2
| 430,981 | 1 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,262 |
Debate on effective implementation is a moral responsibility
|
Taub et al 3
|
Taub et al 3 Sara Taub, Andrew H. Maixner, Karine Morin, Robert M. Sade, For The Council On Ethical And Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association. "Cadaveric Organ Donation: Encouraging The Study Of Motivation." Transplantation Forum. Vol. 76, 748–751, No. 4, August 27, 2003. https://www.musc.edu/humanvalues/pdf/Cadaveric-organ-donation.pdf
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If policymakers, ethicists, or legislators prohibit the implementation of programs that could be shown to increase the number of available organs and reduce the number of deaths, then they must bear some moral responsibility for the patients who die from lack of an organ transplant. Therefore, a better informed debate is necessary, one that can occur only after the effectiveness of various incentive models has been measured.
| null |
A thorough discussion of this matter also must include an examination of the costs of foregoing such studies. Currently, about 16 patients die each day waiting for an available organ (15). If policymakers, ethicists, or legislators prohibit the implementation of programs that could be shown to increase the number of available organs and reduce the number of deaths, then they must bear some moral responsibility for the patients who die from lack of an organ transplant. Therefore, a better informed debate is necessary, one that can occur only after the effectiveness of various incentive models has been measured.
| 617 |
<h4>Debate on effective implementation is a moral responsibility</h4><p><strong>Taub et al 3</strong> Sara Taub, Andrew H. Maixner, Karine Morin, Robert M. Sade, For The Council On Ethical And Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association. "Cadaveric Organ Donation: Encouraging The Study Of Motivation." Transplantation Forum. Vol. 76, 748–751, No. 4, August 27, 2003. <u>https://www.musc.edu/humanvalues/pdf/Cadaveric-organ-donation.pdf</p><p></u>A thorough discussion of this matter also must include an examination of the costs of foregoing such studies. Currently, about 16 patients die each day waiting for an available organ (15). <u><strong>If policymakers, ethicists, or legislators prohibit the implementation of programs that could be shown to increase the number of available organs and reduce the number of deaths, then they must bear some moral responsibility for the patients who die from lack of an organ transplant. Therefore, a better informed debate is necessary, one that can occur only after the effectiveness of various incentive models has been measured.</p></u></strong>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,266 | 7 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,263 |
FEDERALISM SOLVES WAR OVER AFRICA
| null |
Brand 2005[Constant, Associated Press Writer, "Leaders advocate federal model to solve conflicts in Iraq, Cyprus, Sudan," http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id article=8334, March 3, 2005]
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the benefits of regional government systems could end conflicts in countries such as Iraq, Cyprus and Sudan. federalism could promote peace and stability, especially in the Middle East and Africa. "The facts prove that it is definitely the right way to prevent conflicts, whether between cultures, languages, or reli gions, model could be useful for Iraq as it drafts its new constitution "It could be a way to achieve the so much-needed stability that is lacking today," "For Sudan, too, it's a solution federalism could also bring a resolution to the decades long division of his Mediterranean island. still remain committed to a settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of a ... bicommunal federal solution federalism could work in conflict zones, and on giving political power to minorities in Cyprus, Afghanistan, Sudan, Congo and Iraq.
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benefits of regional government systems could end conflicts in countries such as Iraq, Cyprus and Sudan especially in the Middle East and Africa. "The facts prove that it is definitely the right way to prevent conflicts, whether between cultures, languages, or reli gions," It could be a way to achieve the so much-needed stability that is lacking today," t federalism could work in conflict zones, and on giving political power to minorities in Cyprus, Afghanistan, Sudan, Congo and Iraq.
|
Government leaders from Africa, Europe and North America opened a conference on federalism Thursday, arguing that_ the benefits of regional government systems could end conflicts in countries such as Iraq, Cyprus and Sudan. Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt said federalism could promote peace and stability, especially in the Middle East and Africa. "The facts prove that it is definitely the right way to prevent conflicts, whether between cultures, languages, or reli gions," Verhofstadt said at the conference, the third of its kind since 1999. Bilingual Belgium's Francophone and Dutch-speaking populations share power, and Verhofstadt said that model could be useful for Iraq as it drafts its new constitution. He recommended that the new government be a federal one, with regional governments run by Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds. "It won't be easy at all, for Iraq has various languages, ethnic groups and religions," he said, and whether such a system could offer enough autonomy must be studied. "It could be a way to achieve the so much-needed stability that is lacking today," he said. "It's a solution, a way to respect diversity," said Canadian Intergovernmental Affairs Minister Lucienne Robillard, adding that Canada was looking into whether it could help draft an Iraqi constitution. "For Sudan, too, it's a solution." Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, who currently holds the presidency of the African Union, said federalism offered African nations like his a way to provide rights and powers to minorities. "With over 350 languages and even more dialects, Nigerians feel they are respected and represented at the center," Obasanjo told the conference. Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos agreed that federalism could also bring a resolution to the decades long division of his Mediterranean island. "I still remain committed to a settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of a ... bicommunal federal solution ,"Papadopoulos said, but added that under such a system of two regional governments - one Greek and the other Turkish, which was pushed by the United Nations - "no community should be able to impose its will on the other." Cyprus, which joined the European Union last year, has been split into the Greek Cypriot-controlled south and the Turkish-occupied north since Turkey invaded in 1974 in the wake of an abortive coup by supporters of union with Greece. The breakaway state in the north is only recognized by Turkey, which maintains 40,000 troops there and it does not enjoy the benefits of EU membership. Verhofstadt said one of the main goals of the three-day conference is to share ideas on solutions to ethnic conflicts. Some 12 expert workshops were to focus on drafting proposals for Saturday's closing session on how federalism could work in conflict zones, and on giving political power to minorities in Cyprus, Afghanistan, Sudan, Congo and Iraq.
| 2,897 |
<h4>FEDERALISM SOLVES WAR OVER AFRICA</h4><p><u>Brand 2005</u>[Constant, Associated Press Writer, "Leaders advocate federal model to solve conflicts in Iraq, Cyprus, Sudan," <u>http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id article=8334</u>, March 3, 2005]</p><p>Government leaders from Africa, Europe and North America opened a conference on federalism Thursday, arguing that_ <u><strong>the <mark>benefits of regional government systems could end conflicts in countries such as Iraq, Cyprus and Sudan</mark>. </u></strong>Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt said <u><strong>federalism could promote peace and stability, <mark>especially in the Middle East and Africa. "The facts prove that it is definitely the right way to prevent conflicts, whether between cultures, languages, or reli gions,</u></strong>"</mark> Verhofstadt said at the conference, the third of its kind since 1999. Bilingual Belgium's Francophone and Dutch-speaking populations share power, and Verhofstadt said that <u><strong>model could be useful for Iraq as it drafts its new constitution</u></strong>. He recommended that the new government be a federal one, with regional governments run by Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds. "It won't be easy at all, for Iraq has various languages, ethnic groups and religions," he said, and whether such a system could offer enough autonomy must be studied. <u>"<strong><mark>It could be a way to achieve the so much-needed stability that is lacking today,"</u></strong> </mark>he said. "It's a solution, a way to respect diversity," said Canadian Intergovernmental Affairs Minister Lucienne Robillard, adding that Canada was looking into whe<mark>t</mark>her it could help draft an Iraqi constitution. <u>"<strong>For Sudan, too, it's a solution</u></strong>." Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, who currently holds the presidency of the African Union, said federalism offered African nations like his a way to provide rights and powers to minorities. "With over 350 languages and even more<u><strong> </u></strong>dialects, Nigerians feel they are respected and represented at the center," Obasanjo told the conference. Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos agreed that <u><strong>federalism could also bring a resolution to the decades long division of his Mediterranean island. </u></strong>"I <u><strong>still remain committed to a settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of a ... bicommunal federal solution</u></strong> ,"Papadopoulos said, but added that under such a system of two regional governments - one Greek and the other Turkish, which was pushed by the United Nations - "no community should be able to impose its will on the other." Cyprus, which joined the European Union last year, has been split into the Greek Cypriot-controlled south and the Turkish-occupied north since Turkey invaded in 1974 in the wake of an abortive coup by supporters of union with Greece. The breakaway state in the north is only recognized by Turkey, which maintains 40,000 troops there and it does not enjoy the benefits of EU membership. Verhofstadt said one of the main goals of the three-day conference is to share ideas on solutions to ethnic conflicts. Some 12 expert workshops were to focus on drafting proposals for Saturday's closing session on how <u><strong><mark>federalism could work in conflict zones, and on giving political power to minorities in Cyprus, Afghanistan, Sudan, Congo and Iraq.</p></u></strong></mark>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 430,982 | 1 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,264 |
CP leads to federal legalization- sequencing is key- bottom-up pressure from state legalization FIRST is key- close-to-simultaneous action links to politics
|
Bulman-Pozen 2014
|
Bulman-Pozen 2014 (Jessica, Associate Professor, Columbia Law School, ARTICLE: PARTISAN FEDERALISM, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1077, lexis)
|
States often serve as laboratories by giving concrete form to a position that has a national partisan valence but is not embodied in federal policy many issues that are branded "state" rather than "national" questions are best understood as national experiments carried out within state fora Even as they undertake discrete actions, state actors are motivated by partisan commitments that transcend state borders As multiple states flesh out one party's position, composite subnational action comes to define the national States generate a horizontal nationalism that is no less national for being bottom-up rather than top-down. such bottom-up partisan activity can force federal politicians' hands or make it attractive for them State decisions both fuel and reflect proposed lines of partisan division, and there is slippage between state and federal politics, as state and federal actors self-consciously treat states as testing grounds for national policies. for instance, the national Democratic Party embraces same-sex marriage, but only following a partisan contest in the states As a small and then growing number of blue states adopted marriage equality, same-sex marriage became a Democratic issue at the national level For federal politicians, state politics forced the issue For others, state politics provided cover for a position they already favored They could cautiously advance the mantra of federalism, rather than support for same-sex marriage as such, and when it turned out their constituents supported same-sex marriage, move to a fuller-throated endorsement of equality Debates about the legalization of marijuana also have this character Recent ballot initiatives in Colorado and Washington have legalized recreational marijuana under state law, a group of mostly blue states has decriminalized possession of small amounts of marijuana, still more states have decriminalized medicinal marijuana, and a growing number of state Democratic parties and politicians now endorse legalization. Such state activity puts pressure on the national Democratic Party to follow suit federalism gives national politicians who favor legalization a lower-stakes way to advance this substantive position calling for respect for state decisionmaking has a different ring than calling for outright legalization If popular support for legalization continues to grow, national politicians can transform arguments for federalism into arguments about ending the United States' war on drugs, Marijuana has an emerging, if still contested, national partisan valence - but it is one that is being generated by state, not national, action
|
States serve as laboratories by giving concrete form to a position that has a national partisan valence but is not embodied in federal policy state actors are motivated by partisan commitments that transcend state borders As multiple states flesh out one party's position, composite subnational action comes to define the nation , such bottom-up partisan activity can force federal politicians' hands or make it attractive for them for instance, the national Democratic Party embraces same-sex marriage, but only following a partisan contest in the states. As a small and then growing number of blue states adopted marriage equality, same-sex marriage became a Democratic issue at the national level. For federal politicians, state politics forced the issue Debates about the legalization of marijuana also have this character. a group of mostly blue states has decriminalized possession of small amounts of marijuana, still more states have decriminalized medicinal marijuana, and a growing number of state Democratic parties and politicians now endorse legalization Such state activity puts pressure on the national Democratic Party to follow sui , federalism gives national politicians who favor legalization a lower-stakes way to advance this substantive position Marijuana has an emerging, if still contested, national partisan valence - but it is one that is being generated by state, not national, action
|
States often serve as laboratories, for example, by giving concrete form to a position that has a national partisan valence but is not embodied in federal policy. Sometimes a handful of states, or even a single state, define and promote a party's stance on a particular issue. California has advanced the Democratic position with respect to global warming and emissions standards, while Arizona has been the standard-bearer for the Republican Party on immigration. n228 Other times, a wide variety of states participate in developing the national vision with respect to a particular issue. For many years now, the Democratic and Republican positions on guns have been framed by the states in the absence of federal action. Certain states require background checks, limit bulk purchases of firearms, ban assault weapons, or regulate large-capacity magazines. n229 Other states authorize school employees to carry guns, require employers to allow guns in the workplace, or limit law enforcement discretion to deny concealed-carry [*1128] permits. n230 The national partisan cleavage is clear, but it is principally state, not federal, politicians who have shaped it. And while the main divide is between the two parties, states governed by the same party also differ in their substantive policies and the relative attention they pay to gun-related issues. n231 More generally, many issues that are branded "state" rather than "national" questions - insofar as state governments rather than the federal government are addressing them - are best understood as national experiments carried out within state fora. From fracking to in-state tuition for undocumented immigrants; from charter schools to tax rates; from public sector unions to takings for economic development - states serving as laboratories for these issues are participating in national partisan struggle. Even as they undertake discrete actions, state actors are motivated by partisan commitments that transcend state borders. And their experiments are often adopted by other states along partisan lines, as organizations like the Republican and Democratic Governors Associations and the American Legislative Exchange Council cross-pollinate. As multiple states flesh out one party's position, composite subnational action comes to define the national. States generate a horizontal nationalism that is no less national for being bottom-up rather than top-down. n232 In time, moreover, such bottom-up partisan activity can force federal politicians' hands or make it attractive for them to take a position they once feared might amount to political suicide. State decisions both fuel and reflect proposed lines of partisan division, and there is slippage between state and federal politics, as state and federal actors [*1129] self-consciously treat states as testing grounds for national policies. n233 Today, for instance, the national Democratic Party embraces same-sex marriage, but only following a partisan contest in the states. As a small and then growing number of blue states adopted marriage equality, same-sex marriage became a Democratic issue at the national level. For some federal politicians, state politics forced the issue. For others, state politics provided cover for a position they already favored. They could cautiously advance the mantra of federalism, rather than support for same-sex marriage as such, and when it turned out their constituents supported same-sex marriage, move to a fuller-throated endorsement of equality. As same-sex marriage has become a Democratic issue at the national level, moreover, additional blue states are taking up the cause, shoring up the base of national support and, at least for now, the national partisan valence. Debates about the legalization of marijuana also have something of this character. Recent ballot initiatives in Colorado and Washington have legalized recreational marijuana under state law, a group of mostly blue states has decriminalized possession of small amounts of marijuana, still more states have decriminalized medicinal marijuana, and a growing number of state Democratic parties and politicians now endorse legalization. n234 Such state activity puts pressure on the national Democratic Party to follow suit, or - more likely in the short term - to adopt a modus vivendi approach to state legalization. n235 As with same-sex marriage, moreover, federalism gives national politicians who favor legalization a lower-stakes way to advance this substantive position: [*1130] calling for respect for state decisionmaking has a different ring than calling for outright legalization. n236 If popular support for legalization continues to grow, national politicians can transform arguments for federalism into arguments about ending the United States' war on drugs, but they will not have committed to this position if popular support wanes. Marijuana has an emerging, if still contested, national partisan valence - but it is one that is being generated by state, not national, action
| 5,026 |
<h4>CP leads to federal legalization- sequencing is key- bottom-up pressure from state legalization FIRST is key- close-to-simultaneous action links to politics</h4><p><strong>Bulman-Pozen 2014</strong> (Jessica, Associate Professor, Columbia Law School, ARTICLE: PARTISAN FEDERALISM, 127 Harv<u><mark>. L. Rev. 1077, lexis)</p><p>States</mark> often <mark>serve as laboratories</u></mark>, for example, <u><mark>by giving concrete form to a position that has a national partisan valence but is not embodied in federal policy</u></mark>. Sometimes a handful of states, or even a single state, define and promote a party's stance on a particular issue. California has advanced the Democratic position with respect to global warming and emissions standards, while Arizona has been the standard-bearer for the Republican Party on immigration. n228 Other times, a wide variety of states participate in developing the national vision with respect to a particular issue. For many years now, the Democratic and Republican positions on guns have been framed by the states in the absence of federal action. Certain states require background checks, limit bulk purchases of firearms, ban assault weapons, or regulate large-capacity magazines. n229 Other states authorize school employees to carry guns, require employers to allow guns in the workplace, or limit law enforcement discretion to deny concealed-carry [*1128] permits. n230 The national partisan cleavage is clear, but it is principally state, not federal, politicians who have shaped it. And while the main divide is between the two parties, states governed by the same party also differ in their substantive policies and the relative attention they pay to gun-related issues. n231 More generally, <u>many issues that are branded "state" rather than "national" questions</u> - insofar as state governments rather than the federal government are addressing them - <u>are best understood as national experiments carried out within state fora</u>. From fracking to in-state tuition for undocumented immigrants; from charter schools to tax rates; from public sector unions to takings for economic development - states serving as laboratories for these issues are participating in national partisan struggle. <u>Even as they undertake discrete actions, <mark>state actors are motivated by partisan commitments that transcend state borders</u></mark>. And their experiments are often adopted by other states along partisan lines, as organizations like the Republican and Democratic Governors Associations and the American Legislative Exchange Council cross-pollinate. <u><mark>As multiple states flesh out one party's position, composite subnational action comes to define the nation</mark>al</u>. <u>States generate a horizontal nationalism that is no less national for being bottom-up rather than top-down.</u> n232 In time, moreover<mark>, <u><strong>such bottom-up partisan activity can force federal politicians' hands</u></strong> <u>or make it attractive for them</u></mark> to take a position they once feared might amount to political suicide. <u>State decisions both fuel and reflect proposed lines of partisan division, and there is slippage between state and federal politics, as state and federal actors</u> [*1129] <u>self-consciously treat states as testing grounds for national policies.</u> n233 Today, <u><mark>for instance, the national Democratic Party embraces same-sex marriage, but only following a partisan contest in the states</u>. <u>As a small and then growing number of blue states adopted marriage equality, same-sex marriage became a Democratic issue at the national level</u>. <u><strong>For</u></strong></mark> some <u><strong><mark>federal politicians, state politics forced the issue</u></strong></mark>. <u>For others, state politics provided cover for a position they already favored</u>. <u>They could cautiously advance the mantra of federalism, rather than support for same-sex marriage as such, and when it turned out their constituents supported same-sex marriage, move to a fuller-throated endorsement of equality</u>. As same-sex marriage has become a Democratic issue at the national level, moreover, additional blue states are taking up the cause, shoring up the base of national support and, at least for now, the national partisan valence. <u><mark>Debates about the legalization of marijuana also have</mark> </u>something of <u><mark>this character</u>.</mark> <u>Recent ballot initiatives in Colorado and Washington have legalized recreational marijuana under state law, <mark>a group of mostly blue states has decriminalized possession of small amounts of marijuana, still more states have decriminalized medicinal marijuana, and a growing number of state Democratic parties and politicians now endorse legalization</mark>.</u> n234 <u><strong><mark>Such state activity puts pressure on the national Democratic Party to follow</mark> <mark>sui</mark>t</u></strong>, or - more likely in the short term - to adopt a modus vivendi approach to state legalization. n235 As with same-sex marriage, moreover<mark>, <u>federalism gives national politicians who favor legalization a lower-stakes way to advance this substantive position</u></mark>: [*1130] <u>calling for respect for state decisionmaking has a different ring than calling for outright legalization</u>. n236 <u>If popular support for legalization continues to grow, national politicians can transform arguments for federalism into arguments about ending the United States' war on drugs,</u> but they will not have committed to this position if popular support wanes. <u><mark>Marijuana has an emerging, if <strong>still contested</strong>, <strong>national partisan valence</strong> - but it is one that is being generated by state, not national, action</p></u></mark>
|
2nr
| null |
A2
| 430,983 | 1 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,265 |
Afghanistan instability allow for opium growth --- that shifts opium production away from Burma
|
Fuller, 07
|
Fuller, 07 (Thomas, Southeast Asia Correspondent for The New York Times, “No Blowing Smoke: Poppies Fade in Southeast Asia:”, 9/16/2007, New York Times, Proquest, JKahn)
|
the Golden Triangle has been eclipsed by the Golden Crescent the poppy-growing area in and around Afghanistan that is now the source of 92 percent of the world's opium opium production there is in areas controlled by the Taliban, which uses revenue from opium and heroin to finance itself. This shift to Afghanistan has had major consequences for the global heroin market The area of Myanmar along the Chinese border was declared opium-free Myanmar's central government banned poppy cultivation border areas of Burma are by now economically connected to China for any investments they want to attract, cooperation is a necessity some are working to destroy the crop They sell the drugs, they buy weapons, and they use those weapons to attack us
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the poppy-growing area around Afghanistan is now the source of 92 percent of the world's opium the Taliban uses revenue from opium to finance itself. This shift to Afghanistan has had consequences for the global market Myanmar was declared opium-free Myanmar's government banned poppy cultivation
|
As a result, the Golden Triangle has been eclipsed by the Golden Crescent -- the poppy-growing area in and around Afghanistan that is now the source of an estimated 92 percent of the world's opium, according to the United Nations. Much of the growth in opium production there is in areas controlled by the Taliban, which United States officials say uses revenue from opium and heroin to finance itself. This shift to Afghanistan has had major consequences for the global heroin market: a near doubling of opium production worldwide in less than two decades. Poppies grown in the fertile valleys of southern Afghanistan yield on average four times more opium than those grown in upland Southeast Asia. A striking aspect of the decline of the Golden Triangle is the role China has played in pressing opium-growing regions to eradicate poppy crops. A major market for Golden Triangle heroin, China has seen a spike in addicts and H.I.V. infections from contaminated needles. The area of Myanmar along the Chinese border, which once produced about 30 percent of the country's opium, was declared opium-free last year by the United Nations. Local authorities, who are from the Wa tribe and are autonomous from Myanmar's central government, have banned poppy cultivation and welcomed Chinese investmentin rubber, sugar cane and tea plantations, casinos and other businesses. "China has had an underestimated role," said Martin Jelsma, a Dutch researcher who has written extensively on the illicit drug trade in Asia. "Their main leverage is economic: These border areas of Burma are by now economically much more connected to China than the rest of Burma," he said, using the former name for Myanmar. "For local authorities it's quite clear that, for any investments they want to attract, cooperation with China is a necessity." Myanmar remains the world's second-leading source of opium but is a distant second; its production declined by 80 percent over the last decade. Insurgents have long used opium to help finance civil wars in the Golden Triangle. But some are now working to destroy the crop. At least one faction of the Shan State Army, a group that long had ties to the heroin business, says it is leading eradication efforts. Kon Jern, a military commander for the group, which is based along Myanmar's border with northern Thailand, says he is cracking down because government militias and corrupt officials profit from opium. "They sell the drugs, they buy weapons, and they use those weapons to attack us," he said. The United Nations credits Myanmar's central government with leading the eradication effort in Shan areas. In Laos, where the political situation is more stable, the government began a crackdown in the 1990s to increase its international credibility and because officials realized their own children were at risk, said Leik Boonwaat, the representative in Laos for the U.N.'s Office on Drugs and Crime. Laos finally outlawed opium in 1996. The government, Mr. Boonwaat said, also saw that opium did little to help poor farmers who grew poppies. "It's mostly the organized crime syndicates that made most of the profits," he said. The amount of land cultivated in Laos for opium has fallen 94 percent since 1998. The country now produces so little opium that it may now be a net importer of the drug, the United Nations says. Yet experts warn that the reductions may not hold unless farmers develop other ways to make a living. Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, an opium specialist at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris, says it took Thailand 30 years to wean opium farmers from poppy production, a transition led by the Thai royal family, which encouraged opium-growing hill tribes to use their cooler climate to produce coffee, macadamia nuts and green vegetables. But, he said, "In Laos and Burma, we've had a very quick decrease." He asked, "Is it going to last?" Four years ago farmers in Banna Sala, an isolated Laotian hamlet of several hundred ethnic Hmong, grew opiumpoppies with impunity. No longer. And some farmers are angry. "They stopped me from growing opium, so I don't have money to send my children to school," said one villager, Jeryeh Singya, 34, who has seven children. She once bartered the opium she grew for soap, salt and clothing. "If they let me grow it I would," she said. Mr. Kon, the rebel commander in Myanmar, says farmers are finding it difficult to switch crops. "If they change and grow other kinds of plants nobody comes to buy their products -- the transportation is not good," he said. Experts say that to stay free of opium, isolated villages that depended on it will need assistance and investment for better roads, schools and clinics. But Myanmar, which is run by a military junta, poses a dilemma for Western countries. The United States has an embargo on trade with Myanmar. The European Union has suspended trade privileges and defense cooperation, limiting its aid to humanitarian assistance. "This policy of boycott and isolation has, of course, meant that only very little development aid and humanitarian assistance is flowing into the country," said Mr. Jelsma, the Dutch expert on drugs. "That makes the chances of the sustainability of this decline very questionable."
| 5,250 |
<h4><strong>Afghanistan instability allow for opium growth --- that shifts opium production away from Burma</h4><p>Fuller, 07</strong> (Thomas, Southeast Asia Correspondent for The New York Times, “No Blowing Smoke: Poppies Fade in Southeast Asia:”, 9/16/2007, New York Times, Proquest, JKahn)</p><p>As a result, <u>the Golden Triangle has been eclipsed by the Golden Crescent</u> -- <u><mark>the poppy-growing area</mark> in and <mark>around Afghanistan</mark> that <mark>is now the source of</u></mark> an estimated <u><mark>92 percent of the world's opium</u></mark>, according to the United Nations. Much of the growth in <u>opium production there is in areas controlled by <mark>the Taliban</mark>, which</u> United States officials say <u><mark>uses revenue from opium</mark> and heroin <mark>to finance itself. This shift to Afghanistan has had</mark> major <mark>consequences for the global</mark> heroin <mark>market</u></mark>: a near doubling of opium production worldwide in less than two decades. Poppies grown in the fertile valleys of southern Afghanistan yield on average four times more opium than those grown in upland Southeast Asia. A striking aspect of the decline of the Golden Triangle is the role China has played in pressing opium-growing regions to eradicate poppy crops. A major market for Golden Triangle heroin, China has seen a spike in addicts and H.I.V. infections from contaminated needles. <u>The area of <mark>Myanmar</mark> along the Chinese border</u>, which once produced about 30 percent of the country's opium, <u><mark>was declared opium-free</u></mark> last year by the United Nations. Local authorities, who are from the Wa tribe and are autonomous from <u><mark>Myanmar's</mark> central <mark>government</u></mark>, have <u><mark>banned poppy cultivation</u></mark> and welcomed Chinese investmentin rubber, sugar cane and tea plantations, casinos and other businesses. "China has had an underestimated role," said Martin Jelsma, a Dutch researcher who has written extensively on the illicit drug trade in Asia. "Their main leverage is economic: These <u>border areas of Burma are by now economically</u> much more <u>connected to China</u> than the rest of Burma," he said, using the former name for Myanmar. "For local authorities it's quite clear that, <u>for</u> <u>any investments they want to attract, cooperation</u> with China <u>is a necessity</u>." Myanmar remains the world's second-leading source of opium but is a distant second; its production declined by 80 percent over the last decade. Insurgents have long used opium to help finance civil wars in the Golden Triangle. But <u>some are</u> now <u>working to destroy the crop</u>. At least one faction of the Shan State Army, a group that long had ties to the heroin business, says it is leading eradication efforts. Kon Jern, a military commander for the group, which is based along Myanmar's border with northern Thailand, says he is cracking down because government militias and corrupt officials profit from opium. "<u>They sell the drugs, they buy weapons, and they use those weapons to attack us</u>," he said. The United Nations credits Myanmar's central government with leading the eradication effort in Shan areas. In Laos, where the political situation is more stable, the government began a crackdown in the 1990s to increase its international credibility and because officials realized their own children were at risk, said Leik Boonwaat, the representative in Laos for the U.N.'s Office on Drugs and Crime. Laos finally outlawed opium in 1996. The government, Mr. Boonwaat said, also saw that opium did little to help poor farmers who grew poppies. "It's mostly the organized crime syndicates that made most of the profits," he said. The amount of land cultivated in Laos for opium has fallen 94 percent since 1998. The country now produces so little opium that it may now be a net importer of the drug, the United Nations says. Yet experts warn that the reductions may not hold unless farmers develop other ways to make a living. Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, an opium specialist at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris, says it took Thailand 30 years to wean opium farmers from poppy production, a transition led by the Thai royal family, which encouraged opium-growing hill tribes to use their cooler climate to produce coffee, macadamia nuts and green vegetables. But, he said, "In Laos and Burma, we've had a very quick decrease." He asked, "Is it going to last?" Four years ago farmers in Banna Sala, an isolated Laotian hamlet of several hundred ethnic Hmong, grew opiumpoppies with impunity. No longer. And some farmers are angry. "They stopped me from growing opium, so I don't have money to send my children to school," said one villager, Jeryeh Singya, 34, who has seven children. She once bartered the opium she grew for soap, salt and clothing. "If they let me grow it I would," she said. Mr. Kon, the rebel commander in<strong> Myanmar, says farmers are finding it difficult to switch crops. "If they change and grow other kinds of plants nobody comes to buy their products -- the transportation is not good," he said. Experts say that to stay free of opium, isolated villages that depended on it will need assistance and investment for better roads, schools and clinics. But Myanmar, which is run by a military junta, poses a dilemma for Western countries. The United States has an embargo on trade with Myanmar. The European Union has suspended trade privileges and defense cooperation, limiting its aid to humanitarian assistance. "This policy of boycott and isolation has, of course, meant that only very little development aid and humanitarian assistance is flowing into the country," said Mr. Jelsma, the Dutch expert on drugs. "That makes the chances of the sustainability of this decline very questionable."</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 2
| 430,984 | 1 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,266 |
NUCLEAR WAR
| null |
Deutsch 02 - Founder of Rabid Tiger Project (Political Risk Consulting and Research Firm focusing on Russia and Eastern Europe) [Jeffrey, "SETTING THE STAGE FOR WORLD WAR III," Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Nov 18, http://www.rabidtigers.com/rtn/newsletterv2n9.html]
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nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil as well as brushfire and other wars turn into a really nasty stew Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of
an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.
|
nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil as well as occasional brushfire and other wars Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open rang
an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight.
|
The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of
the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.
| 1,544 |
<h4>NUCLEAR WAR</h4><p><u>Deutsch 02</u><strong> </strong>- Founder of Rabid Tiger Project (Political Risk Consulting and Research Firm focusing on Russia and Eastern Europe) [Jeffrey, "SETTING THE STAGE FOR WORLD WAR III," Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Nov 18, <u>http://www.rabidtigers.com/rtn/newsletterv2n9.html</u>]</p><p>The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a <u><strong><mark>nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil</u></strong></mark> wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, <u><strong><mark>as well as</u></strong> occasional <u><strong>brushfire and other wars</u></strong></mark> (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) <u><strong>turn into a really nasty stew</u></strong>. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. <u><strong><mark>Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open rang</mark>e</strong>.</u> <u><strong>Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of</p><p></u></strong>the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus, <u><strong><mark>an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly</mark>.</u></strong> Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But <u><strong><mark>an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight.</u></strong></mark> Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. <u><strong>Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.</p></u></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 31,632 | 72 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,267 |
Role-playing allows us to critique the state from with in.
|
Stark, ’96
|
Stark, ’96 (Tennessee Associate Law Professor, Winter 32 Stan J Int’L L 91)
|
role-playing enables students to explore state identity from the "inside. Through role-playing, students discover how self-interest shapes state narratives role-playing allows students to forget themselves and their anxieties freeing them to explore these questions creatively
|
role-playing enables students to explore state identity from the "inside. role-playing allows students to explore these questions creatively
|
Role-playing exercises, in which students assume the roles of various states, replicate the diffusion of normative authority and the need for consensus which characterize the law on the use of force. 68 In addition, [*102] role-playing enables students to explore state identity from the "inside." What shapes state identity? The case studies contained in Volume II allow students to explore a wide range of political, geo-political and historical factors which have produced various hot-spots throughout the world, as well as to distinguish state identity from "American" identity. Through role-playing, students discover how self-interest shapes state narratives. Which states want to strengthen the Charter paradigm and which seek to challenge it? Which state dominates the conversation? Why do the others allow it to do so? Finally, as Stephanie Wildman has pointed out, role-playing allows students to forget themselves and their anxieties about their performance in law school, freeing them to explore these questions creatively. 69
| 1,040 |
<h4><strong>Role-playing allows us to critique the state from with in.</h4><p>Stark, ’96</strong> (Tennessee Associate Law Professor, Winter 32 Stan J Int’L L 91)</p><p>Role-playing exercises, in which students assume the roles of various states, replicate the diffusion of normative authority and the need for consensus which characterize the law on the use of force. 68 In addition, [*102] <u><mark>role-playing enables students to explore state identity from the "inside.</u></mark>" What shapes state identity? The case studies contained in Volume II allow students to explore a wide range of political, geo-political and historical factors which have produced various hot-spots throughout the world, as well as to distinguish state identity from "American" identity. <u>Through role-playing, students discover how self-interest shapes state narratives</u>. Which states want to strengthen the Charter paradigm and which seek to challenge it? Which state dominates the conversation? Why do the others allow it to do so? Finally, as Stephanie Wildman has pointed out, <u><mark>role-playing allows students to </mark>forget themselves and their anxieties</u> about their performance in law school, <u><strong>freeing them to <mark>explore these questions creatively</u></mark>. 69</p></strong>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,985 | 1 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,268 |
Footnotes of their ev specifically say the CP solves
|
Wild 2013
|
Wild 2013 [Footnotes 108 and 109 which are after one of their most rhetorically powerful lines, Joshua, JD, Suffolk University, EPIC FAILURE: THE UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTH ABOUT THE UNITED STATES' ROLE IN THE FAILURE OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON DRUGS AND HOW IT IS GOING TO FIX IT, Suffolk University Suffolk Transnational Law Review Summer, 2013, 36 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 423, p. lexis]
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Promotion of more tolerant drug policies through experimenting with one already socially acceptable drug is more likely to occur than a radical culture shift This relatively small step would have a domino effect on the rest of the world because of the United States' international political influence Holder announced that raiding medical marijuana facilities was a low priority of federal law enforcement. This is a pivotal point in progressive reform because it allows states to act without interference from the federal government
| null |
n108. See generally GCDP, supra note 1 (suggesting value of governmental experimentation with legal regulation extends to case study potential). If the United States was to legalize marijuana, it could study the effects on United States society directly and not have to speculate or hypothesize about past studies. See id. Promotion of more tolerant drug policies through experimenting with one already socially acceptable drug is more likely to occur than a radical culture shift. See id. This relatively small step would have a domino effect on the rest of the world because of the United States' international political influence. See id. n109. See Welch & Leinwand, supra note 6 (noting current administration's perspective on marijuana in federal drug policy). The Attorney General of the United States, Eric Holder, announced that raiding medical marijuana facilities was a low priority of federal law enforcement. Id. This is a pivotal point in progressive reform because it allows states to act without interference from the federal government. Id.
| 1,056 |
<h4>Footnotes of their ev specifically say the CP solves</h4><p><strong>Wild 2013</strong> [Footnotes 108 and 109 which are after one of their most rhetorically powerful lines, Joshua, JD, Suffolk University, EPIC FAILURE: THE UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTH ABOUT THE UNITED STATES' ROLE IN THE FAILURE OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON DRUGS AND HOW IT IS GOING TO FIX IT, Suffolk University Suffolk Transnational Law Review Summer, 2013, 36 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 423, p. lexis] </p><p>n108. See generally GCDP, supra note 1 (suggesting value of governmental experimentation with legal regulation extends to case study potential). If the United States was to legalize marijuana, it could study the effects on United States society directly and not have to speculate or hypothesize about past studies. See id. <u>Promotion of more tolerant drug policies through experimenting with one already socially acceptable drug is more likely to occur than a radical culture shift</u>. See id. <u>This relatively small step would have a domino effect on the rest of the world because of the United States' international political influence</u>. See id. n109. See Welch & Leinwand, supra note 6 (noting current administration's perspective on marijuana in federal drug policy). The Attorney General of the United States, Eric <u>Holder</u>, <u>announced that raiding medical marijuana facilities was a low priority of federal law enforcement. </u>Id. <u><strong>This is a pivotal point in progressive reform because it allows states to act without interference from the federal government</u></strong>. Id.</p>
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2nr
| null |
CP: A/T “Wild Ev”
| 430,566 | 47 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,269 |
Sustained drop in revenue is key to regime change in Burma
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ISMI, 1
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ISMI, 1
|
the Burmese junta killed 10,000 people in 1988 and has turned Burma into a vast slave labour camp torture, summary executions, slave labour, rape, forced displacement, and oppression of minorities are commonplace The junta has incorporated drug trafficking into the country's permanent economy heroin finances the SPDC's arms purchases with which it maintains its iron-fisted rule
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the Burmese junta turned Burma into a slave camp torture and oppression are commonplace The junta has incorporated drug trafficking into the country's economy heroin finances arms purchases which it maintains its rule
|
(Asad, Ph.D. in War Studies from the University of London, CCPA Monitor, March, http://www.asadismi.ws/burma.html)
Friedland and the Burmese junta form a powerful combination. Here is a Canadian mining investor linked to major environmental disasters and mercenaries joining with a military junta that killed 10,000 people in 1988 (to crush a student uprising) and has turned Burma into a vast slave labour camp, as well as the world's leading heroin exporter. The SPDC refused to hand over power to Aung San Suu Kyi when her party won the 1990 elections and has held her under house arrest since then. According to the United Nations, torture, summary executions, slave labour, rape, forced displacement, and oppression of minorities are commonplace in Burma. The junta has incorporated drug trafficking into the country's permanent economy, so that Burma now supplies 60% of the world's heroin and 80% of that drug sold in Canada. Under the SPDC, Burma has more than doubled drug exports. Foreign investment is used to launder profits from the junta's drug trafficking. The money generated by heroin, foreign investment and tourism finances the SPDC's arms purchases (mainly from China) with which it maintains its iron-fisted rule.
| 1,234 |
<h4><strong>Sustained drop in revenue is key to regime change in Burma</h4><p>ISMI, 1</p><p></strong>(Asad, Ph.D. in War Studies from the University of London, CCPA Monitor, March, http://www.asadismi.ws/burma.html)</p><p>Friedland and <u><mark>the Burmese junta</u></mark> form a powerful combination. Here is a Canadian mining investor linked to major environmental disasters and mercenaries joining with a military junta that <u>killed 10,000 people in 1988</u> (to crush a student uprising) <u>and has <mark>turned Burma into a</mark> vast <mark>slave</mark> labour <mark>camp</u></mark>, as well as the world's leading heroin exporter. The SPDC refused to hand over power to Aung San Suu Kyi when her party won the 1990 elections and has held her under house arrest since then. According to the United Nations, <u><mark>torture</mark>, summary executions, slave labour, rape, forced displacement, <mark>and oppression</mark> of minorities <mark>are commonplace</u></mark> in Burma. <u><mark>The junta has incorporated drug trafficking into the country's</mark> permanent <mark>economy</u></mark>, so that Burma now supplies 60% of the world's heroin and 80% of that drug sold in Canada. Under the SPDC, Burma has more than doubled drug exports. Foreign investment is used to launder profits from the junta's drug trafficking. The money generated by <u><mark>heroin</u></mark>, foreign investment and tourism <u><mark>finances</mark> the SPDC's <mark>arms purchases</u></mark> (mainly from China) <u>with <mark>which it maintains its</mark> iron-fisted <mark>rule</u></mark>.</p>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 2
| 430,986 | 1 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,270 |
The CP solves the impact of Raich
|
Shansky 7
|
Louis C. Shansky 7, J.D. Candidate 2007, DePaul University College of Law, Winter 2007, “NOTE: GONZALES V. RAICH: POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS UP IN SMOKE?,” DePaul Law Review, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 759
|
The Raich decision has removed most - if not all - of the doctrinal limitations on the reach of the commerce power. at the expense of the individual values that federalism is designed to protect But it may yet be possible for the Court to limit the effects of this decision if it chooses One avenue is to recognize the as-applied challenge in the commerce context Although it seems like the Court rejected this option in Raich, there is language in the opinion that could support another reading At some points, the Court analyzed the CSA in terms of all "intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana"; at others, in terms of "respondents' activities While the former suggests a facial analysis of the statute, the latter may suggest an as-applied analysis Analysis of a given regulation by reference to the specific activity at issue in a particular case would, at a minimum limit Congress's reach to those activities that actually affect interstate commerce Another option would be to simply demand a stronger showing on the record of the claimed connection to commerce, in terms of the jurisdictional findings As it stands, there are few areas that remain off limits to federal regulation Time will tell if the Court will reestablish some limitations and retreat from its deference to Congress
|
Raich removed limitations on But it may be possible for the Court to limit the effects of this decision One avenue is to recognize the as-applied challenge in the commerce context Although it seems like the Court rejected this option in Raich, the opinion could support another reading Analysis by reference to the specific activity at issue would limit Congress's reach to those activities that actually affect interstate commerce Another option would be to simply demand a stronger showing on the record of the claimed connection to commerce Time will tell if the Court will reestablish limitations and retreat from its deference to Congress
|
The Raich decision has removed most - if not all - of the doctrinal limitations on the reach of the commerce power. It has done so at the expense of the individual values that federalism is designed to protect. But it may yet be possible for the Court to limit the effects of this decision if it chooses. One avenue is to recognize the as-applied challenge in the commerce context. Although it seems like the Court rejected this option in Raich, there is language in the opinion that could support another reading. n334 n334. At some points, the Court analyzed the CSA in terms of all "intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana"; at others, in terms of "respondents' activities." Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005). While the former suggests a facial analysis of the statute, the latter may suggest an as-applied analysis--since it arguably refers to "the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law." Id. at 15. Analysis of a given regulation by reference to the specific activity at issue in a particular case would, at a minimum, limit Congress's reach to those activities that actually affect interstate commerce in some way. Another option would be to simply demand a stronger showing on the record of the claimed connection [*797] to commerce, at least in terms of the jurisdictional findings. n335 Although Raich's treatment of congressional findings is very deferential, the ongoing shift in the Court's personnel may be accompanied by a shift in attitude. n336 As it stands, there are few areas that remain off limits to federal regulation. Time will tell if the Court will reestablish some limitations and retreat from its deference to Congress, or whether the federal government will forevermore be able to regulate "quilting bees, clothes drives, and potluck suppers throughout the 50 States." n337
| 1,880 |
<h4>The CP solves the <u>impact</u> of Raich </h4><p>Louis C. <strong>Shansky 7</strong>, J.D. Candidate 2007, DePaul University College of Law, Winter 2007, “NOTE: GONZALES V. RAICH: POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS UP IN SMOKE?,” DePaul Law Review, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 759</p><p><u>The <mark>Raich</mark> decision has <mark>removed</mark> most - if not all - of the doctrinal <mark>limitations on</mark> the reach of the commerce power.</u> It has done so <u>at the expense of the individual values that federalism is designed to protect</u>. <u><mark>But it</u> <u>may </mark>yet <mark>be possible for the Court to limit the effects of this decision</u></mark> <u>if it chooses</u>. <u><mark>One avenue is to</u> <u>recognize the as-applied challenge in the commerce</mark> <mark>context</u></mark>. <u><mark>Although it seems like the Court rejected this option in Raich, </mark>there is language in<mark> the opinion </mark>that <mark>could support another reading</u></mark>. n334 n334. <u>At some points, the Court analyzed the CSA in terms of all "intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana"; at others, in terms of "respondents' activities</u>." Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005). <u>While the former suggests a facial analysis of the statute, the latter may suggest an as-applied analysis</u>--since it arguably refers to "the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law." Id. at 15. <u><mark>Analysis</mark> of a given regulation <mark>by reference to the specific activity at issue</mark> in a particular case <mark>would</mark>,</u> <u>at a minimum</u>, <u><mark>limit Congress's reach to</mark> <mark>those activities that actually affect interstate commerce</u></mark> in some way. <u><mark>Another option would be to</u> <u>simply demand a stronger showing on the record</u> <u>of the claimed connection</u></mark> [*797] <u><mark>to commerce</mark>,</u> at least <u>in terms of the jurisdictional findings</u>. n335 Although Raich's treatment of congressional findings is very deferential, the ongoing shift in the Court's personnel may be accompanied by a shift in attitude. n336 <u>As it stands, there are few areas that remain off limits to federal regulation</u>. <u><mark>Time will tell if the Court will</u> <u>reestablish</mark> some <mark>limitations and</mark> <mark>retreat from its deference to Congress</u></mark>, or whether the federal government will forevermore be able to regulate "quilting bees, clothes drives, and potluck suppers throughout the 50 States." n337</p>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 430,987 | 2 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,271 |
Focusing on the details and inner-workings of government policy-making is productive – critical approaches can’t resolve real world problems like poverty, racism and war
|
McClean, 01
|
McClean, 01 – Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, Molloy College, New York
|
Displays of high erudition are gratuitously reflected in much of the writing by those still clinging to Marxian ontology and is often just a useful smokescreen which shrouds a near total disconnect from empirical reality. what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of relevance to extant and critical policy debates, the passage of actual laws, and the amendment of existing regulations that might actually do some good for someone else. What Pragmatists see is the hope that we can fix some of the social ills that face us if we treat policy and reform as more important than Spirit and Utopia. the substance of this prose dissipates before it can reach the ground and be a useful component in a discussion of reform It is often too drenched in abstractions and references to a narrow and not so merry band of other intellectuals I try to make space for some new approaches and fresh thinking about that important question that always faces us - "What is to be done?" social justice is not a Platonic form but parses into the specific quotidian acts of institutions and individuals. Social justice is but the genus heading which may be described better with reference to its species iterations- the various conditions of cruelty and sadism which we wittingly or unwittingly permit. we could reconcile the grand general theories of these thinkers to specific bureaucracies or social problems and so try to increase their relevance. We could construct an account which acts as a bridge to relevant policy considerations. But such attempts, usually performed in the reams of secondary literature generated by their devotees, usually make things even more bizarre.
|
what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of relevance to critical policy debates, the passage of actual laws that might actually do some good for someone else. we can fix some of the social ills if we treat policy and reform as more important than Utopia I try to make space for new approaches about that important question "What is to be done?" social justice parses into the specific quotidian acts of institutions and individuals
|
(David E., “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” Presented at the 2001 Annual Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm, JMP)
There is a lot of philosophical prose on the general subject of social justice. Some of this is quite good, and some of it is quite bad. What distinguishes the good from the bad is not merely the level of erudition. Displays of high erudition are gratuitously reflected in much of the writing by those, for example, still clinging to Marxian ontology and is often just a useful smokescreen which shrouds a near total disconnect from empirical reality. This kind of political writing likes to make a lot of references to other obscure, jargon-laden essays and tedious books written by other true believers - the crowd that takes the fusion of Marxian and Freudian private fantasies seriously. Nor is it the lack of scholarship that makes this prose bad. Much of it is well "supported" by footnotes referencing a lode of other works, some of which are actually quite good. Rather, what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of relevance to extant and critical policy debates, the passage of actual laws, and the amendment of existing regulations that might actually do some good for someone else. The writers of this bad prose are too interested in our arrival at some social place wherein we will finally emerge from our "inauthentic" state into something called "reality." Most of this stuff, of course, comes from those steeped in the Continental tradition (particularly post-Kant). While that tradition has much to offer and has helped shape my own philosophical sensibilities, it is anything but useful when it comes to truly relevant philosophical analysis, and no self-respecting Pragmatist can really take seriously the strong poetry of formations like "authenticity looming on the ever remote horizons of fetishization." What Pragmatists see instead is the hope that we can fix some of the social ills that face us if we treat policy and reform as more important than Spirit and Utopia. Like light rain released from pretty clouds too high in the atmosphere, the substance of this prose dissipates before it can reach the ground and be a useful component in a discussion of medicare reform or how to better regulate a pharmaceutical industry that bankrupts senior citizens and condemns to death HIV patients unfortunate enough to have been born in Burkina Faso - and a regulatory regime that permits this. It is often too drenched in abstractions and references to a narrow and not so merry band of other intellectuals (Nietzsche, Bataille, Foucault, Lukács, Benjamin) to be of much use to those who are the supposed subject matter of this preternatural social justice literature. Since I have no particular allegiance to these other intellectuals, no particular impulse to carry their water or defend their reputations, I try and forget as much as I can about their writings in order to make space for some new approaches and fresh thinking about that important question that always faces us - "What is to be done?" I am, I think, lucky to have taken this decision before it had become too late. One might argue with me that these other intellectuals are not looking to be taken seriously in the construction of solutions to specific socio-political problems. They are, after all, philosophers engaged in something called philosophizing. They are, after all, just trying to be good culture critics. Of course, that isn't quite true, for they often write with specific reference to social issues and social justice in mind, even when they are fluttering about in the ether of high theory (Lukács, for example, was a government officer, albeit a minister of culture, which to me says a lot), and social justice is not a Platonic form but parses into the specific quotidian acts of institutions and individuals. Social justice is but the genus heading which may be described better with reference to its species iterations- the various conditions of cruelty and sadism which we wittingly or unwittingly permit. If we wanted to, we could reconcile the grand general theories of these thinkers to specific bureaucracies or social problems and so try to increase their relevance. We could construct an account which acts as a bridge to relevant policy considerations. But such attempts, usually performed in the reams of secondary literature generated by their devotees, usually make things even more bizarre. In any event, I don't think we owe them that amount of effort. After all, if they wanted to be relevant they could have said so by writing in such a way that made it clear that relevance was a high priority. For Marxians in general, everything tends to get reduced to class. For Lukács everything tends to get reduced to "reification." But society and its social ills are far too intricate to gloss in these ways, and the engines that drive competing interests are much more easily explained with reference to animal drives and fears than by Absolute Spirit. That is to say, they are not easily explained at all.
| 5,199 |
<h4><strong>Focusing on the details and inner-workings of government policy-making is productive – critical approaches can’t resolve real world problems like poverty, racism and war </h4><p>McClean, 01</strong> – Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, Molloy College, New York</p><p>(David E., “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” Presented at the 2001 Annual Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm, JMP)</p><p>There is a lot of philosophical prose on the general subject of social justice. Some of this is quite good, and some of it is quite bad. What distinguishes the good from the bad is not merely the level of erudition. <u>Displays of high erudition are gratuitously reflected in much of the writing by those</u>, for example, <u>still clinging to Marxian ontology and is often just a useful smokescreen which shrouds a near <strong>total disconnect from empirical reality.</u></strong> This kind of political writing likes to make a lot of references to other obscure, jargon-laden essays and tedious books written by other true believers - the crowd that takes the fusion of Marxian and Freudian private fantasies seriously. Nor is it the lack of scholarship that makes this prose bad. Much of it is well "supported" by footnotes referencing a lode of other works, some of which are actually quite good. Rather, <u><mark>what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of relevance to</mark> extant and <mark>critical policy debates, the passage of actual laws</mark>, and the amendment of existing regulations <mark>that might actually do some good for someone else.</u></mark> The writers of this bad prose are too interested in our arrival at some social place wherein we will finally emerge from our "inauthentic" state into something called "reality." Most of this stuff, of course, comes from those steeped in the Continental tradition (particularly post-Kant). While that tradition has much to offer and has helped shape my own philosophical sensibilities, it is anything but useful when it comes to truly relevant philosophical analysis, and no self-respecting Pragmatist can really take seriously the strong poetry of formations like "authenticity looming on the ever remote horizons of fetishization." <u>What Pragmatists see</u> instead <u>is the hope that <mark>we can fix some of the social ills</mark> that face us <mark>if we treat policy and reform as more important than</mark> Spirit and <mark>Utopia</mark>. </u>Like light rain released from pretty clouds too high in the atmosphere, <u>the substance of this prose dissipates before it can reach the ground and be a useful component in a discussion of</u> medicare <u>reform</u> or how to better regulate a pharmaceutical industry that bankrupts senior citizens and condemns to death HIV patients unfortunate enough to have been born in Burkina Faso - and a regulatory regime that permits this. <u>It is often too drenched in abstractions and references to a narrow and not so merry band of other intellectuals</u> (Nietzsche, Bataille, Foucault, Lukács, Benjamin) to be of much use to those who are the supposed subject matter of this preternatural social justice literature. Since I have no particular allegiance to these other intellectuals, no particular impulse to carry their water or defend their reputations, <u><mark>I try</u></mark> and forget as much as I can about their writings in order <u><mark>to make space for</mark> some <mark>new approaches</mark> and fresh thinking <mark>about that important question</mark> that always faces us - <mark>"What is to be done?"</u></mark> I am, I think, lucky to have taken this decision before it had become too late. One might argue with me that these other intellectuals are not looking to be taken seriously in the construction of solutions to specific socio-political problems. They are, after all, philosophers engaged in something called philosophizing. They are, after all, just trying to be good culture critics. Of course, that isn't quite true, for they often write with specific reference to social issues and social justice in mind, even when they are fluttering about in the ether of high theory (Lukács, for example, was a government officer, albeit a minister of culture, which to me says a lot), and <u><mark>social justice</mark> is not a Platonic form but <mark>parses into the specific quotidian acts of institutions and individuals</mark>. Social justice is but the genus heading which may be described better with reference to its species iterations- the various conditions of cruelty and sadism which we wittingly or unwittingly permit.</u> If we wanted to, <u>we could reconcile the grand general theories of these thinkers to specific bureaucracies or social problems and so try to increase their relevance. We could construct an account which acts as a bridge to relevant policy considerations. But such attempts, usually performed in the reams of secondary literature generated by their devotees, usually make things even more bizarre.</u> In any event, I don't think we owe them that amount of effort. After all, if they wanted to be relevant they could have said so by writing in such a way that made it clear that relevance was a high priority. For Marxians in general, everything tends to get reduced to class. For Lukács<strong> everything tends to get reduced to "reification." But society and its social ills are far too intricate to gloss in these ways, and the engines that drive competing interests are much more easily explained with reference to animal drives and fears than by Absolute Spirit. That is to say, they are not easily explained at all.</p></strong>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 12,732 | 159 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,272 |
Wild says SUBSTANCE matters not SIGNAL- the CP is BETTER for “experimenting with models of legal regulation”
|
Wild 2013
|
Wild 2013 [Joshua, JD, Suffolk University, EPIC FAILURE: THE UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTH ABOUT THE UNITED STATES' ROLE IN THE FAILURE OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON DRUGS AND HOW IT IS GOING TO FIX IT, Suffolk University Suffolk Transnational Law Review Summer, 2013, 36 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 423, p. lexis]
|
The U.S. has worked strenuously to ensure that all countries adopt its rigid, prohibitionist approach to drug policy The U.S. can remedy its mistake by using its considerable diplomatic influence and international presence to foster reform in other countries One way to do this is by capitalizing on this unique moment in its existence and experimenting with models of legal regulation specifically with marijuana This will help redeem our image because the international marijuana market is largely created by the exorbitant U.S. demand for the drug
| null |
IV. Analysis A. A Starting Point for Review: Taking Accountability The War on Drugs' demise started when the bellicose analogy was created. n77 The correct classification of the global drug problem was and still is as a set of interlinked health and social challenges to be managed, not a war to be won. n78 The U.S. has worked strenuously for the past fifty years to ensure that all countries adopt its rigid, prohibitionist approach to drug policy, essentially repressing the potential for alternative policy development and experimentation. n79 This was an expensive mistake that the U.S. unfortunately cannot take back. n80 The current emergence from the economic recession of 2008-2009 has set the stage for a generational, political and cultural shift, placing the U.S. in a unique moment in its history; the necessary sociopolitical context to revoke its prohibitionist ideals and replace them with more modern policies grounded in health, science and humanity. n81 The U.S. can remedy its mistake by using its considerable diplomatic influence and international presence to foster reform in other countries. n82 One way to do this is by capitalizing [*438] on this unique moment in its existence and experimenting with models of legal regulation, specifically with marijuana because nearly half of U.S. citizens favor legalization of it. n83 This will help redeem our image internationally and help repair foreign relations because the monumental scope of the international marijuana market is largely created by the exorbitant U.S. demand for the drug which partially stems from the illegality of the market. n84
| 1,621 |
<h4>Wild says SUBSTANCE matters not SIGNAL- the CP is BETTER for “experimenting with models of legal regulation”</h4><p><strong>Wild 2013</strong> [Joshua, JD, Suffolk University, EPIC FAILURE: THE UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTH ABOUT THE UNITED STATES' ROLE IN THE FAILURE OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON DRUGS AND HOW IT IS GOING TO FIX IT, Suffolk University Suffolk Transnational Law Review Summer, 2013, 36 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 423, p. lexis] </p><p>IV. Analysis A. A Starting Point for Review: Taking Accountability The War on Drugs' demise started when the bellicose analogy was created. n77 The correct classification of the global drug problem was and still is as a set of interlinked health and social challenges to be managed, not a war to be won. n78 <u>The U.S. has worked strenuously</u> for the past fifty years <u>to ensure that all countries adopt its rigid, prohibitionist approach to drug policy</u>, essentially repressing the potential for alternative policy development and experimentation. n79 This was an expensive mistake that the U.S. unfortunately cannot take back. n80 The current emergence from the economic recession of 2008-2009 has set the stage for a generational, political and cultural shift, placing the U.S. in a unique moment in its history; the necessary sociopolitical context to revoke its prohibitionist ideals and replace them with more modern policies grounded in health, science and humanity. n81 <u>The U.S. can remedy its mistake by using its considerable diplomatic influence and international presence to foster reform in other countries</u>. n82 <u>One way to do this is by capitalizing </u>[*438] <u>on this unique moment in its existence and <strong>experimenting with models of legal regulation</u></strong>, <u>specifically with marijuana</u> because nearly half of U.S. citizens favor legalization of it. n83 <u>This will help redeem our image</u> internationally and help repair foreign relations <u>because</u> the monumental scope of <u>the</u> <u>international marijuana market is largely created by the exorbitant U.S. demand for the drug</u> which partially stems from the illegality of the market. n84</p>
|
2nr
| null |
CP: A/T “Wild Ev”
| 430,567 | 2 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,273 |
Survival of the current Burmese government will eventually result in prolif and nuclear war
|
Selth, 7
|
Selth, 7 (Andrew, Research Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, ‘Burma and Nuclear Proliferation: Policies and perceptions’, Regional Outlook Paper No. 12, 2007, www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0015/18240/regional-outlook-volume-12.pdf)
|
The regime has long been subject to a demand for regime change To an isolated, insecure and fearful group of military officers in Burma, all these statements could be interpreted as evidence of an intention to impose political change on Burma, against which they needed to prepare global developments have sharpened Burma’s concerns the worry is the Western democracies will be able to impose their agenda on Burma the support of the Burmese people cannot be relied upon many would welcome the downfall of the regime in these circumstances a nuclear deterrent could appeal to Burma’s leaders the SPDC may have drawn the same conclusions from Iraq and will seek to acquire a nuclear weapon Burmese generals ‘admire the North Koreans for standing up to the United States and wish they could do the same’ Possession of nuclear weapons would be more than symbolic Burma’s military government might actually consider using them SRBMs could easily reach Bangkok, a city of nine million If it possessed WMD, Burma would have the option of visiting even greater destruction upon its neighbour.
|
many welcome the downfall of the regime a nuclear deterrent could appeal to Burma’s leaders the SPDC may draw conclusions from Iraq and acquire a nuclear weapon Possession of nuclear weapons would be more than symbolic Burma’s military government might us them SRBMs could reach Bangkok Burma would visit greater destruction upon its neighbour
|
The regime has long been subject to harsh criticism from Western leaders. Implicit in most of these comments has been a demand for regime change. In 2003, for example, US Secretary of State Colin Powell referred to ‘the thugs who now rule Burma’ and his successor has labelled Burma ‘an outpost of tyranny’ to which the US must help bring freedom. In 2005, President Bush told an international audience that the Burmese people ‘want their liberty – and one day they shall have it’. In his 2006 State of the Union speech, immediately after references to the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, Burma was ranked alongside Syria, Iran and North Korea as places where ‘the demands of justice, and the peace of the world, require their freedom’. In the UK, Prime Minister Blair has been reported as saying that the SPDC was a ‘loathsome regime’ that he would ‘love to destroy’. Also, senior members of Congress have repeatedly characterised the SPDC as ‘repressive and illegitimate’ and in 2007 a leading UK parliamentarian told a visiting Burmese minister that Burma was a ‘pariah state’ ruled by ‘a wicked regime’. In stark contrast, public comments about Burmese opposition figures like Aung San Suu Kyi have been uniformly complimentary and supportive. To an isolated, insecure and fearful group of military officers in Burma, all these statements could be interpreted as evidence of an intention to impose political change on Burma, against which they needed to prepare. Also, global developments over the past few decades have sharpened Burma’s concerns that it might fall victim to a larger, more powerful state. In the past, this fear was focused on China but the worry is now that, in a post-Cold War world dominated by the US, the Western democracies will be able to impose their liberal, democratic and humanitarian agenda on Burma. Since 2002, there have been numerous calls for Burma to be included in President Bush’s ‘axis of evil’. The armed interventions in Haiti, Panama, Somalia, Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq (twice) are all viewed as examples of the US’s determination, unilaterally if necessary, to intervene in the affairs of other states and overthrow regimes whose policies are inimical to Washington. The 1999 multinational operation in East Timor, where a separatist movement was able to win independence from its parent state, is cited by members of Burma’s military hierarchy as another example of the way in which the US and its allies are forcibly reshaping the world order. In this process, the UN is seen as unwilling or unable to defend the interests of its smaller and weaker members. It is always difficult to determine what Burma’s military leadership is thinking, particularly with regard to matters of national security. However, faced with these perceived threats, the regime’s strategic planners seem to have fallen back on Burma’s traditional strengths – both real and imagined. These include Burma’s armed forces, its highly varied geography and the patriotism of its people. Developments in Burmese military doctrine suggest that, faced with an invasion by modern armed forces, the regime would attempt first to deter an assault with the threat of high casualties. It would next mount a conventional defence of Burma’s borders, followed by a prolonged guerrilla war conducted by the population at large. Large numbers of Burmese citizens would be mobilised as militia units, to sap the will of an invader until a counter-offensive could be organised or external assistance arrived. The regime clearly recognises that it could not win a direct force-on-force confrontation with a coalition like that which attacked Afghanistan or Iraq, but it seems to feel that it could force an enemy to think twice about invading, and then buy time until the international community forced a ceasefire. This doctrine, however, has two major flaws, which must be recognised by the SPDC’s more honest and clear-sighted strategic planners. The first is that the support of the Burmese people cannot be relied upon. The majority are intensely patriotic, but they owe their loyalty to the country – not necessarily to the military government. There are many, both ethnic Burmans and members of the minority races, who would welcome the downfall of the current regime. Also, the SPDC’s plan to appeal to the international community must now be looking very weak. The Bush Administration and its allies have demonstrated a preparedness to invade another country despite the lack of an immediate or obvious threat, and in the face of strong opposition from both their critics and traditional partners, including in the UN. Also, in 2007 a move to censure Burma in the UNSC was only prevented by the SPDC’s new allies, China and Russia. Any faith that the regime might have had in support from that institution must now be severely undermined. Direct assistance from China is possible but, given the regime’s suspicion of Beijing’s long terms aims, any help from that quarter would be a mixed blessing. It is in these circumstances that a nuclear deterrent could have some appeal to Burma’s leaders. Of concern to strategic analysts is the possibility that the SPDC may have drawn the same conclusions from the 2003 Iraq War that North Korea seems to have done, and will seek to acquire a nuclear weapon as a bargaining chip to protect itself against the US and its allies. According to one report, some Burmese generals ‘admire the North Koreans for standing up to the United States and wish they could do the same’. The SPDC could argue that North Korea’s possession of a nuclear retaliatory capability has been the main reason why the US and its allies, or the UN, have not taken tougher action against Pyongyang, despite its long record of provocative behaviour. Viewed from this perspective, the possession of nuclear weapons has given North Korea a higher international profile, a stronger position at the negotiating table and the proven ability to win concessions (including funds, food aid, fuel oil and technical assistance) from the international community. Iran’s nuclear weapons program may have a different outcome, but there are reportedly a few generals in Burma who feel that the SPDC should at least consider the benefits of such an approach. Possession of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles would be more than symbolic. If Burma’s military government ever felt seriously threatened, it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which it might actually consider using them. For example, faced with an imminent invasion, and with Kuwait’s role in the Iraq war in mind, any ballistic missiles acquired from Pyongyang could be aimed at Thailand, a US ally and Burma’s ‘nearest enemy’. This might help dissuade the Thai government from allowing its territory to be used as the launching pad for a major ground and air assault against its western neighbour. SRBMs may not be very accurate but, if launched from a Burmese site near the Thai border, they could easily reach greater Bangkok, a city of nearly nine million people. Even if armed only with a conventional warhead, such a threat would certainly concentrate the minds of Thai leaders. If it possessed WMD, Burma would have the option of visiting even greater destruction upon its neighbour.
| 7,292 |
<h4><strong>Survival of the current Burmese government will eventually result in prolif and nuclear war</h4><p>Selth, 7</strong> (Andrew, Research Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, ‘Burma and Nuclear Proliferation: Policies and perceptions’, Regional Outlook Paper No. 12, 2007, www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0015/18240/regional-outlook-volume-12.pdf)</p><p><u>The regime has long been subject to </u>harsh criticism from Western leaders. Implicit in most of these comments has been <u>a demand for regime change</u>. In 2003, for example, US Secretary of State Colin Powell referred to ‘the thugs who now rule Burma’ and his successor has labelled Burma ‘an outpost of tyranny’ to which the US must help bring freedom. In 2005, President Bush told an international audience that the Burmese people ‘want their liberty – and one day they shall have it’. In his 2006 State of the Union speech, immediately after references to the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, Burma was ranked alongside Syria, Iran and North Korea as places where ‘the demands of justice, and the peace of the world, require their freedom’. In the UK, Prime Minister Blair has been reported as saying that the SPDC was a ‘loathsome regime’ that he would ‘love to destroy’. Also, senior members of Congress have repeatedly characterised the SPDC as ‘repressive and illegitimate’ and in 2007 a leading UK parliamentarian told a visiting Burmese minister that Burma was a ‘pariah state’ ruled by ‘a wicked regime’. In stark contrast, public comments about Burmese opposition figures like Aung San Suu Kyi have been uniformly complimentary and supportive. <u>To an isolated, insecure and fearful group of military officers in Burma, all these statements could be interpreted as evidence of an intention to impose political change on Burma, against which they needed to prepare</u>. Also, <u>global developments</u> over the past few decades <u>have sharpened Burma’s concerns</u> that it might fall victim to a larger, more powerful state. In the past, this fear was focused on China but <u>the worry is</u> now that, in a post-Cold War world dominated by the US, <u>the Western democracies will be able to impose their</u> liberal, democratic and humanitarian <u>agenda on Burma</u>. Since 2002, there have been numerous calls for Burma to be included in President Bush’s ‘axis of evil’. The armed interventions in Haiti, Panama, Somalia, Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq (twice) are all viewed as examples of the US’s determination, unilaterally if necessary, to intervene in the affairs of other states and overthrow regimes whose policies are inimical to Washington. The 1999 multinational operation in East Timor, where a separatist movement was able to win independence from its parent state, is cited by members of Burma’s military hierarchy as another example of the way in which the US and its allies are forcibly reshaping the world order. In this process, the UN is seen as unwilling or unable to defend the interests of its smaller and weaker members. It is always difficult to determine what Burma’s military leadership is thinking, particularly with regard to matters of national security. However, faced with these perceived threats, the regime’s strategic planners seem to have fallen back on Burma’s traditional strengths – both real and imagined. These include Burma’s armed forces, its highly varied geography and the patriotism of its people. Developments in Burmese military doctrine suggest that, faced with an invasion by modern armed forces, the regime would attempt first to deter an assault with the threat of high casualties. It would next mount a conventional defence of Burma’s borders, followed by a prolonged guerrilla war conducted by the population at large. Large numbers of Burmese citizens would be mobilised as militia units, to sap the will of an invader until a counter-offensive could be organised or external assistance arrived. The regime clearly recognises that it could not win a direct force-on-force confrontation with a coalition like that which attacked Afghanistan or Iraq, but it seems to feel that it could force an enemy to think twice about invading, and then buy time until the international community forced a ceasefire. This doctrine, however, has two major flaws, which must be recognised by the SPDC’s more honest and clear-sighted strategic planners. The first is that <u>the support of the Burmese people cannot be relied upon</u>. The majority are intensely patriotic, but they owe their loyalty to the country – not necessarily to the military government. There are <u><mark>many</u></mark>, both ethnic Burmans and members of the minority races, who <u>would <mark>welcome the downfall of the</u></mark> current <u><mark>regime</u></mark>. Also, the SPDC’s plan to appeal to the international community must now be looking very weak. The Bush Administration and its allies have demonstrated a preparedness to invade another country despite the lack of an immediate or obvious threat, and in the face of strong opposition from both their critics and traditional partners, including in the UN. Also, in 2007 a move to censure Burma in the UNSC was only prevented by the SPDC’s new allies, China and Russia. Any faith that the regime might have had in support from that institution must now be severely undermined. Direct assistance from China is possible but, given the regime’s suspicion of Beijing’s long terms aims, any help from that quarter would be a mixed blessing. It is <u>in these circumstances</u> that <u><mark>a nuclear deterrent could</mark> </u>have some <u><mark>appeal to Burma’s leaders</u></mark>. Of concern to strategic analysts is the possibility that <u><mark>the SPDC may</mark> have <mark>draw</mark>n the same <mark>conclusions from</u></mark> the 2003 <u><mark>Iraq</u></mark> War that North Korea seems to have done, <u><mark>and</mark> will seek to <mark>acquire a nuclear weapon</u></mark> as a bargaining chip to protect itself against the US and its allies. According to one report, some <u>Burmese generals ‘admire the North Koreans for standing up to the United States and wish they could do the same’</u>. The SPDC could argue that North Korea’s possession of a nuclear retaliatory capability has been the main reason why the US and its allies, or the UN, have not taken tougher action against Pyongyang, despite its long record of provocative behaviour. Viewed from this perspective, the possession of nuclear weapons has given North Korea a higher international profile, a stronger position at the negotiating table and the proven ability to win concessions (including funds, food aid, fuel oil and technical assistance) from the international community. Iran’s nuclear weapons program may have a different outcome, but there are reportedly a few generals in Burma who feel that the SPDC should at least consider the benefits of such an approach. <u><mark>Possession of nuclear weapons</u></mark> and ballistic missiles <u><mark>would be more than symbolic</u></mark>. If <u><mark>Burma’s military government</u></mark> ever felt seriously threatened, it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which it <u><mark>might</mark> actually</u> <u>consider <mark>us</mark>ing <mark>them</u></mark>. For example, faced with an imminent invasion, and with Kuwait’s role in the Iraq war in mind, any ballistic missiles acquired from Pyongyang could be aimed at Thailand, a US ally and Burma’s ‘nearest enemy’. This might help dissuade the Thai government from allowing its territory to be used as the launching pad for a major ground and air assault against its western neighbour. <u><mark>SRBMs</u></mark> may not be very accurate but, if launched from a Burmese site near the Thai border, they <u><mark>could</mark> easily <mark>reach</u></mark> greater <u><mark>Bangkok</mark>, a city of</u> nearly <u>nine million</u> people. Even if armed only with a conventional warhead, such a threat would certainly concentrate the minds of Thai leaders. <u>If it possessed WMD, <mark>Burma would</mark> have the option of <mark>visit</mark>ing even <mark>greater destruction upon its neighbour<strong></mark>.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 2
| 430,988 | 1 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,274 |
Some instances of the state is necessary for true social reform
|
Chomsky 96
|
Chomsky, 1996 (Noam, quoted by Tom Lane, December 23, http://www.totse.com/en/politics/anarchism/161594.html)RC
|
Prospects for freedom and justice are limitless The steps we should take depend on what we are trying to achieve. they must expand the floor of the cage, until the point when they can break the bars. that even requires defense of the cage against even worse predators outside: defense of illegitimate state power against predatory private tyranny in the United States today, a point that should be obvious to any person committed to justice and freedom -
|
freedom and justice steps should depend they must expand the floor of the cage, against even worse predators outside: defense of state power agains private tyranny in the United States today,
|
Prospects for freedom and justice are limitless. The steps we should take depend on what we are trying to achieve. There are, and can be, no general answers. The questions are wrongly put. I am reminded of a nice slogan of the rural workers' movement in Brazil (from which I have just returned): they say that they must expand the floor of the cage, until the point when they can break the bars. At times, that even requires defense of the cage against even worse predators outside: defense of illegitimate state power against predatory private tyranny in the United States today, for example, a point that should be obvious to any person committed to justice and freedom -- anyone, for example, who thinks that children should have food to eat -- but that seems difficult for many people who regard themselves as libertarians and anarchists to comprehend. That is one of the self-destructive and irrational impulses of decent people who consider themselves to be on the left, in my opinion, separating them in practice from the lives and legitimate aspirations of suffering people.
| 1,082 |
<h4><strong>Some instances of the state is necessary for true social reform</h4><p>Chomsky</strong>, 19<strong>96</strong> (Noam, quoted by Tom Lane, December 23, http://www.totse.com/en/politics/anarchism/161594.html)RC</p><p><u>Prospects for <mark>freedom and justice</mark> are limitless</u>. <u>The <mark>steps </mark>we <mark>should</mark> take <mark>depend</mark> on what we are trying to achieve. </u>There are, and can be, no general answers. The questions are wrongly put. I am reminded of a nice slogan of the rural workers' movement in Brazil (from which I have just returned): they say that <u><mark>they must expand the floor of the cage,</mark> until the point when they can break the bars.</u> At times, <u>that even requires defense of the cage <mark>against even worse predators outside: defense of</mark> illegitimate <mark>state power agains</mark>t predatory <mark>private tyranny in the United States today,</u></mark> for example, <u>a point that should be obvious to any person committed to justice and freedom -</u>- anyone, for example, who thinks that children should have food to eat -- but that seems difficult for many people who regard themselves as libertarians and anarchists to comprehend. That is one of the self-destructive and irrational impulses of decent people who consider themselves to be on the left, in my opinion, separating them in practice from the lives and legitimate aspirations of suffering people.</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 132,755 | 3 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,275 |
Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations
|
Taylor 2013
|
Taylor 2013 (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)
|
without congressional action and given Obama’s opposition to legalizing marijuana the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with states The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives broad discretion to do so including legally binding contractual agreements. Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do should not require much boldness Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise prosecutorial discretion to ensure that Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong deterrent to unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently in contrast to the uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to marijuana with the invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen too much chaos
|
Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,
|
The good news is that even without a congressional action, and even given President Obama’s opposition to legalizing recreational or medical marijuana, the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana states and the District of Columbia. The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives him broad discretion to do so, through means including legally binding contractual agreements. This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do (cooperate with the states) should not require much boldness. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. Written contractual agreements should, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise his prosecutorial discretion to ensure that his Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General (or a high-level designee) personally finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently—again, in marked contrast to the chaos and uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to medical marijuana. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, with the above-mentioned invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse. At the very last, they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen, of late, all too much chaos.
| 5,417 |
<h4>Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations</h4><p><strong>Taylor 2013</strong> (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)</p><p>The good news is that even <u>without</u> a <u>congressional action</u>, <u>and</u> even <u>given</u> President <u>Obama’s</u> <u>opposition to legalizing</u> recreational or medical <u>marijuana</u>, <u>the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with</u> Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana <u>states</u> and the District of Columbia. <u>The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives</u> him <u>broad discretion to do so</u>, through means <u>including legally binding contractual agreements.</u> This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). <u>Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do</u> (cooperate with the states) <u>should not require much boldness</u>. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. <u><mark>Written contractual agreements should</u></mark>, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, <u><mark>provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate</u></mark> licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; <u><mark>and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate </mark>in targeting those who grow and distribute <mark>marijuana without state licenses</u>. <u>This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to </mark>control trafficking, abuse, and diversion <mark>than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes</u>. <u>Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General </mark>to exercise</u> his <u>prosecutorial discretion to ensure that</u> his <u>Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General</u> (or a high-level designee) personally <u>finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law</u> and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But <u><strong><mark>the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong</u></strong> political <u><strong>deterrent to</u></strong> such an <u><strong>unwarranted enforcement action</u></strong></mark>. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, <u><mark>the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,</mark> by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently</u>—again, <u>in</u> marked <u>contrast to the</u> chaos and <u>uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to</u> medical <u>marijuana</u>. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, <u>with the</u> above-mentioned <u>invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states</u>, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, <u>the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse</u>. At the very last, <u>they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen</u>, of late, all <u>too much chaos</u>.</p>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 56,721 | 34 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,276 |
Legalization in advance of treaty revision causes treaty withdrawal – only the CP alone maintains compliance
|
Donohue et al 2010
|
Donohue et al 2010 (C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford, John, “Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy” http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12096)
|
Another complication for legalization is international law the Single Convention binds all UN member nations to maintain prohibition of drugs, including cannabis specifically While the Single Convention requires that countries maintain prohibition it does not require a punitive regime reforms working within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require either a country’s withdrawal or revision due to the Single Convention even countries with more liberal narcotics policies lack full- fledged drug legalization in the Netherlands the importation and commercial production of cannabis remains illegal
|
the Single Convention binds nations to prohibition including cannabis specifically While the Convention requires prohibition it does not require a punitive regime reforms within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require withdrawal even countries with more liberal narcotics policies lack full- fledged legalization in the Netherlands importation and commercial production remains illegal
|
International Law. Another complication for legalization is international law. While many researchers attempt to make international comparisons in studying drugs, one area of drug control policy that receives scant attention is the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 which binds all UN member nations to maintain prohibition of drugs, including cannabis specifically (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 61). While the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs requires that countries maintain prohibition of manufacture, sales, and import, it does not require a punitive regime of the type currently found in the United States. Article 36 of the Single Convention, “Penal Provision,” specifically allows for treatment programs to either enhance or serve as a substitute for punishment.81 The Economist reports that countries like the Netherlands are able to allow for some innovation in controlling marijuana use through the convention’s commentary, which states that its goal is “improvement of the efficacy of national criminal justice systems in the field of drug trafficking” (“A Toker’s Guide” 2009). Thus, reforms working within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require either a country’s withdrawal from the treaty or revision thereof. Perhaps partly due to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, even countries with more liberal narcotics policies than the United States lack full- fledged drug legalization and at most allow for depenalization of marijuana and/ or widespread needle exchange programs. As discussed above, in the Netherlands, a country long known for its tolerance of marijuana smoking, the importation and commercial production of cannabis remains illegal (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 64). When considering its own drug reform, Portugal declined to adopt outright legalization likely in part because of its treaty obligations under th
| 1,927 |
<h4>Legalization <u>in advance</u> of treaty revision causes <u>treaty withdrawal</u> – only the CP alone maintains compliance</h4><p><strong>Donohue et al 2010 </strong> (C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford, John, “Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy” http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12096)</p><p>International Law. <u>Another complication for legalization is international law</u>. While many researchers attempt to make international comparisons in studying drugs, one area of drug control policy that receives scant attention is <u><mark>the</u></mark> United Nations <u><mark>Single Convention</u></mark> on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 which <u><mark>binds</mark> all UN member <mark>nations to</mark> maintain <mark>prohibition</mark> of drugs, <mark>including cannabis specifically</u></mark> (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 61). <u><mark>While the</mark> Single <mark>Convention</u></mark> on Narcotic Drugs <u><strong><mark>requires</mark> that countries maintain <mark>prohibition</mark> </u></strong>of manufacture, sales, and import, <u><strong><mark>it does not require a punitive regime</u></strong></mark> of the type currently found in the United States. Article 36 of the Single Convention, “Penal Provision,” specifically allows for treatment programs to either enhance or serve as a substitute for punishment.81 The Economist reports that countries like the Netherlands are able to allow for some innovation in controlling marijuana use through the convention’s commentary, which states that its goal is “improvement of the efficacy of national criminal justice systems in the field of drug trafficking” (“A Toker’s Guide” 2009). Thus, <u><mark>reforms</mark> working <strong><mark>within the framework of the existing treaty</strong> are possible, though <strong>full- scale legalization</strong> would require</mark> either a country’s <strong><mark>withdrawal</strong></mark> </u>from the treaty<u> <strong>or revision</strong> </u>thereof. Perhaps partly <u>due to the Single Convention </u>on Narcotic Drugs, <u><mark>even countries with more liberal narcotics policies</u></mark> than the United States <u><mark>lack <strong>full- fledged</mark> drug <mark>legalization</u></strong></mark> and at most allow for depenalization of marijuana and/ or widespread needle exchange programs. As discussed above, <u><mark>in the Netherlands</u></mark>, a country long known for its tolerance of marijuana smoking, <u>the <mark>importation and commercial production</mark> of cannabis <strong><mark>remains illegal</u></strong></mark> (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 64). When considering its own drug reform, Portugal declined to adopt outright legalization likely in part because of its treaty obligations under th</p>
|
2nr
| null |
CP: A/T “Wild Ev”
| 430,457 | 62 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,277 |
North Korea prolif spreads nuclear development throughout Asia – destroys deterrence and escalates to nuclear conflict
|
Cimbala, 10
|
Cimbala, 10 - Prof. of Political Science @ Penn State, (Stephen, Nuclear Weapons and Cooperative Security in the 21st Century, p. 117-8)
|
Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout Asia. Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons A pentagonal configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basis (Russia, China, Japan, and the two Koreas could put deterrence at risk and create enormous temptation toward nuclear preemption. A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents in India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place U.S. proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options, an eight-sided nuclear arms race in Asia would increase the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. some of these states already have histories of protracted conflict states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction that caused an unintended launch, or a deliberate but unauthorized launch by rogue commanders faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other’s defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption
|
Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout Asia Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons nuclear powers in the Pacific could put deterrence at risk and create temptation toward nuclear preemption A five-sided nuclear competition would be linked to the existing nuclear deterrents in India and Pakistan, and Iran. An arc of nuclear instability could place U.S. proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history an arms race would increase the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war
|
Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout Asia. Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons and missile defenses. A pentagonal configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basis (Russia, China, Japan, and the two Koreas – not including the United States, with its own Pacific interests) could put deterrence at risk and create enormous temptation toward nuclear preemption. Apart from actual use or threat of use, North Korea could exploit the mere existence of an assumed nuclear capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy. As George H. Quester has noted: If the Pyongyang regime plays its cards sensibly and well, therefore, the world will not see its nuclear weapons being used against Japan or South Korea or anyone else, but will rather see this new nuclear arsenal held in reserve (just as the putative Israeli nuclear arsenal has been held in reserve), as a deterrent against the outside world’s applying maximal pressure on Pyongyang and as a bargaining chip to extract the economic and political concessions that the DPRK needs if it wishes to avoid giving up its peculiar approach to social engineering. A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents in India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place U.S. proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses, and counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, an eight-sided nuclear arms race in Asia would increase the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. It would do so because: (1) some of these states already have histories of protracted conflict; (2) states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction that caused an unintended launch, or a deliberate but unauthorized launch by rogue commanders; (3) faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other’s defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption.
| 2,419 |
<h4><strong>North Korea prolif spreads nuclear development throughout Asia – destroys deterrence and escalates to nuclear conflict</h4><p>Cimbala, 10</strong> - Prof. of Political Science @ Penn State, (Stephen, Nuclear Weapons and Cooperative Security in the 21st Century, p. 117-8)</p><p><u><mark>Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout Asia</mark>. <mark>Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons</u></mark> and missile defenses. <u>A pentagonal configuration of <mark>nuclear powers in the Pacific</mark> basis (Russia, China, Japan, and the two Koreas </u>– not including the United States, with its own Pacific interests) <u><mark>could put deterrence at risk</mark> <mark>and create</mark> enormous <mark>temptation toward nuclear preemption</mark>.</u> Apart from actual use or threat of use, North Korea could exploit the mere existence of an assumed nuclear capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy. As George H. Quester has noted: If the Pyongyang regime plays its cards sensibly and well, therefore, the world will not see its nuclear weapons being used against Japan or South Korea or anyone else, but will rather see this new nuclear arsenal held in reserve (just as the putative Israeli nuclear arsenal has been held in reserve), as a deterrent against the outside world’s applying maximal pressure on Pyongyang and as a bargaining chip to extract the economic and political concessions that the DPRK needs if it wishes to avoid giving up its peculiar approach to social engineering. <u><mark>A five-sided nuclear competition</mark> in the Pacific <mark>would be linked</mark>, in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, <mark>to the existing nuclear deterrents in India and Pakistan, and</mark> to the emerging nuclear weapons status of <mark>Iran. An arc of nuclear instability</mark> from Tehran to Tokyo <mark>could place U.S. proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history</mark> and call for more drastic military options,</u> not excluding preemptive war, defenses, and counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, <u><mark>an</mark> eight-sided nuclear <mark>arms race</mark> in Asia <mark>would increase the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war</mark>.</u> It would do so because: (1) <u>some of these states already have histories of protracted conflict</u>; (2) <u>states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis</u> involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; <u>unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction that caused an unintended launch, or a deliberate but unauthorized launch by rogue commanders</u>; (3) <u>faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other’s defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption</u><strong>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A2
| 190,063 | 28 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,278 |
Obama can sustain a veto of sanctions now but it’s close- PC’s key- new sanctions cause war with Iran
|
CNN 1/9
|
CNN 1/9/2015 (New Congress, new nuclear showdown over Iran, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/09/politics/iran-sanctions-fight-republican-congress/)
|
Iranian and American negotiators will be eying another showdown in Washington GOP lawmakers are poised to push a bill authorizing additional sanctions the majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need and the fight is already underway for the votes that could fill the gap With fewer than two months until agreement deadline, and expecting the White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors supporters know the clock is ticking the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran Kirk expects a high-profile challenge from the White House four Democrats rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations after the White House made its push on Capitol Hill to keep the measure from a floor vote if Kirk, Menendez and their allies can pressure those four Democrats into signing on, they will need to pull three more Senate Democrats who didn't cosponsor the bill last year to secure the 15 needed to override a veto A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the toughest battle yet on this issue
|
, GOP poised t push a bill authorizing additional sanctions majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need fight is already underway f With fewer than two months expecting the White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran Kirk expects a high-profile challenge from the White House the four Democrats rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations after the White House made its push . A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the toughest battle yet on this issue
|
Iranian and American negotiators preparing to square off in Geneva next week over Iran's nuclear ambitions will also be eying another showdown brewing in Washington. One year after a Republican-led coalition in the Senate came up just short of a deal, GOP lawmakers are poised to wield their new power in the Senate to push a bill authorizing additional sanctions against Iran. But the new 54-member majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need to override a presidential veto, and the fight is already underway for the votes that could fill the gap. With fewer than two months until diplomats' March 1 framework agreement deadline, and expecting the White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors, supporters know the clock is ticking to pass a sanctions bill they say will ratchet up pressure on Iran. But for opponents of additional sanctions, the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran, they claim. For Sen. Mark Kirk, the Republican half of the Kirk-Menendez sanctions bill he has pushed for the last three years, the sooner a sanctions bill hits the Senate floor, the better -- both politically and policy-wise. "If the Senate was allowed to vote tomorrow, I would be able to get two-thirds," Kirk said Sunday in a phone interview. "Now is the time to put pressure on Iran especially with oil prices so low. We are uniquely advantaged at this time to shut down this nuclear program." Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina), another major proponent of the legislation, told CNN last month the Kirk-Menendez bill "will come up for a vote in January," a pledge he made the same day to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a meeting in Jerusalem. Kirk said he backed that timing but insisted that it depends on Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. A McConnell spokesman called the legislation "a priority," but said there isn't yet a schedule for a sanctions bill. Republicans have been clamoring for additional sanctions on Iran, but with control of Congress in their hands, Republican lawmakers will also have to own the consequences of sanctions legislation -- which the President, State Department and Iranian officials have warned could derail negotiations. "We have long believed that Congress should not consider any new sanctions while negotiations are underway, in order to give our negotiators the time and space they need to fully test the current diplomatic opportunity. New sanctions threaten the diplomatic process currently underway," a senior administration official told CNN. The Kirk-Menendez bill that died in the Senate last year would reimpose sanctions on Iran if Obama couldn't certify that Iran doesn't finance terror groups that have attacked Americans and would keep Iran from maintaining low-level nuclear enrichment in a final deal, just a few terms that are much stricter than the current framework for negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 world powers. Those congressional provisions are "poison pills," according to Dylan Williams, head of government affairs at J Street, a group that bills itself as pro-Israel. It lobbied heavily on the issue last year and is ramping up for another forceful push. "All of these things are poison pills, far from the clean sanctions, just-if-things-go-wrong idea," Williams said. "We know that many if not most of the people pushing for legislation don't want diplomacy to work." Kirk has already been working with Sen. Bob Menendez, of New Jersey, his Democratic partner on the bill, to rework some of its language -- changes that could potentially draw more Democratic support. The pair are still working on final language for the bill, which drew 59 cosponsors last year, though Kirk said he is working to stave off as many changes as possible -- "The more changes, the worse," he said. The Illinois Republican expects a high-profile challenge from the White House and its allies, but he will be getting his own backup from some Capitol Hill heavyweights: the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, which typically spends more than $2.5 million a year on lobbying, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. "I think they're pretty damned strong. This would be the No. 1 thing for them," Kirk said of AIPAC. Intense lobbying from AIPAC could help the sanctions supporters win back the four Democrats who joined 13 others in cosponsoring the sanctions bill last year, but later backtracked their support. Sens. Kirsten Gillibrand of New York, Joe Manchin of West Virginia, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut and Chris Coons of Delaware rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations after the White House and allies made its push on Capitol Hill to keep the measure from a floor vote. "I did not sign it with the intention that it would ever be voted upon or used upon while we were negotiating," Manchin said on MSNBC after Obama talked about Iran in his State of the Union address. "I signed it because I wanted to make sure the president had a hammer if he needed it and showed them how determined we were to do it and use it if we had to." After talks failed to materialize into an agreement by the November 2014 deadline, some Democrats have started to lose patience with the stop-and-stall pace of negotiations with Iran and are facing pressure from groups like AIPAC to support a sanctions bill, though the White House insists the negotiations have yielded tangible results: rolling back Iran's nuclear program during negotiations. But even if Kirk, Menendez and their allies can pressure those four Democrats into signing on, they will need to pull three more Senate Democrats who didn't cosponsor the bill last year to secure the 15 Democrats needed to override a presidential veto. And they won't just be targeted by AIPAC. A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the toughest battle yet on this issue, and while they're clear-eyed about the uphill climb they face, they dismiss the overconfident stride of pro-sanctions leaders. These groups will look to paint any new sanctions as a step onto the warpath with Iran and show wary Democrats that they have the grassroots backing to stave off attacks from groups like AIPAC. More than 400 faith leaders and activists traveled to D.C. in late November to lobby Congress against the sanctions in a day of action organized by the Friends Committee on National Legislation, a Quaker-founded organization, and the group plans to drive its 50,000 supporters to flood Congress with calls and letters in the weeks ahead. "The real trick that we have to do is really to make that opposition -- both in the public and that opposition on the Hill -- to really make it become public and to amplify those voices," said Kate Gould, the group's lead lobbyist on the issue. "Because right now you hear from, it's Lindsey Graham and (Marco) Rubio, who are very confident in their prognosis and have made it sound like it's inevitable that these sanctions will pass with a veto-proof majority."
| 7,128 |
<h4><strong>Obama can sustain a veto of sanctions now but it’s close- PC’s key- new sanctions cause war with Iran</h4><p>CNN 1/9</strong>/2015 (New Congress, new nuclear showdown over Iran, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/09/politics/iran-sanctions-fight-republican-congress/)</p><p><u>Iranian and American negotiators</u> preparing to square off in Geneva next week over Iran's nuclear ambitions <u>will</u> also <u>be eying</u> <u>another showdown</u> brewing <u>in Washington</u>. One year after a Republican-led coalition in the Senate came up just short of a deal<mark>, <u>GOP</mark> lawmakers are <mark>poised t</mark>o</u> wield their new power in the Senate to <u><mark>push a bill authorizing additional sanctions</mark> </u>against Iran. But <u>the</u> new 54-member <u><mark>majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need</u></mark> to override a presidential veto, <u>and the <strong><mark>fight is already underway</strong> f</mark>or the votes that could fill the gap</u>. <u><mark>With fewer than two months</mark> until</u> diplomats' March 1 framework <u>agreement deadline, and <mark>expecting the <strong>White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors</u></strong></mark>, <u>supporters know the clock is ticking</u> to pass a sanctions bill they say will ratchet up pressure on Iran. But for opponents of additional sanctions, <u><strong><mark>the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran</u></strong></mark>, they claim. For Sen. Mark Kirk, the Republican half of the Kirk-Menendez sanctions bill he has pushed for the last three years, the sooner a sanctions bill hits the Senate floor, the better -- both politically and policy-wise. "If the Senate was allowed to vote tomorrow, I would be able to get two-thirds," Kirk said Sunday in a phone interview. "Now is the time to put pressure on Iran especially with oil prices so low. We are uniquely advantaged at this time to shut down this nuclear program." Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina), another major proponent of the legislation, told CNN last month the Kirk-Menendez bill "will come up for a vote in January," a pledge he made the same day to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a meeting in Jerusalem. Kirk said he backed that timing but insisted that it depends on Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. A McConnell spokesman called the legislation "a priority," but said there isn't yet a schedule for a sanctions bill. Republicans have been clamoring for additional sanctions on Iran, but with control of Congress in their hands, Republican lawmakers will also have to own the consequences of sanctions legislation -- which the President, State Department and Iranian officials have warned could derail negotiations. "We have long believed that Congress should not consider any new sanctions while negotiations are underway, in order to give our negotiators the time and space they need to fully test the current diplomatic opportunity. New sanctions threaten the diplomatic process currently underway," a senior administration official told CNN. The Kirk-Menendez bill that died in the Senate last year would reimpose sanctions on Iran if Obama couldn't certify that Iran doesn't finance terror groups that have attacked Americans and would keep Iran from maintaining low-level nuclear enrichment in a final deal, just a few terms that are much stricter than the current framework for negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 world powers. Those congressional provisions are "poison pills," according to Dylan Williams, head of government affairs at J Street, a group that bills itself as pro-Israel. It lobbied heavily on the issue last year and is ramping up for another forceful push. "All of these things are poison pills, far from the clean sanctions, just-if-things-go-wrong idea," Williams said. "We know that many if not most of the people pushing for legislation don't want diplomacy to work." Kirk has already been working with Sen. Bob Menendez, of New Jersey, his Democratic partner on the bill, to rework some of its language -- changes that could potentially draw more Democratic support. The pair are still working on final language for the bill, which drew 59 cosponsors last year, though <u><mark>Kirk</u></mark> said he is working to stave off as many changes as possible -- "The more changes, the worse," he said. The Illinois Republican <u><mark>expects a <strong>high-profile challenge from the White House</u></strong></mark> and its allies, but he will be getting his own backup from some Capitol Hill heavyweights: the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, which typically spends more than $2.5 million a year on lobbying, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. "I think they're pretty damned strong. This would be the No. 1 thing for them," Kirk said of AIPAC. Intense lobbying from AIPAC could help the sanctions supporters win back <mark>the <u>four Democrats</u></mark> who joined 13 others in cosponsoring the sanctions bill last year, but later backtracked their support. Sens. Kirsten Gillibrand of New York, Joe Manchin of West Virginia, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut and Chris Coons of Delaware <u><mark>rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations <strong>after the White House</strong></mark> </u>and allies<u> <strong><mark>made its push</strong></mark> on Capitol Hill to keep the measure from a floor vote</u>. "I did not sign it with the intention that it would ever be voted upon or used upon while we were negotiating," Manchin said on MSNBC after Obama talked about Iran in his State of the Union address. "I signed it because I wanted to make sure the president had a hammer if he needed it and showed them how determined we were to do it and use it if we had to." After talks failed to materialize into an agreement by the November 2014 deadline, some Democrats have started to lose patience with the stop-and-stall pace of negotiations with Iran and are facing pressure from groups like AIPAC to support a sanctions bill, though the White House insists the negotiations have yielded tangible results: rolling back Iran's nuclear program during negotiations. But even <u>if Kirk, Menendez and their allies can pressure those four Democrats into signing on, they will need to pull three more Senate Democrats who didn't cosponsor the bill last year to secure the 15</u> Democrats <u>needed to override a</u> presidential <u>veto</u><mark>.</mark> And they won't just be targeted by AIPAC. <u><mark>A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the <strong>toughest battle yet on this issue</u></mark>, and while they're clear-eyed about the uphill climb they face, they dismiss the overconfident stride of pro-sanctions leaders. These groups will look to paint any new sanctions as a step onto the warpath with Iran and show wary Democrats that they have the grassroots backing to stave off attacks from groups like AIPAC. More than 400 faith leaders and activists traveled to D.C. in late November to lobby Congress against the sanctions in a day of action organized by the Friends Committee on National Legislation, a Quaker-founded organization, and the group plans to drive its 50,000 supporters to flood Congress with calls and letters in the weeks ahead. "The real trick that we have to do is really to make that opposition -- both in the public and that opposition on the Hill -- to really make it become public and to amplify those voices," said Kate Gould, the group's lead lobbyist on the issue. "Because right now you hear from, it's Lindsey Graham and (Marco) Rubio, who are very confident in their prognosis and have made it sound like it's inevitable that these sanctions will pass with a veto-proof majority."</p></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
1
| 220,775 | 10 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,279 |
Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics
|
American Banker 2014
|
American Banker 7/18/2014 (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)
|
The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry The legislation has yet to pass in the Senate Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system
|
The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, , would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry,"
|
The House of Representatives gave a thumbs-up Wednesday to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system. The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark. "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry," Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. The legislation, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, has yet to pass in the Senate. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.
| 1,984 |
<h4>Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics</h4><p><strong>American Banker</strong> 7/18/<strong>2014</strong> (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)</p><p><u><mark>The House</u></mark> of Representatives <u><mark>gave a thumbs-up</u></mark> Wednesday <u><mark>to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system</u></mark>. <u><mark>The legislation, </mark>which passed by a 231-192 margin<mark>, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses.</mark> </u>It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, <u>the House vote <mark>marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream</u></mark>. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. <u><strong><mark>The House measure passed</strong> with the support of <strong>186 Democrats and 45 Republicans</u></strong>, <u></mark>and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark</u>. <mark>"<u><strong>This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry</u></strong>,"</mark> Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. <u>The legislation</u>, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, <u>has yet to pass in the Senate</u>. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. <u>Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system</u>. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.</p>
| null |
1nc
|
2
| 430,418 | 16 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,280 |
We definitely compete- “legalizing in the US” means marijuana has to be LEGAL IN THE US as a mandate of the plan- if they don’t change the CSA, they can’t be topical
|
Jackson et al 2011
|
Jackson et al 2011 (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)
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legalization and decriminalization are terms for very different proposals even though they are sometimes conflated Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production „Legalization‟ authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana, and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civil rather than criminal offense What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers. This is what separates decriminalization from legalization
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legalization and decriminalization are terms for very different proposals even though they are sometimes conflated. Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production. „Legalization‟ authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana, A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civi rather than criminal offense What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers. This is what separates decriminalization from legalization.
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Any white paper that includes a policy review of drug legislation must include key term definitions that are clear, accurate, and coherent. Thus, there are various definitions of „legalization‟ of marijuana use and commerce strewn across countless reports, papers and analyses of drug policy. It is critical to note that legalization and decriminalization are terms for very different proposals even though they are sometimes conflated. Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production. „Legalization‟ authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana, and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption.4 This study takes a holistic approach to examining how legalization of marijuana in the United States would affect Mexican DTOs. However, in the United States there has been no example of true marijuana legalization since the inception of the modern drug control regime. This is why our case studies will look at changes that occurred after various countries relaxed their system of marijuana prohibition. We will look at decriminalization in Mexico and Portugal, as well as a special case of toleration/de facto legalization in the Netherlands. However, we will first lay out in detail what each type of change entails. Decriminalization is one of the most common methods employed by countries that seek to ease or lighten anti-marijuana policies. A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civil (fines, counseling etc), rather than criminal offense. 5 One common example of this type of reform is the 2001 Law 30/2000 in Portugal. What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers. This is what separates decriminalization from legalization.
| 2,020 |
<h4>We definitely compete- “legalizing in the US” means marijuana has to be LEGAL IN THE US as a mandate of the plan- if they don’t change the CSA, they can’t be topical</h4><p><strong>Jackson et al 2011</strong> (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)</p><p>Any white paper that includes a policy review of drug legislation must include key term definitions that are clear, accurate, and coherent. Thus, there are various definitions of „legalization‟ of marijuana use and commerce strewn across countless reports, papers and analyses of drug policy. It is critical to note that <u><mark>legalization and decriminalization are terms for <strong>very different proposals</strong> even though they are sometimes conflated</u>. <u>Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production</u>. <u>„Legalization‟ <strong>authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana</strong>,</mark> and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption</u>.4 This study takes a holistic approach to examining how legalization of marijuana in the United States would affect Mexican DTOs. However, in the United States there has been no example of true marijuana legalization since the inception of the modern drug control regime. This is why our case studies will look at changes that occurred after various countries relaxed their system of marijuana prohibition. We will look at decriminalization in Mexico and Portugal, as well as a special case of toleration/de facto legalization in the Netherlands. However, we will first lay out in detail what each type of change entails. Decriminalization is one of the most common methods employed by countries that seek to ease or lighten anti-marijuana policies. <u><mark>A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civi</mark>l</u> (fines, counseling etc), <u><mark>rather than criminal offense</u></mark>. 5 One common example of this type of reform is the 2001 Law 30/2000 in Portugal. <u><mark>What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers.</u> <u><strong>This is what separates decriminalization from legalization</u></strong>.</p></mark>
|
2nr
| null |
CP: A/T “Wild Ev”
| 430,568 | 11 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,281 |
It’s also reverse causal -- Beating North Korea creates broad allied confidence in America that averts regional instabilityShen 6—executive director and professor of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University (Dingli, Autumn 2006, China Security, “North Korea’s Strategic Significance to China,” http://www.wsichina.org/cs4_2.pdf
North Korea, also known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) serves as China’s strategic buffer zone in Northeast Asia. With a shared border of 1,400 kilometers, North Korea acts as a guard post for China, keeping at bay the tens of thousands of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. This allows China to reduce its military deployment in Northeast China and focus more directly on the issue of Taiwanese independence. To a certain extent, North Korea shares the security threat posed by U.S. military forces in South Korea and Japan. At present, North Korea has acquired certain nuclear capabilities through testing that has greatly irritated the United States, though not yet to the point of provoking it to use force. The United States has to maintain military pressure in the Korean Peninsula to prevent North Korea from taking pre-emptive action. However, the deterrent that North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons obtains could further restrict the U.S. military’s room to take action in the Korean Peninsula. The net effect of this also helps to contain the freedom of U.S. policy choices regarding Taiwan. Whether China needs it or not, this is North Korea’s “contribution” to China’s national security, and China is, therefore, unlikely to ignore its strategic value. Cooperation and assistance between China and North Korea is, at a minimum, mutual. In fact, China merely provides North Korea with the means to survive, while North Korea acts as a bulwark against U.S. forces. How much has China spent on this arrangement? For approximately no more than a few billion dollars a year (as of late), China has been provided with more than 50 years of peace. 2 There is an argument that China has helped North Korea without getting anything in return. 3 This statement is partially wrong. There is no altruism in international relations, including those between China and North Korea. By providing aid to North Korea, China is in essence helping itself. In this way, North Korea’s resistance to American interference on the question of Taiwan and China’s aiding North Korea are intertwined. Conversely, North Korea may have its own view regarding this state of affairs. It may not be satisfied with the outcome of the original Korean War – a divided Korea – despite the best efforts of a Chinese Volunteer Force. North Korea reduces the military pressure China faces from the United States in the contingency of Taiwanese independence. Shen DingliChina Security Autumn 2006 21 The DPRK may still bear a grudge over conducting the war on its own soil. When China provides aid to North Korea some would view this as buying security insurance at a basement bargain price. One could even interpret the China-North Korea alliance as being more important to China than the U.S.Japan alliance is to the United States because the latter is largely asymmetrical in nature; that is, the security the United States has provided Japan was not equally reciprocated until roughly 10 years ago. 4 A Northeast Asian Libya? The antagonism between North Korea and the United States creates a complicated strategic situation for China. A North Korea with nuclear weapons deters aggression on the one hand, but can also potentially trigger destabilizing events on the other. For China, any destabilizing action runs counter to its interests of economic development. In addition, China needs to act in accordance with its role as a ‘responsible stakeholder’. In this regard, China will work with the United States and other states to the six-party talks to dissuade North Korea from nuclear brinkmanship. Meanwhile, the U.S. push to sell weapons to Taiwan directly harms mainland China’s national security. Even if China would not ask for it, a nuclear North Korea’s ability to pin down U.S. forces in a Taiwan Strait contingency deters America’s consideration of possible military intervention. Whether one likes it or not, this is the link between North Korea and Taiwan. China must then ask itself: what kind of security situation it will face if one day North Korea signs a treaty with the United States, exchanges nuclear weapons for friendship, and, by doing so, follows in Libya’s footsteps? It is not a trivial question. The question that is more fundamental than nuclear weapons development is what North Korea’s orientation will be. If China fails to handle the matter with deftness there is a real chance that North Korea will be cornered into provoking a war with the United States, a conflict that might eventually lead to North Korea’s defeat. The latter scenario would be disastrous for China. If North Korea was defeated, the eventual outcome could lead to Japan, South Korea, North Korea and Taiwan (a part of China all aligning with the United States. In that case, China’s security pressure regarding Taiwanese independence would be far more severe – a burden that would be hard to bear.
|
. In that case, China’s security pressure regarding Taiwanese independence would be far more severe – a burden that would be hard to bear.
| null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>It’s also reverse causal -- Beating North Korea creates broad allied confidence in America that averts regional instabilityShen 6—executive director and professor of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University (Dingli, Autumn 2006, China Security, “North Korea’s Strategic Significance to China,” http://www.wsichina.org/cs4_2.pdf</h4><p></strong>North Korea, also known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) serves as China’s strategic buffer zone in Northeast Asia. With a shared border of 1,400 kilometers, <u><mark>North Korea acts as a guard post for China,</mark> keeping at bay the tens of thousands of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. <mark>This allows China to</mark> reduce its military deployment in Northeast China and <mark>focus more directly on the issue of Taiwan</mark>ese independence</u>. To a certain extent, North Korea shares the security threat posed by U.S. military forces in South Korea and Japan. At present, North Korea has acquired certain nuclear capabilities through testing that has greatly irritated the United States, though not yet to the point of provoking it to use force. The United States has to maintain military pressure in the Korean Peninsula to prevent North Korea from taking pre-emptive action. However, the deterrent that North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons obtains could further restrict the U.S. military’s room to take action in the Korean Peninsula. The net effect of this also helps to contain the freedom of U.S. policy choices regarding Taiwan. Whether China needs it or not, this is North Korea’s “contribution” to China’s national security, and China is, therefore, unlikely to ignore its strategic value. Cooperation and assistance between China and North Korea is, at a minimum, mutual. In fact, China merely provides North Korea with the means to survive, while North Korea acts as a bulwark against U.S. forces. How much has China spent on this arrangement? For approximately no more than a few billion dollars a year (as of late), China has been provided with more than 50 years of peace. 2 There is an argument that China has helped North Korea without getting anything in return. 3 This statement is partially wrong. There is no altruism in international relations, including those between China and North Korea. By providing aid to North Korea, China is in essence helping itself. In this way, North Korea’s resistance to American interference on the question of Taiwan and China’s aiding North Korea are intertwined. Conversely, North Korea may have its own view regarding this state of affairs. It may not be satisfied with the outcome of the original Korean War – a divided Korea – despite the best efforts of a Chinese Volunteer Force. North Korea reduces the military pressure China faces from the United States in the contingency of Taiwanese independence. Shen DingliChina Security Autumn 2006 21 The DPRK may still bear a grudge over conducting the war on its own soil. When China provides aid to North Korea some would view this as buying security insurance at a basement bargain price. One could even interpret the China-North Korea alliance as being more important to China than the U.S.Japan alliance is to the United States because the latter is largely asymmetrical in nature; that is, the security the United States has provided Japan was not equally reciprocated until roughly 10 years ago. 4 A Northeast Asian Libya? The antagonism between North Korea and the United States creates a complicated strategic situation for China. A North Korea with nuclear weapons deters aggression on the one hand, but can also potentially trigger destabilizing events on the other. For China, any destabilizing action runs counter to its interests of economic development. In addition, China needs to act in accordance with its role as a ‘responsible stakeholder’. In this regard, China will work with the United States and other states to the six-party talks to dissuade North Korea from nuclear brinkmanship. Meanwhile, the U.S. push to sell weapons to Taiwan directly harms mainland China’s national security. Even if China would not ask for it, a nuclear North Korea’s ability to pin down U.S. forces in a Taiwan Strait contingency deters America’s consideration of possible military intervention. Whether one likes it or not, this is the link between North Korea and Taiwan. China must then ask itself: what kind of security situation it will face if one day North Korea signs a treaty with the United States, exchanges nuclear weapons for friendship, and, by doing so, follows in Libya’s footsteps? It is not a trivial question. The question that is more fundamental than nuclear weapons development is what North Korea’s orientation will be. If China fails to handle the matter with deftness there is a real chance that North Korea will be cornered into provoking a war with the United States, a conflict that might eventually lead to North Korea’s defeat. The latter scenario would be disastrous for China<u>. <mark>If North Korea was defeated, the</mark> eventual <mark>outcome could lead to Japan,</mark> South <mark>Korea</mark>, North Korea <mark>and Taiwan</mark> (a part of China <mark>all aligning with the United States<strong></mark>. In that case, China’s security pressure regarding Taiwanese independence would be far more severe – a burden that would be hard to bear. </p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A2
| 430,989 | 1 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,282 |
Prostitution legalization unpopular
|
YouGov 11
|
YouGov 11
|
8/25/11 [AW]
In the Economist/YouGov Americans have very different views about legalizing prostitution. 52% oppose that Those under 30 are divided those 65 and older are overwhelmingly opposed Men are more favorable to legalizing prostitution than women are 49% of independents and 42% of Democrats would legalize prostitution, only 26% of Republicans agree.
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Americans have different views about legalizing prostitution. 52% oppose that those 65 and older are overwhelmingly opposed. Men are more favorable than women and 42% of Democrats would legalize prostitution, only 26% of Republicans
|
You Gov: 68% Favor Legalized Gambling; 39% Would Legalize Prostitution http://today.yougov.com/news/2011/08/25/68-favor-legalized-gambling-39-would-legalize-pros/ 8/25/11 [AW]
Many states permit gambling -in casinos or through lotteries -and Americans generally support that. In the latest Economist/YouGov Poll, two out of three favor legalized gambling, 22% oppose it. Republicans and Democrats, the young and the old, support it at about the same level. But Americans have very different views about legalizing prostitution. 52% oppose that. And support differs from one group to the next. Those under 30 are divided about the prospect; those 65 and older are overwhelmingly opposed. Men are more favorable to legalizing prostitution than women are; college graduates more positive than those with less education. And while 49% of independents and 42% of Democrats would legalize prostitution, only 26% of Republicans agree.
| 928 |
<h4><strong>Prostitution legalization unpopular</h4><p>YouGov 11</p><p></strong>You Gov: 68% Favor Legalized Gambling; 39% Would Legalize Prostitution http://today.yougov.com/news/2011/08/25/68-favor-legalized-gambling-39-would-legalize-pros/<u> 8/25/11 [AW]</p><p></u>Many states permit gambling -in casinos or through lotteries -and Americans generally support that. <u>In the</u> latest <u>Economist/YouGov</u> Poll, two out of three favor legalized gambling, 22% oppose it. Republicans and Democrats, the young and the old, support it at about the same level. But <u><mark>Americans have</mark> very <mark>different views about legalizing prostitution. 52% oppose that</u></mark>. And support differs from one group to the next. <u>Those under 30 are divided</u> about the prospect; <u><mark>those 65 and older are overwhelmingly opposed</u>. <u>Men are more favorable</mark> to legalizing prostitution <mark>than women</mark> are</u>; college graduates more positive than those with less education. And while <u>49% of independents <mark>and 42% of Democrats would legalize prostitution, only 26% of Republicans</mark> agree.<strong></p></u></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
1
| 429,805 | 7 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,283 |
Tobacco companies are collapsing now- federal marijuana legalization revives them
|
Washington Times 2014
|
Washington Times 2014 (4/16, With pot and e-cigarettes, Big Tobacco is just waiting to inhale emerging markets, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/apr/16/with-pot-and-e-cigarettes-big-tobacco-is-just-wait/?page=all)
|
marijuana could prove a vital breath of fresh air for the nation’s fading tobacco industry. Desperate for new products legal pot could be throwing a lifeline to Big Tobacco which boasts the expertise to take advantage of the opportunity. major tobacco companies are poised to benefit from these “potential game-changers for the growth-challenged tobacco industry.” The new products and market opportunities are arriving just in time as its core cigarette business declines. It’s only a matter of time before it goes away if legalization becomes official federal policy, Big Tobacco will end up dominating the marijuana market, not all analysts and tobacco companies are encouraged by the e-cigarette craze A report by Moody’s said e-cigarettes will not have a significant impact on the tobacco industry the earnings contribution will be quite modest
|
marijuana could prove a vital breath of fresh air for the nation’s fading tobacco industry. Desperate for new products legal pot could be throwing a lifeline to Big Tobacco expertise to take advantage of the opportunity. “B major tobacco companies core cigarette business slowly declines. “It’s only a matter of time before it goes away if legalization becomes official federal policy, Big Tobacco will end up dominating the marijuana market
|
Electronic cigarettes and marijuana could prove a vital breath of fresh air for the nation’s fading tobacco industry. Desperate for new products and new customers as social and legal attitudes toward cigarette smoking have changed in recent decades, e-cigarettes and legal pot could be throwing a lifeline to Big Tobacco, which already boasts the marketing expertise and regulatory savvy to take advantage of the opportunity. “Bottom line, the long-held investor perception of tobacco as a sunset industry is wrong,” said David Sealy, senior equity research analyst at the Boston Co. and author of an analysis released Wednesday of the changes sweeping the industry. The major tobacco companies, including RJ Reynolds, Lorillard and Altria Group, the parent company of Philip Morris USA, are poised to benefit from these “potential game-changers for the growth-challenged tobacco industry.” The new products and market opportunities are arriving just in time, Mr. Sealy said, as its core cigarette business slowly declines. “It’s only a matter of time before it goes away,” he said. Mr. Sealy said it is no longer an industry that rolls tobacco, but an industry that provides nicotine. Discussion over the saving powers of e-cigarettes and marijuana to the tobacco industry comes at a time when industry officials, investors and consumers are watching what regulations, if any, the Food and Drug Administration will place on e-cigarettes. With regulations in mind, the report says the $3 billion e-cigarette market is only going to grow and become more of a substantial player in the tobacco industry. The legalization of marijuana will become an option for tobacco companies as well. “Quantifying the exact change will depend on regulator response, but anyone not thinking about these related opportunities will miss an inflection in one of the world’s largest and oldest consumer businesses,” Mr. Sealy said in the report. Moving away from nicotine, The Boston Co. report brings another debated drug into the picture as a viable product to sustain tobacco industries: marijuana. Sixteen states have decriminalized marijuana use, 20 states have allowed medical marijuana use and Colorado and Washington have fully legalized marijuana use. Mr. Sealy said these trends, plus polling that cites 58 percent of Americans support marijuana legalization, signal “snowballing” to move toward national legalization. “The momentum behind marijuana legalization has not been lost on the marketplace. To date, the market has focused mostly on speculative small caps, but if legalization becomes official federal policy, Big Tobacco will end up dominating the marijuana market,” he said in the report. But the focus of a savior to the tobacco industry remains on e-cigarettes. E-cigarettes started with small entrepreneurial businesses that often sell over the Internet, but Big Tobacco, or the handful of major tobacco companies, are ready to capitalize on the device that delivers nicotine through vapor. One of these top tobacco companies, Lorillard, has developed Blu eCigs, a brand of e-cigarettes that boasts 50 percent of the U.S. e-cigarette market. In the company’s 2013 annual financial report, net sales increased by 4.9 percent because of an increase in both traditional and electronic cigarettes. Lorillard’s traditional cigarettes such as Newport and Maverick increased in net sales by $158 million. The net sales of their e-cigarettes increased even more, by $169 million. But not all analysts and tobacco companies are encouraged by the e-cigarette craze. A report out this week by Moody’s Investors Service said e-cigarettes will not have a significant impact on the tobacco industry in the next couple of years because the product makes up only 1 percent to 2 percent of the total U.S. tobacco market. “Despite the excitement about the category and its extraordinary growth, we believe that the earnings contribution will be quite modest over the near term,” said Nancy Meadows, vice president and senior analyst of Moody’s Investors Service corporate finance group.
| 4,072 |
<h4>Tobacco companies are collapsing now- federal marijuana legalization revives them</h4><p><strong>Washington Times 2014</strong> (4/16, With pot and e-cigarettes, Big Tobacco is just waiting to inhale emerging markets, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/apr/16/with-pot-and-e-cigarettes-big-tobacco-is-just-wait/?page=all)</p><p>Electronic cigarettes and <u><mark>marijuana could prove a vital breath of fresh air for the nation’s fading tobacco industry. <strong>Desperate for new products</u></strong></mark> and new customers as social and legal attitudes toward cigarette smoking have changed in recent decades, e-cigarettes and <u><mark>legal pot could be <strong>throwing a lifeline to Big Tobacco</u></strong></mark>, <u>which</u> already <u>boasts</u> <u>the</u> marketing <u><mark>expertise</u></mark> and regulatory savvy <u><mark>to take advantage of the opportunity. </u>“B</mark>ottom line, the long-held investor perception of tobacco as a sunset industry is wrong,” said David Sealy, senior equity research analyst at the Boston Co. and author of an analysis released Wednesday of the changes sweeping the industry. The <u><mark>major tobacco companies</u></mark>, including RJ Reynolds, Lorillard and Altria Group, the parent company of Philip Morris USA, <u>are poised to benefit from these “potential game-changers</u> <u>for the growth-challenged tobacco industry.” The new products and market opportunities are arriving just in time</u>, Mr. Sealy said, <u>as its <mark>core cigarette business </u>slowly<u> declines. </u>“<u><strong>It’s only a matter of time before it goes away</u></strong></mark>,” he said. Mr. Sealy said it is no longer an industry that rolls tobacco, but an industry that provides nicotine. Discussion over the saving powers of e-cigarettes and marijuana to the tobacco industry comes at a time when industry officials, investors and consumers are watching what regulations, if any, the Food and Drug Administration will place on e-cigarettes. With regulations in mind, the report says the $3 billion e-cigarette market is only going to grow and become more of a substantial player in the tobacco industry. The legalization of marijuana will become an option for tobacco companies as well. “Quantifying the exact change will depend on regulator response, but anyone not thinking about these related opportunities will miss an inflection in one of the world’s largest and oldest consumer businesses,” Mr. Sealy said in the report. Moving away from nicotine, The Boston Co. report brings another debated drug into the picture as a viable product to sustain tobacco industries: marijuana. Sixteen states have decriminalized marijuana use, 20 states have allowed medical marijuana use and Colorado and Washington have fully legalized marijuana use. Mr. Sealy said these trends, plus polling that cites 58 percent of Americans support marijuana legalization, signal “snowballing” to move toward national legalization. “The momentum behind marijuana legalization has not been lost on the marketplace. To date, the market has focused mostly on speculative small caps, but <u><mark>if legalization becomes official federal policy, <strong>Big Tobacco will end up dominating the marijuana market</strong></mark>,</u>” he said in the report. But the focus of a savior to the tobacco industry remains on e-cigarettes. E-cigarettes started with small entrepreneurial businesses that often sell over the Internet, but Big Tobacco, or the handful of major tobacco companies, are ready to capitalize on the device that delivers nicotine through vapor. One of these top tobacco companies, Lorillard, has developed Blu eCigs, a brand of e-cigarettes that boasts 50 percent of the U.S. e-cigarette market. In the company’s 2013 annual financial report, net sales increased by 4.9 percent because of an increase in both traditional and electronic cigarettes. Lorillard’s traditional cigarettes such as Newport and Maverick increased in net sales by $158 million. The net sales of their e-cigarettes increased even more, by $169 million. But <u>not all analysts and tobacco companies are encouraged by the e-cigarette craze</u>. <u>A report</u> out this week <u>by Moody’s</u> Investors Service <u>said e-cigarettes will not have a significant impact on the tobacco industry</u> in the next couple of years because the product makes up only 1 percent to 2 percent of the total U.S. tobacco market. “Despite the excitement about the category and its extraordinary growth, we believe that <u>the earnings contribution will be quite modest</u> over the near term,” said Nancy Meadows, vice president and senior analyst of Moody’s Investors Service corporate finance group.</p>
| null |
1nc
|
3
| 430,991 | 1 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,284 |
limits – they can do any action that produces marijuana stores in the US in whatever capacity even one state run store in Florida
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>limits – they can do any action that produces marijuana stores in the US in whatever capacity even one state run store in Florida</h4>
|
2nr
| null |
CP: A/T “Wild Ev”
| 430,990 | 1 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,285 |
Liberal AG leads to descheduling of marijuana- solves the aff
|
Lopez 9/25
|
Lopez 9/25/2014 (German [his name, not necessarily nationality], writer for Vox, covers criminal justice, the war on drugs, health, and LGBT issues, Eric Holder questions marijuana's legal status as he prepares to leave Justice Department, http://www.vox.com/2014/9/25/6842187/US-drug-schedule-marijuana-Justice-Department-Eric-Holder)
|
Holder said it's time to reconsider marijuana's legal classification A reclassification could dramatically shift how the federal government handles marijuana The question enshrines Holder's openness to drawing down the war on drugs. Holder's office had already allowed Colorado and Washington to carry out their own experiments in legalization without federal interference the most significant steps in dismantling the war on drugs since its beginnings in the 1970. Holder also supported reforms that will pull back prison sentences for nonviolent drug offenders. the US attorney general holds a lot of power in deciding when to review a drug's schedule the process involves significant bureaucratic processes, some of which are already underway for marijuana.
|
Holder said it's time to reconsider marijuana's legal classification A reclassification could dramatically shift how the federal government handles marijuan Holder's office had already allowed Colorado and Washington to carry out their own experiments in legalization without federal interferenc the most significant steps in dismantling the war on drugs since its beginnings in the 1970. the US attorney general holds a lot of power in deciding when to review a drug's schedule the process involves significant bureaucratic processes, some of which are already underway for marijuana.
|
On the eve of his reported resignation, US Attorney General Eric Holder said in an interview with Yahoo News that it's time to reconsider marijuana's legal classification in the federal government's scheduling system. Under the current classification, marijuana is placed in the same category as heroin, which severely limits how researchers and doctors can use the drug. A reclassification could dramatically shift how the federal government handles marijuana in the war on drugs and provide some legal legitimacy to medical marijuana at the federal level. "I think it's certainly a question that we need to ask ourselves — whether or not marijuana is as serious a drug as is heroin," Holder said. "[T]he question of whether or not they should be in the same category is something that I think we need to ask ourselves, and use science as the basis for making that determination." The question, which goes at the heart of US drug policy, enshrines Holder's openness to drawing down the war on drugs. Holder's office had already allowed Colorado and Washington to carry out their own experiments in legalization without federal interference — arguably the most significant steps in dismantling the war on drugs since its beginnings in the 1970. Holder also supported reforms that will pull back prison sentences for nonviolent drug offenders. Holder clarified that he's still unsure about where he stands on the decriminalization and legalization of marijuana, but he said legalization efforts at the state level should provide a lesson for federal policymakers. While decriminalization and legalization are largely up to an act of Congress, the US attorney general holds a lot of power in deciding when to review a drug's schedule, as I explained before. But the process also involves significant scientific and bureaucratic processes, some of which are already underway for marijuana.
| 1,886 |
<h4><strong>Liberal AG leads to descheduling of marijuana- solves the aff</h4><p>Lopez 9/25<u></strong>/2014 (German [his name, not necessarily nationality], writer for Vox, covers criminal justice, the war on drugs, health, and LGBT issues, Eric Holder questions marijuana's legal status as he prepares to leave Justice Department, http://www.vox.com/2014/9/25/6842187/US-drug-schedule-marijuana-Justice-Department-Eric-Holder) </p><p></u>On the eve of his reported resignation, US Attorney General Eric <u><mark>Holder said</u></mark> in an interview with Yahoo News that <u><mark>it's time to reconsider marijuana's legal classification</u></mark> in the federal government's scheduling system. Under the current classification, marijuana is placed in the same category as heroin, which severely limits how researchers and doctors can use the drug. <u><strong><mark>A reclassification could dramatically shift how the federal government handles marijuan</mark>a </u></strong>in the war on drugs and provide some legal legitimacy to medical marijuana at the federal level. "I think it's certainly a question that we need to ask ourselves — whether or not marijuana is as serious a drug as is heroin," Holder said. "[T]he question of whether or not they should be in the same category is something that I think we need to ask ourselves, and use science as the basis for making that determination." <u>The question</u>, which goes at the heart of US drug policy, <u>enshrines Holder's openness to drawing down the war on drugs.</u> <u><mark>Holder's office had already allowed Colorado and Washington to carry out their own experiments in legalization without federal interferenc</mark>e</u> — arguably <u><mark>the most significant steps in dismantling the war on drugs since its beginnings in the 1970.</mark> Holder also supported reforms that will pull back prison sentences for nonviolent drug offenders. </u>Holder clarified that he's still unsure about where he stands on the decriminalization and legalization of marijuana, but he said legalization efforts at the state level should provide a lesson for federal policymakers. While decriminalization and legalization are largely up to an act of Congress, <u><mark>the US attorney general holds a lot of power in deciding when to review a drug's schedule</u></mark>, as I explained before. But <u><mark>the process</u></mark> also <u><mark>involves</u> <u>significant</u></mark> scientific and <u><strong><mark>bureaucratic processes, some of which are already underway for marijuana.</p></u></strong></mark>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NR
|
Econ impact overview
| 430,915 | 4 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,286 |
New sanctions destroy the Iran deal- causes prolif and Israel strikes- extinction
|
Borger 12/31
|
Borger 12/31/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation)
|
There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba This deal will be about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. the parties to the talks have given themselves more time They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions That would provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment.
|
no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. is deal will b about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets anctions would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment
|
There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. This deal will not be about cash machines in the Caribbean, but about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away from the table. A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. So the parties to the talks have given themselves more time – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor. The legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. That would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, and a very volatile environment. It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year.
| 3,580 |
<h4><strong>New sanctions destroy the Iran deal- causes prolif and Israel strikes- extinction</h4><p>Borger 12/31</strong>/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation)</p><p><u>There will be <mark>no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.</mark> In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba</u>, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. <u>Th<mark>is deal will</u></mark> not <u><mark>b</mark>e</u> about cash machines in the Caribbean, but <u><mark>about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth</u></mark>. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These <u>gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away</u> from the table. <u><strong><mark>A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel</u></strong>; <u>the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a <strong>wave of proliferation across the region and beyond</strong> as other countries hedge their bets</mark>. </u>So <u>the parties to the talks have given themselves more time</u> – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. <u>They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran</u>. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, <u>the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor</u>. The <u>legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered s<mark>anctions</u></mark>, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. <u>That</u> would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it <u><mark>would</u> also <u>provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament</u></mark>, the Majlis, <u><mark>and a very volatile environment</mark>. </u>It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
1
| 171,429 | 23 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,287 |
Tobacco industry kills 10 million people per year- largest, most probable impact- also destroys global economy
|
NBC News 2014
|
NBC News 2014 (Citing the WHO and UN Development Program, 7/21, Why Uruguay’s Fight With Big Tobacco Matters, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/why-uruguays-fight-big-tobacco-matters-n157176)
|
increase in smokers has triggered a world pandemic that, unchecked, will kill up to 10 times more than the 100 million who died during the 20th century The cigarette crisis is also undermining global attempts to defeat poverty the U N D P calculated that smoking costs 2 percent of global GDP That burden is placed disproportionately on the poorest countries That leaves hungry and sick children unable to concentrate at school locking them into a poverty cycle Impoverishment is a direct result of consuming tobacco the decision to smoke is shaped by the social environment That includes advertising
|
increase in smokers has triggered a world pandemic that, unchecked, will kill up to 10 times more The cigarette crisis is also undermining global attempts to defeat poverty the U N D calculated that smoking costs 2 percent of global GDP. That burden is placed disproportionately on the poorest countries That leaves hungry and sick children unable to concentrate at school locking them into a poverty cycle Impoverishment is a direct result of consuming tobac the decision to smoke is shaped by the social environment." That includes the advertisin
|
The increase in smokers has triggered a world pandemic that, unchecked, will kill up to 10 times more people this century than the 100 million who died from tobacco during the 20th century, according to the WHO. The cigarette crisis is also undermining global attempts to defeat poverty, says Doug Webb, a public health expert at the United Nations Development Program. Overall, his agency has calculated that smoking costs between 1 percent and 2 percent of global GDP. That burden is placed disproportionately on the poorest countries, where most smokers now reside. In some cases, families without enough cash to cover food and health care are spending up to 15 percent (page XIII) of their income on tobacco, Webb notes. Uruguay’s fight with Philip Morris, the world’s largest cigarette manufacturer, just might mark a turning point in the global smoking pandemic That leaves hungry and sick children unable to concentrate at school, if they even attend, locking them into a poverty cycle that passes from one generation to the next. "Impoverishment is a direct result of consuming tobacco," Webb told GlobalPost. “It is the poorest who are most likely to smoke in any country, whether you are talking about Uruguay, Egypt or Indonesia. They are the ones who are least able to afford tobacco, never mind the health care costs that inevitably follow." "The narrative has been that smoking is simply a matter of personal choice, and that if you smoke it is your own fault. We now realize this is not true, that the decision to smoke is instead largely shaped by the social environment." That environment, Webb says, includes the advertising that is everywhere in modern life, as well as the glamorous branding of cigarette packaging.
| 1,735 |
<h4>Tobacco industry kills 10 million people per year- largest, most probable impact- also destroys global economy</h4><p><strong>NBC News 2014</strong> (Citing the WHO and UN Development Program, 7/21, Why Uruguay’s Fight With Big Tobacco Matters, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/why-uruguays-fight-big-tobacco-matters-n157176)</p><p>The <u><mark>increase in smokers has triggered a world pandemic that, unchecked, will kill up to 10 times</u> <u>more</u></mark> people this century <u>than the 100 million who died</u> from tobacco <u>during the 20th century</u>, according to the WHO. <u><mark>The cigarette crisis is also undermining global attempts to defeat poverty</u></mark>, says Doug Webb, a public health expert at <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>N</u></mark>ations <u><mark>D</u></mark>evelopment <u>P</u>rogram. Overall, his agency has <u><mark>calculated that smoking costs</u></mark> between 1 percent and <u><strong><mark>2 percent of global GDP</u></strong>. <u>That burden is placed disproportionately on the poorest countries</u></mark>, where most smokers now reside. In some cases, families without enough cash to cover food and health care are spending up to 15 percent (page XIII) of their income on tobacco, Webb notes. Uruguay’s fight with Philip Morris, the world’s largest cigarette manufacturer, just might mark a turning point in the global smoking pandemic <u><mark>That leaves hungry and sick children unable to concentrate at school</u></mark>, if they even attend, <u><mark>locking them into a poverty cycle</u></mark> that passes from one generation to the next. "<u><mark>Impoverishment is a direct result of consuming tobac</mark>co</u>," Webb told GlobalPost. “It is the poorest who are most likely to smoke in any country, whether you are talking about Uruguay, Egypt or Indonesia. They are the ones who are least able to afford tobacco, never mind the health care costs that inevitably follow." "The narrative has been that smoking is simply a matter of personal choice, and that if you smoke it is your own fault. We now realize this is not true, that <u><mark>the decision to smoke is</u> </mark>instead largely <u><mark>shaped by the social environment</u>." <u>That</u> </mark>environment, Webb says, <u><mark>includes</u> the <u>advertisin</mark>g</u> that is everywhere in modern life, as well as the glamorous branding of cigarette packaging.</p>
| null |
1nc
|
3
| 430,992 | 1 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,288 |
United States divides power between the states and federal government
|
Columbia Encyclopedia '9
|
Columbia Encyclopedia '9 http://education.yahoo.com/reference/encyclopedia/entry/US
|
The government of the United States is that of a federal republic set up by the Constitution of the United States There is a division of powers between the federal government and the state governments. The federal government consists of three branches: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.
| null |
The government of the United States is that of a federal republic set up by the Constitution of the United States, adopted by the Constitutional Convention of 1787. There is a division of powers between the federal government and the state governments. The federal government consists of three branches: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. The executive power is vested in the President and, in the event of the President's incapacity, the Vice President. (For a chronological list of all the presidents and vice presidents of the United States, including their terms in office and political parties, see the table entitled Presidents of the United States.) The executive conducts the administrative business of the nation with the aid of a cabinet composed of the Attorney General and the Secretaries of the Departments of State; Treasury; Defense; Interior; Agriculture; Commerce; Labor; Health and Human Services; Education; Housing and Urban Development; Transportation; Energy; and Veterans' Affairs.
The Congress of the United States, the legislative branch, is bicameral and consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The judicial branch is formed by the federal courts and headed by the U.S. Supreme Court. The members of the Congress are elected by universal suffrage (see election) as are the members of the electoral college, which formally chooses the President and the Vice President
| 1,424 |
<h4>United States divides power between the states and federal government</h4><p><strong>Columbia Encyclopedia '9</strong> http://education.yahoo.com/reference/encyclopedia/entry/US</p><p><u>The government of the United States is that of a federal republic set up by the Constitution of the United States</u>, adopted by the Constitutional Convention of 1787. <u>There is a division of powers between the federal government and the state governments. The federal government consists of three branches: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.</u> The executive power is vested in the President and, in the event of the President's incapacity, the Vice President. (For a chronological list of all the presidents and vice presidents of the United States, including their terms in office and political parties, see the table entitled Presidents of the United States.) The executive conducts the administrative business of the nation with the aid of a cabinet composed of the Attorney General and the Secretaries of the Departments of State; Treasury; Defense; Interior; Agriculture; Commerce; Labor; Health and Human Services; Education; Housing and Urban Development; Transportation; Energy; and Veterans' Affairs.</p><p>The Congress of the United States, the legislative branch, is bicameral and consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The judicial branch is formed by the federal courts and headed by the U.S. Supreme Court. The members of the Congress are elected by universal suffrage (see election) as are the members of the electoral college<strong>, which formally chooses the President and the Vice President</p></strong>
|
2nr
| null |
CP: A/T “Wild Ev”
| 72,319 | 30 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,289 |
Colorado and Washington prove they either don’t solve because the tax is too small, or they link to gray market fill-in
|
Kleiman 2014
|
Kleiman 2014 (Mark, professor of public policy at the University of California Los Angeles, How Not to Make a Hash out of Cannabis legalization, Washington Monthly, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/how_not_to_make_a_hash_out_of049291.php?page=all)
|
The revenue take could be substantial If prices were kept high and virtually all of the surplus were captured by taxation it’s possible that cannabis taxation could yield $20 billion per year Those are, of course, two big ifs. The current pricing and tax systems in Colorado and Washington won’t give taxpayers there anything resembling the $1 billion a year that would be their prorated share
|
If prices were kept high and surplus were captured by taxation, it’s possible taxation could yield 20 billion Those are, of course, two big ifs and tax systems in Colorado and Washington, won’t give taxpayers there anything resembling the $1 billion a year
|
To those real gains must be added the political lure of public revenue that comes without raising taxes on currently legal products or incomes. The revenue take could be substantial: legal production and distribution of the amount of cannabis now sold in the U.S. wouldn’t cost more than 20 percent of the $35 billion now being paid for it. If prices were kept high and virtually all of the surplus were captured by taxation, it’s possible that cannabis taxation could yield as much as $20 billion per year—around 1 percent of the revenues of all the state governments. Those are, of course, two big ifs. The current pricing and tax systems in Colorado and Washington, which between them account for about 5 percent of national cannabis use, won’t give taxpayers there anything resembling the $1 billion a year that would be their prorated share of that hypothetical $20 billion.
| 879 |
<h4><strong>Colorado and Washington prove they either don’t solve because the tax is too small, or they link to gray market fill-in</h4><p>Kleiman 2014</strong> (Mark, professor of public policy at the University of California Los Angeles, How Not to Make a Hash out of Cannabis legalization, Washington Monthly, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/how_not_to_make_a_hash_out_of049291.php?page=all)</p><p>To those real gains must be added the political lure of public revenue that comes without raising taxes on currently legal products or incomes. <u>The revenue take could be substantial</u>: legal production and distribution of the amount of cannabis now sold in the U.S. wouldn’t cost more than 20 percent of the $35 billion now being paid for it. <u><strong><mark>If prices were kept high and</mark> virtually all of the <mark>surplus were captured by taxation</u></strong>, <u>it’s possible</mark> that cannabis <mark>taxation could yield</u></mark> as much as <u>$<mark>20 billion</mark> per year</u>—around 1 percent of the revenues of all the state governments. <u><strong><mark>Those are, of course, two big ifs</mark>.</u></strong> <u>The current pricing <mark>and tax systems in Colorado and Washington</u>,</mark> which between them account for about 5 percent of national cannabis use, <u><strong><mark>won’t give taxpayers there anything resembling the $1 billion a year</u></strong></mark> <u>that would be their prorated share</u><strong> of that hypothetical $20 billion.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NR
|
AT: legalization solves
| 430,993 | 1 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,290 |
Legalization ONLY refers to regulated regimes. “Decriminalization” is a distinct literature base in prostitution referring to unregulated models
|
Mossman 07
|
Mossman 07 Dr. Elaine Mossman, Honorary Research Fellow, Victoria University of Wellington, NZ International Approaches to Decriminalising or Legalising Prostitution, Prepared for the Ministry of Justice by Crime and Justice Research Centre Victoria University of Wellington, http://prostitution.procon.org/sourcefiles/newzealandreport.pdf
|
Legalisation This is where prostitution is controlled by government and is legal only under certain state- specified conditions. Key indicators of legalised regimes are prostitution-specific controls These can include licensing, registration, and mandatory health checks The key difference between legalisation and decriminalisation is that with the latter there are no prostitution-specific regulations imposed by the state. Rather, regulation of the industry is predominantly through existing ‘ordinary’ statutes and regulations covering employment and health for instance.
|
Legalisation This is where prostitution is controlled by government and is legal only under specified conditions Key indicators of legalised regimes are prostitution-specific controls licensing, registration, and mandatory health checks The key difference between legalisation and decriminalisation is that with the latter there are no prostitution-specific regulations regulation is predominantly through existing ‘ordinary’ statutes covering employment and health
|
Legalisation This is where prostitution is controlled by government and is legal only under certain state- specified conditions. The underlying premise is that prostitution is necessary for stable social order, but should nonetheless be subject to controls to protect public order and health. Some jurisdictions opt for legalisation as a means to reduce crimes associated with prostitution. Key indicators of legalised regimes are prostitution-specific controls and conditions specified by the state. These can include licensing, registration, and mandatory health checks. Prostitution has been legalised in countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, Iceland, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Greece, Turkey, Senegal, the USA state of Nevada, and many Australian states (Victoria, Queensland, ACT and Northern Territory). Decriminalisation Decriminalisation involved repeal of all laws against prostitution, or the removal of provisions that criminalised all aspects of prostitution. In decriminalised regimes, however, a distinction is made between (i) voluntary prostitution and (ii) that involving either force and coercion or child prostitution – the latter remaining criminal. The difference between legalised and criminalised regimes has been described as often largely a matter of degree – a function of the number of legal prostitution-related activities, and the extent of controls and restrictions that are imposed. The key difference between legalisation and decriminalisation is that with the latter there are no prostitution-specific regulations imposed by the state. Rather, regulation of the industry is predominantly through existing ‘ordinary’ statutes and regulations covering employment and health for instance.
| 1,729 |
<h4>Legalization ONLY refers to regulated regimes. “Decriminalization” is a distinct literature base in prostitution referring to unregulated models</h4><p><strong>Mossman 07 </strong>Dr. Elaine Mossman,<strong> </strong>Honorary Research Fellow, Victoria University of Wellington, NZ International Approaches to Decriminalising or Legalising<u> Prostitution, Prepared for the Ministry of Justice by Crime and Justice Research Centre Victoria University of Wellington, http://prostitution.procon.org/sourcefiles/newzealandreport.pdf</p><p><mark>Legalisation This is where prostitution is controlled by government and is legal only</mark> <mark>under</mark> certain state- <mark>specified conditions</mark>. </u>The underlying premise is that prostitution is necessary for stable social order, but should nonetheless be subject to controls to protect public order and health. Some jurisdictions opt for legalisation as a means to reduce crimes associated with prostitution. <u><mark>Key indicators</mark> <mark>of legalised regimes are prostitution-specific controls</u></mark> and conditions specified by the state. <u>These can include <mark>licensing, registration, and mandatory health checks</u></mark>. Prostitution has been legalised in countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, Iceland, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Greece, Turkey, Senegal, the USA state of Nevada, and many Australian states (Victoria, Queensland, ACT and Northern Territory). Decriminalisation Decriminalisation involved repeal of all laws against prostitution, or the removal of provisions that criminalised all aspects of prostitution. In decriminalised regimes, however, a distinction is made between (i) voluntary prostitution and (ii) that involving either force and coercion or child prostitution – the latter remaining criminal. The difference between legalised and criminalised regimes has been described as often largely a matter of degree – a function of the number of legal prostitution-related activities, and the extent of controls and restrictions that are imposed. <u><mark>The key difference between legalisation and decriminalisation is that with the latter there are no prostitution-specific regulations</mark> imposed by the state. Rather, <mark>regulation</mark> of the industry <mark>is predominantly through existing ‘ordinary’ statutes</mark> and regulations <mark>covering employment and health</mark> for instance. </p></u>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 430,994 | 59 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,291 |
Econ decline causes major power war- stats
|
Reghr 2013
|
Reghr 2013 (Ernie, Senior Fellow in Arctic Security at The Simons Foundation, 2-4-13, “Intrastate Conflict: Data, Trends and Drivers” http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?lng=en&id=158597&tabid=1453496807&contextid774=158597&contextid775=158627)
|
“The most robustly significant predictor of [armed] conflict risk and its duration is some indicator of economic prosperity. At a higher income people have more to lose from the destructiveness of conflict; and higher per-capita income implies a better functioning social contract, institutions and state capacity.”[3] This correlation between underdevelopment and armed conflict is confirmed in a 2008 paper by Thania Paffenholz[4] which notes that “since 1990, more than 50% of all conflict-prone countries have been low income states there is a clear correlation between a low and declining per capita income and a country’s vulnerability to conflict the escalation of conflict during economic downturns is more likely in countries recovering from conflict, or fragile states.” weak economies often translate into weak and fragile states and the presence of violent conflict, which in turn prevents economic growth.” One study argues that “the risk of war in any given country is determined by the initial level of income, the rate of economic growth and the level of dependency on primary commodity exports.” Changes in rates of economic growth thus lead to changes in threats of conflict. As unemployment rises in fragile states this can “exacerbate conflict due to comparatively better income opportunities for young men in rebel groups as opposed to labour markets The wars of the recent past were overwhelmingly fought on the territories of states at the low end of the human development scale. A country’s income level is thus a strong indicator of its risk of being involved in sustained armed conflict. Low income countries lack the capacity to create conditions conducive to serving the social, political, and economic welfare of their people. And when economic inequality is linked to differences between identity groups, the correlation to armed conflict is even stronger group based inequalities are especially destabilizing international economic and security conditions and the interests of the major powers and these factors frequently combine with internal political/religious/ethnic circumstances that create conditions especially conducive to conflict and armed conflict.
|
The most robustly significant predictor of [armed] conflict risk is economic prosperity. At a higher income people have more to lose since 1990, more than 50% of all conflict-prone countries have been low income states there is a clear correlation between income and conflict the escalation of conflict during economic downturns is more likely weak economies often translate into fragile states One study argues Changes in rates of economic growth lead to changes in threats of conflict international economic and security conditions and the interests of the major powers these factors frequently combine with internal circumstances that create conditions conducive to armed conflict
|
“The most robustly significant predictor of [armed] conflict risk and its duration is some indicator of economic prosperity. At a higher income people have more to lose from the destructiveness of conflict; and higher per-capita income implies a better functioning social contract, institutions and state capacity.”[3] This correlation between underdevelopment and armed conflict is confirmed in a 2008 paper by Thania Paffenholz[4] which notes that “since 1990, more than 50% of all conflict-prone countries have been low income states…. Two thirds of all armed conflicts take place in African countries with the highest poverty rates. Econometric research found a correlation between the poverty rate and likelihood of armed violence….[T]he lower the GDP per capita in a country, the higher the likelihood of armed conflict.” Of course, it is important to point out that this is not a claim that there is a direct causal connection between poverty and armed conflict. To repeat, the causes of conflict are complex and context specific, nevertheless, says Paffenholz, there is a clear correlation between a low and declining per capita income and a country’s vulnerability to conflict. It is also true, on the other hand, that there are low income countries that experience precipitous economic decline, like Zambia in the 1980s and 1990s, without suffering the kind of turmoil that has visited economically more successful countries like Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire. Referring to both Zambia and Nigeria, Pafenholz says these are cases in which “the social compact” has proven to be resilient. Both have formal and informal mechanisms that are able to address grievances in ways that allowed them to be aired and resolved or managed without recourse to violence. A brief review of literature on economics and armed conflict, published in the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, indicates the complexity and imprecision behind the question, “does poverty cause conflict?” While many of the “world’s poorest countries are riven by armed conflict,” and while poverty, conflict and under-development set up a cycle of dysfunction in which each element of the cycle is exacerbated by the other, it is also the case that “conflict obviously does not just afflict the poorest countries” – as Northern Ireland and the former Yugoslavia demonstrate. “Many poor countries are not at war; shared poverty may not be a destabilizing influence. Indeed, economic growth can destabilize, as the wars in countries afflicted by an abundance of particular natural resources appear to show.”[5] Another review of the literature makes the general point that “the escalation of conflict during economic downturns is more likely in countries recovering from conflict, or fragile states.” That makes Africa especially vulnerable on two counts: economic deprivation and recent armed conflict are present in a relatively high number of states, making the continent especially vulnerable to economic shocks. As a general rule, “weak economies often translate into weak and fragile states and the presence of violent conflict, which in turn prevents economic growth.” One study argues that “the risk of war in any given country is determined by the initial level of income, the rate of economic growth and the level of dependency on primary commodity exports.” Changes in rates of economic growth thus lead to changes in threats of conflict. As unemployment rises in fragile states this can “exacerbate conflict due to comparatively better income opportunities for young men in rebel groups as opposed to labour markets.”[6] The concentration of armed conflict in lower income countries is also reflected in the conflict tabulation by Project Ploughshares over the past quarter century. The 2009 Human Development Index ranks 182 countries in four categories of Human Development – Very High, High, Medium, Low. Of the 98 countries in the Medium and Low categories of human development in 2009, 55 per cent experienced war on their territories in the previous 24 years. In the same period, only 24 per cent of countries in the High human development category saw war within their borders, while just two (5 per cent) countries in the Very High human development ranking had war on their territory (the UK re Northern Ireland and Israel). The wars of the recent past were overwhelmingly fought on the territories of states at the low end of the human development scale. A country’s income level is thus a strong indicator of its risk of being involved in sustained armed conflict. Low income countries lack the capacity to create conditions conducive to serving the social, political, and economic welfare of their people. And when economic inequality is linked to differences between identity groups, the correlation to armed conflict is even stronger. In other words, group based inequalities are especially destabilizing.[7] These failures in human security are of course heavily shaped by external factors, notably international economic and security conditions and the interests of the major powers (in short, globalization),[8] and these factors frequently combine with internal political/religious/ethnic circumstances that create conditions especially conducive to conflict and armed conflict.
| 5,276 |
<h4>Econ decline causes major power war- stats</h4><p><strong>Reghr 2013 <u></strong>(Ernie, Senior Fellow in Arctic Security at The Simons Foundation, 2-4-13, “Intrastate Conflict: Data, Trends and Drivers” http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?lng=en&id=158597&tabid=1453496807&contextid774=158597&contextid775=158627)</p><p>“<mark>The <strong>most robustly significant predictor</strong> of [armed] conflict risk</mark> and its duration <mark>is</mark> some indicator of <mark>economic prosperity. At a higher income people have more to lose</mark> from the destructiveness of conflict; and higher per-capita income implies a better functioning social contract, institutions and state capacity.”[3] This correlation between underdevelopment and armed conflict is confirmed in a 2008 paper by Thania Paffenholz[4] which notes that “<mark>since 1990, more than 50% of all conflict-prone countries have been low income states</u></mark>…. Two thirds of all armed conflicts take place in African countries with the highest poverty rates. Econometric research found a correlation between the poverty rate and likelihood of armed violence….[T]he lower the GDP per capita in a country, the higher the likelihood of armed conflict.” Of course, it is important to point out that this is not a claim that there is a direct causal connection between poverty and armed conflict. To repeat, the causes of conflict are complex and context specific, nevertheless, says Paffenholz, <u><mark>there is a clear correlation between</mark> a low and declining per capita <mark>income and</mark> a country’s vulnerability to <mark>conflict</u></mark>. It is also true, on the other hand, that there are low income countries that experience precipitous economic decline, like Zambia in the 1980s and 1990s, without suffering the kind of turmoil that has visited economically more successful countries like Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire. Referring to both Zambia and Nigeria, Pafenholz says these are cases in which “the social compact” has proven to be resilient. Both have formal and informal mechanisms that are able to address grievances in ways that allowed them to be aired and resolved or managed without recourse to violence. A brief review of literature on economics and armed conflict, published in the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, indicates the complexity and imprecision behind the question, “does poverty cause conflict?” While many of the “world’s poorest countries are riven by armed conflict,” and while poverty, conflict and under-development set up a cycle of dysfunction in which each element of the cycle is exacerbated by the other, it is also the case that “conflict obviously does not just afflict the poorest countries” – as Northern Ireland and the former Yugoslavia demonstrate. “Many poor countries are not at war; shared poverty may not be a destabilizing influence. Indeed, economic growth can destabilize, as the wars in countries afflicted by an abundance of particular natural resources appear to show.”[5] Another review of the literature makes the general point that “<u><mark>the escalation of conflict during economic downturns is more likely</mark> in countries recovering from conflict, or fragile states.” </u>That makes Africa especially vulnerable on two counts: economic deprivation and recent armed conflict are present in a relatively high number of states, making the continent especially vulnerable to economic shocks. As a general rule, “<u><mark>weak economies often translate into</mark> weak and <mark>fragile states</mark> and the presence of violent conflict, which in turn prevents economic growth.” <mark>One study argues</mark> that “the risk of war in any given country is determined by the initial level of income, the rate of economic growth and the level of dependency on primary commodity exports.” <mark>Changes in rates of economic growth</mark> thus <mark>lead to changes in threats of conflict</mark>. As unemployment rises in fragile states this can “exacerbate conflict due to comparatively better income opportunities for young men in rebel groups as opposed to labour markets</u>.”[6] The concentration of armed conflict in lower income countries is also reflected in the conflict tabulation by Project Ploughshares over the past quarter century. The 2009 Human Development Index ranks 182 countries in four categories of Human Development – Very High, High, Medium, Low. Of the 98 countries in the Medium and Low categories of human development in 2009, 55 per cent experienced war on their territories in the previous 24 years. In the same period, only 24 per cent of countries in the High human development category saw war within their borders, while just two (5 per cent) countries in the Very High human development ranking had war on their territory (the UK re Northern Ireland and Israel). <u>The wars of the recent past were overwhelmingly fought on the territories of states at the low end of the human development scale. A country’s income level is thus a strong indicator of its risk of being involved in sustained armed conflict. Low income countries lack the capacity to create conditions conducive to serving the social, political, and economic welfare of their people. And when economic inequality is linked to differences between identity groups, the correlation to armed conflict is even stronger</u>. In other words, <u>group based inequalities are especially destabilizing</u>.[7] These failures in human security are of course heavily shaped by external factors, notably <u><mark>international economic and security conditions and the <strong>interests of the major powers</strong></mark> </u>(in short, globalization),[8] <u>and <mark>these factors frequently combine with internal</mark> political/religious/ethnic <mark>circumstances that create conditions</mark> especially <mark>conducive to</mark> conflict and <mark>armed conflict</mark>.</p></u>
| null |
1nc
|
3
| 100,076 | 66 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,292 |
state legalization explicitly doesn’t link because of constitutional commitment
|
Kleiman 12
|
Kleiman 12 (Mark, 7/20/12, Marijuana policy and international law, www.samefacts.com/2012/07/drug-policy/marijuana-policy-and-international-law/)
|
Within the constraints of those treaties decriminalization and wink-wink nudge-nudge lack of enforcement are indeed all we could have at a national level First, the treaties don’t bind the fifty states. The treaties explicitly recognize that the obligations they impose on the signatories are limited by those signatories’ own domestic constitutional arrangements, and it’s settled constitutional law that the federal government may not require a state to criminalize something, or force a state to help carry out federal law
|
Within the constraints of those treaties F treaties don’t bind the fifty states. The treaties explicitly recognize that the obligations they impose on the signatories are limited by those signatories’ own domestic constitutional arrangements, and it’s settled constitutional law that the federal government may not require a state to criminalize something, or force a state to help carry out federal law
|
Commenting on Matt Yglesias’s essay about how cheap pot would be post-legalization, my old friend Kevin Drum notes that marijuana prohibition is built into the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its successor international drug control treaties. Within the constraints of those treaties, what Kevin calls “decriminalization and wink-wink nudge-nudge lack of enforcement” are indeed all we could have at a national level. But that doesn’t mean taxation-and-regulation needs to be completely off the table. First, the treaties don’t bind the fifty states. The treaties explicitly recognize that the obligations they impose on the signatories are limited by those signatories’ own domestic constitutional arrangements, and it’s settled constitutional law that the federal government may not require a state to criminalize something, or force a state to help carry out federal law. For example, if the Michigan proposal to simply repeal the state’s marijuana laws – parallel to what New York did with respect to alcohol in 1923 – had passed, Michigan would have been entirely within its constitutional powers, and no international law would have been violated.
| 1,161 |
<h4><strong>state legalization explicitly doesn’t link because of constitutional commitment</h4><p>Kleiman 12</strong> (Mark, 7/20/12, Marijuana policy and international law, www.samefacts.com/2012/07/drug-policy/marijuana-policy-and-international-law/)</p><p>Commenting on Matt Yglesias’s essay about how cheap pot would be post-legalization, my old friend Kevin Drum notes that marijuana prohibition is built into the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its successor international drug control treaties. <u><mark>Within the constraints of those treaties</u></mark>, what Kevin calls “<u>decriminalization and wink-wink nudge-nudge lack of enforcement</u>” <u>are indeed all we could have at a national level</u>. But that doesn’t mean taxation-and-regulation needs to be completely off the table. <u><mark>F</mark>irst, the <mark>treaties don’t bind the fifty states. The treaties explicitly recognize that the obligations they impose on the signatories are limited by those signatories’ own domestic constitutional arrangements, and it’s settled constitutional law that the federal government may not require a state to criminalize something, or force a state to help carry out federal law</u></mark>. For example, if the Michigan proposal to simply repeal the state’s marijuana laws – parallel to what New York did with respect to alcohol in 1923 – had passed, Michigan would have been entirely within its constitutional powers, and no international law would have been violated.</p>
|
2nr
| null |
CP: A/T “Wild Ev”
| 430,996 | 7 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,293 |
It’s NOT a sure thing- PC is key to Dem unity and ensuring progress on our impacts
|
Newell 9/25
|
Newell 9/25/2014 (Jim, covers politics and media for Salon, Who will replace Eric Holder? The thorny politics of selecting a new attorney general, Salon, http://www.salon.com/2014/09/25/who_will_replace_eric_holder_the_thorny_politics_of_selecting_a_new_attorney_general/)
|
Holder has been leading the charge for drug war and prison sentencing reform, two of the few remaining areas in which this late-stage administration can effect real and profound progressive change Democrats will only need 51 votes to break a presumed Republican filibuster on Holder’s replacement. Procuring those 51 votes shouldn’t be considered a sure thing though Democrats should expect zero votes from Republican senators in the lame duck The GOP will be furious at the Democrats for using the lame duck the nuclear option’s track record has been stellar, but not perfect recall how Democrats joined the filibuster against Obama’s nominee to head the Civil Rights Division never underestimate the ability of conservative Democrats to throw their lot in with Republicans
|
. Holder has been leading the charge for drug war and prison sentencing reform, two areas i this late-stage administration can effect Democrats will only need 51 votes to break a presumed Republican filibuster on Holder’s replacement. Procuring those 51 votes shouldn’t be considered a sure thing The GOP will be furious at the Democrats for using the lame duc the nuclear option’s track record has been stellar, but not perfect never underestimate the ability of conservative Democrats to throw their lot in with Republicans
|
Eric Holder’s resignation as attorney general does come as a surprise. While he’s served a lengthy period already, dating to the beginning of the Obama administration, it looked like he might have gone the “full Reno” and weathered through two consecutive terms at the post. In the two years since the House of Representatives voted to find him in contempt, Holder finally appeared to feel comfortable enough in his role to pursue legacy issues of personal importance to him. His Civil Rights Division is in the midst of investigating police abuses in Ferguson, Missouri, and other departments across the country. Holder has also been leading the charge for drug war and prison sentencing reform, two of the few remaining areas in which this late-stage administration can effect real and profound progressive change. But however powerful Holder’s personal interest in civil rights and criminal justice arenas may have been, they’re apparently not powerful enough to overcome his exhaustion. He’s trying to get out before he’s “locked in” for the final quarter of the Obama administration. It’s the same rationale for why certain Bush administration staffers, like Karl Rove, left in late 2006: once you’re in for the final two years, you’re in. Karl Rove’s role as an aide to the president, though, wasn’t a Senate-confirmed position, and congressional politics are even more cutthroat now than they were back then. Holder claims he’s going to stay on the job until his successor is confirmed. Given the very real possibility of a Republican Senate majority next year, maybe Eric Holder will end up serving out the rest of President Obama’s second term after all. Except for our good friend, the post-election lame duck session. Once again Democrats who were cautious at the time should be grateful for Sen. Harry Reid’s invocation of the “nuclear option” on judicial and executive appointments. Democrats will only need 51 votes to break a presumed Republican filibuster on Holder’s replacement. Procuring those 51 votes shouldn’t be considered a sure thing, though. Democrats should expect zero votes from Republican senators in the lame duck if Republicans win control of the Senate this November. The GOP will be furious at the Democrats for using the lame duck to confirm a new leader of the Justice Department, denying Republicans the chance to make a circus of a confirmation hearing in 2015. And the nuclear option’s track record has been stellar, but not perfect: recall how a number of Senate Democrats joined the successful Republican filibuster against President Obama’s nominee to head the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, Dego Adegbile. Even though the 2014 election will be behind them, never underestimate the ability of conservative Democrats to throw their lot in with Republicans determined to blunt the Obama administration at every corner.
| 2,871 |
<h4><strong>It’s NOT a sure thing- PC is key to Dem unity and ensuring progress on our impacts</h4><p>Newell 9/25</strong>/2014 (Jim, covers politics and media for Salon, Who will replace Eric Holder? The thorny politics of selecting a new attorney general, Salon, http://www.salon.com/2014/09/25/who_will_replace_eric_holder_the_thorny_politics_of_selecting_a_new_attorney_general/)</p><p>Eric Holder’s resignation as attorney general does come as a surprise. While he’s served a lengthy period already, dating to the beginning of the Obama administration, it looked like he might have gone the “full Reno” and weathered through two consecutive terms at the post. In the two years since the House of Representatives voted to find him in contempt, Holder finally appeared to feel comfortable enough in his role to pursue legacy issues of personal importance to him. His Civil Rights Division is in the midst of investigating police abuses in Ferguson, Missouri, and other departments across the country<mark>. <u>Holder has</u></mark> also <u><mark>been leading the charge for drug war and prison sentencing reform, two</mark> of the few remaining <mark>areas i</mark>n which <mark>this late-stage administration can effect</mark> <strong>real and profound progressive change</u></strong>. But however powerful Holder’s personal interest in civil rights and criminal justice arenas may have been, they’re apparently not powerful enough to overcome his exhaustion. He’s trying to get out before he’s “locked in” for the final quarter of the Obama administration. It’s the same rationale for why certain Bush administration staffers, like Karl Rove, left in late 2006: once you’re in for the final two years, you’re in. Karl Rove’s role as an aide to the president, though, wasn’t a Senate-confirmed position, and congressional politics are even more cutthroat now than they were back then. Holder claims he’s going to stay on the job until his successor is confirmed. Given the very real possibility of a Republican Senate majority next year, maybe Eric Holder will end up serving out the rest of President Obama’s second term after all. Except for our good friend, the post-election lame duck session. Once again Democrats who were cautious at the time should be grateful for Sen. Harry Reid’s invocation of the “nuclear option” on judicial and executive appointments. <u><mark>Democrats will only need 51 votes to break a presumed Republican filibuster on Holder’s replacement. <strong>Procuring those 51 votes shouldn’t be considered a sure thing</u></strong></mark>, <u>though</u>. <u>Democrats should expect zero votes from Republican senators in the lame duck</u> if Republicans win control of the Senate this November. <u><mark>The GOP will be furious at the Democrats for using the lame duc</mark>k</u> to confirm a new leader of the Justice Department, denying Republicans the chance to make a circus of a confirmation hearing in 2015. And <u><mark>the nuclear option’s track record has been stellar, <strong>but not perfect</u></strong></mark>: <u>recall how</u> a number of Senate <u>Democrats</u> <u>joined the</u> successful Republican <u>filibuster</u> <u>against</u> President <u>Obama’s nominee to head the</u> Justice Department’s <u>Civil Rights Division</u>, Dego Adegbile. Even though the 2014 election will be behind them, <u><strong><mark>never underestimate the ability of conservative Democrats to throw their lot in with Republicans</u></mark> determined to blunt the Obama administration at every corner.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NR
|
AT: legalization solves
| 430,962 | 5 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,294 |
They violate- “legalizing” requires regulation
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>They violate- “legalizing” requires regulation</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 430,995 | 1 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,295 |
Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)
|
All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection
|
The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection
|
All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.
| 1,067 |
<h4>Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)</p><p><u><strong>All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity</u></strong>, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> <mark>strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses</u></strong></mark> to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, <u><strong><mark>while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option</mark> to consider in various parts of the world</u></strong>, the <u><strong><mark>reputational</u></strong></mark> (and possibly economic) <u><strong><mark>costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond</u></strong></mark> some form of <u><strong><mark>soft defection</u></mark>.</p></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
treaties
| 430,419 | 39 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,296 |
Q solves- collaboration with private sector overcomes any shortage and prosecutorial deterrence solves
|
Konkel 9/10
|
Konkel 9/10/2014 (Frank, writer for NextGov, IS THERE ANY PART OF GOVERNMENT THAT HASN’T BEEN HACKED YET?, http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2014/09/there-any-part-government-hasnt-been-hacked-yet/93704/)
|
The way to stay ahead of the evolving threats is to collaborate and share information with the private sector We’re engaging in an unprecedented level of collaboration” with industry international law organizations and other bodies, those partnerships will continue to expand. the FBI released 40 near real-time alerts on “current and emerging threat trends and technical indicators,” to the private sector – with 21 of those alerts sent to the financial industry. The agency is now engaging in a more back-and-forth dialogue as opposed to the FBI listening and rarely sharing – which used to be the case Anderson also vowed harsher deterrents for malicious actors, referencing the recent indictments of Chinese citizens who were caught hacking Coburn was pleased with FBI’s get-tough approach. “I’m happy to see the FBI being aggressive on deterrence We need prosecutorial deterrence. I’m thankful of that attitude from FBI both domestically and internationally
|
The way to stay ahead of the evolving threats is to collaborate with the private sector We’re engaging in an unprecedented level of collaboration partnerships will continue to expand. The agency is engaging in back-and-forth dialogue . Anderson vowed harsher deterrents
|
Feds Cite ‘Unprecedented’ Collaboration with Industry The only way to stay ahead of the evolving threats is to collaborate and share information with the private sector, officials testified. “We’re engaging in an unprecedented level of collaboration” with industry, international law organizations and other bodies, Anderson said, and those partnerships will continue to expand. For example, the FBI released 40 near real-time alerts on “current and emerging threat trends and technical indicators,” to the private sector – with 21 of those alerts sent to the financial industry. The agency is now engaging in a more back-and-forth dialogue as opposed to the FBI listening and rarely sharing – which used to be the case. Anderson also vowed harsher deterrents for malicious actors, referencing the recent indictments of Chinese citizens who were caught hacking the networks of American companies. Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla., said he was pleased with FBI’s get-tough approach. “I’m happy to see the FBI being aggressive on deterrence,” said Coburn, the committee’s ranking Republican. “For so long, we thought building a higher wall was [the way to protect], but people are going to climb over any war we have. We need prosecutorial deterrence. I’m thankful of that attitude from FBI both domestically and internationally.”
| 1,320 |
<h4>Q solves- collaboration with private sector overcomes any shortage and prosecutorial deterrence solves</h4><p><strong>Konkel 9/10</strong>/2014 (Frank, writer for NextGov, IS THERE ANY PART OF GOVERNMENT THAT HASN’T BEEN HACKED YET?, http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2014/09/there-any-part-government-hasnt-been-hacked-yet/93704/)</p><p>Feds Cite ‘Unprecedented’ Collaboration with Industry <u><mark>The</u></mark> only <u><mark>way to stay ahead of the evolving threats</mark> <mark>is to collaborate</mark> and share information <mark>with the private sector</u></mark>, officials testified. “<u><strong><mark>We’re</mark> <mark>engaging in an unprecedented level of collaboration</mark>” with industry</u></strong>, <u>international law organizations and other bodies,</u> Anderson said, and <u>those <mark>partnerships will continue to</mark> <mark>expand.</u></mark> For example, <u>the FBI released 40 near real-time alerts on “current and emerging threat trends and technical indicators,” to the private sector – with 21 of those alerts sent to the financial industry.</u> <u><mark>The agency is</mark> now <mark>engaging in</mark> a more <strong><mark>back-and-forth dialogue</strong></mark> as opposed to the FBI listening and rarely sharing – which used to be the case</u><mark>. <u>Anderson</mark> also <mark>vowed harsher deterrents</mark> for malicious actors, referencing the recent indictments of Chinese citizens who were caught hacking</u> the networks of American companies. Sen. Tom <u>Coburn</u>, R-Okla., said he <u>was pleased with FBI’s get-tough approach. “I’m happy to see the FBI being aggressive on deterrence</u>,” said Coburn, the committee’s ranking Republican. “For so long, we thought building a higher wall was [the way to protect], but people are going to climb over any war we have. <u>We need prosecutorial deterrence. I’m thankful of that attitude from FBI both domestically and internationally</u>.”</p>
|
2nr
| null |
CP: A/T “Wild Ev”
| 203,265 | 4 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,297 |
PC is key to a good nominee- their arg misunderstands our scenario
|
Manley 9/26/2014 (Jim, director of the communications practice at QGA Public Affairs, is a former aide to Sens. Harry Reid and Edward Kennedy, In Picking Holder’s Successor, How Progressive Should Obama Go?, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/09/26/in-picking-holders-successor-how-progressive-should-obama-go/)
|
Manley 9/26/2014 (Jim, director of the communications practice at QGA Public Affairs, is a former aide to Sens. Harry Reid and Edward Kennedy, In Picking Holder’s Successor, How Progressive Should Obama Go?, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/09/26/in-picking-holders-successor-how-progressive-should-obama-go/)
|
What does President Obama do? Under the current rules of the Senate, these kinds of executive branch nominees can’t be filibustered and thus can be confirmed with a simple majority. So does he swing for the fences and nominate a progressive activist who would guarantee a political brawl unanimous Democratic backing might not be guaranteed, especially if he swung for the fences a handful of Senate Democrats refused to support the nomination of Adegbile As long as the president makes a decision soon–there is plenty of time the process of confirming a successor won’t be trouble-free.
|
President Obama swing for the fences and nominate a progressive activist who would guarantee a political brawl unanimous Democratic backing might not be guaranteed, especially if he swung for the fences a handful of Senate Democrats refused to support the nomination of Adegbile As long as the president makes a decision soon–there is plenty of time
|
But the real question is this: What does President Obama do? Under the current rules of the Senate, these kinds of executive branch nominees can’t be filibustered and thus can be confirmed with a simple majority. So does he swing for the fences and nominate a progressive activist who would guarantee a political brawl of a confirmation process? Or does he choose someone who has a chance of picking up some Republican votes? The problem is that unanimous Democratic backing might not be guaranteed, especially if he swung for the fences. In one of the more unfortunate situations in recent Senate history, a handful of Senate Democrats refused to support the nomination of Debo Adegbile to head the Justice Department’s Civil Right Division because as a lawyer he signed a brief supporting an appeal for convicted cop-killer Mimia Abu- Jamal. As long as the president makes a decision soon–there is plenty of time to do a background check, the committee hearings and have a vigorous debate on the Senate floor before the Senate adjourns, likely in December. Attorney General Holder is a good man who will be missed – perhaps more so now since the process of finding and confirming a successor won’t be trouble-free.
| 1,216 |
<h4><strong>PC is key to a good nominee- their arg misunderstands our scenario</h4><p>Manley 9/26<u>/2014 (Jim, director of the communications practice at QGA Public Affairs, is a former aide to Sens. Harry Reid and Edward Kennedy, In Picking Holder’s Successor, How Progressive Should Obama Go?, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/09/26/in-picking-holders-successor-how-progressive-should-obama-go/)</p><p></u></strong>But the real question is this: <u>What does <mark>President Obama</mark> do? Under the current rules of the Senate, these kinds of executive branch nominees can’t be filibustered and thus can be confirmed with a simple majority. So does he <mark>swing for the fences and nominate a progressive activist</u> <u>who would <strong>guarantee a political brawl</u></strong></mark> of a confirmation process? Or does he choose someone who has a chance of picking up some Republican votes? The problem is that <u><strong><mark>unanimous Democratic backing might not be guaranteed, especially if he swung for the fences</u></strong></mark>. In one of the more unfortunate situations in recent Senate history, <u><mark>a handful of Senate Democrats refused to support the nomination of</u></mark> Debo <u><mark>Adegbile</u></mark> to head the Justice Department’s Civil Right Division because as a lawyer he signed a brief supporting an appeal for convicted cop-killer Mimia Abu- Jamal. <u><mark>As long as the president makes a decision soon–there is plenty of time</u></mark> to do a background check, the committee hearings and have a vigorous debate on the Senate floor before the Senate adjourns, likely in December. Attorney General Holder is a good man who will be missed – perhaps more so now since <u>the process of</u> finding and <u>confirming a successor <strong>won’t be trouble-free.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NR
|
AT: legalization solves
| 430,969 | 3 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,298 |
Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention
|
Rico 2014 Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)
|
Rico 2014 (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)
|
marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
|
marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
|
It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, marijuana legalization still violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
| 936 |
<h4>Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention</h4><p><strong>Rico 2014</strong> (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?,<u><strong> Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)</p><p></u></strong>It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, <u><strong>marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic</u></strong>. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, <u><strong><mark>marijuana legalization</u></strong></mark> still <u><strong><mark>violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs</mark>.</p></u></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
treaties
| 430,420 | 24 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,299 |
Salaries and retention are key alt causes- outweighs the aff
|
Washington Post 10/1
|
Washington Post 10/1/2014 (Key Homeland Security official urges passage of cybersecurity bill, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2014/10/01/key-homeland-security-official-urges-passage-of-cybersecurity-bill/)
|
A top Homeland Security official called on Congress to pass cybersecurity legislation, saying there is a “dire need the department’s “labrynthine” hiring processes often prevents it from grabbing top recruits the government can’t match higher private sector salaries. We have a difficult time competing with the private sector because of financial realities DHS has had major difficulties in not only hiring cyber officials but retaining them once they arrive. A parade of high-level cyber departures in recent years has helped slow the rollout of key cybersecurity initiatives
|
the department’s “labrynthine” hiring processes prevents it from grabbing top recruits he government can’t match higher private sector salaries. DHS has had major difficulties retaining them high-level cyber departures has helped slow the rollout of key cybersecurity
|
A top Department of Homeland Security official on Wednesday called on Congress to pass cybersecurity legislation, saying there is a “dire need” to strengthen the department’s ability to defend against cyberattacks. Deputy Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas said the legislation would “better equip us” to fight computer hackers and state-sponsored cyberattacks and is especially important in helping DHS compete with private industry to recruit top cyber personnel. He said the department’s “labrynthine” hiring processes often prevents it from grabbing top recruits and that the government can’t match higher private sector salaries. “We have a difficult time competing with the private sector because of financial realities,’’ Mayorkas said at The Washington Post’s Cybersecurity Summitt 2014, held at the Post building in the District. “On the other hand, we are advantaged because … our mission is an extraordinary one.’’ Homeland Security logo reflected in the eyeglasses of a cybersecurity analyst at the agency’s secretive cyber defense facility in Idaho. (Mark J. Terrill/AP). Congress has been struggling for years to pass cybersecurity legislation, even as law enforcement officials have said cyberattacks increasingly pose the biggest threat to the nation’s security. A comprehensive bill to establish cybersecurity standards died in 2012, but several pieces of legislation are now pending in Congress. One bill that recently passed the House would require a DHS strategy to recruit and keep cyber personnel. Congressional aides from both parties have said in recent days that they are hoping to reach agreement on a comprehensive cyber bill to be voted on during Congress’s lame-duck session after November’s midterm elections. DHS has had major difficulties in not only hiring cyber officials but retaining them once they arrive. A parade of high-level cyber departures in recent years has helped slow the rollout of key cybersecurity initiatives, including a program aimed at blocking malicious software before it can infiltrate civilian government computers, former officials have said. Mayorkas said he and Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson are focused on the problem, pointing out that Johnson personally went on a trip in February to Georgia Institute of Technology and Morehouse College aimed at recruiting young cyber leaders. While Mayorkas said “attackers are in fact becoming more and more sophisticated,’’ he added that DHS and the rest of the government are up to the challenge of stopping them. “Our prevention capabilities are growing in sophistication,’’ he said.
| 2,591 |
<h4>Salaries and retention are key alt causes- outweighs the aff</h4><p><strong>Washington Post 10/1</strong>/2014 (Key Homeland Security official urges passage of cybersecurity bill, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2014/10/01/key-homeland-security-official-urges-passage-of-cybersecurity-bill/)</p><p><u>A top</u> Department of <u>Homeland Security official</u> on Wednesday <u>called on Congress to pass cybersecurity legislation, saying there is a “dire need</u>” to strengthen the department’s ability to defend against cyberattacks. Deputy Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas said the legislation would “better equip us” to fight computer hackers and state-sponsored cyberattacks and is especially important in helping DHS compete with private industry to recruit top cyber personnel. He said <u><mark>the department’s “labrynthine” hiring processes</mark> often <mark>prevents it from grabbing top recruits</u></mark> and that <u><strong>t<mark>he government can’t match higher private sector salaries.</mark> </u></strong>“<u>We have a difficult time competing with the private sector</u> <u>because of financial realities</u>,’’ Mayorkas said at The Washington Post’s Cybersecurity Summitt 2014, held at the Post building in the District. “On the other hand, we are advantaged because … our mission is an extraordinary one.’’ Homeland Security logo reflected in the eyeglasses of a cybersecurity analyst at the agency’s secretive cyber defense facility in Idaho. (Mark J. Terrill/AP). Congress has been struggling for years to pass cybersecurity legislation, even as law enforcement officials have said cyberattacks increasingly pose the biggest threat to the nation’s security. A comprehensive bill to establish cybersecurity standards died in 2012, but several pieces of legislation are now pending in Congress. One bill that recently passed the House would require a DHS strategy to recruit and keep cyber personnel. Congressional aides from both parties have said in recent days that they are hoping to reach agreement on a comprehensive cyber bill to be voted on during Congress’s lame-duck session after November’s midterm elections. <u><mark>DHS has had major difficulties</mark> in not only hiring cyber officials but <strong><mark>retaining them</strong></mark> once they arrive.</u> <u>A parade of <mark>high-level cyber departures</mark> in recent years <mark>has helped <strong>slow the rollout of key cybersecurity</mark> initiatives</u></strong>, including a program aimed at blocking malicious software before it can infiltrate civilian government computers, former officials have said. Mayorkas said he and Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson are focused on the problem, pointing out that Johnson personally went on a trip in February to Georgia Institute of Technology and Morehouse College aimed at recruiting young cyber leaders. While Mayorkas said “attackers are in fact becoming more and more sophisticated,’’ he added that DHS and the rest of the government are up to the challenge of stopping them. “Our prevention capabilities are growing in sophistication,’’ he said.</p>
|
2nr
| null |
CP: A/T “Wild Ev”
| 430,574 | 7 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,300 |
They’ll say they include regulations on facilitators so they meet- but they’re at best extra-topical. Their aff is a CP- their “hybrid model” relies on decriminalizing individualized sex-work rather than legalizing it
|
Showden, 9 -
|
Showden, 9 - Assistant Professor Political Science University of North Carolina Greensboro (Carisa, “Prostitution and Women’s Agency: A Feminist Argument for Decriminalization” http://policeprostitutionandpolitics.com/pdfs_all/Academics%20Research%20Articles%20Support%20Prostitution%20%20Decriminalization/2009%20Prostitution%20and%20Womens%20Agency%20A%20Feminist%20Argument%20for%20Decriminalization%20.pdf
|
Ideally, feminists would move to supporting a hybrid legalization/decriminalization model that opens up space for women to operate singly or in small groups without state intervention while labor law and safety provisions were applied to any third-party business interests working with prostitutes Certain features of current practices would not be part of an ideal state policy. For example, prostitutes must not be required to register with police, and self-employed independent operators should not be required to get a state license.
|
a hybrid legalization/decriminalization model opens up space for women to operate without state intervention while labor law and safety provisions were applied to any third-party business interests features of current practices would not be part of an ideal state policy. prostitutes must not be required to register with police, and self-employed independent operators should not be required to get a state license.
|
Ideally, feminists would move to supporting a hybrid legalization/decriminalization model that opens up space for women to operate singly or in small groups without state intervention while labor law and safety provisions were applied to any third-party business interests working with prostitutes (e.g., escort service providers, corporate brothel owners). Certain features of current practices would not be part of an ideal state policy. For example, prostitutes must not be required to register with police, and self-employed independent operators should not be required to get a state license. Registration is a further effort to monitor and control 39 prostitutes—to mark ―whores‖ off from ―respectable‖ women—and is not necessary to allowing women to engage in sex work or to receive services that might put them on the path of improving their working conditions or leaving prostitution. Registration schemes are also unlikely to work. Prostitutes across the globe generally try to avoid complying with registration imperatives, even when it would garner them public benefits. Partly this is because of the temporary nature of most prostitutes‘ work in the field, and partly because they wish to avoid the bureaucratic stigmatization of registering.54
| 1,257 |
<h4>They’ll say they include regulations on facilitators so they meet- but they’re at best extra-topical. Their aff is a CP- their “hybrid model” relies on decriminalizing individualized sex-work rather than legalizing it</h4><p><strong>Showden, 9 -</strong> Assistant Professor Political Science University of North Carolina Greensboro (Carisa, “Prostitution and Women’s Agency: A Feminist Argument for Decriminalization” http://policeprostitutionandpolitics.com/pdfs_all/Academics%20Research%20Articles%20Support%20Prostitution%20%20Decriminalization/2009%20Prostitution%20and%20Womens%20Agency%20A%20Feminist%20Argument%20for%20Decriminalization%20.pdf</p><p><u>Ideally, feminists would move to supporting <mark>a hybrid legalization/decriminalization model</mark> that <mark>opens up space for women to operate</mark> singly or in small groups <strong><mark>without state intervention</u></strong> <u>while labor law and safety provisions were applied to any third-party business interests</mark> working with prostitutes</u> (e.g., escort service providers, corporate brothel owners). <u>Certain <mark>features of current practices would not be part of an ideal state policy.</mark> For example, <mark>prostitutes must not be required to register with police, and self-employed independent operators should not be required to get a state license.</u></mark> Registration is a further effort to monitor and control 39 prostitutes—to mark ―whores‖ off from ―respectable‖ women—and is not necessary to allowing women to engage in sex work or to receive services that might put them on the path of improving their working conditions or leaving prostitution. Registration schemes are also unlikely to work. Prostitutes across the globe generally try to avoid complying with registration imperatives, even when it would garner them public benefits. Partly this is because of the temporary nature of most prostitutes‘ work in the field, and partly because they wish to avoid the bureaucratic stigmatization of registering.54</p>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 430,998 | 1 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,301 |
All of the people under consideration would solve
|
Washington Post 9/26
|
Washington Post 9/26/2014 (Attorney general confirmation fractious before it's even begun, lexis)
|
The resignation announcement plunged the Washington legal community into an urgent parlor game of ranking potential candidates' chances. the president's supporters say the list represents top-quality choices. you have really a deep bench of people who understand what the mission of Department of Justice is and have served at its highest levels."
|
the president's supporters say the list represents top-quality choice you have really a deep bench of people who understand what the mission of Department of Justice is and have served at its highest levels."
|
Obama, in remarks Thursday at the White House, gave no indication of when he would announce Holder's replacement or who that person might be. The resignation announcement plunged the Washington legal community into an urgent parlor game of ranking potential candidates' chances. Some Democrats suggested that it could be weeks before a nominee is announced, while others said that senior Obama officials have begun informal discussions with potential nominees. Possible contenders include U.S. Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr.; former White House counsel Kathryn Ruemmler; Tony West, the former associate attorney general who just stepped down; Loretta E. Lynch, the U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York; Preet Bharara, the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York; and Jenny Durkan, who is about to step down as the U.S. attorney for the Western District of Washington state. Some of the president's supporters say the list represents top-quality choices. Neal Kaytal, who served as acting solicitor general of the United States under Obama and is now a partner at Hogan Lovells, said in an interview that in contrast to the beginning of the Obama administration, "Now you have really a deep bench of people who understand what the mission of Department of Justice is and have served at its highest levels."
| 1,341 |
<h4><strong>All of the people under consideration would solve</h4><p>Washington Post 9/26<u></strong>/2014 (Attorney general confirmation fractious before it's even begun, lexis)</p><p></u>Obama, in remarks Thursday at the White House, gave no indication of when he would announce Holder's replacement or who that person might be. <u>The resignation announcement plunged the Washington legal community into an urgent parlor game of ranking potential candidates' chances.</u> Some Democrats suggested that it could be weeks before a nominee is announced, while others said that senior Obama officials have begun informal discussions with potential nominees. Possible contenders include U.S. Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr.; former White House counsel Kathryn Ruemmler; Tony West, the former associate attorney general who just stepped down; Loretta E. Lynch, the U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York; Preet Bharara, the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York; and Jenny Durkan, who is about to step down as the U.S. attorney for the Western District of Washington state. Some of <u><mark>the president's supporters say the list represents top-quality choice</mark>s.</u> Neal Kaytal, who served as acting solicitor general of the United States under Obama and is now a partner at Hogan Lovells, said in an interview that in contrast to the beginning of the Obama administration, "Now <u><strong><mark>you have really a deep bench of people who understand what the mission of Department of Justice is and have served at its highest levels."</p></u></strong></mark>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NR
|
Liberal key
| 430,999 | 2 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,302 |
Reasons to vote-
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Reasons to vote-</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 430,997 | 1 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,303 |
The Brownfield doctrine of flexible treaty interpretation will be accepted internationally and solves the war on drugs- staying within the treaty is the ONLY way to achieve reform- leaving the ban on the books is enough compliance
Collins 12/1/2014 (Jonathan, International Drug Policy Project Coordinator at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics. He served as Coordinator of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy and Editor of the 2014 report 'Ending the Drug Wars.', The State Department’s move to a more flexible diplomatic policy on drugs is a rational approach to a difficult question., http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-s-new-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrine-on-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-a-difficult-question/)
|
Collins 12/1
| null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The Brownfield doctrine of flexible treaty interpretation will be accepted internationally and solves the war on drugs- staying within the treaty is the ONLY way to achieve reform- leaving the ban on the books is enough compliance</h4><p><strong>Collins 12/1</strong>/2014 (Jonathan, International Drug Policy Project Coordinator at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics. He served as Coordinator of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy and Editor of the 2014 report 'Ending the Drug Wars.', The State Department’s move to a more flexible diplomatic policy on drugs is a rational approach to a difficult question., http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-s-new-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrine-on-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-a-difficult-question/)</p>
| null |
1nc
|
treaties
| 431,000 | 1 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,304 |
Legalization increases cyberterror and guts cybersecurity resources—cartels shift markets
|
Executionists 2014 an innovative creative agency specializing in design, development, marketing and client services. Our Los Angeles-based team excels in executing strategic online solutions that focus on your business goals “Does Legalized Pot Equate to a Rise in Cyber Crime?” Executionists; 2014; http://www.executionists.com/blog/does-legalized-pot-equate-to-a-rise-in-cyber-crime/
|
Executionists 2014 an innovative creative agency specializing in design, development, marketing and client services. Our Los Angeles-based team excels in executing strategic online solutions that focus on your business goals “Does Legalized Pot Equate to a Rise in Cyber Crime?” Executionists; 2014; http://www.executionists.com/blog/does-legalized-pot-equate-to-a-rise-in-cyber-crime/
|
Does the legalization of marijuana contribute to cyber crime? considering that the illegal traffic and sale of marijuana brings billions of dollars to drug lords, $1 a gram weed and medical marijuana laws must be putting a major crimp in their cash flow. cartels could see their revenue drop by as much as 30 percent So what’s a drug lord to do? How does a smart (drug) business maintain revenue when one source dries up? They either downsize or diversify. Let’s suppose for a moment that diversifying to legitimate business is unpalatable to the average drug lord cyber crime could be a viable revenue stream The rise of e-commerce and the public’s willingness to freely provide their credit card, social security number and other financial data to websites will look like easy pickings to forward-thinking criminals This is why we believe that cyber crime and hacking will rise with the ongoing legalization of marijuana. they will relentlessly search for and attack any weakness in your code, servers or network. There will be an increasing demand for network security professionals and services that “harden” websites to reduce the vulnerabilities rampant in common web code, plugins and frameworks.
|
Does legalization contribute to cyber crime? cartels could see their revenue drop by as much as 30 percent How does a drug) business maintain revenue when one source dries up? They downsize or diversify Let’s suppose for a moment that diversifying to legitimate business is unpalatable to the average drug lord, cyber crime could be a viable revenue stream The rise of e-commerce will look like easy pickings to criminals. hacking will rise with legalization of marijuana There will be an increasing demand for network security professionals and services that “harden” websites
|
Does the rapid legalization of medical marijuana in the US, 20 states to date, and legalization by countries around the world contribute to cyber crime? This is the question I asked myself when I read that Uruguay is planning to start selling marijuana legally next year for $1 a gram. Forgive me if I’m late to the party, but considering that the illegal traffic and sale of marijuana brings billions of dollars to drug lords, $1 a gram weed and medical marijuana laws must be putting a major crimp in their cash flow. A 2012 study, by the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness (IMCO), found that “Mexican drug cartels could see their revenue drop by as much as 30 percent across the board if current ballot initiatives on marijuana legalization in three states are passed.” That’s only 3 states. So what’s a drug lord to do? How does a smart (drug) business maintain revenue when one source dries up? They either downsize or diversify. Let’s suppose for a moment that diversifying to legitimate business is unpalatable to the average drug lord, cyber crime could be a viable revenue stream. The rise of e-commerce and the public’s willingness to freely provide their credit card, social security number and other financial data to websites will look like easy pickings to forward-thinking criminals. This is why we believe that cyber crime and hacking will rise with the ongoing legalization of marijuana. E-commerce websites, financial websites, membership websites, mobile app companies need to take extra steps to make sure their users, clients and customer’s privacy is protected. Hackers are relentless, like the Terminator in that Terminator movie, they will relentlessly search for and attack any weakness in your code, servers or network. There will be an increasing demand for network security professionals and services that “harden” websites to reduce the vulnerabilities rampant in common web code, plugins and frameworks.
| 1,935 |
<h4>Legalization increases cyberterror and guts cybersecurity resources—cartels shift markets</h4><p><strong>Executionists 2014 an innovative creative agency specializing in design, development, marketing and client services. Our Los Angeles-based team excels in executing strategic online solutions that focus on your business goals “Does Legalized Pot Equate to a Rise in Cyber Crime?” Executionists; 2014; <u>http://www.executionists.com/blog/does-legalized-pot-equate-to-a-rise-in-cyber-crime/</p><p></strong><mark>Does</mark> the </u><strong>rapid <u></strong><mark>legalization</u><strong></mark> <u></strong>of</u><strong> medical <u></strong>marijuana</u><strong> in the US, 20 states to date, and legalization by countries around the world <u></strong><mark>contribute to cyber crime?</mark> </u><strong>This is the question I asked myself when I read that Uruguay is planning to start selling marijuana legally next year for $1 a gram. Forgive me if I’m late to the party, but <u></strong>considering that the illegal traffic and sale of marijuana brings billions of dollars to drug lords, $1 a gram weed and medical marijuana laws must be putting a major crimp in their cash flow.</u><strong> A 2012 study, by the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness (IMCO), found that “Mexican drug <u></strong><mark>cartels could see their revenue drop by as much as 30 percent</u><strong></mark> across the board if current ballot initiatives on marijuana legalization in three states are passed.” That’s only 3 states. <u></strong>So what’s a drug lord to do? <mark>How does a</mark> smart (<mark>drug) business maintain revenue when one source dries up?</mark> <mark>They</mark> either <mark>downsize or diversify</mark>.</u><strong> <u></strong><mark>Let’s suppose for a moment that diversifying to legitimate business is unpalatable to the average drug lord</u><strong>, <u></strong>cyber crime could be a viable revenue stream</u><strong></mark>. <u></strong><mark>The rise of e-commerce</mark> and the public’s willingness to freely provide their credit card, social security number and other financial data to websites <mark>will look like easy pickings to </mark>forward-thinking <mark>criminals</u><strong>. <u></mark>This is why we believe that cyber crime and <mark>hacking will rise with</mark> the ongoing <mark>legalization of marijuana</mark>.</u> E-commerce websites, financial websites, membership websites, mobile app companies need to take extra steps to make sure their users, clients and customer’s privacy is protected. Hackers are relentless, like the Terminator in that Terminator movie, <u></strong>they will relentlessly search for and attack any weakness in your code, servers or network.</u><strong> <u><mark>There will be an increasing demand for</mark> <mark>network security professionals and services that “harden” websites</mark> to reduce the vulnerabilities rampant in common web code, plugins and frameworks.</p></u></strong>
|
2nr
| null |
CP: A/T “Wild Ev”
| 430,794 | 5 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
Subsets and Splits
Filtered Text and Summaries
This query fetches 100 rows where the text length is between 400 and 600 and ensures that summary, spoken, and fulltext fields are not null, providing a simple filtered dataset but limited analytical insights.
Filtered Text Length 9900-1
Retrieves specific records with a text length between 9900 and 10100 characters, ensuring all text fields are not null, which provides limited insight into data distribution.
Filtered Text Length 4900-5
Returns a sample of records with text lengths between 4900 and 5100 where both summary, spoken, and fulltext fields are present, providing limited insight into the dataset's structure.
Filtered Text Length 3900-4
This query retrieves a limited set of records that meet specific criteria, which can be useful for a closer look at specific data points but doesn't provide deeper insights.
Filtered Text Length 2900-3
Retrieves a sample of rows with textLength between 2900 and 3100, ensuring none of the summary, spoken, or fulltext fields are null.
Filtered Text Length 1900-2
Retrieves a sample of records with text length between 1900 and 2100 characters where summary, spoken, and fulltext fields are not null, providing limited filtering for data exploration.
Filtered Text Length 900-11
Retrieves a sample of entries with text lengths between 900 and 1100 characters, ensuring that the entries have both summaries and spoken text available, providing a basic filtering of the dataset.